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JUDICIAL  AND  STATUTORY  DEFINITIONS 


OF 


WORDS  AND  PHRASES 


SECOND  SERIES 


COLLECTED.  EDITED,  AND  COMPILED 

BY  TBB 

EDITORIAL  STAFF  OF  THE  NATIONAL  REPORTER  SYSTEM 


VOLUME  3 

LAND  —  PTOSIS  ABDOMINALIS 


ST.  PAUL 

WEST  PUBLISHING  CO. 
1914 


COPTBIOHT,     1914 
BY 

WEST  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

(3WD8AP.?pSBB.)t 

252001 


JUDICIAL  AND  STATUTORY  DEFINITIONS 


OF 


WORDS  AND  PHRASES 

SECOND   SERIES 


VOLUME  3 


LAND 

See  Arable  Land;  Cemetery  Land;  Claim 
Against  Land;  Claim  upon  Land ;  Coal 
Lands;  Common  Lands;  Contract 
Made  Touching  the  Land;  Crown 
Lands;  Cultivated  Lands;  Drainage  of 
Land;  Earned  Land;  Qranted  Lands; 
Improved  Land;  Inclosed  Land;  Iron 
Land;  Lots,  Blocks,  Tracts,  and  Par- 
cels of  Land;  Mainland;  Marsh 
Land;  Mineral  Land;  Overflowed 
Lands;  Public  Land;  Respecting  Ti- 
tle to  Land;  School  Land;  Shore 
Land;  Suit  for  Land;  Sunk  Land; 
Swamp  and  Overflowed  Lands;  Tide 
Land;  Timber  Land;  Uninclosed 
Lands;  Unplatted  Lands;  Vacant 
Land;    Wild  and  Forest  Lands. 

Adjacent  lands,  see  Adjacent. 

All  my  lands,  see  AIL 

Contract  for  sale  of  land,  see  Contract 
of  Salfe 

Improvement  of  land,  see  Improvement 

Interest  in  land,  see  Interest  (In  Prop- 
erty). 

My  land,  see  My. 

Other  lands,  see  Other. 

Raw  prairie  land,  see  Raw. 

Right  of  way  as  land  Itself,  see  Right  of 
Way. 

See,  also.  Real  Property. 

"Land"  is  a  term  used  to  designate  all 
real  estate,  Just  as  money  is  used  to  desig- 
nate the  whole  volume  of  the  medium  of  ex- 
change. Montgomery  County  v.  Cochran,  121 
Fed.  17,  21,  57  C.  C.  A.  261. 

'The  word  *land*  •  •  •  comprehends 
ground,  soil,  or  earth,  pastures,  woods, 
springs,  wells,  lakes,  ponds,  and  all  things 
that  have  become  a  fixed  part  of  the  soU." 
Orchard  v.  Wrlght-Dalton-Bell-Anchor  Store 
Co.,  125  S.  W.  486,  4H  225  Mo.  414,  20  Ann. 
Cas.  1072. 

3  WnaA  P.2d  See.— 1 


The  primary  meaning  of  the  word 
"land,"  at  common  law,  is  "any  ground,  soil, 
or  earth  whatsoever;  as  meadows,  pastures, 
woods,  waters,  marshes,  furzes  and  heath." 
In  a  more  limited  sense  the  term  denotes 
the  quantity  and  character  of  the  interest  or 
estate  which  the  tenant  may  own  In  the 
lands.  Kemp  ▼.  Ooodnight,  80  N.  B.  160,  161, 
168  Ind.  174. 

''Land,"  in  its  legal  signlflcation,  has  an 
indefinite  extent  upwards,  so  that  by  a  con- 
veyance of  land  all  buildings,  growing  tim- 
ber, and  water  erected  and  being  thereupon 
shall  likewise  pass.  Trustees  of  the  Free- 
holders &  Commonalty  of  Town  of  Brook- 
haven  V.  Smith,  90  N.  Y.  Supp.  646,  660,  98 
App.  Div.  212. 

It  is  elementary  that  the  word  "land" 
in  its  legal  signification  has  an  indefinite 
extent  upwards  as  well  as  downwards,  and 
therefore  if  it  were  possible  for  a  man  to 
live  in  a  state  of  nature,  unconnected  with 
other  individuals,  the  proprietor  of  land 
would  own  not  only  the  face  of  the  earth 
within  the  boundaries  of  his  proprietorship, 
but  also  everything  under  it  and  over  it.  An 
imaginary  person  living  in  such  a  state  of 
nature  would  be  at  liberty  to  use  his  land  as 
he  pleased  to  build  on  It  to  any  height  and  to 
dig  into  it  to  any  depth  without  restraint. 
But  as  man  was  formed  for  society  and  is 
Incapable  of  living  alone,  organized  society 
is  essential  to  his  well-being  and  happiness, 
and  every  person  who  enters  society  must 
give  up  a  part  of  his  so-called  natural  rights 
and  liberty  for  the  benefit  of  the  communi- 
ty. Cochran  v.  Preston,  70  Atl.  113,  114,  108 
Md.  220,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  11C3,  129  Am. 
St  Rep.  482,  15  Ann.  Cas.  1048  (citing  1 
BL  Comm.  p.  125). 

Land  In  its  broadest  signification  in- 
cludes not  only  the  surface  of  the  earth  but 
the  mines,  quarries,  and  everything  under  it; 


LAND 


LAND 


and  whoever  has  the  fee  in  the  surface  pre- 
sumptively owns  everything  of  a  permanent 
nature  under  or  over  it  Notwithstanding  it 
is  competent  for  the  owner  to  convey  the 
mines  or  quarries  by  a  separate  grant  vest- 
ing in  one  person  a  freehold  in  the  soil  and 
in  another  a  freehold  in  the  mines  or  quar- 
ries and  to  sever  the  ownership  of  the  sur- 
face from  the  ownership  from  that  which  is 
under  it,  there  may  exist  a  double  owners 
ship  or  two  freeholds  in  the  same  parcel  of 
land.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Go.  v.  Boykln,  76 
Ala.  660,  663  (citing  2  Washb.  Real  Prop. 
876). 

The  word  "land"  includes  not  only  the 
soil,  but  everything  attached  to  it,  whether 
attached  by  the  course  of  nature,  as  trees, 
herbage,  and  water,  or  by  the  hand  of  man, 
as  buildings  aud  fences.  Crawford  Ck).  v. 
Hathaway,  93  N.  W.  781,  788,  67  Neb.  325,  60 
L.  R.  A.  889,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  647  (ciUng 
McGee  Irrigating  Ditch  Go.  v.  Hudson  [Tex.] 
22  S.  W.  967). 

Anderson's  Law  Diet  says  that  the 
word  "land"  comprehends  all  things  of  a 
permanent  and  substantial  nature,  being  a 
word  of  very  comprehensive  significance. 
Act  Feb.  22,  1851,  pp.  64,  65,  is  entitied  "An 
act  for  the  benefit  of  William  Jewell  College. 
Certain  lands  owned  by  William  Jewell  Col- 
lege exempted  from  tax."  And  section  1 
provides  that  ''all  the  land  and  improvements 
thereon  now  owned  by  the  William  Jewell 
College  •  •  •  and  all  the  lands  that  may 
hereafter  be  granted  or  devised  to  said  col- 
lege, or  any  other  institution  of  learning  in 
this  state,  for  the  benefit  of  education,  be, 
and  the  same  are  hereby,  exempted  from  all 
taxes  *  *  *  80  long  as  said  lands  may  be 
owned  by  said  college."  Section  2  releases 
from  delinquent  taxes  the  "land"  belonging 
to  the  college  in  the  counties  named,  and 
section  3  makes  it  a  misdemeanor  to  willfully 
injure  or  destroy  timber,  etc.,  from  any  of 
the  lands  belonging  to  the  college.  The  en- 
tire endowment  fund  of  the  college  was  in 
lands  when  the  act  was  passed,  the  colleges 
of  that  time  being  generally  endowed  in  land 
alone,  and  the  charters  of  a  number  of  col- 
leges perpetually  relieved  them  from  taxa- 
tion on  all  kinds  of  property.  Held,  that  the 
word  "land"  as  used  in  the  act  will  be  con- 
strued to  include  personalty,  so  that  the  col- 
lege cannot  be  taxed  on  its  endowment  fund, 
consisting  of  personalty.  State  ex  rel.  Wall- 
er V.  Trustees  of  William  Jewell  College,  136 
S.  W.  397,  399,  401,  402,  234  Mo.  299. 

The  term  "land"  in  statutes  conferring 
power  to  condemn  is  to  be  taken  in  the  legal 
sense,  and  includes  both  the  soil  and  build- 
ings and  other  structures  on  it  and  all  inter- 
ests therein.  White  v.  Cincinnati,  R,  &  M. 
R.  R.,  71  N.  E.  276,  278,  34  Ind.  App.  287 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Lewis, 
Em.  Dom.  [2d  Ed.]  §  285). 

"The  term  *land,'  in  statutes  conferring 
power  to  condemn,  is  to  be  taken  in  the  legal 


sense,  and  includes  both  the  soil  and  build- 
ings and  other  structures  on  it,  and  an^'  and 
all  interests  therein."  In  assessment  of  dam- 
ages in  proceedings  for  condemnation  of  laud, 
the  appraisers  should  value  the  land  taken 
with  the  buildings  on  it,  and  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  buildings  were  included  in 
the  award.  Stauffer  v.  Cincinnati,  R.  &  M. 
R.  R.,  70  N.  E.  543,  644,  33  Ind.  App.  356 
(quoting  Lewis,  Em.  Dom.  [2d  Ed.]  |  285; 
citing  Brocket  v.  Ohio  &  P.  R.  Co.,  14  Pa. 
241,  53  Am.  Dec.  534 ;  State  v.  Reed,  88  N. 
H.  59;   Mills,  Em.  Dom.  ff  49,  223). 

The  word  "land"  comprehends  ground, 
soil,  or  earth,  pastures,  woods,  spring,  wells, 
lakes,  ponds,  and  all  things  which  have  be- 
come a  fixed  part  of  the  soil.  The  word 
"tenement,"  in  its  ordinary  meaning,  means 
a  "house,"  which  is  the  subject  of  tenure, 
and  includes,  not  only  corporeal  heredita- 
ments, which  are  or  may  be  held,  but  also  all 
lnhei*itances  issuing  out  of  any  of  these  in- 
heritances, or  concerning  or  annexed  to  or 
exercised  within  the  same,  though  they  lie 
not  in  tenure.  "Tenement"  is  a  word  of 
greater  scope  than  "lands,"  and  though,  in 
its  vulgar  acceptation,  is  only  applied  to 
houses  and  other  buildings,  yet,  in  its  orig- 
inal, proper,  and  legal  sense,  it  signifies  any- 
thing that  may  be  holden,  provided  it  be  of  a 
permanent  nature,  whether  of  a  substantial 
and  sensible,  or  of  an  unsubstantial,  ideal, 
kind.  The  term  "hereditaments"  Includes 
rights  unconnected  with  land,  but  generally 
used  as  the  widest  expression  for  real  prop- 
erty of  all  kinds,  being  divided  into  real  her- 
editaments, which  are  lands  and  tenements, 
and  personal  hereditaments,  which  are  rights 
concerning  neither  lands  nor  tenements.  As 
so  defined,  neither  the  term  "tenement"  nor 
"hereditament"  includes  in  law  a  lease  of 
lands  for  years.  Orchard  v.  Wright-Dalton- 
Bell-Anchor  Store  Co.,  125  S.  W.  486,  494, 
225  Mo.  414,  20  Ann.  Gas.  1072. 

In  common  speech  the  nonmlneral  portion 
of  land,  the  portion  which  covers  and  en- 
velopes the  minerals,  is  called  the  "surface" 
of  the  land,  and  the  proprietor  of  land  who 
devests  himself  of  title  to  the  minerals  which 
it  contains  is  still  spoken  of  as  the  owner  of 
the  fee  or  of  the  surface  or  of  the  land. 
Kansas  Natural  Gas  Go.  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Neosho  County,  89  Pac  750,  751,  75  Kan. 
335. 

The  word  "land,"  as  a  conveyance,  car- 
ries every  kind  of  property,  right,  and  aw)ur- 
tenance  which  is  legally  embraced  in  that 
word,  but  what  rights  go  to  a  patentee  of 
land  depend,  not  upon  any  supposed  adjudi- 
cation contained  in  the  patent,  but  upon  the 
general  law  of  the  state  where  the  land  is 
situated.  City  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Los  Angeles 
Farming  &  Milling  Co.,  93  Pac.  869,  871,  152 
Gal.  645. 

A  win  whereby  testator  devised  farm 
lands  to  his  daughters  for  life,  remainder  in 
fee  simple  to  their  children,  and  whereby  he 


L.AND 


a 


LAND 


proTided  tbat  tbey  mli^t  sell  their  respectilTe 
lands,  proceeds  to  be  reinvested  in  "lands'* 
to  be  held  for  the  same  use,  and  that  por- 
idiaser  must  see  that  the  reinvestment  was 
made  before  acquiring  title  to  land  devised, 
did  not  require  reinvestment  in  farm  lands, 
but  reinvestment  could  be  made  in  city  real 
estate;  the  word  "lands"  including  every 
form  of  real  estate.  Clay  v.  Bogie  (Ky.)  119 
S.  W.  737.  738. 

Statutory  deflsltloifts 

"Gen.  St  1901,  |  7342,  defines  the  word 
land'  in  the  phrases  'real  estate*  and  'real 
property*  as  including  lands,  tenements,  and 
hereditaments  and  all  rights  thereto  and  in- 
terest therein,  equitable  as  well  as  legal." 
Clarke  v.  lAwience,  88  Pac.  786,  738,  75  Kan. 
26. 

The  word  "land"  or  "lands,"  as  used  in 
Code  1899,  c.  13,  |  17,  eh  16,  relating  to  taxa- 
tion, expressly  includes  lands,  tenements,  and 
hereditaments,  and  all  rights  thereto  and  in- 
terests therein,  except  chattel  interests  and 
chattels  real.  Harvey  Coal,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Dil- 
lon, 53  S.  E.  928,  936,  59  W.  Va.  605. 

Under  Ky.  St  1909,  |  458,  providing  that 
the  words  "real  estate"  or  "land"  shall  be 
construed  to  mean  any  interest  other  than  a 
chattel  interest,  and  section  470,  providing 
that  no  action  shall  be  brought  upon  a  con- 
tract relating  to  real  estate  unless  in  writing, 
a  parol  contract  to  board  and  care  for  the 
owner  of  a  life  estate  In  land  in  consideration 
of  the  use  of  the  land  is  void,  though  board 
was  furnished  in  reliance  on  the  contract 
Hampton  v.  Glass  <Ky.)  116  S.  W.  243.  244. 

Tnder  the  statutes  declaring  that  the 
word  "land,"  and  the  phrases  "real  estate," 
and  "real  property,"  shall  include  lands,  ten- 
ements, hereditaments  and  all  rights  thereto 
and  interests  therein  equitable  as  well  as  le- 
gal, and  providing  that  lands  not  exempt  by 
law  shall  be  liable  to  be  taken  on  execution, 
laud  held  by  an  equitable  title  may  be  levied 
upon  and  sold  by  virtue  of  an  execution. 
Poole  V.  French,  80  Pac  997,  1000,  71  Kan. 
391. 

Laws  1903,  p.  376,  relating  to  street  open- 
ings, requires  by  section  15  that  each  lot, 
piece,  or  parcel  of  land  be  designated  upon 
a  diagram  as  a  basis  for  assessments.  Sec- 
tion 17  requires  the  amount  of  assessment  to 
be  set  opposite  each  lot,  piece,  or  parcel  of 
land  which  under  section  20  is  made  a  lien 
upon  the  property  assessed.  These  sections 
and  sections  23  and  26,  use  the  terms  "prop- 
erty," "lands,"  and  "ea<di  lot,  piece  or  parcel 
of  land,"  interchangeably.  Held  that,  in  re- 
quiring the  superintendent  of  streets  to  as- 
sess the  b^ieflts  from  street  improvements  on 
the  property  of  any  street  railroad  within  the 
assessment  district,  the  word  "property"  was 
used  in  a  limited  sense  and  as  referring  to 
that  species  of  property  designated  as  "land," 
which  as  defined  by  Civ.  Code,  |  669,  is  "the 
solid  material  of  the  earth,"  and  hoice  there 
was  no  authority  for  an  assessment  against 


the  'ties,  tracks,  poles,  rails  and  switches" 
as  such  or  apart  from  the  franchise.  Los 
Angeles  Pac.  Co.  v.  Hubbard,  121  Pac.  806, 
308,  17  Cal.  App.  646. 

The  vendee's  right  to  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract  to  convey  land  is  "lands" 
and  "real  estate"  within  the  statute  defini- 
tion (Bev.  St  I  4971,  sut>d.  9),  as  including 
"lands,  tenements  and  hereditaments  and  all 
rights  thereto  and  interests  therein."  The 
lands,  on  the  vendee's  death,  descend  at  once, 
by  operation  of  law  to  his  children  (Rev.  St 

I  2270,  subd.  1).  An  administrator  cannot 
sue  to  compel  specific  performance  of  a  con- 
tract to  convey  land  to  his  decedent,  the 
price  for  which  has  been  paid,  where  it  does 
not  appear  that  the  administrator  is  in  pos- 
session, or  that  the  personal  assets  of  the  es- 
tate are  Insufllclent  to  pay  the  debts.  Car- 
penter V.  Fopper,  68  N.  W.  874,  94  Wis.  146. 

As  agxionltiurAl  or  srasiiis  land 

"Lands  of  the  state,"  as  used  in  the  tiUe 
of  act  to  promote  public  health,  etc.,  by  drain- 
ing such  lands,  included  agricultural  lands. 
Sisson  V.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Buena  Vista 
County,  104  N.  W.  454,  458,  128  Iowa,  442, 
70  L.  B.  A.  440. 

In  Bev.  av.  St  1897,  |  4218fff,  prescrib- 
ing the  classified  free  school,  asylum,  and 
public  lands  subject  to  sale  to  actual  settlers, 
the  terms  "land"  and  "other  lands"  are  used 
in  the  popular  sense  "as  not  embracing  town 
lots,  but  meaning  agricultural  or  grazing 
lands."  Conn  v.  Terrell,  80  S.  W.  608,  609, 
97  Tex.  67a 

BvUdlsc  or  otkmr  strnetwre 

According  to  Blackstone,  "land"  legally 
includes  all  castles,  houses,  and  other  build- 
ings, for  they  consist  of  two  thing»— land, 
which  is  the  foundation,  and  the  structure 
thereupon.  Where  defendant  in  trespass  to 
try  title  disclaimed  any  title  or  interest  in 
the  land,  but  claimed  title  to  a  house  stand- 
ing thereon,  the  plea  of  the  three-year  stat- 
ute of  limitations  was  without  application; 
the  land  legally  including  all  houses.  Fidel- 
ity Cotton  on  &  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Martin 
(Tex.)  136  S,  W.  533. 

An  assessment  under  Pub.  St  1901,  c.  79, 

II  4,  8,  authorizing  an  assessment  on  lands 
receiving  special  benefits  from  the  construc- 
tion of  a  sewer,  for  their  Just  share  for  the 
cost  of  construction  and  maintenance,  etc., 
recognizes  the  ownership  of  buildings  on  lands 
of  another,  and  buildings  so  situate  are  real 
estate  for  the  purposes  of  assessment,  and 
are  properly  assessed  to  the  owner  thereof; 
such  buildings  being  "lands."  Granite  State 
Land  Co.  v.  Town  of  Hampton,  79  AtL  25, 
29,  76  N.  H.  1. 

"Under  the  general  tax  law,  and  by  the 
general  understanding,  the  term  'lands,*  when 
used  with  reference  to  assessments  for  pur- 
poses of  taxation,  includes  with  the  land 
above  or  under  water  all  constructions  which 
have  been  erected  upon  or  afllxed  thereto." 


LAND 


LAND 


In  re  City  of  New  York,  76  N.  E.  18,  19,  183 
N.  Y.  246. 

Where  one  making  an  excavation  in  a  lot 
negligently  left  it  exposed  to  inclement 
weather  for  an  unreasonable  length  of  time 
without  putting  in  foundation  walls,  thereby 
causing  injury  to  a  building  on  an  adjoin- 
ing lot  by  the  caving  in  of  the  ground,  he  1b 
liable  to  the  adjoining  owner  for  the  injury 
to  the  building,  though  Bev.  Civ.  Code,  § 
291,  providing  that  each  coterminous  owner 
is  entitled  to  the  lateral  support  which  his 
land  received  from  the  adjoining  land,  sub- 
ject to  the  right  of  the  adjoining  owner  to 
make  proper  excavations  on  using  ordinary 
care,  and  taking  reasonable  precautions  to 
sustain  the  land,  and  giving  previous  reason- 
able notice  to  the  other  of  his  intention  to 
make  the  excavations,  and  section  187,  defin- 
ing "land"  as  the  solid  material  of  the  earth, 
whatever  may  be  its  ingredients,  give  only 
the  right  to  damages  for  injuries  to  the  land 
itself,  and  not  to  buildings  placed  thereon. 
Hannlcker  v.  Lepper,  107  N.  W,  202,  203,  20 
S.  D.  371,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  243,  129  Am.  St 
Rep.  938. 

Easeuents   aad   Inoorporeal   lieredlta- 
ments 

The  word  "land,**  as  used  in  Code  1904,  f 
1105f  (3-6),  authorizing  the  condemnation  of 
lands  or  any  interest  or  estate  therein,  in- 
cludes easements,  and  other  incorporeal  her- 
editaments, and  all  rights  thereto  and  inter- 
est therein,  and  is  synonymous  with  the 
terms  "real  estate**  and  "real  property.** 
Swann  v.  Washington  Southern  R.  Co.,  61  S. 
E.  750,  751,  108  Ya.  282  (quoting  2  Bouv.  Law 
Diet.  306), 

In  an  eminent  domain  statute  which  au- 
thorizes certain  classes  of  public  service  cor- 
porations to  condemn  land  for  their  use,  the 
word  "land**  is  comprehensive,  and  includes 
any  interest  in  land,  and  under  it  an  ease- 
ment or  right  of  way  may  be  condemned. 
Pacific  Postal-Telegraph-Cable  Co.  ▼•  Oregon 
&  C.  R.  Co.,  163  Fed.  967,  969. 

The  term  "lands,**  as  used  in  the  con- 
demnation statute,  embraces  all  rights  and 
easements  growing  thereout  South  Bound 
R.  R.  V.  Burton,  46  S.  E.  340,  342,  67  S.  0. 
615. 

The  word  "land,"  as  used  in  the  Eminent 
Domain  Act,  is  capable  of  Including  ease- 
ments in  its  signification.  McEwan  v.  Penn- 
sylvania, N.  J.  &  N.  Y.  R.  Co.,  60  Atl.  1130. 
1131,  72  N.  J.  Law,  419. 

The  word  "lands"  is  not  coextensive  with 
the  words  "tenements  and  hereditaments,** 
and  does  not  comprehend  incorporeal  heredi- 
taments. In  re  Handley's  Estate,  57  Atl. 
755,  757,  208  Pa.  388  (citing  2  Jarm.  Wills, 
382). 

Under  Laws  1896,  p.  796,  c.  908,  |  2,  as 
amended  by  Laws  1899,  p.  1689,  c.  712,  pro- 
viding that  the  term  "land"  shall  include, 


not  only  the  land  itself,  but  all  buildings  and 
other  articles  and  structures  and  superstruc- 
tures erected  on  or  under  the  same,  where 
a  turnpike  company  did  not  own  the  fee  in 
the  land,  but  owned  a  continuing  easement 
therein  for  the  maintenance  of  the  pike  dur- 
ing the  life  of  the  company's  franchise,  such 
easement,  together  with  the  corporation's 
tangible  property,  consisting  of  bridges,  cul- 
verts, ditches,  prepared  roadbeds,  and  struc- 
tures on  the  soil,  were  taxable  to  it  as  land. 
In  re  President,  etc.,  of  Albany  &  B.  Turn- 
pike Road,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  1104,  1105,  94  App. 
Div.  509. 

Franoliise  of  corporation 

Under  Tax  Law,  |  2,  subd.  3,  defining  the 
terms  "land,**  "real  estate,**  and  "real  prop- 
erty** to  include  land,  underground  railroads. 
Including  the  valuation  of  franchises  to  con- 
struct and  operate  the  same,  and  defining  a 
"special  franchise**  to  include  the  value  of 
the  tangible  property  of  a  corporation  situat- 
ed in  or  under  or  above  any  street,  a  cor- 
poration owning  special  franchises  to  operate 
an  underground  railroad  under  city  streets 
owns  special  franchises  subject  to  taxation, 
though  only  so  small  a  part  of  the  railroad 
is  constructed  and  in  operation  as  is  insuffi- 
cient to  meet  operating  expenses,  taxes,  and 
interest,  and  the  franchises,  if  possessing  a 
value,  are  taxable,  though  they  are  not  used. 
People  ex  rel.  Hudson  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  State 
Board  of  Tax  Com'rs,  127  N.  Y.  Supp.  918, 
143  App.  Div.  26. 

Laws  1896,  p.  796,  c  908,  as  amended  by 
Laws  1899,  p.  1589,  c.  712,  §  2,  subd.  3,  de- 
fines the  terms  "lands,**  "real  property,"  and 
"real  estate**  as  including,  besides  the  tan- 
gible property  enumerated,  the  value  of  all 
franchises,  rights,  authority  or  permission  to 
construct,  maintain,  or  operate  in,  under, 
above,  upon,  or  through  any  streets,  high- 
ways, or  public  places,  mains,  pipes,  etc. 
The  term  "real  property*'  for  the  purposes 
of  taxation  seems  to  be  limited  to  such  in- 
tangible rights  or  fifanchises  as  relate  to 
public  streets  or  highways  and  to  exclude  by 
interference  such  as  relate  to  public  waters. 
People  ex  rel.  Edison  Electric  Illuminating 
Co.  V.  Commissioners  of  Taxes  &  Assess- 
ments, 110  N.  Y.  Supp.  833,  58  Misc.  Rep.  249. 

The  tax  law  (Laws  1881,  c.  293),  din- 
ing the  terms,  "land,**  "real  estate,"  and 
"real  property"  as  including  "all  surface,  un- 
derground or  elevated  railroads,*'  and  the 
value  of  all  franchises  to  construct  or  oper- 
ate railroads,  in,  under,  above  or  through 
streets,  is  not  limited  to  street  surface  rail- 
roads only,  but  Includes  long  distance  surface 
steam  railroads,  and  hence  a  franchise  grant- 
ed by  the  state  to  a  steam  surface  railroad 
for  its  road  in,  under,  above,  or  through 
streets  is  property,  and  a  special  franchise, 
and  taxable.  People  ex  rel.  New  York  Cent 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Woodbury,  133  N,  Y.  Supp. 
135,  139,  74  Misc.  Rep.  130,  145. 


LAND 


LAND 


Growing  crops  of  grain  are  fmctns  in- 
dustriales,  and  av.  Code,  U  18©-188,  defin- 
ing ''land"  as  the  solid  material  of  the  earth, 
whether  soil,  rock,  or  other  substance,  ex- 
clude growing  grain,  and  only  include  such 
growing  things  as  are  annexed  to  the  earth 
by  roots,  such  as  are  deemed  fructus  natu- 
rales.  BJomson  v.  Rostad  (S.  D.)  1S7  N.  W. 
«5e7.  670. 

Htffliwmy,  street,  or  Hsht  •f  way 

Rem.  A  Bal.  Code,  |  8739,  authorises  any 
railroad  corporation  to  enter  upon  any  of  the 
state  school  lands  to  locate  its  road.  Section 
8740  authorizes  every  railroad  corporation  to 
"appropriate"  by  condemnation  any  land  or 
interest  therein,  and  any  rights  of  way  for 
tunnels  beneath  the  surface,  including  state 
school  lands,  tide  lands,  etc.,  necessary  for  the 
line  of  the  road,  provided  that,  if  the  bed  of 
such  railway  is  upon  a  state  or  county  road, 
the  corporation  shall  be  responsible  for  the 
cost  of  relocating  the  road  appropriated.  Sec- 
tion 8738  permits  any  corporation  to  change 
the  grade  or  location  of  its  "road  or  canal'*  in 
order  to  avoid  dangerous  or  deficient  curves, 
eta  Section  5717,  provides  that  "when  it 
shall  be  necessary  in  the  location  of  any  road 
herein  mentioned  to  appropriate  any  part  of 
any  public  road,  street  or  alley,"  etc.,  the 
county  court  may,  except  within  the  limits  of 
a  municipal  corporation,  agree  with  the  cor- 
poraUon  upon  the  conditions  upon  which  it 
may  be  appropriated,  and,  if  the  parties  can- 
not agree,  the  corporation  may  appropriate 
so  much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary  in  the 
location  of  the  road.  Section  5718  provides 
that  whenever  a  private  corporation  is  au- 
thorized to  appropriate  any  public  highway, 
etc.,  as  mentioned  in  the  last  section,  if  it  be 
within  any  town,  incorporated  or  not,  the 
corporation  shall  locate  its  road  upon  the 
particular  street,  etc.,  designated  by  the  local 
authorities ;  but  if  they  refuse  to  make  such 
designation  the  corporation  may  make  such 
appropriation  without  reference  thereto.  Sec- 
tion 5719  provides  that  when  a  public  high- 
way, etc,  is  taken  by  agreement,  the  corpora- 
tion may  place  toUgates  thereon  with  the 
consent  of  the  local  authorities,  but  shall  not 
when  the  highway  is  appropriated  without 
agreement.  Section  8737  authorizes  every 
railroad  corporation  to  construct  its  railway 
across,  along,  or  upon  any  stream,  plank 
road,  turnpike,  etc.,  paying  any  damages  caus- 
ed thereby.  Held,  that  a  railway  company 
could  not  acquire  by  eminent  domain  as 
against  the  public  the  exclusive  right  to  use 
one-half  of  a  street  for  a  double- track  rail- 
way; the  term  "land,"  as  used  in  sections 
8739  and  8740,  not  including  land  already  de- 
voted to  a  public  use,  such  as  a  street.  State 
ex  rel.  B.  Schade  Brewing  Co,  v.  Superior 
Court  of  Spokane  County,  113  Pac  576^  578, 
e2  Wash.  9& 


The  word  "lands,"  as  used  in  a  statute 
governing  descent  and  distribution,  which 
provides  that  a  surviving  spouse  shall  be  en- 
titled to  an  estate  for  life  in  the  lands  of  an 
intestate  leaving  issue,  remainder  to  such  is- 
sue, includes  a  mine  open  at  the  time  of  the 
vesting  of  the  life  estate,  and  such  mine  is, 
under  the  statute,  inherited  as  lands  by  the 
life  tenant  Lone  Acre  Oil  Co.  v.  Swayne 
(Tex.)  78  S.  W.  380,  383. 

The  term  "land,"  as  used  in  statutory 
enactments,  means  and  includes  mines  and 
mining  claims.  Bradford  v.  Morrison,  29 
Sup.  CL  349,  351,  212  U.  S.  389,  53  U  Bd. 
564  (quoting  and  adopting  definitions  in  Rev. 
St  Ariz.  pars.  2708,  2948). 


"Land"  Includes  coal  and  minerals  in 
place.  Huss  v.  Jacobs,  59  Atl.  991,  994,  210 
Pa.  145. 

Under  Code,  c.  2,  f  5,  subsec  10,  provid- 
ing that  "land"  includes  lands,  tenements, 
and  hereditaments  and  all  rights  thereto  and 
interest  therein  other  than  a  chattel  inter- 
est therein,  where  on  a  bill  filed  by  a  vendor 
for  a  specific  performance,  it  was  decreed 
that  the  land  be  sold,  and  the  entire  acreage 
was  sold  and  conveyed  without  restriction  or 
reservation,  the  conveyance  carried  title  to 
the  coal  and  minerals  beneath  the  surface  of 
the  land.  Steinman  v.  Vicars,  39  S.  B.  227, 
229,  99  Va.  695. 

A  bill  may  be  maintained  to  quiet  the  ti- 
tle to  coal  and  other  minerals  under  and  on 
a  tract  of  land;  the  minerals  being  "laud" 
within  Code  1896,  |  809,  providing  that  when 
any  person  is  in  peaceable  possession  of  lands, 
whether  actual  or  constructive,  claiming  to 
own  the  same,  and  his  title  thereto  or  to  any 
part  thereof  is  denied  or  disputed,  he  may 
maintain  a  suit  in  equity  to  settle  the  title 
and  to  clear  up  all  doubts  and  disputes  con- 
cerning it  Gulf  Coal  A  Coke  Co.  v.  Alabama 
Coal  &  Coke  Ck).,  40  South.  397,  398,  145  Ala. 
228. 

Petroleum,  oil,  and  natural  gas  are  in- 
duded  in  the  comprehensive  idea  which  the 
law  attaches  to  the  word  "land"  and  are  a  part 
of  the  soil  In  which  they  are  found.  A  lease 
of  land  for  the  purpose  of  mining  coal  or  ex- 
tracting oil  or  natural  gas  from  the  soil  or 
rock  is  in  effect  a  grant  of  the  corpus  of  the 
land.  Haskell  v.  Sutton,  44  S.  B.  533,  536,. 
53  W.  Va.  206, 

"  'Oil,'  before  its  extraction,  is  a  mineral, 
and  is  a  part  of  the  land.* "  Swayne  v.  Lone 
Acre  Oil  Co.,  86  S.  W.  740,  742,  98  Tex.  597. 
69  L.  R.  A,  986,  8  Ann.  Cas.  1117 ;  Isom  v. 
Hex  Crude  Oil  Co.,  82  Pac  317,  318,  147  CaL 
659. 

Pontooa 

A  pontoon  floating  upon  the  water  of  a 
navigable  stream,  between  high  and  low  wa- 
ter mark,  though  fastened  to  the  shore  by  a 


LAND 


« 


liAKD 


cable,  l8  not  "land/'  and  an  action  for  an  In- 
jury to  a  person  thereon  by  a  moving  vessel 
is  within  the  admiralty  jurisdiction.  The 
Mackinaw,  165  Fed.  361,  852. 

Premises  synonymous 

Premises  as  including  land,  see  Premises. 

The  Liquor  Tax  Law  (Laws  1807.  p.  225, 
c  812,  I  24,  subd.  1),  prior  to  the  amendment 
made  by  Laws  1905,  p.  145,  c.  104,  made  it 
unlawful  to  traffic  in  liquor  within  one-half 
mile  of  the  building  and  "premises,"  of  any 
state  hospital,  and  the  amendment  added  the 
words  "or  lands"  after  the  word  "prem- 
ises.** On  a  petition  for  the  cancellation  of 
a  liquor  tax  certificate,  it  was  stipulated  that 
defendant,  prior  to  the  amendment,  had  been 
legally  selling  liquor  at  the  place  in  question. 
Held,  that  "lands**  was  synonymous  with 
"premises,"  and  in  view  of  the  stipulation 
there  could  be  no  cancellation  of  the  certifi- 
cate, whether  defendant  was  carrying  on  his 
business  within  one-half  mile  of  lands  owned 
and  used  by  a  state  hospital  and  contiguous 
to  it,  or  within  one-half  mile  bf  the  buildings, 
or  not  The  terms  "premises**  and  "lands'* 
are  synonymous,  and,  if  there  is  any  distinc- 
tion between  the  words,  it  is  that  the  word 
'^premises*'  is  more  inclusive.  According  to 
Bouv.  Law  Diet  and  Worcest.  Diet  the  word 
"premises"  is  defined  as  "lands  and  tene- 
mtots.*'  According  to  Gent  Diet,  it  is  de- 
fined as  "lands  and  houses  or  tenements." 
According  to  Stand.  Diet.,  it  is  defined  as 
"land  or  lands;  land  with  its  appurtenances." 
In  re  Oullinan,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  874,  875,  118 
App.  Div.  485. 

As  property 

See  Private  Property ;  Property. 
Proeeeds  of  sale 

Act  of  Separation  from  Massachusetts 
(Rev.  St  1883,  p.  1005)  S  1,  par.  7,  exempt- 
ing from  taxation  "lands**  theretofore  grant- 
ed to  any  religious  society,  etc.,  while  the 
same  continue  to  be  owned  by  such  society, 
does  not  exempt  a  fund  created  from  the  pro- 
ceeds of  a  sale  of  such  lands.  Inhabitants  of 
Gorham  v.  Trustees  of  Ministerial  Fund  in 
First  Parish  in  Gorham  in  Cumberland  Coun- 
ty, 82  Ati.  290,  292,  109  Me.  22. 

Real  estate  and  real  property  synony- 
mous 

The  word  "land,"  as  used  in  Code  1904, 
S  1105  (8-6),  authorizing  the  condemnation  of 
lands  or  any  in  trust  or  estate  therein,  is 
synonymous  with  "real  estate**  and  "real 
property.'*  Swan  v.  Washington  Southern  R. 
Co.,  61  S.  E.  750.  761,  108  Va.  282. 
As  security 

See  Security. 
Sniimersed  land 

The  word  "lands**  includes  the  beds  of 
nonnavfgable  lakes  and  streams,  and  lands 
are  none  the  less  land  for  being  covered  with 
water.  State  v.  Jones^  122  N.  W.  241,  248, 
148  Iowa,  39a 


'T«and"  covered  by  water  within  the  pub- 
lic domain  of  the  United  States  Is  as  much 
a  part  thereof  as  the  dry  land.  Eean  v.  Cal- 
umet Canal  &  Improvement  Co.,  28  Sup.  Ct 
651,  659,  190  U.  S.  452,  47  L.  Ed.  1134. 

The  owner  of  the  bank  of  a  navigable 
stream  owns  to  the  center  of  the  stream,  un- 
less the  ownership  of  the  bank  and  the  bed 
of  the  stream  has  been  separated,  subject 
only  to  governmental  and  public  rights ;  and 
the  bed  of  a  navigable  stream  is  "land." 
Green  Bay  &  Mississippi  Canal  Co.  v.  Telu- 
lah  Paper  Co.,  122  N.  W.  1062. 1065, 140  Wis, 
417. 

Timber 

The  word  "lands,"  in  Const  1890.  f  211, 
prohibiting  the  sale  of  school  lands.  Includes 
the  soil  only,  and  not  timber  growing  there- 
on ;  and  hence  Code  1906,  f  4702,  is  not  un- 
constitutional because  it  authorizes  a  sale  of 
such  timber.  L.  N.  Dantzler  Lumber  Co.  v. 
State,  53  South.  1,  2.  97  Miss.  355. 

Town  lots  or  blooks 

Where  a  party  contracts  for  the  pur- 
chase of  a  threshing  outfit,  unless  he  shall  go 
to  Oklahoma  and  buy  land,  the  word  "land*' 
is  broad  enough  to  include  a  piece  of  real 
property  described  as  a  block  in  a  town  site. 
J.  I.  Case  Threshing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Mlckley,  88 
Pac.  970,  72  Kan.  872. 

Trees 

At  common  law,,  "land**  embraces,  not 
only  the  soil,  but  its  natural  products,  such 
as  trees,  growing  upon  and  afiixed  to  It  L. 
N.  Dantzler  Lumber  Co.  v.  State,  58  South. 
1,  2,  97  Miss.  855. 

Trees  standing  on  land  are  a  part  of  the 
"land,"  the  title  to  which  can  be  passed  by 
a  statutory  deed.  Morgan  v.  Pott,  101  S.  W. 
717,  719,  124  Mo.  App.  371. 

Water  and  water  power 

"Land**  includes  the  water  upon  it,  and, 
when  the  fee  to  land  is  acquired  by  condem- 
nation, everything  which  is  comprehended  In 
the  term  "land,**  including  water,  vests  in  the 
expropriator.  Philadelphia  Trust,  Safe  De- 
posit &  Ins.  dk).  V.  Borough  of  Merchant- 
vlUe,  69  Ati.  729,  780,  74  N.  J.  Bq.  330. 

Under  Gen.  St  1902,  f  2321,  which  pro- 
vides for  the  taxation  of  land  owned  or  tak- 
en by  a  municipal  corporation  for  the  crea- 
tion or  furnishing  of  a  supply  of  water,  if 
the  inhabitants  of  the  town  in  which  it  is 
situated  do  not  have  the  use  and  do  actually 
use  sucn  water  supply  on  the  same  terms  as 
the  inhabitants  of  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion, in  which  case  the  property  shall  be  ex- 
empt, a  dam  located  on  such  land  is  not  an 
item  subject  to  taxation  separate  from  the 
land,  and  should  have  been  included  in  an 
item  of  the  assessment  denominated  "land 
used  in  connection  with  reservoir.**  City  of 
Norwalk  v.  Town  of  New  Canaan,  81  AtL 
1027,  1029,  85  Conn.  119. 


LAND 


LAND  TO  LAND 


The  Flowage  Act  (Laws  1868,  c.  20,  f  1; 
Pub.  St  1901,  c.  142,  f  12)  proTldes  that  any 
corporation  authorized  by  charter  may  erect 
and  maintain  on  its  land  a  water  mill  or  dam 
to  back  the  flowage  of  water  for  the  develop- 
ment of  power  and  section  13  provides  that  if 
land  is  overflowed  or  otherwise  injured  by 
the  use  of  SQdx  dam,  and  such  injury  is  not 
within  30  days  after  due  notice  satisfactorily 
adjusted,  petition  may  be  brought  to  the  su- 
perior court  to  have  the  damage  assessed. 
Held,  upon  petition  to  assess  damages  for 
the  flowing  out  or  taking  of  the  head  or  falls 
of  a  stream  located  upon  petitioner's  land, 
which  had  been  neither  utilized  nor  developed, 
that  the  term  "land"  In  the  act  was  not  used 
in  a  narrow  or  restricted  sense  to  apply  only 
to  land  as  distinguished  from  water,  but  to 
land  with  all  the  incidents  of  full  ownership ; 
that  the  damage  or  "injury"  intended  by  the 
act  was  such  as  resulted  from  depriving  the 
landowner  of  the  ability  to  use  his  land  to 
the  best  advantage  in  view  of  its  location 
and  natural  adaptability;  and  that  a  limi- 
tation of  the  use  of  undeveloped  water  pow- 
er was  an  injury  to  land,  for  which  compen- 
sation must  be  made.  Swain  v.  Pemlgewas- 
set  Power  Ck>.,  85  Ati.  288,  289,  76  N.  H.  498. 

LAHB  AGT0AIXT  USED 

See  Actually  Used. 

LAHB  OiatTIFZOATE 

As  chattel,  see  Chattel 
As  personal  property,  see  Personal  Prop- 
erty. 

A  "land  certificate"  is  the  obligation  of 
the  government  entitling  the  owner  to  secure 
the  designated  quantity  of  land  by  following 
the  requirements  of  the  law.  Waterman  v. 
Charlton,  120  S.  W.  171,  172,  102  Tex.  610. 

liAHB  DAMAGES 

Compensation  for  land  taken  under  the 
power  of  eminent  domain,  and  for  the  build- 
ings on  it,  is  technically  "land  damages." 
The  building  is  technically  not  only  a  part  of 
the  land,  but  Is  technically  land ;  and  an  ac- 
tion for  compensation  for  land  taken  under 
the  power  of  eminent  domain,  and  buildings 
which  are  upon  that  land,  is  as  matter  of 
technical  law  and  ordinary  parlance,  spoken 
of  as  an  action  for  "land  damages."  In  an 
award  of  special  commissioners  to  assess 
damages  for  land  taken  to  widen  a  street 
under  a  railroad's  track  directing  that  the 
town  should  pay  the  entire  expense  of  land 
damage  occasioned  by  the  taking  of  land  and 
property,  the  term  "land  damages"  was  not 
limited  to  the  value  of  the  land  taken  apart 
from  the  erection  thereon,  and  hence,  where 
the  land  taken  supported  one  of  the  abut- 
ments of  the  railroad  bridge,  the  railroad  was 
entitled  to  damages  for  the  taking  of  the 
abutment  as  well  aa  the  land.  New  York, 
N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  V.  Blackstone,  60  N.  £. 
315,  816,  184  MasB.  40L 


LARB  FOB  HOZ.DIHO  WATER     ' 

The  words  "land  for  holding  such  wa- 
ter," hi  St  1883,  p.  460,  c.  177,  creating  a 
water  company  to  supply  the  inhabitants  of 
a  town  with  water,  and  authorizing  the  com- 
pany to  take  and  hold  water  of  designated 
streams  and  all  lands  ''necessary  for  hold- 
ing and  preserving  such  water,"  mean  land 
for  a  reservoir.  Dorr  v.  Inhabitants  of  Shar- 
on, 84  N.  B.  446,  449,  198  Mass.  240. 

lOLXm  JOBBER 

A  man  who  occasionally  buys  and  sells 
land  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  land  jobber  o^ 
a  dealer  in  lands;  but,  if  a  man  makes  a 
particular  business  of  buying  and  selling 
land  to  obtain  profit,  he  is  properly  designat- 
ed as  a  "land  jobber"  or  dealer  in  land. 
Vanderbilt  University  v.  Cheney,  94  S.  W.  90, 
92,  116  Tenn.  259. 

ZiAKD  MUTTASLE  FOR  OULTIVATIOE 

See  Suitable  for  Cultivation. 

XiABB,      TIMBEB,      AED      TIMBER 
RXOHT8 

The  term  "land,  timber  and  timber 
rights,"  as  used  in  a  lease  of  a  railroad,  etc., 
specifying  that  plaintiff  demised,  let,  etc.,  to 
defendant  for  91  years,  all  land,  timber,  and 
timber  rights,  etc.,  included  all  the  standing 
timber.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Atlantic  & 
N.  C.  R.  Co..  61  S.  B.  186,  190,  147  N.  C. 
368,  23  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  223,  126  Am.  St  Rep. 
650,  16  Ann.  Cas.  363. 

laAND  TITIiEB 

Const  art.  14,  i  2,  provides  that  all  gen- 
eral land  certificates  shall  be  located,  sur-  • 
▼eyed,  or  patented  only  on  vacant  and  un- 
appropriated public  domain,  and  not  on  any 
"land  titled"  or  equitably  owned  under  color 
of  title  from  the  sovereignty  of  the  state, 
evidence  of  the  appropriation  of  which  is  on 
the  county  record  or  in  the  general  land 
office,  or  when  the  appropriation  is  evidenced 
by  the  occupation  of  the  owner  or  of  some 
person  holding  for  him.  Held,  that  where  it 
was  not  claimed  that  certificates  by  which 
land  was  surveyed  under  a  railroad  grant 
were  improperly  issued,  and  the  descriptions 
in  the  patents  in  express  terms  covered  the 
land  described  in  a  subsequent  patent  to  K., 
it  being  necessary  to  resort  to  evidence  ali- 
unde to  show  that  the  railroad  patents  did 
not  convey  the  state's  title  to  the  land  in . 
controversy,  it  was  "land  titled,"  within  such 
constitutional  provision.  McLennan  v.  Fish- 
er (Tex.)  180  S.  W.  698,  699. 

liANB  TO  UUfB 

Fishing  for  menhaden  with  purse  or 
drag  seines,  in  a  bay  on  our  coast  not  having 
an  entrance  over  three  nautical  miles  in 
width  between  headlands  on  the  main,  or 
between  the  mainland  and  an  island,  or  be- 
tween islands,  is  prohibited  by  chapter  261, 
Pub.  Laws  1886,  defining  the  width  of  such 


LAND  VALUABLE  FOR  MINERALS       8 


LANDED  PROPERTY 


entranbe»  or  any  part  thereof,  to  such  pro- 
hibited waters,  measured  from  "land  to 
land."  McOlain  y.  TiUson,  19  AtL  467,  458, 
82  Me.  28L 

LAHD  VALUABLE  FOB  MINEBAL8 

*'Land8  valuable  for  minerals"  in  the 
law  means  all  lands  chiefly  valuable  for  any 
of  the  mineral  deposits  treated  in  the  legis- 
lation relating  to  mining  claims,  rather  than 
lands  (diiefly  valuable  for  agricultural  pur- 
poses. Webb  V.  American  Asphaltum  Mln. 
Co.,  157  Fed.  208,  205,  84  C.  C.  A.  651. 

Under  Rev.  St  U.  8.  If  2318,  2819,  re- 
serving from  sale  lands  valuable  for  miner- 
als, and  opening  for  exploration  and  pur- 
chase all  valuable  mineral  deposits  in  the 
lands  of  the  United  States,  to  render  lands 
valuable  for  minerals  there  must  be  miner- 
als in  such  quantities  as  to  Justify  effort  to 
•extract  them;  but  it  is  not  necessary  that 
minerals  of  sufficient  amount  to  allow  im- 
mediate profitable  working  be  shown  to  ex- 
ist, but  it  is  enough  if  the  vein  or  deposit  has 
a  present  or  prospective  commercial  value. 
Madison  v.  Octave  Oil  Co.,  99  Pac.  178,  178, 
154  CaL  768. 

ItAKBED 

Plaintiff,  cotton  company,  delivered  cot- 
ton to  a  compress  company  and  subsequently 
delivered  the  warehouse  receipts  of  that  com- 
pany to  a  railway  company  and  received  in 
exchange  bills  of  lading.  The  cotton  com- 
pany shipped  the  cotton  over  the  railway  line 
to  a  purchaser  under  a  contract  requiring 
that  the  cotton  should  be  delivered  in  good 
.  condition  to  the  purchaser's  mills  ''landed/' 
and  drafts  for  the  purchase  price  with  bills 
of  lading  attached  were  drawn  by  the  cotton 
company  on  the  purchaser  and  honored  be- 
fore the  cotton  was  delivered  at  its  destina- 
Uou.  Held,  that  "landed"  meant  that  the 
cotton  company  was  responsible  for  the  en- 
tire shipment  of  cotton  and  for  damages  to 
it  until  delivered  at  the  point  of  destination, 
and  therefore  the  right  of  recovery  for  dam- 
ages to  the  cotton  resulting  from  exposure 
to  the  weather  while  in  the  possession  of  the 
compress  company  was  in  the  cotton  company, 
although  it  had  not  been  called  on  to  repay 
any  of  the  purchase  price.  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Jones  Cotton  Co.,  52  South.  899,  900,  167 
,575. 


LANDED  PBOPEBTT 

In  an  act  annexing  certain  territory  to 
a  city,  providing  that  the  rates  of  taxation 
on  all  "landed  property*'  so  annexed  shall 
not  exceed  a  certain  rate,  the  phrase  "landed 
property,"  as  used  in  the  act,  meant  rural, 
unimproved  land,  as  distinguished  from  real 
estate  compactly  built  on,  as  in  a  city. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  Baltimore  v.  Rosen- 
thal, 62  Ati.  579,  581,  102  Md.  298  (citing 
Sindall  V.  City  of  Baltimore,  49  AtL  647,  93 
Md.  533). 


f  The  term  "landed  property"  is  defined 
by  Acts  1902,  p.  199,  c  130,  as  "real  estate, 
whether  in  fee  simple  or  leasehold,  and 
whether  improved  or  unimproved."  JoesUng 
V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Baltimore,  55  Atl.  456,  457, 
97  Md.  589. 

Annexation  Act,  |  19  (Acts  1888,  p.  127, 
c.  98),  declared  that  until  1900  the  rate  of 
taxation  on  all  'landed  property"  in  certain 
territory  annexed  to  Baltimore  should  not 
exceed  the  rate  for  Baltimore  coimty,  and 
that  after  1900  the  county  rate  should  not  be 
increased  for  dty  purposes  on  "landed  prop- 
erty" within  the  territory  until  avenues, 
streets,  or  alleys  shall  have  been  opened  or 
constructed  through  the  same,  nor  until  there 
shall  be  on  every  block  of  ground  so  to  be 
formed  six  dwellings  or  storehouses  ready 
for  occupation.  Acts  1902,  p.  199,  c.  130,  i 
4a,  defined  "landed  property**  to  mean  real 
estate,  whether  improved  or  unimproved 
and  until  avenues,  streets,  or  alleys  shall 
have  been  opened,  constructed,  and  improved, 
shall  be  construed  to  mean  until  avenues, 
streets,  or  alleys  shall  have  been  opened, 
graded,  curbed,  and  otherwise  improved  to 
full  width  by  some  substantial  materiaL 
Held,  that  property  within  the  territory  an- 
nexed to  the  city  by  the  act  of  1888  situated 
in  a  block  bounded  by  improved  streets, 
though  not  containing  six  dwellings  or  store- 
houses, was  not  "landed  property*'  within 
such  act  Hiss  v.  City  of  Baltimore,  64  AtL 
52,  103  Md.  620. 

Acts  1888,  p.  127,  c.  98,  f  19,  relating  to 
the  annexation  of  a  certain  tract  to  Balti- 
more, provided  that  until  19(X)  the  tax  rate 
upon  all  "landed  property'*  and  taxable  per- 
sonal property  in  the  tract  should  not  exceed 
the  rate  of  Baltimore  county  for  1887,  and 
that  after  1900  the  rate  should  be  the  same  as 
for  the  rest  of  the  city  of  Baltimore,  provided 
that  the  increased  rate  should  not  take  effect 
until  avenues,  streets,  or  alleys  should  be 
opened  through  the  property,  and  at  least  six 
dwellings  or  storehouses  be  ready  for  occupa- 
tion upon  each  block  of  ground  so  to  be 
formed.  Acts  1902»  p.  199,  c.  130,  provided 
that  the  term  "landed  property'*  in  the  act 
of  1888  should  mean  real  estate  whether  in 
fee  simple  or  leasehold;  that  the  provision 
as  to  the  opening  of  avenues,  etc,  should 
mean  avenues,  etc,  opened,  graded,  curbed, 
and  otherwise  improved  from  curb  to  curb 
by  pavement  or  other  substantial  material, 
and  that  the  term  "block  of  ground"  should 
mean  an  area  not  exceeding  200,000  superfi- 
cial square  feet  bounded  on  all  sides  by  in- 
tersecting avenues,  streets,  or  alleys,  graded, 
curbed  and  otherwise  improved  from  curb  to 
curb,  by  pavement  or  other  substantial  ma- 
teriaL A  triangular  block,  being  part  of  the 
tract  annexed  by  the  act  of  1888,  contained 
1,000,000  superficial  square  feet,  bounded  on 
one  side  by  3034  feet  of  a  road,  part  of  which 
was  curbed  and  macadamized,  the  rest  co^ 


LANDED  PROPERTY 


9 


liANDINO  PLACE 


ered  with  an  Inch  of  stone,  but  nncnrbed. 
On  another  side  was  a  common  road  not 
graded,  cnrbed,  or  payed,  and  on  the  third 
Bide  was  a  private  toll  road,  cnrbed  and 
paved  In  the  middle.  There  were  abont  47 
dwellings  and  storehouses  on  the  block. 
Held,  that  a  leasehold  Interest  In  the  block 
was  taxable  under  the  county,  and  not  the 
dty,  tax  rate.  City  of  Baltimore  v.  Schafer, 
68  AtL  138,  140,  107  Md.  88. 

Acts  1888,  p.  127,  c.  98,  §  19,  provides 
after  the  year  1900  the  Baltimore  county  rate 
of  taxation  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the 
act  shall  not  be  increased  for  dty  purposes 
on  any  landed  property  within  the  annex 
until  avenues,  streets,  or  alleys  shall  have 
beoi  opened  or  constructed  through  the  same, 
nor  until  there  shall  be  on  every  blodk  of 
ground  so  to  be  formed  at  least  six  dwellings 
or  warehouses  ready  for  occupation.  Acts 
1902,  p.  199,  c.  120,  defines  'landed  property" 
to  mean  real  estate,  whether  In  fee  simple  or 
leasehold,  and  whether  Improved  or  unim- 
proved. Held,  that  a  wholly  unimproved  lot 
bound  by  a  street  or  alley  on  two  of  Its  four 
sides  and  contiguous  to  a  28-acre  tract  of 
land  with  no  visible  boundary  separating  it 
from  such  tract  was  "landed  property"  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  acts,  and  hence  not 
subject  to  the  Baltimore  dty  rate  of  taxation 
until  it  had  reached  the  standard  of  devel- 
opment required  by  the  act  to  make  it  urban 
property.  City  of  Baltimore  v.  Gail,  68  AtL 
282,  285,  106  Md.  684. 

LANDHOI.DEB 

Acts  1903,  p.  266,  c.  146,  relating  to  im- 
provement of  gravel  and  macadamized  roads, 
contemplates  as  resident  "landholders"  of 
the  county,  whose  lands  abut  upon  the  pro- 
posed improvements,  who  are  entitled  to  sign 
a  petition  for  the  improvements,  only  the 
holders  of  a  title  in  fee,  and  not  mere  life 
tenantflL  Kemp  v.  Goodnight,  80  N.  E.  160, 
162,  168  Ind.  174. 

LAHDIHO 

See  Public  Landing. 

According  to  the  accepted  meaning,  the 
act  of  "landing"  is  setting  on  shore,  or  com- 
ing on  shore.  Taylor  v.  United  States,  152 
Fed.  1, 10, 81  C.  C.  A.  197  (dissenting  opinion). 

"Landing  from  such  vessel"  takes  place 
and  is  complete  the  moment  the  vessel  is  left 
and  the  shore  reached  within  Immigration 
Act  March  3,  1903,  c.  1012,  i  18,  82  Stat  1213, 
1217,  making  it  the  duty  of  any  officer  in 
charge  of  any  vessel  bringing  an  alien  to  the 
United  States  to  adopt  precautions  to  prevent 
the  landing  from  such  vessel  of  such  alien 
at  any  time  or  place  other  than  that  desig- 
nated by  the  immigration  officers.  Taylor  v. 
United  States,  28  Sup.  Ct  58,  54,  207  U.  S. 
120,  52  L.  Ed.  130. 

The  transfer  of  a  Chinese  person  from 
the  vessel  In  which  he  was  brought  to  the 


United  States  to  a  detention  shed  maintained 
by  the  owners  of  the  vessel  on  their  dock, 
where  he  was  detained  under  guard  pending 
determination  of  his  right  to  enter  the  Unit- 
ed States,  did  not  constitute  a  "landing**  of 
such  person  within  Act  Cong.  May  6,  1882, 
c.  126,  I  2,  22  Stat.  59,  as  amended  by  Act 
July  5,  1884.  c.  220,  23  Stat  115,  prohibiting 
the  master  of  any  vessel  from  knowingly 
landing  or  permitting  to  be  landed  any  Chi- 
nese laborer,  etc.  United  States  v.  Seabury, 
133  Fed.  983,  985. 

Act  March  3,  1903,  c.  1012,  f  18,  82  Stat. 
1217,  declares  that  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
owners,  officers,  and  agents  of  any  vessel 
bringing  an  alien  to  the  United  States  to 
adopt  due  precautions  to  prevent  the  "land- 
ing** of  any  such  alien  "from  such  vessel**  at 
any  time  or  place  other  than  that  designated 
by  the  immigration  officers,  and  any  such 
owner,  etc.,  who  shall  land  or  permit  to  land 
any  alien  at  any  other  place  shall  be  guilty 
of  a  misdemeanor.  Held,  that  the  words 
"landing  from  vessel"  as  so  used  mean  "to 
go  ashore,*'  the  landing  being  complete  the 
moment  the  vessel  is  left  and  the  shore  la 
reached.  Nlven  v.  United  States,  169  Fed. 
782,  785,  95  a  O.  A.  24a 

The  word  "landing"  tn  Hurd*s  Rev.  St 
1908,  c.  93,  I  28,  par.  "b,**  providing  that 
there  must  be  maintained  at  the  "landing" 
at  which  miners  take  or  leave  the  cage  suffl- 
dent  light  to  show  the  "landing"  and  sur- 
rounding objects,  when  considered  in  con- 
nection with  section  16,  par.  "e,**  requiring 
the  mine  superintendent  to  see  that  suffldent 
lights  are  maintained  at  the  top  and  botton^ 
landings  when  the  men  are  hoisted  and  low- 
ered, and  section  2,  par.  ••b,'*  providing  that 
at  the  bottom  of  every  shaft  and  at  every 
caging  place  therein  a  suffldent  passageway- 
must  be  cut  around  the  landing  place.  Is 
broad  enough  to  cover  the  place  at  the  bot- 
tom or  at  the  top  of  the  shaft  where  miners 
enter  or  leave  the  cage  and  the  mine  operator 
must  keep  each  of  those  places  lighted.  Rob- 
ertson V.  Donk  Bros.  Coal  ft  Coke  Co.,  87 
N.  E.  373,  374,  238  IlL  844. 

As  wKarf  or  plaoo  for  loading  and  «n- 
loadlaK 

"A  'landing*  is  a  space  adjacent  to  a 
navigable  water  where  vessels  may  approach 
and  land  to  unload  and  receive  passengers 
and  freight,  and  where  articles  of  freight 
may  be  left  for  loading  on  the  vessel^  or 
after  they  have  been  unloaded  until  they  can 
be  taken  away.**  Chicago,  R.  I.  ft  P.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  People  ex  rel.  Dalley,  78  N.  E.  790,  793, 
222  111.  427  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Farnham,  Water  ft  Water  Rights,  i  145a). 

liAUDXKO  PliACE 

Land  abutting  upon  water,  from  which 
water  shipments  can  be  made,  and  leased  for 
that  purpose,  with  privileges  of  piling  lum- 
ber, is  a  landing  place,  within  Rev.  St  c.  9. . 


LANDING  PliAOE 


LO 


IjAlSfDJX>KD 


f  18,  sabsec.  1,  authorizing  taxation  of  per- 
sonalty employed  in  trade  where  the  owner 
occupies  a  landing  place.  Inhabitants  of 
Georgetown  y.  William  E.  Hanscome  &  Co., 
79  AU.  879,  880,  108  Me.  181. 

Rev.  St.  c  9,  §  12,  provides  that  all  per- 
sonal property  within  or  without  the  state 
shall  be  assessed  to  the  owner  in  the  town 
where  he  is  an  inhabitant  on  the  1st  day  of 
each  April.  Section  22  provides  that  part- 
ners in  business  whether  residing  in  the 
same  or  different  towns,  may  be  jointly 
taxed  under  their  partnership  name  in  the 
town  where  their  business  is  carried  on  for 
all  personal  property  enumerated  in  section 
13,  par.  1,  employed  in  such  business,  except 
that,  if  any  portion  of  suc^  property  is 
placed  or  situated  in  a  town  other  than 
where  their  place  of  business  is  under  speci- 
fied circumstances,  they  shall  be  taxed  there- 
for in  such  other  town.  Section  18,  par.  1, 
provides  that  all  personal  property  employed 
in  trade  shall  be  taxed  in  the  town  where  so 
employed  on  the  1st  day  of  each  April,  pro- 
vided that  the  owner,  his  servant,  subcon- 
tractor, or  agent  so  employing  it  occupies 
any  ''landing  place,"  etc.,  therein  for  the  pur- 
pose of  such  employment  Held  that,  to  sus- 
tain an  assessment  of  taxes  on  lumber  be- 
longing to  a  firm  in  a  certain  town,  it  must  ap- 
pear that  the  firm  were  at  the  time  of  the  as- 
sessment carrying  on  business  in  the  town, 
and  that  the  property  assessed  was  employed 
in  that  business,  or  if  their  place  of  business 
was  in  another  town  that  the  property  so  em- 
ployed was  placed  or  situated  in  the  town 
where  sought  to  be  assessed  and  the  proper- 
ty must  be  employed  in  trade,  etc.,  and,  if 
their  place  of  business  is  in  another  town 
than  that  in  which  the  property  is  deposited, 
it  must  appear  that  the  firm  or  their  serv- 
ants or  agents  so  employing  the  property  oc- 
cupied for  purposes  of  the  employment  a 
"landing  place,"  eta,  in  the  town  where  the 
assessment  is  sought  to  be  made,  and  where 
members  of  a  firm  resided  in  other  towns 
and  cut  logs  in  other  towns,  which  were 
hauled  to  a  town  where  they  were  sought  to 
be  assessed  for  taxation,  there  sawed  by  a 
portable  sawmill,  and  "stuck  up"  to  season 
in  a  field  within  the  town  with  the  intent  to 
leave  it  there  until  sold,  when  it  was  to  be 
hauled  to  a  railroad  siding,  half  a  mile 
distant  also  in  the  town,  for  shipment,  and 
all  the  work  done  on  the  lot  was  done  under 
contract  of  another  person,  the  firm,  how- 
ever, supervising  the  work  so  far  as  to  de- 
termine the  size  and  shape  of  the  manufac- 
tured product,  the  firm  having  no  office  any- 
where, thoir  books  being  kept  in  another 
town  at  a  dwelling  house  from  where  the 
correspondence  of  the  firm  was  carried  on 
and  prospective  purchasers  taken  by  the  firm 
to  the  sticking  grounds  to  examine  the  lum- 
ber, the  business  of  the  firm  was  being  car- 
ried on  in  another  town,  and  the  lumber  was 


not  subject  to  taxation  in  the  town  where 
deposited,  since  the  field  where  the  lumber 
was  "stuck  up"  was  not  a  'landing  place" 
within  the  statute,  the  term  "landing*'  first 
incorporated  into  the  statute  in  Laws  1869,  c. 
53,  then  meaning  a  place  on  a  river  or  other 
navigable  water  for  landing  and  unlandlng 
goods,  or  for  taking  on  or  letting  off  passen- 
gers or  a  place  where  any  kind  of  craft 
lands  or  for  storing  logs  for  winter.  Mc- 
Cann  v.  Inhabitants  of  Town  of  Minot,  78 
AtL  466,  467,  107  Me.  393. 

LAin>I.OB]> 

A  man  to  be  a  "landlord*'  must  sustain 
some  relation  to  the  land,  such  as  owner,  or 
quasi  owner,  and,  while  a  landlord  may  as- 
sign the  rent,  the  assignee  is  not  a  "landlord" 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  giving  a 
landlord's  lien.  State  y.  Blmore,  46  S.  B. 
939,  941,  68  S.  C.  140. 

''A  'landlord'  is  a  person  whose  lands 
are  occupied."  Hence,  when  a  petitioner 
said  htf  was  a  landlord,  he,  in  effect,  said  he 
was  the  person  whose  lands  were  occupied. 
Loft  V.  Kaziz,  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  228,  230. 

Under  General  Milwaukee  Ordinance,  c. 
20, 1 36,  inhibiting  all  persons  from  leasing  or 
letting  either  as  landlord  or  agent,  any 
room,  house,  or  other  premises  to  be  used  for 
the  purpose  of  prostitution  or  lewdness,  the 
term  "landlord"  is  not  restricted  in  its  mean- 
ing to  the  owner  of  an  estate  in  lands,  but 
refers  to  lessees  who  let' particular  rooms. 
City  of  miwaukee  v.  Beatty,  135  N.  W.  873. 
874,  149  Wis.  349. 

Under  a  statute  enacted  in  the  reign  of 
George  II,  a  landlord  was  permitted  to  ap- 
pear and  defend  in  ejectment,  and  the  word 
"landlord"  was  interpreted  to  include  all 
persons  claiming  title  consistent  with  the 
persons  sued  as  tenants  in  possession.  Bow* 
er  V.  Cohen,  54  S.  E.  918,  919,  126  Ga.  35. 

Premises  were  leased  for  one  year,  and 
before  the  expiration  of  that  term  the  land- 
lord leased  to  another  the  premises  for  a 
term  to  begin  at  the  expiration  of  the  first 
term.  The  first  tenant  held  over,  and  the 
Landlord  brought  summary  proceedings  to 
dispossess  him.  Section  2231,  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
provides  that  a  tenant  holding  over  at  the 
expiration  of  his  lease  may  be  removed  and 
section  2235  provides  that  the  application 
may  be  made  by  the  "landlord  or  lessor." 
Held  that  the  lessor  of  both  tenants  was  the 
"landlord  or  lessor"  within  the  statute,  and 
could  maintain  an  action  to  dispossess  the 
first  tenant,  if  there  had  been  no  election  by 
the  landlord  to  continue  the  lease.  Bells  v. 
Morse,  127  N.  Y.  Supp.  438,  440,  142  App. 
Div.  592. 

A  petition  in  summary  proceedings  for 
the  possession  of  land,  alleging  that  the  peti- 
tioner is  the  lessee  and  "landlord"  thereof, 
is  not  a  sufficient  oompliance  with  Code  Giv. 


LANDLORD 


11 


LANDLORD  AND  TENANT 


Proc.  I  2235,  requiring  the  petition  to  state 
the  Interest  of  the  petitioner  In  the  premises. 
The  statement  that  the  petitioner  was  the 
'aessee"  and  'landlord"  is  the  assertion  mere- 
ly of  an  Interest  and  not  a  description  of 
snch  Interest  Ferber  y.  Apfel,  99  N.  Y. 
Sopp.  215.  216,  113  App.  Wv.  T20  (dtlng 
Kazls  ▼.  Loft,  80  N.  Y.  Supp.  1015,  81  App. 
Dlv.  036;  Loft  v.  Kazlz,  84  N.*Y.  Supp.  228; 
Engel-Heller  Co.  v^  Henry  Ellas  Brewing  CJo., 
75  N.  Y.  Supp.  1080,  37  Misc.  Rep.  480;  Po^ 
ter  ▼.  New  York  Baptist  Mission  Soc,  52 
N.  Y.  Supp.  294,  23  Misc.  Rep.  671 ;  Ross  ▼. 
Same,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  303,  23  Misc.  Rep.  683; 
Cram  v.  Dietrich,  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  948,  38 
Misc.  Rep.  790. 

Owner  not  •qplYal«At 

A  description  of  the  petitioner  as  the 
"landlord  pf  the  premises  hereinafter  de- 
scribed" Is  insufficient  to  confer  Jurisdiction 
of  summary  proceedings,  for  that  does  not 
state  that  he  Is  the  owner,  but  merely  alleg- 
es the  relation  of  the  parties  without  stating 
petitioner's  Interest  In  the  premises.  Under- 
hiU  T.  Cohen,  114  N.  Y.  Supp.  115,  117,  61 
Misc.  Rep.  627. 

liAHBIfOBD  AHD  OBOFPER 

A  verbal  contract  between  a  cropper,  who 
owed  a  large  supply  account  for  which  his 
landlord  was  security  and  also,  owed  his 
landlord  for  supplies,  and  his  landlord, 
whereby  It  was  agreed  that,  If  the  cropper 
should  desire  to  work  elsewhere  the  follow- 
ing year,  he  should  settle  up  his  supply  ac- 
count and  notify  the  landlord  before  a  time 
fixed,  so  that  he  might  have  time  to  get  some 
one  else,  and  that,  If  the  cropper  did  not  set- 
tle up  and  notify  the  landlord  before  the 
time  fixed,  then  he  was  to  be  a  cropper  for 
the  landlord  for  the  following  year,  does  not 
create  the  relation  of  landlord  and  cropper 
within  Act  Dec.  17,  1901  (Acts  1901,  p.  63). 
as  amended  by  Act  Aug.  7,  1903  (Acts  1903, 
p.  91),  providing  that,  where  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  cropper  has  been  created.  It 
shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person  during  the 
contract  to  employ  the  cropper  or  to  disturb 
in  any  way  snch  relation;  that  act  contem- 
plating a  complete  contract  and  not  a  con- 
tract whereby  the  relation  will  be  created  in 
the  future  on  the  happening  or  nonhappenlng 
of  a  given  contingency,  dependent  on  the  will 
of  one  of  the  parties.  Polk  v.  Thomason,  61 
S.  E.  123,  124,  130  Qa.  542. 

LAHDI.OBD  AKD  TEKAKT 

The  relation  of  ''landlord  and  tenant"  is 
that  which  subsists  by  virtue  of  a  contract 
for  the  possession  of  lands  at  will,  for  a 
definite  period,  or  for  life.  Foss  v.  Stanton, 
57  AtL  942,  76  Vt  365. 

The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  aris- 
es under  contract,  express  or  implied,  for 
possession  of  lands  or  tenements  in  consid- 
eration of    certain  rent  to  be  paid  therefor; 


possession  being  an  essential  element. 
Whiteside  v.  Oasis  Club,  142  S.  W.  752,  758, 
162  Mo.  App.  502. 

The  words  "landlord  and  tenant"  signify 
not  only  the  immediate  parties  to  a  lease, 
but  also  their  respective  successors  in  inter- 
est Where  a  landlord  assigns  his  lease  with 
his  right  to  the  control,  occupancy,  and  pos- 
session of  the  premises  for  more  than  four 
years  beyond  the  expiration  of  the  term,  and 
the  tenant  holds  over,  the  assignee  may  elect 
to  treat  the  holding  over  as  a  tenancy  for 
another  year.  United  Merchants'  Realty  -ft 
Improvement  Co.  v.  Roth.  103  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1112,  1113,  53  Misc.  Rep.  92. 

Under  the  direct  provisions  of  Code  1896, 
I  2711,  where  one  party  furnishes  land  for 
raising  a  crop  and  another  furnishes  the 
labor  and  the  team  to  cultivate  It,  with  a 
stipulation  for  a  division  of  the  crop  between 
them,  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  ex- 
ists between  them;  the  status,  fixed  by  the 
statute,  being  contractual.  Kennedy  v.  Mc- 
Dlarmld,  47  South.  792,  793,  157  Ala.  496. 

Where  one  enters  into  possession  of  land 
under  a  deed  claiming  it  in  good  faith  as 
owner,  and  does  not  recognize  any  interest  in 
the  grantor,  the  relation  of  "landlord  and  ten- 
ant" does  not  exist,  and  he  cannot  be  sum- 
marily dispossessed  as  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance. Shatpe  V.  Mathews,  51  S.  E.  706,  707, 
123  Oa.  794  (citing  Watson  v.  Toliver,  29  8. 
E.  614,  103  Ga.  123). 

The  reservation  of  rent  in  some  form 
and  allegiance  to  the  title  are  distinguishing 
characteristics  of  a  contract  by  which  the 
relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  exists.  An- 
drews V.  Erwin  (Ky.)  78  S.  W.  902,  903. 

Reservation  of  rent  is  not  essential  to 
the  creation  ot  the  relation  of  "landlord  and 
tenant"  PlaintifTs  conveyed  to  defendant 
by  deed  all  the  timber  and  trees  on  the  tract 
of  land  described;  the  deed  providing  that 
the  grantee  should  have  all  the  rights  of  way 
and  privileges  over  and  upon  the  land 
usually  extended  to  lumbermen,  provided 
that  the  timber  should  be  removed  within 
three  years,  and  that  all  refuse,  tbnber, 
bams,  houses,  cabins,  sheds,  etc.,  remaining 
on  the  premises  at  that  time  should  revert  to 
and  become  the  property  of  plaintiffs.  Held, 
that  such  deed  was  not  a  mere  license,  but 
was  sufficient  to  create  the  relation  of  "land- 
lord and  tenant"  Alexander  v.  Gardner,  96 
S.  W.  818,  819,  123  Ky.  552,  124  Am.  St  Rep. 
378. 

Plaintiff,  who  resided  on  a  farm,  con- 
tracted to  allow  defendant  to  occupy  free  of 
rent  one  of  the  houses  on  the  farm  and  carry 
on  the  same  for  a  term  of  years.  Each  party 
was  to  furnish  certain  things  for  the  farm, 
and  the  crops  were  to  be  sold  and  proceeds 
divided.  Held,  that  the  relaUon  of  "land- 
lord and  tenant"  did  not  exist  between  the 
parties  as  to  the  bouse,  but  that  defendant's 


LANDOWNER 


12 


LARCEJJY 


■occupancy  was  a  mere  Incident  of  his  carry- 
ing on  the  farm,  and  an  action  wonld  not  lie 
against  htm  to  recover  possession  of  the 
house  under  V.  S.  1660,  providing  that, 
when  a  lessee  holds  possession  without  right, 
the  person  entitled  to  possession  may  have 
a  writ  to  restore  him  thereto.  Mead  v. 
Owen,  67  Aa  722,  724,  80  Vt  273,  13  Ann. 
Gas.  231. 

IiANDOWNEB 

The  county  named  in  the  preliminary 
report  of  the  surveyor  as  a  landowner  affect- 
ed by  a  proposed  drainage  is  not  a  "land- 
owner" within  the  provision  of  the  drainage 
■act  requiring  the  dismissal  of  the  petition 
upon  remonstrance  of  two-thirds  of  the 
^'landowners"  affected.  Honnold  v.  Endlcott, 
«3  N.  E.  502,  170  Ind.  16. 

The  word  "landowner,"  In  the  statute 
giving  a  company  power  to  condenm  land, 
and  providing  that  it  shall  be  liable  for  all 
such  damages  as  may  be  established  by  any 
landowner,  embraces  not  only  the  owner  of 
the  fee,  but  a  lessee  for  years  and  any  other 
person  who  has  an  Interest  in  the  property 
affected  by  the  condemnation.  Woodstock 
Hardwood  &  Spool  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Charleston 
Light  &  Water  Co.,  66  S.  B.  104,  196,  84  S. 
C.  306. 

LANGUAGE 

See  Doubtful  Language;  Ordinary  Lan- 
guage. 

English  language,  see  English. 

'Obscene  language,  see  Obscene — Obscen- 
ity. 

Profane  language,  see  Profane — Profan- 
ity. 

"Language"  is  the  expression  of  thought 
'by  means  of  spoken  or  written  words  which 
are  but  signs  of  ideas.  United  States  v.  One 
Car  Load  of  Corno  Horse  and  Mule  Feed, 
188  Fed.  453,  462. 

"Language"  is  a  generic  term,  and  in- 
cludes any  words  or  speech  by  which  thought 
may  be  conveyed,  and  language  may  be  ob- 
scene and  vulgar  when  used  in  the  presence 
•of  a  female  without  the  use  of  a  single  word 
which  could  be  intrinsically  classified  as  be- 
ing obscene  and  vulgar.  Morris  v.  State,  65 
S.  B.  58,  59,  6  Ga.  App.  895. 

"  'Language*  is  the  offspring  of  the  past, 
but  its  life  is  in  and  for  the  ever  opening  and 
progressive  future.  Its  principal  mission  is 
to  convey  from  one  mind  to  another  the  new 
thoughts  as  they  arise;  for  the  old  is  con- 
tinually dying,  while  the  new  is  being  bom. 
If  each  word  had  a  single  fixed  and  un- 
changing meaning,  and  if  there  simply  were 
certain  established  collocations  of  words, 
«ach  with  one  signification,  the  powers  of 
language  would  be  very  limited,  and  it  could 
never  express  a  new  idea."  State  v.  Stuart, 
^  S.  W.  818,  S8U  104  Mo.  845»  112  Am.  St 


Rep.  629,  5  Ann.  Cas.  063  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  from  Bishop). 

LAP 

Where  one  grant  conflicts  in  part  with 
another,  occasioning  what  is  called  a  "lap" 
or  "interlock,"  the  elder  patentee  under  his 
grant  acquires  at  once  constructive  seisin  in 
deed  of  all  the  land  embraced  within  its 
boundaries,  although  he  has  taken  no  actu- 
al possession  of  any  part  thereot  The  Jun- 
ior grantee  under  his  grant  acquires  similar 
constructive  seisin  in  deed  of  all  the  land 
embraced  by  his  boundaries,  except  that  por- 
tion within  the  interlock,  the  s^sln  of  which 
had  already  vested  in  the  senior  grantee. 
Green  v.  Pennington,  64  S.  B.  877,  878.  105 
Va.  801  (citing  Koiner  y.  Rankin's  Heirs 
[Va.]  11  Grat  427). 

I.AP  POSITION 

In  the  railway  automatic  quick  action 
brake  system,  the  position  known  as  the  "lap 
position"  was,  where  the  engineer  thought 
that  the  train  pipe  pressure  had  been  suffi- 
ciently reduced  by  the  resultant  brake  appli- 
cation, he  moved  the  handle  back  a  short  dis- 
tance so  as  to  close  all  the  ports  and  hold 
the  brakes  at  the  point  at  which  they  had 
been  set.  Westlnghouse  Air  Brake  Co.  v. 
New  York  Air  Brake  Co.,  110  Fed.  874,  875, 
56  C.  C.  A.  404. 

LAPPINGS 

"Lappings"  consist  of  a  woven  fabric 
composed  of  a  flax  warp  and  a  wool  filling 
and  is  dutiable  under  paragraph  346  of  the 
Tariff  Act  of  1897.  United  States  v.  B.  De 
F.  Wilkinson  Co.,  154  Fed.  751,  752. 

LAPSE 

ULPSE  OF  TIME 

The  phrase  "lapse  of  time,"  as  used  In 
a  constitutional  provision  giving  the  Legisla- 
ture power  to  revive  any  remedy  which  may 
have  been  barred  by  "lapse  of  time"  or  "by 
any  statute  of  limitations,"  means  a  period 
of  time  limiting  the  action,  and  relates  alone 
either  to  an  express  statute  of  limitations  or 
to  a  "lapse  of  time"  dealt  with  either  under 
the  statute  or  the  general  law,  as  a  limita- 
tion of  time.  North  British  &  Mercantile 
Ins.  Co.  of  London  &  Eidinburgh  t.  EJdwards, 
37  South.  748,  85  Miss.  822. 

LARCENY 

See  Compound  Larceny;  Grand  Lar- 
ceny; Petit  Larceny;  Simple  Lar- 
ceny ;  Taking  (In  Larceny). 

Hog  stealing,  see  Hog. 

Property  subject  of  larceny,  see  Person- 
al Property;  Property. 

Stealth  as  element,  see  Stealth. 

See,  also.  Fraud,;  Fraudulent  Taking; 
Horsestealing;  Theft 


LARCENY 


13 


IiARCENT 


•*Larceny"  Is  taking  personal  property  by 
stenltncr;  by  theft  Cox  v.  Territory,  104 
Pac.  378,  379,  2  OU,  Or.  66& 

**Larceny"  is  predicated  on  the  wrongful 
taking  of  property  with  intent  to  convert  it. 
Axtell  V.  State,  91  N.  B.  8M.  865,  178  Ind. 
TLL 

"Larceny"  is  the  felonious  taking  of  the 
property  of  another.  State  ▼.  Wasson,  101 
N.  W.  1125,  1126,  126  Iowa,  320. 

"Larceny"  is  the  taking  of  another's  per- 
sonal property  without  the  owner's  consent, 
accompanied  by  an  intent  to  wholly  deprive 
him  of  its  \*alue.  State  v.  Hinton,  109  Pac. 
24,  27.  56  Or.  42a 

"Larceny"  is  the  felonious  taking  and 
carrying  away  of  the  personal  property  of 
another,  with  the  intent  to  convert  it  to  the 
use  of  the  taker  without  the  consent  of  the 
owner.  State  v.  De  Luca  (Del.)  77  AtL  742, 
743,  2  Boyce,  158;  State  v.  Stewart  (DeL)  67 
Aa  786,  788,  6  Pennewill,  435. 

"Larceny"  is  the  felonious  taking  and 
carrying  away  of  the  personal  goods  of  an- 
other, with  IntS^t  to  deprive  the  owner  of 
his  property  therein,  and  to  appropriate  the 
same  to  the  use  of  the  taker.  State  v.  Spen- 
cer (DeL)  53  Ati.  337,  338,  4  Pennewill, .  92. 

"Larceny"  is  the  felonious  taking  and 
carrying  away  of  the  personal  property  of 
another,  with  intent  to  convert  it  to  the 
taker's  use,  and  to  deprive  tlie  owner  of  the 
same,  without  the  owner's  consent.  State  y. 
Palmer  (Del.)  53  Atl.  359,  4  Pennewill,  126. 

"Larceny"  is  the  felonious  taking  and 
carrying  away  of  the  personal  property  of 
another,  with  intent  to  convert  it  to  the  tak- 
er's use  and  deprive  the  owner  of  its  use 
without  his  consent.  State  v.  Dredden,  73 
Atl.  1042,  1043,  6  Pennewill,  446. 

"Larceny"  is  the  wrongful  or  fraudulent 
taking  and  carrying  away  by  any  person  of 
the  personal  goods  of  another  without  the 
owner's  consent,  with  a  felonious  Intent  to 
convert  them  to  the.  taker's  U8&  State  v. 
James,  113  S.  W.  232,  233,  183  Mo.  App.  800. 

"Larceny"  is  the  wrongful  or  fraudulent 
taking  and  carrying  away  of  the  personal 
goods  or  property  of  another,  with  the  feloni- 
ous intent  to  convert  it  to  his  own  use  and 
make  It  his  own  property  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner.  State  v.  Wolf  (Del.)  66 
AtL  739,  741,  6  Pennewill,  323. 

At  common  law,  as  well  as  by  statute, 
*1arceny"  is  the  wrongful  taking  and  carry- 
ing away  of  the  personalty  of  another,  with 
a  felonious  intent  to  convert  it  to  the  taker's 
use  without  the  owner's  consent.  State  v. 
Brewington  (Del.)  78  Atl.  402,  403,  2  Boyce, 
71. 

"•Larceny*  is  defined  as  the  wrongful 
or  fraudulent  taking  and  carrying  away  of 
the  personal  property  of  another,  from  any 
Pilaoe,  with  a  felonious  Intent  to  convert  the 


same  to  the  taker's  use,  and  make  it  his  own, 
without  the  consent  of  the  owner.' "  State  v. 
Weatherman,  100  S.  W.  482,  483,  202  Mo.  6 
(quoting  and  adopting  d^nition  in  State  r. 
Gray,  87  Mo.  468). 

"Larceny"  Is  a  felonious  taking  and  car- 
rying away  of  the  personal  goods  or  chattels 
of  another  with  intent  to  deprive  the  owner 
of  his  property  therein  and  to  appropriate 
the  same  to  the  use  of  the  taker.  Asporta- 
tion, nonconsent  of  the  owner,  and  a  feloni- 
ous intent  to  thereby  convert  the  stolen  prop- 
erty to  the  defendant's  own  use  are  necessary 
elements  of  larceny.  Ladeauz  v.  State,  103 
N.  W.  1048,  1049,  74  Neb.  19. 

A  "larceny"  has  been  defined  as .  a  fe- 
lonious taking  of  the  property  of  another, 
without  his  consent  and  against  his  will,  with 
intent  to  convert  it  to  the  use  of  the  taker,  or 
"the  wrongful  or  fraudulent  taking  or  carry- 
ing away  by  any  person  of  the  personal  goods 
of  another  with  a  felonious  intoit  to  convert 
them  to  his  (the  taker's)  own  use  and  make 
them  his  own  property  without  the  consent 
of  the  owner."  Bassett  v.  Spoflord,  45  N.  Y. 
387,  391,  6  Am.  Rep.  101  (citing  2  Russ. 
Crimes,  1;  Mowrey  v.  Walsh  [N.  Y.]  8  Cow. 
238). 

The  phrase  "deemed  guilty  of  larceny," 
as  used  in  B.  &  C  Comp.  |  1805,  providing 
that,  if  any  person  shall  embezzle  or  fraudu- 
lently convert  any  money  belonging  to  anoth- 
er in  his  possession,  he  shall  "be  deemed  guil- 
ty of  larceny,"  and  on  conviction  shall  be 
punished  accordingly,  refers  to  statutory 
larceny  and  not  larceny  at  conunon  law. 
State  V.  Browning,  82  Pac.  955,  966,  47  Or. 
470. 

Where  one  collects  money  for  another 
and  neglects  or  refuses  to  turn  it  over  but 
uses  the  money  himself,  he  commits  a  "lar- 
ceny." Specifically,  it  Is  embezzlement  and 
is  punishable  as  "larceny."  State  v.  Oonklin, 
84  Pac.  482,  484, 47  Or.  509. 

If  the  general  bookkeeper  of  a  bank, 
having  no  general  or  special  custody  or  pos- 
session of  the  funds  of  the  bank,  secretly 
takes  from  the  safe  or  drawer  of  the  receiv- 
ing or  paying  teller  moneys  of  the  bank,  with 
the  intent  to  appropriate  the  same  to  his 
own  use,  he  commits  an  act  of  "larceny." 
United  States  v.  Breese,  131  Fed.  915,  920. 

In  a  prosecution  for  larceny,  the  state 
must  prove  that  the  property  taken  was  per- 
sonal property  of  some  value  belonging  to  the 
owner  named  in  the  Indictment  and  that  it 
was  taken  feloniously  by  the  defendant  with 
intent  to  convert  it  to  his  own  use  within 
two  years  prior  to  the  finding  of  the  indict- 
ment, and  In  the  county  in  which  the  case 
was  being  prosecuted.  State  v.  De  Luca 
(Del.)  77  Atl.  742,  743,  2  Boyce,  158. 

A  bill  of  particulars,  filed  with  an  indict- 
ment for  "larceny"  of  a  receipt,  which  alleged 
that  accused  told  prosecutor  that  he  would 


LABCENT 


14 


LARCENY 


loan  proBecotor  money  and  take  from  Mm 
as  collateral  a  negotiable  receipt  of  a  third 
person  for  certain  bonds,  that  accused  false- 
ly represented  to  prosecutor  that  he  intended 
either  to  keep  the  certificate  in  his  posses- 
sion or  to  place  the  same  as  collateral  with 
a  bank  for  a  loan,  that  accused  loaned  to 
prosecutor  money  and  received  as  collateral 
the  receipt,  that  accused  sold  the  receipt,  that 
after  the  maturity  of  the  debt  prosecutor 
made  demands  on  accused  for  the  return  of 
the  receipt  and  tendered  the  amount  of  the 
debt,  that  accused  declined  to  deliver  the  re- 
ceipt or  any  receipt  of  the  same  amount,  and 
that  accused  never  intended  to  retain  posses- 
sion of  the  receipt,  but  at  the  time  of  making 
the  representation  and  receiving  the  receipt 
he  intended  to  dispose  of  the  same,  etc.,  per- 
mitted the  commonwealth  to  prove  common 
larceny,  embezzlement,  obtaining  property  by 
false  pretenses,  or  larceny,  defined  by  Rev. 
Laws,  c.  208,  §  26,  making  one  who,  with  in- 
tent to  defraud,  obtains  property  by  false  pre- 
tense guilty  of  "larceny."  Commonwealth  v. 
Althause,  93  N.  E.  202,  205,  207  Mass.  32,  31 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  999. 

In  a  trial  for  "larceny,"  the  gist  of  the 
o^Tense  is  the  unlawful  taking  and  appropri- 
ating by  the  accused  of  the  property  of  an- 
other, the  name  of  the  owner  being  a  matter 
of  secondary  importance  or  consideration. 
Where  the  name  of  the  owner  is  not  known, 
it  is  sufficient  to  allege  that  fact  State  v. 
afcDuflPy,  60  South.  80.  81,  131  La.  695  (citing 
State  V.  Hanks,  1  South.  458,  39  La.  Ann. 
234 ;  State  v.  Dominique,  1  South.  665,  39  La. 
Ann.  323;  State  v.  Harris,  8  South.  530,  42 
La.  Ann.  980;  State  v.  Southern,  19  South. 
668,  48  La.  Ann.  628). 

Statutory  deflaitloiis 

"Larceny''  is  the  felonious  stealing  or 
carrying  away  the  personal  property  of  an- 
other. People  V.  Devlin,  76  Pac.  900,  143 
Cai.  128  (citing  Pen.  Oode..§  484). 

Pen.  Code,  f  441,  defines  "larceny"  as 
the  felonious  stealing,  taking,  carrying,  lead- 
ing, or  driving  away  of  the  personal  property 
of  another.  Buffehr  v.  Territory,  89  Pac. 
415,  11  Ariz.  165. 

"Larceny"  is  Gie  felonious  stealing,  tak- 
ing, carrying,  leading,  or  driving  away  the 
personal  property  of  another.  State  v.  Da- 
vis, 76  Pac.  705,  706,  28  Utah,  10  (citing  Rev. 
St.  1898,  t  4355). 

"Larceny"  is  to  take,  steal,  and  carry 
away.  An  instruction  thus  defining  larceny 
in  the  words  of  the  statute  Was  sufladent, 
since  the  words  employed  are  daily  in  com- 
mon use  and  such  as  the  jury  were  presumed 
to  understand.  State  v.  Clarter,  121  N.  W. 
694,  695,  697,  144  Iowa,  280. 

Ann.  St.  1899,  Ind.  T.  f  965,  defines  'lar- 
ceny" as  follows:  "  'Larceny'  is  the  felonious 
stealing,  taking,  carrying,  riding  or  driving 
away  the  personal  property  of  another."    It 


was  not  error  for  the  trial  court  to  give  the 
jury  the  following  definition  of  "larceny,"  to 
wit:  "'Larceny'  is  the  felonious  stealing, 
taking,  carrying,  riding  or  driving  away  the 
property  of  another."  It  is  the  felonious 
taking;  that  is,  wrongful  and  corrupt  taking. 
Hendrix  v.  United  States,  101  Pac,  125,  128, 
2  Okl.  O.  240. 

Hurd's  Rev.  St  1905,  c.  38,  |  167,  pro- 
vides that  larceny  may  be  committed  by  fe- 
loniously taking  and  carrying  away  any  bond, 
bill,  receipt,  or  any  instrument  of  writing  of 
value  to  the  owner.  So  an  indictment  charg- 
ing the  larceny  of  a  bill  of  exchange  must 
aver  the  value  thereol  People  v.  Silbertrust, 
86  N.  E.  203,  204,  236  111.  144. 

Hurd's  Rev.  St  1909,  c.  38,  i  75,  provides 
that  if  any  agent  embezzles  or  fraudulently 
converts  to  his  own  use,  or  takes  with  intent 
to  do  so,  without  the  consent  of  the  employer, 
any  property  of  the  employer  which  has  come 
to  his  possession  or  to  his  ofllce  by  virtue  of 
such  employment,  is  to  be  deemed  guilty  of 
"larceny."  So  an  indictment,  charging  in 
the  language  of  the  statute  that  defendant 
was  the  agent  of  B.,  and  as  such  agent  col- 
lected and  embezzled  funds  belonging  to  her 
in  the  amount  of  $7,000,  was  suflScient  Peo- 
ple V.  O'Farrell,  93  N.  E.  136,  139,  247  111.  44. 

Pen.  Code,  §  484,  defines  "larceny"  as  the 
felonious  stealing,  taking,  carrying  away  of 
the  property  of  another.  So  an  information 
charging  that  accused,  from  the  immediate 
presence  of  prosecutor,  by  means  of  force 
and  against  prosecutor's  will,  did  take,  steal, 
and  carry  away  certain  property  of  the  value 
of  $1,026  of  the  personal  property  of  prose- 
cutor, was  sufiiident  People  y.  Ho  Sing,  93 
Pac.  204,  205.  6  CaL  App.  752. 

"A  person  who,  with  the  intent  to  de- 
prive or  defraud  the  true  owner  of  his  prop- 
erty, or  of  the  use  or  benefit  thereof,  or  to 
appropriate  the  same  to  the  use  of  the  taker, 
or  of  any  other  person,  either:  (1)  Takes 
from  the  possession  of  the  true  owner,  or  of 
any  other  person,  or  obtains  from  such  posses- 
sion by  color  or  aid  of  fraudulent  or  false  rep- 
resentation or  pretense,  or  of  any  false  token 
or  writing,  or  secretes,  withholds,  or  appro- 
priates to  his  own  use,  or  that  of  any  x>erson 
other  than  the  true  owner,  any  money,  per- 
sonal property,  thing  in  action,  evidence  of 
debt  or  contract,  or  article  of  value  of  any 
kind;  or  (2),  having  in  his  possession,  cus- 
tody, or  control,  as  a  bailee,  servant,  attor- 
ney, agent,  clerk,  trustee,  or  oflacer  or  any 
person,  association,  or  corporation  or  public 
officer,  or  as  a  person  authorized  by  agree- 
ment, or  by  competent  authority,  to  hold  or 
take  such  possession,  custody,  or  control,  any 
money,  property,  evidence  of  debt  or  con- 
tract, article  of  value  of  any  nature  or  thing 
in  action  or  possession,  appropriates  the  same 
to  his  own  use,  or  that  of  any  other  person 
other  than  the  true  owner  or  person  entitied 
to  the  benefit  thereof,  steals  such  propeiity 


LARcxarr 


15 


LARCENY 


and  is  guilty  of  larceny."  People  ex  rel. 
Perkins  t.  Moss,  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  427-429,  50 
Misc.  Rep.  198  (dttng  Pen.  Code,  i  52$). 

Pen.  Code,  |  528,  makes  It  "larceny"  for 
a  servant  to  appropriate  to  his  own  use  any 
money  which  he  has  in  his  possession  as  snch 
servant,  with  intent  to  deprive  the  true  own- 
er of  his  property  or  the  use  thereof.  Sec- 
tion 548  provides  that  it  is  a  sufficient  de- 
fense that  the  property  was  appropriated 
openly  under  a  claim  of  title  preferred  in 
good  faith,  but  that  the  section  shall  not  ex- 
cuse the  retention  of  the  property  of  another 
to  pay  demands  held  against  him.  An  em- 
ploy6  collected  over  $900  for  his  employer, 
and  deducted  therefrom  over  $400,  which  he 
claimed  was  for  arrears  of  salary  and  ex- 
penses and  a  certain  other  item,  and  sent  his 
check  to  the  employer  for  the  balance,  with 
a  statement  showing  how  it  was  arrived  at 
Held,  that  where  the  employer  owed  less  than 
$100,  and  the  claim  of  the  employ^  was  made 
with  Intent  to  avoid  payment  of  certain 
sums  due,  the  employ^  was  guilty  of  larceny 
under  the  Code,  for  the  appropriation  was 
not  under  a  claim  of  title,  but  under  a  claim 
of  indebtedness,  and  was  not  made  in  good 
faith.  J.  W.  Matthews  ft  Co.  v.  Employers' 
Liability  Assur.  Corp.,  Ill  N.  Y.  Supp.  76,  77, 
127  App.  Wv.  195. 

Penal  Code,  |  528,  declares  that  a  person 
who,  "with  intent  to  deprive  or  defraud  the 
true  owner  of  his  property,"  etc.,  appropri- 
ates the  same  to  his  own  use  or  benefit,  or 
that  of  any  other  person  other  than  the  true 
owner,  is  guilty  of  larceny,  and  section  548 
declares  that  on  an  indictment  for  larceny 
it  shall  be  a  defense  that  the  property  was 
appropriated  openly  xakder  a  claim  of  title 
made  in  good  faith,  even  though  such  claim 
is  untenable.  The  president  of  a  life  insur- 
ance company,  having  promised  to  contribute 
np  to  $50,000  to  a  political  campaign,  request- 
ed relator,  a  vice  president,  to  make  the  pay- 
ment personally,  as  that  would  make  it  easier 
to  refuse  the  other  demands,  and  that  the 
president  would  see  that  the  matter  was 
taken  care  of  later.  Relator  made  the  pay- 
ment, after  which  the  president  brought  the 
matter  to  the  attention  of  the  finance  com- 
mittee of  the  insurance  company,  and,  it 
being  of  the  opinion  that  relator  diould  be  re- 
imbursed from  the  company's  funds,  the 
president,  under  his  authority  to  pay  out  the 
company's  money  on  executive  order,  caused 
such  r^mbursement  to  be  made  without  fur- 
ther action  on  the  part  of  the  finance  com- 
mittee or  trustees  of  the  company.  In  pro- 
ceedings for  relator's  arrest  for  the  larceny 
of  such  fund,  the  proof  showed  that  relator 
derived  no  personal  advantage  from  the  mon- 
ey, and  that  it  was  paid  by  him  in  the  honest 
belief  ^t  he  was  benefiting  the  insurance 
company.  Held,  that  the  facts  did  not  estab- 
lish prima  fade  the  commission  of  larceny; 
there  being  no  evidenoe  of  an  attempt  to  de- 


fraud. People  ex  rel.  Perkins  v.  Moss,  80 
N.  E.  383,  387,  187  N.  Y.  410,  11  L.  R.  A 
(N.  S.)  528,  10  Ann.  Gas.  309. 

Under  the  statutes  of  Oklahoma  a  person 
who  takes  personal  property  unlawfully,  felo- 
niously, and  with  Intent  to  deprive  another 
thereof,  is  guilty  of  larceny;  and  it  is  imma- 
terial whether  the  property  is  taken  from  the 
owner  or  another.  State  v.  Clark,  128  Pac. 
161,  103,  8  OkL  Cr.  432. 

"Larceny"  is  defined  by  Snyder's  St  | 
2591,  as  the  taking  of  personal  property  ac- 
complished by  fraud  or  stealth  and  with  in- 
tent to  derive  another  thereof.  Section 
2606  punishes  any  person  who  shall  steal 
any  stallion,  mare,  etc.,  creates  a  separate 
and  distinct  offense,  and  to  support  a  con- 
viction under  it  the  state  must  prove  a  felo- 
nious Intent  on  the  part  of  accused  to  deprive 
the  owner  thereof,  and  to  convert  the  same 
to  his  own  use^  which  specific  proof  is  not 
necessary  to  support  a  conviction  under  the 
general  larceny  statute.  Crowell  v.  State, 
117  Pac.  883,  884,  6  Okl.  Cr.  148. 

Pen.  Code,  f  528,  defines  "larceny"  as 
follows:  "A  person  who,  with  the  intent  to 
deprive  or  defraud  the  true  owner  of  his 
property,  or  of  the  use  and  benefit  thereof,  or 
to  appropriate  the  same  to  the  use  of  the 
taker,  or  of  any  other  person,  •  •  ♦  hav- 
ing in  his  possession,  custody  or  control,  as  a 
bailee,  servant,  attorney,  agent,  clerk,  trus- 
tee or  ofilcer  of  any  person,  assodation  or 
corporation,  ♦  •  ♦  any  money,  property, 
evidence  of  debt  or  contract,  article  of  value 
of  any  nature  or  thing  in  action  or  posses- 
sion, appropriates  the  same  to  his  own  use, 
or  that  of  any  other  person  other  than  the 
true  owner  or  person  entitled  to  the  benefit 
thereot  steals  such  property  is  guilty  of 
•larceny.'"  People  ▼.  Bumham,  104  N.  Y. 
Supp.  725,  727,  119  App.  Dlv.  302. 

Section  880  et  seq.  of  the  Penal  Code 
contains  the  definition  of  "larceny,"  which  is, 
in  substance,  that  every  person  who,  with 
the  Intent  to  deprive  or  defraud  the  true 
owner  of  his  property,  or  of  the  use  and  ben- 
efit thereof,  or  to  appropriate  the  same  to 
the  use  of  the  taker,  or  of  any  other  person, 
takes  property  from  the'  possession  of  an- 
other, or,  having  in  his  possession  property  of 
another,  appropriates  the  same  to  his  own 
use,  or  that  of  any  other  person  other  than 
the  one  entitled  to  it,  is  guilty  of  "larceny." 
When  the  property  taken  is  of  a  value  ex- 
ceeding $50,  or  when  it  is  taken  from  the 
person  of  another,  it  is  termed  grand  lar- 
ceny; otherwise,  petit  larceny.  Under  this 
section  what  at  common  law  constituted  the 
offenses  of  larceny  and  embezzlement  are 
merged  in  the  one  offense  of  larceny,  and 
thereby  the  distinction  formerly  recognized 
between  cases  where  the  taking  was  unlaw- 
ful and  those  where  the  possession  had  been 
lawfully  obtained  is  abolished.  Property 
must  have  an  owner  before  it  is  the  subject 


liABCENY 


id 


LARCENY 


of  larceny,  but  this  statute  does  not  define 
the  character  of  that  ownership — whether  it 
is  general  or  special,  joint  or  several,  abso- 
lute or  qualified,  arises  from  title  or  from 
possession.  The  particular  ownership  of  the 
property  stolen  does  not  fall  within  the  defi- 
nition, and  is  not  of  the  essence  of  the  crime. 
Neither  the  legal  nor  moral  quality  of  the  act 
is  affected  by  the  fact  that  the  property  stol- 
en, instead  of  being  owned  by  one,  or  by  two 
or  more  jointly,  is  the  several  property  of 
different  owners.  The  gist  of  the  (MDFense  is 
the  felonious  taking  or  appropriation.  The 
grade  of  the  offense  is  determined  by  the 
value  of  the  property  taken.  State  v.  Mjelde, 
7^  Pac.  87,  29  Mont.  490. 

Where  a  territorial  statute  defined  lar- 
ceny as  a  taking  with  a  felonious  intent  to 
deprive  the  owner  of  the  property  taken,  and 
with  intent  to  appropria^  the  same  to  the 
use  and  benefit  of  the  taker,  an  instruction 
authorizing  a  conviction  if  the  property  was 
taken  by  defendant  with  the  felonious  intent 
to  deprive  the  owner  thereof  was  erroneous. 
Miller  v.  Territory  of  Oklahoma,  149  Fed. 
330,  339,  79  O.  O.  A.  268,  9  Ann.  Gas.  389. 

An  indictment  alleging  that  accused,  do- 
ing business  as  the  L.  Company,  misrepre- 
sented to  a  certain  person  the  resources  of 
such  company,  and  induced  such  person,  re- 
lying on  the  misrepresentations,  to  subscribe 
and  pay  for  stock  in  an  Arkansas  corpora- 
tion, thereby  fraudulently  obtaining  of  such 
person  a  certain  amount  of  money,  without 
showing  that  accused  or  the  L.  Company 
were  in  any  manner  connected  with  the  Ar- 
kansas corporation,  and  without  alleging  that 
the  L.  Company  was  the  Arkansas  corpora- 
tion, nor  that  accused  owned  any  stock  in  the 
Arkansas  corporation,  nor  was  an  ofiAcer  or 
agent  thereof,  or  authorized  to  represent  it  in 
the  sale  of  its  stock,  did  not  charge  an  of- 
fense under  Kirby's  Dig.  §  1689,  making  one 
guilty  of  "larceny"  who  with  intent  to  de- 
fraud or  cheat  another  shall  designedly,  by 
color  of  any  false  token  or  writing,  etc.,  ob- 
tain from  any  person  any  money.  State  v. 
luester,  126  S.  W.  846,  847,  94  Ark.  242. 

Rev.  St  1899,  §  1903,  enacted  in  1835, 
provides  that  if  a  person  alter  the  marks  of 
any  animal  the  subject  of  larceny,  being  the 
property  of  another,  with  intent  to  steal  or 
convert  it  to  his  own  use,  he  shall  be  guilty 
of  larceny,  and  punished  in  the  same  manner 
as  if  he  had  feloniously  stolen  such  animal. 
Prior  to  the  revision  of  1879,  grand  larceny 
was  the  felonious  stealing,  taking,  and  carry- 
ing away  of  goods  worth  $10  or  more  or  any 
horse,  sheep,  hog,  etc.,  belonging  to  another 
and  by  the  revision  the  act  was  amended  by 
striking  out  the  words  "sheep"  and  "hog," 
and  by  increasing  the  value  of  the  stolen 
property  to  $30.  Held,  that  section  1903  does 
not  limit  the  offense  to  the  felonious  mark- 
ing of  any  animal  the  subject  of  grand  lar- 
ceny, but  merely  the  subject  of  larceny, 
which  includes  petit  larceny,  and  the  fact' 


that  the  amendment  of  the  statute  excluded 
hogs  and  sheep  from  the  list  of  animals,  the 
stealing  of  which  constituted  grand  larceny, 
per  se,  did  not  operate  to  exclude  such  ani- 
mals under  the  value  of  $30  from  the  opera- 
tion of  section  1903.  State  r.  Zehnder,  128 
S.  W.  960,  962,  228  Mo.  310. 

An  employ^  of  a  railroad  company  was 
required  to  make  an  independent  check  of 
the  men  employed  by  a  construction  company, 
which  relied  on  the  reports  made  by  the  em- 
ploy^  in  paying  the  men.  The  employe  and 
the  timekeeper  of  the  construction  company 
reported  that  a  third  person  was  entitled  to 
receive  compensation  for  work  done,  and  they 
procured  the  presentation  to  the  coi^struction 
company  of  a  check  therefor,  which  it  paid. 
They  received  the  proceeds.  The  report  was 
false.  Held,  that  the  employ^  was  guilty  of 
larceny  under  Pen.  Code,  |  528,  punishing  one 
who,  with  intent  to  defraud,  obtains  from 
another  by  aid  of  fraudulent  representations 
any  money,  etc  People  v.  Eaton,  107  N.  Y. 
Supp.  849,  853,  122  App.  Div.  706. 

Animiui  fuimndi 

Intent  is  a  necessary  element  of  "lar- 
ceny." Sutherland  v.  St  Lawrence  County, 
91  N.  Y.  Supp.  962,  966,  101  App.  Div.  299. 

To  constitute  "larceny"  the  taking  must 
be  done  with  a  felonious  intent  Bailey  v. 
State,  122  S.  W.  497,  498,  92  Ark.  216. 

Criminal  intent  is  the  principal  element 
of  "larceny,"  whether  of  grand  larceny  which 
is  a  felony,  or  petit  larceny  which  is  a  mis- 
demeanor. State  v.  Claybaugh,  122  S.  W. 
319,  321,  138  Mo.  App.  360. 

It  is  insuflElcient  to  constitute  "larceny" 
that  the  taking  was  without  color  of  right  or 
authority,  but  it  must  have  beon  with  a  fe- 
lonious intei.t  State  v.  Peterson,  92  Pac. 
802,  303,  36  Mont  109. 

Where  one  has  taken  and  converted  ani- 
mals to  his  own  use,  if  at  the  time  of  the 
taking  there  was  a  felonious  intent  to  de- 
prive the  true  owner  of  the  permanent  use 
and  benefit  of  his  property,  he  is  guilty  of 
larceny.  Blackshare  v.  State,  128  S.  W.  549, 
552,  94  Ark.  548,  140  Am.  St  Rep.  144. 

It  is  essential  to  a  conviction  of  'lar- 
ceny" that  the  property  be  taken  "animo  fu- 
randi,"  and  where  it  clearly  appears  that  the 
taking  was  perfectly  consistent  with  honest 
conduct,  although  the  party  charged  with  the 
crime  may  have  been  mistaken  he  cannot  be 
convicted  of  "larceny."  Bird  v.  State,  37 
South.  525,  527,  48  Ela.  3. 

"Larceny"  is  the  felonious  taking  and 
carrying  away  of  the  personal  property  of 
another,  with  intent  to  convert  it  to  the  tak- 
er's use  and  deprive  the  o\\Tier  of  Its  use 
without  his  consent  Felonious  intent  is  a 
material  element  of  the  crime  of  larceny. 
State  V.  Dredden  (Del.)  73  AtL  1042,  1043,  6 
Pennewill,  446. 


LARCENY 


17 


LARCENY 


Under  Pen.  Code,  f  528,  making  guilty  of 
larceny  one  who  takes  property  with  intent 
to  deprive  the  owner  of  the  same,  or  of  the 
use  and  benefit  thereof,  a  taking  of  property 
without  an  intent  to  so  permanently  appro- 
priate the  same  as  to  deprive  the  owner  of 
the  property  itself,  or  its  use  and  benefit,  is 
not  'larceny."  There  must  be  something 
more  than  an  intention  to  retain  possession 
of  property,  without  an  intent  to  actually  ap- 
propriate it  People  V.  Kenny,  119  N.  Y. 
Supp.  854,  855.  135  App.  Div.  380. 

'•Larceny"  is  the  wrongful  and  fraudu- 
lent taking  or  carrying  away  of  the  personal 
goods  of  another  with  felonious  intent  to 
convert  them  to  the  taker's  own  use  and 
make  them  his  property  without  consent  of 
the  owner;  but  the  felonious  intent  is  not 
necessarily  an  intent  to  gain  an  advantage 
for  the  taker,  it  being  sufficient  that  there 
be  an  intention  to  deprive  the  owner  of  his 
property;  and,  even  in  those  jurisdictions 
where  a  lucri  causa  is  required,  it  is  not  nec- 
essary that  the  benefit  to  the  defendant  be 
of  a  pecuniary  nature.  Canton  Nat  Bank 
V-  American  Bonding  &  Trust  Co.,  73  Atl. 
684.  685,  111  Md.  41,  18  Ann.  Gas.  820. 

"•Larceny*  is  the  unlawful  taking  and 
carrying  away  the  goods  or  property  of  an- 
other, secretly  or  furtively  with  the  feloni- 
ous Intent  to  appropriate  them  to  the  use  of 
the  trespasser.  •  *  *  From  the  foregoing 
authority  we  deduce  the  rule  that,  under  the 
English  common  law,  and  consequently  un- 
der our  statute,  which  is  merely  declaratory 
thereof,  one  cannot  commit  the  crime  of  'lar- 
ceny' or  robbery  without  a  felonious  intent, 
or,  in  other  words,  he  cannot  commit  them 
by  inadvertence  or  through  ignorance." 
Where  accused  took  from  the  possession  of 
the  court's  receiver  certain  cattle  belonging 
to  him  and  taken  from  him  under  process  In 
an  action  against  him,  he  was  not  guilty  of 
robbery  or  "larceny,"  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence of  felonious  intent  Triplett  v.  Com., 
01  S.  W.  281,  282,  283,  122  Ky.  35. 

Both  at  common  law  and  under  Pen. 
Code,  f  880,  and  section  883  as  amended  by 
Sess.  Laws  1897,  p.  247,  defining  larceny  as 
a  taking  "with  intent  to  deprive  or  defraud" 
the  true  owner,  an  indictment  charging  that 
defendant  "feloniously  and  with  the  intent 
then  and  there  to  steal,"  etc,  sufficiently 
charges  a  felonious  intent,  the  phrase  fol- 
lowing the  word  "feloniously"  taking  noth- 
ing from  the  effect  thereof.  State  v.  Allen, 
87  Pac.  177,  178,  34  Mont  408  (citing  Whar- 
ton's  Precedents,  415;  State  v.  Rechnltz,  52 
Pac.  264,  20  Mont  488). 

In  an  action  for  slander  by  a  daughter 
against  her  father,  where  it  was  doubtful 
whether  the  father  meant  to  charge  his 
daughter  with  the  crime  of  larceny,  the  court 
should  have  charged  that  the  crime  of  lar- 
ceny is  committed  where  one  person  takes 
the  property  of  another  with  Intent  to  con- 
Tert  it  to  his  own  use  or  that  of  another, 

8  WDS.&  PJ2d  Skb.— 2 


and  that  the  crime  is  not  committed  where 
the  taking  is  done  by  a  person  innocently 
and  without  any  evil  intent,  and  that  unless 
the  words  were  intended  to  charge  the  plain- 
tiff with  the  crime  of  larceny,  and  would 
be  naturally  so  understood  by  the  person 
hearing  them,  they  should  find  for  defend- 
ant Beams  v.  Beams,  129  S.  W.  298,  299, 
138  Ky.  818. 

Same— At  time  of  takijis 

"Larceny"  at  common-law  was  the  fe- 
lonious taking  of  the  property  of  another 
against  his  will,  with  the  Intent  to  convert 
It  to  the  use  of  the  taker,  or,  as  some  au- 
thorities hold,  the  use  of  the  taker  or  a 
third  person.  In  "larceny"  the  felonious  in 
tent  must  have  existed  at  the  time  of  the 
taking  of  the  property.  Williams  v.  United 
SUtes  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Ck).,  66  AtL  495, 
496^  105  Ind.  490. 

"Larceny"  consists  of  an  intent  to  tres- 
pass on  the  personal  property  of  another, 
coupled  with  an  Intent  wholly  to  deprive  the 
owner  thereof,  and  the  crime  is  not  commit- 
ted unless  such  intents  concurrently  and 
contemporaneously  exist.  State  v.  Teller,  78 
Pac.  980,  45  Or.  671  (citing  1  Blsh.  Crlm.  Law 
[7th  Ed.]  f§  207,  342;  Rapalje,  Larceny,  §  20; 
Stote  V.  Hull.  54  Pac.  159,  33  Or.  56,  72  Am. 
St  Rep.  6W ;  State  v.  Meldrum,  70  Pac.  526, 
41  Or.  380;    Johnson  v.  People,  113  UL  99). 

A  felonious  intent  at  the  time  of  the 
taking  is  essential  to  "larceny."  To  make 
the  finder  of  a  check  guilty  of  larceny,  he 
must  have  had  an  intent  or  fraudulent  pur- 
pose to  convert  it  to  his  own  use  at  the  time 
he  took  possession  thereof,  and  that  he  knew 
or  had  reasonable  means  of  knowing  the 
owner  is  evidence  of  such  intent,  if  he  after- 
wards converts  it  to  his  own  use.  State  ▼. 
Jlinton,  109  Pac.  24,  27,  66  Or.  428. 

In  every  "larceny"  there  must  be  a  tres- 
pass in  the  original  taking  of  the  property; 
that  is.  In  larceny  the  felonious  intent  must 
have  existed  at  the  time  of  the  taking.  State 
V.  Casey,  105  S.  W.  645,  647,  207  Mo.  1,  123 
Am.  St.  Rep.  367.  13  Ann.  Cas.  878  (citing 
State  V.  Shermer,  55  Mo.  83;  State  v.  Ware, 
62  Mo.  loc.  clt  602). 

Defendant  took  a  bull  from  the  range, 
believing  it  to  be  his  own,  and  later,  ascer- 
taining that  It  belonged  to  another,  convert- 
ed it.  There  was  no  willful  trespass  in  the 
taking.  Held,  that  it  was  not  "larc^iy,"  as 
the  felonious  intent  at  the  time  of  taking  was 
absent,  and,  there  being  no  trespass,  the 
doctrine  that  a  person,^  taking  property  by 
trespass,  who  subsequently  wrongfully  con- 
verts it,  is  guilty  of  larceny,  had  no  applica- 
tion here.  WUson  v.  State,  181  S.  W.  386,  96 
Ark.  148,  41  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  649,  Ann.  Cas. 
1912B,  339. 

The  crime  of  'larceny,"  under  the  stat- 
ute defining  "larceny**  as  the  taking  of  per- 
sonal property  accomplished  by  fraud  or 
stealth,  with  intent  to  deprive  another  there- 


LABCENY 


18 


LARCENY 


of,  may  be  shown  by  proof  that  at  the  time 
of  the  taking  of  the  property  it  was  taken 
with  the  felonious  intent  to  convert  it  to 
the  taker's  own  use,  and  to  deprive  the  own- 
er thereof,  regardless  of  the  fact  as  to  wheth- 
er the  taking  was  accomplished  by  fraud  or 
stealth.  To  constitute  larceny  the  criminal 
Intent  must  exist  at  the  time  of  the  taking, 
and  the  taking  may  be  by  stealth  with  such 
criminal  intent,  or  the  taking  may  be  with 
the  owner's  knowledge  through  fraudulent 
practice.  Flohr  v.  Territory,  78  Pac  565, 
570,  14  Okl.  477. 

Asportation 

Any  felonious  taking  or  asportation  of 
personal  property  may  be  "larceny";  there- 
fore the  omission  of  the  word  "away"  from 
a  charge  as  to  "the  felonious  taking  and  car- 
rying of  the  personal  property  of  another"  Is 
not  per  se  error.  Presley  v.  State,  67  South. 
605,  607,  63  Fla.  37. 

In  a  trial  under  an  indictment  charging 
defendant  with  larceny  of  a  suit  case  and  its 
contents  from  a  railroad  depot  the  court,  aft- 
er defining  larceny  as  the  felonious  stealing, 
taking  and  carrying  away  of  the  personal 
property  of  another,  charged  that  if  defend- 
ant actually  took  into  his  hands  the  prop- 
erty named  in  the  indictment  and  lifted  it 
from  the  place  where  the  owner  had  put  It, 
so  as  to  entirely  remove  it  from  the  place 
where  it  was  put  defendant  was  guilty  of  lar- 
ceny, and  that  if  the  jury  did  not  find  that 
defendant  took  the  property  from  the  depot, 
but  did  find  that  he  took  and  carried  it  away 
from  a  place  outside  of  any  building,  the  ver- 
dict should  be  guilty  of  larceny,  fixing  there- 
in the  value  of  the  property  stolen.  Held 
that,  in  the  absence  of  a  request  by  defend- 
ant for  instructions,  the  Instructions  were  as 
specific  as  the  case  demanded.  State  v.  Mc- 
Dermet,  115  N.  W.  884,  885,  138  Iowa,  86. 

Asportation  to  now  jnrisdiotion  as  new 
offense 

Where  defendant  induced  R.,  who  had 
previously  been  employed  by  a  dray  company 
authorized  to  receive  goods  for  a  consignee 
of  certain  shoes,  and  who  was  known  to  the 
servants  of  the  carrier  holding  such  goods 
for  delivery,  to  go  to  the  freight  depot  of 
the  carrier  in  Illinois  after  his  employment 
by  the  dray  company  had  terminated,  and 
procure  a  load  of  shoes  from  the  carrier,  and 
R.  obtained  such  shoes,  and  delivered  them 
to  a  person  other  than  the  consignee  in  Mis- 
souri, such  act  constituted  "larceny,"  and 
not  "false  pretenses,"  and  was  therefore  pun- 
ishable under  Rev.  St  1899,  §  2362,  providing 
that  every  person  who  shall  steal  the  prop- 
erty of  another  in  any  other  state  and  shall 
bring  the  same  into  Missouri  may  be  convict- 
ed and  punished  for  larceny  as  though  the 
property  was  stolen  in  Missouri.  State  v. 
Mlntz,  88  S.  W.  12,  16,  189  Mo.  268. 

Under  section  285,  Grimes  Act  (Gen.  St 
1901,  §  2286),  providing  that  every  person 


who  shall  steal  or  obtain  by  robbery  the 
property  of  another  in  any  other  state,  terri- 
tory, or  country,  and  shall  bring  the  same 
into  this  state,  may  be  convicted  and  pun- 
ished for  larceny  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
such  property  had  been  feloniously  stolen  or 
taken  within  this  state,  and  section  83, 
Crimes  Act  (Gen.  St  1901,  §  2076),  making 
the  alteration  of  brands  with  intent  to  steal 
or  convert  the  branded  animal  "larceny,"  one 
who  in  another  state  marks  or  brands,  or  al- 
ters the  mark  or  brand  of,  any  animal,  the 
subject  of  larceny  and  the  property  of  an- 
other, with  intent  to  steal  it  or  convert  it  to 
his  own  use,  so  that  if  the  marking,  brand- 
ing, or  alteration  were  done  in  this  state  he 
would  be  guilty  of  the  larceny  as  defined  by 
section  83,  may  be  convicted  and  punished 
for  larceny  under  section  285,  whether  or 
not  the  original  taking  may  have  been  a 
crime  against  the  laws  of  the  state  or  coun- 
try where  it  was  committed.  State  v.  White, 
92  Pac.  829,  831,  76  Kan.  654,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  556. 

Oonfldeneo  same  distingnisliod 

See  Confidence  Game. 

Consent  of  owner 

As  used  in  Cr.  Code,  |  114,  making  it 
criminal  to  steal  money  or  other  property, 
the  word  "steal"  includes  all  the  elements  of 
larceny  at  common  law.  If  the  original  tak- 
ing of  the  property  is  with  the  consent  of 
the  owner,  the  crime  of  "larceny"  is  not  com- 
Oiitted.  Cohoe  v.  State,  113  N.  W.  532,  533, 
79  Neb.  811. 

Where  the  owner  of  personalty  volun- 
tarily parts  with  its  possession  for  a  particu- 
lar purpose,  and  the  person  receiving  posses- 
sion for  that  purpose  has  at  the  time  a  fraud- 
ulent intent  to  make  use  of  such  possession 
as  a  means  of  converting  the  property  to  his 
own  use,  the  crime  is  larceny.  Bivens  v. 
State,  120  Pac.  1033,  1036,  6  Okl.  Cr.  521. 

Where  one  by  fraud,  trick,  or  false  pre- 
tense induced  the  owner  to  part  merely  with 
the  possession  of  his  property,  there  being 
no  Intent  to  pass  title,  and  the  party  receiv- 
ing takes  It  with  Intent  fraudulent  to  con- 
vert it  to  his  own  use,  the  crime  is  "larceny." 
State  V.  Loser,  104  N.  W.  337,  340,  132  Iowa, 
419  (citing  State  v.  Edwards,  41  S.  B.  429, 
51  W.  Va.  220,  59  L.  R.  A.  465;  State  v.  Hall, 
40  N.  W.  107,  76  Iowa,  85,  14  Am.  St  Rep. 
204;  People  v.  Morse.  2  N.  E.  45,  99  N.  Y. 
662;  State  v.  Anderson,  47  Iowa,  142;  Peo- 
ple V.  Rae,  6  Pac.  1,  66  Cal.  423,  56  Am. 
Rep.  102;  Loomls  v.  People,  67  N.  Y.  329,  23 
Am.  Rep.  123;   1  Whart  Cr.  Law,  f  1179). 

Where  it  appeared  that  the  whole 
scheme  by  which  a  person  obtained  money 
was  a  fraud  from  the  beginning  and  that  pos- 
session obtained  by  mere  trickery  with  a 
present  Intent  to  convert  it  to  his  own  use 
that  he  had  no  rightful  possession,  and  that 
delivery  was  made  to  him  without  any  in- 
tent to  pass  the  title,  but  merely  to  enable 


IjARCEKT 


19 


IjARGENT 


Mm  to  make  a  apecific  use  of  the  money,  his 
appropriatioii  of  It  constituted  "larceny"  at 
common  law.  Commonwealth  ▼.  King,  88 
N.  E.  454,  400,  202  Mass.  879  (citing  Common- 
wealth  ▼.  Flynn,  45  N.  B.  924,  167  Mass. 
460,  57  Am.  St  Rep.  472;  Commonwealth 
T.  Rubin,  43  N.  B.  200,  165  Mass.  453 ;  Com- 
monwealth y.  Lannan,  26  N.  E.  858, 153  Mass. 
287.  289,  11  L.  R  A.  450,  25  Am.  St  Rep. 
629;  Commonwealth  t.  Barry,  124  Mass.  325). 

OojkwmrmUtm 

There  was  a  ''converaion,"  within  B.  & 
C.  Comp.  I  1807,  declaring  guilty  of  larceny 
one  who  receives  money  of  the  state  and  con- 
verts it,  where  money  being  deposited  in  a 
bank  by  the  State  Treasurer  for  safe-keep- 
ing was  paid  out  to  others  than  such  Treas- 
orer.  State  v.  Ross,  104  Pac  696,  599,  55 
Or.  450,  42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  601. 

CeaTertlns  or  el  aiming  property  fowmd 

Where  accused,  as  4gent  of  prosecutor, 
had  an  interest  in  certain  rent  collected  by 
him,  he  could  not  be  convicted  of  larceny 
by  embezzlement  of  such  rent,  under  Hurd's 
Rev.  St  1909,  c.  88,  f  76,  providing  that,  if 
an  agent  fraudulently  embezzles  or  oonverts 
property  In  his  hands  belonging  to  his  em- 
ployer, he  shall  be  guilty  of  larceny.  People 
y.  O'Farrell,  93  N.  E.  136,  189,  247  IlL  44. 

On  an  information  drawn  under  Comp. 
lisws  1909,  §  2591,  defining  larceny  generally, 
a  conviction  may  be  had  under  section  2592 
on  proof  that  accused  found  lodt  property 
with  means  of  inquiry  as  to  the  owner,  and 
appropriated  the  same  to  his  own  use  with- 
out a  reasonable  effort  to  discover  the  own- 
er; the  latter  section  only  prescribing  a  rule 
of  evidence.  Berry  v.  State,  111  Pac.  676, 677, 
4  Okl.  Cr.  202,  31  L.  E,  A.  (N.  S.)  840. 

When  a  delivery  of  goods  is  made  for 
a  specific  purpose,  the  possession  is  still  sup- 
posed to  reside  in  the  first  proprietor,  and, 
where  any  person  has  the  bare  charge  of 
another's  effects,  legal  possession  remains  In 
the  owner,  and  therefore,  where  the  finder 
of  the  purse  told  defendant's  wife  thereof, 
and  she  stated  that  the  purse  looked  like  her 
husband's  and  took  the  same  telling  the  find- 
er that,  if  it  did  not  belong  to  her  husband, 
she  would  return  it,  and  afterwards  posses- 
sion was  given  to  him  on  his  claim  of  owner- 
ship, when  in  fact  it  belonged  to  another, 
the  legal  possession  remained  in  the  finder, 
and  defendant's  claim  thereto  constituted  lar- 
ceny. Williams  V.  State,  75  N.  B.  875,  877, 
165  Tnd.  472,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  248  (citing 
Smith  v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  Ill,  13  Am.  Repi 
474;   Bish.  New  Cr.  Law,  |  824). 

Difforeat  srades 

"Larceny"  is  divided  into  two  degrees, 
or  otherwise  varied  in  punishment,  by  the 
value  of  the  thing  stolen ;  and  an  Indictment 
must  allege  the  value  of  the  article  stolen, 
and  the  proof  of  value  wUl  be  adequate  if 
it  simply  shows  to  which  of  the  classes  merit- 
ing corresponding  punishment  the  offense  be- 


longs.   Woodring  y.  Toxitory,  78  Pac  86,  86, 
14  Okl.  250,  2  Ann.  Cas.  866. 

Under  Rev.  Pen.  Code,  f|  606,  607,  608, 
as  amended  by  Laws  1908,  p.  175,  c.  151, 
"larceny"  is  the  taking  of  personal  property 
accomplished  by  fraud  or  stealth  and  with 
intent  to  deprive  another  thereof.  Larceny 
is  divided  into  two  degrees,  the  first  of  which 
is  termed  "grand  larceny";  the  second,  *1;>etit 
larceny."  Grand  larceny  is  larceny  com- 
mitted in  either  of  the  following  cases:  (1) 
When  the  property  taken  Is  of  value  exceed- 
ing |20.  (2)  When  such  property,  although 
not  of  value  exceeding  ^,  is  taken  fi*om 
the  person  of  another.  (3)  When  such  prop- 
erty, although  not  of  value  exceeding  $20,  Is 
a  ball,  steer,  cow,  heifer,  or  calf,  or  is  a 
stallion,  mare,  gelding,  horse,  or  colt  Lar- 
ceny in  other  cases  is  petit  larceny.  Under 
Rev.  Pen.  Code,  t§  605,  607,  608,  as  amended 
by  Laws  1903,  p.  175,  c.  151,  making  it  grand 
larceny  to  take  property  exceeding  $20  in 
value,  or  when  the  property,  though  not  of 
value  exceeding  |Q0,  is  a  stallion,  mare,  geld- 
ing, horse,  or  colt  there  is  no  variance  be- 
tween an  information  alleging  larceny  of  a 
horse  and  proof  of  the  larceny  of  a  gelding, 
especially  in  view  of  Rev.  Code  Cr.  Proc.  | 
569,  providing  that  neither  a  departure  from 
the  form  or  mode  prescribed  as  to  any 
pleading  nor  error  therein  renders  it  invalid, 
unless  it  has  prejudiced  defendant,  and  sec- 
tion 229,  providing  that  an  indictment  is 
sufficient  if  the  act  charged  is  clearly  set 
out  in  ordinary  and  concise  language,  so  as 
to  enable  a  person  of  common  understanding 
to  know  what  is  intended.  State  v.  Matejous- 
ky,  116  N.  W.  96,  98,  22  S.  D.  SO. 

To  feloniously  take  from  the  person  of 
another  the  goods  of  that  other  and  carry 
the  same  away  has  always  been  a  crime, 
punishable  as  either  grand  or  petit  "larceny," 
80  that  the  Legislature  in  defining  and  mak- 
ing punishable  the  specific  act  of  felonious- 
ly taking  property  from  the  person  of  an- 
other did  not  create  a  new  offense,  but  rec- 
ognized such  act  as  a  degree  of  larceny  in 
which  the  grades  of  grand  and  petit  larceny 
are  included,  so  that  a  defendant  charged 
with  larceny  from  the  person  may  properly 
be  convicted  of  any  of  the  lesser  offenses 
proved.  SUte  v.  Clem,  94  Pac.  1079,  1080, 
49  ^ash.  273. 

Bement  of  InMrglarj 

See  Burglary. 

Under  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  2564,  making 
it  burglary  to  break  and  enter  any  building, 
etc.,  with  Intent  to  steal  therein,  the  word 
"steal"  involves  a  felonious  intent  on  the 
part  of  the  taker  to  deprive  the  owner  of 
property  and  to  convert  it  to  the  taker's  use; 
while  any  trespass  involving  the  taking  of 
personal  property  with  Intent  to  deprive  an- 
other thereof  is  "larceny,"  within  .<iectlon 
2557,  making 'it  burglary  to  enter  any  build- 
ing, etc,  with  intent  to  conunit  any  felony. 


liARCENT 


20 


LARGENT 


larceny,  or  malicious  mischief.     SalllTan  t. 
State,  123  Pac.  569,  570,  7  Okl.  Or.  307. 

Under  Rev.  St  1898,  |  4334,  as  amended 
by  Sees.  Laws  1905,  p.  16,  c  19,  making  it 
burglary  for  any  person  to  break  and  enter 
a  building  with  Intent  to  commit  a  ''larceny" 
or  any  other  felony,  an  Information,  charg- 
ing the  breaking  and  entering  a  building  at 
night  with  intent  to  steal  goods,  without 
stating  their  value,  sufficiently  charges  a 
burglary  in  the  first  degree,  as  "larceny" 
within  such  section  includes  both  a  mis- 
demeanor and  a  felony,  and  the  words  "or 
any  other  felony"  are  equivalent  to  "or  any 
felony  other  than  that  embraced  within  the 
larceny."  State  v.  Hows,  87  Paa  163,  31 
Utah,  168. 

Embeulement  distlnsaisl&ed 

••Larceny"  and  "embezzlement"  are  dis- 
tinguishable, in  that  in  larceny  possession  of 
the  property  may  be  obtained  by  fraud,  while 
it  cannot  be  so  obtained  in  embezzlement. 
People  V.  Grlder,  110  Pac  586,  588,  13  Gal. 
App.  703. 

The  distinction  between  "larceny"  and 
'•embezzlement"  is  one  fully  recognized  In 
the  criminal  law.  While  the  two  offenses 
have  much  in  common,  for  the  purpose  of 
prosecution  they  have  uniformly  been  regard- 
ed as  distinct  In  every  "larceny"  there 
must  be  a  trespass  in  the  original  taking  of 
the  property;  that  is,  in  larceny  the  felo- 
nious intent  must  have  existed  at  the  time  of 
taking.  Whereas  "embezzlement"  is  the 
fraudulent  and  felonious  appropriation  of 
another's  property  by  a  person  to  whom  it 
has  been  intrusted,  or  into  whose  hands  it 
has  lawfully  come.  State  v.  Casey,  105  S. 
W.  645,  647,  207  Mo.  1,  123  Am.  St  Rep. 
367,  13  Ann.  Cas.  878. 

The  crimes  of  "embezzlement"  and  "lar- 
ceny" are  so  different  in  their  character  that 
they  should  be  treated  in  an  indictment  as 
distinct  and  separate  offenses.  State  v.  Fln- 
negean,  103  N.  W.  155,  157,  127  Iowa,  286, 
4  Ann.  Cas.  628. 

The  term  "embezzle,"  as  used  in  the 
statute,  is  a  broader  term  than  "larceny," 
but  not  exclusive  of  it.  State  v.  Sullivan, 
21  South.  688,  689,  49  La.  Ann.  200,  62  Am. 
St  Rep.  644;  State  v.  Pellerln,  43  South. 
159, 161, 118  La.  547. 

To  constitute  "larceny"  as  distinguish- 
ed from  "embezzlement,"  there  must  be  a  tres- 
pass to  the  possession,  but  it  is  larceny  where 
one  gains  possession  of  another's  personal 
property  so  as  to  constitute  only  a  bare  cus- 
tody, or  procures  it  by  subterfuge;  the 
owner's  property  not  being  divested  in  such 
case ;  he  still  having  constructive  possession. 
Boswell  V.  State,  56  South.  21,  22,  1  Ala.  App. 
178. 

At  common  law,  possession  wfts  a  neces- 
sary element  of  "larceny,"  and  the  distinc- 
tion between  "larceny"  and  ''embezzlement" 
depends  on   the  nature  of   the  possession 


and  the  manner  of  obtaining  it,  and  it  would 
seem  that  a  mere  credit  is  not  the  subject 
of  "larceny"  at  common  law.  Higbee  v. 
State,  104  N.  W.  748.  749.  74  Neb.  331. 

"Embezzlement"  is  defined  as  the  fraud- 
ulent appropriation  of  property  by  a  person 
to  whom  such  property  has  been  intrusted 
or  into  whose  hands  it  has  lawfully  come. 
It  differs  from  "larceny"  in  the  fact  that  the 
original  taking  of  the  property  was  lawful 
or  with  the  consent  of  the  owner,  while  in 
"larceny"  the  felonious  intent  must  have  ex- 
isted at  the  time  of  the  taking.  United 
States  V.  Allen,  150  Fed.  152,  153  (citing 
Moore  V.  United  Stales,  16  Sup.  Ct  294,  295, 
160  U.  S.  268,  269,  40  L.  Ed.  422). 

"One  who  obtains  money  or  goods  by 
some  fraudulent  trick  or  artifice,  and  car- 
ries them  away,  Is  guilty  of  'larceny.* "  Thus 
where  one  marries  a  woman  in  pursuance  of 
a  scheme  to  procjc^  money  which  she  has 
on  deposit  in  bank,  and  later  procures  a 
check  for  the  money  on  representations  that 
he  will  use  the  money  in  making  an  invest- 
ment for  her,  he  is  guilty  of  "larceny"  and 
not  "embezzlement"  Hunt  v.  State,  79  S.  W. 
769,  771,  72  Ark.  241,  65  L.  R.  A.  71,  105  Am. 
St  Rep.  34,  2  Ann.  Gas.  33  (citing  Beasley 
V.  State,  38  N.  S.  35,  138  Ind.  552,  46  Am.  St 
Rep.  418). 

The  crime  of  "embezzlement"  differs  in 
its  essential  ingredients  from  the  crime  of 
"larceny"  in  this:  That  in  "larceny"  the  gra- 
vamen of  the  offense  is  the  unlawful  and  fe- 
lonious taking  of  personal  property  with  the 
intent  to  convert  and  steal  the  same,  while 
in  "embezzlement"  the  taking  is  lawful,  be- 
cause of  the  trust  reposed  in  the  agent  serv- 
ant, or  trustee  receiving  it  and  the  gist  of 
the  offense  consists  of  the  conversion  of  the 
property  so  received  with  a  felonious  and 
fraudulent  intent  of  converting  the  same  to 
the  use  of  the  agent,  servant,  or  trustee. 
State  ▼.  Culver,  97  N.  W.  1015,  1016,  5  Neb. 
(Unof.)  238. 

According  to  Pen.  Code,  i  528,  "larceny" 
Includes  every  act  which  was  larceny  at  com- 
mon law,  and  in  addition  such  acts  as  form- 
erly constituted  "false  pretenses"  and  ••em- 
bezzlement" At  common  law,  if  a  person 
honestly  and  in  good  faith  received  posses- 
sion of  personal  property  in  trust  and  there- 
after converted  the  same  to  his  own  use,  he 
was  guilty  of  "embezzlement"  If  he  ob- 
tained possession  of  the  property  by  fraud, 
the  owner  intending  nevertheless  to  part 
with  the  title  as  well  as  the  possession,  the 
offense  was  obtaining  property  under  ''false 
pretenses."  If  the  possession  was  wrong- 
fully or  fraudulently  obtained,  without  the 
owner's  consent,  and  without  color  of  title, 
and  with  a  felonious  intent  of  converting 
the  property  to  the  use  of  the  taker  or  an- 
other, the  offense  was  "larceny."  People  ex 
rel.  Perkins  v.  Moss,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  138,  144, 
145,  113  App.  Div.  329  (citing  People  v.  Mill- 


LABCENT 


21 


LARCENY 


«r,  62  N.  B.  418,  169  N.  Y.  800,  88  Am.  8t 
Bep.  546). 

'^Larceny"  was  a  crime  at  common  law 
and  consisted  of  a  trespass,  committed  in  ttie 
taking  of  tbe  personal  goods  and  chattels  of 
another  with  intent  to  convert  them  to  the 
taker's  nse,  without  the  consent  of  the  own- 
er. "Embezzlement"  cannot  be  committed 
unless  the  defendant  is  in  the  lawful  posses- 
sion of  the  property  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
version. As  trespass  is  an  injury  to  the 
possession  only,  it  logically  and  legally  fol- 
lows that  one  in  the  lawful  possession  of 
goods  cannot  commit  larceny  of  them,  for  it 
were  idle  and  absurd  to  talk  of  one  commit- 
ting an  Injury  to  his  own  possession.  "Em- 
bezzlement" consists  in  the  breach  of  some 
trust  relation  by  one  in  the  lawful  posses- 
sion of  the  personal  property  of  another  who 
fraudulently  converts  it  to  his  own  use.  In 
"larceny"  there  is  no  breach  of  any  confi- 
dential relation  as  in  embezzlement,  while 
in  the  latter  crime  there  is  no  trespass  as  in 
larceny.  State  v.  Browning,  82  Pac.  955,  956, 
47  Or.  470. 

"Larceny**  at  common  law  was  the  fe- 
lonious taking  of  the  property  of  another 
against  his  will  with  intent  to  convert  it  to 
the  use  of  the  taker,  or,  as  some  authorities 
hold,  the  use  of  the  taker  or  third  person. 
"Embezzlement"  consists  in  the  fraudulent 
Appropriation  to  one's  own  use  of  money  or 
goods  intrusted  t(^  him  by  another.  In  lar- 
-ceny  the  felonious  intent  must  have  existed 
At  the  time  of  taking,  whereas  in  embezzle- 
ment the  fraudulent  act  consists  in  the  ap- 
propriation of  the  property  to  the  use  of  the 
taker  or  third  party,  but  the  felonious  or 
fraudulent  intent  is  of  the  essence  of  the 
offense  in  each  case.  Where  an  insurance 
agent  was  entitled  under  his  contract  with 
the  company  to  a  credit  of  three  months  on 
his  monthly  balances  due  the  company,  the 
fact  that  at  the  end  of  the  three  months  he 
was  unable  to  pay,  or  simply  failed  to  pay, 
with  no  proof  of  a  fraudulent  disposition  of 
the  money,  would  not  have  established  em- 
bezzlement. The  mere  failure  to  pay  a  debt 
without  compulsion  even  by  one  having  the 
financial  ability  is  neither  larceny  nor  em- 
bezzlement. Williams  V.  United  States  Fi- 
deUty  ft  Guaranty  Co.,  66  Atl.  495,  496,  105 
Md.  490. 

The  distinction  between  larceny  by  fraud 
and  embezzlement  is  determined  as  to  the 
time  when  a  fraudulent  intent  to  convert 
arose,  and  in  larceny  the  criminal  intent 
must  exist  at  the  time  of  the  taking,  and  if 
the  taker  received  the  property  as  a  bailment 
with  intent  to  conform  to  the  owner's  wishes 
and  thereafter  fraudulently  appropriates  the 
property,  the  crime  is  embezzlement  under 
Snyder*8  Comp.  Laws  1909,  f I  2591  and  2609. 
Bivens  v.  State,  120  Pac.  1033,  1036,  6  Okl. 
-Or.  521. 

"Where  one  honestly  receives  the  pos- 
session of  goods  upon  trust,  and  after  re- 


ceiving them  fraudulently  converts  them  to 
hi8  own  use,  it  is  a  case  of  'embezzlement 
But  where  the  possession  has  been  obtained 
through  a  trick  or  device,  with  the  intent, 
at  the  time  the  party  receives  it,  to  conv^t 
the  same  to  his  own  use,  and  the  owner  of 
the  property  parts  with  the  possession  and 
not  with  the  title,  the  offense  is  •larceny.*" 
Where  a  person  gave  money  to  another  as  a 
stakeholder  on  a  bet,  such  delivery  having 
been  brought  about  by  fraud  and  artifice  of 
the  stakeholder,  who  intended  to  appropriate 
the  money  in  any  event,  and  who  did  so, 
the  offense  was  "larceny."  State  v.  Byan, 
82  Pac  703,  706,  47  Or.  338,  1  L.  B.  A  (N. 
S.)  862  (quoting  and  adopting  the  statement 
in  People  v.  Tomlinson,  36  Pac.  506,  507,  102 
Cal.  19,  28). 

Where  a  person  honestly  receives  the 
possession  of  goods,  chattels,  or  the  money  of 
another  on  any  trust,  express  or  implied, 
and  after  receiving  them  fraudulently  con- 
verts them  to  his  own  use,  he  may  be  guilty 
of  "embezzlement**  but  not  of  "larceny,"  ex- 
cept as  "embezziemait**  is  by  statute  made 
'larceny.**  State  ▼.  Buck,  84  S.  W.  951.  952, 
186  Mo.  15,  2  Ann.  Oas.  1007  (citing  Common- 
wealth V.  Barry,  124  Mass.  325). 

False  pretenses  dUtiacsiahed 

'Die  distinction  between  the  crime  of 
larceny  and  that  of  cheating  by  '^lae  pre- 
tenses" is  this:  *'If  the  false  pretenses  Induce 
the  owner  to  part  with  his  property  intend- 
ing to  transfer  both  title  and  possession, 
the  crime  is  cheating  by  'false  pretenses.*  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  one  by  fraud,  trick,  or 
false  pretense  Induces  the  owner  to  part 
merely  with  the  possession  of  his  property, 
there  being  no  intent  to  pass  the  title,  and 
the  party  who  reoelveB  It  took  it  with  intent 
fraudulently  to  convert  it  to  his  own  use, 
the  crime  is  'larceny.*  **  State  v.  Loser,  KM 
N.  W.  337,  339,  340,  132  Iowa,  419. 

Prosecutor  met  defendant  through  a 
newspaper  advertisement,  and  defendant  of- 
fered to  sell  him  a  half  interest  in  the  room- 
ing house  department  of  a  brokerage  com- 
pany for  $200,  and  represented  that  he  (de- 
fendant) needed  an  assistant,  and  that  the 
business  netted  profits  of  between  $200  and 
$300  a  month.  Prosecutor  desired  a  salary, 
but  thereafter  paid  defendant  $50  to  be  kept 
by  him  for  30  days;  defendant  agreeing 
to  return  the  same  to  prosecutor  at  the  ex- 
piration of  such  time  if  he  was  dissatisfied, 
which  defendant  failed  to  do.  Held  that 
since  the  ownership  of  the  money  so  depos- 
ited remained  In  prosecutor,  and  there  was 
no  intent  on  his  part  to  deliver  possession 
thereof  to  defendant,  except  temporarily,  the 
latter*s  offense,  if  any  con^mitted,  was  "lar- 
ceny,** and  not  obtaining  money  by  ''false 
pretenses.**  State  v.  Anderson,  84  S.  W.  940, 
949,  186  Mo.  25  (citing  State  v.  Vickery,  19 
Tex.  326;  2  Arch.  C?r.  PI.  372;  Loomis  v. 
People,  67  N.  Y.  322,  23  Am.  Bep.  123;  Peo- 
ple V.  Morse,  2  N.  £>.  45,  99  N.  Y.  662). 


LAROENT 


LARCENY 


"Larceny"  and  "false  pretenseB"  are  dis- 
tinguishable, in  that  in  larceny  the  owner 
does  not  intend  to  part  with  his  property 
to  accused,  though  he  may  intend  to  part 
with  possession ;  while  In  false  pretenses  he 
does  intend  to  part  with  his  title.  People  t. 
Grider,  UO  Pac.  586,  588,  13  Cal.  App.  703. 

The  distinction  between  "false  pretenses" 
and  "larceny"  is  that  in  the  former  the  own- 
er parts  with  the  possession  and  title  of 
property  by  reason  of  false  and  fraudulent 
representations  knowingly  and  designedly 
made,  while  in  the  latter  the  owner  of  the 
property  stolen  must  not  have  intended  to 
part  with  the  title  to  it.  People  v.  Proctor, 
82  Pac.  551,  552,  1  Cal.  App.  521. 

"Where,  by  means  of  fraud,  conspiracy, 
or  artifice,  possession  of  the  property  is  ob- 
tained with  felonious  intent,  and  the  title 
still  remains  in  the  owner,  'larceny'  is  es- 
tablished, while  the  crime  is  'false  pretenses* 
if  the  title,  as  well  as  possession,  is  absolute- 
ly parted  with."  People  v.  Delbos,  81  Pac. 
131,  132,  146  Cal.  734  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  People  v.  Rae.  6  Pac.  1,  66  Cal. 
425,  56  Am.  Rep.  102). 

Where  possession  of  personal  property 
is  obtained  from  the  owner  by  fraud,  trick, 
or  device,  and  the  owner  intends  to  part  with 
both  possession  and  the  title  when  he  sur- 
renders control  of  the  property,  the  offense 
is  obtaining  property  by  *'false  pretenses"; 
but  if  the  possession  is  fraudulently  secured, 
and  the  owner  does  not  intend  to  part  with 
the  title,  the  offense  is  "larceny."  Beckwlth 
V.  Galice  Mines  Co.,  93  Pac.  453,  455,  50  Or. 
542,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  723. 

"If  the  possession  has  been  obtained  by 
fraud,  trick,  or  device,  and  the  owner  of 
it  intends  to  part  with  his  titie  when  he 
gives  up  possession,  the  offense,  if  any,  is 
obtaining  money  by  'false  pretenses.'  But 
where  the  possession  has  been  obtained 
through  a  trick  or  device,  with  the  intent, 
at  the  time  the  party  receives  it,  to  convert 
the  same  to  his  own  use,  and  the  owner  of 
the  property  parts  with  the  possession  and 
not  with  the  title,  the  offense  is  *larceny.*" 
Where  a  person  gave  money  to  another  as 
a  stakeholder  on  a  bet,  such  delivery  having 
been  brought  about  by  fraud  and  artifice  of 
the  stakeholder,  who  intended  to  appropriate 
the  money  in  any  event,  and  who  did  so, 
the  offense  was  "larceny."  State  v.  Ryan, 
82  Pac.  703,  706,  47  Or.  338,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  862  (quoting  and  adopting  the  statement 
in  People  v.  TomUnson,  36  Pac.  506,  507,  102 
CaL  19,  23). 

If  the  owner  of  property  part  with  not 
only  the  possession  but  with  the  right  of  prop- 
erty also,  the  offense  of  the  party  obtaining 
the  property  will  not  be  larceny,  but  will 
be  that  of  obtaining  goods  by  "false  pre- 
tenses." Zink  V.  People,  77  N.  Y.  114,  128, 
33    Am.    Rep.    589    (adopting    definition   in 


Smith  V.  PeoiHe,  58  N.  Y.  Ill,  13  Am.  Rep. 
474). 

One  who  went  to  a  wholesale  cigar  store, 
and,  giving  an  assumed  name,  falsely  repr^ 
sented  that  be  had  come  to  get  cigars  for  a 
retail  dealer,  and  thereby  procured  the  cigars 
and  converted  them  to  his  own  use,  was 
guilty  of  "larceny,"  since  the  wholesaler  in- 
tended to  deliver  him  merely  the  possession 
of  the  goods  for  the  retailer,  and  not  to  sell 
them  to  him  personally,  and  was  not  guilty 
of  "obtaining  property  by  impersonating  an- 
other," within  the  meaning  of  Rev.  St  1899, 
f  1900.  State  v.  Kosky,  90  S.  W.  454,  457, 
191  Mo.  1. 

Where  defendant  induced  R.,  who  had 
previously  been  employed  by  a  dray  company 
authorized  to  receive  goods  for  a  consignee 
of  certain  shoes,  and  who  was  known  to  the 
servants  of  the  carrier  holding  such  goods 
for  delivery,  to  go  to  the  freight  depot  of 
the  carrier  in  Illinois  after  his  employment 
by  the  dray  company  had  terminated,  and 
procure  a  load  of  shoes  from  the  carrier,  and 
R.  obtained  such  shoes,  and  delivered  them 
to  a  person  other  than  the  consignee  in  Mis- 
souri, such  act  constituted  "larceny,"  and 
not  "false  pretenses,"  and  was  therefore  pun- 
ishable under  Rev.  St  1899,  i  2362,  provid- 
ing that  every  person  who  shall  steal  the 
property  of  another  In  any  other  state  and 
shall  bring  the  same  into  Missouri  may  be 
convicted  and  punished  for  larceny  as  though 
the  property  was  stolen  in  Missouri.  State 
V.  Mintz,  88  S.  W.  12,  16,  189  Mo.  268. 

According  to  Pen.  Code,  i  528,  "larceny" 
includes  every  act  which  was  larceny  at  com- 
mon law,  and  in  addition  such  acts  as 
formerly  constituted  "false  pretenses"  and 
"embezzlement"  At  common  law,  if  a  per- 
son honestiy  and  in  good  faith  received  pos- 
session of  personal  property  in  trust  and 
thereafter  converted  the  same  to  his  own 
use,  he  was  guilty  of  "embezzlement"  If 
he  obtained  possession  of  the  property  by 
fraud,  the  owner  intending  nevertheless  to 
part  with  the  title  as  well  as  the  possession, 
the  offense  was  obtaining  property  under 
"f^lse  pretenses."  If  the  possession  was 
wrongfully  or  fraudulently  obtained,  without 
the  owner's  consent  and  without  color  of 
title,  and  with  a  felonious  intent  of  convert- 
ing the  property  to  the  use  of  the  taker  or 
another,  the  offense  was  "larceny."  People 
ex  rel.  Perkins  v.  Moss,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  138, 
144,  145,  113  App.  Div.  329  (citing  People  v. 
Miller,  62  N.  E.  418,  169  N.  Y.  350,  88  Am. 
St  Rep.  546). 

Prosecutor  applied  to  defendant  for  a 
position,  who  introduced  him  to  A.  to  ar- 
range the  terms  of  his  employment  A.  re- 
quired prosecutor  to  deposit  $50  as  a  guar- 
anty of  his  honesty,  to  be  returned  on  ter- 
mination of  his  employment;  but  defendant 
on  the  next  day  told  prosecutor  that,  as  $400 
or    $500   would    pass    through    prosecutor's 


LARCENT 


23 


LARCENT 


hands  every  day,  be  must  deposit  $160  more, 
which  he  did.  Defendant  pretended  to  gire 
him  a  reiceipt  for  this  money,  which,  instead, 
was  a  bill  of  sale  for  a  one-half  interest  in 
the  rooming  house  business  conducted  by  the 
concern.  Prosecutor  worked  for  $16  per 
week  for  three  or  four  weeks,  during  which 
time  he  drew  $16.76,  and,  becoming  dissatis- 
fied, demanded  the  return  of  his  money, 
which  defendant  refused  to  pay  him,  and 
then  prosecutor  discovered  that  his  receipt 
therefor  was  a  bill  of  sale.  Held  that,  prose- 
cutor never  having  intended  to  part  with  the 
title  to  the  money  so  deposited,  defendant, 
having  acquired  the  same  by  fraud,  with  the 
felonious  intent  to  convert  it  to  his  own 
use,  was  guilty  of  "larceny,"  and  not  "false 
pretenses."  State  v.  Buck,  84  S.  W.  d61, 
962, 186  Mo.  16,  2  Ann.  Gas.  1007  (citing  Com- 
monwealth V.  Barry,  124  Mass.  326;  People 
V.  Morse,  2  N.  £.  46,  99  N.  X.  662;  People 
V.  Dunmar,  13  N.  E.  326,  106  N.  Y.  602;  Peo- 
ple V.  Miller,  62  N.  E.  418,  169  N.  Y.  339, 
88  Am.  St.  Rep.  646;  People  v.  Gottachalk, 
20  N.  Y.  Supp.  777,  66  Hun,  64). 

As  felony 

See  Felony. 
Foree  and  mrmm 

Though  an  indictment  charged  that  ac- 
cused **with  force  and  arms'*  stole  a  horse, 
those  words  should  have  been  omitted  from 
the  instructions,  for,  neither  force  nor  arms 
being  an  element  of  the  offense,  their  use  in 
the  indictment  was  unnecessary.  Walklate 
▼.  Commonwealth  (Ky.)  118  S.  W.  314,  316. 

Oambltitc  distlagmished 

The  obtaining  of  money  under  pretext 
of  betting  at  cards  and  the  best  hand  win- 
ning, but  where  in  fact  prosecuting  witness 
had  no  chance  to  win,  and  was  the  only 
player  who  actually  risked  anything,  is  with- 
in Comp.  Laws  1907,  |  4366,  defining  "lar- 
ceny" as  the  felonious  taking  of  the  prop- 
erty of  another,  and  such  a  game  cannot  be 
held  to  constitute  gambling  merely.  State  v. 
Donaldson,  99  Pac.  447,  449,  35  Utah,  96,  20 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1164,  136  Am.  St  Rep.  1041. 

As  Infamous  erlaio 

See  Infamous  Crime. 

As  misdemeanor 

See  Misdemeanor. 

Ps^porty  of  another 

To  constitute  "larceny,**  the  thing  stolen 
must  be  the  property  of  another ;  but  either 
general  or  special  ownership  may  be  suffi- 
cient SUte  V.  RoBweU,  133  S.  W.  99,  100, 
163  Mo.  App.  888. 

"Larceny"  consists  in  two  essential  ele- 
ments: l^^rst,  the  misappropriation;  and, 
second,  the  accompanying  Intent  Evidence 
of  ownership  is  therefore  admissible,  even 
necessary,  in  proving  the  misappropriation, 
since  one  may  not  usually  wrongfully  ap- 
propriate his  own  property.     But  it  is  as 


mudi  a  crime  to  steal  one  person's  property 
as  another's.  The  ownership  of  the  property 
is  not  an  essential  ingredient  of  the  crime, 
so  long  as  it  appears  that  the  title  to  the 
same  is  not  in  the  accused.  The  crime  is 
complete  when  it  appears  that  the  property 
feloniously  taken  or  appropriated  was  not 
the  property  of  the  accused.  People  v.  Mead, 
109  N.  Y.  Supp.  163.  164,  126  App.  Dlv.  7. 

"  'Larceny*  Is  the  felonious  stealing,  tak- 
ing, carrying,  leading,  or  driving  away  the 
personal  property  of  another,"  and  an  indict- 
ment charging  defendant  with  willfully,  etc., 
taking  from  the  person  and  possession  of 
prosecutors  said  money,  was  insufficient  in 
not  charging  that  the  property  was  not  that 
of  defendant  People  v.  Cleary,  81  Pac.  763, 
1  Cal.  App.  6a 

One  who  has  taken  an  estray  and  is  in 
possession  thereof  has  such  property  interest 
therein  tliat  the  taking  of  it  from  him  may 
be  "larceny";  so,  also,  one  In  possession  of 
stolen  property  purchased  from  the  thief; 
so,  also,  a  thief,  in  possession  of  property 
he  has  stolen,  as  against  another  than  the 
owner.  Maxwell  v.  Territory,  86  Pac.  116, 
10  Ariz.  1. 

Pen.  Code.  |  484,  defines  "larceny"  as 
the  felonious  stealing,  etc.,  of  personal  prop- 
erty of  another.  Held,  that  the  phrase 
"personal  property  of  another,'*  as  so 
used,  means  property  in  the  possession  of 
another  who  is  entitled,  as  bailee  or  other- 
wise to  retain  possession  for  some  benefit 
or  profit  to  himself  to  the  exclusion  of  all  ^ 
others,  and  not  absolute  ownership  as  de- 
fined by  Civ.  Code,  I  679,  so  that  a  taking  of 
a  heifer  by  the  general  owner  thereof  from 
the  possession  of  an  agister  entitled  to  hold 
the  same  under  a  lien  for  pasturage,  with 
the  intent  to  deprive  the  latter  thereof,  con- 
stituted "larceny."  People  v.  Cain,  93  Pac. 
1037, 1039,  7  Cal.  App.  168. 

Bobbery  as  inelndinc 

See  Robbery. 

Bobbery  distlnsnisbed 

See  Robbery. 

Biot  synonjmona 

See  Riot 

Steal 

See  SteaL 
niof t  synonymons 

See  Theft 

Trespass 

"Larceny"  is  the  fel<mious  stealing  and 
carrying  away,  etc.,  of  the  personal  property 
of  another,  every  larceny  including  a  tres- 
pass to  the  possession,  which  cannot  exist 
unless  the  property  waa  in  the  possession  of 
the  person  from  whom  it  is  charged  to  have 
been  stolen.  People  v.  Iloban,  88  N.  E.  806, 
807,  240  111.  303,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1132,  16 
Ann.  Cas.  226. 


LARCENY 


24 


LARCENY  FROM  THE  PERSON 


'To  constitute  'larceny'  there  must  be  a 
trespass  in  the  taking.  •  •  •  It  is  not 
necessary  that  the  taking  be  by  force  or 
stealth.  If  possession  is  obtained  by  fraud 
with  intent  to  convert  the  property  to  the 
use  of  the  taker,  and  it  is  so  converted, 
•larceny*  may  be  charged."  Where  E.  and 
defendants  conspired  to  steal  the  funds  of  a 
labor  union,  and  to  that  end  procured  the 
election  of  Ew  as  recording  secretary  of  the 
union,  and  pursuant  to  his  duty  as  such  re- 
cording secretary  he  drew  money  from  a 
bank  to  be  forwarded  to  the  district  and 
national  organizations,  and  carried  the  money 
on  his  person  until  late  in  the  evening,  when 
pursuant  to  the  conspiracy  he  pretended 
to  have  been  held  up  and  robbed,  the  crime 
was  not  "larceny"  because  of  the  absence  of 
a  felonious  taking.  State  ▼.  Gothem,  115  K. 
W.  800,  891,  138  Iowa,  236. 

"At  common  law  and  under  the  statute, 
in  larceny'  there  must  be  a  trespass.  Where 
the  ownership  of  property  is  not  parted  with 
and  by  a  fraud  or  trick  the  possession  of  the 
property  is  obtained  and  is  converted  to  the 
use  of  the  taker  without  the  consent  of  the 
owner,  and  at  the  time  of  resorting  to  the 
trick  or  fraud  to  obtain  the  possession  it 
was  intended  to  take  the  property  and  per- 
manently deprive  the  owner  of  it,  this  would 
constitute  'larceny'  at  common  law  as  well 
as  under  the  statute."  State  v.  Copeman,  84 
S.  W.  942,  945,  186  Mo.  108  (citing  1  Bish. 
New  Cr.  Law,  $  585;  State  v.  Murphy,  90 
Mo.  App.  648;  Loomis  v.  People,  67  N.  Y. 
'822,  23  Am.  Rep.  123;  State  v.  Vickery,  19 
Tex.  326). 

LARCEITT      AFTER      TRUST      DELE- 
GATED 

If  a  person,  fraudulently  intending  to 
get  possession  of  the  money  of  another  and 
appropriate  the  same  to  his  own  use,  by  false 
representations  induces  the  owner  to  deliver 
the  money  to  him  for  the  purpose  of  being 
applied  for  the  owner's  use  or  benefit,  and 
then  appropriates  it  in  pursuance  of  the 
original  intent,  he  is  guilty  of  both  "larceny" 
after  trust  delegated  and  simple  larceny,  and 
may  be  prosecuted  for,  and  convicted  of, 
either  ofifeuse.  Martin  v.  State,  51  S.  B.  384, 
128  Ga.  478. 

LARCENY  BT  BAILEE 

See,  also,  Bailee. 

The  language  of  Mills'  Ann.  St  •  1256, 
defining  *'larceuy"  by  a  bailee  converting 
money,  etc.,  "he  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of 
larceny  in  the  same  manner  as  if  the  original 
taking  had  been  felonious,  and  on  conviction 
shall  be  punished  accordingly,"  makes  the  con- 
version by  a  bailee  with  intent  to  steal  the 
exact  equivalent  of  a  felonious  stealing,  tak- 
ing, and  carrying  away.  Quinn  v.  People, 
75  Pac.  396,  897,  32  Colo.  185. 

LARCEITT  BT  FALSE  PRETENSES 

See  False  Pretense. 


LARCENY  FROK  THE  HOTTSB 

House  as  element  of,  see  House. 

Under  Pen.  Code  1895,  |  178,  provldlng^ 
that  "larceny  from  the  house"  is  the  break- 
ing or  entering  any  house  with  intent  to  steaU 
or  after  breaking  or  entering  said  house  steal- 
ing therefrom  anything  of  value,  the  offense 
can  be  committed  in  four  different  ways.  It 
may  consist  in  the  breaking  of  a  house  with 
intent  to  steal,  provided  the  offense  is  not 
burglary ;  entering  any  house  with  intent  to 
steal ;  breaking  a  house  and  stealing  there- 
from, where  it  can  be  accomplished  without 
entry  or  ^terlng  and  stealing.  Section  182 
defines  two  classes  of  "larceny  from  the 
house"  and  distinguishes  them.  It  provides 
that  "any  person  breaking  and  entering  any 
house  or  building  (other  than  a  dwelling 
house  or  its  appurtenances)  with  intent  to 
steal,  but  is  detected  and  prevented  from 
carrying  such  intent  into  effect  or  in  steal- 
ing any  of  the  articles  therein  contained.** 
The  section  then  provides  that  "any  person 
breaking  or  entering  any  such  house  or 
building  and  stealing  therefrom  any  money, 
goods,  chattels,  wares  or  merchandise  or  any 
other  article  of  value  shall  be  guilty  of  a 
misdemeanor."  This  second  division  of  the 
section  is  subdivided  into  thefts  where  there 
is  a  breaking  and  entering  in  order  to  accom- 
plish the  theft,  and  where  there  is  no  break- 
ing, but  merely  an  entrance  into  the  building^ 
and  a  theft  is  accomplished.  But  in  both 
cases  a  theft  must  actually  be  committed. 
Under  the  first  portion  of  section  182,  as  in 
the  first  clause  of  section  178,  where  a  house 
other  than  a  dwelling  house  and  its  appur- 
tenances is  broken  and  entered  with  intent 
to  steal,  and  the  offender  is  detected,  he  ia 
guilty  of  "larceny  from  the  house,"  though 
nothing  be  taken.  Glaze  v.  State,  58  S.  E. 
1126,  1127,  2  Ga.  App.  704. 

liARCENT  FROM  THE  PERSON 

Included  in  robbery,  see  Robbery. 
Robbery  distinguished,  see  Robbery. 
See,  also,  Theft  from  the  Person. 

The  crime  of  "larceny  from  the  person" 
(B.  &  C.  Comp.  §  1800)  is  a  compound  larceny 
consisting  of  simple  larceny  (section  1798) 
aggravated  by  the  drcumstanoe  of  taking  the 
property  from  the  person  of  another  in 
which  the  value  of  the  property  is  not  an 
ingredient  of  the  offense,  as  in  case  of  simple 
larceny.  State  v.  Reyner,  91  Pac.  301,  302, 
50  Or.  224. 

The  act  of  pocket  picking  is  the  offense 
of  "larceny  of  the  person."  State  y.  Whit- 
ten,  92  N.  E.  79,  80,  82  Ohio  St  174. 

The  two  elements  peculiar  to  **larceny" 
from  the  person  In  the  nighttime  are  that  it 
must  be  "from  the  person"  and  "in  the  night- 
time"; and,  upon  information  for.  larceny 
from  the  person  in  the  nighttime,  a  verdict 
of  larceny  from  "a"  person  in  the  nighttime 
is  insuiticient  State  t.  McG.ee,  80  S.  W.  899,. 
900,  181  Mo.  312. 


LARD 


26 


LAST  CLEAR  CHANCE 


URD 

Where  'lard"  compound  web  made 
of  cotton  seed  oil  and  oleostearlne,  and  was 
generally  described  as  lard  both  in  trade  and 
among  consumers,  proof  of  the  theft  of  such 
compound  was  sufficient  to  sustain  a  con- 
viction under  an  indictment  charging  the 
theft  of  lard,  though  "lard"  as  defined  by 
the  dictionaries  and  the  pure  food  law  means 
a  product  of  a  hog.  Roman  v.  State,  142  S. 
W.  912,  913,  64  Tex.  Cr.  K.  515. 

URGE 

See  At  Large. 

A  complaint  f6r  Injury  to  a  pedestrian 
while  passing  along  a  sidewalk  on  a  dark 
night  by  running  into  a  stone,  in  alleging 
that  the  dty  had  permitted  a  '*large'*  stone, 
unguarded  and  unprotected,  to  remain  along 
the  sidewalk,  at  the  edge  thereof,  for  a  long 
time  prior  to  the  accident,  and  that  It  was 
the  city's  duty  to  guard  against  the  danger 
by  erecting  barriers,  is  insufficient;  it  not 
showing  the  size  or  location  of  the  stone,  or 
how  long  it  had  been  there,  so  as  to  make 
it  clear  that  it  was  the  city's  duty  to  main- 
tain barriers.  The  word  ••large,"  as  here 
used,  like  "along"  and  "edge,"  is  a  relative 
term.  It  does  not  Indicate  the  size  or  char- 
acter of  the  stone,  except  in  a  comparative 
sense.  City  of  Vincennes  v.  Spees,  74  N.  E. 
277,  280,  35  Ind.  App.  389. 

IJIROE  OOK SUMEB 

The  term  "large  consumer,"  used  In  a 
<!ontract  between  a  dty  and  a  water  company 
providing  that  the  cost  of  furnishing  water 
to  manufacturers  and  large  consumers  was 
to  be  estimated  according  to  the  sice  of  the 
establishment,  does  not  mean  persons  taking 
water  for  ordinary  family  use,  where  such 
persons  are  fuUy  covered  by  a  schedule  based 
on  houses  having  a  certain  number  of  rooms 
and  occupied  by  different  numbers  of  fami- 
lies, but  contemplates  concerns  like  manu- 
factories, which  differ  more  or  less  from  in- 
stances specifically  provided  for.  Berends 
V.  Bellevue  Water  &  Fuel  Gaslight  Co.,  82 
8.  W.  983.  984,  119  Ky.  8. 

URRY 

A  "larry"  is  a  kind  of  car  used  to  haul 
coal  from  a  coal  mine  tipple  to  coke  ovens, 
and  from  which  larry  ovens  are  charged  with 
coal.  Hairston  v.  United  States  Coal  and 
Coke  Co.,  66  S.  B.  473,  66  W.  Va.  324. 

LASCIVIOUS 

See,  also,  Lewdness. 

Character  usually  cannot  be  characteriz- 
ed as  lascivious,  wanton,  or  lewd  unless  it 
was  intentionally  calculated  to  incite  to  lust 
It  is  thus  distinguished  from  indecency  and 
Impropriety,  which  may  or  may  not  Indicate 


lust,  depending  upon  the  purposes  or  feelings 
of  the  person  who  is  guilty  of  such  indecen- 
cy or  impropriety.  Indecency  of  conduct 
may  tend  t<f  prove  lasdvlousness,  but  when 
lasciviousness  Is  proven  an  unchaste  char- 
acter is  thereby  established.  State  v.  Hum- 
mer, 104  N.  W.  722,  724,  128  Iowa,  605. 

Rev.  St  I  3893,  declares  every  obscene, 
lewd,  or  lascivious  book,  pamphlet,  print  or 
other  publication  of  an  indecent  character, 
or  notices  giving  Information  for  obtaining 
such  publications,  to  be  nonmailable  matter, 
and  prescribes  a  punishment  for  the  use  of 
the  malls  to  transmit  or  circulate  the  same. 
Held,  that  the  words  "obscene,**  "lewd,"  and 
"lascivious,"  as  used  in  such  section,  signify 
that  form  of  immorality  which  has  relation 
to  sexual  impurity,  having  the  same  meaning 
as  is  given  them  at  common  law  in  prosecu- 
tions for  obscene  libel.  Hanson  ▼.  United 
States,  157  Fed.  749,  750,  85  C.  a  A.  825. 

'liasdvlousness"  is  defined  as  wanton- 
ness or  lewdness.  State  v.  Hummer,  104  N. 
W.  722,  728,  128  Iowa,  505  felting  E2z  parte 
boran,  82  Fed.  76;  United  States  v.  Clarke, 
88  Fed.  732;  United  States  v.  XJurant  46 
Fed.  753;  State  r.  Lawrence,  27  N.  W.  126, 
19  Neb.  307). 

LAST 

See  Same  as  Last 

XJkST  AOJU8TED  VAI.UATIOK 

Under  Act  April  12, 1905  (P.  L.  142).  pro- 
viding for  the  levy  of  a  road  tax  on  "the 
last  adjusted  valuation"  for  county  purposes, 
there  is  no  such  valuation  until  the  county 
coiimissioners  have  corrected  the  assessor's 
return,  and  the  board  of  revision  has  given 
the  taxpayers  opportunity  to  object  H.  C. 
Frick  Coke  Co.  v.  Mt  Pleasant  Tp.,  71  Atl. 
930,  931.  222  Pa.  461. 

LAST  ABSEBSBCEHT 

The  "last  county  assessment."  contem- 
plated by  Kirby's  Dig.  t  5683,  providing  that 
no  single  improvement  shall  be  undertaken 
which  exceeds  in  cost  20  per  cent,  of  the 
value  of  the  property  in  the  Improvement  dis- 
trict as  shown  by  the  "last  county  assess- 
ment" includes  the  valuation  added  by  the 
county  board  of  equalization,  and  where  the 
value  is  thus  increased  before  the  board  of 
improvement  of  a  city  reports  the  estimat- 
ed cost  of  an  Improvement,  and  before  the 
passage  of  an  ordinance  levying  the  assess- 
ment to  pay  for  the  improvement  such  in- 
creased value  must  be  considered.  Board 
of  Improvement  Dlst  No.  5  of  Texarkana  v. 
Offenhauser,  105  S.  W.  265,  268,  84  Ark.  257. 

IiABT  OXiEAB  OKAHOE 

See,  also,  Discovered  Negligence;    Dto- 
covered  Peril ;  Humanitarian  Doctrine. 

The  doctrine  of  the  "last  clear  chance," 
generally  attributed  to  the  case  of  Davies  v. 
Mann,  10  Mees.  &  W.  Rep.  546,  In  which  the 


LAST  CLEAR  CHANGE 


26 


LAST  CLEAR  CHANCE 


owner  of  a  donkey,  who  negligently  turned 
it  out  on  the  highway  with  its  feet  hobbled, 
was  allowed,  nothwithstanding  his  own  negli- 
gence, to  recover  from  a  personMriying  along 
the  highway  who  carelessly  ran  into  and  kill- 
ed it,  is  that  the  contributory  negligence 
of  the  party  injured  will  not  defeat  the  ac- 
tion if  it  be  shown  that  the  defendant  might 
by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  and  pru- 
dence have  avoided  the  consequences  of  the 
injured  party's  own  negligence.  Pilmer  v. 
Boise  Traction  Co.,  94  Pac  437,  438,  14 
Idaho,  327,  15  L  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  254,  125  Am. 
St.  Rep.  161. 

^'The  last  clear  chance  doctrine''  arises 
where  plaintiff  has  been  negligent  in  plac- 
ing himself  in  a  position  of  danger,  but 
that  negligence  has  spent  its  force  at  the 
time  he  received  an  injury  owing  to  the  neg- 
ligence of  defendant  Scholl  v.  Belcher,  127 
Pac.  068,  975,  03  Or.  810. 

Under  the  **last  clear  chance  doctrine," 
one  is  liable  for  injury  negligently  inflicted 
upon  another,  though  the  injured  person  by 
his  own  negligence  put  himself  in  the  place 
of  danger,  if  the  person  inflicting  the  in- 
juries saw  the  peril  in  time  to  have  avoid- 
ed the  accident  by  using  ordinary  care.  CJer- 
rano  v.  Portland  Ry.,  Light  &  Power  Co., 
126  Pac.  37,  40,  62  Or.  421. 

The  "last  clear  chance"  to  avoid  injury  is 
the  last  opportunity  to  avoid  the  danger,  by 
one  of  the  parties  learning  of  it,  and  know- 
ing that  the  safety  of  the  other  depends  sole- 
ly upon  his  conduct,  and  the  rule  does  not 
apply  where  the  act  of  the  Injured  party  and 
the  defendant  are  substantially  concurrent 
Indianapolis  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Bolin,  78  N.  B. 
210,  213,  215,  39  Ind.  App.  169. 

The  "last  clear  chance"  doctrine,  which 
is  the  rule  that,  notwithstanding  the  injured 
person*s  original  negligence,  the  defendant 
is  liable  if,  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care, 
he  might  have  discovered  plaintiff's  peril  in 
time  to  have  avoided  the  injury,  is  in  con- 
flict with  the  contributory  negligence  rule. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Lilley,  93  N.  W. 
1012,  1016,  4  Neb.  <Unof.)  286. 

"Last  clear  chance"  is  the  doctrine  that 
though  the  plaintiff  may  have  been  guilty 
of  negligence,  and  although  that  negligence 
may  in  fact  have  contributed  to  the  accident, 
yet,  if  the  defendant  could,  in  the  result,  by 
the  exercise  of  proper  care  and  diligence, 
have  avoided  the  mischief  which  happened, 
the  plaintiff's  negligence  will  not  excuse  him. 
McClanahan  v.  Vicksburg,  S.  &  P.  R.  Co., 
35  South.  902,  906,  111  La.  781. 

If  the  negligence  of  both  parties  co- 
operate there  is  usually  no  liability,  except 
for  the  "humanitarian  or  *last  chance*  doc- 
trine," which  means  that,  though  the  in- 
jured party  may  have  been  negligent  in  plac- 
ing himself  in  a  position  of  peril,  yet  if 
defendant,  by  ordinary  care,  did  see,  or 
could  see,  him  in  time  to  have  averted  injury. 


defendant  is  liable.    Matz  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  117  S.  W.  584,  591,  217  Mo.  275. 

The  doctrine  of  "last  clear  chance"  is 
not  limited  to  cases  where  the  peril  of  the 
person  injured  has  been  actually  discovered 
by  those  causing  the  injury,  but  extending  to 
cases  where  the  peril  could  have  been  dis- 
covered by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  on 
their  part  The  duty  to  exercise  due  care 
to  avoid  the  consequence  of  another's  negli- 
gence arises  when  the  circumstances  are 
such  that  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would 
have  reason  to  apprehend  its  existence. 
Nichols  V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  98  Pac. 
808,  814,  44  Colo.  50L 

The  "last  clear  chance"  doctrine  is  some- 
what of  an  exception  to  the  general  rate 
of  law,  by  which  an  injury  caused  by  the 
joint  negligence  of  the  wrongdoer  and  the 
person  injured  is  not  actionable.  Murphy  v. 
Wabash  R.  Co.  (Mo.)  128  S.  W.  481,  485. 

The  doctrine  of  the  "last  clear  chance" 
does  not  involve  the  recognition  of  liability 
in  case  of  concurrent  negligence,  and  does 
not  Involve  a  case  of  comparative  negligence, 
but  requires  one  to  use  reasonable  care  not 
to  injure  another  in  the  condition  in  which 
the  latter  has  placed  himself,  though  the  lat- 
ter is  guilty  of  negligence  in  putting  himself 
in  a  place  of  danger  avoidable  by  reasonable 
precautions.  Welsh  v.  Tri-City  Ry.  Co.,  126 
N.  W.  1118,  1119,  148  Iowa,  200. 

The  exception  to  the  general  rule  mak- 
ing contributory  negligence  a  defense,  known 
as  the  "last  chance  doctrine,"  does  not  ap- 
ply where  there  is  no  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant supervening  subsequently  to  that  of 
the  plaintiff,  as  where  his  negligence  is 
continuous  and  operative  down  to  the  moment 
of  the  injury,  or  where  his  negligence  or  posi- 
tion of  danger  is  not  discovered  by  the  de- 
fendant in  time  to  avoid  the  injury.  Denver 
City  Tramway  Co.  v.  Cobb,  164  Fed.  41,  43, 
90  C.  C.  A.  459. 

The  rule  of  "the  last  clear  chance"  im- 
plies that  the  one  charged  with  negligence 
knew  the  person  injured  was  in  a  place  of 
danger  and  negligently  failed  to  avoid  injur- 
ing him;  but  his  testimony  that  he  did  not 
have  such  knowledge  is  not  conclusive.  Such 
knowledge  may  be  shown  by  proof  that  the 
person  Injured  was  in  a  situation  of  immi- 
nent danger,  and  so  situated  that  the  one  in- 
juring him,  if  he  used  his  senses  as  human 
beings  ordinarily  do,  must  have  known  the 
danger.  Zltnik  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  136  N. 
W.  995,  997,  91  Neb.  679. 

The  doctrine  of  "last  clear  chance"  can- 
not be  applied  where  both  parties  are  con- 
temporaneously and  actively  in  fault,  and 
by  their  mutual  carelessness  an  injury  en- 
sues to  one  or  both  of  them.  Rowe  v.  South- 
ern CaUfomia  Ry.  Co.,  87  Pac.  220,  221,  4 
Cal.  App.  1  (citing  Holmes  v.  South  Paa 
Coast  Ry.,  31  Pac.  834,  97  Cal.  169). 


I«AST  CLEAR  CHANOlfi 


27 


LAST  CLBAR  CHANOB 


The  "last  clear  chance  doctrine"  applies 
to  the  facts  of  the  particular  case,  and  the 
doctrine  is  applicable  if  it  appears  that 
plaintiff  was  negligent  and  the  defendant 
was  not  negligent  in  bringing  about  the  dan- 
gerous situation,  bnt  saw  or  might  have  seen 
plaintiff's  peril  in  time  to  prevent  the  injury. 
McGee  v.  Wabash  R,  Co.,  U4  8.  W.  83,  35, 
214  Mo.  530. 

The  doctrine  of  '^st  clear  chance''  is 
an  exception  to  the  general  rule  that  con- 
tributory negligence  of  the  person  injured 
will  bar  recovery  without  reference  to  the 
degree  of  negligence,  and  under  the  doctrine, 
an  injured  person  may  recover  from  the  in- 
Jury  resulting  from  the  negligence  of  another 
though  his  own  negligence  exposed  him  to 
the  danger  of  injury,  if  the  injury  was  more 
immediately  caused  by  want  of  care  on  the 
other's  part  to  avoid  the  injury  after  dis- 
covering the  peril  of  the  person  injured. 
Clark  V.  St  Louis  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.,  108  Pac. 
961,  863,  24  Okl.  764. 

The  doctrine  of  the  "last  clear  chance'* 
rests  upon  the  principle  that  there  is  some- 
thing in  the  plaintiff's  condition  or  situation 
to  admonish  the  defendant  that  he  is  not 
able  to  protect  himself.  It  is  the  doctrine  of 
prior  and  subsequent  negligence,  or  remote 
and  proximate  cause,  and  presui^poses  the  in- 
tervention of  an  appreciable  interval  of  time 
between  the  prior  negligence  of  the  plaintiff 
and  the  subsequent  negligence  of  the  defend- 
ant It  applies  notwithstanding  the  contribu- 
tory negligeiice  of  the  plaintiff  when  the  de- 
fendant knows,  or  by  the  exercise  of  ordi- 
nary care  ought  to  know,  of  plaintiff's  dan- 
ger, and  fails  to  do  something  which  it  has 
power  to  do  to  avoid  the  injury,  or  when  the 
platotiff  \B  in  some  position  of  danger  from 
a  threatened  contact  with  some  agency  un- 
der the  control  of  the  defendant,  when  the 
plaintiff  cannot  and  the  defendant  can  pre- 
vent a  resulting  injury.  Roanoke  Ry.  & 
EDiectric  Co.  v.  CferroU,  72  8.  E.  125,  127,  112 
Va.  698. 

"The  party  who  has  the  last  opportunity 
of  avoiding  an  accident  is  not  excused  by 
the  negligence  of  any  one  else.  His  negli- 
gence>  and  not  that  of  the  one  first  in  fault, 
is  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury."  Again 
it  has  been  stated  in  this  way:  '*Where  both 
parties  are  negligent,  the  one  that  has  the 
last  dear  opportunity  to  avoid  the  accident, 
notwithstanding  the  negligence  of  the  other, 
is  solely  responsible  for  it;  his  negligence 
being  deemed  the  direct  and  proximate  cause 
of  it"  The  rule  is  bottomed  sometimes  upon 
one  proposition,  and  sometimes  upon  the 
other,  and  sometimes  upon  both.  The  first 
is  that  in  such  cases  defendant's  negligence, 
Instead  of  being  concurrent,  is  the  sole  and 
proximate  cause  of  the  injury,  and  the  other 
is  that  plaintiff's  negligence  is  no  defense  to 
wanton  or  willful  negligence.  When  bottom- 
ed solely  upon  the  last  proposition,  to  wit, 


wantonness  or  willfulness,  it  is  apparent 
that  something  more  than  the  want  of  ordi- 
nary care  is  necessary.  The  injury  must 
either  be  willful,  or,  as  said  in  some  cases, 
be  due  to  such  gross  negligence  as  that  wan- 
tonness or  willfulness  may  be  inferred. 
When  bottomed  upon  the  former  proposition 
—that  is  to  say,  upon  the  doctrine  that  de- 
fendant's negligence,  being  last  in  point  of 
time,  is  the  proximate,  and  plaintiff's  pre- 
cedent negligence  the  remote,  cause — neither 
wantonness  nor  willfulness  nor  their  equiva- 
lent need  be  shown.  But  it  must  appear  in 
9uch  cases  that  plaintiff's  and  defendant's 
negligence  are  not  concurrent  in  point  of 
time.  If  concurrent  in  this  sense,  then  there 
can  be  no  recovery  save  where  the  rule  of 
comparative  negligence  obtaina  McCormick 
V.  Ottumwa  Ry.  &  light  Co.,  124  N.  W.  889, 
892,  146  Iowa,  119. 

Under  the  'last  chance^  doctrine, 
"though  plaintiff  negligently  placed  himself 
in  a  perilous  position  by  driving  near  the 
track,  the  motorman  operating  the  car  owed 
the  plaintiff  the  duty  to  avoid  injuring  him, 
and  plaintiff's  previous  negligence  did  not 
bar  a  recovery  if  the  injury  resulted  from 
the  negligence  of  the  motorman  is  not  stop- 
ping or  checking  the  car."  Deitring  v.  St 
Louis  Transit  Co.,  86  8.  W.  140,  144,  109 
Mo.  App.  524  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion In  Sepetowski  v.  St  Louis  Transit  Co., 
76  8.  W.  693,  102  Mo.  App.  119;  Morgan  v. 
Wabash  R.  Co.,  60  8.  W.  195,  159  Mo.  262; 
Hutchinson  v.  St  Louis  &  M.  R.  Co.,  88  Mo. 
App.  loc.  cit  383). 

The  theory  of  the  last  chance  doctrine, 
which  applies  only  where  there  is  negligence 
of  defendant  subsequent  to  the  negligence  of 
plaintiff,  so  that  defendant's  negligence  is 
the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury  notwith- 
standing plaintiff's  prior  negligence,  is  not 
submitted  by  instructions  that  plaintiff  could 
recover  if  she,  in  attempting  to  cross  a  street, 
and  while  crossing  it,  was  exerdsing  ordi- 
nary care  to  avoid  injury,  and  defendant's 
driver  negligently  failed  to  give  warning  of 
her  danger,  or  negligently  failed  to  stop  the 
team  after  he  could  have  seen  by  the  exer- 
cise of  ordinary  care  that  plaintiff  was  in 
danger  of  collision  with  the  team.  Vaughn 
V.  Wm.  J.  Lemp  Brewing  Co.  (Mo.)  132  a  W. 
293,297. 

Wliat  is  termed  as  the  "last  chance  doc- 
trine" is  the  doctrine  to  the  effect  that  in 
cases  of  contributory  negligence  he  who  has 
the  last  clear  opportunity  to  avoid  inflicting 
an  injury  is  responsible  if  in  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  care  he  fails  to  do  so.  Where  those 
in  charge  of  a  locomotive  saw  plaintiff's 
team  slowly  approaching  a  crossing  150  feet 
away,  they  were  not  chargeable  with  negli- 
ligence  in  failing  to  chec^  the  train,  but 
were  entitled  to  presume  plaintiff  would  stop. 
Lambert  v.  Southern  Paa  R.  Co.,  79  Pac. 
873,  875,  146  CaL  231. 


LAST  CLEAR  CHANCB 


28 


IJABT  CLEAR  CHANCE 


An  Instruction  that  If  the  Jury  find  from 
the  eyidence  that  plaintiff  was  negligent  in 
attempting  to  cross  the  street,  yet  if  they 
further  find  that  defendant's  agent  or  serv- 
ant in  charge  of  the  car  alleged  to  have  in- 
flicted the  injury,  either  saw,  or  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  ordinary  care  could  have  seen,  the 
danger  of  plaintiff*8  position  in  time  to  have 
avoided  the  collision,  but  failed  to  exercise 
care  and  negligently  allowed  the  car  to  col- 
lide with  plaintiff  and  injure  her,  then  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  recover,  presented  what  is 
known  as  the  "humanitarian"  or  "last 
chance"  doctrine.  Hough  v.  St.  Louis  Car 
Co.,  123  S.  W.  83,  Se,  146  Mo.  App.  58. 

The  doctrine  of  the  "last  chance,"  or 
"last  clear  chance,"  makes  It  necessary  for 
the  servants  of  a  railway  company,  after 
they  see  the  danger  of  a  person  who  has 
negligently  come  upon  the  track,  to  avoid 
injuring  him.  To  this  end,  the  servants  of 
the  railway  company  are  bound  to  keep  a 
vigilant  lookout  in  front  of  advancing  en- 
gines or  trains  in  order  to  discover  persons 
exposed  to  danger  on  highway  crossings,  or 
at  other  places  where  they  have  a  legal  right 
to  be,  and  the  railway  company  will  be  liable 
for  running  over  them  if,  by  maintaining  such 
a  lookout  and  by  using  reasonable  care  and 
exertion  to  check  or  stop  its  train,  It  could 
avoid  injury  to  them.  The  doctrine  applies 
where  the  negligence  of  the  person  injured 
is  remote  and  that  of  the  railway  com- 
pany proximace,  for  if  both  be  negligent,  and 
the  negligence  of  both  be  concurrent  and  di- 
rectly contributing  to  produce  the  accident, 
then  the  case  is  one  of  contributory  negli- 
gence pure  and  simple.  If,  however,  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  person  injured  merely  puts 
him  in  the  place  of  danger  and  stops  there 
and  does  not  actively  continue  until  the 
moment  of  the  accident,  and  the  railway 
company  either  knew  of  his  danger,  or  by 
the  exercise  of  such  diligence  as  the  law  im- 
poses would  have  known  it,  then,  if  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  person  injured  did  not  concur- 
rently combine  with  that  of  the  railway  com- 
pany to  produce  the  injury,  the  company's 
negligence  is  the  proximate  cause,  and  that 
of  the  person  injured  is  the  remote  cause. 
Drown  v.  Northern  Ohio  Traction  Co.,  81  N. 
E.  326,  328,  76  Ohio  St  284,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  421,  118  Am.  St  Rep.  844. 

The  "last  clear  chance"  doctrine  is  thus 
^.eflned  in  Thompson  on  Negligence,  449; 
"When  it  is  said,  in  case  where  the  plaintiff 
has  been  guilty  of  contributory  negligence, 
that  the  company  is  liable  if  by  the  exercise 
of  ordinary  care  it  could  have  prevented  the 
accident,  it  is  understood  that  it  will  be  so 
liable  if  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care, 
after  a  discovery  by  defendant  of  the  danger 
in  which  the  party  stood,  the  accident  could 
have  been  prevented,  or  if  the  company  fail- 
ed to  discover  the  danger  through  the  reck- 
lessness or  carelessness  of  its  employes,  when 
th'^  exercise  of  ordinary  care  would  have  dis- 


covered the  danger  and  averted  the  calam- 
ity." This  rule  calls  for  "ordinary  care"  and 
not  for  extraordinary  care,  and  the  use  of 
all  possible  precautions;  and  where  plaintiff 
stepped  onto  the  track  in  front  of  some  cars 
moving  towards  him  by  gravity  under  con- 
trol of  the  brakes  alone,  the  mere  fact  that 
the  crew  of  the  switching  engine  standing 
close  by,  on  a  parallel  track,  did  not  sound 
either  whistle  or  bell,  but  attempted  to  warn 
him  by  shouting  to  him,  was  not  negligence 
on  th^  part  which  would  create  a  liability 
under  the  "last  clear  chance"  doctrine,  but 
at  most  an  error  of  Judgment  in  an  emergen- 
cy created  by  plaintiff's  own  act,  especially 
where  plaintiff  heard  but  did  not  heed  the 
shouts.  Jones  v.  Sibley,  L.  6.  &  S.  R.  Co.» 
46  South.  61,  64,  121  La.  89  (citing  Harlan 
V.  St  Louis,  K.  a  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  65  Mo.  22). 

In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  person  on 
the  track  of  an  electric  street  railway,  an 
instruction  that  the  motorman  must  use  dili- 
gence to  avoid  danger  to  a  person  on  the 
track,  and  that  the  car  must  be  stopped,  if 
there  Is  time  to  stop  it,  where  the  person  1m 
in  a  dangerous  position,  and  If  there  was 
time,  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  for  a 
motorman  to  have  stopped  the  car  after  see- 
ing, or  after  he  was  bound  to  see,  with  ordi- 
nary care,  the  dangerous  position  of  the 
person  on  the  track,  and  failed  to  check  the 
speed  of  the  car,  then  the  defendant  was 
guilty  of  negligence,  is  not  objectionable  in 
not  properly  stating  the  theory  of  "the  last 
dear  diance."  Indianapolis  St  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Seerley,  72  N.  E.  169,  1034,  85  Ind.  App.  467. 

The  rule  that  one's  neglect  to  discover 
peril  of  another  is  to  be  held  to  be  the  sole 
proximate  cause  of  resulting  injury  is  not 
an  arbitrary  but  a  reasonable  one.  The  test 
is:  What  wrongful  conduct  occasioning  an 
injury  was  in  operation  at  the  very  moment 
it  occurred  or  became  inevitable?  If  Just  be- 
fore the  climax  only  one  party  had  the  pow- 
er to  prevent  the  catastrophe,  and  he  neg- 
lected to  use  it,  the  legal  responsibility  is 
his  alone.  If,  however,  each  had  such  pow- 
er and  each  neglected  to  use  it,  then  their 
negligence  was  concurrent,  and  neither  can 
recover  of  the  other.  The  doctrine  of  "last 
clear  chance"  will  not  be  extended  to  cases 
where  the  plaintiff's  own  negligence  extend- 
ed up  to  and  actually  contributed  to  the 
injury.  To  warrant  its  application  there 
must  have  been  some  new  breach  of  duty 
upon  the  part  of  the  defendant  subsequent 
to  the  plaintiff's  negligence.  In  an  action 
for  damages  for  the  death  of  a  railroad  em- 
ploy6  who  was  run  over  by  an  engine  while 
at  work  on  the  track,  where  there  was  no 
evidence  to  show  whether  he  looked  and 
listened,  an  instruction  that,  if  the  employes 
in  charge  of  the  engine  could  by  the  exercise 
of  reasonable  diligence  have  seen  deceased 
on  the  track  in  sufficient  time  to  have  stopped 
the  engine  and  avoided  the  Injury,  plaintiff 
will  be  entitled  to  recover,  notwithstandinf 


LAST  CLEAB  CHANCE 


LAST  DSaCRIBBD 


deceased  was  negligent  In  failing  to  see  the 
approach  of  a  train,  was  erroneous.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.  V.  Bentley,  98  Pac.  150, 152, 
78  Kan.  221  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Dyerson  t.  Union  Pac  R.  Co..  87  Pac  680, 
74  Kan.  528,  7  Ll  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  132,  11  Ann. 
Oas.  207). 

The  engineer  of  a  train  who  has  given 
the  danger  signal,  commencing  when  a  track- 
man was  seen  on  the  track  600  feet  away, 
and,  as  8o<»i  as  he  discovers  that  the  man  is 
apparently  unconscious  of  the  approach  of 
the  train,  adopts  every  possible  means  to 
avert  the  accident,  by  sounding  bell  and 
whistle  and  reversing  the  engine  and  putting 
on  the  air  brakes,  has  done  his  full  duty, 
as  respects  "the  last  clear  chance."  Hoifard 
V.  IlUnols  Cent  R.  Co.,  110  N.  W.  446,  460, 
138  Iowa,  543,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  797. 

As  applied  to  an  action  for  injuries  to  a 
traveler  in  a  collision  with  a  street  car,  the 
doctrine  of  the  "last  clear  chance"  Is  that, 
even  assuming  the  negligence  of  plaintiff  con- 
tributed to  the  Injury  of  which  he  com- 
plains, still  If,  after  the  occurrence  of  such 
contributory  negligence,  the  employes  of  de- 
fendant saw  the  dangerous  condition  in 
which  plaintiff  was  placed,  and  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  ordinary  care  could  have  stopped 
the  car,  and  so  have  avoided  Injuring  him, 
and  failed  to  do  so,  the  defendant  is  respon- 
sible. Henderson  v.  Los  Angeles  Traction 
Co.,  89  Pac.  976,  980,  150  Cal.  689. 

The  theory  of  the  "last  clear  opportu- 
nity," in  the  case  of  injury  to  one  on  the 
track  by  being  struck  by  the  engine.  Is  that 
the  engineer  saw  the  party  Injured  and  real- 
ized her  perilous  situation  and  had  ample 
opportunity  to  have  avoided  the  accident  by 
the  exercise  of  reasonable  caution  and  care. 
Zipperlen  v.  Southern  Paa  Co.,  93  Pac.  1049, 
1053,  7  CaL  App.  206. 

Under  the  doctrine  of  the  "last  clear 
chance,"  where  negligence  of  defendant  ia 
the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury  for  which 
suit  Is  brought,  and  that  of  plaintiff  a  remote 
cause  only,  the  plaintiff  may  recover.  In  the 
case  of  a  person  injured  at  a  street  railway 
creasing,  if  the  motorman  saw,  or  oould  have 
seen  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  the 
situation  of  the  person  In  time  to  have  avoid- 
ed injuring  him,  and  ftiils  to  do  so,  the  rail- 
road oompany  Is  liable  for  his  injury,  and, 
notwithstanding  the  negligence  of  the  person 
in  placing  himself  in  a  position  of  peril,  un- 
der the  doctrine  of  the  "last  clear  chance," 
this  operates  as  an  exception  to  the  general 
rule  forbidding  recovery  by  plaintiff  guilty 
of  contributory  negligence.  It  is  no  depar- 
ture from  just  principles,  but  a  wholesome 
and  humane  doctrine,  to  hold  that  if  after 
the  defendant  knew,  or  in  the  exercise  of  or- 
dinary care  ought  to  have  known,  of  plain- 
tiiTs  negligence,  he  could  have  avoided  the 
accident,  but  failed  to  do  so,  the  plaintiff 
caa  recover.    Qrass  v.  Pt.  Wayne  &  W.  VaL 


Traction  Co.,  81  N.  B.  514,  517,  42  Ind.  App. 
395  (citing  Indianapolis  Traction  &  Terminal 
Co.  V.  Kidd,  79  N.  E.  347,  350,  167  Ind.  402, 
7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  143,  10  Ann.  Cas.  942). 

In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  person  on 
the  track  of  an  electilc  street  railway,  an  in- 
struction that  the  motorman  must  use  dili- 
gence to  avoid  danger  to  a  person  on  the 
track,  and  that  the  car  must  be  stopped,  if 
there  is  time  to  stop  it,  where  the  person  is 
in  a  dangerous  position,  and  If  there  was 
time.  In  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  for  a 
motorman,  to  have  stopped  the  car  after  see- 
ing, or  after  he  was  bound  to  see,  with  ordi- 
nary care,  the  dangerous  position  of  the  per- 
son on  the  track,  and  failed  to  check  the 
speed  of  the  car,  then  the  defendant  was 
guilty  of  negligence.  Is  not  objectionable  in 
not  properly  stating  the  theory  of  the  "last 
clear  chance."  Indianapolis  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Seerley,  72  N.  B.  169,  170,  35  Ind.  App.  467. 

The  doctrine  of  the  "last  clear  chance" 
means  that  notwithstanding  the  previous  neg- 
ligence of  plaintiff,  if  at  the  time  of  the  In- 
jury it  might  have  been  avoided  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  reasonable  care  on  the  part  of  de- 
fendant, defendant  will  be  liable  for  the  fail 
ure  to  exercise  such  care.  Ilence,  where  a 
passenger,  a  girl  under  14  years  of  age,  un- 
accustomed to  riding  on  street  cars,  becomes 
frightened  by  the  negligence  of  the  defend- 
ant's servants  In  carrying  such  passenger 
past  her  known  destination,  and  the  conduc- 
tor knows,  or  by  the  exercise  of  due  care  and 
diligence  under  the  circumstances  should 
know,  of  such  passenger's  frightened  condi- 
tion, and  that  she  is  about  to  leave  the  mov- 
ing car,  it  is  hlB  duty  to  exercise  the  high- 
est degree  of  care  i>068ible  under  the  circum- 
stances to  prevent  such  passenger  from 
alighting  from  the  moving  car.  Kruger  v. 
Omaha  &  C.  B.  St  Ry.  Co.,  114  N.  W.  571, 
573,  80  Neb.  490,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  101,  127 
Am  St.  Rep.  786. 

JiABT  BEBOBZBEJD 

A  deed  from  a  tax  collector  to  the  terri- 
tory, which  recites  the  assessment  and  levy 
of  taxes  for  the  year  on  property  described 
as  "Cabin  and  I^ot  6  of  Block  60  and  Cabin 
and  Lot  7  of  Block  60"  of  a  city  and  on  per- 
sonal property,  and  which  states  that  the 
taxes  were  delinquent,  and  that  the  property 
was  sold  to  the  territory,  and  which  conveys 
to  the  territory  "all  that  lot  •  •  •  of 
land  •  •  •  above  and  last  described  In 
this  deed,"  conveys  only  lot  7.  Abell  v. 
Swain,  100  Pac.  831,  a32,  12  Ariz.  421. 

The  phrase  "last  herein  described,"  in  a 
finding  that  a  bankrupt  was  the  owner  of  a 
business,  together  with  a  leasehold  interest 
of  the  premises  and  the  furniture  contained 
therein,  and  the  good  will  of  the  business, 
and  that  he  had  sold  the  property  "last  here- 
in described,"  confines  the  sale  by  the  bank- 
rupt to  a  sale  of  the  good  will  of  his  business 
and  the  furniture  used  in  connection  there- 


I«AST  DESCRIBED 


80 


LAST  SICKNESS 


with,  and  not  a  sale  of  his  leasehold  interest. 
Leist  y.  Dierssen,  88  Pac  812,  814,  4  Gal. 
App.  634. 

The  rule  that  the  expression,  "the  real 
property  last  hereinbefore  described,"  used 
in  the  granting  part  of  a  tax  deed,  includes 
only  one  tract  of  several  described  in  the 
deed,  applies  only  where  the  last  description 
Is  of  a  single  tract  which  is  segregated  from 
the  others  and  described  wholly  apart  from 
them  for  some  independent  purpose,  and 
where  no  language  intervenes  between  such 
description  and  the  operative  words  of  the 
grant  which  will  extend  the  application .  of 
the  word  beyond  that  tract  King  v.  Gibson, 
113  Pac.  429,  430,  84  Kan.  29. 

LAST  GENERAL  ELEGTIOH 

See  General  Election. 

LAST  KHOWH  AODBE8S 

Under  PoL  Code,  {  3650,  which  reauires 
an  assessor  to  state  in  the  assessment  of 
property  the  name  and  post  office  address,  if 
known,  of  the  person  to  whom  the  property 
is  assessed,  the  address  shown  on  the  last 
assessment  constitutes  the  last  known  post 
office  address  so  far  as  the  tax  records  are 
concerned,  and,  in  the  absence  of  other  in- 
formation, the  tax  collector  must  take  notice 
of  the  address  so  shown  and  mail  the  notice 
of  resale  to  such  address.  Campbell  v.  Mor- 
an,  119  Pac.  89,  90,  161  Cal.  326. 

LAST  PLACE  OF  ABODE 

A  service  of  a  writ  of  scire  facias,  in  a 
suit  commenced  in  Massachusetts,  by  the  of- 
ficer's leaving  a  copy  therefor  at  the  "last 
and  usual  place  of  abode*'  of  a  trustee  in 
that  state,  according  to  the  laws  of  the  state, 
was  sufficient,  though  prior  to  such  service 
he  had  removed  to  a  neighboring  state. 
Adams  v.  Rowe,  11  Me.  89,  90,  25  Am.  Dec. 
266. 

LAST  PORT  OF  DISO^ABOE 

See  Final  Port  of  Discharge. 

LAST  FBECEDINO 

The  term  "last  preceding,"  in  a  statute 
providing  that  when  the  common  council  in 
any  city,  having  at  the  "last  preceding"  state 
census  more  than  50,000  inhabitants,  shall 
consider  it  necessary  to  procure  grounds  for 
a  public  market,  such  council  shall  appoint  a 
committee,  refers  to  the  state  census  which 
may  Immediately  precede  in  point  of  time  the 
action  of  the  council,  and  the  law  is  general. 
State  ex  rel.  Board  of  Education  of  City  of 
Minneapolis  v.  Brown,  106  N.  W.  477,  480,  97 
Minn.  402,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  327. 

LAST  PUBLICATION 

In  Comp.  Laws  N.  M.  1897,  |t  2966,  2967, 
relating  to  a  publication  of  a  notice,  and  re^ 
quiring  the  last  publication  at  least  two 
weeks  before  the  return  day,  by  "last  publi- 
cation** the  last  act  of  making  the  notice  pub- 
lic— ^the  last  Insertion  in  a  newspaper  pre- 


scribed-^was  intended,  not  the  last  day  of  tb% 
period  for  which  the  publication  was  direct^ 
ed.  Harrison  v.  Wallia,  90  N.  T.  Snpp.  44, 
49,  44  Mlsa  Bep.  492. 

LAST  SESSIOK 

In  a  statute  providing  that  supervisors 
might,  at  their  last  session  before  regular 
election,  etc.,  "last  session"  means  the  last 
regular  session  appointed  by  law.  It  has  no 
reference  to  special  sessions  called  for  some 
specific  purpose.  The  "session"  includes  the 
entire  sittings  of  the  board,  from  the  meeting 
on  the  first  day  till  the  final  adjournment 
Tuohy  V.  Chase,  30  CaL  524,  527. 

LAST  SIOXHESS 

See  During  Last  Siekness. 

The  term  "last  sickness,"  as  used  in  stat- 
utes of  wills,  means  where  the  testator  is  in 
extremis,  or  overtaken  by  a  sudden  and  vio- 
lent sickness,  and  has  not  time  nor  opportuni- 
ty to  make  a  written  wilL  A  nuncupative 
will  Is  made  "at  the  time  of  the  last  sick- 
ness," as  required  by  Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes 
A  St  I  4605,  though  not  made  when  testator 
is  in  extremis,  or  overtaken  by  sudden  and 
violent  sickness,  and  has  not  time  or  oppor- 
tunity to  make  a  written  will,  where  made 
when  the  last  sickness  has  so  progressed  that 
testator  expects  death,  and  is  liable  to  die 
at  any  time,  and  in  view  of,  and  as  prepara- 
tory to,  such  result,  which  followed,  he  made 
the  verbal  will,  and  this  without  regard  to 
his  opportunity  then  or  afterwards  to  make 
a  written  will.  In  re  Miller's  Estate,  91 
Pac.  967,  47  Wash.  253,  13  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1092,  125  Am.  St  Rep.  904,  14  Ann.  Cas.  1163 
(quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  in  Prince 
V.  Hazelton  [N.  Y.]  20  Johns.  502,  11  Am. 
Dec  307). 

Where  a  verbal  will  is  made  in  the  last 
sickness,  of  which  the  testator  dies,  when 
such  sickness  has  progressed  to  such  a  point 
that  he  expects  death  at  any  time,  and  rea- 
lizes that  he  is  liable  to  die  therefrom  at  any 
time,  and  in  view  of  such  expected  death, 
and  as  preparatory  thereto,  makes  a  will 
near  to  the  time  of  his  death,  such  will  la 
made  in  the  "last  sickness"  of  the  testator, 
although  a  sufficient  time  may  have  inter- 
vened between  the  making  of  the  oral  wiU 
and  the  death  of  the  testator  to  have  per- 
mitted the  making  of  a  written  will.  God- 
frey V.  Smith,  103  N.  W.  450,  455,  73  Neb. 
756, 10  Ann.  Cas.  1128. 

"Last  sickness,*'  as  the  term  Is  used  in 
statutes  allowing  a  verbal  will  to  be  made  in 
the  "last  sickness**  of  the  testator,  does  not 
mean  that  he  must  be  in  extremis  or  artlculo 
mortis,  nor  is  it  necessary  that  he  be  pre- 
vented from  making  a  written  will  by  sur- 
prise of  sudden  death.  The  requirement  is 
satisfied  if  the  disease  of  which  the  testator 
dies  has  progressed  to  such  a  point  that  he 
expects  death  at  any  time  and  is  liable  to 
die  therefrom  at  any  time,  and  in  view  of 
such   expected    death    and    as   preparatory 


IJLTB 


31 


LATERAL 


thereto  snch  will  1b  made,  and  that  there- 
after death  from  such  sickness  does  occur. 
Baird  ▼.  Balrd,  79  Pac.  168,  166,  70  Kan. 
5^,  68  L.  B.  A  627,  8  Ann.  Gas.  812. 

LATE 

The  word  **late,"  as  used  In  an  oflQcer's 
return  of  service  of  the  summons  by  leaving 
at  defendant's  '^ate  place  of  residence" 
means  formerly,  recently,  existing  not  long 
ago.  "Late**  la  defined  as  "existing  not  long 
ago;  not  long  ago  but  not  now.*'  The  term 
**late  place  of  residence"  evidently  meant  the 
place  where  the  defendant  had  recently  re- 
sided but  did  not  then  reside,  and  hence  the 
return  did  not  show  compliance  with  the 
statute  requiring  service  by  leaving  at  de- 
fendant's usual  place  of  residence.  Minneso- 
ta Thresher  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L'Heureux,  118  N.  W. 
566,  666,  82  Neb.  6d2  (quoting  and  adopting 
definitions  in  26  Cyc.  p.  161;   Webst  Diet). 

IiATEIiT  PEHDnrO 

Where  an  exhibit  in  the  record  recited 
that  certain  chancery  causes  were  "lately 
pending"  in  a  certain  circuit  court,  such  re- 
cital did  not  show  that  such  causes  were  still 
on  docket  Scott  v.  Thomas,  61  S.  B.  829, 
831.  104  Va.  380. 

An  order-book  entry  of  final  judgment  is 
eawenttal  to  shpw  in  the  record  on  appeal  ren- 
dition th^eof.  Reference  to  the  cause,  in 
the  clerk's  certificate,  as  one  '^tely  pending" 
in  the  court  below,  is  not  enough.  Ghieago 
Horseshoe  Go.  of  Indiana  ▼.  Ooatlin,  66  N.  B. 
614,  616,  80  Ind.  App.  604. 

LATENT 

"Latent^  means  not  discernible  by  exam- 
ination. Anderson  ▼.  Van  Riper,  128  N.  T. 
Supp.  66,  67. 


LATEXT 


lOUITY 


A  ''latent  ambiguity"  is  one  developed 
by  extrinsic  evidence,  where  the  particular 
words,  In  themselves  clear,  apply  equally 
well  to  two  different  meanings.  Wolff  Truck 
Frame  Go.  v.  American  Steel  Foundries,  105 
Fed.  940,  944,  115  C.  C.  A  628  (citing'  defini- 
tion in  Petrie  v.  Trustees  of  Hamilton  Col- 
lege, 68  N.  E.  216,  158  N.  T.  458). 

A  "latent  ambiguity,"  as  defined  by  Lord 
Bacon,  is  "that  which  seems  certain  and 
without  ambiguity  for  anything  that  appear- 
eth  upon  the  deed  or  Instrument,  but  there 
is  some  collateral  matter,  outside  of  the 
deed,  that  breedeth  the  ambiguity."  If  this 
double  meaning  is  apparent  on  the  face  of 
the  instrument,  then  the  ambiguity  is  a  pat- 
ent one.  If  the  language  is  apparently  not 
of  double  meaning,  but  is  shown  to  be  so 
only  by  the  aid  of  collateral  or  extrinsic 
facts,  the  ambiguity  is  "latent"  OUver  v. 
Henderson,  49  8.  E.  743,  121  Ga  836,  lOi 
Am.  St  Rep.  186  (citing  1  Jarm.  Wills  [Am. 


Notes]  top  p.  743;   Walker  v.  Wells,  26  Oa. 
141,  71  Am.  Dec.  164). 

"Latent  ambiguity"  arises  from  some 
collateral  circumstance  or  extrinsic  matter 
in  a  case  where  the  language  of  the  instru- 
ment is  intelligible.  Barrett  v.  Kansas  & 
Texas  Goal  Go.,  79  Pac.  150, 151,  70  Kan.  649. 

A  "latent  ambiguity"  exists  when,  there 
being  no  defect  in  the  description  on  the 
face  of  the  instrument,  it  becomes  necessary 
to  fit  the  description  to  the  thing — ^in  other 
words,  to  identify  it  by  parol  evidence;  and 
evidence  of  surrounding  circumstances  and 
inferences  from  such  circumstances  are  ad- 
missible to  show  to  which  thing  the  ambigu- 
ous description  applies.  Sherrod  t.  Battle, 
70  S.  B.  834,  888,  154  N.  G.  845. 

"A  latent  ambiguity'  in  a  will,  which  may 
be  removed  by  extrinsic  evidence,  may  arise 
(1)  either  when  it  names  a  person  as  the  ob- 
ject of  a  gift,  or  a  thing  as  subject  to  it, 
and  there  are  two  persons  or  things  that 
answer  such  name  or  description;  or  (2) 
when  the  will  contains  a  misdescription  of 
the  object  or  subject,  as  where  there  is  no 
person  or  thing  in  existence,  or,  if  in  exist- 
ence, the  person  Is  not  the  one  intended,  or 
the  thing  does  not  belong  to  the  testator.*' 
Wheaton  v.  Pope,  97  N.  W.  1046,  1048,  91 
Minn.  299  (quoting  Patch  v.  White,  6  Sup. 
Gt  617,  117  U.  S.  210,  29  L  Ed.  860). 

A  "latent  ambiguity"  is  one  where  the 
equivocality  of  expression  or  obscurity  of  in- 
tention does  not  arise  from  the  words  them- 
selves, but  from  the  ambiguous  state  of  ex- 
trinsic circumstances  to  which  the  words  of 
the  instrument  refer,  and  which  is  suscepti- 
ble of  explanation  by  the  mere  development 
of  extraneous  facts  without  altering  or  add- 
ing to  the  written  language  or  requiring 
more  to  be  understood  thereby  than  will  fair- 
ly comport  with  the  ordinary  or  legal  sense 
of  the  words  and  phrases  used.  Teague  v. 
Sowder,  114  S.  W.  484,  488,  121  Tenn.  132. 

Where  there  is  no  defect  on  the  t&ce  of 
a  will,  but  there  Is  an  uncertainty  in  at- 
tempting to  put  it  into  effect,  the  ambiguity 
is  "latent"  Jennings  t.  Telbert,  68  S.  E. 
420-421,  77  S.  G.  454. 

IsATEWI  BEFEOT 

A  "latent  defect"  Is  one  which  could 
not  have  been  discovered  by  Inspection.  L. 
McManus  Go.  v.  Drexel  Furniture  Go.,  68  S. 
E.  859,  860,  8  Oa.  App.  158. 

A  defect  in  a  roll  of  cloth  sold,  which 
consists  of  holes  in  the  cloth,  is  not  a  latent 
defect,  since  it  is  easily  discoverable.  Strauss 
V.  Salzer,  109  N.  T.  Supp.  784,  736,  68  Misc. 
Rep.  678. 

LATERAL 

In  a  statute  providing  that  a  petition  to 
widen,  deepen,  and  alter  a  ditch  "shall  be 
held  to  include  any  side  'lateral'   spur  or 


LATERAL 


32 


LATERAL  RAILROAD 


branch  ditch,  drain  or  water  conrse  neces- 
sary to  secure  the  object  of  the  Improyement, 
whether  the  same  is  mentioned  therein  or 
not,"  the  word  "lateral"  does  not  quality  the 
words  "branch  ditch,  drain  or  water  course," 
and  therefore,  under  a  petition  to  Improve  a 
ditch  extending  in  a  southerly  direction,  it  is 
proper  to  order  the  construction  of  a  branch 
ditch  commencing  half  a  mile  northeast  of 
the  starting  point  of  the  main  ditch  and  in- 
tersecting the  main  ditch  about  a  hundred 
feet  from  its  starting  point  Omaha  &  N.  P. 
R.  Co.  T.  Sarpy  CJounty,  117  N.  W.  116,  117, 
82  Neb.  140. 

Ses&  Laws  1905,  c  140,  p.  254,  I  1,  re- 
quiring a  "lateral  passageway  of  at  least  900 
feet*'  between  all  flsh  traps,  means  that  erery 
trap  must  be  so  located  that  there  shall  be 
no  other  trap  within  a  distance  of  900  feet 
laterally  therefrom;  and  a  trap  was  not 
properly  located  where  a  parallelogram, 
formed  by  lines  900  feet  long,  projected  at 
right  angles  to  the  ends  of  the  trap  and  lines 
connecting  the  same  drawn  parallel  to  the 
course  of  the  trap  900  feet  on  either  side 
thereof,  intersected  traps  previously  located, 
though  the  trap  in  question  did  not  inter- 
sect similar  parallelograms  of  the  prior 
traps.  Johansen  v.  Mulligan,  83  Paa  417, 
418.  41  Wash.  379. 

JiATEKAL  RAILROAO 

"A  'lateral  road'  is  one  proceeding  from 
some  point  on  the  main  trunk  between  its 
termini.''  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Waters, 
66  Aa  685,  688,  105  Md.  896,  12  L  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  826  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Newhall  v.  Galena  &  0.  U.  R.  Go.,  14  lU. 
273). 

Within  the  meaning  of  section  1  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  (Act  Feb.  4,  1887, 
c  104,  24  Stat  379),  as  amended  by  Act  June 
29,  1906,  c.  3591,  S  1,  34  Stat.  584,  which  pro- 
vides that  "any  common  carrier  subject  to 
the  provisions  of  this  act  upon  application 
of  any  lateral  branch  line  of  railroad 
•  •  •  shall  construct,  maintain  and  op- 
erate upon  reasonable  terms,  a  switch  con- 
nection with  any  such  lateral  branch  line  of 
railroad,"  etc.,  and  further  providing  (as 
amended  by  Act  June  18,  1910,  c.  309,  §  7, 
36  Stat  545)  that,  if  it  fails  to  make  such 
connection  on  application,  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  may,  on  complaint 
and  after  a  hearing,  order  it  done,  whether 
a  road  is  or  is  not  a  "lateral  branch  line  of 
railroad,"  and  entitled  to  invoke  the  powers 
of  the  commission,  depends  on  the  relation 
which  it  bears  to  the  line  with  which  switch 
connection  is  asked,  and  not  upon  its  relation 
to  the  shippers  or  territory.  It  is  such  a  later- 
al branch  when  it  is  tributary  to  and  depend- 
ent on  the  other  line  for  an  outlet,  or  in  oth- 
er words  Is  essentially  a  feeder,  but  not 
when  It  is  in  effect  an  independent  and  com- 
peting line,  although  it  does  not  compete  as 
to  a  portion  of  the  territory  involved,  and 


such  dependent  relation  is  not  established  by 
the  fact  that  it  seeks  the  connection  at  one 
of  Its  terminals.  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R. 
V.  United  States,  195  Fed.  962,  965. 

An  interurban  electric  railway  for  pas- 
sengers and  some  freight,  running  under  a 
state  charter  between  points  in  the  state 
through  the  middle  of  a  diamond-shaped 
area  inclosed  by  two  steam  railways,  and  in 
its  general  course  parallel  to  and  more  or  less 
competing  with  the  steam  roads,  and  work- 
ing on  a  different  plan,  is  not  a  "lateral 
branch  line  of  railroad,"  within  the  meaning 
of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  of  February 
4,  1887,  as  amended  by  the  act  of  June  18, 
1910,  requiring  carriers  subject  to  the  act  to 
establish  switch  connections  with  such  lines 
on  certain  conditions,  and  permitting  owners 
of  such  lines  as  well  as  shippers  to  make 
complaint  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission in  case  of  the  carrier's  failure  upon 
written  application,  and  authorizing  such 
commission  to  hear,  investigate,  and  deter- 
mine whether  such  conditions  exist,  and  to 
make  an  order  directing  the  carrier  to  com- 
ply with  the  act  United  States  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  33  Sup.  Ct  5,  6, 
226  U.  8.  14,  57  L.  Ed.  104. 

Laws  1869,  p.  2399,  c.  917,  ||  8,  4,  under 
which  plaintiif  railroad  company  was  organ- 
ised by  the  consolidation  of  the  N.  and  H. 
Railroad  Companies,  provide  that  the  con- 
solidation shall  not  release  the  new  corpora- 
tion from  any  of  the  restrictions  of  duties 
of  the  several  corporations.  Laws  1846,  p. 
272,  c  216,  creating  the  H.  Company,  author^ 
ized  it  to  construct  a  single,  double,  or  treble 
track  road  between  New  York  and  Albany, 
and  section  1  further  authorized  it  to  con- 
struct the  branches  fbr  depot  and  station 
accommodations  needed  for  its  business. 
Plaintiff  seeks  to  condemn  land  for  35  miles 
of  track  from  its  general  depot  In  New  York 
City  for  an  "additional  main  track,"  and  to 
afford  a  more  expeditious  means  of  handling 
tralBc.  Held,  that  the  charter  contemplated 
such  tracks  as  would  accommodate  the  depot 
conditions  for  a  treble-track  railroad,  and 
the  purposes  of  the  desired  track  In  question 
came  within  the  spirit  of  the  additional  char- 
ter power  to  construct  branches  for  station 
accommodation  needed  for  railroad  business, 
though  it  already  had  treble  tracks  over  the 
same  distance.  So  it  is  true  that  a  lateral 
or  branch  railroad"  usually  contemplates  one 
running  from  some  point  on  the  main  line, 
intended  as  a  connecting  line  or  feeder,  to 
quote  the  American  &  English  Encyclopedia 
of  Law  (volume  18,  p.  561) ;  but  in  the  pres- 
ent case  the  statute  itself  defines  the  branch 
or  branches  to  be  constructed,  and  these  are 
"for  depot  and  station  accommodations,  as 
may  be  required  for  the  business  of  said 
railroad."  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R  R.  Co.  v. 
Untermyer,  117  N.  Y.  Supp.  443,  446,  183 
App.  Div.  146. 


JS^ 


liATERAL  RAILROAD 


LAW 


A  «nateral  railroad"  built  under  the  lat- 
eral railroad  law  (Bums'  Ann.  8t.  1908,  H 
68d8-G40i)  is  governed  by  the  general  rail* 
road  laws  so  £ar  as  applicable,  and  is  sub- 
ject to  goTemmental  regulation.  A  railroad, 
to  be  built  by  a  stone  company,  is  not  de- 
prived of  its  character  as  a  lateral  railroad 
within  the  lateral  railroad  law  (Biums*  Ann. 
8t  1908,  SI  5398-5404),  because  it  is  to  con- 
nect with  a  lateral  road  already  existing, 
where  the  two  roads  together  do  not  exceed 
the  length  fixed  by  the  statutes  and  will  be 
used  as  one  road.  Westport  Stone  Co.  ▼. 
Thomas,  94  N.  B.  406,  409,  175  Ind.  319,  85 
U  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  646. 

The  right  glren  to  a  railroad  company 
chartered  to  construct  a  railroad  from  the 
dty  of  Baltimore  to  the  Ohio  river,  to  con- 
struct "^teral  railroads,"  in  any  direction 
whatever,  in  connection  with  such  railroad, 
is  not,  in  the  absence  of  anything  in  the 
charter  to  that  effect,  limited  to  construction 
of  branches  which  will  be  feeders  for  the 
port  of  Baltimore,  but  authorizes  the  con- 
struction of  a  branch  from  the  main  line  to 
connect  with  another  branch,  so  as  to  take 
around  the  dty  of  Baltimore  freight  going  in 
either  direction,  and  not  intended  for  that 
dty.  Baltimore  ft  O.  R.  Go.  r.  Waters,  66 
AtL  685,  688,  105  Md.  396,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
8.)S2a 

ULTEKAh  SUPPORT 

The  right  of  **lateral  supports  extends 
DO  further  than  to  avoid  negligence  as  to 
land  incumbered  with  buildings.  Sharplees 
T.  Boldt,  67  AtL  602,  658,  218  Pa.  872. 

UUNCH 

As  rigging  and  apparel,  see  Ships'  Rig- 
ging and  AppareL 

LAUNDRY 

See  Occupied  as  a  Steam  Laundry. 

LAUREL 

See  Japanese  LaureL 


LAW 


See  At  Law  and  in  Equity ;  Attorney  at 
Law;  Authorized  by  Law;  Business 
Required  by  Law;  By-Law;  Ck)lor  of 
Law;  Ck>mmerclal  Law;  Common 
Law;  Condusibn  of  Law;  Ck)nflict 
with  General  Law ;  Contrary  to  Law ; 
Court  of  Law;  Criminal  Law;  Cus- 
tody of  the  Law;  Decision  Against 
Law ;  Due  Course  of  Law ;  Due  Pro- 
cess of  Law;  Election  Law;  English 
Law;  Equal  Protection  of  Law;  Er- 
ror of  Law;  Existing  Law;  General 
Law;  Ignorance  of  Law;  Insurance 
Law ;  Intestate  Laws ;  Issue  at  Law ; 
Issue  of  Law ;  Knowledge  ef  the  Law ; 

8  Wns.&  Pih>  8xB.— • 


Learned  in  the  Law;  LtabiUtar  Great* 
ed  by  Law;  Limited  by  Law;  Local 
Law;  Matter  of  Law;  Mistake  of 
Law;  Municipal  Law;  Operation  of 
Law;  Ordinary  Course  of  Law;  Or- 
ganic Law;  Penal  Laws;  Practice 
(In  Law) ;  Practice  of  Law ;  Prescrib- 
ed by  Law  or  Ordinance;  Presump- 
tion of  Law;  Previously  Ascertained 
by  Law;  Provided  by  Law ;  Provisions 
of  Law;  Remedial  Law;  Retrospective 
Law;  Returnable  According  to  Law; 
Revenue  Law;  Seisin  in  Law;  Session 
Laws;  Special  Law;  Specially  Prescrib- 
ed by  Law;  Statute;  Stock  Law;  Sub- 
stantive Law;  Surrender  by  Operation 
of  Law;  Trial  at  Law;  Under  the 
Laws;  Uniform  Operation  of  Laws. 

As  regulation,  see  Regulation. 

Ex  post  facto  law,  see  Ex  Post  Facto. 

Law  of  necessity,  see  Police  Power. 

Otherwise  iHrovided  by  law,  see  Other- 
wise. 

Prohibited  by  law,  or  otherwise,  see  Oth- 
erwise. 

Remedy  at  law,  see  Remedy. 

Similar  law,  see  Similar. 

See,  also,  Act  (In  Legislation). 

''Law,**  according  to  an  ancient  maxim, 
"is  good  sense,  and  what  is  contrary  to  good 
sense  is  not  good  law."  Burke  ▼.  State,  119 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1089,  1009,  64  MiB&  Rep.  668. 

"Law''  is  a  rule  of  civil  conduct  prescrib- 
ed by  the  supreme  power,  says  Bladutone. 
It  can  never  properly  be  a  law,  unless  noti- 
fied to  those  who  are  to  obey  it-  Ingersoll  ▼. 
Goal  Greek  Goal  Co.,  98  a  W.  178,  186,  117 
Tenn.  268,  9  L.  R  A.  (N.  6.)  282,  119  Am. 
St  Rep.  1003,  10  Ann.  Gas.  829  (citing  Green 
Bag,  Oct  1906). 

"Law"  might  be  defined  as  the  aggregate 
of  those  rules  and  principles  of  conduct  pro- 
mulgated by  legislative  authority  or  estab- 
lished by  local  custom,  and  our  laws  are  the 
resultant  derived  from  a  combination  of  the 
divine  or  moral  laws,  the  laws  of  nature 
and  human  experience,  as  such  resultant  has 
been  evolved  by  human  intellect  influenced 
by  the  virtues  of  the  ages.  State  v.  Central 
Lumber  Co.,  123  N.  W.  604,  608,  24  S.  D. 
136,  42  K  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  804. 

"Law"  is  defined  to  be  a  rule  of  dvil  con- 
duct prescribed  by  the  supreme  power  in  a 
state,  commanding  what  is  right  and  prohib- 
iting what  is  wrong.  The  laws  of  a  state 
are  more  usually  understood  to  mean  the 
rules  and  enactments  promulgated  by  legis- 
lative authority  or  long-established  lo^al 
customs  having  the  force  of  law.  Henry 
V.  Cherry  &  Webb,  73  Ati.  97.  105,  30  R.  I. 
13,  24  U  R.  A.  (N.  &)  991,  136  Am.  St  Rep. 
928,  18  Ann.  Gas.  1006. 

"Legislative  power,"  within  Const  art 
4,  I  1  (Ann.  St  1906,  p.  176),  providing  that 
the  legislative  power  shall  be  vested  in  the 
General  Assembly,  is  the  power  to  make  laws; 


LAW 


34 


LAW 


a  "law**  Is  a  rale  of  dvll  condnct  prescribed 
by  the  sapreme  power  of  a  atate;  a  "rule"  is 
distinguished  from  whim,  caprice,  compact, 
agreement,  or  discretion,  and  "prescribed" 
means  that  the  rale  shall  be  manifested  and 
published,  so  as  to  be  known  as  a  rale  of  cir- 
11  conduct  Merchants*  Bzchange  of  St 
Loois  ▼.  Knott,  in  S.  W.  666,  671,  212  BCo. 
616. 

"Law"  is  something  more  than  mere  will 
exerted  as  an  act  of  power.  In  the  lan- 
guage of  Mr.  Webster  in  his  famous  defini- 
tion: "It  is  the  general  law,  the  law  which 
hears  before  It  condemns,  which  proceeds  up- 
on inquiry  to  render  Judgment  after  trial  so 
that  every  citizen  shall  hold  his  life,  liberty, 
property  and  immunities  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  general  rules  which  gorem  soci- 
ety." It  is  not  every  act  of  legislation  in 
form  that  is  law.  Jamison  v.  Wimblsh,  180 
Fed.  361,  368  (quoting  Hurtado  v.  People  of 
California,  4  Sup.  Ct  111,  110  U.  &  636,  28 
L.  Ed.  232). 

The  phrase,  "which  may  by  law  be 
brought  before  him,"  used  in  a  statute  de- 
fining the  offense  of  bribery,  and  making  it 
a  material  element  thereof  that  the  offered 
bribe  shall  be  on  a  question  which  may  by 
law  be  brought  before  the  person  sought  to 
be  bribed  in  his  official  capacity,  means  a 
law  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  offered  bribe. 
State  V.  Butler,  77  Sw  W.  660,  672,  178  Mo. 
272. 

It  is  not  every  act,  legislative  in  form, 
that  is  "law."  "Law**  is  something  more 
than  mere  will  asserted  as  an  act  of  power. 
It  must  be  not  a  special  rule  for  a  particular 
person  or  a  particular  case,  but,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Mr.  Webster,  "the  general  law,  a 
law  which  hears-  before  it  condenms,  which 
proceeds  upon  inquiry,  and  renders  Judg- 
ment only  after  trial,  so  that  every  citizen 
shall  hold  his  life,  liberty,  property,  and  im- 
munities under  the  protection  of  the  general 
rules  which  govern  society,"  and  thus  ex- 
cluding, as  not  due  process  of  law,  acts  of 
attainder,  bills  of  pains,  and  penalties,  acts 
of  confiscation,  acts  reversing  Judgments,  and 
acts  directly  transferring  one  man's  estate 
to  another,  legislative  Judgments  and  de- 
crees, and  other  similar  special,  partial,  and 
arbitrary  exertions  of  power  under  the  forms 
of  legislation.  Arbitrary  power,  enforcing 
its  edicts  to  the  injury  of  the  persons  and 
property  of  its  subjects,  is  not  law,  whether 
manifested  as  the  decree  of  a  personal  mon- 
arch or  of  an  impersonal  multitude.  In  re 
McNaught,  99  Pac.  241.  247,  1  Okl.  Cr.  628 
(qhoting  with  approval  from  Hurtado  v.  Cal- 
ifornia, 4  Sup.  Ct  111,  110  U.  S.  616,  28  L. 
Ed.  232). 

The  rule  that  equity  will  not  reform  a 
deed  on  the  ground  of  mistake  where  the 
mistake  is  one  of  law  applies  only  where  the 
word  "law"  is  used  in  the  sense  of  general 
law,  or  law  of  the  country,  and  does  not  ap- 
ply where  it  is  used  in  the  sense  of  a  private 


right,  for  in  such  case  the  mistake  is  really 
one  of  fact  Marshall  v.  Lane,  27  App.  D. 
a  276,280. 

To  have  the  force  of  "law,"  a  rule  must 
possess  the  quality  of  uniformity  and  uni- 
versality and  must  operate  upon  all  improve- 
ments of  the  entire  political  community  af- 
fected by  it  alike.  "Laws"  are  not  like  gar- 
ments which  citizen  and  Judge  may  put  on 
and  off  at  wllL  A  law  for  a  section  of  the 
state  is  not  a  law  of  the  land,  and  modifica- 
tion of  the  common  law  to  meet  the  condi- 
tions and  wants  of  individuals  in  localities 
would  not  constitute  modifications  to  meet 
the  oonditions  and  wants  of  the  people. 
Nothing  less  than  the  welfare  of  the  whole 
people  can  be  considered,  and  the  sovereign- 
ty of  society  at  large  must  be  behind  the 
adoption  and  enforcement  of  any  rule  or  it 
is  not  law.  Clark  v.  Allaman,  80  Paa  671, 
680,  71  Kan.  206,  70  L.  R.  A.  971  (citing  1 
Black.  Com.  46). 

Regulations  prescribed  by  the  Secretary 
of  Agriculture  for  the  inspection,  disposition, 
etc.,  of  cattle,  sheep,  etc,  and  the  carcasses 
and  meat  food  products  of  cattle  sheep,  etc., 
not  inconsistent  with  Act  Cong.  June  30, 
1906,  c.  3913,  34  Stat  674,  authorizing  such 
regulations,  had  the  force  of  "law."  State 
V.  Peet,  68  Aa  661,  663.  80  Vt  449,  14  L.  B. 
A.  (N.  S.)  677,  130  Am.  St  Rep.  998. 

"  'Law'  is  a  statement  of  the  civcum- 
stanees,  in  which  the  public  force  will  be 
brought  to  bear  upon  men  through  the  courts. 
But  the  word  commonly  is  confined  to  such 
prophecies  or  threats  when  addressed  to  per- 
sons living  within  the  power  of  the  courts. 
A  threat  that  depends  upon  the  choice  of  the 
party  affected  to  bring  himself  within  that 
power  would  be  called  law  in  the  ordinary 
sense.  We  do  not  speak  of  blockade  running 
by  neutrals  as  unlawful.  And  the  usages  of 
speech  correspond  to  the  limit  of  the  at- 
tempts of  the  lawmaker,  except  in  extraordi- 
nary cases.  It  is  true  that  domestic  corpora- 
tions remain  always  within  the  power  of  the 
domestic  law."  Acts  done  by  domestic  cor- 
poration outside  of  the  United  States,  which 
largely  depend  for  their  efficacy  upon  the 
co-operation,  in  a  'conspiracy  to  drive  a  rival 
out  of  business,  of  soldiers  and  officials  in 
Costa  Rica,  acting  under  governmental  sanc- 
tion, in  territory  over  which  that  state  exer- 
cises a  de  facto  sovereignty,  cannot  be  made 
the  basis  of  the  action  to  recover  threefold 
damages  authorized  by  the  Sherman  Anti- 
Trust  Act  of  July  2,  1890  (26  Stat  209,  210, 
c.  647)  8  7,  on  behalf  of  those  injured  in  their 
business  by  reason  of  violations  of  that  stat- 
ute. American  Banana  Co.  v.  United  Fruit 
Co.,  29  Sup.  Ct  611,  612,  213  U.  S.  347,  366^ 
63  L  Ed.  826,  16  Ann.  Oas.  1047. 

Under  Const  art  6,  |  23,  making  the 
county  court  a  tribunal  of  limited  Jurisdic- 
tion, and  after  designating  certain  matters 
of  which  it  shall  have  cognizance  adds  and 


ULW 


» 


ULW 


court  and  criminal  JulBdlctlan  as  may 
be  ooDferied  by  "law,"  and  aectlon  28  of  the 
same  article,  requiring  that  all  laws  relating 
to  courts  shall  be  general  and  of  uniform 
operation  throughout  the  state  and  the  or- 
ganization, Jurisdiction,  powers,  proceedings, 
and  practice  of  all  the  courts  of  the  same 
class  or  grade  so  far  as  regulated  by  "law" 
shall  be  uniform.  The  word  "law,"  as  that 
word  is  used  in  section  23,  obviously  means 
law  which  Is  enacted  by  the  leglslatiTe  de- 
partment of  the  state  govemment  which  the 
Constitution  has  created,  and  "law"  found  in 
section  28  is  of  the  same  character.  Const 
art.  20,  provides  for  the  organization  of  the 
dty  and  county  of  Denver.  By  section  4  of 
the  article  the  people  of  the  new  organization 
are  vested  with  the  exclusive  power  to  make 
their  own  municipal  charter,  and  under  this 
constitutional  authority  a  charter  was  adopt- 
ed. Section  182  of  the  charter  provides  that 
all  cases  of  contested  elections  shall  be  tried 
by  the  county  court,  with  certain  exceptions. 
Const  art  6,  |  23,  makes  of  the  county  court 
a  tribunal  of  limited  jurisdiction,  not  includ- 
ing matters  of  Section  contests.  Section  28 
provides  that  all  laws  relating  to  courts  shall 
be  of  uniform  operation  throughout  the  state. 
Const  art  7,  1 11,  provides  that  the  General 
Assembly  shall  pass  laws  to  secure  the  purity 
of  the  elections.  Section  12  that  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  shall  by  general  law  designate 
the  courts  by  whom  the  election  contests  not 
therein  provided  for  shall  be  tried.  Held, 
that  legislation  relating  to  the  Jurisdiction 
and  procedure  of  the  state  courts  is  exclu- 
sively within  the  purview  of  the  General  As- 
aembly,  and  that  section  182  of  the  charter  is 
void.  Hence  the  county  courts  did  not  have 
Jurisdiction  of  a  proceeding  to  contest  an  elec- 
tion on  the  proposition  of  granting  certain 
franchises  in  the  city  streets.  Williams  v. 
People,  88  Pac.  463,  465,  38  Colo.  497. 

Const  1901,  I  46,  providing  that  no 
*aaw"  shall  be  revived,  amended,  or  the  pro- 
▼laions  thereof  extended  or  conferred,  by  ref- 
erence to  its  title  only,  but  so  much  thereof 
as  is  revived,  amended,  extended,  or  confer- 
red shall  be  enacted  and  published  at  length, 
reaches  only  those  cases  where  the  act  is 
strictly  amendatory  or  revisory  in  its  char- 
acter ;  and  if  a  law  is  in  itself  complete,  in- 
telligible, and  original  in  form,  it  does  not 
fall  within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution. 
Miller  ▼.  Griffith,  64  South.  660,  661,  171 
Ala.    337. 

"There  is  no  merit  in  the  contention  that 
section  222  of  the  Constitution  prohibits  the 
passage  of  a  single  law  covering  the  issuance 
of  bonds,  and  that  it  requires  that  more  than 
one  law  should  be  passed  to  authot^  a  city 
or  town  to  issue  the  bonds.  The  authority 
to  the  Legislature,  given  by  this  section,  is  to 
pass  general  laws  authorizing  counties,  cities, 
towns,  villages,  districts,  or  other  political 
subdivisions  of  counties,  to  issue  bonds;  and 
the  plural  word  laws'  was  employed  mani- 


festly tot  flie  purpose  of  allowing  the  Legla- 
latore  to  pass  a  different  act  for  cities,  towns, 
and  villages,  and  another  act  for  counties 
and  political  subdivisions  of  counties.  If  the 
plural  had  not  been  used,  and  the  Legislature 
had  been  simply  authorized  to  pass  a  gen- 
eral law,  then  It  would  have  been  compelled 
to  pass  one  general  law,  applying  alike  to 
cities  and  counties.  Blakey  v.  City  Council 
of  Montgomery,  39  South.  746,  746,  144  Ala. 
481.  • 

As  doa&estle  laws 

The  statutes  of  a  state  have  no  extrater- 
ritorial force,  and  are  not  "law"  in  another 
states  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term.  Mu- 
tual Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York  y.  Prewitt 
106  S.  W.  463,  465,  127  Ky.  899. 

Bylaws  ef  eorpoxatlom 

That  a  day  fixed  by  the  by-laws  of  a  cor- 
poration for  the  regular  monthly  meeting  of 
the  directors  fell  on  a  holiday  did  not  war- 
rant a  meeting  the  next  day,  where  the  by- 
laws made  no  such  provision;  Civ.  Code,  | 
11,  permitting  an  act  appointed  by  "law  or 
contract"  to  be  performed  on  a  particular 
day,  which  fails  on  a  holiday,  to  be  perform- 
ed on  the  next  business  day,  being  inappli- 
cable. Cheney  ▼.  Canfield,  111  Pac  02,  93, 
168  CaL  842,  32  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  16. 

Oonstttutloiis  and  amendments 

The  word  "law,"  in  Const  1867,  art  2, 
I  17,  declaring  that  a  biU  shaU,  before  it 
becomes  a  law,  be  presented  to  the  Governor, 
etc.,  does  not  include  a  proposed  constitu- 
tional amendment  authorized  by  article  14, 
empowering  the  General  Assembly  to  propose 
constitutional  amendments,  and  a  proposed 
constitutional  amendment  adopted  by  the 
General  Assembly  need  not  be  submitted  to 
the  Governor  for  his  approval.  Warfield  v. 
Vandiver,  60  AtL  638,  640,  101  Md.  78,  4 
Ann.  Cas.  692. 

The  term  "law,"  as  used  in  Const  art 
6,  I  31,  providing  that  no  law  shall  extend 
the  term  of  any  public  officer  after  his  elec- 
tion, does  not  refer  to  the  Constitution  and 
the  will  of  the  people  expressed  at  the  polls 
in  the  matter  of  proposed  amendments  to 
tliat  instrument,  but  relates  to  statutes  enact- 
ed by  the  Legislature.  State  ex  rel.  Teague 
V.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Silver  Bow  County, 
87  Paa  450,  461,  34  Mont  426. 

The  state  and  federal  Constitutions  are 
•laws,"  within  How.  Ann.  St  c.  164,  |  4,  giv- 
ing mutual  benefit  associations  power  to 
make  regulations  for  their  own  government 
not  contrary  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
or  this  state.  Kern  v.  Arbeiter  Unterstuet- 
zungs  Yerein,  102  N.  W.  746,  760,  139  Mich. 
233. 

Beeislons 

Where  a  statute  or  decfsions  of  the  conrts 
authorizes  a  revisal  on  the  ground  that  the 
verdict  is  contrary  to  the  'Taw,"  the  'law" 
referred  to  means  the  **law"  of  that  case  as 


liAW 


86 


liAW 


giren  by  the  court,  whether  right  or  wrong. 
Lynch  y.  Snead  Architectural  Iron  Works, 
U6  8.  W.  603,  695,  696,  132  Ky.  241,  21  U 
IL  A.  (N.  8.)  862. 

A  judicial  decision  is  not  a  "law."  It  is 
merely  evidence  of  what  the  law  is,  and  a 
change  of  decision  is  not  the  promulgation  of 
a  new  law.  Hence  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision as  to  laws  impairing  the  obligations 
of  contracts  does  not  apply  to  judicial  de- 
cisions. Swanson  t.  City  of  Ottumwa,  106  N. 
W.  9, 13,  131  Iowa,  540,  5  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  S60, 
9Ann.  Gas.  1117. 

MiiaioipAl  ordhuatf 

Ordinance  distinguished,  see  Ordinance. 

"Ordinances**  are  mere  rules  or  by-laws 
of  a  municipal  corporation.  Hie  word 
"law"  does  not  ordinarily  include  a  munici- 
pal ordinance.  Wright  y.  City  of  Macon,  64 
8.  B.  807,  813,  5  Oa.  App.  750. 

A  city  ordinance  may  be  considered  a 
law  of  the  state,  within  the  constitutional 
provision  prohibiting  the  state  from  passing 
laws  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts. 
Cumberland  Telephone  ft  Telegraph  Co.  y. 
City  of  Memphis,  198  Fed.  955,  956. 

Though  an  ordinance  of  a  county  re- 
quiring one  engaged  in  the  busineas  of  rais- 
ing cattle  to  pay  a  license  fee  does  not  de- 
nounce failure  to  obtain  the  license  as  a 
crime,  one  so  failing  is  subject  to  prosecution 
by  virtue  of  Pen.  Code,  i  435,  declaring 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  every  person  who 
commences  or  carries  on  any  business  with- 
out procuring  a  license  required  by  "any 
law  of  this  state**  for  the  carrying  on  of  the 
same ;  an  ordinance  being  a  law  within  such 
code  provision.  Ex  parte  Miller,  110  Pac. 
139,  13  Cal.  App.  564. 

In  Ky.  St  I  3096,  as  amended  and  re- 
enacted  by  Acts  1910,  c.  107,  providing  that 
when,  in  any  dty  of  the  second  class  having 
a  street  railway,  the  railway  company  is  re- 
quired by  law  or  its  franchise,  or  by  any 
contract  with  the  dty,  to  pave  any  part  of  a 
street  or  alley,  the  cost  shall  be  assessed 
against  the  company,  the  term  "required  by 
law"  applies  where  the  general  council  pass- 
es an  ordinance  making  the  requirement  and 
such  a  requirement  by  ordinance  is  authoriz- 
ed by  the  act  City  of  Newport  v.  Silva,  137 
8.  W.  546,  549,  144  Ky.  450. 

A  munidpal  ordinance  providing  what 
officer  of  a  municipality  shall  sign  the  certifi- 
cate of  legality  to  be  indorsed  on  munidpal 
bonds  issued  under  authority  of  Rev.  St  1899, 
If  1719-1724,  is  a  provision  of  "law,"  with- 
in the  constitutional  requirement  that  such 
certificate  shall  be  indorsed  on  the  bond  of 
any  county,  etc,  to  be  signed  by  the  coun- 
ty auditor  or  other  officer  "authorized  by 
law.*'  Diefenderfer  y.  State,  83  Pac.  591, 
093, 14  Wyo.  302. 

The  clause  "law  of  this  state,**  as  used 
in  Pen.  Code,  t  436,  providing  that  every 


person  whd  oommenoes  or  cafries  on  any 
business,  eta,  for  the  tranaactloii  or  oarrylng 
on  of  which  a  lioanse  is  required,  by  "any 
law  of  this  state,"  wlttiout  taking  oat  a  U- 
cense  prescribed  by  such  law,  is  guilty  of  a 
misdemeanor,  indudes  a  "county  ordinance.** 
Plumas  County  v.  Wheeler,  87  Pac  900,  913, 
149  CaL  768  (dting  In  re  Lawrence^  11  Pac 
217,  69  Cal.  60$. 

A  complaint  by  a  dty  ffled  in  the  record- 
er's court  of  the  dty  whidi  alleges  that  ac- 
cused committed  the  prohibited  act  within 
the  police  jurisdiction,  contrary  to  law  and 
in  violation  of  an  ordinance  of  the  dty,  charg- 
es a  violation  of  the  ordinance,  for  the  word 
"law**  may  include  an  ordinance,  and  accused 
must  know  that  lie  is  prosecuted  for  a  viola- 
tion of  an  ordinance  of  the  dty.  Dowling  y. 
City  of  Troy,  66  South,  116,  117, 1  Ala.  Appi 
608. 

A  complaint  by  a  dty  by  its  attorn^ 
which  alleges  that  accused  did  the  prohibited 
act  "contrary  to  law**  fails  to  charge  a  vio- 
lation of  a  munidpal  ordinance;  the  phrase 
"contrary  to  law'*  having  been  appropriated 
by  Code  1907,  |  7353,  to  the  definition  in  in- 
dictments of  violations  of  statutes,  and  the 
word  "law,*'  unless  otherwise  qualified  in  a 
penal  proceeding,  presumptively  referring  to 
the  common  law,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
giving  it  another  meaning.  Rosenberg  v. 
aty  of  Selma,  62  South.  742,  743,  168  Ala. 
196. 

Ovder  of  eovvt 

The  term  "by  law,**  as  used  In  Ky.  St 
1903,  I  4129,  providing  that  the  sheriff  shall 
be  collector  of  all  taxes  unless  the  payment 
thereof  is  "by  law*'  directed  to  be  made  to 
some  officer,  means  a  statute  and  does  not 
include  an  order  of  the  fiscal  court  Com- 
monwealth V.  Wade*8  Adm'r,  104  8.  W.  965, 
966,  126  Ky.  791. 

Speeial  laws 

The  word  ''laws,"  in  a  constitutional 
provision  that  all  laws  not  repugnant  to  the 
Constitution  shall  be  continued  in  force  un- 
til they  expire  by  limitation,  etc,  applies  to 
all  special  as  well  as  general  laws.  But- 
ler V.  City  of  Lewiston,  83  Pac  234,  236,  U 
Idaho,  396. 

Statutes  mnd  oommon  law 

The  expressions  "required  by  law,"  "al- 
lowed by  law,"  and  "limited  by  law,*'  and  the 
like,  employed  in  a  statute,  refer  to  statutory 
law.  People  v.  Knapp,  132  N.  Y.  Supp.  747, 
750,  147  App.  Div.  436. 

A  plea  averring  that  arbitrators  were 
sworn  according  to  the  law  is  not  subject  to 
the  objection  that  it  omits  to  aver  that  the 
arbitrators  were  sworn  in  accordance  with 
av.  Code  1896,  |  516,  since  the  term  "Uw,**  if 
unqualified,  except  in  cases  involving  penal 
matters,  embraces  legislative  enactments,  as 
well  as  the  common  law.    Tennessee  Coal* 


LAW 


37 


LAW  OF  THS  OASB 


Iron  ft  R.  Co,  ▼.  RoasscU,  46  South.  866»  870, 
XS5  Ala.  435,  130  Am.  St  Bep.  66. 

The  term  '*laws»"  in  Const  art  8,  Test- 
ing the  legislatiTe  power  in  the  Senate  and 
House  of  RepresentatiYes,  constituting  togeth- 
er the  General  Assembly,  and  d^larlng 
that  the  style  of  their  "laws"  shall  he,  etc., 
denotes  action  of  the  General  Assembly  in  its 
legislatiTe  capacity,  and  their  style  must  be 
that  of  enactment,  and  they  are  the  outcome 
of  a  bill  for  an  act  which  has  been  presented 
to  the  GoTemor  for  his  approTal.  McGoTem 
▼.  Mitchell,  68  Aa  433,  441,  78  Conn.  686. 

The  word  "laws,"  as  used  in  the  federal 
statute  denouncing  conspiracies  to  commit  of- 
fenses against  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
means  statutory  laws.  United  States  t. 
Thomas,  145  Fed.  74,  70. 

It  is  a  general  rule  of  eonstmction  that 
where  an  act  of  the  G^ieral  Assembly  re- 
fers to  the  *1aws"  of  its  own  state,  the  ex- 
pression will  be  held  to  refer  to  statute  law, 
rather  than  to  unwritten  law,  unless  the  con- 
text requires  a  different  construction;  and 
especially  is  this  true  of  acts  which  are  them- 
selTes  In  derogation  of  the  common  law. 
Southern  Bell  Telephone  A  Telegraph  Co.  ▼. 
Beftch,  70  &  B.  187,  188,  8  Qa.  App.  720  (cit^ 
Ing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  pp.  4021,  4022). 

UBooBstltiitiomal  aet 

"An  unconstitutional  act  Is  not  a  law. 
It  confers  no  rights.  It  Imposes  no  duties. 
It  affords  no  protection.  It  creates  no  of- 
fense. It  is  in  legal  contemplation  as  inop- 
eratlTe  as  though  it  had  neTor  been  passed." 
Wright  T.  DSTis,  48  a  B.  170,  172,  120  Ga. 
670  (quoting  Norton  t.  Shelby  County,  6  Sup. 
Ct  1121,  118  U.  S.  425,  80  L.  Ed.  178). 

ULJXr  DAT 

"Foreclosure"  and  "law  day"  are  synony- 
mous in  the  sense  that  it  is  the  time  when 
the  mortgagor  declares  a  default  and  sub- 
mits his  case  to  a  court  of  competent  Juris- 
diction. The  word  "foreclosure,"  as  used 
with  reference  to  the  rule  under  which  a 
mortgage  is  discharged  by  a  tender  before 
foreclosure,  must  be  talien  in  the  meaning 
which  is  commonly  and  generally  accepted 
by  the  laity,  as  well  as  by  the  bar ;  Qiat  is, 
the  institution  of  a  suit  or  the  "law  day," 
as  contradistinguished  from  the  *1aw  day"  of 
the  common  law.  Murray  t.  O'Brien,  106 
Pac.  840,  844,  66  Wash.  361,  28  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
8.)  996. 

ImAW  MEBOSAirr 

See,  also,  Commercial  Law. 

There  is  no  presumption  that  the  so- 
called  "law  merchant,"  taken  as  a  Taguely 
defined  portion  of  the  common  law  or  in  its 
widest  interpretation  of  the  law  of  European 
countries  hsTing  the  Roman  and  the  Prankish 
law  for  its  parents,  preTails  in  other  coun- 
tries.  Aslanian  t.  Dostumian,  54  N.  B.  845, 
846^  174  Mass.  328,  47  L.  Ri  A.  495,  75  Am.  St 


Rep.  348  (citing  and  adopting  SaTage  ▼• 
O'Neil,  44  N.  Y.  298,  300,  301 ;  Owen  t.  Boyle, 
15  Me.  147,  32  Am.  Dec.  143 ;  Flato  t.  Mul- 
hall,  72  Mo.  522;  2  Starkie,  Et.  [4th  Am. 
Ed.]  568;  Whart.  Bt.  f|  314,  315,  1292; 
Smith,  Merc.  Law  [10th  Ed.]  Introduction). 

LAW  OF  THE  0A8E 

The  opinion  dellTcred  on  a  former  ap- 
peal is  the  "law  of  the  case."  Hooker  t. 
LouiSTille  ft  N.  R.  Co.  (Ky.)  96  S.  W.  526, 
527. 

"The  doctrine  of  law  of  the  case'  extends 
only  to  the  questions  squarely  presented  and 
distinctly  passed  upon  on  the  former  appeaL" 
Hunter  t.  Porter,  77  Pac  484,  439,  10  Idaho, 
86. 

A  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  ap- 
peal, is  the  "law  of  the  case"  on  a  subse- 
quent trials  whether  right  or  wrong.  Neary 
T.  Northern  Paa  By.  Co.,  110  Pac.  226,  235, 
41  Mont  480. 

A  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  ap- 
peal Is  the  "law  of  the  case^'  gOTeming  the 
trial  court  on  a  subsequent  triaL  Berger  t. 
Metropolitan  Press  Printing  Co.,  Ill  Pac.  872, 
61  Wash.  85. 

The  phrase  "law  of  the  case,"  as  applied 
to  the  effect  of  a  decision  of  an  appellate 
court  in  an  earlier  appeal  in  the  same  case, 
merely  expresses,  in  the  absence  of  statute, 
the  practice  of  courts  generally  to  refuse  to 
reopen  what  has  been  decided,  and  not  a  lim- 
it to  their  power.  Messinger  t.  Anderson,  32 
Sup.  Ct  739,  740,  225  U.  S.  436,  56  L.  Ed. 
1152. 

The  opinion  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  Is 
the  "law  of  the  case"  on  the  subsequent  trial. 
South  CoTington  &  C.  St  Ry.  Co.  t.  Schilling 
(Ky.)  89  S.  W.  220.  221. 

The  "law  of  the  case"  is  a  rule  of  expedi- 
ency, which  should  not  be  lightly  disregard- 
ed ;  but  it  should  be  restricted  to  such  ques- 
tions as  hsTo  been  presented  to  and  decided 
on  the  former  appeal,  and  those  necessarily 
iuTolTed  in  such  decision,  and  should  not  ap- 
ply to  a  mere  expression  of  opinion  in  regard 
to  matters  not  actually  iuTolTed  in  the  de- 
cision, nor  should  it  apply  to  questions  re- 
ferred to  by  intimation  only,  and  not  deter- 
mined. First  Nat.  Bank  of  Hastings  t. 
Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Bank  of  Platte  Cen- 
ter, 95  N.  W:  1062.  1064.  2  Neb.  (Unof.)  104. 

The  decision  of  certain  questions  by  a 
District  Court  of  Appeal,  with  a  Tiew  to  fur- 
ther proceedings  in  the  case,  only  concurred 
in  by  two  of  the  Justices  of  such  court,  does 
not  constitute  '*the  law  of  the  case'*  for  fur- 
ther proceedings.  Turner  t.  Fidelity  Loan 
Concern,  83  Pac.  70,  2  Cal.  App.  122. 

The  cTidcnce  on  retrial  being  substantial- 
ly the  same  as  on  the  first  trial,  the  decision 
on  the  questions  presented  on  the  former  ap- 
peal is  the  "law  of  the  case"  on  a  subsequent 
appeal.    Teakle  t.  San  Pedro.  L.  A.  &  S.  L. 


LAW  OF  THE  CASE 


88 


LAW  OF  THE  CASE 


R.  Co.,  102  Pac.  635,  637,  86  Utah,  29  (dtlng 
5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4024). 

A  decision  on  appeal  that,  upon  the  facts 
in  the  record,  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  be- 
comes the  "law  of  the  case"  on  a  subsequent 
appeal,  wherein  the  record  discloses  a  sub- 
stantially unchanged  set  of  fact&  Thuis  ▼. 
City  of  Vincennes,  73  N.  B.  1098,  85  Ind.  App. 
350. 

On  the  first  appeal  of  a  suit  concerning 
the  title  to  land,  the  qfiestion  involved  was: 
Did  a  decree  in  a  former  suit  to  correct  a 
deed  to  the  land  by  striking  therefrom  the 
words  *'her  bodily  heirs,'*  inserted  after  the 
name  of  the  grantee,  finding  that  the  deed 
should  be  so  corrected  and  the  master^s  deed 
made  pursuant  to  that  decree,  to  correct  the 
former  deed,  devest  the  plaintiffs,  T.  and  S., 
bodily  heirs  of  the  original  grantee,  of  the 
fee-simple  title  thereof?  And  it  was  held 
that  the  decree  was  inoperative,  and  that 
the  master's  deed  did  not  devest  these  plain- 
tiffs of  the  fee-simple  title,  but  that  it  still 
remained  in  them.  On  a  second  appeal  the 
question  presented  was:  Did  the  court  prop- 
erly decree  upon  the  cross-bills  filed  after 
the  case  was  reinstated,  on  the  evid^ice  sub- 
mitted to  it,  that  the  deed  should  be  correct- 
ed, and  in  correcting  it  and  decreeing  the  fee- 
simple  title  to  the  land  to  be  in  defendants, 
the  remote  grantees  of  the  original  grantee? 
Held,  that  the  decision  of  the  court  on  the 
first  appeal  is  not  conclusive  against  the 
rights  of  the  defendants  on  the  second  ap- 
peal, since  the  question  presented  for  deter- 
mination is  not  the  same.  Teel  v.  Dunnihoo, 
82  N.  E.  844,  847,  230  IlL  476,  120  Am.  St 
Rep.  319. 

A  decision  on  a  former  appeal  is  the 
"law  of  the  case"  as  to  all  questions  then 
decided,  so  far  as  the  facts  remain  the  same; 
the  court  on  a  subsequent  appeal  being  enti- 
tled to  look  to  the  report  of  the  former  ap- 
peal to  determine  to  what  extent  the  rule 
applies.  Gipe  v.  Pittsburgh,  0.,  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  82  N.  B.  471,  472,  41  Ind.  App.  156. 

A  holding  on  appeal  that  plaintiff's  evi- 
dence entitled  him  to  have  the  issues  sub- 
mitted to  the  Jury  is  not  conclusive  that 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  go  to  the  Jury  on  a 
retrial,  but  that  question  depends  on 
the  evidence  introduced  on  retrial.  Hartley 
V.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  E..398,  399,  214 
lU.  78. 

That  principle  of  the  "law  of  the  case," 
when  applicable  to  a  subsequent  appeal  of 
the  same  case,  is  limited  to  decisions  on  a 
prior  appeal  on  points  necessary  to  a  deter- 
mination of  the  cause.  City  of  RushviUe  v. 
Rushville  Natural  Gas  Co.,  78  N.  B.  87,  89, 
164  Ind.  162,  3  Ann.  Gas.  86. 

Where,  in  an  action  at  law  tried  to  the 
court,  the  facts  were  in  dispute,  a  submitted 
proposition  as  the  *law  of  the  case,"  which 
was  a  mixed  proposition  of  law  and  fact, 


was  properly  refused.  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co. 
V.  Seitz,  73  N.  E.  585,  586,  214  IlL  350,  106 
Am.  St  Rep.  108. 

Where,  in  an  action  by  a  servant  for  in- 
juries, the  cause  was  reversed  on  appeal  on 
the  ground  that  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  con- 
tributory negligence,  as  shown  by  his  testi- 
mony that  he  was  not  looking,  at  the  time  of 
the  injury,  at  the  piece  of  machinery  which 
caused  the  injury,  but  on  the  next  trial  he 
testified  that  he  was  looking  at  it  the  hold- 
ing on  the  former  appeal  was  not  the  "law  of 
the  case"  on  the  next  appeal/  Buehner 
Chair  Co.  v.  Feulner,  78  N.  E.  816,  817,  164 
Ind.  368. 

Where  the  only  question  involved  or 
decided  on  a  former  appeal  was  the  suffi- 
ciency of  an  answer  setting  up  the  statute 
of  limitations  as  a  defense,  and  no  question 
as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  complaint  was 
disclosed,  but,  after  the  case  ^as  remanded, 
plaintiff  filed  an  amended  complaint  which 
was  not  shown  to  be  substantially  the  same 
as  the  original,  the  ruling  on  the  former  ap- 
peal that  the  answer  was  insufficient  was  no 
bar  to  a  subsequent  objection  to  the  suffi- 
ciency of  such  amended  complaint  Stafford 
V.  St  John,  73  N.  B.  596.  600,  164  Ind.  277. 

The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  ou 
appeal  on  a  will  contest  as  to  the  insufficien- 
cy of  the  evidence  to  overthrow  the  will  1b 
the  "law  of  the  case^'  on  those  facts.  West- 
fall  V.  Wait,  73  N.  EL  1089,  1091,  165  Ind.  353, 
6  Ann.  Caa  78a 

The  ''law  of  the  case"  does  not  mean  the 
application  of  the  recognized  rules  of  law  to 
the  proven  facts  but  is  a  precise  application 
of  the  law  as  laid  down  by  the  trial  Judge 
and  if  erroneous  is  ground  for  reversal, 
though  given  at  the  request  of  the  complain- 
ing party.  Weeks  v.  Auburn  &  S.  Electric 
Ry.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  Supp.  636,  637,  60  Misc. 
Rep.  400. 

Where  the  instructions  of  the  court 
on  the  second  trial  of  a  cause  conform  to 
the  opinion  on  appeal  from  the  Judgment 
on  the  first  trial,  it  is  not  error  to  refuse 
requested  instructions.  Where,  on  the  fire^ 
trial  of  a  cause,  a  peremptory  instruction 
was  not  given  or  requested,  and  that  question 
was  not  presented  on  appeal,  the  propriety 
of  giving  a  peremptory  instruction  on  the 
second  trial  must  be  determined  by  the  evi- 
dence, without  reference  to  the  opinion  of 
the  appellate  court.  Miller  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.  (Ky.)  89  S.  W.  183,  184. 

The  rule  of  the  "law  of  the  case"  has 
no  application  to.  questions  of  fact,  so  that 
nothing  said  on  a  former  appeal  as  to  the 
facts  can  bind  the  trial  court  or  be  conclusive 
on  a  second  ap];>eal.  Where,  in  an  action  on 
a  policy,  the  Supreme  Court  reversed  a  Judg- 
ment in  favor  of  plaintiff,  and  remanded  the 
cause  for  new  trial,  holding  that  the  policy 
was  void  for  breach  of  a  condition,  and  that 


LAW  OV  THB  CASK 


39 


I4AWS  OP  THE  OOUNTUT 


tbe  facts  proved  did  not  establish  a  waiver 
thereof,  such  Jadgnient  was  not  res  Judicata 
of  the  issue  of  waiver  on  the  retrial  at 
which  the  evidence  was  materially  different 
Hartford  Fire  Ina  Ck>.  v.  Bnoch,  96  S.  W. 
393,  394,  79  Ark.  475. 

The  decision  of  the  appellate  court  will 
be  followed  on  a  subseQuent  appeal,  where 
the  record  therein  supports  the  conclusion 
reached  on  the  prior  appeal.  Malone's  Ck>m- 
mittee  v.  Lebus  (Ky.)  96  8.  W.  519,  521. 

Under  Acts  1903,  p.  55,  c.  39,  making  it 
the  duty  of  the  court  to  charge  the  law  of 
the  case,  "the  law  of  the  case"  means  the 
substantial  issues  of  the  case.  Gibson  & 
Cunningham  v.  Purifoy,  120  S.  W.  1047,  56 
Ter.  Civ.  App.  879. 

''According  to  the  more  rigid  rule,  an 
expression  of  opinion,  however  deliberate  up- 
on a  question,  however  fully  argued,  if  not 
essential  to  the  disposition  that  was  made  of 
the  case,  may  be  regarded  as  a  dictum ;  but 
it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  said  that  it  is  diffl- 
colt  to  see  why,  in  a  philosophical  point  of 
▼lew,  the  opinion  of  the  court  is  not  as  per- 
suasive on  all  the  points  which  were  so  in* 
volved  in  the  cause  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
counsel  to  argue  them,  and  which  were  de- 
liberately passed  over  by  the  court,  as  if 
the  decision  had  hung  upon  but  one  point" 
Bouvier.  Where,  in  an  action  on  a  contrac- 
tor's bond  for  the  construction  of  a  high 
school,  the  constitutionality  of  the  Code  pro- 
vision providing  for  such  bonds,  and  the 
validity  of  the  bond  in  question  given  there- 
xuider,  were  directly  presented  and  decided 
by  the  court,  to  the  effect  that  the  bond  was 
enforceable  as  a  common-law  bond  voluntari- 
ly given,  regardless  of  the  validity  of  the 
statute,  such  decision  was  not  obiter,  but  con- 
stituted the  "law  of  the  case'*  and  was  con- 
clusive on  the  parties  on  a  subsequent  ap- 
peaL  People's  Lumber  Co.  v.  Gillard,  90 
Paa  556.  557,  5  Cal.  App.  435. 

The  doctrine  of  the  "law  of  the  case" 
presupposes  error  in  the  enunciation  of  a 
principle  of  law  applicable  to  the  fact^  of  a 
case  under  review  by  an  appellate  tribunal, 
but  the  ruling  adhered  to  in  the  single  case 
where  it  arises  is  not  carried  iuto  other 
cases  as  a  precedent.  Allen  v.  Bryant,  100 
Pac.  704,  705,  155  Cal  256. 

"The  doctrine  of  the  'law  of  the  case*  is 
this :  That  where  the  Supreme  Court,  in  de- 
ciding an  appeal,  states  in  its  opinion  a  prin- 
ciple of  law  or  rule  necessary  to  the  ded- 
elon,  that  principle  or  rule  becomes  the  'law 
of  the  case,'  and  must  be  adhered  to  through- 
out its  subsequent  progress,  both  in  the 
lower  opurt  and  upon  subsequent  appeal, 
*  *  *  and  this,  although  in  its  subse- 
qu^it  consideration  this  court  may  be  clear- 
ly of  the  opinion  that  the  former  decision 
is  erroneous  in  that  particular."  Wester- 
feld  V.  New  York  U  Ins.  Co.,  107  Pac  699, 


700,  157  Cal.  839  (quoting  Tally  v.  Oanahl,  90 
Pac.  1049,  1050,  151  Cal.  418,  421). 

The  rule  of  the  *1aw  of  the  case"  is  ap- 
plicable only  where  the  same  matters  de* 
t^rmined  in  a  previous  appeal  are  Involved 
in  a  subsequent  appeal,  and  a  Judgment  on 
appeal  sustaining  a  demurrer  to  a  complaint 
is  not  conclusive  on  a  sul^^uent  appeal, 
where  the  facts  alleged  are  different  and 
present  different  questions  of  law.  Flood  v. 
Templeton,  92  Pac.  78,  63^  152  CaL  148,  13 
U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  579. 

ULW  OF  OOHTRAOT 

"The  *law  of  contract*  may  be  described 
as  the  endeavor  of  the  state,  a  more  or  less 
imperfect  one,  by  the  nature  of  the  case,  to 
establish  a  positive  sanction  for  the  expec- 
tation of  good  faith  which  has  grown  up  in 
the  mutual  dealings  of  men  of  average  right- 
mindedness.**  Viles  V.  Barre  &  M.  Traction 
&  Power  Co.,  66  AtL  104,  105,  79  Vt  811 
(quoting  and  adopting  Williston's  Wald's  Pol. 
Cont  1). 

I<AW8  OF  THE  OOUVTBT 

See  Ck>nformably  with  the  Laws. 

The  treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Argentine  Republic  of  July  27,  1853 
(article  9, 10  Stat  1009),  provides  that  if  any 
citizen  of  either  of  the  two  contracting  par- 
ties shall  die  without  will  in  any  of  the  ter- 
ritories of  the  other,  the  Consul  General  or 
consul  of  the  nation  to  which  decedent  be- 
longed, or  the  representative  of  such  Consul 
Cfeneral  or  consul,  may  intervene  in  the  pos- 
session, administration,  and  judicial  liquida- 
tion of  decedent's  estate,  conformably  with 
the  laws  of  the  country,  for  the  benefit  of  the 
creditors  and  legal  heirs.  Held,  that  the 
phrase  "laws  of  the  country,"  so  far  as 
the  United  States  is  concerned,  means  the 
local  laws  of  administration  and  procedure 
of  the  respective  states,  and  qualifies  the 
right  and  the  method  of  intervention,  as  well 
as  the  procedure  after  intervention  takes 
place,  so  that  if  a  consul  intervenes  he 
must  do  so  in  the  manner,  to  the  extent,  and 
for  the  purpose  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the 
jurisdiction  where  the  property  is  situated, 
and  the  Italian  Consul  General,  under  the 
treaty  of  May  8,  1878,  between  Italy  and 
the  United  States  (article  17,  20  Stat  732), 
providing  that  the  respective  Consuls  Gen- 
eral, eta,  shall  enjoy  in  both  countries  all 
the  rights  which  are  or  may  hereafter  be 
granted  to  the  officers  of  the  same  grade  of 
the  most  favored  nation,  would  not  have 
the  right  to  be  appointed  administrator  of 
the  estate  of  a  subject  of  Italy  resident  in 
California,  leaving  property  there  with  his 
heirs  resident  in  Italy,  in  view  of  the  Cali- 
fornia law  providing  that  the  public  admin- 
istrator of  the  county  shall  officiate  in  such 
a  case.  In  re  Ghio's  EsUte,  108  Pac  516, 
518, 157  CaL  552, 37  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  549,  137 
Am.  St  Bep.  146, 


LArW  OF  HIB  RKSIDENOfi 


40        LAW  OF  TfiB  UNITED  STATES 


I.AW  OF  HIS  BBSll>Elf€B 

Code  Civ.  Proc.   i  390,  proTldes  that, 
where  a  cause  of  action  not  inroMng  real 


United  States  is  entltied  to  priority,  insol- 
vency laws  are  "laws  of  the  states,"  altfaongh 
their  operation  is  suspended  by  the  bank- 


estate  within  the  state  accrues  against  a  non-   ruptcy  act    In  re  Bennett,  153  Fed.  673,  687, 
resident,  an  action  cannot  be  brought  there- !  82  C.  C.  A.  631  (citing  In  re  Wright,  06  Fed. 


on  in  the  state  after  the  expiration  of  the 
time  limited  by  the  "law  of  his  residence^' 
for  bringing  a  like  action.  Held,  that  the 
phrase  "law  of  tils  residence"  means  the  law 
of  the  debtor's  residence  at  the  time  the 

cause  of  action  accrued,  and  not  the  time  

when  the  action  was  commenced.    Utah  Nat   the  priorities  must  be  determined  by  the  laws 


807). 

The  phrase  "laws  of  the  states,"  as  used 
in  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1808,  providing  for  the 
payment  of  debts  owing  to  any  person  who, 
by  the  "laws  of  the  states,"  or  the  United 
States,  is  entitled  to  priority,  means  that 


Bank  v.  Jones,  06  N.  Y.  Supp.  338^  330,  100 
App.  Div.  526. 


LAW  OF  THE  LAND 

See  Due  Process  of  Law. 

LAW  OF  HE0ES8ITT 

The  "law  of  necessity,"  as  applied  to  the 


of  the  particular  state  where  the  proceeding 
is  pending,  and  not  by  the  laws  of  all  the 
states  together.  In  re  P.  J.  Potter's  Sons, 
143  Fed.  407,  411. 

A    county    ordinance   regulating    sheep 

grazing,  and  imposing  a  license  tax  thereon 

/is  a  law  of  this  state"  within  Pen.  Code,  | 

power  to  punish  for  contempt.  Is  the  law  of   4^»  providing  that  every  person  commencing 


self-defense.  People  ex  reL  Attorney  Gen-  ^^  carrying  on  any  business  for  wlilch  a  U^ 
eral  v.  News-Times  Pub.  Co.,  84  Pac.  012,  ■  ce^^se  ^  required  by  any  "law  of  this  state," 
067,  35  Colo.  253  (adopting  definition  in  !  without  taking  out  or  procuring  the  license 
Thomas,  Constructive  Contempt).  prescribed,  is  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.    Plu- 


LAW  OF  THE  BOAD 

The  custom  of  the  road,  and  the  law 
founded  on  it,  to  go  to  the  right  of  the  cen- 
ter  of  the   road  in   order   to   safely   pass 


mas  County  v.  Wheeler.  87  Pac.  000,  018,  140 
Cal.  768;  Sierra  County  v.  Flanigan,  87  Pae 
013,  140  CaL  760  (citing  In  re  Lawrence^  U 
Paa  217,  60  CaL  608). 

Municipal  ordinances  are  "laws  of  the 


governs  the  case  of  vehicles  passing  on  the  state,"  within  the  provisions  of  Pen.  Code, 
same  side  of  the  roads  and  streets  so  wide  fi  435,  making  it  a  misdemeanor  for  a  per- 
that  there  is  no  necessity  for  them  to  turn  ^  son  to  carry  on  any  calling  for  the  transac- 
tion of  which  a  license  is  required  by  any 
law  of  the  state,  without  taking  out  or  pro- 
curing the  prescribed  license.  Bx  parte 
Sweetman,  00  Pac.  1060,  1070,  5  Cal.  App. 
677 ;  Ex  parte  Bagshaw,  03  Pac  864,  865, 152 
CaL  701. 


to  the  right  of  the  center  line  in  order  to 
pass  safely.  Wright  v.  Fleischman*  86  N. 
Y.  Supp.  62,  41  Blisc.  Rep.  533. 

LAW  OF  THE  STATE 

The  "laws  of  a  state"  are  sudi  enact- 
ments as  its  Legislature  promulgates,  and 
as  expounded  by  its  courts,  and  a  state  stat- 
ute has  such  meaning  as  the  judicial  depart- 
ment of  the  state  construes  it  to  have,  though 
without  such  judicial  construction  the  fed- 
eral courts  might  from  its  language  construe 
it    differently.    Commonwealth    v.    Interna- 


LAW  STXTDEKT 

See  Student 

LAW  OF  THE  UlflTEB  STATES 

Congressional  enactments  having  gener- 
al application  throughout  the  United  States, 


^.1>"''^^^*''7®^i?''  «;  ''^n^'^''^^'^  ^i^  \ll'   and  not  the  purely  local  laws  of  the  District 
703,  706,  131  Ky.  551,  133  Am.  St  Rep.  256; !  ^f  (Columbia,  are  what  are  meant  by   the 


American    Tobacco    Ck).    v.    Commonwealth 
(Ky.)  115  S.  W.  755,  756. 

A  provision  in  a  note  that  the  same  shall ! 
be  construed  by  the  "laws  of  the  state"  of 
Kansas  means  the  statute  of  the  state  with  ' 


provision  of  the  Federal  Judicial  Code,  | 
250,  for  the  appellate  review  in  the  Federal 
Supreme  CJourt  of  judgments  and  decrees  of 
the  court  of  appeals  of  the  District  in  cases 
in  which  the  construction  of  "any  law  of 
reference  to  negotiable  instrument  and  the   the  United  States'*  is  drawn  in  question  by 


rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  thereto, 
and  does  not  comprehend  the  decisions  of 
local  courts  construing  like  contracts  that 
had  been  or  might  thereafter  be  announced, 
nor  can  it  be  expended  so  as  to  make  the  de- 
cisions of  the  local  courts  the  governing  law 
with  respect  to  the  construction  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  mortgage  given  to  secure  such 
note.  Eeene  Five  Cent  Sav.  Bank  v.  Reid, 
123  Fed.  221,  227,  50  C.  C.  A.  225. 


Within  the  provision  of  Bankr.  Act,  i 
64b(5),  giving  priority  to  debts  owing  to  any  j  gard  of  such  regulations* 
person  who  by  the  laws  of  the  state  or  the  '  160  Fed.  154, 162. 


the  defendant  American  Security  &  Trust 
Co.  V.  Commissioners  of  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 32  Sup.  Ct  553,  554,  224  U.  &  401,  56 
L.  Ed.  856. 

The  phrase,  "laws  of  the  United  States," 
as  used  in  the  removal  acts,  authorising  re- 
moval of  a  cause  arising  under  the  laws  of 
the  United  States,  means  acts  of  (Congress, 
and  does  not  include  executive  rules  and  reg- 
ulations, unless  a  recovery  of  damages  is 
expressly  authorized  by  statute  for  a  disre- 

Beck  y.  Johnson, 


LAW  OF  THE  UNITKP  STATES         il 


LAWFUL  BUSINESS 


The  laws  enacted  by  a  territorial  Legla- 
Uiture,  subject  to  dlsapproyal  by  Congress* 
are  not  ''laws  of  tbe  United  States,*'  and  a 
snlt  arising  onder  them,  as  where  a  corpora- 
tion organized  under  them  is  a  party  to  th^ 
suit,  does  not  arise  under  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  a  federal  court  has  no 
jurisdiction  on  that  grouzid.  Maxwell  v. 
Federal  Gk>ld  ft  Ck>pper  Ck>.,  155  Fed.  110, 112, 
83  C.  C.  A.  570. 

X.AW8,    BUItES,    AWP    BSOtrUkTIOHS 
GOVEBNINO  THE  8O0IETT 

A  certificate  in  a  mutual  benefit  associa- 
tion, requiring  that  members  should  comply 
with  all  "laws,  rules,  and  regulations  govern- 
ing the  society/'  or  that  might  be  thereafter 
enacted  for  its  government,  related  to  by- 
laws enacted  to  control  the  internal  manage- 
ment of  the  association,  and  did  not  include 
a  by-law  by  which  the  society  attempted  to 
limit  its  liability  on  aU  outstanding  certif- 
icates to  an  amount  not  exceeding  one-half  of 
the  amomit  the  association  had  contracted 
to  pay  on  the  death  of  members  in  good 
standing.  Bomstein  v.  District  Qrand  Lodge 
No.  4  Independent  Order  B'nal  B'rith,  84 
Pac.  271-276,  2  OaL  App.  624. 


I.AW7UI. 

See  Shall  be  LawfnL 
See,  also,  Legal. 

Where  plaintiffs  alleged  that,  being  the 
owners  of  certain  capital  stock  in  defendant 
company,  they  deposited  it  with  the  com- 
pany, to  be  sold  by  defendant  and  the  pro- 
ceeds used  in  paying  its  debts,  in  considera- 
tion of  an  agreement  that  plaintiffs  should 
hold  certain  offices  of  defendant  until  its 
business  should  be  in  successful  operation, 
that  defendant  violated  its  agreement  and 
ejected  plaintiffs  from  tbe  offices,  and  had 
sold  and  issued  the  stock  to  others,  and 
refused  and  failed  to  deliver  it  to  plaintiffs, 
or  to  pay  plaintiffs  the  value  thereof,  though 
requested  to  do  so,  there  could  be  no  recov* 
ery  as  on  a  contract,  as  the  alleged  contract 
was  illegal  under  Civ.  Code,  |  431,  requiring 
directors  of  a  corporation  to  be  elected  an- 
nually by  the  stockholders  or  members,  and 
section  2240,  declaring  that  which  is  con- 
trary to  an  express  provision  of  the  law 
not  "lawful."  Glass  v.  Basin  &  Bay  State 
Mln.  Co.,  77  Pac  302,  804,  31  Mont  21. 

Itesal,   adequate,   aad  reasoaalile  syn- 


1015,  1019,  177  Mo.  ee9  (quoting  wltH  ap^ 
proval  from  State  v.  Bulling,  15  S.  W.  867, 
16  S,  W.  830,  106  Mo.  204). 


In  speaking  of  the  provocation  neces- 
sary to  arouse  the  heat  of  passion,  which 
would  result  in  reducing  the  crime  to  man- 
slaughter, "this  court  has  held  that  iawful,' 
legal/  'adequate,'  and  'reasonable,'  when 
used  as  adjectives  qualifying  'provocation,' 
are  synonyms ;  and,  as  a  general  rule,  with 
very  few  exceptions,  it  takes  an  assault  or 
personal  violence  to  constitute  this  provoca- 
tion." State  V.  He^th,  121  S.  W.  149,  154, 
221  Mo.  565;   State  v.  McKenzie,  76  S.  W. 


UkWFin.  ACT 

The  words  "lawful  act,"  as  used  in  Pen. 
Code  1895,  i  684,  providing  that  if  any  per- 
son in  the  performance  of  a  lawful  act  shall 
by  negligence  and  carelessness  causie  the 
death  of  another  he  is  guilty  of  negligent 
homicide  of  the  first  degree,  is  defined  by 
article  685  as  an  act  not  forbidden  by  the 
penal  law,  and  which  would  give  no  just 
occasion  for  a  dvil  action.  Gorden  v.  State 
(Tex.)  90  S.  W.  636.  637. 

LAWFUL  AXTTHOBITT 

See  Proper  and  Lawful  Authority. 

Plaintiff's  superintendent  visited  the 
land  on  which  defendants  were  claimed  to 
have  committed  a  trespass  in  cutting  timber, 
and  on  each  of  the  visits  stopped  at  defend- 
ants' camp.  On  his  first  visit  the  superin- 
tendent pointed  out  the  section  or  lot  lines 
to  the  foreman  of  defendant  company  and 
requested  him  to  keep  an  accurate  account 
of  all  timber  he  might  cut  A  like  request 
was  made  of  defendant  S.,  who  was  presi- 
dent and  general  manager  of  defendant  com- 
pany. Held,  sufficient  to  show  that  plaintiff 
acquiesced  in  the  cutting  and  removing  of  the 
timber,  subject  to  defendants'  accounting  for 
its  actual  value,  and  that  it  was  not  cut 
without  "lawful  authority,"  within  Rem.  & 
Bal.  Code,  §  939,  authorizing  a  recovery  of 
treble  damages  for  the  cutting  of  timben 
without  lawful  authority,  etc.  Lytie  Log- 
ging &  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Humptullps  Driving 
Co.,  Ill  Pac.  774,  775,  60  Wash.  559. 

LAWFUL  BEHETIOIABT 

The  word  "lawful,"  as  used  in  a  benefit 
certificate,  providing  that  the  beneficial  as- 
sociation would  pay  to  the  beneficiary  a  cer- 
tain sum  of  money,  provided  he  was  the 
"lawful"  beneficiary  of  the  member  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  means,  according  to  the 
laws  of  the  beneficial  association,  that  plain- 
tiff should  be  at  the  time  of  the  member*s 
death  within  the  order  of  family  relation- 
ship to  the  beneficiary  mentioned  in  the  char- 
ter. Davln  V.  Davin,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  1012, 
1014,  114  App.  Div.  896. 

LAWFUL  BUSINESS 

In  Business  Corporations  Law,  |  2,  au- 
thorizing the  formation  of  stock  corporations 
for  any  lawful  business,  "lawful  business" 
means  one  lawful  to  all  who  engage  in  it  and 
does  not  include  the  business  of  practicing 
law;  the  right  to  practice  law  being  in  the 
nature  of  a  franchise  from  the  state  confto- 
red  only  for  merit.  In  re  Co-operative  Law 
Co.,  92  N.  B.  15,  16, 198  N.  Y.  479,  32  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  55,  139  Am.  St.  Bep.  839, 19  Ann.  Cas. 
879. 


liAWFUL  CHASTISEMENT 


42 


LAWFUL  DCFEKSB 


IJLWFUXi  OHASTISEMEIIT 

Wh^e  the  paniahment  inflicted  by  a  pax^ 
ent  on  a  child  Is  so  ezcesslye  and  cruel  as 
to  show  that  the  parent  was  not  acting  In 
good  teith  for  the  benefit  of  the  child,  the 
parent  Is  guilty  of  an  onlawfol  assault,  and 
cannot  justly  his  act  by  claiming  that  the 
punishment  inflicted  was  a  'lawful  chastise- 
ment" ;  but  so  long  as  a  parent  acts  in  good 
faith,  honestly  thinking  that  what  he  does  is 
for  the  benefit  of  the  child,  he  is  within  his 
prerogatlye,  and  the  law  will  not  Interfere. 
State  y.  Koonse,  101  S.  W.  189,  141,  123  Mo. 
App.  666. 

LAWFUL  CHILD 

Where  a  will  provided  that  the  property 
given  to  one  of  the  devisees  diould,  if  he 
died  without  lawful  children,  go  to  the  heirs 
of  another  devisee,  an  adopted  child  of  the 
devisee  first  mentioned  was  not  a  'lawful 
child,**  within  the  meaning  of  the  wllL  Coch- 
ran V.  Cochran,  96  S.  W.  781,  782,  48  Tez. 
ay.  App.  269. 

LAWFUL  CLAIM 

A  good  faith  dlaim,  appearing  to  be  for- 
midable and  founded  on  grounds  haying  the 
appearance,  though  false,  of  a  paramotmt 
title^  is  not  covered  by  a  warranty  against 
lawful  claims,  but  such  a  warranty  is  in- 
tended to  cover  real  claims  and  not  claims 
only  appearing  real.  An  outstanding  legal 
title  is  within  a  covenant  of  warranty  against 
"lawful  claims,"  and  If  asserted,  is  a  "law- 
ful claim,'*  though  an  eviction  may  be  avoid- 
ed by  showing  a  superior  equity.  Mackenzie 
v.  Clement,  129  S.  W.  780,  731,  144  Mo.  App. 
114. 

LAWFUL  OOUBSE 

A  bond  recited  that  plaintiff  lumber  and 
oil  company  had  a  claim  on  certain  timber 
in  litigation  which  had  been  attached  in  a 
certain  suit  against  the  S.  Lumber  Company, 
and  provided  that  in  consideration  of  the  re- 
lease of  the  attachments,  and  that  plaintiff 
would  not  litigate  its  rights  in  8U<di  suit,  the 
obligors  bound  themselves  to  pay  any  inter- 
est which  plaintiff  might  have  in  the  timber 
to  be  determined  by  any  lawful  course. 
Held,  that  a  lawful  course  for  determining 
plaintiff's  interest  was  by  suit  on  the  bond; 
plaintiff  not  being  required  to  establish  first 
its  Interest  in  the  timber  by  suit  against  the 
S.  Lumber  Company.  Camp  v.  Capital  Min- 
ing, Lumber  A  Oil  Co.  (Ky.)  128  S.  W.  323, 
324. 


LAWFUL  GURREHOT 

See  Lawful  Money. 

An  indictment  charging  theft  from  the 
person  of  *'two  dollars  in  money,  lawful  cur- 
rency of  the  United  States  of  America  and 
of  the  value  of  two  dollars,"  was  sustained 
by  proof  of  the  theft  of  two  dollars  in  silver ; 
the  term  "currency,"  or  "lawful  currency," 


being  suflUdently  broad  to  Include  gold  and 
silver,  as  well  as  paper  money.  Brlttatn  v. 
State,  106  8.  W.  817,  819,  820,  62  Tex.  Cr.  B. 
109. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  in  an  in- 
dictment for  the  larceny  of  money  It  is  suf- 
ficient to  allege  the  larceny  of  the  same^  with- 
out specifying  the  denomination  or  kind  there- 
of, an  indictment,  charging  accused  with  steal- 
ing money  "lawful  currency  of  the  realm" 
(X.  e.,  of  the  United  States),  to  the  amount 
and  value  of  $20  or  more,  sufficiently  de- 
scribes the  money,  to  constitute  larceny, 
within  Ey.  St  1903,  i  1194,  punishing  lar- 
ceny  of  money  of  the  value  of  $20  or  more. 
Todd  V.  Com.  (Ky.)  93  S.  W.  631,  632  (citing 
Commonwealth  v.  Mann  [Ky.]  14  S.  W.  686; 
Jones  V.  Commonwealth,  13  Bush  [76  Ky.) 
356;  Travis  v.  Conmionwealth,  27  S.  W.  863, 
96  Ky.  77). 

Where  a  theft  is  charged,  and  the  alle- 
gation is  general  that  the  money  taken  was 
lawful  current  money  of  the  United  States, 
the  evidence  must  show  that  it  was  legal 
tender  coin  or  legal  tender  currency  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  nickel  is  legal  tender 
under  the  provisions  of  U.  S.  CSomp.  St  1901, 
p.  2349.  Blade  v.  State,  79  S.  W.  811,  46 
Ter.  Or.  B.  107. 

LAWFUL  DEBT 

"A  *debt'  is  defined  as  'that  whidi  is  due 
from  one  person  to  another,  whether  money, 
goods,  or  services;  that  which  one  person 
is  bound  to  pay  to  or  to  perform  for  anothtf , 
that  which  one  is  obliged  to  do,  or  suffer.' " 
Plaintiff's  husband  gave  his  bond  for  the  pay- 
ment of  money,  securM  by  a  mortgage  on 
his  farm,  in  which  plaintiff  Joined.  The 
husband  died,  devising,  the  farm  to  plaintiff, 
who  deeded  it  to  her  son,  who  assumed  and 
agreed  to  pay  the  mortgage,  but  failed  to 
do  so.  On  the  death  of  the  son,  without  is- 
sue, his  widow,  having  a  dower  in  trust  in 
the  farm,  executed  a  quitclaim  deed  of  it  to 
plaintiff  and  the  other  heirs,  subject  to  de- 
cedent's "lawful  debts,"  which  plaintiff  as- 
sumed and  agreed  to  pay.  Held  that,  since 
plaintiff  did  not  sign  the  bond  and  was  not 
personally  liable  for  the  mortgage  debt,  the 
covenant  of  her  son  to  pay  it  was  not  en- 
forceable against  him,  and  hence  the  cove-' 
nant  in  the  deed  from  his  widow  to  plaintiff 
did  not  obligate  plaintiff  to  pay  the  debt;  a 
claim  not  enforceable  at  law  not  being  a 
"lawful  debt"  Bonhoff  v.  Wiehorst,  108  N. 
Y.  Supp.  437,  441,  57  Misc.  Rep.  456  (quoting 
and  adopting  definition  in  Imp.  Diet. ;  citing 
Latimer  v.  Veader,  46  N.  Y,  Supp.  823,  20 
App.  Dlv.  426). 

LAWFUL  DEFEH8E 

By  the  words  "lawful  defense  of  the  per- 
son" is  meant  what  is  sometimes  termed 
self-defense.  Robinson  y.  Territory,  85  Pac. 
451,  456,  16  OkL  241. 


LAWFUL  DUTY 


48 


LAWFUL  F£NCS 


ZkAWfuii  duty 

In.Bev.  St.  |  6461,  urtiidi  makes  it  a 
criminal  offense  to  give  or  offer  bribes,  etc., 
to  Induce  any  officer  of,  or  person  acting  lor 
9r  on  behalf  of,  the  United  States  in  any  offi- 
cial function  to  do  or  omit  to  do  any  act  in 
violation  of  his  lawful  duty,  the  phrase  *'law- 
ful  duty**  is  not  restricted  to  a  duty  imposed 
by  statute,  but  is  broad  enough  to  cover  a 
duty  imposed  by  a  lawful  superior;  and  an 
indictment  charging  a  conspiracy  to  induce 
an  assistant  statistician  in  the  Department 
of  Agriculture  to  furnish  to  the  accused  ad- 
vance news  of  crop  conditions,  and  to  cause 
to  be  published  false  reports  as  to  such  con- 
ditions in  violation  of  the  rules  of  the  depart- 
ment, to  aid  defendants  in  market  specula- 
tions, by  promising  such  employ^  a  percent- 
age of  the  profits  of  such  speculations,  charg- 
es a  conspiracy  to  commit  an  offense  against 
the  United  States  under  Rev.  St  §  5440. 
United  States  v.  Haas,  1^  Fed.  908,  910. 

Regulations  of  the  Agricultural  Depart- 
ment having  forbidden  the  giving  out  of  any 
statement  relating  to  the  business  of  the  de- 
partment without  the  approval  of  the  chief 
of  the  bureau,  and  secrecy  having  been  im- 
posed on  all  employ^  by  the  established  us- 
age and  practice,  Indictments  charging  bri- 
bery of  an  associate  statistician  of  the  Bureau 
of  Statistics  of  the  Department  of  Agricul- 
taie  to  divulge  the  contents  of  the  current 
cotton  crop  report  In  advance  of  its  official 
publication  stated  an  offense  under  Bev.  St 
I  5461,  making  it  a  crime  to  bribe  any  per- 
son acting  for  the  United  States  in  any  offi- 
cial function  to  do  or  commit  any  act  in  vio- 
lation of  his  lawful  duty.  Haas  v.  Henkel, 
166  Fed.  621,  627. 

LAWFUL  EKTBT 

The  expression  that  the  "entry  must  be 
lawful*'  means,  not  that  It  must  have  been 
effected  under  a  formal  right  capable  of  en- 
forcement by  legal  proceedings,  but  that  it 
must  not  be  through  any  unlawful  or  wrong- 
ful act,  upon  which  the  mortgagee  would  be 
estopped  to  found  a  right  Stouffer  v.  Har- 
lan, 74  Pac.  610,  613,  68  Kan.  185,  64  L.  B. 
A.  320,  104  Am.  St  Bep.  396. 


LAWFUL  EXOU8E 

That  provision  for  alimony  made  by  a 
Nevada  court  is  not  enforceable  against  the 
husband,  a  resident  of  California,  because  no 
jurisdiction  of  his  person  was  acquired,  does 
not  constitute  a  lawful  excuse  within  Pen. 
Code,  i  270,  which  makes  It  an  offense  for 
a  parent  to  willfully  omit  without  lawful  ex- 
cuse to  furnish  necessary  food,  etc.,  for  his 
cfaUd.  Ex  parte  McMuUin,  126  Paa  368,  370, 
19  Cal.  App.  48L 

LAW  BXPEirSBS 

Other  lawful  expenses,  see  Other. 


LAWFUL  FENCE 

See,  also»  liSgal  and  Sufficient  Fences 
A  fence,  posts  oi  Thl<di  are  rotted  off.  Is 
not  a  lawful  fence  within  Rev  St  1899,  i 
8295,  providing  that  in  a  county  where  swine 
are  restrained  from  running  at  large  a  fence 
composed  of  three  barbed  wires,  stretched 
on  posts,  firmly  set  in  the  ground,  not  more 
than  16  feet  apart  shall  be  a  lawful  fence. 
Smith  V.  Chicago  A  A.  Ry.  Co.,  105  S.  W.  10, 
12,  127  Mo.  App.  160. 

Under  Sev.  St  1899,  i  1105,  requiring 
a  railroad  company  to  construct  and  main- 
tain fences  sufficient  to  prevent  stock  getting 
on  the  track,  an  instruction,  in  an  action 
under  such  section  for  injuries  to  stoc^ 
which  defined  a  lawful  fence  as  one  sufficient 
''to  resist  hoirses,  cattle*  swine,  and  like 
stock,'*  was  not  erroneous  for  using  the 
phrase  'to  resist" ;  such  phrase  not  being  as 
strong  as  the  phrase  "to  prevent*'  in  the 
statute.  Hax  v.  Qulncy,  O.  A  K.  C.  R.  Co., 
100  8.  W.  696,  60S,  128  Mo.  App.  172. 

Rev.  St  1899,  §  3295,  providing  for  the 
construction  of  fences  sufficient  to  prevent 
swine  from  running  at  large,  composed  of 
wire  4  feet  high  and  posts  16  feet  apart,  re- 
ferred to  outside  fences  other  than  those  re- 
quired of  railroads,  so  that  a  fence  conform- 
ing to  such  specifications,  constructed  by  an 
adjoining  landowner  along  a  railroad  right 
of  way,  did  not  constitute  a  "lawful  fence,** 
for  the  building  of  which  the  landowner 
could  recover  from  the  railroad  under  Rev, 
St  1899,  §  1105  (Ann.  St  1906,  p.  945).  Sharp 
V.  Qulncy,  O.  A  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  123  S.  W. 
507,  508,  139  Mo.  App.  525. 

The  petition  in  an  action  for  damages  to 
growing  crops  from  trespassing  stock  alleged 
that  the  premises  were  situated  in  a  subdiyl- 
sion  where  hogs,  etc.,  were  prohibited  from 
running  at  large,  and  were  inclosed  by  a  law- 
ful fence  under  the  statute  when  the  tres- 
passes occurred,  and  described  the  stock  law 
district  by  metes  and  bounds,  and  further  al- 
leged that  in  the  event  that  plaintifTs  fence 
was  not  in  strict  compliance  with  the  statute, 
nevertheless  it  was  sufficient  to  keep  out  all 
stock  sought  to  be  excluded  of  an  ordinary 
disposition,  and  not  of  a  fence-breaking  na- 
ture. Held,  that  the  petition  alleged  a  com- 
mon-law  liability  based  on  the  stock  owner's 
negligence  in  knowingly  permitting  vicious 
animals  to  run  at  large,  as  well  as  the  statu- 
tory liability  based  upon  plaintiff's  main- 
tenance of  a  'lawful  fence,"  within  the  stat- 
ute. Posey  V.  Coleman  (Tex.)  133  S.  W.  937, 
939. 

Sayles'  Ann.  Olv.  St  1897,  art  2496,  re- 
quires every  farmer,  etc.,  to  make  a  sufficient 
fence  at  least  five  feet  hi^  which  shall  be 
hog-tight,  around  his  cleared  land.  Article 
2497  permits  one  injured  by  the  trespass  of 
cattle  or  other  stock  to  complain  to  a  Justice 
of  the  peace,  who  shall  appoint  two  free- 
holders to  ascertain  the  sufficiency  of  the 


Lawful  fencb 


44 


LAWFUL  HSIR8 


taioe  and  the  damages,  and,  If  It  appears  that 
the  fence  was  sufficient,  the  owner  of  the 
stock  shall  he  liable  for  the  damages.  Article 
2498  author!^  the  impounding  of  trespass- 
ing stock  for  a  second  offense  when  the  owner 
of  the  premises  deems  it  necessary  for  his 
protection.  Article  2499  exempts  the  stock 
owner  from  liability  if  the  fence  be  insuf- 
ficient Sayletf  Ann.  CLy.  St  1897,  art  4998, 
as  amended  by  Acts  1901,  c.  123,  provides 
that  any  fence  in  a  locality  which  has  stat- 
utory restrictions  upon  the  running  at  large 
of  stock  which  is  sufficient  to  ieep  out  or- 
dinary stock  permitted  to  run  at  large  under 
the  chapter  shall  be  deemed  a  lawful  fence, 
and  requires  all  such  fences  to  be  four  feet 
high.  Held,  that  the  statutes  were  enacted  to 
give  lanaowners  complying  with  their  re- 
quirements as  to  fences  a  special  remedy  for 
damages  by  trespassing  stock,  irrespective 
of  negligence.  Posey  v.  Coleman  (Tex.)  133 
S.  W.  937,  939. 

Under  Code  Civ.  Proc  c  44,  providing 
that  a  corral  fence  exclusively  for  the  pur- 
pose of  inclosing  stacks,  if  outside  of  any 
lawful  inclosure,  shall  be  sufficient  and  law- 
ful if  it  is  not  less  than  15  feet  distant  from 
the  stacks,  is  substantially  built  with  posts 
not  more  thau  8  feet  distant  from  each  other 
and  with  not  less  than  5  strands  of  barbed 
fence  wire  and  not  less  than  5  feet  high,  and 
that  any  other  kind  of  fence  which  is  as 
effective  for  the  purpose  of  a  fence  as  that 
above  prescribed  is  lawful  and  sufficient,  a 
fence  the  posts  of  which  were  17  or  18  feet 
apart,  which  approached  the  stacks  in  places 
within  6  feet,  consisted  of  but  4  strands  of 
barbed  wire,  and  was  only  46  inches  high, 
was  not  a  'iawful  fence/*  Johnson  v.  Rick- 
ford,  122  N.  W.  386,  389,  18  N.  D.  268. 

Rev.  St  1899,  i  1973,  defining  a  lawful 
fence,  and  providing  that  unless  the  fence 
comes  up  to  the  requirements  any  person 
may  have  a  right  of  action  for  damages  re- 
sulting from  injuries  to  his  live  stock  from 
such  illegal  fence,  refers  to  what  is  termed  a 
"lawful  inclosure,"  and  does  not  create  a 
liability  on  the  railroad  company  for  the  kill- 
ing of  live  stock  in  collision  with  a  train, 
where  such  stock  strayed  onto  the  right  of 
way  because  of  a  defect  in  the  railroad's 
right  of  way  fence.  Martin  v.  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Pac.  1025,  15  Wyo.  493. 

LAWFUL  HEIRS 

See  Personal  and  Lawful  H^r. 
Devise  to  lawful  heirs  as  devise  to  class, 
.  see  Class. 

The  word  "lawful"  before  the  word 
"heir"  in  a  devise  does  not,  in  the  absence  of 
a  contrary  intent  clearly  indicated  in  the 
will,,  mean  "legitimate,"  but  means  simply 
the  pofrson  designated  by  law  to  take  by  de- 
scent Harrell  v.  Hagan,  69  8.  E.  909-911, 
147  N.  C.  Ill,  126  Am.  St  Rep.  539. 

"Children"  are  embraced  within  the  term 
"lawful  heirs,"  but  the  word  is  not  per  se 


descriptive  of  the  whole  line  of  lawful  heirs. 
ReiUy  y.  Bristow,  66  Aa  262,  264,  105  Md. 
326. 

The  word  "lawful,"  qualifying  the  word 
"heirs,"  is  not  sufficient  per  se  to  show  an 
intention  not  to  use  the  word  "heirs"  in  its 
ordinary  legal  sense  as  a  word  of  inheritance 
or  of  limitation.  Wool  v.  Fleetwood,  48 
S.  n.  786,  789.  136  N.  O.  460,  67  L.  B.  A.  444. 

The  words  "lawful  heirs,"  as  used  in  a 
will  whereby  the  testator  bequeathed  his 
residuary  estate  to  his  lawful  heirs,  without 
other  or  further  designation  as  to  who  are  in- 
tended as  his  beneficiaries,  and  directed  that 
the  same  should  be  equally  divided  among 
his  lawful  heirs,  share  and  share  alike,  de- 
scribed all  the  persons  who,  at  the  time  of 
the  death  of  the  testator,  answered  the  de- 
scription of  lawful  heirs  and  were  entitled 
to  share  in  the  residuary  estate,  regardless 
of  the  degree  of  their  relationship  to  the  tes- 
tator, and  resort  must  be  had  to  the  statute 
in  order  to  determine  who  were  the  legal 
h^s  of  the  testator.  Mooney  v.  Purpos,  70 
N.  B.  894,  896,  70  Ohio  St  57. 

In  construing  a  will  using  the  words 
"legal  heirs"  and  "lawful  heirs,"  the  words 
"legal"  and  "lawful"  do  not  modify  or  change 
the  legal  effect  of  the  word  "heirs."  Btlsser 
V.  Stlsser,  85  N.  £.  240,  242,  235  IlL  207. 

In  oommon  parlance,  the  terms  "heirs  at 
law"  and  **lawful  heirs"  are  used  indiscrim- 
inately as  synonymous  and  convertible  terms, 
and,  whenever  either  is  used,  they  invariably 
refer  to  the  heirs  on  whom  descent  is  cast  by 
law,  and  not  to  an  heir  by  adoption.  The 
relation  of  an  heir  by  adoption  is  an  excep- 
tional and  unusual  one,  and  does  not  come 
within  the  ordinary  and  usual  meaning  of  the 
words  "lawful  heirs,"  and  those  words  ought 
not  to  be  held  ex  vi  termini  to  include  an 
adopted  heir.  Hockaday  v.  Lynn,  98  S.  W. 
585,  589,  200  Mo.  456,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  117, 
118  Am.  St  Rep.  672,  9  Ann.  Cas.  775  (citing 
Reinders  v.  Koppelman,  7  S.  W.  288,  94  Mo. 
338). 

A  devise  to  the  testator's  'lawful  heirs" 
should  be  construed  as  referring  to  those  who 
are  such  at  the  testator's  death,  unless  a  dif- 
ferent intent  is  plainly  manifested  by  the 
will.  Hill  V.  Hill,  132  N.  W.  738,  789,  90 
Neb.  43,  38  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  19a 

A  devise  of  land  to  testator's  children, 
subject  to  the  provision  that  the  share  of 
any  child  dying  without  issue  of  his  body 
shall  descend  to  the  survivors  of  the  chil- 
dren, or  the  lawful  h^rs  surviving  any  of 
the  children,  gives  to  the  diildren  an  estate 
in  fee,  defeasible  as  to  each  on  his  dying 
without  leaving  lawful  issue,  and  on  the 
death  of  a  child,  without  issue  surviving,  his 
interest  passes  to  the  surviving  children  or 
grandchildren  surviving  any  of  the  children ; 
the  words  "lawful  heirs"  meaning  surviving 
children  and  grandchildren  of  the  devisees, 


tiAWFUIi  HEIBS 


45 


IiAWFUIi  ISSUE 


who  take  and  hold  as  purchasers  directly 
from  testator.  Smith  v.  EUlngton-Gnj  Tim- 
ber Ck>.,  71  S.  B.  445,  446.  156  N.  G.  889. 

Under  a  will  giving  all  the  testator^s 
land  to  his  son  for  life  with  remainder  to 
his  "lawful  heirs  bom  of  his  wife,"  the  son 
did  not  take  a  fee  under  the  rule  In  Shel- 
ley's Case  so  as  to  glre  his  widow  a  dower 
therein.  The  words  "bom  of  his  wife,"  qual- 
ifying and  explaining  his  "lawful  heirs," 
confining  the  remainder  to  the  children  of  his 
wife,  and  preventing  the  operation  of  the 
rule.  The  superadded  words  show  that  the 
devisor  Intended  to  make  the  words  'law- 
ful heirs"  deslgnatlo  personarum;  that  Is, 
they  show  an  intention  on  his  part  to  limit 
the  remainder  over  to  a  particular  class  of 
heirs.  Thompson  v.  Crump,  50  S.  B.  457,  188 
N.  C.  82,  107  Am.  St  Rep.  514. 

Testatrix  adopted  defendant  In  1880,  but, 
aside  from  recording  of  the  deed,  no  public 
recognition  of  the  relationship  appears,  testa- 
trix having  assumed  no  authority  over  de* 
fendant  who  continued  to  reside  with  her 
natural  parents  and  other  relatives  until  her 
marriage.  In  1905  testatrix  made  a  will  giv- 
ing defendant,  who  was  designated  '*my 
young  friend,"  |100.  After  various  other 
dispositions,  the  will  provided  that  the  resi- 
due of  the  estate  should  go  to  testatrix's 
"lawful  heirs,"  excepting  specified  nephews. 
Held,  that  defendant  Is  not  entitled  to  share 
under  the  residuary  clause.  Warden  v. 
Overman,  185  N.  W.  649,  652,  156  Iowa,  1. 

Where  a  testator  deVlses  a  parcel  of  real 
estate  to  his  son  for  life  with  remainder  to 
his  lawful  helr%  and  the  son  marries  after 
the  death  of  the  testator,  held,  that  upon  the 
death  of  the  son,  the  wife  takes  as  heir, 
where  there  is  nothing  In  the  will  tending  to 
show  that  the  testator  used  the  words  "law- 
ful heirs"  In  a  different  sense  from  their 
strict  technical  Import.  Miller  v.  Miller,  29 
Ohio  Cir.  Ot  R.  451,  454. 

In  a  devise  to  the  testator's  grandson  of 
a  tract  of  land,  and^lf  he  should  die  without 
"lawful  heirs  of  his  body"  then  to  the  tes- 
tator's granddaughter,  does  not  limit  the  es- 
tate of  the  grandson  to  a  life  estate  where 
he  had  heirs  of  his  body,  but  merely  creates 
a  conditional  estate  in  the  granddaughter 
by  way  of  executory  devise  or  shifting  use. 
Sessoms  v.  Sessoms,  66  S.  E.  687,  688,  144 
N.  C.  121  (dtlng  Smith  v.  Brisson,  90  N.  a 
284;  Morrlsett  v.  Stevens,  48  S.  B.  661,  186 
N.  C.  160;  Jones  v.  Ragsdale,  53  S.  E.  842, 
141  N.  C.  200;  Whitfield  v.  Garrls,  42  S.  B. 
568,  181  N.  C.  148,  reafilrmed  in  45  S.  E.  904, 
184  N.  C.  24;  criticising  Bird  v.  GUllam,  28 
S.  B.  489,  121  N.  C.  328;  X>aws6n  V.  Quiu- 
nerly,  24  S.  E.  483, 118  N.  C.  188;  Thompson 
T.  Crump,  50  S.  B.  457,  188  N.  0.  32,  107 
Am.  St.  B^.  51^. 

A  grantor  executed  a  deed  to  his  son, 
granting  the  property  to  him  during  his  natu- 
ral life,  and  at  his  death,  then  to  his  lawfully 


constituted  heirs.  Held,  that  the  term  "law- 
fully constituted  helis"  was  merely  a  tauto- 
logical way  of  referring  to  his  lawful  h^rs 
at  his  death;  and  that  the  grantee  took  a 
llfto  estate,  with  remainder  to  those  who 
should  comprise  the  class  known  as  the  gran- 
tee's heirs  at  his  death.  Bradley  v.  Uoif, 
147  8.  W.  1012,  1014,  248  Mo.  95. 

A  testator  gave  his  wife,  for  life,  all  of 
his  estate,  and  provided  that  after  her  death 
It  should  go  to  his  eldest  daughter  for  life. 
He  then  declared  that  after  the  daughter's 
death  such  portion  of  his  estate  as  might 
remain  should  be  equally  divided  between 
his  lawful  heirs.  Held,  that  the  testator 
meant  by  the  term  "lawful  heirs"  those  per- 
sons who  at  his  death  were  entitled  to  In- 
herit his  Intestate  real  estate.  In  re  Cow- 
ley's WIU,  97  N.  W.  930, 931,  120  Wis.  263. 

IlAWFUXi  usite 

See  Die  Without  Lawful  Issue  Surviv- 
ing. 

The  term  "lawful  Issue"  Is  not  a  techni- 
cal term,  and  when  used  In  a  deed  does  not 
necessarily  bring  the  deed  under  the  rale  In 
Shelley's  Case,  like  the  word  "heirs,"  which 
Is  always  a  technical  word,  necessarily  bring- 
ing the  deed  under  the  rule  regardless  of  In- 
tention. Hopkins  V.  Hopkins,  114  8.  W.  678, 
676. 

Am  oUUtm  bova  la  wedloek 

After  death  of  testator  and  probate  of 
his  win,  devising  land  In  New  York  to  B.  for 
Ufe,  and  on  his  death  to  his  "lawful  issue," 
Acts  Mich.  1881,  p.  48,  No.  55,  and  Laws  N. 
Y.  1895,  p.  818,  c.  531,  declaring  that  the 
subsequent  marriage  of  the  parents  shall 
legitimatize  their  children  previously  bora, 
were  passed.  Prior  to  either  act,  and  while 
B.  had  a  lawful  wife,  M.,  by  whom  he  had 
children,  he  had  children  by  another  woman, 
S.,  and,  after  enactment  of  the  Michigan 
act,  he,  In  an  action  in  that  state  In  which 
Jurisdiction  was  not  acquired  of  M.,  a  resi- 
dent of  New  York,  and  on  grounds  not  recog- 
nized by  the  laws  of  New  York  for  divorce, 
obtained  a  decree  of  divorce;  and  there- 
after In  Michigan  there  was  a  marriage  cere- 
mony between  him  and  S.  Subsequently,  in 
an  action  In  New  York  by  M.  against  B.  for 
separation,  there  was  a  decree  establishing 
the  fact  that  M.  was  still  the  wife  of  B.,  not- 
withstanding the  Michigan  decree.  Held, 
that  B.'s  children  by  S.  were  not  entitled  to 
take  under  the  will.  Olmsted  v.  Olmsted, 
83  N.  B.  569,  190  N.  Y.  458,  128  Am.  St  Rep. 
585. 

Under  the  rale  that,  where  statutes  can 
reasonably  be  constraed  to  avoid  conflict, 
that  construction  must  be  adopted.  Civ. 
Code  Cal.  fi  1388,  providing  that  when  an  Ille- 
gitimate child,  who  has  not  been  acknowl- 
edged or  adopted  by  his  father,  dies  Intestate 
without  lawful  issue,  his  estate  goes  to  his 
mother,  or  In  case  of  h^r  decease  to  her  heirs 


LAWFUL  ISSUE 


46 


LAWFUL  IfiSXJB 


at  law,  and  aectiozi  1887,  proylding  that  every 
illegltiinate  child  Is  an  heir  to  the  person 
who,  in  writing  signed  in  the  presence  of  a 
competent  witness,  acknowledges  himself  to 
be  the  father  of  such  child,  and  in  all  cases 
is  an  heir  of  his  mother,  and  inherits  his  or 
her  estate,  in  whole  or  in  part,  as  the  case 
may  be,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  had 
been  born  in  lawful  wedlock,  will  be  held 
not  to  be  in  conflict  in  the  case,  where  both 
the  mother  and  child  are  illegitimate,  on  the 
ground  that  section  1387  makes  the  child  the 
heir  of  his  mother,  while  section  1388,  takefa 
alone,  excludes  him,  but  section  1387,  which 
has  to  do  solely  with  the  right  of  illegiti- 
mates to  inherit,  will  be  construed  as  appli- 
cable only  to  inheritance  by  an  illegitimate 
from  a  parent  who  is  legitimate,  or,  for  pur- 
poses of  inheritance,  the  illegitimate  child 
by  reason  of  section  1387  is  to  be  held  to  be 
within  the  terms  "lawful  issue,"  as  that  term 
is  used  in  section  1388.  In  re  De  Cigaran's 
Estate,  89  Pac.  833,  836,  160  Cal.  682. 

Where  the  father  of  defendants  at  the 
time  of  their  birth  was  the  lawful  husband 
of  another  woman  than  their  mother,  but 
thereafter,  in  Michigan,  obtained  a  divorce 
legal  in  that  state,  though  not  in  the  state 
of  New  York,  and  married  their  mother  there- 
by establishing  their  legitimacy  in  that  state, 
under  Act  Mich.  March  28,  1881  (Pub.  Acts 
1881,  p.  48,  No.  66),  they  are  entitied  in  New 
York  to  take  under  a  devise  to  "the  lawful 
issue"  of  their  father.  Olmsted  v.  Olmsted, 
102  N.  Y.  Supp.  1019,  1020,  118  App.  Div.  69. 

A  will,  dated  and  which  took  effect  in 
lS72,  gave  property  in  trust  for  the  testator's 
son,  with  remainder  to  his*  "lawful  issue." 
The  son  was  then  married  and  had  children. 
After  the  death  of  his  then  wife,  he  married 
the  mother  of  certain  illegitimate  children. 
Laws  1895,  c.  531,  providing  that  illegitimate 
children  whose  parents  had  theretofore  inter- 
married or  should  thereafter  intermarry 
should  thereby  become  legitimatized.  Held, 
that  the  illegitimate  children  were  not  enti- 
tled to  share  in  the  remainder,  since,  while 
all  children,  whether  legitimate  or  not,  are 
the  'Issue"  of  their  parents,  that  word,  when 
qualified  by  the  adjective  "lawful,"  which  is 
the  antithesis  of  unlawful  or  illegitimate,  is 
ordinarily  understood  to  mean  those  only  be- 
gotten and  born  in  lawful  wedlock,  and  it 
cannot  be  assumed  that  the  testator  consid- 
ered the  contingencies  of  the  birth  of  illegiti- 
mate children,  the  enactment  of  a  statute  by 
which  they  might  be  legitimatized,  and  the 
marriage  of  their  parents.  Central  Trust  Co. 
of  New  York  v.  SkilUn,  138  N.  Y.  Supp.  884, 
886,  154  App.  Div.  227. 

As  desoendants 

The  words  "lawful  issue,  if  any,  of  the 
body,"  mean  lineal  descendants,  taking  by 
right  of  representation  per  stirpes.  Union 
Safe  Deposit  &  Trust  Co,  v.  Dudley,  72  Atl. 
166,  169,  104  Me.  297. 


The  primary  meaning  of  ^Hawful  Issud" 
is  descendants,  and,  in  the  absence  of  the  use 
of  the  words  in  a  will  in  another  sense,  it 
will  be  so  construed.  Under  a  residuary  be- 
quest to  testator's  stepmother  and  half-sister, 
in  equal  portions,  and,  in  the  event  of  either 
dying  without  issue,  the  share  of  the  one  so 
dying  to  the  survivor,  the  stepmother  dying 
before  testator,  he  does  not  die  intestate  as 
to  the  share  given,  but  there  is  an  implied 
bequest  of  it  to  her  issue.  In  re  Disney's 
Will,  103  N.  Y.  Suw>.  391,  392,  118  App.  Div. 
378  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  New 
York  life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Viele,  56  N. 
B.  311,  161  N.  Y.  11,  76  Am.  St.  Rep.  238; 
Chwatal  v.  Schreiner,  43  N.  B.  166,  148  K.  Y. 
683). 

Under  a  will,  establishing  a  trust  fund 
for  the  benefit  of  a  daughter  of  the  testa- 
trix during  her  life,  {md  directing  that  on 
her  death  the  principal  be  paid  to  her  then 
"lawful  living  issue,"  the  term  "lawful  living 
issue"  does  not  include  an  adopted  daughter. 
In  re  Hopkins,  89  N.  Y.  Supp.  467,  468,  43 
Misc.  Rep.  464  (citing  New  York  life  Insur- 
ance &  Trust  Co.  V.  Viele,  66  N.  B.  8U,  161 
N.  Y.  11,  76  Am.  St  Rep.  239). 

Where  testator  by  will  devised  his  prop- 
erty in  trust  for  his  wife,  on  her  death  to  be 
divided  among  his  lawful  issue,  and  gave 
the  same  to  the  persons  entitled  to  the  other 
half  of  his  residuary  estate,  and  by  a  clause 
disposing  of  such  half  testator  provided  that 
it  should  go  to  the  lawful  issue  of  his  children 
or  to  his  lawful  issue  per  stirpes  and  not  per 
capita,  it  was  the  intent  of  the  testator  to 
limit  the  phrase  "lawful  issue"  in  the  first 
clause  to  the  lawful  issue  of  his  children,  or 
to  his  lawful  issue.  Inglis  v.  McCook,  59 
Ati.  630,  633,  68  N.  J.  Bq.  27. 

'*The  words  lawful  issue,'  when  used  in 
a  domestic  will,  primarUy  and  generally 
mean  descendants.  Where  there  is  nothing 
to  the  contrary  to  be  found  in  the  context  of 
the  instrument,  or  in  extraneous  facts  proper 
to  be  considered,  that  Is  the  sense  in  which 
they  are  presumed  to  be  used.  The  real  ques- 
tion ♦  ♦  ♦  is  whether  the  testatrix  used 
them  in  that  sense  or  in  some  other  sense. 
In  giving  construction  to  the  words  used  by 
the  testatrix  in  a  domestic  will,  we  cannot 
assume,  without  the  clearest  evidence,  that 
she  used  the  words  'lawful  issue'  in  the  sense 
they  might  possibly  bear  under  the  laws  of 
a  foreign  cduntry  in  which  she  died."  In  re 
Tenney,  93  N.  Y.  Supp.  811,  818,  104  App. 
Div.  290  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
New  York  Life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Viele,  65 
N.  B.  311,  161  N.  Y.  19,  20,  76  Am.  St  Rep. 
238). 

Testator's  will  directed  that  his  estate  be 
divided  into  as  many  parts,  as  he  had  chil- 
dren, the  income  of  each  part  to  go  to  a 
child  for  life,  and  upon  the  child's  death  the 
part  to  be  divided  among  the  "lawful  issue" 


XiAWFUIi  ISSUB 


a 


IiAWFUIi  OBDBB 


of  the  child.  At  the  time  tiie  wiU  was  exe- 
cuted several  of  the  testator's  childien  were 
married  and  had  children.  Held,  that  the 
daughters  of  a  deceased  daughter  and  a 
grandchild  of  snch  daughter  took  equally  un- 
der the  dense  ''lawfol  issne'*;  that  phnse 
b^ng  equivalent  to  "descendants."  Phelps  t. 
Cameron,  96  N.  Y.  Snpp.  1014,  1016»  109  App. 
Mt.  798. 

Testator  gave  one  half  of  his  residuary 
estate  to  trustees  for  the  use  of  his  wife  for 
Ufe,  and  on  her  death  to  divide  the  same 
among  his  lawful  issue,  or  to  trustees  for 
their  use  as  his  wife  should  direct  by  will. 
In  default  of  such  will,  he  gave  the  same  to 
persons  then  entitled  to  the  other  half  of  his 
residuary  estate,  to  be  distributed  and  held 
on  the  same  trusts  and  in  the  same  propor- 
tions as  were  mentioned  in  another  clause  of 
his  will.  Held,  that  the  term  "lawful  issue" 
includes  not  only  children  but  descendants. 
Inglis  V.  McCook,  59  AtL  630,  635,  68  N.  J. 
Bq.  27. 

Where  the  phrase  'Oawfnl  Issae"  is  used 
in  a  will,  if  it  clearly  appears  that  it  was 
used  in  a  particular  meaning,  the  phrase  may 
be  I'estricted  to  children  then  living,  or  to 
diildren  thai  living  and  to  the  representa- 
tives of  any  deceased  child.  Inglis  v.  Mc- 
Cook, 59  Aa  680,  685,  68  N.  J.  Bq.  27. 

Testator  gave  property  to  trustees  lA 
trust,  with  directions  to  pay  the  net  income 
to  his  three  children  for  life;  the  trust  to 
continue  as  long  as  any  of  the  children  lived. 
He  provided  that,  if  any  of  his  children  should 
die  without  lawful  issue,  the  surviving  chil- 
dren should  have  his  share,  and  if  any  of 
the  children  should  die,  leaving  lawful  issue, 
the  child  so  surviving  should  take  the  share 
of  the  income  which  the  deceased  parent 
would  have  taken,  had  he  survived,  and  on 
the  termination  of  the  trust  the  property 
should  vest  in  the  surviving  lawful  issue  of 
testator's  children.  Held,  that  words  "lawful 
issue"  meant  children,  and  Included  only  the 
lawful  children  of  testator's  children  in  be- 
ing at  the  time  of  their  death.  Brlsbin  v. 
Huntington,  103  N.  W.  144,  147,  128  Iowa, 
166,  5  Ann.  Gas.  931. 

Am  words  of  pwofcAse 

The  words  "lawful  issue"  in  a  deed  are 
words  of  purchase  and  not  of  limitation.  La- 
cey  V.  Floyd,  87  S.  W.  665,  667,  99  Tex.  112. 

Where  a  deed  conveyed  land  to  the  gran- 
tee and  his  wife  and  to  the  legitimate  heirs 
of  the  grantee,  and  in  case  of  no  "lawful 
Issue^'  then  over,  the  words  "lawful  issue" 
mean  legitimate  heirs  and  are  words  of  pur- 
chase. Lamb  v.  Medsker,  74  N.  EL  1012,  1013, 
85  Ind.  App.  662. 

XtAWXUI.  MERGHAXBISE 

Asfphalt  is  "lawfal  merchandise"  in  a 
charter  for  West  Indian  trade,  which  pro- 
vides that  the  vessel  shall  be  employed  in 


carrying  'Hawfiil  merchandise."  Dene  Ship- 
ping Co.  T.  Tweedie  Trading  COt  148  Fed. 
854,  866,  74  a  a  A.  606. 

ZJkWFUL  MOXET 

See  Lawful  Currency. 

The  term  "lawful  money,**  in  an  Indict- 
ment charging  *1arceny"  of  certain  money 
being  "lawful  money"  of  the  Uuited  States, 
means  money  as  commonly  understood  and 
includes  bank  notes.  State  v.  Finnegean,  108 
N.  W.  155, 157, 127  Iowa,  286,  4  Ann.  Cas.  62& 

''Lawful  money"  means  money  which 
passes  from  hand  to  hand  and  from  person 
to  person  and  circulates  through  the  com- 
munity, and  is  synonymous  with  "current 
money."  Lawful  money  is  that  which  is  usu- 
ally used  as  a  medium  of  exchange.  State  v. 
Quackenbush,  108  N.  W.  958,  956^  98  Minn. 
516. 

ZJkWFUX.  OBSTBUOnOHS 

Although  the  grass  plats  and  shade 
trees  along  the  sidewalk  may  be  "obstruc- 
tions," yet  when  ample  wVlth  is  left  to  an- 
swer the  demands  of  travel  they  are  obstruct 
tions  that  serve  a  useful  purpose  and  are  not 
inconsistent  with  the  object  for  which  streets 
are  made  and  maintained.  Like  a  fence,  a 
hydrant,  a  hitching  post,  telei^one  or  tele- 
graph poles,  they  are  'lawful  obstructions," 
and  a  wire  stretched  around  a  grass  and  tree 
plat  in  a  street  for  the  protection  of  the  plat 
is  not  such  an  obstruction  as  to  render  the 
dty  liable  for  injuries  received  by  one  who 
tripped  and  fell  over  such  wire;  the  wire 
being  in  plain  sight  of  pedestrians  passing 
along  the  street  Teague  v.  dty  of  Bloom- 
ington,  81  N.  B.  103,  104,  40  Ind.  App.  68 
(citing  Lostutter  v.  City  of  Aurora,  26  N.  B. 
184,  126  Ind.  436,  12  L.  B.  A.  259;  aty  of 
Vincennes  v.  Specs,  74  N.  B.  277,  35  Ind.  App. 
389;  Welnstein  v.  City  of  Tene  Haute^  46 
N.  B.  1004, 147  Ind.  55^. 

LAWFUIi  OBDEB 

Interstate  Commerce  Act,  t  10»  relating ' 
to  the  authority  of  a  commerce  commission, 
provides  with  respect  to  proceedings  at  law 
in  a  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  in 
case  of  the  disregard  of  a  "lawful  order"  of 
the  commission,  the  finding  of  fkcts  of  the 
commission  shall  be  prima  fade  evidence  of 
the  matters  therein  stated.  The  court  says 
that  the  phrase  "lawful  order"  Implies  more 
than  the  exercise  of  mere  Jurisdictional  pow- 
er or  authority.  "The  words  lawful  order* 
mean  an  order  the  commission  has  Jurisdic- 
tion to  make.  An  order  may  be  lawful  and 
at  the  same  time  erroneous,  so  that  if  the 
commission  made  an  order  in  a  matter  over 
which  they  had  Judisdictlon,  whidi  was 
merely  an  error  of  Judgment  as  to  precisely 
the  degree  of  reparation,  for  instance,  the 
carrier  ought  to  make,  the  order  would  still 
be  lawfuL"    Western  New  York.  &  P.  B.  Go. 


LAWFUIi  POSSESSION 


4B 


LAWFUL  I^BSTRAWT 


T*  Penn  B^fliitag  €o.,  Limitedl*  of  Oil  CUyt 
Pa^  137  Fed.  343,  852,  70  a  €.  ▲.  28. 

LAWFUL  P088ES8IOir 

In  St  1907,  p.  099,  c.  588,  |  2,  providing 
that  the  owner  or  ottier  person  In  the  lawful 
po80e08ioa  of  land  may  recover  damages  by 
trespassing  animals  from  the  owner  or  per- 
son chargeable  with  the  care  of  such  ani- 
mals, the  words  "lawful  possession''  mean 
only  peaceable  or  quiet  possession,  contradis- 
tinguished from  *  possession  which  is  not 
merely  constructively  tortious,  but  actually 
so.  Flsch  y.  Nice,  106  Pac  598^  599,  12  OaL 
App.  60. 

LAWFUL  PURPOSE 

County  Government  Act  1897  (St  1897, 
p.  466)  I  25,  subd.  35,  authorizes  county  su- 
pervisors to  grant  franchises  over  the  public 
roads  and  highways  for  all  "lawful  pur- 
poses" on  such  terms  and  conditions  as,  in 
their  Judgment,  may  be  necessary  and  prop- 
er, and  in  such  manner  as  to  present  the 
least  possible  obstruction  and  inconvenience 
to  the  traveling  public.  Held,  that  the  words 
"lawful  purposes,"  as  so  used,  should  be  con- 
strued as  limited  to  purposes  in  aid  of  the 
public's  easement  of  travel,  something  which 
would  promote  the  public  comfort  and  con- 
venience In  the  use  of  the  highway;  and 
hence  such  act  did  not  authorize  a  county 
board  of  supervisors  to  grant  a  franchise  to 
an  electric  power  company  to  erect  Its  power 
line  along  a  highway,  the  title  to  the  soil  of 
which  Is  not  in  the  abutting  property  owners, 
for  the  primary  purpose  of  furnishing  light 
and  power  to  private  individuals,  without 
rendering  compensatloQ  to  such  abutting 
owners.  Gurnsey  v.  Northern  California 
Power  Co.,  117  Pac.  906,  909,  160  CaL  699, 
36  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  185. 

The  payment  of  a  debt  by  a  county 
which  the  Legislature  has  authorized  is  a 
"lawful  purpose,"  for  the  issuing  of  bonds 
as  authorized  by  County  Law,  |  12  (Laws 
■  1892,  p.  1746,  TR  686),  giving  to  boards  of 
supervisors  the  power  to  borrow  money  on 
the  credit  of  the  county.  County  of  Ontario 
V.  Shepard,  91  N.  Y.  Supp.  611,  614,  100  App. 
Dlv.  200. 

A  "lawful  purpose"  which  will  excuse 
one  for  carrying  a  concealed  weapon  is  "a 
lawful  purpose  that  was  specific,  and,  in  a 
sense,  temporary.  For  example,  if  a  person 
should  buy  a  deadly  weapon  at  a  store,  and 
put  it  in  his  pocket  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
it  home;  or  if  a  person  should  find  a  deadly 
weapon,  and  place  it  in  his  pocket  for  the 
purpose  of  keeping  it  only  till  he  could  re- 
store it  to  the  owner,  or  make  some  other  ; 
disposition  of  it—fluch  person  would  not  be 
carrying  a  deadly  weapon  concealed  within 
the  meaning  of  said  act."  State  v.  lannucd 
(JDeL)  55  Aa  336^  387,  4  PennewlU,  193. 


Under  (bounty  Government  Act  Oal.  1897 
(St  1897,  p.  458)  i  25,  subd.  35,  authorizing 
a  board  of  supervisors  to  grant  franchises 
along  and  over  the  public  roads  and  high- 
ways fOr  all  "lawful  purposes,"  upon  such 
terms  and  conditions  as  in  their  judgment 
may  be  necessary  and  proper,  the  authority 
of  the  board  has  relation  to  the  purposes  for 
which  a  highway  is  dedicated,  and  is  llmltea 
by  the  uses,  primary  and  incidental,  to 
which  under  the  law  a  highway  is  devoted; 
the  "lawful  purpose"  must  be  consistent 
with  the  character  and  in  furtherance  of 
the  design  of  the  easement  which  the  public 
has  in  and  to  the  highways.  The  only  right 
which  the  public  has  in  and  to  the  highways 
is  to  use  it  for  the  purpose  of  traveling  over 
it  without  obstruction  or  interference;  and 
the  control  which  the  board  of  supervisors 
can  lawfully  exercise  must  have  in  view  the 
promotion  of  that  use,  and  cannot  extend  be- 
yond whatever  is  necessary  to  facilitate 
travel.  A  grant  by  a  county  board  of  super- 
visors x)f  a  franchise  to  erect  poles  and  string 
electric  wires  thereon,  along  and  over  the 
public  highway  of  a  county  tcr  the  purpose 
of  lighting  the  highway,  is  an  incident  to 
the  contemplated  use  of  such  highway,  and 
is  for  a  "lawful  purpose^"  and  it  is  immate- 
rial that  the  lighting  .was  in  part  used  for 
private  purposes.  Gurnsey  t.  Northern  Cal- 
Momia  Power  Co.,  94  Pac.  858,  860,  7  CaL 
App.  534. 

The  words  "lawful  purposes,"  in  the 
New  York  statute  providing  that  no  corpo- 
ration shall  issue  either  stock  or  bonds  ex* 
oept  for  money,  labor,  or  property  actually 
received  for  the 'use  and  lawful  purposes  of 
such  corporation,  are  general  in  character, 
but  would  seem  to  mean  such  property  as 
would  be  germane  to,  or  connected  with,  the 
business  purposes  of  the  corporation,  as  de- 
fined in  its  charter  or  articles  of  incorpora- 
tion. Corporate  bonds  cannot  be  issued  for 
the  consideration  of  a  note  which  is  never 
collected.  In  re  Waterloo  Organ  Go,  X34 
Fed.  341,  343,  67  0.  C.  A.  255. 

LAWFUL  REASOHS 

See  Good  and  Lawful  Reasons 

LAWFUL  BESTRAIirr 

Where  a  bank  which  paid  money  into 
the  state  treasury  as  taxes,  supposing  that  it 
had  the  right  to  do  so,  in  lieu  of  county  and 
city  taxes,  delayed  for  more  than  two  years 
to  make  application  to  the  auditor  to  issue 
his  warrant  for  the  repayment  of  the  money, 
relying  upon  a  decision  of  the  C!ourt  of  Ap- 
peals to  the  effect  that  such  payments  by 
other  banks  similarly  situated  were  proper,, 
it  lost  the  right  to  demand  such  a  warrant, 
though  that  decision  was  overruled  after  the 
lapse  of  the  two  years,  as  the  decision  was 
not  a  "lawful  restraint,"  within  Ky.  St  i 
2544,  providing  that.  In  all  cases  where  the 
doing  of  an  act  necessary  to  save  any  rlghjt 


Ukynnjh  restrictions 


49 


LiiWTER. 


or  benefit  is  restrained  at  superseded  bj  In- 
junction or  other  **lawful  restraint,"  the 
time  covered  by  the  injunction  or  restraint 
Bhall  not  be  estimated  in  the  application  of 
mjoj  statnte  ot  limitattons.  Bank  of  Com- 
merce of  LooisviUe  V.  Stone,  66  S.  W.  683, 
68i,  108  Ky.  427. 

I.AW7UI.  BESTBIOTIOirS 

The  "lawful  restrictions"  authorised  by 
P.  L.  1893,  p.  302  (Gen.  St  p.  8280,  providing 
for  the  granting  of  a  location  for  street  rail- 
way tracks  subject  to  restrictions,  refer  to 
restrictions  that  are  to  be  made  in  the  inter- 
est of  the  public  and  Indicate  a  legislative 
act  In  granting  a  location.  An  ordinance 
granting  a  location  may  contain  restrictions 
In  the  fbrm  of  covenants  requiring  the  street 
railway  comi>any  to  pave  the  streets  in  which 
the  tracks  are  laid,  and  such  restrictions  are 
obligatory  on  any  subseQuent  purchaser  of 
the  street  railway  tracks  and  franchisee, 
even  without  an  express  assumption.  Bor- 
ough of  Rutherford  v.  Hudson  River  Trae* 
tlon  Co.,  63  AtL  84,  88,  78  N.  J.  Law,  227. 

LAWFiiii  vn 

An  instruction,  In  an  action  for  the 
death  of  an  automoblllst  struck  by  a  car, 
that  the  street  railway  company  must  use 
reasonable  care  to  operate  its  cars  on  publle 
streets  with  regard  to  "the  lawful  and  eusto- 
mary  use"  of  the  streets  by  others,  and  that 
If,  at  the  time  decedent  was  killed,  the  com- 
pany was  not  operating  the  car  with  regard 
to  **the  lawful  and  customary  use"  of  the 
streets,  but  negligently  operated  the  car,  it 
was  liable,  Ib  not  erroneous  as  referring  to 
the  extent  of  travel,  of  which  there  was  no 
evidence,  but  refers  to  the  use  of  the  street 
by  the  public;  the  word  "lawful"  meaning 
according  to  law  as  distinguished  from  an 
unlawful  use  and  the  word  "customary" 
meaning  according  to  usage  and  referring  to 
the  mode  of  using  the  streets.  Smiley  v. 
East  St  Louis  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  100  N.  B.  157, 
158,  256  lU.  4^. 


JsAWTUh  WEDX^OK 

See  Same  as  Lawful  Wedlock. 

I.AWFUIXT  AITTHOBXZEB 

Under  Civ.  Code  1001,  pars.  721,  726, 
782,  26d6,  providing  that  no  estate  in  land 
for  a  term  of  more  than  one  year  shall  be 
conveyed,  except  by  an  Instrument  in  writing 
subscribed  by  the  party,  "or  by  his  agent 
thereunto  authorized  in  writing,"  prohibiting 
actions  on  any  lease  for  more  than  one  year, 
unless  in  writing  and  signed  by  the  party  to 
be  charged,  **or  by  some  person  by  him 
thereunto  lawfully  authorized,"  a  lease  for 
more  than  a  year,  signed  by  one  of  the  par- 
ties and  by  a  person  verbally  authorized  by 
the  other  party,  but  not  acknowledged  by 
•ither,  is  not  a  valid  lease,  but  Is  not  within 
the  prohibition  in  paragraph  2690,  and  Is  en- 

8  Wl>s.&  P.2D  Sbb.-^ 


foroeftble  as  a  contract  to  lease;  the  words 
"lawfully  authorized"  in  paragraph  2686  not 
meaning  an  authorization  in  writing.  Mur- 
phey  V.  Brown,  100  Pac.  801,  804,  12  ArhL 
268. 

LAWFUZXT  BEOOTTEK 

See  Heirs  Lawfully  Begotten. 

LAWFULLY    CLAXMIKO    P088E88IOII 

Civ.  Code,  I  1927,  provides  that  agree- 
ments of  letting  upon  hire  bind  the  letter  to 
secure  to  the  hirer  the  quiet  possession  of 
the  thing  hired  during  the  term  of  the  hiring 
against  all  persons  lawfully  claiming  the 
same.  Defendant  on  August  29,  1906,  leased 
to  plaintiff  for  22  months,  to  commence  Jan- 
uary 21,  1907,  certain  land.  P.  A.  was  In 
possession  of  the  land  under  lawful  lease 
from  the  owners,  and  it  was  determined  In 
litigation  to  oust  him  that  he  was  entitled  to 
possession  until  March  6,  1907.  Plaintiff  had 
been  a  tenant  of  P.  A.  but  his  lease  exi^red 
In  November,  1906,  but  he  was  permitted  by 
P.  A.  to  occupy  a  house  but  Instructed  by  P. 
A.  not  to  farm  the  land.  He  did  farm  the 
land  and  gave  defendant  his  share  of  the 
crops  as  rental  under  the  lease  commencing 
January  1,  1907.  During  January  and  Feb- 
ruary, 1007,  P.  A.'s  cattie  got  upon  the  land 
and  did  -damage  to  the  plaintiff's  croi>.  Held, 
that  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  damages  from 
defendant  as  for  breach  of  the  Implied  cove- 
nant for  quiet  enjoyment,  as  P.  A.'s  act  was 
the  act  of  one  lawfully  claiming  possession. 
Agoure  v.  Lewis,  113  Pac.  882,  884,  10  CAl. 
App.  71. 

LAWITTLLT  HATUBALIZED 

In  Rev.  St  i  1004,  providing  that  any 
woman  married  to  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  and  who  might  herself  be  lawful- 
ly naturalised,  shall  be  deemed  a  citizen,  the 
clause  *'who  might  herself  be  lawfully  natr 
urall^ed"  limits  the  section  to  a  woman 
lawfully  within  the  country,  her  own  capac- 
ity independent  of  her  marital  status,  being 
essential  to  citizenship;  so  that  where  an 
alien  married  woman  was  not  entitied  to 
enter  the  country  under  the  Immigration  reg- 
ulations, because  of  a  contagious  disease,  the 
naturalization  of  her  husband  would  not 
make  her  a  citizen  entitied  to  enter,  under 
the  statute.  In  re  Rustigian,  166  Fed.  980, 
082. 

LAWTEB 

As  laborer,  see  Laborer. 

As  learned  in  the  law,  see  Learned  in 

the  Law. 
As   member  of  learned  profession,  see 

Learned  Profession. 

A  "lawyer"  is  one  skilled  in  the  law, 
while  an  "attorney"  is  an  officer  in  a  court  of 
Justice  who  is  eraplc^ed  by  a  party  in  a 
cause  to  manage  it  for  him.  A  law  student 
fresh  from  his  school  and  not  a  licensed  of- 


LAY— LAID 


50 


LAT  OUT— liAID  OUT 


fleer  of  the  court  may  well  be  termed  a  law- 
yer, bnt  not  an  attorney.  Danforth  y.  Egan, 
119  N.  W.  1021,  1024,  23  S.  D.  43»  139  Am. 
St  Bep.  1030,  20  Ann.  Cas.  418. 

UY— LAID 

As  ooiEfttraot 

Where  the  city  of  Camden  laid  new  pipes 
in  place  of  old  ones,  which  had  been  laid  by 
a  water  company,  the  city's  predecessor,  such 
laying  is  within  the  meaning  of  Act  March  9, 
1871  (P.  Li  p.  415),  authorizing  the  city  to 
charge  75  cents  per  foot  of  frontage  on  land 
bordering  on  streets  through  which  water 
pipes  are  laid.  Doughten  y.  City  of  Camden, 
59  AtL  16,  17,  71  N.  J.  Law,  42^ 

I<AID  DOWN 

The  word  "laid  down,"  in  a  contract  of 
sale  which  requires  the  buyer  to  pay  a  spec- 
ified price  t  o.  b.  cars  at  his  place  of  busi- 
ness in  this  country,  or  "laid  down"  at  his 
place  of  business,  or  free  at  his  place  of 
business,  duty  unpaid,  must  be  construed  ac^ 
cording  to  the  uniyersal  understanding  of 
merchants  and  importers  throughout  the 
United  States  and  the  foreign  country,  and 
the  universal  understanding  is  that  the  buy- 
ers should  pay  import  duties ;  and  the  buyer 
must  pay  such  duties  without  deduction  from 
or  credit  on  the  price.  -Steidtmann  t.  Joseph 
Lay  Co.,  84  N.  B.  640,  642,  234  IlL  84. 

LAID  UP 
Ship 

A  yacht  is  "laid  up  for  repairs,"  within 
a  provision  of  the  charter  party,  in  such 
case  allowing  a  rebate  from  the  charter 
money,  where  it  is  at  re^t,  having  some  dam- 
age made  good,  that  in  a  material  degree 
impairs  its  ability  to  pursue  the  voyage  as  a 
yacht,  though  the  charterer  may  continue  to 
eat  and  sleep  and  entertain  friends  on  board. 
Dahlgren  v.  Whitaker,  124  Fed.  695,  696. 

liAT  OFF— LAID  OFF 

The  words  "laid  off,"  in  Pierce's  Code 
1905,  i  3560,  providing  that  all  streets,  lanes, 
and  alleys  "laid  off"  and  recorded  in  accord- 
ance with  the  statute  shall  be  considered 
highways,  must  be  given  their  usual  and  or- 
dinary meaning,  and  a  town  site  or  addition 
Is  "laid  off"  when  it  is  surveyed  or  measured 
and  marked  on  the  ground.  Meachem  ▼. 
Seattle,  88  Pac.  628,  630,  45  Wash.  380. 

Though  the  words  "lay  off"  were  used  in  a 
notice  terminating  the  service  of  an  employ^, 
it  was  a  sufficient  indication  of  action  under 
Greater  New  York  Charter  (Laws  1901,  p. 
636,  a  466)  {  1543,  authorizing  his  suspen- 
sion without  pay  for  a  year.  Shane  v.  City 
of  New  York,  120  N.  Y.  Supp.  428,  430,  135 
App.  Div.  2ia 

ULY  OUT-^LAID  OUT 

The  words  "lay  out,"  in  the  will  of  Ben- 
jamin Franklin,  creating  a  trust  fund  for  the 


town  of  Boston,  do  not  mean  merely  the 
adoption  of  a  plan  for  the  use  of  the  money 
in  accordance  with  the  will,  but  include  the 
actual  expenditure  of  it  by  the  board  of  man- 
agers named  in  the  will  in  the  establishment 
of  public  works  of  the  kind  described.  City 
of  Boston  V.  Doyle,  68  N.  EL  851,  864,  184 
Mass.  373. 

Under  the  deed  of  U^  the  owner  of  the 
east  half  of  a  block,  of  the  southern  half  of 
his  land,  the  northern  boundary  line  of  the 
land  conveyed  being  described  as  binding  on 
a  10-foot  alley  "here  laid  out,"  and  the  grant 
including  the  use  of  this  alley  in  common, 
"together  with  the  use  of  any  alley  10  feet 
wide  to  be  laid  out  by  U.,  extending  norther- 
ly parallel  to  P.  street  from  the  northwest 
corner  of  the  land  conveyed  "to  H.  street," 
while  the  words  "laid  out,"  in  reference  to 
the  latter  alley,  are  used  in  the  sense  of  con- 
structed or  improved,  and  not  in  their 
ordinary  meaning  of  the  adoption  of  out- 
lines or  location,  the  alley  being  laid  out  in 
such  sense  by  the  deed,  which  clearly  defines 
its  location,  the  grantee*s  easement  in  the 
alley  is  not  dependent  on  the  grantor  im- 
proving it,  and  is  not  lost  by  nonperformance 
of  his  personal  covenant  to  do  so.  Oberhelm 
V.  Reeside,  81  Atl.  590,  592,  116  Md.  265  (cit- 
ing 6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4037). 

The  delineation  of  a  street  on  a  map 
made  pursuant  to  Act  March  21,  1871  (P.  L. 
p.  638)  I  23,  in  amendment  of  the  charter  of 
the  village  of  Passaic,  does  not  suffice  to 
make  an  actual  street  within  section  57  of 
the  charter  (Act  April  2, 1873  [P.  U  p.  507]), 
empowering  the  counsel  to  alter  any  street 
already  or  thereafter  to  be  laid  out  Brie 
R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Passaic,  74  Aa  338,  339,  79 
N.  J.  Law,  19. 

Laws  N.  H.  1903,  p.  267,  c  255,  |  3,  rel- 
ative to  establishment  of  waterworks,  pro- 
vides that,  "in  case  the  town  shall  not  be  able 
to  agree  with  the  owner  of  any  property  or 
right  taken  for  the  purposes  of  this  act,  ei- 
ther party  may  apply  to  the  superior  court  to 
have  the  same  'laid  out'  and  damages  deter- 
mined." The  court  says  the  words  "laid  out" 
are  undoubtedly  derived  from  the  procedure 
followed  In  laying  out  highways,  "and  the 
term  itself  and  the  direct  reference  indicate 
that  the  method  of  the  divestiture  of  pri- 
vate title  in  road-laying  proceedings  was  with- 
in legislative  contemplation  in  this  class  of 
legislation.  The  decision  of  the  selectmen 
laying  a  highway  is  a  Judgment,  and  in- 
cludes both  a  finding  upon  the  question  of 
public  good  and  a  location  upon  the  ground 
of  the  new  way.  The  term  *lald  ouf  is  of 
familiar  use  in  the  taking  of  land  for  rail- 
roads. In  such  cases  the  corporation  is  au- 
thorized to  locate  its  road,  subject  to  petition 
by  any  landowner  for  a  change  of  location, 
and  to  obtain  title  by  deed  to  any  lands 
which  it  deems  necessary  for  the  road.  Pub. 
St  1901,  c.  158,  I  8.    If  such  deeds  cannot 


LAY  OUT— LAID  OUT 


51 


LBAD 


be  obtained,  a{^]icatLoii  may  be  made  for 
an  assessment  of  damages.  Id.  {  d.  The 
damages  must  be  paid,  or  tendered,  or  de- 
posited for  the  landowner,  before  entry  is 
made  upon  the  land  to  construct  the  road,  ex- 
cept by  the  owner's  consent  Id«  K  l^t  19. 
From  all  the  eridence  it  is  clear  that  by 
the  permission  given  in  certain  cases  to  ap- 
ply to  have  the  desired  right  'laid  out*  was 
meant  an  application  to  have  the  desired 
light,  in  the  language  before  quoted  (Lkws 
1901,  p.  806,  c  290,  I  2),  'taken,  appropriated, 
and  condemned.'  The  words  'laying  out'  and 
taking,'  in  a  statute  relating  to  eminent  do- 
main, were  held  to  have  the  same  meaning 
in  Charlestown  Branch  R.  v.  County  Com'rs 
of  Middlesex,  7  Mete  [48  Mass.]  78,  84. 
The  legislative  intention  seems  clear,  there- 
fore, to  authorize  the  plaintiffs  to  secure  the 
necessary  rights  by  purchase  if  they  could; 
if  not,  by  condemnation.'*  Town  of  Littleton 
Y.  Berlin  MiUs  Co.,  68  AtL  877,  880,  78  N.  H. 
IL 

Am  siurreyed  or  platted 
A  town  site  or  addition  is  "Oald  ontf' 
when  it  is  surveyed  or  measured  and  marked 
upon  the  ground.    Meachem  v.  City  of  Seat- 
Ue^  88  Pac.  628,  630,  45  Wash.  380. 

AU  meoesMKvy  steps  laolitded 

The  city  of  Boston  took  part  of  lands  fbr 
a  short  parkway,  to  be  controlled  by  the 
park  commissioners,  and  made  a  settlement 
with  the  owner,  by  which  the  city  agreed  to 
construct  a  roadway  and  walk,  to  which  he 
should  have  perpetual  access,  and  to  assume 
any  assessment  for  betterments  for  the  con- 
stmction  of  the  park  on  the  land  not  taken. 
Subsequently  the  dty  street  commissioners 
laid  out  a  street  several  miles  long,  which, 
where  the  owner^s  land  lay,  was  superim- 
posed on  the  parkway,  and  no  physical 
change  was  made  therein.  Held  not  to  pre- 
clude assessment  for  betterments  on  the 
owner's  lands  for  the  new  street,  which  was 
a  wholly  new  layout  by  the  commissioners; 
to  "lay  out"  meaning,  in  this  connection,  to 
fix  the  termini  and  presciibe  the  boundaries 
of  a  highway,  and  establish  it  as  a  public 
easement  of  travel,  by  oflaclal  act  of  the 
proper  authorities.  Leahy  v.  Charles,  95  N. 
E.  834,  835,  209  Mass.  316. 

The  word  "established,"  in  Pol.  Code,  { 
671,  providing  that,  if  a  private  way  is  "es- 
tablished" over  the  wild  lands  of  a  person 
who  has  no  notice  of  the  proceeding,  he  may 
within  six  months  after  receiving  such  no- 
tice, and  not  thereafter,  proceed  to  have  his 
damages  assessed,  has  the  same  meaning  as 
the  words  "laid  out"  in  section  672;  that 
is,  the  laying  out  of  a  way  under  the  order 
of  the  ordinary.  Watklns  v.  Country  Club, 
47  S.  ET.  538,  539,  120  Oa.  45. 

Under  Bums'  Rev.  8t  1894,  |  6759,  de- 
claring that  every  public  highway  'Oald  out,** 
er  which  may  hereafter  be  "laid  out,"  and 
which  shall  not  be  opened  or  used  within  six 


years  ftom  the  time  of  its  beinf  laid  out; 
shall  cease  to  be  a  highwaj  for  any  imr- 
pose  whatever,  the  words  "laid  out"  doabtleas 
mean  established,  surveyed,  declared  a  road ; 
a  highway  has  been  laid  out—- that  is  to 
say,  it  has  been  estabUshed  and  declared  to 
be  a  highway  by  the  Judgment  of  the  court 
Where  a  highway  was  established  by  the 
Judgment  of  the  county  commissioners,  and 
within  six  years  thereafter  it  was  Included 
within  the  corporate  limits  of  a  town,  it  did 
not  become  extinct,  under  such  statute, 
though  not  opened  or  used  as  a  highway. 
Baltimore,  O.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Town  of  Whit- 
ing, 65  N.  E.  759,  761,  30  Ind.  App.  182  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definitions  In  Decker  v. 
Washburn,  35  N.  B.  1111,  8  Ind.  App.  673), 

As  looate 

A  petition  for  a  highway  was  not  ob- 
jectionable, because  it  prayed  that  the  court 
"locate  and  establish"  a  road,  instead  of  ask- 
ing to  have  the  road  "laid  out";  the  term 
"laid  out"  being  colloquial,  meaning  "to  plan 
in  detail,"  while  "to  locate"  is  to  define  the 
limits,  to  establish  In  a  particular  place,  and, 
in  a  road  proceeding,  is  as  comprehensive  as 
"lay  out" — ^the  term  'lay  out"  expressing  the 
work  to  be  done  by  the  viewers  in  establish- 
ing on  the  ground  the  lines  and  angles  of  the 
road.  Feagins  v.  Wallowa  County,  123  Pac. 
902,  62  Or.  186. 

UkTINO  OB  BELATIKO 

Buffalo  City  Charter,  §  288  (Laws  1891, 
p.  200,  a  105,  as  amended  by  Laws  1901,  p. 
661,  a  228,  i  8),  provides  for  the  laying  and 
relaying  of  sidewalks  at  the  expense  of  abut- 
ting owners.  Laws  1891,  p.  221,  c.  105,  i  398, 
divides  streets  into  carriage  ways  and  side- 
walks, and  Buffalo  City  Ordinance,  a  4,  pars. 
8,  9,  declares  that  the  owner  or  occupant 
may  be  required  to  grade  and  level  the  side- 
walk in  front  of  his  premises  between  the 
street  and  curbs,  and,  on  his  failure  to  grade 
and  level  the  sitlewalk  for  ten  days  after  no- 
tice, the  same  may  be  done  at  his  expense. 
Held,  that  the  words  "laying  or  relaying"  of 
a  sidewalk,  within  section  288,  have  the  same 
meaning  as  "grading  or  regrading"  in  section 
8,  in  each  case  referring  to  original  work 
on  the  sidewalk  or  street,  and  not  to  repair 
after  the  sidewalk  1b  once  laid  or  relaid. 
Konowalskl  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  115  N.  Y. 
Supp.  467,  470,  131  App.  Div.  465. 

LEAD 

The  zinc  ores  known  as  carbonate,  sili- 
cate and  sulphide  of  zinc  are  free  of  duty, 
the  carbonate  and  silicate  as  "calamine," 
and  the  sulphide  as  "minerals,  crude,"  under 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  i  2,  Free  list 
pars.  514,  614,  30  Stat  196,  199,  except  that 
when  they  contain  lead  they  are  subject  to 
the  duty  provided  on  "lead-bearing  ore  of  all 
kinds,"  in  section  1,  Schedule  C,  par.  181,  30 
Stat  166.  United  States  v.  Brewstw,  167 
Fed.  122,  123,  92  a  a  A.  574. 


USADZNO 


62 


LEADING  QUESnON 


LEADING 


XiEABIlfO    XiIFB    OF    mOSTXTUTIOH 
AND  LEWDNEM 

Resorting  to  a  botel  for  the  commission 
of  acts  of  lewdness  during  one  night,  consti- 
tuting parts  of  a  continuous  transaction,  does 
not  amount  to  "leading  the  life  of  lewdness'* 
within  Code,  {  4043.  State  v.  McDavitt,  118 
N.  W.  370,  140  Iowa,  842,  132  Am.  St  Rep. 
275. 

A  woman  who  inhabits  a  house  of  ill 
fame  or  other  place  as  a  shelter  or  resort 
in  which  to  engage  in  unlawful  sexual  com- 
merce is  ''leading  a  life  of  prostitution  and 
lewdness,"  within  the  meaning  of  Code,  i 
4943,  which  provides  that  if  any  person  for 
the  purpose  of  prostitution  or  lewdness  re- 
sorts to,  uses,  occupies,  or  inhabits  any  house 
of  ill  fame  or  place  kept  for  sucdi  purpose,  or 
if  any  person  be  found  leadln|f  a  life  of  pros^ 
tlttttion,  such  person  shall  be  imprisoned, 
etc.  The  law  means  during  every  instant  of 
her  residence  there^  and  not  merely  while  In 
the  flagrant  act  True,  as  counsel  say,  "she 
must  be  found  while  in  the  act  prohibited  by 
the  statute*';  but  the  acts  here  prohibited 
Is  not  the  act  of  sexual  intercourse,  but  the 
living  of  a  life  of  prostitution  and  lewdness 
in  the  house  or  other  resort  in  which  she  is 
found.  State  v.  Shaw,  101  N.  W.  109,  126 
Iowa,  422. 

liEADINO  QtnssTioir 

A  "question  is  leading"  when  it  suggests 
the  desired  answer  to  the  witness.  Bl  Paso 
ft  S.  W.  Ry.  CJo.  T.  Welter  (Tex.)  125  S.  W. 
45,  49. 

"Leading  questions"  are  such  as  suggest 
answers  favorable  to  the  interests  of  the 
party  asking  them.  Parsons  v.  Bridgham,  34 
Me.  240,  242  (citing  1  Starkie,  Bv.  [7th  Ed.] 
109). 

A  "leading  question"  is  a  question  "em- 
bodying a  material  fact  and  admitting  of  an 
answer  by  a  simple  negative  or  affirmative." 
Walker  v.  Baldwin  &  Prick,  68  Atl.  25,  30, 
106  Md.  619  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  1  GreenL  Bv.  i  434;  Lee  v.  Tinges*  7  Md. 
234). 

A  "leading  question"  is  one  which  sug- 
gests the  desired  answer;  and  a  question 
susceptible  to  either  an  affirmative  or  nega- 
tive answer,  which  does  not  suggest  the  de- 
sired answer,  is  not  objectionable  as  leading. 
Williams  v.  Smith,  72  AtL  1093,  1099,  29  R. 
L562. 

"Any  question  by  which  the  fact  is  made 
known  to  the  witness,  which  the  interrogator 
wishes  to  find  asserted  in  and  by  his  answer, 
is  a  'leading  question.'  It  is  none  the  less 
leading  because  the  alternative  form  of  ex- 
pression is  used,  as  *Dld  you,  or  did  you 
not?  "  Parsons  v.  Huff,  38  Me.  137, 141  (cit- 
ing People  V.  Mather  [N.  Y.]  4  Wend.  247,  21 
Am.  Dec.  122;  Hopper  v.  Ck)mmonwealth,  6 
Grat  [47  Va.l  68«; 


"Leading  questions"  are  defined  to  be 
those  which  ordinarily  suggest  to  the  witness 
the  answer  desired,. or  which,  embodying  a 
material  fact,  admit  <A  a  direct  answer  by  a 
simple  "yes"  or  ••no,"  or  which  instruct  a 
witness  how  to  answer  on  material  iM>tnts. 
Rosenkovitz  v.  United  Railways  &  Blectric 
Co.,  70  Atl.  108»  110,  108  Md.  806. 

A  question  is  not  necessarily  "leading" 
beeause  it  admits  of  a  direct  negative  or  af- 
firmative answer,  but  to  make  it  objection- 
able when  only  a  single  fact  is  sought  to  be 
elicited  it  should  suggest  the  answer.  The 
use  of  the  words  "whether  or  not"  in  pro- 
pounding a  question  to  a  witness  does  not  in 
all  cases  relieve  the  question  from  the  objec- 
tion of  being  leading.  Bryan  Press  Co.  v. 
Houston  k  T.  C.  Ry.  CJo.  (Tex.)  110  S.  W.  99, 
100,  101. 

A  question,  containing  the  words  •'wheth- 
er ^  not,"  so  as  in  most  instances  to  pre- 
vent the  use  of  the  words  "yes"  or  "no"  in 
answer,  is  said  to  be  ordinarily  not  leading; 
whether  it  is  or  not  depends  on  the  nature  of 
the  question,  the  subject-matter,  and  the  par^ 
ticular  manner  in  whidi  the  other  parts  of  it 
are  framed.  State  v.  Taylor,  60  S.  B.  247, 
254,  57  W.  Va.  22a 

A  question  is  "leading"  when  it  indicates 
the  real  or  supposed  fact  which  the  examiner 
desires  to  have  confirmed  by  the  answer  and 
the  use  of  the  words  "whether  or  not"  does 
not  necessarily  prevent  a  question  from  being 
leading  if  it  still  suggests  the  answer  desired. 
Peebles  v.  0*Gara  Coal  Co.,  88  N.  B.  166,  168, 
239  IlL  370. 

A  question  propounded  plaintiff,  as  to 
whether  two  items  in  an  account  previously 
rendered  defendant,  and  offered  in  evidence 
by  him,  represented  or  was  intended  to  repre- 
sent the  notes  sued  on,  was  rightfully  reject- 
ed as  being  "leading."  Sayre  v.  Woodyard, 
66  S.  B.  320,  322,  66  W.  Va.  288. 

The  question,  "Did  you  make  any  de- 
mand upon  the  defendant  for  the  value  of 
said  damaged  goods?"  addressed  to  a  wit- 
ness, was  not  "leading."  International  &  G. 
N.  R.  Co.  V.  H.  P.  Drought  k  Co.  (Tex.)  100 
S.  W.  1011,  1012. 

A  witness  was  asked  by  the  state  in  a 
burglary  case,  in  order  to  identify  a  suit 
case  as  one  which  accused  and  another  had 
in  their  possession:  "Do  you  think  that  you 
would  know  that  grip  if  you  was  to  see  it? 
A.  I  do  not  know ;  I  think  I  would.  Q.  How 
does  that  compare  with  it?  A.  That  kinder 
looks  like  the  color  of  the  grip  they  had.  Q. 
Do  you  know  whether  it  is  or  not?  A.  No, 
sir ;  I  do  not  know  exactly  whether  it  is  or 
not"  Held,  that  the  questions  were  not  ob- 
jectionable as  leading;  a  "leading  question" 
being  one  framed  so  as  to  indicate  the  an- 
swer desired.  Majors  ▼.  8tate»  140  8.  W. 
1095,  63  Tex  Cr.  R.  48a 

The  question  asked  by  the  defense,  if  ft 
was  possible^  during  the  time  the  fight  tras 


LEADING  QDESTIOK 


«8 


In  progress,  for  any  man  to  leave  the  crowd 
and  go  40  feet  and  return  with  a  bat  without 
witness  seeing  him,  whidi  question  was  ad- 
dressed to  the  evidence  of  the  state  that  de- 
fendant had  done  just  this  thing,  is  not  a 
"leading  question'*;  a  question  not  being 
leading  because  it  can  be  answered  "Yes**  or 
*'No,"  but  being  leading  where  it  suggests  the 
answer  desired.  People  y.  Jones,  117  Pae 
176,  180,  leO  Cat  358. 

In  an  action  by  a  mine  employ^  for  in- 
juries resulting  from  the  fUl  of  ro^  or  slate 
from  tlie  roof,  a  question  on  the  direct  ex- 
amination of  a  witness  called  on  behalf  of 
plaintiff  ''whether  in  that  mine  that  roof  will 
sound  all  right  in  response  to  tapping  and 
drumming  with  a  pick  and  in  a  minute  or 
two  fall,"  is  objectionable  as  leading.  Har- 
per y.  Black  Diamond  Coal  Co.,  142  III.  App. 
594,  597. 

A  'leading  question"  is  one  that  may  be 
answered  "yes"  or  "no,"  and  suggests  the  an- 
swer desired.  Indeed,  by  a  "leading"  ques- 
tion is  meant  one  which  suggests  to  the  wit- 
ness the  desired  answer.  Merely  because  it 
may  be  answered  by  "yes"  or  "no"  does  not 
render  the  question  leading.  Where  a  wit- 
ness was  asked  by  his  counsel  (1)  'if  his 
wife  •  •  •  had  ever  had  any  cough  or 
lung  trouble"  prior  to  a  certain  exposure ;  (2) 
"whether  or  not  his  wife  had  ever  had  any 
female  trouble**  prior  to  such  exposure;  (3) 
"If  his  wife  *  •  •  ever  suffered  with 
rheumatism,  lumbago,  or  anything  of  that 
kind**  before  such  exposure — ^it  was  held  not 
leading,  though  answerable  "yes"  or  "no." 
St  Louis  Southwestern  R.  Co.  y.  Lowe  (Tex.) 
97  8.  W.  1087,  1088  (citing  Able  y.  Sparks,  6 
Tex.  350;  Mathls  y.  Buford,  17  Tex.  155; 
Trammel  v.  McDade,  29  Tex.  301;  Lott  y. 
King,  15  S.  W.  231,  79  Tex.  292;  Birgen  y. 
Producers'  Yard,  11  S.  W.  1027,  72  Tex.  55; 
Cleveland  v.  Duggan,  2  Willson,  Civ.  Cas.  Ct 
App.  I  84). 

LEAF  TOBACCO 

Filler  tobacco  as  leaf  tobacco,  see  Filler 
Tobacco. 

'Xk>ngre88  is,  of  course,  presumed  to  be 
familiar  with  the  fact  that  'leaf  tobacco'  is 
divided  into  classes,  or  is  subjected,  before 
being  placed  in  bales,  to  some  kind  of  an 
assortment"  Brhardt  v.  Schroeder,  15  Sup. 
Ct  45,  48,  156  17.  S.  124,  39  L.  Ed.  94. 

LEAGUE 

See  Major  League;    Square  League. 

"Leagpe"  and  "legion"  are  of  entirely 
different  meanings;  "league*'  being  defined 
as  an  "alliance  of  persons,"  and  "legion"  as 
a  "military  body  or  organisation."  People 
«z  reL  Felter  v.  Rose,  80  N.  B.  298,  296,  225 
lU.  496. 


LEARNED 

lA&BNED  nr  THB  ULW 

Where  an  attorney  has  been  disbarred 
for  violation  of  legal  ethics,  which  is  one  of 
the  branches  required  by  Pol.  Code,  |  680,  to 
be  considered  in  passing  upon  the  qualifica- 
tions of  one  seeking  admission  to  the  bar,  be 
is  not  "learned  in  the  law**  within  the  con- 
stitutional provision  requiring  that  a  state's 
attorney  shall  be  learned  in  the  law.  Dan- 
forth  v.  Bgan,  119  N.  W.  1021,  1025,  23  S.  D. 
43,  139  Am.  St  Rep.  1030,  20  Ann  Cas.  418. 

LEARHCD  PROTEsnmr 

Aliens  imported  under  contract  as  ex- 
pert accountants  were  not  members  of  a 
recognlEed  "learned  profession,'*  within  Act 
Cong.  March  8,  1908,  a  1012,  32  Stat  1218, 
relating  to  the  departure  of  aliens,  and  de- 
claring in  section  4  that  the  inhibition  against 
the  importation  of  aliens  to  perform  labor  or 
services  of  any  Idnd,  skilled  or  unskilled, 
shall  not  apply  to  persons  belonging  to  any 
recognized  learned  profession.  The  defini- 
tion of  the  word  ''profession**  given  in  the 
Century  Dlctonary  and  approved  in  United 
States  v.  Laws,  16  Sup.  Ct  998,  168  U.  8. 
259,  41  L.  Ed.  151,  is  a  broad  one,  and  it 
seems  not  unreasonable  to  assume  that  Con- 
gress qualified  it  with  the  adjective  ''learn- 
ed** for  the  express  purpose  of  restricting 
the  scope  of  the  exception.  In  re  Ellis,  124 
Fed.  637,  643. 

Physicians,  teachers,  and  lawyers  be- 
long to  the  "learned  professfona."  Flanders 
v.  Daley,  48  S.  B.  827,  120  Ga.  886. 

XJSARVIHO 

See  Institution  of  Learning. 

LEASE 

See  Entire  Lease;  Further  Lease;  Grant- 
ed and  Leased ;  Lessee ;  ^kinlng  Lease; 
Oral  Lease;  Sublease. 

Expiration  of  lease,  see  Expire — Expira- 
tion. 

See,  also,  Let 

'Tbe  right  to  lease*  by  the  ordinarily 
accepted  meaning  of  the  terms  is  unto  the 
lessee.  The  owner,  or  first  party,  grants  the 
lease,  lets  or  demises  the  leased  premises, 
and  it  is  the  second  party  who  leases.*' 
Hence  where  plaintifTs  predecessor  in  title 
as  ''party  of  the  first  part"  executed  a  lease 
of  certain  premises  to  defendant  "as  party 
of  the  second  part**  for  a  term  of  two  years, 
which  contained  a  clause  that  at  the  expira- 
tion of  the  lease  the  party  of  the  "first  part** 
should  have  the  privilege  of  leasing  the 
premises  for  a  further  term  of  one  year,  etc., 
the  words  "party  of  the  first  part"*  used  in 
such  renewal  clause  were  so  plainly  a  cler- 
ical error,  used  in  the  place  of  party  of  the 
"second  part*'  intended,  as  to  put  a  purchas- 
er of  the  property  on  inquiry  as  to  the  ten- 


IaEASE 


54 


I4EASB 


anf  8  right  to  renew.  Gray  y.  Maier  &  Zobe- 
lein  Brewery,  84  Paa  280,  281,  2  CaL  App. 
653. 

A  ''lease"  is  a  commutatiye  contract 
Werlein  y.  Janssen,  86  Soutlu  216,  218,  112 
La.  31, 

'*A  'lease'  is  nothing  but  a  contract,  and 
is  goyemed  by  the  same  rules  that  other  con- 
tracts are."  Feaster  y.  Fagan,  113  N.  W. 
478,  479,  136  Iowa,  633. 

The  contract  employed  in  the  creation  of 
the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  is  called 
a  "lease,"  and  with  reference  to  this  the  par- 
ties are  designated  as  "lessor"  and  "lessee." 
Foss  y.  Stanton,  67  AtL  942,  76  Vt  365. 

The  indenture  or  writing  is  the  eyidence 
of  the  lease,  though  the  term  "lease"  is  some- 
times used  to  designate  the  writing  or  instru- 
ment. Mattlage  y.  McGuire,  111  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1083,  1085,  59  Misa  Rep.  28. 

The  word  "lease"  has  a  settled  technical 
import  It  imports  a  contract  by  which  one 
person,  either  natural  or  artificial,  deyests 
himself,  or  itself  of,  and  another  person 
takes  possession  of,  lands  or  chattels  for  a 
term.  Moorshead  y.  United  States  Rys.  Co., 
96  S.  W.  261,  272,  203  Mo.  121. 

A  "lease"  in  writing  constitutes  a  writ- 
ten contract,  and  the  lessee  cannot  surren- 
der it  or  be  released  from  its  terms  without 
the  consent  of  the  lessor,  and  it  is  absolutely 
essential  to  the  termination  of  the  term  that 
both  the  lessor  and  lessee  agree  to  the  sur- 
render, and,  when  this  is  shown,  the  tenant 
is  no  longer  liable.  To  constitute  the  surren- 
der there  must  be  a  mutual  agreement  be- 
tween the  lessor  and  lessee.  Higgins  y. 
Street,  92  Pac.  153,  154,  19  Okl.  46,  13  U  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  398,  14  Ann.  Cas.  1086. 

A  "lease"  is  "a  species  of  contract  for 
the  possession  and  profits  of  lands  and  tene- 
ments, either  for  life,  or  for  a  certain  term 
of  years,  or'  during  the  pleasure  of  the  par- 
ties." A  writing  by  which  defendants  gaye 
plaintiff  the  right  to  enter  on  and  take  pos- 
session of  a  strip  of  their  land,  and  construct 
thereon  a  tramway,  and  occupy  it  for  a  stated 
time,  in  consideration  of  a  certain  amount 
per  year,  is  a  lease.  Asher  y.  Johnson,  82 
S.  W.  300,  301,  118  Ky.  702  (quoting  Bouyier). 

An  Instrument  reciting  that  it  is  agreed 
that  a  lease  will  be  giyen  on  certain  terms, 
and  which  was  preceded  by  a  letter  in  which 
different  terms  were  proposed,  and  the  par- 
ties subsequently  agreed  on  still  other  terms, 
did  not  constitute  a  "lease,"  though  It  was 
accompanied  by  a  payment  of  rent  and  the 
lessee  took  possession.  Ver  Steeg  y.  Becker- 
Moore  Paint  Co.,  80  S.  W.  346,  351,  106  Mo. 
App.  257. 

To  constitute  a  "lease"  the  essentials  of 
a  contract  must  be  present  and  there  must  be 
an  offer  and  an  acceptance  of  the  terms  of 
the  offer.  Israelson  y.  WoUenberg,  116  N.  Y. 
Supp.  626^  627,  63  Misc.  Rep.  293. 


A  "lease"  is  a  contract  for  the  poeseBslon 
and  profits  of  land  and  tenements  on  the 
one  side  and  the  recompense  of  rent  or  prop- 
erty on  the  other.  Ward  y.  American  Health 
Food  Co.,  96  N.  W.  388,  391,  119  Wis.  12. 

A  paper  cannot  be  considered  as  a 
"lease,"  where  it  is  not  signed  by  the  lessee, 
does  not  identify  the  premises,  or  state  when 
the  term  is  to  begin  or  upon  what  dates  the 
rent  is  payable.  Kuntz  y.  Mahrenholz,  88  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1002,  1003. 

An  agreement  to  glye  a  lease  Is  not  a 
"lease,"  unless  followed  up  by  occupation, 
which  is  eyidence  of  lessee's  agreement  to 
hire.  Goldberg  y.  Wood,  90  N.  Y.  Supp.  427, 
428,  45  Misc.  Rep.  327. 

No  particular  form  of  expression  Is  nee- 
saiy  to  constitute  a  lease,  and  whateyer  ex- 
pressions explain  the  intentions  of  the  parties 
to  be  that  one  shall  diyest  himself  of  the  pos- 
session of  his  property  and  that  the  other 
shall  take  it  for  a  certain  period  of  time  are 
sufficient  and  will  amount  to  a  "lease"  for 
the  specified  time  as  ^ectually  as  if  the  most 
proper  form  of  words  had  been  used  for  that 
purpose.  Board  of  Supers  of  Hancock  County 
y.  Imperial  Nayal  Stores  Co^  47  South.  177, 
179,  93  Miss.  822, 17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  698. 

The  word  'lease,"  as  used  in  Bums'  Ann. 
St  Ind.  1901,  I  5624,  proylding  that  any  tele- 
phone company  authorized  under  the  act 
shall  haye  power  to  lease  or  attach  to  other 
telephone  lines  or  exchanges  by  lease  or  pur- 
chase, does  not  include  the  power  to  sell  all 
the  property  and  franchises  of  a  telephone 
company  to  another  corporation,  nor  can  the 
power  to  sell  be  necessarily  Implied  from  the 
grant  of  the  expressed  powers.  Cumberland 
Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  y.  City  of  Eyans- 
yllle,  127  Fed.  187,  193. 

The  word  "lease,"  as  used  in  a  lease  for 
a  term  of  one  year  with  the  priyilege  of  four 
years'  additional  "lease,"  was  equiyalent  to 
"term."  Quinn  y.  VaUquette,  68  Ati.  515,  519, 
80  Vt  434,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  962  (citing 
Harding  y.  Seeley,  33  Atl.  1118,  148  Pa.  20. 

A  direction  by  one  who  had  been  occupy- 
ing an  apartment  to  the  Janltress,  who  was 
without  authority  to  lease  the  same,  not  to 
let  any  one  haye  the  apartment  during  his 
absence,  and  a  statement  by  him  that  whei 
he  came  back  he  would  sign  the  lease  with 
the  agent  and  that  he  wanted  it  for  a  year, 
did  not  constitute  an  "oral  lease,"  and  was 
no  more  than  an  agreement  for  a  lease.  Co- 
lumbia Bank  y.  Clarke,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  587, 
588. 

An  instrument  reciting  receipt  from  de- 
fendants of  $10  for  deposit  on  rent  of  two 
specified  lofts,  "rent  to  be  $65  per. month  and 
to  run  for  two  years,"  did  not  constitute  a 
"lease"  of  the  lofts  for  two  years ;  it  haying 
been  deliyered  to  defendants  by  an  agent  of 
the  owners  not  authorized  to  make  leases, 
and  it  also  b^ng  contemplated  that  a  "leasei" 


66 


T.iBAine 


■honld  be  sQbeeQuently  executed  by  tbe  own- 
en.  Finkelst^n  t.  Fabylk,  lOT  N.  Y.  Bnpp. 
07,  69. 

Ab  instrument  described  as  a  'lease,** 
whicb  fixed  no  length  of  time  for  it  to  run 
nor  expressed  any  consideration  tberefor,  and 
wMcih    recited    tbat    it    was    for    ''• 


montbs,"  and  provided  that  "on  leaving  the 

order  for  said  goods dollars  on  the 

deliyery  of  the  same,  dollars,  and 

every  week  thereafter  the  sum  of dol- 
lars," and  which  purported  to  be  for  the  rent 
of  household  goods  and  Jewelry,  which  were 
nowhere  set  forth  or  included  in  the  cove- 
nants or  agreements  contained  in  the  instru- 
ment, was  not  a  "lease."  State  v.  Gordray,  98 
a  W.  1,  2,  200  Mo.  29,  9  Ann.  Gas.  UIO. 

Since  Bev.  St  1899,  §  1187,  expressly  au- 
thorizes a  street  railway  company  to  lease 
its  property,  and  since  section  4160,  provides 
that  when  technical  words  having  a  peculiar 
meaning  are  used  in  a  statute  they  shall  be 
understood  according  to  their  technical  im- 
port, a  street  railroad  company  leasing  its 
property  and  franchises  to  another  street 
railroad  company  is  not  liable  for  an  Injury 
to  a  passenger  resulting  from  the  negligence 
ef  the  employ^  of  the  latter  company;  the 
word  "lease"  importing  a  contract  by  which 
one  person  devests  himself  and  another  per- 
son takes  possession  of  property  for  a  term. 
Moorshead  v.  United  Rys.  Co.  of  St.  Louis, 
100  &  W.  611,  618,  203  Mo.  121. 

Where  the  owner  of  a  sewing  machine 
places  it  in  possession  of  a  prospective  pur- 
diaser  with  an  option  to  purchase  at  a  fixed 
valuation,  and  with  no  agreement  to  rent, 
such  transaction  is  not  a  lease  within  Comp. 
St  1907,  c.  32,  I  26,  providing  that  an  agree- 
ment for  lease  must  be  in  writing,  and  a 
copy  filed  with  the  county  derk.  Singer 
Sewing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Omaha  Umbrella  Mfg. 
Ca,  119  N.  W.  958,  959,  83  Neb.  619. 

The  word  "lease,**  as  used  in  Bev.  St 
1899,  §  1060,  authorizing  railroad  leases,  con- 
templates such  an  instrument  as  divests  the 
lessor  of  possession  and  control  and  places 
the  same  in  the  lessee  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  lessor,  possessing  all  the  qualities  and 
Incidents  of  a  lease  at  common  law  between 
landlord  and  tenant  The  rule  that  a  land- 
lord, in  the  absence  of  a  covenant  to  do  so, 
is  under  no  obligation  to  make  repairs,  is  ap- 
plicable to  leases  of  railroads;  so  that  the 
lessor,  in  the  absence  of  a  covenant  to  repair, 
is  not  liable  for  injuries  sustained  by  em- 
ployte  of  tbe  lessee  company  by  the  latter's 
negligence  in  failing  to  keep  the  track  in 
proper  repair.  Hahs  v.  Cape  Girardeau  &  O. 
B.  Co.,  126  S.  W.  524,  528,  147  Mo.  App.  262. 

Where  an  instrument  granted  to  defend- 
ants the  use  of  and  the  right  to  occupy  cer- 
tain lands  described  as  a  game  preserve,  and 
provide!  that  it  was  understood  that  any  fail- 
ure on  defendants'  part  to  perform  any  of 
the  agreements  expressed  should  work  "a  for- 


feiture of  this  lease^**  and  plalntlfT  In  Its  com- 
plaint alleged  that  it  "entered  into  a  certain 
indenture  of  lease,**  and  that  "at  the  time  of 
the  commission  of  said  acts  last  aforesaid 
such  defendants  were  tenants  of  said  plain- 
tlif  under  and  by  virtue  of  said  lease,  and  for 
the  purposes  therein  mentioned,"  the  instru- 
ment  would  be  regarded  as  a  "lease,**  creat- 
ing the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
Shafter  Estate  Go.  t.  Alvord,  84  Pa&  279,  2 
Gal.  App.  602. 

A  "lease**  is  defined  by  Bouvler  to  be: 
"A  species  of  contract  for  the  possession  and 
profits  of  lands  and  tenements  either  for  life 
or  for  a  term  of  years  or  during  the  pleasure 
of  the  parties.  A  conveyance  by  way  of  de- 
mise always  for  a  less  term  than  the  party 
conveying  has  in  the  premlsea  Duration  for 
a  shorter  period  than  the  duration  of  the 
interests  of  the  lessor  in  the  land  is  one  of 
its  essential  features,  for  if  the  lessor  dis- 
poses of  his  entire  interest  It  becomes  an 
assignment,  and  is  not  a  lease.  In  other 
words,  the  granting  of  a  lease  always  sup- 
poses that  the  grantor  reserves  in  himself 
a  reversion.**  In  18  Am.  &  Eng.  Bnc  of  Law 
(2d  Ed.)  697,  a  lease  is  defined  as:  "A  con- 
tract for  the  possession  and  profits  of  lands 
and  tenements  oh  the  one  side  and  the  rec^ 
ompense  or  rents  on  the  other,  or  in  other 
words,  a  conveyance  to  a  person  for  life, 
years  or  at  will,  in  consideration  of  a  rent 
or  other  recompense.**  Within  these  defini- 
tions a  sealed  writing,  witnessing  that  "the 
lessors  do  demise,  let  and  lease  for  coal 
mining  and  coke  manufacturing  purposes  for 
a  period  of  thirty  years"  a  tract  of  land,  and 
which  expressly  agrees  that  "if  at  the  expira- 
tion of  the  said  period  of  thirty  years,  all  the 
available  merchantable  coal  which  can  be 
profitably  mined  has  not  been  mined  and 
removed,  the  lessees  shall  have  the  privilege 
of  an  extension  of  this  lease  on  the  same 
terms  and  conditions  as  those  hereinbefore 
set  forth,  for  a  reasonable  additional  time 
until  the  whole  of  said  coal  can  be  so  mined 
and  removed,"  and  which  provides  for  a  rent 
or  royalty  to  the  lessors  of  a  certain  amount 
per  ton,  created  a  'aease.**  Harvey  Coal,& 
Coke  Co.  V.  Dillon,  53  S.  B.  928.  930,  59  W. 
Va.  606,  6  li.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  628. 

Where  a  statute  provides  for  the  pay- 
ment of  a  franchise  tax  by  railroads,  express 
companies,  chair  and  dining  car  companies, 
etc.,  to  the  state,  and  also  a  local  tax  to 
the  county,  dty,  or  taxing  district,  and  an- 
other statute  provides  for  the  ascertainment 
of  the  franchise  tax  according  to  that  pro- 
portion of  the  capital  stock  which  the  length 
of  lines  operated,  owned,  or  leased  in  the 
state  bears  to  the  total  mileage  operated, 
owned,  or  leased,  and  the  proportion  of  the 
tax  to  be  paid  in  any  locality  is  to  be  com- 
puted In  the  same  way,  a  trafllc  arrangement 
by  which  one  railroad  obtains  the  right  t6 
use  the  tracks  of  another  for  a  certain  pe- 
riod of  time  at  a  certain  rental,  in  order  to 


I/BASB 


5« 


y^ilE^jlH 


obtain  ingrasB  to  a  terminal  dty,  to  a  ''lease/' 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  and  tor 
the  mileage  operated  under  which  the  rail- 
road is  liable  to  pay  a  franchise  tax.  Jeffer- 
son Ck>unty  t.  Board  of  Valuation  &  Assess- 
ment of  Kentucky,  78  S.  W.  443,  445, 117  Ky. 
531. 

Where  a  will  devised  a  farm  to  a  son 
of  testatrix,  and  provided  that  if  the  farm 
should  be  leased  for  the  purpose  of  mining 
the  proceeds  of  the  lease  should  be  divided 
among  the  children  of  testatrix,  the  word 
"lease"  was  not  used  in  a  technical  sense, 
but  indicated  a  method  of  converting  the  min- 
erals into  proceeds.  Hyde  v.  Rainey,  82  Atl. 
781,  784,  233  Pa.  540,  Ann.  Cas.  1913B,  726. 

Under  a  covenant  in  an  oil  and  gas  lease 
that  the  lessor  would,  in  and  by  any  deed 
thereunder  executed  by  him,  prohibit  any 
drilling  for  oil  or  gas  on  any  land  so  con- 
veyed, the  word  "deed"  does  not  Include  a 
"lease,"  so  as  to  prohibit  the  lessor  from 
leasing  the  IsBd  for  the  purpose  of  drilling 
oil  and  gas  wells  thereon.  Test  Oil  Co.  v. 
La  Tourette,  91  Pac.  1025,  1029,  19  Okl.  214. 

The  use  in  a<  writing  of  such  words  as 
"lease"  and  "rent,"  the  fact  that  it  is  for  a 
definite  period  and  a  recited  consideration, 
that  it  provides  for  an  abatement  of  rent  in 
case  of  the  obstruction  of  the  wall  by  other 
buildings,  also  for  necessary  access  through 
and  upon  the  premises,  and  that  the  lessor 
warrants  the  title  to  said  leasehold  for  the 
time  herein  mentioned,  demonstrates  that  the 
writing  was  intended  as  a  "lease."  Levy 
V.  Louisville  Gunning  System,  89  S.  W.  528, 
580,  121  Ky.  510,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  859. 

The  words  "reserves"  and  "leases,"  in 
the  title  and  body  of  chapter  244,  p.  456, 
Laws  1897,  providing  for  the  assessment  and 
taxing  of  mineral  reserves,  or  leases,  or  sep- 
arately owned  mineral,  or  mineral  rights, 
to  the  owner  thereof,  separately  from  the 
land,  and  providing  penalties  for  its  viola- 
tion, mean  at  one  time  reserved  or  leased 
mineral,  and  at  another  written  instruments 
evidencing  mineral  rights.  Kansas  Natural 
Gas  Co.  V.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Neosho  Coun- 
ty, 89  Pac.  750,  751,  75  Kan.  335. 

Naphtha  lamps  and  fire  alarm  lanterns 
owned  and  used  by  a  lighting  company  in 
performance  of  its  contract  to  light  and 
maintain  all  naphtha  lamps  used  by  the  city 
for  lighting  are  not  within  Rev.  Laws,  c.  12, 
i  23,  cl.  2,  making  personal  property  "leased" 
for  profit  liable  to  taxation  where  located, 
since  the  lamps  are  not  held  by  the  city  as 
a  "lessee."  Rising  Sun  St.  Lighting  Co.  v. 
aty  of  Boston,  63  N.  E.  408,  181  Mass.  211. 

A  "lease"  granted  premises,  described 
on  a  blueprint  attached,  reserving  from  the 
said  "leased  premises"  that  portion  lying 
between  the  tracks  of  the  L.  Railroad,  as 
shown  on  such  blueprint,  and  also  reserving 
a  strip  of  land  10  feet  on  either  side  of 
said  railroad  tracks.    Another  clause  granted 


the  lessee  an  optSou  to  purdiaae  111*' said 
"leased  premises"  at  a  certain  price.  Held, 
that  the  saving  clause  was  not  a  reservation 
of  an  easement  merely,  but  reserved  from 
the  operation  of  the  lease  the  fee  of  the  por- 
tion reserved,  and,  such  reservation  having 
been  omitted  from  a  deed  executed  on  the 
exprcise  of  the  option,  the  grantor  was  en- 
titled to  have  the  mistake  corrected.  Los 
Angeles  ft  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New  Liverpool  Salt 
Co.,  87  Pac.  1029,  1030,  150  Cal.  21. 

A  Jury's  negative  answer  to  the  special 
interrogatory,  "Did  you  find  that"  the  land- 
lord's agent  "had  authority  to  waive  the 
lease"  of  the  landlord  on  any  part  of  the 
crop  covered  by  his  lien,  is  not  inconsistent 
with  the  verdict  for  the  defendant,  as  author- 
ity to  "waive  the  lease"  is  something  different 
from  authority  to  waive  the  lien.  Fishbaugh 
V.  Spunaugle.  92  N.  W.  58,  60,  118  Iowa,  337, 

As  eoaTejraaoo 

Conveyance  as  including,  aee  ConTeyancft 
A  "lease"  is  defined  to  be  "a  conveyance 
of  lands  or  tenements  to  a  person  for  life, 
for  a  term  of  years,  or  at  will,  in  considera- 
tion of  a  return  of  rent  or  some  other  rec- 
ompense." Hayes  v.  aty  of  Atlanta,  57 
S.  B>.  1087,  1089,  1  Ga.  App.  25  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  In  Black,  Law  Diet). 

A  "lease"  is  a  conveyance  of  an  estate 
or  interest  in  real  property  for  life^  for  years, 
at  will,  or  for  a  term  less  than  the  grantor 
had  in  the  real  property.  The  term  is  not 
satisfied  by  a  contract  by  which  a  landowner 
gives  to  another  a  right  to  convey  water 
from  a  spring.  Clark  v.  Strong,  93  N.  T. 
Supp.  514,  516,  105  App.  Div.  179. 

"A  'lease'  may  be  in  a  sense  a  convey- 
ance, but  such  is  not  the  commonly  accepted 
nor  the  accurate  meaning  of  the  term.  When 
we  say  premises  are  'leased,'  we  generally 
mean  that  the  use  of  them  Is  transferred." 
Duff  V.  Keaton,  124  Pac.  291,  294,  33  Okl.  92, 
42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  472  (quoting  definition  in 
Perkins  v.  Morse,  2  Atl.  130,  78  Me.  17,  57 
Am.  Rep.  780). 

A  "lease"  is  a  conveyance  by  the  owner 
of  an  estate  to  another  of  a  portion  of  his 
interest  therein  for  a  term  less  than  his  own, 
and  it  passes  a  present  Interest  in  the  land 
for  the  period  specified.  Chandler  v.  Hart, 
119  Pac.  516,  519,  161  CaL  405,  Ann,  Cas. 
1913B,  1094. 

To  "lease"  is  to  transfer,  for  a  term 
specified  therein,  from  the  lessor  to  the  lessee, 
the  property  therein  demised.  Moorshead  v. 
United  Rys.  Co.,  96  S.  W.  261,  277,  203  Mo. 
121. 

The  word  "lease"  is  sometimes  used  to 
signify  the  interest  and  estate  which  is 
conveyed,  but  may  properly  apply  to  the  in- 
strument or  means  of  conveyance.  Weauder 
V.  Claussen  Brewing  Ass'n,  84  Pac  7^,  736». 
42  Wash.  226,  114  Am.  St  Rep.  UO,  7  Ana 
Cas.  536. 


IrEASE 


67 


tXABA 


"A  lease^  Is  a  contract  for  the  posaeaston 
of  profits  of  land  and  tenements  on  tlie  one 
aide  and  the  recompense  or  rents  on  the  oth- 
er, or,  in  other  words,  a  conveyance  to  a  per- 
son for  life,  years,  or  at  will  in  consideration 
of  a  rent  or  other  recompense."  Headley  v. 
Hoopengamer,  56  8.  E.  744,  748»  60  W.  Va. 
026. 
Onutt  of  oasememt 

Ky.  St  1903,  S  2031,  anthorizes  a  guard- 
ian to  lease  any  real  estate  of  his  ward  until 
the  latter  shall  arrive  at  full  age  provided  no 
such  lease  Is  made  for  a  longer  term  than 
seven  years.  Held  that,  where  a  guardian 
granted  an  easement  for  the  laying  of  pipe 
line  over  his  ward's  land,  a  conveyance  would 
be  construed  as  a  valid  lease  of  the  property 
for  the  purpose  intended  during  the  minority 
of  the  ward  but  not  for  a  longer  term  than 
seven  years.  Cumberland  Pipe  Line  Oo.  v. 
Howard  (Ky.)  100  S.  W.  270. 

As  deed 

(see  ijeeo* 


See  Grant 
As  iaewAtoftaee 

See  Incumbrance. 
Zdcense  diatbugnUiheA 

The  difference  between  a  license  and  a 
lease  is  that  a  lease  gives  to  the  tenant  the 
right  of  possession  against  the  world,  while 
a  license  creates  no  interest  in  the  land,  but 
is  simply  the  authority  or  power  to  use  it  in 
some  specific  way.  Joplin  Supply  Oo.  v. 
West,  130  S.  W.  166,  161,  149  Mo.  App.  78. 

A  license  in  respect  to  real  estate  is  an 
authority  to  do  a  particular  act  or  series  of 
acts  on  the  land  of  another  without  possess- 
ing an  estate  therein.  The  test  to  determine 
whether  an  agreement  for  the  use  of  real 
estate  is  a  license  or  a  lease  is  whether  the 
contract  gives  exclusive  use  of  the  premises 
against  all  the  world,  including  the  owner» 
in  which  case  it  is  a  lease,  or  whether  it 
merely  confers  a  privilege  to  occupy  under 
the  owner,  in  which  case  it  is  a  license,  the 
question  to  be  determined  by  a  construction 
of  the  instrument  Shaw  v.  Oaldwell,  116 
Pac.  941,  943, 16  CaL  App.  1. 

The  test  to  determine  whether  an  agree- 
ment for  the  use  of  real  estate  is  a  "leased* 
or  a  license  is  whether  the  contract  gives  ex- 
clusive possession  of  the  premises  against 
the  world,  including  the  owner,  in  which  case 
it  is  a  lease,  or  whether  it  merely  confers  a 
license  to  occupy  under  the  owner.  An  in- 
strument by  which  the  owner  of  premises  let 
to  defendant  '*his  ioe  business  and  privileges 
in  *  *  *  with  the  use  and  benefit  of  his 
icehouses,"  for  a  term  ending  on  a  certain 
date^  gave  defendant  the  exclusive  posseo- 
Bion  of,  and  the  entire  beneficial  interest  in, 
the  icehouses  and  the  land  under  them,  so 
as  to  eonstitnte  a  lease  of  the  iwemises,  in- 


stead of  a  mere  contract  for  their  use  as 
licensee  under  the  owner.  Roberts  v.  Lynn 
Ice  Oo.,  78  N.  E.  623,  624, 187  Mass.  402. 

A  contract,  whereby  it  was  agreed  that 
plaintiff  should  have  the  exclusive  privilege 
of  the  public  stenographer's  office  in  a  cer- 
tain hotel,  plaintiff  agreeing  to  pay  the  rent 
promptly  each  month  in  advance  for  the 
exclusive  privilege  of  the  public  stenogra- 
pher's office,  and  to  do  private  correspondence 
for  the  hotel  management,  and  to  furnish 
competent  stenographers  for  this  service, 
was  not  a  "lease,"  but  a  mere  agreement  to 
allow  plaintiff  to  carry  on  bqfitneBS  in  the 
hotel.  Hess  v.  Roberts,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  894, 
896,  124  ^p.  Div.  828. 

An  agreement  whereby  tenants  of  a  store 
building,  leased  for  a  plumbing  business,  al- 
lowed a  third  person  to  occupy  part  of  it  in 
conducting  an  electrical  supply  business,  was 
a  'lease,"  though  called  a  "license"  by  them. 
Denecke  v.  Henry  F.  Miller  ft  Son,  119  N.  W. 
880,  384, 142  Iowa,  466^  19  Ann.  Gas.  949. 

An  instrument  by  whidi  defendant  con- 
tracted to  "let,"  and  plaintiff  to  "take,"  the 
right  to  maintain,  at  a  race  park,  three 
stands  for  sale  of  candies,  said  right  b^ng 
exclusive  for  said  business  within  said  park, 
also  the  storeroom  under  the  tracks,  and  one 
of  said  stands,  not  to  exceed  a  certain  size, 
to  be  in  the  main  pavillion,  and  providing 
the  period  of  "letting,"  and  the  amount  and 
times  of  payment  of  the  "rent,"  instead  of 
b^ng  a  "license,"  is  a  "lease,"  affecting  de- 
fendant in  the  exclusive  use  of  the  land,  so 
that  plaintiff,  having  paid  the  rent,  can  re^ 
cover  no  part  of  it,  though  the  park  is  de- 
stroyed by  fire  before  the  end  of  the  period 
of  letting.  Mehlman  v.  Atlantic  Amusement 
Co..  119  N.  T.  Supp.  222,  223,  66  Misc.  Rep. 
26. 

A  contract  to  let  to  plaintiffs  the  exclu- 
sive news,  confectionery,  view,  and  checking 
privileges  on  defendant's  steamers  for  cer- 
tain specified  seasons,  though  denominated  a 
"lease,"  was  not  a  "lease,"  but  a  "license." 
Nash  V.  Thousand  Islands  Steamboat  Co., 
108  N.  T.  Supp.  336,  342, 123  App.  Div.  148. 

An  instrument  granting,  demising,  and 
leasing  certain  land  for  the  purpose  solely  of 
mining  and  operating  for  oil,  gas,  and  other 
minerals,  laying  pipe  lines,  building  tanks, 
and  structures  to  take  care  of  the  products 
is  a  lease  conveying  an  interest  in  the  land, 
and  not  merely  a  license  to  enter  and  operate 
for  oil  or  gas.  Barnsdall  v.  Bradford  Gas 
Co.,  74  AU.  207,  226  Pa.  838. 

An  instrument  by  whidi  the  owner  of 
land  therein  described  grants  to  another  all 
the  gas  and  oil  under  it,  with  the  exclusive 
right  to  enter  thereon  at  all  times  to  drill 
and  operate  for  oil  or  gas,  etc.,  and  provides 
for  the  time  within  which  the  various  wells 
shall  be  completed,  with  a  stipulated  month- 
ly rental  for  each  well  not  finished  on  time. 


UBASB 


68 


T^TCAftTB 


and  tbat  each  locatioa  shall  consist  of  ten 
acres  more  or  less,  and  that  no  well  shall 
occupy  more  than  one  acre,  is  not  a  *'lease/' 
as  leases  are  usually  understood,  but  a  mere 
grant  of  an  ezduslye  right  to  enter  and  ex- 
plore for  oil  and  gas,  and  prosecute  such  busi- 
ness, occupying  no  more  land  than  is  needed 
for  that  purpose,  not  more  than  one  acre  to 
a  well.  Stahl  v.  Illinois  Oil  Co..  90  N.  E. 
632,  633,  45  Ind.  App.  211. 

Mining  lieense 

A  contract  simply  giving  a  right  to  take 
ore  from  a  mine,  no  estate  being  granted, 
confers  a  mere  "license,"  and  licensee  ac- 
quires no  right  to  the  ore  until  separated 
from  the  freehold;  but  an  instrument  deyls- 
ing  lands  for  mining  purposes,  for  a  desig- 
nated term  of  years,  at  a  fixed  rent,  and  giv- 
ing the  right  to  erect  all  necessary  buildings, 
is  a  ''lease,"  not  merely  a  mining  license. 
BarnsdaU  v.  Bradford  Gas  Co.,  74  AtL  207, 
208,  225  Pa.  338,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  614. 

Implied  eeTenaAt  tor  qvlet  enjoyment 

The  words  "grant,"  "demise,"  or  "lease," 
in  a  lease  for  years,  creates  a  covenant  in 
law  for  good  title  and  quiet  enjoyment  of  the 
lands  demised  during  the  term.  Headley  v. 
Hoopengamer,  55  S.  B.  744,  747,  60  W.  Va. 
626. 

Am  purpetnlty 

See  Perpetuity. 
As  property 

See  Personal  Property;  Property. 
As  privileso 

See  Privilege. 
Sale  and  eontraot  of  sale  distingnislied 

A  conveyance  of  standing  timber  for 
sawmill  purposes  is  a  sale  of  land  and  not  a 
'lease"  within  Civ.  Code  1895,  |  3613,  declar- 
ing that  on  a  sale  of  land  there  is  no  implied 
warranty  of  title,  and  hence  a  vendee  of 
standing  timber  cannot  defend  against  a  suit 
on  purchase-money  notes  in  any  plea  predi- 
cated on  the  breach  of  an  implied  covenant 
of  quiet  enjoyment  McLendon  Bros.  v. 
Finch,  58  S.  E.  600,  692,  2  Ga.  App.  421. 

A  contract  binding  the  party  of  the  first 
part  to  rent  certain  land  to  the  party  of  the 
second  part,  providing  for  the  payment  of 
three  installments  of  rent,  and  agreeing  that 
if  these  are  paid  the  party  of  the  first  part 
will  convey  the  land  to  the  party  of  the  sec- 
ond part,  was  a  "lease"  and  not  a  contract  of 
sale.  Thomas  v.  Johnson,  95  S.  W.  468,  460, 
78  Ark.  574  (citing  Quertermous  v.  Hatfield, 
14  S.  W.  1096,  54  Ark.  16;  Ish  v.  Morgan,  3 
S.  W.  440,  48  Ark.  413 ;  Watson  v.  Pugh,  10 
S.  W.  493,  51  Ark.  218;  Cheney  v.  Ubby,  10 
Sup.  Ct  496,  134  U.  S.  68,  33  L.  Ed.  818; 
Blanchard  v.  Raines,  20  Fla.  467;  Houston 
V.  Smythe,  5  South.  520,  66  Miss.  118). 

A  written  instrument  denominated  a 
"lease,"  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  $50, 
and  providing  for  further  payments  of  $10 


per  month,  with  interest,  until  a  certain  sum 
was  paid,  after  which  the  leased  personalty 
was  to  become  the  property  of  the  lessee,  was 
a  conditional  sale.  Pringle  v.  Ganfield,  104 
N.  W.  223, 19  S.  D.  506. 

A  contract  provided  that  plaintiff  leased 
from  the  owner  of  certain  land  a  tract  con- 
taining 250  acres  and  agreed  to  pay  $205  for 
the  year  1905,  with  the  privilege  of  rerenting 
the  property  on  the  same  terms  for  seven 
successive  years,  and  that  In  case  of  such  re- 
newals, on  full  payment  of  the  rent,  the  own- 
er on  completion  of  the  period  would  convey 
the  property  to  plaintiff  in  consideration  of 
$1,  and  the  amount,  with  legal  interest,  of 
taxes  paid  pending  the  contract  Held,  that 
such  contract  operated  as  a  "lease,"  and 
the  annual  payments  as  rent,  so  long  as  it 
was  executory,  and  on  completion  of  the  pay- 
ments it  became  a  sale,  at  plaintiff's  option, 
on  his  paying  $1,  taxes,  and  interest  pending 
the  contract.  Heard  v.  Heard  ft  Lee,  41 
South.  827,  828,  148  Ala.  673  (citing  Davis  v. 
Robert,  8  South.  114,  89  Ala.  404,  18  Am.  St 
Rep.  126;   Wilkinson  v.  Roper,  74  Ala.  140). 

The  owner  of  land  on  which  there  were 
dumps  of  slag  and  smelter  products  entered 
into  a  contract  denominated  a  "lease,"  by 
which  he  purported  to  lease  the  land  for  a 
stated  term,  with  the  right  to  remove  the 
dumps  on  payment  of  a  series  of  notes  matur- 
ing at  intervals  through  a  portion  of  the 
teruL  The  contract  provided,  in  effect,  that 
removal  of  the  dumps  should  proceed  only  in 
proportion  as  payments  were  made,  that 
when  all  the  dumps  were  removed  the  lease 
should  terminate,  and  that  on  payment  of  all 
the  notes  on  or  before  maturity  the  lessee 
should  be  entitled  to  a  bill  of  sale  of  the 
dumps,  with  the  right  to  remove  the  same 
within  a  specified  term.  It  further  provided 
that:  "It  is  mutually  agreed  that  all  worts 
on  the  said  above-described  slag,  slag  dumps 
and  materials  and  smelter  products  shall  be 
performed  in  a  thoroughly  workmanlike  man- 
ner, and  that  any  failure  of  the  said  party 
of  the  first  part  to  do  or  keep  any  of  the 
agreements  herein,  •  •  •  or  any  failure 
to  pay  immediately  when  due  any  one  or 
more  of  said  100  promissory  notes,  •  •  * 
shall  work  a  forfeiture  of  all  rights  of  the 
said  party  of  the  first  part  under  this  agree- 
ment, and  the  said  party  of  the  second  part 
shall  have  the  right  *  *  *  to  declare 
each  and  every  one  and  all  of  the  said  100 
promissory  notes,  or  whatever  number  of  the 
said  notes  may  remain  unpaid,  •  •  •  im- 
mediately due  and  payable,  and  •  •  • 
to  collect  the  same,  •  •  •  and  in  case  of 
forfeiture  as  aforesaid  all  work  done  and 
money  expended  by  the  said  party  of  the 
first  part  shall  inure  to  the  party  of  the  sec- 
ond  part  as  liquidated  damages,  •  ^  * 
and  the  said  party  *  *  *  may  thereupon 
*  *  •  enter  upon  said  premises  and  dis- 
possess all  persons  occupying  the  same." 
Held,  that  such  transaction  was  not  a  leasee 


IiEASB 


69 


LEASE  FROM  TEAB  TO  TEAR 


but  a  conditional  sale  of  the  material  In  the 
dumps,  whicli  gave  the  owner  alternative 
remedies  for  breach  of  the  contract,  and  that, 
where  lie  declared  a  forfeiture  and  took  pos- 
eesalon  because  of  default  In  payment  of 
notes,  he  conld  not  also  collect  the  notes  ma- 
turing thereafter.  Manson  v.  Dayton,  163 
Fed.  258,  258,  265,  82  a  a  A  588. 

An  agreement  to  sell  a  machine  for  a 
certain  price.  Installments  to  be  paid  on  ac- 
ceptance of  the  proposition  and  shipment  of 
the  ma<diine,  with  an  option  of  returning  It 
within  a  certain  time  In  lieu  of  the  last  pay- 
ment, and  giving  no  claim  on  the  part  paid, 
is  a  'lease"  for  experimental  purposes  with 
the  privilege  of  completing  the  purchase,  and 
not  a  sale  within  Cav.  Gbde,  §  1770,  providing 
that  one  who  manufactures  an  article  under 
an  order  for  a  particular  purpose  warrants 
It  reasonably  fit  therefor.  Kullman,  Salz  & 
CkK  V.  Sugar  Apparatus  Mfg.  Co.,  96  irac  369, 
372, 153  OaL  725. 

A  contract  recited  that  S.  desired  to 
have  the  "use"  of  plalntlflrs  building  and 
saloon  fixtures,  to  become  "the  owner  of  said 
fixtures  w^hen  fully  paid  for,**  and  provided 
that  8.  could  use  the  premises  for  a  spedfled 
term ;  that  he  should  make  spedfled  month- 
ly payments  to  plalntilf,  until  the  total  pay« 
ments,  after  deducting  monthly  ground  rent, 
should  equal  the  cost  of  the  building,  fix- 
tures, etc.,  and  8  per  cent  per  annum  Interest 
thereon,  when  S.  should  be  deemed  the  owner 
of  the  fixtures,  thereafter  paying  plaintiff 
$55  per  month  until  the  expiration  of  ids 
ground  lease,  and  that  S.'s  failure  to  make 
the  monthly  payments  should  evidence  a  re- 
llnqnishment  of  his  rights  under  the  contract. 
Held,  that  the  contract  evidenced  a  condi- 
tional sale  of  the  flxtures,  etc.,  and  not  a 
"lease**  thereof ;  S.  becoming  the  owner  there- 
of on  reimbursing  plaintiff  his  original  in- 
vestment, with  interest,  etc.  Ooors  v.  Rea- 
gan, 96  Pac.  966,  967,  44  Colo.  126. 

A  contract,  after  reciting  that  the  ven- 
dors had  "rented"  certain  furniture,  provided 
that  the  title  should  remain  In  the  vendors 
until  the  purchase  money  was  paid  In  spec- 
ified Installments,  and  on  default  in  any 
payment  the  vendors  reserved  the  right  to 
take  possession  without  legal  process.  There 
was  further  provision  that  all  payments 
should  be  placed  to  the  credit  of  the  vendee 
as  payments  on  the  "lease,"  or  any  other 
goods  for  which  he  might  owe  the  vendors 
on  open  account  on  any  other  "lease,**  and 
that  the  vendee  was  to  have  no  title  to  the 
'iease"  until  his  account  should  be  settled  in 
full.  Held,  that  the  contract  was  one  of 
conditional  sale,  entitling  the  vendors  to  the 
protection  afforded  by  Code  1907,  {  7342,  mak- 
ing it  a  crime  to  remove  or  sell  personal 
property  to  hinder  or  defraud  any  person 
who  has  a  valid  claim  thereto,  wltti  knowl- 
edge of  the  existence  of  such  claim.  Steele 
V.  State,  48  South.  673,  674,  159  Ala.  9. 


A  contract,  though  in  the  form  of  a  lease 
and  called  a  "lease,"  by  whldi  the  vendor 
reserves  title  until  final  payment  should  be 
made,  and  the  right  of  rescission  in  case  the 
purchaser  should  fail  to  pay  any  installments 
of  the  so<»lled  rent,  Is  a  conditional  sale. 
Unitype  Co.  v.  Long,  143  Fed.  315,  317,  74 
O.  a  A.  458. 

A  "lease"  of  property  under  an  agree- 
ment that,  on  payment  of  a  specified  sum  in 
installments,  title  shall  pass  to  the  lessee, 
amounts  to  a  conditional  sale,  valid  as  to 
third  parties  as  well  as  the  parties  to  the 
transaction.  Kidder  v.  Wlttler-Corbin  Ma- 
chinery Co..  80  Pac.  801,  802,  38  Wash.  179. 

Sliartiig  eontraet 

An  owner  of  a  farm  and  milk  route  let 
it  to  one  on  condition  that  he  furnish  horses, 
etc.,  and  divide  the  proceeds  as  follows: 
Eggs,  daily;  crops,  w)ien  sold ;  milk,  month- 
ly. Held,  that  the  contract  did  not  create 
the  relation  of  landlord  and  t^iant  and  is 
not  a  "lease,"  and  h^ice  did  not  create  the 
relation  necessary  to  allow  the  application 
of  the  law  relating  to  the  right  of  distress 
for  rent  Olden  v.  Mather,  67  AtL  435,  73 
N.  J.  IQq.  217  (citing  Gray  T.  Reynolds,  50 
Atl.  670,  67  N.  J.  Law,  169). 

IAA8B  AT  WnX 

A  lease  of  real  property  f6r  more  than 
three  years,  signed  by  an  agent  whose  au- 
thority Is  not  in  writing,  has  against  the 
principal  no  other  force  or  effect,  either  in 
law  or  In  equity,  than  a  '^ease  at  will,"  be- 
cause of  the  first  section  of  the  statute  of 
frauds.  Clement  v.  Young-McShea  Amuse- 
ment Co.,  67  Aa  82,  84,  70  N.  J.  Bq.  677,  118 
Am.  St  Rep.  747  (citing  (3en.  St  p.  1602). 

IAA8B  FOB  TBABS 

A  lease  for  any  definite  period  is  a 
^ease  for  years,"  and  a  lease  for  one  year 
and  a  lease  for  99  years  create  an  estate  of 
equal  dignity.  Moss  Point  Lumber  0>.  v. 
Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Harrison  County,  42 
South.  290,  298,  89  Mlsa  448. 

"A  'lease  for  years*  is  a  contract  between 
lessor  and  lessee  for  the  possession  and 
profits  of  lands  and  .tenements  on  the  one 
hand  and  a  recompense  by  rent  or  other  con- 
sideration on  the  other."  City  of  New  York 
V.  Interborough  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  104  N.  T. 
Supp.  157, 160,  53  Misc.  Rep.  126  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  McAdam,  LandL  ft  T. 
127). 

XiEASE  FROM  TEAB  TO  TEAR 

A  lease  for  one  year  to  continue  there- 
after from  year  to  year  so  long  as  mutually 
agreeable  to  the  parties  Is  a  "lease  from  year 
to  year"  after  the  first  year,  and  entitles  the 
tenant  to  possession  for  at  least  two  years 
and  to  sixty  days*  notice  before  the  end  of  a 
year  to  terminate  the  lease.  McQuinn  v. 
Logue^  128  S.  W.  516»  517, 143  Mo.  App.  232. 


LEASE  OF  OONVICTS 


60 


LEAVE— ^LBAVINa 


I.SA8B  or  ooinrzoTs 

'The  attempt  is  made  to  constrae  the  ex- 
pression 'leasing  or  hiring  of  convicts,'  as 
used  in  the  Oonstitation,  as  being  synony- 
mous with  'leasing  of  farms  to  be  worked  by 
the  convicts.'  How  futile  such  an  effort  is 
will  be  apparent  when  we  recall  that  at  the 
adoption  of  the  Oonstitution  there  was  no 
system  of  leasing  farms,  and  hence  it  was 
Impossible  that  the  constitutional  convention 
could  have  dealt  with  a  situation  which  had 
never  arisen."  Henry  v.  State,  39  South.  856, 
876.  87  Miss.  1. 

LEA8EHOIJ> 

A  "leajsehold"  is  defined  to  be  "an  es- 
tate in  realty  held  under  a  lease."  Hayes  y. 
Olty  of  Atlanta,  67  S.  B.  1087,  1089,  1  Ga. 
App.  25  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Blade,  Law  Diet). 

"A  leasehold  interest'  is  not  real  estate, 
but  merely  a  chattel  real,  which  is  personal 
property."  Townsend  v.  Boyd,  66  AtL  1099, 
1101,  217  Pa.  386, 12  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  U48. 

A  "leasehi^d"  is  an  intangible  chattel 
real;  it  is  an  entity  per  se,  distinguished 
from  the  fee  ownership  out  of  whidi  it  is- 
sues. "Whether  the  disdnction  seems  re- 
fined or  not,  it  is  real  in  legal  thought,  for  a 
leasehold  is  not  the  wheat  or  com  produced 
under  the  right  conferred  by  the  lease.  The 
lease  is  a  thing  apart  from  the  commodities 
produced  under  the  right  conferred  by  it"  A 
sealed  writing  demising  and  leasing  for  ooal 
mining  and  coke  manufacturing  purposes  for 
thirty  years  a  tract  of  land,  and  granting 
unto  the  lessee  the  sole  right  of  mining,  ship- 
ping, and  selling  coal  from  the  leased  prem- 
ises, with  an  extension  to  remove  ooal  which 
can  be  profitably  mined,  providing  for  a  rent 
or  royalty  to  the  lessor  of  ten  cents  a  ton 
for  all  coal  mined,  containing  a  forf<^ture 
clause  for  breach  of  covenant,  created  a 
leasehold  or  chattel  real,  taxable  to  the  les- 
see under  Acts  1905,  p.  285,  c.  35.  Harvey 
Coal,  etc.,  Co.  v.  DiUon,  53  S.  B.  928,  936,  59 
W.  Va.  605. 

A  "leasehold"  is  the  right  to  use  proper- 
ty upon  which  a  lease  is  held  for  the  purpos- 
es of  the  lease.  It  is  intangible  property, 
which  the  law  recognizes  as  having  value, 
but  which  is  incorporeal  in  its  nature.  It  is 
not  the  property  upon  which  the  lease  is  held 
nor  the  property  used  in  its  exercise.  In 
determining  the  taxable  value  of  the  lease- 
hold, the  pecuniary  value  of  the  property 
used  in  connection  therewith  or  the  use  of 
which  constitutes  the  leasehold  estate  may 
not  be  teken  into  consideration.  The  land 
which  constitutes  the  subject  of  the  lease- 
hold is  taxed,  not  as  a  leasehold,  nor  in  the 
name  of  the  lessee,  but  as  land,  In  the 
name  of  the  owner,  and  is  not  to  be  taxed 
over  again  in  the  name  of  the  lessee,  on  the 
theory  that  it  constitutes  part  of  the  lease- 
hold.   Nor  are  the  improvemente  on  the  land, 


whether  they  bdong  to  the  landowntf  or  the 
lessee,  to  be  taxed  under  the  designation  of 
"leasehold."  If  they  belong  to  the  owner  of 
the  land,  they  are  charged  to  him,  either  as 
land  or  as  personal  property.  Their  value 
is  not  to  be  included  in,  or  taken  to  make  up^ 
the  value  of  the  intangible  thing,  the  lease- 
hold. Stete  T.  Bare,  66  S.  E.  890,  893,  60 
W.  Va.  483. 

IJnder  Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  |$  8396, 
8396,  giving  a  mechanic's  lien  on  buildings 
and  land  to  the  extent  of  the  title  of  the 
owner  for  whose  immediate  benefit  the  labor 
was  done,  or  materials  furnished,  and  where 
the  owner  has  only  a  leasehold,  the  lien  is 
not  Impaired  by  a  forfeiture  of  the  lease  for 
rent,  one  furnishing  materials  under,  a  con- 
tract with  a  purchaser  in  possession  does 
not  obtein  a  lien  on  the  building  as  against 
the  vendor  after  a  surrender  of  the  posses- 
sion  and  righto  of  the  purchaser;  the 
term  "leasehold"  not  including  such  purchas- 
er. Toner  v.  Whybrew,  96  N.  B.  460,  468,  60 
Ind«  App.  887. 

As  ehattel  real 

See  Chattel  Real. 
As  freeliold 

See  Freehold. 
As  goods  and  eliattels 

See  Goods. 
As  lionestead 

See  Homestead. 
As  interest  in  land 

See  Interest  (In  Property). 
As  property 

See  Personal  Property;  Property;  Beal 
Property. 

LEAST 

See  At  Least 

LEAVE— LEAVING 

See  Die  Leaving  Children;  Die  Leaving 
No  Children;  Die  Leaving  No  Issue; 
Loss  Through  His  Leaving;  Should 
They  Leave  Issue. 

Going  away  from  a  horse,  beyond  sight, 
hearing,  and  reasonably  immediate  reach,  is 
"leaving"  it,  within  a  city  ordinance  declar- 
ing leaving  any  horse  unhitched  within  a 
street  a  nuisance.  Monroe  v.  Hartfoid  St. 
Ry.  Co.,  66  Aa  498,  600,  76  Conn.  201. 

The  word  "leaving,"  as  used  in  an  ordi- 
nance forbidding  the  leaving  of  a  horse,  etc., 
unattended  in  the  street,  means  to  desert,  to 
abandon,  to  forsake;  hence  to  give  up,  to 
relinquish.  Southern  Hardware  &  Supply 
Co.  V.  Standard  Equipment  Co.,  48  South. 
357,  358,  158  Ala.  696. 

The  word  "leave,"  in  a  letter  written  by 
testator  to  plaintiff,  reciting  "Delos,  if  there 
is  not  any  change  in  my  family,  I  shall  leave 


IJBAV]B*-IiSAVIKa 


61 


LEFT  WITH 


oae-half  of  wbat  I  liave  for  yoUt  but  hare 
willed  yoa  $1,000— now  I  want  to  say  to  you 
— ^yon  get  me  up  a  cane  that  will  be  good 
enough  f6r  you  when  I  get  through  with, 
and  I  win  'leave'  the  cane  and  $1,000  with 
It  when  I  get  through/*  means  prima  fade 
wllL  The  testator  accepted  the  cane  fur- 
nished by  plaintiff,  and  used  It  for  many 
years,  but  did  not  leave  $1,000  to  plalntlfE, 
but  substantially  all  of  his  property  to  an 
adopted  daughter,  who  was  amply  provided 
for  without  the  $1,000.  Plaintiff  was  entitled 
to  specific  performace  of  the  contract  cre- 
ated by  the  letter.  Bush  v.  Whltaker,  91  N. 
Y.  Supp.  616,  618,  45  Misc.  Rep.  74. 

D^endanf  a  dray  driver  finished  loading 
his  dray  from  a  car,  drove  away  from  the 
car  from  four  to  six  feet  and  stopped  the 
team,  and  was  tying  the  load  on  the  dray 
without  having  hold  of  the  lines,  when  an- 
other team  frightened  his  horses  and  they 
backed  against  the  car,  crushing  plaintiff. 
Held,  that  the  driver  was  not  negligent  as 
having  left  his  team,  within  an  ordinance 
making  it  unlawful  to  leave  an  animal  at- 
tached to  a  dray  upon  a  public  street  with- 
out locking  the  wheels  of  the  vehicle;  to 
leave,*'  within  the  ordinance,  meaning  to 
depart  or  abandon  for  the  time,  to  go  away 
from  the  immediate  charge  and  supervision 
of  the  animals.  While  the  driver  of  M.'8 
team  had  gotten  down  to  fasten  his  load, 
B.'s  team  was  negligently  drivoi  so  as  to 
frighten  M.'s  team,  which  backed  up  and 
crushed  plaintiff's  intestate.  Held,  that  the 
fact  that  the  accident  would  not  have  hap- 
pened if  the  wheels  of  M.'a  dray  had  been 
locked  was  no  excuse  for  the  negligent  driv- 
ing of  B.'s  team,  where  the  act  of  M.'s  driv- 
er in  getting  down  did  not  amount  to  a  leav- 
ing of  his  team  within  an  ordinance  requir- 
ing wheels  to  be  locked  in  such  cases,  the 
condition  and  equipment  of  M.'s  dray  being 
immaterial  on  the  question  of  B.*s  liability, 
unless  M.'s  driver  violated  the  ordinance  and 
by  the  fact  of  so  doing  was  negligent.  Sul- 
Uvan  V.  Morton  Draying  ft  Warehouse  Co., 
108  Pac  895,  896,  13  Cal  App.  85. 

Laws  N.  C.  1899,  p.  175,  c  54,  {  62,  author- 
izes service  on  certain  insurance  companies 
by  ''leaving"  the  summons  in  the  office  of 
the  conmaissioner  of  insurance.  Held  that, 
where  a  return  recited  that  service  was  made 
by  reading  the  summons  to  the  commission- 
er of  insurance  and  "delivering"  a  copy  there- 
of to  him,  it  would  be  presumed  that  a  copy 
of  the  summons  was  left  with  the  commis- 
sioner; the  court  in  which  the  action  was 
brought  being  one  of  general  Jurisdiction. 
Johnston  V.  Mutual  Reserve  life  Ins.  Co., 
98  N.  Y.  Supp.  1052,  1059,  104  ApQ.  Div.  550. 

LEAVENED 

Edible  wafers,  raised  in  the  making  by 
the  use  of  baking  powder  or  bicarbonate  of 
soda,  are  "leavened,"  although  such  agents 


do  not  produce  fermentation.    F.  H.  Leggett 
ft  Ck>.  V.  United  States*  181  Fed.  817,  818. 

LEAVES 

See  Ornamental  Leaves. 

Artificial  leaves,  see  Artificial  Flowers. 

As  to  palm  leaves  which  have  been  sub- 
jected to  processes  that  restore  their  natural 
appearance  and  prevent  decay,  and  some  of 
which  have  been  arranged  in  wreaths  on 
wire  frames,  held*  that,  as  there  had  be^  no 
advance  in  manufacture  that  destroyed  the 
original  articles  or  made  them  useful  for  oth- 
er purposes,  or  altered  their  trade  designa- 
tion, they  still  remained  dutiable  as  "leaves," 
under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  a  11,  J  1. 
Schedule  N,  par.  425,  30  Stat  191,  rather 
than  as  "manufactures"  of  palm  leat  pro- 
vided for  tn  paragraph  450,  30  Stat  198. 
Kreshower  t.  United  States,  152  Fed.  485, 
486. 

LEDGER 

See  Stoac  Ledger. 

As  book  of  original  entries,  see  Book  of 
Original  Entries. 

A  ledger  is  a  book  of  accounts  in  which 
are  colleeted  and  arranged,  each  und^  its 
appropriate  head,  the  various  transactions 
scattered  throughont  the  journal  or  daybook. 
First  Nat  Bldg.  Co.  v.  Vandenberg,  119  Pac 
224,  227,  29  OkL  688. 

LEFT 

See  Whatsoever  is  Left 

''Left,"  in  a  devise  of  all  the  testatrix's 
estate  to  two  grandchildren  equally  to  be 
their  estate,  not  subject  to  the  debts  or  con- 
trol of  their  husbands,  and  providing  that 
on  the  death  of  either  of  them  without  de- 
scendants the  survivor  should  have  the  share 
of  the  one  so  dying,  and  on  the  death  of  the 
survivor  without  descendants  what  was  left 
should  go  to  the  others,  shows  that  testatrix 
did  not  intend  to  devise  to  others  the  entire 
fund,  but  only  so  much  of  it  as  should  vest 
at  the  death  of  the  surviving  issue.  Irvine 
V.  Putnam  (Ky.)  89  S.  W.  520,  521. 

lAFT  SECURED  OE  MT  BEAL  ESTATE 

In  a  will  giving  testator's  wife  the  in- 
terest on  a  sum  of  money  so  long  as  she 
lives  and  ronains  unmarried,  to  be  "left  se- 
cured on  my  real  estate,"  the  phrase  quot- 
ed did  not  require  the  legacy  to  the  wife  to 
be  secured  by  a  mortgage  on  testator's  real 
estate,  but  created  a  charge  on  such  real 
estate  without  the  aid  of  a  mortgage.  Plum 
V.  Smith,  82  Aa  768,  764,  70  N.  J.  Bq.  002. 

LEFT  WITH 

A  person  being  in  charge  of  an  ofllce 
must  be  understood  to  have  been  la  charge 
of  the  whole  of  it,  and  a  paper  placed  before 


jjEa 


IiEOAOT 


his  eyes  in  a  conspicuous  place  on  the  office 
desk  therein  Is,  In  contemplation  of  Ckxle  Olv. 
Proc.  §  lOU,  "left  with  a  person  having 
charge"  of  the  office.  People  t.  Perils  Irr. 
Dist,  76  Pac.  381,  142  Cal.  601. 

LEG 

See  Breaking  of  a  Leg. 

A  policy  insuring  against  an  accidental 
breaking  of  a  "leg  or  arm"  covers  fractures 
of  bones  of  the  limbs  whether  In  the  hands 
or  feet  or  in  the  upper  or  central  divisions  of 
the  limbs,  Including  a  fracture  of  the  heel 
bone  (OS  calcis).  Rogers  v.  Modem  Brother- 
hood of  America,  111  S.  W.  618,  181  Mo. 
App.  358. 

LEGACY 

See  Beneficial  Legacy;  Contingent  Leg- 
acy; Cumulative  Legacy;  Demonstra- 
tive Legacy ;  Entitled  to  Legacy;  Gen- 
eral Legacy;  Modal  Legacy;  Specific 
Legacy;   Vested  Legacy. 

Legacies  are  parcels  of  the  distributable 
estate.  Their  amount  may  be  expressed  in 
precise  figures,  or  they  may  be  determinable 
upon  an  established  basis  of  computation. 
Blakeslee  v.  Pardee.  56  AtL  503, 505,  76  Conn. 
268. 

Testamentary  trustees  are  entitled  to 
pay  the  Income  from,  trust  funds  to  the 
guardian  of  an  infant  beneficiary  pending 
proceedings  for  settlement  of  their  accounts 
without  requiring  a  bond;  such  income  be- 
ing neither  a  "legacy"  nor  "distributive 
share,"  within  Code  Civ.  Proc.  f  2746.  In  re 
Williams,  123  N.  Y.  Supp.  883,  884,  66  Misc. 
Rep.  417. 

Testator  gave  his  sister  a  specified 
amount  and  also  one-half  of  his  residuary 
estate.  By  a  codicil  he  gave  to  two  nieces 
and  a  nephew  **the  legacy  which  I  have  left 
to  my  sister,"  share  and  share  alike.  Held, 
that  the  word  "legacy"  will  be  construed  to 
include,  not  only  the  money  legacy  in  the 
win,  but  the  gift  of  half  of  the  residuary 
estate.  In  re  Norritf  Estate,  66  AtL  1000, 
1001,  217  Pa.  560. 

"No  particular  words  are  essential  to 
create  a  'legacy'  or  devise;  the  essential 
thing  is  that  the  intention  of  the  testator 
to  thereby  make  the  gift  from  property  of 
the  estate  is  shown."  A  clause  of  a  will 
providing  that  "the  residue  of  my  real  es- 
tate, after  my  son  H.  has  been  paid  what  he 
has  paid  for  me  at  various  times,  I  will  and 
bequeath,"  etc.,  creates  a  "legacy"  to  H. 
of  the  amounts  paid  by  him  for  the  tes- 
tator. In  re  Barclay's  Estate,  93  Pac  1012, 
1014,  152  Cal.  753. 

The  right  given  to  a  beneficiary  by  a 
will  to  receive  a  stated  share  of  the  net 
income  from  the  entire  residuary  estate  of 
^he  testator,  left  in  trust  until  the  time  fixed 


for  its  distribution,  Is  not  a  "legacy^  or 
"distributive  share,"  within  the  meaning  of 
such  terms  as  used  in  War  Revenue  Act 
June  13,  1808,  c.  448,  |  29,  80  Stat  464; 
and,  under  Act  June  27,  1902,  c.  1160,  |  8, 
32  Stat  406,  which  provides  that  no  tax 
shall  be  assessed  under  said  section  29  in 
respect  of  any  contingent  beneficial  interest 
which  shall  not  become  absolutely  vested  in 
possession  or  enjoyment  prior  to  July  1, 1902, 
the  only  interest  of  the  legatee  in  such  in- 
come which  was  subject  to  taxation  was  the 
amount  thereof  actually  received  by  him 
prior  to  said  July  1,  1902,  provided  such 
amount  was  $10,000  or  more.  Lynch  r. 
Union  Trust  Co.  of  San  Francisco,  164  Fed. 
161,  168,  90  C.  C.  A.  147. 

Shares  of  stock  in  a  New  Jersey  cor- 
poration belonging  to  a  testatrix,  residmit  of 
Rhode  Island,  and  passing  under  a  bequest 
in  her  will,  are  subject  to  the  inheritance 
tax  imposed  by  P.  L.  1906,  p.  432,  c.  228, 
entitled  "An  act  to  amend  an  act  entitled 
*An  act  to  tax  intestates'  estates,  legades,'" 
etc,  which  by  section  1,  subd.  2,  imposes  a 
tax  when  the  transfer  is  by  will  of  property 
within  the  state,  and  decedent  was  a  non- 
resident of  the  state  at  death;  the  stock  be- 
ing embraced  by  the  term  "legacies"  as  used 
in  the  title.  Dixon  v.  Russell,  73  Atl.  51, 
52,  78  N.  J.  Law,  296. 

Gift  oausa  mortis  dlstingwlslied 

See  Gift  Causa  Mortla 

Paymemt  of  d«1»t 

A  legacy  implies  a  bounty,  and  not  a 
payment  In  re  Bailey's  Estate,  89  N.  T. 
Supp.  538,  542,  43  Misc.  Rep.  662. 

The  word  "legacy,"  as  used  In  the  War 
Revenue  Act  June  13,  1898,  imposing  a  tax 
on  "legacies"  in  the  hands  of  administratorSk 
executors,  or  trustees,  is  a  definite  gift  by 
wUl  of  personal  property  either  general  and 
pecuniary,  or  spedflc.  It  is  of  specific  article 
of  personal  property  or  of  ascertained  and 
definite  pecuniary  amount  which  may  be 
readily  valued  by  the  executor  or  trustee 
having  it  in  charge.  Disston  v.  McOain, 
147  Fed.  114,  117,  77  O.  C.  A.  340. 

Personalty  or  realty 

A  "legacy"  is  a  gift  by  will  of  personal 
property.  Harding's  Adm'r  v.  Harding,  116 
S.  W.  305,  307,  132  Ky.  133. 

A  "legacy"  is  defined  as  "a  bequest  or 
gift  of  personal  property  by  last  will  and 
testament"  Desloge  v.  Tucker,  94  S.  W. 
283,  286,  196  Mo.  587  (quoting  Black,  Law 
Diet). 

The  terms  "legacy"  and  "legatee"  have 
different  meanings  in  the  French  Code  and 
Civil  Law,  from  what  they  usually  have 
under  the  English  system;  but  even  in  the 
United  States  they  may  be  used  to  refer  to 
a  devise  of  real  property.    Lindsay  t.  Wll- 


IiEGACT 


LEOAOT  TAX 


8on,  63  Aa  566,  570,  108  Hd.  262,  8  L.  B. 
A.  (N.  8.)  408. 

A  "legacy"  is  a  disposition  of  personal 
property  by  wllL  Under  a  will  creating  a 
trust,  tbe  benefldary  was  empowered  to  dis- 
pose of  the  property  by  will  and  giye  tbe 
same  to  varioas  charitable  institutions  and 
directed  her  executors  after  the  payment 
of  numerous  bequests,  to  pay  out  of  the 
residue  any  inheritance  taxes  due  on  any  of 
tbe  legacies  whether  to  the  state  or  federal 
authorities.  Held,  that  the  various  disposi- 
tions of  the  trust  estate  constituted  *'leg- 
ades"  and  are  entitled  to  have  the  transfer 
taxes  paid  out  of  the  residuary  estate.  Is- 
ham  Y.  New  York  Ass'n  for  ImproTlng  the 
Condition  of  the  Poor,  69  N.  E.  367,  869, 
m  N.  Y.  218. 

Strictly  speaking,  the  t^m  "legadeir  re- 
fers to  personal  property,  but  it  may  be, 
and  often  is,  used  in  a  more  extended  sense 
by  persons  una^uainted  with  the  precise 
meaning  of  legal  terms,  and,  when  so  used, 
may  embrace  real  estate.  Bussell  t.  Blden, 
15  Me.  103,  196. 

Although  the  words  "devise**  and  "dev- 
laee"  properly  and  technically  apply  only  to 
real  estate,  and  the  words  "legacy,"  "leg- 
atee," "bequest,"  and  "bequeath"  only  to 
personal  property,  they  have  been  made  in- 
terchangeable by  Ky.  St  1903,  f  467,  which 
provides  that  "the  words  'legatee'  and  'dev- 
isee' shall  each  be  held  to  convey  the  same 
idea;  and  the  words  'bequeath'  and  'devise' 
to  mean  the  same  thing;  and  the  words 
'bequest'  and  'legacy'  shall  each  be  held  to 
mean  the  same  thing  and  to  embrace  and 
in<dude  either  real  or  personal  property  or 
both."  Roberts  v.  Chenoweth,  112  S.  W.  625, 
627. 

In  common  acceptation,  "bequest"  and 
"legacy"  are  synonymous  terms,  but  "be- 
qaeath"  is  the  term  generally  by  which  a 
gift  of  personalty  is  made  in  a  will,  and  a 
legacy  is  the  money  or  personal  property 
bequeathed.  The  words  "devise,"  "bequest," 
and  "legacy"  are  not  infrequently  used  in 
wills  in  a  sense  different  from  their  strict 
legal  meaning.  It  is  stated,  in  a  recent 
work  on  wilhi,  that:  "Of  the  verbs  used  to 
denote  the  act  of  making  a  will,  'devise' 
is  properly  used  of  realty,  and  'bequeath' 
of  personalty.  Of  the  nouns  used  to  name 
the  various  forms  of  gift,  'devise'  is  used 
of  a  gift  of  realty.  'Legacy'  is  used  of  a 
gift  of  personalty  in  general.  None  of  these 
words  have  so  fixed  a  legal  meaning,  how- 
ever, that  a  gift  will  fail  because  testator 
does  not  use  the  words  descriptive  of  the  gift 
or  the  act  of  giving  with  technical  accura<*y. 
A  devise  is  often  miscalled  a  'bequest,'  or 
'bequest'  is  often  used  to  include  both 
realty  and  personalty,  or  is  used  of  a  gift  of 
money  alone.  So  the  verb  'devise'  is  often 
used  to  refer  to  personalty  alone."    In  re 


CkunpbeU's   Estate,    75    Pac   851,   853,   27 
Utah,  361  (citing  Page,  Wills,  I  2). 

"Legacy  and  devise"  and  "legatee  and 
devisee^'  are  often  used  as  interchangeable 
phrases  in  wills  and  everyday  conversation, 
and  therefore  courts  would  not  feel  fettered 
to  any  nice  construction  where  the  subject- 
matter  or  context  shows  the  words  were 
used  intendiangeably  and  as  of  the  same 
import  But  such  popular  and  loose  con- 
struction is  hardly  permissible  in  view  of 
the  statutory  rule  of  hermeneutics.  Desloge 
V.  Tucker,  94  8.  W.  283,  286,  196  Mo.  587. 

While  the  word  "devise"  is  the  appro- 
priate term  to  pass  title  to  real  estate,  and 
"bequeath"  the  term  applicable  to  gifts  of 
personal  property,  a  strict  adherence  to 
technical  words  Is  not  necessary  to  give 
effect  to  a  testator's  intent,  and  the  fact 
that  the  word  "devise"  is  not  used  does  not 
prevent  the  title  to  real  estate  passing  by 
the  use  of  the  word  "bequeath."  Mills  v. 
Tompkins,  97  N.  Y.  Supp.  9,  10,  HO  App. 
Div.  212. 

USOAOT  TAX 

See  Inheritance  Tax. 

A  tax  on  an  interest  in  personal  prop- 
erty passing  by  will  is  a  "legacy  tax."  In 
re  Macky's  Estate,  102  Pac  1075,  1078^  46 
Colo.  79,  23  L.  B.  A«  (N.  S.)  1207. 

The  inheritance  tax  is  variously  termed 
"succession  tax,"  "legacy  tax,"  and  "probate 
duties" ;  but,  whatever  it  may  be  termed,  it 
is  not  a  tax  upon  property,  but  upon  the 
right  of  succession  thereto.  State  ex  rel. 
Foot  V.  Bazllle,  106  N.  W.  93,  96,  97  Minn. 
11,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  732,  7  Ann.  Cas.  1056. 

A  tax  may  be  laid  upon  property  Im- 
mediately after  it  has  devolved  upon  any 
person  by  will  or  inheritance  so  as  to  be  not 
easily  distinguishable  from  a  form  of  taxa- 
tion sometimes  called  "legacy  tax."  Appeal 
of  Hopkins,  60  AU.  657,  659,  77  Conn.  644. 

The  tax  variously  called  an  "inheritance 
tax,"  a  "legacy  tax,"  a  "transfer  tax,"  and  a 
"succession  tax,"  is  a  "burden  imposed  by 
government  on  all  gifts,  legacies,  and  succes- 
sions, whether  of  real  or  personal  property  or 
both,  or  any  Interest  therein,  passing  to  cer- 
tain persons  (other  than  those  specially  ex- 
cepted), by  will,  by  intestate  law,  or  by  deed 
or  assignment  made  inter  vivos,  intended  to 
take  effect  at  or  after  the  death  of  the  gran- 
tor." In  re  Morris'  Estate,  50  S.  E.  682,  138 
N.  G.  259  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Dos  Passes  [2d  Ed.]  §  2). 


The  words  "an  act  to  tax  •  •  • 
cies,"  in  the  tltie  of  Act  May  15,  1906  (P.  L. 
p.  432)  do  not  express  that  the  object  of  the 
act,  so  far  as  It  relates  to  legacies,  is  the 
Imposition  of  a  tax  upon  the  transfer  of  prop- 
erty which  is  the  subject  of  a  bequest,  and 
as  Const  art.  4,  §  7,  par.  4,  requires  that  the 
object  of  every  law  shall  be  expressed  in  the 


UE^AJj 


64 


JJEQAJj  CAUSB 


dtle  thereof;  the  statote  is  vnconstitutioiial 
so  far  as  It  se^s  to  tax  the  transfer  of  prop- 
erty which  Is  the  subject  of  a  bequest  Dix- 
on T.  Russell*  76  Aa  082,  988,  79  N.  J.  Law, 
490. 

LEGAL 

See,  also,  LawfuL 

The  term  "legal"  means  that  which  Is  ac- 
cording to  law.  Vaughn  v.  National  Council, 
Junior  Order  United  American  Mechanics, 
117  S.  W.  116,  116,  136  Ma  App.  362. 

"Legal"  is  defined  as  according  to  the 
principle  of  law;  according  to  the  method 
required  by  statute;  by  means  of  judicial 
proceedhigs.  In  re  Folwell's  Estate,  62  Atl. 
414,  415,  68  N.  J.  Bq.  728,  2  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1193. 
Lawful,  adequate,  and  reasonablet  syn- 
onyuLoiui 

"'Legal,'  'lawful,'  'adequate,'  and  'rea- 
sonable,' when  used  as  adjectives  qualify- 
ing 'provocation,' ^are  synonymous,  and,  as 
a  general  rule,  with  few  exceptions,  it  takes 
an  assault  or  personal  violence  to  constitute 
this  provocation."  State  v.  McKenzle,  76 
S.  W.  1015.  1019,  177  Mo.  699  (quoting  with 
approval  from  State  v.  Bulling,  15  S.  W.  867, 
16  S.  W.  830,  105  Mo.  204) ;  State  v.  Heath, 
121  S.  W.  149,  154,  221  Mo.  665  (quoting  and 
.  adopting  definition  in  State  v.  Balling,  15  S. 
W.  867,  16  S.  W.  830.  105  Mo.  204). 

LEGAL  ADVICE  AHB  SERVICES 

The  services  of  an  attorney  for  an  ad* 
ministratrix,  consisting  of  giving  her  advice, 
drawing  leases  and  other  legal  instruments, 
ejecting  nonpaying  tenants,  collecting  doubt- 
ful demands  due  the  estate,  discovering  as- 
sets, and  in  investigating  and  adjusting  dis- 
puted claims,  are  such  as  the  estate  is  liable 
for.  under  Rev.  St  1899.  $  223,  providing  for 
allowances  for  "legal  advice  and  services." 
Hill  V.  Bvans,  91  S.  W.  1022,  1024,  114  Mo. 
App.  715. 

LEGAL  AND  SUFFICIENT  FENCE 

The  phrase  "legal  and  suffldent  fence," 
as  used  Id  Rev.  St  1883,  c.  61,  §§  36,  37,  re- 
quiring a  railroad  company  to  erect  and 
maintain  along  the  line  of  its  road  a  legal 
and  sufficient  fence,  means  a  fence  sufficient 
to  restrain  and  exclude  any  of  the  ordinary 
domestic  animals  from  straying  oh  that  part 
of  its  track  which  passes  through  and  is 
contiguous  to  the  inclosure  where  such  ani- 
mals are  pastured  or  kept;  and  a  fence  abut- 
ting a  railroad,  four  feet  in  height  and  other- 
wise complying  with  the  statute,  and  that  will 
restrain  horses,  cows,  and  oxen,  but  will  not 
restrain  sheep,  is  not  a  legal  and  sufficient 
fence.  Cotton  v.  Wiscasset,  W.  A  F.  E*  CJo., 
57  Atl.  785,  786.  98  Me.  511. 

LEGAL  AVOIDANCE 

See  Matter  of  Legal  Avoidance^ 


LEGAL  CAFAcmnr 

See,  also.  Legal  Disability. 

The  ''capacity  to  sue"  is  the  right  ts 
come  into  court,  and  differs  from  a  "cause 
of  action,"  which  is  the  right  to  relief  in 
court  Howell  v.  lola-  Portland  Cement  Co., 
121  Pac.  346,  847,  86  Kan.  460. 

"Incapacity  to  sue  exists  where  there 
is  some  legal  disability,  such  as  infancy,  or 
lunacy,  or  a  want  of  title  in  the  plaintiff  to 
the  character  in  which  he  sues."  That  plain- 
tiff was  appointed  administrator  as  alleged, 
accepted  the  office,  and  qualified  therefor, 
and  letters  of  administration  de  bonis  non 
are  issued  to  him,  and  the  validity  of  his  ap- 
pointment was  not  questioned,  gives  him  "ca- 
pacity to  sue,"  though  he  may  not  be  the 
real  party  in  interest  and  though  the  admit- 
ted facts  may  not  authorize  a  recovery  by 
him.  Homans  v.  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.,  106 
N.  Y.  Supp.  929.  930,  56  Misc.  Rep.  574  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  Ward  v.  Petrie,  61  N.  B. 
1002,  167  N.  T.  301,  68  Am.  St  Rep.  790). 

"Want  of  legal  capacity,"  within  the 
meaning  of  Rev.  St  1898.  |  2649,  specifying 
the  grounds  for  demurrer  to  a  complaint,  re- 
fers to  personal  disability,  such  as  infancy, 
idiocy,  coverture,  and  the  like,  or  to  want 
of  title  to  the  character  in  which  the  plaintiff 
sues;  a  defect  going  to  the  cause  of  action 
itself  as  regards  the  plaintiff.  One  showing 
that  in  no  event,  under  no  circumstances,  and 
in  no  capacity  does  plaintiff  own  or  repre- 
sent the  cause  of  action  sought  to  be  enforced, 
does  not  fall  within  the  statute.  McKenney 
V.  Minahan.  97  N.  W.  489,  491,  119  Wis.  651. 

Under  the  express  provisions  of  Rev.  St 
1899.  S  3535,  it  is  only  when  the  plaintiff  has 
no  legal  capacity  to  sue  that  a  demurrer  will 
lie  on  the  ground  that  he  has  no  capacity  to 
sue;  the  words  "legal  capacity  to  sue"  re- 
ferring to  infancy,  want  of  authority,  or  any 
personal  disability  to  maintain  the  action. 
Littleton  v.  Burgess,  91  Pac  832,  836,  16 
Wyo.  58,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  49. 

A  demurrer  on  the  ground  of  want  of 
"legal  capacity  to  sue"  must  relate  to  some 
legal  disability  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff 
to  prosecute  and  maintain  his  action.  This 
disability  must  be  "such  as  infancy,  cover- 
ture, idiocy,  and  the  like,  and  not  the  absence 
of  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of 
action."  Pratt  v.  Northern  Pac  Exp.  Co.,  90 
Pac  341,  342,  13  Idaho.  373,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
8.)  499,  121  Am.  St  Rep.  268  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Pomeroy  Code  Reme- 
dies [4th  Ed-]  p.  180). 

LEGAL  CAUSE 

"Legal  cause"  is  necessarily  the  deduc- 
tion from  some  act,  event,  or  circumstance. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  McCarthy,  90  Pac  208, 
206,  5  Cal.  App.  301  (citing  Marsh  y.  8a- 
perior  Court,  26  Pac  962,  88  Cal.  596). 

"Legal  cause,"  as  used  in  an  Instmctian 
In  an  action  for  abuse  of  process  author- 


LEGAIi  CAUSE 


65 


LEGAL  EVIDENCE 


izlng  recovery  if  defendant  Issued  an  attach- 
m^it  against  plaintiffs  without  legal  cause, 
was  not  synonymous  with  "probable  cause." 
Sehon,  Blake  &  Stevenson  ▼.  White  (Ky.)  92 
S.  W.  280,  281. 

An  entry,  under  statutes  authorizing  an 
entry  on  land  under  the  directions  of  a  rall< 
road  company  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
making  a  preliminary  survey  of  a  proposed 
railway  line  subject  to  liability  for  all  dam- 
ages dode  to  the  land,  constitutes  a  "legal 
cause  and  good  excuse"  within  the  statute 
providing  that  any  person  who  without  legal 
cause  and  good  excuse  enters  the  premises  of 
another  after  warning  shall  be  punished. 
State  V.  Simons,  40  South.  662,  145  Ala.  d5. 

I£6AI.  CHAKOE  OF  CRIME 

A  "legal  charge  of  crime,"  as  contem- 
plated by  extradition  statutes,  means  one 
made  in  that  state  having  jurisdiction  to  try 
the  offense,  and  from  which  the  fugitive 
fled.  The  word  "charged,"  in  2  Ballinger's 
Ann.  Codes  &  St.  |  7017,  declaring  that,  when 
any  person  shall  be  found  within  the  state 
charged  vrith  an  offense  committed  in  another 
state,  the  court  or  magistrate  may  on  com- 
plaint issue  a  warrant  for  his  arrest,  con- 
templates that  the  person  arrested  and  de- 
livered up  committed  the  offense  in  another 
state  and  is  in  such  state  legally  charged 
with  crime.  State  ex  rel.  Grass  v.  White, 
82  Pac.  907,  908,  909,  40  Wash.  560,  2  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  563. 

I.EOAI.  COXntTY  ROAD 

In  Sess.  Laws  1893,  p.  380,  making  a 
<x>unty  liable  for  injuries  from  defects  in  a 
"legal  county  road,"  it  is  apparent  that  the 
Legislature  only  intended  to  provide  a  rem- 
edy for  injuries  received  by  a  traveler  on  a 
county  road  or  highway.  Schroeder  v.  Mult- 
nomah County,  76  Pac  772.  778,  46  Or.  92. 

IiEOAIi   DEPENDEHT 

A  member  of  a  fraternal  insurance  order, 
who  dies  leaving  only  brothers  and  sisters 
and  nieces  and  nephews  not  livhig  with  him, 
dies  without  "legal  dependents,"  within  the 
certificate  of  membership,  providing  for  pay- 
ment to  legal  dependents,  and  his  adminis- 
trator is  entitled  to  the  fund  for  the  pay- 
ment of  debts  and  distribution  in  due  course 
of  administration;  the  words  "legal  depend- 
ents" meaning  those  relying  on  the  member 
for  support  Little  v.  Colwell,  74  S.  B.  10, 
158  N.  C.  351,  39  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  450  (citing 
2  Words  and  Phrases,  pp.  1991,  1992). 

There  being  no  legal  duty  imposed  by 
law  on  insured  to  support  his  mother,  as  is 
the  case  with  his  wife  and  minor  children, 
she  is  not  a  "legal  dependent"  within  the 
meaning  of  a  policy  payable  to  his  "legal 
dependent"  Vaughn  v.  National  Council, 
Junior  Order  United  American  Mechanics, 
117  S.  W.  115,  116, 186  Mo.  App.  362. 
3  WDS.&  P.2d  Seb.— 5 


IiEOAIi  DISABIUTT 

A  petition  by  adult  heirs  and  on  behalf 
of  minor  heirs  to  open  a  decree  of  the  county 
court  approving  the  final  report  of  the  execu- 
tor and  distributing  the  estate,  to  correct  an 
error  resulting  from  an  erroneous  allowance 
to  the  executor  and  his  attorney,  which  pur- 
ports to  be  a  petition  of  persons  interested 
in  the  estate,  and  which  sets  forth  facts 
showing  that  the  allowance  is  erroneous  as 
a  matter  of  law,  and  which  avers  the  fact' 
of  the  minority  of  heirs  and  presentation  of 
the  petition  on  their  behalf,  is,  as  to  such 
heirs,  a  sufficient  petition  within  Prob.  Code, 
8  287,  authorizing  persons  laboring  under  any 
legal  disability,  to  move  to  reopen  the  ac- 
count of  executor  before  final  distribution; 
the  term  "legal  disability"  including  minor- 
ity, though  the  minors  have  a  guardian.  In 
re  Nelson's  Estate,  129  N.  W.  113,  116.  26 
S.  D.  615. 

Rev.  St  1898,  f  3968,  provides  that  no 
action  can  be  maintained  against  the  sure- 
ties on  any  bond  given  by  a  guardian  unless 
It  be  commenced  within  four  years  from  the 
time  when  the  guardian  shall  have  been 
discharged,  excepting  that  if,  at  the  time  of 
such  discharge,  the  person  entitled  to  bring 
the  action  shall  be  under  any  "legal  dis- 
ability to  sue,"  the  action  may  be  commenced 
at  any  time.  Held,  that  the  words  "legal 
disability  to  sue,"  as  used  therein,  referred 
to  some  characteristic  of  the  person  disqual- 
ifying him  from  acting  freely  for  the  pro- 
tection of  his  rights,  and  not  to  an  impedi- 
ment to  the  suability  of  the  particular  cause 
of  action,  and  so  inability  of  the  plaintiff  to 
sue  during  the  period  of  accounting  and 
until  the  settlement  of  the  guardian's  account 
was  not  within  the  exception  of  persons  "un- 
der [any]  legal  disability  to  sue."  Wescott 
V.  Upham,  107  N.  W.  2,  3,  127  Wis.  590  (cit- 
ing 5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4060). 

IiEOAI.  DUTY 

See  Lawful  Duty. 

IiEOAIi  EKTITT 

See  Etatity. 

I.EGAI.  ESTATE 

Seised  importing,  see  Seised. 
Seisin  importing,  see  Seisin. 

IiEOAIi  ESTOPPEIi 

Equitable  estoppel  distinguished,  see  Es- 
toppel in  Pais. 
Estoppel  by  deed,  see  Estoppel. 

IiEGAIi  EVIDEHCE 

It  was  unnecessary  to  advise  the  Jury 
oi  the  meaning  of  "legal  evidence"  in  an  in- 
struction that  the  law  demanded  conviction 
where  there  was  sufQdent  legal  evidence  to 
show  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  as  any 
man  competent  to  serve  as  a  Juror  would  un- 
derstand that  it  meant  any  evidence  the  Jury 


LEGAL  EXPENSES 


66 


LEGAL  HEIRS 


had  a  right  to  consider.    People  v.  AndersoD* 
87  N.  E.  917,  918,  923.  239  lU.  168. 

LEGAL  EXPENSES 

See  Proper  and  Legal  Expenses. 

LEGAL  FENCE 

See  Lawful  Fence. 

LEGAL  FRAUD 

Promissory  representation,  looking  to  the 
future,  as  to  what  the  vendee  can  do  with 
the  property,  how  much  he  can  make  on  It, 
and  how  much  he  can  save  by  the  use  of  it, 
are  on  a  par  with  false  affirmations  and 
opinions  as  to  the  value  of  property,  and  do 
not  generally  constitute  "legal  fraud."  Na- 
tional Cash  Register  Co.  v.  Townsend  Gro- 
cery Store,  50  S.  B.  306,  307,  137  N.  C.  652, 
70  L.  R.  A.  349. 

A  bill  of  sale  intended  as  an  absolute 
transfer  of  title,  but  made  with  a  secret 
agreement  that  the  grantee,  after  selling 
enough  goods  to  pay  the  grantor's  indebted- 
ness to  him,  should  turn  back  to  the  grantor 
the  remainder,  or  their  proceeds,  presents  a 
case  of  "constructive  fraud,"  sometimes  call- 
ed "legal  fraud."  Walklin  v.  HorswiU,  123 
N.  W.  668,  672,  24  S.  D.  191. 

Misrepresentations  of  a  material  fact, 
made  willfully  to  deceive,  or  recklessly  with- 
out knowledge,  or  if  made  by  mistake  and  in- 
nocently, and  acted  on  by  the  opposite  party, 
constitute  legal  "fraud,"  under  Code  1907,  | 
4298,  authorizing  the  rescission  of  a  contract 
of  sale  of  stock  of  a  corporation.  Southern 
States  Fire  &  Casualty  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wllmer 
Store  Co.  (Ala.)  60  South.  98,  99. 

"Misrepresentation  of  a  material  fact 
made  willfully  to  deceive,  or  recklessly  with- 
out knowledge,  and  acted  upon  by  the  op- 
posite party,  or  if  made  by  mistake  and 
Innocently  and  acted  upon  by  the  opposite 
party,  constitutes  'legal  fraud.' "  Camp  v. 
Carithers,  65  S.  B.  583,  585,  6  Ga.  App.  608 
(quoting  definition  in  Civ.  Code,  §  4026). 

LEGAL  GROUND  FOR  NEW  TBL^kL  AS 
MATTER  OF  LAW 

The  words  "legal  ground  for  granting  a 
new  trial  as  matter  of  law,"  in  a  request  for 
a  ruling  that  if  plaintiff  after  testifying  was 
arrested  in  court  during  the  trial  of  the 
case,  and  the  jury  noticed  some  of  the  acts 
connected  with  her  arrest,  and  were  thereby 
made  suspicious  that  plaintiff  was  arrested 
for  perjury,  there  was  a  "legal  ground  for* 
granting  a  new  trial  as  a  matter  of  law," 
mean  that  the  conditions  referred  to  called 
for  a  new  trial  as  a  matter  of  law,  and  as 
so  construed  the  request  is  erroneous.  Kel- 
ley  V.  City  of  Boston,  87  N-  B.  493,  494,  201 
Mass.  86. 

LEGAL  HEIRS 

See  Lawful  Heirs. 

My  legal  heirs,  see  My. 


The  term  "legal  heirs,"  in  its  technical 
sense,  as  used  in  the  common  law,  includea 
all  i)ersons  born  in  lawful  matrimony  who 
succeed  to  the  estate  in  real  property  of  an 
ancestor.  Thomas  v.  Supreme  Lodge  Knights 
of  Honor,  105  N.  W.  922,  923,  126  Wis.  593, 
3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  904,  5  Ann.  Cas.  456. 

The  term  "legal  heirs,"  in  legal  strict- 
ness signifies  those  entitled  to  inherit  real 
estate ;  it  is  also  used  to  indicate  those  who 
would  take  under  the  statute  of  distribution. 
Dickerman  v.  Ailing,  76  Atl.  362,  363,  83 
Conn.  342  (citing  Ruggles  v.  Randall,  38  Atl. 
885,  70  Conn.  44;  Tlngler  v.  Chamberlin,  42 
Aa  718,  71  Conn.  469). 

In  construing  a  will  using  the  words  ''le- 
gal  heirs"  and  "lawful  heirs,"  the  words 
"legal"  and  "lawful"  do  not  modify  or  change 
the  legal  effect  of  the  word  "heirs."  Stisser 
V.  Stisser,  85  N.  E.  240,  242,  235  111.  207. 

As  used  in  a  will  making  a  bequest  to 
testator's  wife  and  the  legal  heirs  of  hia 
son,  and,  in  case  his  son  should  die  without 
wife  or  heirs,-  then  to  the  heirs  of  another, 
the  words  "heirs"  and  "legal  heirs"  meant 
"children."  Knowles  ▼.  Knowles,  65  S.  B. 
128,  130,  132  Ga.  806. 

Where  testator,  by  a  codicil  to  his  will, 
provided  that  the  income  derived  from  cer- 
tain property  should  go  to  "my  legal  heirs," 
the  term  "legal  heirs"  means  next  of  kin  and 
legal  heirs  of  testator,  and  does  not  include 
next  of  kin  or  legal  heirs  of  his  wife.  Miller 
v,  Metcalf,  58  Atl.  743,  744,  77  Conn.  176. 

Under  a  limitation  in  a  wUl  to  the  "legal 
heirs"  of  a  person,  they  were  to  be  deter- 
mined as  of  the  date  of  his  decease,  and  are 
the  persons  who  under  the  laws  then  in  force 
would  have  been  entitled  to  inherit  his  real 
estate  if  he  had  died  intestate.  Holmes  v. 
Holmes,  80  N.  E.  614,  617,  194  Mass.  552. 

The  words  "legal  heirs,"  In  a  wUl  which 
bequeathed  a  feather  bed  to  testator's  son 
and  devised  to  his  "wife  and  legal  heirs  of  J. 
my  youngest  son"  all  the  household  furni- 
ture, meant  "chlldren.Y  Knowles  v.  Knowles^ 
65  S.  E.  128,  130,  132  Ga.  806. 

Testator  bequeathed  certain  personalty 
to  "the  legal  heirs"  of  his  housekeeper. 
Held,  that  her  husband  was  excluded*  In  re 
Schnitzler,  114  N.  T.  Supp.  934,  935,  61  Misc. 
Rep.  218. 

Where  a  testator  left  to  trustees  an  estate 
for  his  grandchild,  the  trust  to  continue 
three  years  during  which  the  trustees  were 
to  possess  and  manage  the  property  and  its 
income  and  provide  for  and  pay  over  to  the 
grandchild  at  their  discretion,  and  at  the 
end  of  the  three  years  the  estate  to  pass  Uy 
the  possession  of  the  grandchild,  if  then 
alive,  and  "if  the  grandchild  die  before  the 
trust  ceases  her  legal  heirs  to  be  substituted 
in  place  of  deceased  in  every  respect,"  the 
granddaughter's  husband  is  not  one  of  her 
"legal  heirs"  in  the  sense  of  the  devise  over 


LEQAL  HEIRS 


67 


LBGAIi  HOLIDAYS 


to  her  legal  helra    Buck  t.  Paine,  75  Me. 
582,689. 

Testator  gave  half  of  his  residuary  es- 
tate of  which  his  homestead  formed  a  part  to 
a  Diece  for  life,  and  provided,  on  her  death 
without  issue,  the  homestead  should  pass  to 
the  children  of  an  uncle,  and  such  children 
should  participate  equally  with  testator's 
*negal  heirs"  in  whatever  balance  there 
might  be  over  and  above  the  homestead. 
Held,  that  his  legal  heirs  were  those  who,  in 
absence  of  a  will,  were  entitled  by  law  to  in- 
herit by  descent  ascertained  at  the  time  of 
testator's  death,  excluding  the  widow.  Per- 
ry V.  Bulkley,  72  Aa  1014, 1019,  82  Conn.  158. 

A  deed  of  gift  by  parents  to  a  son,  which 
designates  the  son  and  his  legal  heirs  as  par- 
ties of  the  second  part,  and  whidi  conveys 
the  property  to  the  legal  heirs,  and  which  re- 
cites that  the  son  shall  liave  full  control  of 
it  for  life  to  maintain  his  family,  and  de- 
clares that  he  shall  not  sell,  mortgage,  or 
transfer  his  life  interest,  and  that  at  his 
death  his  wife  surviving  shall,  for  life  or 
until  her  remarriage,  have  equal  shares  with 
the  heirs  of  the  son,  she  not  to  sell  or  incum- 
ber her  interest,  gives  the  son  no  interest  in 
the  property  except  the  power  to  control  it 
for  life,  and  In  the  absence  of  any  showing 
that  there  is  a  surplus  of  income  above  what 
Is  necessary  for  the  family,  the  son  has  no 
taterest  subject  to  execution,  within  Ky.  St 
I  1691,  subjecting  equitable  interests  to  the 
payment  of  the  debt  of  an  execution  creditor; 
the  words  "legal  heirs*'  meaning  children. 
Mt  Sterling  Nat  Bank  v.  Duflf,  140  8.  W.  60, 
61. 145  Ky.  67. 

A  testator  bequeathed  corporate  stock  to 
a  trustee,  to  pay  the  income  thereof  to  a 
grandson  and  granddaughter  for  life,  and  at 
their  death  the  same  to  be  distributed  to 
their  respective  "legal  heirs,*'  except  that,  if 
the  'legal  heirs"  of  the  grandson  should  be 
the  granddaughter,  tlie  trusteeship  should 
continue  and  the  income  be  paid  to  the 
granddaughter  for  life.  Held,  that  the  words 
"legal  heirs"  were  used  in  their  primary 
sense.  Grant  v.  Stlmpson,  66  Atl.  166,  167, 
79  Conn.  617. 

The  *  legal  heirs"  intended  by  a  will 
were  those  who  answered  the  description  at 
the  time  of  testator's  death,  where  no  con- 
trary intention  was  indicated.  The  term 
"legal  heirs"  meant  those  who  answered  that 
description  under  the  laws  of  the  state;  and 
a  provision  for  equally  dividing  each  of  four 
certain  parts  of  the  estate  among  the  legal 
heirs  of  the  persons  named  required  such  a 
division  as  is  provided  by  the  laws  of  the 
state  for  the  distribution  of  the  estate  of  a 
deceased  person  among  his  descendants. 
Harris  v.  Xngalls,  68  AU.  34,  37,  74  N.  H.  339. 

Where  testator  devises  land  to  his  wife 
for  life,  and  after  her  death  to  his  daughter, 
and,  if  she  shall  not  outlive  her  mother  **and 


leave  no  legal  heirs,"  then  to  the  son,  Ihe 
words  'leave  no  legal  heirs"  are  equivalent 
to  "leave  no  lawful  issue."  Church  v.  Baer, 
84  AtL  1009,  1100,  286  Pa.  605. 

LEGAI.  HOLIDATS 

The  words  ''legal  holidays,"  as  used  in 
Comp.  Laws  1897,  {  5395,  requiring  saloons 
to  be  closed  on  all  "legal  holidays,"  not  only 
includes  legal  holidays  existing  at  the  time 
of  the  adoption  of  the  section,  but  includes 
holidays  subsequently  created  by  the  Legis- 
lature, such  as  Labor  Day,  made  a  holiday 
by  the  act  of  1893.  People  v.  Kriesel,  98  N. 
W.  850,  851,  136  Mich.  80,  4  Ann.  Caa.  5. 

Code,  §  2448,  par.  9,  provides  that  sa- 
loons shall  not  be  open  nor  shall  any  sales 
be  made  on  Sunday,  or  any  election  day,  "or 
legal  hoUday."  SecUon  3053,  headed  "HoU- 
days,"  directs  that  certain  days,  including 
July  4th,  shall  be  legal  holidays  for  purposes 
relating  to  bills  of  exchange.  Section  3541 
provides  that  no  person  shall  be  held  to  an- 
swer in  any  court  on  the  days  enumerated  in 
the  preceding  secti^m.  Section  4688,  headed 
"Not  on  election  days  or  holidays,"  declares 
that  no  party  shall  be  required  to  take  deposi- 
tions on  any  days  on  which  appearance  can- 
not be  required.  Held,  that  the  term  "legal 
holiday,**  as  used  in  section  2448,  relates  to 
the  days  designated  in  section  8063  as  ''holi- 
days." Brennan  v.  Roberts,  101  N.  W.  460, 
462, 125  Iowa,  616. 

The  meaning  of  the  phrase  "days  of 
public  rest  and  legal  holidays"  is  the  oppo- 
site of  "secular  or  business  day,"  and  ex- 
cludes entirely  and  absolutely  the  idea  of 
holding  court  The  words  "legal  holiday" 
and  "dies  non"  are  convertible  terms.  That 
they  are  so  in  the  legislation  of  Louisiana  "is 
demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  they  are  so 
used  in  Act  No.  110  of  1896,  p.  158,  malting 
Decoration  Day  a  legal  holiday."  State  t. 
Duncan,  43  South.  283,  287,  118  La.  702,  10 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  791,  11  Ann.  Cas.  557. 

Act  March  4,  1905  (Acts  1905,  p.  196,  c. 
118),  is  entitled  "An  act  concerning  legal  hol- 
idays, the  maturity  of  negotiable  instru- 
ments, creating  a  Saturday  half-holiday  for 
banking  institutions  in  certain  cities,  repeal- 
ing all  laws,"  etc  Section  1  designates  cer- 
tain days,  including  Labor  Day,  as  "legal 
holidays,"  without  restriction  or  limitation. 
Section  2  (page  197)  declares  that  every  Sat- 
urday after  12  o'clock  noon  in  cities  of  more 
than  35,000  inhabitants  shall,  in  addition  to 
the  legal  holidays  mentioned  in  section  1, 
be  a  legal  holiday  for  banks,  etc.,  and  section 
3  provides  for  the  presentation,  payment, 
etc.,  of  negotiable  instruments  which  mature 
on  Sunday  or  a  legal  holiday.  Held,  that  the 
holidays  created  by  section  1  were  legal  holi- 
days for  all  purposes,  and  hence  the  sale  of 
liquor  on  Labor  Day  constituted  a  violation 
of  Act  March  10,  1905  (Laws  19Q6,  p.  721,  c 
169,  S  579),  prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquor  on 


liEOAIi  HOLIDAYS 


68 


L£QAL  MEETIKa 


certain  specified  days  '"or  any  legal  holiday.** 
State  v.  Shelton,  77  N.  E.  1052-1054,  38  Ind. 
App.  80. 

In  view  of  Const  art  6,  §  5,  providing 
that  courts  shall  be  always  open,  legal  holi- 
days excepted,  and  Code  Civ.  Proc.  §  10,  as 
amended  by  St  1907,  p.  561,  c.  287,  making 
every  Saturday  from  12  o*clock  noon  until  12 
o*clock  midnight  a  holiday,  and  sections  134, 
135,  as  amended  by  St  1907,  pp.  681,  682,  c. 
358,  authorizing  courts  to  be  open  on  holi- 
days for  specified  purposes,  trial  courts  ought 
to  treat  Saturday  afternoon  as  a  legal  holi- 
,  day.  People  v.  Heacock,  102  Paa  543,  546, 
10  Cal.  App.  450. 

Under  Rev.  St  1895,  art  2939,  declaring 
February  22d  a  legal  holiday,  and  article 
1180,  inhibiting  the  issuance  of  process  on 
any  legal  holiday  excepting  in  cases  of  in- 
junction, distress  proceedings,  etc.,  a  citation, 
in  a  divorce  preceeding,  whether  original  or 
an  alias,  issued  on  February  22,  is  invalid, 
and  will  not  confer  Jurisdiction  upon  the 
court  nor  support  a  judgment  Michael  ▼. 
Michael    (Tex.)  100  S.  W.  1018. 

IJBO  AI.  IN  JURY. 

Whatever  invades  a  person's  rightful 
dominion  over  his  property  is  a  "legal  in- 
jury,'* whether  damage  ensues  or  not  Such 
dominion  is  a  right  for  the  violation  of  which 
the  law  Imports  damage,  and  courts  of  equi- 
ty have  always  interposed,  in  a  proper  case, 
to  protect  the  right  without  any  reference  to 
the  question  of  actual  damage,  the  motive 
which  instigated  the  party  to  invoke  its  aid, 
or  the  benefits  it  derives  from  the  act  Al- 
len V.  Stowell,  79  Pac  371,  372,  145  Cal.  666, 
68  L.  B.  A.  223,  104  Am.  St  Rep.  80. 

A  contract  or  combination  in  restraint  of 
interstate  commerce,  prohibited  by  Aatl- 
Trust  Act  July  2,  1890,  c  647,  26  Stat  210, 
is  not  merely  illegal  in  the  sense  that  it  Is 
not  enforceable,  but  is  per  se  unlawful,  and 
one  who  is  harmed  in  his  business  or  proper- 
ty by  such  a  contract  or  combination  has  suf- 
fered a  "legal  Injury,"  within  the  meaning  of 
section  7  of  the  act,  and  is  by  such  section 
given  a  right  of  action  therefor.  Wheeler- 
Stenzel  Co.  v.  National  Window  Glass  Job- 
bers* Ass*n,  152  Fed.  864,  865,  871,  81  O.  C.  A. 
658,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  972. 

I.EOAI.  IN8ANITT 

"Iiegal  insanity"  excusing  the  commis- 
sion of  a  criminal  act  is  a  disease  of  the 
brain,  rendering  a  person  incapable  of  distin- 
guishing between  right  and  wrong  with  re- 
spect to  the  ofl'ense  charged.  State  ▼.  Privltt, 
75  S.  W.  457,  459,  175  Mo.  207. 


UBOAI.  INTENT 

The  words  "legal  intent,"  when  applied 
to  the  intention  of  a  testator,  mean  that 
where  a  testator  has  used  in  his  will  techni- 
cal terms  to  which  the  courts  of  his  domicile 
have  attached  a  settled  judicial  meaning  con- 


stituting a  rule  of  property  in  that  state,  then 
the  courts  of  other  states  construing  the  will 
give  to  such  words  the  same  meaning.  Ball 
V.  Phelan,  49  South.  966,  968,  94  Miss.  293»  23 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  895. 

I.EOAI.  INTEBE8T 

See  Direct  Legal  Interest 
Ab  interest  see  Interest  (In  Property); 
Interest  (On  Money). 

Under  Revision  1902,  i  56,  providing  for 
a  rebate  of  legal  interest  on  the  payment  of 
that  portion  not  yet  due  of  a  mortgage  pay- 
able at  a  future  date  without  interest  such 
"legal  interest*'  is  the  rate  used  by  the 
parties  in  fixing  the  amount  of  the  mortgage 
payable  in  monthly  installmehts  without  in- 
terest Greenville  Building  ft  Loan  Ass'n  ▼. 
Wholey,  59  Atl.  341,  346,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  92. 

I.EOAI.  ISSUE 

Legal  heirs  as  including,  see  Legal  H^bnu 

The  words  "legal  issue,"  when  used  in  a 
will  and  tinexplained  by  the  context  have 
the  meaning  of  descendants,  and  gift  to  the 
"legal  issue"  of  testator's  daughter,  after  a 
life  estate  to  her,  is  a  gift  to  her  descendants, 
and  is  not  limited  to  her  diildren.  Under 
a  gift  to  the  "legal  issue"  of  testator's 
daughter,  after  a  life  estate  to  her,  the  trust 
fund  held  for  her  life  will  vest  on  her  deatli 
absolutely  in  interest  in  all  her  descendants 
who  are  living  in  equal  portions  per  capita. 
Schmidt  V.  Jewett  88  N.  B.  1110,  1111,  195 
N.  Y.  486,  133  Am.  St  Rep.  815. 

LEOAI.  XKOWUSDGE 

See  Presumption  of  Legal  Knowledge. 

I.EOAI.  LIFE  ESTATE 

"Legal  life  estates"  are  those  made  by 
operation  of  law.  Disley  y.  Disley.  75  AtL 
481,  483,  30  R.  I.  366. 

IiEOAIi  MAUOE 

See  ImpUed  Malice;  Malice. 

LEGAL  MEASUBE  OF  DUTY 

The  rule  of  law  now  generally  recognized 
is  that  the  "legal  measure  of  duty,"  except  that 
made  absolute  by  law,  is  better  expressed  by 
the  phrases  "due  care,"  "reasonable  care,"  or 
"ordinary  care,"  used  interchangeably.  Ray- 
mond V.  PorUand  R.  Co.,  62  Aa  602,  604,  100 
Me.  529,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  94. 

LEGAL  MEETIKG 

In  the  statute  providing  that  no  alien- 
ation, or  mortgage,  of  the  real  estate  of 
any  mining  corporation  shall  have  any  force 
or  efl'ect  unless  authorized  at  some  meeting 
of  stockholders,  and  that  no  meeting  of  stock- 
holders shall  be  held  to  be  "legal  or  valid," 
unless  notice  of  the  time,  place,  and  object 
of  holding  the  same  be  published,  etc.,  the 
words  "legal  or  valid"  are  not  to  be  given 
a  literal  interpretation.  The  statute  does  not 
give  strangers  the  right  to  raise  questions  as 


LEGAL  NAME 


LEGAL  POSSESSION 


to  the  regularity  of  a  mortgage  which  the 
stockholders  elect  to  waive.  Thus  where  the 
notice  for  a  stockholders'  meeting  of  a  corpo- 
ration stated  that  the  purpose  of  such  meeting 
was  to  authorize  the  issue  of  bonds  to  the 
extent  of  $100,000,  to  be  secured  by  mor^ 
gage,  etc.,  and  the  issue  authorized  was  $150,- 
000,  one  not  a  stockholder,  but  a  purchaser, 
at  execution  sale,  of  the  corporation's  equity 
of  redemption  in  the  property  mortgaged, 
could  not  raise  the  question  of  the  irregular- 
ity. Beecher  ▼.  Marquette  &  Pacific  Rolling 
Mill  Co^  7  N.  W.  005.  006,  607,  45  Mich.  103. 

IXGAI.  NAME 

For  the  purpose  of  giving  constructive 
notice  to  a  defendant  in  a  suit  to  foreclose 
a  mortgage,  where  he  has  not  sued  on  a 
written  Instrument  signed  by  himself,  his 
"legal  name*'  Includes  his  first  Christian 
name  and  surname.  Hence  foreclosure  of  a 
mortgage  did  not  divest  the  title  of  a  non- 
resident defendant  who  was  sued  by  the  ini- 
tial letters  of  his  name^  there  being  no  per- 
sonal service  of  summons  upon  him,  or  ap- 
pearance in  his  behalf,  and  the  record  show- 
ing that  he  did  not  sign  the  mortgage  or  the 
note  secured  thereby.  Butler  v.  Smith,  120 
N.  W.  1106,  1107,  84  Neb.  78,  28  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)436. 

I.EOAI.  KEGLIOENOE 

"Legal  negligence"  is  the  omission  of 
such  care  as  persons  of  ordinary  prudence 
exercise  and  deem  adequate  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case.  Doollng  v.  City  of  New 
York,  132  N.  Y.  Supp.  1012,  1014,  148  App. 
Mv.  713. 

UBOAI.  HEWSPJlPEB 

See  Newspaper. 

I«EOAI<  NOTICE 

See  Implied  Notice. 

"Legal"  or  "Implied  notice"  Is  the  same 
as  "constructive  notice,"  which,  according  to 
Wilson's  Rev.  St  Ann.  1903,  c.  16,  1 12,  is  no- 
tice imputed  by  the  law  to  a  person  not  hav- 
ing actual  notice.  Implied  notice  does  not 
indude  either  positive  knowledge  or  infor- 
mation 80  direct  as  to  necessarily  carry  con- 
viction to  the  mind  of  the  person  notified, 
and  neither  does  It  belong  to  that  dass 
which  depends  on  legal  presumption,  but  it 
is  substantial  evidence  from  which  the  jury 
after  estimating  its  value  may  infer  notice. 
Cooper  V.  Flesner,  103  Pac.  lOlG,  1020,  1021, 
24  Okl.  47,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1180,  20  Ann. 
Cas.  29  (quoting  Wilson  v.  Brown,  15  N.  Y. 
354;  Wade,  Law  of  Notice,  K  3,  4,  5). 

Rules  of  the  Mississippi  Railroad  Ck>m- 
misslon  provide  that  railroad  companies  shall 
give  prompt  notice  by  mall  or  otherwise  to 
the  consignee  of  the  arrival  of  goods  and 
that  no  storage  or  demurrage  charges  shall 
be  allowed  unless  legal  notice  of  the  arrival 
of  the  goods  has  been  given,  and  defines  "le- 


gal notice"  in  this  connection  as  either  actual 
or  constructive  notice,  and  provides  that, 
where  the  consignee  is  personally  served 
with  notice,  free  time  begins  at  7  o'clock  the 
following  morning.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R. 
Go.  V.  A.  H.  Qeorge  &  Co.,  35  South.  193,  195, 
82  Miss.  710. 

Notice  of  appointment  of  two  executors, 
one  residing  within  the  state  and  the  other 
without,  the  state,  which  failed  to  Include  the 
name  and  address  o^  the  agent  or  attorney 
of  the  latter,  was  not  a  "legal  notice"  with- 
in the  meaning  of  Rev.  St  a  87,  §  18,  provid- 
ing that,  when  an  executor  or  administrator 
does  not  give  "legal  notice"  of  his  appoint- 
ment, he  cannot  avail  himself  of  the  statute 
of  limitations  against  claims  against  the  es- 
tate. Id.  I  12,  providing  that  executors  or 
administrators  residing  out  of  the  state  at 
the  time  of  giving  notice  of  their  appoint- 
ment shall  appoint  an  %gent  or  attorney  in 
the  state,  and  insert  his  name  and  address 
in  such  notice.  Dyer  v.  Walls,  24  Atl.  801, 
802,  84  Me.  143. 

Where  it  appeared  from  the  report  of 
viewers  for  the  laying  out  of  a  lot  that  they 
had  given  "legal  notice"  of  the  fact,  presum- 
ably they  had  given  the  notice  required  by 
law.  Crescent  Tp.  v.  Pittsburg  ft  L.  E.  R. 
Co.,  59  Ati.  1103,  1105,  210  Pa.  334. 

Whatever  is  sufficient  to  put  a  subse- 
quent purchaser  on  inquiry  must  be  consid- 
ered 'Megal  notice"  to  him  of  the  facts  in- 
quiry would  have  disclosed  by  the  exercise 
of  reasonable  diligence.  Jennings  v.  Lentss, 
93  Pac.  327,  829,  50  Or.  488,  29  L.  B.  A.  (N. 
S.)  584. 

I.EOAZ.  OBUOATION 

Debt  as  legal  obligation,  see  Debt 

IJSOAI.  PEB80NAUTT 

The  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  the  Phil- 
ippine Islands  is  a  legal  personality,  with  ca- 
pacity to  hold  property  acquired  by  gift. 
Santos  V.  Holy  Roman.  Catholic  and  Apostol- 
ic Church,  29  Sup.  Ct  838,  339,  212  U.  S.  463, 
53  L.  Bd.  509. 


LEOAI.  PI.AXNTIFF 

The  "legal  plalntifl"  Is  the  person  in 
whom  the  legal  title  or  right  of  action  is 
vested,  while  the  "equitable  plaintiff"  is  the 
person  who  does  not  have  the  legal  title  to 
the  right  of  action  but  is  in  equity  entitled 
to  the  thing  sued  for.  Burrell  v.  United 
States,  147  Fed.  44,  46,  77  C.  C.  A.  308. 

LEOAI.  POSSESSION 

As  possession,  see  Possession. 

When  a  delivery  of  goods  is  made  for  a 
specific  purpose,  the  possession  is  still  sup- 
posed to  reside  in  the  first  proprietor,  and, 
where  any  person  has  the  bare  charge  of  an- 
other's effects,  legal  possession  remains  in 
the  owner;  and  therefore  where  the  finder 
of  the  purse  told  defendant's  wife  thereof. 


LEGAL  POSSESSION 


70 


LEGAL  PROCEEDINGS 


and  she  stated  that  the  purse  looked  like 
her  husband's  and  took  the  same,  telling  the 
finder  that  If  it  did  not  belong  to  her  hus- 
band she  would  return  it,  and  afterwards 
possession  was  given  to  him  on  his  claim  of 
ownership,  when  in  fact  it  belonged  to  an- 
other, the  "legal  possession'*  remained  in 
the  finder,  and  defendant's  claim  thereto 
constituted  larceny.  Williams  v.  State,  75 
N.  B.  875,  877,  165  Ind.  472,  2  L.  1^.  A.  (N. 
S.)  248  (citing  Smith  v,  People,  53  N.  T.  Ill, 
13  Am.  Rep.  474;  Bish.  New  Cr.  Law,  |  824). 

To  be  "legal,"  possession  taken  by  a 
mortgagee  must  have  been  taken  in  good 
faith,  free  from  fraud  or  wrong,  and  with- 
out violation  of  any  contract  relation  with 
the  mortgagor.  Jaggar  v.  Plunkett,  106  Pac 
280,  281,  81  Kan.  565,  25  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  935. 

The  term  "legal  possessor,"  as  used  in 
Glv.  Code  CaL  {  3052,  providing  that  a  per- 
son who  makes,  alters,  or  repairs  any  arti- 
cle of  personal  property  at  the  request  of 
the  owner  or  legal  possessor  of  the  property 
has  a  lien  upon  the  same  for  his  reasonable 
charges,  means  one  who  has  the  right  by 
'  virtue  of  his  possession  to  originally  con- 
tract with  reference  to  the  manufacture,  al- 
teration, or  repair  thereof,  such  as,  for  ex- 
ample, a  lessee  or  pledgee  of  the  property; 
some  one  having  a  possession  coupled  with  a 
right  of  property  so  that  he  can  contract 
with  reference  to  it  respecting  any  of  the 
matters  enumerated  in  the  section.  Where 
defendants  engaged  another  to  peel  tanbark 
from  trees  on  their  land  and  deliver  it  at  a 
certain  place,  and  the  latter  hired  plaintiffs 
to  do  the  work,  and  no  contractual  relation- 
ship existed  between  defendants  and  plain- 
tiffs, plaintiffs  were  not  entitled  to  a  lien 
for  their  wages  on  bark  peeled  by  them  re- 
maining on  defendants'  land.  Qulst  v.  Sand- 
man. 99  Pac.  204,  209,  154  Cal.  748. 

LEGAL  FBESTJMPTION 

'The  French  Civjl  Code,  calls  all  'pre- 
sumptions' consequences  that  the  law  or 
the  Judge  draws  from  a  known  fact  to  an 
unknown  fact,  and  a  'legal  presumption'  one 
that  a  special  law  applies  to  certain  facts. 
Cachard'A  Translation,  arts.  1349,  1350."  In 
re  Cowdry's  Will,  60  Atl.  141,  142,  77  Vt  359, 
3  Ann.  Cas.  70. 

As  said  by  Doe,  J.,  in  Lisbon  v.  Lyman, 
49  N.  H.  553,  663:  **A  'legal  presumption'  Is 
not  evidence.  In  civil  cases  it  Is  the  finding 
of  a  fact  or  the  decision  of  a  point,  when 
there  is  no  testimony,  and  no  inference  of 
fact  from  the  absence  of  testimony,  on  the 
subject  or  when  the  evidence  is  balanced. 
And  often  the  fact  is  also  found,  or  the  de- 
cision made,  by  the  rule  of  law  which  im- 
poses the  burden  of  proof  on  the  party  hav- 
ing the  afllrmatlve."  In  his  Treatise  on  Evi- 
dence, Prof.  Thayer  says  (page  314):  "Pre- 
sumptions are  aids  to  reasoning  and  argu- 
mentation, which  assume  the  truth  of  cer- 


tain matters  for  the  purpose  of  some  given 
inquiry.  They  may  be  grounded  on  the  gen- 
eral experience  or  probability  of  any  kind, 
or  merely  on  policy  and  convenience.*  On 
whatever  basis  they  rest,  they  operate  In 
advance  of  argument  or  evidence,  or  Irre- 
spective of  it,  by  taking  something  for  grant- 
ed; by  assuming  its  existence."  And  on 
page  337  this  language  occurs:  "While  it  1« 
obvious,  then,  that  a  presumption — i.  e.,  the 
assumption,  intendment,  taking  for  granted 
— Which  we  call  by  that  name,  accomplishes, 
for  the  moment  at  any  rate,  the  work  of 
reasoning  and  evidence  it  should  be  remark- 
ed, as  I  have  said  before,  that  neither  this 
result,  nor  the  rule  which  requires  it,  con- 
stitutes in  itself  either  evidence  or  reasoning. 
This  might  seem  too  plain  to  require  men- 
tion if  it  were  not  for  the  loose  phraseology 
in  which  courts  sometimes  charge  the  jury, 
leaving  to  it  in  a  lump  'all  the  evidence  and 
the  presumptions'  as  if  they  were  capable  of 
being  weighed  together  as  one  mass  of  pro- 
bative matter."  If  there  is  a  legal  presump- 
tion that  the  ordinary  man  performs  his  du- ' 
ty  and  is  not  negligent,  it  Is  no  more  com- 
petent as  evidence  to  prove  the  fact  In  a 
particular  case,  in  the  absence  of  other  proof, 
than  are  other  rules  of  law,  including  the 
presumption  of  innocence  of  criminal  cases. 
Wright  V.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  65  Atl.  687, 
691,  74  N.  H.  128,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  832,  124 
Am.  St.  Rep.  949. 

A  "legal  presumption"  is  one  which  the 
law  will  recognize.  Thus  where  testator  re- 
tained custody  of  his  will  or  had  ready  ac- 
cess to  it,  and  it  could  not  be  found  after 
his  death,  a  "legal  presumption"  would  be 
raised  that  the  will  and  codicil  were  destroy- 
ed by  him  animo  revocandi.  Hutson  v.  Hart- 
ley, 74  N.  E.  197,  199,  200,  72  Ohio  St.  262. 

In  an  action  against  a  physician  for 
malpractice,  there  is  no  presumption  of  the 
physician's  negligence,  and  the  burden  of 
showing  it  is  upon  plaintiff.  A  true  "legal 
presumption"  is  in  the  nature  of  evidence, 
and  is  to  be  weighed  as  such.  The  rules 
which  impose  the  burden  of  proof  upon  cer- 
tain parties,  when  designated  as  presump- 
tions, are  dry  presumptions,  having  only  a 
technical  existence,  and  barren  of  all  pro- 
bative character  when  the  case  goes  to  the 
jury  on  conflicting  evidence.  Sheldon  v. 
Wright,  67  Atl.  807,  814,  816,  80  Vt.  298. 

LEGAL  PRO0EEBINO8 

Expenses  of  legal  proceedings,  see  Ex- 
penses. 

Attachment  proceedings  are  "legal  pro- 
ceedings" within  Bankruptcy  Act  July  1, 
1898,  c.  641,  i  8a  (3),  30  Stat  646,  which 
makes  it  an  act  of  bankruptcy  for  an  insolv- 
ent person  to  permit  a  creditor  to  obtain  a 
preference  through  legal  proceedlng&  In  re 
Putman,  193  Fed.  464,  473. 


LBGAL  PROCEEDINGS 


71 


LEGAL  REPRESENT ATIVE 


A  landlord  within  four  months  before 
the  filing  of  a  petition  in  bankruptcy  may 
levy  his  distress  and  thereby  acquire  a  lien 
which  a  subsequent  bankruptcy  adjudication 
would  not  render  void  or  voidable,  the  lien 
thereby  secured  not  being  under  the'  law  of 
Maryland  a  lien  secured  "by  legal  proceed- 
ings" within  Bankruptcy  Act  July  1,  1898,  c. 
541,  §  67c,  30  Stat  564.  In  re  Potee  Brick 
Co.  of  Baltimore  City,  179  Fed.  526,  530. 

All  goods  on  demised  premises,  by  the 
common  law,  or  the  statutory  law  of  Penn- 
sylvania, may  be  considered  as  under  a  quasi 
pledge  to  the  landlord,  which  gives  superiori- 
ty to  the  specific  lien  acquired  by  a  dis- 
traint Such  a  lien  is  not  one  obtained 
through  legal  proceedings  within  Bankr.  Act. 
July  1,  1898,  e.  541,  §  67f,  30  Stat  565.  and 
is  not  divested  by  the  bankruptcy  of  the  ten- 
ant within  four  months  thereafter,  and  the 
same  rule  applies  where  the  bankrupt  was 
a  subtenant,  admitted  to  the  premises  by  the 
lessee  without  the  landlord's  consent  In  re 
West  Side  Paper  Co.,  162  Fed.  110,  112,  89 

0.  a  A.  UO,  16  Ann.  Ca&  384. 

The  general  lien  of  a  landlord  for  rent, 
given  by  Code  Oa.  S  2795,  to  "date  from  the 
time  of  the  levy  of  a  distress  warrant  to  en- 
force the  same,"  is  not  created  by  judgment, 
nor  obtained  through  legal  proceedings,  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  bankrupt  act  of  July 

1,  1898  (30  Stat  665,  c.  641),  f  67f,  and  is 
therefore  not  defeated  by  the  provisions  of 
that  section,  although  the  levy  was  made 
within  four  months  of  the  filing  of  the  pe- 
tition in  bankruptcy  against  the  tenant 
Henderson  v.  Mayer,  32  Sup.  Ct  699,  700,  226 
U.  S.  631,  56  L.  Ed.  1233. 

A  lien  on  a  bankrupt's  assets  secured  by 
filing  a  creditor's  bill  within  four  months  of 
the  filing  of  a  bankruptcy  petition  is  one  se- 
cured "by  legal  proceedings,"  which  by  Bank- 
roptcy  Act  July  1, 1898,  c.  541,  i  67c,  30  Stat 
541,  is  avoided  by  the  adjudication.  In  re 
Potee  Brick  Co.  of  Baltimore  City,  179  Fed. 
525,  530. 

ILEGAJL  FBOCES8 

The  term  "legal  process"  means  a  pro- 
cess fair  on  its  face,  and  one  charged  with 
resisting  an  officer  in  the  levying  of  an 
execution  issued  by  a  justice  of  peace  on 
a  judgment  rendered  by  him  may  show  that 
the  judgment  was  void  and  that  the  officer 
had  knowledge  thereof,  though  the  state  to 
make  out  a  case  need  not  show  that  the  exe- 
cution had  behind  it  a  legal  Judgment.  State 
T.  Knapf,  96  Pac.  1076,  50  Wash.  229,  21  L, 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  66. 

The  phrase  "legal  process"  means  valid 
legal  process*  Where  a  policy  provided  that, 
if  any  change  take  place  in  the  possession  of 
the  property  by  legal  process,  it  shall  avoid 
the  policy,  an  illegal  assessment  and  a  sei- 
snre  and  sale  of  the  insured  property  there- 
under were  not  a  change  in  the  possession  by 


"legal  process."    Bunkle  v.  Citizens*  In&  Co., 
6  Fed.  143,  145. 

I.EOAI.RATE 

See  Contract  Rate. 

The  expression  'Uegal  rate,"  used  in  Rev. 
St  1899,  i  1092,  requiring  railroads  to  fur- 
nish double-deck  cars  for  the'  shipment  of 
sheep,  and  declaring  that  it  shall  not  be  law- 
ful for  any  railroad  to  charge  for  transpor- 
tation of  a  double-deck  car  more  than  the  le- 
gal rate  of  freight  allowed  for  the  shipment 
of  stock,  means  that,  as  a  maximum  rate  has 
been  fixed  for  stock  of  all  kinds,  the  charge 
for  a  double-deck  car  of  sheep  should  not  ex- 
ceed that  rate.  Wynn  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  86 
S.  W.  562,  564,  111  Mo.  App.  642. 

I.EOAI1  RELATION 

"Legal  relation,"  as  used  in  the  rule 
that  the  measure  of  a  succession  tax  under 
a  will  is  the  "legal  relation"  borne  by  the 
legatee  to  the  testator,  is  the  relation  estab- 
lished by  the  law,  and,  while  it  usually  fol- 
lows the  natural  relation,  it  does  not  in  all 
cases.  In  re  Cook's  Estate,  79  N.  E.  991. 
993,  187  N.  Y.  263. 

I.EOAI.  BEMEDT 

A  '^personal  remedy"  is  where  the  injur- 
ed party  seeks  redress  of  the  party  who  in- 
flicted the  wrong  and  thus  obtains  a  remedy 
for  the  wrong  committed,  while  a  "legal  rem- 
edy" is  where  the  injured  party  seeks  his 
remedy  by  and  through  the  intervention  of 
the  courts.  People  ex  reL  Stidger  v.  Horan, 
86  Pac.  263,  34  Colo.  336,  114  Am.  St  Rep. 
163. 

LEGAI.  REPRESENTATIVE 

The  phrase  "legal  representatives"  usu- 
ally means  executors  or  administrators,  but 
it  cannot,  of  course,  mean  executors  and  ad- 
ministrators only,  in  whatever  instrument  it 
may  appear,  and  with  reference  to  all  the 
different  subject-matters  treated  of  in  the 
multitude  of  varying  instruments,  and  no 
matter  what  the  plain  purpose  of  the  maker 
of  the  instrument  using  the  phrase  may  be  in 
using  it  It  may,  in  various  circumstances, 
mean  executors,  administrators,  heirs,  lega- 
tees, assignees,  and  devisees,  even  while  lega- 
tees or  devisees  are  strangers;  in  short  it 
may  mean  any  person  or  corporation  taking 
the  beneficial  interest  in  property,  real  or 
personal.  Allen  v.  Alliance  Trust  Co.,  36 
South.  285,  286,  84  Miss.  319. 

The  terms  "legal  representatives,"  ••per- 
sonal representatives,"  etc.,  are  often  used  in 
statutes  and  instruments  of  writing  so  as  to 
include  all  persons  who  stand  in  place  or  rep- 
resent the  interests  of  another,  either  by  his 
act  or  by  operation  of  law.  In  re  Barton's 
Estate,  62  Atl.  1058,  1059,  213  Pa.  499,  4  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  939. 

Testator,  after  bequeathing  one  half  of 
his  estate  to  his  wife,  directed  that  t&e  re- 


LBX>AL  REPRBSENTATIVB 


72 


LEGAL  REPRESENTATIVE 


malning  half  be  distributed  among  his  legal 
heirs  and  legal  representatives  according  to 
the  laws  of  distribution.  Held,  that  the  term 
"legal  representatives*'  was  without  precLse 
determinate  meaning,  and  was  used  merely 
to  indicate  that  testator  intended  that  all 
who  would  take  under  the  statute  of  distri- 
bution were  entitled  to  share  under  the  term 
"legal  heirs,"  and  hence  did  not  include  chil- 
dren of  testator's  first  cousins  who  died  be- 
fore testator,  they  not  being  entitled  to  dis- 
tribution in  intestacy,  as  provided  by  Gen. 
St.  1902,  I  398.  Dickerman  y.  Ailing,  76  AU. 
362,  363,  83  Conn.  342. 

A  certificate  issued  by  a  fraternal  insur- 
ance association  payable  to  the  estate  of  a 
member  is  payable  to  his  "legal  representa- 
tive" within  the  by-laws  of  the  association 
authorizing  certificates  to  be  made  payable 
to  legal  representatives  of  members.  Vaugh- 
an's  Adm'r  v.  Modem  Brotherhood  of  Amer- 
ica, 149  S.  W.  937,  938,  149  Ky.  587. 

As  BdiBialstrators  or  ezeontors 

The  phrase  "legal  representatives"  ordi- 
narily means  executors  or  administrators 
where  not  qualified  by  context  An  act  of 
Congress  (Act  April  28,  1904,  c.  1759,  33  Stat. 
436)  provided  a  pension  of  $1,000  which 
should  be  exempt  from  payment  of  debts  of 
decedent,  to  be  paid  to  the  legal  representa- 
tives of  any  railway  clerk  killed  while  on 
duty.  Held,  that  the  words,  "legal  represent- 
atives," were  used  in  their  ordinary  sense; 
the  intent  being  that  the  money  should  be 
imid  to  the  administrator  to  be  distributed 
according  to  the  laws  of  the  state  of  dece- 
dent's domicile,  saving  the  payment  of  debts. 
Wolfe  V.  Wolfe,  134  S.  W.  33,  34.  154  Mo. 
App.  218. 

The  phrase  "legal  representatives,"  in 
its  ordinary  acceptation,  means  executors 
and  administrators,  though  it  may  mean  next 
of  kin  or  descendants.  Kelsay  v.  Baton,  76 
Pac.  770,  772,  45  Or.  70,  106  Am.  St.  Rep. 
662. 

"The  words  'legal  representatives'  or 
'personal  representatives'  have  also  been  used 
as  designating  executors  or  administrators, 
and  not  next  of  kin,  in  acts  of  Congress  giv- 
ing actions  for  wrongs  or  injuries  causing 
death."  Briggs  v.  Walker,  19  Sup.  Ct  1,  3, 
171  U.  S.  466,  43  L.  Ed.  243. 

The  words  "legal  representatives"  have 
a  well-recognized  meaning  in  law  that  are 
e<iuivalent  to  executor  or  administrator,  and 
are  technical  words,  and  when  used  in  any 
legal  instrument,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the 
context  or  otherwise  to  explain  their  mean- 
in??,  they  should  be  understood  in  their  tech- 
nical sense.  Page  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  135  S.  W.  911,  912,  98  Ark.  340. 

It  may  be  conceded  that  the  words  "le- 
gal representatives"  frequently  mean  execu- 
tors and  administrators  as  used  in  a  policy 
of  insurance  payable  to  insured's  wife  and 
children  if  li\'ing  at  the  time  of  his  death, 


otherwise  to  the  legal  representatives  or  as- 
signs of  said  member.  Hall  v.  Ayers'  Guard- 
ian (Ky.)  105  S.  W.  911,  913,  914. 

Where  a  will  provided  that  any  real 
property*  of  testatrix  that  had  not  been  dis- 
posed of  by  her  husband  at  his  death  should 
be  equally  divided  between  her  heirs  and  le- 
gal representatives  and  his  legal  representa- 
tives, one  who  was  executrix  of  the  husband's 
will  and  a  devisee  thereunder  was  a  "legal 
representative,*'  of  the  husband,  within  the 
will  of  testatrix.  Gruenewald  v.  Neu,  74  N. 
E.  101-103,  215  111.  132. 

The  use  of  the  expression,  "heirs  and  le- 
gal representatives"  instead  of  "heirs,  execu- 
tors, and  administrators,"  may,  under  some 
circumstances,  raise  the  presumption  that 
those  who  are  beneficially  interested  and  suc- 
ceed to  the  property  and  rights  of  the  dece- 
dent are  intended.  Marsh  v.  Marsh,  137  N. 
W.  1122,  1124,  92  Neb.  189. 

"The  ordinary  meaning  of  the  words  'le- 
gal representatives'  is  'executors  and  admin- 
istrators,' and  they  are  to  be  given  that 
meaning  unless  there  is  something  in  the  will 
properly  construed  to  show  that  they  should 
have  some  other  meaning."  Alexander  v.  Mc- 
Peck,  75  N.  E.  88,  91,  189  Mass.  34. 

"Personal  representatiTes'*  and  "legal 
representatives"  are  sometimes  used  inter- 
changeably, as  signifying  not  only  executors 
or  administrators,  but  also  those  who  legal- 
ly stand  in  place  of,  or  represent  the  inter- 
ests of,  another.  Lowry  v.  City  of  Duluth, 
101  N.  W.  1059,  1060,  94  Minn.  95. 

Under  a  life  policy  in  which  the  insurer 
agreed  with  the  "insured,  his  executors,  ad- 
ministrators, and  assigns,"  to  pay  the  amount 
of  the  policy  to  losured's  "legal  representa- 
tives," the  amount  is  payable  to  insured's  ex- 
ecutors or  administrators,  and  not  to  his 
next  of  kin.  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kan- 
sas City  Nat  Bank,  97  S.  W.  195,  196,  121 
Mo.  App.  479. 

The  words  "legal  representative"  are  pre- 
sumed to  mean  executors  and  administrators, 
and  that  meaning  will  be  attributed  to  them 
in  any  instance,  unless  by  the  context  or  sur- 
rounding circumstances  it  be  shown  that  the 
words  were  not  so  used,  but  denote  some  oth- 
er and  difl'erent  idea.  Rockland-Rockport 
Lime  Co.  ▼.  Leary,  97  N.  E.  43,  47,  203  N.  Y. 
469,  Ann.  Cas.  1913B,  62. 

The  term  "legal  representatives"  of  a 
deceased  person  will  mean  the  executor  or 
administrator  if  the  subject-matter  is  per- 
sonalty, and  heirs  or  devisees  if  it  is  realty, 
within  the  rule  that  all  the  necessary  par- 
ties to  a  judgment  sought  to  be  reviewed 
must  be  the  parties  to  the  bill  of  review,  and, 
if  they  are  dead,  their  "legal  representa- 
tives" must  be  parties.  State  Fair  Ass'n  v. 
Terry,  85  S.  W.  87,  89,  74  Ark.  149  (citing 
Cochran  v.  Cochran,  17  Atl.  981,  127  Pa.  486; 
Ralston  v.  Sharon,  51  Fed.  702;   Johnson  v.* 


LEGAL  REPRESENTATIVE 


73 


LEGAL  REPRESENTATIVE 


Van  Epps,  110  111.  557;   Turner  t.  Berry,  8 
IlL  541). 

In  wlUs  and  other  written  Instruments, 
the  words  "legal  representatives"  are  fre- 
quently used  to  mean  the  persons  who  suc- 
ceed beneficially  to  the  property  or  Interest 
of  the  deceased.  Whether  In  any  given  case 
they  are  so  used,  or  the  executor  or  adminis- 
trator is  Intended,  must  be  determined  from 
a  consideration  of  all  of  the  provisions  of 
the  will.  Marsh  t.  Marsh,  137  N.  W.  1122, 
1124,  02  Neb.  189. 

Within  an  order  of  a  probate  court  that 
money  be  paid  to  a  legatee  of  testatrix  or  his 
''legal  representative,"  his  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator, and  not  his  heirs,  is  such  repre- 
aentative,  as  that  court  could  not  properly 
undertake  to  distribute  his  estate  as  part  of 
the  settlement  of  testatrix's  estate;  the  as- 
certainment of  his  legal  heirs  being,  under 
Gen.  St  1902,  S  394,  for  that  court  In  the 
settlement  of  his  estate.  Cooley  v.  Pigott, 
80  AU.  92,  93,  84  Conn.  323. 

The  words  "legal  representatives,"  in  a 
certificate  issued  by  a  foreign  corporation 
authorized  to  issue  benefit  certificates,  whi^ 
recites  that  the  amount  thereof  shall  be  paid 
to  'legal  representatives,  related  to  the  mem- 
ber as  "do  not  Include  any  of  the  per- 
sons spedfled  in  Rev.  St.  1909,  |  7109,  pro- 
viding that  death  benefits  shall  be  paid  to 
the  families,  heirs,  blood  relatives,  afllanced 
husband  or  wife  of,  or  to  persons  dependent 
on,  the  member,  but  mean  the  executor  or 
administrator  of  the  member,  and  the  liabil- 
ity of  the  corporation  is  that  of  a  life  in- 
surance company,  under  section  6945,  making 
the  defense  of  suicide  unavailable  to  life  in- 
surance companies.  Ordelheide  v.  Modem 
Brotherhood  of  America,  139  S.  W.  269,  270, 
158  Mo.  App.  677. 

The  words  "representattre"  and  "legal 
representative"  of  a  person  do  not  necessarily 
exclude  the  administrator  or  executor,  but 
such  words  employed  in  a  policy  of  a  l>enefit 
association  in  view  of  the  purposes  of  the 
association  to  benefit  the  family  and  heirs 
of  deceased  members  were  not  intended  to 
include  the  administrator  of  the  member 
referred  to  in  a  policy.  Tucker  v.  Knights 
of  Pythias  of  North  and  South  America,  68 
S.  Bw  796,  797,  135  Ga.  56. 

A  claim  against  a  dty  for  the  instanta- 
neous death  of  plaintiff's  intestate,  through 
the  city's  negligence,  stated  that  the  dalm 
was  for  damages  sustained  by  his  estate, 
legal  representatives,  and  heirs,  and  that  his 
estate,  legal  representatlTes,  and  heirs  claim- 
ed a  specified  sum  as  damages.  Held,  that 
the  words  "legal  representatives"  were  not 
used  in  their  strictly  technical  sense  as  exec- 
utors or  administrators,  nor  was  the  word 
•'heir"  used  in  its  primary  and  technical 
sense  as  one  who,  by  reason  of  birth  in  law- 
ful wedlock.  Inherits  real  property,  but  that 
the  expression,  "estate,  legal  representatives, 


and  heirs,"  was  used  with  the  idea  of  using 
words  broad  enough  in  their  significance  to 
include  all  persons  having  claims  against  the 
city  on  account  of  the  death,  and  hence  the 
claim  was  sufiiclent  as  a  basis  for  an  action 
for  the  benefit  of  the  widow  under  the  stat- 
ute. Moyer  v.  aty  of  Oshkosh,  139  N.  W. 
378,  380,  151  Wis.  586  (citing  4  Words  and 
Phrases,  pp.  3241-3264 ;  5  Words  and  Phras- 
es, pp.  4070-4079). 

Gen.  St  1906,  |  3147,  provides  that, 
where  the  death  of  a  mitior  child  is  caused 
by  the  wrongful  act  or  negligence  of  a  cor- 
poration or  its  agents,  the  father,  as  the 
legal  representative  of  such  minor  child,  may 
sue  for  the  loss  of  services  of  the  child  and 
for*  the  mental  pain  and  suffering  of  the 
parent  or  parents.  Held,  that  the  damages 
authorized  are  personal  to  the  parents,  and 
an  action  therefor  should  be  by  the  parent 
personally,  and  an  administrator  of  the  mi- 
nor child  has  no  interest  in  or  right  to  such 
recovery;  the  term  "legal  representative" 
havidig  reference  to  the  parties  benefited  by 
the  rights  conferred,  and  not  to  the  adminis- 
trator or  executor  of  a  decedent.  Seaboard 
Air  Line  Ry.  v.  Moseley,  53  South,  718,  719. 
60  Fla.  186. 

Testator  devised  the  residue  of  his  es- 
tate to  trustees,  and  directed  that,  if  his 
wife  survived  him,  they  should  set  apart  a 
third  thereof  and  pay  the  income  to  her  for 
life,  and  at  her  death  the  fund  should  be 
divided  into  three  parts,  one  of  which  should 
be  paid  to  his  son,  if  surviving  testator's 
wife,  otherwise  to  his  issue  living  at  the 
time  of  her  death,  and  in  default  of  issue  to 
his  legal  representatives.  He  directed  the 
trustees,  if  the  son  survived  him,  to  set  apart 
and  invest  a  specified  sum  and  pay  the  in- 
come thereof  to  the  son  for  life,  and  at  his 
death  to  pay  the  principal  to  his  issue,  and 
in  default  of  Issue  to  his  legal  representa- 
tives. Held,  that  the  words  "legal  repre- 
sentatives" meant  executors  and  admini.stra- 
tors,  so  that  the  son  took  one-third  of  the 
trust  fund  created  for  the  use  of  the  widow 
if  he  survived  her,  and  the  right  to  have  it 
administered  as  a  part  of  his  estate  by  his 
own  executors  or  administrators,  if  he  died 
before  the  widow  without  issue,  and  the 
trust  fund  created  for  his  own  use  was  also 
to  be  turned  over  to  his  executors  or  admin- 
istrators, if  he  died  without  issue  Alex- 
ander V.  McPeck,  75  N.  EL  88,  91,  189  Mass. 
34. 

Where  two  beneficiary  certificates  were 
payable  to  testator's  mother,  who  died  be- 
fore he  did,  and  provided  that  in  such  case 
they  should  be  payable  to  the  "legal  repre- 
sentatives" of  the  member,  and  the  articles 
of  incorporation  declared  the  object  of  the 
association  to  be  the  equitable  distribution 
of  the  fund  among  the  "families  or  benefici- 
aries" of  deceased  members,  and  declared 
that  each  certificate  entitled  "the  heirs  or 
legal  representatives  or  designated  benefici- 


UIGAL  REPRESENTATIVE 


74 


liKOAX  REPRESENTATIYS 


arles"  to  |2,000,  and  testator's  will  gave  each 
of  hifi  two  sisters  such  of  his  property  as 
they  might  have  in  charge  at  his  death,  and 
all  the  "residue  of  which  I  may  die  seised, 
real,  personal  and  mixed,"  absolutely  to  his 
affianced,  it  was  held  that,  while  the  words 
*'legal  representatives"  might  sometimes  be 
interpreted  as  "legal  heirs,"  here  they  must 
be  given  their  usual  meaning  and  carried  the 
certificates  to  the  executor,  and  they  went  to 
the  affianced  by  the  residuary  clause.  Walk- 
er V,  Peters,  124  8.  W.  35^  86,  13»  Mo.  App. 
G81. 

The  word  "heirs"  properly  means  those 
on  whom  the  law  casts  the  real  estate  im- 
mediately on  the  death  of  the  ancestor,  and 
the  words  "legal  representatives"  mean  exec- 
utors and  administrators.  These  words  are 
to  be  construed  unless  from  the  context  of 
a  will  it  may  be  seen  that  testator  intended 
to  use  them  with  another  meaning.  Where 
a  share  of  an  estate  consisting  of  both  real 
estate  and  personalty  was  to  go  to  the  "heirs 
or  legal  representatives"  of  a  deceased  lega- 
tee, the  "heirs,"  according  to  the  plain  mean- 
ing of  the  term,  would  take  the  real  estate. 
Where  a  share  of  an  estate  consisting  of 
both  real  estate  and  personalty  was  to  go  to 
the  "heirs"  or  "legal  representatives"  of  a 
deceased  legatee,  the  personalty  would  go 
to  the  next  of  kin,  since  to  construe  'iegal 
representatives"  in  its  primary  meaning 
would  make  the  personalty  subject  to  the 
testamentary  disposition  and  the  debts  of 
the  deceased  legatee,  while  the  real  estate 
was  not  Howell  v.  Gifford,  53  AU.  1074, 
1077.  64  N.  J.  Eq.  180  (citing  Williams'  Bx'rs, 
1013). 

Testator  bequeathed  to  his  wife  the 
balance  due  on  a  poUcy  of  insurance  issued 
by  a  company  which  was  neither  a  fraternal 
nor  a  mutual  benefit  association.  The  policy 
provided  for  payment  to  the  beueflciary, 
his  "legal  representatives"  or  assigns.  The 
application  directed  that  the  insurance 
should  be  paid  "to  whom  I  may  direct  in 
my  will."  Held,  that  the  titie  vested  in  the 
widow,  after  the  satisfaction  of  a  debt  to 
secure  which  it  had  been  assigned,  as  execu- 
trix, and  not  as  a  beneficiary  under  the 
policy.  Leonard  v.  Harney,  66  N.  E.  2,  173 
N.  Y.  352. 

A  fraternal  insurance  association  issued 
a  certificate  of  membership  to  a  man  who 
named  his  wife  as  beneficiary.  It  provided 
that  if  his  wife  died  before  he  did,  he  might 
name  another  beneficiary,  but  if  he  failed  to 
do  so,  the  insurance  should  be  paid  to  his 
legal  representative.  The  wife  died;  he 
died  later;  an  administrator  was  appointed 
to  whom  the  association  paid  the  money.  The 
insured  left  three  children  who  sued  the  ad- 
ministrator to  recover  the  money.  Held, 
that  the  administrator  was  the  legal  repre- 
sentative of  the  deceased  within  the  meaning 
of  that  term  and  was  entitled  to  the  money. 


Hunt  T.  Remsberg,  112  Pac.  590,  591,  83  Kan. 
665,  32  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  246,  21  Ann.  Gas.  1267. 

Aseat 

A  provision  of  an  insurance  policy  that 
the  term  insured,  as  used  therein,  shall  in- 
clude his  "legal  representatives,"  does  not 
include  his  agents.  Boston  Marine  Ins.  Go. 
V.  Scales,  49  S.  W.  743,  745,  101  Tenn.  628. 

Assignees,  pmroliasers,  a&d  Kr«nte«i 

The  words  "legal  representative,"  as 
used  in  a  statute  relating  to  settlement  on 
public  lands,  included  not  only  heirs,  execu- 
tors, or  administrators  of  a  settier,  but  his 
legal  assigns.  Lapish  y.  Wells,  6  GreenL 
(6  Me.)  175,  185. 

An  assignment  of  a  patent  to  two  per- 
sons named,  "and  to  their  legal  representa- 
tives," to  be  held  and  enjoyed  by  them  for 
their  own  use  and  behoof  "and  for  the  use 
and  behoof  of  their  legal  representatives," 
is  not  a  mere  personal  license  to  the  persons 
named,  but  the  words  "legal  representatives" 
mean  "assigns"  as  well  as  "executors  and  ad- 
ministrators." Hamilton  v.  Kingsburg,  U 
Fed.  Ga&  346,  347,  15  Blatchf.  64. 

On  the  death  of  a  party  to  an  action  In- 
volving real  estate,  the  heir  of  the  deceased 
party  must  be  brought  in  as  successor,  and 
hence  a  contention  that  the  provisions  of  the 
Code  of  Public  General  Laws,  providing  that 
if  a  party  to  a  suit  in  equity  shall  die  before 
final  decree,  leaving  heirs  at  law  or  repre- 
sentatives who  should  be  made  parties,  it 
shall  not  be  necessary  to  file  an  amended 
bill,  do  not  contemplate  that  such  proceed- 
ings should  be  revived  by  summoning  in  the 
heir,  but  that  they  mean,  by  using  the  term 
"legal  representative,"  that  the  purchaser, 
and  none  other,  in  case  of  a  sale  of  the  land 
by  the  fraudulent  vendee,  should  be  brought 
In,  is  untenable.  Sinclair  v.  Auxiliary  Real- 
ty Go.,  67  Atl.  664,  668,  99  Md.  223. 

The  term  "legal  representative,"  as  used 
in  a  land  patent,  embraced  a  representative 
by  contract,  a  grantee,  or  assignee,  as  well 
as  a  representative  by  operation  of  law.  The 
purchaser  of  a  land  claim  sold  by  a  Louisi- 
ana parish  court  in  administration  proceed- 
itngs  is  a  "legal  representative"  of  the  claim- 
ant, within  the  meaning  of  Act  Gong.  June 
2,  1858,  requiring  the  surveyor  general  of  the 
district  in  which  a  land  claimed  is  located, 
on  satisfactory  proof  that  such  claim  had 
be^i  confirmed  and  is  unsatisfied,  to  issue  to 
the  claimant  or  his  "legal  representative"  a 
certificate  of  location  of  a  quantify  of  land 
equal  to  that  so  confirmed  and  unsatisfied. 
Bradley  v.  Dells  Lumber  Go.,  81  N.  W.  394, 
396,  105  Wis.  245. 

Gode  Civ.  Proc.  Gal.  {  473,  provides  that 
an  assignee  or  grantee  is  a  "legal  representa- 
tive" of  the  assignor  or  grantor  In  regard  to 
the  things  assigned  or  granted.  Abb.  Law 
Dictionary  says  that  "to  represent  a  person" 
is  to  stand  in  his  place,  to  act  his  part,  ex- 


LEGAL  REPRESENTATIVS 


75 


LEGAL  KEPBESENTATIVB 


ercise  bis  right,  or  take  his  share.    Brown  t. 
Massey,  76  Pac.  226,  228, 13  Okl.  670. 

While  In  common  parlance  the  expres- 
sion '*legal  representatives"  means  adminis- 
trators or  executors,  legally  it  is  not  always 
so  exclusive.  Under  a  lease  giving  the  lessor 
the  right  to  cancel  the  lease  and  providing 
that  the  covenant  and  agreements  contained 
therein  were  binding  on  the  parties  and  their 
legal  representatives,  a  grantee  of  the  lessor 
had  a  right  to  cancel  the  lease.  Adler  v. 
Lowensteln,  102  N.  T.  Supp.  492,  493,  52 
Misc.  Rep.  556  (citing  Mutual  lAte  Ins.  Go.  v. 
Armstrong,  6  Sup.  Ct  877,"  879,  117  U.  S.  691, 
597,  29  L.  Ed.  999 ;  Warnecke  v.  Lembca,  71 
IlL  91,  93,  12  Am.  Rep.  85). 

As  asslsits 

See  Assigns. 

Desceadaate 

While  the  term  "legal  representatives'* 
in  Its  ordinary  acceptation  means  executors 
and  administrators,  it  may  also  mean  de- 
scendants. Kelsay  v.  Eaton,  76  Pac  770,  772, 
45  Or.  70,  106  Am.  St  Rep.  662. 

Under  a  will  giving  legacies  to  relatives 
who  shall  be  living  or  whose  legal  represent- 
atives shall  be  living  at  a  certain  time,  the 
words  "legal  representatives"  mean  children 
or  lineal  descendants.  Miller  v.  Metcalf,  68 
Ati.  743.  745,  77  Conn.  176. 

Testator  created  a  testamentary  trust, 
and  provided  that  the  Income  thereof  should 
be  applied  to  the  use  of  daughters  named 
and  a  son  named,  and  declare<l  that  on  the 
death  of  the  daughters,  respectively,  the 
principal  held  in  trust  for  the  daughter  dy- 
ing should  be  transfoiTed  to  the  children  of 
the  deceased  daughter,  and,  in  default  of  chil- 
dren, the  property  should  go  to  the  other  chil- 
dren named  in  the  will  and  to  their  legal  rep- 
resentatives. Held,  that  the  words  **legal  rep- 
resentatives" meant  lineal  descendants, 
though  the  daughters  were  illegitimate  chil- 
dren of  testator.  Dwight  v.  Gibb,  129  N.  X. 
Sopp.  961,  964,  145  App.  Div.  223. 

DeTisees  and  legatees 

The  words  "legal  representatives,"  as 
used  in  a  contract  for  preferential  rates  be- 
tween a  railroad  company  and  "a  shlpi)er, 
which  provided  that  the  railroad  agreed  to 
transfer  logs  for  such  shipper  and  his  as- 
signs at  a  prescribed  rate,  and  defined  the 
word  ''assigns"  as  limited  to  the  shipper'a 
legal  representatives  in  case  of  death,  to  his 
successors  in  the  timber  and  lumber  business 
in  case  of  his  retirement,  and  to  any  mill 
that  he  might  build  or  purchase,  does  not  in- 
clude a  legatee  of  the  shipper's  lumber  busi- 
ness under  his  will.  Sullivan  v.  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.,  36  South.  694.  697,  138  Ala.  650. 

In  Rev.  Civ.  St  art  2248,  providing  that 
in  actions  against  executors,  etc.,  neither  par- 
ty shall  be  allowed  to  testify  against  the  oth- 
er as  to  any  transaction  with  the  testator, 


etc.,  unless  called  by  the  opposite  party,  and 
provldipg  that  the  provision  shall  extend  to 
all  actions  by  or  against  the  heirs  or  **legal 
representatives"  of  a  decedent  arising  out  of 
transactions  with  the  decedent  the  reference 
to  heirs  and  "legal  representatives"  does  not 
include  devisees  and  legatees,  and  In  an  ac- 
tion to  cancel  a  deed  given  to  one  since  de- 
ceased, where  it  appeared  that  by  a  settle- 
ment among  the  defendants  certain  churches 
were  entitled  to  an  interest  in  the  estate  as 
legatees  and  other  defendants  were  entitled 
to  an  interest  as  heirs,  plaintifl'*s  testimony 
that  the  deed  to  the  decedent  had  been  given 
to  secure  a  debt  which  had  been  released  by 
decedent's  will  was  admissible,  as  against  the 
churches  as  legatees,  but  not  as  against  the 
other  defendants  as  heirs.  Emerson  v.  Scott 
87  S.  W.  369,  370,  39  Tex.  Civ.  App.  66. 

The  term  "legal  representatives"  of  a  de- 
ceased person  will  mean  the  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator if  the  subject-matter  is  person- 
alty, and  heirs  or  devisees  if  it  is  realty, 
within  the  rule  that  all  the  necessary  par- 
ties to  a  judgment  sought  to  be  reviewed 
must  be  the  parties  to  the  bill  of  review,  and, 
if  they  are  dead,  their  ''legal  representatives" 
most  be  parties.  State  Fair  Ass'n  v.  Terry, 
86  S.  W.  87,  89,  74  Ark.  149  (citing  Cochran 
V.  Cochran,  17  Atl.  981,  127  Pa.  486;  Ralston 
V.  Sharon,  51  Fed.  702 ;  Johnson  v.  Van  Eppe, 
110  IlL  657;  Turner  v.  Berry,  8  111.  641). 

Under  Laws  1885,  p.  698,  c.  405,  S  6,  pro- 
viding for  the  delivery  of  a  tax  deed  to  the 
purchaser,  his  "legal  representatives"  or  as- 
Bigns,  a  deed  is  properly  delivered  to  the 
sole  devisee  of  the  purchaser's  estate,  the 
quoted  term  not  being  necessarily  confined  to 
executors,  administrators,  etc.  Rosenblum  v. 
Elsenherg,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  350,  353,  123  App. 
Div.  896  (citing  Griswold  v.  Sawyer,  26  N.  E. 
464,  125  N.  Y.  411 ;  Rice's  Lessee  v.  White,  8 
Ohio,  216 ;  2  Blackw.  Tax  TiUes,  i  963,  and 
note  1,  citing  cases;  Black,  Tax  Titles,  p. 
312 ;  Morehouse  v.  Phelps,  18  111.  472 ;  Mutu- 
al Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  6  Sup.  Ct  877, 
117  U.  S.  691,  29  L  Ed.  997 ;  Duncan's  Les- 
see V.  Walker  [Pa.]  1  Yeates,  213 ;  Common- 
wealth ex  rel.  Kreber  v.  Bryan  [Pa.)  6  Serg. 
&  R.  81;  Wamsley  v.  Crook,  3  Neb.  844; 
Lee  V.  DUl  [N.  Y.j  39  Barb.  621). 

Heirs,  aezt  of  kia»  and  distrlbvtees 

Heirs  as  Including,  see  Heirs. 

Lineal    heir    as    including,    see    Lineal 
Heirs. 

While  the  term  "legal  representatives" 
ordinarily  means  executors  or  administra- 
'  tors,  it  may  be  shown  to  mean  next  of  kin. 
•  Wolfe  V.  Wolfe,  134  S.  W.  33,  34,  154  Mo. 
'  App.  218 ;  Kelsay  v.  Eaton,  76  Pac.  770.  772, 
'  45  Or.  70,  106  Am.  St  Rep.  662. 

P.  L.  1898,  p.  778,  §  168,  provides  that 

^  the  orphans'  court  shall  make  distribution 

',  **to  the  next  of  kindred  to  the  intestate  in 

equal  degrees,  or  legally  rei)reHentmg  their 

'  stocks,"  and  section  169  provides  that,  "in 


LKGAL  REPRESENTATIVE 


76 


LEGAL  REPRESENTATIVE 


case  there  be  no  child,  then  to  the  next  df 
kindred  of  equal  degree  of  or  unto  the  intesh 
tate  and  their  legal  representatives  as  afore- 
said." Held  that  the  words  "legal  represen- 
tatives/' as  used  in  section  169,  mean  legal 
representatives  of  their  stocks,  and,  having 
found  a  common  ancestor  of  the  intestate 
and  the  living  next  of  kin,  the  logical  con- 
clusion is  that  the  nearest  class  of  kinsman 
descending  from  that  ancestor,  together  from 
the  stock  to  which  representation  is  limited. 
Smith  V.  McDonald,  61  AtL  453,  454,  69  N.  J. 
Bq.  765. 

The  term,  "legal  representatives"  of  a  de- 
ceased person  will  mean  the  executor  or 
administrator  if  the  subject-matter  is  per- 
sonalty, and  heirs  or  devisees  if  It  is  realty, 
within  the  rule  that  all  the  necessary  par- 
ties to  a  Judgment  sought  to  be  reviewed 
must  be  the  parties  to  the  bill  of  review,  and, 
if  they  are  dead,  their  "legal  representatives" 
must  be  parties.  State  Fair  Ass'n  v.  Terry, 
85  S.  W.  87,  89,  74  Ark.  149  (citing  Cochran 
V.  CJochran,  17  Atl.  981,  127  Pa.  486 ;  Ralston 
V.  Sharon,  51  Fed.  702 ;  Jo&nson  v.  Van  Epps, 
110  111.  557;   Turner  v.  Berry,  8  111.  541). 

While  it  may  be  conceded  that  the  words 
"legal  representatives"  mean  executors  and 
administrators,  as  used  in  Ky.  St  1904,  f 
655,  providing  that  when  a  policy  of  insur- 
ance is  effected  on  one's  own  life,  in  favor 
of  some  person  other  than  himself,  having  an 
insurable  interest  therein,  the  lawful  benefi- 
ciary, other  than  himself  or  his  "legal  repre- 
sentatives," shall  be  entitled  to  its  proceeds 
as  against  creditors  and  representatives  of 
insured,  yet  in  an  assessment  insurance  poli- 
cy that  the  amount  should  go  on  his  death 
to  his  wife  (naming  her)  and  his  two  daugh- 
ters, if  living,  otherwise  his  "legal  representa- 
tives" should  be  entitled  to  the  insurance 
in  equal  parts,  the  words  mean  heirs  and 
distributees.  Hall  v.  Ayer's  Guardian  (Ky.) 
105  S.  W.  911,  913,  914. 

That  the  heirs  at  law  of  a  lessor,  who 
dies  intestate,  were  the  only  persons  who 
could  execute  a  good  and  sufl9clent  deed  to 
premises  leased  with  an  option  to  the  lessee 
to  purchase,  will  not  make  them  the  "legal 
representative"  contemplated  by  the  lease,  to 
whom  notice  of  a  desire  to  exercise  the  op- 
,tion  was  to  be  given,  where,  by  its  terms,  the 
legal  representative  provided  for  was  not  re- 
quired to  execute  the  deed,  but  only  to  deliv- 
er it  or  cause  it  to  be  delivered.  Rockland- 
Rockport  Lime  Co.  v.  Leary,  97  N.  B.  43,  47, 
203  N.  Y.  469,  Ann.  Gas.  1913B,  62. 

"While  technically  the  words  'legal  rep- 
resentatives' mean  administrators  or  execu- 
tors, they  may  refer  to  heirs  or  next  of  kin. 
A  'representative'  is  one  who  stands  in  the 
place  of  an  owner  of  real  estate  as  heir,  of 
personalty  as  next  of  kin.  He  is  one,  also, 
who  takes  by  representation,  and  in  wills 
and  settlements  the  terms  'representatives* 
and  legal  representatives'  are  frequently  held 


to  mean  heirs  and  next  of  kin,  and  not  ex- 
ecutors and  administrators."  Davidson  v. 
Jones, '98  N.  Y.  Supp.  265,  266,  112  App.  Div. 
254  (citing  Griswold  v.  Sawyer,  26  N.  E.  464, 
125  N.  Y.  411). 

In  Davidson  v.  Jones,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  265, 
112  App.  Div.  255,  it  was  held  that  though 
the  words  "legal  representative"  in  a  will  de- 
vising property  to  the  testktor's  wife  and  on 
her  decease,  to  her  children,  or  to  their  legal 
representative,  refer  technically  to  executors 
or  administrators,  yet  they  may  also  mean 
heirs  at  law  or  UQxt  of  kin,  and  where  used 
in  reference  to  real  estate,  they  mean  heirs 
of  testator's  deceased  children.  In  re  Alli- 
son, 102  N.  Y.  Supp.  887,  895,  53  Misc.  Rep. 
222. 

Where  a  testator  makes  a  bequest  to  his 
sister,  or,  in  case  of  her  death  before  his 
own,  to  her  heirs  and  legal  representatives, 
the  expression  "legal  representatives"  is 
equivalent  to  "heirs,"  and  may  be  regarded  as 
mere  surplusage.  In  re  Riesenberg's  Es- 
tate, 90  S.  W.  1170,  1171,  116  Mo.  App.  308. 

Where  there  was  nothing  in  the  contract 
of  insurance  nor  in  any  statute  or  provision 
in  the  charter  of  the  company  to  indicate 
that  the  words  "legal  representatives"  were 
used  in  their  broader  sense  to  mean  heirs  at 
law,  and  the  policy  was  an  endowment  paya- 
ble to  the  insured  if  he  was  alive  at  the  end 
of  15  years,  and  to  his  legal  representative 
if  he  died  before  that  time,  his  heirs  had  no 
vested  interest  in  the  policy  by  the  use  of 
such  phrase,  which  would  prevent  the  insured 
from  assigning  the  policy.  Page  r.  Metropol- 
itan Life  Ins.  Co.,  135  S.  W.  911,  912,  98 
Ark.  340, 

Gen.  St  1902,  §  398,  provides  that  ances- 
tral real  estate  shall  be  distributed  to  the 
brothers  and  sisters,  and  those  who  legally 
represent  them,  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor 
from  whom  such  estate  came;  that,  if  there 
are  none  such,  then  to  the  children  of  the 
ancestor,  and  those  who  legally  represent 
them;  that,  if  there  be  none  such,  then  to 
the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  ancestor,  aiid 
those  who  legally  represent  them ;  and  that, 
if  there  be  none  such,  then  it  shall  be  divided 
in  the  same  manner  as  other  real  estate. 
Held  that  "legal  representatives"  means 
those  who  inherit  property  per  stirpes  as 
the  representatives  of  a  deceased  ancestor, 
in  whose  place,  for  the  purpose  of  succession 
to  such  property,  they  stand,  and  so,  where 
a  son  as  the  sole  issue  of  his  father  died 
without  issue,  his  mother  surviving,  ances- 
tral estate  which  he  had  inherited  from  his 
father  did  not  pass  to  her  as  the  "legal  rep- 
resentative" of  the  son's  children,  and  hence 
on  the  death  of  the  mother  the  nearest  of 
kin  to  the  son  on  his  father's  side  were  en- 
titled to  the  property  as  against  the  nearest 
of  kin  on  his  mother's  side.  In  re  Tuttle's 
Estate,  59  AtL  44,  45,  77  Conn.  310  (citing 
Ketchum  v.  Corse,  31  AtL  486,  65  Conn.  89). 


LEGAIi  REPKESENTATIVE 


77 


LEGAL  RESIDENCE 


In  Const.  §  193,  the  phrase  "legal  or  per- 
sonal representatives,"  embraces  not  only  the 
executor  or  administrator,  but  the  heirs  or 
next  of  kin,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  action 
for  death  may  be  brought  by  the  executor, 
administrator,  heirs,  or  next  of  kin,  and  the 
widow,  children,  and  administrator  may  join 
in  an  action.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Wash- 
ington, 46  South.  614,  92  Miss.  129. 

By  "legal  representatiyes"  in  a  bequest 
in  trust  to  pay  the  income  to  H.,  nephew  of 
testatrix,  and,  at  his  death,  the  principal 
to  such  of  his  legal  representatives  "as  are 
related  to  me  by  blood,"  is  meant  his  heirs 
at  law.  Hartford  Trust  Co.  v.  Wolcott,  81 
Aa  1057,  85  Conn.  134. 

A  life  policy  stipulated  that  the  insurer 
agreed  with  the  "insured,  his  executors,  ad- 
ministrators and  assigns,"  to  pay  the  amount 
of  the  x)olicy  to  the  insured's  "legal  repre- 
sentatives" within  .  a  specified  time  after 
proof  of  the  death  of  the  Insured.  The  in- 
sured, at  the  time  the  policy  was  issued,  was 
unmarried.  Held,  that  the  words  "legal  rep- 
resentatives" meant  the  insured's  executors 
or  adminlstrntors,  and  not  his  next  of  kin. 
New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  Nat 
Bank,  97  S.  W.  195, 196,  121  Mo.  App.  479. 

Receiver 

A  provision  in  an  insurance  policy  that, 
where  the  expression  "insured"  is  used  there- 
in it  shall  include  the  "legal  representatives" 
of  the  insured,  does  not  entitle  a  receiver  to 
take  the  place  of  the  insured  in  answer  to 
a  demand  by  the  ccmipany  that  the  insured 
shaU  appear  for  examination  under  oatjbi  re- 
specting a  loss,  as  required  by  the  policy,  al- 
though the  receiver  was  appointed  for  the 
express  purpose  of  collecting  the  insurance; 
the  insured  having  absconded  and  having 
been  adjudged  a  bankrupt  Sims  v.  Union 
Assnr.  Soc.,  129  Fed.  804,  805,  808. 

Spouse 

The  fact  that  the  statute  authorizes 
proof  to  be  made  by  the  heirs  or  "legal  rep- 
resentatives" does  not  give  the  widow,  claim- 
ing only  a  dower  interest,  any  title  in  the 
land,  since  the  quoted  phrase,  in  its  ordi- 
naiy  acceptation,  means  executor  or  admin- 
istrator. Braun  v.  Mathieson,  116  N.  W. 
789,  791,  139  Iowa,  409. 

Swvivliic  partner 

Under  the  statute  prohibiting  a  party  to 
testify  against  the  opposite  party  in  actions 
by  or  against  the  heirs  or  legal  representa- 
tives of  a  decedent  arising  out  of  any  trans- 
action with  such  decedent,  etc.,  a  surviving 
partner,  suing  for  the  benefit  of  the  firm,  is 
not  a  "legal  representative"  of  the  deceased 
partner.  Shivel  &  Stewart  v.  Greer  Bros. 
(Tex.)  123  S.  W.  207,  208. 

Triftstee  Im  bankniptey 

"The  terms  legal  representative'  and 
'personal  representative,*  in  their  commonly 
accepted  senses  mean  administrator  or  ex- 


ecutor, though  this  is  not  their  only  defini- 
tion. They  may  mean  heirs,  next  of  kin,  or 
descendants,  and  sometimes  assignees  or 
grantees.  The  sense  in  which  the  term  is  to 
be  understood  depends  somewhat  on  the  In- 
tention of  the  party  using  it,  and  is  to  be 
gathered,  not  altogether  from  its  use,  but 
by  the  surrounding  circumstances."  Whether 
a  trustee  in  bankruptcy  is  a  "legal  represen- 
tative" within  Act  June  3,  1864,  §  30,  la 
Stat  108,  c.  106  (Rev.  St  fg  5197,  5198).  pro- 
viding that,  where  a  greater  rate  of  interest 
has  been  paid  a  bank  than  that  allowed  by 
that  section,  the  person  paying  the  same  or 
his  "legal  representative"  may  recover  back 
twice  the  amount  of  interest  so  paid,  might 
admit  of  doubt.  Reed  v.  American-German 
Nat  Bank,  155  Fed.  233,  236  (citing  6  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  5358;  Griswold  r.  Sawyer, 
26  N.  B.  464,  125  N.  Y.  411). 

LEOAI.  BESIBEKOE 

As  residence,  see  Residence. 
Inhabitant  synonymous,  see  Inhabitan- 
cy— Inhabitant 
Resident  importing,  see  Resident 

The  "legal  residence"  of  a  corporation, 
within  a  statute  providing  that  actions  shall 
be  tried  in  the  county  In  which  defendant  re- 
sides, etc.,  is  the  county  designated  in  its 
articles  of  incorporation  as  the  county  in 
which  its  principal  office  shall  be  kept 
Woods  Gold  Min.  Ck>.  v.  Royston,  1j03  Pac. 
291,  292,  293,  46  Colo.  191. 

"There  is  a  broad  distinction  between 
a  legal  and  actual  residence.  A  'legal  resi- 
dence' (domicile)  cannot,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  coexist  in  the  same  person  in  two 
states  or  countries.  He  must  have  a  legal 
residence  somewhere.  He  cannot  be  a  cos- 
mopolitan. The  succession  to  movable  prop- 
erty, whether  testamentary  or  in  case  of  in- 
testacy, except  as  regulated  by  statute^  the 
Jurisdiction  of  the  probate  of  wills,  the  right 
to  vote,  the  liability  to  poll  tax,  and  to  mili- 
tary duty,  and  other  things,  all  depend  up- 
on the  party's  legal  residence  or  domicile. 
For  these  purposes,  he  must  have  a  legal  res- 
idence. Othe  law  will,  from  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances, fix  a  legal  residence  for  him,  un- 
less he  voluntarily  fixes  it  himself.  His  le- 
gal residence  consists  of  fact  and  intention. 
Both  must  concur.  And  when  his  legal  resi- 
dence is  once  fixed*  it  requires  both  fact  and 
intention  to  change  it  Aa  contradistinguish- 
ed from  his  legal  residence,  he  may  have 
an  actual  residence  in  anothtt  state  or  coun- 
try. He  may  abide  In  the  latter  without 
surrendering  his  legat  residence  in  the  for- 
mw,  provided  he  so  intends.  His  legal  res- 
idence, for  the  purposes  above  indicated,  may 
be  merely  ideal,  but  his  actual  residence 
must  be  substantive.  He  may  not  actually 
abide  at  his  legal  residence  at  all,  but  his  ac- 
tual residence  must  be  his  abiding  place." 
Pickering  v.  Winch,  87  Pac.  768,  766,  48  Or. 
500,  9  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1169  (quoting  and 


LEGAL  REPRESENTATIVE 


76 


LEOAIi  REPRESENTATIVE 


case  there  be  no  child,  then  to  the  next  dt 
kindred  of  equal  degree  of  or  unto  the  intes- 
tate and  their  legal  representatives  as  afore- 
said." Held  that  the  words  "legal  represen- 
tatives," as  used  in  section  169,  mean  legal 
representatives  of  their  stocks,  and,  having 
found  a  common  ancestor  of  the  Intestate 
and  the  living  next  of  kin,  the  logical  con- 
clusion is  that  the  nearest  class  of  kinsman 
descending  from  that  ancestor,  together  from 
the  stock  to  which  representation  is  limited. 
Smith  V.  McDonald,  61  AtL  453,  454,  69  N.  J. 
Eq.  765. 

The  term,  "legal  representatives"  of  a  de- 
ceased person  will  mean  the  executor  or 
administrator  if  the  subject-matter  is  per- 
sonalty, and  heirs  or  devisees  if  it  is  realty, 
within  the  rule  that  all  the  necessary  par- 
ties to  a  Judgment  sought  to  be  reviewed 
must  be  the  parties  to  the  bill  of  review,  and, 
if  they  are  dead,  their  "legal  representatives" 
must  be  parties.  State  Fair  Ass*n  v.  Terry, 
85  S.  W.  87.  89,  74  Ark.  149  (citing  Cochran 
V.  Cochran,  17  Atl.  981,  127  Pa.  486 ;  Ralston 
V.  Sharon,  51  Fed.  702 ;  Jol^nson  v.  Van  Epps, 
110  111.  557;  Turner  v.  Berry,  8  111.  541). 

While  it  may  be  conceded  that  the  words 
"legal  representatives"  mean  executors  and 
administrators,  as  used  in  Ky.  St  1904,  i 
655,  providing  that  when  a  policy  of  insur- 
ance is  effected  on  one's  own  life,  in  favor 
of  some  person  other  than  himself,  having  an 
insurable  Interest  therein,  the  lawful  benefi- 
ciary, other  than  himself  or  his  "legal  repre- 
sentatives," shall  be  entitled  to  Its  proceeds 
as  against  creditors  and  representatives  of 
insured,  yet  in  an  assessment  Insurance  poli- 
cy that  the  amount  should  go  on  his  death 
to  his  wife  (naming  her)  and  his  two  daugh- 
ters, if  living,  otherwise  his  "legal  representa- 
tives" should  be  entitled  to  the  insurance 
in  equal  parts,  the  words  mean  heirs  and 
distributees.  Hall  v.  Ayer's  Guardian  (Ky.) 
105  S.  W.  911,  913,  914. 

That  the  heirs  at  law  of  a  lessor,  who 
dies  Intestate,  were  the  only  persons  who 
could  execute  a  good  and  sufficient  deed  to 
premises  leased  with  an  option  to  the  lessee 
to  purchase,  will  not  make  them  the  "legal 
representative"  contemplated  by  the  lease,  to 
whom  notice  of  a  desire  to  exercise  the  op- 
,tlon  was  to  be  given,  where,  by  its  terms,  the 
legal  representative  provided  for  was  not  re- 
quired to  execute  the  deed,  but  only  to  deliv- 
er it  or  cause  it  to  be  delivered.  Rockland- 
Rockport  Lime  Co.  v.  Leary,  97  N.  B.  43,  47, 
203  N.  Y.  469,  Ann.  CJas.  1913B,  62. 

"While  technically  the  words  'legal  rep- 
resentatives* mean  administrators  or  execu- 
tors, they  may  refer  to  heirs  or  next  of  kin. 
A  'representative'  is  one  who  stands  in  the 
place  of  an  owner  of  real  estate  as  heir,  of 
personalty  as  next  of  kin.  He  is  one,  also, 
who  takes  by  representation,  and  in  wills 
and  settlements  the  terms  'representatives' 
and  'legal  representatives*  are  frequently  held 


to  mean  heirs  and  next  of  kin,  and  not  ex- 
ecutors and  administrators."  Davidson  v- 
Jone8,'98  N.  Y.  Supp.  265,  266,  112  App.  Dlv. 
254  (citing  Griswold  ▼.  Sawyer,  26  N.  E.  464, 
125  N.  Y.  411). 

In  Davidson  ▼.  Jones,  98  N.  Y,  Supp.  265, 
112  App.  Dlv.  255,  it  was  held  that  though 
the  words  "legal  representative"  in  a  will  de- 
vising property  to  the  testktor's  wife  and  on 
her  decease,  to  her  children,  or  to  their  legal 
representative,  refer  technically  to  executors 
or  administrators,  yet  they  may  also  mean 
heirs  at  law  or  UQxt  of  kin,  and  where  used 
in  reference  to  real  estate,  they  mean  heirs 
of  testator's  deceased  children.  In  re  Alli- 
son, 102  N.  Y.  Supp.  887,  895,  53  Misc.  Rep. 
222. 

Where  a  testator  makes  a  bequest  to  his 
sister,  or,  in  case  of  her  death  before  his 
own,  to  her  heirs  and  legal  representatives, 
the  expression  "legal  representatives"  is 
equivalent  to  "heirs,"  and  may  be  regarded  as 
mere  surplusage.  In  re  Riesenberg's  Es- 
tate, 90  S.  W.  1170,  1171,  116  Mo.  App.  308. 

Where  there  was  nothing  in  the  contract 
of  Insurance  nor  in  any  statute  or  provision 
in  the  charter  of  the  company  to  indicate 
that  the  words  "legal  representatives"  were 
used  in  their  broader  sense  to  mean  heirs  at 
law,  and  the  policy  was  an  endowment  paya- 
ble to  the  insured  if  he  was  alive  at  the  end 
of  16  years,  and  to  his  legal  representative 
if  he  died  before  that  time,  his  heirs  had  no 
vested  Interest  in  the  policy  by  the  use  of 
such  phrase,  which  would  prevent  the  insured 
from  assigning  the  policy.  Page  v.  Metropol- 
itan Ufe  Ins.  Co.,  135  S.  W.  911,  912,  98 
Ark.  340. 

Gen.  St  1902,  §  398,  provides  that  ances- 
tral real  estate  shall  be  distributed  to  the 
brothers  and  sisters,  and  those  who  legally 
represent  them,  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor 
from  whom  such  estate  came;  that,  if  there 
are  none  such,  then  to  the  children  of  the 
ancestor,  and  those  who  legally  represent 
them;  that.  If  there  be  none  such,  then  to 
the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  ancestor,  and 
those  who  legally  represent  them ;  and  that, 
if  there  be  none  such,  then  It  shall  be  divided 
in  the  same  manner  as  other  real  estate. 
Held  that  "legal  representatives"  means 
those  who  Inherit  property  per  stirpes  as 
the  representatives  of  a  deceased  ancestor, 
in  whose  place,  for  the  purpose  of  succession 
to  such  property,  they  stand,  and  so,  where 
a  son  as  the  sole  issue  of  his  father  died 
without  issue,  his  mother  surviving,  ances- 
tral estate  which  he  had  Inherited  from  his 
father  did  not  pass  to  her  as  the  "legal  rep- 
resentative" of  the  son's  children,  and  hence 
on  the  death  of  the  mother  the  nearest  of 
kin  to  the  son  on  his  father's  side  were  en- 
titled to  the  property  as  against  the  nearest 
of  kin  on  his  mother's  side.  In  re  Tuttle's 
Estate,  59  AtL  44,  45,  77  Conn.  310  (citing 
Ketchum  v.  Corse,  31  AtL  486,  65  Conn.  89). 


LEQAIi  KEPKESENTATIVE 


77 


LEGAL  RBSIDENCB 


In  Const.  §  193,  the  phrase  'legal  or  per- 
sonal representatives,"  embraces  not  only  the 
executor  or  administrator,  but  the  heirs  or 
next  of  kin,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  action 
for  death  may  be  brought  by  the  executor, 
administrator,  heirs,  or  next  of  kin,  and  the 
widow,  children,  and  administrator  may  Join 
in  an  action.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  y.  Wash- 
ington, 45  South.  614,  92  Miss.  129. 

By  *legal  representatiyes"  in  a  bequest 
in  trust  to  pay  the  income  to  H.,  nephew  of 
testotrix,  and,  at  Ills  death,  the  principal 
to  such  of  his  legal  representatives  "as  are 
related  to  me  by  blood,'*  is  meant  his  heirs 
at  law.  Hartford  Trust  CJo.  ▼.  Wolcott,  81 
Aa  1057,  85  Conn.  134. 

A  life  policy  stipulated  that  the  insurer 
agreed  with  the  "insured,  his  executors,  ad- 
ministrators and  assigns,"  to  pay  the  amount 
of  the  i)ollcy  to  the  insured's  "legal  repre- 
sentatives" within  a  specified  time  after 
proof  of  the  death  of  the  Insured.  The  in- 
sured, at  the  time  the  policy  was  issued,  was 
unmarried.  Held,  that  the  words  "legal  rep- 
resentatives" meant  the  insured's  executors 
or  administrators,  and  not  his  next  of  kin. 
New  Yoric  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  Nat 
Bank,  97  S.  W.  195,  196,  121  Mo.  App.  479. 

BeceiTer 

A  provision  in  an  insurance  policy  that, 
where  the  expression  "insured"  is  used  there- 
in it  shall  include  the  "legal  representatives" 
of  the  insured,  does  not  entitle  a  receiver  to 
take  the  place  of  the  insured  in  answer  to 
a  demand  by  the  c(Hupany  that  the  insured 
shaU  appear  for  examination  under  oatjbi  re- 
.specting  a  loss,  as  required  by  the  policy,  al- 
though the  receiver  was  appointed  for  the 
express  purpose  of  collecting  the  insurance; 
the  insured  having  absconded  and  having 
been  adjudged  a  bankrupt  Sims  v.  Union 
Assnr.  Soc.,  129  Fed.  804,  805,  808. 

Spouse 

The  fact  that  the  statute  authorizes 
proof  to  be  made  by  the  heirs  or  "legal  rep- 
resentatives" does  not  give  the  widow,  claim- 
ing only  a  dower  interest,  any  title  in  the 
land,  since  the  quoted  phrase,  in  its  ordi- 
nary acceptation,  means  executor  or  admin- 
iBtrator.  Braun  v.  Mathieson,  116  N.  W. 
789,  791,  139  Iowa,  409. 

SvvviTliic  partaer 

Under  the  statute  prohibiting  a  party  to 
testify  against  the  opposite  party  in  actions 
by  or  against  the  heirs  or  legal  representa- 
tives of  a  decedent  arising  out  of  any  trans- 
action with  such  decedent  etc.,  a  surviving 
partner,  suing  for  the  benefit  of  the  firm.  Is 
not  a  "legal  representative"  of  the  deceased 
partner.  Sbivel  A  Stewart  v.  Greer  Bros. 
(Tex.)  123  S.  W,  207,  208. 

Traatee  Im  bankniptoy 

"The  terms  legal  representative*  and 
'personal  representative,'  in  their  commonly 
accepted  sense,  mean  administrator  or  ex- 


ecutor, though  this  is  not  their  only  defini- 
tion. They  may  mean  heirs,  next  of  kin,  or 
descendants,  and  sometimes  assignees  or 
grantees.  The  sense  in  which  the  term  is  to 
be  understood  depends  somewhat  on  the  in- 
tention of  the  party  using  it,  and  is  to  be 
gathered,  not  altogether  from  its  use,  but 
by  the  surrounding  circumstances."  Whether 
a  trustee  in  bankruptcy  is  a  "legal  represen- 
tative" within  Act  June  3,  1864,  §  30,  ]:i 
Stat  108,  a  106  (Rev.  St  f|  6197.  6198),  pro- 
viding that,  where  a  greater  rate  of  interest 
has  been  paid  a  bank  than  that  allowed  by 
that  section,  the  person  paying  the  same  or 
his  "legal  representative"  may  recover  back 
twice  the  amount  of  interest  so  paid,  might 
admit  of  doubt.  Reed  v.  American-German 
Nat  Bank,  155  Fed.  233,  236  (citing  6  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  5358;  Oris  wold  Y.  Sawyer, 
26  N.  B.  464,  125  N.  Y.  411). 

I.EGAI.  BESIBEKOE 

As  residence,  see  Residence. 
Inhabitant  synonymous,   see  Inhabitan- 
cy— Inhabitant 
Re^dent  importing,  see  Resident 

The  "legal  residence"  of  a  corporation, 
within  a  statute  providing  that  actions  shall 
be  tried  in  the  county  in  which  defendant  re- 
sides, etc.,  is  the  county  designated  in  its 
articles  of  incorporation  as  the  county  in 
which  its  principal  office  shall  be  kept. 
Woods  Gold  Min.  Ck>.  v.  Royston,  103  Pac. 
291,  292,  293,  46  Colo.  191. 

"There  is  a  broad  distinction  between 
a  legal  and  actual  residence.  A  legal  resi- 
dence' (domicile)  cannot,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  coexist  in  the  same  person  in  two 
states  or  countries.  He  must  have  a  legal 
residence  somewhere.  He  cannot  be  a  cos- 
mopolitan. The  succession  to  movable  prop- 
erty, whether  testamentary  or  in  case  of  in- 
testacy, except  as  regulated  by  statute^  the 
Jurisdiction  of  the  probate  of  wills,  the  right 
to  vote,  the  liability  to  poll  tax,  and  to  mili- 
tary duty,  and  other  things,  all  depend  up- 
on the  party's  legal  residence  or  domicile. 
For  these  purposes,  he  must  have  a  legal  res- 
idence. The  law  will,  from  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances, fix  a  legal  residence  for  him,  un- 
less he  voluntarily  fixes  it  himself.  His  le- 
gal residence  consists  of  fact  and  intention. 
Both  must  concur.  And  when  his  legal  resi- 
dence is  once  fixed*  it  requires  both  fact  and 
intenticm  to  change  it  As  contradistinguish- 
ed from  his  legal  residence,  he  may  have 
an  actual  residence  in  anothtt  state  or  coun- 
try. He  may  abide  in  the  latter  without 
snrroidering  his  legat  residence  in  the  for- 
mer, provided  he  so  intends.  His  legal  res- 
idence, for  the  purposes  above  indicated,  may 
be  merely  ideal,  but  his  actual  residence 
must  be  substantive.  He  may  not  actually 
abide  at  his  legal  residence  at  all,  but  his  ac- 
tual residence  must  be  his  abiding  place." 
Pickering  v.  Winch,  87  Pac.  768,  766,  48  Or. 
500,  9  li.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1169  (quoting  and 


I^EGAIi  RESIDENOE 


78 


LEGAIi  SHARE 


adopting  definition  in  Tipton  v.  Tipton,  8  S. 
W.  440,  87  Ky.  245;  Michael  y.  Michael,  79 
8.  W.  74,  75,  34  Tex.  av.  App.  630). 

The  actual  residence  is  not  always  the 
"legal  residence'*  or  inhabitancy  of  a  man. 
The  foreign  minister  actually  resides  and 
is  personally  present  at  the  court  to  which  he 
is  accredited,  but  his  "legal  residence"  or  in- 
habitancy or  domicile  are  in  his  own  country. 
Under  Ck)de  Iowa,  §  2906,  which  requires  a 
chattel  mortgage  to  be  recorded  in  the  coun- 
ty where  the  holder  of  the  property  resides, 
a  mortgagor  may  be  a  resident  of  a  coun- 
ty, within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  al- 
though his  legal  donUcile  is  elsewhere;  and 
a  mortgage  given  by  a  railroad  contractor  on 
property  in  his  possession,  in  a  county  where 
he  is  at  work,  and  in  which  he  actually  re- 
sides with  his  family,  while  engaged  in  per- 
forming his  contract,  is  properly  recorded  in 
such  county,  although  his  residence  there 
may  be  only  temporary.  In  re  Brannock,  131 
Fed.  819,  822,  823. 

LEGAI.  BIGHT 

See  Mutuality  of  Legal  Right 

A  "legal  right"  is  a  claim  recognizable 
and  enforceable  at  law.  In  re  Folwell's  Es- 
tate, 62  Atl.  414,  415,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  728,  2  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1193. 

By  "legal  rights"  are  meant  rights  which 
have  been  firmly  established,  and  are  undis- 
puted or  indisputable.  Tacoma  R.  &  Power 
Co,  V.  Pacific  Traction  CJo.,  155  Fed.  259,  261. 

The  words  "legal  right,"  within  the  rule 
relating  to  uttering  forged  writings  to  the 
effect  that  the  writing  forged  or  counter- 
feited must  be  apparently  such  as  will  de- 
prive a  person  of  property,  estate,  or  a  "le- 
gal right,"  evidently  mean  a  right  that  may 
be  enforced  in  a  civil  action.  Commonwealth 
v.  Tabor  (Ky.)  104  S.  W.  261,  262. 

A  cause  of  action  is  inconceivable  sep- 
arately from  the  rights  which  it  invades,  and 
a  legal  right  is  inconceivable  separately  from 
I)08sible  infractions  of  that  right  A  "legal 
right"  or  title  in  this  aspect  is  the  privilege 
found  in  law  against  certain  acts  or  omis- 
sions on  the  part  of  others.  Telulah  Paper 
Co.  V.  Patten  Paper  Co.,  112  N.  W.  522,  524, 
132  Wis.  364,  425. 

The  order  of  deportation  of  a  Chinese 
I)erson,  who  has  plainly  violated  the  ezclu 
sion  act  made  by  a  court  of  the-  United 
States,  pursuant  to  the  acts  of  Congress,  is 
not  made  in  an  ordinary  justiciable  case,  and 
does  not  deal  with  "le^al  lights,"  as  that  ex- 
pression is  generally  understood.  It  merely 
involves  the  pretended  claim  to  remain  in 
this  country  of  an  individual  who,  against 
settled  American  policy  and  against  the  posi- 
tive command  of  our  statutes,  has  surrepti- 
tiously and  fraudulently  obtruded  his  unac- 
ceptable presence  among  our  people.  Unit- 
ed States  V.  Pah  Chung,  132  Fed.  109,  110. 


IiEGAI.  SEPARATION 

The  provision  of  Code,  f  966,  that  "legal 
separation  from  bed  and  board  may  be  grant- 
ed for  drunkenness,  cruelty,  and  desertion,'' 
read  in  connection  with  the  other  sections  of 
the  Code  relating  to  divorce,  and  their  index 
or  head  lines,  which  plainly  contemplate  and 
provide  for  the  two  kinds  of  divorce  known 
to  the  law  before  the  adoption  of  the  Code, 
namely,  divorce  a  vinculo  and  divorce  a  men- 
sa  et  thoro,  has  no  application  to  voluntary- 
deeds  of  separation,  nor  does  it  apply  to  di- 
vorce a  vinculo,  but  means  that  a  divorce  a 
mensa  et  thoro  may  be  granted  for  the  causes 
mentioned;  the  prefixing  of  the  adjective  "le- 
gal" to  the  words  "separation  from  bed  and 
board"  being  only  an  inartificial  mode  of  ex- 
pressing the  meaning  of  what  would  have 
been  better  expressed  by  the  use  of  the  word 
"divorce,"  instead  of  the  term  "legal  sep- 
aration." Maschauf  v.  Maschaur,  28  App. 
D.  C.  87,  89. 

I.EOAI.  8ERVIOE8 

"Legal  services"  are  "extraordinary  serv- 
ices" within  Rev.  St  1898,  |  3929,  providing 
that  an  allowance  may  be  made  to  adminis- 
trators for  all  extraordinary  services.  In  re 
Ryan's  Estate,  94  N.  W.  342,  344»  117  Wis. 
480. 

UBOAI.  gSTTLEMENT 

Rev.  PoL  Code  1903,  §§  2810,  2812,  charge 
the  care  of  an  insane  person  to  a  county 
where  he  has  acquired  a  "legal  settiement," 
without  defining  what  shall  constitute  such 
a  settiement  Held,  that  it  must  be  deemed 
to  have  been  used  with  the  same  meaning 
as  in  section  2764,  relating  to  poor  and  indi- 
gent persons,  and  providing  that  they  acquire 
a  "legal  settlement"  diarging  a  county  with 
their  support  by  a  residence  therein,  for  90 
days  which  they  lose  by  acquiring  a  new  one 
or  by  willful  absence  from  the  county  for 
90  days;  it  not  appearing  that  a  legal  sup- 
plement was  otherwise  defined  by  any  stat- 
ute. In  re  Bigelow,  96  N.  W.  698.  17  S.  I>. 
331. 

LEOAI*  SHABE 

The  words  "legal  share,**  standing  alone 
and  unqualified  by  other  expressions  in  a 
will  whereby  testator  gave  to  his  wife  the 
legal  share  of  his  real  estate  and  personal 
property,  indicate  an  intention  that  she  shall 
take  one-half  of  the  personal  property  abso- 
lutely and  the  income  of  one-half  of  the  real 
estate  for  life,  in  the  absence  of  any  children 
of  the  parties,  and  a  will  whereby  testator 
gave  to  his  wife  described  property  for  use 
as  long  as  she  desired,  after  which  the  same 
should  be  sold  by  his  executors  and  become 
a  part  of  his  estate,  and  whereby  he  declared 
that  the  legal  share  of  his  real  estate  and  per- 
sonal property  should  be  paid  to  his  wife  as 
her  share,  and  whereby  he  gave  a  legacy  in 
money  and  the  balance  of  his  estate  to 
enumerated   relatives,   and  whereby,  he  di- 


I^EGAJj  SUBDIVISION 


79 


USaAL  YOTBR 


rected  his  ezecators  to  dispose  of  all  bis 
estate  within  a  spedfled  time,  used  the  term 
in  SDch  sense.  In  re  Dull's  Estate,  71  Atl. 
9, 10, 222  Pa.  206, 128  Am.  St  Rep.  790. 

LEGAL  8UBBIVI8IOH 

''Legal  subdivision/'  as  used  in  Gen.  St 
1901,  i  6339,  requiring  each  "legal  subdivision 
of  Behool  land  to  be  appraised  separately 
pilor  to  its  being  exposed  to  sale,  refers  to 
the  smallest  subdivision  under  the  congres- 
sional  system  of  surveying,  namely  (except 
where  for  special  reasons  lots  are  platted  in 
more  or  less  irregular  shape  as  in  the  case 
of  fractional  sections),  quarter-quarter  sec- 
tions, or  40-acre  tracts.  Hopper  t.  Nation, 
98  Pac.  77,  78,  78  Kan.  108. 

LEGAL  SUB  vznr 

Act  March  30,  1872  (St  1871-72,  p.  706, 
c.  531),  for  the  survey  of  a  line  dividing  par- 
ticular counties,  declaring  that  the  line  so 
surveyed  should  be  conclusive  until  the  Legls- 
lotore  should  change  it  or  order  another  sur- 
vey, did  not  repeal  Pol.  Code,  §|  39()9-3972, 
providing  that  any  county  lines  not  adequate- 
ly marked  should  be  run  and  marked  by  the 
Surveyor  General;  and  hence  a  survey  under 
the  qiedal  act  was  a  "legal  survey."  Trini- 
ty County  V.  Mendocino  County,  00  Pac  685, 
686,  161  CJal.  270. 

LEGAL  TEHDEB 

As  money,  see  Money. 

To  constitute  a  **legal  tender"  it  is  essen- 
tial to  prove  an  actual  offer  of  the  sum  due, 
onless  the  actual  production  and  offer  of  the 
money  be  dispensed  with  by  the  express  dec- 
laration of  the  creditor  that  he  will  not  ac- 
cept it,  or  by  some  equivalent  act  Green- 
wood V.  Watson,  171  Fed.  610,  621,  06  C.  C. 
A.  421  (citing  Buchenau  v.  Homey,  12  111. 
336). 

A  decree  requiring  payment  at  a  certain 
time  is  not  complied  with  by  a  tender  of  the 
amount  in  "national  bank  notes."  Lawrence 
V.  Staigg,  10  R.  I.  581,  508. 

A  bill  of  exchange  is  not  "legal  tender." 
United  States  Health  A  Accident  Ins.  Co.  v. 
(nark,  83  N.  E.  760,  762,  41  Ind.  App.  345. 

LEGAL  TITLE 

See  Inchoate  Legal  Title. 
Seisin  importing,  see  Seisin. 

A  purchaser's  interest  in  land  by  virtue 
of  a  contract  of  sale  is  '*legal  title"  within 
the  one-year  limitation  (Ode  Supp.  1007,  i 
3447b),  barring  the  claim  of  a  spouse  not 
joining  in  a  conveyance  by  the  holder  of  the 
legal  tiUe.  Hutchinson  v.  Olberding,  130  N. 
W.  130,  140,  150  Iowa,  604. 

The  phrase  "legal  title"  in  CkMie  av. 
Proc.  i  368,  providing  that  in  an  action  to 
recover  real  property  he  who  establishes  a 
legal  title  to  the  premises  is  presumed  to  have 
been  possessed  thereof  within  the  time  re- 
quired by  law,  is  not  necessarily  a  mere  pa- 


per title,  but  such  a  title  as  undisputed  will 
sustain  an  action  of  ejectment  Aubuchon  v. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  122  N.  T. 
Supp.  581,  588,  187  App.  Div.  834. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Appeals  of  West 
Virginia,  referring  to  a  statement  in  Adams 
V.  Alklre,  20  W.  Va.  480.  in  regard  to  ad- 
verse possession,  that  'It  is  entirely  immate- 
rial whether  this  color  or  claim  of  title  be  un- 
der a  good  or  bad,  a  legal  or  equitable  title," 
say  that  they  "do  not  think  the  Judge  meant 
to  say  that  an  equitable  title  is  color  of  title. 
In  his  statement  he  includes  both  color  and 
claim,  two  dLstlnct  things.  This  is  followed 
by  the  terms  *legal  title'  and  'equitable  title.' 
We  think  that  he  meant  that  Uie  terms  'le- 
gal' and  'equitable*  should  be  used  distribu- 
tlvely ;  'legal'  referring  to  color  of  title  and 
'equitable'  to  clalm.^  Lewis  v.  Yates,  50  S. 
E.  107a.  1075,  62  W.  Va.  575. 

LEGAL  VOTER 

Nonregtetered  electors  who  may  exercise 
the  right  to  vote  at  an  election  by  the  pro- 
duction of  the  proof  required  by  L.  O.  L.  { 
3463,  prescribing  the  manner  in  which  non- 
registered  electors  may  establish  their  right 
to  vote,  are  "legal  voters"  within  Ck)nst.  art 
11,  I  2,  and  article  4,  f  la,  granting  to  legal 
voters  the  right  to  amend  their  municipal 
charter,  and  such  electors  may  sign  an  initia- 
tive petition  proposing  an  amendment  to  the 
charter.  Woodward  v.  Barbur,  116  Pac.  101, 
104,.  60  Or.  70. 

A  county  court,  in  considering  a  petition 
for  an  election  to  determine  whether  the  sale 
of  liquors  shall  be  prohibited,  recited  in  their 
order  that  the  matter  came  before  them  on 
the  petition  of  "legal  voters"  of  the  county, 
and  that  "it  appearing  to  the  court  that  said 
petition  is  signed  by  more  than  10  per  cent 
of  the  qualified  electors,  *  *  *  and  has 
been  properly  compared  and  certified  to  be 
genuine  and  is  in  all  respects  in  due  form  of 
law,  it  is  therefore  considered  and  ordered 
by  the  court  that  the  prayer  of  said  petition 
be  and  the  same  is  hereby  granted."  Held, 
tliat  the  terms  "legal  voters"  and  "qualified 
electors"  as  used  in  the  order  are  not  equiva- 
lent to  "registered  voters"  as  used  in  Laws 
1005,  p.  41,  providing  for  the  calling  of  an 
election  to  determine  whether  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  shall  be  prohibited  on  pe- 
tition of  10  per  cent  of  the  "registered  vot- 
ers." Roesch  T.  Henry,  108  Pac  430-441, 
54  Or.  230. 

Laws  1005,  p.  41,  provides  that  whenever 
a  petition  therefor,  signed  by  not  less  than  10 
per  cent  of  the  "registered  voters"  of  any 
county,  shall  be  filed  with  the  county  clerk, 
the  county  court  shall  order  an  election  to 
determine  whether  the  sale  of  liquors  shall 
be  prohibited,  and  that,  in  detennining 
whether  any  such  petition  contains  the  req- 
uisite percentage  of  "legal  voters,"  said  per- 
centage shall  be  based  on  the  total  vote  in 
such   county    for   Justice   of  the   Supreme 


LEGAIi  VOTER 


LEGALLY  AUTHORIZED 


Court  at  the  last  preceding  general  election, 
provided  that  In  no  event  shall  more  than  GOO 
petitioners  who  are  legal  voters  be  necessary 
upon  any  such  petition,  and  "the  county 
clerk  shall,  upon  receipt  of  such  petition,  Im* 
mediately  file  the  same,  and  shall  compare 
the  signatures  of  the  electors  signing  the 
same  with  their  signatures  on  the  registra- 
tion books  of  the  election  then  pending,  or, 
if  none  pending,  with  the  signatures  on  the 
registration  books  and  blanks  on  file  in  his 
office  for  the  preceding  general  election." 
Held,  that  the  phrase  "legal  voters"  is  a 
synonym  for  "registered  voters,"  and  that  no 
qualified  elector  is  a  competent  petitioner  for 
a  local  option  election  unless  his  signature 
appears  on  the  registration  books,  the  privi- 
lege of  signing  such  a  petition  not  being  a 
right  of  franchise  In  which  all  the  electors 
enumerated  in  Const,  art  2,  {  2,  may  partici- 
pate, but  whether  there  is  a  sufficient  number 
of  signers  is  to  be  determined  by  comparing 
such  number  with  the  number  who  last  voted 
for  Justice,  and  the  number  of  registered  vot- 
ers in  a  district  is  only  important  for  the 
purpose  of  comparing  the  signatures  of  the 
petitioners  with  the  signatures  on  the  regis- 
tration books.  Roesch  v.  Henry,  103  Pac. 
439-441,  54  Or.  230. 

A  nonregistered  voter  may  sign  a  peti- 
tion for  the  nomination  of  a  candidate  for  a 
public  office,  though  the  statute  uses  the 
words  "voter"  and  **logally  qualified  voter 
or  elector."  In  re  Herman,  90  N.  Y.  Supp. 
144,  145,  108  App.  Div.  335. 

The  General  Election  Law  (P.  L.  1898, 
p.  819)  defines  the  phrase  "legal  voters"  as 
persons  entitled  to  vote  and  who  do  vote  at 
the  time  and  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  and 
by  the  statute  on  the  question  or  proposition 
^submitted.  Murphy  v.  City  of  Long  Branch 
(N.  J.)  61  Ati.  593,  594. 

Revision  1898,  Act  April  4,  1898,  S  185 
(P.  L.  p.  319),  declares  the  meaning  of  the 
words  "legal  voters"  to  be  persons  entitled  to 
vote  and  who  do  vote  at  the  time  and  in  the 
manner  prescribed  in  and  by  the  statute  up- 
on the  question  or  proposition  submitted. 
Nugent  V.  City  of  Newark,  72  Ati.  11,  12.  77 
N.  J.  Law,  425. 

A  finding  by  the  county  court  in  an  or- 
der calling  the  election  that  a  petition  for  a 
local  option  election  was  signed  by  "legal" 
voters,  when  L.  O.  L.  {  4920,  requires  such 
petition  to  be  signed  by  "registered"  voters, 
would  not  Invalidate  the  election;  "legal" 
voters  being  synonymous  with  "registered" 
voters  as  used  in  the  statute.  State  v.  Bll- 
lups,  127  Pac.  686,  689,  63  Or.  277. 

Article  4,  |§  2  and  8,  of  the  state  Con- 
stitution, provides  that  senators  and  members 
of  assembly  shall  be  elected  by  the  legal 
voters.  "Legal  voters"  are  the  male  citizens 
who,  by  article  2,  are  given  a  vote  for  officers 
elected  by  the  people.  Carpenter  v.  Cornish, 
85  Aa  240,  243,  83  N.  J.  Law,  690, 


XJBOAI.  WRONG 

It  is  the  general  rale  of  law  that'^ 
'legal  wrong*  is  committed  whenever  a  man 
is  dispossessed  of  his  property  against  bis 
will."  De  Vries  v.  Crofoot,  111  N.  W.  775- 
777,  148  Mich.  183. 

X.EOALITT 

Where  plaintiffs  recovered  against  a 
county  for  taxes  paid  on  an  alleged  errone- 
ous assessment  of  a  section  of  land  whi<^ 
by  mistake  of  the  taxing  officers  was  assess- 
ed as  containing  more  land  than  it  in  fact 
contained,  the  action  did  not  involve  the 
"legality  of  a  tax  or  assessmeiit,"  within 
provisions  permitting  an  appeal  to  the  Su- 
preme Court  in  certain  cases  involving  the 
legality  of  a  tax  or  assessment  Thomas  ▼. 
Lincoln  County,  83  Paa  18,  24,  41  Wash. 
150. 

UBOAIXT 

The  conclusion  of  the  court  In  an  action 
involving  the  dedication  of  a  street,  tried 
to  the  court  without  a  Jury,  that  the  street 
was  never  "legally"  dedicated  to  the  public, 
was  properly  designated  as  a  conciuslon  of 
law,  and  was  reviewable  on  appeal;  the 
word  "legally"  clearly  indicating  that  the 
court  referred  to  a  statutory  dedication. 
Sweatman  v.  Bathrick,  95  N.  W.  422,  424, 
17  S.  D.  138. 

I.EOAIXT  ASSESSED 

Under  Rev.  Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  64,  making 
10  years*  possession  under  color  of  titie,  and 
payment  of  all  taxes  "legally  assessed," 
ground  for  an  adjudication  of  ownership, 
actual  possession  and  payment  of  taxes  un- 
der color  of  title,  and  in  g<k)d  faith,  for  the 
required  period,  entitles  one  to  be  deemed 
the  legal  owner,  although  the  assessment  of 
taxes  for  one  or  more  of  the  years  may  be 
technically  Illegal;  the  term  "legally  assess- 
ed" meaning  merely  assessed  uPder  color  of 
legal  authority.  Murphy  v.  Nelson,  102  N. 
W.  691.  694,  19  S.  D.  197. 

Mills*  Aim.  St  S  3807,  requires  the  state 
board  of  equalization  to  make  assessments 
upon  railways,  and  include  therein  Its  rights 
of  way,  etc.,  and  the  revenue  act  (Laws  1902, 
c.  2)  requires  such  board  to  assess  all  prop- 
erty used  or  controlled  by  railroad  compa- 
nies with  certain  exceptions.  Held,  that  a 
railroad  company  in  posrsession  of  and  using 
land  as  its  right  of  way  was  "legally  assess^ 
ed"  thereon  by  the  state  board  of  equaliza- 
tion, within  the  meaning  of  Sess.  Laws  1893, 
c.  118,  f  6  (Rev.  St  1908,  f  4089),  making 
every  person  the  legal  owner  of  land  who  is 
in  the  actual  possession  thereof  as  stated, 
for  seven  successive  years,  and  during  such 
time  pays  all  taxes  legally  assessed  thereon. 
Denver  &  R.  6.  B.  Co.  v.  Doels,  111  Pae. 
595,  596,  49  Colo.  48. 

LEOALLT  AUTHORIZEB 

See  Lawfully  Authorized. 


LaEQALLT  CAUGHT 


81 


LEGALIST  SUFFICIENT 


LE6AIXT  GAirOHT 

See  Fiah  Legally  Qaugbt 

LE6ALLT   CHARGED 

Under  policies  issued  to  employers  and 
railroad  companies  insuring  them  against 
damages  with  which  they  might  be  "legal- 
ly charged"  by  reason  of  injuries  to  em- 
ployes or  to  persons  or  property  while  being 
traasported,  the  liability  of  the  insurer  arose 
on  the  happening  of  the  injury,  and  not  at 
the  time  Judgment  was  recovered  against  the 
toaured  for  such  injury.  Boss  v.  American 
ii)mployer8*  Liability  Ins.  Co.,  38  AtL  22,  23, 
56  N.  J.  Eq.  41. 

LEGALLY  COMPETENT 

The  words  "legally  competent"  meah 
tbat  the  person  named  as  executor  must  be 
of  legal  age,  of  sound  mind  and  memory,  and 
untainted  by  conviction  for  a  crime  which 
renders  the  convicted  person  iii£amoa& 
Clark  V.  Patterson,  114  la  App.  312,  816. 

LEGALLY  COH STITU  TED  COURT 

A  de  fSacto  court  is  a  "legally  constituted 
orart"  within  a  habeas  corpus  statute.  State 
ex  reL  Bales  v.  BaUey,  118  N.  W.  676,  678, 
106  Minn.  138.  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  775,  130 
Am.  St  Rep.  092,  16  Ann.  Gas.  338. 

LEGALLY   DISCHARGED 

The  phrase  ''legally  discharged,"  as  used 
in  Code  Civ.  Proc.  §  2972,  providing  that 
every  guardian  of  an  incompetent  person 
shall  have  the  custody  of  the  person  of  his 
ward  and  his  estate  until  such  guardian  is 
'legally  discharged,"  does  not  mean  until  he 
is  discharged  by  an  order  of  the  court,  but 
his  authority  is  terminated  under  section 
2973  ipso  facto  by  an  adjudication  of  res- 
stlfutlon  to  capacity.  In  re  Scheuer's  Es- 
tate, 79  Pac.  244,  246.  31  Mont.  606. 

LEGALLY  DUE 

Where  a  city  tax  was  assessed  against 
a  bankrupt's  property  on  May  1,  1899.  prior 
to  his  being  adjudged  a  bankrupt  on  August 
8th,  such  taxes  became  "legally  due  and 
owing"  on  the  day  they  were  assessed,  with- 
in Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  §  64,  c.  541,  30 
Stat  563,  making  such  taxes  a  preferred 
claim  against  the  bankrupt's  estate,  though 
the  taxes  were  not  payable  until  after  the 
adjudication.    In  re  Flynn,  134  Fed.  145. 

The  franchise  tax  assessed  under  Qen. 
St.  N.  J.  1895,  {§  251,  252,  257,  258,  260,  on 
the  basis  of  the  capital  stock  of  a  corpora- 
tion, issued  and  outstanding  on  the  1st  of 
January  preceding  the  making  of  the  re- 
turn, is  'Hegally  due  and  owing"  within  the 
meaning  of  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  |  64a, 
providing  that,  taxes  must  be  paid  in  ad- 
vance of  the  payment  of  dividends  to  credi- 
tors, although  such  tax  may  not  have  been 
collectible  until  after  the  corporation  was  ad- 
judged a  bankrupt  State  of  New  Jersey  v. 
Anderson,  27  Sup.  Ct  137,  141,  203  U.  S. 
483,  51  L.  Ed.  284. 

8  WDS.&  P.2d  Skb.— 6 


LEGALLY  LTABLT8 

Where  a  bill  of  lading  contained  a 
provision  that  neither  the  company  nor  any 
connecting  carrier  shall  be  liable  for  dam- 
ages to  or  the  destruction  of  the  cotton  by 
fire,  and  the  consignor  of  the  cotton  gave 
up  insurance  thereon  in  his  favor  and  took 
out  a  policy  in  favor  of  the  carrier,  fully 
protecting  it  from  loss  or  destruction  by  fire, 
such  insurance  was  a  valid  consideration  for 
the  promise  not  to  insist  on  recovery  of 
damage  on  account  of  the  destruction  by 
fire  contained  in  the  bill  of  lading,  for  it 
fully  protected  the  carrier  from  loss  or 
damage  by  fire  for  which  it  was  "legally 
liable,"  and  this  included  liability  resulting 
from  the  negligence  of  its  own  employes, 
and  for  which  it  was  unquestionably  liable 
to  the  consignor,  notwithstanding  the  exemp- 
tion in  the  bill  of  lading.  Texas  ft  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Can,  120  Fed.  15,  16,  57  O.  O.  A.  35. 

LBOALLT  BEQimiED 

Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  1989,  provides  that  a 
witness  is  not  obliged  to  attend  as  witness 
before  any  court  out  of  the  county  in  which 
he  resides,  unless  the  distance  be  less  than 
30  miles  from  his  residence  to  the  place  of 
trial,  and  by  Pol.  Code,  §  4300g,  witnesses, 
when  "legally  required"  to  attend  the  su- 
perior court  in  civil  cases,  are  entitled  to 
mileage  actually  traveled.  Witnesses  for  the 
plaintiff  residing  200  miles  from  the  place 
of  trial,  without  subpoena,  and  on  the  request 
of  the  plaintiff,  voluntarily  went  from  their 
residence  to  the  place  of  trial  and  testified. 
Held,  that  they  were  not  "legally  required" 
to  attend,  and  hence  were  not  entitled  to 
the  mileage  allowed  by  section  4300g,  and 
that  an  allowance  for  mileage  could  not  be 
taxed  in  plaintiff*s  cost  bill.  Naylor  v. 
Adams,  114  Pac.  997,  998,  15  CaL  App.  353. 

A  witness  may  waive  the  manner  of 
service  and  accept  service  in  some  other  form 
though  not  in  strict  compliance  with  the 
statute,  and  he  will  be  required  to  obey  a 
subpoena  so  served,  so  that  such  witnesses 
were  "legally  required  to  attend,"  within 
Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  994,  so  as  to  be  entitled 
to  mileage  fees  from  their  home  to  the  place 
of  triaL  Holt  v.  Nielson,  109  Pac.  470,  475, 
37  Utah,  566. 

LEGALLY  SUFFICIENT 

Under  L.  O.  Lu  §  3474»  providing  that 
the  court,  on  a  showing  that  any  petition  for 
a  referendum  is  not  legally  sufficient,  may 
enjoin  the  Secretary  of  State  and  all  other 
officers  from  certifying  or  printing  the  title 
and  number  of  the  measure  on  the  official 
ballot,  the  petition,  to  be  "legally  sufficient," 
must  be  a  valid  petition,  signed  by  legal  vot- 
ers, and  complying  substantially  with  the 
requirements  of  the  law;  and,  although  a  pe- 
tition appears  regular  on  its  face,  the  court 
may  Inquire  into  its  legal  sufficiency.  State 
v.  Olcott,  125  Pac.  303.  304,  62  Or.  277. 


LEGATEE 


ffi 


LBQIOK 


LEGATEE 

See  General  Legatee;    Residuary  Lega- 
tee ;  Sole  Legatee ;   Specific  Legatee. 

A  "legatee"  Is  a  person  to  whom  a  legacy 
Is  given.  Desloge  v.  Tucker,  94  S.  W.  283, 
286,  196  Mo.  587  (dUng  Black,  Law  Diet 
tit  "Legatee"). 

Societies  and  corporations  to  whom  lega- 
cies are  given  by  a  will  are  "legatees,"  within 
the  meaning  of  a  clause  of  the  will  providing 
that  property  of  testatrix,  not  otherwise  dis- 
posed of,  shall  be  sold,  and  the  money  "paid 
to  the  legatees  hereinbefore  named."  So, 
also,  where  the  will  provided  that  the  prop- 
erty of  testatrix  otherwise  undisposed  of 
shall  be  sold,  and  proceeds  paid  to  the  "lega- 
tees hereinbefore  named"  in  specified  propor- 
tions, trustees  previously  named  In  the  will 
and  who  are  thereby  given  the  legal  title  to 
the  trust  fund  during  the  period  of  trust  are 
^legatees,"  and  as  such  take  the  legal  title  to 
whatever  share  of  the  property  not  otherwise 
disposed  of  the  trust  fund  Is  entitled.  Craw- 
ford V.  Mound  Grove  Cemetery  Ass'n,  75  N. 
£.  998,  1001,  218  111.  399. 

Testator  by  olographic  will,  after  having 
bequeathed  to  his  wife  the  homestead  with 
furniture,  etc.,  together  with  a  one-fourth  In- 
terest in  the  residue  after  paying  all  be- 
quests made,  bequeathed  the  remaining  three- 
fourths  of  the*  residue  to  his  three  other  chil- 
dren, and  provided  that,  if  any  of  the  "lega- 
tees" died  before  testator's  death,  then  the 
legacy  provided  for  him  or  her  should  be  di- 
vided equally  among  the  residuary  legatees. 
Held,  that  the  word  "legatees"  was  used  In 
an  ordinary  nontechnical  sense  to  include 
bequests  of  both  real  and  personal  proper- 
ty, and  that,  under  the  rule  that  the  testa- 
tor's intention,  as  disclosed  by  the  language 
used,  must  control,  such  term  included  the 
bequest  to  the  wife,  and  that  on  her  pre- 
deceasing the  testator  her  share  became  a 
part  of  the  residue  within  the  substitution- 
ary clause.  In  re  Henderson's  Estate,  119 
Pac.  496,  498,  161  Cal.  353. 

A  will  provided  that  upon  the  death  of 
the  life  tenant  the  remainder  should  be  di- 
vided pro  rata  among  the  legatees  named 
in  the -will.  If  the  word  "legatees"  was  in- 
tended to  indicate  the  five  persons  named  as 
such  in  the  will,  the  entire  estate  could  not 
be  disposed  of,  and,  if  testator  had  so  in- 
tended, he  could  easily  have  called  them  by 
name.  In  another  clause  providing  for  abate- 
ment of  legacies,  a  certain  process  of  propor- 
tion was  ordained  necessarily  applicable  only 
to  the  beneficiaries  who  survived  testator. 
Held,  that  "legatees"  should  be  construed  to 
mean  only  those  who  survived  testator,  and 
thus  became  legatees  In  the  proper  Import  of 
the  term.  In  re  Hoffman,  124  N.  Y.  Supp. 
680,  681,  67  Misc.  Rep.  334. 


CUldrea 

Where  testator  Revises  stock  in  trust  for 
his  daughter,  one  of  the  trustees  being  also 
an  executor,  and  by  another  item  directs 
that  the  executors  shall  hold  it,  together  with 
other  stock,  the  dividends  of  which  are  dis- 
posed of  by  the  will,  until  a  designated  time,  in 
the  meantime  paying  the  dividends  and  prof- 
its to  each  of  said  "legatees,**  and  provides 
that,  if  any  of  the  legatees  die  before  such 
time  without  children,  the  dividends  so  be- 
queathed to  each  legatee,  as  well  as  the  stock, 
shall  be  distributed  among  his  surviving  chil- 
dren, the  words  "legatees"  and  "children"  are 
used  interchangeably,  and,  as  to  that  item  of 
the  \iill,  synonymously,  so  that  the  dividends 
are  payable  directly  to  the  beneficiary  of  the 
trust,  and  not  to  the  executors  as  trustees. 
Lamar  v.  Harris,  48  S.  E.  932,  933,  121  Ga. 
285. 

As  oreditor 

See  Creditor. 
Devisee 

Devisee  as  including,  s^  Devisee. 

The  terms  "legatee"  and  "devisee"  are 
more  strictly  interpreted  as  referring  the 
one  to  personalty  and  the  other  to  realty,  in 
the  construction  of  statutes  than  in  the  con- 
struction of  wills  and  deeds,  and,  where  a 
deed  describes  the  grantor  as  the  only  heir 
and  legatee  of  a  certain  person,  the  word 
''legatee"  may  be  regarded  as  meaning  dev- 
isee of  land  as  well  as  donee  of  personalty. 
Weigel  V.  Green,  75  N.  E.  913,  918,  218  111. 
227. 

"Legacy  and  devise"  and  "legatee  and 
devisee"  are  often  used  as  interchangeable 
phrases  in  wills  and  everyday  conversation, 
and  therefore  courts  would  not  feel  fettered 
to  any  nice  construction,  where  subject-matter 
or  context  shows  the  words  were  used  inter- 
changeably and  as  of  the  same  import  But 
such  popular  and  loose  construction  ia  hardly 
permissible  in  view  of  the  statutory  rule  of 
hermeneutics.  Desloge  ▼•  Tucker,  94  S.  W. 
283,  286,  196  Mo.  587. 

Although  the  words  "devise''  and  "dev- 
isee" properly  and  technically  apply  only 
to  real  estate,  and  the  words  "legacy"  and 
"legatee"  only  to  personal  property,  they 
have  been  made  interchangeable  by  Ky.  St. 
1903,  f  467,  which  provides  that  "the  words 
'legatee'  and  'devisee'  shall  each  be  held  to 
convey  the  same  idea."  Roberts  v.  Gheno- 
weth  (Ky.)  112  S.  W.  625,  627, 

As  heir 

See  Heirs. 
As  legal  represeatatiTS 

See  Legal  Representatiye. 

LEGION 

"League"  and  "legion"  are  of  entirely 
different  meanings ;  "league"  b^ng  defined  as 
"an  alliance  of  persons,"  and  "legion"  as  "a 


LEGISLATION 


LEOISLATIYK  ACT 


military  body  or  organization.**    People  ex 
rel.  Felter  v.  Rose,  80  N.  B.  2d3,  2d5,  225 

111496. 

LEGISUTION 

See  Class  Legislation;  Bxclnsiye  Leg- 
islation; Expository  Legislation;  Mu- 
nicipal Legislation;  Specially  Named 
Legislation. 

See,  also.  General  Law ;  Special  Law. 

The  Legislature  at  a  special  session  has 
all  the  power  it  has  at  a  regular  session,  ex- 
cept 80  far  as  restrained  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  the  limitation  by  article  3,  S  40, 
proyiding  that  at  such  sessions  there  shall 
be  no  "legislation*'  on  subjects  not  designat- 
ed by  the  GoTemor,  does  not  preclude  the  ap- 
pointment of  an  inyestigating  committee  to  ob- 
tain information  for  future  use,  even  on  a 
subject  not  submitted  by  the  Goyemor ;  the 
word  "legislation*'  having  a  well-defined 
meaning,  and  indnding  only  the  Enactment, 
repeal,  and  amendment  of  laws.  Ex  parte 
Wolters,  144  S.  W.  C31.  538.  64  Tex.  Cr.  R.  238 
(DavidBon,  P.  J.,  dissenting). 

The  word  "legislation,"  as  used  in  Const 
8  76,  246,  providing,  respectively,  that  at  a 
special  session  of  the  Legislature  there  shall 
be  no  legislation  upon  subjects  other  than 
those  designated  in  the  call  for  the  session 
except  by  vote  of  two-thirds  of  each  House, 
and  that  no  railroad  shall  have  the  benefit 
of  any  future  legislation  by  general  or  spe- 
cial laws,  refers  to  the  enactment  of  statutes 
and  is  not  descriptive  of  the  processes  by 
or  through  which  laws  are  perfected  by  con- 
stituted authority,  and  hence  such  sections  do 
not  forbid  the  introduction  of  bills  not  with- 
in the  subjects  specially  designated  in  the 
proclamation,  unless  the  named  proportion  of 
the  respective  Houses  sanction  It.  State  ex 
reL  Woodward  v.  Skeggs,  46  South.  268,  271, 
154  Ala.  249. 

Const  art  14,  declares  that  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  may  propose  constitutional 
amendments,  each  amendment  being  embrac- 
ed in  a  separate  bill,  by  three-fifths  of  all 
members  elected  to  each  of  the  two  houses, 
which  bill  shall  be  published  by  order  of 
the  Governor  for  a  specified  time  before  the 
election  at  which  the  amendment  shall  be 
submitted  to  the  voters  in  a  form  to  be  pre- 
scribed by  the  General  Assembly.  Many  pro- 
visions of  the  Constitution  refer  to  the  "Gen- 
eral Assembly**  in  a  manner  indicating  that 
the  Governor  is  not  included  witliin  the  term. 
By  the  Constitutions  of  1776,  1851,  and  1864 
the  Governor  was  given  no  authority  to  veto 
a  proposed  constitutional  amendment  Const. 
1867,  art  2,  |  17,  declares  that,  to  guard 
agahist  hasty  and  partial  legislation,  every 
'Ml"  which  shall  have  passed  the  House  of 
Delegates  and  the  Senate  shall  be  presented 
to  the  Governor  before  It  becomes  a  "law." 
Only  a  majority  of  both  houses  is  required  to 
adopt  leglslatiye  measures.   Held,  that  a  pro- 


posal to  amend  the  Constitution  is  not  "legis- 
lation,** and  the  term  ''General  Assembly**  in 
article  14  does  not  include  the  Governor; 
and  hence  a  bUl  proposing  a  constitutional 
amendment,  and  having  appended  to  it  no 
measures  essentially  legislaUve,  need  not  be 
submitted  to  the  Governor  for  his  approval. 
Warfield  v.  Vandiver.  60  Atl.  e3&-643,  101 
Md.  78,  i  Ann.  Cas.  692. 

When  an  incumbent  of  an  office  is  remov- 
ed by  the  action  of  the  Legislature  by  abol- 
ishing the  office  or  termluating  his  term* 
the  officer  is  popularly  said  to  be  "legislated 
out  of  office.**  This  colloquial  term  ex- 
presses with  the  precision  of  the  logician  the 
character  of  the  removal.  It  is  "legislation." 
People  ex  rel.  Devery  v.  Coler,  66  N.  B.  956» 
059,  173  N.  Y.  103. 

LEGISLATIVE 

The  word  ^legislatiye"  is  applied  to  the 
organ  or  organs  of  government  which  makes 
the  law.  People  v.  Salsbury,  06  N.  W.  036, 
038-041,  134  Mich.  637  (citing  Webst  Diet). 

Z.EOI8rATZVS  ACT 

The  filling  of  vacancies  in  a  city  council 
by  the  council  is  not  a  "legislative  act,"  and 
therefore  no  aye  and  nay  vote  is  necessary : 
Bums*  Ann.  St  1008,  |  8662,  requiring  the 
clerk  of  the  common  council  to  enter  ayes 
and  nayes  on  the  passage  of  every  ordinance 
and  resolution  applying  only  to  legislative 
acts.  Wagner  v.  State  ex  reL  Walker,  01  N. 
B.  1,  2. 173  Ind.  603. 

The  creation  of  reclamation  districts  and 
the  setting  off  of  lands  and  the  fixing  of  the 
boundaries  of  such  districts  are  legislative 
acts,  within  the  power  of  the  Legislature,  and 
the  Legislature  can  neither  be  compelled  to 
act  or  to  refrain  from  acting,  or  controlled 
by  any  other  power  of  government  when  it 
has  acted  within  constitutional  limitations. 
Inglin  ▼.  Hoppin,  106  Pac.  682,  688»  166  Oal. 
483. 

Judicial  aet  distlAsnislied 

An  act  is  a  "Judicial**  one  where  It  un- 
dertakes to  determine  a  question  of  rl^ht  or 
obligation  or  of  property  as  the  foundation 
on  which  it  proceeds.  ▲  "Judicial  act**  deter- 
mines what  the  law  Is  and  what  the  rights 
of  parties  are  in  reference  to  transactions  al- 
ready had;  a  "legislative  act**  determines 
what  the  law  shall  be  in  future  cases.  New- 
eU  V.  Franklin,  74  Atl.  1000,  1011,  80  R.  L 
258 ;  In  re  County  Commissioners  of  Counties. 
Comprising  Seventh  Judicial  Dist.,  08  Pac. 
557,  560,  22  Okl.  435  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Sinking  Fund  Cases).    , 

"A  ^legislative  act*  is  one  which  pre- 
scribes a  general  rule  of  conduct.**  A  munic- 
ipal ordinance  providing  for  the  paving  of  a 
street  at  the  cost  of  the  property  benefited 
thereby  to  the  extent  of  the  benfit  being  a 
Judicial  and  not  a  legislative  act,  is  invalid 


liEGISIiATIVE  ACT 


84 


LEGISLATIVE  AUTHORITY 


because  passed  without  notice  to  the  prop- 
erty owners  affected  thereby.  Sears  ▼.  At- 
lantic City,  64  Atl.  1062,  1063,  73  N.  J.  Law, 
710,  118  Am.  St  Rep.  724. 

The  official  action  of  a  legal  body  whlcdi 
Is  the  result  of  judgment  and  discretion  is  a 
"Judicial  act"  rather  than  a  "legislative 
act,"  and  so  too  an  act  which  determines  the 
rights  and  duties  of  parties  under  existing 
law,  with  relations  to  existing  facts,  Is  said 
to  be  judicial  rather  than  legislative.  Gul- 
nac  V.  Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders,  64  Atl. 
d&8,  1000,  74  N.  J.  Law,  548,  122  Am.  St 
Rep.  405. 

State  courts,  in  reviewing  orders  of  the 
public  service  commission,  act  judicially  and 
not  "legislatively."  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  V.  Stevens,  172  Fed.  595,  600. 

When  the  public  service  commission,  on 
complaint  after  hearing  and  the  taking  of  evi- 
dence, entered  an  order  requiring  that  com- 
plainants stop  its  Interstate  trains  at  a  sta- 
tion, the  commission's  act  was  "legislative" 
and  not  judicial.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  B,  Co. 
V.  Stevens,  172  Fed.  595,  606. 

The  passage  of  a  dty  ordinance  granting 
a  franchise  to  a  public  service  corporation 
involves  "legislative  action"  only,  and  such 
action  cannot  be  reviewed  by  a  writ  of  cer- 
tiorari. Tenny  v.  City  of  Columbia,  92  Pac. 
895,  896,  48  Wash.  150. 

That  which  distinguishes  a  "judicial" 
from  a  "legislative"  act  is  that  the  one  is  a 
determination  of  what  the  law  is  in  relation 
to  some  existing  thing  already  done  or  hap- 
pened, while  the  other  is  a  predetermination 
of  what  the  law  shall  be  for  the  regulation 
of  future  cases  falling  under  its  provisions. 
Tyson  v.  Washington  County,  110  N.  W. 
634,  636,  78  Neb.  211,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.^  S.)  350 
(citing  and  adopting  definition  in  Oooley. 
Oonst  Um.). 

Establiflbuent   of  rates  m  lesislntiTe 
or  jndicdal  act 

The  fixing  of  water  rates  by  a  city,  when 
not  a  matter  of  contract  is  a  "legislative 
function"  rather  than  a  judicial  function. 
<31ty  of  Pocatello  v.  Murray,  173  Fed.  382, 
385  (citing  Reagan  v.  Farmers*  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.,  14  Sup.  Ct  1047,  154  U.  &  397,  38  L. 
Ed.  1014;  Southern  Pac.  CO.  v.  Colorado  B^iel 
A  Iron  Co.,  101  Fed.  779,  42  C.  C.  A.  12). 

The  function  of  fixing  railroad  rates  is 
A  "legislative  function."  Oregon  R  &  Nav. 
<?o.  V.  Campbell,  173  Fed.  957,  973,  974. 

The  establishment  of  railway  passenger 
rates  by  the  Virginia  Corporation  Commis- 
sion is  not  res  judicata  in  a  spit  which  seeks 
injunctive  relief  on  the  ground  that  the 
rates  are  confiscatory,  although  such  commis- 
sion for  some  purposes  is  a  court,  and  acted 
only  after  hearing  and  investigation,  since 
proceedings  to  establish  rates  are  legislative, 
and  not  judicial,  in  their  nature.    Prentis  v. 


Atlantic  Coast  Line  Ck).,  29  Sup.  Ct  67,  69, 
211  U.  S.  210,  63  L.  Bd.  160. 

Injunctive  relief  against  railway  passen- 
ger rates  as  fixed  by  the  Virginia  State  Cor- 
poration Commission  may  be  granted  by  a 
federal  court  If  such  rates  are  confiscatory, 
although,  for  some  purposes,  the  commission 
is  a  court  since  proceedings  to  estabUsh 
rates  are  legislative,  and  therefore  are  not 
comprehended  by  the  provision  of  Rev.  St  { 
720,  forbidding  federal  courts  from  enjoining 
proceedings  in  state  courts,  which  provision 
looks  to  the  character  of  the  proceedings,  not 
the  character  of  the  body.  Prentis  v.  Atlan- 
tic Coast  Line  Co.,  29  Sup.  Ct  67,  69,  2U  U. 
S.  210,  53  L.  Ed.  150. 

LEGISLATIVE  AUTHOBITT 

The  words  "legislative  authority/'  as 
used  in  Const  art  11,  S  8,  have  no  gieater 
significance  than  such  words  as  "common 
council  or  other  legislative  body"  would  have 
had.  They  were  simply  intended  to  desig- 
nate the  particular  body,  ^hich  it  was  recog- 
nized would  exist  under  some  name  or  other 
in  every  municipality,  as  the  proper  ofilcial 
agency  to  submit  propositions  for  amend- 
ments to  charters,  and  were  not  intended  to 
define  the  powers  of  that  body  or  place  It  in 
a  position  where  it  would  be  beyond  restric- 
tions by  the  organic  act  of  the  city.  Hence 
the  "initiative"  provision  of  the  charter  of 
Los  Angeles,  giving  power  to  the  electors  to 
adopt  ordinances,  is  not  shown  to  be  uncon- 
stitutional because  of  the  words  "legislative 
authority"  being  used  by  the  Constitution  to 
designate  the  ordinary  legislative  body  of 
a  dty,  in  providing  for  submission  by  legis- 
lative authority  of  the  city  of  a  proposed 
charter  amendment  to  the  voters  of  the  city. 
In  re  Pfahler,  88  Pac.  270,  278,  150  CaL  71, 
11  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1092,  11  Ann.  Cas.  911. 

The  term  "legislative  authority  of  a 
city,"  as  used  in  Laws  1908,  p.  364,  c.  175,  as 
amended  by  Laws  1907,  p.  192,  c.  99,  provid- 
ing that  the  legislative  authority  of  a  dty 
having  contipl  of  any  public  street  shall  have 
power  to  grant  authority  for  the  construction 
of  street  railways  thereon  of  which  the  mo- 
tive power  is  other  than  steam,  and  to  pre- 
scribe the  terms  and  conditions,  and  in 
Const  art  11,  f  10,  providing  that  dty  char- 
ters may  be  amended  by  proposals  therefor, 
submitted  by  legislative  authority  of  the  city 
to  the  electors  thereof,  etc.,  and  in  numerous 
statutes,  means  the  mayor  and  council,  and 
hence  the  mayor  and  coundl  had  the  sole 
power  to  prescribe  the  terms  on  granting  a 
street  railway  franchise;  and  an  ordinance 
passed  by  the  dty  council,  and  approved  by 
the  mayor,  granting  such  a  franchise  is  val- 
id, notwithstanding  an  amendment  to  the 
city  charter  requiring  the  council  to  submit 
street  railway  franchises  to  the  voters  for 
their  approval.  Benton  v.  Seattle  E^lectric 
Co.,  96  Pac.  1033,  1035,  60  Wash.  166. 


LEGISLATIVE  BOAKD 


85 


LEGISLATIVE  POWER 


IEOI8LATIVIS  BOABB 

Acts  1906,  pt  1,  c.  1,  empowering  cities 
of  the  first  class  to  construct  a  system  sewer- 
age, authorizing  tbe  mayor  to  appoint  a  oom- 
mission  who  may  appoint  an  engineer,  secre- 
tary, and  treasurer,  and  determine  what  sys- 
tem of  sewerage  is  most  expedient,  and  re- 
port the  same  to  the  council,  etc,  is  not  in 
conflict  with  Const  {  160,  providing  thAt  the 
mayor,  police  Judges,  members  of  legislative 
boards,  etc.,  shall  be  elected  by  qualified  vot- 
ers; the  commission  not  being  a  "legtslative 
board."  MiUer  v.  City  of  LouisvUle  (Ky.)  99 
S.  W.  284,  286. 

LEGISLATIVB  BODY 

A  "legislative  body"  is  any  body  of  per- 
sons authorized  to  make  laws  or  rules  for  the 
community  represented  by  them.  It  is  one 
capable  of  or  pertaining  to  the  enactment  of 
laws.  The  common  council  of  a  city  or  town 
is  the  local  legislature  of  tiiat  dty  or  town. 
Burke  v.  Wood, '162  Fed.  688,  638. 

Bouvler  defines  "legislative  oflicers**  as 
•those  whose  duties  relate  mainly  to  the  en- 
.actment  of  laws."  The  board  of  aldermen  of 
the  dty  of  New  York  is  a  "legislative  body  " 
withUi  the  Civil  Service  Law,  providing  that 
the  unclassified  service  shall  comprise  offi- 
cers and  employ^  of  a  legislative  body.  As 
the  services  rendered  by  the  appointees  in 
tbe  office  of  the  city  derk  and  clerk  of  tiie 
board  of  aldermen  are  in  the  main  legislative, 
such  appointees  are  in  tiie  undassifled  serv- 
ice, though  such  appointees  are  not  directly 
appointed  by  the  board  of  aldermen,  but  by 
the  dty  clerk  himself  elected  by  the  board. 
Such  employes  are  in  the  unclasstfied  serv- 
ice, though  they  may  also  aid  the  clerk  in 
the  discharge  of  other  duties  not  legislative. 
O'Gwdy  V.  Polk,  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  290,  291,  182 
Api^.  Div.  47. 

Under  N.  Y.  Const  art  8,  §  26,  provid- 
ing that  the  powers  and  duties  of  a  board 
of  supervisors  may  be  devolved  upon  the  mu- 
nicipal assembly,  etc.,  or  other  "legislative 
body,"  the  words  "or  other  legislative  body" 
mean  the  legislative  body  of  the  city  by 
whatever  Lame  it  may  be  designated.  Wil- 
cox V.  McClennan,  95  N.  Y.  Supp.  941,  942,  47 
Misc.  Rep.  466. 

LEOIBLATZVE  BVKOnSBU 

Under  Const  art  4,  f  8,  relating  to  ex- 
tra sessions  of  the  Legislature,  and  provid- 
ing that  it  shall  transact  no  "legislative  busi- 
ness" other  than  that  for  which  it  is  espe- 
cially convened,  or  which  is  called  to  its  at^ 
tention  by  the  Qovemor,  except  by  a  two- 
thirds  vote  of  each  house,  the  confirmation 
by  the  Senate  of  executive  appointments  to 
office  cannot  be  regarded  as  "legislative  busi- 
ness," since  such  confirmation  is  not  essen- 
tially legisUitive  in  its  nature,  and  does  not 
require  the  co-operation  of  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives. In  re  Advisory  Opinion  to  the 
Qovemor,  59  South.  782,  786,  64  Fla.  16. 


ZiEOnrATZVB  BEPABTMEBT 

The  "legislative  department*'  witliin 
Const  art  3,  dividing  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment into  the  legislative,  executive,  and  Judi- 
cial departments,  is  composed  of  the  body 
enacting  laws  for  the  state  or,  by  delegation, 
for  minor  subdivisions  and  municipalities. 
Witter  V.  Cook  County  Oom'ra,  100  N.  B.  148, 
149,  256  IlL  616. 

LEGISLATZVS  FUHGTIOH 

Const,  art  3,  dividing  the  powers  of  gov- 
ernment into  the  legislative,  executive,  and 
Judicial  departments,  and  prohibiting  the  ex- 
ercise of  any  power  belonging  to  any  depart- 
ment by  any  person  belonging  to  another  de- 
partment, does  not  mean  that  the  legislative, 
executive,  and  Judicial  powers  shall  be  kept 
so  entirely  separate  and  distinct  as  to  have 
no  connection  with  or  dependence  on  each 
other,  and  it  is  a  "legislative  function"  to 
provide  places  for  holding  courts  and  for  the 
expenses  of  the  Judicial  system  and  the  com- 
pensation of  Judicial  oflBcers,  and  the  Legis- 
lature may  invest  the  board  of  county  com- 
missioners with  the  custody  of  property  of 
the  county,  though  the  property  is  used  in 
the  exercise  of  Judicial  power  by  the  Judicial 
department;  and,  though  a  sheriff  and  derk 
are  essential  to  a  court  and  to  the  exercise 
of  Judicial  power,  the  former  performs  exec- 
utive and  the  latter  clerical  duties  only.  Wit- 
ter ▼.  -Cook  County  Com'rs,  100  N.  E.  148, 
149,  256  IlL  616. 

The  function  exercised  by  voters  or  a 
representative  body  upon  whose  approval  the 
inception  of  a  franchise  grant  by  the  Legis- 
lature is  made  conditional  is  not  the  exercise 
of  a  "legislative  function."  It  is  the  exer- 
cise of  the  function  of  "referendum."  which 
is  not  legislative.  Duflleld  v.  Aahurst,  100 
Pac.  820,  825,  12  Ariz.  360. 

XiEOZ8I.ATZVS  OFFIGER 

"Legislative  ofllcers"  are  those  whose  du- 
ties relate  mainly  to  the  enactment  of  laws. 
State  V.  Kelly,  77  8.  W.  996,  997,  103  Mo. 
App.  711  (quoting  Bouv.  Law  Diet.) ;  O'Grady 
V.  Polk,  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  290,  291,  132  App. 
Div.  47  (quoting  Bouv.  Law  Diet). 

LEGI8LATZVS  POWER 

See  Full  Legislative  Powers. 
See,  also,  Public  Power. 

The  'leglslattve  power"  of  government  is 
that  which  makes  the  laws.  In  re  Appoint- 
ment of  BevlBor  of  Statutes,  124  N.  W.  670, 
671,  141  Wis.  692,  18  Ann.  Cas.  1176. 

''Legislative  power**  is  the  power  to  pre- 
scribe the  rules  of  dvil  conduct  Schaake  v. 
Dolley,  118  Pac.  80,  82,  85  Kan.  598,  37  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  877,  Ann.  Cas.  1913A,  254. 

"Legislative  power,"  within  Const  art  4, 
I  1,  providing  that  the  legislative  power 
shall  be  vested  in  the  General  Assembly,  is 
the  power  to  make  laws.    M'erchants*  Bx- 


LEaiSLATlVE  POWEK 


LiEGISLATIVE  POWER 


change  of  St.  Louis  y.  Knott,  111  S.  W.  665, 
571,  212  Mo.  616. 

The  words  ''legislative  power,''  used  in 
Const  I  20,  providing  that  the  legislative 
power  shall  be  vested  in  a  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, etc.,  is  a  comprehensive  phrase, 
meaning  all  powers  that  appertain  to  or  are 
usually  exercised  by  a  legislative  body. 
Bootli*s  Ex'r  V.  Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Jeff- 
erson County  Attorney,  113  S.  W.  61,  62,  130 
Ky.  88,  33  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  592. 

The  term  "legislative  power,"  as  used  in 
section  1  of  article  4  of  the  Constitution,  de- 
claring that  legislative  power  shall  be  vested 
In  the  General  Assembly,  elected  by  the 
people,  means  the  power  to  enact  laws,  or  to 
declare  what  the  law  shall  be.  It  is  the 
power  to  enact  new  rules  for  the  regulation 
of  future  conduct,  rights,  and  controversies. 
It  does  not  mean  that  every  act  of  officers 
created  by  the  Legislature  must  be  expressly 
prescribed  by  the  lawmaking  power.  People 
V.  Koth,  94  N.  m  953,  954,  249  lU.  532,  Ann. 
Casj  1912A,  100. 

Theoretically  the  "legislative  power"  la 
the  authority  to  make,  order,  and  repeal 
laws.  Richardson  ▼.  Young,  125  S.  W.  664, 
668,  122  Tenn.  471. 

The  power  to  carry  into  effect  Const.  U. 
8.  art  4,  |  4,  providing  that  the  United 
States  shall  guarantee  to  very  state. in  the 
tJnion  a  republican  form  of  government  is 
a  "legislative  power"  and  resides  in  Con- 
gress; and  Congress  may  delegate  to  the 
President  the  power  to  determine  whether 
the  Constitution  of  a  new  state  is  republican 
In  form.  Frantz  v.  Autry,  91  Pac.  193,  214, 
18  Okl.  561. 

Whether  ,or  not  a  state  has  ceased  to  be 
republican  in  form  within  the  meaning  of 
the  guaranty  in  Const,  art.  4,  {  4,  because  of 
its  adoption  of  the  initiative  and  referendum, 
is  not  a  Judicial  question,  but  a  political  one, 
which  is  solely  for  Congress  to  determine. 
Pacific  States  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
State  of  Oregon,  32  Sup.  Ot  224,  228,  223  U. 
S.  118,  66  L.  Ed.  377. 

The  words  "legislative  power,"  as  used 
in  Const  art  4,  §  1,  conferring  legislative 
power  on  the  G^eneral  Assembly,  mean  the 
power  or  authority,  under  the  Constitution 
or  form  of  government,  to  make,  alter,  and 
repeal  laws  and  to  pass  any  law  within  the 
ordinary  functions  of  legislation  not  delegat- 
ed to  the  federal  government  or  prohibited  by 
the  state  Constitution,  not  transferring,  how- 
ever, from  the  people  fundamental  legisla- 
tive power.  EUingham  v.  Dye,  99  N.  E.  1,  4, 
178  Ind.  336. 

The  granting  to  a  municipal  corporation 
of  power  to  pass  all  necessary  ordinances 
for  the  protection  of  the  safety  of  citizens 
is  not  an  infringement  of  the  maxim  that 
"legislative  power"  may  not   be  delegated. 


Sluder  v.  St  Louis  Transit  Co.,  88   8.  W. 
648,  650,  189  Mo.  107,  5  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  186. 

By  the  provision  in  the  federal  Constitu- 
tion that  all  "legislative  powers"  herein 
granted  shall  be  vested  in  a  Congress  of  the 
United  States  is  meant  that  Congress  keep- 
ing within  the  limits  of  its  power  and  observ- 
ing the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Constita- 
tion  may  in  its  discretion  enact  any  statute 
appropriate  to  accomplish  the  objects  for 
which  the  national  government  was  establish- 
ed. The  powers  of  the  federal  government 
were  not  exceeded  by  the  enactment  of  Rev. 
St.  {  1782,  making  it  a  misdemeanor  for  a 
United  States  senator  to  receive  or  agree  to 
receive  compensation  for  services  rendered 
before  any  department,  in  relation  to  any 
proceeding  in  which  the  United  States  is  in- 
terested. Burton  v.  United  States,  26  Sup. 
Ct  688,  693,  202  U.  8.  844,  50  L.  Ed.  1057, 
6  Ann.  Cas.  392.  ' 

The  authority  granted  to  a  city  council 
to  grade  and  pave  streets  and  sidewalks  is 
"legislative"  in  character,  so  that  the  amount 
of  the  improvement  its  kind  and  character, 
must  first  be  ascertained  by  the  city  council' 
and  cannot  be  delegated  to  any  other  official 
or  committee.  Harton  ▼.  Town  of  Avondale, 
41  South.  934,  939,  147  Ala.  458. 

Act  May  29,  1908  (Sess.  Laws  1907-08, 
p.  453,  c.  46,  {  1),  providing  that  upon  the  rec- 
ommendation of  the  Supreme  Court  the  Gov- 
ernor shall  appoint  an  additional  judge  "for 
the  time  recommended  by  the  court"  for 
a  district  which  has  such  an  unusual  number 
of  cases  awaiting  trial  that  a  thorough  and 
effective  administration  of  Justice  cannot  be 
secured,  is,  at  least  as  to  the  fixing  of  the 
term  of  office  of  such  additional  Judge  by  the 
Supreme  Court  a  delegation  of  legislative 
power  to  the  Judicial  branch  of  the  govern- 
ment in  violation  of  Const  art  4, 1 1  (Bunn's 
Ed.  $  50),  dividing  the  powers  of  government 
into  three  separate  departments,  the  legisla- 
tive, executive,  and  Judicial,  and  providing 
that  neither  shall  exercise  the  powers  proper- 
ly belonging  to  either  of  the  others.  In  re 
County  Com'rs  of  Counties  Comprising  Sev- 
enth Judicial  Dist,  98  Pac  557,  559,  22  Okl. 
435. 

Acts  1905,  p.  873,  c  410,  providing  that  it 
shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person,  other  than 
the  authorized  agent  of  a  common  carrier, 
to  sell  nontransferable  tickets,  issued  and 
sold  below  the  standard  schedule  rate,  etc., 
and  providing  a  penalty  for  Its  violation,  is 
not  unconstitutional  as  a  delegation  to  the 
common  carrier  of  legislative  authority  to 
create  a  penal  offense  or  not  by  the  issuance 
or  nonissuance  of  nontransferable  tickets  to 
the  original  purchaser  below  the  standard 
schedule  rate.  There  is  a  distinction  be- 
tween a  ''delegation  of  legislative  power"  in- 
volving discretion  and  conferring  of  authori- 
ty or  discretion  as  to  the  execution  of  the 
law  to  be  exercised  under  and  in  pursuance 


IiSOISLATIVE  POWER 


87 


LEGISLATIVE  POWER 


of  tbe  law.  The  former  cannot  be  done, 
wliile  to  the  latter  no  valid  objection  can  be 
made.  The  Leglslatare  cannot  delegate  Its 
power  to  make  a  law,  but  it  can  make  a 
law  to  delegate  a  power  to  determine  some 
fact,  or  state  of  things,  upon  wliieh  the  law 
makes,  or  intends  to  make,  its  own  action 
depend.  Saniuelson  v.  State,  95  S.  W.  1012, 
1016,  116  Tenn,  470,  116  Am.  St.  Rep.  805 
(citing  appeal  of  Locke,  72  Pa.  491,  13  Am. 
Rep.  716;  Cincinnati,  W.  &  Z.  R.  Co.  v.  Clin- 
ton County  Com*rs,  1  Ohio  St.  88 ;  State  y. 
Barrlnger,  14  S.  B.  781,  110  N.  C.  525;  Com- 
monwealth y.  Abrahams^  80  N.  E.  79,  156 
Mass.  57;  Commonwealth  y.  Dayis,  4  N.  E. 
577,  140  Mass.  485;  In  re  Nightingale,  11 
Pick.  [28  Mass.]  168:  Commissioners  of 
Easton  y.  Coyey,  22  Atl.  266,  74  Md.  262;  In 
re  Flaherty,  38  Pac.  981,  105  CaL  558,  27  L. 
B.  A.  529 ;  Debardelaben  y.  State,  42  S.  W. 
684,  99  Tenn.  649). 

'To  declare  what  a  law  is  or  has  been 
is  a  'Judicial  power'  i  to  declare  what  it  shall 
be  is  'legislatiye.*  *'  Act  July  6,  1906  (Pub. 
Acts  1905,  p.  413,  c  217),  which  limits  the 
recoyery  in  a  suit  against  an  administrator 
for  the  statutory  penalty  for  failing  to  file  an 
inyentory  does  not  inyade  the  Judicial  proy- 
ince  nor  interfere  with,  dictate  to  or  coerce 
the  Judicial  department.  Atwood  y.  Bucking- 
ham. 62  Atl.  616,  618,  78  Conn.  423  (citing 
Dash  y.  Van  Kleeck  [N.  Y.}  7  Johns,  477,  498, 
5  Am.  Dec.  291). 

A  statute  authorized  a  dty  to  enlarge 
or  contract  its  boundaries  by  ordinance  defin- 
ing the  territory,  and  provided  that  any  per- 
son interested  might  by  certain  procedure  ap- 
ply to  the  district  court,  which  should  de- 
termine tbe  reasonableness  of  the  alteration. 
Held,  that  the  statute  was  not  objectionable 
on  the  ground  that  it  conferred  "legislatiye 
power"  on  the  court  "To  legislate  is  to  make 
or  enact  a  law  or  laws.'*  Webster's  Diet. 
"L^islatiye  power"  is,  therefore,  the  power 
to  nmke  laws,  and  incidentally  to  repeal 
tbem.  But  the  power  to  determine,  in  a  given 
case,  presented  by  parties  baying  property 
or  other  rights  at  stake,  and  independent  of 
the  exerdse  of  any  enacting  power,  whether 
a  municipal  corporation,  professing  to  leg- 
islate under  incidental  or  general  authority, 
has  exercised  such  authority  In  accordance 
with  the  condition  of  the  grant,  relates,  not 
to  the  power  of  legislation,  but  to  the  man- 
ner of  its  exercise,  and  is  itself  Judicial. 
New  Orleans  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  y.  Town  of 
Vidalia,  42  South.  139,  143,  117  La.  561  (cit- 
ing CaUen  y.  City  of  Junction  City,  28  Pac. 
652,  43  Kan.  62T,  7  L.  R.  A.  736;  Porsythe 
V.  Hammond,  40  N.  E.  267,  41  N.  B.  950,  142 
Ind.  505,  30  L.  R.  A.  576 ;  Territory  ex  reL 
Kelly  y.  Stewart,  23  Pac.  405,  1  Wash.  98,  8 
Ia  R.  A  106;  In  re  Incorporation  of  Village 
of  North  Milwaukee,  67  N.  W.  1033,  93  Wis. 
616,  33  L.  R.  A.  638 ;  Wahoo  y.  Dickinson,  36 
N.  W.  813,  23  Neb.  426;  Forsythe  v.  City  of 
Hammond,  58  Fed.  774). 


The  board  of  superyisors  of  a  county,  in 
passing  a  resolution  reylying  the  distinction 
between  town  and  county  poor,  pursuant  to 
Laws  1896,  p.  176,  c.  225,  §  134,  and  appor- 
tioning among  the  town  the  taxes  for  the  sup- 
port of  poor,  pursuant  to  sections  9, 10  (page 
139),  discharges  "legislatiye  functions,'*  so 
that  its  acts  cannot  be  reviewed  by  certior- 
ari. People  ex  rel.  Allen  y.  Board  of  Sup'rs 
of  Westchester  County,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  348, 
849, 113  App.  Diy.  773  (citing  People  y.  Board 
of  Supers  of  Queens  County,  30  N.  E).  488,  ISl 
N.  Y.  468;  People  ex  rel.  O'Connor  y.  Board 
of  Sup'rs  of  Queens  County,  47  N.  SL  790, 168 
N.  Y.  370). 

The  power  to  determine  what  persons 
and  property  shall  be  taxed  belongs  exclu- 
sively to  the  legislative  branch  of  the  govern- 
ment, and,  whether  exercised  by  the  Legisla- 
ture itself  or  delegated  to  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, is  strlctiy  a  "legislative  power." 
Risley  y.  TJtica,  173  Fed.  502,  507  (citing  New 
Orleans  Water- Works  Co.  v.  Louisiana  Sugar 
Refining  Co.,  8  Sup.  Ct  741,  125  U.  S.  18, 
31  L.  Ed.  607 ;  United  States  ex  rel.  Ranger 
v.  New  Orleans,  98  U.  S.  381,  392,  25  L.  ETd. 
225 ;  Meriwetiier  y.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472,  26 
L.  Ed.  197). 

The  "legislatiye  power"  of  the  territory 
of  Oklahoma  extended  to  all  rightful  subjects 
or  legislation  pertaining  to  local  self-govern- 
ment when  not  inconsistent  with  the  CTonsti- 
tution  and  laws  of  the  United  States,  and 
when  the  exercise  of  such  power  did  not  in 
any  way  interfere  with  the  supreme  right 
of  Congress  to  control  its  governmental  af- 
fairs. Territory  y.  Long  Bell  Lumber  Co., 
99  Pac.  911,  914,  22  Okl.  890. 

St  1889,  p.  368,  c  247,  proyiding  that 
new  territory  may  be  annexed  to  any  town 
by  tlie  filing  of  a  petition  describing  the  ter- 
ritory desired  to  be  annexed  and  a  favorable 
vote  at  the  election  called  pursuant  to  the  pe- 
tition, thus  leaving  the  determination  of  the 
boundaries  of  the  annexed  territory  to  the  in- 
habitants, is  not  for  this  reason  Invalid  as 
a  delegation  of  "legislative  authority,"  since, 
under  Const  art  11,  |  6,  forbidding  the  Leg- 
islaturo  to  create  or  provide  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  municipal  corporations  by  any  other 
than  general  laws,  fixing  the  boundaries  of 
towns  is  not  a  legislative  function.  People  v. 
Town  of  Ontario,  84  Pac  205,  207,  148  Cal. 
625. 

While  it  is  one  of  the  settied  maxims  in 
constitutional  law  that  the  "power  confer- 
red upon  the  Legislature  to  make  laws  can- 
not be  delegated*'  by  that  department  to  any 
other  body  or  authority,  this  does  not  pre- 
vent legislatiye  functions,  which  are  merely 
ministerial  or  executive  in  their  character, 
from  being  delegated  by  that  branch  of  the 
government  to  other  departments  or  to  bodies 
created  by  it  for  that  purpose.  Laws  1905,  p. 
275,  c.  163,  creating  a  board  for  the  purpose 
of  procuring  the  erection  of  a  capitol  building 


LEGISLATURE 


88 


LEGITIMATE  TITLE 


and  authorizing  such  board  to  procure  the 
erection  of  a  building  adopt  plans  and  sped- 
flcatlons,  etc.,  is  not  unconstitutional  as  a 
delegation  of  "legislative  power."  Daven- 
port V.  Elrod,  107  N.  W.  833,  836,  20  S.  D.  W7. 

LEGISLATURE 

See  House  of  Legislature. 

Member    of    Legislature,    see    Member. 

The  word  "Legislature,"  as  used  in 
Const  U.  S.  art  1,  §  4,  providing  that  the 
time,  place,  and  manner  of  holding  elections 
for  Senators  and  Representatives  shall  be 
prescribed  in  each  state  by  the  Legislature 
thereof,  but  that  Congress  may  make  or  alter 
such  regulations  does  not  mean  simply  the 
members  who  compose  the  Legislature,  but 
refers  to  the  lawmaking  body  or  power  of 
the  state,  as  established  by  the  state  Consti- 
tution, and  which  in  this  state,  under  the  ref- 
erendum Const  art  3,  8  1,  includes  the  peo- 
ple, and  hence  SSess.  Laws  1909,  c.  223,  divid- 
ing the  state  into  congressional  districts,  is 
subject  to  the  referendum  vote  of  the  people 
the  same  as  any  other  law  passed  by  the 
Legislature.  State  ex  rel.  Schrader  v.  Pol- 
ley,  127  N.  W.  848,  849,  26  S.  D.  5. 

A  'legislator**  Is  one  who  makes  laws 
for  a  state  or  community.  Burke  v.  Wood, 
162  Fed.  533,  538. 

LEGITIMACY 

LEOITIliATE 

"Legitimate"  means  lawful ;  lawfully  be- 
gotten ;  born  in  wedlock ;  of  lawful  birth ;  a 
legitimate  heir.  Lamb  v.  Medsker,  74  N.  E. 
1012,  1013,  35  Ind.  App.  662  (quoting  and 
adopting  definitions  in  Webst  Diet.;  Cent 
Diet.). 

The  term  "legitimate,"  in  Laws  1895,  c. 
570,  providing  for  the  incorporation  of  asso- 
ciations for  the  improvement  of  the  breed  of 
horses  and  for  the  establishment  of  a  state 
racing  commission,  and  authorizing  the  com- 
mission to  issue  licenses  for  running  races 
and  for  the  revocation  of  licenses,  if  for  any 
reason  the  continuance  thereof  shall  not  be 
conducive  to  the  interests  of  "legitimate" 
racing,  is  used  in  its  broad  and  not  techni- 
cal sense,  and  means  good  or  proper  and  not 
merely  unlawful.  People  ex  rel.  Empire  City 
Trotting  Club  v.  State  Racing  Commission, 
103  N.  Y.  Supp.  955,  961,  57  Misc.  Rep.  331. 

LEGITIMATE  CHIIiD 

Child  as  including,  see  Child-— Children 
(In  Statutes). 

"  'A  legitimate  child*  is  he  that  is  bom 
in  lawful  wedlock  or  within  a  competent  time 
afterward.*'  A  child  born  20  days  after  its 
mother  was  divorced  from  one  husband, 
whose  whereabouts  were  not  shown,  and  15 
days  after  her  marriage  to  another  man,  wbo 
recognized  the  child  as  his  offspring,  will 
be  presumed  to  be  his  legitimate  child.    Zach- 


mann  y.  Zachmann,  66  N.  E.  256,  257,  201 
111.  380,  94  Am.  St  Rep.  180  (citing  5  Cyc  p. 
626;  Coke^  Litt  344a;  Dennison  v.  Pafi^e,  2» 
Pa.  420,  72  Am.  Dec.  644 ;  quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  1  BL  Comm.  446). 

A  child  bom  after  marriage,  during 
wedlock,  and  within  the  usual  period  of  ges- 
tation, after  the  husband  has  had  opportu- 
nity to  have  begotten  it  is  conclusively  pre- 
sumed to  be  "legitimate."  Buckner's  Adm'r 
V.  Buckner,  87  S.  W.  776,  777,  120  Ky.  596. 

UiOITIMATE  ISSUE 

Under  Act  Cong.  Feb.  28, 1891,  c.  383,  26 
Stat.  794,  f  5,  in  amendment  of  Act  Cong. 
Feb.  8,  1887,  c.  119,  24  Stat  388,  providing 
that  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  de- 
scent of  land  to  the  heirs  of  any  deceased  In- 
dian allottee  of  land,  whenever  any  male,  and 
female  Indian  shall  have  cohabited  together 
as  husband  and  wife  according  to  the  custom 
of  Indian  life,  the  issue  of  such  cohabitation 
shall  be,  for  the  purpose  aforesaid,  taken  to 
be  the  legitimate  issue  of  the  Indians  so  liv- 
ing together,  and  that  every  Indian  child, 
otherwise  illegitimate,  shall  for  that  purpose 
be  taken  to  be  the  legitimate  issue  of  the 
father,  the  illegitimate  children  of  an  al- 
lottee are  entitled  to  inherit  and  share  in  the 
lands  allotted  to  their  father  the  same  as 
though  they  were  legitimate  children,  and  the 
children  of  a  deceased  illegitimate  child  are 
entitled  to  the  share  of  their  deceased  par- 
ent In  re  House's  Heirs,  112  N.  W.  27,  29, 
132  Wis.  212. 

LEGITIMATE  PXJBPOSE 

The  term  "legitimate  purpose,"  as  ap- 
plied to  the  acts  of  a  municipal  corporation, 
means  such  a  purpose  as  is  authorized  by  the 
municipal  charter.  Vaughn  v.  Village  of 
Greencastle,  78  S.  W.  50,  61,  104  Mo.  App. 
206. 

The  creation  of  so-called  treasury  stock 
and  disposition  of  It  upon  the  representation 
that  it  was  fully  paid  and  nonassessable,  and 
at  a  price  inferentially  below  par,  for  the 
purpose  of  providing  working  capital  for  a 
corporation,  is  not  a  "legitimate,  corporate 
purpose,"  within  the  act  concerning  corpora- 
tions (revision  of  1896),  granting  power  to 
corporations  to  purchase  shares  of  their  own 
capital  stock,  if  such  purchase  is  for  a  legiti- 
mate corporate  purpose,  but  not  otherwise. 
Knickerbocker  Importation  Co.  v.  State 
Board  of  Assessors,  65  AtL  913,  914,  74  N.  J. 
Law,  583,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  885. 

LEGITIMATE  TITLE 

In  the  provision  of  the  protocol  of  the 
treaty  of  tbe  Guadalupe  Hidalgo  that  Mex- 
ican "grants"  in  the  ceded  territory  shall 
preserve  their  legal  value,  and  that  the  gran- 
tees may  cause  "their  legitimate  titles"  to  be 
acknowledged,  the  terms  "grants"  and  "legit- 
imate titles"  are  not  restricted  to  absolute 
perfect  grants  made  prior  to  the  treaty,  but 
Include  also  equitable  titles  which,  if  there 


LEGITIMATION 


UESSEXnSSD  CAPACITY 


litd  been  no  change  of  sovereignty,  would 
have  become  perfect  or  could  have  been  made 
perfect  If  the  proper  steps  had  been  taken. 
The  words  *iegitlmate  titles"  mean  titles 
that  are  comprehended  in  the  term  "grants/* 
^ud  since  the  term  "grants  "  as  employed  in 
treaties,  embraces  all  character  of  titles, 
equitable  or  legal,  it  reflects  the  sense  and 
meaning  In  which  the  term  "legitimate  titles'* 
was  intended  to  be  employed.  State  v.  Rus- 
sell, 85  S.  W.  288,  203,  38  Tex.  Ciy.  App.  13; 
Haynes  v.  State  (Tex.)  85  S.  W.  1029,  1039. 


. '^ 


XEGITIMATIOH 

While  "adoption,'^  properly  considered, 
refers  to  persons  who  are  strangers  in  blood, 
''legitimation*'  refers  to  persons  where  the 
blood  relation  exists.  The  verb  "adopts,"  in 
WUson's  Rev.  &  Ann.  St..  1903,  c.  59,  art  2, 
I  36,  providing  that  the  father  of  an  illegiti- 
mate child,  by  acknowledging  it  as  his  own, 
etc.,  thereby  "adopts"  it  as  such,  is  used  in 
the  sense  of  "legitimates."  Allison  v.  Bryan, 
97  Pac.  282,  283,  21  Okl.  557,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  031,  17  Ann.  Cas.  468  (quoting  Blythe  v. 
Ayres,  31  Pac  915,  96  Gal.  582,  19  L.  R.  A. 
40,  and  dtlng  Bouvier,  Black,  Anderson,  and 
Rapalje  Law  Dictionaries). 

LEMON 

As  fruit,  see  Fruit 

As  goods,   wares,  and  merchandise,  see 
Goods. 

LEND— LENT 

See  Money  Lent ;  Money  Loaned  and  In- 
vested. 

Rev.  St.  c.  48,  {  64,  providing  that  pre- 
mioms  for  building  association  loans  shall 
consist  of  a  percentage  charged  on  the 
amount  lent  in  addition  to  interest,  and  sec- 
tion 65,  providing  that  the  monthly  interest 
flhall  not  be  at  a  greater  rate  than  6  per  cent 
per  annum,  mean  by  the  words  "loan"  and 
*'lent"  the  whole  sum  contracted  for,  not  the 
som  actually  advanced.  Tlbbetts  v.  Deering 
Loan  &  BuUding  Ass'n,  72  AU.  162,  166,  104 
Me.  404. 

As  glTe 

Under  Revlsal  1905,  {  1578,  converting 
estates  tall  into  estates  in  fee  simple,  a  will 
whereby  the  testator  "lends"  land  to  his 
grandson  and  his  lawful  heirs  of  the  body 
forever  conveys  an  estate  in  fee  simple.  Ses- 
soms  V.  Sessoms,  56  S.  B.  687,  688,  144  N.  C. 
m  (citing  Cox  V.  Marks,  27  N.  C.  361 ;  Bang 
▼.  Utley,  85  N.  C.  59;  Edgerton  v.  Aycock,  31 
S.  E.  382,  123  N.  0.  134 ;  Hlnson  v.  Pickett 
[8.  C]  1  mu  Eq.  86). 

A  clause  of  a  will  bequeathed  two  sep- 
arate parcels  of  land  to  the  daughter  of  the 
testator,  and,  on  her  death,  to  her  heirs  and 
to  her  issue  if  living  in  fee  simple,  otherwise, 
"all  the  real  estate  loaned  her  to  be  divided 
between"   certain  persons.     There   was  no 


punctuation  or  anything  to  indlc&te  that  the 
testator  intended  to  differentiate  the  two  par- 
cels of  property  in  reference  to  the  quantity 
of  the  estate.  Held,  that  as  "lend"  may  be 
construed  as  synonymous  with  give,  devise, 
or  bequeath,  unless  it  is  manifest  that  a  dif- 
ferent meaning  was  intended,  the  testator 
must  be  held  to  have  referred  to  all  the  prop- 
erty devised  his  daughter  in  the  residuary 
clause.  Falson  y.  Moore,  75  S.  B.  993,  160 
N.  O.  148. 

LENSE 

It  is  necessary  that  "lenses"  should  be 
both  ground  and  polished  in  order  to  be 
brought  within  the  provision  of  the  Tariff 
Act  for  "lenses  •  •  ♦  ground  and  polish- 
ed to  a  spherical,  cylindrical  or  prismatic 
form";  and,  where  they  have  been  brought 
to  such  form  by  molding,  they  are  not  within 
that  provision.  United  States  y.  Robinson, 
140  Fed.  968,  969. 

LESS 

See  More  or  Less ;  Not  Less  Than. 

In  an  action  under  Laws  1907,  p.  495,  c. 
254,  defining  the  liabilities  of  railroads  for  in- 
juries to  employ^,  for  the  death  of  a  brake- 
man,  the  use  of  the  words  "less  or  greater," 
Instead  of  the  statutory  words  "slighter  or 
greater,"  in  determining  decedent's  negli- 
gence as  a  contributing  cause  in  comparison 
with  that  attributable  to  the  railroad,  was 
not  erroneous,  as  the  word  "less"  conveyed 
the  idea  conveyed  by  the  word  "slighter"  as 
used  in  the  statute.  Boucher  v.  Wisconsin 
Cent  Ry.  Co.^  128  N.  W.  913,  914,  141  Wis. 
160. 

LESS  NOTE 

Where  a  will  gave  a  legacy,  less  a  note 
held  by  the  testator  against  the  legatee,  in- 
terest was  properly  charged  on  the  note  up 
to  the  time  of  the  probate  of  the  will.  Rev. 
CkMles,  I  4770,  requiring  the  language  of  a 
will  to  be  given  its  ordinary  meaning,  and  the 
words  "less  a  note"  would,  in  ordinary  busl* 
ness  transactions,  refer  to  the  debt  as  a 
.whole,  and  not  tiie  sum  mentioned  as  the 
principal  only.  In  re  Beck's  Estate,  121  Pac. 
784,  789,  44  Mont  561. 

IiESSElfED  OAPAOIT7 

In  a  personal  injury  action,  an  instruc- 
tion that  the  jury,  in  assessing  damages,  might 
consider  the  bodily  and  mental  pain  endured 
by  the  Injured  party,  loss  of  time,  and  inabil- 
ity to  work  and  earn  money,  and  her  dimin- 
ished capacity  for  labor,  etc.,  was  not  er- 
roneous as  permitting  double  damages  for  the 
same  cause ;  "inability  to  work"  meaning  the 
total  suspension  of  the  power  to  work,  and 
"diminished  capacity  to  labor"  meaning  les- 
sening, without  totally  destroying,  the  power 
to  labor,  and  "inability"  meaning  without 
ability,  and  "lessened  capacity"  meaning  that 


LESSEB  OFF£NSK 


90 


LET 


partial  ability  remains.    Houston  ft  T.  C.  R. 
Co.  V.  Maxwell  (Tex.)  128  S.  W.  160,  166. 

LESSEB  OFFENSE 

Under  a  count  of  a  presentment  for  sell- 
ing liquor  without  a  license,  In  violation  of 
Acts  1899,  c.  161,  §  1,  to  constitute  which  of- 
fense a  single  sale  is  sufficient,  defendant  can- 
not, there  being  no  evidence  of  any  s|)ecific 
sale,  so  as  to  authorize  a  conviction  of  the 
offense  charged,  be  convicted  of  violation  of 
Acts  1909,  c.  479,  §  16,  making  it  an  offense 
to  exercise  the  privilege  of  retail  liquor  deal- 
er without  first  paying  the  taxes  prescribed 
for  exercise  thereof,  though  he  has  a  United 
States  revenue  license  to  retail  liquor,  made 
by  the  act  (page  1743)  prima  fade  evidence 
that  he  is  in  the  retail  liquor  business ;  the 
offense  denounced  by  the  act  of  1909,  though 
having  a  lighter  punishment  prescribed,  not 
being  a  lesser  offense  than,  and  included  in, 
the  offense  denounced  by  the  act  of  1899, 
within  Shannon's  Code,  §§  7085,  7195,  permit- 
ting, on  an  indictment  for  an  offense  admit- 
ting, or  consisting,  of  different  degrees,  a  con- 
viction of  a  lower  degree  of  the  offense  than 
that  charged,  or  of  any  offense  necessarily  in- 
cluded in  that  charged.  Brinkley  v.  State, 
145  S.  W.  161,  162,  125  Tenn.  445. 

LESSEE 

A  petition  in  summary  proceedings  for 
the  possession  of  land,  alleging  that  the  pe- 
titioner is  the  "lessee"  and  landlord  thereof, 
is  not  a  sufficient  compliance  with  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  §  2235,  requiring  the  petition  to  state 
the  Interest  of  the  petitioner  in  the  premises. 
The  statement  that  the  petitioner  was  the 
•^lessee*'  and  "landlord"  is  the  assertion  mere- 
ly of  an  interest  and  not  a  description  of 
such  interest  Ferber  y.  Apfel,  99  N.  Y. 
Supp.  215,  216,  113  App.  Div.  720  (citing  Ka- 
zis  V.  Loft,  80  N.  Y.  Supp.  1015,  81  App.  Div. 
636;  Loft  v.  Kaziz,  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  228;  Bn- 
gle.  Heller  Co.  v.  Henry  Ellas  Brewing  Co., 
75  N.  Y.  Supp.  1080,  37  Misc.  Rep.  480;  Pot- 
ter V.  New  York  Baptist  Mission  Society,  52 
N.  Y,  Supp.  294,  23  Misc.  R^.  671 ;  Ross  v. 
Same,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  303,  23  Misc.  Rep.  683 ; 
Cram  v.  Dietrich,  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  948,  38 
Misc.  Rep.  790). 

A  covenant  to  pay  to  the  lessees  and 
their  assigns,  on  the  termination  of  the  lease, 
a  compensation  for  buildings  and  improve- 
ments put  on  the  demised  land  during  the 
term  of  the  lease  was  not  to  be  restricted  to 
buildings  put  on  the  land  by  the  lessees,  but 
would  include  buildings  put  on  it  by  subten- 
ants or  assigns  of  the  lessees.  If  the  op- 
posite were  the  true  construction  of  the  word 
"lessees"  in  this  covenant,  the  covenant  In 
the  earlier  part  of  the  lease  that  the  said 
"lessees"  shall  have  a  right  of  way,  and  the 
covenant  to  "warrant  and  defend,"  would 
have  to  be  restricted  in  the  same  way.  Hol- 
lywood V.  First  Parish  in  Brockton,  78  N.  E. 
124, 125, 192  Mass.  269. 


A  'lessee'*  of  a  store  building,  who  as- 
sumes entire  control  of  a  room  connected 
therewith,  is  the  "lessee  and  occupant'*  of 
such  room  within  the  law  forbidding  gamini:. 
Ford  V.  State,  38  South.  229,  230,  86  Miss. 
123. 

As  e«mtraotor 

See  Contractor. 


See  Owner. 

As  pnroluiser  for  Talnalile  eoiuide: 
tion 

See  Purchaser  fof  Valuable  Considera- 
tion. 

le'ssor 

See  Owner. 

LET 

See  Agree  to  Let 

The  term  "let"  is  usually  applied  to  leas- 
es and  conveyances  of  real  estate  and  con- 
tains the  idea  of  a  grant,  and  when  the  par- 
ties have  used  it  as  the  operative  word  ap- 
plied to  a  transfer  of  timber  rights  and  con- 
tracts passing  such  interest  for  91  years  and 
more,  by  fair  interpretation  and  consider- 
ing the  nature  of  the  interest,  the  parties 
could  only  have  intended  an  assignment  At- 
lantic &  N.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Atlantic  &  N.  C. 
Co.,  61  S.  E.  185,  190,  147  N.  C.  368,  23  li. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  223,  125  Am.  St  Rep.  550,  15 
Ann.  Cas.  363. 

As  allow  or  permit 

Where  defendant  who  had  an  option  to 
purchase  certain  property,  represented  to 
plaintiff  that  they  were  to  be  'let  in  on  the 
ground  floor"  with  certain  spedfled  excep- 
tions, it  meant  that  they  were  to  come  into 
the  purchase  upon  the  same  terms  and  condi- 
tions that  he  had  made  with  the  holder  of 
the  property,  save  as  particularly  specified. 
KroU  V.  Coach,  78  Pac.  397,  399,  45  Or.  459. 

As  demise,  arant,  or  lease 

The  term  "let"  contemplates  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant.  It  is  defined  as  **t(> 
give  leave  to;  to  permit;  to  grant  the  use  of 
realty  for  a  compensation  correlative  to 
hire;  to  lease  or  hire  out  for  compensation.'* 
Land,  into  possession  of  which  one  enters  un- 
der a  contract  to  purchase,  is  not  **let*  to 
him,  within  a  statute  making  it  forcible  de- 
tainer to  willfully  hold  over  without  force 
after  the  termination  of  the  time  for  which 
the  property  was  "let"  after  demand  for  pos- 
session. Francis  v.  Holmes,  118  S.  W.  S81» 
883,  54  Tex.  av.  App.  608. 

'*The  mere  use  of  the  words  lease'  and 
*let'  in  a  contract  of  letting,  does  not  neces> 
sarily  create  a  lease  as  distinguished  from 
a  license;"  but  an  instrument  by  which  one 
contracted  to  let  and  another  to  take  the  ex- 


liET  FOR  HIRE 


91 


liEVEB 


dnslve  right  to  malDtain  stands  for  the  sale 
of  candles  at  a  race  park,  also  a  storeroom 
onder  the  tracks  providing  the  period  of  "let- 
ting** and  the  amount  and  times  of  payment 
of  rent,  Is  a  lease  and  not  a  license.  Mehl- 
man  r.  Atlantic  Amusement  Co.,  119  N.  Y. 
Supp.  222,  223,  65  Misc.  Rep.  25. 

LETFOBHIBE 

As  used  in  an  ordinance  providing  for 
the  payment  of  a  license  by  owners  of  ve- 
hicles used  or  let  for  hire,  the  term  "letting 
for  hire"  was  intended  to  apply  to  cases 
where  persons,  the  hirers,  took  temporary 
possession  of  the  wagon  and  t^m.  8wet- 
man  v.  aty  of  Covington  <Ky.)  82  8.  W.  886. 

LETTINO 

See  Public  Letting;  Subletttnf. 

LETTER 

See  Not  to  the  Letter;  Threftteolng  Let- 
ter. 


See  Memorandum. 
As  publio  doonment 

See  Public  Document. 
As  ■•Ueitatiom 

See  SoUcit 

LETTEB8  OF  ASMXNI8TRATIOH 

See  Ancillary  Letters;  Domiciliary  Let- 
ters. 

IiETTEBB  OF  CREDIT 

A  "letter  of  credit"  is  a  letter  containing 
a  general  or  special  request  to  pay  the  bear- 
er or  person  named  money,  or  sell  him  some 
commodity  on  credit,  or  give  him  something 
of  value,  and  look  to  the  writer  of  the  letter 
for  recompense,  and  which  partakes  of  the 
nature  of  a  negotiable  instrument.  Liggett 
V.  Levy,  136  S.  W.  299,  801,  233  Mo.  590,  Ann. 
Cas.  1912C,  70. 

LETTERS  PATEHT 

**  ^Letters  patent*  are  not  to  be  regarded 
as  monopolies,  created  by  the  executive  au- 
thority at  the  expense  and  to  the  prejudice 
of  all  the  community  except  the  persons 
therein  named  as  patentees,  but  aa  public 
franchises  granted  to  the  inventors  of  new 
and  useful  improvements  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  to  them  as  «uch  inventors,  for  the 
limited  term  therein  mentioned,  the  exclusive 
light  to  make  and  use,  and  vend  to  others  to 
be  used,  their  own  inventions,  as  tending  to 
promote  the  progress  of  science  and  the  use- 
ful arts,  and  as  matter  of  compensation  to 
the  inventors  for  their  labor,  toil,  and  ex- 
pense in  making  the  inventions  and  reducing 
the  same  to  practice  for  the  public  benefit, 
as  contemplated  by  the  Constitution  and 
sanctioned  by  the  laws  of  Congress.'*  Mon- 
aghan  v.  City  of  Indianapolis,  76  N.  B.  424, 
^25,  37  Ind.  App.  280  (quoting  and  adopting 


definition  in  Seymour  t.  Osborne,  11  Wall. 
[78  U.  8.1  516,  20  L.  Ed.  83). 

A  license  to  keep  a  dramshop  is  not  a 
'letter  patent,"  which  can  be  tested  or  va- 
cated by  quo  warranto.  Ilargett  v.  Bell,  46 
8.  B.  749,  750,  134  N.  C.  394. 

LETTERS  TE8TAMEHTART 

See  Entitled  to  Letters  Testamentary. 

"Letters  testamentary'*  are  of  two  kinds, 
"domiciliary  letters**  and  "ancUlary  letters"; 
the  first  being  issued  at  the  place  of  the  tes- 
tator's domicile,  and  the  latter  at  some  place, 
other  than  domicile,  where  personalty  of  the 
testator  is  found.  Such  letters  depend  upon 
the  situs  of  Huch  personalty,  and  do  not  au- 
thorize the  administrator  or  representative 
to  perform  any  act  or  to  reduce  to  possession 
personalty  not  within  territorial  authority  of 
the  court  where  Issued.  Lockwood  v.  Unit- 
ed States  Steel  Corporation,  138  N.  X.  Supp. 
725,  727,  153  Appu  DlY.  655. 

LEVEE 

"Levees"  keep  out  the  water.  Mound 
aty  Land  ft  Stock  Go.  v.  Miller,  70  S.  W. 
721,  724,  170  Mo.  240,  60  L.  R.  A.  190,  94  Am. 
SL  Rep.  727. 

"A  ievee'  is  a  space  adjacent  to  a  navi- 
gable water  where  vessels  may  approach  and 
land  to  unload  and  receive  passengers  and 
freight,  and  where  articles  of  freight  may  be 
left  for  loading  on  the  vessels,  or  after  they 
have  been  unloaded  until  they  can  be  taken 
away.**  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  People 
ex  reL  Dalley,  78  N.  E.  790,  793,  222  111.  427 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Farnham, 
Water  ft  Water  Righte,  §  145a). 

The  word  "levee,"  as  used  in  the  West 
and  South,  means  a  landing  place  for  vessels 
for  the  delivery  of  merchandise,  and,  as  in- 
cident thereto,  for  the  temporary  storage  of 
the  merchandise.  In  other  words,  a  public 
landing.  Louisville  ft  N.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati,  81  N.  E.  983,  989,  76  Ohio  St  481. 

That  a  tract  of  land  bordering  a  river 
was  designated  as  a  steamboat  lauding  on  a 
plat  and  was  dedicated  to  public  use  shows 
it  to  be  a  "levee."  Betcher  v.  Chicago,  M.  ft 
St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  124  N.  W.  1096,  1097,  110 
Minn.  228. 

Where  a  strip  of  land  lying  along  the 
margin  of  a  navigable  stream  was  included 
in  the  plat  of  a  city  and  dedicated  to  the 
public  by  the  use  of  the  word  "levee"  writ- 
ten thereon,  and  several  streets  opened  upon 
this  tract,  and  many  lots  had  no  other  means 
of  Ingress  and  egress,  except  over  and  along 
it.  Its  dedication  included  its  use  as  a  street, 
as  well  as  a  landing  place  for  boats.  Mc- 
Alpine  V.  Chicago  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  75 
Pac.  73,  74,  68  Kan.  207,  64  L.  R.  A.  85,  1 
Ann.  Cas.  452. 


LEVEE 


LEVY 


A  "levee"  is  a  landing  place  for  yessels, 
or  a  dyke  or  breakwater.  Sanborn  y.  Van 
Duyne,  96  N.  W.  41,  44,  90  Minn.  215. 

As  street 

See  Street. 

LEVEE  BOARD 

As  municipal  corporation,  see  Mnnicipal 
Corporation. 

LEVEE  DISTRICT 

As  citizen,  see  Citizen. 
As  municipal  corporation,  see  Municipal 
Corporation. 

LEVEE  DI8TRIOT  DIRECTOR 

As  county  officer,  see  County  Officer. 

LEVEE  TAX 

A  tax  levied  by  a  sanitary  district  organ- 
ized under  Act  July  1,  1907  (Laws  1907,  p. 
289),  is  not  a  "levee  tax"  within  Act  July  1, 
1909  (Laws  1909,  p.  323),  providing  for  a  re- 
duction in  taxes,  excepting  "levee  taxes,"  etc. 
People  ex  rel.  Sanders  v.  Chicago  &  A.  B.  Co., 
94  N.  E.  14,  15,  248  111.  417;  Same  v.  Toledo, 
St.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  94  N.  B,  le,  249  111.  175. 

LEVEL 

There  is  a  distinction  between  the  words 
"aim,"  "point,"  and  "leveL"  "Aim"  expresses 
more  than  the  other  two  words  inasmuch  as 
it  denotes  a  direction  towards  some  minute 
point  in  an  object,  and  the  others  imply  direc- 
tion towards  the  whole  objects  themselves. 
We  aim  at  a  bird ;  we  point  a  cannon  against 
a  wall ;  w&  level  a  cannon  at  a  wall.  Point- 
ing is  of  course  used  with  most  propriety 
with  reference  to  instruments  that  have 
points.  It  is  likewise  a  less  decisive  action 
than  either  aiming  or  leveling.  A  stick  or 
finger  may  be  pointed  at  a  person  merely  out 
of  derision ;  but  a  blow  Is  "leveled"  or  aimed 
with  an  expressed  intent  of  committing  an 
act  of  violence.  Livingston  v.  State,  65  S.  E. 
812,  6  Ga.  App.  805  (quoting  Crabbe's  Eng- 
lish Synonyms). 

LEVEL  RATE  PREMIUM 

A  "level  rate  premium  policy"  is  a  policy 
on  which  the  regular  annual  renewal  premi- 
ums provided  are  to  be  kept  down  to  a  level, 
or  are  to  be  brought  down  to  the  level  of  the 
premiums  charged  for  the  first  year's  insur- 
ance by  the  application  of  the  profits  earned 
on  the  policy.  IJams  v.  Providental  Sav. 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  New  York,  84  S.  W.  51,  60, 
185  Mo.  466. 

LEVER 

See  (3ut-Off  Lever. 

LEVY 

All  levies,  see  All. 


LEW  (Of  Taxes) 

"Levy"  is  defined  as  "the  amount  accru- 
ing from  a  tax  or  execution."  State  ex  reL 
Ledwith  v.  Brian,  120  N.  W.  916,  917,  84 
Neb.  30. 

"Levy"  is  used  variously,  but,  as  applied 
to  the  determination  of  the  amount  or  rate  ta 
be  charged,  it  is  a  legislative  function,  to  be 
exercised  only  by  the  state,  or  some  infe- 
rior political  division  to  which  the  power 
has  been  delegated.  School  Dist.  No.  127  of 
Reno  County  v.  School  Dist.  No.  45  of  Bena 
County,  103  Pac.  126,  127,  80  Kan.  641. 

The  word  "levy,'*  as  applied  to  taxation,, 
is  given  a  variety  of  meanings,  among  wMch 
are:  "To  impose  or  assess" ;  "to  impose,  as- 
sess and  collect  under  authority  of  law";  **ta 
raise  or  collect  by  assessment" ;  "to  charge  a 
sum  of  money  already  ascertained  against  a 
person  or  property  subject  to  the  charge"; 
"to  determine  by  vote  the  amount  of  tax  to 
be  raised" ;  "to  fix  the  rate  at  which  property 
is  to  be  taxed."  Gray  v.  Board  of  Sch' 
Inspectors  of  Peoria,  83  N.  E.  95,  98,  231 
111.  63. 

The  word  "levy,"  as  used  in  constitu- 
tional and  statutory  provisions  that  the  coun- 
ty commissioners  shall  levy  a  tax  in  their 
respective  counties  for  the  support  of  pub- 
lic schools,  and  that  county  boards  shall  levy 
ah  annual  tax  on  all  the  property  in  their 
respective  counties,  to  be  collected  at  the 
same  time  and  by  the  same  officers  as  other 
taxes,  excludes  from  the  act  of  levying  any 
signification  of  creation.  The  duty  to  levy 
Imposed  on  the  board  is  therefore  purely 
ministerial,  and  only  imports  that  it  should 
take  such  action  as  would  result  in  the  tax 
being  placed  on  the  auditor's  books.  The 
boards  have  no  power  to  do  anything  more 
or  less  than  require  that  the  tax  be  entered. 
Dickson  V.  Burckmyer,  46  S.  E.  343,  346,  67 
S.  C.  626. 

"Levied,"  with  reference  to  taxes,  means 
the  extension  of  a  tax  against  taxable  prop- 
erty, since  a  tax  cannot  be  said  to  be  levied 
until  it  has  been  so  extended.  Pettibone  v. 
West  Chicago  Park  Com'rs,  74  N.  B.  387,  392, 
215  111.  304. 

A  tax  cannot  be  said  to  be  "levied"  when 
it  is  only  estimated,  and  the  time  for  levying 
it  has  not  arrived.  The  limitation  on  the 
power  of  the  county  board  to  contract  for 
bridge  building  to  coA  a  sum  not  greater 
than  the  amount  of  money  on  hand  in  the 
county  bridge  fund  derived  from  a  levy  of 
previous  years  and  two-thirds  of  the  levy  of 
the  current  year  gives  no  authority  to  the 
board  to  take  into  account  the  levy  of  the 
current  calendar  year  prior  to  the  making  of 
such  levy.  Until  this  is  made,  there  Is  no 
levy  of  the  current  year.  Clark  v.  Lancaster 
County,  96  N.  W.  593,  599,  69  Neb.  717. 

"Three  things  are  essential  to  a  *tax,' 
as  that  term  is  understood  by  our  Constitu- 


LBVT 


8S 


UIVT 


tlon:  First,  the  aacertainment  of  a  aam  cer- 
tain, or  tbat  can  be  rendered  certain,  to  be 
Imposed  on  the  collective  body  of  taxpayers; 
second,  a  legal  imposition  of  that  sum  as  an 
obligation  on  the  coUectiye  body  of  taxpay- 
ers; third,  an  apportionment  of  sach  sum 
among  individnal  taxpayers  so  as  to  ascer- 
tain the  part  or  share  that  each  should 
bear.  ♦  ♦  ♦  The  first  two  acts  above  de- 
scribed, namely,  the  ascertainment  of  a  sum 
to  be  imposed  on  the  collective  body  of  tax- 
payers and  its  imposition  by  a  legislative 
declaration  to  that  effect,  are  essentially  leg- 
islative acts  or  acts  proper  directly  to  the 
lawmaking    function    of    the    government. 

•  •  •  The  third  act,  namely,  the  appor- 
tionment of  the  whole  sum  imposed  by  way 
of  tax  on  the  collective  body  of  taxpayers 
npon  the  separate  Individuals  composing  that 
body,  is  usually  an  administrative  act  per- 
formed under  specific  statutory  directions, 
ascertaining  the  mode  and  time  of  its  per- 
formance. •  •  •  The  word  *leTy*  Is  indif- 
ferently employed,  as  conunonly  used,  to  ex- 
press either  one  of  these  processes  separately 
or  both  collectively.  A  tax  is  said  to  be  lev- 
led  when  the  amount  or  rate  to  be  imposed  is 
fixed  by  law,  for  what  is  wanting  to  com- 
plete such  levy  Is  supplied  by  the  standing 
tax  laws,  and  consists  in  a  course  of  adminis- 
trative action.  When  the  levying  of  a  tax 
is  spoken  of  as  a  legislative  act,  it  Is  common- 
ly understood  to  describe  such  action  on  the 
part  of  the  Legislature  as  would,  with  stand- 
ing tax  laws,  complete  the  legislative  authori- 
ty requisite  to  enable  the  administrative  de- 
partment to  distribute  and  collect  the  tax. 

*  ♦  ♦  In  other  words,  the  tax  directed  to 
be  levied  must  be  so  far  imx)osed,  in  order  to 
comply  with  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  Con- 
stltntion,  that  no  further  legislation  will  be 
necessary  to  enable  its  collection.'*  Rice  v. 
Shealy,  50  S.  B.  868,  870,  71  8.  C.  161  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  Morton  v. 
Ck)mptroller  General,  4  S.  C.  430,  453). 

The  power  of  the  state  tax  commissioner 
conferred  by  Code  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904,  art 
81,  i  150,  requiring  the  commissioner  to  levy 
taxes  on  shares  of  corporate  stock  and  to 
place  a  valuation  on  corporate  stock  for  pur- 
poses of  assessment.  Is  not  affected  by  Laws 
1906,  c.  404,  amending  article  81,  §  22,  and 
fixing  a  tax  for  each  $100  for  a  specified  pur- 
pose, and  directing  the  Comptroller  to  levy 
the  taxes  on  corporate  stock,  since  the  func- 
tion of  the  Comptroller,  nnder  the  act  of 
1906,  is  a  purely  ministerial  act  fully  per- 
formed when  he  enters  on  his  books  the  num- 
ber of  shares  of  stock  liable  to  taxation,  the 
corporation  the  stock  of  which  is  taxed,  the 
rate  of  taxation,  and  extends  the  amount  of 
the  tax,  and  since  the  word  "levy"  as  applied 
to  taxes  means  in  some  cases  to  raise  and 
exact  by  authority  of  government  the  amount 
of  a  tax  to  be  raised,  and  in  other  cases  the 
word  is  used  with  reference  to  the  mere  min- 
^Bterlal  act  of  entering  the  taxes  on  the  tax 


book  and  collecting  them.  Union  Trust  Co. 
of  Bfaryland  v.  State,  81  AU.  878,  874,  116 
Md.  368. 

By  section  16  of  P.  L.  1903,  p.  789,  the 
commissioners  are  required  each  year  to 
cause  a  tax  to  be  "levied  and  assessed,"  etc., 
and  to  certify  to  the  tax  assessor,  taxing 
board,  or  taxing  officer  the  amount  of  tax 
required  to  be  levied,  assessed,  and  raised, 
and  the  said  assessors,  etc.,  shall  assess  said 
sums  so  directed  to  be  assessed  and  certified 
upon  all  the  persons  and  property  liable,  and 
the  said  tax  shall  be  levied,  assessed,  and 
collected  by  the  same  officers,  etc.,  and  the 
tax  so  levied  upon  real  estate  shall  be  a  lien 
thereon.  Held,  that  throughout  the  section 
the  word  "levy"  is  used  as  referring  to  the 
administrative  functions  of  taxation  and  not 
to  the  legislative  function,  the  differences 
between  which  are  pointed  out  in  the  case  of 
Township  of  Bernards  v.  Allen,  61  N.  J.  Law, 
228,  at  page  288,  89  AU.  716,  at  page  719, 
also  referred  to  in  the  dissenting  opinion,  61 
N.  J.  Law,  692,  41  AtL  250;  one  of  the  judges 
using  the  phrase  "levying  taxes"  as  descrip- 
tive of  the  legislative  function,  while  the 
other  used  it  as  referring  to  the  administra- 
tive process  of  collecting  the  taxes.  Van 
Cleve  V.  Passaic  Vall^  Sewerage  Com'rs,  68 
Atl.  671,  586,  71  N.  J.  Law,  188. 

Provisions  in  the  body  of  an  act  confer- 
ring on  parochial  and  municipal  corporations 
power  to  levy  license  taxes  was  within  the 
title  of  the  act  "to  levy,  enforce,  and  collect 
a  license  tax."  Mayor  and  Council  of  Alex- 
andria V.  White,  16  South.  16,  16,  46  La. 
Ann.  449. 

As  all  aeeessaiy  prooeedlrngs 

A  city  ordinance  authorizing  the  issuance 
of  bonds  dated  in  1910  and  payable  in  1930, 
which  provides  that  "there  is  hereby  levied" 
on  the  taxable  property  of  the  dty  a  spedfled 
sum,  of  which  a  certain  amount  Is  to  pay 
the  principal  of  the  bonds  and  the  balance 
to  iMiy  interest,  of  which  sum  a  spedfled 
amount  shall  be  collected  each  year  to  and 
including  1930,  the  amount  collected  each 
year  over  that  required  for  interest  to  con- 
stitute a  sinking  fund  to  the  principal,  com- 
plies with  Laws  1907,  c  236,  and  Const  art 
11,  S  3,  requiring  dties  issuing  bonds,  to  pro- 
vide before,  or  at  the  time  of  doing  so,  for  the 
collection  of  a  direct  annual  tax  sufficient  to 
pay  the  interest  as  it  falls  due  and  to  dis- 
charge the  principal  within  20  years,  since 
"levy"  in  tax  matters  has  various  meanings 
dependent  on  the  context,  and  in  this  Instance 
includes  everything  necessary  to  the  collec- 
tion of  the  tax.  Borner  v.  City  of  Prescott, 
136  N.  W.  552,  554,  150  Wis.  197. 

Assess  distinsnlslied 

Assessment  as  including,  see  Assess. 

To  "assess"  a  tax  is  to  adjudge  and  de- 
termine what  proportion  of  his  property  the 
taxpayer  shall  contribute  to  the  public.  To 
"levy"  a  tax  is  to  make  a  record  of  this  de- 


LKVT 


94 


I-BVT 


termination,  and  to  extend  the  assessment 
against  the  taxpayer's  property.  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Ca  V.  Klein,  71  N.  W.  1069,  1071, 
52  Neb.  258. 

As  used  in  Code  CIt.  Proc.  {  325,  requir- 
ing an  adverse  occupant  to  pay  all  the  taxes 
which  have  been  levied  and  assessed  upon 
the  land,  the  word  "levied"  refers  to  the  act 
of  the  board  of  supervisors  In  making  the 
"levy,"  and  the  word  "assessed"  refers  to  the 
act  of  the  assessor  in  making  the  assessment. 
The  statute  does  not  require  the  payment  of 
taxes  assessed  before  the  occupancy,  and 
levied  afterwards,  but  only  such  taxes  as 
were  both  levied  and  assessed  during  the 
occupancy.  Allen  y.  McKay,  52  Pac.  828,  829, 
831, 120  Cal.  332. 

As  €oUeetioa 

In  our  revenue  laws  the  word  "levy"  is 
sometimes  used  in  the  sense  of  "raising"  or 
"imposing,"  and  not  in  the  sense  of  "collect- 
ing" a  tax  by  execution.  In  different  places 
in  these  laws  the  boards  of  county  commis- 
sioners are  authorized  to  "levy,"  or  lay,  tax- 
es, while  the  word  "collect"  is  used  to  define 
the  power  of  the  county  treasurers  to  gather 
in  or  receive  money  for  taxes  theretofore  as- 
sessed by  county  assessors  and  levied  by  the 
boards.  Parsons  v.  People,  76  Pae.  666,  669, 
32  Colo.  22L 

The  tonnage  tax  imposed  on  the  use  of 
foreign  built  yachts  owned  by  citizens  of 
the  United  States  by  Tariff  Act  Aug.  5,  1909, 
c.  6,  §  37,  36  Stat.  112,  being  a  tax  upon  the 
privilege  of  use,  is  assessable  to  and  collect- 
ible from  the  personal  user,  and  the  provi- 
sion of  the  statute  that  such  tax  shall  be  lev- 
ied and  collected  by  the  "collector  of  cus- 
toms of  the  district  nearest  the  residence  of 
the  managing  owner"  requires  that,  where 
the  owner  resides  in  one  district,  the  col- 
lector of  that  district  shall  levy  and  collect 
the  tax,  and  the  attempted  action  of  the  col- 
lector of  another  district  to  that  end  is  not  a 
"levy"  and  will  not  support  an  action  to  recov- 
er the  tax.  United  States  v.  Blair,  190  Fed. 
372,  375  (citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  pp. 
4101-4104). 

Special  assessments 

The  "levy"  of  special  assessments  for 
street  improvements  is  the  exercise  of  a  spe- 
cies of  the  taxing  power  of  the  state,  and  not 
of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  New  York, 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  aty  of  Hammond,  83 
N.  E.  244,  245,  170  Ind.  493. 

LEVY  (Of  Wrfts) 

See  Equitable  Licvy. 

As  a  sheriff's  deed  to  land  sold  under 
execution  need  recite  only  the  names  of  the 
parties  to  the  execution,  the  date  when  issu- 
ed, and  of  the  Judgment,  and  other  particu- 
lars recited  in  the  execution,  which  necessa- 
rily includes  the  fact  that  notice  was  given, 
and  as  a  "levy,"  is  under  Rev.  St.  1909,  f 


2195,  defined  as  a  "taking,"  whicb  means  to 
gain  control  or  possession  of,  in  any  way, 
a  sheriff's  deed,  need  not  recite  that  a  levy 
was  made,  for  the  recital  of  notice  and  other 
formality  shows  that  the  land  was  taken, 
and  hence  a  deed  is  prima  facie  correct  al- 
though reciting  an  invalid  levy,  for  that  recit- 
al will  be  rejected  as  surplusage.  Butler  ▼. 
Imhoff,  142  S.  W.  287,  288,  238  Mo.  584. 

In  a  notice  of  sale,  reciting  that  tlie 
land  was  levied  under  a  Judgment  rendered 
before  a  Judge  named,  and  that  the  levy  men- 
tioned was  made  by  virtue  of  an  order  ot 
sale,  the  contention  that  the  words  "levy*' 
and  "Judgment"  indicate  an  execution  sale 
is  not  tenable,  as  under  the  Code  Judgment 
is  the  apt  word  in  proceedings  of  an  equitable 
nature,  as  well  as  in  those  which  are  strictly 
legal.  Gray  v.  Enrich,  96  N.  W.  848,  2  Neb. 
(Unof.)  194. 

Seianre  under  garatshmemt 

The  word  "levied,"  as  used  in  Civ.  Code 
1895,  §  2913,  providing  that  a  "thing  hired  is 
not  subject  to  sale  under  Judgment  obtained 
subsequent  to  the  contract  of  hire  against  the 
ovmer,  but  may  be  levied  on,  and  a  b<Hid  for 
its  forthcoming  at  the  expiration  of  the  time 
for  which  it  is  hired  may  be  demanded  of  the 
person  hiring,"  is  to  be  given  its  technical 
meaning  (that  is,  an  actual  seizure  of  the 
property  by  a  levying  officer  under  a  pro- 
cess); and  the  latter  part  of  the  section  in  re- 
lation to  a  forthcoming  bond  would  have  no 
application  to  a  case  where  the  property  is 
seized  under  a  garnishment  which  is  not  a 
technical  "levy,"  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute,  though  for  some  purposes  a  garnish- 
ment is  treated  as  in  effect  a  levy  upon  the 
property.  Southern  Flour  &  Grain  Co.  v. 
Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.,  56  S.  E.  742,  743,  127 
Ga.  626,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  853,  119  Am.  St 
Rep.  356,  9  Ann.  Cas.  437. 

Selsnre  under  writ  of  replevin 

"The  strict  meaning  of  the  woTd  •levy' 
is  usually  a  seizure  of  the  defendant's  prop- 
erty." By  the  word  "levy,"  as  used  in  Bankr. 
Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  {  67f,  30  Stat.  565, 
making  void  all  levies.  Judgments,  attach- 
ments, or  other  liens  obtained  through  legal 
proceedings  within  four  months  prior  to  the 
bankruptcy  of  an  insolvent  defendant,  seems 
to  include  any  seizure  of  property  in  the 
bankrupt's  possession  and  which  he  claims 
to  own,  and  seems  to  cover  a  seizure  on  a 
writ  of  replevin  in  a  suit  to  recover  property 
sold  and  delivered  on  credit  under  a  contract 
which  the  plaintiff  claims  a  right  to  rescind 
for  fraud.  In  re  Weinger,  Bergman  St  Ca, 
126  Fed.  875,  877. 

GonstmetiTe  seianre 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  1899,  9  4043,  provid- 
ing that  if  a  constable  levy  an  execution,  and 
a  third  party  claim  the  property,  he  may 
take  a  bond  of  indemnity,  the  word  "levy" 
means  such  levy,  either  actual  or  construc- 
tive, as  the  situation  of  the  property  permits. 


LEVY 


96 


USWDXESS 


If  It  l8  already  in  the  custody  of  the  law, 
because  preyioualy  seized  under  a  writ  of  at- 
tachment, a  levy  or  seizure  under  a  subse- 
quent execution  in  a  mode  adjudged  to  be  suf- 
ficient to  give  a  lien  on  the  property  and  en- 
able the  officer  to  sell  it  is  also  sufficient  to 
bring  into  operation  the  statutory  provisions 
in  regard  to  a  demand  for  indemnity  by  the 
officer  if  notice  is  given  of  outside  ownership. 
Smith  ex  rel.  McElhaney  v.  Rogers,  73  S.  W. 
243,  244,  09  Mo.  App.  252. 
TrnkinslaiMl 

In  Georgia,  a  levy  on  land  la  made  by  the 
official  entry  thereof  on  the  execution,  and 
not  by  seizure.  Keaton  v.  Farkas,  70  S.  E. 
1110,  1111,  136  Ga.  188. 

The  object  of  a  levy  of  execution  is  to 
bring  the  property  within  the  custody  of  the 
law  and  prevent  the  judgment  debtor  from 
disposing  of  it  to  the  prejudice  of  the  credi- 
tor before  sale  can  be  made,  and  in  case  of 
real  estate,  on  which  the  Judgment  is  already 
a  lien  by  docketing,  the  ordinary  meaning  of 
the  word  "levy"  as  used  in  section  6827  and 
elsewhere  is  inapplicable.  Britannia  Mln. 
Ot).  v.  United  Stotes  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co., 
115  Pac.  46,  48,  43  Mont  83. 

Sclsvre  required 

"A  levy*  under  an  execution  upon  per- 
sonal property  is  made  by  the  officer  having 
the  writ  seizing  the  property  and  taking  it 
into  his  possession.*'  People,  to  Use  of  Ken- 
field,  V.  Finch,  76  Pac.  1120,  1123,  19  Oolo. 
App.  512. 

To  constitute  a  levy  there  must  be  an  ac- 
tual or  constructive  ^seizure  of  property,  and 
the  property  must  be  so  far  brought  under 
the  sabjection  of  the  officer  that  he  can  exer- 
else  control,  and  does  assume  to  exercise  con- 
trol, by  virtue  of  the  writ;  and  the  mere 
declaration  of  an  intent  to  seize  does  not 
coDstltate  a  levy,  but  the  officer  must  do 
some  act  for  which  be  could  be  prosecuted  as 
a  trespasser,  if  it  were  not  for  the  protection 
afforded  by  the  writ  Dean  y.  State,  71  S.  B. 
597,  598,  9  Ga.  App.  303. 

LEWD 

See,  also.  Lascivious. 

**  'Lewd'  is  defined  to  mean  given  to  the 
onlawful  Indulgence  of  lust;  eager  for  sex- 
ual indulgence."  Jamison  v.  State,  94  S.  W. 
675-678,  117  Tenn.  58  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  United  States  v.  Bebout,  28  Fed. 
522). 

As  used  in  Rev.  St.  {  3893,  declaring 
every  obscene,  lewd,  or  lascivious  book,  pam- 
phlet, print,  or  other  publication  of  an  in- 
dec^t  character,  or  notices  giving  informa- 
tion for  obtaining  such  publications,  to  be 
nonmailable  matter,  the  words  "obscene," 
"lewd,"  and  "lascivious"  signify  that  form 
of  immorality  which  has  relation  to  sexual 
impurity,  having  the  same  meaning  as  is 
g^y&L  them  at  common  law  in  prosecutions 


for  obscene  libel.    Hanson  v.  United  States, 
157  Fed.  749,  750,  85  C.  C.  A.  325. 

The  words  "lewd  and  lascivious,"  as 
used  in  a  statute  providing  that  any  person 
who  shall  unlawfully  and  feloniously  commit 
any  lewd  and  lascivious  act,  other  than  those 
constituting  other  crimes,  on  or  with  the 
body,  or  any  part  or  member  thereof,  of  a 
child  under  the  age  of  14  years,  with  the 
intent  of  arousing  the  passions  or  sexual  de- 
sires of  such  child,  shall  be  guilty  of  a  felony, 
do  not  limit  the  application  of  the  section  to 
an  act  attempted  or  committed  between  per- 
sons of  opposite  sexes.  People  v.  Zuell,  82 
Pac.  1128, 1129,  2  CaL  App.  59. 

LEWD  H01T8E 

■  The  words  "ill  fame"  are  synonymous 
with  the  word  "lewd,"  as  used  in  the  statute, 
making  it  an  offense  to  keep  a  lewd  house, 
and  the  reputation  of  a  house  being  kept  and 
maintained  as  a  lewd  house  is  admissible 
evidence  on  a  trial  of  a  person  charged  with 
the  offense.  McConnell  v.  State,  58  S.  E. 
546,  547,  2  Ga.  App.  445. 

A  house  may  be  a  lewd  house,  within 
Pen.  Code  1910,  |  382,  making  it  criminal  for 
any  person  to  maintain  a  lewd  house  or  place 
for  the  practice  of  fornication  and  adultery, 
though  the  house  may  be  devoted  chiefly  to 
the  carrying  on  of  some  other  vocation  (such 
as  boarding  house  or  hotel),  if  lewd  women 
are  accustomed  to  frequent  there  and  to 
carry  on  their  practices.  Fitzgerald  v.  State. 
72  S.  E.  541,  542, 10  Ga.  App.  70. 

There  is  no  difference  in  meaning  be- 
tween the  two  expressions  "house  of  ill  fame" 
and  "lewd  house  or  place  for  the  practice  of 
fornication  or  adultery."  Cotton  v.  City  of 
Atlanta,  73  &  E.  683,  684,  10  Ga.  App.  397. 

LEWDNESS 

See  Leading   LAfe  of  Prostitution  and 
Lewdness. 

"Lewdness  is  lustfulness  and  lascivious 
behavior;  a  synonym  of  unchastity,  sensuali- 
ty, and  debauchery."  On  a  prosecution  for 
keeping  a  house  of  ill  fame,  instructions  that 
a  house  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  prosti- 
tution and  lewdness  was  a  house  visited  by 
persons  of  both  sexes  for  the  purpose  of  hav- 
ing sexual  intercourse,  or  some  other  lewd 
purpose,  and  that  lewdness  was  the  unlaw- 
ful indulgence  of  the  animal  desires,  were 
correct  State  v.  Wilson,  99  N.  W.  1060, 
1061,  124  Iowa,  264. 

The  Century  Dictionary  makes  "lewd- 
ness** synopymous  with  "impurity,"  "unchas- 
tity," "licentiousness,"  "sensuality."  In  Com- 
monwealth V.  Warden,  128  Mass.  54,  35  Am. 
Rep.  357,  it  was  held  that  "lewdness"  is  the 
irregular  indulgence  of  lust,  whether  public 
or  private.  "Lewdness,"  as  used  in  the  age 
of  consent  law  (Acta  1901,  p.  29,  c.  19),  which; 
after  prohibiting  carnal  knowledge  of  a  fe- 
male over  12  and  under  18  years  of  age,  de- 


LEWDNESS 


96 


LIABIiB 


dares  that  nothing  contained  In  the  act  shall 
authorize  a  conviction  when  the  female  is 
at  the  time  or  before  the  carnal  knowledge 
a  bawd,  lewd,  or  kept  female,  includes  pri- 
vate as  well  as  public  unchastity.  Jamison 
V.  State,  94  S.  W.  675,  678,  117  Tenn.  58. 

The  term  "lewdness,"  as  used  In  Code,  { 
4939,  prohibiting  the  keeping  of  a  house  of  ill 
fame  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  prosti- 
tution or  lewdness,  means  lustfulness,  lech- 
erous, lascivious,  or  libidinous  conduct. 
As  used  in  section  4938,  declaring  that  if  any 
man  or  woman  not  being  married  to  each 
other  lewdly  and  lasciviously  associate  and 
cohabit  together,  or  if  any  man  or  woman 
married  or  unmarried  is  guilty  of  open  and 
gross  lewdness,  and  designedly  makes  an 
open  and  indecent  or  obscene  exposure  of  his 
or  her  person,  or  of  the  person  of  another, 
every  such  person  shall  be  imprisoned,  etc., 
the  term  "lewdness"  means  open  and  public 
indecency  tending  to  corrupt  public  morals, 
and  not  mere  unlawful  indulgence  of  the  ani- 
mal desires,  so  that  where  accused  was  in- 
dicted for  conspiracy  to  induce  certain  fe- 
males to  commit  the  crime  of  lewdness,  and 
no  act  was  shown  indicating  illicit  inter- 
course or  anything  more  than  a  conspiracy  to 
procure  the  girls'  willing  assent  to  a  single 
act  of  intercourse,  an  instruction  defining 
'lewdness"  as  the  unlawful  indulgence  of 
the  animal  desires  was  misleading  and  erron- 
eous. State  V.  Mitchell,  128  N.  W.  378,  379, 
149  Iowa,  362. 

A  statute  declaring  that  whoever  commits 
an  unnatural  and  lascivious  act  with  another 
person  shall  be  punished,  etc.,  makes  crim- 
inal any  and  all  unnatural  and  lascivious 
acts  with  another  person;  and  it  is  no  de- 
fense that  the  act  was  not  an  act  of  copula- 
tion, since  copulation  is  not  within  the  stat- 
ute. Ck)mmonwealth  v.  Delano,  83  N.  E.  406, 
197  Mass.  166. 

Prostitution  is  the  common  "lewdness" 
of  a  woman  for  gain,  or  the  offering  of  her 
person  to  indiscriminate  intercourse  with 
man,  while  "lewdness"  is  unlawful  indul- 
gence of  the  animal  desire.  State  v.  Porter, 
107  N.  W.  923,  924,  130  lowa,  690. 

To  convict  of  the  crime  of  "lewd  and  las- 
civious cohabitation,"  denounced  by  section 
2596,  Rev.  St.  1892,  there  must  be  proved 
both  lewd  and  lascivious  intercourse,  and  a 
living  or  dwelling  together  as  though  the 
conjugal  relation  existed  between  the  parties. 
Where  the  proofs  show  a  residing  together  of 
the  parties,  but  are  silent  as  to  any  lewd  and 
lascivious  intercourse  between  them,  there 
can  be  no  conviction  of  the  crime.  White- 
head V.  State,  37  South.  302,  48  Fla.  64. 

"Lewd  and  lascivious  association  and  co- 
habitation," as  used  in  Code  1906,  §  4358, 
queans  the  living  and  cohabiting  together  of  a 
man  and  a  woman,  not  married  to  each  other, 
in  the  same  house,  as  husband  and  wife. 
State  V,  White,  66  S.  E.  20,  66  W.  Va.  45. 


Under  a  statute  providing  that,  if  any 
man  or  woman  "cohabit  together  as  husband 
and  wife  without  being  married,"  each  of 
them  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  proof 
of  sexual  intercourse  between  persons  not 
married,  though  living  in  the  same  house,  is 
insufficient  to  constitute  the  offense  defined, 
without  evidence  that  they  cohabited  and 
dwelled  together  and  deported  themselves  to- 
ward each  other  as  husband  and  wife.  Mc- 
Neely  v.  State,  106  S.  W.  674,  84  Ark.  484. 

LEX  LOCI  CONTRACTUS 

"The  phrase  'lex  loci  contractus'  is  used, 
in  a  double  sense,  to  mean,  sometimes,  the 
law  of  a  place  where  a  contract  is  entered  in- 
to; sometimes,  that  of  the  place  of  its  per- 
formance. And  when  it  is  employed  to  de- 
scribe the  law  of  the  seat  of  the  obligation,  it 
is,  on  that  account,  confusing."  Pritchard 
V.  Norton,  1  Sup.  Ct  102,  111,  106  U.  S.  124, 
27  L.  Ed.  104. 

LIABLE 

See   Party    Uable;     Primarily    Liable; 
Secondarily   Liable;     Usually    Liable. 

The  word  "liable"  in  a  plea  of  contrib- 
utory negligence,  that  plaintiff  attempted  to 
cross  the  road  in  front  of  the  approaching  au- 
tomobile, when  she  knew  that  by  so  doing 
she  was  "liable"  to  be  struck  by  the  machine^ 
does  not  mean  "probably,"  but  no  more  than 
"possibly."  Terrill  v.  Walker,  59  South.  775. 
776,  5  Ala.  App.  535  (citing  5  Words  and 
Phrases,  p.  4110). 

The  words  **probable,"  "likely,"  and  "li- 
able" are  synonymous  when  applied  to  the 
effects  of  a  personal  injury,  each  dealing 
with  reasonable  probability,  not  with  possibil- 
ity, and  what  may  probably,  or  is  likely  or 
liable  to,  be  the  future  result  of  a  personal 
injury,  is  competent  evidence  to  prove  what 
is  reasonably  certain  in  the  matter.  Hallum 
V.  VUlage  of  Omro,  90  N.  W.  1051,  1054,  122 
Wis.  337. 

In  Webster's  Dictionary,  the  word  "lia- 
ble" is  said  to  refer  to  a  possible  or  probable 
happening  which  may  not  actually  occur,  as 
horses  are  liable  to  slip;  even  the  sagacious 
are  liable  to  make  mistakes.  The  word,  as 
used  in  an  insurance  policy,  does  not  signify 
a  perfected  or  fixed  legal  liability,  but  rather 
a  condition  out  of  which  a  legal  liability  may 
arise.  The  word  as  most  frequently  used 
does  not  necessarily  exclude  the  idea  of  a 
contingency.  State  ex  rel.  Breeden  v.  Sheets, 
72  Pac.  334.  335,  26  Utah,  105  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Home  Ins.  CJo.  of  New 
York  V.  Peoria  &  P.  U.  R  CJo.,  52  N.  B.  862, 
178  111.  64). 

"The  word  liable'  denotes  something  ex- 
ternal which  may  befall  us;  'subject*  refers 
to  evils  which  arise  chiefly  from  internal 
necessity,  and  are  likely  to  do  so.  Hence  the 
former  applies  more  to  what  is  accidental; 


TTjA'ftT.ie 


97 


LIABI«B  TO  FORFXrrUBJB 


tbe  latter  to  fMngs  from  whldi  we  often  or  i 
IneTitably  enffer."    Webster.    Therefore  the 
proYisloii  of  the  general  drain  law  that  an 
application  for  the  establishment  of  a  drain 
shall  be  signed  by  not  less  than  ten  free- 
holders, flye  or  more  of  whom  shall  be  own- 
ers of  land  ''liable"  to  assessment  for  benefits 
in   the  constmctlon  of  sach  drain,   means 
that  at  least  five  of  the  signers  must  be  per- ; 
sons  who  may  properly  be  assessed  for  bene- 1 
flts»  and«  as  so  construed,  is  not  snbject  to  | 
the  objection  of  being  impossible  of  enforce- 1 
m&it    Albert  t.  Gibson,  105  N.  W.  19,  21,  j 
141  Mich.  888  (dUng  6  Words  and  Phrases, 
p.  4110). 

"A  party  Hable^  is  one  who  may  be  held 
reeponsible  ^ther  directly  or  conditionally, 
liability  is  predicable  of  a  contingent  obli- ! 
gation  as  well  as  one  matured  and  flzed."  j 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  1027,  subd.  1,  providing 
that  any  person  who  is  liable  to  the  plaintiff  • 
for  the  payment  of  a  debt  secured  by  a  mor^  ; 
gage  may  be  made  a  defepdant  in  the  f ore- ! 


closure  salt,  applies  to  an  assic^nor  of  a  bond 
and  mortgage  who  has  guaranteed  the  collec- 
tion thereof.  Robert  t.  Kidansky,  97  N.  T. 
Snpp.  918,  916,  111  App.  Div.  475. 

The  qualifying  phrase  "and  against  the 
property  liable  for  assessment  for  such  im- 
provement at  the  time  of  the  making  there- 
of/' in  section  129,  c.  122.  p.  207,  Laws  1903, 
means  the  property  which  would  have  been 
liable  for  the  special  assessment  had  no  in- 
firmity existed  therein  or  in  the  steps  leading 
thereto,  which  Infirmity  this  section  was  en- 
acted to  cure  by  the  terms  thereof.  To  con- 
strue the  word  'liable**  to  mean  legally  liable 
would  take  away  the  entire  force  of  the  cura- 
tive act.  Shepherd  v.  Kansas  City,  106  Pac 
581,  533,  81  Kan.  809. 

The  word  "liable,"  in  an  instruction,  in 
an  action  for  personal  injuries,  that  if  the 
Jury  find  for  plaintiff  they  can  take  into  con- 
sideration as  elements  of  damages  plaintiff^s 
I^ysical  and  mental  pain  and  suffering,  and 
that  which  he  is  "Uable"  to  endure  in  the 
future  by  reason  of  his  Injury  signifies  some- 
thing that  may  happen  without  importing 
reasonable  certainty  that  it  will  happen,  and 
tbe  charge  indicates  that  the  Jury  may  enter 
into  full  conjecture  as  to  the  possible  future 
suffering  and  injury,  and  the  charge  should 
be  that  the  verdict  may  include  not  future 
damages  which  plaintiff  is  liable  to  suffer 
(that  is,  may  suffer),  but  such  damages  as  it 
Is  reasonably  certain  will  of  necessity  result 
from  the  injury;  Qreen  v.  Oatawba  Power 
Go^  55  8.  B.  125,  120,  75  8.  O.  102  (citing 
Ayers  v.  Delaware,  L.  ft  W.  B.  Co..  53  N.  IB. 
22,  158  N.  T.  254;  Stutz  v.  Chicago  ft  N.  W. 
By.  Co.,  40  N.  W.  053,  73  Wis.  147,  9  Am.  St 
Bep.  769;  Louisville  8.  B.  Ca  v.  Minogue,  14 
S.  W.  857,  90  Ky.  309,  29  Am.  St  Bep.  878» 
and  note;  Ford  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  75  N. 
W.  630,  106  Iowa,  94;  McBride  v.  St  Paul 
8  WDS.ft  P.2D  Saa.— 7 


aty  By.  Oo.,  76  N.  W.  281,  72  IClnn.  291;  It 
Cyc  pw  18$). 

The  word  'liable,'*  in  an  instruction,  in 
an  action  for  injuries  to  a  pedestrian  trip- 
ping over  a  brick  thrown  on  the  sidewalk 
ttom  a  pile  of  brick  between  the  curb  and  the 
sidewalk,  that  tbe  municipality  was  respon- 
sible if  the  brick  was  placed  on  the  sidewalk 
so  that  it  was  "liable"  to  taU  upon  or  be 
ttirown  thereupon,  has  the  effect  of  imposing 
on  the  municipality  the  highest  degree  of 
possible  care,  and  makes  that  which  was  pos^ 
sible  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  munici- 
pality and  is  erroneous.  Sutter  v.  Kansas 
City,  119  S.  W.  1084,  1086,  188  Mo.  App.  105. 

As  used,  an  instruction  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  a  railroad  company  to  exercise  ordi- 
nary care  to  keep  its  right  of  way  free  from 
dry  and  combustible  matter  which  would  be 
"liable^  to  teke  fire  and  communicate  it  to  a 
trestle,  ete.,  had  a  meaning  sufficiently  wide 
to  admit  of  a  gloss  rendering  ite  meaning 
"within  the  range  of  possibility,*'  which  made 
the  instruction  erroneous  as  imposing  too 
high  a  degree  of  care.    Boot  v.  Kansas  City 

■  Southern  B.  Co.,  92  S.  W.  621,  681,  195  Mo. 

I  348,  6  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  212. 

i         The  expression  "liable  to  catdi  and  hold 
'  vehicles"  Is  indeterminate  and  of  a   wide 
;  i«eanlng,.and  the  fact  that  a  street  railway 
switch  was  so  constructed  that  it  was  liable 
;  to  "catch  and  hold  vehicles**  does  not  of  it- 
self show  that  the  switeh  was  such  a  struc- 
ture as  to  render  the  railroad  liable  for  in- 
I  Juries  to  a  traveler  in  a  buggy,  the  wheels  of 
,  which  were  caught  by  the  switch,  and  who 
was  thereby  thrown  to  the  ground  and  In- 
;  Jured.    Morie  v.  St  Louis  Transit  Co.,  91  S. 
I  W.  962,  967, 116  Mo.  App.  12. 

jlJABIiE   AS   OABBSBB 

i  The  phrase  "liable  as  carrier,**  as  used 
in  Bev.  St  i  4281,  providing  that  if  any  ship- 
per of  certein  designated  merchandise  shall 
lade  it  as  freight  or  baggage  on  any  vessel 
without  then  giving  to  ite  master  or  agent  a 
written  notice  of  the  true  character  and  val- 
ue thereof,  having  the  same  entered  on  the 
bill  of  lading  therefor,  the  master  and  owner 
shall  not  be  "liable  as  carriers*'  thereof  in 
any  form  or  manner,  means  only  the  liability 
attached  by  law  to  the  carrier's  public  em- 
ployment, and  does  not  attech  to  ite  liability 
as  baUee.  La  Bourgogne,  144  Fed.  781,  786, 
75  C.  a  A.  647. 

IJABLE  TO  FORFEITURE 

Webster  defines  "liable**  thus,  "Obliged 
in  law  or  equity,  subject,**  and  says  it  "de- 
notes something  external  which  may  befall 
us.'*    Bev.  St  I  4189,  declaring  that  for  the 
commission  of  a  certein  act  a  vessel  "shall 
>  be  liable  to  forfeiture,**  does  not  effect  a 
I  present  absolute  forfdture,  but  only  gives  a 
j  right  to  have  the  vessel  forfeited  upon  due 
process  of  law,  and  the  property  in  the  same 


UABLB  TO  FORFJCITUBB 


98 


LXABILITT 


remains  in  the  owner  nntU  setznre  and  con- 
demnation, wbich  relates  back  to  the  time  of 
seizure  and  invalidates  intermediate  sales. 
The  Kate  Heron,  14  Fed.  Cas.  180,  141,  6 
Sawy.  106. 

Where  a  certificate  of  a  mutual  boieflt 
society  provided  that  all  the  benefits  accru- 
ing should  be  ''liable  to  forfeiture*'  if  the 
member  did  not  comply  with  the  associa- 
tion's constitution  and  by-laws  one  of  which 
declared  that,  in  case  of  omission  to  pay 
does  and  assessments  on  the  first  of  each 
month,,  the  member  should  stand  suspended, 
the  phrase  "liable  to  forfeiture,"  when  con- 
strued in  connection  with  the  by-laws,  part 
of  the  contract  making  the  default  itself  op- 
erate as  a  forfeiture  did  not  require  affirma- 
tive action  on  the  part  of  the  association  be- 
fore a  member's  rights  could  be  barred. 
Brown  v.  Knights  of  the  Protected  Ark,  96 
Pac.  450,  453,  43  Colo.  280. 

LIABILITY 

See  Contingent  Liability;  Contract  Lla- 
bUlty;  Existing  LiabiUty;  Fixed  LU- 
biUty;  Original  Liability;  Prima  Fa- 
de LiabiUty;  Statutory  Liability. 

Any  and  all  liability,  see  Any. 

Any  other  liability,  see  Any  Other. 

Other  liabilities,  see  Other. 

"Liability"  in  its  broadest  and  most  com- 
prehensive use  includes  any  obligation  one 
is  bound  in  law  or  Justice  to  perform,  and  is 
synonymous  with  "responsibility";  in  a  more 
restricted  and  perhaps  in  its  popular  sense, 
it  means  that  which  one  is  under  obligation 
to  pay  to  another.  State  ex  rel.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee V.  Milwaukee  Electric  Ry.  &  Light 
Co.,  120  N.  W.  623,  630, 144  Wis.  386,  140  Am. 
St  Rep.  1025. 

The  words  "debt"  and  *lUbillty,"  as 
used  in  Const  art  8,  i  1,  forbidding  the  Leg- 
islature to  create  any  debt  or  liability,  singly 
or  in  the  aggregate,  exceeding  1%  per  cent 
of  the  assessed  value  of  taxable  property  in 
the  state,  are  not  employed  tn  a  technical 
sense,  but  have  special  reference  to  the  basic 
legislative  authority  on  which  a  state  con- 
tract must  rest,  and  in  which  alone  a  state 
debt  must  find  its  sanction.  Lewis  v.  Brady, 
104  Pac.  000,  001,  17  Idaho,  251,  28  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  140. 

A  "liability"  on  an  insurance  policy  as 
afTecting  deductions  in  assessing  insurer's 
property  for  taxation  is  an  obligation  by  in- 
surer to  pay  the  moneys  which  the  policy 
calls  for,  on  compliance  by  insured  with 
binding  conditions,  regardless  of  whether  the 
sum  to  be  paid  under  the  contract  is  a  fixed 
amount  or  a  stated  sum  plus  profits.  Supple- 
ment to  the  general  tax  act,  approved  May 
11,  1006  (P.  L.  p.  418),  provides  for  taxation 
of  certain  property  of  life  insurance  com- 
panies after  deducting  "liabilities,"  and  re- 
quires "liabilities  on  policies"  to  be  deter- 


mined as  of  the  date  of  taxation  on  a  basts 
adopted  by  the  insurance  commissioner. 
Held,  that  an  amount  apportioned  to  de- 
ferred dividend  policies  as  required  by  Laws 
1007,  p.  132,  is  not  properly  deducted  from 
an  assessm^it  as  constituting  a  "liability"; 
widsL  amount  b^ng  a  "liability  on  the  poli- 
cies" comprehended  in  valuing  the  polidee. 
City  of  Newark  v.  State  Board  of  Equaliza- 
tion of  Taxes,  79  Aa  843,  345,  81  N.  J.  Law, 
416;  Same  v.  Board  of  Bqualisation  of  Tax- 
es of  New  Jersey,  77  AtL  705,  80  N.  J.  Law* 
258. 

The  term  'liability"  is  commonly  used 
to  denote  the  indebtedness*  or  claim  of  a 
mutual  insurance  order  against  its  members 
for  dues  or  assessments,  though  it  may  not 
be  a  technical  ^'liabiUty"  for  the  reason  that 
the  whole  matter  is  optional  with  the  mem- 
ber. The  term  is  not  used  in  the  sense  that 
an  absolute  personal  obligation  to  pay  ex- 
ists, but  rather  in  the  sense  that,  if  he  would 
continue  the  liability  of  the  insurer,  the 
member  himself  is  obligated  to  pay.  The 
use  of  the  term  is  not  fatal  to  a  pleading. 
Logsdon  V.  Supreme  Lodge  of  Fraternal 
Union  of  America,  76  Pac.  202,  204,  84  Wash. 


The  charter  of  a  corporation,  which  de- 
clares that  it  shall  have  a  first  lien  on  all 
stock  registered  in  the  names  of  each  mem- 
ber for  his  liabilities  to  the  corporation,  and 
that  the  lien  shall  extend  to  all  dividends, 
embraces  a  demand  for  damages  for  breach 
of  contract  by  a  stockholder  receiving  the 
stock  in  consideration  that  the  corporation 
may  purchase  at  a  fixed  low  price  machines 
to  be  made  by  the  stockholder;  the  word 
"liability"  meaning  responsibility,  or  the 
state  of  one  who  is  bound  in  law  and  Justice 
to  do  something  which  may  be  enforced  by 
action.  United  Cigarette  Mach.  Co.  v.  Wins- 
ton Cigarette  Mach.  Co.,  104  Fed.  047,  060, 
114  C.  C.  A.  583;  United  States  v.  General 
Inspection  ft  Loading  Co.,  102  Fed.  228  (quot- 
ing 5  Words  and  Phrases,  pp.  4111,  4114, 
4115). 

As  used  in  a  policy  of  Indemnity  insur- 
ance providing  that  the  policy  should  only 
cover  losses  sustained  by,  and  liability  for,  / 
any  claims  against  the  assured  as  a  result 
of  the  risk  specified  in  the  attached  contract 
or  contracts,  the  word  "liability"  referred  to 
a  liability  other  than  one  strictly  in  the  na- 
ture of  indemnity,  and  included  liability  in- 
curred in  calling  a  physician  in  case  of  an 
emergency.  Kelly  v.  Maryland  Casualty  Co., 
04  N.  W.  880,  800,  80  Minn.  337. 

Decedent  executed  a  demand  note  to  de- 
fendant, agreeing  that  the  proceeds  of  cer- 
tain policies  of  life  insurance,  which  he  had 
deposited  with  defendant  as  collateral  to  se- 
cure the  note,  should  be  applied  to  the  pay- 
ment thereof,  and  that,  if  he  should  come 
under  any  other  liability  or  enter  into  any 
other  agreement  with  defendant  while  it  was 


UABHilTT 


99 


UABILITT 


the  holder  of  sach  obllgatioii,  tben  any  ezoetB 
of  eoUaterals  abould  te  applied  to  aiicli  other 
note  or  claim*  axid,  In  case  of  any  exchange 
of  the  ooUaterala,  the  pzoTlBons  of  the  note 
should  extend  to  the  new  oollaterala.  Dece- 
dent thereafter  executed  a  new  note  to  de- 
fendant's cashier  for  a  debt  owing  to  de- 
fendant, which  note  was,  in  fact,  for  defend- 
ant's benefit  When  decedent  died,  he  waa 
alao  a  member  of  a  firm  which  waa  indebted 
to  defendant  for  insarance  preminma  collect- 
ed and  unpaid.  At  this  time  all  but  $181.50 
of  the  original  debt  had  been  paid,  for  which 
amount  a  renewal  note  had  been  given 
which  was  due  and  unpaid.  Held,  that  the 
words  "liability,"  "agreement"  and  "daim," 
used  in  the  collateral  agreement,  were  sufB- 
dent  to  coyer  every  concelyable  obligation, 
and  that  the  surplus  due  on  the  policies  was 
therefore  liable^  not  only  for  the  balance  of 
the  original  debt,  but  also  for  the  note  made 
payable  to  defendant's  cashier,  and  for  the 
firm's  liability  for  the  unpaid  premiums. 
Norfieet  ▼.  Pamlico  Ins.  &  Banking  Co^  76  8. 
B.  937,  939,  160  N.  O.  827. 

Bond 

A  bond  is  not  a  'llaMUty**  but  is  only 
the  evidence  or  representation  of  an  indebt- 
ednesa  City  of  Los  Angeles  r.  Teed.  44  Pac. 
580,  582,  112  Gal.  319. 

CkmtiBaiwmt  fmtww  UaMUty 

When  we  speak  of  "liabilities,"  we  mean 
those  obligationa  which  are  contingent,  as 
well  as  those  which  are  absolute.  Fidelity 
&  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland  v.  Commonwealth 
Trust  Co^  119  N.  Y.  Supp.  598,  599,  65  Mlsa 
Rep.8& 

^There  is  a  distinction  made  by  the  au- 
thorities between  a  contract  of  Indemnity 
against  liability  for  damagesf  and  a  simple 
contract  of  Indemnity  against  damages.'  In 
the  former  case  it  has  very  generally  been 
held  that  an  action  may  be  brought  and  a 
recovery  had  as  soon  as  the  liability  is  le- 
gally imposed,  while  in  the  latter  there  la 
no  cause  of  action  until  there  la  actual  dam- 
age." Agreements,  in  an  employer's  Ua- 
Ullty  policy,  that  If  suit  la  brought  against 
the  assured  he  shall  immediately  forward  the 
process  to  the  Insurer,  which  will  defend  or 
settle  the  dalm,  do  not,  when  considered  with 
a  provision  of  the  policy  dedarlng  Its  pur* 
pose  to  be  indemnity  to  the  assured  "against 
loss  from  liability  for  damages,"  and  another 
agreement  that  no  action  shall  He  against 
the  Insurer  in  reference  to  any  loss  under  the 
policy  unless  brought  by  the  insured  him- 
self to  reimburse  him  for  payment  by  him 
in  satisfaction  of  a  judgment,  render  the 
policy  one  of  "indemnity  against  liability," 
but  it  Is  a  policy  against  loss  or  damage  by 
reason  of  liability.  Finley  v.  United  States 
Casually  Co.,  88  S.  W.  2,  8, 118  Tenn.  692,  8 
Ann.  Cas.  962  (quoting  Fenton  v.  Fidelity  & 
Casoalty  Co.,  56  Pac.  1096,  86  Or.  283,  48  L. 
R.  A.  770,  and  dtlng  Jones  v.  Chllds,  8  Nev. 


121;  Smith  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  18 
Wis.  21;  Thompson  v.  Taylor,  30  Wi&  73; 
Locke  V.  Homer,  131  ICass.  93,  41  Am.  Rep. 
190;    TMnlty  Church  v.  Hlgi^  48  N.  Y. 


Contract  respoasllillity 

As  used  in  the  statute  of  limitations 
whldi  provides  that  an  action  on  a  contract 
or  "liability,"  express  or  implied,  which  is 
not  in  writing  and  does  not  arise  out  of  any 
instrument,  etc.,  the  term  "liability"  was  ev- 
idently Intended  to  refer  to  a  contractual  lia- 
bility. Suter  V.  Wenatchee  Water  Power  Co., 
76  Pac  298,  299,  36  Wash.  1,  102  Am.  St 
Rep.  881. 

The  word  "aiability,"  as  used  in  BalUn- 
ger^s  Ann.  Codes  ft  St  Wash.  |  4800,  subd.  3, 
providing  a  limitation  for  an  "action  upon  a 
contract  or  liability,'  expressed  or  implied, 
whldi  is  not  in  writing  and  does  not  arise 
out  of  any  written  instrument,"  is  applicable 
only  to  contracts.  The  personal  'liability"  of 
shareholders  In  a  national  bank,  under  Rev. 
St  U.  8.  I  5151,  for  the  contracts,  debts,  and 
engagements  of  the  bank,  cannot  be  regarded 
as  a  contract  "liability,"  for  the  imrpose  of 
making  applicable  the  limitation  prescribed 
by  Bellinger's  Ann.  Codes  ft  St  Wash.  1 4800, 
subd.  8,  for  an  "action  upon  a  contract  or 
liability,'  expressed  or  implied,  which  is  not 
in  writing,  and  does  not  arise  out  of  any 
written  Instrument"  McClalne  v.  Rankin, 
25  Sup.  Ct  410,  411,  197  U.  8.  154,  49  L.  Ed. 

3  Ann.  Cas.  500. 


The  liability  of  a  corporatlen  for  rent 
accruing  from  August  1,  1902,  to  June  11th 
following,  under  a  lease  executed  in  1,^99,  and 
fixing  a  m<mthly  rental,  is  a  liability  within 
Membership  Corporation  Law,  Laws  1895,  p^ 
335,  c  559,  I  11,  making  the  directors  of  a 
membership  corporation  liable  for  any  debt 
of  the  corporation  contracted  while  they  are 
directors  and  payable  within  one  year  or  less 
from  the  date  when  contracted.  Thistle  v. 
Jones,  107  N.  X.  Supp.  840,  841, 123  App.  Div. 
40. 

Costs 

As  between  the  parties  to  a  pending  pro- 
ceeding to  establish  a  public  drain,  unadjudg- 
ed  costs  do  not  constitute  a  liability  within 
Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  |  248,  providing  that  r^ 
peal  of  a  statute  shall  not  extinguish  any 
liability  incurred  under  it;  so  that  as  be- 
tween such  parties  repeal  of  the  statute  for 
the  proceeding  by  Act  March  6,  1905  (Acts 
1906,  p.  456,  c.  167),  and  its  consequent  dis- 
missal, did  not  affect  any  vested  or  contracts 
ual  right  Kunkalman  v.  Gibson,  84  N.  B. 
985v  86  N.  SL  850,  851,  171  Ind.  503. 

€or«Bamt 

A  covenant  of  warranty  in  a  deed  createa 
a  liability  as  of  the  date  of  the  deed  and  not 
as  of  the  date  of  an  eviction  thereunder,  and 
hence  persons  who  have  assumed  the  liabil- 
ities of  a  national  bank  on  its  voluntary  liq- 


UABILITT 


100 


LIABIIiITT 


uidatlon  cannot  escape  UaMll^  for  breadi  of 
the  bank's  warranty  in  a  deed  because  tbe 
warranty  was  not  broken  when  tbe  liabili- 
ties were  assumed.  McLean  ▼.  Moore  (Tex.) 
145  S.  W.  1074,  1076  (citing  6  Words  and 
Phrases,  p.  4112). 

DaM 

The  word  'liability^  Is  mnch  more  com- 
prehensive than  the  term  "debt" ;  "UabiUty** 
meaning  the  state  or  condition  of  one  who 
is  under  obligation  to  do  at  once  or  at  some 
future  time  something  which  may  be  enforc- 
ed by  action.  Hyatt  ▼.  Anderson's  Trustee 
(Ky.)  74  S.  W.  1004,  1096  (citing  White  T. 
Green,  74  N.  W.  929, 105  Iowa.  181). 

The  proYlsions  of  Pub.  St  N.  H.  a  140, 
relative  to  the  execution  and  record  of  chat- 
tel mortgages,  must  be  fully  complied  with  to 
render  them  valid  against  any  one  except  the 
parties  thereto.  Under  section  6  requiring 
the  parties  to  swear  that  the  mortgage  is 
made  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  debt 
spedfled  in  the  condition  and  for  no  other 
purpose,  and  section  9  providing  that  if  the 
mortgage  Is  executed  to  secure  the  mort- 
gagee for  a  liability  other  than  a  debt  due 
from  the  mortgagor,  the  form  of  the  oath 
shall  be  so  varied  as  truly  to  describe  the 
"liability" ;  if  the  mortgage  is  given  to  se- 
cure a  debt,  the  condition  and  oath  must 
describe  it  as  a  debt;  if  to  secure  a  liability, 
it  must  be  described  as  such,  and  a  liaUlity 
is  not  covered  by  the  term  "debt"  Sherman 
V.  Estey  Organ  Ck).,  38  AtL  70,-  71,  69  Vt  355. 

Franclilse 

The  relation  between  a  dty  and  the  owii- 
er  of  an  existing  telephone  franchise  being 
quasi  contractual  for  the  performance  of  a 
service,  an  ordinance  modifying  the  terms  of 
the  franchise  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
more  efTective  service  in  competition  with  the 
owner  of  another  franchise  ia  not  invalid  as 
releasing  an  "indebtedness"  or  "liability"  to 
the  municipality  in  violation  of  Const  f  52. 
Louisville  Home  Tel.  Ck).  v.  Oity  of  Lonia- 
vUle,  113  S.  W.  855,  856,  860,  130  Ky.  611. 

Judgment 

The  term  'liability"  generally  includes 
every  kind  of  legal  obligation  and  is  used  in 
Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  §  17,  80  Stat 
550,  as  amended  to  1903  (Act  Feb.  5,  1903,  c. 
487, 32  Stat  798),  providing  that  a  discharge 
in  bankruptcy  releases  a  bankrupt  from  his 
debts,  except  such  as  are  liabilities  for  ob- 
taining property  by  false  pretenses  or  repre- 
sentations as  including  every  obligation  to 
pay  money  whether  evidenced  by  Judgment 
or  not  &nd  every  unsatisfied  Judgment  is  a 
UablUty.  Woehrle  v.  OancUnl,  109  Pac.  888, 
889,  158  OaL  107 ;  In  re  United  Button  Co., 
140  Fed.  495,  505. 

Under  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c  541,  30 
Stat  544,  as  amended  by  Act  Feb.  5,  1903,  c 
487,  1 17,  32  Stat  800,  excepting  certain  "lia- 
bilitieB"  from  those  released  by  a  discharge 


in  bankroptcy,  an  excepted  liability  need  not 
be  reduced  to  judgment  Bevor  v.  Swecker, 
lie  N.  W.  704,  706^  188  Iowa,  721. 

The  diaractex'  of  the  "UabiUty,**  as  that 
word  is  used  in  Bankr.  Act  (Act  July  1, 1898. 
a  641,  80  Stat  660)  f  17,  subd.  2,  as  amended 
by  Act  Feb.  6,  1908,  a  487,  f  6,  82  Stat  798. 
specifying  certain  debts  of  a  bankrupt  not 
affected  by  a  discharge^  is  not  changed  by 
the  fact  that  the  liability  has  been  reduced  to 
Judgment  Peters  v.  United  States,  177  Fed. 
885,  887,  101  0.  O.  A.  99. 

The  change  made  in  Bankr.  Act  July  1, 
1898,  a  541,  |  17a  (2),  30  Stat  550,  which  as 
originally  enacted  provided  that  a  discharge 
should  release  a  bankrupt  from  all  of  his 
provable  debts  except  such  as  "are  Judgments 
in  actions  •  •  •  f or  willful  and  mali- 
cious injuries  to  the  person  or  property  of 
another,"  and  which  was  amended  Feb.  5, 
1903,  c.  487,  I  5,  32  Stat  798,  by  substituting 
for  the  words  "Judgments  In  actions"  the 
word  *aiablUties,"  did  not  have  the  effect  of 
removing  Judgments  for  such  causes  from  the 
excepted  class,  but  of  including  such  liability, 
whether  judgment  has  been  rendered  upon 
it  or  not  Thompson  v.  Judy,  169  Fed.  663, 
554,  95  0.  0.  A.  51. 

As  oUlsAtloa 

See  Obligation. 

As  all  oliligatioas 

An  order  of  the  federal  court  directing 
its  receiver  of  a  railroad  to  restore  to  the 
railroad  its  property  in  his  hands  on  the 
agreement  of  the  railroad  to  assume  "all  law- 
ful liabilities  and  obligations  of*  the  receiver 
existing  on  a  designated  date  and  save  the 
receiver  harmless  against  the  payment  of 
liabilities  incurred  by  him.  Imposes  on  the 
railroad  the  payment  of  liabilities  incidental 
to  the  receiver's  operation  of  the  road,  in- 
dnding  that  for  injuries  to  a  passenger 
through  the  negligence  of  the  receiver's  serv- 
ants ;  the  word  ''obligations"  meaning  dntiee 
arising  out  of  a  contract  or  from  an  action- 
able tort  and  the  word  'liabilities"  includ- 
ing any  form  of  legal  obligation  measured  by 
money  valuation,  whether  arising  from  con- 
tract, express  or  implied,  from  duty  imposed 
by  law  or  Judgment  of  court  or  in  conse- 
quence of  a  tort  Yandalia  Ry.  Go.  t.  Keys, 
91  N.  B.  173,  175,  46  Ind.  App.  353  (qnottng 
6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4878). 

Ordlnamoe 
**UabiUt7,"  within  MUwaukee  Charter,  c. 
4,  U  2,  4,  requiring  the  vote  on  ordinances 
creating  "liability"  against  the  dty  or  any 
fund  thereof  to  be  taken  by  ayes  and  noes, 
means  more  than  a  naked  undertaking  In 
volving  no  expense,  covering  a  claim  or  ob- 
ligation presented  to  the  council  for  audit 
and  allowance  against  some  fund,  and  hence 
the  section  does  not  apply  to  an  ordinance 
requiring  street  railway  companies  to  sprin- 
kle the  part'  of  streets  occupied  by   their 


IJABIIJTT 


101      LIABUilTT  CREATED  BT  XjAW 


tmckn  on  tbe  dtj  farnishing  tbe  neoeaaary 
water.  State  ez  rel.  City  of  BAilwankee  t. 
MHwankee  Electric  Ry.  ft  Light  Ck>.,  129  N. 
W.  623,  029,  144  Wis.  380,  140  Am.  8t  Rep. 
1025. 
TaiB 
The  word  "liabUity"  ia  of  large  afgnifl- 
cance,  bat,  as  used  in  the  statute  limiting  the 
time  for  bringing  actions  founded  on  con- 
tracts or  liabilities,  express  or  implied,  it  re- 
fen  plainly  to  liabilitleB  of  a  oontractoal 
nature,  and  not  to  taxes.  Bradford  t.  Sto- 
rey, 75  N.  E.  250,  257, 189  Mass.  104. 

laalrfUty  f  •»  tort 

The  word  ''liability,"  in  the  absence  of 
anything  limiting  its  acope,  include^  obli- 
gations arising  out  of  torts  as  well  as  out 
of  contracts.  Thus  where,  on  the  dissolu- 
tion of  a  firm  engaged  in  the  insurance  and 
brokerage  business,  the  continuing  partner 
gaTe  a  bond  to  the  outgoing  partner,  condi- 
tioned to  par  all  *«liabiUtie8"  of  the  firm,  it 
embraced  a  claim  against  the  firm  for  dam- 
ages caused  by  false  representations  nmde 
in  a  sale  by  the  firm  of  certain  secailtie& 
Price  ▼.  Parker,  83  N.  B.  323,  187  Maw.  1, 
125  Am.  St.  Rep.  820. 

The  limitation  of  a  shipowner's  liabili- 
ty for  maritime  torts  not  the  result  of  his 
own  fault,  provided  by  Rev.  St  |f  4288-4286, 
was  extended  to  nonmaritime  torts  by  Act 
June  20,  1884,  23  Stat  67,  c.  121,  f  18,  Hmit- 
ing  the  tndlvidual  liability  of  a  shipowner 
for  ''any  or  all  debts  and  liabilities"  except 
wages  and  liabilities  incurred  prtor  to  such 
enactment  to  his  share  in  the  vessel,  and 
the  aggregate  liabilities  of  all  the  owner  of 
a  vessel  on  account  of  the  same  to  the  value 
of  the  vessel  and  freight  pending.  Richard- 
son V.  Harmon,  82  Sup.  Ot  27,  29,  222  U.  & 
90,  56  L.  Ed.  110. 

The  exemption  of  lands,  acquired  under 
the  homestead  laws,  from  "liability**  for  any 
debt  contracted  by  the  parties  does  not  ex- 
empt them  from  liabilities  for  torts.  Brun  v. 
Kann,  151  Fed.  145,  166.  80  O.  O.  A.  513,  12 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  6.)  164. 

Const  art  12,  |  7,  declares  that  *^o  cor- 
poration shall  lease  or  alienate  any  franchise 
so  as  to  relieve  the  franchise  or  property 
held  thereunder  from  the  liabilities  of  the 
lessor  or  grantor,  lessee  or  grantee,  contract- 
ed or  incurred  in  the  operation,  use,  or  en- 
joyment of  such  franchise  or  any  of  its 
privileges."  Held,  that  a  corporation  exer^ 
dsing  the  right  to  occupy  and  use  the  streets 
and  public  places  for  the  operation  of  an 
electric  light  and  power  plant  axul  a  street 
lailwajt  under  a  franchiae  granted  by  the 
dty,  cannot  convey  such  franchise  so  as  to 
relieve  the  property  used  in  the  exercise 
thereof  from  liability  for  a  Judgment  ob- 
tained for  personal  injuries  to  an  employ^ 
in  the  operation  of  such  property.  Coop^  v. 
Utah  Ught  ft  R.  Co.,  102  Pac.  202,  200,  36 
Utah.  570,  130  Am.  St  Rep.  1075. 


Temporarily  eoMaiforeeable  obUgattea 

"  'liability,'  in  a  legal  sense,  is  the  state 
or  condition  of  one  who  \b  under  obligation 
to  do  at  once,  or  at  some  future  time,  some- 
thing which  may  be  enforced  by  action.  It 
may  exist  without  the  right  of  immediate 
enforcement"  Hyatt  v.  Anderson's  Trustee 
(Ky.)  74  S.  W.  1094, 1090  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  White  v.  Green,  74  N.  W. 
929,  105  Iowa,  181,  and  citing  Fisse  v.  Bln- 
steln,  6  Ho.  App.  78 ;  Home  Ina  Ca  of  New 
York  V.  Peoria  &  P.  U.  Ry.  Co.,  52  N.  B. 
802,  178  lU.  04 ;  Pittsburgh  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Clarke,  29  Pa  140;  Cochran  v.  United  States, 
15  Sup.  Ct  028,  157  U.  S.  290,  39  U  Ed.  704). 

uabujtt  obsated  bt  ulw 

See  also.  Legally  Liable. 

The  liability  of  a  stockholder  for  his 
proportion  of  a  corporate  debt  is  a  "liability 
created  by  law,"  as  that  term  is  used  in  the 
statute  of  llmitationa  O'Neill  v.  Quam- 
Strom,  92  Pac.  391,  392,  0  CaL  App.  409. 

An  action  against  a  railroad  company  to 
recover  for  personal  injuries  alleged  to  have 
been  caused  by  the  violation  by  defendant  of 
Safety  Appliance  Act  la  one  "upon  a  liabil- 
ity created  by  statute"  within  the  meaning 
of  Ky.  St  i  2515,  Umitlng  the  time  for  bring- 
ing such  actions  to  five  years,  and,  in  ab- 
sence of  any  federal  statute  of  limitations, 
is  governed  by  that  section  where  the  action 
is  in  that  state.  Nichols  v.  Chesapeake  & 
0.  Ry.  Co.,  195  Fed,  913,  910,  115  C.  C.  A. 
OOL 

Though  the  master's  liability  for  injury 
to  an  employ^  in  a  mine  through  negligence 
of  a  fellow  servant  did  not  exist  prior  to 
Rev.  Codes,  |  5248,  yet  such  statute  is  to  be 
regarded  not  as  creating  a  new  cause  of  ac- 
tion, but  as  merely  carrying  forward  the 
right  of  the  injured  party,  and  removing  a 
defense  theretofore  available  in  such  class  of 
cases;  so  that  as  regards  the  statute  of  lim- 
itations, the  action  for  personal  injuries  is 
founded  on  actionable  negligence,  and  not  on 
a  "liability  created  by  statute"  within  sec- 
tion 0449,  subd.  1;  which  phrase  has  come 
to  have  a  fixed  application  to  a  class  of  cas- 
es Quite  distinct  from  those  elsewhere  meu- 
tioned  or  referred  to  in  the  chapter  on  11m- 
itationa  Beeler  v.  Butte  &  London  Copper 
Development  Co.,  110  Pac.  528,  530,  41  Mont 
406. 

City  taxes  on  omitted  property  are  a 
**UabiUt7  imposed  by  statute,"  within  the 
meaning  of  that  term  as  used  in  the  statute 
of  limitations,  and  are  barred  in  five  yeara 
Mulr's  Adm'r  v.  City  of  Bardstown,  87  S. 
W.  1090,  1100.  120  Ky.  739. 

Taxes  are  a  "liability  created  by  stat- 
ute," within  Ky.  St  S  2515,  limiting  an  ac- 
tion on  a  liability  created  by  statute.  Chat- 
terson  v.  City  of  Louisville,  140  S.  W.  047, 
145  Ky.  485. 


LIABlIilTY  OP  CX)UNTY 


102 


UBEL 


Z.IABILITT  OF  OOITIITT 

The  state  may  authorize  drainage  dds- 
trlcts  to  Incnr  indebtedness  for  which  they 
alone  are  liable  and  to  issue  evidence  of  in- 
debtedness for  which  lands  within  the  dis- 
tricts are  alone  liable,  and  where  such  bonds 
are  issued  they  are  not  a  "liability  of  the 
county,"  within  Const  art  12,  |  5,  prohibit- 
ing the  loan  of  credit  by  any  county  to  any 
corporation  or  association.  Lee  Wilson  & 
Go.  y.  Wm.  R.  Ck>mpton  Bond  ft  Mortgage 
Ck).,  146  S.  W.  110,  113,  108  Ark.  462.  . 

LIBEL 

See  Criminal  LibeL 

Malice  in  libel  and  slander,  see  Malice. 
See,  also.  Actionable  Per  Se;    Jactita- 
tion;   Privileged   Communication. 

"Libel"  is  the  invasion  of  the  reputation 
of  private  persons.  State  ex  inf.  Crow  v. 
Shepherd,  76  S.  W.  79,  02,  177  Mo.  205,  09 
Am.  St  Rep.  624.  See,  also,  Brown  v.  Pub- 
lishers: George  Knapp  ft  Co.,  112  S.  W.  474, 
485,  213  Mo.  655. 

A  "libel"  is  a  malicious  defamation  ex- 
pressed in  printing  or  writing,  or  by  signs, 
pictures,  etc.,  tending  to  injure  the  reputa- 
tion of  another,  thereby  exposing  such  per- 
son to  public  hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule. 
Henry  v.  Cherry  ft  Webb,  73  AtL  07,  00,  30 
R.  I.  13,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  001,  136  Am.  St. 
Rep.  028,  18  Ann.  Cas.  1006;  State  v.  0*Ha- 
gan,  63  Aa  05,  73  N.  J.  Law,  200  (quoting 
4  Black.  Com.  150;  Ogders  on  Libel  and 
Slander);   Horton  v.  Binghamton  Press  Co., 

106  N.  Y.  Supp.  875,  876,  122  App.  Div.  332; 
Hughes  V.  New  York  Evening  Post  Co.,  100 
N.  Y.  Supp.  082,  084,  115  App.  Div.  611. 

A  "libel"  is  a  malicious  publication,  ex- 
pressed either  in  printing  or  in  writing,  or 
by  signs  and  pictures,  tending  either  to 
blacken  the  memory  of  one  dead,  or  the  rep- 
utation of  one  who  is  alive,  and  expose  him 
to  public  hatred,  contempt,  and  ridicule. 
Watson  V.  Detroit  Journal  Co.,  107  N.  W.  81, 
84,  143  Mich.  430,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  480,  8 
Ann.  Cas.  131  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion of  Chief  Justice  Parsons  in  Common- 
wealth V.  Clap,  4  Mass.  168,  3  Am.  Dec.  212); 
Vassar  College  v.  Loose-Wiles  Biscuit  Co., 

107  Fed.  082,  085. 

"A  *liber  is  malicious  defamation,  ex- 
pressed either  by  writing  or  printing,  or  by 
signs,  pictures,  effigies,  or  the  like,  tending 
to  blacken  the  memory  of  one  who  is  dead, 
or  to  impeach  the  honesty  or  integrity  or 
reputation,  or  publish  the  natural  or  alleged 
defects,  of  one  who  is  alive,  and  thereby  to 
expose  him  to  public  hatred,  contempt,  ridi- 
cule, or  obloquy,  or  to  cause  him  to  be  shun- 
ned or  avoided,  or  to  injure  him  in  his  office, 
business,  or  occupation."  Hubbard  v.  Pur- 
man  University,  57  S.  B.  478,  76  S.  C.  510 
(quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  in  Smith 


V.  Bradstreet  Co.,  41  S.  B.  763,  764,  63  8.  a 
525,  630). 

"Ubel."  in  the  criminal  law,  is  "a  ma- 
licious defamation,  ^pressed  either  in  print- 
ing or  writing,  or  by  signs  or  pictures,  tend- 
ing to  blacken  the  memory  of  one  who  is 
dead,  with  intent  to  provoke  the  living;  or 
the  reputation  of  one  who  Is  alive  and  to  ex* 
pose  him  to  public  hatred,  contempt,  or  ridi- 
cule.'* State  V.  Kieman,  41  South.  55,  116 
La.  789  (quoting  and  adopting  the  definition 
in  Bouv.  Law  Diet  and  Black,  Law  Diet). 

"A  'liber  is  the  malicious  defamation  of 
a  person,  made  public  by  any  printing  or 
writing  which  tends  to  provoke  him  to  wrath 
or  expose  him  to  public  hatred,  contempt, 
or  ridicule,  or  to  deprive  him  of  the  benefits 
of  public  confidence  and  social  Intercourse. 
A  libel*  is  a  tort,  and,  generally  speaking, 
neither  the  intention  with  which  a  tort  feas- 
or acted,  nor  the  state  of  his  feelings  toward 
the  person  injured  or  mankind  at  large,  les- 
sens his  responsibility  for  injuries  actually 
caused  by  his  wrongful  act  He  must  make 
recompense,  although  he  was  free  from  mor- 
al delinquency.  Any  false  or  defamatory 
publication  which  is  not  privileged  gives  rise 
to  a  case  for  damages  sustained  from  it 
This  is  true  of  libel,  notwithstanding  the 
formula  so  often  reiterated  that  malice  is 
the  gist  of  the  action.  The  essential  facts 
are  the  falsity  of  the  charge,  and  its  pub- 
lication and  libelous  nature.  If  true,  no  de- 
gree of  malice  in  the  publisher  will  make  it 
libel,  nor,  if  false,  will  rectitude  of  purpose 
exonerate  him."  Farley  v.  Evening  (^roni- 
cle  Pub.  Co.,  87  S.  W.  566,  567,  113  Mo.  App. 
216. 

A  "libel''  is  a  malicious  publication,  ex- 
pressed either  in  printing  or  writing,  or  by 
signs  or  pictures,  tending  either  to  injure 
the  memory  of  one  dead  or  the  reputation  of 
one  living,  and  exposes  him  to  public  ridicule 
or  contempt;  the  injury  to  reputation  in 
the  case  of  one  living  being  the  gist  of  the 
action.  Cohen  v.  New  York  Times  CJo.,  138 
N.  Y.  Supp.  206,  200,  153  App.  Div.  242. 

A  "libel"  is  a  malicious  publication  ex- 
pressed either  in  printing  or  writing  or  by 
signs  or  pictures,  tending  to  blacken  the 
memory  of  the  dead,  or  the  reputation  of  one 
who  is  alive,  and  expose  him  to  public  ha- 
tred, contempt,  or  ridicule.  As  the  falsity 
of  the  publication  is  essential  to  render  a 
publication  a  libel,  which  may  be  defined  as 
any  publication  injurious  to  the  reputation 
of  another,  an  instruction  in  an  action  upon 
a  libel  which,  in  purporting  to  define  a  libel, 
failed  to  mention  the  element  of  falsity,  is 
erroneous.  Words  written  of  a  person's 
trade  or  business  may  be  libelous  when  they 
might  not  be  so  if  spoken  of  the  individual 
personally,  for  every  publication,  written  or 
printed,  which  as  a  necessary  or  natural  con- 
sequence will  occasion  pecuniary  loss  to  a 
business  man,  is  a  UbeL    Dobbin  v.  Chicago^ 


XJOBEL 


108 


LIB£L 


R.  I.  A  P.  Ry.  Co.,  188  8.  W.  682,  685,  157 
Mo.  App.  689  idUng  5  Words  and  Phrases, 
p.  4116). 

Since,  under  the  statnte,  the  tmth  of  an 
alleged  libelous  article  may  be  shown  in  Jus- 
tification, the  word  "false**  must  be  added  to 
the  definition  of  libel  as  any  publication  in- 
jurious to  the  reputation  of  another.  Julian 
V.  Kansas  City  Btar  Co.,  lOT  8.  W.  496,  500, 
aoe  Mo.  86. 

"A  libel'  is  anything  written  or  printed 
whi<^  from  its  terms  is  calculated  to  injure 
the  character  of  another  by  bringing  him 
into  hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule,  and  which 
is  published  without  lawful  Justification  or 
excuse.**  ''Scandalous  matter  is  not  neces- 
sary to  make  a  libel.  It  is  enough  if  the 
defendant  induces  an  ill  opinion  to  be  had 
of  the  plaintiff  or  to  make  him  contemptible 
and  ridiculous.**  Cranfill  t.  Hayden,  80  8. 
W.  609,  612,  97  Tex.  544. 

"Ubel*'  Is  that  which  is  written  and 
published  to  injure  the  reputation  of  another, 
by  bringing  him  into  ridicule,  hatred,  or 
contempt  Petitioners,  as  members  of  a 
society,  published  an  article  charging  a 
majority  of  their  fellow  members  with  un- 
just and  stupid  attacks  and  low  and  vile 
insinuations  against  petitioners,  causing 
them  to  resign  from  a  c^ebration  committee. 
It  was  also  alleged  that  the  "new  brave 
committee**  were  inefficient  to  conduct  a  con- 
templated celebration  by  reason  of  illiteracy, 
etc.,  and  charged  the  president  with  being 
"more  unreasonable  still  and  childishly 
ambitious,**  bringing  to  the  society  dishonor, 
and  that  petitioners,  representing  a  minority, 
did  not  recognize  the  celebration  of  the 
majority  as  a  celebration  of  the  society,  for 
the  purpose  of  safeguarding  the  dignity  of  its 
members.  Held,  that  such  article  was  de- 
famatory, and  warranted  petitioners'  expul- 
sion from  the  society  under  a  by-law  author- 
izing such  expulsion  for  defamation  of  the 
association.  Del  Ponte  v.  Societa  Itallana  Dl 
M.  S.  Guglielmo  Marconi,  60  Atl.  237,  240,  27 
B.  I.  1,  70  L.  R.  A  188,  114  Am.  St.  Rep.  17. 

"Any  false  and  malicious  writing  pub- 
lished of  another  is  'libelous  per  se'  when  its 
tendency  is  to  render  him  contemptible  or 
ridiculous  in  public  estimation,  or  expose 
him  to  public  hatred  or  contempt,  or  hinder 
virtuous  men  from  associating  with  him.'* 
WUllams  V.  FuUer,  94  N.  W.  118,  119,  68 
Neb.  354  (citing  Cooley,  Torts,  206;  World 
Pub.  Co.  r.  Mullen,  61  N.  W.  108,  43  Neb. 
126,  47  Am.  St  Rep.  737). 

Any  written  words  which  directly  or 
Indirectly  charge  a  person  with  crime,  or 
which  tend  to  injure  his  reputation  in  any 
other  way,  or  to  expose  him  to  public  hatred, 
eontempt,  or  ridicule,  if  published  without 
legal  excuse  or  Justification,  constitute  a 
'Oibei,'*  and  the  person  ip  respect  to  whom 
they  are  written  may  see  therefor,  without 
alleging  or  proving  q^edal  damages.    Bich- 


ardson  v.  Thorpe,  63  Atl.  580,  73  N.  H.  532 
(citing  Giles  V.  John  B.  Clarke  CSo.,  36  Atl. 
876,  69  N.  H.  92;  Palmer  v.  City  of  Concord, 
48  N.  H.  211,  97  Am.  Dec  605;  Newell, 
Slander  &  Libel  [2d  Bd]  43-45). 

Any  publication  in  writing  whi<di  holds 
one  up  to  ridicule,  contempt,  hatred,  or 
obloquy  is  **libelous»"  even  though  it  charge 
no  criminal  offense.  Gordon  v.  New  York 
Bvening  Journal  Pub.  Co.,  Ill  N.  T.  Supp. 
574,  576,  127  App.  Div.  353. 

It  is  not  necessary,  to  constitute  a  libel, 
that  the  publication  charge  one  with  the  com- 
mission of  a  crime  or  with  having  a  conta- 
gious disease,  but  any  words  which  impute  to 
him  conduct  or  qualities  tending  to  injure 
his  character,  or  to  degrade  him  or  which 
expose  him  to  contempt,  ridicule,  or  public 
hatred,  are  libelous  per  se.  Weeks  v.  News 
Pub.  Ca,  88  Aa  162,  164,  117  Md.  126. 

A  letter,  to  be  libelous,  must  be  defama- 
tory, and  communicated  to  bring  another 
Into  contempt,  ridicule,  or  hatred.  Dickin- 
son V.  Hathaway,  48  South.  136,  137,  122  La. 
644,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  33. 

To  make  a  writing  actionable  as  being 
libelous,  it  must  impute  something  which 
tends  to  disgrace  a  man,  lower  him  in  or  ex- 
clude him  from  society,  or  bring  him  into 
contempt  or  ridicule.  It  is  not  intended  by 
this  that  to  make  a  publication  libelous  it 
must  contain  a  direct  and  open  charge.  The 
publication  must  be  Judged  by  its  general 
tenor,  and  if,  taking  the  terms  in  their  ordi- 
nary acceptation,  it  conveys  a  degrading 
imputation,  however  indirectly,  it  is  a  "libel.** 
If  the  article  complained  of  represents  a  per- 
son as  a  dishonest  or  dishonorable  man,  it 
would  be  a  libel.  Tqdd  v.  Every  Bvening 
Printing  Co.  (Del.)  66  Aa  97,  99,  6  PennewlW, 
233  (citing  Rice  v.  Simmons  [Del.]  2  Har. 
429,  31  Am.  Dec.  766). 

A  ftalse  and  malicious  printed  or  written 
publication,  whi<di  imputes  conduct  or  quali- 
ties tending  to  disparage  or  degrade  the 
plaintiff,  or  exposes  him  to  contempt,  ridi- 
cule, or  public  hatred,  or  prejudice  his  pri- 
vate character,  or  credit,  is  "libelous  per  se.** 
A  publication  stating  that  the  vestryman  of  a 
diurch  ''relentlessly  turned  his  back  on 
moral  and  legal  obligations  to  the  detri- 
ment of  a  rector,  who  had  suffered  himself 
to  become  debilitated  while  plodding  along 
the  path  of  duty  to  the  congregation,**  or 
that  the  vestryman  had  violated  a  promise 
he  had  made  to  the  members  of  the  church 
whereby  objections  to  his  election  as  vestry- 
man were  prevented,  was  libelous  per  se. 
Goldborough  v.  Orem  ft  Johnson,  64  Atl.  36, 
40,  103  Md.  671. 

Any  language  written  of  another  that 
tends  to  degrade  him  or  to  bring  him  into  ill 
repute  or  to  destroy  the  confidence  of  his 
neighbors  in  his  integrity,  or  to  cause  other 
like  injury,  is  libelous  per  se.  Stewart  v. 
Godrington,  45  South.  809,  812»  55  Fla.  327, 


lilBEL 


104 


UBTL 


To  constitute  a  pubUcatloii  respeetliig  a 
person  libelous  per  se,  it  must  reflect  on  the 
character  of  sudi  person  by  bringing  bim  into 
ridicule,  hatred,  or  contempt,  or  affect  him 
injuriously  in  his  trade  or  profession,  and  a 
statement  in  a  newspaper  concerning  a 
woman  that  she  had  hysterics,  the  same  not 
containing  any  imputation  upon  her  as  an 
indiyidual  or  in  respect  to  her  profession,  is 
not,  though  untrue,  per  se  libelous,  and  can- 
not be  ground  of  recovery  of  damages  in  the 
absence  of  proof  of  special  damage.  Cleve- 
land Leader  Printing  Co.  v.  Nethersole,  95 
N.  E.  735,  737,  84  Ohio  St.  U8,  Ann.  Cas. 
1912B,  978. 

A  publication  is  'libelous  per  se*'  where 
it  has  a  tendency  to  injure  a  person  in  his 
business  or  occupation  or  exposes  him  to  pub- 
lic hatred,  contempt,  ridicule,  or  disgrace. 
Bergstrom  v.  Ridgway-Thayer  Co.,  103  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1093,  1094,  53  Misc.  Rep.  95. 

A  written  or  printed  publication,  false, 
defamatory,  and  tending  to  expose  one  to 
ridicule  or  contempt,  or  to  render  him  odi- 
ous, or  injure  him  in  his  business  or  calling 
or  in  his  social  standing,  is  a  libel.  Register 
Newspaper  Co.  v.  Worten,  111  S.  W.  693,  697. 

A  writing  is  libelous  if  it  subjects  the 
person  referred  to  to  odium  or  ridicule,  or 
tends  to  subject  him  to  obloquy.  Kentucky 
Journal  Pub.  Co.  v.  Brock,  131  S.  W.  1,  140 
Ky.  373. 

The  test  whether  a  newspaper  article  is 
*'libelous  per  se"  is  whether  to  the  mind  of  an 
intelligent  man,  the  tenor  of  the  artide 
and  the  language  used  naturally  import  a 
criminal  or  disgraceful  charge.  It  is  libel- 
ous per  se  to  chargs  a  person  with  but  a 
single  commission  of  an  act,  if  the  act  itself 
amounts  to  or  imports  moral  delinquency 
or  disreputable  conduct  Church  v.  Tribune 
Ass'n,  119  N.  T.  Supp.  885,  886,  185  App. 
Wv.  30. 

An  article  designed  and  calculated  to 
exhibit  plaintiff  as  a  shallow,  ridiculous, 
and  contemptible  person,  dishonest  and  un- 
deserving of  confidence,  is  libelous  per  se. 
Morse  v.  Times-Republican  Printing  Co.,  100 
N.  W.  867,  869,  124  Iowa,  707. 

A  written  or  printed  statement  or  arti- 
cle published  of  or  concerning  another,  which 
is  false,  and  tends  to  injure  his  reputation 
and  thereby  expose  him  to  public  hatred,  con- 
tempt, scorn,  obloquy,  or  ^hame,  is  "libelous 
per  se."  Woolworth  v.  Star  Co.,  90  N.  Y. 
Supp.  147, 148,  97  App.  Div.  525  (citing  Triggs 
V.  Sun  Printing  ft  Publishing  Co.,  71  N.  B. 
739,  742,  179  N.  Y.  1^4,  153,  66  L.  R.  A. 
612,  103  Am.  St  Rep.  841,  1  Ann.  Cas.  326. 

To  call  a  white  man  a  negro  is  a  *'libel," 
since  it  tends  to  interfere  with  his  social 
relation  with  his  fellow  white  men.  Flood 
V.  News  ft  Courier  Co.,  50  S.  B.  637,  639, 
71  S.  C.  112,  4  Ann.  Cas.  685. 


UULtatoTf  dcflaitiims 

The  California  statute  (Civ.  Code,  i  45) 
defines  "libel"  which  may  be  the  subject  of  a 
dvil  action  for  damages  as  a  false  and  un- 
privileged publication  by  writing,  printing, 
picture,  effigy,  or  other  fixed  representation 
to  the  eye,  which  exposes  any  person  to 
hatred,  contempt,  ridicule,  or  obloquy,  or 
which  causes  him  to  be  shunned  or  avoided, 
or  has  a  tendency  to  injure  him  in  his  oc- 
cupation. Under  this  definition,  malice  is 
not  an  ingredient  of  a  cause  of  action  for  a 
civil  libel,  and  a  recovery  of  full  and  com- 
pensatory damages  may  be  had,  though  ab- 
sence of  malice  is  proved.  Another  provi- 
sion (Pen.  Code,  |  248)  defines  "libel,"  the 
basis  of  a  criminal  prosecution,  to  consist 
of  a  malicious  defamation,  expressed  either 
by  writing,  printing,  signs,  pictures,  or  the 
like,  tending  to  blacken  the  memory  of  one 
who  is  dead,  or  to  impeach  the  honesty, 
integrity,  virtue,  or  reputation,  or  publish 
the  natural  or  alleged  defects  of  one  who 
is  alive,  and  thereby  expose  him  to  public 
hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule.  While  mal- 
ice is  an  essential  element  of  the  offense 
of  libel  80  defined,  prima  fade  proof  of  such 
maUce  is  made  by  evidence  that  an  injurl* 
ous  publication  conGeming  another  has  been 
made  without  Justifiable  motive,  whereupon 
the  law  presumes  malice  sufficient  to  sup- 
port a  criminal  charge,  as  provided  by  sec- 
tion 250.  Davis  v.  Hearst,  116  Pac.  530,  5S1, 
160  Cal.  143. 

The  Idaho  statute  (Rev.  8t  1887,  |  6737) 
defines  "libel"  as  a  malicious  defamation, 
expressed  either  by  writing,  printing,  or  by 
signs  or  pictures,  or  the  like,  tending  to 
blacken  the  memory  of  one  who  is  dead,  or 
to  impeach  the  honesty,  integrity,  virtue,  or 
reputation,  or  publish  the  natural  or  alleged 
defects,  of  one  who  Ib  alive,  and  thereby  to 
expose  him  to  public  hatred,  contempt,  or 
ridicule.  It  is  sufficient  that  the  defamation 
tends  to  impeach  the  honesty,  integrity,  vir- 
tue, or  reputation,  and  thereby  to  expose  sudi 
person  to  public  hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule. 
To  constitute  libel,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  alleged  libelous  matter  charge  the  person 
named  with  a  crime.  State  v.  Sheridan,  93 
Pac.  656,  657,  14  Idaho,  222,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  497. 

Under  the  Colorado  Statute  (Mills'  Ann. 
St  I  1313),  defining  "Ubel"  as  a  malicious 
defamation  expressed  either  by  printing,  or 
by  signs,  or  pictures,  or  the  like,  tiding  to 
blacken  the  memory  of  one  who  is  dead,  or 
to  impeach  the  honesty,  integrity,  virtue,  or 
reputation,  or  publish  the  natural  defects  of 
one  who  is  alive,  and  thereby  to  expose  him 
or  her  to  public  hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule^ 
a  publication  to  be  libelous  must  be  maU- 
cious.  Rocky  Mountain  News  Printing  Oo. 
V.  Frldbom,  104  Pac.  956,  958,  46  Colo.  440, 
24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  891. 

The  Georgia  Statute  defines  "Ubel"  as  a 
false  and  malidous  defamati<m  of  anot^ar, 


UBELi 


IW 


jfimcfM 


repressed  in  print  or  writing,  or  piotarea.  or 
fii^ns,  tending  to  injure  the  repntatioa  of  an 
individnal  and  exposing  him  to  public  hatred, 
contempt,  or  ridicule.  To  falsely  publiah  of 
another  that  there  are  criminal  cases  pending 
against  him  is  libelous  per  se.  Witham  ▼. 
Atlanta  Journal,  53  S.  E.  106,  107,  124  Ga. 
688,  4  L.  R.  A-  (N.  S.)  977. 

Gr.  Ctode,  f  177  (Huid's  Ber.  St  1909,  c 
38),  defines  libel  as  a  malicious  defiimation, 
expressed  either  by  printing  or  by  signs  or 
pictures,  tending  to  impeach  the  honesty,  in- 
tegrity, virtue,  or  reputation,  or  publish  the 
natural  defects  of  one  who  is  alive  and  there- 
by expose  him  to  public  hatred,  contempt, 
ridicule,  or  financial  injury.  A  newspaper 
article  published  by  accused  charging  pros- 
ecutor with  improper  and  dishonest  actions 
as  state's  attorney,  and  with  having  prosti- 
tuted his  office  for  private  interests  and  po* 
litical  purposes,  and  that  he  was  in  collusion 
with  violators  of  the  liquor  law,  that  he  was 
actuated  by  improper  motives  with  reference 
to  an  alleged  bridge  trust,  and  that  there 
was  no  doubt  but  that  such  trust  had  "prov- 
en a  fat  goose  to  some  one,"  that  there  was 
also  good  ground  to  suspect  something  dis- 
honest and  crocked  in  the  matter,  and  that 
it  was  not  prosecutor's  purpose  to  enforce 
the  law,  was  libelous  per  se.  Beople  v. 
Strauch,  98  N.  &  126,  130,  247  IlL  220. 

At  common  law  any  publication  is  a  "li- 
bel*' which  degrades  and  injures  another 
person,  or  brings  him  into  contempt,  hatred, 
or  ridicule,  or  which  accuses  him  of  a  crime, 
punishable  by  law,  or  of  an  act  odious  and 
disgraceful  in  society.  It  is  defined  by  the 
Penal  Code  of  Indiana  to  be  a  malicious 
publication  of  any  false  charge  of  and  con* 
eeming  another,  accusing  such  other  of  any 
degrading  or  infamous  act  Cronin  v.  Zim- 
merman»  88  N.  E.  718,  719,  44  Ind.  App.  118; 
Id.,  90  N.  E.  339.  45  Ind.  App.  712. 

The  Iowa  statute  (Oode,  |  5086),  defines 
libel  as  the  malicious  defamation  of  a  person, 
made  public  by  any  printing,  etc.,  tending  to 
provoke  hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule,  or  to 
deprive  him  of  the  benefit  of  public  confi- 
dence and  social  intercourse.  In  a  criminal 
prosecution  for  libel,  the  information  alleged 
that  defendant  charged  the  prosecutor  with 
scheming  to  disbar  certain  attorneys,  because 
they  acted  as  attorneys  for  a  temperance  or- 
ganization, and  that  he  was  guilty  of  grossly 
unprofessional  conduct  by  testifying  as  a 
witness  while  acting  as  prosecutor  in  the 
disbarment  cases,  and  that  the  prosecution 
was  an  attempt  to  cover  the  record  of  prose- 
cutor as  county  attorney  for  unprofessional 
conduct  before  the  grand  Jury,  and  that  he 
attempted  to  falsify  the  court  record  in  the 
disbarment  proceedings,  and  suppressed  cer- 
tain affidavits  in  the  investigation,  which 
charges  defendant  pubUsbed  in  a  temperance 
paper  edited  by  him.  Held,  that  the  publica- 
tion charged  was  libelous  per  se,  and  it  was 


erroir  to  leave  to  the  jury  the  (luestion  wheth- 
me  it  was  libti.ou8,  as  there  was  no  ambiguity 
in  the  language.  State  v.  Cooper,  116  N.  W. 
691,  692,  188  Iowa,  516. 

The  Kansas  stetute  (section  2271,  Gen. 
St  1901)  defines  a  "libel"  as  a  malicious  def- 
amation of  a  person  made  public  by  any 
printing,  writing,  sign,  picture,  represente- 
tion,  or  efflgy,  tending  to  provoke  him  to 
wrath  or  expose  him  to  public  hatred,  con- 
tempt, or  ridicule,  or  to  deprive  him  of  tiie 
benefite  of  public  confidence  and  social  inter- 
course, or  any  malicious  defamation  made 
public  as  aforesaid,  designed  to  blacken  and 
vilify  the  memoir  of  one  who  is  dead,  and 
tending  to  scandalize  or  provoke  his  surviv- 
ing relatives  and  friends.  To  say  of  a  man 
that  he  is  a  eunuch  is  actionable  per  se.  Eck- 
ert  V.  Van  Pelt,  76  Pac.  909,  910,  69  Kan. 
357,  66  L.  B.  A.  266. 

It  is  libelous  per  se  to  write  of  a  clergy- 
man, an  applicant  for  a  pulpit,  *'I  would  not 
have  anything  to  do  with  him  or  touch  him 
with  a  ten-foot  pole,"  if  the  words  would  ex- 
pose the  person  written  of  to  hatred  or  con- 
tempt, or  injury  to  his  business  or  occupation 
within  the  definition  of  "Ubel"  in  the  Minne- 
sote  statute  (Rev.  Laws  1906„  |  4916).  Dole 
V.  Millspaugh,  126  N.  W.  626,  111  Minn.  159, 
28  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  152,  137  Am.  St  Rep.  546, 
20  Ann.  Out.  717. 

The  Missouri  stetute  (Rev.  St  1899,  S 
2259)  defining  libel  as  a  malicious  defamation 
of  a  person  made  public  by  any  printing, 
writing,  sign,  picture,  etc.,  tending  to  provoke 
him  to  wrath,  or  expose  him  to  public  hatred, 
contempt,  and  ridicule,  etc.,  and  section  2260 
making  the  circulation  of  a  libel  a  misde- 
meanor, made  all  classes  of  libels  misdemean- 
ors and  actionable  per  se,  but  did  not  make 
publications  libelous  that  were  not  so  at  com- 
mon law.  Kenworthy  v.  Journal  Ck).,  93  S. 
W.  882,  885,  117  Mo.  App.  327.  Under  the 
stetute  of  this  state  (Rev.  St  1899,  f§  2260, 
2863;  Ann.  St  1906,  pp.  1426,  1637),  declar- 
ing that  one  publishing  a  libel  shall  be  guilty 
of  a  misdemeanor,  and  providing  that  it  is 
actionable  to  publish  falsely  that  any  person 
has  been  guilty  of  adultery,  it  is  libel  to  al- 
lege in  a  circular  printed  and  published  that 
one  has  committed  adultery.  Stete  v.  Sant- 
huflr,  110  S.  W.  624,  626,  131  Mo.  App.  620. 
The  stetute  of  this  stete  (Rev.  St  1909,  | 
4818)  defining  a  libel  as  the  maUdous  def- 
amation of  a  person  by  printing  so  as  to 
expose  him  to  public  hatred,  contempt,  or 
ridicule,  though  a  part  of  the  Criminal  Ck)de, 
is  applicable  to  dvil  actions,  and,  under  it  a 
newspaper  article  steting  that  plaintiff  was 
served  with  a  summons  in  an  alleged  fraudu- 
lent cattie  transaction,  and  that  he  had  tok- 
en advantege  of  the  banKruptcy  law  to  es- 
cape liability,  is  libelous  per  se.  Sotham  v. 
Drovers'  Telegram  CO.,  144  8.  W.  428,  431, 
239  Mo.  606.  Under  this  stetute  the  publica- 
tion, without  consent,  of  the  picture  of  a 


XilBBL 


in 


dklld  five  years  old,  with  the  false  statement 
that  "Papa  Is  going  to  buy  mamTna  an  Blgtai 
watch  for  a  present,  and  some  one  (I  must 
not  tell  who)  Is  going  to  buy  my  big  sister  a 
diamond  ring,  so  don't  yon  think  you  ought 
to  buy  me  something?"  as  an  advertisement 
In  aid  to  business,  Is  libelous,  as  exposing 
the  child  to  ridicule.  Munden  y.  Harris,  134 
S.  W.  1076, 1081,  153  Mo.  App.  G52. 

Under  the  Montana  statute  defining  '^li- 
b^"  as  a  false  and  unprivileged  publication 
in  writing,  printing,  picture,  efllgy,  or  other 
fixed  r^reeentation  to  the  eye  whldti  exposes 
any  person  to  hatred,  contempt,  ridicule^  or 
obloquy,  or  which  causes  him  to  be  shunned  or 
avoided,  or  which  has  a  tendency  to  injure 
him  In  his  occupation,  the  existence  of  malice 
is  not  a  necessary  ingredient  to  entitle  plain- 
tUf  to  recover.  Paxton  v.  Woodward,  78  Pac 
215,  217,  31  Mont  195,  107  Am.  St  Bep.  416, 
3  Ann.  Gas.  546. 

The  Penal  Law  of  New  Tork  (OonsoL 
Laws,  a  40)  I  1346,  provides  that  an  indict- 
ment for  a  libel  contained  in  a  newspaper 
published  in  the  state  against  a  resident 
thereof  may  be  found  In  the  county  where 
the  paper  was  published  or  In  the  county 
where  the  person  libeled  resided  when  the 
offense  was  committed,  and  section  1847  pro- 
vides that  in  libel  against  a  nonresident  the 
indictment  shall  be  found  and  the  trial  had 
at  the  place  where  the  paper  containing  the 
libel  purports  on  its  face  to  be  published,  or, 
if  no  county  Is  Indicated  thereon,  in  any 
county  where  the  paper  Is  circulated.  Code 
Cr.  Proc.  1 138,  contained  substantially  simi- 
lar provisions  relating  to  the  place  of  Indict- 
ment and  trial  where  the  person  libeled  is  a 
resident  and  nonresident  Penal  Law,  | 
1340,  defines  libel  as  a  malicious  publication 
by  writing,  printing,  etc.,  which  exposes  any 
living  person  to  contempt,  etc.  Held,  that 
the  purpose  of  sections  1346  and  1347  was  to 
designate  the  place  of  Indictment  and  trial, 
and  not  to  define  libel;  and  hence  do  not 
limit  the  operation  of  section  1340  by  exclud- 
ing books  or  writings  other  than  newspapers, 
and,  under  the  latter  section,  as  well  as  at 
common  law,  one  could  be  prosecuted  for  a 
libel  published  in  a  book  in  this  state,  though 
committed  against  a  nonresident  People  v. 
Fomaro,  119  N.  Y.  Supp.  746,  748,  65  Misc. 
Rep.  457. 

The  North  Dakota  statute  (Rev.  Codes 
1899,  §  2715)  defines  "Ubel"  as  "a  false  and 
unprivileged  publication  by  writing,  printing, 
picture,  effigy,  or  other  fixed  representation 
to  the  eye,  which  exposes  any  person  to  ha- 
tred, contempt,  ridicule,  or  obloquy,  or  which 
causes  him  to  be  shunned  or  avoided,  or 
which  has  a  tendency  to  Injure  him  in  his 
occupation."  If  the  language  of  an  alleged 
libel  is  fairly  susceptible  of  a  construction 
which  renders  it  defamatory,  the  complaint 
states  a  cause  of  action.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  render  the  words  defamatory  and  action- 


able that  they  shall  make  the  diarge  in  di- 
rect terms.  Lauder  v.  Jones,  101  N.  W. 
907,  9U,  18  N.  D.  625. 

The  statute  (Rev.  Codes  1905,  |  8877)  de- 
fines "criminal  Ubel"  as  "the  maUdous  def- 
amation of  a  person  made  public  by  any  prints 
Ing,  writing,  sign,  picture,  r^utation  or  effigy 
tending  to  expose  him  to  public  hatred,  con- 
tempt or  ridicule,  or  to  deprive  him  of  the 
benefits  of  public  confidence  or  social  inters 
course.  •  «  •»»  And  the f oUowlng sectl<m 
provides  that:  "Every  person  who  makes  or 
composes,  dictates  or  procures  the  same  to 
be  done  or  who  willfully  publishes  or  circu- 
lates such  libel  or  in  any  way  knowingly  or 
willfully  aids  or  assists  in  making,  publish- 
ing or  circulating  the  same  is  guilty  of  a 
felony."  The  gist  of  the  crime  Is  the  mali- 
cious defamaticm  of  a  person  made  public  in 
one  or  more  of  the  modes  prescribed  and 
tending  to  expose  such  person  to  public  ha- 
tred, contempt,  or  ridicule,  etc  State  v.  Td- 
ley,  186  N.  W.  784,  786,  23  N.  D.  284. 

It  is  not  necessary,  In  order  to  render  a 
publication  libelous,  that  it  should  charge 
any  crime  or  public  offense,  inasmuch  as  the 
South  Dakota  statute  (Giv.  Code,  |  29)  defines 
"libel"  as  a  false  and  unprivileged  publica- 
tion, by  writing,  printing,  picture,  effigy,  or 
other  fixed  representation  to  the  eye,  which 
exposes  any  person  to  hatred,  contempt,  ridi- 
cule, or  obloquy,  or  which  causes  him  to  be 
shunned  or  avoided,  or  which  has  a  tendency 
to  injure  him  In  his  occupation.  Barron  v. 
Smith,  101  N.  W.  1106,  1106,  19  S.  D.  50; 
Nichols  V.  Smith,  102  N.  W.  1135,  19  S.  D. 
159. 

The  Texas  statute  (Acts  1901,  p.  30,  c. 
26)  defining  a  "libel"  as  a  defamation  tending 
to  blacken  the  memory  of  the  dead  or  to  in- 
jure the  living,  or  expose  him  to  public  ha- 
tred, contempt,  ridicule,  or  financial  injury, 
or  to  Impeach  his  honesty  and  Integrity,  etc. 
Includes  any  case  which,  in  the  absence  of 
statute,  was  libelous  at  common  law,  and 
a  publication  directly  Impeaching  one's  in- 
tegrity and  truthfulness  is  libelous  per  se. 
Fleming  v.  Mattlnson,  114  S.  W.  650,  652,  52 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  476.  In  view  of  this  statute, 
words  libelous  per  se  and  from  the  publica- 
tion of  which  damages  are  implied  as  a  mat- 
ter of  law  are  such  words  as  tend  to  expose 
one  to  public  hatred  or  disgrace  or  vilify  him 
or  injure  his  character.  Allen  v.  Blarnest 
(Tex.)  145  S.  W.  1101,  1103. 

Under  Pen.  Code,  art  721,  declaring  that 
he  iB  guilty  of  "Ubel"  who,  with  intent  to 
injure,  makes,  publishes,  or  circulates  any 
malicious  statement  affecting  the  reputation 
of  another  as  to  any  matter  or  thing  pointed 
out  in  the  chapter,  and  article  727  declaring 
that  the  written,  printed,  or  published  state- 
ment, to  come  within  the  definition  of  "libel," 
must  convey  the  idea  that  the  pers<Hi  to 
whom  it  refers  has  been  guilty  of  some  penal 
offense,  eta,  it  was  held  that  an  indictment 


LIBSi; 


107 


LIBSL 


for  Ubel,  alleging  that  defendant  published 
a  malicious  statement  concerning  complain- 
ant, reciting  that  he  was  a  United  States  fed- 
eral gaard,  that  he  was  a  highwayman  and 
cowardly  assassin,  and  the  murderer  of  a  cer- 
tain person  who  on  the  morning  of  March  19, 
1906,  was  cowardly  assassinated  on  a  public 
highway,  etc,  sufficiently  charged  complain- 
ant with  a  penal  offense,  and  was  therefore 
sufficient.  Gonzalez  v.  State,  124  S.  W.  937, 
938,  58  Tex.  Or.  B.  141. 

The  Texas  statute  (Rev.  dr.  St  1911, 
art.  5595),  defining  a  libel  as  a  defamation 
expressed  In  printing  or  writing  tending  to 
Injnre  the  repotation  of  a  person  and  expose 
him  to  public  hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule, 
or  to  Impeadi  his  honesty,  Int^g^ty,  or  yir- 
toe,  modifies  the  common-law  rule  as  to 
libel  and  slander,  and  a  publication  is  libelous 
whether  it  is  libelous  per  se  or  not;  it  being 
sufficient  if  it  can  be  shown  by  innuendo  that 
the  matter  imputed  had  the  tendency  de- 
scribed in  the  statute  and  had  reference  to 
tbe  plaintiff.  Guisti  r.  Galveston  Tribune, 
150  S.  W.  874,  876,  105  Tex.  497. 

A  "Oibel,"  as  defined  by  the  Washington 
statute,  is  the  defamation  of  a  person  made 
public  by  any  words,  printing,  writing,  sign, 
picture,  representation,  or  effigy  tending  to 
provoke  him  to  wrath,  or  expose  him  to  pub- 
lic hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule,  or  to  de- 
prive him  of  the  benefits  of  public  confidence 
and  social  intercourse,  or  any  defamation, 
made  public  as  aforesaid,  designed  to 
blacken  and  vilify  the  memory  of  one  who 
is  dead,  and  tending  to  scandalise  or  provoke 
his  surviving  relatives  or  frienda  Reynolds 
V.  HoUand,  90  Pac.  648,  650,  46  Wash.  537; 
Chambers  v.  Leiser,  86  Paa  627,  628,  43 
Wash.  285,  10  Ann.  Cas.  270;  State  v.  Mays, 
107  Pac.  368,  866,  57  Wash.  640.  And  where 
a  newspaper  published  an  article  stating 
that  plaintiffs  father  had  been  charged  with 
using  the  mails  to  defraud  in  selling  land, 
and  would  be  arrested,  giving  the  details  of 
the  fraudulent  operations,  and  published  a 
photograph  of  the  members  of  his  family, 
including  plaintiff,  his  young  daughter,  the 
publication  of  plaintiff's  photograph  in  con- 
nection with  the  article  concerning  her  fa- 
ther was  not  a  "libel,"  within  this  statute. 
miiman  v.  Star  Pub.  Co.,  117  Pac.  594,  596, 
64  Wash.  691,  35  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  595.  As 
tUs  statute  does  not  expressly  make  malice 
an  ingredient  of  libel,  a  publication  which 
tends  to  expose  a  person  to  public  hatred, 
contempt,  or  ridicule  is  libelous,  without  re- 
gard to  the  existence  of  actual  malice. 
Byrne  v.  Funk,  80  Pac.  772,  774,  88  Wash. 
606^  8  Ann.  Gas.  647.  And  so,  where  there 
has  been  an  unwarranted  publication  in  a 
newspaper  of  a  list  of  conditional  sales  made 
by  a  retail  dealer  taken  from  memoranda 
legally  filed  by  him  with  the  county  auditor, 
the  dealer  to  charge  a  criminal  libel  under 
Rem.  &  BaL  Gode,  |  2424,  defining  libel  as  a 


malicious  publication  exposing  any  person 
to  hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule,  or  injuring 
him  in  his  business,  must  allege  facts  to 
show  that  the  publication  produced  such  re- 
sults. State  V.  Darwin,  115  Pac.  309,  311, 
63  Wash.  803,  33  L.  R.  A  (N.  SO  1026. 
IaJ«rj  to  bwsimass  or  trade 

To  be  libelous,  as  tending  to  injure  one 
in  his  business  or  profession,  the  words  must 
have  a  direct  tendency  to  hurt,  as  in  the  case 
of  a  charge  of  incapacity,  dishonesty  or  in- 
solvency. T^  publish  concerning  a  lawyer 
that  he  was  thrown  into  Jail  by  a  magistrate 
without  a  chance  to  tell  his  side  of  the 
case  on  the  complaint  of  a  woman  for  whom 
he  had  collected  a  debt,  and  from  which 
amount  of  money  collected  he  had  deducted 
only  the  legal  percentage  for  collection,  was 
not  "libelous,"  since  tbe  only  fair  import 
was  that  the  lawyer  was  wrongfully  thrown 
into  Jail  which  could  not  refieet  upon  his 
previous  conduct,  capacity,  or  character  and 
did  not  tend  to  injure  him  in  his  profession. 
Hughes  V.  New  York  Evening  Post,  100  N.  Y. 
Supp.  982,  984, 115  App.  Div.  611. 

Any  written  words  are  ''libelous"  which 
in  any  manner  are  prejudicial  to  another 
in  the  way  of  his  employment  or  trade.  In 
a  publication  referring  to  plaintiff  twice  as 
a  detective,  and  stating  that,  when  plaintiff 
was  attacked  by  robbcl^s,  he  showed  great 
cowardice  and  attempted  to  hide  under  the 
seat  of  the  vehicle,  the  tendency  of  the 
words  was  to  hold  him  up  to  scorn  as  a 
detective^  and  was  "libelous."  Holland  v. 
FUck,  61  AU.  828,  829,  212  Pa.  201. 

Ckmstmettoaa  of  laMCwage 

The  fact  that  an  alleged  libelous  article 
uses  a  slang  word  upon  which  its  libelous 
character  depends  does  not  render  the  ar- 
ticle any  the  less  libelous,  provided  the  word 
used  has  a  well-recognised  meaning,  or  by 
the  article  itself  is  given  a  meaning  which 
conveys  to  the  reader  the  understanding  that 
the  word  is  used  so  as  to  impeach  the  hon- 
esty or  reputation  of  the  person  named  and 
expose  him  to  public  hatred,  contempt,  or 
ridicule.  State  v.  Sheridan,  93  Pac.  656,  657, 
14  Idaho,  222,  15  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  497. 

In  a  published  statement,  referring  to 
plaintiff,  a  candidate  for  public  office,  that 
"no  man  in  the  community  has  any  interest 
in  seeing  the  county  disgraced  by  sending 
a  'social  lej;^  to  qpeak  and  act  f6r  her  in 
public  councils,"  the  term  "social  leper"  may 
mean  that  his  moral  traits  of  character  are 
such  as  to  require  his  banishment  from  so- 
ciety, and,  if  there  Is  an  inducement  and 
innuendo,  which,  fairly  interpreted,  would 
give  this  meaning,  may  be  "libelous." 
Sweeney  v.  Baker,  IB  W.  Va.  158,  198,  81 
Am.  Rep.  757. 

Defendant  wrote  and  published  a  letter 
to  tbe  mayor  of  New  York,  stating  that  de- 
fendant had  written  a  letter  to  the  Qovemoc 


UBBL 


108 


XJB1SL 


to  get  redress  "Yor  the  sconndrelism"  herein- 
after mentioned  throngh  the  power  of  re- 
moval of  city  officials,  but  on  second  thought 
concluded  to  seek  redress  from  the  mayor. 
He  then  proceeded  to  make  complaint  against 
plaintiff  as  police  commissioner  for  alleged 
Incompetency  and  lawlessness  in  the  admin- 
istration of  the  police  force  of  New  York; 
the  scoundrelism  referred  to  being  plaintiff's 
refusal  as  police  commissioner  to  remove  the 
photograph  and  record  of  a  certain  boy  from 
the  Rogues'  Gallery;  plaintiff  being  the  only 
one  defendant  was  complaining  of,  and  his 
removal  from  office  being  the  only  redress 
sought  Held,  that  the  word  "scoundrelism" 
referred  to  plaintiff  with  sufficient  certainty, 
and  was  libelous  per  se.  Bingham  v.  Gaynor, 
126  N.  Y.  Supp.  363,  360,  141  App.  DIt.  301. 

Imputation  of  orimo 

Whai  a  newspaper  published  a  news 
article  stating  that,  within  15  minutes  after 
the  discovery  of  the  body  of  plaintiff's  wife, 
plaintiff  had  a  quarrel  with  the  undertaker, 
who  had  been  called  by  her  sister,  and 
threatened  to  kill  the  undertaker  unless  he' 
left  the  house,  since  the  publication  repre- 
sented, in  effect,  that  plaintiff  threatened 
to  kill  another  in  a  passion,  without  Just 
cause,  it  would  necessarily  bring  him  into 
contempt  and  hatred  so  as  to  make  the  pub- 
lication actionable  llbeL  Gordon  v.  New 
York  Evening  Journal  Pub.  Co.,  Ill  N.  Y. 
Supp.  574,  575,  127  App.  Div.  353. 

Imputation  of  deatb 

It  is  libelous  per  se  to  publish  of  a  living 
person  that  he  is  dead,  because,  exposing 
him  to  ridicule;  a  libel  being  a  malicious 
publication  tending  to  expose  one  to  public 
hatred,  contempt,  or  ridicule.  Cohen  v.  New 
York  Times  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  Supp.  1,  74  Misc. 
Rep.  618. 

MaUoe 

A  publication  tending  to  expose  one  to 
contempt,  ridicule,  hatred,  and  derogation  of 
character,  if  malicious,  is  "libelous."  Mul- 
derig  V.  Wilkes-Barre  Times,  64  Atl.  636, 
637,  215  Pa.  470,  114  Am.  St  Rep.  967. 

As  misdemeanor 

See  Misdemeanor. 

As  personal  injnry 

See  Personal  Injury. 
Slander  distingnislied 

Included  in  slander  by  writing  or  speak- 
ing, see  Slander  by  Writing  or  Speak- 
ing. 

A  "libel"  differs  from  a  "slander"  in 
that  a  publication  may  be  libelous  when,  if 
spoken  orally,  it  would .  not  be  slanderous. 
This  distinction  is  said  by  the  books  to  be 
based  upon  the  grounds  that  a  vocal  utter- 
ance does  not  import  the  same  quality  of 
deliberation,  and  Is  more  prone  to  be  the 
ebullition  of  mere  effervescence  or  lack  of 
mental  equipoise,  and  to  be  accepted  as  in- 


dicative of  feeling,  rather  than  of  conTictloii, 
and  therefore  not  so  much  gravity  is  al- 
lowed to  it  as  to  words  deliberately  written 
down  and  published;  the  latter  justifying 
the  inference  that  they  are  the  expression  of 
settled  conviction  and  affect  the  public  mind 
correspondingly.  So,  too,  an  oral  charge 
merely  falls  upon  the  ear,  and  the  agency 
of  the  wrongdoer  in  inflicting  injury  comes 
to  an  end  when  his  utterance  has  died  on 
the  ear,  but  not  so  with  the  written  or 
printed  charge,  which  may  pass  from  hand 
to  hand  ludefinitely,  and  may  renew  its 
youth,  so  to  speak,  as  a  defamation  as  long 
as  the  libel  itself  remains  in  existence,  and 
hatch  a  new  crop  of  slanders,  to  be  blown 
hither  and  yon  like  thistledown  at  every 
sight  of  the  libel,  so  that  a  printed  slander, 
when  published,  takes  a  wider  and  more 
mischievous  range  than  mere  oral  defama- 
tion, and  is  more  reprehensible  in  the  eye  of 
the  law.  Cooley,  Torts  (2d  Ed.)  240;  Odgers, 
L.  &  Sland.  (2d  Ed.)  3;  Dexter  v.  Spear, 
7  Fed.  Cas.  624,  4  Mason,  115.  Thus^  for 
instance,  to  publish  of  a  man  that  he  is  a 
"skunk"  (Massuere  v.  Dickens,  35  N.  W.  349, 
70  Wis.  83),  a  "swine"  (Solverson  v.  Peter- 
son, 25  N.  W.  14,  64  Wis.  198,  54  Am.  Rep. 
607),  a  "drunkard,"  a  "cuckold,"  a  -tory" 
(Giles  V.  State,  6  Ga.  276),  "I  look  on  him 
as  a  rascal"  (Williams  v.  Karnes,  4  Humph. 
[28  Tenn.]  9),  "an  imp  of  the  devil  and  a 
cowardly  snail"  (Price  ▼.  Whitely,  50  Mo. 
439),  or  that  he  has  been  "in  collusion  with 
ruffians"  (Snyder  v.  Fulton,  84  Md.  128,  6 
Am.  Rep.  314),  are  each  and  all  libelous. 
Ukman  v.  Dally  Record  Co.,  88  S.  W.  60,  64, 
189  Mo.  378  (citing  Nelson  v.  Musgrave,  10 
Mo.  648;  Hermann  v.  Bradstreet  Co.,  19  Mo. 
App.  227;  Manget  v.  O'Neill,  51  Mo.  App.  35). 

"Libel"  is  a  published  writing,  picture, 
or  similar  production  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  immediately  tend  to  do  mischief  to  a 
party,  or  injure  the  character  of  an  in- 
dividual. Slander  of  title  is  a  false  and 
malicious  statement,  whether  by  word  of 
mouth  or  in  writing,  In  reference  to  a  person's 
title  to  som^  right  or  property  belonging  to 
him,  as  where  a  person  alleges  that  the 
plaintiff  has  a  defective  title  to  land.  A 
written  slander  of  title  Is  sometimes  called 
a  libel  in  the  nature  of  slander  of  title. 
Words,  though  not  slanderous  in  themselves, 
yet  if  published  in  writing,  tending  in  any 
way  to  the  discredit  of  a  man,  are  "libel." 
Macurda  v.  Globe  Newspaper  Co.,  165  Fed. 
104,  107  (citing  Bacon's  Abridgement  and 
Rapalje). 

Written  or  printed  matter  which  Is  com- 
municated to  third  persons  stands  on  a  dif- 
ferent footing  from  spoken  words,  and  is  often 
actionable  when  it  wduld  not  be  if  spoken, 
and  if  it  is  of  a  character  conducive  to 
blacken  the  reputation  of  the  person  referred 
to,  or  excite  ridicule  or  wrath  against  him, 
or  destroy  public  confidence  in  him,  H  U 


jTtm^f 


IM 


UBSBTT 


actionable  without  proof  of  special  damagea, 
because  written  or  printed  Injuriona  state- 
ments about  a  person  imply  a  deliberate  pur- 
pose to  do  harm,  whereas  detrimental  wcwds 
are  often  spoken  thoughtlessly  or  in  a  pas- 
sion. Wei^t  is  allowed,  also^  to  the  more 
enduring  character  and  wider  vogue  of  pub- 
lished statements.  Farley  ▼.  Eyening  Chron- 
icle Pub.  Ck)..  87  a  W.  665,  008,  113  Mo. 
App.  216  (citing  Odgen^  U  *  Sland.  [4th 
Ed.]  p.  4). 

As  trespass 

See  Trespass. 

LIBERAL 

LTBEBAIi  OOHSTKirOTXOir 

Strict  construction  distinguidied»  see 
Strict  Construction. 

UBEBAIiITT 

See  Salvage. 

LIBERTIES 

See  Indecent  UbertiflSi 

LIBERTY 

See  Abuse  of  liberty;  Oivll  Uberty; 
Constitutional  Uberty;  IndiTidnal  lib- 
erty; life,  liberty,  and  Property; 
life,  liberty,  and  Pursuit  of  Happi- 
ness; Personal  liberty;  Restrained 
and  Deprived  of  liberty. 

Bestrained  of  liberty,  see  Bestrain. 

The  term  "Uberty"  includes  the  Individu- 
al righta  of  dtisenship  and  its  privileges. 
State  ex  reL  Ouion  r.  llUes,  100  S.  W.  695, 
610,  210  Mo.  127. 

One  definition  of  'liberties"  is  privUeges 
or  licenses  taken  in  violation  of  the  laws  or 
propriety.  Dekelt  v.  People,  09  Pac.  880,  881, 
44  Colo.  525  (adopting  definition  in  Webst 
Wet). 

"liberty,"  in  its  broad  sense,  means  the 
right,  not  only  of  freedom  from  servitude, 
imprisonment,  or  restraint,  but  the  right  of 
one  to  use  his  faculties  in  all  lawful  ways,  to 
live  and  work  where  he  will,  to  earn  his  live- 
lihood in  any  lawful  calling,  and  to  pursue 
any  lawful  trade  or  avocation.  Wyatt  v. 
James  McCreery  Co.,  Ill  N.  T.  8.  86,  88,  126 
App.  Div.  660  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  Fisher  Co.  v.  Woods,  70  N.  B.  886, 187 
N.  Y.  90, 12  Ii.  R.  A.  [N.  8.]  707) ;  Health  De- 
partment of  CSty  of  New  York  v.  Rector,  etc., 
of  Trinity  Church,  89  N.  B.  888,  145  N.  Y. 
32,  27  L.  R.  A.  710,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  579; 
People  V.  Ginson,  17  N.  B.  348,  109  N.  Y. 
889,  4  Am.  Bt  Rep.  466;  Colon  v.  lisk,  47 
N.  EL  802,  153  N.  Y.  188,  69  Am.  St  Rep.  609; 
Lawton  V.  Steele,  14  Sup.  Ct.  489,  162  U.  &, 
133,  38  L.  Ed.  885;  People  ex  rel.  Tyn^r  v. 
Warden  of  City  Prison,  51  N.  Bw  1006,  167 
N.  Y.  116,  48  L.  R.  A.  264,  68  Am.  St  Rep. 


768;  Stoart  v.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.  188,  80  Am. 
Rep.  289;  Oilman  v.  Tucker,  28  N.  B.  1040, 
128  N.  Y.  190,  200,  18  L.  R.  A.  804,  26  Am.  St 
Rep.  464;  Frank  L.  Flaher  Co.  v.  Woods,  79 
N.  B.  837,  187  N.  Y.  90.  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
707. 

"Liberty,"  in  its  broad  sense,  means  the 
right  not  only  of  freedom  from  actual  re- 
straint of  the  person  but  the  right  of  such 
use  of  his  faculties  in  all  lawful  ways  to 
live  and  work  where  he  will,  to  earn  his  live- 
lihood in  any  lawful  calling,  and  to  pursue 
any  lawful  trade  or  avocation.  All  laws, 
therefore,  which  impair  or  trammel  those 
rights  or  restrict  his  freedom  of  action  or  his 
choice  of  methods  In  the  transaction  of  his 
lawful  business  are  infringement  upon  his 
fundamental  right  of  "liberty"  and  are  void. 
People  V.  Lochner,  69  N.  B.  878,  386,  177  N. 
Y.  145,  101  Am.  St  Rep.  773. 

The  "liberty*'  guaranteed  by  the  four- 
teenth amendment  of  the  federal  Constitu- 
tion against  derivation  without  due  process 
of  law  Is  a  liberty  of  natural,  not  artificial, 
persona  Western  Turf  Ass*n  v.  Greenberg, 
27  Sup.  Ct  884,  886^  204  U.  S.  359,  61  L.  Bd. 
520. 

"liberty"  includes  not  only  the  right  to 
be  out  of  prison,  free  to  come  and  go,  If  the 
law  is  not  violated  in  so  doing,  but  to  en- 
gage in  all  lawful  pursuits,  earn  a  livelihood, 
and  own  and  enjoy  property.  To  exclude 
from  entry  into  the  United  States,  or  to  de- 
port therefrom,  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
deprives  him  of  liberty  in  the  constitutional 
sense.    In  re  Sing  Tuck,  126  Fed.  886,  894. 

Const  U.  S.  Amend.  14,  and  Const.  R.  I. 
art  1,  i  10,  providing  that  no  person  shall  be 
derived  of  "liberty"  without  due  process  of 
law,  were  borrowed  from  the  thirty-ninth  ar- 
ticle of  the  Great  Charter,  declaring  that  no 
free  man  shall  be  taken  or  Imprisoned,  or 
disseised,  or  outlawed  or  punished  or  in  any 
ways  destroyed,  nor  "will  we  pass  upon  him, 
or  send  upon  him,  unless  by  legal  judgment 
of  his  peers,  or  by  the  law  of  the  land";  the 
words  corresponding  to  "liberty"  in  the  first 
pronouncement  being-  **taken,**  "Imprisoned," 
"outlawed,"  and  "punished,"  which  are  not 
confined  to  mere  freedom  from  incarceration 
or  imprisonment  Henry  v.  Cherry  St  Webb, 
73  Att.  97,  107,  80  R.  I.  13,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  991,  186  Am.  St  Rep.  928,  18  Ann.  Cas. 
1006. 

The  word  "liberty,"  as  used  in  Const, 
art  2,  providing  that  no  person  shall  be  de- 
prived of  life,  liberty,  or  property  except  by 
due  process  of  law,  means  not  only  the  right 
to  freedom  from  actual  servitude,  imprison- 
ment, or  restraint,  but  the  right  of  one  to  use 
his  faculties  in  all  lawful  ways,  to  live  and 
work  where  he  will,  to  earn  his  livelihood 
in  any  lawful  calling,  and  to  puvsoe  any  law- 
ful trade  or  vocation.  State  ex  rel.  Oalle  v. 
City  of  New  Orleans,  86  South.  ^999,  1001,  113 
La.  ^71,  67  L.  R.  A.  70,  2  Ann.  Cas.  92  (dt- 


LIBERTY 


110 


LIBSRTT 


lug  In  re  Jacobs,  08  N.  T.  98,  50  Am.  B^. 

"By  the  term  'liberty/  as  used  In  the  pro- 
vision [Fourteenth  Amendment],  something 
more  is  meant  than  mere  freedom  from  phys- 
ical restraint  or  the  bounds  of  a  prison.  It 
means  freedom  to  go  where  one  may  choose, 
and  to  act  in  such  manner,  not  inconsistent 
with  the  equal  rights  of  others,  as  his  judg- 
ment may  dictate  for  the  promotion  of  his 
happiness;  that  is,  to  pursue  such  callings 
and  avocations  as  may  be  most  suitable  to 
develop  his  capacities,  and  give  to  them  their 
highest  enjoyment."  Powell  v.  Pennsylvania, 
8  Sup.  Ot  992,  1269,  127  U.  S.  678,  32  L.  Ed. 
263  (Field,  J.,  dissenting). 

"The  Uberty  of  which  the  fburteenth 
amendment  forbids  a  state  from  depriving 
any  one  without  due  prooess  of  law  is  some- 
thing more  than  freedom  from  the  enslave- 
ment of  the  body  or  from  physical  restraint 
In  my  judgment  the  words  'life,  liberty  or 
property*  in  the  fourteenth  amendment  should 
be  interpreted  as  embracing  every  right  that 
may  be  brous^t  within  judicial  cognizance, 
and  therefore  no  right  of  that  kind  can  be 
taken  in  violation  of  'due  process  of  law.'" 
Taylor  v.  Beckham,  20  Sup.  Ct  890,  1016,  178 
U.  S.  548,  44  Ii.  Bd.  1187  (Harlan,  X,  dissent- 
ing). 

"The  term  'liberty,'  as  protected  by  the 
Constitution,  is  not  cramped  into  a  mere 
freedom  from  physical  restraint  of  the  per- 
son of  the  citizen,  as  by  incarceration,  but  it 
is  deemed  to  embrace  the  right  of  man  to  be 
free  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  faculties  with 
which  he  has  been  endowed  by  his  Creator, 
subject  only  to  such  restraints  as  are  neces- 
sary for  the  common  welfare."  MacMullen 
7,  City  of  Middletown,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  146, 
149,  112  App.  Dlv.  81  (quoting  Rapallo,  J.,  in 
Pe<^le  V.  Marx,  2  N.  B.  29,  99  N.  Y.  877,  52 
Am.  Rep.  84). 

"'liberty,'  in  the  sense  in  which  the 
term  is  employed  in  the  Constitution,  is  not 
restricted  to  mere  freedom  from  imprison- 
ment, but  it  embraces  the  right  of  a  person 
to  use  his  God-given  powers,  employ  his  fac- 
ulties, exercise  his  judgment  in  the  affairs 
of  life,  and  to  be  free  in  the  enjoyment  and 
disposal  of  his  acquisitions,  subject  only  to 
such  restraints  as  are  imposed  by  the  law  of 
the  land  for  the  public  welfare.  The  word 
'liberty,'  as  thus  c^mployed  in  the  Constitu- 
tions and  understood  in  the  United  States,  is 
a  term  of  comprehensive  scope.  It  embraces 
not  only  freedom  from  servitude  and  from 
imprisonment  and  arbitrary  restraint  of  per- 
son, but  also  all  our  religious,  civil,  political, 
and  personal  rights,  including  the  right  in 
each  subject  to  purchase,  hold,  and  sell  or 
dispose  of  iHToperty  in  the  same  way  that  his 
neighbor  may;  and  of  such  liberties  no  one 
can  be  deprived  except  by  due  process  of 
law."    Block  T.  Schwartz,  76  Pac  22,  26»  27 


Utah»  887,  66  L.  R.  A.  308,  101  Am.  St.Bep. 
971, 1  Ann.  Cas.  660. 

The  word  "liberty,"  as  used  in  the  con- 
stitutional guaranty  against  deprivation  of 
liberty,  means  the  right,  not  only  to  freedom 
from  actual  servitude,  imprisonment,  or  re- 
straint, but  the  right  of  one  to  use  his  fac- 
ulties in  all  lawful  ways,  to  live  and  work 
where  he  will,  to  earn  his  livelihood  In  any 
lawful  calling,  and  to  pursue  any  lawful 
trade  or  vocation.  City  of  New  Orleans  v. 
Smythe,  41  South,  33,  36»  U6  La.  686,  6  K 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  722,  144  Am.  St  Rep.  666  (cit- 
ing In  re  Jacobs,  98  N.  Y.  98,  60  Am.  Rep. 
636;  People  v.  Marx,  2  N.  E.  29,  62  Am. 
Rep.  34,  99  N.  Y.  386;  Bx  parte  Virginia, 
100  U.  8.  339^  26  L.  Bd.  676), 

By  the  term  "liberty,"  as  used  in  the 
fourteenth  amendment  to  the  federal  0>nsti- 
tutlon,  something  more  is  meant  than  mere 
freedom  from  physical  restraint  or  the 
bounds  of  a  prison.  It  means  freedom  to 
go  where  one  may  choose,  and  1^  act  in  such 
manner,  not  inconsistent  with  the  egual 
rights  of  others,  as  his  judgment  may  dictate 
for  the  promotion  of  his  happiness;  that  is, 
to  pursue  such  callings  and  avocations  as 
may  be  most  suitable  to  develop  his  capac^ 
itles  and  give  to  them  their  highest  enjoy- 
ment Kansas  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  Haskell, 
172  Fed.  646,  666  (dting  Munn  T.  XUinois,  94 
U.  S.  118,  24  L.  Ed.  77). 

The  "liberty"  mentioned  in  the  four- 
teenth amendment  of  the  Ck)nstitution  of  the 
United  States  means  not  only  the  right  of 
the  citizen  to  be  free  from  the  mere  physical 
restraint  of  his  person,  as  by  Incaroeration, 
but  the  term  is  deemed  to  embrace  the  right 
of  the  citizen  to  be  free  in  the  employment 
of  all  his  faculties;  to  be  free  to  use  them  in 
all  lawful  ways;  to  live  and  work  where  he 
will;  to  earn  his  livelihood  by  any  lawful 
calling.  It  is  a  part  of  every  man's  civil 
right  that  he  be  left  at  liberty  to  refuse 
business  relations  with  any  person  whomso- 
ever, whether  the  refusal  rests  upon  reason, 
or  is  the  result  of  whim,  caprice,  prejudice, 
or  malice.  Bx  parte  Drayton,  163  Fed.  986, 
989  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  AU- 
geyer  v.  State  of  Louisiana,  17  Sup.  Ct  431, 
165  U.  S.  589,  41  L.  Ed.  832;  Cooley,  Torts, 
p.  278). 

"The  term  'liberty,'  as  used  in  the  Con- 
stitution, is  not  dwarfed  into  mere  freedom 
from  physical  restraint  of  the  person  of  the 
citizen,  as  by  Incarceration*  but  is  deemed 
to  embrace  the  right  of  man  to  be  free  in 
the  enjoyment  of  the  faculties  with  which  he 
has  be^i  endowed  by  his  Creator,  subject 
only  to  such  restraints  as  are  necessary  for 
the  common  welfare."  It  Is  not  every  equal 
law  which  is  a  just  law,  but,  within  limits,  it 
may  be  said  that  equality  Is  an  attribute  of 
liberty.  McKlnster  v.  Sager,  72  N.  B.  864, 
867,  163  Ind.  671,  68  I/.  R.  A.  273,  106  Am. 
St  Rep.  268  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 


LXBBBTT 


HI 


XJBlSaTT 


In  People  r.  Gttlson,  17  N.  B.  Ml,  M5, 109  N. 
Y.  389,  898»  4  Am.  8t  Rep.  485). 

The  state  may  decline  to  confer  official 
power  on  residents  of  otlier  states  without 
depriving  sncfa  nonresidents  of  ^'liberty*'  or 
"^property,**  within  the  meaning  of  those 
words  as  used  In  the  Oonstltntlon.  "liber- 
ty,'* as  the  term  is  nsed  In  the  constltational 
proTlsion,  includes  freedom  from  serrltude 
and  nnlawfol  restraint,  the  right  to  pursue 
any  ordinary  calling,  trade,  or  employment, 
and  acQulre  property  thereby,  but  does  not 
Include  any  supposed  right  of  a  nonresident 
to  receive  an  appointment  to  a  position  cre- 
ated by  the  general  laws  of  the  state  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  into  tf  ect  legislation  af- 
fecting the  state  and  its  people.  No  nonres- 
ident enjoys  the  right  of  "Uberty"  or  prop- 
erty in  tbe  fees  or  emoluments  of  the  office 
of  the  executor  or  administrator.  In  re  Mul- 
ford,  75  N.  B.  846,  846,  217  111.  242, 1  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  8.)  841, 106  AnL  8t  Rep.  249,  8  Ann.  Oas. 
960. 

Bickt  to  iMmtrmet 

Freedom  to  contract  is  "Uberty,"  within 
Const,  art  1,  |  5,  and  Const  U.  S.  Amend  14, 
f  1.  Sturgess  y.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co. 
(S.  C.)  00  8.  B.  1135,  1141. 

The  privilege  of  contracting  i»  both  a 
"liberty"  and  a  property  right,  and  is  pro- 
tected by  the  Constitution.  People  v.  Steele, 
83  N.  B.  236,  237,  231  IlL  840,  14  I4.  R.  A. 
(N.  8.)  861,  121  Am.  St  Rep.  821. 

"It  has  been  held  that  the  word  liberty,' 
as  used  in  the  Constitution,  was  not  to  be 
confined  to  the  mere  liberty  of  person,  but 
included,  among  others,  a  right  to  enter  into 
certain  classes  of  contracts  for  the  purpose 
of  enabling  the  citizen  to  carry  on  its  busi- 
ness." Addyston  Pipe  ft  Steel  Co.  v.  United 
States,  20  Sup.  Ct  96,  102,  175  U.  S.  211,  44 
L.Bd.186. 

''Congress  may  restrain  individuals  from 
making  contracts  under  certain  circumstanc- 
es and  upon  certain  subjects."  United  States 
V.  Joint  Traffic  Ass'n,  10  Sup.  Ot  25,  88,  171 
U.  8.  505,  43  L.  Bd.  259. 

'The  word  liberty,'  as  used  in  the  con- 
stitutional declarations,  means  more  than 
freedom  of  locomotion.  It  includes  and 
comprehends,  among  other  things,  freedom 
of  speech,  the  right  to  self-defense  against 
unlawful  violence,  and  the  right  to  buy  and 
sell  as  others  may."  Rev.  St  1899,  |  8142, 
prohibiting  any  person  or  corporation  from 
issuing,  in  payment  of  wages,  any  order  or 
evidence  of  Indebtedness  not  negotiable  and 
redeemable  at  its  face  value  in  lawful  mon- 
ey of  the  United  States  by  the  person  issu- 
ing it,  section  8143,  requiring  all  persons  is- 
suing such  orders  during  business  hours  to 
be  ready  to  redeem  the  same  in  lawful  mon- 
ey at  the  United  States  at  the  option  of  the 
holder,  and  section  8144,  providing  that  a 
violation  of  the  preceding  sections  shall  con- 


stitnte  a  misdemeanor  subject  to  fine  er 
imprisonment  or  both*  axe  unconstitutional 
as  depriving  persons  or  corporations  issuing 
suoh  orders  of  their  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  In  that  they  restricted  their 
freedom,  or  "liberty,"  to  contract  State  v. 
Missouri  Tie  ft  Timber  Co.,  80  S.  W.  933, 
941,  181  Mo.  636,  65  li.  R.  A.  588,  103  Am. 
St  614,  2  Ann.  Cas.  119  (citing  2  Story, 
Const  [5th  Bd.]  |  1950). 

The  ''liberty"  guaranteed  by  the  four- 
teenth amendment  to  the  federal  Constltu- 
tlon  means,  not  only  the  right  of  the  dti- 
aen  to  be  free  from  mere  physical  restraint 
of  his  person,  but  the  term  embraces  the 
right  of  the  dtlzen  to  be  free  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  his  faculties  in  lawful  ways,  to  earn 
his  livelihood  by  any  lawful  calling,  to  pur- 
sue any  livelihood,  and  for  that  purpose  to 
enter  into  contracts  which  may  be  proper, 
but  the  freedom  of  contract  is  a  qualified 
right  and  the  freedom  of  contract  is  not 
unconstitutionally  infringed  by  Code  Iowa,  | 
2071,  defining  the  liability  of  railway  cor- 
porations for  injuries  from  negligence,  so 
that  a  railway  company,  when  sued  on  such 
liability,  is  precluded  from  making  the  de- 
fense that  a  recovery  Is  barred  by  the  ac- 
ceptance of  benefits  under  a  contract  of 
membership  in  its  relief  department  Chi- 
cago, B.  ft  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  McGuixe,  31  Sup.  Ct 
259,  262,  219  U.  8.  549,  55  L.  Bd.  328  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  Allgeyer  v. 
State  of  Louisiana,  17  Sup.  Ct  427,  165  U. 
a  578,  41  I4.  Ed.  832). 

The  fourteenth  amendment,  however, 
does  not  guarantee  the  citizen  the  right  to 
make  within  his  state,  either  directly  or  in- 
directly, a  oontrect  the  maldng  whereof  is 
constitutionally  forbidden  by  the  state.  The 
proposition  that  because  a  dtisen  might 
make  such  a  contract  tot  himself  beyond  the 
confines  of  his  state,  therefore  he  might  au- 
thorize an  agent  to  violate  in  his  behalf  the 
laws  of  his  state,  within  her  own  limits, 
involves  a  clear  non  sequltur,  and  ignores 
the  vital  distinction  between  acts  done  with- 
in and  acts  done  beyond  a  state*s  Jurisdic- 
tion." Hooper  v.  California,  15  Sup.  Ot 
207,  211,  155  U.  8.  648,  39  L.  Ed.  297. 

Blglit  to  ehoose  employmemt 

''Privileges  and  immunities"  of  a  citi- 
zen, as  well  as  his  ''liberty,"  within  the 
guarantiee  of  Const  U.  8.  Amend.  14,  in- 
volve the  right,  not  only  to  be  free  from 
physical  restraint  but  the  right  to  follow 
any  lawful  business  or  avocation  in  life 
and  to  make  all  proper  contracts  in  fur- 
therance thereof.  Bx  parte  HoUman,  60 
S.  E.  19,  80,  79  8.  C.  9,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.) 
242,  14  Ann.  Cas.  1105. 

"liberty,"  as  guaranteed  by  the  Con- 
stitution, is  the  right  of  a  dtlzen  to  use  his 
faculties  in  all  lawful  ways,  to  live  and 
work  where  he  will,  to  earn  his  livelihood 
in  any  lawful  calling,  and  to  pursue  any  law- 


XilBBRTT 


lis 


LIBERTY 


Tal  trade  or  ayocatlon.  Irm  r.  Sootli  Biif- 
ftilo  Ry.  Co.,  94  N.  B.  481,  439,  201  N.  T. 
271,  84  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  162,  Ann.  Oaa.  1012B, 

ise. 

"liberty,**  in  the  constitatlonal  Bense^ 
means,  not  only  freedom  from  seryitude 
and  restraint,  but  embraces  tbe  right  of  ev- 
ery man  to  be  free  In  the  use  of  his  facul- 
ties and  to  adopt  such  avocation  as  he  may 
choose,  subject  only  to  the  restraints  neces- 
sary to  secnre  the  common  welfare,  and  the 
right  of  every  man  to  choose  his  own  oocn- 
patlon  Is  Included  in  the  constitutional  right 
to  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  People  v.  Steele, 
83  N.  E.  236,  237,  281  111.  840,  14  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  361,  121  Am.  St  Rep.  321;  City  of 
Chicago  V.  Powers,  83  N.  B.  240,  281  111.  600. 

The  word  "liberty,"  as  used  in  the  four- 
teenth amendment  to  the  federal  Constitu- 
tion, means  not  only  the  right  of  the  citizen 
to  be  free  from  mere  physical  restraint  of 
his  person,  as  by  incarceration,  but  the  term 
is  deemed  to  embrace  the  right  of  the  clti- 
ssens  to  be  free  In  the  enjoyment  of  all  his 
faculties;  to  be  free  to  use  them  in  all  law- 
ful ways;  to  live  and  work  where  he  will; 
to  earn  his  livelihood  by  any  lawful  calling; 
to  pursue  any  livelihood  or  vocation  and  for 
the  purpose  to  enter  into  all  contracts  which 
may  be  proper,  necessary,  and  essential  to 
his  carrying  out  to  a  successful  conclusion 
the  purposes  above  mentioned.  Toney  t. 
State,  37  South.  332,  333,  141  Ala.  120,  67 
L.  R.  A.  286,  109  Am.  St  Rep.  29,  3  Ann. 
Cas.  319  (quoting  Allgeyer  v.  Louisiana,  17 
Stip.  Ct  427,  166  U.  S.  578,  41  L.  Ed.  832); 
Hodges  V.  United  States,  27  Sup.  Ct  6,  16, 
203  U.  S.  1,  36,  36,  51  L.  Ed.  66;  Crescent 
liquor  Co.  v.  Piatt,  148  Fed.  894,  902  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  Allgeyer  v. 
State  of  Louisiana,  17  Sup.  Ct  427,  431,  165 
U.  S.  678,  689,  41  L.  Ed.  832). 

"liberty,**  In  its  broad  sense,  as  under- 
stood in  this  country,  means  the  right,  not 
only  of  freedom  from  actual  servitude,  im- 
prisonment or  restraint,  but  the  right  of  one 
to  use  his  faculties  in  all  lawful  ways,  to 
live  and  work  when  he  will,  to  earn  his  live- 
lihood in  any  lawful  calling,  and  to  pursue 
any  lawful  trade  or  avocation.  All  laws, 
therefore,  which  impair  or  trammel  these 
rights,  or  which  limit  him  in  his  choice  of 
a  trade  or  profession,  are  infringements  up- 
on his  fundamental  rights  of  liberty  which 
are  under  constitutional  protection.  State 
ex  rel.  Richey  r.  Smith,  84  Pac.  861,  42 
Wash.  287,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  674,  114  Am. 
St  Rep.  114,  7  Ann.  Cas.  577  (quoting  In  re 
AUbxy,  78  Paa  900,  36  Wash.  308,  104  Am. 
St  Rep.  962,  1  Ann.  C^s.  927). 

*The  word  liberty,*  as  used  in  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  and  the  sev- 
eral states,  has  frequently  been  construed, 
and  means  more  than  mere  freedom  from 
restraint  It  means,  not  merely  the  right 
to  go  where  one  chooses,  but  to  do  such 


acts  as  lie  may  Judge  best  tOft  his  interest, 
not  inconsistent  with  the  equal  rights  of 
others;  that  is,  to  follow  such  pursuits  as 
may  be  best  adapted  to  his  faculties,  and 
which  will  give  him  the  highest  enjoyment 
The  liberty  mentioned  is  deemed  to  embrace 
the  right  of  the  citizen  to  be  free  in  the  en- 
joyment of  all  ills  faculties,  to  be  free  to  use 
them  in  all  lawful  ways,  to  live  and  work 
where  he  will,  to  earn  his  livelihood  by  any 
lawful  calling,  and  for  that  purpose  to  enter 
into  all  contracts  which  may  be  proper,  neo- 
essaiy,  and  essential  to  his  carrying  out  to 
a  successful  conclusion  the  purpose  above 
mentioned.  These  are  individual  rights,  for- 
mulated as  such  under  the  phrase  *pur8uit 
of  happiness,*  in  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, which  begins  with  the  fundamen- 
tal proposition  that  all  men  are  created 
equal;  that  they  are  endowed  by  their 
Creator  with  certain  inalienable  rights ;  that 
among  these  are  Ufe,  liberty,  and  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness."  E7x  parte  Drexel,  82  Paa 
429,  430.  147  CaL  763,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  588, 
3  Ann.  Cas.  878  (quoting  and  adopting  def- 
inition in  Young  v.  Commonwealth,  46  S.  E. 
327,  101  Va.  853). 

In  its  broad  sense,  as  used  in  this  coun- 
try, "liberty**  means  the  right,  not  only  to 
freedom  from  actual  servitude,  imprison- 
ment, or  restraint,  but  the  rig^t  of  one  to 
use  Ills  faculties  in  all  lawful  ways,  to  live 
and  work  when  he  will,  to  earn  his  liveli- 
hood in  any  lawful  calling,  and  to  pursue 
any  lawful  trade  or  avocation.  An  act  re- 
quiring examination  by  and  a  license  from  a 
dental  board  before  one  may  own,  run,  or 
manage  a  dental  office,  as  distinguished  from 
the  actual  practice  of  dentistry,  is  not  a  prop- 
er exercise  of  the  police  power,  but  is  uncon- 
stitutional. State  V.  Brown,  79  Pac.  636,  637, 
37  Wash.  97,  68  L.  R.  A.  889,  107  Am.  St 
Rep.  798  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Re  Aubry,  78  Pac.  900,  36  Wash.  308, 104  Am. 
St  Rep.  952,  1  Ann.  Cas.  927). 

Sess.  Laws  1901,  p.  116,  c.  67,  providing 
for  the  examination  and  registration  of 
horseshoers,  is  unconstitutional,  as  depriv- 
ing citizens  of  their  liberty  and  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  *'One  may  be 
deprived  of  his  liberty,  and  his  constitution- 
al rights  thereto  may  be  violated,  without 
the  actual  Imprisonment  or  restraint  of  his 
person.  'Liberty,*  in  its  broad  sense,  as  un- 
derstood in  this  country,  means  the  right  not 
only  of  freedom  from  actual  servitude,  im- 
prisonment, or  restraint,  but  the  right  of 
one  to  use  his  faculties  In  all  lawful  ways, 
to  live  and  work  when  he  will,  to  earn  his 
livelihood  in  a  lawful  calling,  and  to  pur- 
sue any  lawful  trade  or  avocation.  All  laws, 
therefore,  which  impair  or  trammel  these 
rights,  which  limit  him  in  his  choice  of  a 
trade  or  profession,  are  infringements  of  his 
fundamental  rights  of  liberty,  which  are 
under  oonstitational  protectien."    In  le  An- 


UBEBTT 


113 


LIBERTT  OP  CONTRACT 


hrj,  TB  Pac  900,  902,  86  Wash.  806.  104  Am. 
St.  Bep.  952,  1  Ann.  Gas.  927  (citing  People 
ex  leL  Nechamcns  v.  Warden  of  City  Pria- 
on,  39  N.  E.  680,  144  N.  Y.  Q29,  27  L.  R.  A. 
718), 

*'The  term  'liberty,'  aa  used  in  the  four- 
teenth amendment  to  the  federal  Conatitu- 
tlon,  is  not  dwarfed  into  mere  freedom  from 
physical  restraint  of  the  person  of  the  dtl- 
sen,  as  by  incarceration,  bnt  is  deemed  to 
embrace  the  light  of  a  man  to  be  free  in 
the  employment  of  the  faculties  with  which 
he  has  been  endowed  by  his  Creator,  sub- 
ject only  to  such  restraints  as  are  necessary 
for  the  common  welfare:  liberty,  in  its 
broad  sense,  as  miderstood  In  this  country, 
means  the  right  not  only  of  freedom  from 
serritnde,  imprisonment,  or  restraint,  but 
the  right  of  one  to  use  his  faculties  in  all 
lawful  ways,  live  and  work  where  he  will, 
to  earn  his  liTelihood  in  any  lawful  calling, 
and  to  pursue  any  lawful  trade  or  avoca- 
tion," so  that  Laws  1901,  c.  128,  am^ding 
Pen.  Code,  |  640,  by  making  it  an  offense,  in 
cities  of  the  first  and  second  classes,  for  any 
person  to  offer  real  property  for  sale  with- 
out the  written  authority  of  the  owner,  or 
his  attorney  in  fact,  appointed  in  writing,  or 
of  the  bolder  of  a  written  contract  with  the 
owner  for  the  purchase  of  such  property,  is 
unconstitutional.  Grossman  v.  Camineas,  79 
N.  Y.  Supp.  900,  902,  79  App.  Div.  16  (quot- 
ing and  applying  People  v.  Gillson,  17  N.  Bl 
843,  346,  109  N.  X.  889,  899,  4  Am.  St.  Rep. 
466). 

Rickt  to  Imhme 

St.  1903,  p.  88,  c.  10,  providing  an  eight* 
hour  day  for  workmen  in  mines,  smelters, 
and  mills,  does  not  contravene  the  consti- 
tutional provision  relating  to  deprivation  of 
'^liberty."  Belknap,  C.  J.,  dissenting,  quotes 
to  the  effect  that  the  term  "liberty,"  in  the 
COinstitutiou,  is  not  dwarfed  into  mere  free- 
dom from  physical  restraint  of  the  person, 
but  embraces  the  right  to  be  free  in  the  en- 
joyment of  the  faculties  with  which  the  cit- 
izen has  been  endowed  by  his  Creator,  and 
that  "liberty,"  in  its  broad  sense,  as  under- 
stood in  this  country,  means  the  right  not 
only  of  freedom  from  servitude  or  restraint, 
but  the  right  of  one  to  use  his  faculties  in 
all  lawful  ways,  to  live  and  work  where 
he  wUl,  to  earn  his  livelihood  in  any  lawful 
calling,  and  to  pursue  any  lawful  trade  or 
avocation.  In  re  Boyce,  75  Pac.  1,  17,  27 
Nev.  299,  66  U  R.  A.'47,  1  Ann.  Cas.  66. 

Restiralnt  1>y  law  implied 

"Even  'liberty*  itself,  the  greatest  of  all 
rights,  is  not  unrestricted  license  to  act  ac- 
cording to  one's  own  wilL  It  is  only  free- 
dom from  restraint  under  conditions  essen- 
tial to  the  equal  enjoyment  of  the  same  right 
by  others.  It  is,  then,  'liberty'  regulated  by 
Uw."  McLaury  v.  Watelsky,  87  S.  W.  1046, 
1047,  39  Tex.  Civ.  App.  394  (quoting  and  ap- 

8  WDS.ft  P.2D  SxB.— 8 


proving  Crowley  y.  Chrlstensen,  11  Sup.  Ct. 
13,  137  U.  S.  86,  84  L.  Ed.  620). 

"Liberty,"  aa  understood  in  this  coun- 
try»  ia  not  license  but  liberty  regulated  by 
law.  The  personal  liberty  of  every  man  Is 
subject  to  such  reasonable  regulations  as 
in  the  wisdom  of  the  Legislature  are  regard- 
ed as  necessary  to  promote,  not  only  the 
peace  and  good  order  of  society,  but  its  well- 
being.  Rev.  St.  §  4284,  prohibiting  g^ier- 
ally  the  keeping  open  on  Sunday  of  any 
place  of  business  for  the  purpose  of  trans- 
acting business  therein,  is  not,  as  applied 
to  a  barber's  shop,  unconstitutional,  as  be- 
ing an  undue  restraint  of  personal  liberty, 
and  depriving  a  person  of  life,  liberty,  and 
property  without  due  process  of  law,  but  is 
a  proper  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the 
state.  State  v.  Sopher,  71  Pac  482,  484,  26 
Utah,  318,  60  li.  R.  A.  468,  05  Am.  St  Rep. 
846  (quoting  and  adopting  State  v.  Powell, 
60  N.  E.  900,  58  Ohio  St  324,  41  U  R.  A. 
864). 

The  industrial  insurance  law  (Laws  1911, 
c.  74),  whidb  undertakes,  by  requiring  contri- 
butions from  employers  to  an  accident  or. in- 
surance fund,  to  provide  fixed  and  certain 
relief  for  workmen  injured  in  extrahazardous 
work,  and  for  families  and  dependents,  re- 
gardless of  questions  of  fault  or  negligence, 
to  the  exclusion  of  every  other  remedy  or 
compensation,  and  which,  by  section  11,  pro- 
vides that  no  employer  shall  exempt  himself 
from  the  burden  or  waive  the  benefits  of  the 
act  by  any  contract,  agreement,  or  regulation, 
and  that  any  such  contract  or  regulation 
shall  be  pro  tanto  void,  is  not  an  interference 
with  the  right  to  contract,  since  there  is  no 
absolute  right  to  do  as  one  wills,  pursue  any 
calling  one  desires,  or  contract  as  one  choos- 
es, and  since  the  term  'liberty"  means  ab- 
sence of  arbitrary  restraint  and  not  immuni- 
ty from  reasonable  regulations  and  provisions 
imposed  in  the  Interests  of  the  community. 
State  ex  reL  Davis-Smith  Co.  v.  Clausen,  117 
Pac.  1101,  1112,  66  Wash.  166,  87  L.  R,  A.  (N. 
S.)466. 

ZiZBSBTT  OF  OOHTR ACT 

Liberty  of  contract  does  not  imply  liber- 
ty in  a  corporation  or  individuals  to  defy  the 
national  will  when  legally  expressed;  nor 
does  it  Involve  a  right  to  deprive  the  public 
of  the  advantages  of  free  competition  in  trade 
and  commerce.  The  enforcement  of  Anti- 
Trust  Act  July  2,  1890,  c.  647,  26  Stat  209, 
declaring  illegal  every  combination  or  con- 
spiracy in  restraint  of  interstate  or  foreign 
commerce,  and  forbidding  attempts  to  monop- 
olize such  commerce,  or  any  part  of  it  does 
not  infringe  on  liberty  of  contract  Northern 
Securities  Co.  v.  United  States,  24  Sup.  Ct 
436,  462,  198  U.  S.  197,  48  L.  fid.  679. 

**Whlle  it  may  be  conceded  that  gener- 
ally speaking,  among  the  Inalienable  rights  of 
the  citizen  is  that  of  the  liberty  of  contract, 
yet  such  liberty  is  not  absolute  and  unlver- 


LIBEBTT  OF  CONTRACT 


114    LIBEBT7  OF  SPEBCk  AND  THB  PRESS 


BsL  It  is  within  the  undoubted  power  of 
govemment  to  restrain  some  indiyidualB  from 
all  contracts,  as  well  as  all  individuals  from 
some  contracts.  It  may  deny  to  all  the  right 
to  contract  for  the  purchase  or  sale  of  lottery 
tickets,  to  the  minor  the  right  to  assume  any 
obligations,  ezc^t  for  the  necessaries  of  exist- 
ence; to  the  common  carrier  the  power  to 
make  any  contract  releasing  himself  from 
negligence,  and,  indeed,  may  restrain  all  en- 
gaged in  any  employment  from  any  contract 
in  the  course  of  that  employment  which  is 
against  public  policy."  Friable  r.  United 
States,  15  Sup.  Ot  586,  588,  157  U.  B.  160,  89 
L.  Bd.  657. 

"Liberty  to  contract"  is  one  of  the  in- 
alienable rights  of  man,  guaranteed  to  every 
citizen  by  the  Bill  of  Rights  (Const  art  1,  I 
1),  subject  only  to  such  restrictions  as  clearly 
appear  to  be  for  the  general  welfare.  The 
mere  fact  that  the  General  Assembly  has  en- 
acted a  law  which  narrows  the  liberty  of 
contract  as  to  the  whole  people  or  to  a  class 
of  citizens  is  not  dedslye.  Where  an  act  re- 
lating to  the  giving  of  surety  bonds  makes  se- 
curity by  surety  companies  exclusive  and 
compulsory,  it  is  not  promoted  by  considera- 
tion of  the  public  necessity  or  public  welfare, 
and  hence  it  follows  that  it  is  an  unconsti- 
tutional restriction  on  the  liberty  to  con- 
tract, guaranteed  by  the  Constitution.  State 
V.  Robins,  73  N.  B.  470,  471,  71  Ohio  St  278, 
69  li.  R.  A.  427,  2  Ann.  Cas.  486. 

Act  Dec.  10,  1906,  No.  117,  requiring  cer- 
tain corporations  to  pay  their  employ^  each 
week  in  lawful  money,  is  not  invalid  as  re- 
stricting the  rights  of  employ^  to  contract 
with  their  employer;  such  restriction  not  be- 
ing direct,  but  resulting  from  the  employer's 
right,  and  that  restriction  being  valid  as  to 
the  employer.  Lawrence  v.  Rutland  R.  Co., 
80  Vt  370.  67  Atl.  1091,  1096,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  350,  13  Ann.  Cas.  475. 

LIBEBTT  OF  8PKB0H  AND   THE 
PRESS 

The  "freedom  of  the  press"  consists  in  a 
right  to  print  what  he  chooses  without  pre- 
vious license,  but  subject  to  be  held  respon- 
sible therefor.  Levert  v.  Dally  States  Pub. 
Oa,  49  South.  206,  211,  123  La.  594,  23  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  726,  131  Am.  St  Rep.  356w 

The  phrase  "liberty  of  the  press"  means, 
in  the  language  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  that  any 
citizen  may  write  or  publish  his  sentiments 
on  all  subjects,  being  responsible  only  for  the 
abuse  of  that  right  Williams  Printing  Co.  v. 
Saunders,  73  S.  B.  472,  477, 113  Va.  156,  Ann. 
Cas.  1913B,  578. 

The  press  has  only  the  same  privilege  as 
to  publications  as  private  individuals;  the 
phrase  "liberty  of  the  press"  merely  meaning 
that  newspaper  publications  shall  not  be  sub- 
ject to  censorship.  Williams  Printing  Co.  v. 
Saunders,  73  S.  B.  472,  477»  113  Ya.  156,  Ann. 
Cas.  1913E,  57& 


The  "liberty  of  tiie  press**  Is  not  guaran- 
teed by  the  Constitution  against  the  publica- 
tion of  deliberate  falsehood  and  misrepresen- 
tation in  regard  to  decisions  of  courts,  even 
though  the  publishers  may  think  that  pablic 
and  political  interests  would  be  subserved 
by  such  falsehood  and  misrepreeentatton. 
McDougall  V.  Sheridan,  128  Pac.  954,  968»  28 
Idaho,  191. 

"Liberty  of  ngeech  and  of  the  press**  im- 
plies not  only  liberty  to  publish  but  complete 
immunity  from  legal  censure  and  punishm^it 
for  the  publication,  so  long  as  it  is  not  harm- 
ful in  its  character,  when  tested  by  such 
standards  as  the  law  affords.  People  ex  reL 
Attorney  General  v.  News-Times  Pub.  Co., 
84  Pac.  912,  948,  35  Colo.  253  (adopting  defin- 
ition in  Cooper  v.  People  ex  reL  Wyatt  22 
Pac.  790,  13  Colo.  837,  378,  6  L.  R.  A.  430). 

"Liberty  of  the  press"  is  not  synonymous 
with  license^  nor  does  it  give  a  newapaper  any 
greater  license  to  publish  libelous  matter 
than  the  ordinary  citizen  may  hare.  Lowe 
V.  News  Pnb.  Co.,  70  S.  B.  607,  9  Oa.  App. 
106. 

The  "liberty  of  the  press,*'  as  the  law 
now  stands,  is  only  a  more  extensive  and 
improved  use  of  the  liberty  of  spee<di  which 
prevailed  before  printing  became  general,  and 
is  the  right  belonging  to  every  one,  whether 
the  conductor  of  a  newspaper  or  not,  to  pub- 
lish whatever  he  pleases  without  the  license, 
interference,  er  control  of  the  government; 
the  publisher  b^ng  responsible  only  for  the 
abuse  of  the  privilege.  Williams  v.  Black, 
124  N.  W.  728,  732,  24  S.  D.  501  (citing  25 
Cyc.  pp.  406,  407). 

Liberty  and  freedom  of  speech  guaran- 
teed by  the  Constitution  does  not  mean  the 
unrestricted  right  to  do  and  say  what  one 
pleases  at  all  times  and  under  all  circum- 
stances. Act  Cong.  Sept  26,  1888,  c.  1039, 
25  Stat  496,  forbidding  deposit  in  the  mails 
of  anything  upon  the  exposed  surface  of 
which  appears  language  scurrilous,  defama- 
tory, threatening,  or  calculated  and  obvious- 
ly intended  to  reflect  injuriously  on  the 
character  or  conduct  of  others,  is  not  objec- 
tionable as  denying  or  abridging  freedom  of 
speech.  Warren  v.  United  States,  183  Fed. 
718,  721,  106  C.  C.  A.  156,  33  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
800. 

"'Liberty  of  the  press'  consists  in  the 
right  to  publish,  with  impunity,  truth  with 
good  motives  and  for  justiflable  ends,  wheth- 
er it  respects  the  government,  magistries,  or 
individuals.*'  Laws  1889,  p.  66,  c.  20,  forbid- 
ding'the  publication  by  newspapers  of  de- 
tailed accounts  of  the  execution  of  criminals 
convicted  of  murder,  is  not  in  conflict  with 
Const  art.  1,  |  3,  which  preserves  the  liberty 
of  the  press.  State  v.  Pioneer  Press  Co.,  110 
N.  W.  867,  868,  100  Minn.  173,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  480,  117  Am.  St  Rep.  684,  10  Ann.  Cas. 
351  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  of  Chan- 
cellor  Kent). 


UBERTX  OF  SPBiOOH  AND  THB  PRESS    U5    UBBBXX  OF  SPEECH  AND  THE  PRESS 


''Liberty  of  the  praw'*  li  stIU  an  naite- 
fined  teno,  and,  like  some  otber  flwinllliiT 
phrases  of  oonstltatioiial  law,  most  remain 
undefined.  Certain  boundaries  are  fairly  dis- 
cernible within  which  the  liberty  most  be  dis- 
played, but  precise  roles  cannot  be  formulat- 
ed in  advance  to  gorem  its  exercise  on  partic- 
ular occasions.  In  the  decision  of  controver- 
sies,  the  charaoter,  the  organization,  the 
needs,  and  the  will  of  society  at  the  present 
time  must  be  given  dne  consideration.  The 
press,  as  we  know  it  to-day,  is  almost  as  mod- 
em as  the  telephone  and  the  phonograph. 
The  functions  which  It  performs  at  the  pres- 
ent stage  of  our  social  development,  if  not 
substantially  different  in  kind  from  what  they 
have  been,  are  magnified  many  fold,  and  the 
opportunities  for  its  influence  are  multiplied 
many  times.  Generally  publication  should 
be  no  wider  than  the  moral  or  social  duty 
to  publish.  If  it  be  designedly  or  unnecessar- 
ily or  negligently  excessive,  privilege  is  lost 
But,  if  a  state  newspaper,  published  primar- 
ily for  a  state  constituency,  have  a  small  cir- 
culation elsewhere,  it  is  not  deprived  of  its 
privilege  in  the  discussion  of  subjects  of 
state-wide  concern  because  of  that  fact  Cole- 
man V.  MacLennan,  98  Pac.  2S1,  283,  78  Kan. 
711,  20  Ij.  R.  A.  (N.  B.)  861,  180  Am.  Bt  Rep. 
390. 

The  "liberty  of  the  press,"  guaranteed  by 
Const  art  1,  |  7,  guaranteeing  to  every  per- 
son the  liberty  to  speak,  write,  and  publish 
his  sentiments  on  all  subjects,  but  holding 
him  responsible  for  the  abuse  of  that  right, 
has  sever  been  held  to  mean  that  the  pub- 
Usher  of  a  newspaper  diall  be  any  less  re- 
sponsible than  any  other  person  would  be  for 
publishing  otherwise  the  same  libelous  mat- 
ter. The  contrary  rule  has  been  affirmed  by 
the  courts  of  this  country  and  England  with 
great  uniformity.  Morse  v.  Times-Republican 
Printing  Co.,  100  N.  W.  867,  873,  124  Iowa. 
707  (dtlng  Jones  v.  Townsend*s  Adm*x,  21 
Fla.  431,  58  Am.  Rep.  676 ;  Sheckell  v.  Jack- 
son, 10  Cush.  [64  Mass.]  25 ;  Aldrich  v.  Press 
Printing  Co.,  0  Minn.  138  [Gil.  129]  86  Am. 
Dec  84;  Root  v.  King  [N.  T.]  7  Cow.  628; 
TiUson  V.  Robbins,  68  Me.  295,  28  Ajn.  Rep. 
50 ;  Smart  v.  Blanchard,  42  N.  H.  137 ;  Foster 
V.  Scripps,  39  Mich.  876,  33  Am.  Rep.  403; 
Barr  v.  Moore,  87  Pa.  385,  80  Am.  Rep.  367 ; 
Eviston  V.  Cramer,  3  N.  W.  392,  47  Wis.  669; 
Edwards  v.  San  Jose  Printing  ft  Pub.  Soc., 
34  Pac  128,  99  Cal.  431,  37  Am.  St  Rep.  70; 
McAllister  v.  Detroit  Free  Press,  43  N.  W. 
431,  76  Mich.  338, 15  Am.  St  Rep.  318;  I^pton 
V.  Hume,  33  Pac  810,  24  Or.  420,  21  Jx  R.  A. 
493,  41  Am.  St  Rep.  863 ;  Smith  v.  Tribune 
Co.,  22  Fed.  Cas.  689;  Davis  v.  Sladden,  21 
Pac  140,  17  Or.  26&;  Barnes  v.  CampbeU,  59 
N.  H.  128,  47  Am.  Rep.  183;  MaUory  v.  Pio- 
neer Press  Co.,  26  N.  W.  904,  34  Minn.  5^1; 
Delaware  State  Fire  ft  Marine  Ins.  Ca  v. 
Croasdale  [DeL]  6  Houst  181;  Palmer  v.  City 
of  Conco'dt  48  N.  H.  216,  97  Aol  Dec  605). 


'The  Constitotion  of  this  state  declares 
what  is  meant  by  'liberty  of  speech'  and 
'liberty  of  the  press'  in  the  following  words: 
'Any  person  may  speak,  write,  and  publish 
his  sentiments  on  all  subjects,  being  respon- 
sible for  the  abuse  of  that  liberty.'  Civ. 
Code  1895^  |  5712.  The  right  preserved  and 
guaranteed  against  invasion  by  the  Consti- 
tution is  therefore  the  right  to  utter,  to 
writer  and  to  print  one's  sentiments,  subject 
only  to  the  limitation  that  in  so  doing  he 
shall  not  be  guilty  of  an  abuse  of  this  priv- 
ilege, by  Invading  the  legal  rights  of  others. 
The  Constitution  uses  the  word  'sentiments,' 
but  it  is  used  in  the  sense  of  thoughts,  ideas, 
opinions.  To  make  intelligent,  forceful,  and 
effective  an  expression  of  opinion,  it  may 
be  necessary  to  refer  to  the  life,  conduct, 
and  character  of  a  person;  and,  so  long  as 
the  truth  is  adhered  to,  the  right  of  privacy 
of  another  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  in- 
vaded by  one  who  speaks  or  writes  or  prints, 
provided  the  reference  to  such  person,  and 
the  manner  in  which  he  is  referred  to,  is 
reasonably  and  legitimately  proper  in  an  ex- 
pression of  opinion  on  the  subject  that  is 
under  investigation.  It  will  therefore  be 
seen  that  the  right  of  privacy  must  in  some 
particulars  yield  to  the  right  of  speech  and 
of  the  press.  It  is  well  recognized  that 
slander  is  an  abuse  of  the  liberty  of  speech, 
and,  that  a  libel  is  an  abuse  of  the  liberty 
to  write  and  print,  but  it  is  nowhere  ex- 
pressly declared  in  the  law  that  these  are 
the  only  abuses  of  such  rights.  And  that 
the  law  makes  the  truth  in  suits  for  slan- 
der and  in  prosecutions  and  suits  for  libel 
a  complete  defense  may  not  necessailly 
make  the  publication  of  the  truth  the  legal 
right  of  every  person,  nor  prevent  it  from 
being  in  some  cases  a  legal  wrong.  The 
truth  may  be  spoken,  written,  or  printed 
about  all  matters  of  a  public  nature,  as  well 
as  matters  of  a  private  nature  in  which  the 
public  has  a  legitimate  interest  The  truth 
may  be  uttered  and  printed  in  reference  to 
the  life,  character,  and  conduct  of  individ- 
uals whenever  it  is  necessary  to  the  full  ex- 
ercise of  the  right  to  express  one's  senti- 
ments on  any  and  all  subjects  that  may  be 
proper  matter  for  discussion.  But  there 
may  arise  cases  where  the  speaking  or  print- 
ing of  the  truth  may  be  considered  an  abuse 
of  the  'liberty  of  speech  and  of  the  press,' 
as  in  a  case  where  matters  of  purely  private 
concern,  wholly  foreign  to  a  legitimate  ex- 
pression of  opinion  on  the  subject  under  dis- 
cussion, are  injected  into  the  discussion  for 
no  other  purpose  and  with  no  other  motive 
than  to  annoy  and  harass  the  individual  re- 
ferred to.  Such  cases  might  be  of  rare  oc- 
currence, but,  if  such  should  arise,  the  par- 
ty aggrieved  may  not  be  without  a  remedy. 
The  right  of  privacy  is  unquestionably  lim- 
ited by  the  right  to  speak  and  print  It 
may  be  said  that  to  give  liberty  of  speech 
and  of  the  press  such  wide  scope  as  has 


I4IBERUM  T£N£H£NTUM 


IK 


LIOENSB 


^een  Indicated  would  impose  a  very  serious 
fimitatioii  upon  the  right  of  privacy,  bnt, 
if  it  does,  it  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  law 
considers  that  the  welfare  of  the  public  is 
better  subserved  by  maintaining  the  liberty 
of  speech  and  of  the  press  than  by  allowing 
an  individual  to  assert  his  right  of  privacy 
in  such  a  way  as  to  interfere  with  the  free 
expression  of  one's  sentiments,  and  the  pub- 
lication of  every  matter  in  which  the  public 
may  be  legitimately  interested.  In  many 
cases  the  law  required  the  individual  to  sur- 
render some  of  his  natural  and  private 
rights  for  the  benefit  of  the  public,  and  this 
is  true  in  reference  to  some  phases  of  the 
right  of  privacy  as  well  as  other  legal  rights. 
Those  to  whom  the  right  to  speak  and  write 
and  print  is  guaranteed  must  not  abuse  this 
right,  nor  must  one  in  whom  the  right  of 
privacy  ezists  abuse  this  right  The  law 
will  no  more  permit  an  abuse  by  one  than 
by  the  other.  Liberty  of  the  speech  and 
of  the  press  is  and  has  been  a  useful  in- 
strument to  keep  the  individual  within  lim- 
its of  lawful,  decent,  and  proper  conduct; 
and  the  right  of  privacy  may  be  well  used 
within  its  proper  limits  to  keep  those  who 
speak  and  write  and  print  within  the  legit- 
imate bounds  of  the  constitutional  guar- 
anties of  such  rights.  One  may  be  used  as 
a  check  upon  the  other,  but  neither  can  be 
lawfully  used  for  the  other's  destruction.** 
Pavesich  v.  New  England  Life  Ins.  Co.,  00 
S.  E.  68,  73,  74,  122  Ga.  190,  09  L  B.  A. 
101,  106  Am.  St  Rep.  104,  2  Ann.  Gas.  061. 

LIBERUM  TENEMENTUM 

The  plea  of  "liberum  tenementum"  was 
at  one  time  used  only  where  plaintiff's  dec- 
laration was  very  general  in  its  description 
of  the  land,  not  specifying  it,  and  this  plea 
performed  the  office  of  compelling  a  new 
assignment  or  more  definite  description,  but 
the  plea  has  long  since  performed  a  wider 
function,  and  its  office  is  to  confess  that  the 
plaintiff  had  possession  of  the  land  at  the 
time  the  act  complained  of  was  committed, 
and  that  such  act  was  in  fact  committed  by 
defendant,  as  set  forth,  but  avoiding  the  al- 
legation by  the  averment  of  a  right  to  en- 
ter and  do  the  act  as  alleged.  In  legal  ef- 
fect the  plea  admits  possession  in  the  plain- 
tiff sufficient  to  enable  him  to  maintain  the 
action  against  the  wrongdoer  and  asserts 
a  freehold  in  the  defendant,  with  right  to 
immediate  possession  as  against  plaintiff. 
On  the  filing  of  this  plea,  defendant  must 
prove  his  title  either  by  deed  or  other  docu- 
mentary evidence,  or  by  an  actual  adverse 
and  exclusive  possession  for  20  years,  since 
by  the  issue  he  undertakes  to  show  a  title 
in  himself  by  which  the  presumption  arising 
from  plaintiff's  possession  will  be  avoided. 
Since  the  plea  raises  the  question  of  titie 
and  boundary,  a  judgment  on  the  plea  is 
conclusive  on  the  question  of  titie  to  land, 


and  therefore  a  writ  of  etror  wHl  He  to  re- 
view the  judgment  Dickinson  v.  Mankin, 
06  8.  B.  824,  825,  61  W.  Va.  429. 

LIBRARY 

St  1909,  I  4260,  obUgates  a  county  rer- 
enue  agent  to  cause  to  be  listed  for  taxa- 
tion all  property  omitted* by  the  assessor 
and  other  taxing  office,  and  provides  that 
he  shall  file  a  statement  of  propwty  omit- 
ted, and  that  such  statement  shall  contain 
"a  description  and  value  of  the  property  pro- 
posed to  be  assessed."  A  revenue  agent 
acting  under  such  statute  filed  a  statem^it 
of  property  belonging  to  a  person  named 
omitted  from  taxation,  and  such  statement 
specified,  among  other  things,  a  "library^ 
of  a  value  specified.  Held,  that  the  state- 
ment was  sufficient  as  to  the  library,  as 
"library"  means  such  books  or  works  of 
literature,  science,  art,  or  business  as  one 
may  have  in  his  residence  or  office.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Glover,  116  &  W.  769,  774, 
132  Ky.  58a 

As  charity 

See  Charity. 
As  edaeatloaal  eorporatlom 

See  Educational  Corporation. 
As  pablie  j^laee 
See  Public  Place. 

LICENSE 

See  Exclusive  License;  Implied  Ucenae; 
Irrevocable  lioense;  Life  License; 
Mining  license;  Resident  license; 
Simple  License. 

A  ''license"  is  a  permission  to  do  some- 
thing. People  ex  rel.  Moses  v.  Gaynor,  137 
N.  Y.  Supp.  196,  198,  77  Misc.  Rep.  576. 

A  mere  'Ulcense"  is  but  an  authority 
to  do  a  particular  act  or  series  of  acts  up- 
on another's  land  without  possessing  any  es- 
tate therein.  Dawson  v.  Western  M.  R.  Co., 
68  Ati.  301,  305,  107  Md.  70,  14  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  809,  126  Am.  St  Rep.  337,  15  Ann. 
Cas.  678. 

"A  'license'  is  technically  an  authority 
given  to  do  some  one  act  or  series  of  acts 
on  the  land  of  another  without  passing  any 
estate  in  the  land."  Where  an  owner  orally 
offered  to  give  land  to  another,  providing 
the  latter  would  not  construct  a  building 
in  such  a  way  as  to  cut  off  the  light  of  a 
window  in  the  owner's  house,  and  the  of- 
fer was  accepted,  and  a  building  erected 
according  to  the  plans  agreed  on,  the  own- 
er merely  gave  a  parol  license  for  the  erec- 
tion of  the  building.  Shipley  v.  Fink,  62 
Ati.  360,  362,  102  Md.  219,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  1002. 

A  'license"  merely — a  verbal  license — ^Is 
the  right  to  do  a  particular  act  or  series  of 
acts,  without  any  interest  in  the  land.    Sueh 


lilCJENSB 


117 


UOEMSB 


a  llcenae  will  exempt  a  party  from  an  ac- 
tion of  trespass  for  entering  the  land  of 
another  to  dig  ore  and  will  give  him  the 
property  in  the  ore  which  is  actually  dug 
under  it,  but  it  is  revocable  at  the  pleas- 
ure of  him  who  gives  it.  Clark  ▼,  Wall,  79 
Pac  1052,  1053,  32  Mont  219. 

'*A  'license'  is  a  personal  revocable  and 
nonassignable  privilege  conferred  either  by 
writing  or  parol  to  do  one  or  more  acts  on 
land  without  possessing  any  interest  there- 
in.*' Rodefer  v.  Pittsburg,  O.  V.  ft  0.  B.  Co., 
74  N.  EL  188,  18(1,  72  Ohio  St.  272,  70  U  R. 
A.  844  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Greenwood  Lake  ft  P.  J.  R.  Ck>.  v.  New 
York  ft  G.  L.  R.  Co.,  81  N.  B.  874,  875,  134 
N.  T.  435,  489);  Yeager  v.  Tuning,  86  N.  B. 
657,  658,  79  Ohio  St  121,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
8.)  700,  128  Am.  St  Rep.  679;  Reeve  v. 
Dnryee,  129  N.  Y.  Supp.  748,  750,  144  Ai^. 
Dlv.  647. 

A  'license**  is  a  mere  personal  or  rev- 
ocable privilege  to  do  an  act  or  series  of 
acts  upon  lands  of  another  without  possess- 
ing any  interest  or  estate  in  the  lands.  City 
of  Berwyn  v.  Beiglund,  99  N.  B.  706,  70^ 
2S6  HI.  49a 

A  "license"  is  a  personal  privilege  to 
do  certain  acts  upon  the  lands  of  another, 
but  creates  no  estate  therein,  is  revocable  at 
wHl,  and  may  rest  in  parol.  Howes  v.  Har- 
mon, 81  Pac.  48,  49,  11  Idaho,  64,  69  L.  R. 
A.  568,  114  Am.  St  Rep.  255. 

A  "license"  contemplates  not  a  denial 
of  a  right  or  power,  but  the  regulation  of 
such  right  or  power.  A  license  is  a  permis- 
sion to  do  something  under  regulations,  and 
not  a  prohibition.  People  ex  rel.  Empire 
City  Trotting  Club  v.  State  Racing  Com- 
mission, 105  N.  Y.  Supp.  528,  630,  120  App. 
Dlv.  484. 

A  "Ucense"  implies  that  the  Uocosee 
shall  not  be  evicted  from  its  enjoyment,  and 
such  an  eviction  is  a  defense  to  a  suit  for 
royalties  accruing  after  it  occurred.  Amer- 
ican Street  Car  Advertising  Co.  v.  Jones, 
142  Fed.  974,  977,  74  C.  C.  A.  236. 

A  "Ucense"  is  simply  a  permission  or 
authority  to  do  something,  and  a  Ueense  to 
take  tlm^r  would  be  an  authority  or  permis- 
sion to  go  on  the  land  and  cut  and  remove 
tbe  timber  specified  in  the  license.  Snyder 
▼.  East  Ba^  Lumber  Co.,  97  N.  W.  49,  50, 
135  Mich.  31. 

A  "license"  is  defined  to  be:  "An  au- 
thority to  do  some  act,  or  a  series  of  acts, 
on  the  land  of  another,  without  passing  an 
estate  in  the  land.  It  amounts  to  nothing 
more  than  an  excuse  for  the  act  'Which 
would  otherwise  be  a  trespass.  Being  a 
personal  privilege,  it  can  be  enjoj'ed  only  by 
the  licensee.  It  is  not  assignable,  so  that 
an  undertenant  can  claim  the  benefit  of  the 
license  to  the  licensee."  ^aintitfs  convey- 
^d  to  defendant  by  deed  all  the  timber  and 


trees  on  the  tract  of  land  described;  the 
deed  providing  that  the  grantee  should  have 
all  the  rights  of  way  and  privileges  over  and 
upon  the  land  usually  extended  to  lumber- 
men, provided  that  the  timber  should  be 
removed  within  three  years,  and  that  all  ref- 
use, timber,  bams,  houses,  cabins,  sheds, 
etc.,  remaining  on  the  premises  at  that  time, 
should  revert  to  and  become  the  property 
of  plaintiffs.  Held,  that  such  deed  was  not 
a  mere  "license,"  but  was  sufllcient  to  cre- 
ate the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
Alexander  v.  Gardner,  96  S.  W.  818,  819, 
128  Ky.  552,  124  Am.  St  Rep.  378  (citing 
Tayl.  Land.  &  Ten.  |  237;  Wood,  Land.  & 
Ten.  I  227;  Haywood  v.  Fulmer,  32  N.  B. 
574,  158  Ind.  658,  18  L.  K  A.  491). 

A  ticket  of  admission  to  a  race  track, 
a  theater,  a  concert,  or  any  such  entertain- 
ment is  a  mere  revocable  "license.**  Buen- 
zle  V.  Newport  Amusement  Ass'n,  68  AtL 
721,  722,  728,  29  R.  L  2S,  14  Li  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1242. 

An  instrument  leasing  the  side  wtJl  of 
defendant's  proi)erty  to  plaintUOF  for  adver- 
tising purposes,  *'until  said  wall  is  obstruct- 
ed so  it  is  not  available  for  advertising  pur- 
poses," grants  a  mere  'license*'  revocable  at 
the  owner's  option.  Manheimer  v.  Gndat, 
106  N.  Y.  Supp.  461,  4^,  55  Misc.  Rep.  330. 

Where  the  owner  of  a  building  exe- 
cuted a  written  contract  granting  defendant 
the  right  to  use  one  of  the  walls  thereof  for 
advertising  purposes  for  a  specified  con- 
sideration and  for  a  definite  period,  and 
providing  that,  in  case  of  an  obstruction 
of  the  wall  by  other  buildings,  defendant 
should  have  an  abatement  of  the  land,  to- 
gether with  necessary  access  through  and 
upon  tlie  premises,  and  warranting  title  to 
the  leasehold  for  the  term  mentioned,  the 
contract  was  to  be  regarded  as  a  ^'license." 
A  license  may,  if  executed  in  proper  form, 
take  effect  as  a  grant  as  to  some  things  and 
as  a  mere  license  as  to  others.  Levy  v. 
Louisville  Gunning  System,  89  &  W.  528, 
530,  121  Ky.  510,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.   S.)  359. 

A  contract  for  a  right  to  erect  advertis- 
ing matter  was  described  as  a  "wall  or  fence 
permit,"  and  provided  that,  in  consideration 
of  150  cash  payable  yearly  in  advance,  the 
owner  leased  to  the  R  Sign  Company  the 
entire  side  wall  of  a  certain  building  for  ad- 
vertising purposes  for  one  year  with  privilege 
of  renewal  at  the  same  rate,  and  that,  in 
case  the  sign  was  obstructed  or  the  house 
sold,  the  money  would  be  returned  for  the  un- 
expired term.  Held,  that  the  instrument 
constituted  a  mere  "license**  revocable  by  the 
owner  at  will  on  returning  a  pro  rata  amount 
of  the  license  fee  for  the  unexpired  term. 
Reeve  v.  Duryee,  129  N.  Y,  Supp.  748,  749, 
144  App.  Dlv.  647. 

"A  siding  or  switch  constructed  by  a 
railroad  company  from  its  road  to  a  manu- 
factory at  the  expense  and  over  the  land  df 


lilGENSB 


118 


LICENSE 


the  latter,  solely  for  Its  benefit,  and  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  affording  it  facilities  for  re- 
ceiving and  shipping  freight,  and  under  a 
written  agreement  silent  as  to  the  length  of 
time  it  is  to  remain,  may  not  be  maintained 
by  the  railroad  company  against  the  objec- 
tion of  the  owner  of  the  manufactory;  the 
agreement,  so  far  aa  the  right  of  the  rail- 
road company  is  conoemed,  being  merely  a 
'license'  revocable  at  the  option  of  the  licen- 
sor or  his  grantee."  Rodefer  y.  Pittsburg, 
O.  V.  &  C.  B.  Co^  74  N.  H.  18^-186,  72  Ohio 
8t.  272,  70  L.  R.  A.  844. 

The  interest  conveyed  by  an  <^  and 
gas  lease  is  a  mere  'license"  to  explore,  an 
incorporeal  hereditament,  a  profit  k  prendre. 
A  mechanic's  lien  will  not  attach  to  the  in- 
terest acquired  in  lands  by  the  lessee  under 
an  ordinary  oil  or  gas  lease,  notwithstanding 
oil  or  gas  is  discovered.  Phillips  v.  Spring- 
field Crude  Oil  Co.,  02  Pac.  1110,  76  Kan.  783. 

Where  the  president  of  a  corporation  by 
a  verbal)  agreement  grants  permission  to 
another  to  box  and  gather  the  turpentine 
from  the  pine  trees  growing  upon  the  land 
of  the  corporation,  such  permit  amounts  to 
nothing  more  than  a  "license,"  which  termi- 
nates and  becomes  void  on  the  appointment 
of  a  receiver  for  the  corporation.  McKinnon- 
Young  Co.  v.*  Stockton,  44  South.  237,  247,  &3 
Fla.  734. 

Where  the  right  of  way  on  which  plain- 
tiff's decedent  was  killed  was  not  on  or  par- 
allel to  an  adjoining  street,  but  was  entire- 
ly inclosed  to  prevent  its  use  by  the  public, 
its  use  by  the  public  in  sometimes  passing 
that  way  did  not  amount  to  a  "license." 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Redmon's  Adm'z, 
01  S.  W.  722,  724,  122  Ky.  385. 

A  paper,  entitled  "Application  for  Sewer 
Attachment,"  executed  by  a  property  owner 
and  a  sewer  company,  allowing  the  owner  to 
attach  his  property  to  the  main  sewer  i^pe, 
sewer  to  be  used  at  named  rates  per  year, 
and  reciting  that  the  owner  applies  for  sewer 
attachment  as  above,  and  agrees  to  comply 
with  all  the  company's  present  and  future 
rules  relative  to  the  use  of  sewer,  is  a 
"license*^  to  connect  Fogg  v.  Ocean  City 
Sewer  Co.,  66  Ati.  600,  610,  72  N.  J.  Eq.  736. 

CoTenaat   numing   with    land    distln- 

An  instrument  giving  a  person  the  right 
to  construct  a  drainage  ditch  through  the 
land  of  the  person  executing  the  instrument, 
without  consideration  and  not  acknowledged 
and  recorded,  was  a  mere  "license,"  revoca- 
ble at  the  will  of  the  licensor  and  his  gran- 
tee, and  not  "a  covenant  running  with  the 
land."  Williams  v.  Beatty,  122  S.  W.  323, 
326,  130  Mo.  App.  167. 

Dedioation  distingnlsked 
Mere  user  by  the  public  of  a  supposed 
street,  though  long  continued,  will  be  regard- 
ed as  a  mere  "license,"   revocable   at  the 


pleasure  of  the  owner  of  the  land,  and  not 
to  constitute  a  dedication,  where  it  does  not 
appear  that  any  public  or  private  interests 
have  been  acquired  on  the  faith  of  the  sup- 
posed dedication  of  the  land  for  a  street 
Town  of  West  Point  v.  Bland,  56  S.  B.  802, 
805,  106  Va.  702  (quoting  Harris'  Case,  20 
Grat  [60  Va.]  840;  Talbott  v.  Richmond  & 
D.  R.  Co.,  81  Grat  [72  Va.]  688, 


Easememt  distincvislied 

Irrevocable  license  as  easement,  see 
Easement 

With  reference  to  real  estate,  "license" 
is  a  permission  or  authority  to  do  a  partic- 
ular act  or  series  of  acts  on  the  land  of 
another  without  possessing  any  estate  there- 
in. So,  with  reference  to  personal  property, 
"license"  impUes  and  carries  the  power  to 
do  some  act  upon  or  in  reference  to  cmt  to  do 
something  with  the  property  of  another. 
Herein  it  differs  from  9^  easement  The 
word  "easement"  always  implies  an  interest 
in  the  land.  Bobbs-Merrill  Co.  v.  Straus,  130 
Fed.  155,  188  (citing  5  Words  and  Phrases, 
p.  4133). 

A  "license"  Is  an  authority  given  to  do 
some  act  or  acts  on  the  land  of  another 
without  giving  any  estate  in  the  land  itself. 
It  differs  from  an  easement  in  that  the  lat- 
ter is  a  permanent  interest  with  a  right  at 
all  times  to  enter  and  enjoy  it,  while  the 
continuance  of  the  former  depends  on  the 
will  of  the  person  who  has  created  it  There 
is  a  distinction  between  an  easement  and  a 
license,  although  in  some  cases  It  is  difficult 
to  see  a  substantial  difference  between  them. 
An  easement  is  a  privilege  in  land  founded 
upon  a  deed  or  other  writing  or  upon  pre- 
scription. It  is  a  permanent  Interest  In 
another's  land  with  the  right  to  enjoy  it 
fully  and  without  objection.  It  may  attach 
to  the  land  and  pass  with  the  dominant  tene- 
m&kt  as  an  appurtenant  thereto.  Asher  v. 
Johnson,  82  S.  W.  300,  801,  118  Ky.  702  (quot- 
ing 5  Lawson,  Rights,  Rem.  &  Pr.  {  2668). 

A  "license"  is  a  permission  to  do  some 
act  or  series  of  acts  on  the  land  of  the  licens- 
or, without  having  a  permanent  interest  in 
the  land,  and  is  distinguished  from  an  "ease- 
ment" in  that  an  easement  is  a  right  with 
reference  to  certain  land  o(mferri|jg  on  the 
owner  of  the  easement  a  perman^it  interest 
in  the  land;  the  word  "permanent,"  being 
used  not  in  the  sense  of  perpetual,  but  as 
relating  to  a  specific  period.  Borough  Bill 
Posting  Co.  V.  Levy,  120  N.  Y,  Supp.  740,  742, 
144  App.  Div.  784. 

A  'license"  is  distinguished  from  an 
easement  in  that  a  license  is  an  authority  to 
enter  on  land,  but  confers  no  interest  in  the 
estate ;  it  is  generally  granted  by  parol,  and 
may  be  revoked  by  the  licensor  at  pleasure, 
and,  being  a  personal  privilege,  is  not  as- 
signable, and  usually  amounts  to  an  excuse 
for  what  would  otherwise  be  a  trespass,  while 
an  easement  confers  an  interest  in  the  land 


UOEKSB 


119 


UCBK8B 


and  iDTests  the  owner  with  privUeges  that 
he  cannot  be  deprived  of  at  the  mere  wiU  or 
wlflh  of  the  proprietor  of  the  senrlent  estate. 
Rlttenhonae  r.  Swango  (Ky.)  07  8.  W.  743,  744 
(4dtlBg  Wliklna  T.  Irvine,  33  Ohio  St  138). 

A  "Ilcenae"  in  respect  of  real  property  is 
authority  to  do  a  particular  act  or  series  of 
acts  on  the  land  of  another  withoat  possess- 
ing an  estate  or  interest  therein,  while  an 
easement  always  implies  an  interest  in  the 
land  involving  two  distinct  elements,  a  domi- 
nant tenement  to  which  the  right  is  appoz^ 
tenant,  and  a  servient  tenement  upon  which 
the  servitude  is  imposed ;  but  a  license  is  in 
the  nature  of  a  personal  privilege,  which  may 
be  revoked  before  any  rights  have  been  as- 
serted under  it,  or  money  expended  on  the 
faith  thereof.  Where  an  easement  is  granted 
speciflcally  or  by  language  from  which  such 
an  interest  is  implied  under  settled  rules 
of  construction,  the  covenant  will  be  enforced 
accordingly,  but,  where  the  language  used  is 
of  doubtful  meaning,  it  is  for  the  court  to 
construe  the  grant  and  determine  whether  it 
la  of  a  permanent  interest  running  with  the 
land,  or  only  a  personal  privilege  aJlecting 
the  rights  of  the  parties.  Lehigh  ft  N.  B.  B. 
Co.  V.  Bangor  &  P.  By.  Ck>.,  77  Atl.  552,  553, 
228Fa«850. 

A  permission,  given  without  considera- 
tion by  an  owner  for  the  use  by  a  township 
of  his  land  for  the  discharge  across  his  land 
of  the  surplus  water  of  an  artesian  well  sunk 
by  the  township  on  its  land  for ,  irrigation 
purposes  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  township, 
and  not  given  in  the  form  of  a  grant  or  con- 
veyance in  writing,  is  a  mere  Ueense,  subject 
to  revocation  by  the  owner  or  his  grantee; 
a  "Ueense,"  in  real  estate,  being  an  authority 
to  do  a  particular  act  on  the  land  of  another 
without  poBsesslng  any  estate  therein,  and 
being  founded  in  personal  oonlldence,  revoo- 
aMe  at  will;  and  an  "easement"  being  a 
privilege  in  land,  without  profit,  existing  die* 
tlnct  from  the  ownership  of  the  land,  found- 
ed on  a  grant  in  writing,  within  the  statute 
of  frauds  (Civ.  Code,  |  1238).  Butz  v.  Blch- 
land  Tp.,  134  N.  W.  805,  898,  28  S.  D.  442. 


See  Incumbrance. 
XBTltation  distiasuUAed 

There  is  a  clear  distinction  between  a 
"license"  and  an  "invitation"  to  enter  prem- 
ises, and  an  equally  clear  distinction  as  to 
the  duty  of  the  owner  in  the  two  cases.  An 
ovnier  owes  to  a  licensee  no  duty  as  to  the 
condition  of  the  premises,  unless  imposed  by 
statute,  save  that  he  should,  not  knowingly 
let  him  run  upon  a  hidden  peril  or  willfully 
cause  him  harm,  while  to  one  invited  he  is 
under  obligation  for  reasonable  security  for 
the  purposes  of  the  invitation.  Mere  per- 
mlsBion  to  enter  creates  the  relation  of 
licensee.  Mandevllle  Mills  v.  Dale^  58  8.  E. 
lOeO-KNC,  2  Ga.  App.  607  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing Beehler  v.  Daniels,  29  Aa  6^  IS  B.  L 


968,  060,  2T  L.  R.  A  612,  40  Am.  8t  Beix 
790). 

As  respects  the  question  whether  a  per- 
son is  on  premises  as  a  licensee  or  by  invita- 
tion, "invitation  is  inferred  where  there  is  a 
common  interest  or  mutual  advantage,  while 
'license'  is  inferred  where  the  object  is  the 
mere  pleasure  or  benefit  of  the  person  using 
it"  Southern  R.  in  Kentucky  v.  Goddard,  89 
8.  W.  675,  676,  121  Ky.  667.  12  Ann.  Caa  116 
(quoting  and  adopting  distinction  stated  in  1 
Whart  Neg.  §  349). 

A  "licensee"  who  goes  on  the  premises  of 
another  by  that  other's  invitation  and  for 
that  other's  purposes  is  an  "invitee,"  and  the 
duty  to  take  ordinary  care  to  prevent  injury 
is  at  once  raised,  and  the  word  "invitation," 
in  the  rule,  covers  and  includes  in  it,  entice- 
ment, allurement,  and  inducement  if  the 
case  holds  such  features,  and  the  invitation 
may  also  be  implied  by  a  dedication,  or  it 
may  arise  from  known  customary  use,  or  it 
may  be  implied  by  any  state  of  facts  on 
which  it  naturally  and  reasonably  arises. 
Where  a  proprietor  of  a  store  invited  plain- 
tiff to  come  to  the  store  to  advise  him  in  a 
business  transaction,  and  plaintiff,  on  reach- 
ing the  store,  found  the  proprietor  busy,  and 
while  waiting,  as  he  was  required  to  do,  he 
asked  permission  to  go  to  the  basement 
to  a  doset,  and  permission  was  granted,  and 
while  going  he  fell  into  an  unguarded  pit  in 
the  basement,  plaintiff  was  on  the  premises 
in  response  to  the  proprietor's  invitation  and 
was  not  a  bare  licensee  at  the  time,  and  the 
proprietor  owed  him  the  duty  of  exercising 
ordinary  care  for  his  protection.  Glaser  v. 
Rothschild,  120  S.  W.  1,  3,  221  Mo.  180,  22 
L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1045, 17  Ann.  Cas.  576. 

"It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  determine 
whether  the  circumstances  make  a  case  of 
'invitation,'  in  the  technical  sense  of  that 
word,  as  used  in  a  large  number  of  adjudged 
cases,  or  only  a  case  of  mere  license.  The 
principle,'  says  Mr.  Campbell,  in  his  treatise 
on  Negligence,  'appears  to  be  that  invitation 
is  inferred  where  there  is  a  common  interest 
or  mutual  advantage,  while  a  "license"  is 
inferred  where  the  object  is  the  mutual  pleas- 
ure or  benefit  of  the  person  using  it' "  De- 
fendant operated  a  railroad  to  the  summit 
of  Pikes  Peak  and  leased  certain  buildings 
to  H.  for  a  hotel  for  25  p^  cent  of  H.'s 
gross  receipts.  The  hotel  was  higher  than 
the  station  platform,  and  a  retaining  wall 
protected  the  platform  from  loose  stones 
which  might  roll  down  the  side  of  the  moun- 
tain. The  wall  was  ascended  by  a  flight  of 
steps,  and  the  buildings  were  located  16  feet 
from  the  top  thereof.  Plaintiff  arrived  at  the 
hotel  at  about  10  o'clock  p.  m.,  and,  after  be- 
ing informed  that  the  beds  were  all  full,  he 
obtained  an  employfi^s  bed.  Later  in  the 
night  he  went  out  of  doors  for  a  private  pur- 
pose and,  not  keeping  within  the  light  reflec- 
tion from  the  house,  stepped  off  the  retaining 


UOEENBB 


120 


IJOENW 


wall  and  was  injured.  Held,  that  plaintiff 
was  not  an  invited  guest  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany, but  was  at  most  a  mere  licensee  there- 
of, as  to  whom  It  owed  no  active  duty  to 
light  or  rail  the  wall.  Watson  y.  Manitou 
&  Pikes  Peak  Ky.  Co.,  92  Pac  17, 19,  41  Ck>lo. 
138,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  916. 

An  implied  "inyltation"  to  use  danger- 
ous premises,  as  distinguished  from  a  mere 
'^license,"  arises  when  a  benefit  accrues  to  the 
owner  from  such  use,  or  when  the  use  is  in 
the  interest  of  both  parties,  or  is  connected 
with  the  owner's  business.  Cleveland,  C,  0. 
Sc  St.  li.  R.  Co.  T.  Powers,  88  N.  B.  1073, 
1077,  173  Ind.  105. 

Lease  distiiiciKished 

Q^ie  difference  between  a  license  and  a 
lease  is  that  a  lease  gives  to  the  tenant  the 
right  of  possession  against  the  world,  while  a 
license  creates  no  interest  in  the  land,  but 
is  simply  the  authority  or  power  to  use  It  in 
some  specific  way.  Joplln  Supply  Go.  ▼• 
West,  130  S.  W.  156,  161.  149  Mo.  App.  78. 

A  license  in  respect  to  real  estate  is  an 
authority  to  do  a  particular  act  or  aeries  of 
acts  on  the  land  of  another  without  possess- 
ing an  estate  therein.  The  test  to  determine 
whether  an  agreement  for  the  use  of  real  es- 
tate is  a  license  or  a  lease  is  whether  the  con- 
tract gives  exclusive  use  of  the  premises 
against  all  the  world,  including  the  owner, 
in  which  case  It  is  a  lease,  or  whether  it 
merely  confers  a  privilege  to  occupy  under 
the  owner,  in  which  case  it  is  a  license,  the 
question  to  be  determined  by  a  construction 
of  the  instrument  Shaw  v.  Caldwell,  115 
Pac.  941,  943,  16  Cal.  App.  1. 

The  test  to  determine  whether  an  agree- 
ment for  the  use  of  real  estate  is  a  ''lease" 
or  a  * 'license"  is  whether  the  contract  gives 
exclusive  possession  of  the  premises  against 
the  world,  including  the  owner,  In  which  case 
it  is  a  lease,  or  whether  it  merely  confers  a 
license  to  occupy  under  the  owner.  An  in- 
strument by  which  the  owner  of  premises  let 
to  defendant  "his  ice  business  and  privileg- 
es in  *  ♦  ♦  with  the  use  and  benefit  of 
his  icehouses,"  for  a  term  ending  on  a  cer- 
tain date,  gave  defendant  the  exclusive  pos- 
session of,  and  the  entire  beneficial  interest 
in,  the  icehouses  and  the  land  under  them, 
so  as  to  constitute  a  lease  of  the  premises, 
instead  of  a  mere  contract  for  their  use  as 
licensee  under  the  owner.  -Roberts  v.  Lynn 
Ice  Co.,  73  N.  B.  523,  524,  187  Miass.  402. 

A  contract  whereby  it  was  agreed  that 
plaintiff  should  have  the  exclusive  privilege 
of  the  public  stenographer's  office  in  a  cer- 
tain hotel,  plaintiff  agreeing  to  pay  the  lent 
promptly  each  month  In  advance  for  the  ex- 
clusive privilege  of  the  public  stenographer's 
office,  and  to  do  private  correspondence  for 
the  hotel  management,  and  to  furnish  compe- 
tent stenographers  for  this  service,  was  not 
a  lease,  but  a  mere  agreement  to  allow  plain- 
tiff to  carry  on  business  in  the  hotcO.    Hess 


T.  Boberti^  108  N.  T.  Sapp.  894,  895, 124  App- 
mv.  32a 

An  agreement  whereby  tenants  of  a  store 
building,  leased  for  a  plumbing  bnalneaa,  al- 
lowed a  third  person  to  occupy  part  oC  It 
in  conducting  an  electrical  supply  business, 
waa  a  'lease,"  though  called  a  "license"  by 
them.  Denecke  v.  Henry  F.  Miller  &  Son* 
119  N.  W.  380,  384,  142  Iowa,  486,  19  Ann. 
Cas.  949. 

An  instrument  by  whi(di  defendant  con- 
tracted to  'let,"  and  plaintiff  to  "take,"  tlie 
right  to  maintain,  at  a  race  park,  three 
stands  for  sale  of  candies,  said  right  beingr 
exclusive  for  said  business  within  said  park« 
also  the  storeroom  under  the  tracks,  and  one 
of  said  stands,  not  to  exceed  a  certain  size* 
to  be  in  the  main  pavilion,  and  providing  the 
period  of  "letting,"  and  the  amount  and 
times  of  payment  of  the  "rent,"  instead  of 
being  a  "license,"  is  a  "lease,"  affecUng  de- 
fendant in  the  exclusive  use  of  the  land,  bo 
that  plaintiff,  having  paid  the  r^at,  can  re- 
cover no  part  of  it,  though  the  park  is  de- 
stroyed by  fire  before  the  end  of  the  period 
of  letting.  Mehlman  ▼.  Atlantic  Amusement 
Co.,  119  N.  Y.  Supp.  222,  223,  66  Misc.  Bep.  25. 

A  contract  to  let  to  plaintiffs  the  exclu- 
sive news,  confectionery,  view,  and  checking 
privileges  on  defendant's  steamers  for  certain 
specified  seasons,  though  denominated  a 
Uase,  was  not  a  "lease,"  but  a  "license.** 
Nash  V.  Thousand  Island  Steamboat  Co.,  108 
N.  Y.  Supp.  336,  342, 123  App.  Div.  148. 

An  instrument  granting,  demising,  and 
leasing  certain  land  for  the  purpose  solely  of 
mining  and  operating  for  oil,  gas,  and  other 
minerals,  laying  pipe  lines,  building  tanks, 
and  structures  to  take  care  of  the  products 
is  a  lease  conveying  an  interest  in  the  land« 
and  not  merely  a  "license"  to  enter  and  op- 
erate for  oil  or  gas.  Bamsdall  ▼.  Bradford 
Gas  Co.,  74  AU.  207,  225  Pa.  838,  26  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  614. 

An  instrument  by  which  the  owner  of 
land  therein  described  grants  to  another  all 
the  gas  and  oil  under  It,  with  the  exclusive 
right  to  enter  thereon  at  all  times  to  drill 
and  operate  for  oil  or  gas,  etc.,  and  provides 
for  the  time  within  which  the  various  wells 
shall  be  completed,  with  a  stipulated  month- 
ly rental  for  each  well  not  finished  on  time, 
and  that  each  location  shall  consist  of  ten 
acres  more  or  less,  and  that  no  well  shall  oc- 
cupy more  than  one  acre  is  not  a  "lease,"  as 
leases  are  usually  understood,  but  a  mere 
grant  of  an  exclusive  right  to  enter  and  ex- 
plore for  oil  and  gas,  and  prosecute  such 
business,  occupying  no  more  land  than  is 
needed  for  that  purpose,  not  more  than  one 
acre  to  a  well.  Stahl  v.  Illinois  Oil  Co.,  90 
N.  B.  632,  633,  45  Ind.  App.  211. 

A  contract  simply  giving  a  right  to  take 
ore  from  a  mine,  no  estate  being  granted, 
confers  a  mere  "licensci"  and  licensee  ao- 


LICEK8B 


121 


lilCBNSB 


quires  no  rigbt  to  fhe  ore  until  MpftrfttoA 
from  the  frediold;  bnt  an  InBtmment  de- 
misincr  land  tor  mining  purposes,  for  a  des* 
Isnated  term  of  years,  at  a  fixed  rent,  and 
giving  the  right  to  erect  all  necessary  bnlld* 
inSB,  is  a  "lease,"  not  merely  a  mining  "li- 
cense.'* Barnsdall  v.  Bradford  Qas  Co.,  74 
AtL  207,  208,  225  Pa.  338,  26  U  a  A.  (N.  &) 
614. 


See  Office. 
As  a  r^TooaUe  atttikoritj 

A  "license"  is  a  mere  authority  to  use 
real  property,  and  hence  is  revocable.  Unit* 
ed  Merchants'  Bealty  &  ImproYement  Ck>.  ▼• 
American  Billposting  Go.,  128  N.  Y.  Sapp. 
666,  667,  71  M&sc  Bepu  457. 

A  deed  whereby,  for  raloe,  one  grants 
tbe  right  to  lay  pipes  to  convey  petroleum, 
together  with  all  rights  and  privileges  neces- 
sary to  the  enjoyment  of  the  grant  and  to 
the  removal  of  the  pipes,  the  pipes  to  be  laid 
within  ten  feet  of  the  line  of  the  grantor's 
property,  does  not  grant  a  "license"  which 
may  be  revoked  at  the  grantor's  wilL  Stand- 
ard Oil  Ck>.  V.  Bnchi,  66  AU.  427,  429,  72  N.  J. 
Bq.4d2. 
Bateats 

A  grant  of  any  interest  in  or  right  on- 
der  a  patent,  less  ttum  the  exclusive  rights 
as  to  making,  using,  and  vending  the  same, 
la  a  "license."  Paulus  t.  M.  M.  BiMdc  Mfg. 
Co.,  129  Fed.  594-596,  64  O.  G.  A.  162. 
Sai^e-^Asfligaateat  distlaaolsked 

A  conveyance  by  a  patentee  to  another 
of  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  and  license  to 
use  and  to  build  for  use  within  territory  de- 
acribed  the  machines  of  the  patent,  with  cer- 
tain express  exceptions,  and  also  reserving 
to  the  patentee  the  right  to  build  machines 
In  said  territory  for  use  outside  thereof,  is  a 
mere  "license,"  and  not  an  "aaslgnment** 
Bowers  v.  Atlantic,  Gulf  ft  Pacific  Co.,  162 
Fed.  895,  902. 

A  patent  secures  the  exclusive  right  to 
make,  use,  and  vend  the  invention  it  pro- 
tects. A  grant  of  all  these  exclusive  rights 
throughout  the  United  States  or  a  specified 
part  thereof  is  an  assignment  of  an  interest 
In  the  patent  by  whatever  name  it  is  desig* 
nated.  A  grant  of  any  interest  In  or  right 
under  a  patent,  less  than  these,  is  a  "license." 
Paulus  V.  M.  M.  Buck  Mfg.  Oo.,  129  Fed.  594, 
096,  64  C.  0.  A  162. 

IiXOENSE  (OoTemiaemtal  Regnlatloa) 

See  Sale  Without  a  (License. 
Application  for  as  civil  action,  see  Civil 

Action — Case — Suit— ete. 
Licenses  of  all  kinds,  see  All. 
Order  granting  license  as  Judgment,  see 

Judgment. 
Renewal  license,  see  RenewaL 
Bequiiing  license  to  sell  liquor  as  taking 

prcHPerly,  see  Taking  (la  Ominent  Do- 

main). 


'The  popdiar  understanding  of  the  word 
license^  undoubtedly  is  a  permlnlon  to  do 
something  which,  without  the  license,  would 
not  be  allowable.  The  object  of  the  license 
is  to  confer  a  right  that  does  not  exist  with« 
out  the  license."  Ck>mmonwealth  v.  Central 
Hotel  Co.,  90  8.  W.  565,  121  Ky.  846, 12  Ann. 
Gas.  172  (Quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  82  &  W. 
1021,  119  Ky.  75). 

A  "license"  is  a  mere  permit  to  do  some- 
thing that  without  it  would  be  unlawful. 
Littleton  V.  Burgess,  82  Pae.  864,  866,  14 
Wyo.  173,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  631. 

A  "license"  confers  the  right  to  do  that 
which,  without  the  license^  would  be  unlaw- 
ful. Board  of  Oom'rs  of  Jefferson  County  v. 
Mayr,  74  Pac.  458,  31  Colo.  173  (citing  People 
V.  Raima,  89  Pac.  341,  20  (>)lo.  489); 
Schwarts  v.  People,  104  Pac.  92, 103,  46  Colo. 
239  (Quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Peo- 
ple T.  Raima,  89  Pae.  841,  20  (3olo.  489). 

"The  word  license'  means  permission  or 
authority,  and  a  license  to  do  any  particular 
thing  is  a  permission  or  authority  to  do  that 
thing,  and,  if  granted  by  a  person  having 
power  to  grant  It,  transfers  to  the  grantee 
the  right  to  do  whatever  it  purports  to  au- 
ttiorise.  It  certainly  transfers  to  him  all 
rights  which  the  grantor  can  transfer  to  do 
what  is  in  flie  terms  of  the  license."  Ry- 
man  Steamboat  Line  v.  Commonwealth,  101 
&  W.  408,  404,  125  Ky.  268,  10  Lu  R.  A.  (N. 
8.)  1187  (citing  Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  9  Wheat 
(22  U.  8.1  1,  6  Li  Bd.  2«. 

The  law  dictionary  and  lexicographers 
concur  in  saying  that  a  "license"  Is  a  "per- 
mit^ to  do  a  certain  thing,  and  it  is  clear 
that  these  words  are  used  synonymously  in 
the  act  in  Sees.  Laws  1895,  p.  221,  c.  96,  giv- 
ing municipal  corporations  power  to  "license" 
the  sale  of  liquor  and  grant  "permits"  to  drug- 
gists for  the  sale  of  liquor  for  medicinal  uses, 
and  the  contention  that  the  license  to  sell  liq- 
uors and  the  permit  w«re  distinct  things  was 
untenable.  Parsons  v.  People,  76  Pac.  666, 
669,  82  Colo.  22L 

A  "license"  is  a  privilege  granted  by  the 
state  directly  or  indirectly  through  the  mu- 
nicipality usually  upon  payment  of  the  con- 
sideration, and  confers  authority  to  do  some- 
thing which  would  be  illegal  if  done  without 
a  license.  License  fees  may  be  imposed  for 
regulation,  revenue,  or  prohibition.  Metropo- 
lis Theater  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  92  N.  B. 
597,  599,  246  IlL  20. 

"Power  to  'license,'  conferred  on  a  mu- 
nicipality, is  generally  understood  to  mean 
power  to  regulate  by  prescribing  the  condi- 
tions or  compliance  with  which  the  thing 
shaU  be  permitted."  Village  of  St  Anthony 
V.  Brandon,  77  Pac  822,  325,  10  Idaho,  205 
(quoting  Cent  Diet). 

"A  'license'  is  a  pernlt  to  do  bustness 
paid  for  in  advanosb  end.  In  the  nature  ol 


UCSN8X 


122 


laosaiBB 


tbingB,  all  queetioiiB  pertaining  to  iti  issu- 
ance should  be  determined  before  the  privi- 
lege is  exercised  and  as  early  in  the  current 
tax  year  as  is  practicable.  Like  an  assess- 
ment, a  license  apportionment  once  made  and 
returned  cannot  be  changed  without  express 
legislatiye  authority.*'  A  social  club  is  not 
subject  to  license  taxation,  except  in  so  far 
as  it  engages  in  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liq- 
uors to  its  members.  Where  such  club  has 
for  five  successive  years  paid  license  taxes 
based  on  sworn  returns,  which  were  accepted 
as  correct  by  the  taxing  ofiBcers,  no  action 
will  lie  in  behalf  of  the  state  to  recover  addi- 
tional license  taxes  for  the  same  year.  State 
V.  New  Orleans  Chess,  Checkers  ft  Whist 
Club,  40  South.  52e,  628,  116  La.  46. 

A  tax  on  the  net  receipts  of  an  insur- 
ance company  is  not  a  "license"  to  do  busi- 
ness. People  V.  Cosmopolitan  Fire  Ins.  Co., 
©2  N.  B.  922,  927,  246  IlL  442. 

A  "license  to  practice  medicine"  is  a  priv- 
ilege or  franchise  granted  by  the  government, 
and  a  refusal  to  grant  such  franchise,  what- 
ever the  reason  may  be  for  such  refusal,  does 
not  constitute  a  penalty.  Morse  v.  State 
Board  of  Medical  Examiners,  122  S.  W.  446, 
448,  57  Tex.  av.  App.  93. 

A  "license^'  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors 
is  the  authority  of  the  state  to  carry  on  the 
business,  and  Act  March  21,  1906,  making  it 
unlawful  for  any  person  to  bring  into  any 
coxmty,  eta,  where  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  is  prohibited,  or  may  be  prohibited, 
any  intoxicating  liquors*  does  not  apply  to 
liquor  destined  for  one  whose  "license"  to 
sell  liquor  has  not  expired.  Sheehan  v. 
Louisville  ft  N.  R.  Co.,  101  S.  W.  380,  381, 125 
Ky.  478. 

Act  March  12,  1909  (100  Ohio  Laws,  p. 
89),  providing  that  no  person  shall  engage  In 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  without  hav- 
ing properly  answered  certain  spedfled  ques- 
tions, was  not  objectionable  as  thereby  li- 
censing those  who  answered  the  questions 
correctly  in  violation  of  Const.  Schedule,  | 
18,  providing  that  no  license  to  traffic  in  in- 
toxicating liquors  shall  be  granted  in  the 
state,  but  that  the  General  Assembly  may  by 
law  provide  against  the  evils  resulting  there- 
from; the  term  "license"  as  so  used  mean- 
ing permission  to  do  something  which  with- 
out the  license  would  not  be  allowed,  to 
confer  a  right  that  did  not  exist  without  it, 
the  granting  of  a  special  privilege  to  one  or 
more  persons  not  enjoyed  by  citizens  gener- 
ally, or  the  class  to  which  the  license  belongs. 
Bloomfleld  v.  State,  99  N.  B.  309,  310,  86  Ohio 
St  253,  41  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  726,  Ann.  Ca& 
1913D,  629  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p. 
4133). 

The  word  "license^"  as  used  in  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  every  person  and  corpora- 
tion erecting  and  using  poles  on  the  public 
streets  of  a  dty  to  pay  as  a  license  therefor 
a  certain  sum  for  each  pole,  means  the  sum 


paid  for  permission  to  erect  or  maintain  polea 
in  the  streets  and  alleys  of  the  city,  for  the 
purpose  of  defraying  the  expenses  of  regu- 
lating and  controlling  the  use  of  the  same 
under  the  police  power  of  the  city.  City  of 
Ft  Smith  V.  Hunt,  82  S.  W.  163,  165,  72  Ark. 
656,  66  L.  R.  A.  238,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  61. 

An  ordinance^  requiring  a  fee  to  be  paid 
by  milk  and  meat  dealers  to  the  inspector  of 
milk  and  meats  solely  to  defray  the  cost  of 
inspection,  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  "license" 
as  that  word  is  used  in  Acts  1911,  p.  847, 1 1, 
making  it  unlawful  for  any  city  coundl  to 
impose  a  tax  or  license  upon  any  person  in 
the  selling  of  any  farm  products  including 
meats;  the  statute  being  Intended  to  pro- 
hibit the  issuance  of  a  license  as  a  condition 
to  carrying  on  the  business.  Carpenter  v. 
aty  of  Little  Rock,  142  S.  W.  162,  164,  101 
Ark.  23a 

Acts  1905,  p.  258,  c  129,  authorizing  any 
city  to  tax,  license,  or  regulate  junk  stores, 
etc.,  authorizes  the  enactment  of  ordinances 
regulating  the  general  business  of  junk  deal- 
ers, and  not  merely  the  places  where  junk 
is  dealt  in,  in  view  of  the  purposes  of  the  act 
and  the  granting  of  authority  to  license;  a 
"license"  being  a  privilege  granted  to  a  per- 
son, and  not  to  an  inanimate  object,  to  pur- 
sue some  occupation  ot  exercise  some  right 
declared  unlawful,  except  upon  compliance 
with  such  conditioiiai  Grossman  v.  City  of 
IndianapoUs,  88  N.  E.  946,  947,  173  Ind.  157. 

The  92  on  each  |100  of  premiums  paid  by 
foreign  iDsuranee  companies  doing  biydness 
in  the  etate,  which  Is  required  to  be  paid  in- 
to the  stete  treasury,  is  no  part  of  the  22 
cents  on  each  $100  valuation  of  property  or 
corporate  franchises  directed  to  be  assessed 
for  taxation  for  the  school  fund  by  Ky.  St 
1903,  §  4370,  subdi  5,  nor  is  it  a  "fine,"  'for- 
feiture,"  or  "license,"  within  subdivision  6, 
providing  that  a  portion  of  such  revenues  be 
paid  into  the  school  fund.  Fuqua  v.  Hag^, 
84  S.  W.  325,  119  Ky.  407. 

The  word  ''licenses,"  as  used  in  the  Tlli- 
nolB  act  relating  to  the  Chicago  City  Rail- 
ways, and  providing  that  any  deeds  of  trans- 
fers of  rights,  privileges,  or  franchises  be- 
tween railway  corporations,  or  any  two  of 
them,  and  all  contracts,  stipulations,  licenses, 
and  undertakings  made,  entered  Into,  or  giv- 
en, and  as  made  or  amended  by  and  between 
the  common  council  of  the  dty  and  any  one 
or  more  of  the  railway  corporations  respect- 
ing the  location,  use, -or  exclusion  of  rail- 
ways in  or  upon  the  streets,  or  any  of  them, 
of  the  city,  etc.,  refers  to  the  designation  by 
the  council  of  the  streets  to  be  occupied  by 
the  companies.  Covin  v.  City  of  Chicago,  132 
Fed.  848,  867. 

Where  a  dty  ordinance  regulating  auto- 
mobiles required  registration  and  numbering 
thereof  at  a  cost  to  the  owner  of  |1  to  cover 
the  value  of  figures  fumiahed  by  the  dty  to 
form  the  number,  such  provisions  are  not  ob- 


XJGENSB 


123 


LICENSE 


jecHonable  as  a  "license";  it  being  at  most 
a  mere  means  of  regulation  and  not  a  license 
for  revenue.  The  court  said:  "If  the  provi- 
sion for  registration  and  numbering,  wbidi 
inrolTed  no  discrimination,  and  requires  the 
payment  of  nothing  more  than  is  necessary 
to  pay  for  the  number  which  the  municipality 
fumlahes,  can  be  regarded  as  a  license  (for 
conflicting  definitions  of  license^'  see  Gooley, 
Tax.  [3d  Ed.]  p.  1137;  Adler  v.  Whitbeck,  9 
N.  E.  ei2,  44  Ohio  St  539)  it  is  not  a  license 
for  the  purpose  of  raising  revenue.  If  it 
were,  it  might  well  be  contended  that  it  did 
not  pass  as  an  incident  to  the  power  to  regu- 
late. See  Ck>oley,  Tax.  (3d  Ed.)  p.  1141 ;  The 
Laundry  License  Case,  22  Fed.  703.  It  is  a 
license  (if  a  license  at  all)  as  a  mere  means 
of  regulation;  indeed,  we  might  say,  as  al- 
ready shown*  as  a  necessary  means  of  regu- 
lation. This  proposition  is  self-evident,  viz., 
that  the  grant  of  authority  to  accomplish  a 
certain  purpose  carries  with  it  authority  to 
use  any  proper  and  lawful  means  without 
which  that  purpose  cannot  be  accomplished. 
If,  therefore,  the  speed  of  automobiles  can- 
not be  effectually  regulated  without  licensing 
them,  the  grant  of  the  power  to  regulate  con- 
fers upon  the  city  power  to  license,  unless 
some  other  provision  of  law  forbids  the  ex* 
erdse  of  that  power.*'  People  v.  Schneider, 
1(»  N.  W.  172,  173,  139  Mich.  873,  09  I/.  K  A. 
345,  5  Ann.  Cas.  790. 

Buffalo  City  (Charter  (Laws  1891,  p.  137, 
a  106,  I  17,  subd.  6,  as  amended  by  Laws 
1904,  p.  83,  c.  31),  empowering  the  city  to  en- 
act an  ordinance  imposing  a  "taf*  on  auto- 
mobiles ''for  the  privilege^'  of  operating  the 
same  on  its  streets,  and  to  prohibit  such  use 
in  case  of  nonpayment  of  the  tax,  and  to 
provide  a  penalty  for  violation  of  the  ordi- 
nance, is  repealed  by  a  later  act,  Hie  Motor 
Vehicle  Law  (Laws  1904,  p.  1816,  c.  538,  |  4, 
subd.  4),  providing  that  the  city  shall  have 
no  power  to  pass,  maintain,  or  enforce  ordi* 
nances  requiring  from  owners  of  automobHes 
"licenses"  or  permits  to  use  the  streets,  or 
prohibiting  them  tnm  the  free  use  thereof;  a 
tax  for  the  privilege  of  operating  automobtles 
on  the  streets  being  but  a  license.  CSity  of 
Buffalo  T.  Lewis,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  450,  123 
App.  DiT.  103. 

A  city  ordinance  provided  that  it  should 
be  unlawful  for  any  person  to  keep  any  sa- 
loon where  IntozicatiDg  liquors  were  sold  or 
drunk  as  a  beverage  without  first  pajring  a  li- 
cense fee  of  |300  per  annum,  and  that  the 
dty  treasurer,  on  payment  of  the  fee,  should 
give  a  receipt  for  the  amount  paid,  which 
should  constitute  a  license  for  the  keeping  of 
a  saloon.  Held,  that  the  ordinance  applied 
only  to  saloons  where  intoxicating  liquors 
were  sold,  and  hence  was  an  attempt  to  "li- 
cense**  the  sale  of  such  liquors  contrary  to 
Comp.  Laws  1897,  f  3107,  giving  such  city  au^ 
thority  to  license  all  taverns  and  houses  of 
public  oitertainment,  saloons,  restaurants, 
and  eating  houses,  but  providing  that  such 


act  should  not  authorize  the  licensing  of  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors.  Fitzpatrick  v. 
Weaver,  111  N.  W.  168,  164,  147  Mich.  382. 

As  m  oontraoi 
See  Contract 
As  written  doomneatt 

The  word  ''Ucense,"  in  Oen.  St.  1902,  tit 
16,  entitled  "Intoxicating  Liquors,"  providing 
for  the  issuance  of  liquor  licenses,  and  pro- 
hibiting the  sale  of  liquor  without  a  license, 
etc.,  signifies  an  intangible  right  granted  to 
the  licensee  and  signifies  the  writing  signed 
by  the  county  commissioners,  which  is  the  in- 
strument, and  evidence  of  that  grant,  but  the 
grant  of  such  right  can  only  be  had  by  writ- 
ing signed  by  the  county  commissioners  in 
which  the  town  and  the  particular  building 
in  which  the  sales  licensed  ;ire  to  be  made 
and  person  who  is  licensed  to  make  them,  as 
provided  by  sections  2669,  2672,  2675.  Con- 
necticut Breweries  Co.  v.  Murphy,  70  Atl.  450, 
452,  81  Conn.  145. 

The  word  ''Ucense^"  as  used  in  Act  March 
11, 1903,  relating  to  the  appropriation  of  pub- 
lic waters,  and  regulating  the  issnance  of  a 
certificate  ahd  license  after  inspection  by  the 
state  engineer,  applies  to  the  paper  to  be  is- 
sued on  proof  of  aiHPlication  to  beneficial  use 
of  the  waters.  Idaho  Power  &  Transporta- 
tion Co.  V.  Stephenson,  101  Pac.  821,  823,  16 
Idaho,  418. 

The  word  'license,'*  in  AcU  1905^  p.  492, 
1 1,  providing  tliat  no  person  shall  be  eligible 
to  the  office  of  county  superintendoit  of 
schoola  unless  he  shall  hold  a  86  months'  li- 
cense^ a  60  monthsP  license,  a  life  or  prof es^ 
sional  license  to  teach  in  the  schools  of  the 
states  means  the  written  document  by  which 
permission  or  authority  has  h&exk  granted  to 
the  holder  thereof  te  teach  in  the  common 
sdiools  for  the  period  of  time  required  by 
the  act,  and  sudi  a  document,  in  the  absence 
of  fraud  affecting  it,  is  conclusive  evidence 
that  tiie  person  to  whom  it  Is  issued  has  the 
legal  qualifications  of  a  teacher.  State  ex 
r^  Benham  v.  Bradt,  84  N.  S.  1084, 1087, 170 
Ind.  480  (citing  Blmore  v.  Overton,  4  N.  EX 
197,  104  Ind.  548,  54  Am.  St  Bep^  848). 
As  lawful  act 

A  "license"  to  carry  on  a  business  or 
trade  has  been  defined  to  be  an  official  per- 
mit to  carry  on  the  same,  or  perform  other 
acts  forbidden  by  law  except  to  persons  ob- 
taining such  permit  Bauvler*s  Law  Diction- 
ary. City  of  Savannah  v.  Cooper,  63  S.  B. 
138, 140, 131  Oa.  670. 
Franeliise  dlstliigliislied 

Permission  given  by  a  city  ordinance  for 
the  exercise  of  a  corporate  franchise  within 
the  dty  Is  a  "license"  and  not  a  franchise. 
People  ex  reL  Fitdienry  v.  Union  Gas  ft  Elec- 
tric Co.,  98  N.  S.  7681,  Ttl,  254  111.  395. 

The  right  to  construct  a  street  railway 
within  any  municipality  comes  from  the 
state  as  a  "franchise,"  while  the  power  to 


LICENSE 


124 


LICENSE 


consent  and  designate  the  streets  to  be  occa- 
pied  comes  from  the  municipality  as  a  'li- 
cense'* or  contract  right  Potter  v.  Calumet 
Electric  St  R.  Co.,  168  Ted.  621,  627  (citing 
Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  ▼.  People  ex  rel.  Story, 
73  lU.  641). 

A  gas  "franchise**  is  property,  a  vested 
right  protected  by  the  Constitution,  while  a 
"license"  is  a  mere  personal  privilege,  and 
revocable,  except  in  rare  instances  and  under 
peculiar  conditions.  Elizabeth  City  v.  Banks, 
64  S.  B.  189,  102,  160  N.  C.  407,  22  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  S.)  926. 

A  "franchise**  is  a  privilege  which  eman- 
ates from  the  sovereign  power  of  the  state  or 
government  A  power  conferred  upon  a  rail- 
road company  by  ordinance  to  locate  and 
maintain  a  railroad  in  the  streets  of  a  city 
is  a  "license,'*  Which,  after  the  road  is  built, 
may  be  irrevocable,  but  such  ordinance  does 
not  create  or  confer  on  the  railroad  company 
constructing  the  railroad  in  the  street  a 
"franchise."  The  "license"  granted  by  the  or- 
dinance is  no  more  a  '*franchise"  than  would 
be  a  grant  of  right  of  way  by  a  private  dti- 
aen  to  the  company  to  construct  its  road  over 
his  lands,  and  it  is  as  competent  for  the  dty 
as  for  a  private  owner  to  extend  the  time 
of  performance  or  to  amend,  modi^T,  or  annul 
the  contract  by  mutual  agreement  City  of 
Chicago  V.  RothschUd  ft  Co.,  72  N.  B.  098,  099, 
212  111.  690  (citing  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Story,  78  IlL  641,  647 ;  Metro- 
politan City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  W.  D.  By. 
Co.,  87  111.  817;  Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago 
T.  People  ex  reL  Sturges,  91  IlL  80;  Mills  Vi 
Parlin,  106  111.  60;  Chicago  Municipal  Gas- 
light ft  Fuel  Co.  V.  Town  of  Lake,  22  N.  B. 
616, 130  IlL  42;  aty  of  Belleville  v.  Citisens' 
Horse  Ry.  Co.,  38  N.  B.  684,  162  IlL  171,  26 
L.  R.  A.  681 ;  People  ex  reL  City  of  Pontlac 
V.  Central  Union  TeL  Co.,  61  N.  B.  428,  192 
BL  807,  86  Am.  St  Rep.  338;  Rostad  v.  Chi- 
cago Suburban  Water  ft  Light  Co.,  71  N.  B. 
078,  211  lU.  248;  Davis  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
City  of  New  York,  14  N.  T.  606,  67  Am.  Dec 
186;  Bank  of  Augusta  v.  Earle,  18  Pet  [38 
U.  S.]  679,  10  L.  Ed.  274;  City  of  Bridgeport 
T.  New  York  ft  N.  H.  R.  Co.,  36  Conn.  266,  4 
Am.  Rep.  63;  Morgan  v.  Loulsianat  93  U. 
S.  217,  23  L.  Ed.  860). 

A  right  not  essential  to  the  general  pur- 
pose of  a  grantee,  and  such  that  a  private 
party  might  grant  over  his  property,  such  as 
a  revocable  permission  to  occupy  a  portion 
of  some  public  ground,  highway,  or  street, 
is  a  "license,"  and  not  a  franchise.  McPhee 
ft  McGinnity  Co.  V;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  168 
red.  6,  10,  87  C.  C.  A,  619. 

The  grant  by  a  municipality  of  a  fran- 
chise to  use  its  streets  is  the  exercise  by 
delegation  of  a  powjer  which  resides  in  the 
state,  and  which  is  by  its  nature  governmen- 
tal; hence,  if  grounds  for  forfeiture  arise, 
the  state  may  alone  enforce  it,  and  may 
alone  waive  it;  toza,  franchise  may  be  said 


to  be  a  giant  from  the  state  to  a  omporatlon 
of  authority  to  oocupy  the  dty  streets,  "li- 
censes*' to  be  the  designation  by  the  dty 
council  of  the  streets  to  be  occupied,  and 
"contracts"  the  stipulated  arrangements  be- 
tween the  companies  and  the  dty  as  to  the 
manner  of  occupancy.  State  on  Inf.  of  Jones 
V.  West  Bnd  Light  ft  Power  Co^  162  S.  W. 
67,  76,  246  Ma  618L 

InTmlid  Ueense 

A  dramshop  license  issued  without  com- 
pliance with  an  ordinance,  requiring  the  ap- 
plication to  be  signed  by  a  majority  of  the 
property  owners  according  to  frontage  on  both 
sides  of  the  street  in  the  block  where  the 
dramshop  Is  to  be  kept,  or  by  a  majority  of 
the  bona  flde  householders  and  persons  or 
firms  living  in  or  doing  business  on  each  side 
of  the  street  in  the  block  on  which  the  dram- 
shop has  its  entrance,  is  invalid,  and  a  dram- 
shop, operated  under  such  a  license  is  "oper- 
ated without  a  license"  within  Hurd's  Rev. 
St  1909,  c.  43,  i  7,  providing  that  an  unli- 
censed dramshop  shall  be  a  nuisance.  Hoyt 
V.  McLaughlin,  96  N.  B.  461,  467,  260  111.  442. 

As  a  peraomd  trust  or  privilege 

A  Ucense  is  a  grant  of  spedal  privilege 
to  one  or  more  persons,  not  enjoyed  by  dtl- 
zens  generally,  or,  at  least»  not  enjoyed  by  a 
class  of  citizens  to  which  the  licensee  belongs, 
and  grants  a  permission  to  do  something 
which,  without  a  license,  is  not  allowable. 
State  V.  Parker  Distilling  Co.,  139  S.  W  453, 
466,  236  Mo.  219,  237  Mo.  103  (auoting  5 
Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4137). 

"A  license'  to  deal  in  intoxicating  liquors 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  personal  trust,  and  the 
applicant  for  such  privilege  must  be  a  per- 
son able,  willing,  and  competent  to  carry  out 
such  trust,  and  not  delegate  it  entirely  to 
others,  whose  character  may  not  be  such  as 
the  law  requires  of  the  licensee."  In  re 
Krug,  101  N.  W.  242,  244,  72  Neb.  676  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  Watklns  ▼« 
Grieser,  66  Pac.  332, 11  OkL  802). 

A  "license"  for  the  sale  of  liquor  is  but 
a  personal  privilege  and  not  assignable  ex- 
cept as  authorized  by  the  Legislature  and  in 
the  mode  therein  prescribed.  Though  a  trus- 
tee in  bankruptcy  cannot  sell  a  retail  liquor 
license  issued  to  a  bankrupt,  he  can  sell  the 
unexpired  lease  of  a  licensed  saloon  with 
the  furniture  and  fixtures,  on  condition  that 
the  license  shall  be  transferred  to  the  pur- 
chaser by  the  license  court,  and,  where  the 
purdiaser  abandons  his  purchase  without  any 
attempt  to  secure  a  transfer  of  the  license^ 
he  is  liable  for  loss  on  resale.  Snyder  v. 
Rougher,  63  Aa  893,  894,  214  Pa.  453  (dting 
in  support  of  definition,  Blumenthal's  Peti- 
tion, 18  AU.  396,  126  Pa.  412). 

A  "license"  to  sell  intoxicating  liquor  is 
a  personal  privilege,  which  may  be  valuable 
as  property,  in  a  certain  s^ise,  for  the  per- 
sonal use  of  the  holder,  but  which  is  not  as- 
signable or  transferable  by  him  in  any  way. 


UOJBKSa 


126      LICENSE,  REOX7LATE.  AND  TAX 


Tracy  v.  Glnzberg,  75  N.  IL  637^  688;  188 
Mass.  260,  2S5. 

As  a  mere  veeeipt 

Under  Pen.  Code  1895,  art  112,  penaliz- 
ing tLe  pursuit  of  a  profession  without  a 
•Ticenae"  therefor,  a  receipt  for  the  occnpation 
tax  ia,  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provi- 
sion aa  to  what  the  license  shall  contain,  a 
^mcense."  Fduts  y.  State,  101  &  W.  223,  224, 
61  Tex.  Gr.  B.  8. 

The  word  "license,"  in  the  Chicago 
Wheel  Tax  Ordinance,  which  requires  owners 
of  automoMles  to  obtain  a  license  or  permit 
to  use  a  Tehicle  in  the  city  in  addition  to  the 
license  or  permit  obtained  from  the  Secretary 
of  State,  as  required  by  the  Motor  Vehicle 
Law,  is  used  in  the  sense  of  tax,  and  the  ia- 
Buance  of  the  license  thereunder  amounts  to 
no  more  than  the  giving  of  a  receipt  showing 
that  the  annual  tax  imposed  by  the  ordinance 
liaa  been  paid.  Ayres  v.  City  of  Chicago,  87 
N.  B.  1073,  1076,  238  IlL  287. 

Under  the  statotea  of  Alabama  all  occn- 
paticm  taxes  are  evidenced  by  a  receipt, 
which  ia  called  a  "license,"  and  the  fact  that 
an  act  Impoeiag  a  tax  on  the  occupation  of 
aa  emigrant  agent  called  the  receipt  evidenc- 
ing the  payment  thereof  a  license  did  not  ren- 
der it  any  less  a  tax  on  the  eeenpatlon  for 
revenue.  Kendrick  v.  State,  88  Souttu  208» 
204,  142  Ala.  43. 


diatiBgvlalMd 

See  Assignment. 

Aa  property 

See  Property. 

BesaUie  dlstlBgiilalied 

To  "license"  means  to  permit,  to  give  an- 
thorlty,  to  couduct  or  carry  on.  It  differs 
from  "regulate**  in  that  regulate  means  to 
preacribe  the  manner  in  which  a  thing  may 
be  conducted.  Pacific  University  r.  Johnson, 
84  Pac.  704,  706,  47  Or.  448. 

Tax  dlstlBSiiiahed 

Sea  Tax— Taxation. 

Aa  vested  nigkt 

See  Vested  Right 


A  "license  fee**  ia  a  sum  demanded  of 
mxk  individual  in  return  for  the  grant  of  a 
privilege  which  he  did  not  previously  possess, 
and  is  not  a  tax,  as  ordinarily  understood, 
mm  a  contribution  demanded  by  a  sovereign 
from  his  subjects  in  return  fbr  his  protection. 
The  power  to  enforce  the  terms  of  a  treaty 
with  the  Choctaw  and  Chickasaw  Indiana 
that  no  person  shall  expose  goods  for  sale 
virlthout  a  pennit  is  a  duty  imposed  on  the 
executive  department  of  the  government,  and 
In  the  discharge  of  that  duty  it  la  not  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  to  enjoin  sudi 
action.  Zevely  v.  Weimer,  82  S.  W.  941,  843, 
6  Ind.  T.  646. 


"A  license  fee'  la  understood  to  be  a 
charge  for  the  privilege  of  carrying  on  a 
business  or  occupation,  and  is  not  the  equiv- 
alent or  in  lieu  of  a  property  tax."  The  con- 
tract arrangements  for  the  payment  to  a  mu- 
nicipality of  a  "license  fee"  on  each  street 
car,  modified  as  to  the  amount  of  such  fees 
under  the  authority  of  a  statute  accepted  by 
the  street  railway  company,  stating  that  such 
fees  should  be  taken  "in  full  satisfaction  for 
the  use  of  the  streets  or  avenues,"  does  not 
exempt  the  company  from  the  tax  Imposed, 
under  Laws  N.  T.  1899,  c.  712,  on  its  fran- 
diiae.  People  of  State  of  New  Tork  ex  rel. 
Brooklyn  City  B.  Co.  v.  State  Board  of  Tax 
Com'rs,  25  Sup.  Ct  718,  714,  199  U.  S.  48, 
60  U  Ed.  79. 

The  registration  fee  of  f2,  required  by 
St  1908,  p.  607,  c.  473,  1 1,  providing  for  the 
registration  of  automobiles,  is  a  '^license  fee," 
and  not  a  tax  for  revenue.  Commonwealth 
V.  Boyd,  74  N.  B.  266,  266^  188  Mass.  79, 
106  Am.  St  Rep.  464. 

A  tax  on  the  gross  recdpts  of  a  street 
railroad  company  Imposed  as  a  condition  to 
the  exercise  of  the  special  privileges  grant- 
ed it  is  not  a  property  tax  but  is  a  "license 
fee."  North  Jersey  St  By.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City, 
67  AU.  38,  84,  74  N.  J.  Law,  761. 

Under  Tax  Law,  |  46,  providing  that 
where  a  dty  haa  assessed  a  tax  upon  the 
ffpedal  franchise  of  a  corporation,  and  it  ap- 
pears that  the  corporation  has  paid  to  the 
dty  any  sum  based  on  a  percentage  of  gross 
earnings  or  other  income  or  any  license  fee 
or  any  sum  of  money  on  account  of  such 
special  franchise,  which  payment  was  in  the 
nature  of  a  tax,  anoh  payment  shall  be  de« 
ducted  from  the  franchise  tax  assessed, 
whi^e  a  subway  company,  under  the  condi- 
tions of  its  franchise^  waa  compelled  to  fur- 
nish free,  to  the  dty,  spaoe  In  its  subway% 
the  giving  of  thla  free  space  waa  not  a  "li- 
cense fee^';  the  term  "Ucense  fee"  not  mean- 
ing anything  else  than  a  payment  in  cash. 
Consolidated  Telegraph  &  Biectrlcal  Subway 
Co.  V.  Metz,  104  N.  Y.  Supp.  922,  923,  119 
App.  Dlv.  836. 

UOBlfSS,       BSOULATEt       AHD       BE- 
8TBAIV 

See,  also,  Begulate  and  Bestraln. 

The  grant  of  power  to  "license,  regulate, 
and  restrain"  shops  for  the  sale  of  iutoxl- 
cating  liquors  is  sufBdently  broad  to  war- 
rant a  city  ordinance  requiring  applicants 
for  such  license  to  procure  the  written  as- 
sent of  a  majority  of  the  property  owners 
in  the  Immediate  district  City  of  Baton 
Bouge  V.  Butler,  42  South.  660,  663,  U8  La. 
73. 

UCEiraE.  BEOUUkTE,  AHD  TAX 

The  new  charter  of  the  dty  of  Baltimore 
(section  6),  authorizing  the  mayor  and  couje^ 
dl  "to  license^  tax,  and  regiUate  all  busi- 


UCENSE  TAX 


126 


IJOXKSBaB 


nes8e0,  trades,  ayocatioiis  or  profeisloDs/' 
conferred  on  the  city  the  power  to  impose  a 
charge  on  commission  merchants  for  the  prly- 
ilege  of  selling  in  the  city  market;  such 
charge  being  a  tax  for  revenue,  and  not  a 
liooise  or  regulation  tax.  Meushaw  y.  State, 
71  Aa  467,  459,  109  Md.  84. 

UOEHSE  TAX 

As  tax,  see  Tax — ^Taxation. 

A  "license  tax"  is  one  imposed  on  the 
privilege  of  exercising  certain  callings,  pro- 
fessions, and  avocations,  and,  when  collect- 
ed, is  a  part  of  the  general  funds  of  a  city. 
State  ex  reL  Smith  v.  Berryman,  127  S.  W. 
129,  1S2,  142  Mo.  App.  373. 

Every  "license  tax*'  is  imposed  for  rais- 
ing revenue  or  as  a  police  regulation,  or  for 
both  purposes.  Johnson  v.  City  of  Great 
Falls,  99  Pae  1069,  1060,  38  Mont  369,  16 
Ann.  Cas.  974. 

A  "license  tax*'  is  "either  a  license,  strict- 
ly so  called,  imposed  in  the  exercise  of  ordi- 
nary police  power  of  the  state^  or  it  is  a  tax 
laid  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  oi  taxatioa 
City  Council  of  Montgomery  v.  Kelly,  38 
South.  67,  68,  142  Ala.  552,  70  L.  R.  A.  209, 
110  Am.  St  Rep.  43  (citing  Tied.  -Urn.  Po- 
lice Power). 

The  words  "licence  tax,'*  used  with  ref- 
erence to  corporations  exclusively,  mean  no 
more  necessarily  than  a  charge  of  some  kind 
imposed  upon  them  solely  for  their  corpo- 
rate privilege.  Kaiser  Land  &  Fruit  Co.  y. 
Curry,  103  Pac.  341.  344,  349,  156  Cal.  638. 

The  tax  authorized  by  Sees.  Laws  1902, 
p.  73,  c.  3,  i  65,  caUed  a  "license  tax,**  is,  in 
form  of  an  excise,  a  tax  on  the  business  of 
foreign  corporations  levied  for  the  purpose  of 
state  revenue,  and  Is  not  a  property  tax,  and 
so  does  not  violate  the  uniformity  clause  of 
the  Constitution.  American  Smelting  &  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  People  ex  reL  Lindsley,  82  Pac. 
631,  538,  34  Colo.  24a 

The  tax  imposed  by  Act  Ky.  March  28, 
1906,  upon  persons  engaged  in  compounding, 
rectifying,  adulterating,  or  blending  distilled 
spirits,  is  a  "license  or  occupation  tax,'*  and 
not  a  property  tax.  Brown-Forman  Co.  v. 
Commonwealth  of  Kentucky,  30  Sup.  Ct  578, 
580,  217  U.  S.  563,  54  L.  Bd.  883. 

An  ordinance  enacted  by  the  board  of 
supervisors  of  the  city  and  county  of  San 
Francisco  is  entitled  "An  ordinance  impos- 
ing a  license  for  the  purpose  of  regulation 
upon  persons  •  •  •  selling  •  •  •  malt 
or  ferm^ited  liquors  •  ♦  •  in  quan- 
tities of  one  quart  or  more,  less  than  five 
gallons,  when  the  same  is  contained  in  seal- 
ed packages,  and  not  to  be  drunk  on  the 
premises  where  sold,  •  •  •  requiring  a  per- 
mit therefor.'*  The  ordinance  makes  it  un- 
lawful to  sell  such  liquors  "without  first  hav- 
ing obtained  a  permit  therefor  from  the 
board  of  police  commissioners,  and  paying 


the  license  fee  herein  provided";  requires 
any  person  doing  such  act  to  procure  a  li- 
cense, paying  therefor  "a  license  fee  of  $150 
per  annum**;  requires  application  for  renew- 
als to  be  passed  upon  by  the  board  of  police 
commissioners,  and  declares  that  the  ordi- 
nance and  "the  license  herein  imposed"  are 
enacted  to  regulate  the  business  described. 
The  charter  of  the  dty  and  county  of  San 
Francisco  (article  2,  c.  2,  |  1)  authorizes  the 
board  of  supervisors  to  make  all  necessary 
police  regulations;  and  subdivision  15  au- 
thorizes it  to  impose  "license  taxes,"  but 
provides  that  no  license  taxes  shall  be  Im- 
posed upon  one  who,  at  any  fixed  place  of 
business,  sells  goods,  etc.,  except  such  as  re- 
quire permits  from  the  board  of  police  com- 
missioners, as  provided  in  this  charter.  Held, 
that  the  ordinance  was  enacted  solely  for 
regulation,  and  not  for  revenue,  and  the  li- 
cense imposed  was  a  "license  tax"  within 
subdivision  15,  so  that  the  board  had  no  pow- 
er to  impose  it,  since,  while  a  "tax,"  tech- 
nically, only  Includes  diarges  Impcraed  for 
producing  revenue,  and  not  for  purposes  of 
regulation  under  the  police  power,  the  term 
"license  tax,*'  as  used  in  the  statotes  and 
by  the  courts,  Inclttdes  license  charges  of 
every  character,  whether  imposed  for  reve- 
nue or  police  regulations,  or  both.  John 
Rapp  &  Son  y.  Kiel,  115  Paa  661,  662,  159 
Cal.  702. 

UOENSED 

See  Duly  Licensed. 

UiiXENMEE 

A  "licensee"  is  one  who  goes  onto  the 
land  of  another  for  his  own  purposes  only. 
Williams  V.  Belmont  Coal  &  Coke  Co.^  46  S. 
E.  802,  806,  56  W.  Va.  84. 

The  terms  "mere  licensee"  or  "bare  li- 
censee'* are  often  used  as  synonymous  with 
"trespasser."  Pittsburgh,  C,  C.  &  St  L.  R. 
Co.  V.  Simons  (Ind.)  76  N.  B.  883,  886. 

A -"mere  licensee**  is  one  who  is  clothed 
with  no  right  and  to  whom  no  invitation  has 
been  extended  but  who  is  upon  the  premises 
of  another  by  permission  or  acquiescence. 
Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  *Denny*s  Adm'r,  56 
S.  E.  321,  328,  106  Va.  383. 

A  person  is  a  mere  "licensee^'  where  he 
was  not  on  the  premises  by .  invitation  ex- 
pressed or  Implied,  nor  for  any  business  con- 
nected with  defendant  nor  in  relation  to  any 
business  for  which  the  freight  house  in  which 
he  was  injured  was  used,  but  went  there  of 
his  own  volition,  uninvited,  concerning  a 
matter  which  was  personal  to  himself  In 
which  the  defendant  had  no  Interest  Means 
v.  Southern  CaL  R.  Co.,  77  Pac.  1001*  1002, 
144  CaL  473«  1  Ann.  Cas.  206. 

A  person  is  a  "licensee**  when  he  is  on 
the  land  of  others  with  their  consent,  ex- 
pressed or  Implied.  If  a  person  is  a  licensee, 
he  is  rightfully  on  the  landowners'  premises^ 


LTCEKSEB 


127 


UOENSSB 


mud  it  cftnnot  be  found  he  la  in  fault  when 
be  shows  he  was  exercising  ordinary  cara 
Consequently  he  may  recover  if  it  appears 
they  failed  to  do  what  the  ordinary  man 
would  have  done  to  prevent  an  accident. 
Brown  t.  Boston  &  M.  B.  B.,  64  AtL  194,  109, 
78  N.  H.  6a& 

Where  plaintiff  went  on  defendant's 
premises  to  transact  private  business  with 
the  defendant's  employes,  in  which  defend- 
ant had  no  Interest,  he  was  a  mere  'licen- 
see," though  defendant  directed  him  to  use 
the  elevator  in  which  he  was  Injured;  and, 
no  active  negligence  being  shown,  he  was  not 
entitled  to  recover  for  injuries  sustained  in 
using  the  elevator.  Muencfa  ▼.  Heinemann, 
96  N.  W.  800-802,  119  Wis.  441. 

"In  a  strict  and  legal  sense  there  is  a 
well-defined  distinction  between  a  mere  'li- 
censee' and  one  who  goes  upon  the  premises 
of  another  by  invitation,  express  or  implied. 
In  a  general  sense,  one  upon  the  premises  of 
another  by  invitation  is  a  licensee,  and,  if 
sued  for  trespass,  his  defense  would  be  leave 
and  license  of  the  owner;  but,  in  a  strict  and 
somewhat  technical  senses  to  go  upon  prem- 
ises upon  an  implied  invitation  means  more 
than  a  mere  license."  Pauckner  v.  Wakem, 
83  N.  E.  202.  204,  231  IlL  276,  14  L.  R  A.  (N. 
S.)  1118. 

The  occupant  ct  a  stall  in  a  public  mar- 
Icet  is  not  neoessailly  a  mere  "licensee." 
Swayze  v.  City  of  Monroe,  40  South.  926, 
928,  116  La.  643. 

A  newsboy  who  enters  a  stone  quarry  to 
sell  papers,  in  his  own  interest  or  that  of 
his  employer,  or  who  enters  by  permission 
to  sell  his  papers,  or  to  accommodate  some 
workman  who  wishes  to  purchase  a  paper,  is 
only  a  '^censee,"  as  his  business  has  no  re- 
lation to  the  business  of  the  proprietor,  and 
it  was  not  the  duty  of  the  proprietor  to  have 
the  grounds  reasonably  safe  for  such  licensea 
Norrls  v.  Hugh  Nawn  Contracting  Co.,  91  N. 
£L  886,  887,  206  Mass.  68,  31  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
628,  19  Ann.  Cas.  424. 

Where  a  complaint  for  injuries  to  plain* 
tiff  alleged  that  he  was  employed  by  defend- 
ants, and  that  defendants  by  their  agent  of- 
fered to  convey  plaintiff  in  a  sleigh  to  his 
place  of  employment,  wliich-  offer  plaintiff  ac- 
eei>ted,  and  was  injured  by  the  negligent 
driving  of  such  agent,  plaintiff  was  not  pre- 
cluded by  the  complaint  from  proving  that, 
at  the  time  of  the  injury,  the  relationship  ex- 
latin^  between  him  and  defendants  was  that 
of  "licensor  and  llc^isee,"  and  not  that  of 
master  and  servant  Pigeon  v.  Lane,  67  AtL 
886,  887,  80  Conn.  237,  11  Ann.  Cas.  371, 

Unless  mainly  imposed  for  revenue  a  li- 
cense fee  is  not  a  tax,  but  the  price  paid  for 
the  privilege  of  exerciiEding  a  franchise.  Sums 
Imposed  in  the  regulation  of  the  business  of 
running  vehicles  for  hire  are  license  fees  and 
not  occupation  taxes.  Bx  parte  Dennyp  129 
8.  W.  1115,  59  Tex.  Cr.  R.  57a 


''A  "bare  licensee'  is  one  who  enters  upon 
the  land  of  another  simply  without  objection 
of  the  owner  or  by  sufferance  of  the  owner 
or  occupier,  whether  such  land  be  inclosed 
or  unlncloeed.  Such  bare  licensee  enters  the 
land  at  his  own  risk,  and  if,  while  on  such 
land,  such  bare  licensee  be  injured  by  the 
negligence  of  the  owner  or  occupant  of  such 
land,  he  has  no  right  to  recover."  Connell 
V.  Keokuk  Electric  B.  &  Power  Co.,  109  N. 
W.  177,  178,  131  Iowa,  622. 

A  person  accompanying  passengers  to  as- 
sist them  in  entering  a  train,  though  not  a 
passenger,  is  not  a  "bare  licensee,"  as  he 
has  at  least  a  tacit  invitation  of  the  carrier 
by  virtue  of  the  relation  existing  between  the 
carrier  and  the  passenger,  and  the  carrier 
must  exercise  at  least  ordinary  care  to  avoid 
injuring  him  by  defective  stational  facilities 
or  approaches  thereto.  Chesapeake  &  O.  By. 
Co.  V.  Paris'  Adm'r,  59  S.  SL  398,  399,  107  Va. 
408. 

A  bare  "licensee,"  barriilg  wantonness  or 
some  form  of  intentional  wrong  or  active  neg- 
ligence by  the  owner  or  occupier,  takes  the 
premises  as  he  finds  them,  and  mere  per- 
mission involves  leave  and  license  but  be- 
stows no  right  to  care.  Where  a  proprietor 
of  a  store  invited  plaintiff  to  come  to  the 
store  to  advise  him  in  a  business  transaction, 
and  plaintiff,  on  reaching  the  store,  found  the 
proprietor  busy,  and  while  waiting,  as  he  was 
required  to  do,  he  asked  permission  to  go 
to  the  basement  to  a  closet,  and  permission 
was  granted,  and  while  going  he  fell  into  an 
unguarded  pit  in  the  basement,  plaintiff  was 
on  the  premises  in  response  to  the  proprie- 
tor's invitation  and  was  not  a  bare  licensee 
at  the  time,  and  the  proprietor  owed  him  the 
duty  of  exercising  ordinary  care  for  Ms  pro- 
tection. Glaser  v.  Bothschild,  120  S.  W.  1,  3, 
221  Mo.  180,  22  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1045,  17 
Ann.  Cas.  576. 

A  "licensee"  of  a  patent  is  one  who  is 
not  the  owner  of  an  interest  in  the  patent, 
but  who  has,  by  contract,  acquired  a  right  to 
make,  or  use,  or  sell  machines  embodying  the 
invention.  Hartman  v.  John  D.  Park  &  Sons 
Co.,  145  Fed.  358,  368;  Cortelyou  v.  Charles 
Eneu  Johnson  &  Co.,  138  Fed.  110,  117  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  Heaton-Pen- 
insular  Button  Fastener  Co.  v.  Eureka  Spe- 
cialty Co.,  77  Fed.  288,  25  C.  O.  A.  267,  35 
L.  B.  A.  728,  and  citing  Oayler  v.  Wilder,  10 
How.  [51  U.  S.3  477,  18  L.  Ed.  504;  GUver  v. 
Bumford  Chemical  Works,  3  Sup.  Ct.  61,  109 
U.  S.  75,  27  L.  Ed.  862). 

A  club  incorporated  by  Acts  1858,  p.  121, 
c.  95,  as  amended  as  a  social  club,  and  main- 
taining a  clubhouse  in  the  dty  of  Baltimore, 
and  there  furnishing  to  its  members  refresh- 
ment, including  intoxicating  liquors,  and 
holding  a  license  to  sell  liquors  in  the  city 
of  Baltimore,  is  a  "licensee"  under  Pub.  Loa 
Laws  Baltimore  City,  art.  4,  relating  to  in- 
toxicating liquors,  and  by  virtue  of  Acts  1S98, 


IiIOEKSEB 


128 


LIEK 


p.  778,  e.  246,  and  Acts  1906,  p.  474,  C  278, 
l8  liable  to  the  penalty  prescribed  by  Balti- 
more City  Charter,  (  685,  for  selling  llqaor  on 
Sunday,  though  the  sale  is  made  to  its  mem- 
bers. State  y.  Maryland  Club,  66  Atl.  667, 
668,  105  Md.  585. 

"Lieensee^"  as  that  term  la  used  in  con- 
nection with  railway  property,  and  the  op- 
eration of  railway  trains,  is  one  who  goes 
upon  the  station  grounds  or  tracks  for  pur- 
poses other  than  transportation  by  permis- 
sion, either  express  or  implied.  Where  the 
wife  of  a  station  agent  was  accustomed  to 
assist  her  husband  with  the  work  in  the  sta- 
tion office,  which  was  known  to  the  officers 
of  the  road  in  charge  of  the  diTlsion,  and  not 
objected  to  by  them,  she  was  a  licensee,  and 
the  road  was  liable  for  injuries  to  her  while 
so  in  the  office,  owing  to  the  derailment  of  a 
train  caused  by  running  it  at  a  dangerous 
speed  over  a  defective  track.  Croft  ▼.  Chi- 
cago, B.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  W.  1063,  1056, 
182  Iowa,  687. 

The  relation  of  carrier  and  passenger  is 
one  of  contract.  There  must  be  an  agreement 
by  the  carrier  and  generally  a  consideration 
paid  by  or  for  the  passenger  to  bring  the 
relation  into  being.  Where  plaintiff,  upon 
the  invitation  of  his  brother,  a  switch  brake- 
man,  attempted  to  Vide  ^upon  a  portion  of  a 
freight  train  being  switched  in  railroad  yards 
and  was  injured,  he  was  neither  a  passen- 
ger nor  a  "licensee."  Skirvin  v.  Louisville  ft 
N.  R,  Co,  (Ky.)  100  S.  W.  308. 

Where  the  roadbed  of  a  railroad  had 
long  been  used  with  the  knowledge  and  tacit 
consent  of  the  railroad  as  a  common  passage- 
way by  the  public  generally  at.  all  times,  a 
pedestrian  on  the  roadbed  was  a  "licensee,** 
and  the  railroad  owed  him  the  duty  of  ordi- 
nary care  to  avoid  injuring  him.  Chesapeake 
ft  O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Corbin's  Adm'r,  67  S.  El  179, 
181,  110  Va.  700. 

A  "licensee"  is  a  person  who  is  neither  a 
passenger,  servant,  nor  trespasser,  and  not 
standing  in  any  contractual  relation  to  the 
railroad,  and  permitted  to  come  on  its  prem- 
ises for  his  own  interest,  convenience,  or 
gratification.  Gainesville  ft  Gulf  R.  Co.  r. 
Peck,  46  South.  1019,  1022,  55  Fla.  402. 

Mere  failure  to  pay  fare  does  not  deprive 
one  riding  on  a  street  car  of  his  rights  as  a 
passenger,  nor  does  it  convert  his  relation  to 
the  owner  into  that  of  a  mere  "licensee." 
Gabbert  v.  Hackett,  115  N.  W.  345,  347,  135 
Wis.  86, 14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1070  (citing  Qeve- 
land,  C,  C.  ft  St  L,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ketcham,  33 
N.  B.  116,  133  Ind.  346,  19  L.  R.  A.  339,  36 
Am.  St  Rep.  550;  Hurt  v.  Southern  R.  Co., 
40  Miss.  891;  Muehlhausen  v.  St.  Louis  R. 
Co.,  2  S.  W.  315,  91  Mo.  332;  Rose  v.  Des 
Moines  Val.  R.  Co.,  39  Iowa,  246;  Shear,  ft 
R.  Neg.  f  491 ;  Todd  v.  Old  Colony  ft  F.  R. 
R.  Co.,  3  Allen  [85  Mass.]  18,  80  Am.  Dec.  49 ; 
Wilton  V.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  107  Mass.  108,  9 
Am.  Rep.  11;   Jacobus  v.  St  Paul  ft  C.  Ry. 


Co.,  20  Minn.  126  [GIL  110],  18  Am.  Bep.  800 ; 
Philadelphia  ft  R.  B.  Co.  v.  Derby,  14  How. 
[65  U.  S.]  468, 14  Jj.  Sd.  502;  The  New  World 
▼.  King,  16  How.  [57  U.  SJ  469,  14  L.  EVL 
1019). 

UCEH8EE  BT  BZFRESS  INVXTATKMr 

"A  'licensee  by  eaq;>reB8  invitation'  is  one 
who  is  directly  invited  by  the  owner  of  the 
land  to  enter  upon  it,  and  such  person  Is 
rightfully  upon  such  land."  Connell  ▼.  Keo- 
kuk Electric  B.  ft  Power  Co.,  109  N.  W.  177, 
178,  131  Iowa,  622. 

LICENSEE  BT  IMPLIED  IHVITftTIOir 

"A  'licensee  by  implied  invitation'  is  one 
who  has  been  invited  to  enter  upon  the  land 
either  by  the  owner  or  occupier  of  the  same 
by  some  affirmative  act  done  by  such  owner 
or  occupant,  or  by  appearances  which  justify 
persons  generally  in  believing  that  such  own- 
er or  occupant  had  given  his  consent  to  the 
public  generally  to  enter  upon  or  to  cross 
over  his  premises;  and,  while  such  licensee 
is  acting  within  tbe  scope  and  limit  of  such 
implied  invitation,  he  has  the  lawful  right  to 
be  where  he  is  so  invited."  Connell  v.  Keo- 
kuk Electric  B.  ft  Power  Co.,  109  N.  W.  17T, 
178,  131  Iowa,  622. 

UGEHSEE  WITH  AK  HfTEBEST 

"One  who,  in  the  performance  of  bis 
own  InterestB  or  those  of  his  master's,  as- 
sists servants  of  another  In  the  performance 
of  their  work,  is  not  a  'fellow  servant'  of 
such  servants,  .nor  a  'volunteer,'  but  occupies 
a  third  position,  viz.,  that  of  a  licensee  with 
an  interest.' "  Kelly  v.  Tyra,  114  N.  W.  750, 
753,  103  Minn.  176,  17  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  334 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Byan  v. 
John  O'Brien  Boiler  WorkSi  68  Mo,  App.  148» 
151). 

LICENTIOUSNESS 

See  Lewdness. 

LIEN 

See  Attorney's  lien;  Builder's  JAem; 
Carrier's  Lien;  Charging  Lien;  Com- 
mon-Law Lien;  Equitable  lien;  Fac- 
tor's lien;  Grantor's  lien;  Judgment 
fbr  BecoVery  of  Property  or  for  ESn- 
forcement  of  lien;  Judgment  lien; 
Maritime  lien;  Mechanic's  lien; 
iPartner's  lien;  Possessory  Lien;  Pre- 
ferred lien;  Seller's  Lien;  Statutory 
lien;  Tax  lien;  Valid  lien;  Vm- 
dor's  Lien. 

Other  lien,  see  Other. 

Secured  by  legal  proceedings,  see  Legal 
Proceedings. 

Such  ilen,  see  Such. 

''A  'lien*  is  said  to  be  a  qualified  right 
which.  In  a  given  case,  may  be  exercised  over 
the  property  of  another."  Advance  Thresher 
Co.  T.  Beck,  128  N.  W.  815,  816,  21  N.  D.  55, 


umr 


129 


KJBN 


Ann.  OttB.  mSB,  MT  (quoting  and  dtlng^  a 
defiDition  In  Anderson  y.  State.  28  liiae.  4S9). 
A  "Uen"  iB  a  right  by  which  a  person  is 
entitled  to  obtain  satisfaction  of  a  debt  by 
means  of  property  belonging  to  the  person  In- 
debted to  him.  Frlck  v.  Hllllard,  96  M.  O. 
117,  122. 

In  the  strict  legal  sense,  a  'lien**  is  a 
right  in  one  person  to  detain  that  which  is  in 
his  possession  belonging  to  another  until  cer- 
tain demands  of  such  person  in  possession 
are  satisfied.  In  re  Ransford,  194  Fed.  658, 
eaO,  115  C.  G.  A.  560. 

A  'lien"  is  a  holding  or  claim  which  one 
person  has  on  the  property  of  another  as  se- 
curity for  a  Judgment  or  some  charge  or 
debt  out  of  that  property.  United  States  Ox- 
ygen Co.  y.  Bernard  A.  Buge,  136  N.  Y.  Supp« 
297,  301  (citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p. 
4144);  Meanor  y.  Goldsmith,  65  Atl.  1084, 
1086,  216  Pa.  489,  10  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  342 
(quoting  definition  In  2  Bouy.  Law  Diet  226). 

A  "lien**  is  the  right  of  the  creditor  to 
take  bis  debt  out  of  a  specified  res,  which, 
though  it  may  be  a  changing  fund,  must  ney- 
ertheless  be  ascertained,  since  it  is  a  prop- 
erty right,  and  could  not  be  said  to  arise  by 
a  mere  custom  restricting  a  borrower's  right 
to  use  the  money  loaned  to  release  certain 
securities  ftom  a  former  pledge,  nor  by  a 
promise  to  pay  the  creditor  from  a  partic- 
ular fund.  Hotchklss  y.  National  City  Bank 
of  New  York,  200  Fed  287,  291. 

The  term  *'lien,*'  in  a  narrow  ti>r*hnimi 
sense,  signifies  a  right  by  which  a  person  in 
possession  of  personal  property  holds  and 
detains  It  against  the  owner  in  satisfaction 
of  a  demand.  The  term,  howeyer,  has  a 
more  extensiye  meaning,  being  used  to  de- 
note a  legal  claim  or  charge  on  property,  real 
or  personal,  for  the  payment  of  a  debt  or 
dtity;eyery  such  claim  or  charge  being  still 
a  •'lien,"  though  the  property  be  not  in  the 
possession  of  him  to  whom  the  debt  or  duty 
is  due  It  is  a  hold  or  dalm  which  one 
has  on  the  property  of  another  as  security 
for  some  debt  or  charge  and  may  exist  inde- 
pendent of  possession.  As  in  maritime  law 
and  in  equity,  the  term  is  used  as  synony- 
mous with  a  charge  or  incumbrance  on  the 
tiling  where  there  1b  neither  jus  in  re  nor  ad 
rem,  nor  possession  of  the  thing.  In  re  Ma- 
her,  169  Fed.  997,  999  (citing  6  Words  and 
Plirases,  p.  4144  et  seg.). 

"The  term  Tien,*  in  a  narrow  and  more 
te<3mical  sense,  signifies  the  right  by  which 
a  person  in  possession  of  personal  property 
holds  and  detains  it  against  the  owner  in 
satisfaction  of  a  demand;  but  it  has  a  more 
extensiye  meaning,  and  in  conunon  accepta- 
tion is  understood  and  used  to  denote  a  le- 
gal claim  or  charge  on  property,  either  real 
oiT  personal,  for  the  payment  of  any  debt  or 
duty.  Byery  such  claim  or  charge  1b  stiU  a 
tten  on  the  property,  although  the  property  be 
not  in  the  possession  of  him  to  whom  the 
3  WDS.&  PJ2d  Ssb.— 9 


debt  or  daty  is  due.  A  lien'  Is  defined  to  be 
a  hold  or  claim  as  security  for  some  debt  ot 
(diarge.  At  common  law  there  could  be  no 
lien  without  possession.  It  is  therein  defin- 
ed as  a  right  in  one  man  to  retain  that  which 
is  in  possession  and  belonging  to  another. 
In  maritime  law,  liens  eidst  indQ[>endently 
of  possession,  either  actual  or  constructiye; 
and  in  the  courts  of  equity  the  term  lien'  is 
used  as  syonymous  with  a  charge  or  Incum- 
brance upon  the  thing,  where  there  Is  nei- 
ther jus  in  re  nor  ad  rem,  nor  posBesslon  of 
the  thing."  Irrespectiye  of  whether  tbe  lien 
upon  the  funds  impounded  by  the  senrice  of 
the  summons  of  garnishment  attaches  before 
fiinal  Judgment  or  not,  the  serylce  of  the  sum- 
mons of  garnishment  so  far  places  the  funds 
found  in  the  hands  of  the  garnishee  (espe- 
cially when  the  money  is  paid  into  court,  or 
in  lieu  thereof  a  dlssoMng  bond  giyen)  into 
the  custody  and  control  of  the  court  admin- 
istering the  case  that  it  will  be  entitled  to 
hold  and  subject  the  fund,  despite  the  sub- 
sequent bankruptcy  of  the  defendant,  if  the 
petition  in  bankruptcy  be  filed  more  than 
four  months  after  such  custody  is  obtained. 
National  Surety  Co.  of  New  York  t.  Med- 
lock,  68  S.  B.  1131,  2  Oa.  App.  fi66  (quoting 
5  Words  and  PhraseSk  P-  4144). 

The  '*lien"  giyen  persons  who  haye  fni^ 
nished  material  for  the  construction  of  a 
yessel  has  been  defined  as  "a  tie  hold  or  se- 
curity," or  "a  sort  of  proprietary  interest 
springing  from  the  nature  of  the  transaction 
and  beneficial  serylce  rendered  to  the  ship,'* 
or  as  a  "hold  upon  property  specifically  at- 
taching thereto  for  the  satisfitctlon  of  some 
claim.'*    Wight  y.  Maxwell,  4  Mich.  46,  66. 

A  bank  holding  notes  of  a  depositor 
which  are  due  has  the  right  to  charge  the 
same  to  the  depositor's  account  Such  right 
is  not  strictly  a  lien,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  bankruptcy  law,  but  a  right  of  set-ofT; 
but  it  can  be  exercised  only  as  to  notes  which 
are  due.  Irish  y.  Citizens'  Trust  Ck>.  of  Uti- 
ca,  N.  Y.,  163  Ve±  880,  89L 

The  word  '^en**  is  inaptly  applied  to  a 
general  deposit  which  is  the  property  of  the 
bank  Itself,  but  can  be  properly  applied  to 
special  specific  deposits  of  chattels,  choses  in 
action,  yaluables,  etc.  •  Wynn  y.  Tallapoosa 
Ck>unty  Bank,  63  South.  228,  236, 168  Ala.  469. 

A  right  to  a  "lien"  does  not  include  the 
right  to  eyery  onerous  burden  which  may 
be  thought  to  be  adyantageous  to  the  fayor- 
ed  creditors.  The  burden  sought  to  be  en- 
forced must  be  something  that  can  reason- 
ably be  considered  as  naturally  a  part  of 
the  thing  granted->the  lien.  But  a  lien  on 
real  property  is  a  thing  entirely  different  and 
distinct  from  a  personal  obligation  in  the 
form  of  a  bond.  The  latter  is  not  included 
in  the  former,  and  Is,  Indeed,  a  totally  differ- 
ent kind  of  security.  Shaughnessy  y.  Amer- 
ican Surety  Oa,  71  Pae.  701,  188  OaL  648. 


lilEN 


130 


UXN 


Under  Civil  Damage  Act  (Oodd  1900,  e 
92)  i  26»  proTidlng  that  If  a  landlord's  prop- 
erty be  "seized  or  taken"  for  any  fine,  etc., 
by  reason  of  his  tenant's  unlawful  acts,  such 
landlord  may  recover  damages  and  costs,  a 
"Hen"  upon  a  landlord's  property,  being  de- 
fined as  a  hold  or  dalm  which  one  has  upon 
the  property  of  another  as  a  security  for 
some  d^t  or  charge,  does  not  constitute  a 
''seizure  or  taking"  of  his  property  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute.  Brown  t.  United 
States  FideUty  &  Guaranty  Co.,  74  8.  EL  868, 
869,  70  W.  Va.  613. 

The  right  of  creditors  of  a  mortgagor, 
dying  without  sufilcient  personal  estate  to 
pay  his  debts,  to  sell  the  real  property  for 
that  purpose  within  three  years  after  admin- 
istration, as  authorized  by  Code  Civ.  Proc.  f  § 
2749,  2750,  is  a  mere  statutory  power,  and 
not  a  "lien"  on  the  lands,  which  would  make 
them  necessary  parties  to  a  foreclosure  ac- 
tion. Heidgerd  y.  Reis,  11^  N.  Y.  Supp.  921, 
928,  185  App.  DlT.  414. 

A  contract  with  a  subagent  to  solicit  in- 
surance for  commissions,  stipulating  that 
the  general  agent  will  advance  him  $25  per 
week,  and  providing  that  all  money  collected 
by  the  subagent  for  premiums  on  policies 
must  be  turned  over  to  the  general  agent, 
and  that  the  subagent  will  repay  the  general 
agent  all  sums  advanced,  said  advances  to 
constitute  a  lien  against  all  commissions,  ab- 
solutely binds  the  subagent  to  repay  all  ad- 
vances; the  word  "lien"  meaning  a  claim 
which  one  has  on  the  property  of  another  as 
a  security  for  a  debt,  contemplating  that  the 
advances  constitute  a  debt.  Straus  v.  Rosen- 
thal, 121  N.  Y.  Supp.  267,  269. 

Pub.  St  1901,  c.  245,  i  28,  provides  that, 
if  a  trustee  is  adjudged  chargeable  for  any 
personal  property  subject  to  mortgage,  pledge, 
or  other  lien,  the  court  may  appoint  a  receiv- 
er. Section  29  provides  that,  if  a  trustee  is 
adjudged  chargeable  for  any  security  for 
payment  of  money,  or  any  chose  in  action 
upon  which  execution  cannot  be  levied,  the 
court  may  appoint  a  receiver.  Section  80 
provides  that  the  trustee  may  be  adjudged 
trustee  for  the  value  of  any  note,  chose  in 
action,  etc.,  which  he  refuses  to  deliver  to 
the  receiver.  The  trustee  held  a  check  pay- 
able to  himself  and  defendant,  who  trans- 
ferred his  interest  to  claimant,  after  service 
of  the  writ  with  claimant's  knowledge.  Held, 
that  the  check  was  a  chose  in  action,  the 
possession  of  which  was  a  'lien"  within  the 
statute,  though  defendant  did  not  indorse  the 
check  to  him  for  collection,  so  that  the  trus- 
tee was  chargeable  therefor,  and  a  receiver 
was  properly  appointed  to  collect  it  Mus- 
grove  V.  Qoss,  72  Aa  371,  873,  75  N.  H.  208. 

Under  Civ.  Code  1895,  I  2801,  subd.  2. 
Us  amended  by  the  act  of  1899  (Acts  1899,  p. 
88;  Van  Bpps'  Code  Supp.  f  6176),  giving  to 
mechanics,  contractors,  materialmen,  and 
persona  furnishing  material  for  the  improve^ 


ment  of  real  estate,  special  liens  thereon,  and 
when  work  done  or  material  furnished  for 
the  improvement  of  real  estate  is  done  or 
may  be  furnished  upon  the  employment  of 
a  contractor,  or  other  persons  than  the  own- 
er, the  lien  shall  attach  to  the  real  estate 
improved,  for  the  amount  of  work  done,  or 
material  furnished,  unless  the  owner  shows 
that  such  lien  has  been  waived  in  writing, 
or  produces  the  sworn  statement  of  the  con- 
tractor, or  other  person,  at  whose  instance 
the  work  was  done,  or  material  was  furnish- 
ed, that  the  agreed  price  or  reasonable  value 
thereof  has  been  paid,  the  word  "liens"  is  to 
be  construed  to  mean,  not  the  perfected  and 
recorded  liens,  but  the  inchoate  or  imperfect 
liena^  or  claims  arising  by  the  mere  furnish- 
ing of  material  or  the  performance  of  labor. 
Green  v.  Farrar  Lumber  Co.,  46  S.  B.  62, 
68,  119  Oa.  SO. 

Lien  Law  (Consol.  Laws  1909,  c.  33)  { 
17,  providing  that,  if  a  lienor  is  made  de- 
fendant to  a  suit  to  enforce  another  li^i, 
and  plaintiff  or  such  defendant  has  filed  no- 
tice of  pendency  of  the  suit,  the  lien  of  such 
defendant  is  continued,  does  not  extend  to 
municipal  "liens."  William  Bradley  &  Son 
V.  Henry  Huber  Co.,  181  N.  Y.  Supp.  888,  390, 
146  App.  Div.  630. 

The  word  "lien,"  in  Comp.  Laws,  i  5031, 
giving  a  "lien"  to  warehousemen  which  shall 
extend  to  all  legal  demands  for  storage 
against  the  owner  of  the  property,  means  a 
general  "lien,"  and,  where  goods  removed 
without  payment  of  charges  are  subsequent- 
ly stored,  the  warehouseman  may  retain 
them  for  payment  of  the  first  charges.  Kauf- 
man V.  Leonard,  102  N.  W.  632,  139  Mich. 
104. 

The  "lien"  given  under  Wilson's  Rev.  & 
Ann.  St  1903,  c.  3,  §§  108,  110,  providing  that 
any  person  employed  in  feeding  or  herding 
any  domestic  animals  shall,  for  the  amount 
due  for  such  feeding  or  herding,  have  a  "Uen" 
on  the  animals,  is  similar  to  a  lien  under  a 
chattel  mortgage.  It  may  be  foreclosed,  and 
the  property  sold  to  satisfy  it  Crlsmon  v. 
Barse  Live  Stock  Commission  Co.,  87  Pac. 
876,  877,  17  OkL  117. 

Where  a  deed  provides  that  the  grantee 
shall  assume  and  pay  existing  mortgages, 
"liens,"  taxes,  and  claims  of  any  and  every 
description,  the  assumption  clause  making 
use  of  the  general  word  "liens"  includes  not 
only  mechanics'  liens  but  all  kinds  of  "liens." 
Gage  V.  Cameron,  72  N.  B.  204,  209,  212  IlL 
146. 


A  lien  is  a  hold  or  daim  which  one  per- 
son has  upon  the  property  of  another  aa  a 
security  for  some  debt  or  charge.  In  the  na- 
ture of  things,  no  tax  or  assessment  can  ex- 
ist, so  as  to  become  a  lien  or  incumbrance 
upon  real  estate,  until  the  amount  th^eof  is 
ascertained  and  determined.  Gillmor  t.  Dale, 
75  Pac.  932,  934,  27  Utah,  872. 


UIIN 


tSl 


unr 


Where  the  ewnsre  9I  a  tanemeiit  bovae 
Qn  November  1,  1906,  contracted  to  convey 
the  same  free  from  all  incumbrances  and  vio- 
lations of  the  tenement  house  act  (Laws  1901, 
p.  889,  c  334),  and  on  May  26th  had  been 
served  with  notice  to  install  a  water  meter, 
which  was  installed  by  the  water  department 
on  Ck!tober  8th,  but  the  cost  was  not  certified 
until  November  1st,  nor  the  bill  certified  to 
the  comptroller  until  December  13,  1906,  the 
assessment  therefor  was  not  a  lien  on  the 
premises,  when  conveyed  on  December  11th, 
the  words  "Uen  or  incumbrance"  being  used 
to  cover  only  a  charge  against  the  property 
af ttf  it  has  been  ascertained  or  determined. 
Feder  v.  Rosenthal,  U6  N.  Y.  Supp.  %  4,  62 
Misc.  Bep.  610. 

Defendant  vendors  covenanted  to  pay 
any  assesnnent  of  a  kind  mentioned  therein 
for  the  payment  of  which  any  lien  existed 
July,  1899,  on  the  lot  conveyed;  there  being 
then  no  power  to  lay  any  such  assessments, 
and  the  land  not  beii^  subject  to  any  existing 
lien  for  such  assessments.  A  valid  assess- 
ment was  thereafter  laid  under  St  1902,  c. 
627.  Held,  that  the  word  'lien,"  in  defend- 
ants* covenant,  referred  to  the  lien  of  an  ex- 
isting incumbrance,  and  was  not  to  be  ex- 
tended to  include  the  possibility  of  a  future 
incumbrance  being  created  by  subsequent  leg- 
islation, and  hence  that  the  defendants  were 
not  bound  to  pay  such  subsequent  assessment 
Campbell  v.  Haven,  97  N.  B.  611,  612,  211 
MasBB.  121. 

Tax  liens  held  by  the  state  of  IdOnnesota 
are  within  the  terms  of  Laws  1906,  p.  469, 
^  306,  I  13,  providbig  that  it  shall  be  Joined 
as  a  party  defendant  whenever  it  has  an  in- 
terest in  or  "lien  upon  the  land"  in  suit  In 
re  National  Bond  &  Security  Co.,  104  N.  W. 
678,  679,  96  Minn.  119. 

AMlcamaat 

The  right  created  by  the  assignment,  as 
security,  of  one's  expectancy  in  the  estate  of 
his  living  ancestor,  being  a  present  equitable 
charge,  which,  when  the  descent  is  cast,  at 
once  ripens  into  a  "lien"  on  the  property,  is 
within  Bankr.  Act  July  1, 1898,  c.  641,  i  67,  80 
Stat  664,  exempting  trom  its  operation  and 
preserving  all  liens  created  by  the  bankrupt, 
and  therefore  enforceable  against  the  bank- 
rapt  after  his  discharge^  especially  where  the 
property  did  not  come  into  the  possession  of 
the  assignee  in  bankruptcy,  because  not  then 
acquired  by  the  bankrupt  Bridge  v.  Kedon, 
126  Pac.  149,  152,  163  Cal.  493,  43  L.  B.  A. 
<N.  8.)  404. 


a  dtJm  against  tba  teodcttv  was  aot  a  valid 
flien"  against  the  property,  unless  it  appear- 
ed of  record.  Brown  v.  Gordon-Tiger  Mining 
&  Reduction  Co.,  97  Faa  1042,  1046,  44  Colo. 
311. 

Under  a  provision,  in  a  certificate  of  pre- 
ferred stock  in  a  corporaticm,  that  no  mort^ 
gage  or  "lien  of  any  nature"  should  be  placed 
upon  the  property  of  the  company  without 
the  unanimous  consent  of  the  preferred  stock- 
holders, tbe  w<Hrds  "lien  of  any  nature"  did 
not  include  the  claims  of  general  creditors, 
since  a  "lien"  Is  something  distinct  from  a 
daim  and  in  the  nature  of  a  security.  Fryer 
V.  Wiedemann,  146  8.  W.  762,  766,  148  Ky. 
379,  39  L.  B.  ▲•  (N.  8.)  1011. 

-   As  eentvaetaal  lien 

Under  Civ.  Code  Prac.  I  62,  tabd.  8,  re- 
quiring an  action  for  the  sale  of  real  proper- 
ty under  a  mortgage  lien,  or  other  incum- 
brance or  charge,  etc.,  to  be  brought  in  the 
county  In  which  the  subject  of  the  action,  or 
some  part  thereof,  is  situated,  the  words 
"lien,  or  other  incumbrance  or  diarge,*'  do 
not  embrace  an  attachment  lien,  but  refer  to 
liens  or  charges  created  by  contract  or  Judg- 
ment Hatton  V.  Bogers,  121  8.  W.  696,  699, 
134  Ky.  84a 


A  personal  claim  against  a  bankrupt's 
estate  does  not  constitute  a  "lien."  Eason  v. 
Garrison  ft  Kelly,  82  8.  W.  800,  801,  36  Tex. 
GIv.  App.  674. 

Where  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land 
containing  a  mine  limited  the  application  of 
S60,000  of  the  price  to  the  payment  of  "Uens," 


Dower  is  not  a  lien**  of  any  kind,  Imt  an 
estate.  The  fiict  that  it  is  an  incumbrance 
does  not  constitute  it  a  lien«  An  incumbrance 
is  not  always  a  lien,  though  a  lien  is  always 
an  incumbrance.  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  106  N.  Y. 
Supp.  161,  163,  i20  App.  Div.  681. 

EqattaMeUoB 

The  term  "lien**  Is  used  in  equity  in  a 
broader  sense  than  at  law,  and  denotes  any 
right  of  a  special  nature  over  a  thing,  which 
constitutes  a  charge  or  incumbrance  upon  it, 
and  may  be  enforced  by  proceeding  against  it, 
and  to  the  existence  of  sudi  a  lien  possession 
is  not  essential  An  equitable  lien  is  distinct 
from  the  general  title,  and  may  exist  separate 
from  it,  or  both  may  be  vested  in  the  same 
person.  In  re  National  Cash  Beglster  Co., 
174  Fed.  619,  681,  98  C.  C.  A.  426. 

A  "lien,"  from  a  legal  standpoint,  em- 
bodies the  idea  of  a  deed  or  bond,  and  neces- 
sarily implies  that  there  is  something  in  ex- 
istence to  which  it  attaches.  In  equity  there 
may  be  an  agreement  that  there  sfaidl  be  a 
lien  upon  a  thing  if  and  when  it  exists,  but 
that  agreement  is  not  itself  a  "lien."  On 
an  equitable  assignment  of  money  to  be  earn- 
ed in  the  future  by  the  assignor,  the  assignee 
acquires  no  "lien"  on  the  money  unless  th« 
assignor  has  earned  it  Gogan  v.  Conover 
Mfg.  Co.,  60  AtL  408,  414,  69  N.  J.  Bq.  868. 


See  Bstate. 

As  latevMit  im  laad 

See  Interest  (In  Property). 


UBK 


182 


UttK 


Service  of  a  writ  of  gamisluneiit  gives 
plaintiff,  at  least  before  Judgment  against 
the  garnished,  a  specific  right  to  have  his 
claim  satisfied  out  of  the  funds  In  the  gar- 
nishee's hands,  which  Is  a  ''Hen,**  within 
Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  {  67,  subd. 
''f ,"  80  Stat  664,  566,  making  void  101  attach- 
'  ments  or  other  liens  obtained  through  legal 
proceedings  against  the  Insolvent  within  four 
months  after  filing  the  petition  In  bankrupt- 
cy; the  statute  applying  to  voluntary  as 
well  as  Involuntary  proceedings,  In  view  of 
section  1,  subd.  1,  providing  that  the  term 
*'a  person  against  whom  a  petition  has  been 
filed*'  shall  Include  one  filing  a  voluntary  pe- 
tition, liongley  Bros.  v.  McGann,  119  S.  W. 
268,  269,  90  Ark.  252. 

Jndsmaat  or  attaehment 

An  attachment  on  mesne  process  under 
the  statute  creates  a  Uen.  This  lien  does  not 
depend  upon  possession.  It  is  created  by 
process  of  law,  sometimes  by  a  record  of*  the 
doings  of  an  oflacer,  as  In  the  case  of  attach- 
ments of  real  estate  and  of  personal  property 
that  cannot  easily  be  removed.  Undoubted- 
ly an  attachment  by  trustee  process  gives  a 
lien  on  property  which  will  be  good  against 
bankruptcy,  If  more  than  four  months  old. 
Snyder  t.  Smith,  69  N.  B.  1089,  1090,  185 
^j^a^s.  58. 

A  "lien,"  In  Its  usual  and  ordinary  sig- 
nification. Is  a  claim  which  one  person  has 
on  the  property  of  another  as  security  for 
some  debt  or  charge  for  the  payment  or  sat- 
isfaction of  which  the  property  may  be  sold, 
and  COmp.  Laws  Dak.  1887,  I  4339.  giving 
one  who  has  a  lien  the  right  to  redeem  from 
a  superior  lien  on  the  same  property,  does 
not  give  an  attaching  creditor,' whose  claim 
has  not  been  reduced  to  Judgment,  the  right 
to  redeem  from  a  purchaser  of  the  attached 
property  at  an  auction  sale  before  the  pass- 
ing of  the  sheriff's  deed,  which,  under  other 
statutory  provisions,  is  not  Issued  until  the 
expiration  of  a  year  after  the  sale;  the  in- 
terest of  such  purchaser  not  being  a  lien  in 
a  legal  sense,  but  rather  an  Inchoate  owner- 
ship which  may  automatically  ripen  into  a 
legal  title  without  any  further  act  on  his 
part  Hardin  y.  Eelley,  144  Fed.  353,  854, 
75  C.  a  A.  355. 

A  Judgment  is  a  purely  legal  "lien"  on 
land,  and  in  an  action  In  a  court  other  than 
that  In  which  the  Judgment  was  rendered, 
and  in  which  the  issue  was  as  to  whether 
one  of  the  parties  who  had  paid  the  Judg- 
ment was  entitled  to  subrogation,  the  land 
on  which  the  Judgment  was  a  lien  could  not 
be  made  the  subject  of  a  direct  order  or  de- 
cree, the  proper  mode  of  control  being  by  di- 
rections as  to  the  legal  ownership  or  control 
of  the  Judgment  Bolce  v.  Conover,  61  Atl. 
159,  163,  69  N.  J.  Bq.  58a 


A  mortgage  Is  a  *lien,"  and  a  pledge  is 
a  lien,  so  that  under  Bev.  Codes  1909,  f 
4308,  subd.  1,  providing  that  the  deik  of 
the  court  must  issue  a  writ  of  attachment  up- 
on receiving  an  afiadavlt  by  or  on  behalf  of 
the  plaintiff,  setting  forth  Inter  alia  that  the 
payment  of  the  debt  sought  to  be  collected 
has  not  been  secured  by  any  mortgage  or 
Hen  upon  real  or  personal  property,  or  any 
pledge  of  personal  property,  etc.,  an  affidavit 
partially  following  the  language  of  the  stat- 
ute in  regard  to  the  debt  not  being  secured, 
and  falls  to  state  that  it  Is  not  secured  by 
pledge  of  personal  property,  and  contains  no 
statement  equivalent  to  that,  is  not  sufficient 
as  it  does  not  contain  the  language  of  the 
statute  or  language  equivalent  to  that  re- 
quired by  the  statute.  Knutsen  r,  Phlllipa, 
101  Pac.  596,  596,  16  Idaho,  267. 

A  deed  of  trust  on  a  homestead  is  not  a 
"Uen,"  within  Code  Olv.  Proc  i  1476,  requir- 
ing the  presentation  of  the  claim  against  the 
estate  as  a  condition  precedent  to  enforcing 
a  lien  or  incumbrance  on  the  homestead,  ao 
that  a  trust  deed  executed  by  a  husband  and 
wife  on  the  homestead  was  enforceable  with- 
out presenting  a  claim  to  the  husband's  ad- 
ministrator for  the  debt  secured  thereby. 
Atheam  v.  Byan,  98  Pac.  890,  391,  154  CaL 
554. 

"A  lien'  is  a  charge  Imposed  in  some 
mode  other  than  by  a  transfer  in  trust  upon 
specific  property  by  which  it  is  made  security 
for  the  performance  of  an  act"  Ov.  Code,  f 
2872.  Hence  a  deed  of  trust  is  not  a  lien, 
within  Code  Civ.  Proc.  f  1475,  declaring  that, 
if  there  are  subsisting  liens  on  the  homestead 
of  a  decedent,  the  claims  secured  thereby 
must  be  presented  and  allowed  as  other 
claims  against  the  estate.  Weber  v.  Mc- 
aeverty,  86  Pac.  706,  708,  149  CaL  816.  - 

Same— Power  of  sale 

av.  Code,  (I  868,  2932,  provide  that  a 
power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  shall  be  deemed 
a  part  of  the  security,  and  section  2872  de- 
clares that  a  lien  is  a  charge  imposed  in  some 
mode  other  than  by  a  transfer  in  trust  on 
specific  property,  by  which  it  is  made  securi- 
ty for  the  performance  of  a  particular  act 
Held,  that  a  power  of  sale  contained  in  a 
mortgage  is  a  *'lien,*'  and  can  no  longer  be 
exercised  after  an  action  on  the  debt  is  bar- 
red. Goldwater  v.  Hibernia  Savings  &,  Loan 
Society,  126  Pac.  861,  862,  19  CaL  App.  511. 

Possessiom  reqvlrod 

The  word  "lien,"  at  common  law,  signi- 
fies that  a  person  who  has  bestowed  labor  up- 
on an  article  of  personal  property  shall  be 
authorized  to  retain  possession  until  his  rea- 
sonable charges  are  paid;  it  must  be  so  un- 
derstood, as  used  in  Bev.  St  1889,  i  2843, 
giving  a  lien  for  cutting  wood,  so  that  there 
is  no  enforceable  lien  after  the  property  liaa 
lawfully  passed  out  of  the  debtor's  post^ea- 


UEN 


138 


LIKNHOLDBB 


iion  to  m  ttilrd  person.    TorD«r  r.  Hoiton, 
106  Pac  688,  091,  IS  Wyo.  281. 

As  rli^t  of  pviovit7 

''A  'llm'  l8  a  priority.  It  Is  tbat,  and 
something  more.  That  something  more  is 
that  it  is  a  hold  on  the  property  covered  by 
It  that  fixes  the  priority  so  that  it  cannot  be 
affected  by  subsequent  events."  In  re  Ben- 
nett, 158  Fed.  d73»  680,  82  0.  O.  A.  681. 

''A  'Hen'  is  a  right  of  one  to  retain  prop- 
erty in  his  possession  belonging  to  another 
until  certain  demands  of  him  in  possession 
are  satisfied."  A  right  to  prior  payment  is 
not  In  itself  a  '*lien."  Weisel  v.  Old  Domin- 
ion 8.  8.  Co.,  01  N.  Y.  Supp.  140,  141,  90  App. 
Dlv.  668  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Jordan  v.  National  Shoe  ft  Leather  Bank,  74 
N.  Y.  467,  80  Am.  Rep.  810). 

The  creditors  of  a  firm  have  the  privi- 
lege, sometimes  loosely  denominated  a  "lien," 
to  have  debts  due  to  them  paid  out  of  the  aa- 
aets  of  the  firm  in  course  of  liquidation,  to 
the  exclusion  of  creditors  of  its  several  mem- 
bers. This  equity  is  a  derivative  one.  It 
is  practically  a  subrogation  to  equity  of  the 
iBdivldual  partner  to  have  partnership  prop- 
erty applied  to  the  payment  of  partnership 
debts  in  preference  to  those  of  any  individu- 
al partner.  People's  Nat  Bank  of  Jackson 
T.  Wilcox,  100  N.  W.  24,  20,  186  Mich.  667, 
4  Ann.  Cas.  466  (quoting  CSase  v.  Beauregard, 
00  U.  S.  110,  26  L.  Ed.  870). 

As  seeultj 

See  Security. 

Am  speeifle  Ilea 

Civ.  Code,  §  2872,  declares  that  a  'Oien" 
la  a  charge  imposed  upon  specific  property  by 
which  it  is  made  security  for  the  perform- 
ance of  some  act,  and,  if  the  contract  with 
a  water  company  provides  that  the  agree- 
Doent  to  furnish  water  shall  bind  its  canal, 
there  would  be  created  thereby  a  lien  on  the 
canal  for  the  performance  of  the  act  of  fur- 
nishing the  water  as  agreed.  Stanislaus  Wa- 
ter Co.  V.  Bachman,  08  Pac.  868,  868,  162 
Cal.  716,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  360  (citing  Fres- 
no Canal  &  Irr.  Co.  v.  RoweU,  22  Pac  68,  80 
CaL  114,  3  Am.  St  Rep.  112;  Same  v.  Dun- 
bar, 22  Pac.  276,  80  Cal.  630). 

X«tEH  OI.AI]fAHT 

Act  ^farch  13,  1800,  |  1  (Laws  1800,  p. 
143,  a  00),  provides  that  costs  shall  not  be 
allowed  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  logger's  lien 
unless  a  demand  for  payment  of  the  lien  has 
been  made  before  suit,  unless  the  court  finds 
that  the  claimant  had  reasonable  grounds  to 
believe  that  the  owner  or  a  person  having 
control  of  the  property  on  which  the  lien  was 
claimed  was  attempting  to  defraud  the  claim- 
ant Held,  that  the  terms  '*Uenholder'*  and 
"lien  claimant"  included  a  person  having  a 
lienable  claim,  though  not  perfected,  and 
hence  a  demand  b^ore  the  flUag  of  the  lien 
notice  was  a  sufficient  compliance  therewith. 


Smnpter  v.  Bumliam,  00  Paa  782,  768,  61 
Wash.  600. 

mar    ob    nrrEiuBST    gbeateb 

THEREBY 

The  owner  of  property,  exempt  from  tax- 
ation under  Its  charter  (Pub.  &  Loc.  Laws 
1800,  c.  140),  executed  a  mortgage  to  secure 
a  loan,  and  executed  its  bonds  to  secure  the 
mortgage,  and  agreed  that  it  would  pay  all 
taxes  aud  assessments  imposed  on  the  mort- 
gaged property,  all  taxes  assessed  or  impos- 
ed on  the  mortgage,  and  all  taxes  assessed 
against  the  lien  or  Interest  created  by  the 
mortgage.  St  1808,  |  1042d,  added  by  laws 
1003,  a  878,  {  2,  provided  that,  whenever  tax- 
able real  estate  is  subject  to  mortgage,  the 
mortgage,  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  should 
be  an  interest  in  the  real  estate  taxable  as 
such  where  the  real  estate  was  located  or 
might  be  separately  assessed  and  taxed. 
Heldt  In  the  mortgagee's  action  to  foreclose 
because  of  the  mortgagor's  refusal  to  pay 
taxes  against  the  bonds  in  the  hands  of  pur- 
chasers from  the  mortgagee,  that  the  first 
obligation  referred  only  to  general  taxes  or 
special  assessments  levied  on  the  property; 
that  the  third  obligation  referred  to  an  as- 
sessment against  some  interest  in  the  mort- 
gaged, real  estate,  not  including  an  assess- 
ment on  the  bonds;  that  the  words  "mort- 
gage" and  *1ien  or  interest  created  thereby" 
were  synonymous;  that  the  obligation  to  pay 
taxes  on  the  "mortgage"  did  not  comprehend 
such  taxes  assessed  on  the  bonds,  and  that 
the  mortgagor  was  not  liable  therefor.  Citi- 
zens' Savings  &  Trust  Co.  v.  School  Sisters 
of  Notre  Dame,  130  N.  W.  430,  441^  161  Wis. 
610. 

UBNABLB  ABTIGLB 

Gas  appliances,  sudi  as  pendants,  dian- 
dellers,  brackets,  and  globes,  are  not  fixtures 
nor  "lienable  articles,"  within  the  statute 
giving  liens  for  mat^al  furnished  and  labor 
done  on  buildings,  in  the  absence  of  evid<M)ce 
of  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  owner 
when  he  has  them  put  in  to  make  them  per- 
manent parts  of  the  building,  and  audi  inten- 
tion is  not  ahown  by  the  mere  fitct  that  they 
are  put  in  by  the  original  owner  of  the  build- 
ing, and  remain  in  the  same  after  it  is  sold 
by  him  to  another.  Frank  Adam  Electric 
Co.  V.  OottUeb,  86  S.  W.  001,  008,  112  Mo. 
App.  226. 

LIEHABLB   OLAHE 

The  term  "lienable  claim"  suggests  mere 
right  to  obtain  an  interest  in  specified  prop- 
erty, instead  of  an  interest  in  prffisentl  there- 
in. Jackman  v.  Ban  Claire  Nat  Bank,  104 
N.  W.  08,  106,  126  Wis.  466,  116  Am.  St  Rep. 
966. 

LIENHOIiDEB 

As  owner,  see  Owner. 

Act  March  13,  1880,  |  1  (Laws  1809,  p. 
143,  c.  00),  provides  that  coats  shall  not  be 
allowed  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  logger*s  lien 


LIEU  OF 


134 


LIPS  BSTATB 


unless  a  demand  for  payment  of  the  Uen  has 
been  made  before  suit,  unless  the  court  finds 
that  the  claimant  had  reasonable  grounds 
to  believe  that  the  owner  or  a  person  having 
control  of  the  property  on  which  the  lien  was 
claimed  was  attempting  to  defraud  the  claim- 
ant Held,  that  the  terms  "lienholder**  and 
"lien  claimant*'  Included  a  person  having  a 
lienable  claim,  though  not  perfected,  and 
hence  a  demand  before  the  filing  of  the  lien 
notice  was  a  sufficient  compliance  therewith. 
Sumpter  v.  Bumham,  99  Pac.  752,  768,  61 
Wash.  699. 

LIEU  OF 

See  In  lieu  ot 

LIFE 

See  During  Natural  life;  Bzpeetancy 
of  life;  For  Life;  Imprisonment  for 
Life  or  Less  Than  Natural  life;  Quar- 
terly During  His  Natural  life;  Take 
His  Own  life. 

''By  the  term  'lif^*  as  here  used  [refer- 
ring to  the  fourteenth  amendment  of  the  Oon- 
stitution],  something  more  is  meant  than 
mere  animal  existence.  The  inhibition  against 
its  deprivation  extends  to  all  those'  limbs 
and  faculties  by  which  life'  is  enjoyed.  The 
provision  equally  prohibits  the  mutilation  of 
the  body,  by  the  amputation  of  an  arm  or 
leg,  or  the  putting  out  of  an  eye,  or  the  de- 
struction of  any  other  organ  of  the  body 
through  which  the  soul  communicates  with 
the  outer  world.  The  deprivation,  not  only 
of  life,'  but  of  whatever  God  has  given,  to 
every  one  with  'lif^'  for  its  ^owth  and  en- 
joyment, is  prohibited  by  the  provision  In 
question,  if  its  efficacy  be  not  frittered  away 
by  Judicial  decision."  MacMullen  v.  City  of 
Middletown,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  146. 160, 112  App. 
DiT.  81  (quoting  Field,  J.,  in  Munn  v.  Illinois, 
M  U.  S.  113,  24  L.  Ed.  77). 

The  use  of  the  word  "life,"  in  a  will 
creating  a  trust,  devising  the  fund  to  the 
trustees  to  hold  and  collect  the  rents,  income, 
and  profits  thereof,  and  pay  over  the  same  to 
such  three  children  annually,  during  the  term 
of  their  natural  ''life,"  in  the  singular,  if  sig- 
nificant, tends  to  show  that  the  testator  was 
thinking  of  the  life  of  each.  Brown  v.  Farm- 
er, 68  K.  B.  32,  33,  184  Mass.  136. 

UFE  AND  AGGIDEHT  INSUBAKGE 

"Life  and  accident  insurance"  is  a  con- 
tract whereby  one,  for  a  stipulated  consider- 
ation, agrees  to  indemnify  another  against 
injuries  by  accident  or  death.  State  v.  Wll- 
lett,  86  N.  B.  68,  70,  171  Ind.  296,  23  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  197. 

UFE  ESTATE 

See   Conventional    Life   Estate;     Legal 

Life  Estate, 
▲s  dower  of  use,  benefit,  and  profits*  see 

Dower. 


An  "estate  for  life"  is  a  "freehold"  estate 
not  of  inheritance.  Oummings  v.  CummingSp 
76  Aa  210,  211,  76  N.  J.  Bq.  668. 

life  estates  are  freehold  estates  not  of 
inheritancie,  and  an  estate  that  may  last  for 
a  life  or  lives,  that  is  not  inheritable,  not  at 
will  or  for  any  fixed  period  of  time,  is  a 
"Ufe  estate."  Disley  v.  Disley,  76  Atl.  481, 
483,  30  B.  I.  366. 

"The  very  idea  of  a  'life  estate'  prer 
supposes  a  fee  as  existing  elsewhere  than  in 
the  tenant  for  life,  though  the  latter  may  be 
empowered  to  convey  the  fee  and  thus  divest 
him  who,  but  for  the  exercise  of  the  power, 
would  be  holden  of  the  fee  conditionally,  or 
a  contingent  remainderman."  Beatson  r. 
Bowers,  91  N.  B.  922,  924,  174  Ind.  60L 

An  "estate  for  life"  is  a  freehold  interest 
in  lands,  the  duration  of  whidi  is  confined  to 
the  life  or  lives  of  some  particular  person  or 
persons  or  to  the  happening  or  not  happening 
of  some  uncertain  event  Where  a  grantee 
agreed  that  the  grantors  should  remain  on 
the  premises  during  their  natural  lives,  free 
from  rent,  the  grantors  had  a  lif^  estate. 
Bobb  V.  New  York  ft  a  Gas  Goal  Co.,  66  AtL 
938,  939,  216  Pa.  41& 

"At  common  law  there  were  two  classes 
of  life  estates':  First,  conventional  'life  es- 
tates,' or  those  which  were  created  by  con- 
tract; and,  second,  those  which  came  into 
existence  by  operation  of  law.  The  former 
were  not  impeachable  for  waste,  unless  ex- 
pressly made  so  by  the  conveyance.  The 
reason  assigned  for  this  rule  is  that  it  is  pre- 
sumed that,  if  the  grantor  intaided  to  limit 
the  enjoyment  of  the  estate,  he  would  have 
expressed  his  intention  In  the  deed.  As  to 
the  second  dass  of  life  estates,'  on  the  other 
hand,  they  are,  as  a  general  rule,  impeach- 
able for  waste;  that  is  to  say,  the  tenant  for 
life  cannot  use  the  property  for  any  purpose 
which  would  result  in  an  injury  to  the  inher- 
itance, save  those  only  to  which  it  had  been 
devoted  at  the  time  the  life  estate  came  into 
exist^ioe."  Swayne  y.  Lone  Acre  Oil  Go.,  86 
S.  W.  740,  742,  96  Tex.  697,  69  L.  R.  A.  986, 
8  Ann.  Gifts.  1117. 

Testator  having  devised  certain  lands  to 
his  three  sons  by  clauses  under  which,  with- 
out more,  they  would  have  taken  the  lands 
in  fee,  in  a  subsequent  clause  provided  that 
the  estates  so  taken  by  his  sons  should  only 
be  "life  estates,"  and,  in  case  any  of  them 
died  without  issue,  the  land  thereby  willed 
for  life  should  go  to  the  other  living  children 
or  the  issue  of  such  as  had  died.  Held  that, 
two  sons  having  died  subsequently  to  testa- 
tor's death,  without  issue,  the  third  took  a 
fee  simple,  and  not  merely  a  life  estate ;  the 
words  "life  estate"  being  equivalent  to  de- 
feasible fee.  Smoot  v.  Kirk  (Ey.)  104  S.  W. 
716,  717. 

A  life  estate  may  be  created  by  a  deed, 
leasee  or  devise^  with  or  without  a  stipulation 


LIFE  BSTAIS 


186 


UFB  IKSURAKCB 


for  rent  A  lease  of  premises,  to  have  and 
to  hold  nnto  leasee,  his  heirs,  etc.,  so  long  as 
lie  shonld  wish  to  live  in  the  d^  in  which 
the  premises  were.  Tested  a  life  estate,  ter- 
minable only  at  his  death  or  removal  from 
the  city.  Thompson  v.  Baxter,  118  N.  W. 
797,  708,  107  Minn.  122,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.) 
675. 

Base  fee  distlngwUted 

See  Base  Fee. 
life  rlffht  symomTmosLS 

See  Life  Right 

As  pvopertj 

See  Real  Property. 

TeBA&eies  at  wlll»  from  year  to  year* 
or  at  saff eraaoe  dUtiagaished 

A  life  estate  differs  from  tenancies  at 
will,  or  from  year  to  year,  or  at  sufferance ; 
the  principal  distinction  being  that  the  for- 
mer confers  a  freehold  and  the  latter  a  mere 
chattel  interest  Thompson  v.  Baxter,  119 
N.  W.  797,  798,  107  Minn.  122,  21  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  8.)  576. 

LIFE  nf S17BAK0B 

See  Life  and  Accident  Insurance. 
Proceeds  of,  see  Proceeds. 

Since  the  term  *W^  insurance^'  includes 
accident  policies.  Act  Pa.  June  23,  1886,  pro- 
viding that  when  a  policy  of  life  insurance 
contains  a  warranty  of  the  truth  of  the  an- 
swers contained  in  the  application  no  untrue 
statement  made  in  good  ftith  shall  effect  a 
forfeiture,  unless  the  untrue  statement  re- 
lates to  some  matter  material  to  the  risk.  Is 
applicable  to  accident  Insurance.  Miller  v. 
Maryland  Casualty  Go.,  193  Fed.  848,  848, 
113  C.  C.  A,  267. 

As  chose  Im  aetloa 

See  Chose  in  Action.  . 

As  eoatraet  to  pay  eertain  svat 

Life  insurance  is  a  promise  to  pay  a 
certain  sum  upon  the  death  of  the  insure^. 
Ellison  V.  Straw,  97  N.  W.  168.  170,  119  Wis. 
602. 

An  "insurance*'  upon  life  is  a  contract 
by  which  the  insurer,  for  a  stipulated  sum, 
engages  to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money  if  an- 
other dies  within  the  time  limited  by  the 
policy.  It  is  a  chose  In  action  and  even  be- 
fore the  death  of  the  insured  may  be  as- 
signed. Rylander  y.  Allen,  53  S.  B.  1032, 
1033,  126  6a.  206,  6  L.  a  A.  (N.  &)  128,  6 
Ann.  Caa  366. 

As  expressly  defined  by  dv.  Code  Ga. 
1896,  I  2114,  "life  insurance"  is  '*a  contract, 
by  which  the  Insurer  for  a  stipulated  sum  en- 
gages to  pay  a  certain  amount  if  another 
dies  within  the  time  limited  by  the  policy. 
The  life  may  be  that  of  the  assured,  or  of 
another  in  whose  continuance  the  assured 
has  an  interest"  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  of 
New  York  y.  Lane,  161  Fed.  276,  27& 


A  "life  insurance"  poller  is  not  merely 
a  contract  of  indemnity.  It  is  a  contract 
to  pay  to  the  beneficiary  a  sum  certain  in 
the  event  of  death;  and  if  the  contract  was 
valid  in  its  inception,  and  so  continues  until 
its  maturity,  the  beneficiary  is  entitled  to 
the  whole  of  the  stipulated  sum.  Keckley 
V.  Coshocton  Glass  Oo.,  99  N.  B.  299,  800, 
86  Ohio  St  218,  Ann.  Gas.  1913D,  607. 

A  "life  insurance  policy"  is  not  a  con- 
tract of  indemnity,  but  is  a  contract  to*  pay 
money  upon  the  death  of  the  assured  in  con- 
sideration of  certain  payments  made  during 
his  life.  Wayland  v.  Western  life  Indemni- 
ty Co.,  148  8.  W.  626,  630,  166  Mo.  App.  221; 
Reed  v.  Provident  Sav.  Life  Assor.  Soc.,  82 
N.  B.  784,  786,  190  N.  X,  111. 

As  iasaraaoe 

See  Insurance. 

Beaeflt  sosletlea 

A  certificate  in  a  mutual  benefit  associa- 
tion, providing  that  def^dant  association 
would  pay  on  the  member's  death  to  his  sis- 
ter as  beneficiary  a  specified  sum  on  certain 
conditions,  was  a  life  Insurance  policy,  with- 
in Act  April  11,  1903  (Acts  1903,  c.  119),  pro- 
viding that,  after  Its  passage,  the  suicide  of 
a  policy  holder  of  any  life  insurance  compa- 
ny doing  business  within  tlie  state  should 
not  be  a  defense  to  the  policy,  whether  the 
suicide  was  voluntary  or  involuntary,  or  the 
holder  was  sane  or  insane.  Head  Camp  Pa- 
cific Jurisdiction  Wpodmen  of  the  World  v. 
Sloss,  112  Pae  49,  60,  49  Colo.  177,  31  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  881. 

A  '^ife  insurance  contract"  or  policy  is 
"a  contract  by  which  a  company  or  asso- 
ciation agrees  to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money 
on  the  dcfath  of  a  member,  in  consideration 
of  the  payment  by  the  member  of  fixed 
sums  at  fixed  periods."  A  certificate  issued 
by  a  fraternal  mutual  benefit  society,  pro- 
viding that  on  the  death  of  the  member  a 
spedfled  sum  will  be  paid  his  wife  out  of  the 
mortuary  fund  on  condition  of  payments  by 
the  member  of  fixed  sums  at  fixed  periods,  is 
a  life  insurance  contract  or  policy,  within 
Code  1887,  i  3261,  providing  what  shaU  be  a 
sufildent  declaration  in  an  action  on  a 
policy,  and  is  not  merely  a  certificate  of 
membership  in  a  beneficial  society.  Cosmo- 
politan Life  Ins.  Co.  V.  Koegel,  52  S.  E.  166, 
168,  1C9,  104  Ya.  619  (dtlng  Ix>gan  v.  Fidel- 
ity &  Casualty  Co.,  47  S.  W.  948, 146  Mo.  114; 
1  Bacon  Benefit  Societies  ft  Life  Insurance, 
f  62). 

The  object  of  an  association  was  to  fur- 
nish each  of  its  members  at  death  a  specific 
sum  for  application  to  his  funeral  expenses, 
by  a  system  of  mutual  contribution;  the 
members  at  the  death  of  any  member  paying 
death  assessments.  It  employed  agents  to 
solldt  business  from  the  general  public  and 
was  not  founded  on  prindples  of  philan- 
thropy.    Held»  that  Its  contracts  with  its 


LIFE  IKSURAMOB  OOBiPANT        136     LIFE,  LIBERTY,  AKD  HAPPINESS 


members  constituted  "life  insarance,"  within 
Burns'  Ann.  St  1908,  S  4713,  forbidding  the 
taking  of  an  application  for  insurance  upon 
the  life  of  any  person  in  the  state  in  favor  of 
a  person  not  having  a  bona  fide  insurable 
interest  in  the  life  of  insured,  or  who  is  not 
related  to  him  within  a  certain  degree.  State 
V.  Willett,  86  N.  B.  68,  71,  171  Ind-  296,  23 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  197. 

LIFE  INSURANCE  GOMPANT 

In  the  ordinary  sense^  a  fraternal  order 
is  not  a  '*life  insurance  company."  That 
class  of  fraternal  organizations  which  agree 
to  pay  a  sum  of  money  upon  the  death  of  a 
member  have  that  characteristic  in  common 
with  life  insurance  companies,  but  the  two 
classes  of  corporations  are  organized  under 
different  acts  and  foo  different  purposes. 
The  insurance  company  is  an  ordinary  busi- 
ness corporation,  and  its  poUdes  are  oh* 
tained  for  ordinary  business  purposes,  for  in- 
vestment, for  security  for  the  benefit  of  cred- 
it, as  well  as  the  protection  of  the  family, 
while  the  beneficiary  association  is  not  or- 
ganized for  purposes  of  profit,  its  certificates 
cannot  be  used  for  business  purposes,  and. 
its  members  can  receive  no  pecuniary  ad- 
vantage from  its  certificates  and  creditors 
cannot  reach  them.  The  Modern  Woodmen  of 
America  is  not  an  insurance  company  within 
the  meaning  of  a  question  In  an  application 
for  life  insurance,  "Have  you  ever  been  de- 
clined or  postponed  by  any  company?'  Pe- 
terson V.  Manhattan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  91  N.  B. 
466,  469,  244  111.  329,  18  Ann.  Cas.  96. 

LIFE,  LIBEBTTy  AND  PBOPERTT 

Under  the  Constitution,  no  one  may  be 
deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  with- 
out due  process  of  law,  and  the  terms,  "life," 
"liberty,"  and  '•property"  include  every  per- 
sonal, political,  and  dvil  right,  including 
that  to  labor,  to  contract,  and  to  acquire 
property.  Josma  v.  Western  Steel  Car  & 
Foundry  Co.,  94  N.  E.  945,  946,  249  lU.  508. 

**The  terms  life,'  'liberty,*  and  'property* 
embrace  every  right  which  the  law  protects ; 
they  include  not  only  the  right  to  own  and 
hold,  but  also  the  right  to  use  and  enjoy, 
property."  Kansas  City  Gas  Ca  v.  Kansas 
City,  198  Fed.  500,  510  (quoting  Spring  Valley 
Water  Co.  v.  San  Francisco,  166  Ffed.  667). 

The  terms  "Ufe,"  "liberty,"  and  "prop- 
erty" are  representative  terms,  and  intended 
to  cover  every  right  to  which  a  member  of 
the  body  politic  is  entitled  under  the  law. 
These  terms  include  the  right  of  self-defense, 
freedom  of  speech,  religious  and  political 
freedom,  exemption  from  arbitrary  arrests, 
and  the  right  freely  to  buy  and  sell  as  others 
may.  Indeed,  they  may  embrace  all  our  lib- 
erties, personal,  dvil  and  political,  including 
the  rights  to  labor,  to  contract,  to  terminate 
contracts,  and  to  acquire  property.  None  of 
these  liberties  and  rights  can  be  taken  away, 


except  by  due  piocess  of  law.  Ooffeyville 
Vitrified  Brick  ft  TUe  Co.  ▼.  Perry.  76  Pac. 
848,  850,  69  Kan.  297,  66  L.  B.  A.  185,  1 
Ann.  Cas.  936  (citing  Qlllesple  v.  People,  58 
N.  B.  1007,  188  lU.  176»  62  L.  B.  A.  283,  80 
Am.  St  Bep.  176). 

The  terms  "life,"  "liberty,"  and  "proper- 
ty," as  used  in  the  fourteenth  constttutional 
amendment,  embrace  every  right  which  the 
law  protects;  they  Include  not  only  the  right 
to  own  and  hold,  but  also  to  use,  property, 
and  profits  and  income  are  within  the  protec- 
tion of  the  amendment,  subject,  however,  to 
the  rule  that  when  property  is  devoted  to  a 
public  use  the  owner  is  entitled  to  earn  only 
such  income  therefrom  as  is  just  and  rea- 
sonable as  between  him  and  the  public. 
Spring  Valley  Water  Co.  v.  City  and  County 
of  San  Francisco,  165  Fed.  667,  676. 

"The  term  life,  liberty,  and  property,' 
as  used  in  the  federal  Constitution,  embraces 
every  right  which  the  law  protects.  They 
include,  not  only  the  light  to  hold  and  en- 
joy, but  also  the  means  of  holding  and  en- 
joying, acquiring,  and  disposing  of,  property. 
The  right  to  labor  is  property.  It  is  one  of 
the  most  valuable  and  fundamental  of 
rights.  The  right  to  work  is  the  right  to 
earn  one's  subsistence,  to  live  and  to  support 
wife  and  family.  The  right  of  master  and 
servant  to  enter  into  contracts,  to  agree  up- 
on the  terms  and  conditions  under  which  the 
one  will  employ  and  the  other  will  labor,  is 
property.  The  master  has  the  rii^t  to  fix 
the  terms  and  conditions  upon  which  he  is 
willing  to  give  employment;  the  servant 
has  the  right  to  fix  the  terms  and  conditions 
upon  which  he  is  willing  to  labor ;  and  any 
statute  which  curtails  or  limits  that  right 
deprives  the  party  affected  of  his  property, 
and,  in  the  same  measure,  of  his  liberty. 
Both  parties  are  free  to  enter  into,  or  refuse 
to  enter  into,  the  contract  Before  the  law 
there  is  the  same  freedom  to  employ  as  to 
work,  to  buy  as  to  sell,  to  choose  one*s  em- 
ploy^  as  to  choose  one*s  employer.'*  Branson 
V.  Industrial  Workers  of  the  World,  95  Pac 
354,  361,  30  Neb.  270  (quoting  Goldfield 
Consol.  Mines  Co.  v.  Ck^dfleld  Miners*  Union 
No.  220, 159  Fed.  600). 

UFE,    LIBERTTp    AND    PmEtSITIT    OF 
HAPPINESS 

The  refusal  to  permit  one  to  engage  in  a 
business  of  an  undertaker  is  a  violation  of  a 
right  to  enjoy  *'life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit 
of  happiness,"  secured  under  the  state  and 
federal  Constitutions,  unless  there  Is  some 
good  reason  for  the  refusal ;  and  the  refusal 
to  permit  one  to  bury  the  dead  body  of  a  rel- 
ative or  friend,  except  under  an  unreason- 
able limitation,  is  an  unlawful  Interference 
with  a  private  right  Wyeth  t.  Board  of 
Health  of  City  of  Cambridge,  86  N.  BL  925, 
927,  200  Mass.  474,  28  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  147, 128 
Am.  St  Bep.  439. 


Iii;FB  LICSKfiE 


187 


UOHTER 


LIFE  I«XCKEiniS 

An  act  approved  March  7,  1906  (Acta 
1906,  p.  492,  f  1 ;  Bums'  Ann.  8t  Snpp.  1906, 
f  5902a),  provides  that  no  person  shall  be 
eligible  to  the  office  of  county  superintendent 
of  schools  unless  he  shall  held  a  36  months' 
license,  a  60  months'  license,  a  life  or  profes- 
sional license  to  teach  in  the  common  schools 
of  the  state.  The  act  concerning  common 
schools,  approved  March  6, 1899  (Acts  1899,  p. 
488,  c.  214,  i  1;  Burns'  Ann.  St  1901,  | 
5905b),  provides  for  the  issuance  of  a  36 
months'  license  and  a  60  months'  license  by 
the  state  superintendent  of  public  instruction. 
The  act  of  1899  (Acts  1899,  p.  243,  c.  143, 
i  7;  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  f  6905a),  pro- 
vides for  the  issuance  of  a  professional  li- 
cense on  snch  examination  held  by  the  county 
superintendent  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the 
state  board  of  education,  and  that  such  li- 
cense shall  issue  only  on  the  approval  of  the 
state  board.  The  school  law  of  1865  (Acts 
1865,  p.  34,  c.  1,  I  165;  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901. 
§  5851),  provides  for  the  Issuance  of  state 
certificates  of  qualification  by  the  state  board 
of  education,  which  shall  entitle  the  holder 
to  teach  in  any  of  the  schools  of  the  state 
without  further  examination  and  be  valid 
during  the  lifetime  of  the  holder.  The  act 
approved  March  6,  1873  (Acts  1873,  p.  199,  a 
86,  f  3;  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  {  6049),  in 
amendment  of  and  supplemental  to  the  origi- 
nal act  creating  the  State  Normal  School,  au- 
thorizes the  board  of  trustees  to  grant  certifi- 
cates of  proficiency  to  teachers  completing 
the  prescribed  courses  of  study,  and  provides 
that  two  years  after  graduation,  satisfac- 
tory evidence  of  professional  ability  to  in- 
struct having  been  received,  such  teachers 
shall  be  entitled  to  diplomas  appropriate  to 
such  professional  degrees  as  the  trustees 
shall  confer  on  them,  wbidi  diplomas  shall 
be  considered  sufficient  evidence  of  qualifica- 
tion to  teach  in  any  of  the  schools  of  the 
state.  Held,  that  a  post  graduate  diploma, 
granted  pursuant  to  the  act  aiH^roved  March 
5,  1873  (Acts  1873,  p.  199,  c.  86 ;  Burns'  Ann. 
St  1901,  I  6049),  to  a  graduate  of  the  State 
Normal  School  of  two  years'  standing,  was 
not  a  life  license  within  title  act  approved 
March  7,  1905  (Acts  1905,  p.  492,  c.  168,  S  1; 
Bums'  Ann.  St  Supp.  1906,  §  6002a).  State 
ex  rel.  Benham  v.  Bradt,  84  N.  B.  1084, 1066, 
170  Ind.  480. 

UFi:   OF  AOREEMEH T 

See  During  life  of  Agreement 

UFE  OF  OOWSFtBACT 

See  During  Life  of  Conspiracy. 

LIFE  OB  IiIVES  IN  MBOfQ 

A  corporation  or  Joint-8to(A  company  to 
which  an  annuity  is  bequeathed  will  not  be 
deemed  a  life  in  being  where  so  to  regard  it 
would  cause  a  trust  created  by  the  will  to 
violate  the  rule  against  perpetoitaa.    Fitehie 


V.   Brown,  29  Sup.  Gt.  106, 108,  2U  U.  S.  821, 
68  U  Ed.  202. 

The  rule  has  reference  to  time^  and  not 
to  persons;  the  term  "life  or  lives  in  being" 
referring  not  to  the  persons  who  are  to  take, 
as  testator  may  select  as  the  mea&ure  of 
time  the  lives  of  any  persons  in  existence,  and 
"twenty-one  years  afterward"  are  21  years 
in  gross  without  regard  to  the  life  or  coming 
of  age  of  any  person.  Hays  v.  Mart;^  89  N. 
B.  303,  305,  173  Ind.  279. 

LIFB  POI.IOT 

Old  line  life  policy,  see  Old  lAne  Policy. 

IiIFE  BIGHT 

The  devise  of  a  "life  right"  creates  a 
"life  estate."  Goldsboro  Lumber  Go.  v.  Hines 
Bros.  Lumber  Ck>.,  68  S.  Bl  929,  930,  163  N. 
0.49. 

UFB    TBKAHT 

As  owner,  see  Owner. 


A  provision  in  a  judgment  awarding  to  a 
widow  a  "life  use"  of  an  interest  in  certain 
property  in  controversy  instead  of  a  right  of 
dower  therein  was  improper,  the  life  use  not 
being  the  same  as  a  dower  interest,  prior  to 
assignment  of  dower.  Humphrey  y.  Gerard, 
79  Atl.  67,  68,  84  Conn.  216. 

LIFT 

See  Tbpping  lift 

LIGHT<-LIGHTING 

See  B^are  up  Light ;  Joss  Light 
As  public  work,  see  Public  Work. 
Kind  of  light,  see  Kind. 

UOKT  STATION 

See  Blectric  Light  Station. 

uoHTnre  oompavt 

As  quasi  public  corporation,  see  Quasi 
Public  Corporation. 

LIGHT  (WEIGHT) 

U€«TBR  MATERIAZi 

In  a  claim  of  a  patent  for  a  frame  or 
foundation  for  collars  of  dresses,  a  descrip- 
tion of  an  upper  band  as  of  "lighter  mate- 
rial" than  the  lower  band  applies  to  material 
of  which  the  band  is  composed,  as  diatia- 
gulshed  from  the  band  itself,  and  requires  it 
to  be  comparatively  different — ^whether  light- 
er in  weight,  or  i^mply  more  pliable — from 
material  composing  the  other.  Warren  Feath- 
erbone  Co.  v.  Roberts  ft  Co.,  128  F^.  746, 
747. 

LIGHTER 

As  private  carrier,  ase  Private  Carrier. 


uoHxinNa 


1S8 


LOCBKIN]) 


LIGHTNING 

Under  a  fire  insurance  policy  containing 
a  clause  extending  the  policy  to  "any  direct 
loss  or  damage  caused  by  the  llflplitnlni^  mean- 
ing thereby  the  commonly  accepted  nse  of  the 
term  '^lightning,"  and  exdnding  loss  by  cy- 
clone or  windstorm,  damage  to  goods  from 
water  and  debris,  Into  which  they  were 
thrown  by  the  falling  of  the  wall  as  a  result 
of  lightning,  was  the  direct  and  natural  con- 
sequence of  the  lightning.  Oummlns  t.  Penn- 
sylvania Fire  Ins.  Co.,  134  N.  W.  79,  83,  158 
Iowa,  679,  87  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  U69,  Ann.  Cas. 
1913B,  235. 

uoHTNnra  abbestes 

A  devise  used  by  a  telephone  company  to 
divert  lightning  from  the  line  to  the  ground 
is  spoken  of  as  a  'lightning  arrester,'*  though 
It  might  have  more  properly  been  termed 
a  lightning  dlverter;  its  office  being,  not  to 
arrest  the  lightning,  but  to  divert  it  from  the 
wire  by  offering  a  comparatively  easy  course 
to  the  earth.  Wells  v.  Northeastern  Tele- 
phone Oo^  64  AtL  848,  652, 101  Me.  871. 

LIKE 

See  With  Like  Intent 
See,  also.  Same. 

UXS  GASES 

The  phrase  "in  like  oases  as  natural  per- 
sons,'* as  used  in  Const  Ala.  1901,  S  240,  giv- 
ing the  right  to  foreign  corporations  to  sue  in 
all  courts  "in  like  cases  as  natural  persons," 
must  mean,  where  the  cases  are  alike,  the 
same  description  of  contract  or  tort  Sea- 
board Air  Line  By.  Go.  v.  Bailroad  Commis- 
sion of  Alabama,  165  Fed.  792,  799  (citing 
Smith  V.  Louisville  &  N.  B.  Co.,  75  Ala.  449). 

The  word  "like"  has  been  Judicially  de- 
fined to  mean  "having  the  same  or  nearly 
the  same  appearance,  qualities,  or  character- 
istics; resembling;  similar  to;  equal  in 
quantity,  quality,  or  degree"  (19  Am.  &  Bng. 
Bncy.  of  Law,  180) ;  and,  when  the  Constitu- 
tion declares  that  "all  corporations  shall  have 
the  right  to  sue  and  shall  be  subject  to  be 
sued  in  all  courts  in  like  cases  as  natural  per- 
sons," it  must  be  construed  to  mean  exactly 
what  It  says,  and,  if  the  facts  are  such  as  to 
give  a  private  individual  a  cause  of  action 
under  similar  drcumstanoes,  if  there  are 
facts  which  bring  the  case  within  equitable 
principles,  a  municipal  corporation  has  the 
same  rights  that  a  private  corporation  or  an 
individual  would  have.  Village  of  Haver- 
straw  V.  Eckerson,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  506,  507, 
124  App.  Dlv.  18. 

XJKfi  CTRCUMSTAKGES 

An  instruction  that  "ordinary  care^*  was 
such  care  as  the  great  majority  of  mankind 
would  and  do  exercise  in  the  transactions  of 
human  life  under  like  conditions  and  drcum- 
stanoes, was  not  erroneous  because  of .  the 


use  of  tlie  expression  "undor  like  dzcum- 
stances";  this  being  the  equivalent  of  "un- 
der the  same  or  similar  circumstances," 
which  is  the  proper  standard.  Warden  v. 
Miller,  87  N.  W.  828,  880,  112  Wis.  67. 

LIKE  GOMPAlnr 

As  used  in  Ky.  St  1899,  |  4077,  imposing 
a  franchise  tax  on  20  enumerated  classes  of 
corporations,  all  having  special  or  exclusive 
privileges  or  franchises  not  allowed  by  law 
to  natural  persons,  and  on  every  other  like 
company,  the  word  "like"  refers  to  corpora- 
tions having  or  exercising  some  special  or 
exclusive  privilege  or  franchise  not  allowed 
by  law  to  natural  persons,  or  performing 
some  public  service.  iBtna  lAfe  Ins.  Co.  v. 
CJoulter,  74  S.  W.  1050,  1052,  116  B^y.  787. 

LIKE  EFFEOT 

under  an  instruction  that  an  affidavit 
produced  by  defendant  on  cross-examlnati<m, 
to  impeach  the  credibility  of  the  witness  Who 
made  it  may  be  considered  in  connection 
with  the  affiant's  deposition,  as  evidence 
against  the  plaintiff  of  the  facts  therein  stat- 
ed under  oath  with  "like  effect"  as  his  dep- 
osition, the  words  "with  like  effect"  were 
evidently  intended  to  instruct  the  Jury  that 
the  deposition  and  the  affidavit  were  each 
independent  of  the  other  and  each  affirma- 
tive testimony,  not  however,  that  they  were 
of  equal  weight  and  such  instruction  should 
be  given  where  such  affidavit  is  introduced 
in  evidence  by  plaintiff  on  the  cross-examina- 
tion of  another  witness.  Connecticut  Mut 
life  Ins.  Co.  V.  HiUmon,  23  Sup.  Ot  294, 
296,  188  n.  S.  206,  47  L.  Ed.  446. 

UKE  XIHD 

The  words  "like  kind,"  as  used  in  (}ode, 
c.  151,  f  1,  providing  that  a  person  who 
shall  keep  or  exhibit  a  gaming  table  common- 
ly called  A.  B.  C.  or  E.  O.  table,  or  fftro  bank, 
or  keno  table,  or  "table  of  like  kind,"  etc, 
shall  be  punished,  etc.,  are  used  in  a  broad 
sense,  and  the  act  forbids  certain  kinds  of 
gaming,  among  which  are  faro  banks  and 
keno  tables,  and  all  other  games  like  them. 
So,  on  a  trial  for  unlawfully  keeping  and 
exhibiting  a  slot  machine^  it  is  not  error 
to  instruct  the  Jury  that  if  they  shall  be- 
lieve that  the  slot  machine  described  is  a 
gaming  table,  and  that  the  machine  Is  so 
constructed  that  it  offers  unequal  chances  to 
the  player  and  exhibitor,  and  that  the  un- 
equal chances  are  in  favor  of  the  exhibitor, 
then  the  slot  machine  is  a  gaming  table 
of  like  kind  and  character  to  A.  B.  C.  and 
E.  O.  tables,  faro  bank,  and  keno  table. 
State  V.  Gaughan,  48  S.  E.  210,  212,  55  W. 
Va.  692. 

The  expression  "like  kind  of  property,"  as 
used  in  Bev.  St  1899,  f  1129,  providing  that, 
if  a  carrier  shall  charge  a  greater  or  less 
compensation  for  any  services  in  the  transH 
portation  of  any  kind  of  property  than  it 
charges  any  other  person  for  doing  him  a 


IJK£  MANNER 


I3» 


I/IKd/T 


like  serrloe  in  the  transportation  of  a  "like 
kind  of  property"  under  substantially  the 
same  conditions,  it  shall  be  deemed  guilty 
of  discrimination,  means  "of  the  same  kindt'' 
and  does  not  put  all  live  stock  in  one  class, 
an4  hence  the  charge  of  a  higher  freight 
rate  for  transportation  of  sheep  than  that 
fixed  for  cattle  and  other  lire  stock  does  not 
constitute  a  discrimination.  Wynn  7.  Wa- 
bash R.  Go^  86  S.  W.  00%,  064,  lU  Mo.  Appi 
642. 


Testator  provided  that,  on  the  death  of 
one  of  his  children,  one-third  of  the  Income  of 
Ms  share  of  a  trust  fund  should  be  payable 
**in  like  manner'*  for  the  benefit  of  his  wld%w 
for  life,  and,  on  her  decease  leaving  lawful 
issue  of  testator's  son  then  living,  such  one- 
tlilrd  of  the  Income  and  principal  was  to  go 
to  such  issue  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
other  two-thirds  had  been  decreed.  Held, 
that  the  phrase  *in  like  manner"  was  used  to 
designate  the  mode  in  which  the  recipients 
were  to  be  boiefited,  and  not  to  describe  such 
recipients.  Sterling  t.  Ives,  62  AtL  948,  054, 
78  Gonn.  488. 

St  1898,  i  925—184,  provides  that,  if  a 
landowner  assessed  for  street  improvement 
feels  himself  aggrieved,  he  may  appeal  to  the 
circuit  court,  which  appeal  shall  be  tried  *1n 
like  manner"  as  appeals  from  the  disallow- 
ance of  claims.  Held,  that  the  words  **ln 
like  manner"  did  not  mean  that  equitable 
Issues  should  be  tried  to  a  jury  merely  be* 
cause  legal  claims  and  demands  against  a 
city  were  so  triable  and  did  not  prevent  an 
amendment  on  the  appeal  so  as  to  allow  the 
presentation  of  issues  connected  with  the 
subject-matter  not  triable  below.  Nelson  v. 
aty  of  Waukesha,  182  N.  W.  887,  888,  141 
Wis.  163. 

TiTTTBTiTHOOP 

See  In  AU  Likelihood. 

T.nrBXiT 

See  Reasonably  Lik^. 

The  term  "likely"  means  probable  or 
reasonably  to  be  expected.  Vohs  v.  ShorthiU 
&  Co.,  107  N.  W.  417,  419,  180  Iowa,  638 
(citing  Webst  Diet;  Cent  Diet). 

Since  the  word  '*llkely"  means  "worthy 
of  belief  according  to  Webst  Diet;  "rea- 
sonable expectation,"  aooording  to  Stand. 
Diet ;  or  "as  may  be  reasonably  supposed," 
according  to  Cent  Diet — an  instruction  tn 
regard  to  future  sofltaiing  should  not  leave 
the  Jury  in  doubt  as  to  what  future  losses 
they  may  consider  in  estimating  the  damages, 
and  thus  give  the  Jury  a  roving  commission 
to  find  what  damages  they  saw  fit,  and  an 
instruction  authorising  the  Jury  to  find  such 
damages  as  "plaintiff  will  be  liable  to  suffer 
in  the  future"  was  not  rendered  erroneous 
by  the  use  of  the  word  "likely,**  in  that  it  au- 
thorised the  Jury  to  estimate  the  damages 


irrespective  of  such  as  they  might  believe 
from  the  evidence  would  reasonably  result 
from  the  injuries  in  the  future.  Holden  v« 
Missouri  R.  Co.,  84  S.  W.  138,  136,  108  Mo. 
App.  666  (citing  Illinois  (}ent  Ry.  Ck>.  v. 
Davidson,  76  Fed.  617,  22  a  C.  A.  306 ;  Scott 
Tp.  V.  Montgomery,  96  Pa.  444;  Curtiss  v. 
Rochester  &  S.  R.  Co.  [N.  Y.]  20  Barb.  282; 
dlstingulBhing  Schwend  v.  St  Louis  Transit 
Co.,  80  S.  W.  40,  106  Mo.  App.  634;  Hardy 
V.  Milwaukee  St  Ry.  Co.,  61  N.  W.  771,  88 
Wis.  183 ;  White  v.  Milwaukee  City  Ry.  Co., 
21  N.  W.  624,  61  Wis.  636.  60  Am.  Rep.  154; 
Kucera  v.  Merrill  Lumber  Co.,  66  N.  W.  374, 
91  Wis.  637). 

"Among  other  definitions  of  the  term 
likely*  given  by  some  of  the  lexicographers 
are  the  following:  'Worthy  of  belief.' 
Webst  Diet  'Reasonably  expected.'  Stand. 
Diet  'As  may  be  reasonably  supposed.' 
Out  Diet  Of  course,  the  term  has  other 
significations  less  definite  than  the  foregoing, 
and  for  this  reason  it  should  not  be  used  in 
an  instruction  to  a  Jury  when  plainness  and 
deflniteness  of  direction  are  required;  but  we 
do  not  think  the  Jury  understood  by  the  In- 
struction that  they  were  commissioned  to 
estimate  the  damages  Irrespective  of  what 
they  might  believe  from  the  evidence  would 
reasonably  result  in  the  future  from  the  con- 
sequences of  the  Injury,  but  did  not  under- 
stand that  the  future  losses  for  which  they 
might  assess  present  damages  were  such  loss- 
es as  were  reasonably  certain  to  accrue  from 
the  injury.  It  was  in  this  sense  the  learned 
trial  court  understood  the  term  as  used  in 
the  instruction,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the 
record  to  induce  us  to  believe  that  the  Jury 
had  a  different  understanding.  We  think  a 
fair  construction  of  the  term,  as  used  in  the 
instruction,  means,  and  was  understood  by 
the  Jury  to  mean,  such  losses  as  were  rea- 
sonably certain  to  accrue  in  the  future  as 
the  result  of  the  injury  complained  of." 
There  is  but  a  slight  shade  of  difference  be- 
tween "reasonably  expected"  and  "reason- 
ably certain,"  and  "likely,"  as  used  in  a 
question  to  an  expert  medical  witness  as  to 
what  results  were  Ukely  to  follow,  was  com- 
petoit;  the  term  being  used  synonymously 
with  "reasonably  expected,"  which  might  be 
substituted  for  "reasonably  certain."  Ge- 
rard V.  Manufacturers*  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  105 
S.  W.  767,  771,  207  Mo.  242  (quoting  Holden 
V.  Missouri  R.  Co^  84  8.  W.  133, 108  Mo.  App. 
66Q). 

While  the  term  "likely"  has  in  it  to  a 
certain  extent  an  element  of  probability,  it  is 
not  strong  enough  to  make  proper  evidence 
facts  which  are  likely  to  occur.  In  an  action 
for  injuries,  a  medical  expert  cannot  be  asked 
as  to  whether  an  injury  such  as  the  plaintiff 
received  would  be  "likely"  to  produce  the 
condition  related  to  the  witness.  Higgios  v. 
United  Traction  Co^  89  N.  X«  Supp.  76,  77, 
96  App.  Dlv.  6a 


LISBLT 


UO 


UMIT  AKD  OOKTROL 


In  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  it  was 
not  error  to  refuse  to  strike  out,  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  indefinite  and  speculatire 
expert  testimony,  that  it  was  not  "likely** 
that  there  would  be  any  'improvement  there- 
after in  plaintiff's  sight,  the  word  "likely,** 
although  not  synonymous  with  "probable," 
having  practically  the  same  meaning  in  this 
connection.  Graham  v.  Joseph  H.  Bauland 
Co.,  89  N.  Y,  Supp.  695,  598,  97  App,  Dlv. 
141  (citing  Knoll  v.  Third  Avenue  R.  Co., 
62  N.  Y.  Supp.  16,  46  App.  Div.  527). 

To  constitute  "wantonness**  it  is  suffi- 
cient that  the  act  complained  of  indicates 
that  the  injury  was  the  "likely"  and  not  Im- 
probable result  of  the  wrongful  act  The 
word  "likely**  is  here  used  in  the  sense  of 
something  more  than  possible  and  less  than 
probable.  Conchin  v.  El  Paso  &  S.  W.  B.  Co., 
108  Pac.  260,  261,  18  Aris.  259,  28  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  S.)  88. 

Idable  synonyiiioiia 

See  Liable. 

LILY  OF  THE  VALLEY 

In  construing  the  provision  in  Tariff  Act 
Aug.  27,  1894,  c.  349,  S  1,  Schedule  G,  par. 
234%,  28  Stat  525,  for  "  'lily  of  the  valley* 
•  •  •  plants  used  for  forcing,**  held  that 
"Uly  of  the  valley**  roots,  sprouted,  which  are 
imported  for  forcing,  are  dutiable  thereunder, 
being  included  within  the  term  '^plants**  in 
a  popular  sense,  though  not  technically. 
"Lily  of  the  valley**  roots  are  not  covered  by 
Tariff  Act  Aug.  28,  1894,  c.  349,  §  2,  Free 
List,  par.  558,  28  Stat  542,  relating  to  "moss, 
seaweeds,  and  vegetable  substances,**  not  be- 
ing vegetable  substances  in  the  class  of  moss 
and  seaweeds.  McAllister  v.  United  States, 
147  Fed.  773. 

LIMB 

The  word  "limb**  includes  the  part  of  a 
human  being  from  the  hip  to  the  sole  of  the 
foot  Lorts  &  Frey  Planing  Mill  Co.  v.  W^ 
(Ky.)  113  S.  W.  474,  475. 

LIMES 

As  fruit,  see  Fruit 

Limes  in  brine  held  not  to  be  dutiable  as 
"Umes**  under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11, 
S  1,  Schiedule  6,  par.  266,  30  SUt  172,  but  to 
be  free  of  duty  under  section  2,  Free  List 
par.  556,  of  said  act,  30  Stat  198,  as  "fruits 
in  brine,  not  specially  provided  for.**  Bren- 
nan  v.  United  States,  136  Fed.  743,  744,  69 
C.  C.  A  395. 

LIMESTONE 

As  mineral,  see  MineraL 

Hauteville  stone,  a  compact  "limestone** 
susceptible  of  a  fairly  high  polish  and  used 
for  decorative  work  in  the  interiors  of  build- 


ings, is  dutiable  as  "marble,**  under  Tariff 
Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  f  1,  Schedule  B, 
par.  114,  80  Stat  168,  rather  than  as  "lime- 
stone •  •  •  not  specially  provided  for," 
under  paragraph  117,  30  Stat  169.  The  defi- 
nitions of  "limestone**  and  "marble**  as  glT- 
en  in  Century  and  Worcester*s  Dictionaries, 
New  American  Cyclopedia,  and  New  Inter- 
national Encyclopedia,  do  not  aid  in  any 
great  measure  in  determining  the  dividing 
line  between  what  is  "marble**  and  what  is 
"limestone**  other  than  '^marble.**  Bockmann 
V.  United  States,  154  Fed.  1000,  lOOL 

Marble  is  defined  as  a  "limestone**  bar- 
ing a  granular  and  crystalline  structure, 
bi^  it  is  a  crystalline  limestone.  Hauteville 
stone  is  not  a  crystalline  limestone^  but  is  a 
high-grade  limestone  ornamental  and  polish- 
able.  In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  U»  I  1, 
Schedule  B,  par.  114^  30  Stat  158,  the  term 
"marble"  is  used  according  to  its  more  pre- 
cise definition  as  a  limestone  having  a  gran- 
ular and  crystalline  structure,  rather  than 
its  broader  sense  of  belag  a  limestone  suscep- 
tible of  a  high  polish.  Henoe  Hauteville 
stone,  though  an  ornamental,  polishable, 
high-grade  limestone,  is  not  crystalline,  not 
dutiable  under  the  provision,  but  under  par- 
agraph 117,  as  limestone.  Bockmann  v.  Unit- 
ed SUtes,  158  Fed.  807,  808,  86  C.  C.  A.  67. 

Hauteville  stone,  and  various  other 
stones  of  substantially  the  same  character, 
which  are  susceptible  of  a  high  polish  and 
are  used  as  an  interior  decorative  stone,  are 
not  the  kind  of  limestone  that  is  "marble,** 
within  the  meaning  of  Tariff  Act  July  24, 
1897,  c.  11,  i  1,  Schedule  B,  par.  114,  30  Stat 
158,  but  are  dutiable  as  "limestone,*'  under 
paragraph  117,  30  Stat  159.  United  States  v. 
C.  D.  Jackson  &  Co.,  176  Fed.  884,  885. 

LIMIT 

See  May  Limit;  Patrol  Limits;  Terri- 
torial limit;  Within  the  Limits; 
Without  Time  Limit 

"Limit,"  as  applied  to  a  game  of  poker, 
means  simply  the  maximum  amount  which 
under  the  rules  of  the  game  can  be  wagered 
in  one  bet  Ford  ▼.  State,  38  South.  229,  86 
Miss.  123. 

As  restrict 

See  Restrict 
Exempt  synoymoiu  ^ 

See  Exempt 

LIMIT  AND  OOHTROXi 

The  words  *llmit  and  control,**  as  used 
in  Acts  1902,  p.  420,  c.  300,  entitled  ''An  act 
to  limit  and  control  the  expenditure  of  mon- 
ey upon  public  highways**  by  a  designated 
county,  are  sufficiently  broad  to  cover  a  pro- 
vision in  the  body  of  the  act  prohibiting  the 
county  commissioners  from  levying  taxes  on 
the  assessable  property  of  the  county  for  the 
purpose  of  constructing,  maintaining,  and  re- 


UMITS  OF  lUB  VEIN 


141 


LIMITATION  OF  iiCTIONgr 


pairing  any  highway,  hridge,  or  public  road 
not  in  whole  or  4n  part  within  the  connty; 
and  hence  the  act  is  not  in  conflict  with 
Const  art  S,  i  29,  providing  that  every  law 
Bball  express  bnt  one  subject,  which  shall  be 
described  in  its  title.  Gommlssionen  of 
Qneen  Annexe  County  v.  Conunissionen  of 
Tftlbot  County,  57  AtL  18,  99  Md.  18. 

LIMITS  OF  THE  VSIN 

In  the  absence  of  defined  walls  and  of 
ffllnemllsation  appreciably  greater  than  that 
contained  In  the  general  mass  of  the  moun- 
tain, broken,  stained,  and  fissured  material, 
or  crashed  and  brecclated  matter,  character- 
istic of  the  district,  cannot  be  held  to  con- 
stitute a  vein  or  lode,  and,  in  such  cases,  the 
limits  of  fracturing  do  not  constitute  the 
"limits  of  the  vein,"  and  even  If  there  be 
found  an  occasional  vug,  or  fragment  of  ore, 
yet,  where  It  is  disconnected  from  any  ore 
body  and  so  intermingled  with  the  surround- 
ing country  rock  that  it  cannot  be  regarded 
as  continuous,  it  does  not  mark  the  line  of 
the  vein  or  lode,  within  the  meaning  of  the 
law.  Grand  Central  Min.  Co.  'v.  Manunoth 
Hin.  Co.,  83  Pac.  648,  649,  676-^80,  29  UUh, 
490. 

UMITATIOH 

See  Conditional  Limitation;  Bxeeutory 
Limitation;  Small  limitatioiis;  Title 
by  Limitation  or  Prescription. 

The  word  "limitation,**  as  used  i|i  a  lease 
for  a  term  of  years,  reciting  that  it  is  sub- 
ject to  the  conditional  limitations  herein  stat- 
ed, and  stipulating  in  the  following  para- 
graph that  the  occupation  of  the  premises  by 
the  tenant  and  his  family  as  a  strictly  pri- 
vate dwelling  apartment  Is  a  spedflc  consid- 
eration for  the  granting  of  the  lease,  means 
restriction.  Schwoerer  t.  Connolly,  88  N,  T. 
Supp.  818,  819,  44  Misc.  Bep.  222. 

An  "estate  upon  limitation"  is  one  which 
is  made  to  determine  absolutely  upon  the 
happening  of  some  future  event.  The  tech- 
nical words  generally  used  to  create  limita- 
tions are  conjunctions  relating  to  time,  such 
as  during,  while,  so  long  as,  until,  etc  These 
words  are  not,  however,  absolutely  necessary, 
for,  where  necessary  in  order  to  carry  out 
the  intent  of  the  grantor,  an  estate  will  be 
construed  to  be  a  limitation,  though  words 
ordinarily  used  in  the  creation  of  an  estate 
upon  condition  appear  in  their  stead.  An  "es- 
tate upon  limitation"  dUfers  from  one  upon 
condition  in  this:  That  the  estate  is  deter- 
mined ipso  facto  by  the  happening  of  the 
<x>ntingency  and  does  not  require  any  entry 
by  the  grantor  in  order  to  defeat  it  Dia- 
mond V.  Rotan  (Tex.)  124  S.  W.  196,  200 
(quoting  and  adoptinig  deflnitibn  in  Tied. 
Real  Prop,  f  211). 

Where  an  estate  is  so  ^Epressly  limited 
by  the  words  of  its  creation  that  ft  cannot 
endure  for  any  longer  time  than  until  the 
eontin£^ency  haivsns  vpon  which  the  estate 


la  to  fall,  the  provision  is  a  limitation:    Low 
T.  niompson.  111  N.  7.  Supp.  607,  608. 

Code,  I  1329,  whidi  provides  that  "any 
limitation  by  deed"  to  the  h^rs  of  a  living 
person  shall  be  construed  to  be  to  his  chil- 
dren, abolishes  the  common-law  rule  that  a 
deed  to  the  heirs  of  a  living  person  is  void 
for  uncertainty,  and  makes  a  deed  to  the 
heirs  of  a  living  person  a  valid  deed  to  his 
children;  the  word  "limitation*'  In  the  stat- 
ute meaning  the  creation  of  an  estate.  'The 
confusion  which  has  frequently  arisen  in  the 
use  of  the  word  'limitation'  has  been  due  to 
a  failure  to  appreciate  the  distinction,  its 
original  sense,  namely,  that  of  a  member  of 
a  sentence  expressing  the  limits  or  bounds  to 
the  quantity  of  an  estate,  and  Its  derivative 
sense,  in  which  it  Is  used,  as  an  entire  sen- 
teiiee,  creating  and  actually  or  constructive- 
ly marking  out  the  quantity  of  an  estate.  In 
our  statute  the  word  is  manifestly  used  in  its 
derivative  or  secondary  sense."  Campbell  v. 
Bverhart,  62  8.  B.  201,  204,  189  N.  C.  603 
(dting  2  Fearne,  Remainders  [4th  Am.  Ed.] 
marg.  p.  10,  |  24;  Stames  v.  Hill,  16  S.  E. 
1101,  112  N.  C.  1,  22  L.  R.  A.  698). 

Estate  om,  oeaiditliiA  Jlstl«g»lsliea 

The  distinction  between  an  "estate  on 
limitation"  and  one  **on  condition"  is  that  in 
the  former  the  event  or  occurrence  relied  on 
to  determine  the  first  estate  and  as  the  be- 
ginning of  another  merely  marks  the  end  or 
limit  of  the  first,  and  tiius  indicates  the 
boundary  between  the  two,  while  in  estates 
on  condition  it  actively  defeats  what  might 
otherwise  be  a  greater  interest  Diamond  v. 
Botan  (Tex.)  124  S.  W.  196,  20a 

As  perpetvlij 

See  Perpetuity^ 
As  vroTlso 

See  Proviso. 

luctatioh  of  aotiohs 

The  "statute  of  limiUtions"  Is  a  statute 
of  repose.  McWhorter  ▼.  Cheney,  49  8.  E. 
603,  606,  121  Ga.  641. 

The  statute  of  limitations  is  a  statute  of 
repose,  enacted  as  a  matter  of  public  policy 
to  fix  a  limit  within  which  an  action  must  be 
brought,  or  the  obligation  be  presumed  to 
have  been  paid,  and  is  intended  to  run 
against  those  who  are  neglectful  of  their 
rights,  and  who  fall  to  use  reasonable  and 
proper  diligence  in  the  enforcement  thereof. 
Burleigh  County  v.  Kidder  County,  126  N 
W.  1063,  1066,  20  N.  D.  27. 

"Statutes  of  'UmUation'  are  statutes  of 
repose  intended  to  prescribe  a  definite  limit 
of  time  within  which  the  remedies  included 
within  their  provisions  must  be  prosecuted. 
They  are  designed  to  afford  security  from 
stale  demands,  when  from  lapse  of  time, 
death  of  witnesses^  failure  of  memory,  loss 
of  vouchers,  or  other  causes,  the  true  state 
of  the  transactions  may  ba  in^pable  of  ex- 


LIBitTA/!rrON  OF  ACTIONS 


142 


LIMITATION  OF  ACTIONS 


|»lft^tlon,  and  the  rights  of  the  partLes  can^ 
not  be  satiBfiactorlly  investigated."  Davla  ▼. 
MuBie,  86  N.  E.  943,  944,  23j5  111.  620. 

The  '*Btatate8  of  llmitatton"  are  based 
on  the  theory  of  laches.  Schroeder  y.  Bo- 
sarth,  79  N.  E.  583,  586,  224  111.  310  (citing 
Mettler  v.  liUler,  22  K.  E.  529,  532,  129  IlL 
630,  642). 

A  "statute  of  limitation'*  is  bnt  the  ac- 
tion of  the  state  in  determining  that,  after 
the  lapse  of  a  specified  time,  a  claim  shall 
not  be  legally  enforceable.  State  of  South 
Dakota  t.  State  of  North  Carolina,  24  Snp. 
Ct  269,  288,  192  U.  S.  286,  48  L.  Ed.  448. 

"Statutes  of  limitation*'  are  such  legis- 
lative  enactments  as  prescribe  the  periods 
within  which  actions  may  be  brought  upon 
certain  claims,  or  within  which  certain  ri^^ts 
may  be  enforced.  Peters  y.  Hanger,  134  Fed. 
586»  588,  67  d  C.  A.  386. 

"Statutes  of  limitation,"  as  applied  in 
courts  of  law,  are  inflexible  and  framed  up- 
on the  theory  that  mere  lapse  of  time,  irre- 
spectire  of  other  considerations,  should  bar 
the  claim,  while  the  doctrine  of  "laches,"  ap- 
plied in  courts  of  equity,  is  sufflciaitly  flex- 
ible to  give  reasonable  effect  to  the  special 
circumstances  of  any  case,  and  rests  not 
alone  upon  the  lapse  of  time,  but  upon  the 
inequity  of  permitting  the  claim  to  be  en- 
forced, because  of  some  change  in  the  condi- 
tion or  relations  of  the  property  or  the  par- 
ties. Stevens  v.  Qrand  Central  Min.  Co.,  133 
Fed.  28,  31,  67  C.  O.  A.  284  (citing  Hammond 
V.  Hopkins,  12  Sup.  Ct  418,  143  U.  S.  224, 
250,  36  L;  Ed.  134;  Townsend  v.  Vander- 
werker,  16  Sup.  Ct  258,  160  U.  S.  171,  186, 
40  L.  Ed.  383;  Ward  v.  Sherman,  24  Sup.  Ct. 
227,  192  U.  S.  168,  176,  48  li.  Ed.  391;  Bryan 
V.  Kales,  10  Sup.  Ct  435,  134  U.  S.  126,  135, 
33  L.  Ed.  829). 

"Limitation,"  when  relied  upon  as  a  de- 
fense in  an  action  of  trespass  to  try  title,  is 
in  no  sense  a  plea  of  confession  and  avoid- 
anca  Unlike  a  plea  of  limitation,  when 
urged  against  an  action  of  debt,  it  confesses 
nothing.  In  the  latter  class  of  actions  this 
character  of  pleading  admits  that  the  debt 
once  existed,  and  seeks  to  avoid  its  collec- 
tion by  showing  that  the  right  of  action  is 
barred  by  the  lapse  of  time.  In  those  suits 
the  plaintiff  states  specifically  the  facts  by 
which  he  expects  to  prove  his  debt,  and 
facts  showing  the  promise,  either  express  or 
implied,  upon  which  he  relies.  But  in  an 
action  of  trespass  to  try  title  the  defense 
of  limitation  does  not  expressly  or  impliedly 
admit  that  the  plaintiff  ever  did  have  any 
title  to  the  land  sued  for.  On  the  contrary, 
it  is  as  much  the  assertion  of  an  aflirmative 
title,  or  right  to  the  land,  acquired  by  the 
defendant  under  the  provisions  of  the  stat- 
ute, giving  absolute  title  by  reason  of  ad- 
verse use  and  possession  for  the  statutory 
period,  as  a  denial  of  the  right  of  recovery 
by  reasion  of  the  lapse  of  time.    It  is  not 


simply  a  defense  limited  In  its  effect  to  dis- 
proving the  plaintiff's  right  of  action,  but 
the  setting  of  a  superior  claim  in  the  der 
f endant  In  this  respect  it  occupies  the  sam^ 
plane  as  would  a  superior  right  or  title  ac» 
quired  from  any  other  source,  and  is  no 
more  to  be  regarded  as  a  confession  that 
the  plaintiff  once  had  a  title  than  would  tbe 
pleading  of  a  written  conveyance  acquired 
under  such  conditions  as'  would  render  it 
superior  to  that  under  whi<^  the  plaintiff 
might  daim.  Meade  ▼.  Logan  (Tez.)  110  & 
W.  188,  191. 

Gen.  Laws  1865,  p.  749,  c  191,  |  31,  pro^ 
viding  that  every  judgment  should  be  pre^ 
sumed  to  be  paid  after  20  years  from  rendi- 
tion thereof,  but  that  in  any  suit  in  which 
the  party  against  whom  such  Judgment  was 
rendered  was  a  party  the  presumption  might 
be  repelled  by  written  acknowledgment  or 
proof  of  payment  of  some  part  of  the  amount 
recovered  by  the  judgm^it,  but  that  in  all 
other  cases  it  should  be  conclusive,  is  not 
one  of  limitation,  and  the  absence  of  a  judg- 
ment debtor  from  the  state  did  not  affect  the 
running  of  time  in  favor  of  the  presumption- 
Cobb  V.  Houston,  94  8.  W.  299,  301,  117  Mo. 
App.  645. 

The  provision  of  Civ.  Code  1901,  pax. 
989,  requiring  daima  against  counties  to  be 
presented  within  six  months,  is  not  a  *aaw 
of  limitation"  within  Civ.  Code  19Q1,  par. 
2968,  providing  that  laws  of  limitation  shall 
not  be  Available  in  any  suit  unless  specially 
pleaded  as  a  defense,  but  is  a  special  statu- 
tory limitation  of  the  essence  of  the  right 
created,  and  the  lapse  of  which  not  only  bars 
the  remedy  but  extinguishes  the  right 
Cochise  County  v.  WUcox  (Aria.)  127  Pac 
758,  760. 

Pub.  St  1901,  c.  187,  i  7,  pennlttinjc  a 
petition  to  have  the  probate  of  a  will  re- 
examined in  solemn  form  within  one  year 
after  the  date  of  the  decree,  is  a  statute  of 
limitations  designed  to  secure  the  final  pro- 
bate of  wills,  while  the  facts  are  within  the 
knowledge  of  living  persons,  and  to  promote 
the  requirement  of  public  policy  looking  to 
the  speedy  settlement  of  decedent's  estates, 
and  such  a  petition  cannot  be  maintained 
more  than  a  year  after  the  probate  decree. 
Knight  V.  Hollings,  63  Aa  38,  42,  73  N.  H. 
495. 

The  statute  allowing  two  years  for  re- 
demption from  a  tax  sale  is  not  a  statute 
of  limitations  within  Const  |  104,  providing 
that  limitations  shall  not  run  against  the 
state  or  any  county,  etc.,  and  a  county  has 
not  the  right  after  the  expiration  of  the  two- 
year  period  to  redeem  land,  which  after  the 
tax  sale  it  bought  at  a  trustee's  sale,  to  pro- 
tect a  loan  made  by  it  on  the  land  prior  to 
the  tax  sale.  Tallahatchie  County  v.  little, 
46  South.  257,  258,  93  Miss.  88. 

Statutes  of  limitation  do  not  run  against 
the  state  in  ree^pect  to  '^public  ri^^ts^"  unleea 


UMTTATIQN  OF  ACTIONS 


148 


UOOTBD  PABTHKMHTF 


the  Btate  la  ezpready  incliidad  witlitn  the 
tenaa  of  tbe  statute:  but  where  tbe  state 
beoomea  a  partner  witb  indliiduali  or  en- 
gages In  bnatneaa,  it  devests  itself  of  its 
soTeieIgn  character  and  is  subject  to  the 
statute.  The  rule  that  statutes  of  lindtatiLon 
do  not  run  against  the  state  also  extends 
to  counties,  cities,  towns,  and  mftoor  munici- 
palities in  all  matters  reelecting  strictly  pub- 
lic lights,  as  distinguished  from  pxiyate  and 
local  rights;  but  as  to  matters  involTlng 
prlTate  rights  thsgr  are  subject  to  statutes 
of  limitation  to  the  same  extent  as  individ- 
uals. Brown  ▼.  Trustees  of  Schools,  79  N. 
a  57»,  580,  224  IlL  184,  115  Am.  St  Hep.  146, 
8  Ann.  Gas.  96  (dtlng  County  of  Piatt  v. 
Goodell,  97  HI.  84;  Lee  t.  Town  of  Mound 
Station,  8  N.  B.  759,  118  IlL  304;  President, 
etc:,  of  Ksskaslria  t.  McClure,  47  N.  B.  72, 
167  111.  23). 

EqvitaUe  aetloas 

''limitations*'  and  'ladies,'**  when  ap- 
plied to  the  period  within  which  an  equitable 
right  may  be  asserted,  are  not  synonymous. 
^'Limitations'*  signify  that  fixed  statutory 
period,  whether  expressly  applicable  to  suits 
in  chancery  or  followed  by  analogy,  wMle 
'Aches'*  signifies  unreasonable  delay  inde- 
p»ident  of  statute  or  any  fixed  period  of 
time.  "Laches"  also  involves  prejudice,  ac- 
tual or  implied,  resulting  from  the  delay. 
It  does  not  arise  from  delay  alone,  but  from 
delay  whidi  works  disadvantage  to  another, 
as  the  defense  of  ladies  to  neither  a  limita- 
tion nor  an  estoppel,  but  partakes  of  the 
characteristics  of  both.  Wilder's  Bx'r  v. 
WUder,  72  AtL  206,  205,  82  Yt  128. 

As  yjpeseripttoi 

''So  far,  therefore,  as  the  title  to  prop- 
erty is  concerned,  or,  at  all  events,  so  far  as 
the  title  to  real  property  is  concerned,  'pre- 
scription' and  'limitation'  are  convertible 
terms;  and  a  plea  of  the  proper  statute  of 
limitations  is  a  good  plea  of  prescriptive 
right.  The  language  of  decisions  with  ref- 
erence to  water  rights  has  been  in  accord- 
ance with  this  view."  Hence,  where  defend- 
ant at  the -time  plaintiff  commenced  Its  ac- 
tion had  already  had  a  prescribed  right  to 
divert  the  waters  of  a  certain  ditch,  the  ex- 
tent of  that  right  is  to  be  determined  from 
the  nature  and  character  of  the  adverse  user 
on  whidi  it  is  founded,  and  is  commensurate 
with  the  extent  to  which  it  was  adversely 
enjoyed  for  the  requisite  statutory  period 
auffident  to  vest  the  right  Wutchumna  Wa- 
ter Co.  V.  Ragle,  84  Pac.  16^164,  148  CaL 
759  (quoting  and  adopting  Alhambra  Addi- 
tion Water  Go.  v.  Richardson,  14  Pac.  381, 
72  CaL  601). 

The  term  '^limitations,"  as  used  in  stat- 
utes of  this  country  relating  to  adverse  pos- 
session, is  merely  synonymous  with  the  word 
"prescription"  used  in  the  Roman  law,  and 
means  the  time  prescribed  by  statute  within 
which  a  title  to  property  may  be  acquired  by 


adverse  possession.  Brock  v*  Kirkpatildl; 
48  S.  H  72,  79,  69  &  a  281  (dtlng  Tyler  on 
BJectment;  p.  88). 

UMZTATXOH  07  XJABXUTT 

See  Agreement  Tiimlting  liability. 

LDCXT ATXON  07  A  BEMAXN DEB 

A  "limitation  of  a  remainder,"  strictly 
so  called,  is  a  clause  creating  or  transferring 
an  estate  or  interest  in  lands  or  tenements 
which  is  limited,  dther  directly  or  indirect- 
ly, to  take  effect  in  possession  or  in  enjoy- 
ment, or  fn  both,  subject,  only,  to  any  term 
of  years  or  contingent  interest  that  may  in- 
tervene Immediately  after  the  regular  ex- 
piration of  a  particular  estate  or  freehold 
previously  created  together  with  it  by  the 
same  instrument  out  of  the  same  subject  of 
property.  Biggerstaff  v.  Van  Pelt,  69  N.  B. 
804,  806^  207  IlL  6U  (dtlng  Smith,  Bx.  Int 
Ilfi9). 

UMXTATXON  8PE0XAXXT  P&ESOBIB- 
SD  BT  X.AW 

See  Specially  Prescribed  by  Law, 


Determine  equivalent,  see  Determine. 

UXTTED  B7  X.AW 

See^  also.  Law. 

The  expression  ''limited  by  law,**  em- 
ployed in  a  statute,  refers  to  statutory  law. 
People  V.  Knapp,  132  N.  T.  Snpp.  747,  700, 
147  App.  Div.  486. 

UXITED  JUBI8DIOTION 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Appeals  Is  a  "court 
of  limited  Jurisdiction,"  as  defined  by  the 
Constitution  and  laws  passed  in  pursuance 
thereof,  and  the  burden  is  on  one  invoking 
its  authority  to  establish  its  Jurisdiction  over 
the  matter  In  controversy.  Forbes  v.  State 
Cyoundl,  Junior  Order  United  American  Me- 
dianics  of  Virginia,  60  &  B.  81, 107  Va.  863. 

LIMITEB  P  ABTBEBSKP 

C^ode  Civ,  Proc.  1 758,  as  amended  in  1877 
(Laws  1877,  c  416,  |  1,  subd.  169),  provides 
that  in  the  case  of  death  of  one  of  two  or 
more  defendants,  if  the  entire  cause  of  action 
survives  against  the  others,  the  action  may 
proceed  against  the  survivors,  but  that  the 
estate  of  one  Jointiy  liable  upon  contract' with 
others  shall  not  be  discharged  by  his  death ; 
and  Partnership  Law  (Laws  1897,  c  420)  i  3, 
makes  a  JNirtnership  formed  otherwise  than 
as  prescribed  in  the  chapter  for  tiie  forma- 
tion of  a  limited  partnership  a  general  part- 
nership. Section  4  defines  a  "limited  part- 
nership" as  one  or  mors  persons  called  "gen- 
eral partners,"  and  also  one  or  more  called 
"spedal  partners."  Section  6  makes  every 
general  partner  the  agent  for  the  firm.  Sec- 
tion 6  makes  every  general  partner  liable  for 
ail  Ann  obligations  Jointiy  and  severally  with 
his.  general,  copartner^     Section  7  makes  a 


lilMITlX).  FBRIOD 


14A 


LIKS  OF  DESCatBTT 


flt>ealiil  par(xie»  llAble  only  to  the  amoimt  of 
tbe  cai>itaMiive8ted  by  him,  and. article  8  is 
entiUed  "Limited  Partnership.'.'.  Baction  36 
provides  that  the  genial  partner  "in  sndi 
partnership'*  shall  be  jointly  and  severally 
liable  as  general  partners  are  by  law>  and 
that  special  partners  shall  not  be  liable  be- 
yond the  fund  contributed  by  them  to  the 
capital.  Held,  that  section  6  of  the  partner- 
ship law  is  confined  to  limited  partnerships, 
and  does  not  make  the  partners  of  a  general 
firm  Jointly  and  seyerally  liable  to  the  firm 
creditors,  and  hence  the  representative  of  a 
deceased  partner  cotfld  not  be  substituted 
for  him  in  an  action  for  firm  debts.  Sellg- 
man  v.  Friedlander,  d2  N.  B>.  1047,  1019,  199 
N.  Y.  373. 

lillfZTED  PERIOB 

While  the  Ijegislature  can  authorize  the 
dsSignment  of  a  homestead  upon*  the  granting 
of  a  divorce  to  either  party  absolutely, 
whether  such  homestead  is  carved  out  of  the 
separate  property  of  one  or  selected  from  the 
community,  yet,  under  Giv.  Code,  1 146,  subd. 
4,  which  limits  the  right  of  such  party  in  a 
homestead  selected  from  the  separate  prop- 
erty of  the  other  to  its  enjoyment  "for  a  lim- 
itedf  period,"  there  may  be  enjoyment  or  oc- 
cupation by  the  innocent  party  for  a  long 
period  of  years,  even  during  the  life  of  such 
party,  but  it  does  not  mean  that  the  court 
has  the  powdr  -of  vesting  the  homestead  ab- 
solutely in  saeh  party  unless  he  is  the  former 
owner  of  property  from  which  the  homestead 
was  selected.  Zanone  v.  Sprague»  116  Pac. 
989,  991,  16  Cal.  App.  333. 

XnOTED  PUBIilOATIOir 

A  "limited  publication"  is  one  which  com- 
municates market  quotations  to  a  select  few 
on  condition  expressly  or  impliedly  preclud- 
ing their  rightful  ulterior  communication, 
except  in  restricted  private  intercourse. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Minneapolis  v. 
WeUs,  111  N.  W.  167,  159,  100  Minn.  205 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Keene  v. 
Wheatley,  14  Fed.  Cas.  180). 

UmTED  TERM 

See  Fixed  and  Limited  Term. 

LINE 

See  Back  Line;  Building  Line;  Center 
Line;  Conditional  Line;  Connecting 
Lines;  Continuous  Line;  Curb  Line; 
Dividing  Line;  Each  Line  of  Tax 
Roll;  Half  Section  Line;  Lot  Line; 
Main  Line;  Marked  Line;  Meander 
Line;  On  Its  Line;  Property  Line; 
Shore  Line ;  Side  Lines ;  Stage  Line ; 
Telephone  Line ;   True  Line. 

A  building  line,  see  A. 

Competing  lines,  see  Competing. 

Straight  line,  see  Straight 

In  a  deed  granting  by  metes  and  bounds 
a  small  parcel  of  land  out  of  the  northeaatem 


corner  of  a  Uurge  tract  known  to  contain  ooal, 
and  also  the  privilege,  should  the  grantee, 
"his  heirs,  or  aoBdgns^  open  a  coal  mine  on  said 
<granted)  tract  of  land,  of  undermining  sooth- 
ward  beyond  the  lines  of  said  tract  of  said 
land,  so  far  as  not  to  injure  the  tract  of  land 
of  which  this  was  a  part,  and  now  taken 
from,*'  the  word  "lines"  strongly  imported  an 
intention  to  make  a  larger  grant  than  that 
of  the  coal  lying  immediately  south.  Hl^^ns 
V.  Round  Bottom  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  G9  S.  B. 
1064,  1068,  68  W.  Ya.  218.  - 

The  St  Louis  dty  charter,  which  author- 
izes the  assembly  to  establish  "a  building 
line"  along  boulevards,  does  not  prevent  the 
assembly  from  establishing  different  building 
lines  along  the  same  boulevard;  the  word 
"line,"  as  used  in  the  charter,  meaning:  a 
mark  of  division  or  demarkation,  an  outline 
or  contour,  a  limit  or  boundary,  and  not  a 
straight  line.  City  of  St  Louis  ▼.  Handlan, 
145  S.  W.  421,  423,  242  Mo.  88. 
In  printina 

"The  word  'line'  is  not  a  technical  term, 
but  one  in  common  use,  and  having,  in  com- 
mon usage,  when  applied  to  printing  matter, 
a  well-known  signification.  It  then  means  a 
row  of  words,  letters,  or  figures  printed 
across  a  page  or  column,  without  regard  to 
the  size  of  the  type,"  and  it  has  this  mean- 
ing in  act  approved  April  14,  1891  (2  Qen. 
St  p.  2325),  enacted  to  regulate  the  price  of 
legal  advertising.  Sheehey  v.  Hoboken,  40 
AU.  626,  627,  62  N.  J.  Law  184  (quoting  and 
adopting  Maillard  t.  Lawrence,  16  How.  251. 
261,  14  L«  Ed.  925;  Daly  v.  Ely,  31  Aa  396, 
53  N.  J.  Bq.  270). 

In  flnrTeyina 

That  the  description  of  a  survey  called 
for.  the  marked  "line"  of  another  survey  be- 
tween designated  points  which  was  not  a 
straight  line  but  consisted  of  four  lines  and 
three  marked  corners  was  immaterial;  the 
word  "line"  being  often  used  for  the  plural, 
and  vice  versa,  and  the  singular  being  also 
sufficient  to  describe  the  exterior  boundary  of 
the  survey  line  called  for  between  the  desig- 
nated points.  Bell  ▼.  Powers  (Ey.)  121  S.  W. 
901,  993. 

UNE  OF  DESOEHT 

The  "line  of  descwit"  is  the  course  that 
property  takes  according  to  law  when  the 
owner  dies.  Under  Domestic  Relations  Law 
(Laws  1896,  p.  226,  c  272,  |  64),  providing 
that  the  foster  parent  and  the  minor  sustain 
toward  each  other  the  legal  relation  of  par- 
ent and  child  with  all  the  rights  and  subject 
to  all  the  duties  of  that  relation,  including 
the  right  of  inheritance  from  each  other,  a 
son  of  an  adopted  daughter  of  a  testator  is 
a  "lineal  descendant**  within  Tax  Law  1896 
(Laws  1806,  p.  869,  e.  908,  i  221),  providing 
that  the  transfer  of  property  ffom  a  decedent 
to  any  lineal  descendant  shall  not  be  taxable 
under  the  transfer  tax  law,  etc  In  re  Cook*s 
Sstate^  79  N:!:.  991,  994, 187  N.  Y.  253. 


IJN£  OF  DUTY 


145 


UKS  TREES 


UMM  OF  DUTT 

Laws  1903,  p.  102,  c.  41,  aBthorislug  ft 
penfiioA  to  the  widow  and  children  of  a  po- 
licetnan  on  his  death  **whlle  In  the  line  of 
dQty,"  does  not  authorise  a  pension  where 
a  poUconan  while  at  his  place  of  duty  com- 
mitted suicide  because  of  insanity,  where 
there  was  no  showing  that  the  Insanity  was 
the  result  of  the  performance  of  his  duty. 
A  policeman  would  be  in  the  line  of  his  duty 
while  walking  upon  his  beat  or  while  going 
to  any  point  where  his  duty  called  him,  hut 
if  he  should  meet  a  person  against  whom  he 
held  a  grudge,  and  without  provocation  or 
cause  he  should  assault  him,  and  in  self-de- 
fense such  person  should  take  his  life,  it 
could  not  in  reason  be  said  that  he  came  to 
his  death  while  in  the  line  of  his  duty. 
Again,  a  policeman's  duty  might  call  him  to 
where  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold  to  be 
drunk  as  a  beverage,  and  while  there  he 
would  partake  of  sw^  liquonr  until  he  be- 
came intoxicated,  and  while  in  that  condition 
go  upon  the  street  and  get  killed  as  a  direct 
result  ot  his  intoxication,  it  would  be  tiaye»- 
ty  to  say  that  his  death  resulted  flrom  the 
performance  of  a  duty  enjoined  upon  him,  or 
that  he  was  killed  'In  the  line  of  his  duty." 
In  either  event  his  death  would  not  be  the 
result  of  his  being  a  polic^aan,  or  the  re- 
sult of  his  attempting  to  discharge  any  duty 
as  sudL  Hutchens  v.  Covert,  78  N.  B.  lOdl, 
1062,  30  Ind.  App.  882. 

I.IKE  OF  1iATT«1IOAl> 

The  term  "line"  in  the  general  railroad 
act  declaring  that  the  directors  of  every  com- 
pany formed  under  the  act  may,  by  a  vote 
of  two-thirds  of  their  whole  number,  at  any 
time,  alter  or  change  the  route,  if  it  shall 
appear  to  them  that  the  line  can  be  improved, 
means  the  same  as  "route."  By  "line"  is 
not  meant  the  organization  of  the  several 
particulars  taken  together,  which,  when  used 
for  the  active  affairs  of  the  company  might 
colloquially  be  termed  the  'line,"  but  it  is 
that  spedflc  thing  which,  taken  by  itself, 
even  before  the  company  goes  into  active  op- 
^ation,  is  called  its  "line"  or  "route."  Webb 
V.  Forty-Second  St.,  M.  ft  St  N.  Ave.  Ry. 
Co.,  102  N.  T.  Supp.  762,  787,  52  Misc.  Rep. 
46. 

'TTwo  carriers  may  use  the  same  road, 
but  each  has  its  separate  line.'  The  de- 
fendant may  lease  trackage  rights  to  any 
other  comjAny,  but  the  Joint  use  of  the  same 
track  does  not  create  the  'same  line,'  so  as  to 
compel  either  company  to  graduate  its  tariffs 
by  that  of  the  other."  A  joint  traffic  ar- 
rangement by  which  connecting  carriers  haul 
frcKU  a  point  on  one  road  to  a  point  on  the 
other  road  for  less  than  the  first  carrier 
charges  from  the  same  point  on  its  road  to 
its  terminus  between  the  points  is  not  in 
violation  of  Ky.  St  i'  820,  making  it  an 
offense  for  a  carrier  to  charge  mere  for 
hauling  for  -a^  shorter  distance  than  for  a 
longer  distance  over  Uie  same  line  in  thje 

3  WDS.ft  P.2d  Seb.— 10 


same  diseetiim;  the  expression  '^>ver  the 
same  lla^"  not  including  a  shipment  passing 
in  part  over  the  line  of  each.  Common- 
wealth V.  Chesapeake  ft  O.  R.  Co.,  72  S.  W. 
361,  363,  115  Ky.  57  (quoting  and  adoptii« 
Chicago  ft  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Osborne,  52  Fed. 
012,  8  a  a  A  347). 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  1883,  c.  6,  |.42,  as 
amended  by  Pub.  Laws  1901,  p.  100.  c.  145, 
relating  to  taxation,  the  word  "railroad" 
comprehends  the  equipment,  roadbed,  sites 
of  depots  and  warehouses  and  other  real  es- 
tate, and  the  words  "Une  or  system"  cannot 
be  disconnected  from  it,  and  mean  in  this 
connection  a  railroad  operated  as  a  part  of  a 
Une  or  system  extending  beyond  the  state. 
State  V.  Canadian  Pae  R.  Co.,  60  Atl.  ^1, 
902,  100  Me.  202. 

lilHE  OF  SHIP  OHAXNiX 

A  description  of  a  boundary  as  following 
the  "line  of  ship  channel"  means  the  line  of 
low  tide.  Western  Pac.  Ry.  Oa  Souttiem 
Pac.  Co.,  151  Fed.  376.  386,  80  a  0.  A.  606. 

UaXB     OF     TELBQMABM     OR     TBUEU 
PHOSS  POLES 

By  a  "Une  of  telegraph  or  telephone 
poles"  is  meant  a  line  of  poles  carrying  an 
unlimited  number  of  wires,  and  such  a  line 
is  not  rendered  lAural  in  its  nature  by  hav- 
ing more  than  one  line  stretched  upon  it 
It  still  remains  a  single  line.  Northeastern 
Telephone  ft  T^egraph  Co.  v.  Hepburn,  65 
Ati.  747,  749,  72  N.  J.  Bq.  7. 

LnCE  SHAFT 

The  word  "shaft,"  as  used  in  connection 
with  or  applied  to  factories,  is  a  revolving 
bar  to  convey  the  force  which  is  generated  by 
some  prime  mover  to  the  different  working 
machines,  and  a  "line  or  main  shaft"  is  a  bar 
of  considerable  length,  and  usually  bearing  a 
number  of  pulleys  by  which  power  is  trans- 
mitted to  countershafts.  Hohenstein-Har- 
mets  Furniture  Co.  v.  liatthews,  92  N.  £2. 
196,  199,  46  Ind.  App.  616. 

UHE  TB££S 

"Line  trees"  are  "trees  standing  directly 
on  the  boundary  between  lands  of  adjoining 
owners,"  and  are  "usuaUy  considered  com- 
mon property,  which  neither  may  destroy 
without  the  consent  of  the  other."  Harndon 
V.  Stultz,  100  N.  W.  329,  330,  124  Iowa,  440 
(citing  Musch  v.  Burkhart,  48  N.  W.  1025, 
83  Iowa,  301.  12  L.  R.  A.  484.  32  Am.  St 
Rep.  305). 

Under  the  express  provisions  of  Civ. 
Code,  I  834,  "line  trees"  are  those  whose 
trunks  stand  partly  on  the  land  of  two  or 
more  coterminus  owners,  and  belong  to  them 
In  common.  Scarborough  v.  WoodiU,  93  Pac 
383,  7  Cal.  App.  39. 

Where  adjoining  owners  were  co-tenants 
of  certain  line  trees,  neither  was  at  liberty 
to  cut  the  trees  without  the  consent  of  the 


UNBAIi 


146 


LINKAIi  HSBfl 


other,  If  he  thereby  Injured  the  common 
property  tn  the  trees.  Scarborough  r.  Wood- 
Ul,  08  Pac.  883,  7  O&L  App.  89. 

LINEAL 

"Lineal"  Is  that  which  sabsiats  between 
persons  of  whom  one  is  descended  in  a  direct 
line  from  the  other,  as  between  son,  father, 
grandfather,  great-grandfather,  and  so  up- 
wards in  the  direct  ascending  line;  or  be- 
tween son,  grandson,  great-grandson,  and  so 
downwards  in  the  direct  descending  line. 
State  ▼.  De  Hart,  83  South.  606,  606,  109  La. 
670. 

The  Centnry  Dictionary  defines  'linear 
as  "proceeding  in  a  direct  or  unbroken  line; 
unbroken  in  course;  distinguished  from 
collateral;  as  lineal  descent;  lineal  succes- 
sion." Worcester  defines  "lineal"  as  in  a 
direct  line  from  an  ancestor,  pertaining  to  a 
direct  line  of  descent,  hereditary.  In  re 
Cook's  Estate,  100  N.  T.  Supp.  628»  629,  60 
Misc.  Rep.  487. 


UHEAI.  OOKSAjrOUmiTT 

"Consanguinity"  or  kindred  is  the  con- 
nection or  relation  of  persons  descended 
from  the  same  stock  or  common  ancestor, 
and  is  either  lineal  or  collateral;  and  "lin- 
eal consanguinity"  is  that  which  subsists 
between  persons  of  whom  one  is  descended 
in  a  direct  line  from  the  other.  Suman  v. 
Harvey,  79  Atl.  197,  204, 114  Md.  241. 

UHEAI.  DES0Ein>AHT8 

Testator  devised  part  of  his  estate  to 
trustees,  to  hold  equally  for  the  benefit  of 
testator's  three  children,  and  to  pay  to  each 
of  them  the  rents  and  profits  of  his  or  her 
portion  for  life,  and  at  his  or  her  death  to 
transfer  and  convey  to  his  or  her  "lineal  de- 
scendants," if  any,  and,  if  none,  then  equally 
to  the  survivors  of  testator's  descendants, 
or  to  their  lineal  descendants,  if  any;  that 
the  descendants  of  any  child  should  have 
the  portion  which  their  parent,  if  living, 
would  have  taken,  and,  in  case  of  death  of 
all  of  testator's  children  without  issue,  to 
convey  the  trust  res  to  testator's  heirs  at 
law.  Held,  that  the  words  "lineal  descend- 
ants" had  the  same  legal  eifect  as  "heirs  of 
the  body,"  and  that  equitable  estates  in  fee 
tail  were  therefore  created  by  the  will,  with 
contingent  cross-remainders  to  the  surviv- 
ors or  their  descendants,  if  either  child  died 
without  issue.  Paine  v.  Sackett,  61  AtL  763, 
755,  27  B.  L  300. 

A  trust  deed  conveying  property  to  trus- 
tees during  their  lives  and  the  life  of  the 
survivor  of  them  recited  that  the  grantor 
wished  to  provide  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  beneficiaries  named,  directed  the  trustees 
to  distribute  the  proceeds  among  the  bene- 
ficiaries, provided  for  the  distribution  there- 
of on  the  death  of  one  or  more  of  the  bene- 
ficiaries with   or  without  "Uneal   descend- 


ants,** and  that,  on  the  temdnatioii  of  tbe 
trust  estatt  by  the  death  of  the  last  stur- 
viving  trustee,  the  "lineal  deaoendants"  of 
the  beneficiaries  named  should  take  tiie  body 
of  the  fund,  and  further  provided  that  tlie 
beneficiaries  should  not  take  any  cQn&t  In- 
terest in  the  grantor's  property  in  the  state 
than  that  therein  granted.  Held,  that  the 
phrase  "lineal  descendants"  must  be  taken 
in  its  technical  sense,  and  the  contingeo- 
cies  on  which  the  corpus  of  the  fund  de- 
volved on  the  issue  of  the  beneficiaries  were 
that  all  the  beneficiaries^  as  well  as  all  the 
trustees,  should  be  dead.  Parrish  v.  Mills, 
106  S.  W.  882,  886,  101  Tex.  276. 

Adopted  eUld 

A  legally  adopted  child  is  a  "lineal  de- 
scendant" of  its  adopting  parents.  In  re 
Winchester's  Estate,  74  Pac.  10,  140  Oal. 
468  (citing  Warren  v.  Prescott,  24  Aa  948, 
84  Me.  483,  17  L.  B.  A.  435,  30  Am.  St  Rep. 
370). 

The  Oentury  Dictionary  defines  the 
words  "lineal  descendant"  to  mean  "descend- 
ed from  father  to  son  through  successive 
generations,"  and  "descendant"  as  "an  in- 
dividual proceeding  from  an  ancestor  in  any 
degree;  issue,  offspring,  near  or  remote." 
"Lineal"  is  d^ined  as  "proceeding  In  a  di- 
rect or  unbroken  line;  unbroken  in  course; 
distinguished  from  collateral;  as  lineal  de- 
scent; lineal  succession.''  Worcester  de- 
fines "descendant"  as  '*the  offspring  of  an 
ancestor;  progeny,"  and  "descent"  as  "pro- 
ceeding from  an  original  or  progenitor,  ex- 
traction." A  son  of  an  adopted  daughter 
of  testator  is  not  a  "lineal  descendant"  with- 
in the  transfer  tax  act,  so  as  to  exempt  his 
legacy  from  the  transfer  tax.  In  re  Cook's 
EsUte,  100  N.  T.  Supp.  628,  629,  60  Wac 
Rep.  487. 

A  "lineal  descendant"  is  one  who  is  in 
the  Une  of  descent  from  a  certain  person, 
but,  since  the  passage  of  the  domestic  rela- 
tions law,  not  necessarily  in  the  line  of  gen- 
eration. Under  Domestic  Relations  Law 
(Laws  1806,  p.  226,  c  272,  |  64),  providing 
that  the  foster  parent  and  the  minor  sustain 
toward  each  other  the  legal  relation  of  par^ 
ent  and  child  with  all  the  rights  and  sub- 
ject to  all  the  duties  of  that  relation,  in- 
cluding the  right  of  inheritance  from  each 
other,  a  son  of  an  adopted  daui^ter  of  tes- 
tator is  a  "lineal  descendant"  within  Tax 
Law  1896  (Laws  1896,  p.  869,  c.  908,  |  221), 
providing  that  the  transfer  of  pKq^erty  from 
a  decedent  to  any  "lineal  descendant"  shall 
not  be  taxable  under  the  transfer  tax  law, 
eta  In  re  Cook's  Bstate^  79  N.  B.  991,  994, 
187  N.  Y.  253. 

As  desoendaat 

See  Descendant 

UNEAZ*  KKTRIi 

The  words  "lineal  heirs,"  like  "helm  of 
the  body,*'  mean  all  lineal  descendants  to 


LINEAL  HEIiUS 


U7 


WNT  OOTTOK 


the  remotest  posterity,  and  axe  words  of  | 
Inheritanoe,  and  not  of  parcha8e»  unless  the  I 
instrument  clearly  shows  they  were  nsed  in 
a  restricted  sense  to  denote  ''dUldren." 
Clark  y.  Neves,  57  3.  B.  614,  615,  76  S.  C. 
484,  12  L.  B.  A.  (N.  &)  298  (citing  Dudcett 
V-  Butler,  45  S.  B.  137,  67  S.  C.  130;  Hoi- 
man  t.  Wesner,  45  S.  B.  206,  67  S.  a  307). 

The  phrase  "lineal  heirs"  is  equiyalent 
to  the  words  *l^:al  representatlTe"  In  re 
Tuttle's  Estate,  68  Aa  44,  45,  77  Ck>nn.  810 
(citing  Ketchum  ▼.  Corse,  31  AtL  486,  65 
Conn.  89). 

XiUfEAZi  IHHEBITAHOB  TAX 

A  tax  on  the  interests  of  lineal  descend- 
ants is  a  lineal  inheritance  tax,  and  that 
on  collateral  descendants  a  collateral  in- 
heritance tax.  In  re  Macky's  Estate,  102 
Pac  1075,  1078,  46  Colo.  79,  23  L.  R.  A 
(N.   S.)  1207. 

LIHEAI.  X88UB 

Act  0>ng.  Jnne  18,  1896,  c.  448,  80  Stat 
448,  as  amended  by  Act  March  2,  1901,  e 
806,  31  Stat  938,  imposing  a  succession  tax, 
classifled  legatees  and  distributees  with  ref- 
erence to  their  degree  of  blood  relation- 
ship to  the  deceased*  and  regulated  the  tax- 
es accordingly.  In  the  first  class  were 
placed  the  lineal  issue  or  lineal  ancestor, 
brother  or  sister  of  the  decedent;  in  the  sec- 
ond the  descendants  of  a  brother  or  sister; 
in  the  third  the  brother  or  sister  of  the 
father  or  mother  or  a  descendant;  in  the 
fourth  class,  the  brother  or  sister  of  the 
grandfather  or  grandmother  or  a  descend- 
ant; and  in  the  fifth  all  beneficiaries  found 
to  be  in  any  other  degree  of  collateral  con- 
sanguinity, or  who  may  be  a  stranger  in 
blood  to  the  person  dying  seised  of  the  prop- 
erty. Held,  that  an  adopted  child,  though 
under  the  laws  of  the  state  entitled  to  all 
the  rights  of  heirship  of  a  child  bom  in  law- 
ful ^nedlock,  was  not  a  ^'lineal  issue"  with- 
in the  first  class,  but  was  a  stranger  in  blood 
within  the  fifth  dass.  Kerr  ▼.  Ctoldsbor- 
oush,  150  Fed.  289,  290,  80  a  C.  A  177. 

LINER 

A  machine  ^own  as  a  "liner,**  a  heavy, 
hollow,  rerolving  iron  roller,  filled  with  steam 
of  hi^h  temperature,  with  a  smaller  roller 
above,  between  which  papers  were  passed 
by  the  operator,  was  not  the  character  of 
machinery  required  to  be  guarded  by  Bums' 
Ann.  St  1908,  i  8029,  requiring  employers 
to  guard  '*all  vats,  pans,  saws,  planers,  cogs, 
gearing;  belting,  shafting,  set  screws  and  ma- 
chinery** ;  the  liner  b^g  neither  a  ''rat**  nor 
a  "gearing."  Jenkins  t.  Lafayette  Box  Board 
&  Paper  Co.,  87  N.  Bl  992,  993,  48  Did.  App. 
468. 

LINK 

The  word  "link,**  in  an  instractlon  on 
reasonable  doubt  on  a  trial  for  crime  where 


the  testtmony  of  the  complaining  witness  to 
the  main  ftict  was  direct  and  the  only  cir- 
cumstantial evidence  In  the  case  was  cor- 
roborative, that  it  was  not  necessary  that 
every  fact  and  drcumstanoe  and  every 
"link"  in  the  chain  must  be  proven  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt,  but  that  all  the  evidence 
in  the  case,  when  considered  as  a  wholes 
must  satisfy  the  Jury  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  defendant  was  guilty,  is  used  to 
refer  only  to  evidentiary  facts  which  may 
add  force  or  weight  to  other  facts  from 
which  the  inference  of  guilt  may  be  drawn, 
and  the  instruction  is  not  erroneous.  People 
V.  Rich,  94  N.  W.  375,  878,  133  Mich.  14. 

LINOLEUM 

See  Qranite  Lfnoleum. 

Plank  linoleum,  made  by  running  upon 
the  burlap  foundation  paste  of  two  colors  in 
stripes  of  equal  width,  a  process  differing 
from  that  employed  in  making  inlaid  lin- 
oleum, is,  under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  & 
11,  I  1,  Schedule  J,  par.  337,  30  Stat  180, 
dutiable  as  'linoleum  *  *  •  figured  or 
plain,"  rather  than  as  'Inlaid  linoleum." 
United  States  v.  Scott  &  West,  164  Fed.  286, 
286. 

UNSEED  OIL 

Laws  1897,  p.  403,  c  217,  provides  that 
no  person  or  corporation  shall  manufacture 
or  sell  any  linseed  oil,  unless  the  same  an- 
swers a  chemical  test  for  purity  recognized 
in  the  United  States  Pharmacopceia,  and  de- 
clares that  the  same  shall  be  sold  under  its 
true  name  and  in  vessels  bearing  proper 
stamps,  describing  it  as  pure  linseed  oil  raw 
or  pure  linseed  oil  boiled.  Laws  1901,  c.  332, 
amends  the  act,  and  provides  that  no  person 
or  corporation  shall  manufacture  linseed  oil, 
unless  the  same  answers  to  a  certain  de- 
scribed test  The  amendment  makes  no  ref- 
erence to  raw  or  boiled  oil.  The  words  "lin- 
seed oil,**  as  used  In  the  amendment,  includes 
both  raw  and  boiled  oil.  State  v.  Williams, 
100  N.  W.  641,  642,  93  Blinn.  155. 

LINTCOnON 

Acts  1896,  p.  172,  c.  156,  |  16,  imposes  a 
tax  on  all  "lint  cotton**  annually  grown  in 
a  levee  district  etc.,  and  Acts  1904,  p.  126, 
c  90,  i  5,  makes  it  unlawful  for  any  person 
to  remove  from  the  district  any  "cotton** 
grown  therein  without  first  paying  the  levee 
tax  thereon,  and  declares  that  the  levee 
board  may  recover  from  the  person  wrong- 
fully removing  such  cotton  a  certain  penalty 
tax  on  each  bale  or  hundredweight  of  "seed 
cotton'*  so  removed.  Held,  that  the  wot6b 
"lint  cotton"  in  the  first  act  and  "cotton** 
and  "seed  cotton"  in  the  second  act  were 
limited  to  "lint  cotton'*  ginned  by  ordinary 
gins,  and  did  not  tndude  "linter"  or  **Orab- 
bof*  cotton  obtained  by  reginning  cotton 


LINTER  0OTTO» 


148 


LIQUIDATED 


seed  and  hard  locks  of  cotton  and  cotton 
mixed  with  hulls,  bolls,  and  other  substanc- 
es which  could  not  be  removed  by  ordinary 
ginning.  Mississippi  Levee  Com*r8  ▼.  Ref- 
uge Cotton  OU  Go^  44  South.  82^  829,  91 
Miss.  480. 

LiNTER  COTTON 

See  Lint  Cotton. 

LIQUEUR 

Vermuth  is  not  a  "wine,**  "cordial,"  or 
"liqueur,"  within  the  meaning  of  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1897,  c  11,  i  1,  Schedule  H,  par. 
296,  30  Stat  174,  prohibiting  an  allowance 
for  the  leakage  of  those  three  articles.  Unit- 
ed States  Y.  Julius  Wile,  Sons  ft  Co.,  178 
Fed.  269,  27Q,  101  C.  C.  A.  674. 

LIQUID 

See  Inflammable  Liquid ;  Poisonous  Liq- 
uid. 

LIQUID  mZTUBE 

The  terms  "beverage,**  'liquid  mixture," 
or  "decoction,"  as  used  in  Ky.  St  1903,  | 
2557a,  making  the  sale  at  retail  of  a  bev- 
erage, liquid  mixture,  or  decoction  which 
produces  intoxication,  unlawful  in  a  terri- 
tory wherein  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor 
is  prohibited,  are  used  interchangeably,  each 
synonymous  with  the  other.  Commonwealth 
V.  Jarvls  &  Williams,  86  S.  W.  656,  557»  120 
Ky.  334. 

LIQUIDATE 

Laws  1907,  c.  244,  entitled  an  act  "for 
the  liquidation  and  payment  of  the  claim 
*  •  •  against  the  state  in  full  and  final 
settlement  of  said  claim  and  all  other  de- 
mands," does  not  indicate  any  legislative  in- 
tention to  pay  a  debt  or  claim  which  did  not 
exist,  as  the  word  "liquidate"  Is  defined  to 
be  the  act  of  settling  and  adjusting  debts,  or 
ascertaining  the  amounts  or  balance  due: 
Hanly  v.  Sims,  94  N.  B.  401,  403,  176  Ind. 
346  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4130). 

UQUIDATEB 

Plaintiff's  demand  in  an  action  on  notes 
is  Uquidated,  within  Rev.  St  1895,  art  754, 
providing  that,  if  the  suit  be  founded  on  a 
certain  demand,  defendant  may  not  set  off 
unliquidated  damages.  Wise  v.  Ferguson 
(Tex.)  188  S.  W.  816,  8ia 

Whether  a  claim  is  of  a  nature  connoted 
by  the  term  "set-off,"  and  whether,  as  to 
its  liquidated  or  unliquidated  character,  cap- 
able of  being  the  subject  of  set-off,  is  to  be 
determined  by  applying  the  test,  Will  an  ac- 
tion of  indebitatus  assumpsit  lie  thereon  T 
If  so,  it  la  liquidated  within  the  legal  mean- 
ii4;  of  the  word  "set-off."  Links  v.  Marl- 
owe, 84  AtL  1066,  1067,  83  N.  J.  Law,  389. 


The  words  "sum  liquidated,**  as  used  In 
a  statute  providing  that  no  demand  shall 
be  set  off  unless  for  the  price  of  real  or 
personal  estate  sold  or  for  money  paid,  mon- 
ey had  and  received,  or  for  services  done, 
unless  it  be  for  a  sum  liquidated  or  one  that 
may  be  ascertained  by  calculation,  do  not  in- 
clude an  unliquidated  claim  for  use  and  oc- 
cupation.   Hall  V.  OUdden,  39  Me.  446,  447. 

The  word  "liquidated,"  in  the  sense  of 
the  rule  that  payment  of  a  lesser  sum  is  a 
discharge  oi  the  remainder  where  the  amount 
in  dispute  Is  unliquidated,  but  that  it  is  not  a 
discharge  where  it  is  liquidated,  means  that 
the  amount  due  has  been  ascertained  and 
agreed  on  by  the  parties  or  fixed  by  opera- 
tion of  law.  The  rule  does  not  apply  where 
there  is  a  bona  fide  dispute  as  to  the  amount 
actually  due.  A  demand  is  not  liquidated, 
even,  if  it  appears  that  something  is  due,  un- 
less it  appears  how  much  is  due;  and  when 
it  is  admitted  that  one  of  two  Q^edflc  sums 
is  due,  but  there  is  a  gmeral  dispute  as  to 
which  is  the  proper  amount  the  demand  is 
regarded  as  "unliquidated"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  term  as  applied  to  the  subject  of 
accord  and  satisfaction.  T.  B.  Bedmond  & 
Co.  V.  Atlanta  &  B.  Air  Line  By.,  68  S.  £L 
874-876,  129  6a.  133  (quoting  6  Words  and 
Phrases,  p.  4174). 

A  petition  which  shows  that  the  amount 
sued  for  was  the  price  of  an  article  sold  hy 
plaintiff  to  defendant,  and  which  alleges  that 
defendant  pfomised  to  pay  plaintiff  the  sum 
sued  for,  which  sum  was  the  agreed  value 
thereof,  states  a  cause  of  action  for  a  Uq- 
uidated demand  within  Sayles'  Ann.  Olv.  St 
1897,  arts.  754,  766,  providing  that,  where 
a  suit  is  founded  on  a  certain  demand,  an 
unliquidated  demand  cannot  be  set  off  unless 
it  is  connected  with  the  cause  of  action,  and 
defendant  cannot  set  up  as  a  counterclaim  a 
demand  for  unliquidated  damages  for  breach 
of  warranty  In  the  sale  of  the  other  goods^ 
the  word  "liquidated"  meaning  adjusted,  cer- 
tain, or  settled  in  respect  to  the  amount;  a 
debt  b^ng  liquidated  when  the  amount  is 
agreed  on  by  the  parties,  or  fixed  by  the  op- 
eration of  law.  Brooks  Tire  Mach.  Co.  y. 
Shields,  108  S.  W.  1006,  1006,  48  Tex.  dr. 
App.  63L 

A  claim  \B  a  "liquidated  claim**  where 
the  amount  due  is  fixed  by  law  or  has  been 
ascertained  and  fixed  by  the  parties.  Scar- 
ritt  Estate  Co.  v.  J.  F.  Schmelzer  &  Sons 
Arms  Co.,  86  8.  W.  489,  491,  110  Mo.  App. 
406  (citing  Bouv.  Law  Diet ;  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Mills,  69  Pac  317,  18  Colo. 
App.  8 ;  Commercial  Union  Assur.  Ca  of  Lon- 
don V.  Meyer,  29  S.  W.  93,  9  Tex.  dv.  App. 
7;  Mitchell  v.  Addison,  20  Ga.  60;  Kennedy 
V.  Queens  County,  62  N.  Y.  Supp.  276,  47 
App.  Div.  260). 

"A  demand  is  not  liquidated,*  even  if  it 
appears  that  something  was  due,  unless  it 
appears  how  much  was  dua*'    The  courts 


UQUIDA'TBD 


149 


UQUIDATED  DAMAGB8 


hare  defined  fbe  meaning  of  'tiquidated  de- 
mand" in  language  80  broad  that  almost  any 
daim  abort  of  damages  for  an  assault  and 
battery  might  be  embraced  in  the  definitions 
given,  but  on  principle  and  under  the  cases 
the  court  holds  that  plaintifTs  claim  for 
services  in  this  case  was  not  a  ''liquidated 
demand"*  because  the  number  of  days  he 
worked  for  defendant  was  in  serious  dispute, 
and  the  value  of  his  services  was  also  in 
controversy;  the  evidence*  showing  that  the 
demand  might  be  anywhere  from  $25  to  $75. 
White  V.  Curtis,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  319,  320,  49 
Misc.  Bep.  50  (quoting  from  Nassoiy  v.  Tom- 
llnson,  42  N.  B.  715,  148  N.  Y.  326,  330,  51 
Am.  St  Rep.  095). 

A  demand  is  a  ''liquidated  demand" 
whenever  the  amount  due  is  agreed  on  by 
the  parties  or  fixed  by  operation  of  law.  An- 
other definition  is  adjusted,  certain,  or  set- 
tled in  respect  to  amount  In  an  action  for 
the  price  of  goods  sold,  defendant  pleaded 
that  he  had  paid  plaintiff  for  a  car  load 
of  goods  previously  sold  by  plaintiff  to  de- 
fendant at  a  certain  price  per  sack,  but  that 
on  opening  the  car  d^endant  had  found  a 
shortage  and  a  certain  number  of  sacks  so 
worthless  that  th^  were  rejected.  Held, 
that  the  total  of  the  price  per  sack  for  each 
missing  and  rejected  sack  constituted  a  "liq- 
uidated demand,"  and  hence  might  be  set 
off  in  the  action.  Harrington  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Smith,  99  S.  W.  110,  112,  44  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
363  (quoting  and  adopting  definitions  in  Wat 
Set-Off,  S  337;  Abb.  Law  Diet). 

Where  one  agreed  to  pay  an  attorney, 
for  professional  services  to  be  rendered,  5 
per  cent  of  the  value  of  certain  timber,  tl« 
tie  to  which  was  to  be  acquired  as  a  result 
of  the  attorney's  efforts,  the  claim  of  the  at- 
torney for  compensation  became,  upon  the 
performance  of  the  services,  a  liquidated  de- 
mand, and,  as  such,  bore  interest  from  the 
date  it  became  due,  notwithstanding  the  con- 
tract provided  that,  in  the  event  of  disagree- 
ment as  to  value,  the  owner  of  the  timber 
should  submit  to  the  attorney  a  "give  and 
take  proposition,"  and  thereafter  refused  to 
do  so.  Council  v.  Hixon,  76  S.  B.  603,  607, 11 
6a.  App.  818. 

LIQUIDATED  BT  UTIOATION 

The  words  "liquidated  by  litigation," 
within  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  a  541,  |  57n, 
30  Stat  561,  limiting  the  time  for  proof  of 
claims  liquidated  by  litigation,  are  not  in- 
tended merely  to  preserve  to  litigant  credi- 
tors th^r  rights  against  a  bankrupt  estate, 
80  as  to  preclude  right  of  surety  on  bank- 
rupt's bond  for  costs  on  appeal  to  prove  a 
claim  to  recover  reimbursement  In  re  Lyons 
Beet  Sugar  Refining  Co.,  192  Fed.  445,  447. 

The  i^rase  "liquidated  by  liquidation," 
as  used  in  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  f 
67n,  dO  Stat  561,  is  not  suflBciently  compre- 
hensive to  include  the  Judgment  or  decree 
of  a  court  depriving  a  creditor  of  a  voidable 


preference  at  Hie  suit  of  the  trustee.    In  re 
Otto  F.  Lange  Co.,  170  Fed.  114,  115. 

The  term  "Uquidated  by  Utigation,"  as 
used  in  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1^8,  c  541,  | 
57n,  30  Stat  561,  permitting  proof  of  claims 
after  a  year  if  liquidated  by  litigation,  ap- 
plies to  a  case  where  the  creditor  has  claim- 
ed to  hold  security,  and  has  litigated  that 
question  and  been  defeated  and  thereafter 
attempts  to  prove  as  a  general  creditor.  In 
re  Salvator  Brewing  Co.,  188  Fed.  622,  524. 

After  bankruptcy,  certain  proceedings 
were  brought  in  the  state  court  to  set  aside 
a  conveyance  of  property  from  the  bankrupt 
to  claimants  before  adjudication.  If  the 
conveyance  had  been  held  good,  the  claims 
would  have  been  satisfied  from  the  property 
conveyed,  which  claimants  sought  to  hold  as 
security  for  their  claims,  in  which  they  were 
unsuccessful.  Held  that,  though  such  litiga- 
tion did  not  in  terms  relate  to  the  amounts 
due  claimants,  the  question  litigated  neces- 
sarily involved  a  determination  of  the  net 
amount  for  which  their  claims  should  be 
finally  allowed,  and  hence  such  claims  should 
be  regarded  as  "liquidated  by  litigation,'* 
within  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1897,  c.  541,  |  57n, 
80  Stat  5(11,  providing  that  if  claims  are 
liquidated  by  litigation,  and  final  judgment 
therein  is  rendered  witiiin  80  days  before  or 
after  the  expiration  of  a  year  from  the  ad- 
judication, they  shall  be  proved  within  60 
days  after  the.  rendition  of  such  judgment 
In  re  Keyea,  160  Fed.  768,  764. 

The  term  "liquidated  by  litigation,"  as 
used  in  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  §  57n,  pro- 
viding that  claims  shall  not  be  proved  against 
a  bankrupt  estate  subsequent  to  a  year  after 
the  adjudication  or  if  they  are  liquidated 
by  litigation  and  the  final  judgment  there- 
in is  rendered  within  80  days  before  or  aft- 
er the  expiration  of  such  time,  then  within 
60  days  after  the  rendition  of  such  judgment, 
means  that  a  creditor  who  during  the  year 
was  engaged  in  litigation  with  the  bankrupt's 
estate  concerning  its  liability  to  him  is  enti- 
tled to*additional  time,  though  the  litigation 
was  to  determine  whether  a  mortgage  se- 
curing the  creditor  was  invalid  as  a  prefer- 
ence, which  question  was  determined  in  the 
affirmative.  Powell  v.  Leavitt  150  Fed.  89, 
91,  80  C.  C.  A.  43. 

UQiriDATED  DAMAOBS 

Where  a  fire  insurance  loss  was  adjust- 
ed and  the  amount  due  agreed  on,  audi 
amount  was  "liquidated  damages."  a  H. 
Brown  Banking  Co.  ▼.  Baker,  74  S.  W.  454, 
455,  99  Mo.  App.  660  (citing  Bout.  Law 
Diet). 

A  contract  for  a  penalty  is  an  agreement 
to  pay  a  stipulated  sum  in  case  of  default, 
intended  to  coerce  performance,  to  punish  de- 
fault or  to  secure  the  payinent  of  actual 
damages,  while  a  contract  for  liquidated 
damages  is  a  contract  by  which  the  parties 
in  advance  of  breach  fix  the  amount  of  dam- 


UQUIBATBD  DAMAOS8 


160 


LIQUIDATED  DAMAGES 


ages  which  will  result  therefroai  and  agree 
on  its  payment  Muefalebach  ▼,  Missouri  ft 
K.  I.  Ry.  Co.,  148  S.  W.  453,  456,  166  Mo. 
App.  305. 

The  term  "liquidated  damages"  Is  used 
In  reference  to  the  breach  of  a  contract  or 
nonperformance  of  duty  as  expressing  a 
fixed  sum  which  Is  agreed  upon  between  the 
parties  as  the  ascertained  damage  which  the 
one  is  to  recelye  and  the  other  .to  pay  because 
of  the  default  United  States  ▼.  United 
States  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co.,  151  Fed.  634, 
536. 

CoBstraotion  of  eoatraets 

There  are  two  rules  for  inferring  that 
the  sum  to  be  paid  for  breach  of  a  contract  is 
Intended  as  liquidated  damages:  First, 
where  the  damages  are  not  readily  capable 
of  ascertainment  by  any  known  rule,  whether 
the  uncertainty  lies  in  the  nature  of  the 
subject,  or  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case; 
and,  second,  where  from  the  agreement  it  is 
apparent  that  the  damages  have  been  the 
subject  of  a  fair  adjustment  between  the  par- 
ties. Charleston  Lumber  Co.  ▼.  Friedman,  61 
S.  £.  815,  816,  64  W.  Va.  151. 

In  determining  whether  a  sum  named 
in  a  contract  is  to  be  considered  as  a  "pen- 
alty" or  as  ''liquidated  damages,"  the  courts 
are  aided  by  circumstances  extraneous  of  the 
writing.  When  parties  to  a  contract  stipu- 
late that  in  case  of  a  violaUon  thereof  the 
party  making  the  default  shall  pay  a  stipu- 
lated sum,  the  courts  will 'take  the  sum  so 
fixed  as  the  injured  party's  measure  of  dam- 
ages only  when  It  appears  that  to  do  so 
will  no  more  than  compensate  his  loss;  but, 
if  the  sum  so  fixed  in  such  contract  will 
more  than  compensate  the  Innocent  party, 
the  court  will  regard  the  same  as  a  penalty. 
Lee  V.  Carroll  Normal  School  Co.,  96  N.  W. 
65,  66,  1  Neb.  (Unof.)  681  (citing  Glllilan 
V.  Rollins,  59  N.  W.  893,  41  Neb.  540). 

When  damages  arising  from  breach  of 
contract  are  uncertain,  and  are  not  readily 
susceptible  of  proof,  and,  as  stipulated,  are 
not  so  'disproportionate  to  the  probable  dam- 
age suffered  as  to  appear  unconscionable,  the 
stipulation  will  be  regarded  to  provide  for 
"liquidated  damages,"  and  not  a  '^penalty"; 
but  if  it  is  Inserted  to  secure  the  payment 
of  a  definite  sum  of  money,  or  if  the  actual 
damages  are  easily  ascertainable,  and  are 
less  than  the  stipulated  sum,  or  if  the  prin- 
cipal agreement  provides  for  the  performance 
of  several  acts  of  different  degrees  of  im- 
portance, and  the  stipulated  sum  is  to  be 
paid  on  a  violation  of  any  or  all  of  them, 
and  the  sum  will,  in  some  Instances,  be  too 
large,  or  it  is  uncertain  whether  the  parties 
intended  liquidated  damages  or  a  penalty,  it 
will  be  treated  as  a  **penalty."  Thus,  where 
a  contract  for  the  exchange  of  real  estate 
provided  that,  if  either  of  the  parties  should 
fail  to  comply  with  the  conditions  thereof, 
he  should  pay  in  forf ^t  to  the  other  the  sum 


of  1600  as  liquidated  and  agreed  damacen^ 
which  amount  was  not  so  disproportionate  to 
the  probable  damage  suffered  as  to  appear 
unconscionable,  it  would  be  construed  as 
liquidated  damages,  and  not  a  penalty.  Mad- 
ler  V.  SUverstone,  104  Paa  165, 166,  55  Waah. 
159,  84  L.  B.  A  (N.  S.)  1. 

"Where  an  absolute  sum  is  fixed  In  a 
contract  as  security  against  all  breach  or 
breaches  of  the  contract  without  reference 
to  the  magnitude  of  the  breaches  or  the 
number  thereof  and  without  referring  to  the 
amount  of  the  actual  damages  which  might 
ensue  from  such  breach  or  breaches  wheth- 
er great  or  small,  and  this  where  there  mig^t 
be  several  breaches  and  each  of  a  greater  or 
less  magnitude,  and  each  followed  by  greater 
or  less  damages,  audi  fixed  sum  cannot  be 
considered  as  agreed  or  liquidated  damages,' 
but  must  be  considered  as  a  'ptfialty.*" 
Where  a  party  sold  his  business  and  good 
will  and,  as  a  part  of  the  same  transaction, 
executed  a  written  instrument  in  which  be 
said  that  he  bound  himself  in  the  sum  of 
fSOO;  that  he  would  not  engage  in  the  same 
business  at  the  same  place  for  the  period 
of  five  years,  the  sum  named  in  the  instm- 
m^t  was  a  penalty  and  not  'liquidated  dam- 
ages." Heatwole  v.  Gorrell,  12  Pac  135,  187, 
85  Kan.  692. 

When  a  sum  which  it  is  stipulated  in 
a  contract  shall  be  paid  for  its  breach  Is 
dlsporportionate  to  presumable  or  probable 
damage  or  to  a  readily  ascertainable  loss, 
the  courts  will  treat  it  as  a  ''penalty"  and 
will  rely  on  the  principle  that  the  precise 
sum  was  not  the  ees^ice  of  the  agreement 
but  was  in  the  nature  of  security  for  per- 
formance. Hicks  V.  Monarch  Oyde  Mfg.  Co., 
68  N.  B.  127,  128,  176  N.  T.  Ill  (citing  Ward 
V.  Hudson  River  Bldg.  Co.,  26  N.  B.  256,  125 
N.  Y.  230;  Curtis  v.  Van  Bergh,  66  N.  BL 
398,  161  N.  Y.  47;  8  Pars.  Oont  [6th  Bd] 
157). 

A  stipulation  that  for  each  day's  delay 
beyond  the  time  for  completing  a  water  sup- 
ply works  the  contractor  should  pay  $500  as 
'*liqi}idated  damages,"  and  not  as  a  penalty, 
was  not  in  fiict  a  penalty  and  not  liquidated 
damages,  where,  by  failure  To  complete  the 
water  supply  works,  the  dty  would  be  de- 
prived of  the  right  of  selling  its  surplus 
water  to  municipalities  and  other  persons 
outside  its  corporate  limits,  and  the  damages 
which  it  would  thereby  suffer  were  alto- 
gether uncertain  in  amount  and  not  readily 
susceptible  of  proof.  Jersey  City  v.  Flynn, 
70  Aa  506,  507,  74  N.  J.  Bq.  104. 

While  it  may  be  stated,  as  a  general  prop- 
osition, that  courts  do  not  look  upon  tor- 
feitures  with  favor,  and  will,  when  possible, 
construe  provisions  thezefbr  as  one  fior  a 
penalty  rather  than  as  one  for  liquidatad 
damages,  the  true  rule  is  to  give  sadi  a 
construction  to  the  provision  as  will  carry 
out  the  Intent  ot  the  parties  it  clearly  as- 


XiIQUIBATBD  DAMAQBS 


161 


UQUIBATBD  DAMAOXS 


oertaiBable  from  the  contract     Tomer  ▼. 
Jfremont,  169  FML  221«  225. 

Wbexe  damages  are  not  capable  of  bdng 
aflcertalned  by  any  satlsfiictory  role  and  the 
langaage  of  the  contract  admits  of  the  con- 
struction, the  sum  reserved  Is  "liqaldated 
dtmages,"  but  where  the  loss  may  be  easily 
determined  by  proof  of  market  valnes,  the 
sum  reserved  is  a  ''penalty'*  subject  to  the 
intention  of  the  parties  as  evidenced  by  the 
contract  Kellam  ▼.  Hampton  (Tex.)  124 
8.  W.  970,  971. 

Where  the  sum  named  in  a  contract  is 
declared  to  be  fixed  as  liquidated  damages 
and  is  not  clearly  disproportionate  to  the 
loai  that  may  result  from  a  breach,  and  the 
damages  are  not  measurable  by  any  exact 
pecuniary  standard,  the  sum  designated  is 
'^quldated  damages."  Burley  Tobacco  Soc. 
T.  Qfllaspy  (Ind.)  100  N.  BL  80,  91. 

In  determining  whether  a  specified  sum 
was  intended  and  must  be  treated  as  a  pen- 
alty or  as  liquidated  damages,  it  is  a  well- 
established  principle  of  construction  that  it 
will  be  treated  and  enforced  as  liquidated 
damages  where  it  is  agreed  to  be  paid  for 
doing  or  failing  to  do  an  act  in  respect  to 
which  the  damages  are  uncertain  and  not 
measurable  by  any  exact  pecuniary  standard. 
In  a  contract  for  the  improvement  of  a  dty 
atreet  providing  for  completion  before  Octo- 
ber 1st  on  failure  to  do  which  the  contract* 
or  agreed  to  **piLy  and  forfeit"  to  the  city 
as  "liquidated  damages"  the  sum  of  $25  pot 
day  after  October  1st  though  the  word  **tov- 
felt"  ordinarily  means  ''penalty,"  its  mean- 
ing, like  that  of  the  words  "Uqnidated  dam- 
ages," is  to  be  determiiied  by  the  connection 
hi  which  It  is  used,  and  in  view  of  the  f^ct 
that  it  was  necessary  to  complete  such  im- 
provement in  the  summw  months,  and  dam- 
ages might  reasonably  fiow  from  a  failure  to 
complete  within  the  time  limited,  the  dam- 
ages will  be  considered  liquidated  damages, 
and  not  a  penalty,  regardless  of  whether  the 
city  actually  suffered  damages  by  the  delay. 
Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co.  v.  City  of  Wabash, 
86  N.  BL  1034,  1080,  48  Ind.  App.  107  <quot- 
hig  and  adopting  People  v.  Love,  19  Cal. 
676;  citing  and  adopting  Merica  v.  Burget  75 
N.  B.  1063,  36  Ind.  App.  463;  Ghande  v. 
Shepard,  25  N.  B.  358,  122  N.  T.  897;  Noyes 
T.  Phillips,  60  N.  X.  408;  Bx  parte  Alexander, 
39  Ua.  App.  108;  Pogne  v.  Kaweah  Power  & 
Water  Ck>.,  72  Pac.  144,  138  Gal.  664;  Eakln 
v.  Scott  7  S.  W.  777,  70  Tex.  442;  Wibaux 
▼.  Grinnell  Live-Stock  Go.,  22  Pac.  492,  9 
Mont  154;  Mayne,  Dam.  [5th  Bd.]  146; 
Pastor  V.  Solomon,  55  N.  T.  Supp.  956,  26 
Misc.  R^.  125;  3  Pars.  Gont  [9tiK  Bd.]  *157; 
8treei;)er  v.  Williams,  48  Pa.  4S0). 

*']Bven  if  the  thing  to  be  dona  i«  called 
a  'penalty'  or  'liquidated  damages,'  or  given 
DO  luune  at  all,  it  will  be  treated  according 
to  the  evident  intent  of  the  parties  and  the 
sQbject-matter  of  the  contract"  A  provision 
in  a  contract  that,  if  defendant  failed  to 


divest  from  a  river  a  certain  amount  of 
water  through  a  certain  uncompleted  ditdi, 
which  it  agreed  to  complete  within  a  specified 
time,  and  to  continuously  deliver  sudi 
amount  of  water,  it  would  surrender  to  plain- 
tiff all  rights  which  it  had  acquired  through 
deeds  of  rights  of  way  or  water  rights  ex- 
ecuted by  plaintiff  to  its  predecessor,  was  in 
the  nature  of  liquidated  damages,  and  not  a 
penalty,  within  Giv.  Gode,  |  3369.  Pogue 
▼.  Kaweah  Power  &  Water  Go.,  72  Pac.  144, 
145,  1S8  GaL  664  (citing  and  adopting  People 
▼.  Love,  19  Cal.  677). 

"If  there  are  several  covenants  in  the 
contract  of  different  degrees  of  importance, 
and  the  same  sum  is  stipulated  to  be  paid 
for  a  breach  of  either,  the  courts  Incline  to 
treat  the  sum  as  a  'penalty,*  and,  in  case 
of  the  breach  of  a  covenant,  to  assess  no 
greater  damages  than  win  compensate  the 
obligee."  Whtfe  a  vendor  in  a  contract  for 
the  sale  of  realty  bound  himself  to  keep  the 
premises  in  repair.  Insure  the  buildings 
against  fire,  furnish  an  abstract  within  90 
days,  and  put  a  deed  in  escrow  in  the  same 
time,  a  stipulation  for  payment  of  ffSOO  if 
either  party  failed  to  perform  his  part  of  the 
contract  wbb  for  a  simple  "penalty,"  and  not 
for  liquidated  damages.  Boulware  v.  Grohn, 
122  Mo.  App.  571,  99  S.  W.  796,  800  (citing 
Gower  v.  Saltmarsh,  11  Mo.  271;  Hathaway 
V.  Lynn,  43  N.  W.  956,  75  Wis.  186,  6  L.  B. 
A.  551;  Wilkinson  v.  GoUey,  30  Aa  286,  164 
Pa.  41,  26  L.  R.  A.  U4). 

A  bidder  for  the  erection  of  a  public 
building  for  a  city,  who  made  a  deposit  with 
the  city  and  agreed  that  the  amount  thereof 
was  the  amount  of  damages  which  the  dty 
would  sustain  by  failure  to  carry  out  the  pro- 
posal, made  the  deposit  liquidated  damages, 
and  not  a  penalty.  Wheaton  Building  A 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Gity  of  Boston,  90  N.  BL  598, 
601,  204  Mass.  218. 

When  damages  arising  from  the  breach 
of  a  contract  are  uncertain  in  their  nature, 
and  not  readily  susceptible  of  proof  by  the 
ordinary  roles  of  evidence,  and  are  not  so 
disproportionate  to  the  probable  damages 
suffered  as  to  appear  unconscionable,  and 
it  is  reasonably  clear  from  the  whole  agree- 
ment that  it  is  the  intention  of  the  parties 
to  provide  for  liquidated  damages  and  not  a 
penalty,  such  a  stipulation  is  for  liquidated 
damages.  Herberger  v.  H.  B.  Orr  Co.,  114 
Pac  178,  180,  62  Wash.  526. 

In  a  contract  for  the  purtshase  and  sale 
of  an  article  of  merchandise,  to  be  delivered 
in  stated  quantities  periodically  during  a 
term  of  over  five  years,  a  provision  that  in 
case  of  breadi  by  either  party  the  other  may 
be  released  and  recover  as  liquidated  dam- 
ages a  sum  equal  to  the  entire  purchase  price 
to  be  paid  during  the  term,  is  one  tov  a 
*'penaltyf"  having  no  reference  to  the  actual 
damages,  which  in  sudi  case  are  readily  as- 
oortainable,  and  the  amount  being  grossly 
excessive  in  case  the  contract  had  been  per- 


UaUIDATEQD  DAMAGES 


162 


UaUIDATBD  DAMAOKB 


fanned  for.  any  considerable  time  before  the 
breach.  McGall  Ck>.  ▼.  Deachler,  174  Fed. 
133,  135,  98  C.  O.  A.  169. 

Wfiere  a  contract  provides  for  the  pay- 
ment of  a  certain  snm  as  liquidated  damages 
on  nonperformance  of  a  specific  act  which 
may  produce  damages  of  an  uncertain  char- 
acter, and  no  language  is  used  that  such 
damages  shall  be  considered  only  as  a  "pen- 
alty," the  same  is  to  be  regarded  as  "liqui- 
dated damages."  Where  a  street  railroad,  in 
consideration  of  ^,481.07  paid  to  it  by  the 
owner  of  property  fronting  on  its  line,  agreed 
that  -during  one^alf  of  the  period  named  in 
the  company's  charter  the  road  should  be 
maintained  and  operated  daring  Its  entire 
length,  and  that  in*  event  of  Its  fUluie  to 
do  80  it  would  pay  the  property  owner  the 
sum  of  13,481.07,  with  interest,  the  sum  speci- 
fied was  not  a  "penalty,"  but  "liquidated 
damagesi"  which  the  property  owner  was  en- 
titled to  recover  on  a  breach  by  the  railroad. 
Santa  F6  St  Ry.  v.  Schuts,  88  S.  W.  89,  44, 
87  Tex.  Oiv.  App.  14. 

Where  the  payment  of  a  certain  sum  is 
agreed  to  be  made  for  the  breach  of  a  single 
stipulation  in  a  contract,  and  the  damages 
for  such  breach  are  not  readily  susceptible  of 
proof,  if  such  sum  cannot  be  said  to  be  in 
excess  of  what  might  reasonably  be  recovered 
in  a  suit  for  such  damages,  this  sum  will  be 
held  to  be  for  "liquidated  damages,"  and  not 
a  penalty.  Gussow  v.  Beineson,  68  Atl.  907, 
76  N.  J.  Law,  209. 

A  bond  given  by  a  bidder  for  a  mail  con- 
tract conditioned  as  required  by  the  federal 
statute,  which  provides  that  the  contractor 
and  his  sureties  shall  be  liable  for  the 
amount  of  the  bond  as  "liquidated  damages 
to  be  recovered  in  an  action  of  debt  on  said 
bond,"  is  an  absolute  undertaking  to  pay 
the  amount  named  therein  as  "liquidated 
damages"  in  case  of  condition  broken,  and 
not  one  of  indemnity  or  security  to  the  gov- 
ernment against  loss  or  damages  for  breach 
of  contract,  and  in  an  action  thereon  the  ac- 
tual damages  cannot  be  inquired  into.  Unit- 
ed States  V.  Alcorn,  145  Fed.  995,  1001. 

Where,  on  a  contract  to  convey  land, 
$300  was  paid  by  the  vendee  on  condition 
that  the  vendor  furnish  a  fee-simple  title, 
and  to  be  returned  on  failure  to  do  so,  such 
sum,  in  the  absence  of  any  showing  that 
it  was  disproportionate  to  the  damages  likely 
to  result  from  the  breach,  was  properly 
treated  as  'liquidated  damages."  Pinkney 
V.  Weaver,  74  N.  E.  714,  717,  216  HI.  185. 

The  rule  generally  afitoned  by  authorities 
is  that,  where  it  is  asreed  by  the  parties  that 
the  sum  or  rate  fixed  in  a  contract  shall  be 
"liquidated  damages»"  and  the  case  is  one  in 
which  they  are  at  liberty  to  so  agree,  such  an 
agreement  must  stand  and  control  unless  it 
is  inconsistent  with  other  parts  of  the  con- 
tract or  is  unreasonable  or  unconscionable  in 
view  of  the  probable  damages  which  may  flow 


from  a  breach  of  such  a  oonlaract  Where  de- 
fendant milkman  contracted  .with  plelntiff 
for  the  purchase  of  1,000  pounds  of  milk  each 
day,  which  plaintiff  was  to  be  permitted  to 
purchase  from  certain  territory  without  in- 
terference by  defendant,  the  stipulation  that 
plaintiff  should  pay  five  cents  as  damages  for 
each  gallon  of  milk  which  he  failed  to  furnish 
was  for  "liquidated  damages."  Mondamln 
Meadows  Dairy  Co.  v.  Brudi,.72  N.  B.  643, 
645,  163  Ind.  642. 

A  clause  for  liquidated  damages  most  be 
construed  as  a  penalty,  if  the  damages  upon  a 
breach  are  capable  of  exact  computation*  or 
if  the  so-called  liquidated  damages  are  out 
of  all  proportion  to  possible  damages;  and 
hence,  where  a  party  agrees  to  pay  a  definite 
sum  In  damages  for  his  failure  to  pay  rent, 
such  sum  cannot  be  regarded  as  "liquidated 
damages,"  since,  where  a  larger  sum  is  to  be- 
paid  in  default  of  paying  a  smaller  sum 
agreed  to  be  paid  by  the  same  instrument, 
the  larger  sum  is  a  "penalty,"  although  the 
instnunent  denominates  it  "liquidated  dam- 
ages." Feinsot  v.  Bursteln,  138  K  Y.  Supp. 
185, 188,  78  Misc.  Bep.  259. 

B.  being  the  owner  of  stock  in  a  coal 
company,  which  owned  no  property  exe^t  a 
contract  assigned  to  it  by  B.,  whereby  U. 
agreed  to  sell  coal  land  to  B.,  and  B.  agreed 
to  buy  it  for  134,000,  payable  in  three  in- 
stallments, a  tripartite  agreement  was  made, 
whereby  the  company  agreed  to  sell  to  R.  and 
R.  agreed  to  buy  20,000  shares  of  its  stock  for 
$5,000,  of  which  $1,500  was  then  paid,  with 
right  to  B.  to  rescind  if  representations  made 
be  found  untrue;  gave  R.  for  the  recited  con- 
sideration of  such  agreemeat  and  the  pay- 
ment made  an  option  to  buy  another  20,000 
shares  at  25  cents  a  share;  recited  that  it  was 
understood  and  agreed  that  the  company  was 
Indebted  to  U.  in  the  sum  of  $32,000  payable 
in  three  stated  installments;  that  B.  was 
thereby  given  by  the  company  35,000  shares 
of  its  stock,  in  consideration  of  which  he 
thereby  agreed  to  pay  all  Its  said  indebted- 
ness as  it  became  due;  that,  if  such  sums 
were  not  so  paid,  said  35,000  shares  should 
be  delivered  to  R.,  who  should  either  pay  all 
such  debts  and  release  the  company,  or  de- 
liver such  35,000  shares  to  the  company; 
and  that  B.  should  deliver  to  a  bank  the 
50,000  shares  of  stock  of  the  company  owned 
by  him,  and,  if  he  failed  to  pay  the  debts  of 
the  company  as  agreed,  then  the  bank  should 
deliver  the  60,000  shares  to  R.,  and  R.  should 
become  the  absolute  owner  thereof.  Held, 
that  the  provision  as  to  the  50,000  shares  was 
neither  part  of  the  consideration  nor  one 
for  liquidated  damages,  but  a  penalty  or  for- 
feiture; it  being  applicable  whether  B.  failed 
In  the  payment  of  one  or  all  of  the  install- 
luents  to  U.,  and  even  though  R.  did  not  pay 
such  indebtedness,  and  found  that  misrepre- 
sentations had  beoi  made,  and  on  that  account 
rescinded  his  contract  of  purchase.  A  provi- 
dlou  which  would  be  one  for  a  penalty  if  in- 


UQDIDATED  DAMAGES 


168 


IJQUO& 


volYlng  a  sum  of  moDey  Is  technicaUy  one  for 
a  foif^tara  if  inTolvlDg  loss  of  chattels  or 
secnrlty  pledged.  Bell  t.  Scranton  Coal 
Mines  Co.,  UO  Pac.  e28,  631,  69  Wasb.  669. 

Forf altiire  m»  indieatlas  p«aaliy 
See  Forfeit— Forfeiture. 

UQUIDATZOH 

See  Partial  Liqiiidation. 

"Uquidatlon''  implies  a  winding  ap  of  the 
affairs  of  a  corporation.  Assets  Realiz&tion 
Co.  V.  Howard,  127  N.  Y.  Snpp.  798,  816,  70 
Misc.  Rep.  661. 

"Liquidation"  in  its  general  sense  means 
"the  act  or  operation  of  winding  up  the  af- 
Mrs  of  a  firm  or  company,  by  getting  in  the 
assets,  settling  with  its  debtors  and  creditors, 
and  appropriating  the  amount  of  profit  or 
loss."  In  re  Sllkman,  105  N.  Y.  9upp.  872, 
875, 121  App.  Div.  202  (quoting  6  Words  and 
Phrases,  p.  4180). 

The  word  "liquidation,"  as  used  in  the 
Customs  Laws,  means  the  ascertainment  of 
the  duties  due  the  United  States,  taxed  at 
the  rate  prescribed  by  law  upon  the  particu- 
lar dass  of  merchandise  Imported.  United 
SUtes  ▼.  Sommers,  171  Fed.  67,  63,  96  C.  G. 
A.  299. 

Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c  641,  |  57n,  80 
Stat  561,  declares  that  claims  shall  not  be 
proved  against  a  bankrupt's  estate  subse* 
quent  to  one  year  after  the  adjudication,  or, 
if  liquidated,  by  litigation,  and  the  final  judg- 
ment is  rendered  within  30  days  before  or 
after  the  expiration  of  such  time,  then  with- 
in 60  days  after  the  rendition  of  such  judg- 
ment Held,  that  the  term  ''liquidation,"  as  so 
used,  was  not  limited  to  proceedings  having 
for  their  object  only  the  ascertainment  of 
the  amount  due  on  the  claim,  but  included 
as  well  proceedings  to  ascertain  the  kind 
and  character  as  well  as  the  amount  of  the 
claim,  and  hence  proceedings  against  a  bank- 
rupt's estate  to  establish  certain  bonds  as  a 
preferred  lien  on  the  bankrupt's  assets  cover- 
ed by  mortgage  given  to  secure  the  bonds 
were  proceedings  for  liquidation,  so  that,  on 
adverse  determination,  the  bondholders  were 
entitled  within  60  days  to  file  their  claims  on 
the  bonds  as  general  creditors.  In  re  Stand- 
ard Telephone  &  Electric  Ck>.,  186  Fed.  686, 
SOL 

Complainant  held  260  shares,  of  which 
186  had  been  pledged  to  decedent  in  his  life- 
time as  security  for  complainant's  note  to  tes- 
tator. The  remaining  250  shares  were  held, 
100  by  defendant  trustees  and  160  by  two  oth- 
er persons  individually.  The  business  being 
imsuccessful,  it  was  decided  to  liquidate, 
whereupon  the  estate,  fearing  that  the  divi- 
dend distributable  to  complainant  on  the 
pledged  8t#ck  would  be  insuffident  to  pay  the 
iu)te,  proposed  tliat  if  complainant  would 
tarn  over  his  other  60  shares  the  note  would 
be  surrendered,  with  the  understanding  that 
if,  hi  Ikfuldatioii,  the  property  of  tt&e  com- 


pany amounted  to  more  than  enough  to  pay 
the  note  and  accrued  Interest,  the  balance 
would  be  turned  over  to  complainant,  whidi 
proposition  was  accepted  in  terms,  after 
which  complainant  participated  in  the  liq- 
uidation agreement,  one  of  the  clauses  of 
which  declared  that  after  the  corporation's 
indebtedness  was  paid  the  treasurer  should 
divide  the  balance  among  the  stockholders 
in  proportion  to  their  several  holding&  Held, 
that  the  word  "liquidation,"  as  used  in  such 
agreement,  meant  the  act  of  winding  up  the 
affairs  of  the  company  by  getting  in  the  as- 
sets, settling  with  its  debtors  and  creditors, 
and  apportioning  the  amount  of  profit  or  loss, 
and  that  the  agreement  should  be  construed 
to  mean  only  that,  if  complainant's  propor- 
tion of  the  net  assets  amounted  to  more  than 
enough  to  pay  the  note,  he  should  receive 
the  balance,  and  not  that  he  should  receive 
all  of  the  net  assets  above  the  amount  neces- 
sary to  pay  the  note.  Fuller  v.  Perkins,  73 
Atl.  872.  378,  80  R.  I.  3;  Jones  v.  Seaman, 
117  N.  Y.  Supp.  286,  188  App.  Div.  127. 

LIQUOR 

See  Com  Liquor;  Imitation  Malt  Liq- 
uor; Intoxicating  Liquor;  Malt  Liq- 
uor ;  Nonintoxicating  liquor ;  Spiritu- 
ous liquors;  Substitute  for  Malt  Liq- 
uor; Vinous  and  Spirituous  liquors; 
Vinous  liquor. 

Furnishing  liquor,  see  Furnish. 

Manufacture  of  liquor,  see  Manufacture. 

Sale  of,  see  Liquor ;  S^. 

Sale  of  as  commerce,  see  Commerce, 

Selling  liquor  as  business,  see  Business. 

nie  term  ''liquor  or  liquors"  includes  all 
kinds  of  intoxicating  decoctions,  whether 
spirituous,  vinous,  malt,  or  alcoholic.  Marks 
V.  State,  48  South.  864,  868,  16^  Ala.  71,  188 
Am.  St  Hep.  20. 

The  word  "liquor"  and  the  associated 
word  "drinks"  in  a  statute  regulating  or 
forbidding  the  sale  of  intoxicants,  mean  an 
alcoholic  beverage.  Pennell  v.  State,  123  N. 
W.  116,  116,  141  Wi&  36. 

"Uquor"  is  defined  as:  "a)  A  liquid  or 
fluid  substance,  as  water,  milk,  blood,  sap, 
etc.  (2)  A  strong  or  active  liquid  of  any 
sort  specifically,  an  alcoholic  or  spirituous 
liquor  either  distilled  or  fermented:  an  in- 
toxicating beverage  especially  a  spirituous 
or  distilled  drink  as  distinguished  from  fer- 
mented beverages  as  wine  and  beer.  <b)  A 
strong  solution  of  a  particular  substance 
used  in  the  Industrial  arts."  It  is  also  de- 
fined as:  "Any  liquid  or  fiuid  substance,  as 
water,  milk,  blood,  sap  juice  and  the  like. 
<2)  Especially  alcoholic  or  spirituous  fiuid 
either  distilled  or  fermented.  A  decoction, 
solution  or  tincture."  Luther  v.  State,  120 
N.  W.  126,  128,  88  Neb.  466,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  1146  (dissenting  opinion  of  Letton,  J.; 
citing  Cent  Diet;  Webst  Diet). 


IiIQUOR 


154 


UQUOR  DEALBB 


Gen^niUy,  the  term  "llqaor*'  implies  in- 
tozicating  liquor.  Therefore  proof  tliat  de- 
fendant sold  "liquor"  is  sufficient  to  show, 
in  the  absence  of  adverse  testimony,  that  he 
sold  Intoxicating  liquor,  especially  where  it 
is  shown  that  it  looked  like  rye  whisky. 
Carswell  ▼.  State,  66  S.  B.  488,  7  Ga.  App. 
198. 

The  measurement  intended  by  the  stat- 
ute prohibiting  the  sale  without  a  license  of 
liquor  in  less  quantities  than  five  gallons  Is 
a  measurement  of  the  quiet  liquor  after  it 
has  been  released  from  confinement  and  the 
gas,  froth,  or  foam  arising  when  the  liquor 
is  released  from  the  vessel  in  which  it  is 
contained  cannot  be  considered  in  determin- 
ing the  quantity  of  liquor.  People  ▼.  Nylin, 
86  N.  B.  156,  158,  236  IlL  19. 

The  word  "liquor^  is  collective,  its  sig- 
nificance including  the  plural  as  well  as  the 
singular,  and  a  conviction  in  a  prosecution 
for  selling  alcoholic,  spirituous,  malt  and  in- 
toxicating liquor  may  be  supported  by  proof 
of  the  sale  of  liquor  which  is  either  alcohof- 
ic,  spirituous,  malt,  or  intoxicating  in  qual- 
ity without  proof  that  it  possesses  more  than 
one  of  such  qualities.  Wilbum  v.  State,  68 
S.  B.  460,  461,  8  Ga.  App.  28. 

Acts  1909,  c  479,  imposed  a  privilege  tax 
for  revenue  on  liquor  dealers  selling  liquor 
under  different  conditions,  and  provided  that 
"liquor  dealers"  should  include  every  person, 
company,  or  firm  selling  spirituous,  vinous, 
or  malt  liquors,  beer,  ale,  or  intoxicating 
bitters^  or  any  medicated  or  adulterated  ci- 
der, or  any  club  or  association  handling  such 
liquors  for  sale^  etc.  Held,  that  the  words 
'^liquor"  and  "liquor  dealers"  should  be 
construed  as  limited  to  beverages  and  per- 
sons selling  beverages  containing  a  sufficient 
amount  of  alcohol  to  make  them  intoxicat- 
ing, and  that  the  act  did  not  Impose  such  tax 
on  a  vendor  of  soft  drinks  containing  a  small 
percentage  of  alcohol,  insufficient  in  quantity 
to  render  the  liquors  intoxicating.  Austin 
V.  Shelton,  127  S.  W.  446,  447,  122  Tenn.  634. 

Laws  1897,  p.  207,  a  312,  {  2,  provides 
that  the  term  "liquors"  as  used  in  the  act 
shall  Include  all  distilled  or  rectified  spirits, 
wines,  fermented  or  malt  liquora  Section 
81,  p.  233,  provides  that  it  shall  not  be  law- 
ful for  any  person  who  has  not  paid  a  tax 
and  posted  the  certificate  provided  by  the 
act  to  sell  liquors  in  any  quantity  in  less 
than  five  wine  gallons  at  a  time.  Held,  that 
an  indictment  charging  violation  of  the  lat- 
ter section  need  not  allege  that  the  liquors 
sold  were  distilled  or  rectified  spirits,  wines^ 
fermented  or  malt  liquors;  it  being  sufficient 
to  charge  the  offense  in  the  language  of  such 
section.  People  v.  Myers,  77  N.  B.  1193,  185 
N.  Y.  558. 

Under  Laws  1897,  p.  207,  c.  312,  |  2,  the 
term  "liquors,"  as  used  in  that  act,  includes 
all   "distilled,   rectified   spirits^   wines,   fer- 


mented or  malt  liquors."    People  v.  Myers, 
95  N.  T.  Supp.  993,  994,  109  App.  Dlv.  143. 

Liquor  Tax  Laws,  |  2,  defines  "Uqnor" 
as  meaning  all  distilled  or  rectified  spirits, 
wine,  fermented  or  nmlt  liquors.  CuUinan 
V.  Dwlght,  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  896,  897,  61  Mlaa 
Rep.  221. 

Flavoring  extracts,  composed  of  from  40 
to  60  per  cent  alcohol,  3  per  cent.  flavorlOLg 
principle,  and  water,  the  quantity  of  alcohol 
being  no  greater  than  is  required  to  hold  the 
fiavoring  principle  in  solution,  which  are  not 
made,  nor  used,  nor  capable  of  being  used, 
as  a  beverage,  but  which  are  chiefly  used  In 
fiavoring  soda  water  sjN^ups,  the  quantity  of 
extract  used  in  each  glass  of  the  beverage 
being  about  3  or  4  drops,  are  not  "beverages," 
nor  "liquors,"  within  the  meaning  of  Rev. 
St  i  3244,  and  the  manufacturer  is  not  sub- 
ject to  special  tax  as  a  rectifier  or  wholesale 
or  retail  dealer  in  liquors.  Allen  v.  Liquid 
Carbonic  Co.,  170  Fed.  315,  817,  95  O.  C. 
A.  IX 

A  sale  of  liquor  known  as  "malt  rose" 
containing  between  .74  per  cent  and  1.18  per 
cent  in  volume  of  alcohol,  and  intended  to 
aid  in  the  evasion  and  defeat  of  the  liquor 
law,  is  a  violation  of  Liquor  Tax  Law  (Laws 
1897,  p.  207,  a  312)  i  2,  defining  Uquors,  as 
used  in  the  act,  to  Include  all  distilled  or  rec- 
tified spirits  or  fermented  or  malt  liquors. 
People  V.  Cox.  94  N.  Y.  Supp.  526,  527,  106 
App.  Dlv.  299;  Id.,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  125,  45 
Biisc  Rep.  811. 

Beer 

The  sale  of  'lager  beer"  which  was 
drunk  on  the  premises  during  the  hours  when 
the  sale  of  malt  liquors  was  prohibited  was 
a  violation  of  Liquor  Tax  Law  (Laws  1897, 
p.  207,  c.  312)  I  2,  defining  liquors  as  used 
in  the  act  to  include  all  distilled  or  rectified 
spirits  or  fermented  malt  liquors.  Oul- 
llnan  v.  McGovem,  94  N.  Y.  Supp.  525,  626. 

LIQUOR  BEAI.E& 

See  Retail  Liquor  Dealer. 

Where  one  sold  liquor  under  a  valid 
license  and  bond,  though  the  application  on 
which  the  license  was  granted  was  defective, 
he  was  a  "liquor  dealer"  under  the  laws  of 
Texas,  with  the  right  to  sell  liquor,  and  sub- 
ject to  the  penalties  arising  from  an  infrac- 
tion of  his  bond.  Castellano  v.  Marks,  83  S. 
W.  729,  731,  37  Tex.  av.  App.  273. 

Acts  1909,  c.  479,  imposed  a  privilege 
tax  for  revenue  on  liquor  dealers  selling  liq- 
uor under  different  conditions,  and  provided 
that  "liquor  dealers"  should  include  every 
person,  company,  or  firm  selling  spirituous, 
vinous,  or  malt  liquors,  beer,  ale,  or  intox- 
icating bitters,  or  any  medicated  or  adulter- 
ated dder,  or  any  dub  or  assodation  han- 
dling sudi  liquors  for  sale^  eta  Hdd,  that 
the  words  "liquor"  and  "liquor  dealers" 
should  be  construed  as  limited  to  beverages 


UQUOR  DEALEB 


156 


us  PSKBBNB 


and  persons  selling  beverages  containing  a 
auffident  amoont  of  alcohol  to  make  them  in- 
toxicating, and  that  the  act  did  not  impose 
such  tax  on  a  vendor  of  soft  dvlnks  contain- 
ing a  small  percentage  of  alcohol,  InsofBcient 
in  quantity  to  render  the  liqnors  intoxicat- 
ing. Austin  T.  Shelton,  127  8.  W.  446,  447, 
122  Tenn.  684. 

Where  a  statute  prohibited  a  merchant 
and  dealer  in  spirituous  liqnors  from  keep- 
ing open  his  place  of  business  on  Sunday  for 
the  purpose  of  traffic  and  sale,  a  member  of 
a  firm  engaged  in  the  sale  of  spirituous  liq- 
uors was  a  "dealer,*'  within  such  statute, 
and  was  amenable  in  his  indiyidual  capacity. 
Morris  v.  State,  80  S.  W.  882,  888,  48  Tex. 
Cr.  R.S62. 

UQVOB  DBinOCEB 

See  Drummer. 

UQVOB  xjOEma 

See  license  (Government  R^ulation). 
Application  for,  as  dvil  actioUt  see  Civ- 
il Action— Case— Suit— eta 
As  contract,  see  Contract 
As  franchise,  see  Franchise^ 
As  property,  see  Pxt)perty. 

UQUOB  TAX  OBBTinCATB 

As  property,  see  Property. 

LIS 

LX8MOTA 

The  phrase  lis  mots'*  means  the  com- 
mencement of  the  controversy.  Mutual  Re- 
serve Ufe  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jay,  109  &  W.  1116, 
1118,  GO  Tex.  Civ.  App.  165. 

In  an  action  involving  plaintlff*s  legiti- 
macy, testimony  by  a  deceased  Mnaman  of 
plaintiir,  in  a  prior  action,  given  when  a  con- 
troversy existed  on  the  question,  but  before 
the  present  suit  was  brought,  tending  to  es- 
tablish plaintifrs  legitimacy,  was  not  admis- 
sible; the  term  ''lis  mota,"  as  used  in  the 
rule  requiring  ex  parte  declarations  of  de- 
cedents to  have  been  made  ante  litum  mo- 
tam  to  be  admissible,  meaning  the  beginning 
of  the  controversy,  and  not  of  the  action. 
Rollins  V.  Wicker,  70  &  BL  034,  980^  154  K. 
C.  560. 

LIB  PEHBENS 

"Lis  pendens"  by  itself  does  not  con- 
Btltnte  a  cloud  or  incumbrance  upon  a  title, 
and  does  not,  of  itself,  furnish  any  ground 
In  reason  why  a  purchaser  should  not  be 
compelled  to  complete  his  purchase.  Baecht 
▼.  Hevesy,  101  N.  T.  Supp.  418,  416,  115 
AiH^.  Div.  500. 

Though  the  result  of  a  suit  in  one  court 
may  enter  as  a  factor  Into  the  determination 
of  anocher  in  a  (Xilferent  tribunal,  "lis  pen- 
dens" cannot  be  properly  pleaded  on  the 
Cround  of  the  coexistence  of  the  suits,  where 
the  causes  of  action  are  not  identicaL    Cen- 


tral Improvement  &  Contracting  Co.  v.  Gras- 
ser  Oontractliig  Co^  44  SouUl  10, 18, 110  La. 


Whether  the  doctrine  of  Us  pendens  is 
based  on  constructive  notice  or  on  the  pol- 
icy of  the  law,  forbidding  parties  to  convey 
property  pending  litigation  concerning  it  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  other  party,  the  rule  is 
that  during  the  pendency  of  a  suit  neither 
party  can  alienate  the  property  in  dispute, 
so  as  to  affect  the  rights  of  the  other  par- 
ty, Maes  V.  Thomas  (Tex.)  140  8.  W.  846, 
847.       • 

''lis  pendens"  denotes  those  principles 
and  rules  of  law  which  define  and  limit  the 
operation  of  the  conmxon-law  maxim,  ''Pen- 
dente lite  nihil  Innovetur."  Pending  the  suit 
nothing  should  be  changed,  if  it  has  the  ef- 
fect to  bring  the  subjectrmatter  of  the  liti- 
gation within  the  control  of  the  court;  and 
to  render  the  parties  powerless  to  place  it 
beyond  the  power  of  the  final  judgment 
Powell  V.  National  Bank  of  Commerce  in 
Denver,  74  Pac.  586,  588,  10  Colo.  App.  67 
(citing  Freem.  Judgm.  |  108). 

"As  a  general  rule  an  action  or  suit 
brought  solely  for  the  recovery  of  a  money 
Judgment  or  for  other  relief  not  directly 
affectihg  property  will  not  constitute  a  'lis 
pendens*;  and,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or 
collusion  between  the  parties  thereto,  alien- 
ations are  valid  until  the  property  is  afllxed 
with  a  Judgment  or  execution  lien,  or  taken 
into  custody  by  an  attachment,  receivership, 
or  other  auxiliary  proceeding."  Horagne  v. 
Doe,  30  South.  161,  162,  148  Ala.  450,  111 
Am.  8t  Sep.  52,  6  Ann.  Caa  88L 

Where  no  steps  were  taken  from  March 
4,  1887,  until  September  29,  1002,  by  plain- 
tiff city  in  the  prosecution  of  its  action  to 
recover  taxes  due  for  1885,  and  in  the  mean- 
time defendant  became  a  lender  and  pur- 
chaser for  value  in  good  faith,  without  ac- 
tual notice  of  the  pendency  of  the  suit  or  the 
claim  for  taxes,  and  no  reason  for  delay  in 
prosecuting  the  suit  was  shown,  a  "lis  pen- 
dens" did  not  exist  in  favor  of  the  city  at 
the  time  defendant's  rights  intervened.  City 
of  Louisville  V.  Burke  (Ky.)  87  S.  W.  260, 
270. 

The  object  of  a  "lis  pendens"  notice  is 
to  warn  persons  and  put  them  on  their  guard 
in  their  dealings  with  defendants  regard- 
ing the  subject-matter  of  a  pending  action. 
First  Nat  Bank  of  Peoria  v.  Fanners'  & 
Merchants'  Nat  Bank  of  Wabash  (Ind.)  82 
N.  B«  1018,  1016. 

"Lis  pendens"  is  simply  a  rule  to  give 
effect  to  the  rights  ultimately  established 
by  the  Judgment  It  merely  precludes  any 
change  in  the  subject-matter  to  the  prejuoice 
of  plaintiff  during  the  pendency  of  the  ac- 
tion, and  the  filing  of  the  statutory  notice 
is  designed  to  effect  that  result  not  to  give 
constructive  notice  of  plaintiff's  claim  as 
does  the  recording  of  a  deed  or  mortgage^ 


us  P£KDEHB 


166 


lilST 


Whatever  effect  actaal  notice  of  a  pending 
action  may  have,  the  filing  of  a  statutory 
notice  of  pendency  does  not  constitute  con- 
structive notice  of  anything  more  than  the 
pendency  of  the  action,  and,  when  the  ac- 
tion has  ceased  to  be  pending  under  the  ihw 
of  lis  pendens,  the  statutory  notice  ceases  to 
be  effectual  for  any  purpose.  Its  purpose  Is 
to  prevent  any  alienation  of  the  subject- 
matter  in  litigation,  pending  the  action,  that 
could  prejudice  plaintiff's  rights  or  impair 
or  defeat  any  interest  he  should  establish 
as  against  defendant  in  the  suit,  and  does 
not  constitute  such  notice  of  plaintiff's  eq- 
•  uity  as  would  affect  the  conscience  of  a 
purchaser.  McVay  v.  Tousley,  105  N.  W. 
032,  935,  20  S.  D.  258,  129  Am.  St  Bep.  927. 

The  doctrine  '*ll8  pendens"  applies  not 
merely  to  purchasers  from  the  defendant, 
but  also  to  purchasers  from  the  plaintiff. 
The  rule  has  been  applied  to  all  cases  of 
transfer  during  the  progress  of  the  cause, 
notwithstanding  the  hardships  of  individual 
cases  from  considerations  of  public  policy 
and  convenience.  The  rule  applies  to  a  judg- 
ment creditor  whose  rights  as  an  Incum- 
brancer are  acquired  during  the  existence 
of  the  lis  pendens,  and  also  to  a  purchaser 
at  a  judicial  sale,  had  in  execution  of  a 
judgment  in  favor  of  a  person  whose  Inter- 
ests in  the  property  sold  are  affected  by  the 
lis  pendens.  While  in  England  and  in  some 
of  the  states  it  has  been  held  that  lis  pen- 
dens begins  upon  service  of  process  or  sub- 
poena, in  this  state  a  pending  suit  is  notice 
from  the  filing  and  docketing  of  the  cause, 
if  followed  by  the  Issuance  and  service  of 
process  and  due  prosecution  of  the  suit  Giv. 
Code  1895,  §  3936.  The  question  as  to  when 
Us  pendens  begins,  as  applied  to  a  cross-bill, 
depends  largely  on  what  is  the  extent  of  the 
lis  pendens  arising  on  the  original  suit,  or 
of  what  the  original  suit  gives  notice  to  one 
dealing  with  the  property  affected.  When  a 
suit  is  filed  by  a  plaintiff,  any  one  taking 
from  the  defendant  a  conveyance  of  the 
property  involved  takes  with  notice  of  plain- 
tiff's action,  including  ordinary  or  amplify- 
ing amendments  which  do  not  change  the 
identity  of  the  suit  or  affect  its  general  pur- 
pose or  object  or  create  a  new  lis  pendens. 
A  purchaser,  pending  a  suit,  must  anticipate 
that  the  defendant  will  resist  the  action  and 
will  file  appropriate  defensive  matter  there- 
to, but  he  is  not  bound  to  anticipate  that  de- 
fendant will  bring  a  cross-action  against  the 
plaintiff,  setting  up  some  equitable  right  and 
demanding  affirmative  equitable  relief  in  re- 
gard thereto.  Bridger  v.  Exchange  Bank, 
56  S.  E.  100,  101,  126  Oa.  821,  8  L.  B.  A. 
<N.  S.)  463,  115  Am.  St  Bep.  118  (citing  Se- 
combe  v.  Steele,  61  U.  S.  106,  15  L.  Ed.  838; 
Fash  V.  Bavesies,  32  Ala.  451;  Berry  v. 
Whltaker,  58  Me.  442;  Cole  v.  Winnlpisse- 
ogee  Lake  Cotton  &  Woolen  Mfig.  Co.,  54  N. 
H.  242 ;  Olson  v.  Leibpke,  81  N.  W.  801,  110 
Iowa,  595,  80  Aul  St  Bep.  327;    Welton  v. 


Co<^  61  OaL  481;  Borxowscale  ▼.  liUtile^ 
5  AUen  [87  Mass.]  377;  2  Pom.  Bq.  Jar.  [3d 
Ed.]  §  633;  Story,  Eq.  PL  [10th  Ed.]  |  156: 
Oarmichael  ▼.  Foster,  69  Oa.  372;  Bennett 
Lis  Pendens,  p.  242,  |  181;  Allen  v.  HalU- 
day,  28  Fed.  261;  Cotton  ▼.  Dacey,  61  Fed. 
481 ;  Freeman,  Judgnt  |  205 ;  Hope  v.  Blair, 
16  S.  W.  595,  105  Mo.  85,  24  Am.  St  Bep. 
366;  Watson  v.  Wilson,  2  Dana  [82  Ky.]  406, 
26  Am.  Dec.  459 ;  Ettenborough  v.  Bishop,  26 
N.  J.  Eq.  262;  McCauley  v.  Bogers,  104  111. 
578;  Weems  v.  Harrold,  75  Ga.  867;  Cher- 
ry V.  North  &  S.  B.  B.  Co.,  65  Ga.  633;  a  C. 
Hall  Lumber  Co.  v.  Gustin,  20  N.  W.  616, 
54  Mich.  624;  Henderson  v.  Wanamaker,  79 
Fed.  736,  25  C.  C.  A.  181;  Kinney  v.  Con- 
solidated Va.  Mining  Co.,  14  Fed.  Cas.  612; 
English  V.  Thorn,  96  Ga.  557,  23  S.  E.  843; 
Garver  v.  Graham,  51  Pae  812,  6  Kan.  App. 
314;  Mansur  &  Tebbetts  Implement  Co.  v. 
Beer,  45  S.  W.  972,  19  Tex.  Olv.  App.  SIX, 
313;  Tlnsley  ▼.  Bice,  81  &  B.  174,  105  Ga. 
289. 

As  Botlee 

A  "Us  pendens"  is  not  the  commence- 
ment of  an  action  as  against  the  defend- 
ants. It  is  a  mere  notice  to  outside  parties 
that  such  an  action  is  about  to  be  or  actu- 
ally has  been  commenced.  Cohen  v.  Blber, 
108  N.  Y.  Supp.  249,  250,  123  App.  Dlv.  528. 

A  "lis  pendens"  is  for  the  purpose  of 
giving  notice  of  the  Jurisdiction  or  con- 
trol which  the  court  acquired  over  property 
Involved  in  a  suit  pending  the  continuance 
of  the  action.  State  v.  Washington  Dredg- 
ing &  Improvement  Co.,  86  Pac.  936,  038,  43 
Wash.  508  (adopting  definition  in  Washing- 
ton Dredging  &  Improvement  Co.  ▼•  Kin- 
near,  64  Pac  522,  24  Wash.  405). 

That  the  transferee  of  corporate  stock 
knew  that  suit  was  pending  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver  and  dissolution  of  the  cor- 
poration, and  to  require  the  transferror  to 
account  for  property  alleged  to  have  been 
wrongfully  appropriated,  did  not  prevent  it 
from  purchasing  the  stock  free  from  all  eq- 
uities between  the  transferror  and  another 
stodcholder,  or  the  corporation,  as  the  doc- 
trine of  constructive  notice  by  "lis  pendens" 
does  not  apply  to  such  property.  Central 
Sav.  Bank  ▼.  Smith,  95  Pac.  307,  3U,  43  Cola 
90. 

LIST 

See  Classified  list;  Tax  List 
Such  list,  see  Such. 
Unfair  list,  see  Unfair. 

"List,"  In  its  common  ordinary  flense^ 
means  to  put  into  a  list  or  catalogue,  regis- 
ter, or  enroll.  Strout  Co.  v.  Gay,  72  AtL  881, 
882,  105  Me.  108,  24  L^  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  562. 

Of  witnesses 
Bev.  St  I  1033,  requiring  that  In  a  cap- 
ital case  the  list  of  the  witnesses  and  jurors 
shall  be  delivered  to  the  defendant  at  leasi 


LIST 


167 


UTEBABT  PBOPEBTT 


tiro  oitlre  days  before  the  trial,  by  'list  of 
the  witnesses'*  means  a  list  containing  the 
names  of  the  witnesses,  and  neoessarily  this 
means  the  names  which  they  then  bear,  and 
which  identify  them.  A  woman  who  has 
been  married  and  divorced  is  not  incompe- 
tent as  a  witness  in  a  capital  cause  because 
she  is  designated  on  the  list  of  witnesses  fur- 
nished to  the  defendant  in  compliance  with 
the  statute  by  her  maiden  name,  under  which 
she  has  gone  since  her  divorce  some  10  or  12 
yeais  ago.  Bird  v.  United  States,  23  Sup.  Ct 
42.  45,  187  U.  S.  118,  47  L.  E3d.  100. 

Tax  Ust 

The  phrase  '*Ust  of  all  shares  of  stock,'* 
used  in  the  statute  providing  persons  owning 
shares  of  stock  in  banks  shall  not  be  required 
to  deliver  to  the  assessor  a  list  thereof,  but 
the  president  or  other  chief  officer  shall  deliv- 
er to  the  assessor  a  list  of  all  shares  of  stock 
held  therein  and  the  face  value  thereof,  nec- 
essarily means  "a  Ust  of  all  shares  of  stock, 
with  tiie  names  of  the  owner  or  holders 
thereof,  and  the  amount  of  such  holdings"; 
and  under  the  statute  the  stock  is  not  assess- 
able to  the  bank.  State  e^  rel.  Wilson  v. 
First  Nat  Bank  of  Oarterville,  7»  S.  W.  943, 
945,  946,  180  Mo.  717. 

The  terms  "list,"  "tax  list,"  and  "delin- 
quent tax  list"  are,  by  common  usage,  under- 
stood to  refer  to  the  notices  or  other  matters 
with  which  such  lists  are  included,  and  the 
list  within  Comp.  St  1905,  c  77,  art.  9,  |  7, 
requiring  the  publication  of  a  delinquent 
list,  Is  a  part  of  the  notice  of  the  pendency 
of  the  suit  and  is  a  complete  Ust  of  the  landis 
against  which  there  are  delinquent  taxes, 
while  the  list  required  by  section  17  is  a  part 
of  the  notice  of  sale  under  the  decree,  and  is 
merely  a  Ust  of  aU  the  lands  on  which  de- 
crees have  been  rendered.  The  latter  Ust  Is 
not  the  delinquent  tax  list  within  the  act, 
nor  as  the  term  is  generally  understood,  and 
the  pubUcation  under  section  7  precedes  that 
under  section  17.  State  ex  reL  Oronln  ▼. 
CroniQ,  106  N.  W.  986,  987,  76  Neb.  788. 

Willi  real  estate  aseat 

A  contract  to  "Ust"  real  estate  is  not  sat- 
isfied by  taking  a  description  of  it  by  the  bro- 
ker, but  it  would  at  least  require  that  some 
mention  of  the  real  estate  should  appear  in 
some  of  the  broker's  advertisements,  and,  in 
the  absence  of  such  listing,  the  broker  could 
not  recover  a  commission  provided  in  case  of 
withdrawal  of  the  land  by  the  owner.  B.  A. 
fitrout  Co.  V.  Gay,  72  Aa  881,  882,  106  Me. 
108,  24  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  662. 

^t  is  probably  beyond  dispute  that  the 
ordinary  transaction  by  which  land  is  said  to 
be  listed'  with  an  agent— that  is,  where  an 
owner  informs  a  real  estate  broker  of  his 
wish  to  sell  property  upon  stated  terms,  and 
hivokes  his  professional  services  in  tliat  re- 
spect—does not  imply  any  grant  of  p&wet  to 
execute  a  contract  for  its  sale."  Brown  v. 
GUpin,  90  Pac.  267,  270,  75  KaxL  778. 


Aasestment  as  indading,  see  Assessment 
(In  Taxation). 

LITERARY 

lilTERABT  IN8TITUTIOH8 

An  incorporated  school  is  a  "scientiflc" 
or  'literary"  assocUtton  within  St  1898,  | 
1088,  exempting  from  taxation  property  of 
such  assodationa.  Board  of  Trustees  of 
lAwrenoe  University  ▼.  Outagamie  Ck>anty, 
186  N.  W.  619,  620,  160  Wis.  244. 

The  property  of  a  corporation  organized 
to  provide  a  home  for  working  girls  at  a 
moderate  cost,  which  has  no  capital  stock, 
and  which  can  divide  none  of  the  income  or 
profits  among  the  members  or  use  it  for  any 
other  than  Uterary,  educational,  benevolent, 
charitable,  or  sdentiflc  purposes,  is  exempt 
from  taxation  under  Rev.  Laws,  c.  12,  |  5,  d. 
8,  exempting  the  property  of  ^'Uterary,  benev- 
olent, charitable,  and  sclentlflc  institutions." 
FrankUn  Square  House  v.  City  of  Boston,  74 
N.  B.  675,  676, 188  Mass.  409. 

Under  Rev.  St  c  9,  |  8,  providing  for 
taxation  of  real  estate  against  the  person  in 
possession,  a  university  fraternity  in  posses- 
sion of  a  chapter  house,  built  on  the  campus 
under  a  contract  to  purchase  from  the  uni- 
versity. Is  liable  for  taxes  assessed  against 
the  property;  the  fraternity  not  being  ex- 
empt as  a  Uterary  or  scientific  institution 
within  section  6,  par.  2.  Inhabitants  of  Oro- 
no  V.  Kappa  Sigma  Society,  80  Atl.  831,  832, 
108  Me.  820. 

IiITERART  PROPEBTT 

The  owner  of  a  common-law  copyri;^ht 
has  a  peri)etual  right  of  property  and  the  ex- 
clusive right  of  first  general  pubUcation,  and 
may,  prior  thereto,  enjoy  the  benefit  of  a  re- 
stricted pubUcation  without  forfeiture  of  the 
right  of  general  pubUcation.  Under  Rev.  St. 
§  4952,  giving  to  the  owner  of  a  copyrighted 
book  the  right  to  copy  and  vend  the  same, 
protection  against  mnltipUcation  of  copies 
and  the  incidents  thereof  constitute  the  only 
protection  afforded  by  the  copyright  statutes 
to  the  publisher.  There  is  a  distinction  be- 
tween the  common-law  rlg^t  of  ^literary 
property"  commonly  caUed  common-law  copy- 
right and  copyright  under  the  statute^  A 
copyright  is  an  incorporeal  right  to  print 
and  publish,  being  a  property  in  notion  with- 
out corporeal,  tangible  substance.  A  copy- 
right is  property  distinct  from  the  corporeal 
property  out  of  which  it  arises,  and  each  of 
these  classes  of  property  is  capable  of  ex- 
isting and  being  owned  and  transferred  es- 
pecially and  independent  of  each  other.  The 
property  of  an  author  in  his  intellectual  pro- 
duction is  absolute  untU  he  voluntarily  partA 
therewith.  He  cannot  be  compeUed  to  pub- 
Ush  his  production  or  to  permit  others  to  en- 
Joy  it,  but  he  has  the  right  to  exclude  aU 
persons  from  its  employmoat,  and  any  use  of 


UTHOFOKB 


158 


UTIOATION 


the  property  without  his  consent  Js  a  Tlola- 
tlon  of  his  right  He  may  permit  one  or 
more  persons  to  use  it  to  the  exdosion  of  all 
others,  and  in  doing  so  he  may  restrict  the 
use  which  shall  be  made  of  it  He  may  give 
a  copy  of  a  manuscript  to  a  person  without 
parting  with  his  literary  property  in  it  and 
may  circulate  cojfiieB  among  his  friends  for 
their  own  personal  oijoyment  without  giving 
them  the  right  of  publication.  <}onmion-law 
copyright  and  statutory  copyright  cannot  co- 
exist in  the  same  composition,  and  when  the 
statutory  right  begins  the  common-law  right 
ends.  Bobbs-Merrlll  Ck>.  t.  Straus,  147  Fed. 
15,  18,  77  0.  C.  A.  607,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  766 
(citing  Ager  v.  Murray,  105  U.  S.  126,  26  L. 
Ed.  942;  Stephens  v.  Cady,  14  How.  [55  U. 
S.]  528,  14  L.  Ed.  528;  Stevens  v.  Gladding, 
17  How.  [58  U.  S.]  447,  15  L.  Ed.  155;  Werck- 
meister  v.  American  Lithographic  Co.,  134 
Fed.  321,  323,  324,  69  G.  G.  A.  553,  555,  68 
L.  R.  A.  591;  Drone,  Copyr.  100,  102,  103; 
Bartlette  v.  Crittenden,  2  Fed.  Ca&  981,  4 
McLean,  800;  Bartlett  v.  Crittenden,  2  Fed. 
Cas.  967,  5  McLean,  32;  Press  Pub.  Co.  v. 
Monroe,  73  Fed.  196,  19  C.  G.  A.  429,  51  L. 
R.  A.  353;  Holmes  v.  Hurst,  19  Sup.  Gt  606, 
174  U.  S.  82,  43  L.  Ed.  904;  Jewelers'  Mer- 
cantile Agency  v.  Jewelers'  Weekly  Publish- 
ing Co.,  49  N.  E.  872,  165  N.  Y.  241,  247,  41  L. 
R.  A.  846,  63  Am.  St  Rep.  666;  Palmer  v.  De 
Witt,  47  N.  T.  632,  536,  7  Am.  Rep.  480;  Cop. 
Copyr.  [3d  Ed.]  1 ;  Wheaton  v.  Peters,  8  Pet 
[33  U.  S.]  591,  8  L.  Ed.  1055;  Id.,  29  Fed. 
Cas.  862,  8  Pet  [33  U.  S.]  725;  Johnson  v. 
Donaldson,  3  Fed.  22;  Perrls  v.  Hexamer,  99 
U.  S.  674,  25  L.  Ed.  308;  Henry  Bill  Pub. 
Co.  V.  Smythe,  27  Fed.  914;  Garst  v.  HaU 
&  Lyon  Co.,  61  N.  E.  219,  179  Mass.  588,  591, 
65  L.  R.  A.  631 ;  Harrison  v.  Maynard,  Mer- 
rill &  Co.,  61  Fed.  689,  10  0.  C.  A.  17). 

LITHOFONE 

Where  it  was  proved  that  •Tithofone," 
composed  of  70  per  cent  sulphate  of  barytes 
and  30  per  cent  sulphide  of  zinc,  was  known 
as  "lithofone,"  whether  dry  or  ground  in  oil, 
and  by  commercial  designation  was  known 
as  '^sulphide  of  zinc  white,"  it  was  classifi- 
able for  duty  as  such  under  TarifP  Act  July 
24,  1897,  par.  67,  c  11,  30  Stat  164,  and  not 
as  a  white  paint  or  pigment  containing  zinc, 
but  not  containing  lead.  Gabriel  &  Schall  v. 
United  States,  123  Fed.  296,  69  C.  a  A.  362 

LITHOGRAPH 

UTHOGRAPHIO  PBINT8 

''Lithographic  prints'*  consist  of  complete 
articles  of  a  character  of  pictures  ready 
for  use  in  mounting,  binding  or  framing,  and 
are  the  product  of  the  art  of  lithography, 
which  is  the  art  of  making  a  picture,  design, 
or  writing  on  stone  in  sudi  a  manner  that 
ink  impressions  can  be  taken  from  the  work 
of  producing  such  lmk>resslons  by  a  process 
analogous     to     ordinary     printing.    United 


States  V.  O.  G.  Hempstead  A  Bon,  109  Fed. 
290,292. 

Under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11,  | 
1,  Schedule  M,  par.  400,  30  Stat  188,  relatliic 
respectively  to  "lithographic  prints'*  and  to 
''booklets,'*  articles  consisting  of  several  post 
cards  folded  together  and  ready  to  be  de- 
tadied,  with  a  paper  cover  pasted  thereon, 
are  covered  by  the  former  rather  than  the 
latter  term.  Downing  &  Co.  v.  United 
States,  172  Fed.  447,  448. 

Calendars  composed  of  lithograidilc 
sheets  with  a  metal  strip  at  each  end,  and 
having  a  calendar  pad  composed  of  litho- 
graphic sheeta  attached  thereto,  the  litho- 
graphic printe  being  the  most  important  fSea- 
ture  of  the  importation,  are  dutiable  as 
"lithographic  printe"  bound,  under  Tariff  Act 
July  24, 1897,  c.  11,  1 1,  Schedule  M,  par.  400, 
30  Stat  188,  rather  than  as  printed  matter 
(paragraph  403,  30  Stat  189),  or  as  manu- 
factures of  paper  (paragraph  407,  30  Stat 
189).  Luyties  Bro&  ▼.  United  States^  180 
Fed.  1022,  1023. 

The  expression  'lithographic  prlnta,**  In 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11,  |  1,  Schedule 
If,  par.  400,  30  Stat  188,  had  no  such  defi- 
nite, general,  and  uniform  meaning  in  the 
wholesale  trade  and  commerce  of  the  United 
States  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  that 
act  as  to  control  ite  construction.  Knauth, 
Nachod  &  Kuhne  v.  United  States,  155  Fed. 
144,  146. 

Articles  composed  of  cardboard  on  which 
lithographic  printa  have  been  pasted,  and 
which  is  cut  into  forms  adapted  to  be  folded 
into  pockete  to  hang  on  walls,  some  of  them 
having  pincushions  or  calendars  attached, 
are  not  dutiable  as  "lithographic  prints," 
under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  e  11,  |  1, 
Schedule  M,  par.  400,  30  Stat  188,  but  as 
''manufactures  of  paper,"  under  paragraph 
407,  30  Stat  189.  Knauth,  Nachod  &  Kuhne 
V.  United  States,  165  Fed.  144,  140. 

LITIGATED 

UTIOATIOV 

See  Liquidated  by  Litigation;  Necech 
sary   Litigation;    Without  Litigation. 

Expenses  of  legal  proceeding,  see  BIx- 
penses. 

A  proceeding  to  have  one  declared  an  In- 
competent is  not  a  "litigation,''  in  the  ordi- 
nary sense  of  the  term ;  and,  in  the  absenoe 
of  express  contract  for  services  of  an  un- 
official stenographer  in  taking  the  testimony, 
the  alleged  incompetent  is  not  liable  therefor, 
except  upon  an  implied  contract  Carpenter 
V.  Hammond*  125  N.  Y.  Snpp.  31,  32,  68  Hiac 
Rep.  438. 

•rrhe  purpose  of  all  litigation*  is  to  pre- 
serve and  enforce  ri^to  and  secure  compli- 
ance with  the  law  of  the  state,  either  stat- 
ute or  conmion.*'    Missouri,  BL  A  T.  Ry.  Go. 


XA^ 


LITIGATION 


169 


UYB  APART 


T.  Hickman,  22  Sup.  Ot  18,  21,  188  U.  8. 
63,  46  L.  E<L  7a 

San  Diego  City  Charter,  c.  6,  art  8,  | 
2,  provides  "that  the  connnon  council  shall 
haye  control  of  all  litigation  of  the  city, 
and  may  employ  other  attorneys  to  take 
charge  of  any  sndi  litigation,  or  assist  the 
dty  attorney  therein.**  H^d,  that  the  term 
"litigation  of  the  city*'  applies  to  civil  ac^ 
tions  only,  and  that  the  council  has  no  power 
to  appoint  a  special  prosecutor  to  prosecute 
criminal  violations  of  ordinances,  so  that  no 
liability  results  from  audi  appointment 
Dadmun  v.  City  of  San  Diego,  99  Pac.  988, 
964,  9  CaL  App.  549. 

LinORAL  AND  AQUATIC  RIGHTS 

"littoral  and  aquatic  rights"  are  simply 
those  rights  which,  in  default  of  special  stat- 
utory provisions  to  the  contrary,  appertain 
to  lands  shutting  upon  tide-waters,  to  which 
±e  common-law  doctrine  of  riparian  owner- 
ship does  not  apply.  Barataria  Canning  Co. 
T.  Ott,  87  South.  121,  124,  84  Miss.  737. 

Land  fronting  on  a  sound  was  leased, 
and  the  lessee  obtained  from  the  county 
board  of  supervisors  the  right  to  bank, 
plant,  and  cultivate  oysters  in  the  sound 
within  the  limits  of  the  entiiie  front  of  the 
property,  and  thereafter  the  lessor  deeded 
the  land  to  the  lessee,  reserving  all  'littoral 
and  aquatic  rights  appurtenant  to  the  land," 
and  in  a  suit  between  the  parties  it  was 
decided  on  appeal  that,  the  lessor  having  had 
no  exclusive  right  to  the  water  or  fish,  and 
th^  grant  of  the  supervisors  having  vested 
a  property  right  in  the  lessee,  the  reserva- 
tion was  of  a  thing  which  would  not  other- 
wise have  passed  under  the  deed,  and  did 
not  deprive  the  lessee  of  his  exclusive  right 
to  tbe  oysters.  Held,  that  such  decision  did 
not  bar  a  reformation  of  the  deed  after 
remand  of  the  cause  on  the  ground  that  the 
real  intent  of  the  agreement  between  the 
parties  had  been  that  the  lessor  should  have 
the  right  to  the  oysters  and  oyster  beds. 
Barataria  Canning  Ca  t.  Ott;  41  South.  878, 
379,  88  lllsa  771. 

LIVE— LIVING 

See  Then  living. 


'*One  of  the  deflnltions  given  in  the  dic- 
tionaries of  the  word  live'  is  to  dwell,  to 
reside,  to  abide.'*  Powers  ▼.  United  States, 
m  Fed.  562,  565,  56  C.  a  A.  128. 

A  witness  could  state  in  a  "trustee  suit" 
to  collect  taxes.  In  which  defendant's  resi- 
dence was  involved,  that  defendant  lived  in 
P.  in  a  certain  year;  the  word  "live"  not 
stating  the  ultimate  fact  of  resldenoe,  but  a 
^ct  bearing  on  the  question  of  residence. 
CooUdge  T.  Taylor,  80  Atl.  1088^  1041,  85  Vt 
8ft. 


Statonent  of  a  witness  that  he  lived  at 
a  certain  street  and  number  in  a  4pecilled 
dty  was  not  inconsistent  with  his  "residence" 
in  another  county,  since  a  person  may  "live" 
in  one  place,  and  have  a  legal  residence  in 
another.  O'Brien  v.  O'Brien,  116  Pac.  602, 
604,  16  CaL  App.  103. 

Under  Rev.  Laws,  c.  154,  |  6,  providing 
that  the  libel  for  divorce  must  be  filed, 
heard,  and  determined  in  the  county  in  which 
one  of  the  parties  "lives,'*  a  wife  who  has 
separated  from  her  husband  because  of  his 
adultery  may  obtain  a  domicile  in  a  county 
other  than  that  in  which  he  resides,  and 
bring  a  libel  against  him  for  divorce  at  the 
domicile  so  obtained.  Clark  v.  Clark,  77  N. 
B.  702,  101  Mass.  128. 

The  word  'lives,"  in  Code,  |  1813,  pro- 
viding that  moneys  and  credits  shall  be 
listed  where  the  owner  "lives,"  is  the  equiva- 
lent of  "residence."  Cover  v.  Hatten,  113 
N.  W.  470,  471, 186  Iowa,  68. 

The  place  where  a  person  lives,  within 
Code,  1 1318,  providing  that  moneys  and  cred- 
its shall  be  listed  and  assessed  where  the 
owner  lives,  is  the  place  of  his  residence. 
Glotfelty  V.  Brown,  126  N.  W.  707,  708,  148 
Iowa,  124. 

As  used  in  St  1821,  c  60,  |  27,  provid- 
ing that  in  extending  execution  upon  real 
estate  the  officer  may  appoint  an  appraiser 
for  the  debtor,  if  he  neglect  or  refuse  to 
choose  one  after  being  duly  notified  by  the 
officer,  if  the  debtor  be  living  in  the  county 
where  the  land  lies,  the  phrase  "living  in  the 
county"  means  actual  residence  at  the  time 
of  the  levy  in  the  county  where  the  land 
levied  upon  is  situated.  Dodge  v.  Farns- 
worth,  10  Me.  278,  270. 

DeAtli  of  testator  or  life  tenants  refer- 
red to 

Testator  gave  to  his  son  and  the  son's 
wife  the  use  of  certain  real  estate  for  life, 
and  provided  that  at  their  death  the  prop- 
erty should  descend  to  the  son's  children 
living  at  the  time  and  the  issue  of  any  child 
of  the  son  then  deceased.  Held,  that  such 
description  of  the  remaindermen  did  not 
mean  children  of  the  son  living  at  the  time 
of  testator's  death,  but  excluded  children 
living  at  testator's  death  who  did  not  survive 
the  life  tenants.  Birdsall  v.  Blrdsall  (Iowa) 
182  N.  W.  800,  810,  36  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1121. 

UVE  APART 

Under  Ky.  St  1006,  f  2117,  making  *niv- 
Ing  apart"  without  any  cohabitation  for  five 
consecutive  years  next  before  the  application 
a  ground  for  divorce,  the  time  elapsing  since 
a  spouse  became  a  lunatic  cannot  be  count- 
ed as  part  of  the  five  years  required  by  the 
statute,  but  if  the  parties  lived  apart  with- 
out cohabitation  for  five  years  before  one 
became  a  lunatic,  and  they  have  since  con- 
tinued to  live  apart,  divorce  may  be  granted. 
Andrews  v.  Andrews'  Committee^  87  S.  W« 
1080,  1081,  120  E:y.  718. 


lilVB  IN  ADULTRT 


160     LIVB  STOCX  IKStJRAXCB  CJOMPANT 


XJTE  nr  ADXTLTBKY 

See,  also,  lAve  Together. 

To  constitute  "living  In  adultery  "  there 
must  be  more  than  a  single  act,  but  there 
need  not  be  a  liying  together  continuously, 
or  for  a  given  time,  nor  Is  It  necessary  for 
the  man  to  abide  in  the  same  house  with  the 
woman;  but  the  offense  is  committed  if  he 
at  stated  periods,  or  frequently,  spends  the 
day  or  night,  or  any  considerable  part  of 
his  time,  with  a  woman,  not  his  wife,  at  such 
times  having  carnal  knowledge  of  her  at  will, 
though  at  other  times  he  be  domiciled  with 
his  wife.  Baker  v.  Baker,  124  S.  W.  866, 
867,  136  Ky.  617. 

A  single  act  of  criminal  intercourse  does 
not  constitute  "living  in  adultery  or  fornica- 
tion." Lawson  v.  State,  42  S.  B.  752,  116 
Ga.  671  (citing  McLeland  v.  State,  25  Ga. 
477;   Blsh.  St  Crimes,  |  697). 

One  act,  or  even  occasional  acts,  of  Il- 
licit intercourse  do  not  constitute  the  ot* 
fense  of  "living  together  in  a  state  of  adul- 
tery or  fornication,  or  of  adultery  and  forni- 
cation,*' in  violation  of  Pen.  Code  1895,  | 
381.  Winkles  v.  State^  61  &  B.  1128,  1129,  4 
Ga.  App.  559. 

IiIVB  TOGETHER 

See,  also,  Live  in  Adultery. 

A  husband  and  wife  are  "living  together" 
when  they  dwell  under  the  same  roof,  eat  at 
the  same  table,  and  hold  themselves  out  to 
the  world  and  conduct  themselves  towards 
each  other  as  husband  and  wife,  and  it  is  in- 
correct to  say^  that  they  are  living  as  husband 
and  wife  when  they  do  not  occupy  the  same 
room  or  have  sexual  intercourse.  Levy  v. 
GoldsoU  (Tex.)  131  S.  W.  420,  421. 

The  mere  fact  that  a  man  took  his  meals 
at  the  house  of  a  married  woman  did  not 
constitute  a  "living  together"  by  such  man 
and  woman,  within  the  meaning  of  the  stat- 
ute defining  the  crime  of  adultery.  Paul  v. 
State,  90  S.  W.  171,  49  Tex.  Cr.  R.  20. 

Where  defendant  had  sexual  intercourse 
with  prosecutrix  while  she  was  living  In  de- 
fendant's house  as  his  general  servant,  during 
the  Illness  of  defendant's  wife,  defendant  was 
not  guilty  under  an  indictment  charging  that 
defendant  and  prosecutrix  "lived  together  and 
had  carnal  intercourse."  The  statute  does 
not  Intend  to  convey  the  idea  that  a  married 
man  with  a  family  was  "living  together" 
with  a  servant  merely  because  the  servant 
might  occupy  a  room  in  the  house  of  the 
master.  To  give  the  statute  such  construc- 
tion would  be  to  hold  that,  where  a  landlord 
or  family  slept  under  the  same  roof  with 
the  servant,  this  would  be  a  "living  together" 
with  the  servant  Boswell  v.  State,  85  S.  W. 
1076,  1077,  48  Ttex.  Or.  B.  47,  122  Am.  St. 
Rep.  731. 

Civil  Code,  art.  1481  providing  that  those 
who  *Tiave  lived  together"  in  open  concu- 
binage are  incapable  of  making  to  each  other 


any  doaatioa  of  Immovables,  does  not  mean 
that  the  parties  must  have  dwelt  or  resided 
together.  Succession  of  Jabraus,  88  Sooth. 
417,  418,  114  La.  456. 

LIVED  VPOV 

Where,  on  a  trial  for  violating  Act  April 
26,  1909  (Laws  1909,  c.  196),  punishing  any 
person  who  shall  knowingly  live  on  or  be 
supported  in  whole  or  in  part  by  the  money 
procured  by  any  female  through  the  prosti- 
tution of  any  other  female,  accused  relied  on 
the  fact  that  the  money  given  him  by  a 
third  person  was  received  in  payment  of 
debts  or  to  redeem  jewelry  for  the  third  per- 
son, and  the  third  person  testified  that  she 
never  gave  accused  any  money  for  his  own 
use,  a  charge  authorizing  a  conviction  if  ac^ 
cused  received  money  from  the  third  person 
with  knowledge  that  the  same  was  derived 
through  the  prostitution  of  another,  and  that 
he  used  the  same  for  his  own  living  or  per- 
sonal expenses,  was  erroneous,  because  broad- 
er than  the  statute,  and  as  eliminating  the 
defense;  the  phrase  'lived  upon"  meaning 
to  be  maintained  in  life;  to  acquire  a  liveli- 
hood; to  subsist  with,  on,  or  by,  as  to  Uve  on 
spoils.  Trozzo  v.  People,  117  Pac  160,  156, 
51  Colo.  323. 

UVE  EKOmB 

An  engine  having  no  steam  is  called  a 
"dead  engine,"  and  one  with  steam  is  a 
••live  engine."  Turner  v.  Atchison,  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Pac  438,  88  Kan.  816. 

UVE  SFBOrOS 

Springs  occupying  a  space  of  about  one- 
half  acre  in  a  ten-acre  tract,  marshy  part  of 
the  year,  resting  right  upon  the  brow  of  a 
little  drop-off,  so  that  there  was  quite  a  lot 
of  water  standing  around  in  the  springs,  of 
which  it  looked  as  there  might  be  five  or  six, 
but  into  which  no  stream  led,  and  the  water 
from  which  formed  no  channel  or  stream, 
though,  during  a  part  of  the  wet  season,  some 
of  the  water  would  flow  down  the  hUlslde 
for  a  short  distance  and  disappear  In  the 
soil,  were  not  **llve  springs,"  but  constituted 
nothing  more  than  a  bog  occasioned  by  seep- 
age of  the  water.  Dickey  ▼.  Maddux,  93  Pac 
1090,  1091,  48  Wash.  411. 

UVE  8TOOK  OrSUBAEGE  OOMPAHT 

A  "live  stock  insurance  company"  incor- 
porated under  Rev.  St  1895,  art  642,  subd. 
46,  authorizing  the  incorporation  of  fire,  mar- 
ine, life,  and  live  stock  insurance  companies, 
to  conduct  a  live  stock  insurance  company 
on  a  mutual  or  co-operative  plan  without 
capital  stock,  and  to  issue  policies  of  in- 
demnity on  live  stock  to  its  members,  is  a 
live  stock  insurance  company  conducted  on 
the  mutual  or  co-operative  plan,  and  is  not  a 
-mutual  relief  association"  within  article 
3096,  providing  that  nothing  In  the  title- 
title  68,  entitled  •'Incorporation  of  Insurance 
Companies"— shall  apply  to  mutual  relief  as- 


».lal 


UTE  STOCK  SANITARY  CX}M'B     161 


UVEBT  STABLB  KXSPXB 


■odattooa.     State   t.   Burgeaa*   !€•   8.   W. 
822,  923,  101  Tax.  024. 

UVE     STOCK     SAHITABT     OOIOIZS.- 
SIOHEB 

An  information  drawn  under  aecCton  27, 
e.  486,  p.  823,  Seas.  Lawa  1905,  relating  to 
the  inspection  by  the  "Uve  atock  sanitary 
commissioner'*  of  cattle  imported  from  places 
beyond  the  south  line  of  the  state,  whi<^ 
charges  a  want  of  inspection  by  the  live 
stock  sanitary  "commission,"  and  charges 
generally  the  want  of  any  inspection,  is  not 
invalidated  by  the  omission  of  the  terminal 
syllable  "er^  from  the  word  nsed  to  deacilbe 
the  official  having  power  to  make  the  in- 
spection, since  there  is  no  substantial  differ- 
ence betwe^i  a  commission  composed  of  a 
body  of  individuals  having  lawful  warrant 
to  perform  certain  acts  and  a  commissioner 
having  identical  authority.  Both  terms  are 
general  characterizations  without  fixed  legal 
signification  and  Import  an  office  with  pre- 
scribed duties.  State  t.  Asbell,  86  Pac.  467, 
468,  74  Kan.  397,  121  Am.  St  Rep.  846. 

UVE  WXBS 

The  term  "live  wire^f  is  used  in  electricity 
to  describe  a  wire  charged  with  a  4^01^^- 
ona  voltage  of  electricity.  Potts  v.  Shreve- 
port  Belt  By.  Ck>.,  84  South.  108, 110  La.  1,  08 
Am.  St  Rep.  462. 

A  "live  wlre^*  is  one  charged  with  a 
deadly  current  of  Mectridty.  City  of  Owens-, 
boTO  V.  Knox's  Adm'r,  76  S.  W.  101,  102,  116 
Ky.  461. 

A  "live  wire**  la  one  charged  with  a 
deadly  current  of  electricity.  Mangan's 
Adm'r  v.  Louisville  Electric  Light  Co.,  01  S. 
W.  708,  705,  122  Ky.  476,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
4S9  (quoting  and  adopting  City  of  Qwens- 
boro  V.  Knox'a  Adm'r,  76  S.  W.  101,  116  Ky. 
451). 

uvnra 

The  word  'living,**  aa  ordinarily  used  In 
reference  to  legatees,  without  anything  in 
the  context  to  qualify  Ita  meaning,  signifies 
inch  l^teea  as  are  living  at  the  time  of 
making  the  wUL  Bryant  v.  Flanders,  87  N. 
El  574,  676,  201  Mass.  373. 
Child  «B  Teatra  sa  mmm 

The  term  **eia  ventre  sa  mere**  comes 
dearly  within  the  description  **9l  dilld  living 
at  the  time  of  Its  father's  death."  State  v. 
Atwood,  102  Pac  206,  207,  64  Or.  62Q,  21  Ann. 
Gaa.616. 

Lnmro  Higfim 

See  Remaining  Living  Helis. 

UVIHO    XH    STATS    OF    OOBABXTA- 
TIOH  An  ABULTEBT 

The  worda  ''living  In  a  state  of  oohablta- 
tion  and  adultery"  in  Pen.  Code,  |  260a,  aa 
amended  by  Act  March  21,  lOU  (Lawa  1011, 
p.  42Q,  punishing  living  in  a  atate  of  oohabi- 

8  Wd&A  P.2D  Skb.~11 


latlon  and  adultery,  mean  the  living  together 
aa  hnaband  and  wife;  and  to  Jnatlfy  a  convlo- 
tlon  it  must  appear  that  there  exiated  be- 
tween defendanta  an  adulteroua  cohabitatton. 
People  V.  Breeding,  126  Pac  170, 181, 10  OaL 
App.  800. 

XJVZHOXS8UB 

See  iBrae  (Deaoendantfl). 

LIVERY  STABLE 

Aa  mercantile  pursuit,  aee  Mercantile, 
A  *nivery  stable*'  la  a  building  where 
horses  or  vehicles  are  kept  or  let  for  hire; 
a  'tdace  where  horses  are  groomed,  fed,  and 
hired;  where  vehldea  are  let;*'  a  atable 
where  horses  are  kept  at  livery  and  hire, 
and  vehldea  are  let;  a  atable  where  horses 
are  kept  for  hire,  and  where  atabllng  la  pro- 
vided. Elliott  V.  Hodgson  A  Jackacm,  66  S. 
B.  406,  407,  138  Ga.  200,  184  Am.  St  Rep. 
200  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  In  WU- 
liama  v.  Garignea,  80  La.  Ann.  1004 ;  Stand. 
Diet;  and  Webater,  International  Diet). 

A  "livery  stable'*  la  ordinarily  a  place 
where  horses  and  carriagea  are  kept  to  be 
let  for  hire,  and.  In  the  ordinary  conduct 
of  the  busineaB,  the  horae  or  vehicle  ao  let 
la  In  charge  and  under  the  control  of  the 
hirer  or  hla  representative.  City  of  Dea 
Mdnea  v.  Bolton,  102  N.  W.  1046,  1040^  128 
Iowa,  106,  5  Ann.  Caa.  006. 

XilVEBiT  STABUB  SSSPEB 

A  "livery  atable  keeper"  haa  been  de- 
fined to  be  the  keeper  of  a  atable  where  hora- 
ea  or  vehldea  are  k^  or  let  for  hire;  one 
whoae  butfneaa  It  la  to  keep  horaea  for  hire 
or  to  let,  or  to  keep,  feed,  or  board,  horsea 
for  others ;  one  who  takea  horaea  to  bait  and 
board,  and  he  usually  keeps  horses  to  let; 
the  keeper  of  a  atable  where  horses  are 
groomed,  fed,  and  hired,  where  vehicles  are 
let ;  the  keeper  of  a  stable  where  horses  are 
kept  at  livery  and  hire,  and  vehicles  are  let, 
where  horses  are  kept  for  hire  and  stabling 
is  provided.  While  it  la  not  absolutely  nec- 
essary for  a  stable  keeper  to  exercise  all  the 
difterent  functions  mentioned  In  the  above 
definltlona  in  order  to  be  a  livery  atable  keep- 
er, his  business  must  be  substantially  that  as 
indicated.  Elliott  v.  Hodgson  A  Jackson,  66 
S.  B.  406,  407,  133  Ga.  200,  134  Am.  St  Rep. 
206  (quoting  Abbott,  Law  Diet;  Anderson, 
Law  Diet ;  Black,  Law  Diet ;  Stand.  Diet ; 
Webster,  International  Diet ;  Grovea  v.  KU- 
gore,  72  Me.  480;  WUttama  v.  Garignea,  80 
La.  Ann.  1004). 

A  "livery  stable  keeper**  is  "one  whose 
business  it  is  to  keep  horsea  for  hire,  or  to 
let,  or  to  keep,  feed,  or  board,  horsea  for 
others'*;  one  who  takea  horsea  to  bait  and 
board;  and  he  usually  keepa  horaea  to  let 
It  ia  not  abaoUitaly  neeeaaary  for  a  ttvery 
atable  kovpeit  to  ererdae  all  of  the  iUlEerent 
fonctlona  whldi  auij  be  aometlmea  performed 


UVBRT  STABLB  KSBPXR 


162 


liOADIHO 


by  him  In  order  to  be  a  ''livery  stable  keep- 
er," within  the  meaning  of  the  lien  law,  but 
his  business  must  be  substantially  that  indi- 
cated thereby.  Under  Glv.  Code  1895,  | 
2810,  his  Hen  includes,  not  only  the  actual 
feeding  of  a  horse  placed  with  him,  but  also 
such  charges  as  are  directly  connected  with 
his  keeping  as  were  naturally  in  the  line  of  a 
livery  stable  keeper's  business,  but  expenses 
of  transporting  a  horse  by  railroad  to  races 
In  or  out  of  the  state,  and  of  entering  him 
therein,  do  not  furnish  the  basis  of  a  lien; 
and  where  a  horse  Is  left  with  a  stableman 
to  be  boarded  or  kept  at  an  agreed  price,  and 
the  stableman  had  two  or  more  stables  In 
this  state  for  the  accommodation  of  stock, 
and  by  agreement  with  the  owner  kept  the 
horse  at  one  of  the  stables,  the  fact  that  he 
was  not  kept  at  one  of  the  stables  rather  than 
at  another  would  not  defeat  his  Uen,  al- 
though, where  a  horse  Is  delivered  to  a  livery 
stable  keeper  and,  under  contract  with  the 
owner,  is  sent  to  races  at  distant  points  and 
kept  in  the  stable  of  another  person  who  is 
paid  by  the  liveryman,  the  liveryman  there- 
by acquires  no  statutory  lien.  Blllott  v. 
Hodgson  &  Jackson,  65  S.  B.  405,  407,  133 
Ga.  209,  184  Am.  St  Rep.  206. 

▲n  owner  and  keeper  of  a  livery  stable, 
who  boarded  horses  by  the  month  at  so  much 
per  stall,  but  did  not  feed  or  care  for  them, 
is  entitled  to  a  lien  as  a  "livery  stable  keep- 
er," within  Lien  Law  (Laws  1897,  p.  538,  c. 
418,  §  74,  as  amended  by  Laws  1899,  p.  942, 
c.  465),  saving  a  person  keeping  a  livery  sta- 
ble or  a  boarding  stable,  or  boarding  animals, 
a  lien  for  the  care,  keeping,  or  boarding  of 
such  animals;  and  the  relation  between  the 
parties  was  not  that  of  landlord  and  tenant 
Seiner  v.  Lyons,  110  N.  Y.  Supp.  1048,  1050. 

"Livery  stable  keepers"  are  those  whose 
business  it  is  to  care  for  the  horses  and  car- 
riages of  others  and  to  let  their  own  horses 
and  carriage  either  with  or  without  drivers, 
but  they  are  not  common  carriers  of  passen- 
gers, within  the  legal  meaning  of  that  term, 
and  the  rule  of  law  which  requires  the  high- 
est degree  of  diligence  of  a  carrier  of  passen- 
gers is  not  applicable  to  them.  Stanley  v. 
Steele,  60  Atl.  640,  642,  77  Conn,  688,  69  L. 
R.  A.  561,  2  Ann.  Cas.  342. 

LLOYDS 

The  word  "Lloyds"  has,  by  use,  come  to 
be  understood  by  the  general  public  as  syn- 
onymous with  "insurance."  Under  General 
Corporation  Law  (Laws  1909,  p.  15,  c.  28 
[ConsoL  Laws,  c  23])  f  6,  providing  that  no 
corporation  shall  be  organis^ed  with  the  name 
of  "Insurance"  in  it,  except  a  corporation 
formed  under  the  banking  or  the  Insurance 
law,  a  corporation  cannot  be  formed  under 
the  business  corporations  law  with  the  name 
"Lloyds"  in  Its  name,  as  that  word  has  by 
use   become  synonymous  with  'insurance." 


Barker  ▼.  Koenig,  119  N.  7.  Supp.  777,  778^ 
135  App.  Div.  16. 

LOAD 

See  Car  Load. 

LOADER 

See  Ground  Loader. 

coADnro 

See  Time  Saved  in  Loading. 
Ready  for  loading,  see  Ready. 

Under  a  charter  party  for  a  vessel  to 
carry  a  cargo  of  coal,  which  provided  that 
she  should  "have  turn  in  loading"  and  "be 
loaded  promptly,"  she  was  entitled  to  be  load- 
ed promptly  in  view  of  the  facilities  of  the 
port  and  the  climatic  condititons  which  exist- 
ed at  the  time*  and  to  have  such  facilities 
used  to  their  normal  capacity,  not  only  in 
her  own  loading,  but  also  in  the  loading  of 
other  vessels  after  her  arrival  while  she  was 
waiting  her  turn.  Harding  v.  Cargo  of  4,- 
698  Tons  of  New  Rivers  Steam  Coal,  147  Fed. 
971,  973  (citing  Abb.  Shlpp.  [18th  Ed.]  297). 

Charter  parties  required  the  vessel  in 
each  case  to  load  a  cargo  of  phosphate  at 
Port  IngUs,  Fla.,  and  provided  that  the  vessel 
should  proceed  to  the  Port  IngUs  anchorage, 
"or  as  near  thereunto  as  she  may  safely  get, 
and  there  load.  ♦  ♦  ♦  The  cargo  to  be 
brought  alongside  and  taken  from  alongside 
.free  of  risk  and  expense  to  the  vessel,  any 
custom  of  the  port  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing. *  *  *  Steamer  or  vessel  to  pro- 
ceed to  safe  anchorage  at  port  of  loading  and 
there  load."  Also:  "The  cargo  to  be  sup- 
plied at  the  average  rate  of  not  less  than  400 
tons  per  weather  working  day,  ♦  ♦  • 
commencing  24  hours  after  vessel  Is  in  load- 
ing berth  and  is  ready  to  receive  cargo  and 
written  notice  given  to  that  effect"  Vessels 
were  obliged  to  load  at  such  port  some  miles 
from  shore,  and  the  government  had  estab- 
lished there  two  loading  buoys.  Three  ves- 
sels were  ordered  to  proceed  to  the  port  at 
the  same  time,  and  they  reached  there  and  an- 
chored, and  gave  notice  that  they  were  ready 
to  load.  Held,  that  the  "loading  berth"  re- 
ferred to  in  the  charter  was  the  "safe  an- 
chorage" spoken  of  in  the  prior  clause ;  that, 
having  reached  such  anchorage  and  given 
the  required  notice,  the  lay  days  commenced, 
and  the  charterer  could  not  require  the  ves- 
sels to  await  their  turn  at  the  loading  buoys 
before  the  time  commenced,  even  though  that 
may  have  been  the  custom  of  the  port,  nor 
avoid  liability  for  demurrage  because  of  their 
detention  for  two  or  three  weeks  beyond  the 
time,  either  because  they  could  not  get  to  the 
buoys  or  because  they  could  not,  perhaps  have 
been  fully  loaded  where  they  lay— its  duty 
belDg  to  load  them  there,  so  far  as  could  be 
safely  done,  and  then  permit  them  to  move 
further  out  for  its  completion.  Constantine 
&  Pickering  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Auchindoss,  161  Fed* 
843,  846,  88  C.  a  A.  661. 


I^ADUfO 


les 


liOAH 


The  sum  added  to  the  net  lUe  iBflnzftnee 
preminm  to  meet  expenses  and  contingencies 
Is  called  'loading^  the  premltim.  United 
States  life  Ins.  Go.  v.  SpinlES  (Ky.)  96  8.  W. 
889,  893,  13  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1053. 

Where  Insorance  premioms  and  renewal 
preminma  were  greater  than  the  amount 
necefisary  to  pay  for  the  insurance^  the  excess 
Is  caUed  "loading.**  Mutual  Benefit  Idf  e  Ins. 
Co.  ▼.  Commonwealth,  107  &  W.  802»  800, 
128  Ky.  174. 

LOAF 

See  Loiter,  Loat  and  Idle. 


LOAN 


Sell, 


See  Money  Loaned  and  Invested; 

Barter,  or  Loan;    Btodc  Loan; 

porary  Loan. 
Passing  a  loan,  sea  Pass. 
See,  also.  Lend;  Money  Lent 

From  the  use  of  the  word  ^loan,**  in  its 
ordinary  signification,  the  law  Implies  a 
promise  to  repay.  Herlihy  t.  Goney,  00  AtL 
962,  963,  9Q  Me.  400. 

Rev.  8t  c.  48»  i  64,  providing  that  pre- 
miums for  huilding  association  loans  shall 
consist  of  a  percentage  charged  ,on  ttie 
amount  lent  la  addition  to  interest,  and  sec- 
tion 66,  providing  that  the  monthly  interest 
shall  not  be  at  a  greater  rate  than  6  per  cent 
per  annum,  mean  by  the  words  "loan'*  and 
"lent"  the  whole  sum  contracted  for,  not  the 
Bum  actually  advanced.  Tibbette  v.  Bearing 
Loan  k  BuUding  Ass'n,  72  AtL  162,  166,  104 
Me.  404. 

A  party  advancing  money  to  another  to 
enable  the  latter  to  manufacture  lumber  on 
an  understanding  that  the  lumber  shall  be 
sold  by  the  former  on  conunisaion,  so  that 
the  former  may  get  back  the  advances,  does 
not  make  a  *aoan,"  within  the  strict  defini- 
tion of  the  tenn.  Murphy  t.  Dalton,  102  N. 
W.  277, 130  Mich.  70. 

Where  the  note  of  a  borrowlhg  member 
of  a  building  and  loan  association  contained 
the  words  "monthly  installmento  .on  said 
share,"  but  no  reference  indicated  an  agree- 
ment to  apply  such  installments  on  the  mem- 
ber's loan,  and  the  deed  to  secure  the  loan 
was  conditioned  on  the  payment  of  the  '^oan" 
and  of  'Installments  on  certain  shares/'  re- 
ferring to  the  principal  debt  covered  by  the 
note  both  as  a  "loan  upon  18  membership 
shares, "  the  terms  ''loan'*  and  "installments" 
were  not  used  synonymously.  Cooper  v.  New- 
ton, 160  Fed.  100,  lOa. 

Rev.  St  1806,  art  2547,  provides  that 
where  any  loan  of  goods  or  4^attels  shall  be 
pretended  to  have  been  made  to  any  person 
with  whom,  or  those  claiming  under  him, 
possession  shall  have  remained  for  the  space 
of  two  years  without  demand  made  and  pur- 
sued by  due  process  of  law  on  the  part  ot  the 


pretend»!^  lender,  or -when  any  reseryation 
or  limitation  shall  be  pretended  to  have  been 
made  of  a  use  of  property,  by  way  of  condi- 
tion, etc.,  the  transfer  shall  be  held  fraudu- 
lent, unless  the  loan  is  declared  by  a  written 
instrument  duly  acknowledged  or  proved  and 
recorded.  Held,  that  such  section  bad  no  ap- 
plication to  a  chattel  placed  in  the  bands  of 
bailees  to  be  stmred  without  charge  for  a  rea- 
sonable time  without  any  agreement  that 
such  bailees  should  have  the  right  to  use  the 
same.  Woodward  v.  San  Antonio  Traction 
Co.  (Tex.)  06  S.  W.  76,  78  (citing  Templeman 
V.  Gibbs,  24  S.  W.  702,  86  Tex.  360;  Hunstock 
V.  Roberto  ITex.1  65  S.  W.  676). 

Bvidence,  in  an  action  by  an  ez-county 
treasurer  against  the  county  for  commission, 
on  the  theory  that  a  transaction  by  which, 
during  his  tern^  a  judgment  creditor  of  the 
county  transferred  the  judgment  to  a  bank, 
it  paying  him  therefor,  was  a  loan  by  the 
bank  to  the  county  and  a  payment  of  the 
judgment  creditor  by  the  county,  so  that 
such  treasurer  was  entitled  to  commis0l<ms 
for  receiving  and  disbursing  the  money,  held 
sufllcient  to  support  a  fhiding  that  the  trana- 
action  was  not  a  "loan,''  but  a  puMdiase  by 
the  bank  of  the  judgment  Benefield  v.  Mar- 
ion County,  05  8.  W,  713,  48  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
245. 

The  word  'loaa"  is  defined  to  mean  "to 
deliver  to  another  for  temporary  use,  on  con* 
dition  that  the  thing  be  returned,  or  to  de- 
deliver  for  temporary  use,  on  condition  that 
an  equivalent  in  kind  shall  be  returned  with 
a  compensation  for  ite  use."  Stete  v.  Brown, 
102  8.  W.  804,  805,  88  Ark.  44,  118  Am.  St 
Bep.  100  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Webst  Diet). 

Where  a  bond  guaranteed  that  the  prin- 
cipal would  return  certein  securities  on  a  spe- 
cified day,  and  contained  no  provision  either 
permitting  or  requiring  the  principal  to  dis- 
charge his  obligation  by  payment  of  money  on 
or  before  the  day  named,  which  he  was  au- 
thorized to  do  by  a  collateral  agreement  the 
bond  was  not  given  for  the  "loan  or  forbear- 
ance of  money"  within  the  New  York  usury 
law  (1  Rev.  St  [1st  Ed.l  pt  2,  c.  4,  tit  3,  f  6), 
making  all  bonds,  whereon  is  reserved  any 
greater  sum  than  6  per  cent  for  the  loan  or 
forbearance  of  any  money,  void.  Klein  v. 
Title  Guaranty  &  Surety  Co.,  166  Ted.  366, 
868. 

Though  payment  of  money  be  called  a 
"loan,"  it  is  not  a  loan  where  the  money 
was  not  to  be  paid  back  at  all  events  but  the 
agreement  was  that  on  a  certain  condition  it 
should  be  paid  back.  Teed  v.  Parsons,  66  N. 
B.  1044,  1046,  202  IlL  466. 

A  corporate  officer  having  misappropriat- 
ed funds,  acceptance  by  the  directors  of  his 
notes  in  satisfaction  of  the  misappropriations 
did  not  constitute  a  "loan,"  within  a  charter 
provision  prohibiting  "loans"  of  corporate 
f  tmds  to  corporate  officers  or  employes.   Mur- 


LOAN 


1<4 


IiOOAIi 


plij  ▼.  Pennlmaii,  06  AIL  28Sy  ttTi  105  lid. 
462, 121  Am.  St  Rep.  688. 

Bailmemt  dlstliisiasliad 

See  Bailment 
Deposit 

The  depoOt  of  a  nattonal  bank  eraatl- 
tutes  "loans"  to  it  and  confers  on  the  deposit- 
tor  a  mere  chose  in  action.  State  v.  Clement 
Nat  Bank,  78  AU.  944,  050,  84  ¥t  107,  Ann. 
Gas.  1912D,  22. 

The  transaction  between  a  depositor  and 
the  bank  Is  really  a  "loan"  of  money  and 
not  a  deposit,  in  the  strict  legal  sense  of  the 
term.  Schippers  ▼.  Kempkea  (N.  J.)  67  Atl. 
1042,  1048. 

An  ordinary  deposit  of  money  in  a  bank 
is  not  a  "loan"  of  the  money  to  the  bank. 
ElUott  ▼.  Capital  City  State  Bank,  103  N.  W. 
777,  778,  128  Iowa,  275,  1  L.  B.  A  (N.  S.) 
1130,  111  Am.  St  Rep.  198. 

A  "deposit"  in  a  bank  la  a  "loan"  payable 
on  demand,  and  the  d^;>osltor  may  not,  as  a 
general  mle^  maintain  an  action  for  his 
deposit  nntil  he  has  first  made  a  demand 
for  its  payment  Pratt  y.  Union  Nat  Bank, 
76  AU.  318,  314^  79  N.  J.  Law,  117. 

A  national  bank  had  throogh  an  em- 
ploy6  deposited  money  with  a  sayings  bank, 
and  subsequently,  upon  a  request  for  more 
mon^,  the  national  bank  wrote,  ottering  to 
deposit  more  money,  but  refusing  to  make  a 
loan.  In  response,  it  received  a  oertiflcate 
of  deposit  with  a  letter,  asking  that  it  be 
placed  to  the  credit  of  the  savings  bank. 
The  certificate  was  issued  to  L.,  the  president, 
of  the  savings  bank,  and  was  by  him  indors- 
ed to  A.,  an  employ^  of  the  national  bank, 
who,  in  turn,  indorsed  it  to  the  bank,  which 
gave  credit  on  its  books  to  the  savings  bank 
for  the  amount  of  the  certificate.  The  certi- 
cate  was  marked  "Paid,"  taken  up,  and  re- 
newal certificates  issued  from  time  to  time  in 
the  same  way.  After  failure  of  the  savings 
bank,  recovery  was  sought  on  the  last  certifi- 
cate, which  was  issued  directly  to  A.,  and 
signed  by  the  cashier  of  the  savings  bank. 
Held,  that  the  transaction  was  a  "loan"  and 
not  a  "deposit,"  and  hence  did  not  create  a 
preferential  daim.  State  v.  Corning  State 
Sav.  Bank,  113  N.  W.  500,  508,  136  Iowa,  79. 

A  bank  wrote  to  its  correspondent  that 
180,000  worth  of  bonds  had  been  allotted  to 
it  and  that  it  would  have  to  take  up  and 
carry  about  $15,000  of  old  bonds,  stating  that 
it  would  have  to  finance  the  deal,  and  asked 
if  the  correspondent  could  help  out  on  $10,- 
000  for  30  or  40  days;  that,  if  so,  it  would 
send  up  some  paper  maturing  the  next 
month;  and  that  it  did  not  object  to  any 
fair  rate.  Seven  days  later  two  certificates 
of  $5,000  each  bearing  7  per  cent  interest 
payable  in  40  and  46  days  were  mailed  to 
the  correspondent  Credit  for  the  ftill  amount 
was  given.  Held,  that  the  transaction  was 
a  "loan,"  and  not  a  deposit  and  heocB  did 


create  a  preferential  dalnL  itate  ex  reL 
Carroll  r.  Coming  State  8aT.  Bank,  116  N. 
W.  987,  940,  189  Iowa,  338. 

A  deposit  of  moneys  belonging  to  an  in- 
Buranoe  corporation  in  a  bank,  returnable  on 
demand  In  accordance  with  Otttlfloates  of  de- 
posit issued  at  tlie  time.  Is  not  a  "loan,"  with- 
in Insurance  Law  (ConsoL  Laws  1909,  c.  29 
I  86.  People  ▼.  Thomas,  180  M.  7.  Snpp. 
246^  2M9,  71  MIbc.  Bep.  889. 

As  pwreluuM  atenej 

See  Purchase  Money. 


See  Sale. 

LOAN  A8SOOZATIOV 

See  Homestead  Loan  AasodatioiL 

LOAH  FOB  oomuionnoH 

"A  loan  for  consumption*  la  a  transfer 
of  personal  property,  soeh  as  com  or  money, 
to  be  consumed  by  the  borrower  and  to  be 
returned  to  the  lender  in  kind  and  quality." 
State  V.  Brown,  102  S.  W.  394,  895,  83  Ark. 
44^  119  Am.  St  Bep.  109  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  Kinne  t.  Kinne  [N«  X.]  45 
How.  Prac  81). 

LOBBY 

"Lobbying,"  which  has  a  well-defined 
meaning,  and  signifies  to  address  or  solicit 
members  of  a  legislative  body  for  the  purpose 
of  influencing  their  votes,  Is  ccmtrary  to  pub- 
lic policy,  whether  or  not  It  Is  carried  on  in 
such  manner  as  to  constitata  a  crime  under 
the  statute;  and  a  note  given  for  money  ad- 
vanced for  the  exposes  of  a  person  to  liable 
him  to  engage  in  the  boaineas  of  lobbying 
will  not  be  enforced.  Le  Tonmeiix  ▼.  011- 
liss,  82  Pac  827,  828, 1  OaL  App.  546. 

A  lobbyist  is  one  who  solicits  members 
of  a  legislative  body,  in  the  lobby  or  else- 
where, with  the  purpose  of  influencing  their 
votes,  and  a  contract  to  render  such  services, 
or  services  which  consist  in  part  of  lobbying, 
Is  void  as  tfgainst  public  policy,  and  an  acticm 
cannot  be  maintained  thereon.  Burke  v. 
Wood,  182  Fed.  683,  637. 

LOCAL 

A  "local,"  in  railroad  parlance,  la  a  train 
whl<^  stops  at  all  stations  and  does  not  run 
with  great  rapidity  when  in  motion.  Hides 
V.  Union  Pac.  B.  Oou,  107  N.  W.  798,  800, 
76  Neb.  49a 

The  words  "local  and  spedal"  are  fre- 
quently used  interchangeably,  though  they 
do  not  have  the  same  meaning;  "local"  sig- 
nifying a  belonging  or  confinement  to  a  par- 
ticular place  and  being  a  counter  term  to 
"generak"  People  t.  WUcox,  86  N.  B.  672, 
673,  237  lU.  421. 

The  word  "local,"  which  is  the  ^est^i^ 
tive  word  used  In  the  phrase  'local  improve* 


U>CAIi  ACT 


166 


uocAii  Aonov 


Is  oftm  uwd  in  leferenoe  to  towns 
and  dttaB  so  as  to  Inclode  tbe  wbols  munidl- 
paUty.  We  speak  of  the  "local  affairs"  of  a 
town,  Its  "local  goyemmenty"  the  lights  of 
its  inhabitants  to  "local  option,"  or  their 
liability  to  "local  taxation,'*  referring  in  each 
iDstance  to  the  whole  corporation.  In  the 
same  way,  if  the  local  authorities  of  a  town 
should  undertake  a  general  system  of  street 
improyement  or  a  general  system  of  sewer- 
age, covering  every  street,  we  might,  using 
the  language  in  its  ordinary  meaning,  apeak 
of  such  work  as  a  "local  improvement'*;  the 
purpose  thereof  being  a  benefit  to  the  local  in- 
habitants.  Crane  v.  Oity  of  Siloam  Springs* 
65  &  W.  955,  957,  67  Ark.  aa 

lOOAX.  ACT 

See  Local  Law. 

LOOAZ.  AOnOH 

Where  the  cause  of  action  can  arise  in 
one  place  only,  the  action  Is  local ;  but,  if  the 
cause  of  action  is  one  that  might  bare  arisen 
anywhere,  Hie  action  is  transitory.  Woolf 
V.  M cOau^,  57  South.  754,  765, 175  Ala.  20». 

Trespass  to  real  property  is  a  'local  ac> 
tion,"  and  the  suit  must  be  brought  in  the 
county  or  place  where  the  cause  of  action 
arose.  Mayor,  eto.,  of  City  of  Baltimore  v. 
Meredith's  Ford  ft  Jarrettsville  Turnpike  0>. 
in  Baltimore  &  Harford  Counties,  65  AtL  85, 
86, 104  Md.  851. 

Ejectment  is  a  "local  action"  such  as 
can  be  maintained  only  in  the  district  where 
the  land  lies.  Act  Gong.  Biarch  8,  1887,  c. 
373,  24  Stat  652,  provides  that  no  civil  suit 
shall  be  brought  before  either  of  the  federal 
courts  of  original  Jurisdiction  against  any 
person  or,  by  any  original  process  or  proceed- 
ing in  any  other  district  than  that  whereof  he 
Is  an  inhabitant,  but  where  the  Jurisdiction 
Is  founded  <Hily  on  the  fact  that  the  action 
is  between  dtisens  of  different  states,  suit 
shall  be  brought  only  in  the  district  of  the 
residence  of  either  plaintiff  or  defendant 
Held,  that  the  restriction  as  to  venue  is  not 
applicable  to  local  actions,  and  hence  eject- 
ment can  be  brought  in  a  federal  court  in  the 
district  where  the  land  lay,  though  both 
plaintiff  and  defendant  are  foreign  corpora- 
tions and  nonresidents  of  the  state.  Elk 
Garden  Cto.  v.  T.  W.  Thayer  Ck).,  179  Fed. 
596,  557  (citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p. 
4202). 

By  the  common  law  an  action  for  the 
recovery  of  damages  for  injuries  to  land  is 
"local,"  and  can  be  brought  only  where  the 
land  is  situated;  and  such  is  the  law  in  most 
of  the  states  of  the  Union.  In  Minnesota, 
an  a<^on  for  pecuniary  damages  for  trespass 
to  real  estate  in  another  state  is  viewed,  not 
as  relating  to  the  real  estate^  but  only  as  af- 
fording a  personal  remedy.  It  is  there  deem* 
ed  to  be  transitory  in  Ite  nature,  and  net 
locaL  Peyton  v.  Desmond,  128  VM*  1,  4» 
»  a  a  A  651. 


A  'local  action**  as  distinguished  ftom  a 
transitory  action  is  one  where  the  principal 
facte  on  which  it  is  founded  are  of  a  local 
nature,  or  which  could  have  arisen  only  in 
some  particular  county.  Perry  v.  Seaboard 
Air  Line  By.  Oo.,  68  S.  B.  1060,  1061,  158  N. 
a  117. 

*1%e  distinction  between  local  and  tran- 
sitory actions  Is  as  old  as  actions  themselvesi 
and  no  one  has  ever  supposed  that  laws 
which  prescribe  generally  where  one  should 
be  sued  induded  such  suite  as  were  local  in 
tlieir  character,  either  by  statute  or  the  com- 
mon law,  unless  it  was  expressly  so  declared. 
Local  actions  are  In  the  nature  of  suite  in 
rem,  and  are  to  be  prosecuted  where  the 
thing  on  which  they  are  founded  Is  situated." 
A  suit  to  enjoin  a  defendant  from  diverting, 
In  Oalifomla,  the  waters  naturally  flowing 
down  a  river  having  its  source  in  that  state 
and  flowing  Into  and  through  the  state  of 
Nevada,  where  comirialnant's  lands  are  situ- 
ated, he  being  the  lowest  proprietor  on  the 
river,  is  an  action  transitory  in  Ite  nature, 
so  diat  a  court  In  Nevada,  having  acquired 
Jurisdiction  of  defendant's  person,  had  Juris- 
dlctton  to  try  the  same.  Miller  &  Lux  ▼. 
Rfckey,  127  Fed.  573,  577  (citing  Casey  v. 
Adams,  102  U.  a  66,  26  L.  Ed.  52). 

A  suit  for  partition  is  a  local  action 
within  the  provisions  of  Act  March  d,  1875, 
c.  187,  i  8, 18  Stat  472,  and  one  in  which  any 
question  between  any  of  the  parties,  plaintiffs 
or  defendante,  affecting  their  rights  or  inter- 
esto  In  the  land  may  be  put  in  issue  and  de- 
termined; and  a  federal  court  is  not  without 
Jurisdiction  because  questions  may  arise  be- 
tween plaintiffs  who  are  citizens  of  the  same 
state,  nor  will  it  make  a  realignment  of  par 
ties  to  defeat  ite  Jurisdiction  because  such 
questions  may  arise,  where  the  bill,  although 
properly  setting  out  the  interest  of  each  par- 
ty in  the  premises,  does  not  disclose  any 
controversy  which  renders  it  necessary.  Ger- 
man Savings  4  Loan  Soc.  v.  Tull,  186  Fed.  1, 
11,  69  C.  C.  A  1  (citing  Greeley  v.  Lowe,  15 
Sup.  Ct  24,  155  tJ.  8.  58,  67,  74,  30  L.  Ed.  69). 

"Originally  tiie  pleader  was  required  to 
state  truly  the  place  where  each  fact  assert- 
ed by  him  occurred,  and,  if  issue  was  Join^ 
thereon,  the  fact  was  tried  by  a  Jury  sum> 
moned  from  that  neighborhood  or  venue. 
Afterwards,  when  Jurors  were  no  longer  ex- 
pected to  decide  issues  of  fact  upon  their 
own  knowledge^  a  fictitious  venue  was,  In 
some  actions,  permitted,  and  the  pleader  as- 
signed to  his  faets,  under  a  videlicet,  the 
place  In  which  be  desired  the  trial  to  be  held. 
These  actions  were  then  styled  'transitory.' 
But  this  fictton  was  not  allowed  when  the 
cause  of  action  was  so  rested  to  a  certain 
piece  of  land  that  it  must  have  arisen  on  or 
near  the  land.  Actions  for  su<A  causes  were 
styled  'local,'  and  triable  only  In  the  vicinity 
where  the  land  lay.*'  Defiance  Fruit  Co.  v. 
Fox,  70  Aa  460,  461,  76  N.  J.  Law,  482  (quot- 


LOCAL  AOnOH 


166 


LOCAL  AGENT 


Ing  HiU  r.  Ntiaon,  57  Aa  411,  70  N.  J.  Law, 
376,  378). 

An  action  to  recover  only  the  valne  of 
ore  or  timber  severed  from  land  is  transito- 
ry, and  may  be  maintained  wherever  the 
trespasser  can  be  served  with  summons,  al- 
though plaintiff  therein  may  be  compelled  to 
allege  and  prove  ownership  of  the  land  from 
which  the  timber  is  cut,  or  the  ore  extracted; 
but,  where  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  dam- 
ages claimed  is  for  injury  to  the  freehold, 
the  action  is  ''local"  and  must,  if  the  land  is 
located  in  this  state,  be  tried,  by  the  express 
provisions  of  Code  C^v.  Proc.  |  892,  in  the 
county  where  the  land  is  situated,  or,  if  the 
land  is  located  in  another  state,  it  must  be 
tried  in  the  courts  of  that  state.  Ophir  Sil- 
ver Min.  Co.  V.  Superior  Court  of  City  and 
County  of  San  Francisco,  82  Pac  70,  72,  147 
OaL  467,  3  Ann.  Cas.  840. 

Since  the  Missouil  statutes  provide  for 
every  contingency  as  to  the  bringing  of  ae- 
ttons,  the  rule  of  the  common  law,  which  re- 
garded an  action  for  breach  of  covenants  of 
seisin  and  warranty  as  'local"  and  not  'tran- 
sitory," was  complete  altered,  and  as  to 
such  action  sudi  rule  of  the  common  law  no 
longer  obtains  in  Missouri;  the  title  to  real 
estate  being  only  incidentally  involved  in 
such  action.  Coleman  v.  Luckslnger,  123  S. 
W.  441,  443,  224  Mo.  1,  26  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
034. 

LOCAL  AFFEOTIOH 

A  "local  affection"  is  not  a  local  disease 
within  the  meaning  of  a  warranty  in  a  policy 
of  insurance,  unless  such  affection  has  suffi- 
ciently developed  to  have  some  bearing  on  the 
general  health.  Oady  v.  Fidelity  A  Casualty 
Co.  of  New  York,  113  N.  W.  967,  971,  134 
Wis.  322,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  260. 

LOCAL  AOEMT 

See^  also,  Agent 

The  term  "local  agent,'*  within  Rev.  St 
1895,  art  1223,  providing  for  service  of  writs 
in  suits  against  foreign  corporations  on  any 
local  agent  within  the  state,  means  an  agent 
at  a  given  place  or  within  a  definite  district, 
and  an  "agent  for  the  state"  is  not  a  local 
agent  within  the  state.  Western  Cottage  Pi- 
ano A  Organ  Co.  v.  Anderson,  79  S.  W.  616, 
617,  97  Tex.  432. 

Under  Code,  8  217,  authorizing  service  of 
summons  to  be  made  upon  a  corporation  by 
delivering  a  copy  thereof  to  the  president, 
secretary,  etc.,  "or  local  agent  thereof,*'  and 
providing  that  any  person  receiving  or  col- 
lecting moneys  within  the  state  for  any  do- 
mestic or  foreign  corporation  shall  be  deem- 
ed a  local  agent  for  the  purpose  of  service 
of  summons,  a  traveling  auditor  of  a  foreign 
corporation,  which  has  ceased  to  do  any  busi- 
ness in  the  state,  who  is  not  authorized  to 
collect  or  receive  money,  for  the  corporation, 
is  not  a  "local  agent,"  on  whom  service  may 


be  made.  Sherwood  Higgs  A  Co.  ▼.  Sperzj 
A  Hutchinson  Co.,  61  S.  B.  1020,  1021,  138 
N.  C.  299. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  citation 
or  other  iwocess  against  a  foreign  corpora- 
tion may  be  served  on  any  •'local  agent"  of 
the  corporation  within  the  state,  where  a  ci- 
tation directed  the  officers  to  summon  de- 
fendant foreign  corporation  by  delivering  to 
B.,  "agent,"  and  the  return  recited  delivery 
to  B.,  "agent"  and  the  petition  alleged  that 
B.  was  defendant's  agent  in  the  state  of 
Texas,  who  resided  in  a  spedfled  county, 
and  on  whom  service  could  be  had,  the  re* 
turn  was  insufficient  to  show  that  B.  was  a 
"local  agent"  within  the  state,  and  the  de- 
fect was  not  cured  by  the  allegation  in  the 
petition;  hence  a  judgment  by  default  was 
not  authorized.  National  Cereal  Co.  v.  Earn- 
est (Tex.)  87  S.  W.  734. 

Rev.  St  1896,  art  1228,  provides  that 
citation  may  be  served  on  a  foreign  corpora- 
tion by  service  on  the  ''local  agent"  and  arti- 
cle 1194,  subd.  26,  provides  that  a  fbreign 
corporation  may  be  sued  in  any  county  where 
it  has  an  agency  or  representative.  Held, 
that  the  statute  contemplates  service  on  a 
person  employed  in  forwarding  the  particu- 
lar business  for  which  the  corporation  was 
organized,  and  service  on  an  attorney  repre- 
senting the  defendant  and  who  was  in  the 
county  at  the  time  of  service  merely  for  the 
purpose  of  settling  certain  claims  between 
the  parties  to  the  action,  was  insufficient 
Bay  City  Iron  Works  v.  Reeves  A  Co.,  95 
S.  W.  739,  740,  43  Tex.  Civ.  App.  254. 

One  who,  without  compensation,  pro- 
cured a  watchman  for  a  foreign  corporation's 
sawmill  and  sold  oil  belonging  to  it  for  $7, 
which  he  applied  to  the  payment  of  the 
watchman's  services,  was  not  the  agent  of 
the  corporation,  within  Revlsal  1905,  |  440, 
providing  that  service  of  summons  on  a  cor- 
poration may  be  made  upon  a  "local  agent" 
and  that  any  person  receiving  or  collecting 
moneys  in  the  state  for  any  corporation  shall 
be  deemed  a  local  agent  Kelly  v.  Lefalver 
&  Co.,  56  S.  E.  610,  511,  144  N.  O.  4  (citing 
Moore  V.  Freeman's  Nat  Bank,  92  N.  C.  690; 
Copland  v.  American  De  Forest  T^egraph 
C!o.,  48  S.  E.  501,  136  N.  C.  11). 

The  local  oi)erator  of  defendant  wire- 
less telegraph  company,  who  Is  in  sole  Charge 
of  defendant's  property  at  a  particular  place 
and  in  control  of  its  business  there,  and  has 
received  messages  from  ships  at  sea  for  pay, 
though  the  office  is  not  yet  open  tor  general 
business,  is  defendant's  "local  agent"  with* 
in  a  code  provision,  authorizing  summons  In 
an  action  against  a  corporation  to  be  served 
on  its  local  agent;  the  proviso  that  any  per- 
son rec^vlng  or  collecting  moneys  in  the 
state  for  any  corporation  shall  be  deemed  a 
"local  agent*'  for  the  purpose  of  the  section 
not  being  intended  to  limit  but  to  extend 
the  meaning  of  the  term  "local  agent**    Cop- 


LOCAL  AGBNT 


ler 


LOCAL  CONCBB17 


land^T.  American  DeForest  Wireless  Tele- 
graph Co,  48  S.  B.  001,  136  N.  C.  IL 

Under  Rev.  St  1805,  art  1222,  requiring 
the  citation  to  be  eerred  on  the  president, 
etc^  or  npon  the  local  agent  representing  the 
company  in  the  connty.  In  actions  against  an 
Incorporated  company,  considered  in  view 
of  article  1228,  permitting  process  to  be  serv- 
ed on  the  president  general  manager,  or 
upon  any  *'local  agent^  within  the  state,  in 
salts  against  a  foreign  corporation,  service 
npon  the  manager  of  a  domestic  corporation 
was  not  sufficient  to  sustain  a  defoult  judg- 
ment against  the  corporation,  since  the  term 
'local  agent^  implies  a  representative  of  a 
corporation  appointed  to  transact  its  busi- 
ness and  represent  It  in  a  particular  locality, 
and  it  does  not  emtoace  the  idea  of  an  agent 
who  casually  happens  to  be  in  the  particu- 
lar territory,  or  one  who  Is  temporarily  sent 
to  snch  locality  to  perform  some  particular 
pmrpose  or  specified  act'  or  to  superintend 
the  business  in  a  general  way;  and  while, 
nnder  certain  circumstances  and  in  a  certain 
sense,  the  terms  ''general  manager^  and  "lo- 
cal agent"  may  oonv^  much  the  same  idea, 
they  were  not  used  in  the  statute  as  synony- 
mous. Latham  Co.  v.  J.  M.  Radford  Grocery 
Co.,  117  S.  W.  909,  54  Tex.  Civ.  App.  610. 

Findings  in  a  default  judgment  that 
citation  was  served  on  defendant  corporation 
by  delivering  a  copy  to  the  local  agent  of 
defendant  resident  in  a  certain  city,  who 
was  the  representative,  general  manager, 
and  local  agent  of  the  corporation,  sufDcient- 
ly  showed  that  the  person  served  was  the 
'local  agent  representing  such  company"  in 
the  county  in  which  suit  was  brought  with- 
in the  meaning  of  Rev,  8t  1895,  art.  1222, 
relative  to  the  service  of  process  upon  cor- 
porations. El  Paso  d(  8.  W.  R.  OOl  V.  Kelly 
(Tex.)  88  S.  W.  865,  809. 

LOCAL  AMBVMMUEKTB 

Bee,  also.  Special  Assessment 

A  special  assessment  or  forced  contribu- 
tion levied  on  particular  property  specially 
benefited  by  the  maintenance  of  a  levee  sys- 
tem is  a  "local  assessment **  The  general 
temporary  exemption  of  new  railroads  from 
taxation,"  as  granted  in  article  280  of  the 
Constitution  of  1898  and  in  the  constitution- 
al amendment  of  1904  (Laws  1904,  p.  19,  No. 
18)>  includes  all  ad  valorem  district  levee 
tMcuB,  but  not  "local  assessment"  such  as 
acreage  and  produce  taxes  and  the  mileage 
tax  levied  on  railroads.  Louisiana  Ry.  & 
Nay.  Go.  ▼.  Madere,  60  South*  609,  eiO,  124 
La.  636. 

Special  taxes  voted  in  aid  of  railroads 
nnder  constitutional  sanction  are  not  "local 
assessments,"  since  the  word  "special"  im- 
plies merely  an  additional  tax  over  and 
above  the  general  tax  authorised  by  the 
OonstttutlOB.  Loulslaiia  A  A  Ry.  Ck».  v. 
Shaw,  46  South.  994,  996,  121  La.  997. 


LOGAI.  AVTHOl 

The  term  "local  authorities,"  within 
Railroad  Law  (Laws  1890,  c  666)  I  88  (0)n- 
soL  lAWB  1910,  c  49,  I  68),  providing  that 
where  a  railroad  crosses  a  highway  at  grade 
and  the  railroad  company  refuses,  on  request 
of  the  local  authorities,  to  station  a  fiagman 
there,  the  Supreme  Court  may,  on  applica- 
tion of  the  local  authorities,  order  one  sta- 
tioned there,  means  the  ofiloer  particularly 
charged  with  the  care  of  the  highway,  who 
under  Town  Law  ((^onsol.  Laws,  &  62^  §  80, 
as  amended  by  Laws  1909,  c  491,  |  1,  is  the 
superintendent  of  highways.  Local  Authori- 
ties of  Town  of  Pawling  v.  New  York,  N.  H. 
A  H.  R.  €k>.,  129  N.  T.  Supp.  648,  144  App. 
Div.  791. 

Const  IlL  1870,  art  11,  i  4,  prohibits  the 
granting  of  a  right  to  construct  a  street  rail- 
road in  a  street  without  the  consent  of  the 
"local  authorities,"  and  street  railway  act 
(2  Starr  A  C.  Ann.  St  1896,  p.  2110,  c.  66, 
f  3)  requires  the  consent  of  the  "corporate 
authorities."  Held,  that  the  terms  "local 
authorities"  and  "corporate  authorities" 
were  synonymous,  and  used  to  indicate  those 
representatives  either  directly  elected  by 
the  people  or  appointed  in  some  mode  to 
which  the  people  had  given  their  assent 
Potter  V.  Calumet  Electric  St  Ry.  Co.,  168 
Fed.  621,  627. 

The  Legislature  hsving  conferred  upon 
the  commissioners*  courts  the  power  to  es- 
tablish, diange,  and  discontinue  public  high- 
ways, and  to  exercise  general  superinten- 
dence over  all  highways  in  their  counties, 
commissioners'  courts  are  the  "local  authori- 
ties" within  the  (Constitution,  from  whom 
permission  to  build  a  street  railway  along 
the  public  highways  of  counties  must  be  ob- 
tained. Galveston,  H.  A  S.  A.  Ry.  Ck>.  v. 
Houston  Electric  Co.,  122  8.  W.  287,  289, 
67  Tex.  Civ.  App.  170. 

LOOAX.  BUSIITESS 

A  contract  by  a  foreign  corporation  for 
the  installation  of  a  new  elevator  and  the  re- 
pair of  an  old  elevator  Is  local  business, 
within  Pub.  Acts  1903,  p.  40,  No.  34,  requir- 
ing a  foreign  corporation  doing  business  In 
the  state  to  first  record  a  copy  of  its  charter 
or  articles  of  incorporation.  Haughton  Ele- 
vator A  Machine  Co.  v.  Detroit  Candy  Co., 
120  N.  W.  18,  19,  156  Mich.  26. 

LOCAX.  COHCBBH 

The  formation  of  towns  and  cities,  or 
the  change  of  their  boundaries,  is  not  a 
"local  concern,**  of  which  the  county  court 
has  exclusive  jurisdiction,  under  Const  1874, 
art  7,  I  28,  giving  to  such  courts  exclusive 
original  jurisdiction  in  all  matters  relating 
to  county  taxes,  roads,  bridges,  ferries,  etc., 
and  in  every  other  case  that  may  be  neces- 
sary to  the  internal  improvement  and  local 
concerns  of  the  county.  The  local  concerns 
ovar  whi^  the  county  oourt  Is  given  exdu- 


IXKJAIi  COURTS 


1(» 


UOOALJjAW 


are  Jnrisdictioii  axe  tbose  whldi  relate  spe* 
dally  to  «ouiity  affairs,  such  as  public  roads, 
bridges,  ferries,  and  other  matters  of  the 
kind  mentioned  in  the  section.  City  of  lit- 
tle Bock  T.  Town  of  North  Little  Bock,  79  S. 
W.  785,  788,  72  Ark,  195. 

IiOOAI.  OOUBT8 

See  Inferior  or  Local  Courts. 

LOOAX.  FBfiZOHT 

As  the  term  is  ordinarily  employed,  a 
shipment  between  points  on  the  same  line 
of  road  is  "local  freight."  HiU  v.  Wadley 
Southern  By.  Co.,  57  S.  B.  796,  709,  128  Oa. 
705. 

The  term  "Ideal  freight"  means  a  train 
of  freight  cars  receiving  and  delivering  goods 
within  a  limited  distance,  and  carrying  a 
caboose  for  the  accommodation  of  the  train 
crew,  and,  Incidentally,  a  few  passengers. 
State  V.  Mlssonri  Pac  By.  Co.,  117  S.  W. 
1173,  1175,  219  Mo.  166. 

The  words  "local  freight'*  may  refer  ei- 
ther to  shipments  from  one  way  station  to 
another,  or  to  freight  to  be  carried  wholly 
within  the  boundaries  of  a  particular  state. 
Selectmen  of  Clinton  ▼.  Worcester  Consol.  St 
By.  Co.,  86  N.  E.  507,  510,  199  Mass.  279  (cit- 
ing Mobile  A  M.  B«  Co.  ▼.  Steiner,  61  Ala. 
579;  Shipper  y.  Pennsylvania  B.  Co.,  47 
Pa.  844). 

X.OOAX.  nEPROmBKlDIT 

A  'local  improvement,**  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  law.  Is  an  improvement  whldi,  by 
reason  of  its  being  confined  to  a  locality, 
enhances  the  value  of  property  situated  with- 
in the  particular  district,  as  distinguished 
from  benefits  dllfused  by  it  throughout  the 
municipality.  City  of  Butte  v.  School  Dist 
No.  1,  74  Pac.  869,  870,  29  Mont  386. 

The  term  "local  improvements,**  for 
whlcb  a  city  asserts  the  right  to  make  special 
assessments,  as  applied  to  a  street,  means  the 
improvement  of  the  street  whereby  by  the 
real  property  abutting  or  adjacent  is  special- 
ly benefited  in  its  market  value.  A  local 
assessment  can  only  rest  upon  substantial  en- 
hancement in  values,  rather  than  upon  the 
idea  that  the  public  may  be  Imposing  this 
burden  upon  the  citizen  because  he  is  so  sit^ 
uated  that  he  can  most  promptly  and  con- 
veniently perform  a  duty  highly  salutary 
and  advantageous  to  the  public,  a  doctrine 
which  Is  alleged  to  rest  upon  the  police  power 
of  the  state.  A  statute  authorizing  a  munic- 
ipal corporation  to  assess  cost  of  street 
sprinkling  on  abutting  land  in  proportion  to 
the  frontage  is  unauthorized.  Stevens  v. 
City  of  Port  Huron,  113  N.  W.  291,  296>  149 
Mich.  536,  12  Ann.  Cas.  603. 

A  "local  improvement**  is  a  public  im- 
provement which,  through  its  being  confined 
to  a  locality,  enhances  the  value  of  adjacent 
property,  as  distinguished  from  benefits  dif- 
fused by  it  throughout  the  municipality,  and 


though  a  qystem  of  aewers  to  relieve  the  con- 
gested condition  of  existing  sewers  by*  fur- 
nishing additional  means,  whereby  the  sur- 
face water  caused  by  excessive  rain  may  be 
carried  away,  may  benefit  all  the  property 
in  a  village,  if  the  improvement  will  spe- 
cially enhance  the  adjacent  property,  it  is 
local  and  may  be  paid  for  by  special  assess- 
ment Northwestern  University  v.  VUlage  of 
Wilmette,  82  N.  B.  616,  617,  230  la  80. 

The  term  'local  improvement'*  in  Const 
art  9,  i  9,  aathorialng  the  General  Assembly 
to  vest  municipalities  with  power  to  make 
improvements  by  special  assessmoit  of  con- 
tiguous property,  means  su<^  improvements 
sfl  are  paid  f6r  by  fltpedal  assessment  or  spe- 
cial taxation,  and  the  test  whether  an  im- 
provement is  local  is  whether  it  spedally 
benefits  the  property  assessed  and  a  local  im- 
provement is  an  improvement  within  and  un- 
der the  control  of  one  municipality.  Loefiaer 
▼.  City  of  Chicago,  92  N.  B.  686,  689,  246  IlL 
48,  20  Ann.  Cas.  336. 

A  "local  improvement**  is  a  public  im- 
provement which,  by  reason  of  its  being 
confined  to  a  locality,  enhances  the  value 
of  adjacent  property,  as  distinguished  from 
an  improrement  which  benefits  the  whole 
municipality.  The  term,  when  used  without 
some  specific  designation,  is  not  to  be  limited 
mer^  to  street  improvements  and  sewers, 
but  it  also  includes  the  laying  of  a  water 
main.  Yreeland  ▼.  City  of  Tacoma,  94  Pae 
192,  198,  48  Wash.  626. 

X.O0AL  LAW 

See,  also.  General  Law;   Private  Law; 
Special  Law. 

As  applied  to  legislation,  the  word  "lo- 
cal** is  used  as  a  oounter  term  to  "general,'' 
and  signifies  legislation  relating  to  only  a 
portion  of  the  territory  of  a  stata  People  v. 
Wilcox,  86  N.  E.  672,  673,  237  111.  421  (citing 
Bouv.  Law  Diet;  Burrlll,  Law  Diet;  Peo- 
ple v.'CBrieii,  88  N,  Y.  193;  People  v.  New- 
burgh  &  S.  P.  B.  Co.,  86  N.  T.  1;  Ellis  T. 
Frazler,  63  Pac  642,  88  Or.  462,  53  L.  R.  A 
454). 

A  law  is  not  local  or  special  when  it  is 
general  and  uniform  in  its  operation  upon  all 
in  like  situatloiL  People  ex  reL  Johnson  v. 
Barl,  94  Pac.  294,  302,  42  Colo.  238. 

"Where  a  law  is  general  and  uniform 
throughout  the  states  (derating  alike  upon 
all  persons  and  localities  of  a  dass,  it  is 
not  open  to  the  objection  that  it  is  'local  or 
special  legislation.* "  Allen  v.  Kennard,  116 
K.  W.  63,  64,  81  Neb.  289  (citing  State  ex  reL 
Jones  V.  Graham,  19  N.  W.  470,  16  Neb.  74 
State  V.  Berka,  30  N.  W.  267.  20  Neb.  375 
Van  Horn  v.  State,  64  N.  W.  366,  46  Neb.  62; 
Livingston  Loan  &  Building  Ass'n  v.  Drum- 
mond,  68  N.  W.  375,  49  Neb.  206). 

An  act  oitltled  "An  act  providing  for 
tlie .  permanent  locatloii  of  the  seat  of  gor- 
emment  and  capital  of  the  state,  creatUg  a 


IX)OAI/  LAW 


169 


LOCAL  LAW 


kotrd  of  capital  commlselo&erB  and  Aeflnliig 
Its  powers  and  duties,  anthoriMng  the  Gov- 
ernor  to  aecept,  for  capital  parpoaefl)  the  pro> 
oeeds  of  the  sale  of  land*  or  donatioiMi  from 
other  Bourcee,  and  declaring  an  emergency,'' 
Is  not  a  "local  law/'  within  Const  art  6k 
I  32,  providing  that  no  special  or  local  law 
shall  be  considered  by  the  Legislature  vntil 
notice  of  the  intended  introduction  thereof 
shall  first  have  been  published  in  newspapeni, 
etc.  Coyle  ▼.  Smith,  118  Pac.  944,  948,  28 
0U.121. 

Acts  gist  Leg.  c.  20,  f  2,  providing  for  a 
state  tax  and  authorizing  a  county  tax  for 
mafaitalning  tai  iwohiMtion  territory  a  cold 
storage  whera  intoxicating  or  nonintoxicat- 
lag  liquors  are  kept  on  depoeit  for  others, 
Is  not  a  "local  or  special  law,"  wlthla  the 
prohibition  of  Const  art  a,  §8  M,  67.  Efac 
parte  Flake  fTex.)  149  8.  W.  146»  15L 

Bev.  St  1890,  H  827a-8817c  prevMIng 
fbr  the  drainage  of  everllowed  land,  applies 
to  and  governs  all  persons  equally  who  oome 
within  its  scope,  and  is  not  a  "local  law,** 
within  Const  art  4,  |  08,  pMhIbilIng  local 
laws.  State  «x  reL  Applegate  v.  Taylor,  128 
S.  W.  892,  9118,  224  Mo.  898  (dting  State  v. 
Btdiman,  88  8.  W.  848,  189  Mo.  948;  State 
ex  inf.  Hadley  v.  Standard  Ofl  Co.,  116  8. 
W.  902,  218  Ma  1;  CoflPey  ▼.  City  of  Garth- 
age,  98  S.  W.  662,  200  Mo.  816). 

"In  order  to  determine  whether  or  not  a 
given  law  is  general,  the  purpose  of  the  act 
and  the  objects  on  which  it  is  Intended  to 
opiate  must  be  considered.  If  these  objects 
are  distinguished  from  others  by  character- 
istics evincing  a  peculiar  relation  to  the 
legislative  purpose,,  and  showing  the  legis- 
lation to  be  reasonably  appropriate  to  the 
former  and  inappropriate  to  the  latter,  the 
objects  will  be  considered,  as  respects  such 
legislation  to  be  a  class  by  themselves,  and 
legislation  affecting  such  a  class  to  be  gen- 
eral. Bnt  if  the  characteristics  used  to  dis- 
tinguish the  objects  to  which  the  legislation 
applies  from  other  be  not  germane  to  the  leg- 
islative purpose,  or  do  not  indicate  some  rea- 
sonable appropriateness  in  its  application,  or 
if  objects  with  similar  characteristics  and 
like  relation  to  the  legislative  purpose  have 
been  excluded  firom  the  operation  of  the  law, 
then  the  dassiflcation  is  incomplete  and  faul- 
ty, and  the  legislation  not  general,  but  'local 
and  special.*  *•  Parker-Washington  Co.  v. 
Kansas  City,  Kan.,  86  Pac.  781,  782,  78  Kan. 
T22. 

An  act  is  "geBoral,**  as  contradistinguish- 
ed from,  and  inconsistent  with,  *'local,"  in  the 
sense  the  latter  term  Is  used  in  Const  art  4» 
f  18,  providing  ttiat  no  private  or  local  bill 
Btiall  embrace  more  ttukn  one  subject,  and 
that  shaU  be  expressed  in  the  title  only  when 
Its  operation  extends  te  the  whole  state,  or 
perhaps  to  the  whole  of  some  dass  of  locaU- 
tles  thoKin  which  the  Legislature  may  eon* 
itttationally  mak»  upon  the  prlndpie  leeog- 


nlzed  and  approved  for  the  classification  of 
cities  for  the  purpose  of  general  legislation. 
An  act  is  "goierar'  in  the  restricted  sense  in 
which  the  term  is  used  in  artlde  7,  |  21,  pro- 
viding that  no  general  law  shall  be  in  force 
until  published,  when  it  is  of  that  character 
within  the  broad  meaning  of  the  term,  and 
also  when  it  is  ^'pubUc"  In  that  its  effects  ex- 
tend to  the  pe<9le  of  a  locality  such  as  a 
county,  dty,  town,  or  Tillage,  <v  a  collection 
of  localities  not  forming  a  legislative  dass 
formed  for  some  legitimate  cause;  the  term 
"genwal**  and  the  term  ^^blic^  being  con- 
sidered in  this  respect  synonymous.  When 
an  act  is  "genersl"  merely  because  it  is  "pub- 
lic,** It  is,  at  the  same  time,  ^ocal,"  and 
must  be  tested  as  to  its  validity  by  section 
21,  art  7,  and  section  18,  art  4,  as  well,  and, 
if  It  belong  to  one  of  the  prohibited  classes  of 
qiedal  legislation.  It  must  also  be  tested  by 
the  constitutional  restriction  upon  that  sub* 
ject  Milwaukee  County  v.  Isenring,  86  N. 
W.  131,  136,  109  Wis.  9,  68  L.  R.  A.  686. 

Where  all  objects  which  can  constitution- 
ally be  included  in  a  dass  are  by  legislation 
recognized  by  inclusion  therein,  such  legisla- 
tion win  be  general  in  the  constitutional 
sense,  and  P.  L.  1907,  p.  306,  art  25,  sup- 
plementary to  the  school  law  creating  and 
providing  for  the  Teachers'  Retirement  Fund, 
is  not  a  private,  local,  or  special  law,  violative 
of  Const  art.  4,  f  7,  par.  11,  prohibiting  the 
passage  of  such  laws  in  certain  cases,  be- 
cause for  constitutional  reasons  it  did  not 
compel  teachers  whose  contracts  antedated 
the  enactment  of  the  supplement  to  become 
members  of  the  fund,  but  only  those  whose 
contracts  were  made  after  it  became  effec- 
tive. Allen  V.  Board  of  Education  of  City  of 
Passaic,  79  Atl.  101.  103,  81  N.  J.  Law,  135. 

A  law,  general  in  its  terms,  applying  to 
all  persons  alike  throughout  the  state,  is  not 
a  "local  law"  within  Const  arts.  48,  49,  for- 
bidding  local  laws,  merely  because  the  con- 
ditions under  which  it  can  operate  prevail 
only  In  certain  parts  of  the  state,  and  Rev. 
St  I  910,  as  amended  by  Acts  1902,  No.  06, 
relating  to  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor 
and  restricted  so  as  to  apply  only  to  prohi- 
bition parishes,  and  Acts  1902,  No.  107,  as 
re-enacted  by  Acts  1908,  No.  176,  fixing  the 
punishment  for  illegal  sales  of  liquor,  con- 
strued to  apply  only  to  noDprohibition  par- 
ishes, are  not  local  laws.  State  v.  Donate, 
58  South.  662,  664,  127  La.  393. 

Act  April  17,  1906,  providing  for  spedal 
elections  for  the  rdocation  or  removal  of 
covnty  seats,  being  malleable  to  all  the 
counties  of  tlie  state  alike,  is  not  invalid  as 
a  special  or  local  law,  prohibited  by  Const 
art  6,  H  82,  46.  aty  of  Pond  Creek  v.  Has- 
kell, 07  Pac.  338,  841,  21  Okl.  71L 

Laws  1903,  p.  9,  c.  7,  authorising  every 
cttjr,  '^heretofore^*  incorporated  under  a  spe- 
cial charter,  having  less  than  *'10,900"  in* 
habitants,  ta  be  determined  by  the  "last  pre- 


IiOCAIi  JJLW 


119 


IiOOAIiliAW 


tMng  United  Stetes  ocnaaa,"  and  haTliig 
"power  to  make  special  assessmoitB  to  oon- 
struct  sewers,"  to  make  such  assessments  in 
a  flpecifled  manner,  is  not  onoonstttutional 
as  a  "local  or  special  law/'  wltbln  Const 
art  8,  I  27,  prohibiting  Ba<A  laws  for  the 
incorporation  of  mnnidpalitles,  or  dianglng 


or  amending  their  charters,  etc,  on  the  the- 
ory that  the  restriction  of  the  act  to  cities 
theretofore  Incorporated  under  a  special 
diarter  prevented  other  cities  from  entering 
the  class,  since  the  only  cities  under  ^;)ecial 
charters  are  those*  theretofore  incorporated, 
and  since  under  the  Ck>nstitution  no  other 
dty  can  be  especially  incorporated.  And  the 
act  is  not  ''local  or  spedaV  within  such  con- 
stitutional prohibition,  on  the  theory  that 
the  phrase  ''last  preceding  United  States 
census^'  limits  the  act  to  cities  haying  the 
required  population  at  the  last  census  be- 
fore the  passage  of  the  act,  since  the  phrase 
relates  to  the  census  last  preceding  any 
date  which  may  become  material  in  ascer- 
taining whether  any  particular  city  has  come 
within  the  statute.  And  the  act  is  not  ''lo- 
cal or  special"  within  such  constitutional 
prohibition,  because  restricted  to  cities,  in- 
corporated under  a  special  charter,  having 
10,000  inhabitants.  And  the  act  is  not  "lo- 
cal or  spedal"  within  such  constitutional  pro- 
hibition, because  limited  to  cities  acting  un- 
der a  Qpedal  diarter,  and  having  the  pre- 
scribed population,  "having  power  to  make 
special  assessments  to  construct  sewers," 
though  a  particular  dty  is  the  only  one  which 
could  make  such  assessments  when  the  act 
was  passed.  McGarvey  v.  Swan,  96  Pac 
697,  701,  17  Wyo.  120. 

Const  art  11,  i  %  grants  to  the  legal 
voters  of  every  dty  and  town  power  to  enact 
and  amend  their  munldpal  charter,  and  arti- 
cle 4,  I  la,  provides  that  the  initiative  and 
referendum  powers  reserved  to  the  people 
are  further  reserved  to  legal  voters  of  every 
district  as  to  all  local,  special,  and  municip 
pal  legislation.  Held  that,  as  the  words 
"local"  and  "special"  mean  enactments  In- 
tended only  to  affect  certain  persons  who 
operate  in  spedfled  localities,  an  incorpo- 
rated port  cannot  under  a  special  election 
had  under  such  powers  extend  its  boundaries 
by  annexing  other  territory  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  inhabitants  of  the  territory  an- 
nexed, this  being  particularly  true  in  view 
of  L.  O.  U  I  3209,  and  Laws  of  1911,  p.  158, 
1 8,  both  of  which  provide  for  the  annexation 
of  new  territory  to  munidpalities  and  ports 
only  with  the  consent  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  territory  to  be  annexed.  State  ex  rd. 
Anderson  v.  Port  of  Tillamook,  124  Pac.  687, 
640,  62  Or.  882. 

Highway  Law  (ConsoL  Laws  1909,  c.  26) 
I  69a,  added  by  Laws  1910,  c.  701,  providing 
that  awards  undw  any  statute  for  damages 
to  real  estate  by  duwge  of  grade  of  any 
street,  etc,  shall  bear  interest,  is  a  general, 
and  not  a  local,  law,  as  affecting  the  snffl- 


deoej  of  the  title  of  the  act  People  ex  reL 
Central  Trust  Co.  of  New  York  v.  Prender- 
gast,  96  N.  E.  715,  717,  202  N.  Y.  18& 

The  good  roads  law,  Rev.  Codes,  H  1049- 
1068,  indusive^  providing  for  organization 
and  government  of  good  road  districts,  being 
general  in  its  application,  applying  alike  to 
all  sections  of  the  state  where  the  taxpayers 
are  willing  to  assume  the  burden  of  addition- 
al taxation  to  improve  the  roads  within 
sndi  sections  and  applying  to  all  good  road 
districts  within  the  state,  relating  to  all  of  a 
class,  Is  not  a  local  or  spedal  law  within 
Const  art  8, 1 19,  prohibiting  the  Legislature 
from  passing  local  and  special  laws  In  cer- 
tain cases.  Hettinger  v.  Good  Road  Diet 
No.  1  of  WashlDgton  County*  118  Pac.  721, 
728,  19  Idaho,  818. 

A  local  statute"  is  one  which  applies 
only  to  a  particular  locality  or  limited  part 
of  the  state  and  the  inhabitants  of  that  part 
But  a  law  is  not  local  or  spedal  that  Is  ap- 
plicable throughout  the  state,  even  tiiough 
Its  operation  In  any  locality  Is  made  to  de- 
pend upon  a  local  oontlngen<7f  or  a  particu- 
lar expediency  to  be  ascertained  or  deter- 
mined by  a  pablic  vote  in  the  locality  or  by 
petition,  w  adjudication  of  a  court  or  other 
authority  authorised  by  the  act  It  Is,  never- 
theless, open  to  every  locality  when  brought 
within  its  terms.  Witbin  Const  art  4,  |  23, 
subd.  10,  forbidding  the  enactment  of  special 
or  local  laws  for  the  assessment  and  collec- 
tion of  taxes  for  states  county,  township,  or 
road  purposes.  Act  Nov.  22,  1905  (Laws  1905, 
p.  410),  providing  for  the  Improvement  of 
roads  at  the  expense  of  the  lands  benefited 
thereby  on  petition  of  a  majority  of  the 
resident  landowners,  etc., 'is  general  and  ap- 
plicable throughout  the  state,  and  is  not  a 
local  statute  applicable  only  to  a  particular 
locality  or  limited  part  of  the  state  and  the 
inhabitants  of  that  part,  though  its  operation 
is  contingent,  depending  on  the  wish  of  the 
landowners  in  the  vicinity  of  a  proposed  im- 
provement and  the  existence  of  certain  con- 
ditions. St  Benedict's  Abbey  v.  Marion 
County,  93  Pac.  231,  233,  50  Or.  411  (dting 
Fonts  V.  Hood  River,  81  Pac.  370,  46  Or.  492, 
1  L.  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  483,  7  Ann.  Cas.  1160;  Bax- 
ter V.  State,  88  Pac.  677,  49  Or.  853;  Good- 
rich V.  Winchester  &  D.  Turnpike  Co.,  26  Ind. 
119;  Palmer  v.  Stumph,  29  Ind.  829;  Paul 
V.  Gloucester  County,  16  AtL  272,  50  N.  X 
Law,  586,  1  L.  R.  A.  8Q. 

To  understand  the  signification  of  the 
words  "munldpal  teglslation^"  as  used  in 
Const  art  11,  §  2,  prohibiting  the  L^slature 
from  amending  the  charters  of  dties  and 
towns,  the  right  of  which  is  reserved  to  the 
voters  thereof,  and  arttde  4,  providing  that 
the  referendum  may  be  demanded  by  the 
people,  which  power  Is  reserved  to  the  legal 
voters  of  every  municipality  and  district  as 
to  all  local,  special,  and  munldpal  legislation 
of  every  character  in  and  for  their  respective 


IiOCAL  LAW 


171 


VOCAli  LAW 


nimidptUtlfis  aad  cttsttlcta,  leqnlies  aa  tn- 
teipretation  oi  tlie  term  *'local  and  special 
legisUtlon,"  the  right  to  formulate  mlee  1b 
relation  to  wh]<^  la  Impliedly  denied  to 
cities  and  towns,  on  the  principle  that  the 
expression  of  <me  thing  la  the  exclusion  of 
another.  The  qualifying  words  "local**  and 
'^speclar  are  synonymous,  and.  In  the  sense 
in  which  they  are  used,  mean  any  enactment 
that  Is  plainly  Intended  to  affect  a  particular 
person  or  thing  or  to  he  In  effect  in  some 
spedfled  locality  only.  The  words  **munlcl- 
pallty*'  and  "district"  are  evidently  expres- 
sioDs  of  equlyalent  import,  for  a  district 
legally  created. from  a  designated  part  of  the 
state  and  organized  to  promote  the  conven- 
ience of  the  public  at  large  is  a  municipal 
corporation.  The  authority  of  such  a  corpo- 
ration has  been  heretofore  derived  from  an 
act  of  the  legislative  assembly  creating  it, 
and,  as  such  statute  Is  applicable  to  and  en- 
forceable In  a  part  of  the  state  only,  it  is  a 
local  or  special  law.  The  change  in  the  or- 
ganic law  deprives  the  legislative  assembly 
of  all  authority  to  enact,  amend,  or  repeal 
any  charter  of  a  town,  the  legal  voters  of 
which  reserve  to  themselves  the  ezerdse  of 
an  such  power,  except  the  right  of  repeal, 
and  it  was  evidently  the  intention  ot  the 
framers  of  such  constitutionai  provision,  and 
also  the  people  who  ratified  it,  to  vest  an 
hicorporated  city  or  town  with  authority  to 
proride  the  manner  of  exercising  the  initi- 
ative and  referendum  powers  as  to  amend- 
ments of  a  charter,  which  change  la  reason- 
ably within  the  term  of  "municipal  legisla- 
tion." Acme  Dairy  Go.  y.  City  of  Astoria, 
90  Paa  153,  154,  49  Or.  520. 

Oen.  8t  1006;  ff  8772,  3775,  regnlating 
the  catching  of  fish  in  rivers,  creeks,  bays, 
bayous,  or  other  waters  on  the  coast,  are 
not  'local  or  special  laws,"  where  the  first 
provision  therein  covers  the  full  territory  of 
the  state  defined  as  on  the  coast  of  the  state, 
while  the  latter  applies  to  all  the  rivers  of 
the  state,  and  are  not  in  violation  of  Const 
art  3,  U  20,  21.  Carlton  v.  Johnson,  55 
South.  075,  076,  61  Fla.  15. 

A  class  of  laws  are  known  in  common 
parlance  as  "local  option  laws,"  relating  to 
Bobjects  which,  such  as  intoxicating  liquors 
or  the  running  at  large  of  cattle,  may  be  dif- 
ferently regarded  in  different  localities,  and 
are  sustained  on  the  ground  that  the  subject, 
though  not  embraced  within  the  ordinary 
power  of  the  municipalities  to  make  by-laws 
and  ordinances,  is  within  the  class  of  poUce 
regulationa  in  respect  to  whi<fli  it  is  proper 
that  the  local  Judgment  should  control.  In 
re  O'Brien,  75  Pac  106,  200,  28  Mont  530,  1 
Ann.  Cas.  873  (citing  Cooley,  Const  Linou 
146). 

Iav  applyiac  ^  olaoa 

A  "local  or  special  law,"  within  the  con- 
stitutional pxohlbitton  against  the  passage 
of  such  lawsy  is  oae  which  relates  to  partlca- 


lar  penona  or  tfainga  of  the  same  clas&  Ball 
V.  BeU  County  (Tex.)  138  8.  W.  17a,  170  (cli* 
Ing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4206;  7  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  6577). 

A  "local  law**  applies  to  all  persons  with- 
in the  territorial  limits  prescribed  by  the 
act,  while  a  special  law  ai^lies  to  particular 
persona  or  things  of  a  class.  Commissioners 
of  Prince  George's  County  v.  Baltimore  &  O. 
R.  Co.,  77  AU.  488,  4S4,  118  Hd.  170. 

Olassifloatioa  as  to  poptalatlom 

A  statute  classifying  counties  for  certain 
purposes  and  providing  that  the  twenty-sev- 
enth class,  consl3tlng  of  only  one  county, 
should  be  dasslfled  according  to  the  popula- 
tion, as  shown  by  the  federal  census  of  1000, 
whereas  the  method  of  ascertaining  the  pop- 
ulation in  all  other  counties  la  different,  is  a 
''local  and  special  law.**  Johnson  y.  Oumi 
(CaL)  84  Pac.  870,  871. 

A  statute  classifying  counties  according 
to  population,  providing  that  the  population 
of  some  of  the  counties  shall  be  determined 
by  the  federal  cenaus  of  1000,  and  that  In 
other  oonnties  the  populatl<«  shall  be  deter- 
mined by  different  modes,  la  not  a  "local  or 
special  law,**  In  violation  of  Const  art  11,  f 
5.  Johnson  t.  Qunn,  84  Pac.  665,  666,  148 
Cal.745. 

Act  April  8, 1008  (P.  L.  186),  authorizing 
county  commissioners  In  counties  having  a 
population  of  over  600,000  and  less  than 
1,000,000  to  erect  a  manorial  hall  or  boild- 
ing  in  memory  of  the  soldiers  and  sailors  of 
the  War  of  the  BebeUion,  la  not  a  ''local  act'* 
regulating  the  affairs  of  Allegheny  county 
alone,  but  is  a  classification  of  counties  ac- 
cording to  population  in  order  to  permit  ex- 
penditure of  pubUc  money  in  a  q;)ecified  way. 
Y(^o  V.  Allegheny  County,  67  Aa  648,  660, 
218  Pa.  401  (dtlng  Commonwealth  r.  (HlUgan, 
46  Aa  124,  105  Pa.  504;  Seabolt  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  Northumberland  County,  41  Atl. 
22,  187  Pa.  818). 

A  law  is  not  "locar  or  "spedal,"  within 
the  constitutional  Inhibition  against  such 
laws  regulating  county  and  township  affairs, 
for  classifying  counties  and  townships  on  the 
baals  of  population,  if  population  makes  a 
substantial  difference  In  the  conditions  af- 
fected by  the  statute,  and  the  statute,  if  con- 
sidered aa  regulating  county  and  township 
affairs,  did  not  violate  the  constitotional  in- 
hibition for  fixing  a  lower  tax  rate  in  coun* 
ties  and  dtles  having  a  larger  population. 
People  ex  reL  Booth  r.  Opel,  01  N.  B.  458, 
461,  244  IlL  817. 

Iiaws  havlas  loeal  applioatioa 

A  law  which  has  a  bona  fide  apidicatlon 
to  the  entire  state  aa  to  some  of  its  chief  fea« 
tures  la  a  "general"  and  not  a  "local  law,** 
as  defined  by  Const  1001,  |  HO,  though  it 
does  not  apply  in  every  detalL  The  law  is  a 
"general"  and  not  a  "local  law,"  notwlth.- 


LOOAIi  LAW 


172 


IXXXALIiAW 


itaMlnff  the  ftict  that  local  laws  m  tfie  ao^ 
]ect  were  passed  at  the  same  sessloii  and  ap- 
proved en  ttie  same  day.  State  ez  ret  Goll- 
man  y.  Pitta,  49  South.  441,  442,  leO  Ala.  188» 
185  AoL  St  Rap.  79. 

*lJooal  law"  means  that  code  of  laws 
which  govems  the  affairs  of  a  certain  pre* 
scrlhed  Jurisdiction.  Mather  v.  Cunningham, 
74  AtL  809,  813,  106  Me.  326.  29  L.  B.  A« 
(N.  S.)  761,  18  Ann.  Cas.  692. 

Ck>nst  I  110,  defines  a  ''local  law"  as  a 
law  which  applies  to  any  political  subdi- 
vision or  subdivision  of  the  state  less  than 
the  whole.  State  ez  rel.  Attorney  General  y. 
Sayre^  89  South.  240, 142  Ala.  641. 

Const  i  104,  prohibits  the  Legislature 
from  passing  a  special  or  local  law  in  speci- 
fied instances,  and  section  110  defines  "lo- 
cal law"  In  this  connection  as  one  which  ap- 
plies to  any  subdivision  or  subdivisions  of 
the  state  less  than  the  whole.  Sisk  y.  Car- 
gile,  85  South.  114,  117,  138  Ala.  164. 

The  word  "local,"  as  applied  to  legisla- 
tion, signifies  legislation  relating  to  part  of 
tlie  territory  of  a  state  only,  while  the  word 
"special"  is  more  appropriately  applied  to 
laws  granting  some  special  right,  privilege, 
or  Imnmnity,  or  imposing  some  particular 
burden  upon  some  portion  of  the  people  of 
the  state  less  than  all.  People  v.  Wilcox,  86 
N.  B.  672,  673,  237  lU.  421. 

A  statute  compelling  the  parish  of  Or- 
leans to  erect  a  courthouse  with  Its  own 
funds  is  a  "local  law,"  whose  enactment 
should  have  been  preceded  by  the  publica- 
tion of  the  notice  required  by  article  50  of 
the  Constitution.  Such  a  statute  does  not 
lose  its  character  of  a  "local  law"  from  the 
fact  that  It  provides  that  the  state  shall  con- 
tribute towards  the  erection  of  the  building 
and  be  part  owner  thereof.  Such  provision 
adds  a  public  side  to  the  statute,  but  does 
not  do  away  wHh  the  local  side,  as  to  which 
the  inhabitants  of  the  locality  are  entitled  un- 
der the  Constitution  to  be  notified  and  to  be 
heard.  Benedict  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  39 
South..  792,  796,  115  La.  645. 

An  act  providing  for  the  accomplishment 
of  an  object  and  providing  means  for  pay- 
ment therefor  does  not  contain  two  subjects, 
and  hence  the  provision  of  the  Public  Service 
Commissions  law  (Laws  1907,  p.  889,  c.  429) 
for  payment  of  salaries  and  expenses  of  the 
commission  for  the  First  district  by  New 
York  City  does  not  constitute  a  local  act 
joined  with  general  legislation,  within  Const 
art  3,  i  16,  providing  that  no  local  act  shall 
embrace  more  than  one  subject  etc.;  such 
provision  b^ng  a  matter  of  apportionment, 
within  the  taxing  power.  Oubner  y.  McClel- 
lan,  110  N.  Y«  Supp.  755,  757,  130  App.  IHy. 
716. 

Act  Feb.  25,  1905,  abolishing  the  Watson 
iDdldal  district  of  Desha  county^  and  pro- 
viding for  Ih*  transfer  of  eases  pending  In 


the  Mveral  courts  of  tliat  dlsferlct  is  Bot  ft 
"local  or  special  act"  within  Ooost  1874,  mrt. 
S^  f  26,  declaring  that  no  "local  or  special 
act"  shall  be  passed  until  the  notice  prorld- 
ed  for  Shan  have  been  duly  published.  Wa- 
terman y.  Hawkins,  86  S.  W.  844»  845,  75 
Ark.  120. 

Act  Sept  26,  1903  (AcU  1903,  p.  309), 
providing  for  the  removal  of  causes  from  the 
dty  court  of  Bessemer,  Jefferson  county,  to 
other  courts  in  the  county,  is  a  "local  law,** 
within  Const,  f  106,  requiring  the  publica- 
tion of  notice  of  intention  to  apply  for  the 
enactment  of  local  laws.  Dudley  y.  Fltspat- 
rlck,  39  South.  884,  885,  143  Ala.  162  (citing 
Wallace  v.  Board  of  Revenue  of  Jefferson 
County,  37  South.  321,  140  Ala.  491). 

A  "local  law"  is  one  "which  applies  to 
any  political  subdivision  or  subdlvisious  of 
the  state,  less  than  the  whole."  An  act  to 
consolidate  the  courts  of  a  certain  state  and 
county  is  a  "local  law."  Wallace  v.  Board  of 
Revenue  of  Jefferson  County,  37  South.  321, 
322,  140  Ala.  491  (quoting  Const  |  110). 

Gen.  Acts  1907,  p.  549,  whldi  amends 
Loc.  Acts  1907,  p.  285,  f  11,  so  as  to  provide 
for  the  organisation  of  grand  Juries  for  the 
circuit  court  of  a  designated  county,  is  a  '^o- 
oal  law,"  within  Const  1901,  f  110,  defining 
a  local  law  as  one  which  applies  to  any  politi- 
cal subdivision  or  subdivisions  of  the  state 
less  than  the  whole.  Sellers  y«  States  50 
South.  340,  841, 162  Ala.  85. 

Iaw  applying  to  slnclo  sity 

A  "local  statute"  enacted  fbr  a  particular 
municipality,  for  reasons  satisfactory  to  the 
Legislature,  is  intended  to  be  exceptional  and 
for  the  benefit  of  such  municipality.  Bx 
parte  Young,  95  S.  W.  98»  104,  49  Tex.  Or. 
R.536. 

A  "local  act"  is  one  confined  to  a  particu- 
lar municipality  or  particular  part  of  the 
state.  Oubner  v.  McClellan,  115  N.  Y.  Supp. 
765.  769,  130  App.  Div.  716. 

"The  term  'local,'  as  applied  to  statutes, 
is  of  modern  origin,  and  Is  used  to  designate 
an  act  which  operates  only  within  a  single 
dty,  county,  or  other  particular  subdivision 
or  place  and  not  throughout  the  entire  legis- 
lative jurisdiction.  In  this  sense,  the  term 
'local'  is  the  antithesis  of  'generaL'"  State 
ex  rel.  Attorney  Oeneral  v.  Sayre,  89  South. 
240,  142  Ala.  641  (dtlng  State  v.  Chambers, 
93  N.  C.  600;  Kerrigan  v.  Force,  68  N.  Y.  381). 

The  act  passed  in  1907  (Laws  1907,  p. 
517)  to  make  Judges  of  the  Montgomery  city 
court  elective  by  the  people  is  a  *local  law," 
within  the  requirement  of  Const  t  106,  that 
notice  of  such  acts  be  given.  State  ex  reL 
Thomas  v.  Quhter,  54  South.  283,  284, 170  Ala. 
166. 

An  act  to  oonsofidate  the  courts  of  a  cer- 
tain dty  and  county,  IS  a  "local  law,"  dtf  ned 
by  Const  |  110,  aia  law  which  applies  to 
any  political  tfabdlvialon  «r  subdiviaioiis  of 


LOCAL  LAW 


173 


LOCAL  OFFICSB 


tfie  state  less  than  the  whola  WaSlaoe  t. 
Board  of  Rereniie  of  Jefferson  Ooiinl7i  87 
South.  821,  822,  140  Ala.  4B1. 

Without  undertaking  to  dlBcrbnlnate 
nicely  or  define  with  precision,  It  may  be 
said  that  the  character  of  a  law  as  general 
or  'local**  depends  on  the  character  of  its 
BQbject-matter.  If  that  be  of  a  general  na- 
ture, existing  throughout  the  state,  In  eT- 
eiy  county,  a  subject-matter  in  which  all 
the  dtlsois  hare  a  common  interest,  if  it  be 
a  court  organized  under  the  constitution  and 
laws  withhi  and  for  every  county  of  the  state, 
and  possessing  a  legitimate  Jurisdiction  over 
every  citizen,  then  the  laws  which  relate  to 
and  regulate  it  are  laws  of  a  general  nature, 
and,  by  virtue  of  the  prohibition  referred  to, 
must  have  a  uniform  operation  throughout 
the  state,  92  Ohio  Laws,  p.  068,  providing  for 
the  penslGfning  of  school-teachers  in  school 
districts  in  cities  of  the  third  grade  of  the  first 
class,  is  in  violation  of  Ck>n8t  art  2,  i  26, 
providing  that  laws  of  a  general  nature  shall 
have  a  uniform  operation  throughout  the 
state;  such  act  at  the  time  of  Its  passage 
and  taking  effect  being  applicable  only  to 
the  dty  of  Toledo,  and  containing  a  provision 
hi  section  2  requiring  the  board  of  education 
to  select  three  members  of  a  pension  commit- 
tee at  its  first  regular  meeting  within  80 
days  after  the  law  went  into  effect,  aad  mak- 
hig  no  provision  In  msh  regard  for  dtisB 
whidi  might  thereafter  come  into  the  dass. 
Hibbard  v.  State,  64  N.  B.  109,  111,  66  Ohio 
St  574,  58  U  R.  A  654  (citing  Kelley  v. 
SUte,  6  Ohio  St.  269,  271). 

Chartev  of  ¥ntltHng  aad  loaa  mmooI*- 
tlom 

The  charter  of  a  building  and  loan  asso- 
ciation, obtained  under  the  general  law,  is 
not  a  "local"  or  "private"  law,  within  Code 
1906,  t  8,  providing  that  private  and  local 
laws,  not  revised  and  brought  into  the  Code, 
are  not  affected  by  its  adoption ;  and  so  is 
not  saved  from  the  operation  of  section  2678, 
revising  the  usury  law,  and  doing  away  with 
the  exception  thereof,  whereby  building  and 
loan  associations  could  receive  more  than  10 
per  cent  Interest  Kisslssipid  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  ▼.  Mciaveen,  56  South.  187,  189, 
100  Miss.  16. 

As  q^eolallaw 

Theirords  "local"  and  '^special,"  as  used 
in  Gonst  art  8,  f  80,  provkllng  that  no  local 
or  special  laws  shall  be  passed  for  ttie  Ineor- 
poration  of  cities  and  towns,  are  synonymous 
words  of  description.  Bckerson  ▼.  City  of 
Des  Moines,  116  N.  W.  177.  188,  187  Iowa, 
45Z 

The  words  •*local*'  and  "special"  in  CJonst 
art  4,  I  la,  reserving  the  initiative  and  ref- 
erendum powers  to  the  voters  of  every  mu- 
nicipality as  to  all  local,  special,  and  munici- 
pal legislation,  &re  synonymous,  and  mean 
enactments  intended  to  affect  only  certain 
persons,  or  to  operate  In  specified  localities; 


and  an  act  Ss  "locaT*  when  tiie  subject  v»> 
lates  to  a  portion  only  of  the  people  or  their 
property,  or  ,whiBii  it  operatss  only  within  a 
irilngle  city,  coiinty,  or  other  parttenlar  dlvl- 
sloiL  Ik^ubel  T.  Oleott,  120  Pac.  875,  878, 
aOOE.  506. 

The  terms  "^ocal  law**  and  •bipedal  law** 
are  used  interchangeably.  Const  1901,  f  10, 
defines  a  "local  law**  as  one  applioable  to  any 
political  subdivision  of  the  state,  and  a  ''spe- 
cial law*'  as  one  which  applies  to  an  individ- 
ual association  or  corporation.  Montgomery 
aty  Charter  (Acts  1692-93,  p.  877)  t  ^>  «c- 
empts  persons  procuring  a  liquor  license 
from  the  dty  from  paying  any  tax  or  license 
to  the  county.  Act  March  4, 1906  (Gen.  Acts 
1908,  p.  164),  provides  for  a  oounty  liquor 
tax,  and  repeals  all  laws,  general  and  "spe- 
cial," Inconaistsiit  with  itself,  and  Act  Sept 
80,  1903  ((Sen.  Acts  1908»  p.  298)  I  4,  again 
confers  power  on  counties  to  levy  a  liquor 
tax,  and  provides  that  the  statute  shall  not 
affect  the  exemption  provided  by  any  dty 
charter.  Held  that,  notwithstanding  the  con- 
stitutional definitions,  the  exemption  was 
repealed  by  Act  Kardi  4,  1908  (Gen.  Acts 
1903,  p.  184),  and  not  revived  by  Act  Sept  80, 
1908  (Gen.  Acts  1908.  p.  298)  |  4.  Gaston  v. 
O'Neal,  41  South.  742,  743,  145  Ala.  484  (dt- 
Ing  Maxwell  V.  State,  7  South.  824,  89  Ala. 
150;  Holt  ▼.  City  of  Birmingham,  19  South. 
785,  111  Ala.  889). 

I.O€AIi  IfGULAnOX 

See  Local  Law. 

LOCAI.  HATUKB 

A  suit  by  a  creditor  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  have  its  property,  situated  in  differ- 
ent federal  districts  of  the  same  states  ad- 
ministered for  the  benefit  of  all  creditors  Is 
one  of  a  "local  nature,**  which,  under  Rev. 
St  f  742,  may  be  brought  in  either  of  such 
districts,  and  the  appointment  of  a  receiver 
therdn  is  an  equitable  attachment  of  all 
property  of  the  defendant  within  the  state. 
Horn  V.  Pere  Marquette  B.  Co.,  151  Fed.  626, 
682. 

I.OCAIi  OFFIOEB 

Const  art  10,  f  %  provides  that  dty, 
town,  and  village  officers  whose  appointment 
is  not  provided  for  by  the  Constitution  shall 
be  rtected  by  the  electors  of  such  dties,  etc., 
or  appointed  by  such  authorities  thereof  as 
the  Legislature  shall  designate.  No  provi- 
sion for  election  or  appointment  of  local 
health  officers  is  provided  for.  Public  Health 
Law  (Laws  1893,  p.  1501,  c.  601)  |  20,  as 
amended  by  Laws  1907,  p.  427,  c  225,  pro- 
vides that  the  state  commissioner  of  health 
shall  appoint  a  health  officer  for  eadi  mu- 
nldpallty  except  cities  on  the  nomination  of 
the  local  board  of  health,  devolves  certain 
duties  upon  the  commissioner  respecting  the 
competency  and  'qualifications  of  applicants, 
and  provides  fhat  thette  shall  eontlnue  to  be 
"local"  health  officers  in  the  several  villages. 


LOCAL  OPTION  ELECTION 


174 


LOCAL  ROUTE 


etc  Laws  1893,  p.  1502,  c.  061,.  f  21,  as 
amended  by  Laws  1907,  p.  267,  c.  189,  pro- 
rides  tbat  eveiy  local  board  ot  health  shall 
prescribe  the  duties  and  powers  of  the  'local 
health*'  officer.  Held,  thatmnnicipal  health 
offlicers  are  local  officers  within  the  Constita- 
tlQn,  and  the  provision  of  the  statute  em- 
powering the  state  commissioner  to  appoint 
them  and  pass  on  their  competency  and  qual- 
ifications was  violative  of  the  Constitution; 
the  right  of  appointment  resting  wholly  in 
the  local  authorities.  Towne  v.  Porter,  113 
N.  Y.  Supp.  758,  761,  128  App.  Dly.  717. 

LOCAI.  OPTIOH  ELECTION 

Where  the  question  of  the  sale  of  intox- 
icating liquors  may  be  submitted  to  the  elec- 
tors of  each  municipality  at  each  biennial 
election,  the  determination  of  the  electors  is 
the  exercise  of  "local  option."  ^People  ex 
reL  Sandman  t.  Brush,  71  N.  B.  781,  783, 179 
N.  y.  93. 

"Local  option  elections"  mean  recurring 
elections,  and  mean  recurring  elections  for 
the  territory  spedfled  in  Const  1876,  art 
16,  I  20,  as  amended  in  1891,  providing  for 
the  submission  to  voters  of  the  question 
whether  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
shall  be  prohibited  within  prescribed  limits. 
Ex  parte  Mills,  79  S.  W.  555,  556,  46  Tex. 
O.K.  224. 

LOCAL  OPTION  LAW 

The  term  "local  option"  implies  the  grant 
of  a  right  to  one  locality  to  adopt  and  an- 
other to  decline  to  avail  itself  of  a  law. 
State  ex  rel.  Hooyer  v.  Hickerson,  109  S.  W. 
108,  109,  130  Mo.  App.  47  (citing  Ex  parte 
Handler,  75  S.  W.  922,  176  Mo.  389). 

"A  'local  option  law'  is  a  law  framed  for 
the  purpose  of  prohibiting,  or  severely  re- 
stricting, the  sale  of  tutoxicating  liquors, 
under  penalties,  and  containing  a  provision 
that  the  several  counties,  townships,  or  other 
divisions  of  the  state  may  hold  elections  to 
determine,  by  popular  vote,  whether  they 
desire  the  law  to  be  in  force  in  their  limits, 
and  with  a  further  provision  that,  in  each 
case  where  such  election  results  in  favor  of 
the  adoption  of  the  law,  it  shall  take  effect 
in  the  district  so  voting,  but  that  each  dis- 
trict rejecting  it  shall  continue  to  be  govern- 
ed In  this  respect  by  the  existing  laws. 
♦  ♦  •  But  the  overwhelming  preponder- 
ance of  authority  is  to  the  effect  that  such 
a  statute.  If  it  is  a  complete  enactment  In  it- 
self, requiring  nothing  further  to  give  it  va- 
lidity, and  depending  upon  the  popular  vote 
for  nothing  but  a  determination  of  the  terri- 
torial limits  of  its  operation,  is  a  valid  and 
constitutional  exertion  of  the  legislative  pow- 
er." State  ex  rel*  Crothers  v.  Barber,  101 
N.  W.  1078,  1061«  19  S.  D.  1  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Blacky  Intox.  lAqu  I 
45). 


LOCAL  OPTIOH  TIRBITOBT 

Local  Option  Law,  Act  March  23,  1907, 
p.  495,  c.  198,  f  1,  provides  that  anti-saloon 
territory  shall  mean  all  the  territory  within 
the  limits  of  any  city,  town,  ward,  ward  sub- 
division, district,  or  precinct  in  which, 
through  the  action  of  the  qualified  electors 
ther^n,  as  provided  In  the  act,  the  keeping 
and  sale  of  Intoxicating  liquors  is  prohibited, 
etc.  Section  2  lurovldes  for  a  simultaneous 
submission  by  a  ward^  ^nd  by  a  piednct 
within  the  ward,  of  a  proposition  to  become 
anti-saloon  territory.  Section  7  provides 
that  all  the  territory  within  any  political  sub- 
division which  has  become  anti-saloon  terri- 
tory shall  continue  to  be  such  through  its  en- 
tire extent,  etc.  Held,  that  the  several  po- 
litical subdivisions  enumerated  are  given  the 
right  to  control  within  their  own  territory 
upon  the  question  of  prohibition,  and  each 
has  the  privilege  of  saying  exclusively  and 
conclusively  that  prohibition  shall  prevail 
within  its  limits,  but  not  that  It  shall  not 
prevail;  and,  where  the  question  is  submit- 
ted simultaneously  in  a  ward,  and  in  a  pre- 
cinct of  the  ward,  and  the  ward  votes  for 
prohibition,  and  the  precinct  votes  against  it, 
prohibition  will  prevail  throughout  the  en- 
tire ward.  Schwartz  y.  People,  104  Pac.  92, 
94,  46  Colo.  239. 

Under  Acts  1910,  c  190,  t  30,  requiring 
shipments  of  ardent  spirits  into  local  option 
or  no-license  territory  to  be  plalidy  marked, 
showing  the  kind  and  quantity  of  spirits  and 
the  consignee  of  the  package,  and  section  19c. 
defining  ''local  option  territory^  as  territory 
which,  by  vote  under  the  local  option  law, 
has  declared  against  the  issuance  of  licenses 
for  the  sale  of  ardent  spirits,  and  '*no-license 
territory"  as  territory  in  which,  under  the 
provisions  of  that  or  some  other  act,  no  li- 
cense for  the  sale  of  such  spirits  can  be 
granted,  a  conviction  cannot  be  sustained  for 
failure  to  mark  as  specified  a  shipment  into 
a  magisterial  district,  wliere  licenses  may  be 
Issued  under  certain  conditions,  and  which 
voted  against  local  option  at  the  last  local 
option  election,  although  no  licenses  are 
actually  in  effect.  Armstead  v.  Ck)mmoD- 
wealth,  74  S.  E.  399,  400,  113  Va.  765. 

LOCAL  PROPERTY 

Rolling  stock  of  a  railroad  company, 
which  is  one  place  to-day  and  another  to- 
morrow, and  which  is  continually  carried 
along  tiie  line  of  the  road  in  the  actual  opera- 
tion, has  no  actual  situs  for  the  purposes  of 
local  taxation,  and  hence  is  nob  "local  prop- 
erty," within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution. 
San  Francisco  A  S.  J.  V.  By.  Ck>.  v.  City  of 
Stockton,  84  Pac  771,  774, 149  CaL  83. 

LOCAL  ROUTS 

A  street  railway  franchise  which  pro- 
vides tor  the  exchange  of  transfers  with  any 
other  company  operating  street  railways, 
which  shall  give  and  receive  transfers  on  the 


LOCAL  aXATUTE 


175 


LOOALLY  €ll<OSBI>  CIRCUIT 


basis  of  settlement  tliat  tlM  tnaaler  lOadX  be 
redeemed  at  each  a  iwoportloiiate  part  of  the 
fitre  iwld  as  the  ran  or  local  roate  of  the  oar 
<m  which  the  transfer  Is  reeeiyed  bears  to 
the  sum  of  the  runs  of  the  local  ronte  of  the 
eus  from  whidi  the  transfer  is  Issued,  and 
on  which  it  is  reoelTod,  giyes  a  passenger  the 
same  right  to  travel  as  to  distance  oyer  the 
railway  system  to  which  a  transfer  is  tender* 
ed  as  if  he  pays  fare  on  that  system,  and  two 
street  railway  companies  operating  systems 
under  the  franchise  and  giying  and  reeeiying 
transfers  are  each  entitled  to  one-half  of  the 
fares  earned  from  passengers  receiving  and 
using  transfers,  the  words  **local  rente** 
meaning  the  entire  distance  a  passenger  may 
travel  on  the  system  aa  if  he  paid  fttre, 
whether  he  dianges  cars  on  that  system  or 
not,  and  the  word  "snm"  referring  to  the 
result  of  two  units  added  so  that  the  entire 
diatance  a  passenger  may  travel  on  eadi 
system  constitutes  a  unit  or  the  sum  whidi 
goes  to  make  up  the  entire  service  required  to 
be  furnished  on  the  payment  of  one  fare. 
State  ex  reL  linhoff  v.  Seattle,  R.  A  S.  By. 
Go^  U4  Pac.  431,  433,  02  Wash.  544. 

LOCAL  STATUTB 
See  Local  Law. 

LOCALITT 

See  General  Locality. 

The  word  "locaUty**  within  Rev.  St  1908, 
I  5625,  providing  that  a  nonproducing  gold, 
silTer,  lead,  copper,  etc  mine  shall  not  be 
waflcflsod  at  a  greater  amount  per  acre  than 
is  aBooosod  per  acre  against  the  lowest  pro- 
dodng  mine  in  the  same  locality,  is  not 
synonymous  with  "mining  district" ;  the  term 
''locality"  haying  a  variable  meaning,  depend- 
ing on  particular  drcumstancea.  Foster  v. 
Hart  ConsoL  lUn.  Co.,  122  Pac.  54,  55^  52 
Ck>lo.429L 

Under  Cr.  Code,  f  568  (22  Stat  at  Large, 
p.  128,  f  7),  providing  that,  where  the  county 
board  of  control  designates  a  locality  for  a 
dispensary  on  20  days'  public  notice^  a  maj<»v 
ity  of  the  voters  of  the  township  can  pre- 
vent Its  location  by  petition  to  the  board,  a 
designation  is  sufBicient  without  stating  the 
exact  location  aa  to  street  or  number  of  the 
building  in  which  the  dispensary  is  to  be  situ- 
ated. A  particular  town  is  a  locality**  in  a 
township,  while  a  street  or  street  number  is 
s  'locality"  in  a  town.  Severance  y.  Hur^ 
phy,  46  &  B.  85,  38,  67  &  O.  400. 

In  an  action  for  value  of  wood  burned 
by  fire  set  by  a  railroad  company*s  engine, 
Instruction  that  the  measure  of  damages  was 
the  value  of  the  wood  in  the  locality  where  it 
was,  and  not  what  it  could  be  sold  for  else- 
where^ was  not  erroneous  because  of  the  use 
of  the  word  "locality,"  since  such  word  would 
be  understood  by  the  Jury  to  mean  "place.** 


Hart  y«  Atlantic  €k>ast  line  R.  R.,  56  8.  IL 
550,  144  N.  C.  01,  12  Ann.  Gas.  706. 

The  word  "locality**  is  a  word  of  some- 
What  limited  signification,  tat  it  has  puiely 
a  rdative  meaning.  By  Pub.  St  1882,  c  lift, 
H  4aHUS,  the  Legislature  intended  to  give  the 
board  of  railroad  commissioners  power  to  reg* 
ulate  the  fares  ^larged  by  street  railway 
companies,  whether  or  not  fixed  in  accord- 
anoe  with  restrlctiottB  imposed  by  municipal 
oflloers,  subject  to  the  condition  that  fares 
so  established  f6r  a  municipality  should  not 
be  raised  except  by  mutual  agreement  with 
such  ofladals,  and  even  if  the  fares  between 
a  dty  granting  a  location  and  another  dty 
in  the  state  were  net  established  for  a  "local- 
ity,** within  the  statute,  a  street  railway 
company  cannot  complain  of  the  taaea  fixed 
in  granting  a  location,  when  no  attempt 
has  been  made  to  have  the  fftres  revised  by 
the  railroad  commissioners.  Selectmen  of 
Clinton  y.  Worcester  ConsoL  St  By.  Oo.,  86 
N.  B.  507,  510, 100  Mass.  270« 

LOOAUZBD  FBOPE&TY 

Acts  1807,  p.  102,  c  5,  requiring  rail- 
roads to  file  a  schedule  setting  forth  the 
length  in  miles  of  its  railroad  bed,  switches, 
and  side  trades,  and  the  value  of  the  whole, 
providing  that  the  road  of  any  railroad  shall 
include  side  tracks^  switches,  etc.,  and  that 
the  roadbed,  rolling  stodc,  franchises,  choses 
in  action,  and  personal  property  having  no 
actual  situs  shall  be  known  as  distributable 
property,'*  and  shall  be  valued  separately, 
and  that  the  depot  buildings  and  other  prop- 
erty, real,  personal,  and  mixed,  having  an 
actual  situs,  shall  be  known  as  the  'iocalized 
property,**  and  shall  be  valued  separately, 
divides  the  taxation  of  railroad  property 
into  "localized**  and  "distributable**  property; 
and  switches  and  industrial  tracks  off  the 
main  right  of  way,  but  used  as  a  part  of  the 
general  system,  and  for  the  same  purposes 
as  switdi  tracks  on  the  right  of  way  are 
used,  must  be  assessed  as  "distributable** 
property,  but  all  buildings,  coal  bins,  round- 
houses, machine  shops,  depot  buildings,  and 
other  structures  located  on  the  terminal  yards 
must  be  assessed  as  "localized**  property. 
Nashville,  O.  A  St  L  Ry.  Co.  v.  Patterson, 
122  S.  W.  467,  460,  122  Tenn.  1. 

LOCALLY  0L08£D  OntOVIT 

The  term  "locally  closed  circuit,**  as  used 
in  the  patent  by  the  patentee  of  the  Thomson 
Patent,  Na  430,328,  and  in  prior  patents, 
means  a  circuit  disconnected  from  the  main 
line  It  refers  to  a  circuit  whldi  does  not 
extend  over  the  source  of  energy,  but  per- 
tains to  the  local  place  and  no  other.  As 
used  in  such  patent  and  interpreted  by  its 
use  in  former  patents,  and  construed  in  the 
light  of  the  file  wrapper  and  contents,  it 
must  be  understood  in  its  general  and  ordin- 
ary sense.  Thomson-Houston  Electric  Co.  v. 
Wagner  Blectric  Mfg.  Co.,  110  Fed.  178-180. 


utoAva 


176 


IiOOATB 


LOCATE 

See  Relocate. 

Webster  deflnea  'located  as  *%o  place;  to 
set  in  a  partlciilar  site  or  position ;  to  desis- 
nate  the  place  of."  The  Gentuzy  Diction- 
ary defines  it  as  "to  fix  in  a  place;  to  estah- 
lish  in  a  particular  spot  or  position;  to  fix 
the  place  ot;  to  reside ;  to  place  one's  self  or 
be  placed;  adopt  or  fonn  a  fixed  residence.*' 
.  Where  a  foreign  corpomtion  had  no  office  in 
a  county,  and  its  loan  bnsiness  therein  was 
carried  on  by  a  trareling  solicitor,  who  sent 
applications  to  title  office  of  the  company  in 
another  state,  where  the  notes  evidencing  the 
loan  were  payable,  the  corporation  was  not 
"located"  within  the  connty,  within  section 
B48  of  Rev.  St  Ariz.  1887,  requiring  the  fil- 
ing with  the  county  recorder,  of  the  appoint- 
ment of  an  agent,  upon  whom  notices  and 
processes  may  be  served.  Ixidustrial  Build- 
ing ft  Loan  AsB'n  v.  Meyers-Abel  Go,  9fS  Pac. 
115,  117,  12  Arie.  48. 

As  establisli  and  flz 

A  petition  for  a  highway  was  not  objec- 
tionable, because  it  prayed  that  the  court  *lo- 
cate  and  establish"  a  road,  instead  of  asUng 
to  have  the  road  "laid  out";  the  term  'laid 
out"  being  colloquial,  meaning  *to  plan  in 
detail,"  whUe  "to  locate"  is  to  define  the  lim- 
Its,  to  establish  in  a  particular  place,  and,  in 
a  road  proceeding,  is  as  comprehensive  as 
•lay  out" — the  term  *1ay  out"  expressing  the 
work  to  be  done  by  the  viewers  in  establishing 
on  the  ground  tiie  lines  and  angles  of  the 
road.  Fciagins  v.  Wallowa  County,  128  Pac 
902,  62  Or.  180. 

Const  art  7»  I  23,  designates  the  tem- 
porary location  of  the  seat  of  government 
the  state  university,  insane  asylum,  and  peni- 
tentiary, and  the  last  clause  thereof  provides 
that  the  Legislature  shall  not  locate  any 
other  public  institutions  except  under  general 
laws  and  by  vote  of  the  people.  Act  Jan.  10, 
1881,  provides  that  the  establishment  of  the 
Wyoming  Agricultural  College  be  located  by 
a  vote  of  the  people,  and  such  college  was 
located  by  a  vote  of  the  people  at  Lander. 
Subsequently  Act  Feb.  7,  1905,  was  passed 
purporting  to  repeal  Act  Jan.  10,  1891,  but  it 
was  claimed  that  the  last  law  was  in  contra- 
vention of  Const  art  7,  f  23,  providing  that 
the  Legislatore  shall  not  "locate"  any  other 
public  institutions,  except  under  general  laws, 
and  by  a  vote  of  the  people,  in  that  the  repeal 
of  the  act  constituted  an  attempt  to  dissolve 
an  institution  created  by  the  peotHe  by  their 
own  vote  in  locating  it  Held,  "that  the  in- 
stitution was  not  however,  created  or  es- 
tablished by  the  people  as  distinct  from  the 
Legislature,  either  throng  their  votes  in 
locatiug  it  or  otherwise.  Nor  have  the  people 
by  the  fundamental  instrument  of  their  state 
government  reserved  the  right  to  themselves 
to  establish  or  create  public  Institutions. 
The  people  have  reserved  the  power  to  vote 
upon  the  location  of  such  institutions  estab-' 


Ushed  or  propoaad  to  he  telabtlriMd.  •  •  • 
Unless,  thersfbre,  to  'locate'  is  to  'establish' 
an  institatioii  of  the  character  of  the  coh 
lege  In  question,  it  is  erroneous  to  say  that 
the  people  established  it  *  •  *  Exam- 
ples are  numerous  in  the  books  of  public  in- 
stitutions which  were  esUblished  and  In  exis- 
tence in  advance  of  their  location,  or  the  se- 
lection of  a  site.  They  may  not  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  conduct  operations  until  located;  but 
that  they  may  constitute  an  existing  institu- 
tion, if  so  declared  by  the  Legislature  and 
provided  with  a  governing  board.  Is,  we  think, 
self-evident  •  •  «  The  location  of  an  in- 
stitution differs  essentially  from  its  crea- 
tion." Hence  the  dissolution  by  the  Legisla- 
tinre  of  the  Wyoming  Agricultural  College 
was  not  in  contravention  of  the  Constitution, 
notwithstanding  it  was  located  by  vote  of  the 
people.  State  ex  rel.  Wyoming  Agricultural 
College  V.  Irvine,  84  Pac  90-106,  107,  14 
Wyo.  318. 

Laws  1909,  c.  183,  creates  Lincoln  county, 
and  section  3  provides  that  the  town  of  Lib- 
by  shall  be  the  county  seat  until  the  county 
seat  is  designated  as  provided,  and  that  for 
the  purpose  of  "definitely  fixing  and  creat- 
ing" a  county  seat  the  board  of  county  com- 
missioners shall  insert  on  thelMUots  In  the 
general  election,  "for  the  county  seat  of  Lin- 
coln county ^,"  and  the  town  receiving 

the  largest  number  of  votes  shall  be  the  coun- 
ty seat  Held,  that  the  section  contravened 
Const  art  5,  §  26,  prohibiting  the  Legisla- 
ture from  passing  special  acts  locating  or 
changing  the  county  seats,  which  was  sub- 
stantially adopted  from  Act  Cong.  July  30, 
1886,  c.  818,  24  Stat  170,  relating  to  the  ter- 
ritories, construing  the  constitutional  provi- 
sion and  act  of  Congress  in  view  of  their  leg- 
islative history;  "locating,"  as  used  in  the 
statute,  meaning  to  establish  and  fix  a  perma- 
nent county  seat,  and  "changing"  meaning 
the  removal  of  an  established,  permanent 
county  seat.  State  ex  rel.  Geiger  ▼.  Long, 
117  Pac.  104,  106,  43  Mont  401. 

As  puvoluwe 

See  Purcdiase. 
As  seleetion  of  plaoe 

To  "locate"  is  to  select  by  fixed  bound- 
aries. Petersburg  School  Dist  of  Nelson 
County  V.  Peterson,  108  N.  W.  756^  75^  14  N. 
D.  844. 

A  deed  to  an  electric  railway  company 
of  a  strip  26  feet  in  width  and  such  addition- 
al width  as  may  be  required  for  the  use  of 
the  railway  at  cutting  and  embankments 
and  also  for  side  tracks  and  turnouts  as  final- 
ly located,  executed  in  consideration  of  the 
company  locating  its  railway  on  the  land  of 
the  grantor,  limits  the  grant  to  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  railroad  as  finally  located  and  lim- 
its the  grant  of  land  for  side  tracks  and 
turnouts  to  such  as  were  originally  construct- 
ed, and  the  company  may  not  take  additional 
land- for  clde  tracks  and  turnouts;  the  word 


U>OAT» 


vn 


IiO€4TXO|r 


locate,**  wlien  referiing  to  roads,  meanftnf  a 
determination  and  designation  by  those  a\l- 
thorized  to  do  so  of  the  pveoiser  vUce  where 
the  rottd  is  to  be  biriOt,  or  retarring  to  the 
actual  construction  of  the  road.  KenaingtaB 
Ry.  Co.  oC  Montgomery  County  y.  Moore,  80 
Atl.  614,  616b  115  Md.  86^  Ann.  Ca&  1912C, 
1306  (6  Words  and  Phrases,  pp.  4217,  4218, 
4221). 

In  an  action  to  rescind  a  lease  for  fail- 
are  of  defendant  lessor  to  make  certain  imr 
provements  before  the  ooaunenoement  of  the 
term,  the  answer  alleged  tb»  pendency  of 
proceedin0»  to  open  and  estaUish  a  road,  and 
averred  that  the  location  of  the  improvements 
was  to  be  fixed  after  the  road  had  been  def- 
initely located  through  the  land,  and  con- 
venient to  the  road  when  it  was  opened  and 
ready  for  travel.  Held  that,  while  the  term 
"located"  as  applied  to  a  road  is  of  uncertain 
significance,  and  may  refor  to  the  fixing  of 
the  ttne  which  the  road  is  to  occupy  or  to 
the  actual  construction  of  the  road,  it  was 
meant  as  used  in  the  answer  to  describe  the 
act  of  the  public  officials  in  determining  the 
place  which  the  road  was  to  occupy,  and 
hence  a  finding  that  the  improvements  were 
to  be  placed  after  the  road  was  located  "and 
built"  was  beyond  the  issues.  Schwarting  v. 
Carpenter,  108  Pac.  818,  319, 157  Oal.  432. 

The  word  "locate,**  as  used  in  the  treaty 
of  September  24,  1810,  with  the  Chippewa 
Nation,  reserving  lands  for  the  nae  of  the 
Indians  to  be  located  at  and  near  the  Grand 
Traverse  of  the  F.  river  in  such  manner  as 
the  President  of  the  United  States  should  di- 
rect, does  not  mean  to  patent,  but  to  have 
the  several  sections  surveyed,  marked  out, 
•and  a  map  made  of  them  showing  the  particu- 
lar section  belonging  to  each  of  the  reservees. 
Frauds  v.  Francis,  27  Sup.  Ot  120, 181,  203  U. 
8.  283,  51  li.  Bd.  166  (citing  Stockton  v.  Wil- 
liams [Mich.]  Walk.  Ch.  120,  129). 

Under  the  Nelson  Act,  allowing  allotr 
meats  to  Indians  located  on  the  White  Earth 
Reservation,  the  expression  "located"  in- 
cludes those  Indians  bom  after  the  passage 
of  the  act  United  States  v.  La  Roque,  198 
Fed.  645,  646,  117  C.  C.  A.  349. 

An  Indian  need  not  have  been  on  the 
reservation  at  the  instant  when  the  act  of 
February  28,  1891,  amending  the  general  al- 
lotment act  of  February  8,  1887,  was  passed, 
hi  order  to  avail  himself  of  the  benefit  of 
the  previiion  of  the  later  act  giving  to  each 
Indian  'located"  thereon  one-eighth  section 
of  land.  Fairbanks  v.  United  States,  32  Sup. 
Gt  292,  296,  223  U.  S.  215,  56  L.  Ed.  409. 

LOCATED  PBOQPEBOT 

Stock  in  a  nonresident  railroad  corpora- 
tion, owned  by  a'  domestic  railroad  company, 
Is  taxable  for  county  and  municipal  purposes 
In  ttiat  county  and  city  wherein  the  princi- 
pal office  of  sudi' corporation  Is  fixed  by  its 
charter  or  by4aw.  Such  proDerty  is  "located 
property,"  in  the  meaning  of  the  law  of  thia' 
8  Wna&  P.2D  Skb.— 12 


state  providing  the  machinery  for  diaMba^ 
ing  the  -property  of  railroad  companAes  for 
county  and  municipal  taxation.  Qreene 
County  V.  Wright,  54  S.  B.  951,  953»  126  Ga. 
504. 

X.OOATXOK 

See  Each  Location;  Final  Location; 
Lode  Location ;  Mining  Location ;  Plac- 
er Location ;  Relocation. 

Removal,  see  Remove — ^Removal. 
As. site  ev  sitnattoa 

▲  notice  of  election  for  the  removal  of  a 
county  seat  is  not  objectionable  in  using  the 
word  "site"  in  respect  to  both  building  and 
offices.  The  word  "location"  is  used  in  the 
statute  in  respect  to  offices,  and,  while  it  may 
be  preferable,  both  words  are  frequently  em- 
ployed in  the  same  sense,  and  no  confusion 
could  have  resulted.  Stanton  v.  Board  of 
Sup'rs  of  E^Bsex  County,  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  840, 
842,  48  Misc.  Rep,  415. 

Hisliwmy 

"Location"  of  a  highway  and  "alteration" 
of  a  highway  do  not  amount  to  the  same 
thing.    Ford  v.  Erskine  (Me.)  83  Atl.  455,  457 

The  word  'location,"  as  used  in  Pol 
Code,  f  2689,  relating  to  the  establishment  of 
highways,  refers  to  proceedings  designed  to 
fix  the  line  of  the  highway  at  a  time  prior 
to  its  actual  construction  and  opening. 
Schwartlng  v.  Carpenter,  108  Pac.  318,  320, 
157  CaL  432. 

Fnftnekise  distinguished 

See  Franchise. 
Railroad 

Under  Laws  1854-55,  p.  264,  c.  228,  |  29, 
providing  that  in  the  absence  of  contract  in 
relation  to  land  through  which  a  certain  rail- 
road may  pass  it  shall  be  presumed  that  the 
land  bias  been  granted  by  the  owner  to  the 
company,  unless  the  owner  shall  apply  for  an 
assessment  of  the  value  of  the  land  within 
two  years  next  after  the  road  has  been  "lo- 
cated," the  location  of  the  railroad  is  Its 
physical  location  by  the  laying  of  its  track, 
aty  of  Hickory  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  49  S. 
B.  202,  204,  137  N.  C.  189. 

Under  the  rule  that,  where  a  railroad 
company,  to  which  has  been  given  the  power 
to  choose  its  particular  route  between  desig- 
nated termini;  has  exercised  its  discretion  In 
this  regard.  Its  power  of  choice  is  ejdiansted, 
and  it  cannot  subseguentiy  change  its  "locap 
tion,"  without  express  legislative  authority, 
the  smthorities  differ  somewhat  as  to  what 
will  constitute  a  «*location,"  within  the  rule, 
but,  after  the  selection  of  the  route  and  acto- 
al  construction,  they  generally  ooncur  that 
the  "location"  Is  fixed.  Brown  v.  Atlan- 
tic &  B..llty;  Con  05  S.  B.  24,  20, 126  Ga.  248, 
7  Ann.  Cas.  1026  (citing  Mahaska  County  R. 
Co.  V.  Des  Moines  Val.  R.  Co.,  28  Iowa,  437; 
i  Am.  &  Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  199,  200,  note  to  WeB^ 
em  Penp.  ^.  Co.'s  Appeal). 


tiOOATEON 


178 


I/0OOMOTIVB 


*lx>catton^  of  a  railroad,  within  the 
legal  definition  of  the  terms,  la  a  proceeding 
In  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  do- 
main, amoonting  to  an  appropriation  of  the 
particular  place  selected  for  the  site  of  the 
road,  as  against  all  persons  except  the  owner 
of  the  land,  and  a  person  who  may  hare  per- 
fected a  prior  location  thereon;  and,  as  to 
the  landowner.  It  gives  a  right  to  acquire  his 
title  by  purchase,  or  the  further  exercise  of 
the  power  of  eminent  domain,  paramount  to 
that  of  a  company  claiming  under  a  subse- 
quent location.  A  mere  survey  made  by  the 
engineers  of  a  company,  not  adopted  or  de- 
termined upon  by  the  corporation  Itself,  by 
an  act  of  Its  board  of  directors,  as  the  loca- 
tion of  Its  road,  Is  not  an  appropriation  or 
location  giving  priority  of  right  as  against 
third  persons.  A  survey  staked  out  upon  the 
ground  as  a  center  line,  a  preliminary  llne^ 
or  an  actual  location,  whether  delineated 
on  paper  or  not,  If  adopted  by  the  cor- 
poration as  aforesaid.  Is  a  sufficient  'loca- 
tion." A  'location,"  as  between  rival  com- 
panies, need  not  be  exact  as  to  the  width  of 
the  right  of  way  claimed  or  other  matters  of 
mere  detalL  If  the  site  Intended  to  be  held 
Is  substantially  shown,  the  location  Is  suffi- 
cient A  survey  made  by  promoters  of  a  rail- 
road corporation,  for  the  purposes,  before 
the  company  Is  Incorporated,  or  by  an  exist- 
ing railroad  company,  for  an  extension  of  Its 
road,  before  filing,  In  the  office  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  a  certificate  of  extension,  as  re- 
quired by  section  63  of  chapter  64  of  the 
Code  of  1899,  may  be  adopted  as  a  location 
after  Incorporation  or  the  filing  of  the  certif- 
icate, as  the  case  may  be.  If,  acting  In  good 
faith  and  diligently  prosecuting  the  enter- 
prise. It  professes  t6  have  undertaken  the 
construction  of  Its  road,  a  railroad  corpora- 
tion may  seize  and  hold,  as  against  a  rival 
company,  by  location  thereon,  land  on  any 
part  of  its  proposed  route,  without  having 
made  a  survey  of  Its  entire  road.  Though 
not  the  only  mode  of  adopting  a  survey,  so 
as  to  make  It  a  location,  the  filing  of  a  map 
of  It  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
by  order  of  the  board  of  directors  of  the  com- 
pany, is  prima  fade  proof  of  such  adoption. 
The  mere  filing  of  such  plat  in  such  office, 
without  proof  that  it  was  authorized  by  the 
corporation.  Is  not  evidence  of  an  adoption 
of  the  survey  shown  by  It  A  location  can 
be  made  only  by  act  of  the  corporation 
through  Its  board  of  directors,  but  acts  done 
by  agents  under  the  orders  of  the  board  of 
directors,  for  the  purpose  of  claiming  and 
holding  a  location  designated  by  the  board  as 
such,  are  evidence  of  Intent  on  the  part  of 
the  board  of  directors  to  claim  and  ludd  audi 
location.  Chesapeake  ft  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Deep- 
water  Ey.  Co.,  50  S.  B.  890,  804,  67  W.  Va. 
e41. 

X.OGATOB 

See  Original  Locator;  Relocator. 


LOCK 

Bee  IPoot-Lock. 

In  an  action  agaiost  a  lUltoad  eompany 
to  recover  for  killing  stodc,  an  Instractloa 
that  plaintiff  could  not  recover  If  he  had 
faUed  to  '"lock"  the  gate  leading  to  the  right 
of  way  was  erroneous,  since  the  only  obliga- 
tion of  plaintiff  was  to  secure  the  gate  by  the 
usual  means,  and  the  word  'lodL**  Implying 
an  obligation  to  lock  the  gate  with  a  key. 
Brownfield  v.  Union  Fac  B.  Co.,  104  N.  W. 
876,  877,  74  Neb.  440. 

''A  lock;  Is  almost  invariably  used  In 
connection  with  a  canal,  and  forms  part  of  it 
It  cannot  exist  except  In  connection  with  a 
canal  or  some  equivalent  situation.*'  Winne- 
bago Paper  Mills  v.  Klmberly-Olark  Oo.,  120 
N.  W.  411,  418,  188  Wis.  426. 

XiOCKSD  8TOBEBOOM 

"Locked  storeroom,*'  as  used  in  an  insure 
ance  policy  covering  goods  in  a  locked  store- 
room provided  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the 
assured  by  the  landlord  in  the  same  house, 
does  not  Include  a  separate  laundry,  under 
lock  and  key.  In  the  basement  of  a  flat  house, 
set  aside  for  the  use  of  an  occupant  of  one  of 
the  fiats  used  by  him  for  laundry  purposes, 
cooking,  storing  of  vegetables,  and  wherdn 
he  stored  trunks  padced  with  winter  doth- 
Ing.  Michaels  v.  Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co.  of 
New  York,  106  8.  W.  788,  784,  128  Ma  App. 
1& 

LOCKOUT 

An  employer's  discharge  of  employ^ 
about  to  enter  upon  a  strike,  done  before, 
they  can  strike,  \b  commonly  called  a  "lock- 
out" Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  B.  Ca  ▼.  Gee, 
140  Fed.  168. 

"A  lockout'  Is  a  cessation  of  the  furnish- 
ing of  work  to  employ^  In  an  effort  to  get 
for  the  emi^oyer  more  desirable  terms." 
Iron  Molders'  Union  No.  126  of  Milwaukee, 
Wis.,  V.  AUls-Ghalmers  Co.,  106  Fed.  46,  62, 
01  0.  O.  A.  631,  20  !«.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  316. 

LOCO  PARENTIS 

See  In  Loco  Parentis. 

LOCOMOTIVE 

Operating  locomotive,  see  Operata 

Code  1907,  f  5473,  providing  that  the  en- 
gineer having  the  control  of  the  running  of  a 
locomotive  on  any  railroad  shall  give  spedflc 
signals  in  designated  situations,  does  not  ap- 
ply to  a  street  or  Interurban  railroad  operat- 
ed by  electric  power;  for  a  street  car,  in  its 
popular  sense,  Is  not  a  ''locomotive."  Birm- 
ingham Ry.,  light  ft  Power  Oa  y.  Green,  58 
South.  801,  4  Ala.  App.  417. 

Rev.  St  1889,  f  1106,  provides  that  when 
any  stock  shall  go  en  a  railroad  xlfl^t  of  way 


liOOOMOTIVB 


179 


LOCOMOTIYB 


•t  a  place  where  the  road  la  not  fenced,  and 
the  stock  la  frightened  hy  any  locomottve  or 
train  and  Injured,  the  comiwny  shall  be  lia- 
ble; and  section  4160  provides  that  words 
and  phrases  shall  be  taken  in  their  plain  and 
usual  sense.  Held,  that  a  "speeder"— a  con- 
trirance  similar  to  a  hand  car,  save  that  it 
is  operated  by  a  gasoline  engine— is  not  a  "lo- 
comotive,*' within  the  statute,  and  a  railroad 
is  not  liable  for  injuries  to  stock  frightened 
thereby.  Henson  v.  Williamsville,  G.  &  St 
L  By.  Co.,  86  S.  W.  597,  508,  UO  Mo.  App* 
506. 

Bey.  Laws,  c.  106^  |  71,  d.  8,  declaring 
that  a  master  shall  be  liable  for  injuries  to 
t  servant  caused  by  the  negligence  of  a  per- 
son In  his  employ,  who  is  in  charge  of  an 
engine  or  train  on  a  railroad,  extends  to  a 
manufacturing  plant  which  operates  a  sys- 
tem of  railroad  tracks  in  its  yard  in  conneo* 
tion  with  a  commercial  railroad,  and  an  en* 
gine  and  ears  operated  on  the  tracks  constl- 
tnte  a  "'locomottve  and  train  on  a  railroad." 
Bines  V.  Stanley  O.  I.  Blec.  Mfg.  Oou,  85  N.  B. 
851,  862,  189  Mass.  622. 

A  whirley,  derrick,  or  locomotive  crane 
built  upon  car  trucks,  and  equipped  with  a 
boiler  and  engine  furnishing  the  power  to  op- 
erate the  crane,  and  to  move  the  machine 
about  upon  the  railroad  tracks  in  the  vicinity 
where  it  is  being  operated  by  a  railway  com- 
pany for  the  purpose  of  unloading  heavy  ma- 
terials to  be  used  in  the  construction  of  docks, 
and  not  employed  by  the  railway  company  in 
Its  business  as  a  common  carrier  in  moving 
state  traffic,  is  not,  while  being  so  operated, 
a  "locomotive,  car,  tender,  or  similar  vehicle 
used  in  moving  state  traffic,*'  required  by  sec- 
tions 8050  and  8052  of  the  General  Ck>de  to 
be  equipped  with  an  automatic  coupler  and 
provided  with  drawbars  of  standard  height 
Where  a  railway  company,  as  a  common  car- 
rier, has  deposited  on  tracks  built  upon  a 
partly  constructed  dock,  cars  loaded  with  nuu 
tetials  to  be  used  by  it  in  the  further  con- 
struction of  such  dock,  the  use  of  this  ma- 
chine to  shift  these  loaded  cars  a  short  dis- 
tance to  meet  the  needs  and  convenience  of 
the  employes  engaged  in  unloading  the  same, 
does  not  bring  the  machine,  during  the  time 
it  is  so  employed,  within  the  provision  of 
these  sections.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Benson,  97  N.  B.  417,  410,  85  Ohio  St  215, 
41  L  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  40,  Ann.  Cas.  1013A,  046. 

The  term  "locomotive  engine"  has  a  well- 
known  significance,  and  is  used  generally  for 
an  oigine  to  draw  a  train  of  trucks  or  cars 
along  a  permanent  or  temporary  aei  of  rails. 
There  is  also  a  well-known  class  of  engines, 
such  as  traction  engines,  which,  though  they 
are  capable  of  being  moved  from  place,  to 
places  are  never  spoken  of  as  locomotive  eiv 
gines.  A  pile  driver,  consisting  of  a  steam 
engine  plkced  on  a  flat  car  at  one  end  and 
a  driver  used  in  raising  the  hammer  at  the 
other  end,  all  forming  one  nachine^  capable 


of  self-propnlslon  by  means  of  a  sprocket 
wheel  on  the  axle  under  the  boiler,  connected 
by  a  chain  with  the  engine,  the  chain  being 
removed  when  driving  a  pile,  is  not  a  "loco- 
motive engine,"  within  Bums*  Rev.  St  1001, 
i  7083,  subd.  4,  providing  that  every  railroad, 
etc.,  shall  be  liable  for  Injuries  suffered  by 
an  employ^  and  caused  by  the  negligence  of 
any  other  employ^  having  charge  of  any  "sig- 
nal, telegraph  office,  switch  yard,  shop,  round- 
house, locomotive  engine,  or  train  upon  a 
raUway."  Jarvis  v.  Hitch,  87  N.  B.  1057, 
1059,  161  Ind.  217. 

Ky.  St  I  786,  relating  to  "railroads,"  re- 
quiring every  company  to  provide  every  loco- 
motive engine  on  its  road  with  a  bell  and 
steam  whistle,  and  to  ring  the  one  and  sound 
the  other  outside  cities,  at  a  grade  crossing 
of  its  road  with  a  highway,  in  view  of  section 
842a,  subsec.  1,  providing  that  all  interurban 
electric  companies  authorized  to  construct  a 
railroad  10  miles  long  shall  be  under  the 
same  duties,  so  ftir  as  practicable,  as  railroad 
corporations,  requires  such  an  interurban 
electric  to  sound  the  gong  and  electric  whistle 
of  its  motors  at  such  crossings;  any  engine 
used  in  producing  motion,  whether  by  steam 
or  other  power,  being  a  locomotive  engine, 
within  the  statute ;  and  the  gong  and  electric 
whistle,  being  but  substitutes  for  the  bell  and 
steam  whistle  required  by  the  statute.  Oom- 
monwealth  v.  Louisville  ft  B.  R.  Co.,  183  S. 
W.  230,  281,  141  Ky.  583. 

An  inspectlOB  ear,  operated  by  a  steam 
engine  placed  in  the  center  thereof,  and  de- 
signed to  run  from  place  to  place  for  use  by 
the  officers  of  the  railroad  in  making  inspect 
tions,  is  a  locomotive  engine  within  a  city  or- 
dinance limiting  the  speed  of  engines,  and  re- 
quiring the  giving  of  signals,  and  within  Rev. 
St  1800,  i  1102,  requiring  the  giving  of  sig- 
nals at  crossings,  though  the  term  "locomo- 
tive engine"  usually  signifies  a  steam  engine 
used  to  draw  a  car  or  train  of  cars  along  a 
railroad.  Mudd  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 
124  S.  W.  50,  61,  146  Mo.  App.  388. 

By  the  words  "locomotive  engine  or  train 
upon  a  railroad"  must  be  understood  a  rail- 
road and  locomotive  engine  and  trains  op- 
erated and  run,  or  originally  Intended  to 
be  operated  and  run,  in  some  manner  and 
to  some  extent  by  steam.  Bmployers'  Lia- 
bility Act  March  4,  1893,  p.  295,  c.  130,  {  1 
(Bums'  Ann.  St  1001,  {  7083),  providing  that 
every  railroad  or  other  corporation  shall  be 
liable  for  damages  for  personal  injuries  suf- 
fered by  an  employ^,  where  the  injury  was 
caused  by  the  negligence  of  any  employ^  hav- 
ing charge  of  any  signal,  telegraph  office,  "lo- 
comotive engine,  or  train  upon  a  railroad,** 
does  not  apply  to  employ^  operating  electric 
cars;  such  a  car  not  being  a  "locomotive  en- 
gine** or  a  "train  upon  a  railroad,'*  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute.  Indianapolis  &  G. 
Bapid  Transit  Co.  v.  Andis»  72  N.  B.  146^  150, 
33  Ind.  App.  625, 


LOOOMOTIVB 


180 


liODE  OLAIM 


See  Any. 

As  freight  oa» 

See  Freight  Gar* 

As  Teliiole 

See  Vehicle. 


xocoMOTivE  zmonrEEB 

See  Engineer. 

LODE 

See  Known  Lode  or  Vein ;  Mineral  Lode. 

As  any  minaval  matter 

A  "lode,'*  within  the  meaning  of  the  fed- 
eral statute  making  the  dlscoYery  of  a  vein  or 
"lode''  a  prerequisite  to  the  location  of  a  min- 
ing claim,  is  whatever  the  miner  could  fol- 
low and  find  ore.  A  valid  location  of  a  min- 
ing claim  may  he  made  whenever  the  prospec- 
tor has  discovered  such  indications  of  min- 
eral that  he  is  willing  to  cq[>end  his  time  and 
money  in  following  with  the  expectation  of 
finding  ore,  and  a  valid  location  may  be  made 
of  a  ledge  de^  in  the  ground  and  appearing 
at  the  surface,  not  in  the  shape  of  ore,  but 
in  vein  matter  only.  Ck)lumbia  Copper  Bfin. 
Co.  V.  Duchess  Mining,  Milling  &  Smelting 
Co.,  79  Pac.  386,  386,  13  Wyo.  244  (quoting 
and  adopting  definition  in  1  Lindley,  Mines 
[2d  Ed.]  p.  610). 

Beflaad  bmmdaHes  re^pilred 

''A  'vein'  or  'lode'  is  mineral-bearing  rock 
or  other  earthy  matter  in  place  in  a  fissure 
in  rock,  so  that  its  boundaries  are  sharply 
defined  by  rocky  walls  in  place."  Webb  r. 
American  Asphaltum  Mining  Co.,  157  Fed. 
203,  204,  84  C.  C.  A.  661. 

A  "lode"  is  a  zone  or  belt  of  mineralized 
rock,  lying  within  boundaries  clearly  sepa- 
rating it  from  the  neighboring  rock.  Amber- 
gris Min.  Co.  V.  Day,  85  Pac.  109,  112,  114,  12 
Idaho,  108  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Eureka  ConsoL  Mln.  Co.  v.  Richmond  Min. 
Co.,  8  Fed..  Cas.  819,  and  citing  definitions 
quoted  in  6  Words  ft  Phrases,  p.  4423). 

A  vein  or  "lode,"  within  Rev.  St  U.  S.  { 
2333,  providing  that,  where  an  application 
for  a  patent  for  a  placer  claim  does  not  in- 
clude an  application  for  a  known  vein  or 
lode  within  its  boundaries,  the  application 
shall  be  construed  as  a  declaration  that  the 
claimant  of  the  placer  claim  has  no  right  of 
possession  of  the  vein  or  lode  claim,  but  that, 
where  the  existence  of  a  vein  or  lode  claim 
is  not  known,  a  patent  for  the  placer  claim 
shall  convey  all  valuable  mineral  and  other 
deposits  within  the  boundaries  thereof;  is  a 
body  of  mineral  or  mineral-bearing  rock  with- 
in defined  boundaries  in  the  general  mass 
of  the  mountain,  and  that  a  "known  vein  or 
lode"  is  one  clearly  ascertained,  and  of  such 
extent  as  to  render  the  land  more  valuable 
on  that  account  and  Justify  its  e^iploitation 


and  development    Noyes  ▼.  Clifford,  94  Pac. 
842,  847,  87  Mont  188. 

Veins  or  "lodes"  are  lines  or  aggr^atlons 
of  metal  imbedded  in  quartz  or  other  rock 
in  place,  consisting  of  a  strip  of  mineral- 
bearing  rock  within  defined  boundaries  in 
the  general  mass  of  the  mountain,  which 
must  be  continuous  and  without  taterruption, 
bounded  by  country  rock  mineralized  to  no 
greater  extent  than  the  general  condition  of 
the  vicinity.  Rock  or  matter  of  any  kind. 
In  order  to  constitute  a  vein  or  *lode,"  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  statute,  must  be  metal- 
liferous and  contain  such  mineral  value  as 
will  distinguish  it  from  the  country  rock, 
especially  where  no  well-defined  walls  appear. 
What  values  the  fflling  or  material  of  a  fis- 
sure eAiould  contain  to  constitute  it  a  v^n, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  act  of  Congress, 
must  necessarily  depend  upon  the  character- 
istics of  the  district  or  conntiy  in  which  the 
vein  or  lode,  in  any  partlcnlar  instance 
claimed  to  exist,  is  located,  and  upon  the 
character,  as  to  boundaries,  of  the  vein  itself. 
Values,  therefore,  of  the  fflling  of  flie  vein 
must  be  considered  with  special  reference 
to  the  district  where  the  vein  or  lode  is 
found.  In  the  absence  of  defined  walls  and 
of  mineralization  appreciably  greater  than 
that  contained  in  the  general  mass  of  the 
mountain,  broken,  stained,  and  fissured  ma- 
terial, or  crushed  and  brecdated  matter, 
characteristic  of  the  district,  cannot  be  held 
to  constitute  a  vein  or  "lode,"  under  the 
statute.  In  such  case  the  limits  of  fractur- 
ing do  not  constitute  the  limits  of  the  vein, 
and  even  if  there  be  found  an  occasional 
vug  or  fragment  of  ore,  yet  where  it  is  dis- 
connected from  any  ore  body  and  so  inter- 
mingled with  the  surrounding  country  rock 
that  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  continuous,  it 
does  not  mark  the  line  of  the  vein  or  "lode," 
within  the  meaning  of  the  law.  Grand  Cen- 
tral Min.  Co.  V.  Mammoth  Min«  Co.,  88  Pac. 
648,  676,  677,  678,  679,  29  Utah,  490. 

Placer  distliiciiiilied 

A  "lode"  is  a  solid  vein  of  metal,  while 
a  't>lacer"  is  earth,  sand,  or  gravel  contain- 
ing valuable  mineral  In  particles.  A  mining 
lode  is  a  totally  dlfl'erent  thing  from  a  placer 
mine^  and  not  a  mere  state  or  condition  of 
such  mine  They  are  two  distinct  things, 
and  not  two  different  states  of  the  same 
thing.  McCarter  v.  Sooy  Oyster  Co.,  75  AtL 
211,  215,  78  N.  J.  Law,  394  (quoting,  and 
adopting  definition  in  Webst  Diet). 

X.OBB  CLAIM, 

Laws  1903,  p.  360,  entitled  "An  act  to 
regulate  the  construction,  equipment  and 
operation  of  metalliferous  mines,  •  •  • 
providing  penalties  for  violation  tfaereot 
♦  ♦  ♦"  provides  by  section  18  (Het.  St 
1908, 1 4297)  ''that  all  abandoned  mine  shafts, 
pits  or  other  excavations  endangerijli;  the 
life  of  man  or  beast  shall  be  securely  covered 
or   fmced.*'     The  eomi^aint  in  an  action 


LODE  liOOATIOir 


181 


LOOS  Ajm  TIMBXR 


•galBst  tlid  owner  of  an  xawM.  adning  slmft 
for  damagen  tw  the  deatii  of  plaintUfo'  In- 
tent 8on,  resulting  from  the  alleged  negli- 
gence of  the  owner  In  ftdllng  to  ooTer  or  fteee 
the  shaft,  averred  tbat  the  ehaft  wae  aban- 
doned, ttMt  it  belonged  to  the  defendant,  that 
tbe  def  aidant  was  a  corporation  eodsttng  nn- 
der  the  laws  of  this  state  and  engaged  la 
mining  gold  and  other  preckNB  metals,  ahd 
that  the  shaft  was  located  npon  mining  porop- 
ert7  known  as  ttie  Australia  lodtt  mining 
daim  belonging  to  the  defendant  Held  that, 
while  the  act  applied  on|7  to  mines  yielding 
metals,  the  term  "lode  claim"  meant  a  min- 
ing claim  containing  a  vein  of  metallic  ore, 
and  hence  that  the  complaint  snfBciently 
ayerred  tliat  l^e  shaft  was  upon  a  metallifer- 
ons  mine.  Ittchardson  v.  M  Paso  Gonsol. 
Gold  Mining  Go.,  118  Pac  082,  085,  51  Colo. 
440. 

LODE  Z.OCATIOH 

A  'lode  location"  is  a  location  of  min- 
eral-bearing rock  in  place  in  a  flssnre  in 
ro<±  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  act  of 
Congress..  Webb y. American Asphaltnm  Min- 
ing Co.,  157  Fed.  208,  204,  84  C.  O.  A.  651. 

"A  valid  lode  mining  location'  must  b^ 
open,  unoccupied,  and  unappropriated  public 
domain."  Hoban  y.  Beyer,  85  Paa  837,  888, 
37  Colo.  186. 

LODGE 

LODOEB 

See,  also,  Quest 

Ordinarily  the  landlord  supplies  a  "lodg- 
^*  with  furnished  rooms,  the  care  and  oc- 
cnpation  of  which  the  landlord  has,  the  lodg- 
er merely  having  the  use  of  rooms  without 
tbe  exclusive  possession,  while  the  tenant 
has  exclusive  possession.  Mathews  v.  Liv- 
ingston, 85  Aa  529,  531,  86  Conn.  263. 

One  who  is  in  the  possession  of  apart- 
ments by  virtue  of  a  formal  lease  in  writing, 
by  the  terms  of  which  the  absolute  right  of 
use  and  occupation  is  given  to  the  lessee 
for  the  purpose  of  a  dwelling  for  himself  and 
&ml]y,  the  lessor  having  no  right  to  enter 
except  for  the  purpose  of  making  repairs  or 
alterations,  and  in  which  the  lessee  is  desig- 
nated as  "tenant"  and  the  lessor  as  "land- 
lord," is  not  a  "lodger,"  within  the  intent  of 
UwB  1800,  p.  884,  c  380,  giving  a  lien  to  a 
lodging  house  keeper  on  the  baggage  and 
otber  property  brought  upon  the  premises 
by  a  lodger.  Shearman  y.  Iroquois  Hotel  St 
Apartment  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  S«m>.  365,  866,  42 
Misc.  Sep.  217. 

LOFT 

Of  barn  as  building,  see  Building. 

Loe 

See  Prize  Logs;    Saw  Lpgs. 
The  word  "log;"  as  used  la  a  laggii^ 
coQtiact,  dOaa.  aot  'mean  "tree."    Dee  AUe* 


Lomber  Co^  y.  Morgan  Oitj  Tbnber 
00^  41  South.  882,  848,  117  La.  L 

Zmnber  dlstlagnlAed 

See  Lumber. 


See  MerchandisOi 
As  timbev 

See  Timber. 

I.OO  MBAMrBS 

See  Scribner's  Log  Itula. 

&008  Jjn  BOX  II 

Blocks  of  wood  from  6  to  15  incdies  in 
diameter  and  88  to  42  inches  long,  sawed 
from  round  logs  in  their  natural  state,  are 
not  classified  as  "logs  and  box  materials" 
by  the  110  commodities  act  (Laws  1007,  p. 
200);  and  a  contract  for  th^  transportation, 
which  describes  them  as  cordwood,  at  the 
rate  fixed  for  cordwood.  Is  binding  on  the 
shipper  and  carrier;  and  the  mere  fact  that 
the  consignee  or  subsequent  buyer  may  manu- 
facture the  blocks  into  barrti  heads  does  not 
Justify  the  carrier  in  redassifjring  them  as 
logs  and  box  material,  and  demanding  a 
higher  rate  as  a  condition  precedent  to  a  de- 
livery. Southern  By.  Ck>.  y.  Lowe,  54  South. 
51,  170  Ala.  608. 

%   PBOIK 


UOTS 

See  Other  Timber. 


X.008  ANB  BOTOB  UHlIAMnrAOTUB- 
BD  TIKBB& 

Pulp  wood  subjected  to  the  reeslng  pro- 
cess, by  which  the  bark  and  excrescences  are 
mechanically  removed,  in  order  to  prepare 
it  for  use,  is  not,  by  reason  of  this  treatment, 
to  be  excluded  from  the  provision  in  Tariff 
Act  July  24,  1807,  c  11,  |  2,  Free  List,  par. 
600,  for  "'logs  and  round  unmanufactured 
timber,'  including  pulp  woods,  *  *  *  not 
specially  provided  for."  United  States  v. 
Pierce,  140  Fed.  062,  063. 

LOei  AHB  TODBB 

Under  Rev.  St.  1878,  f  3380,  as  amended 
by  Laws  1870,  c.  187,  f  1,  giving  a  lien  on 
"logs  and  timber"  to  any  person  furnishing 
supplies  to  those  engaged  in  getting  out  logs 
and  timber,  the  word  "legs"  clearly  means 
the  stem  or  trunks  of  trees  cut  into  conven- 
ient lengths  for  the  purpose  of  being  after- 
wards manufactured  into  timber  of  various 
kinds,  and  does  not  include  manufactured 
lumber  of  any  kind  nor  timber  which  is 
squared  or  otherwise  shaped  f6r  use  without 
further  change  in  form,  and  the  wofd  "tim- 
ber^' was  clearly  intended  to  indude  the  same 
stems  or  tmnlas  of  trees  when  cut  and  shaped 
for  use  in  tfao>eroetloa  of  buildings  or  othte 
stractufes,  and  jn&t  to  be  aaanufaetasBd  Into 
lumber,  within  the  meaning  of  'tha  word 
"lumber."  Bailrsad  ties  are  uSoaDy.  made 
from  the  stems  of  small  trees  and  abaped  for 


LOOS,  LUMBEB,  AND  OTH£»  TIMBER      182 


JjOim  ACCOUNT 


use  111  the  constractiotff  of  a  lallroad  trmek; 
and  are  clearly  "timber,**  within  the  meaning 
of  the  word  as  used  in  the  statute.  KoU^k 
V.  Parcher,  9  N.  W.  67,  69,  52  Wia.  393. 

XOG8,    LinflBER,    AND    OTHB&    XIBI- 
BER 

See  Other  Timber. 

X.OG8  OF  WOOD 

Sandalwood  in  pieces  of  YBijing  sizes, 
seyeral  feet  long  and  several  inches  thick, 
to  which  nothing  has  been  done  beyond  re- 
moTing  the  bark  and  sawing  the  wood  into 
lengths  convenient  for  transportation,  is  not 
dutiable  under  Tariff  Act  July  24, 1897,  c.  11, 
i  1,  Schedule  C,  par.  198,  30  Stat  167,  as 
"wood,  unmanufactured,  not  specially  provid- 
ed for,"  but  is  free  of  duty,  under  the  provi- 
sion in  paragraph  699  of  said  act  (section  2, 
Free  Ust,  30  Stat  202,  for  "logs  of  wood." 
George  Lueders  &  Co.  y.  United  States,  181 
Fed.  656. 

LOGGING  AAZZiBOAD 

As  railroad,  see  Railroad — ^Railway* 

LOGROLLING 

'*Logrolling"  consists  in  framing  a  bill 
with  numerous  separate  or  independent  pro- 
visions, none  of  which  would  pass  upon  its 
own  merits,  but  each  of  which  is  made  atr 
tractive  enough  to  cominand  a  certain  num- 
ber of  votes,  which,  being  united,  are  suffi- 
cient to  pass  the  bill.  People  t.  Sullivan,  66 
N.  E.  989,  996,  173  N.  Y.  122,  63  L.  B.  A. 
358,  93  Am.  St  Bep.  582. 

What  is  commonly  known  as  'logrolling^ 
is  passing  through  a  measure,  not  on  its  own 
merits,  by  combining  it  with  other  measures, 
each  of  which  has  a  certain  strength,  and 
thus  pulling  them  through  by  virtue  of  their 
combined  strength.  Christie  v.  Miller,  57  S. 
E.  697,  698,  128  Ga.  412  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing the  definition  of  Judge  McCay  in  Oon- 
ner's  Case,  51  Ga.  573). 

"Logrolling,"  as  applied  to  elections,  con- 
sists in  the  combining  of  several  questions  so 
that  a  voter  cannot  exercise  his  Judgment  as 
to  one  or  more  of  the  several  propositions, 
but  must  either  adopt  or  reject  them  as  an 
entirety.  Tolson  v.  Police  Jury,  48  South. 
1011,  1014,  119  Ga.  215,  12  Ann.  Cas.  847. 

LOITER 

liOITER,  XiOAF,  AlfB  XDIiB 

In  Gen  Laws  3l8t  Leg.  a  59,  i  1,  par. 
"d,"  defining  as  vagrants  all  able-bodied  per- 
sons who  liabitually  "loaf,  loiter,  and  idle" 
in  any  public  plaee,  etc,  for  the  greater  part 
of  their  time,  without  any  regular  employ* 
ment  or  visible  means  of  support,  and  declar- 
ing that  one  is  not  relieved  from  a  charge  of 
vagrancy  who  habitually  loafis,  loiters,  and 
Idlefi,  if  he  it  without  visible  means  of  sup* 


port  by  the  ftoct  tiiat  only  oceasioniklly  he 
has  employment  at  odd  jobs,  being  for  the 
most  part  without  employment  the  terms 
*'loiter,'*  ''loaf,**  and'  "idle,"  when  canstmed 
with  the  words  "larger  portion  of  their  time," 
require  proof,  to  sustain  a  conviction  of  va- 
grancy, that  the  person  diarged  was  able  to 
woric,  and,  being  so  able^  habitually  loafed, 
loitered,  and  idled  in  the  dty  tor  the  greater 
part  of  his  time,  without  employment  or  visi- 
ble means  of  support  Ex  parte  Strittmatter, 
124  S.  W.  906,  907,  58  Tex.  Cr.  R.  166,  187 
Am.  St  Rep.  937,  21  Ann.  Ga&  477. 

ZiOXTERER 

The  term  "loiterer,"  in  a  charge  that  if 
plaintilf  wfis  a  mere  "loiterer"  about  de- 
fendant's station  after  his  discharge^  he  could 
not  recover  for  injories^  of  necessity  implies 
plaintUTs  presence  about  the  station  without 
consent  permission,  or  license^  and,  if  any- 
thing, it  Is  even  broader  than  those  tarms,  for 
one  may  be  about  the  premises  without  con- 
sent permission,  or  license,  and  yet  not  be 
a  "loiterer"  but  a  trespasser.  Hon  ▼.  South- 
er Pae  Co.,  81  Pac.  902,  907,  20  Utah,  127. 

LONE  ENGINE 

A  "lone  engine"  is  a  locomotive  not  haul- 
ing any  cars,  except  its  own  tender.  Kiel- 
beck  V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  B.  €k>.,  97  M«  W.  750, 
70  Neb.  571. 

LONG 

xoHo  Accomrr 

The  services  of  an  attorney,  r^idered  in 
an  action  or  actions  under  a  single  or  differ- 
ent retainers,  which  mer^  involves  charges 
in  connection  with  the  vairlous  steps  in  the 
litigation,  cannot  be  said  to  constitute  a 
long  account  On  the  contrary,  the  charge  in 
each  action,  although  the  service  be  permis- 
sible of  exhaustive  itemization,  is  essentially 
a  single  charge  respecting  each  action,  and 
exceptional  circumstances  must  be  made  to 
appear  in  order  to  remove  the  case  from  the 
operation  of  such  rule.  Prentice  v.  Huif ,  90 
N.  Y.  Supp.  780,  782,  98  App.  Div.  IIL 

Where  the  issues  framed  by  the  plead- 
ings in  a  cause  are  very  numerous,  involving 
many  dealings  between  the  parties  growing 
out  of  farming  transactions  under  a  contract 
under  which  plaintiff  farmed  certain  lands 
for  the  defendant  also  growing  out  of  sale 
of  personal  property  of  various  kinds  and  at 
various  dates,  and  for  work,  labor,  and  serv- 
ices performed  by  plaintiff  for  defendant 
also  for  numerous  items  or  claims  for  money 
advanced  to  and  paid  out  and  expended  at 
various  dates  by  each  party  at  the  request 
of  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  other,  and 
where  there  are  numerous  causes  of  action 
set  forth  in  the  complaint  aa  well  as  those 
set  forth  In  various  counterclaims  contained 
in  the  answer,  are  all  for  the  recovery  of 
money  iq^n  contract,  and  some  of  the  causes 


IX>Na  A<XDUKT 


18S 


Loira  rnuL 


of  acttoB  embrace  manj  's^^aaratt  iteipai  of 
aceoant,  all  of  Wlildi  ard.deniad  tkr  the  op- 
posite party,  and  where  the  lasneB  are  audi 
as  to  render  it  practically  impossible  fbr  a 
Jury  to  intelligeaitl^  try  and  determine  the 
same,  the  case  is  one  eminently  proper  to 
be  referred  as  involTlng  the  examination  ot 
a  ^loDcr  acconnf  Smith  y.  Knnert,  116  N. 
W.  76,  78,  IT  N.  D.  120  (citing  Sutton  y.  Weg- 
ner,  43  N.  W.  107,  74  Wis.  847;  Tamer  ▼. 
NacbtBheim,  86  N.  W.  637,  71  Wis.  16;  La 
Oonrsltf  Y.  Rnssell,  52  N.  W.  176,  82  Wis. 
266;  Otiicago  ft  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  Y.  Faist,  58 
N.  W.  744,  87  Wis.  860;  Ittner  Y.  St  Lonis 
Exposition  &  Music  Hall  A8S*n,  11  8.  W.  58, 
97  Mo.  561;  People  y.  Peck  [N.  T.]  57  How. 
Prac  315;  Spence  v.  Simis,  33  N.  B.  554,  137 
N.  T.  617;  Salem  Traction  Go.  y.  Anson,  67 
Pic.  1015,  69  Pac.  675,  41  Or.  562 ;  Lewis  y. 
Snook,  84  N.  T.  Supp.  634,  88  App.  DIy.  343; 
Halg  Y.  Boyle,  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  816,  20  Misc. 
Bep.  155). 

The  statute  authorizing  references  does 
not  avp^j  to  an  action,  ex  delicto,  though 
there  may  be  a  great  number  of  items  in- 
volved, since  such  an  action  does  not  iuYOlYQ 
tbe  examination  of  a  long  account  as  con- 
templated by  the  statute.  Foster  y.  Missou- 
ri Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  128  S.  W.  36,  37, 143  Mo.  App. 
647. 

An  action  for  work  performed  and  mate- 
rial furnished  does  not  involve  a  "long  ac- 
count," within  the  meaning  of  New  York 
Code,  so  as  to  require  a  reference^  where  the 
work  done,  though  upon  43  different  apart^ 
ments  in  an  apartment  house  appears  to  have 
been  under  a  single  employment,  and  the 
only  work  spedfled  in  the  bill  of  particulars 
is  papering  and  kalsomlning,  and  none  of 
the  items  making  up  the  cJiarge  appears 
to  be  at  all  complex,  and  all  of  them  must  of 
necessity  haYe  been  of  the  same  general 
character.  Levine  y.  Boyal  State  Bank,  113 
N.  7.  Supp.  523,  61  Misc.  Bep.  226. 

A  complaint  alleged  that  between  Decem- 
ber and  the  following  May  plaintiff  rendered 
medical  services  for  defendant,  and  attached 
to  the  complaint  was  a  schedule  giving  the 
date  and  charge  for  ea^  visit  The  answer 
admitted  that  the  services  were  rendered,  but 
denied  the  dates  and  Yalues  of  the  Yisits,  and 
that  the  serYlces  were  rendered  as  set  fbrth 
in  the  sdiedule.  Held,  that  the  pleadings 
did  not  indicate  that  the  trial  would  neces- 
sarily iuYolYe  the  "examination  of  a  'long 
account,'"  within  Code  CflY.  Proc  f  1018, 
authorizing  a  comimlsory  reference  in  such 
a  case.  Fowler  y.  Peck,  09  N.  T.  Supp.  816, 
817,  51  Misc.  Kep.  645. 

Where  serYlces  relate  to  one  matter,  or 
can  be  grouped  into  so  few  separate  matters 
that  a  jury  can  easily  bear  them  in  mind,  a 
compulsory  referevKce  is  improper,  tor  numer^ 
OQs  Itemized  charges  for  one  matter  do  not 
loake  a  'long  account,"  within  the  meaning 
of  Code  aY.  Proa  f  1013»  anthorlxing  the 


eourt  to-  direct  a  mftaremoe,  upon  motion  eC 
either  party  without  the  consent  of  the  other 
where  the  trial  will  require  the  examination 
of  a  long  account  <m  either  side,  and  will  not 
require  the  decision  of  difficult  questions  of 
law ;  and  hence,  in  an  action  by  an  attorney 
for  services  and  disbursements,  where  the 
disbursements  are  inslgniflcant,  and  of  the 
25  separate  charges  for  services  3  are  retain- 
ers, and  the  remaining  22  relate  to  services 
performed  in  five  separate  matters,  not  com- 
plicated in  diaracter,  consisting  mainly  of 
consultations,  conferences,  and  negotiations 
of  settlements,  a  reference  should  be  refused. 
Russell  Y.  McDonald,  110  N.  T.  Supp.  050, 
951,  125  App.  DlY.  844. 

In  an  action  to  recover  part  of  the  price 
paid  for  shoes,  defendant  claimed  that  plain- 
tiff told  him  he  would  sell  him  the  shoes  at 
cost,  and  the  way  to  figure  the  cost  was  to 
divide  the  first  figure  marked  on  each  pair  of 
shoes  by  4,  and  add  5  to  the  next  figure,  and 
plaintiff  admitted  that  the  true  way  to  find 
the  cost  was  to  dlYlde  the  first  figure  by  4, 
bat  that  he  did  not  agree  to  sell  the  shoes  at 
cost,  but  at  50  cents  aboYO  cost,  which  was 
the  price  paid  by  defendant  Held  that,  un- 
der the  compulsory  reference  statute,  there 
was  no  long  account  involved  so  as  to  au- 
thorize a  reference.  Barger  y.  Beach,  127  S. 
W.  120,  121, 142  Mo.  App.  380. 

LOHG  AM 

Bee  As  Long  as;  So  Long  asL 

LOHG  OH 

In  the  parlance  of  the  stock  and  produce 
exchange,  to  say  that  one  was  "long  on  cot- 
ton" means  that  he  had  too  much  cotton. 
Whitley  Y.  Newman,  70  S.  HL  686^  690,  0  Ga. 
App.  80. 

LONG  PBIOB 

Tobacco  in  bond  is  sold  in  two  ways: 
At  the  "long  price,"  which  denotes  that  the 
duty  does  not  come  in  question  but  that  the 
goods  are  sold  at  a  flat  price  without  refer- 
ence to  duty;  and  "short  price"  is  that  the 
merchandise  and  tbe  duties  are  separated. 
Friend  y.  Rosenwald,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  701, 
702,  124  App.  Dlv.  226. 

LOHG  TIME 

In  a  suit  to  enjoin  the  alleged  illegal 
use  of  a  trade-name,  an  affidavit  that  com- 
plainant had  used  the  name  for  a  "long  time" 
is  too  indefinite  for  Judicial  action.  Charles 
R.  De  Bevoise  Co.  y.  H.  &  W.  Co.,  60  Atl. 
407,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  114. 

Where  the  owner  of  lots  wrote  real  es- 
tate agents  that  he  would  sell  the  lots  for  a 
glYen  price,  so  nfuch  cash,  and  the  baUutoe  on 
"long  time,"  the  agents  were  not  authorized 
to  seU  on  terms  whereby  notes  running  from 
one  to  four  years,  given  by  the  purchaser  for 
the  balance,  were  payable  "on  or  before"  cer- 
tain dates.    The  quoted  words  placed  in  each 


Xionra  tok 


184 


zxMm 


^t  tiie  noteir  gave  the  maker  die  priillefe  of 
paying  them  at  any  time  he  might  chooee, 
and  they  did  not  comply  with  the  terms  of 
the  authority,  because  they  were  not  lon^ 
time  notes.  Oolrln  y.  Blanchard,  100  8.  W. 
323,  825,  101  Tex.  281. 

LOK a  TON 

A  "long  ton"  is  a  ton  consisting  of  2,240 
pounds.  Hale  Broe.  t.  Mllllken,  80  Pac  866^ 
370,  5  Cal.  App.  344. 

LONGER  PERIOD  THAN  ONE  TEAR 

An  oral  lease  for  one  year,  the  term  to 
begin  a  day  or  two  in  the  future,  is  not  in- 
valid, under  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1903,  i  1238, 
subd.  5,  providing  that  an  agreement  for  the 
leasing  of  real  estate  "for  a  longer  period 
than  one  year,'*  or  some  note  or  memoran- 
dum thereof,  must  be  in  writing.  Paulton 
V.  Kr^ser,  101  N.  W.  46,  18  S.  D.  487,  5 
Ann.  Gas.  827. 

LOOK 

''A  man  does  not  discharge  his  duty  to 
*look'  out  for  cars  before  going  on  a  track  by 
looking  where  his  sight  is  obstructed."  Ris- 
sler  V.  St  Louis  Transit  Ck).,  87  S.  W.  578, 
579,  113  Mo.  App.  120. 

LOOKOUT 

The  word  "lookout,"  as  used  in  an  in- 
struction in  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  street 
car  passenger  in  jumping  from  a  car  to  es- 
cape an  imminent  collision  with  a  railroad 
train,  as  to  whether  such  street  car  com- 
pany kept  a  reasonably  daffident  lookout  for 
such  train,  was  used  in  a  sense  of  looking 
to  ascertain  the  coming  or  presence  of  a 
train.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Go.  v.  VoU- 
rath,  89  S.  W.  279,  283,  40  Tex.  Olv.  App.  46. 

A  "lookout"  is  only  one  of  the  many  pre- 
cautions which ,  a  prudent  navigator  should 
provide,  but  it  is  not  indispensable,  where, 
from  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  a  lookout 
could  not  possibly  have  been  of  service;  the 
object  being  to  discover  dangers  that  are  un- 
known, such  as  the  advance  of  an  approach- 
ing vessel  or  appearance  of  a  light  on  the 
coast,  the  discovery  of  a  dangerous  object, 
and  many  other  things,  the  existence  and 
presence  of  which  could  not  be  so  easily  and 
quickly  known  to  .the  pilot  as  to  the  person 
whose  sole  business  it  was  to  make  and  com- 
municate such  discoveries.  The  Pocomoke,. 
150  Fed.  193,  198  (quoting  and  adopting  defi- 
nition in  The  Farragut,  10  Wall.  [77  U.  SJ 
338,  19  L.  Ed.  940). 

LOOSE 

XiOOSE  BBAM 

Metal  beads  temporarily  strung  on  cot- 
ton cords  or  strtngs  for  the  purpose  of  facili- 
tating transportation  are  not  dutiable,  under 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11,  S  1,  Schedule 
N,  par.  408,  30  Stat  188,  as  loose  beads. 


Henvjr-flL  Itatrisenberg^Oo.  ▼«  United  States, 
27SUP.  et.>«l8,  at8^  aOtt  U.  fl.  224,  01  U 
Bd.  1084. 

LORD  CAMPBELL'S  ACT 

The  Bngllsh  Act  of  1S46  (SUts.  9  and  10 
Vict  c.  93)  is  commoniy  known  as  ''liord 
Campbell's  Act,"  and  related  ta  the  right 
to  recover  for  death  due  to  the  negUip^ice 
or  wrongful  act  of  another.  This  act  has 
served  as. a  model  for  all  subaequeot  legis- 
lation on  the  subject.  Oasey  t.  St  Louis 
Transit  Co.,  91  S.  W.  419,  421,  U6  Mo.  Appu 
235  (citing,  Hayes  v.  WilUama,  80  Paa  352, 
17  Colo.  465;  Oooley,  Torts  [2d  Bd.]  308). 

LOSE 

As  applied  to  property,  the  word  los^ 
ordinarily  refers  to  an  Involuntary,  not  a 
voluntary,  deprivation.  No  man  may  be  said 
to  have  lost  that  which  on  his  motion  he 
abandons  or  resigns,  and  In  common  speech 
the  repression  a  woman  "has  lost  her  hus- 
band" generally  iiefers  to  a  loss  by  death, 
and  not  to  a  voluntary  dlvoroe  by  the  wife. 
Snorgrass  ▼.  Oliomas,  150  S.  W.  106,  108,  166 
Mo.  App.  603  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases, 
p.  4237  et  seq.). 

To  'lose"  is  casually  and  Involuntarily 
to  part  with  the  possession,  so  that  the  mind 
has  no  impress  of,  and  can  have  no  recourse 
to,  the  event;  and,  if  the  property  is  found 
on  the  surface  of  the  earth,  the  conditions 
suggest  that  it  has  been  intentionally  aban- 
doned, and  as  such  has  returned  to  the  com- 
mon mass  of  things,  in  a  state  of  nature, 
which  belongs  to  the  first  occupant  or  find- 
er, the  owner  not  appearing ;  the  distinction 
between  "losing"  and  "abandonment"  being 
that  one  is  involuntary,  while  the  other  is 
by  intent  or  design.  But  the  result,  as  it 
relates  to  the  property,  is  practically  the 
same ;  the  owner  not  appearing  to  lay  claim 
to  it  In  the  one  case  the  finder  has  the 
right  to  the  possession  against  all  except  the 
true  owner.  In  the  other  he  acquires  the  ab- 
solute property  by  right  of  his  occupancy. 
It  is  the  presumption  of  abandonment  that 
obtains  until  the  owner  appears  and  claims 
the  property  that  gives  the  right  as  legal 
possessor  to  the  first  occupier ;  the  presump- 
tion being  disputable  by  the  rightful  owner. 
Such  presumption  or  inference  does  not  ob- 
tain as  to  property  intentionally  left  or  de- 
posited in  a  designated  place,  and  possibly 
forgotten  for  the  time  being,  as  the  loss  de- 
pends upon  eomething  more  than  knowledge 
or  ignorance,  or  the  memory  or  want  of  mem- 
ory of  the  owner  as  to  the  locality  at  any 
given  moment.  '■'In  such  case  the  taker  is 
not  Justified  in  conchading  tiiat  the  goods 
were  lost,  because  thei^  Is  little  d<»u^t  he 
must  httve  -belieted  that  the  owner  would 
know  where  to  find  them  again,  and  he  had 
no  pretense  to  consider  them  abandoned  or 
derelict"    And  where  (datntUt,  while  in  pos- 


liOSB  ▲  90MICIIJB 


186 


session  of  defendantfB  premlaet  nadir  a 
letse^  ^iaeo^ered  Hoh  spidmeDa  of  gold-bear- 
ing  qoarti  lying  oo  top  of  the  grofmd.  aad 
by  Inveatigatlon  he  dug  up  a  large  quantity 
of  such  quartz  found  lying  in  the  aM  un- 
connected with  any  ledge»  pocket,  placer,  or 
otber  natural  deposit,  the  quartE  being  im- 
bedded in  the  loose  surface  soil,  there  being 
also  evidences  of  a  sack  or  duck  cloth  in 
wbich  the  quartz  might  have  been  burled. 
Rich  quartz  was  not  *loet"  or  "abandoned 
property,"  and  therefore  belonged  to  the 
owner  of  the  soil,  aod  not  to  the  finder.  Feiv 
guson  V.  Ray,  77  Pac  600,  602,  44  Or.  057,  1 
L  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  477,  102  Am.  St  Bep.  648,  1 
Ann.  Cas.  1  (citing  1  Black.  Ck>m.  [Lewis'  Bd.] 
c  8,  •286,  296;  2  BL  Com.  [Lewis'  Ed.] 
c  26,  •402;  2  Kent,  Com.  ^36%;  McLaughlin 
V.  Waite  [N.  Y.]  6  Wend.  406,  21  Am.  Dec. 
232). 

LOBE  A  BOMZCILB 

*^o  lose  a  domicile,'  when  onoe  acquir- 
ed, there  must  be  an  intention  to  do  so.  A 
mere  change  of  the  place  of  abode,  however 
loDg  continued.  Is  not  sufficient,  unless  the 
proper  animus  or  intention  is  present  This 
Intention,  it  is  true,  may  be  inferred  from 
drcmnstances,  and  the  residence  may  be  of 
such  a  character  and  accompanied  by  such 
indices  of  a  permanent  home  that  the  law 
will  apply  to  the  facts  a  result  contrary  to 
the  actual  intention  of  the  party.  Thus  one 
cannot  make  a  permanent  fixed  commercial 
residence  with  all  the  surroundings  of  a 
permanent  home  in  one  place  and  a  domicile 
in  another  by  a  mere  mental  act  But  a 
residence  for  mere  pleasure  or  health  is  not 
regarded  as  of  any  great  weight  in  determin- 
ing the  question  of  a  change  of  domicile,  for 
Id  sudi  case  it  is  Just  as  likely  that  the  party 
intends  to  retain  as  to  abandon  his  present 
domldle."  Pickering  v.  Winch,  87  Pac.  768, 
767,  48  Or.  600,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  &)  1159. 

LOSE  AHAITD 

The  term  "lose  a  hand,"  in  the  consti- 
tution of  a  fraternal  benefit  association,  is 
nsed  in  its  ordinary  and  popular  sense,  and 
does  not  mean  that  there  must  be  a  total 
destruction  of  the  hand,  anatomically  speak- 
ing, but  that  the  loss  of  the  use  of  it  for  the 
purposes  to  which  a  hand  is  adapted  would 
be  a  loss  of  it  Sisson  v.  Supreme  Court  of 
Honor,  78  8.  W.  297,  290,  104  Hio.  App.  54. 

L08EB 

Cr.  Code,  f  162,  providhig  that  any  per- 
son who  siuOl  by  gaming  lose  and  pay  or  ae- 
Uver  to  any  person  any  sum  of  money  or 
other  valuable  tiling  may  recover  the  same, 
was  intended  to  afford  a  remedy  by  way  at 
restitatlon,  enabling  the  person  losing  to  le- 
cover  back  the  money  or  other  valuable  thing 
lost  and  the  'loeer"  is  the  pennn  to  v^om 
such  money  or  other  vsaluable  ttdng 
Ware  v.  Dnmont*  128  111.  App.  1^  6b 


See 


IiOSnia  FABTT 

An  appellant,  who  dlmtnawi  his  appeal 
after  bringing  the  cause  to  the  Appelate 
Court  and  causing  the  same  to  be  placed  on 
its  dockets,  on  procuring  a  aettlement  out 
of  court  from  the  appellee,  is  the  "losing 
party,'*  within  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  i  1837, 
imposing  a  docket  fee  of  |10  on  the  losing 
party.  Stafford  t.  ConweU,  75  N.  H  600,  36 
Ind.  App.  313. 

Bume*  Ann.  St  1906,  |  1894,  providing 
for  filing  a  petition  for  a  rehearing  by  any 
losing  party,  in  any  case  in  the  Appellate 
Court,  and,  after  such  petition  has  been  over- 
ruled, authorising  such  party  to  apply  for  a 
transfer  of  the  case  to  the  Supreme  Court 
on  the  ground  that  the  opinion  of  the  Appel- 
late Court  contravenes  ruling  precedents  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  is  a  remedial  statute, 
and  to  be  liberally  construed,  and  appellant 
is  a  "losing  party,"  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  has  been 
reversed,  if  the  reversal  was  based  on  the 
misconduct  of  counsel  for  appellee,  and  the 
ruling  upon  other  points  alleged  to  contra- 
vene ruling  precedents  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
makes  a  retrial  of  the  case  wholly  unavail- 
ing to  appellant  United  States  Cement  Co. 
V.  Cooper,  88  N.  B.  09^  70,  172  Ind.  599. 

LOSS 

See  Actual  Loss;  Constructive  Total 
Loss;  Direct  Loss;  Irreparable  Loss; 
Partial  Loss;  Pecuniary  Loss;  Proof 
of  Loss;  Tedndcal  T6tal  Loss;  Total 
Loss. 

"  *Loss*  is  a  relative  term.  A  failure  to 
keep  that  which  one  has  is  loss.'"  Foeh- 
renbach  v.  German-American  Title  &  Trust 
Co.,  66  AU.  561,  563,  217  Pa  331,  12  L.  R. 
A«  (N.  a)  466,  118  AUL  St  Bep.  916. 

The  word  "loss,"  as  used  in  Civ.  Code 
1895,  I  2629,  decUrlng  that  a  joint  intere^st 
in  the  profits  and  losses  sustained  by  the 
partnership^  means  something  more  than  the 
mere  failure  to  realise  profits.  Edwards  v. 
Hale,  68  S.  B.  817, 129  Ga.  802. 

"Loss,"  in  relation  to  fire  insurance,  re- 
fers to  the  damages  of  the  assured  measured 
in  money.  Stephenson  v.  Agricultural  Ins. 
Co.,  96  N.  W.  19,  21,  116  Wis.  277. 

Sand.  4  H.  Dig.  {  4133,  excludes  the  ap- 
plication of  the  insurance  laws  to  mutual  in- 
surance societies  conducted  upon  the  assess- 
ment plan,  but  requires  them  to  give  bond 
conditioned  for  the  prompt  payment  of  all 
assessments  to  tke  parties  entitled  thereto, 
and  makes  the  sureties  liable  for  any  viola- 
tion of  condittonB  thmsot  or  tx  any  **loss" 
to  the  peUcy  hoMeni,  asd  section  4124  re- 
quires all  fire^  etc,  imnunnee  companies  to 
give  bond  conditioned  for  the  prompt  payment 


L08B 


186 


L06SBT  THIOrC 


of  all  claims.  Held,  that  the  sureties  on  a 
bond  given  and  conditioned  nnder  section  4133 
are  not  required  to  pay  the  loss  absolutely. 
The  word  "loss,'*  as  used  in  section  4133, 
means  such  a  loss  as  would  accrue  to  policy 
holders  if  the  assessments  were  not  prompt- 
ly paid  over,  and  hence  the  obligation  of  the 
sureties  ceases  when  the  assessments  are  col- 
lected and  paid  over  promptly.  Ingle  v. 
BatesviUe  Grocery  Go.,  117  S.  W.  241,  243,  89 
Ark.  878. 

A  policy  insuring  a  vessel  against  "loss 
sustained  by  collision"  with  another  vessel  is 
identical  with  one  insurjlng  it  against  the 
risk  of  collision  sustained.  Bumham  v.  China 
Mut  Ins.  Ck>.,  76  N.  B.  74,  189  Mass.  100,  109 
AuL  St  Rep.  627. 

A  liability  insurance  policy  provided 
that  no  action  should  lie  thereunder,  unless 
brought  to  reimburse  insured  for  loss  actual- 
ly sustained  and  paid  by  him  in  satisfaction 
of  a  judgment  after  trial  of  the  issue.  An 
employ^  recovered  Judgment  against  the  in- 
sured for  personal  injuries,  and  release  there- 
of was  obtained  by  giving  insured's  note 
for  the  amount  of  the  Judgment,  in  full  sat- 
isfaction thereof.  Held,  that  there  was  a 
"loss"  within  the  meaning  of  the  policy  which 
would  support  an  action  thereunder,  not- 
withstanding the  possibility  of  insured's  in- 
solvency or  of  compromise  for  less  than  the 
amount  of  liability  under  the  policy.  Seattle 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Maryland  Casualty 
Co.,  96  Pac  609, 610,  60  Wash.  44, 18  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  S.)  121. 

The  words  "loss  or  damage,"  in  the  pro- 
vision in  the  contract  of  defendant  railway 
company  to  carry  goods  to  Boston  by  its  own 
and  specified  connecting  lines,  and  of  a 
steamship  company  to  carry  the  goods  from 
Boston  to  Liverpool:  "No  carrier  shall  be 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  not  occurring  on  its 
road  or  its  portion  of  the  through  route,  nor 
after  said  property  is  ready  for  delivery  to 
the  next  carrier.  •  •  •  The  amount  of 
any  loss  or  damage  for  which  any  carrier  be- 
comes liable  shall  be  computed  at  the  value 
of  the  property  at  place  and  time  of  ship- 
ment"— and  according  to  which  claims  for 
loss  or  damage  must  be  made  within  a  cer- 
tain time  after  delivery  or  time  therefor,  are 
limited  to  loss  of  or  injury  to  the  property, 
and  do  not  include  damages  for  loss  of  a  mar- 
ket because  of  delay  in  transportation.  John- 
son V.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas,  96 
N.  y.  Supp.  182.  186,  107  App.  Dlv.  374. 

A  provision  in  a  live  stodE  shipment  con- 
tract, requiring  the  shipper  to  give  notice  in 
writing  of  any  claim  for  loss  or  Injury  to  the 
stodk  before  its  removal  from  the.  place,  of 
destination,  is  limited  to  loss  or  injury  aris- 
ing during  tran^)ortation,  and  does  not  ap- 
ply to  a  daim  for  loss  caused  by  a  falling 
market  during  delayed  transportation.  Estes 
V.  Denver  &  R.  Q.  R.  Co.,  118  Pac  1005,  1007, 
49  Colo.  378. 


]hunas«  syaon7aui«s 

Damage  means  "lost*';  eompemnitlon 
would  be  inadequate  that  did  not  cover  the 
loss  sustained.  Turner  r.  Woodward,  ffl  8. 
E.  762,  128  Ga.  866; 

It  is  not  error  for  the  court  in  its  in- 
structions to  use  the  words  '^loss*'  and  "dam- 
age" interchangeably.  Turner  v.  Woodward. 
61  S.  E.  762,  123  6a.  866. 

I^estmotlttm  syaonyMows 
Under  Code  Civ.  Proc  SS  1866,  1937,  pro- 
viding for  secondary  proof  of  *'loo"  of  writ- 
ten instruments,  the  term  "loss"  is  not  oyn- 
onymous  with  destruction,  for,  in  the  case  of 
destruction,  loss  would  necessarily  follow, 
but  not  so  in  case  of  loss.  "The  instrument 
may  be  lost  for  all  practical  purposes  of  the 
trial  when  it  cannot  be  found  after  diligent 
search,  and  yet  it  may  exist  We  do  not 
think  that  reasonable  diligence  in  making 
the  search  should  require  the  exploration  of 
all  possible  places  where  the  instrument 
might  be."  King  v.  Samuel,  98  Pac  391,  395. 
7  Cal.  App.  66. 

Injury  dUsttngnlslied 

The  phrases  "loss  of  property^  and  "in- 
Jury  to  property"  are  not  synonymous.  The 
one  means  a  total  destruction  of  property 
and  the  other  partial  destruction  of  property. 
Nelson  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  72  Pac.  6^ 
648,  28  Mont  297. 

LOSS  BT  FIBS 

In  an  insurance  policy  covering  loss  or 
damage  by  fire,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
damage  shall  be  occasioned  by  direct  contact 
with  the  fire.  To  render  the  fire  the  imme- 
diate or  proximate  cause  of  the  damage,  it  Is 
not  necessary  that  any  part  of  the  insured 
property  actually  ignited  or  was  consumed 
by  the  fire.  Where  a  building  and  machinery 
used  for  generating  electricity  for  electric 
lighting  was  insured  against  loss  or  damage 
by  fire,  and  a  fire  occurred  which  caused  a 
short  circuit  of  the  electric  current  resulting 
in  damage  to  certain  machinery  in  the  build- 
ing not  reached  by  the  fire,  the  injury  to  the 
machinery  was  a  "loss  or  damage  by  fire," 
within  the  meaning  of  the  policy.  Russell  v. 
German  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  N.  W.  400,  403, 100 
Minn.  628,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  326  (citing 
Lynn  Gas  ft  Electric  Co.  v.  Meriden  Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  83  N.  E.  690,  168  Mass.  670,  20  L. 
R.  A.  297,  35  Am.  St  Rep.  640). 

LOSS  BT  THEFT 

A  policy  of  fire  insurance  providing  that 
the  company  shall  not  be  liable  for  loss  caus- 
ed directly  or  indirectly  "by  theft"  or  by  neg- 
lect of  insured  to  use  all  reasonable  means 
to  save  and  preserve  the  property  at  and  aft- 
er a  fire,  etc,  includes  theft  committed  dur- 
ing the  fire  or  when  the  goods  are  exposed 
as  a  consequence  of  a  fire.  Sklencher  v.  Fire 
Ass'n  of  FUiadelphia,  60  AtL  232,  72  N.  J. 
Law,  4&     . 


IiOBS  OF  ODMBORTIUM 


187 


UOGBEB 


L088  OF  CM>N80BTXW 

The  ^'l088  of  consortium*'  Is  a  depriva- 
tion of  the  full  Bodety,  affection,  and  as- 
slstance  to  which  a  wife  is  entitled.  Angell 
▼.  Reynolds,  68  Ati.  625,  626,  26  R.  1. 160,  106 
Am.  St  Bep.  707. 

LOSS  OF  CONTBOIi 

"Such  a  movement  of  a  team*  as  would 
not  be  uncommon,  is  not  necessarily  a  loss  of 
control.' "  Horses  are  not  considered  beyond 
the  control  of  their  driver  when  they  mere- 
ly aby  or  start,  or  for  a  moment  have  their 
own  way.  Johnson  v.  City  of  Blarquette,  117 
N.  W.  668.  660, 154  Mich.  60. 

LOSS  OF  SABimros 

See  Future  horn  of  Bsmlngs. . 

The  term  "loss  o(.  eandngs,'*  as  used  in 
a  chaise,  in  a  persona^  tojury  action  against 
a  street  car  company,  that  plaintiff's  dam- 
ages, if  any,  should  be  assessed  at  such  sum 
as  would  be  a  reasonable  pecuniary  compen- 
sation to  him  for  all  "loss  of  earnings,"  re- 
ferred to  such  loss  of  earnings  as  plaintiff 
had  sustained  by  reason  of  his  injuries  up 
to  the  time  of  trial«  and  not  those  that  he 
would  probably  lose  in  the  future,  so  as  to  be 
erroneous,  where  the  petition  only  charged 
diminished  earning  capacity^  without  any  ac- 
tual past  loss  of  earnings.  Dallas  Consol. 
Electric  St  By.  CJo.  v.  Hardy  (Tex.)  86  S.  W. 
1053,  1064. 

LOSS  OF  LIMB 

See,  also,  Lost 

A  beneficial  certificate  entitling  the  mdm- 
ber  to  one-fourth  of  his  benefit  if  he  should 
"lose  a  foot,"  does  not  mean  that  there  must 
be  a  severance  of  the  foot  ftom  the  body,  but 
means  a  permanent  loss  of  use  of  the  foot; 
the  language  'loss  of  a  foot"  in  common  par- 
lance meaning  the  loss  of  the  use  of  that 
member.  Modem  Order  of  Pretorians  v. 
Taylor  (Tex.)  127  S.  W.  260,  261. 

Injuring  a  hand  to  the  extent  that  it  be- 
comes useless  as  a  hand  is  "loss  of  the  hand," 
within  the  meaning  of  an  accident  policy, 
though  the  injury  does  not  require  amputa- 
tion of  the  hand  above  the  wrist  Lord  v. 
American  Mut  Ace.  Ass*n,  61  N.  W.  293,  294, 
88  Wis.  19,  26  li.  E.  A.  741,  46  Am.  St  Rep. 
815. 

The  term  "loss  of  a  hand"  may  be  ap- 
plicable to  an  injury  where  the  use  of.  the 
hand  is  destroyed,  and  in  the  case  of  a  "loss'* 
of  both  feet»  the  term,  may  cover  loss  of  the 
use  of  the  feet  by  paralysis.  Fishbum  v. 
Burlington  ft  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  103  N.  W.  481, 
488,  127  Iowa,  483  (citing  definition  in  Sneck 
T.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  545, 
88  Hun,  94;  Lord  v.  American  Mut  Ace. 
As8*n,  61  N.  W.  28»,  89  Wis.  19,  26  L.  R.  A. 
741,  46  Am.  St  Rep.  815;  Sheanon  v.  Pacific 
Mut  Life  Ins.  Co..  46  N.  W.  799,  77  Wis.  618, 
9  L.  R.  A.  685,  20  Am.  St  Rep.  15D* 


X1O88  OF  BSRTt 

An  insurance  policy  which  covers  loss  of 
rents  includes  loss  of  income  where  the  prem- 
ises iti  question  were  not  demised  for  a  spe- 
dflc  term.  Gray  v.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  of 
Newark,  125  lU.  App.  870,  372. 

Z.08S  OF  TIME 

"Loss  of  time,"  as  an  element  of  damages 
for  a  personal  injury  means  time  totally  lost 
because  of  the  inability  of  the  Injured  person 
to  follow  any  wage-earning  occupation  and 
is  more  than  the  impairment  of  the  power 
to  earn  money,  as  "impairment"  implies  that 
he  can  perform  some  services  and  his  ability 
to  earn  money,  though  reduced,  is  not  total- 
ly destroyed.  .Blue  Grass  Tractio^  Co*  v. 
Ingles,  181  S.  W.  278,  281, 140  Ky.  488. 

An  averment  of  "loss  of  time,"  in  a  pet^ 
tion  for  negllgsnt  injuries,  is  the  same  in  le- 
gal effect  as  an  avement  of  "loss  of  earn- 
ings." SchoU  V.  Grayson,  127  S.  W.  4U5,  417, 
147  Mo.  Ai^..652.  . 

The  law  tveats  "loss  of  time,"  generally 
q;)eahing,  as  synonymous  with  "the  loss  of 
those  earnings  which  accrue  from  employing 
time  in  labor  or  business."  Wall  v.  Conti- 
nental Casualty  Co.,. 86  &  W.  491,  499,  Ul 
Mo.  Ai^.  504. 

An  accident  policy  Insuring  one  against 
injury  necessarily  resulting  in  "loss  of  time" 
arising  firom  inability  to  engage  in  any  busi- 
ness insures  against  such  a  "loss  of  time"  as 
immediately  arises  from  an  inability  to  work, 
and  an  accident  and  an  injury  do  not  affect 
the  policy  unless  there  is  a  "loss  of  time," 
and  it  must  be  a  "loss  of  time"  which  is  at 
once  followed,  or  which  Is  at  once  caused  by 
the  inability  to  work,  and  the  Insurer  is  lia- 
ble for  disability  resulting  from  plaintifTs  in- 
jury, though  loss  of  time  does  not  immedi- 
ately follow  it  Baumister  v.  Continental 
Casualty  Co.,  101  S.  W.  152, 163, 124  Mo.  App. 


LOSS  THROUGH  HIS  l^EAVJXa 

An  agreement  by  a  third  person  to  be- 
come bound  in  a  specified  sum,  in  case  an  em- 
ploy6  left  his  master  during  a  certain  season 
and  the  master  sustained  loss  through  his 
leaving,  did  not  render  the  third  person  liable 
for  a  defalcation  by  the  employ^;  for  the 
words  "sustained  loss  through  his  leaving" 
must  be  read  in  connection  with  what  im- 
mediately precedes,  and,  when  so  read,  they 
refer  to  the  direct  pecuniary  loss  that  may 
be  suffered  as  the  result  of  the  employe's 
leaving  the  employment  during  the  period  of 
his  employment  Freeman  v.  Waxman,  88 
N.  Y.  Supp.  129,  130,  43  Misc.  Rep.  656. 

Z.08SBS 

See  Claim  tor  Losses. 
All  other  losses,  see  All  Other. 
Sharing  losses  as  constituting  partner- 
ship, see  Partnership. 


L08SBS  OF  BUSINESS 


188 


UOT 


LOSSES  OF  BUBINEBS 

The  "losses**  of  a  business  necessarily 
Include  such  accounts  as  axe  bad  and  uncol* 
lectible.  Crawford  T.  GaUdnfl,  136  N.  W.  860, 
870,  170  MIdL  687. 

LOST 

The  law  exempting  those  from  payment 
of  a  poll  tax  who  hare  "lost"  a  hand  or  foot 
does  not  exempt  one  who  has  lost  part  of  his 
fingers  or  whose  foot  is  useless.  The  word 
**lost**  must  be  taken  in  its  ordinary  acc^h 
tatlon,  and,  when  we  speak  of  a  person  los- 
ing a  limb,  we  mean  that  It  is  gone,  and  not 
that  it  is  injured  or  mutilated.  A  man  may 
lose  the  use  of  a  limb  and  not  lose  the  Itmb. 
If  the  word  "lost,**  as  used  in  the  statute,  is 
held  to  mean  the  absence  of  three  fingers,  it 
could  be  held  to  mean  the  losa  of  one  finger, 
and  so  on.  Big^am  t.  Glubb,  96  8.  W.  676^ 
677,  42  Tex.  Oiv.  Appi  812. 

'  deposits 

The  word  "lost,**  as  used  in  the  banking 
law,  providing  that  if  any  baidcer  shall  fraud- 
ulently receive  any  money,  etc.,  of  a  person 
not  indebted  to  him  at  a  time  when  he  is  in- 
solvent whereby  the  deposit  shall  be  "lost** 
to  the  depositor,  the  banker  shall  be  guilty 
of  embezzlement,  etc.,  means  a  deprivation 
of  the  use  of  the  deposit  or  some  part  there- 
of which  may  occur,  though  the  estate  is 
found  ultimately  sufildent  to  pay  all  debts. 
State  V.  Krasher,  88  N.  B.  488,  500,  170  Ind. 
48. 

LOST  AXX  HOPS  OF  BBOOVBRT 

The  words  of  the  statute  **lost  all  hope  of 
recovery,*'  relating  to  dying  declarations 
mean  that  it  is  a  belief  of  the  declarant  in 
death  which  excludes  any  hope  of  recovery. 
Graven  v.  State,  00  S.  W.  311,  48  Tex.  Or.  R. 
78,  122  Am.  St  Rep.  789. 

I.OST  COBHEB 

Section  2  of  a  circular  of  the  United 
States  General  Land  Office  relative  to  the 
restoration  of  lost  or  obliterated  comers  de- 
fines an  ''obliterated  comer"  as  one  where 
no  visible  evidence  remains  of  the  work  of 
the  original  surveyor  in  establishing  it;  and 
defines  a  "lost  comer**  as  one^  the  position  of 
which  cannot  be  determined  beyond  reason- 
able doubt,  either  from  original  or  reliable 
marks  or  reliable  external  evidence^  Graven 
V.  Lesh,  126  Pac.  774,  776»  22  Idaho,  468. 

XiOST  HER  BCUSBAHB 

As  applied  to  property,  the  word  'lose*' 
ordinarily  refers  to  an  involuntary,  not  a 
voluntary,  deprivation.  No  man  may  be  said 
to  have  lost  that  which  on  his  motion  he 
abandons  or  resigns,  and  in  common  speech 
the  expression  a  woman  "has  lost  her  hus- 
band*' generally  refers  to  a  loss  by  death, 
and  not  to  a  voluntary  divorce  by  the  wife. 
Snorgrass  v.  Thomas,  160  S.  W.  106, 106,  166 
Mo.  App.  608  (citing  5  Words  ft  Phrases,  p. 
4237  et  seq.). 


XiOBT  FBOFBBVT 

AeddentiUy  leaving  goods  in  a  particu- 
lar place  l«  not  a  case  of  "lost  property," 
and  the  taking  would  be  from  the  owner's 
posscsiBioa.  Moxle  v.  States  114  &  W.  375, 
378,  64  Tex.  Gr.  R.  628  (dtlng  Statom  v. 
State,  8  Tex.  App.  273). 

Property  to  be  "lost*'  must  have  been 
unintentimially  or  involuntarily  parted  with, 
and  money  discovered  in  the  highway  or  on 
the  ground  or  the  floor  will  be  considered  as 
having  been  casuaUy  and  unknowingly  drop- 
ped, and  thus  lost;  but  where  it  is  Intention- 
ally put  down,  as  in  a  drawer  or  on  a  table, 
and  the  owner  forgets  where  he  left  it  and 
cannot  find  it,  it  is  not  in  a  legal  sense  lost 
Booster  v.  Fidelity  Safe  Deposit  Go.,  146  S. 
W.  138,  142,  162  Mo.  App.  166. 

Treaswe  troTe  distlacvished 

"At  common  law  a  distinction  was  made 
between  lost  property  and  treasure  trove. 
Lost  property  was  such  as  was  found  on  the 
surface  of  the  earth,  and  with  which  the 
owner  had  involuntarily  parted.  The  pre- 
sumption arising  from  the  place  of  finding 
was  that  the  owner  had  intended  to  aban- 
don his  property,  and  that  it  had  gone  back 
to  the  original  stock,  and  therefore  belonged 
to  the  finder  or  first  taker,  until  the  owner 
appeared  and  showed  that  its  losing  was  ac- 
cidental, or  without  an  intention  to  aban- 
don the  property.  Treasure  trove,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  money  or  coin  fbund  hid- 
den or  secreted  in  the  earth  or  other  pri- 
vate place;  the  owner  being  unknown.  It 
originally  belonged  to  the  finder,  if  the  own- 
er was  not  discovered,  bat  Blackstone  says 
it  was  afterwards  adjudged  expedient,  for 
the  purposes  of  state,  and  particularly  for 
the  coinage,  that  it  should  go  to  the  king; 
and  so  ttie  rule  was  promulgated  that  prop- 
erty found  on  the  surface  of  the  earth  be- 
longed to  the  finder  untU  the  owner  ap- 
peared, but  that  found  hidden  in  the  earth 
belonged  to  the  king.  (1  BL  Gonun.  *285.) 
In  this  country  the  law  relating  to  treas- 
ure trove  has  generally  been  merged  into 
the  law  of  the  finder  of  lost  property,  and 
it  is  said  that  the  question  as  to  whether 
the  English  law  of  treasure  trove  obtains 
in  any  state  has  never  been  decided  in  Amer- 
ica." Danielson  v.  Roberts,  74  Pac.  813,  914. 
44  Or.  108,  66  U  B.  A.  626, 102  Am.  St  Bep. 
627. 

LOT 

See  Building  Lot;  Oity  Lot;  Bntlre 
Width  of  Lot;  Equal  Apportionment 
by  Lot;  One  Lot;  Small  Lot;  Town 
and  Village  Lots. 

My  house  and  lot,  see  My. 

As  ezpresslTe  of  amamtttj 

A  "lot"  sometimes  means  a  great  deal, 
but  as  used  In  a  confession,  stating  that  a 
short  time  before  the  alleged  ciime  defend- 


LOT 


188 


IiOT 


ant  drank  a  "tor  of  bmekbarry  wUm  wlft^ 
oat  aajlng  bow  much  or  wbat  affect  it  hmd 
on  blm,  it  l8  too  Indefinite  onld  imeAtMae* 
tory  to  anthotlae  an  instruction  on  the  ef- 
fect of  drankennesa  State  ▼.  Chnicli,  08  & 
W.  16,  17,  24,  IM  Mo.  005. 

Tbe  word  ''lot,"  as  nsed  in  an  agreement 
nnder  which  a  party  purchased  a  quantity 
of  apricots  in  the  following  words:  'This 
agreement  made  by  and  between  the  J.  K. 
A.  Co.  and  ttie  0.  Fmit  Company,  witness- 
eth:  That  ttie  said  J.  K.  A.  Oo.  has  this 
day  sold  and  the  said  6.  Fruit  Company  has 
this  day  bought  twenty-fl^e  hundred  boxes 
apricots,  more  or  less,  consistinf  of:  Lot  A, 
287 1)0X66,  tot  K,  104  boxes*  lot  O,  1400  box- 
es, lot  E,  715  boxes  at  seven  (7)  cents  per 
pound  plus  one  per  cent,  net  cash  f  .  o.  b. 
cars  at  Pomoaa«  on  swrtender  of  biil  of  lad- 
iDg;  shipment  to  be  made  during  die  month 
of  October,  1901**—  iM  not  an  asiblguoas  word 
of  warranty,  but  a  word  used  solely  to  de- 
serike  and  Identify.  AU  definitions  of  the 
wotd  display'  its  deviTation  from  "shaie^  per- 
tton,  or  paie^"  Neither  tbe  grammatical 
construction  of  the  language  used  in  the  con- 
tract nor  the  definition  giyen  to  the  word  by 
the  lexicograi^ierB  Justifies  attributing  to  It 
a  meaning  wMch  imports  quality  or  warran- 
ty and  to  hold  that  the  words,  lot  A,  287 
boxes,"  oonsidered  either  in  tiielr  ordinary 
use  or  as  used  in  a  eommerdal  way,  relate 
to  warranty,  rather  than  idoittflcatlon,  would 
do  violence  to  the  use  of  language.  German 
Frait  Oo.  T.  J.  K.  Armsley  Ckk,  00  Pac  819, 
822,  108  Oal.  686. 

As  dlstlnat  ov  sopasate  povtliMS  of  land 

Milwaukee  City  Charter  (Laws  1874,  a 
184)  subc.  7,  S  8»  authorizing  the  board  of 
pubUc  works  to  assess  the  damages  to  lots 
which  they  deemed  benefited  by  a  change  of 
the  street  grade,  and  section  7,  speaking  of 
soch  lots  as  lots  fronting  on  the  Improve- 
ment,  do  not  Undt  such  an  award  of  dam- 
ages to  platted  lots  abutting  on  the  improve* 
ment,  since  parcels  forming  a  distinct  home- 
stead or  other  indosure,  messuage,  or  unit 
of  property  fronting  on  the  improvement, 
bat  laid  out,  occupied,  or  inclosed  without 
regard  to  platted  lines,  may  constitute  a 
**lot"  fronting  on  the  improvement  Schmidt 
▼.  City  of  MUwaukee,  136  N.  W.  868,  887, 
149  Wis.  307. 

Laws  1890,  p.  376,  a  132,  |  32»  provides 
that  the  assessor  shall  actually  view  when 
practicable  and  determine  the  true  and  full 
Talue  of  each  **lot"  of  real  property  listed 
for  taxation  and  shall  enter  the  valve  there- 
of in  one  column,  etc.,  and  the  statutes  far- 
ther provide  that  the  term  "tractf*  or  *aot" 
and  "piece**  or  "parcel  of  real  property/' 
and  ''piece"  or  "parcel  of  land,"  whenever 
used  in  the  act  relating  to  revenue  and  tax- 
ation, shall  be  held  to  mean  any  eondguoas 
quantity  of  land  in  the  possession,  owned 
by,  or  recorded  as  the  property  of»  the  same 


dalmaa^  pavsoa,  or  company.  Held,  that 
uttAar  the  statutea  smaller  tracts  or  subdivi- 
slooa  composing  a  larger  tract  could  not  be 
assessed  as  one  tract,  where  the  land  was 
owned  by  different  persons  under  recorded 
titlea  or  in  joint  ownership,  and  asseasnients 
in  one  tract  of  different  ownershi];is  or  es- 
tatea  in  different  tracts  seem  to  be  inhibited 
where  the  different  titles  are  of  record. 
State  Finance  Co.  v.  Myers,  112  N.  W.  7d,  78, 
16  N.  D.  Ids. 

Xatprovameats 

The  words  "lot,"  "piece,'*  and  "parcel" 
apply  peculiarly  to  the  hind  itself,  and  are 
never  employed  to  describe  improvementa 
Canty  v.  Btaley,  128  Paa  262,  264,  102  Cal. 
879. 

That  an  advertisement  of  a  mortgage 
sale  described  the  premises  to  be  sold  as 
"lots,"  without  mentioning  the  improvements 
upon  them,  was  not  a  good  objection  to  con- 
firmation of  the  sale  if  the  inrice  was  not 
grossly  inadequate.  Guarantee  Trust  Sc  Safe 
Deposit  Co.  V.  Jenkins,  2  Atl.  18,  15,  40  N. 
J.  Bq.  461. 

Aa  ylattod  lots  ov  Moeks 

The  ordinary  meaning  of  the  term  "lot," 
when  used  with  reference  to  a  town  or  city 
property,  is  a  subdivision  of  a  block  accord- 
ing to  the  map  or  survey  of  such  town  or 
dty.  A  statute  relative  to  disconnecting  ter- 
ritory from  a  town  provided  that  it  must 
appear  that  no  part  of  the  territory  has  been 
platted  into  lots  and  blocks  as  part  of  the 
town.  Held,  that  where  the  territory  in 
question  constituted  a  portion  of  a  subdi- 
vision of  the  town  included  in  the  town  site 
at  the  time  of  the  incorporation,  and  the 
plat  of  the  subdivision  showed  the  streets 
of  the  town  proper  running  east  and  west, 
and  each  alternate  street  running  north  and 
south  laid  out  through  the  subdivision,  and 
the  spaces  between  the  streets  divided  into 
parcels  of  various  dimensions,  the  parcels 
being  numbered,  the  territory  eould  not  be 
disconnected;  it  being  platted  into  lots  and 
blocksL  Town  of  Fruita  v.  Williams,  60  Pac. 
182,  188,  83  Colo.  167. 

The  ordinary  meaning  of  the  word  "lot,** 
when  used  with  reference  to  town  or  city 
property  is  a  subdivision  of  a  block  accord- 
ing to  the  map  or  survey  of  such  city,  and 
so  Acts  1869,  p.  184,  c.  122  (Burns*  Ann.  St 
1901,  S  4394),  entiUed  "An  act  to  compel 
owners  of  town  lots  to  grade  and  pave  or 
plank  sidewalks,  and  providing  for  proceed- 
ings to  compel  the  same,"  does  not  authorize 
the  fixing  of  a  lien  for  such  paving  on  large 
tracts  of  land.  Town  of  Greendale  v.  Suit, 
71  N.  a  668,  669,  163  Ind.  282. 

A  dty  charter  defined  the  term  "lot,"  as 
used  in  connection  with  the  establishment 
of  assessment  districts  for  street  Improve- 
ments, to  mean  lots  shown  by  recorded  plats 
of  additions  or  subdivisions,  but,  if  there  were 


LOT 


190 


liOT 


no  Bu<di  recorded  plat,  or  if  the  ovner  bad 
disregarded  the  lots  as  platted,  the  whole 
plat  should  be  treated  as  one  lot  The  allots 
ment  of  portions  of  a  tract  in  the  surrey  of 
a  partition  snit,  and  the  recording  of  snch 
allotments  with  the  commissioner's  deed,  did 
not  constitute  a  division  of  the  lots  by  re- 
corded plat,  as  contemplated  by  the  char- 
ter ;  the  allotment  not  having  been  approved 
by  the  board  of  public  Improvements,  nor  re- 
corded in  the  platbook  in  the  recorder's  office. 
Collier's  Estate  v.  Western  Paving  ft  Supply 
Co.,  79  S.  W.  947,  953,  180  Mo.  362. 

St  Louis  aty  Charter,  art  0,  1 14,  with 
reference  to  the  establishment  of  special  as- 
sessment districts,  provides  that,  if  the  prop- 
erty adjoining  the  street  to  be  improved  is 
divided  into  lots,  the  district  line  shall  be 
so  drawn  as  to  include  the  entire  depth  of 
all  lots  fronting  on  the  street  to  be  improv- 
ed, etc.  It  also  declares  that  the  word  'lot" 
shall  mean  the  lot  as  shown  by  recorded 
plats  of  additions  or  subdivisions,  but  if 
there  be  no  such  recorded  plat,  or  if  the 
owners  of  property  have  disregarded  the 
lines  of  lots  as  platted,  and  have  treated  two 
or  more  lots  or  fractions  thereof  as  one,  then 
the  whole  parcel  of  ground  or  lots  so  treat- 
ed as  one  shall  be  regarded  as  a  lot  for  the 
purpose  of  the  creation  of  the  assessment 
district  Held,  that  the  term  "lot"  as  so 
used  was  not  limited  to  a  platted  lot;  and 
hence,  where  original  platted  lots  are  divid- 
ed either  by  deed  or  by  distinct  use,  each  of 
such  subdivisions  constitutes  a  lot  within 
such  charter  provision.  State  ex.  reL  Skrain- 
ka  Const  Co.  v.  City  of  St  Louis,  111  S.  W. 
89,  94,  211  Mo.  591. 

Comp.  Laws,  |  10,710,  as  amended,  lim- 
its the  area  of  land  to  which  a  mechanic's 
lien  attaches  to  the  "lot"  or  tract  upon 
which  the  improved  structure  is  erected,  not 
exceeding  160  acres  of  rural  land,  or  the 
"lot  or  lots"  upon  which  the  Improvement 
is  made  if  in  a  city.  Held,  that  the  term 
"lot  or  lots"  refers  to  surveyed  lots  conform- 
ing to  a  plat  Adams  v.  Central  City  Gran- 
ite Brick  ft  Block  Co.,  117  N.  W.  932,  935, 
154  Mich.  448,  129  Am.  St  Rep.  484. 

A  lot  owner,  to  be  entitled  to  an  award 
of  damages  on  account  of  the  grading  of  a 
public  street,  must  show  that  his  lots  abut 
on  that  part  of  the  street  graded;  but  the 
term  "lot"  does  not  mean  necessarily  the 
platted  lot  In  determining  whether  a  given 
area  of  land  which  does  not  directly  border 
on  a  graded  street  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
part  of  the  abutting  land  for  the  purpose  of 
awarding  damages  for  a  change  of  the  grade, 
all  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the 
particular  situation  should  be  considered  in 
ascertaining  whether  the  area  in  question  is 
so  identified  with  the  intervening  land  un- 
der common  ownership  that  the  two  cannot 
be  separated  in  use  without  Injury  to  the 
value  of  each.     Where  plaintiff  owned  two 


lots  on  a  comer  of  two  streets,  botli  lots 
being  divided  by  the  recorded  plats  into  In- 
dependent subdivisions,  and  both  were  sep- 
arately acquired  and  improved,  plalntUT  was 
not  entitled  to  an  award  of  damages  to  the 
inside  lot  for  an  alleged  change  of  grade 
of  the  street  on  which  it  did  not  abut  Bur- 
de  V.  City  of  St  Joseph,  110  S.  W.  27,  28. 130 
Mo.  App.  463. 

Const  art  16,  {  51,  provides  that  a  ru- 
ral homestead  shall  consist  of  not  more  than 
200  acres,  and  that  an  urban  homestead  shall 
consist  of  a  "lot  or  lots"  not  to  exceed  in 
value  $5,000.  Land,  designated  as  a  lot  in  a 
particular  block  in  the  dty  plan,  and  within 
the  limits  of  a  city»  was  purchased  and  used 
for  a  residence  in  connection  with  the  own- 
er's business  as  a  merchant,  and  afterwards 
the  owner  purchased  land  adjoining  his  resi- 
denoe  property*  but  s^jiarated  from  it  by  the 
city's  limits  as  generally  recognized,  which 
he  used  for  pasturing  the  family  horses  or 
cattle,  and  for  raising  pvoducts  for  home 
consumption;  both  lots  b^ng  valued  at  leas 
than  the  constitutional  limit  for  .urban  home- 
steads. The  dty  exercised  no  jurisdiction 
over  soch  tract  and  levied  no  taxes  thereon, 
nor  was  it  rendered  for  dty  taxation.  Held, 
that  the  term  "lot  or  lots"  must  be  taken  la 
its  popular  sense,  and  did  not  embrace  land 
within  the  limits  of  the  corporation  not  con- 
nected with  the  plan  of  the  dty;  th&t  the 
original  homestead  was  urban  in  character, 
and  the  later  acquisition  was  rural;  and 
that,  as  there  could  be  no  blending  of  urban 
and  rural  homesteads,  the  tract  last  pur- 
chased was  not  a  part  of  the  owner's  home- 
stead, and  hence  was  subject  to  foredosure 
under  a  deed  of  trust  First  Nat  Bank  v. 
Litdifleld  (Tex.)  144  a  W.  85Q,  362. 

PvUie  street 

See,  also.  Lots,  Blocks,  Tracts,  and  Par- 
cels of  Land. 

That  the  fee  of  the  street  where  a  rail- 
road bridge  is  built  across  it,  together  with 
the  fee  thereof  between  that  point  and  a  dis- 
tant block  abutting  on  the  street,  is  owned 
by  the  owner  of  such  block,  and  not  by  the 
owners  of  the  lots  abutting  at  the  point  of 
the  bridge  and  between  it  and  such  block, 
does  not  make  the  land  under  the  bridge  and 
sudi  block  one  parcel,  within  the  rule  as  to 
damages  to  the  residue  where  part  of  a  tract 
is  taken.  Coatsworth  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Hy. 
Co.,  131  N.  T.  Supp.  300,  ^1,  73  Misa  Bep. 
645. 

As  tract  or  pareel 
When  work  is  done  and  materials  fur- 
nished to  erect  a  building  for  the  owner  of 
a  whole  tract  of  land  without  visible  divi- 
sions, the  whole  tract  is  one  "lot"  within 
Pub.  St  a  191,  §  1,  providing  for  a  Usn 
on  the  *'lot  of  land"  on  which  a  building  is 
situated  for  which  labor  and  materials  are 
furnished.  Orr  v.  Fuller,  52  N.  B.  1091,  172 
Mass.  597. 


liOT 


1»1 


LOTTJS&Y 


Bev.  St  1880,  I  6879,  authorizes  foortb- 
class  dtlefl  to  open  and  improve  streets,  make 
sidewalks,  etc.,  and  gives  them  exclusive 
control  of  all  streets  wltbln  th^r  limits. 
Section  5881  authorizes  them  to  repair  side- 
walks and  levy  special  assessments  on  all 
lots  and  pieces  of  ground  abutting  such  im- 
provements. Held,  that  an  unplatted  tract 
within  the  limits  of  a  fourth-class  city  can 
be  taxed  for  the  construction  of  sidewalks, 
provided  such  exercise  of  the  taxing  power 
iB  reasonable  under  the  circumstances;  the 
word  "lot* *  used  in  section  5981  including 
tracts  or  parcels  of  land,  even  if  the  section 
did  not  authorize  assessments  on  all  pieces 
of  grounds.  City  of  Salem  ex  rel.  Roney  v. 
Young,  125  &  W.  857,  861,  142  Ho.  App.  160. 

Two  or  aaoore  lots 

St  Louis  aty  Charter,  art  6,  S  14,  relat- 
ing to  the  assessment  of  property  for  local 
improvements,  declares  that  the  word  *'lot,"  as 
used  in  the  section,  shall  mean  the  lots  as 
shown  by  recorded  plats  of  additions  or 
subdivisions,  but  If  there  was  no  recorded 
plat,  or  if  the  owners  had  disregarded  the 
lines  of  lots  as  platted,  and  have  treated 
two  or  more  lots  or  fractions  thereof  as  one 
lot  then  the  whole  parcel  so  treated  as  one 
shall  be  regarded  as  a  lot  for  the  purpose 
thereof.  Held  that  where  the  owner  of  a 
tnct  or  lot  had  used  the  same  in  disregard 
of  platted  lot  lines,  and  had  occupied  it  in 
disregard  of  a  platted  street  for  a  race  track 
since  1878,  it  was  properly  assessed  for  a 
street  improvement  as  a  single  lot,  regard- 
less of  its  original  platted  subdivisions. 
Granite  Bituminous  Paving  Co.  v.  McManus, 
129  S.  W.  448,  452,  144  Mo.  App.  593. 

LOT  UNE 

The  term  'lot  line^  or  '^property  line" 
has  a  well  known  and  understood  meaning. 
The  fee  to  the  streets  and  the  sidewalks  is  in 
the  dty.  The  "property  lintf*  or  "lot  line" 
extends  only  to  the  inner  edge  of  the  side- 
walk. If  the  walks  were  to  be  constructed 
one  foot  from  the  "lot  line"  or  "property 
line,"  that  description  definitely  defines  the 
location.  Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago,  79  N.  B. 
294,  285,  223  lU.  602. 

LOTS,  BLOCKS,   TRACTS,   AND   FAB- 
CELS  OFUUro 

The  interests  of  a  street  railroad  compa- 
ny In  the  part  of  a  street  improved  is  not 
subject  to  assessment  for  the  improvement, 
under  Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes  ft  St  S  '796, 
providing  for  assessing  the  "lots,  blocks, 
tracts,  and  parcels  of  land"  that  will  be  spe- 
cially benefited  thereby.  City  of  Seattle  v. 
Seatae  Electric  Co.,*  94  Pac.  194,  196,  48 
Wash.  589,  15  L^  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  486. 

LOHERY 

Lottery  or  similar  scheme^  see  Similar 

Sdieme 
See,  also.  By  COianee;   Qtft  Bnterprlse; 

Piizsb 


▲  lottery  is  a  species  of  gaming  which 
may  be  defined  as  a  scheme  for  the  distribu- 
tion of  prizes  by  chance  among  the  persons 
who  have  paid,  or  agreed  to  pay,  a  valuable 
consideration  for  the  chance  to  obtain  a 
prize.  Burks  v.  Harris,  120  S.  W.  979,  980, 
91  Ark.  205,  23  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  626,  1^  Am. 
St  B^.  67, 18  Ann.  Cas.  566. 

Bvery  drawing,  where  money  or  proper- 
ty is  offered  as  prizes  to  be  distributed  by 
chance  according  to  a  specified  scheme  or 
plan,  and  a  ticket  or  tickets  sold  which  enti- 
tles the  holder  to  money  or  property,  and 
which  is  dependent  npon  chance,  is  a  "lot- 
tery." Grant  v.  State,  112  S.  W.  1068,  1069. 
54  Tex.  Cr.  B.  403,  21  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  876, 
130  Am.  St  Bep.  897,  16  Ann.  Cas.  844. 

In  "lottery"  there  must  be  union  of 
three  elements;  consideration;  chance  and 
prize.  Bussell  v.  Equitable  Loan  ft  Security 
Co.,  68  S.  B.  881-^84,  129  Ga.  154,  12  Ann. 
Cas.  129. 

The  three  necessary  elements  of  a  "lot- 
tery" are  the  furnishing  of  a  consideration, 
the  offering  of  a  prize,  and  the  distribution 
of  the  prize  by  chance  rather  than  entirely 
upon  a  basis  of  merit  Brooklyn  Daily  Bagle 
Y.  Voorhies,  181  Fed.  579,  581. 

Chance  Is  an  essential  dement  of  a  lot- 
tery, whether  it  be  as  to  any  return  or  mere- 
ly as  to  the  amount  or  value  thereof,  and, 
where  there  is  a  hazard  in  which  sums  are 
ventured  on  the  chance  of  obtaining  a  great- 
er value,  the  scheme  partakes  of  the  nature 
of  a  lottery;  that  is,  something  gained  or 
won  by  lot  State  v.  Perry,  70  S.  B.  387,  388, 
154  N.  C.  616  (citing  5  Words  and  Phrases, 
p.  4245). 

*The  word  lottery'  has  no  technical 
meaning.  A  lottety  is  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  a  scheme  or  device  of  chance."  State  v. 
Willis,  2  AtL  848,  849.  78  Me.  70. 

"It  has  been  said  in  some  of  the  books 
and  by  several  of  the  courts  that,  while  the 
word  'lottery*  is  not  a  technical  term  of  the 
law,  and  to  dispose  of  property  of  any  kind 
by  lottery  is  not  an  offense  which  has  a  rec- 
ognized and  established  legal  definitiou,  and 
that  the  meaning  of  the  word  must  be  de- 
termined with  reference  to  a  popular  sense 
of  the  mischief  intended  to  be  redressed  by 
the  statute,  yet  when  thus  construed,  it  in- 
dicates a  scheme  for  the  distribution  of 
prizes  and  for  the  obtaining  of  money  or 
goods  by  chance.  The  word  'lottery'  has 
been  variously  defined  as  a  game  of  hazard, 
in  ^f^iich  small  sums  are  ventured  for  the 
chance  of  obtaining  a  larger  value,  either 
in  money  or  other  articles ;  a  distribution  of 
prizes  won  by  lot  or  <diance;  a  kind  of  game 
or  hazard,  whtf  ein  several  lots  of  goods  or 
merchandise  are  deposited  in  prizes  for  the 
benefit  of  the  fortunate ;  or  a  sort  of  gaming 
contract,  by  which,  4for  valuable  considera- 
tion, one  may,  by  fs^or  of  the  lot,  obtain  a 
prize  superior  to  th»  amount  or  valne  of 


LOTTERY 


192 


liOTTBBY 


that  which  he  risks.  Tested  by  any  one  of 
these  approved  deflnitlons,  a  lottery  always 
Involyes  the  element  of  chance,  fortune,  or 
hazard.  It  is  gaming,  pure  and  simple." 
City  of  Winston  y.  Beeson,  47  S.  B.  45T,  459, 
136  N.  O.  271,  65  L.  R.  A.  167  (citing  State  v. 
Mumford,  78  Mo.  647,  650,  39  Am.  Rep.  632; 
State  v.  Clarke,  33  N.  H.  829,  334,  66  Am. 
Dec  723). 

"Lottery"  has  been  held  to  be  a  gaming 
device,  and  the  keeping  of  a  house  for  the 
purpose  of  selling  lottery  tickets  is  the  keep- 
ing of  a  "gambling  house"  within  the  power 
of  a  dty  to  suppress  gaming  and  gambling 
houses.  Portland  v.  Tick,  76  Pac  706,  709, 
44  Or.  439,  102  Am.  St  Rep.  633. 

"We  approve  the  language  used  in  the 
opinion  of  Ballock  v.  State,  20  AU.  184,  73 
Md.  1,  8  L.  R.  A.  671,  25  Am.  St  Rep.  559, 
where  it  is  said:  'Our  statute  does  not  justi- 
fy a  court  in  deciding  a  thing  is  not  a  'lot- 
tery" simply  because  there  can  be  no  loss, 
when  there  may  be  considerable  contingent 
gain,  or  because  it  lacks  some  element  of  a 
lottery  according  to  some  particular  diction- 
ary definition  when  it  has  all  the  other  ele- 
ments, with  all  the  pernicious  tendencies 
which  the  state  is  seeking  to  prevent* "  Peo- 
ple V.  McPhee,  103  N.  W.  174,  176,  189  Mich. 
687,  69  L.  R.  A.  505,  6  Ann.  Cas.  885. 

The  general  definition  of  a  "lottery"  was 
declared  to  correspond  with  Gen.  St  Minn. 
1894,  {  6576,  defining  it  as  a  scheme  for 
the  distribution  of  property  by  chance,  among 
persons  who  have  paid  or  agreed  to  pay  a 
valuable  consideration  for  the  chance,  wheth- 
er called  a  lottery,  rafile,  or  gift  enterprise, 
or  by  some  other  name.  State  ex  rel.  Hath- 
om  V.  United  States  Express  Ck).,  104  N.  W. 
566,  658,  95  Minn.  442  (citing  5  Words  and 
Phrases,  pp.  4245-4248). 

A  "lottery"  embraces  the  elements  of 
procuring  through  lot  or  chance,  by  the  in- 
vestment of  a  sum  of  money,  some  greater 
amount  of  money.  A  contract  containing  a 
priase  feature  dependent  on  chance,  the  writ- 
ing of  new  contracts  and  lapsation,  both  of 
which  are  contingencies  over  which  the  par- 
ties have  no  control  and  which  they  can- 
not forecast,  is  a  "lottery."  Fidelity  Fund- 
ing Co.  V.  Vaughn,  90  Pac,  34,  37,  18  OkL  13, 
10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1123. 

A  company  operated  a  scheme  containing 
investment  ^d  loan  feature&  The  oppor- 
tunity to  obtain  a  loan  was  determined  to  a 
large  extent  by  the  way  in  which  the  appli- 
cations were  received  at  the  ofilce  of  the  com- 
pany, and  where  a  number  of  applications 
were  received  at  the  same  time  they  were  put 
on  the  records  of  the  company  as  they  were 
opened  and  recorded.  The  investment  fea- 
tures were  not  particalarly  attractive,  and 
the  main  feature  of  the^scheme  was  the  loan 
feature,  and  the  proposed  loan  contracts 
contained  attractive  terms.    Held,  that  the 


scheme  was  a  lottery  because  of  a  considera- 
tion and  becaase  of  the  existence  of  chance, 
based  on  obtaining  a  low  number  and  there- 
by obtaining  a  loan,  and  because  the  obtain- 
ing of  a  loan  at  an  eariy  date  was  the  prize 
in  the  scheme,  since  to  constitute  a  lottery 
there  must  be  a  consideration,  chance,  and 
prize.  United  States  t.  Pnrvls,  196  Fed.  618, 
620. 

A  contract  for  the  sale  and  purdiase  of 
stamps  for  delivery  by  the  buyer  to  his  cus- 
tomers, which  contemplates  that  the  hold»8 
thereof  shall  by  chance  dls];K>se  of  an  automo- 
bile furnished  by  the  seller  of  the  stamps,  is 
a  lottery,  and  the  contract  is  void.  American 
Copying  Co.  V.  Thompson  (Tex.)  110  S.  W. 
777,  779. 

The  derivation  of  the  word  •lottery"  in- 
dicates its  general  definition  as  the  *'distri- 
bution  of  anything  by  lot"  or  "the  drawing 
of  lots,"  and  the  scheme  known  as  "lottery" 
is  defined  as  one  "for  raising  money  by  sell- 
ing chances  to  share  in  a  distribution  of 
prizes"  or  a  "scheme  for  the  distribution  of 
prizes  by  chance  among  persons  purchasing 
tickets;  the  corresponding  numbered  slips, 
or  lots  representing  prizes  or  blanks,  being 
drawn  from  a  wheeL"  An  indictment  for 
using  the  mails  to  defraud,  in  violation  of 
Rev.  St  i  6480,  by  subdividing  a  tract  of  land 
in  Louisiana  of  small  value  into  lots  10  or  20 
feet  square,  and  selling  certificates,  each 
purporting  to  give  the  holder  an  option  to 
purchase  an  interest  in  a  lot,  upon  false 
representations  that  the  lots  were  within  an 
oil  district  and  very  valuable,  and  that  large 
cash  offers  had  been  made  for  certain  of  tbe 
same,  construed,  and  held  to  charge  a  scheme 
and  artifice  to  defraud  within  the  meaning 
of  the  statute,  which,  when  carried  on  by 
means  of  correspondence  through  the  mails, 
constituted  a  violation  thereof,  and  not  to 
describe  a  "lottery"  or  "gambling  enterprise.** 
GourdalB  v.  United  States,  164  Fed.  453,  458, 
83  0.  C.  A.  309  (quoting  and  adopting  the 
definition  in  Century  Dictionary,  and  citing 
Lottery  Case,  23  Sup.  Ct  321,  188  U.  S.  321, 
353,  47  L.  Ed.  492). 

"Bishop  defines  a  lottery*  as  'any  acheme 
whereby  one  on  paying  mon^  or  other  val- 
uable thing  to  another  becomes  entltLed  to 
receive  from  him,  such  a  return  in  value  or 
nothing,  as  some  formula  of  chance  may  de- 
termine.* "  An  indictment  under  Rev.  St 
§  3894,  for  sending  through  the  mails  a  news- 
paper containing  an  advertisement  of  a  lo^ 
tery  or  gift  enterprise,;  or  a  complete  or  par- 
tial list  of  prizes  awarded  at  the  drawing  of 
a  lottery  or  gift  enterprise,  must  aver,  ei- 
ther specifically  or  by  necessary  intendment, 
the  existence  of  a  lottery  or  gift  enterprise. 
United  States  v.  Irvine,  156  Fed.  376,  3T7 
(quoting  2  Bish.  St  Crimea,  §  952). 

A  financial  co-operative  sidieme,  whidi 
contemplates  the  cveatiLon  of  a  fund  oat  of 
enrollment  fees  and  monthly  due%  to  be  re- 


IjOTTBET 


193 


LOTTERY 


turned  to  tbe  memben  at  Hke  eoA  of  ft  ftf)ed 
periotf  of  Bieiibership  in  die  Bbap^  €i  'teall- 
SBtioiw,"  tbe  anevnt  of  wbleli  wfll  depend 
upon  the  growth  1b  membership,  the  plan 
being  certain  to  InvolTe  a  loss  to  e?ery  one 
Interested  as  soon  ae  tbe  nnmher  of  meat- 
bers  ceaeee  to  Increaee,  becanee  of  the  ab- 
sence of  any  proYlaion  for  a  reserve  fund,  Is 
a  lottery,  or  echeme  for  the  distribution  of 
money  by  lot  or  chance^  within  the  meaning 
of  the  iHToyislons  of  Rot.  St.  f  9929,  as  amend- 
ed by  AiCt  Sept  19,  1890,  e.  906,  26  Stat  465^ 
and  of  section  4041,  and  of  Act  March  2, 
1895,  c.  191,  {  4,  28  Stat  964^  empowering 
the  Postmaster  General  to  deny  the  prlTlleges 
of  tbe  mails  and  the  money  order  and  ro- 
istered letter  service  to  persons  engaged  in 
certain  prohibited  enterprises.  Public  Clear- 
hig  House  v.  Coyne,  24  Sap.  Ct  789,  796, 
104  U.  S.  497,  48  L.  Bd.  1092. 

The  term  'aottery''  in  law  Is  of  wide 
stgnlflcatieti.  In  Homer  ▼.  United  States, 
13  Sup.  Gt  409,  147  U.  8.  449,  37  L.  Ed.  237, 
Mr.  Jnstloe  Blatdtiford  dtecnssed  vailoas  defi- 
nitions of  lottery,  and  among  others  approved 
that  foond  In  Worcester's  Dictionary,  in 
whidi  it  is  defined  to  he  ''a  game  of  Hazard 
in  which  smflU  soma  a«e  ventmed  with  tbe 
chance  of  obtaining  a  large  vahte,  either  in 
money  or  other  artides."  A  schense  by  which 
certlllcates  axe  issaed  by  a  corporation,  on 
each  of  whMi  tbe  holder  agrees  to  pay  fl 
per  week,  snbject  to  forteitnre  for  nonpay- 
ment, and  about  75  per  oent  of  wbtob  pay- 
ments are  paid  into  a  "^ntnal  benefit  credit 
fond^  nntU  all  oertlflcatee  prior  tn  date  have 
matured'  and  been  canceled,  When  bis  own 
certificate  rtiall  matm^,  and  be  shall  be 
paid  frouft  sncb  food  tbe  snm  of  92  for  each 
week  sQcb  certUlcate  bas  been  in  lone,  pro*- 
vlded  there  is  so  mnch  in  tbe  fend,  not  e^ 
ceeding  however  flOO,  is  a  'lottery"  witUn 
the  meaning  of  Rev.  St  I  8894,  and  any  person 
engaged  in  conducting  such  scheme  by  means 
of  letters  or  circulars  sent  through  the  mails 
is  guilty  of  a  criminal  offense  under  said  sec- 
tion. Fitasimmons  v.  United  States,  156  Fed. 
477,  479,  84  C.  C.  A.  28T,  IB  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1005;  Id.,  106  Fed.  482,  84  O.  O.  A.  292. 

Where  a  pecuniary  consideration  is  paid*, 
and  it  is  determined  by  lot  or  chance,  ac- 
cording to  some  scheme  held  out  to  the  pub- 
lic, what  and  how  much  he  who  pays  the 
money  is  to  have  for  it,  that  is  a  "lottery." 
It  is  a  sort  of  gaming  contract  by  which, 
for  a  valuable  consideration,  one  may,  by 
favor  of  the  lot,  obtain  a  prize  of  a  value 
superior  to  that  of  the  amount  or  value  of 
that  which  he  risks.  It  Is  a  scheme  by  which 
a  result  is  reached  by  some  action  or  means 
taken,  and  in  which  result  man's  choice  or 
will  has  no  part,  nor  can  human  reason, 
foreelc^t,  sagsfeily,  or  design  enable  him  to 
Imow  or  determine  such  result  until  tbe  same 
bas  been  accomplished.  However,  it  should 
not  be  eonaQded*  that  ttite  term  "lotor  eftance^ 
hsplles  that  IT  any  element  &i  certainty  or 

8  WbbJl  P.2d  Sxb.— 13 


skin  enters  into  the  scheme  tt  therefore  fe- 
Ifeves  It  of  Ite  character  as  a  "lottery^  or 
scheme  of  chance.  A  guessing  contest  in- 
stituted by  a  newspaper  company,  by  wWdi 
persons  are  invited  to  deliver  to  Uie  company 
50  cents  each,  24  cente  of  which  being  pay- 
ment for  a  subscription  to  the  newspaper  and 
26  cents  for  (he  prtvflege  of  making  a  guess 
upon  tbe  totel'  vote  for  a  state  officer  wlio  is 
to  be  chosen  at  an  approadbing  election,  the 
guesser  coming  nearest  to  tbe  actual  total 
vote  cast  to  receive  a  money  prize  from  tbe 
fond  equal  to  one-tenth  thereof,  and  others 
next  nearest  to  receive  from  the  fund  lesser 
money  prises,  fs  within  tbe  condemnation  of 
the  statute  of  Ohio  against  "lotteries  and 
schemes  of  chance,  and  is  an  unlawful  enter- 
prise. And  a  similar  scheme,  involving  the 
same  amount  of  payment  by  each  person, 
but  differing  from  the  former,  in  that  there 
is  to  be  no  subscription  to  a  paper,  and  the 
prizes  promised  are  definite  amonnta  from 
$5,000  down  to  $2,  is  equally  within  the  con- 
demnation of  the  statute  and  unlawful.  Ste- 
vais  V.  Cincinnati  TImes-Ster  (k^  78  N.  B. 
1058,  1060,  72  Ohio  St  112,  100  Am.  St  R^. 
685. 

A  guessing  contest  prior  to  tbe  presi- 
dential election  of  Novembv,  1904,  by  wbftb 
defendant  agreed  to  give  $10,009  to  tbe  per- 
son who  would  make  tbe  nearest  oerreet 
estimate  of  tbe  totel  popular  vote  cast  for 
the  office  of  President  ef  ttie  United  SteteSr 
on  November  S,  19M,  and  |5X)00  for  tete  sec- 
ond nearest  oorroet  esttmatek  persons  Ming 
goesses  being  reqnired  to  pay  sauiH  snaM  as 
a  snbserlption  to  a  periodioal  naaaed  In  tbe 
advertisement,  constituted  &  "lottery"  in  vio- 
lation of  tbe  federal  laws  and  also  of  OonqK 
laws  Mich,  i  11,844^  providing  that  eveir  por- 
Bon  who  shall  set  up  or  promote  within  tbe 
state  any  ''lottery"  or  gift  enterprise  fbr 
money,  or  sball  dispose  of  any  property,  veal 
or  pwsonal,  goods,  chattels,  or  mecbandlse, 
or  any  valna^le  things  by  way  of  "lottery" 
or  gift  enterprise,  sball  be  punished,  ete. 
Waite  V.  Press  Pnb.  Astafn,  165  Fed.  58,  59; 
85  C.  O.  A.  576.  11  Li  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  009, 
12  Ann.  Cas.  319. 

Bead  laTestmeat  solieate 

Where  an  Investment  company  lasnes 
bonds,  numbered  consecutively  in  tbe  order 
in  wbicdi  applications  haiHpen  to  be  received 
by  the  secretary,  and  tbe  time  of  payment 
of  the  bonds,  and  consequently  their  valne, 
depend  on  the  number  tbey  happen  to  re- 
ceive, the  scheme  is  a  lottery.  Slver  v.  Guar- 
antee Inv.  Gon  81  S.  W.  1098,  1100.  183 
Mo.  41. 


et  ygoyertr  ^  elunaoe 

Under  Pen.  Code,  f|  828,  827,  defining  a 
lottery  as  a  sdieme  for  the  dlstrfbution  of 
property  by  chance  among  persons  who  have 
paid  a  valuable  consideration  for  the  diance, 
and  making  advertising  a  lottery  a  misde- 
meanor, a  scflieme  for  the  cyLstributlon  of 
money  and  cigars  among  pordiasers  of  eer- 


liOTTfiRT 


194 


I/>TT£BT 


tain  brands  of  dgarB  who  will  estimate  most 
closely  the  number  of  cigars  of  all  brands  on 
which  taxes  would  be  collected  by  the  gov- 
ernment during  a  named  month  is  a  "lot^ 
tery/'  though  the  distribution  does  not  de- 
pend exclusively  on  chance,  and  the  adver- 
tising of  the  same  is  a  misdemeanor.  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Allison  v.  Lavin,  71  N.  £1  753,  754f 
170  N.  Y.  164,  66  L.  R.  A.  601,  1  Ann.  Cas. 
165. 

Am  sambUms  devio* 
See  Gambling  Device. 

Game  of  skiU 
"A  lottery  is  commonly  understood  as  a 
scheme  for  the  distribution  of  prizes  by  lot 
or  chance,  especially  a  gaming  scheme  in 
which  one  or  more  tickets  bearing  particu- 
lar numbers  draw  prizes,  and  the  rest  of  the 
tickets  are  blank."  A  knife  rack,  consisting 
of  an  inclined  table,  with  knives  stuck  there- 
in, and  so  arranged  that  rings  could  be 
thrown  on  them,  which  rings  are  sold  to  cus- 
tomers, who  endeavor  to  ring  the  knives  on 
the  table,  they  being  entitled  to  any  knives 
rung,  or  on  which  the  rings  caught,  is  not 
a  lottery.  McRea  v.  State,  81  S.  W.  741,  46 
Tex.  Cr.  B.  489. 

Gift  eiiterprls* 

Under  the  provisions  of  Rev.  St  {  8394, 
as  amended  by  Act  Aug.  5,  1900,  c.  6,  §  38, 
that  no  packages  of  manufactured  tobacco 
shall  be  permitted  to  have  packed  In  them 
"any  paper,  certificate  or  instrument  purport- 
ing to  be  or  represent  a  ticket,  chance,  share 
or  Interest  in,  or  dependent  upon,  the  event 
of  a  lottery,"  the  definition  of  a  lottery  is 
not  limited  to  a  scheme  whereby  the  value  of 
the  certificate  or  ticket  is  dependent  upon 
lot  or  chance,  but  Includes  as  well  a  scheme, 
whereby  the  possession  of  a  certificate  or 
prize,  having  a  fixed  value,  is  made  to  de- 
pend on  lot  or  chance,  and  the  statute  is 
violated  by  concealing  in  1  out  of  each  100 
five-cent  cuts  of  plug  tobacco  a  tag  redeem- 
able by  the  maker  for  GO  cents.  United 
States  V.  One  Box  of  Tobacco,  "Foot  Prints," 
100  Fed.  781,  732,  111  C.  C.  A.  459. 

Defendant,  to  induce  the  sale  of  a  cereal 
called  "Mother's  Oats,"  placed  in  each  pack- 
age a  coupon  on  which  one  of  the  letters 
which  spelled  the  word  "Mother's"  was  print- 
ed, and  offered  premiums  to  persons  holding 
coupons  which  would  spell  the  word  "Moth- 
er's"; the  letter  "O"  being  placed  on  only 
one  coupon  In  500.  Held,  that  such  scheme 
was  a  lottery,  within  Act  Oong.  March  2, 
1895,  c.  191,  providing  that  any  person  who 
shall  cause  to  be  carried  from  one  state  to 
another  in  the  United  States  any  paper,  cer- 
tificate, or  instrument  purporting  to  be  or 
representing  a  ticket,  chance^  share,  or  in- 
terest in,  or  dependent  upon  the  event  of,  a 
lottery,  etc.,  or  other  similar  enterprises  of- 
fering prizes  dependent  upon  lot  or  chance, 
shall  be  guilty,  etc.  United  States  v.  Jeffer- 
son, 134  Fed.  299,  300. 


Poliey  playias 

A  scheme*  generally  known  as  "playing 
policy,"  whereby  an  association  sells  for 
five  cents,  or  any  other  specific  sum  of 
money,  certificates  or  tickets  which  entitle 
the  purchaser  to  a  lead  pencil  of  trifling 
value,  and  also  permits  such  purchaser  to 
select  certain  numbers,  say  3-^13,  which,  if 
all  drawn  by  a  blind-folded  boy  from  a  re- 
volving wheel  in  which  several  numbers  are 
placed,  entitle  the  person  purchasing  the  cer- 
tificate or  ticket  to  a  prize  of  money  much 
larger  in  amount  than  he  has  paid  for  his 
certificate  or  ticket,  is  a  "lottery."  State  ex 
rel.  Kellogg  v.  Mercantile  Ass'n,  25  Pac.  984, 
985,  45  Kan.  351,  11  L.  R.  A.  430,  23  Am.  St 
Rep.  727. 

Pool  sellims 

Rev.  Code  1852,  amended  to  1893,  p. 
396,  provides  that  if  any  person  shall  sell 
or*dispose  of  any  lottery  policy,  certificate,  or 
of  anything  by  which  such  person  or  any 
number  of  persons  promises  or  guarantees 
that  any  particular  number,  character,  ticket, 
or  certificate  shall,  in  an  event  or  on  the 
happening  of  any  contingency  in  the  nature 
of  a  lottery,  entitle  the  purchaser  or  holder 
to  receive  money,  property,  or  evidence  of 
debt,  every  person  so  offending  shall  on  con- 
viction be  subject  to  a  penalty.  Held,  that 
the  fact  that  tickets  representing  member- 
ship in  a  baseball  pool  aid  not  in  themselves 
show  a  promise  or  guaranty  that  on  the 
happening  of  an  event,  the  holder  should 
be  entitled  to  money,  did  not  save  the  scheme 
from  being  a  violation  of  the  statute,  since 
the  term  "lottery,"  as  used  therein,  includes 
any  scheme  for  the  distribution  of  money  or 
prizes  by  chance,  not  limited  to  a  sale  of 
tickets  nor  to  the  terms  or  promises  printed 
or  written  upon  them.  State  v.  Sedgwick 
(Del.)  81  Ati.  472,  473,  2  Boyce,  453. 

As  pnlilio  nnisaiLoe 

See  Public  or  Common  Nuisance. 
Trading  stamp  buAiness 

There  can  be  no  "lottery,*'  In  the  ab- 
sence of  the  element  of  chance.  A  trading 
stamp  business,,  consisting  of  the  selling  of 
checks  or  stamps  to  merchants,  who  give 
the  same  to  their  customers  on  purchases  of 
goods,  the  number  of  stamps  given  being  be- 
ing determined  by  the  amount  of  the  pur- 
chase, and  the  stamps,  on  presentation  at  the 
trading  stamp  store,  entitling  the  holders  to 
select  any  article  from  the  assortment  of  ar- 
ticles, each  article  being  plainly  marked  with 
its  value  in  stamps,  such  value  not  being 
greater  than  the  market  value  of  the  articles, 
is  not  a  "lottery,"  within  a  statute  denounc- 
ing lotteries,  etc.  State  v.  Shugart,  35  South. 
28,  29,  138  Ala.  86,  100  Am.  St  Rep,  17. 

Three  things  must  concur  in  order  to  con- 
stitute a  "lottery":  (1)  There  must  be  the 
purchase  of  a  right;  (2)  the  right  must  be  a 
contingent  one  to  receive  something  greater 
than  that  which  is  purchased;   and  (3)  the 


I^tl'BRT  TICKET 


195 


iiOWEST  Bn>i>:&Ji 


<»nttngeait  right  most  depend  upon  a  lot  or 
cbance.  Const  art  18»  {  2,  and  MIUb*  Ann.  8t 
I  2927,  prohibiting  "lotteries''  or  gift  enter- 
prises, does  not  authorize  an  ordinance  pro- 
hibiting gift  enterprises,  designed  to  include 
the  giving  of  trading  stamps,  since  the  term 
"gift  enterprise*'  as  used  in  the  Ck)n8tltution 
and  statute  applied  only  to  transactions  in 
which  the  element  of  chance  is  involved. 
City  and  County  of  Denver  v.  Frueauff,  88 
Pac.  389,  394,  39  Colo.  20,  7  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1131,  12  Ann.  Cas.  521  (quoting  and  adop^ 
iDg  definitions  In  Lohman  t«  States  81  Ind. 
17). 

LOTTEBT  TICKET 

A  "ticket"  is  a  thing  which  Is  holder's 
means  of  paklng  good  his  rights.  Policy 
slips  written  by  a;  customer  to  indicate  a 
choice  of  numbers  and  delivered  by  him  to  an 
agent  of  the  policy  game  to  be  forwarded  by 
him  to  headquarters  in  another  state  are  not 
within  the  provisions  of  the  act  of  Congress 
making  it  an  offense  against  the  United 
States  to  be  caused  to  be  carried  from  one 
state  to  another  any  ticket  in  a  "lottery." 
Francis  v.  United  States,  23  Sup.  Ct  334» 
335,  188  U.  8.  875,  47  Lu  Bd.  608. 

LOW 

See  Too  Low. 

LOWBBIDOE 

In  railroad  parlance,  a  ^ow  bridge'*  la 
one  so  low  as  to  prevent  those  engaged  upon 
box  cars  in  the  fireight  service  from  passing 
mider  the  same  in  a  standing  position.  Kel- 
ler V.  Chicago,  St  P.,  M.  &  O.  By.  Oo.,  129 
N.  W.  220,  221,  118  Minn.  178. 

LOW  jroiHT 

A  "low  Joint"  in  a  railroad  is  where  a 
tie  underneath  that  joint  has  been  pounded  so 
many  times  by  wheels  passing  over  it  that 
there  is  a  little  space  underneath  that  tie, 
80  that  the  rails  will  give  when  the  wheels 
go  over  it  Chicago^  M.  &  St  P.  R.  Oo.  v. 
Benton,  132  Fed.  460,  461,  66  a  a  A.  66a 

LOW-WATEB  MARX 

Ordinary  Low- Water  Mark. 

The  *low-water  mark"  which  under  Act 
Aug.  19,  1749,  is  the  boundary  line  between 
York  and  Lancaster  counties,  is  the  line  to 
which  the  water  recedes  at  ordinary  states 
of  low  water,  and  not  the  lowest  line  the 
water  has  ever  been  Imown  to  reach.  Appeal 
of  York  Haven  Water  Power  CJo.,  62  AtL  97, 
98, 100,  212  Pa.  622. 

Where  in  ejectment  the  location  of  a 
•low-water  mark"  of  tidewater  on  the  east- 
erly side  of  a  creek  is  involve,  it  can- 
not be  assumed  without  proof  that  that  mark 
was  not  west  of  the  center  line  of  the  creek, 
since  one  bank  may  have  fallen  sheer,  and 
the  other  have  been  a  shoal  very  nearly  the 


whole  widfli  of  the  creek.    ISelney  v.  Nolan, 
67  AtL  1008,  l(to9,  75  N.  J.  Law,  897. 

"Low-water  mark"  of  natural  fresh  wa- 
ter rivers  is  the  water's  edge  at  its  lowest 
stage.  City  of  Peoria  v.  Central  Nat  Bank, 
79  N.  E.  296,  299,  224  111.  43,  12  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  B.)  687. 

Fresh  riven  not  subjeet  to  tide  may  rise 
and  fall  at  oertaln  seasons  a&d  thus  have  de- 
fined high  and  low  water  marks.  The  "low- 
water  mark"  is  the  point  to.  whicb.  the  river 
recedes  at  its  lowest  stage,  while  the  ''high- 
water  mark"  is  the  line  which  the  river  im- 
presses on  the  soil  by  oonrerlng  it  fbr  suffi- 
cient periods  to  deprive  it  of  vegetation  and 
to  destroy  its  value  for  agricnltureu  State 
ex  reL  OltixeBs'  Slectilc  Titghting  ft  Power 
Co.  V.  LongfeUow,  69  &  W.  374,  877,  169  Mo. 
109  (citing  Gould,  Waters  [3d  Bd.]  |  45). 

rme  margin  of  Che  bed  of  a  Hver  which 
lies  between  high  and  low  water  mark  is 
called  the  "beaai*'  or  ''shore,"  which  is  actu- 
ally a  part  of  the  bed  of  the  river,  and,  when 
the  river  is  at  its  full  flow,  whether  caused 
by  the  tide  or  by  the  natural  increase  of 
waters  by  rains,  floods,  and  the  like,  flUing  its 
natural  bed  to  its  highest  readi  of  flow,  it 
marks  its  high-water,  while  its  lessened 
range  of  flow  by  summer  heats  shows  its 
low-water,  mark.  Son  Dial  Ranch  v.  liay 
Land  Co.,  119  Pac  758,  762,  61  Or.  206. 

Z.OW  WOMAM 

The  statement  of  a  person  of  another 
that  she  is  &  'low  woman"  and  'lialf  ne- 
gress"  does  not  impute  a  want  of  chastity. 
Kenworthy  v.  Brown,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  84,  85, 
45  Misc.  Rep.  292. 

LOWERMOST  POBTIOH 

The  words  ''beginning  from  the  lower- 
most portion  thereoT'  should  be  construed  as 
meaning  from  the  lowermost  portion  of  the 
bed  of  stream;  not  from  the  lowest  depths 
of  some  hole  or  sudden  depression  therein, 
but  from  the  lowermost  part  of  the  general 
contour  of  the  channel.  Krause  v.  Oregon 
Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  77  Pac.  833,  835,  45  Or.  378. 

LOWEST  BIDDER 

A  single  bid  for  public  work  made  under 
due  advertisements  for  bids,  pursuant  to  an 
ordinance  requiring  such  method  of  letting 
contracts,  authorizes  the  city  council  to  con- 
tract with  the  bidder;  the  term  "lowest," 
in  such  connection,  being  used  in  its  logical 
and  practical,  rather  than  its  grammatical, 
sense.  Hager  v.  Melton,  66  S.  B.  13,  17,  66 
W.  Va.  62. 

The  expression  "lowest  bidder"  necessar- 
ily implies  a  common  standard  by  which  to 
measure  the  respective  bids,  and  that  com- 
mon standard  must  necessarily  be  previously 
prepared  specifications  of  the  work  to  be  done 
and  materials  to  be  furnished.  Where  an 
equipment  of  an  automatic  fire  alarm  office 
for  a  city,  as  designed  by  the  city  electriciaii, 


LOWEST  BJm^OVaiBlM  BIDDER       196 


JiUCID  mnSKVAL 


wwB  aothorlzed  by  oMimn^e,  ft  sobsequeDt 
notice  to  bldiflers,  riifter  eall  for  bUto  had  bem 
published,  which  abrogated  the  specifications 
and  established  In  lien  thereof  an  equipment 
which  the  board  and  city  electricians  might 
deem  adeonate,  render^  the  bids  void  nndifer 
the  requirements  of  the  dty  charter  that  ptrtn 
lic  ImproTements  made  by  contract  should 
be  let  to  the  "lowest  bMdW  and  tbat  the 
contracts  and  specifications  most  at  that  time 
be  on  file  subject  to  publie  inspeotlon.  Gob- 
hert  T.  Seattte,  107  Pac.  866,  882,  57  Wash. 
646. 

U>WBST  BBSPOHWBLC!  BUftDBR 

The  expression  'aowest  bidder^  neoessaiw 
lly  implies  «  -oenmoB  standard  by  whAch  to 
measure  sespeetiTe  bids,  whieh  standard  nrast 
neceesarily  be  previously  prepi»ed  spedfloa* 
tlons  of  me9k  to  be  done  and  materials  to  be 
furviisjied ;  .spedficatlQais  <fredy  aeoeaslble  to 
all  who  may  desire  to  compete,  on  which 
alone  theAr  resQiectlye  bids  lavst  be  based. 
By  the  phcase  "lowest  respoaaible  bladder,** 
as  used  In  a  /Statu^  velatftiiK  ito  school  build- 
ings, it  was  not  iiatended  to  Umlt  the  power 
of  the  board  to  the  simple  ezajnination  of  the 
different  bids  tendered  without  r^^fenee 
from  whom  they  came,  and  that  they  should 
blindly  select  one  solely  from  the  iionsldera- 
tion  that  it  was  lowest  in  |»:ice,  but  it  ve- 
quired  the  board  to  seileet  <that  bidder  who, 
all  things  being  considered,  had  ability  to 
respond  to  the  requirements  uf  the  contract 
haying  fiuU  regard  te  tbe  sul^eot^matter. 
The  word  ^'responslhle,''  as  employed  in  the 
act  when  ailt>li<ed  to  ooptraots  requiring  for 
their  ezeontlon  not  only  pecmilary  ability, 
but  also  judgment  and  skill,  Imposes  not 
merely  a  ministerial  duty  on  the  dty  au- 
thorities, but  also  duties  and  ];K>wer8  deliber- 
ate and  discretionary.  Hannan  r.  Board  of 
Education  of  Oity  of  Lawton,  107  Paa  646, 
660,  654,  25  OkL  872,  SO  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  214 
(ddng  Mazet  ▼.  aty  of  Pittsburgh,  20  AtL 
683, 187  Pa.  546 ;  Oommonwealtii  ez  rel.  Sny- 
der T.  Mitchell,  82  Pa.  8^. 

The  statute  requiring  that  a)ntracts  for 
public  improvements  shall  be  let  to  the  low- 
est responsible  bidder  does  not  require  the 
letting  of  oonttacts  to  the  lowest  bidder,  on 
ascertaining  his  finandal'  responsibility  only, 
but  the  term  "responsible'*  includes  the  abili- 
ty to  respond  by  the  discharge  of  the  con- 
tractor's obligations  in  accordance  with  what 
may  be  ^expected  or  demanded  under  the  con- 
tract, and  where  the  board  of  local  improve- 
ments has  ^erdsed  its  discretion  in  the 
award  of  a  contract  for  a  public  improve- 
ment, the  presumption  prises  that  its  action 
was  legal,  and  the  party  asserting  the  contra- 
ry has  the  burden  of  overcoming  the  pre- 
sumption by  proof  that  the  board  acted  with- 
out jurisdiction  or  fraudulently.  Hallet  v. 
City  of  SSIgiu,  98  N.  Jffi.  580,  682,  254  111.  348. 

The  word  "responsible**  In  the  phrase 
'lowest  re^ponsihle  bidder,"  as  used  in  Qen. 


8t  1900,  I  1017,  profviding  for  competitive 
bids  befiore  awarding  coatraets  tov  public 
improvements,  impUes  skill,  judgment,  and 
integrity  necessary  to  a  faithful  performance 
of  the  contract,  bm  well  as  sufficient  financial 
reaouroes  and  ability.  Williams  v.  City  of 
Top^ka,  118  Pac.  864,  806,  85  Kan.  857,  38 
14.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  672,  Ajul  Cas.  1913A,  ^7. 

Where  one  whose  bid  for  county  road 
work  was  the  lowest  as  to  part  of  tbe  work 
failed  to  submit  samples  of  material  to  be 
tested  as  reasonably  reguested  and  the  bid 
of  the  one  to  Whom  the  contract  was  award- 
ed was  the  lowest  on  all  the  work,  such  lat- 
ter bid  could  be  regarded  and  accepted  by 
the  county  commissioners  as  the  "bid  of  the 
lowest  responsible  bidder,**  as  Tequlred  by 
statute.  Baburban  I»r.  Ooi.  ▼•  Hyde^  65 
South.  76,  78,  61  FUl  609. 

LUBfilCATOR 

See  Force  Feed  Lnbilcatoz; 

LUCK)  INTERVAL 

The  court  wa^  well  wtthin  the  mle  Udd 
down  by  text-writers  and  cases,  in  instruct- 
ing that  by  the  term  "ludd  interval'*  is 
meant  that  period  of  time  during  whidi  the 
person  concerned,  had  so  far  regained  the  po- 
sition of  her  faculties  as  to  be  of  sound  and 
disposing  mind  and  memory  as  deflned  there- 
in, and  .that  it  dpes  aot  mean  thait  there  has 
been  a  simple  diminution  in  her  insanity,  but 
that  her  mind  has  been  temporarily  restored 
to.  sanity»  and  sufficiently  restored  to  quali- 
fy her  to  make  a  will  as  a  person  of  sound 
and  disposing  mind  and  memorj.  King  v. 
Gilson,  90  8.  W.  367,  870, 191  Ha  807. 

'^A  ludd  interval,'  under  the  dvil  law,  is 
not  an  apparent  tranquility  or  seeming  re- 
pose. It  is  not  a  simple  diminution  or  re- 
mission of  tb»  disease,  but  a  temporary 
cure— an  intermission  so  clearly  marked  that 
it  perfectly  resembles  a  return  to  health. 
And,  as  the  nature  of  the  interval  cannot  be 
ascertained  in  an  instant,  it  must  contlnae 
during  a  length  of  time  suffldent  to  give  tbe 
certainty  of  the  temporary  return  to  reason. 
The  time  must  in  all  cases  be  considerable; 
«  •  •  OSie  Roman  jurisconsults  distin- 
guished two  dasaes  of  insane  persons.  One 
class  they  called  furiosos' ;  the  other,  'mente 
eaptos.'  ^  *  ^  All  the  Roman  laws  which 
speak  of  'hidd  tntervais'  have  ezdusive  ref- 
erenee  to  the  first  dass.  For  instance,  tbe 
Law  89,  Digest  ide  JTudidis,  auAhorteed  the  in- 
sane of  the  first  dass  to  disduuipe  judicial 
functions  during  ludd  intervals.  But  this 
was  never  permitted  in  cases  of  simple  in- 
sanity." Succession  of  Morere,  38  South.  435, 
437,  114  La.  506  (quoting  and  adopting  defi- 
nition in  Aubert  v.  Aubert,  6  La.  Ann.  108, 
Quoting  from  Ooin-D^iale,  Donations  e%  Tear 
tameuts,  p.  829* 


LUCID  USmORVAJj 


187 


I/UIIBSB 


"By  'lucid  intervals'  to  meaal:,  not  mereljr 
a  cesBttioo  of  tlie  Tlolent  aymptoms  of  tlie 
disorder,  but  a  teiuporary  restoration  of  rea- 
son such  as  to  create  responsibility  f6r  acts 
done  dnrlag  its  continuance.  Still,  restora- 
tion of  tbe  mental  faculties  to  tbelr  original 
coBidlttoik  is  not  necsflBaiy.  It  Is  soffldtnt  if 
there  be  svcb  lestoratioa  tliat  tbe  peison  is 
able,  beyend  devM,  to  €«ini»tiieiid  and  to 
do  the  act  wftdi  maOx  reasen,  memory,  and 
Judgment  as  to  make  it  a  legal  act"  Team 
▼.  Bryant,  61  S.  B.  148,  100,  71  &  a  88L 

LUCRATIVE  OFFICE 

The  deputy  auditorshlp  of  a  county  to  ft 
*lTicTatiye  office"  within  BumuT  Ann.  St  1908, 
I  9039,  providing  that  no  person  holding  a 
lucratiye  position  shall  be  a  notary  public, 
and  his  acceptance  of  such  office  shall  vacate 
Ms  appointment  as  notary.  Sharp  t.  State 
and.)  90  N.  B.  1072,  lOTC. 

▲  "lucrative  office"  to  one  wheee  pay  to 
affixed  to  tbe  peffoimsace  of  its  duties;  and, 
when  the  duties  of  tbe  office  aire  Axed  by 
statute,  it  to  tmrnatsvial  tbat  tlie  cempensa- 
tion  of  the  officer  to  fixed  by  some  other  board 
or  officer.  The  office  of  deputy  sheriff,  wheth- 
er entitled  to  the  compensation  fixed  by  con- 
tract between  the  sheriff  and  the  deputy,  or 
entiUed  to  the  fees  allowed  by  law,  to  a  lucra- 
tive  office,  within  Const  art  2,  §  96,  dectoxing 
tbat  no  person  shall  lield  more  than  one 
lucrative  office  at  the  same  time.  State  v. 
Blagle,  89  S.  W.  826,  827,  US  Tom.  888  (cit- 
ing State  ex  ret  Piatt  v.  Kirk,  44  Ind.  401, 
15  Am.  Rep.  289 ;  CSiambers  v.  State  eac  rel. 
Barnard,  26  N.  B.  898,  127  Ind.  865,  U  U  B. 
▲.  613). 

Rev.  St  n.  8.  §1  1246-1269,  provide  for 
the  retirement  of  army  officers.  Seotten  1289 
authorises  the  assignment  of  retired  officers 
to  doty  at  the  Soldiers'  Home,  and  by  subse- 
quent enactments  retired  officers  may  be  de- 
tailed for  service  with  the  militia  of  tlie  sev- 
eral states  or  in  colleges  and  military  achooto, 
and  to  time  of  war  may  be  employed  on  ac- 
tive duty  other  than  in  command  of  troops. 
Act  Kerch  2,  1908,  c.  975,  82  Stat  927,  982 ; 
Act  AprU  28,  1904,  a  1485,  88  Stot  259 ;  Act 
Not.  3,  1893,  c  18,  28  Stat  7;  Act  Aug.  6, 
18H  c.  228,  28  Stat  223,  2  Supp.  Bev.  St 
U.  S.  226;  Act  April  21, 1904,  c.  1408,  38  Stot 
225.  Held,  that  a  retired  army  offleer  to  not 
by  reason  of  su^  retirement  holding  an 
office  wtlhJa  State  Const  art  4, 1 90,  making 
any  person  hdidlDg  any  lucrative  office  under 
the  IFidtsd  SUtes  in^gibto  to  any  ctvU  office 
•f  profit  under  the  state.  Beed  v.  Sehon,  88 
Pac.  77,  78,  2  OaL  Ayp.  66. 

LUGGAGE 

See  Ordinary  Luggage;    Persoual  Lug- 
See,  atoo^  Banage. 


LUMBEff 

See  Dressed  Lumber;  FlreProoCsd] 
ber;  Logs,  Lumber,  and  Otker  Tlmbof ; 
Sawed  Lumber. 

Merchantable  lumber,  see  Merdtantabls. 

Tbe  word  "lumber"  to  in  oomason  use  ts 
describe  both  trees  suitable  to  saw  and  tie 
products  Into  wfaMi  they  ave  sawed.  Wkers 
a  deed  of  standlBg  lumber  and  trses  sultaMe 
to  saw  tots  lumber  stiputoted  tbat  tbe  loaiber 
remaining  on  Che  premises  at  tbe  «id  of  a 
specified  time  should  revert  to  tbe  grantor, 
but  not  flttggesttng  tbat  the  tsees  were  to  be 
sawed  <m  the  presatoes,  it  was  held  that  tlie 
focfdtuve  ctouse  ^applied  only  to  standing 
trees,  and  the  sawed  iiuober  which  remained 
on  tbe  iH?omifles  after  oKpiratlon  of  tbe  sped- 
fled  time  did  not  revwt  to  tbe  grantor.  Tnttto 
V.  D.  W.  PiniPBee  Co.,  78  AtL  407,  4^6,  76 
M.H.28& 

Tbe  meaning  of  tbe  word  'lumber^  to 
vague  and  indefinite,  and  it  has  different 
eensss  aoeording  to  tbe  context  In  wtdcb  it 
to  used  or  tbe  nature  of  tbe  transactions  to 
which  the  parties  refer.  Bfost  often  it  des- 
ignates matertoto  of  wood  used  in  construct- 
ing bouses,  fences,  and  other  like  structures 
— wooden  building  matertol.  The  Stondard 
Dictionary  defines  it  as  '^timber  sawed  Into 
merctantable  form;  especially  boards;'' 
I9ie  0entui7f  ns  '*timber  sawed  or  split  for 
use,  such  as  Jotots,  boards,  planks,  stoves, 
hoops,  and  tbe  like;'*  Webster's  Unabridged, 
as  "timber  sawed  or  split  into  the  form  of 
beams.  Joists,  boards,  planks,  stoves,  hoops, 
etc.;  espectoUy  that  which  to  smaller  than 
heavy  timber."  Plaintiffs,  Who  were  regular 
rtdppers  of  "dumber,**  ties,  and  piling,  wrote 
to  defendant  rallfoad,  asking  the  rate  on 
'lumber."  £>efendant  replied,  guaranteeing 
a  rate  to  tbe  point  of  delivery  to  a  connect- 
ing carrier.  Plaintiff  shipped  ties,  for  which 
defendant  charged  and  collected  a  greater 
rate  than  agreed  on  in  ito  letter  to  plain- 
tiff. Defendant's  toriff  Sheet  did  not  in- 
filnde  ties  witbin  tbe  term  "lumber,"  and 
there  was  no  evidsnoe  tbat  defendant  un- 
derstood or  could  have  been  reasonably  ex- 
pected to  bave  understood,  when  applied  to 
by  ptointifl,  that  tiie  totter  intended  to  sbip 
ttee,  wben  he  asked  the  rate  on  "lumber." 
Held,  that  the  letter  written  by  defendant 
did  not  asMMint  to  an  agreement  to  carry  ttoe 
on  tbe  rate  specified  tberein.  Greason  v.  St. 
Louto,  I.  M.  lb  8.  By.  Go.,  88  8.  W.  722,  729, 
112  Ma  App.  116. 

Wben  ptokitttr  applied  for  ears  far  tbe 
transportotion  of  oak  cross-ties,  one  of  de- 
ftodant  carriers  bad  a  Joint  rate  to  Kansas 
points,  including  the  destination  of  the  tios, 
applying  to  "lumber,  car  loads,  all  kinds,"  of 
24  cents  per  100  pounds.  The  other  defend- 
ant carrier  had  a  simitor  rate  on  'lumber, 
all  kinds,"  but  uaither  oanler  bad  a  specific 
rate  on  cross^tiesL  Held,  tbat  "Inmber"  being 
generally  defined  to  include  '*any  timber  saw- 


XUMBEB 


198 


UJNAOT 


ed  or  spilt  for  use,"  whether  by  manl,  wedge, 
or  the  use  of  machinery  in  a  mill,  anything 
manufactured  out  of  a  log  with  saw,  ax, 
maul,  wedge,  or  machine,  for  building  houses, 
bridges,  fences,  or  railroads,  after  the  prod- 
uct leaves  the  log  for  commercial  use,  it  in- 
cluded the  cross-ties  within  such  Joist-rate 
schedules.  Classification  of  railway  crosa- 
ties  in  a  different  class  from  'lumber,"  impos- 
ing on  them  a  higher  rate,  constitutes  un- 
just discrimination.  American  Tie  &  Timber 
Co,  V.  Kansas  City  Southern  By.  Co.,  175 
Fed.  28,  32,  09  O.  O.  A.  44. 

Key.  St  1908,  c.  93,  {  46,  proyides  that 
whoever  labors  at  cutting,  hauling,  rafting, 
or  driving  logs  or  lumber  shall  have  a  lien 
thereon  for  the  amount  due  for  his  personal 
services  and  the  service  performed  by  his 
team.  Held,  that  in  view  of  the  original 
provision  in  the  statute  (Laws  1848,  c.  72), 
providing  a  lien  for  "cutting,  hauling,  or 
driving  logs,  masts,  gpars,  or  other  lumber/' 
meaning  other  lumber  ejusdem  generis,  in  a 
condition  similar  to  logs»  masts,  and  spars, 
that  is,  felled  but  not  manufactured,  but  de- 
signed for  ultimate  manufacture,  as  are  logs, 
or  not  to  be  manufactured,  as  are  spars  and 
masts,  the  word  "lumber"  in  section  46  is  not 
used  in  its  broadest  meaning  as  including 
both  the  manufactured  and  the  unmanufac- 
tured product ;  but  no  lien  Is  given  for  cut- 
ting or  hauling  manufactured  lumber. 
MUchell  V.  Page  (Me.)  78  Atl.  570,  571. 


LB  goods,  wares 
See  Goods. 


and  meroliaiidlBo 


Loss  or  timbev  dlstjngnished 

"Lumber"  is  to  be  distinguished  from  logs 
or  timber,  and  in  common  pariance,  as  well, 
means  more  than  ordinary  logs.  Oaze  v. 
Alabama  State  Land  Ck).,  46  South.  479,  480, 
155  Ala.  431  (citing  definition  in  Webst  Diet). 

As  meroliandlse 

See  Merchandise. 

Timber  asmoBymovs 

Where,  in  a  suit  by  attachment  the  affi- 
davit set  up  a  Uen  for  stumpage,  under  Code 
1907,  t  4814,  for  timber  sold,  and  the  com- 
plaint charged  for  lumber  sold,  but  also 
claimed  under  a  Hen  for  stumpage  under  the 
statute,  which  gives  a  lien  for  timber  sold, 
the  word  "lumber,"  as  used  therein.  Is  syn- 
onymous with  "timber,"  when  considered  in 
connection  with  all  the  averments  of  the  com- 
plaint and  the  affidavit,  as  against  an  objec- 
tion that  there  was  a  fatal  variance  between 
the  pleading  and  proof,  since  it  can  reasonably 
be  construed  to  harmonize  with  the  affidavit 
and  evidence  showing  a  sale  of  timber,  as 
distinguished  from  lumber.  Sligh  v«  Frix,  51 
South.  601,  602,  165  Ala.  230. 

LUMBER  AND  TIMBZSR 

Slabs  are  not  included-  in  the  material 
designated  as  "lumber  and  timber"  in  the 
statute  giving  a  Uen  .on  the  lumber  and  tim- 


ber for  services  in  cutting  logs.    Bngi  r.  Har- 
deU,  100  N.  W.  1046,  1048,  123  Wis.  407. 

LUMBER  DEALER  OR  BCEROKAHT 

As  engaged  in  mercantile  pursuit,  see 
Mercantile. 

One  engaging  in  the  business  of  keeping 
and  selling  lumber  in  considerable  quanti- 
ties is  properly  called  a  "lumber  merchant" 
Jackson  v.  Town  of  Union,  78  AtL  778,  774, 
82  Ck>nn.  266. 

LUMP  SUM 

Code  1899,  c  54,  I  26,  relating  to  con- 
tracts with  building  and  loan  associations,  de- 
mands "that  the  extent  of  payment  of  premi- 
ums be  definite,  and  to  answer  that  demand 
there  must  be  a  lump  sum,'  but  «  «  * 
it  may  be  taken  out  in  advance,  or  be  dis- 
tributed in  stated  periodical  payments;  but 
such  lump  sum  need  not  in  words  be  speci- 
fied, and  then  distributed,  because  if  the  pe- 
riodical payments  be  fixed  in  amount  and 
number,  they  make  up  a  lump  sum.' "  Ta- 
haney  v.  Washington  Nat  Bldg.  ft  Loan 
Ass'n,  68  8.  B.  791«  69  W.  Va.  296L 

LUMPER 

See  Lumping. 

LUMPING 

A  charge  in  the  items  of  a  mechanic's 
lien  is  not  a  "lumping^  one,  where  it  in- 
cludes only  lienable  items  which  are  the  sub- 
ject of  an  express  contract  for  a  given  price, 
which,  in  case  of  a  subcontract,  is  also  shown 
to  be  the  reasonable  value  thereof.  Holland 
V.  Ounliff,  69  S.  W.  737,  740,  96  Mo.  App.  67 
(citing  Hilliker  r.  Francisco,  65  Ma  698; 
Deardorff  v.  Boy,  50  Mo.  App.  70). 

The  term  "lumping,"  in  the  vernacular 
of  members  of  a  trade  union  is  used  to  desig- 
nate a  method  of  doing  work  where  the  con- 
tractor is  only  the  figurehead  of  the  owner 
who  purchases  the  material  and  assumes  all 
the  responsibility  in  connection  with  the  con- 
tract and  the  "lumper"  merely  furnishes  the 
labor  and  acts  as  superintendent  upon  an 
agreed  compensation  for  his  services.  People 
V.  Welnselmer,  102  N.  X.  Supp.  579,  681, 
117  App.  Div.  603. 

LUNACY 

The  words  "lunacy^  and  "unsound  mind" 
have  been  bent  out  of  their  technical  sense 
in  some  instances,  a  legislative  constructiOD 
being  given  thereto  in  harmony  with  the 
broad  views  of  courts  that  they  include  ev- 
ery phase  of  unsound  mind  rendering  one 
incapable  of  caring  for  himself  or  his  prop- 
erty. In  re  Strelff,  97  N.  W.  189,  191,  119 
Wis.  666,  100  Am.  St  Rep.  903. 

Under  section  7,  Statutory  Construction 
law,  the  terms  "lunatic"  and  "lunacy**  iadude 


LUNACY 


199 


LYING  OB  BSINa  WITHIN 


erery  Und  of  imfloimdxiefls  of  mind  except 
Idiocy.  Schoenberg  ft  Oo.  ▼.  Ulman,  99  N.  Y. 
Supp.  eSO,  652,  61  Misc.  Rep.  88. 

Under  Statutory  Construction  Law  (Laws 
1892,  p.  1487,  c.  677)  I  7.  defining  "lunacy" 
to  include  every  kind  of  unsoundness  of  mind 
except  idiocy,  the  word  "lunacy**  in  Code  Civ. 
Proc  S  2335,  providing  that,  where  a  petition 
alleges  that  the  person  with  respect  to  whom 
it  prays  for  the  appointment  of  a  committee 
is  incompetent  by  reason  of  "lunacy,**  the  in- 
quiry with  respect  to  the  competency  must  be 
confined  to  the  question  whether  he  is  in- 
competent at  the  time  of  the  Inquiry,  includes 
all  phases  of  incompetency  including  imbe- 
cility arising  from  old  age.  In  re  Preston's 
Will,  09  N.  Y.  Supp.  312,  313,  113  App.  Div. 
732  (citing  Matter  of  Schrodt,  67  N.  Y.  Supp. 
244,  32  Misc.  Rep.  540;  Matter  of  Clark,  67 
N.  Y.  Supp.  681,  57  App.  Dlv.  6). 

LUKATIO 

As  natural  person,  see  Natural  Fersoa 
As  person,  see  Person. 

Under  section  7,  Staatory  Construction 
£4aw,  the  terms  "lunatic^  and  'lunacy"  In- 
clude every  kind  of  unsonndness  of  mind  ex- 
cept idiocy.  Schqenberg  ds  Co.  ▼.  Ubnan,  99 
N.  T.  Supp.  650,  652,  51  Misc.  Rep.  83. 

Rev.  Laws,  c.  87,  §{  6,  79,  places  the  bur- 
den of  support  of  insane  persons  on  the  state. 
Rev.  Laws,  c.  8,  (  5,  d.  6,  provides  that,  in 
eoDstrulng  statutes  the  words  "insane  per- 
son** and  "lunatic"  shall  include  every  idiot, 
non  compos,  lunatic,  and  insane  and  distract- 
ed person.  Held,  that  persons  committed  to 
the  School  for  Feeble-Minded  are  not  insane 
persons,  and  hence  the  state  is  not  liable  for 
their  support  Chapin  v.  City  of  Lowell,  80 
K  E.  618,  619, 194  Mass.  486* 

LUNAR  MONTH 

As  month,  see  Month. 

LUNCH  WAGON 

As  boilding,  see  Building. 

LUTHERAN 

The  name  "Lutheran"  is  a  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  the  churches  adhering  to 
and  adopting  certain  writings  in  and  short- 
ly after  the  time  of  Martin  Luther  as  conclu- 
dve  expression  of  the  creed,  and  inerrant  in- 
terpretation of  the  Scriptures,  and  rejecting 
certain  other  writings  which  are  adopted  by 
what  are  called  the  "German  Reformed 
Chnrch"  jbm  correct  interpretation  of  the 
Scriptures.  The  Lutherans  prescribe  certain 
books  as  necessary  to  be  used  in  Sunday 
school  and  confessions  of  faith,  and  the  like, 
and  yield  almost  inspirational  authority  to 
the  writings  of  Dr.  Luther.  Marien  v.  Evan- 
gelical Creed  Congregation  of  Milwaukee,  113 
N.  W.  66,  67, 132  Wis.  650. 


LUXURIES 

Food  supplies  ordered  by  the  master  of 
a  fishing  schooner,  who  was  also  managing 
owner,  for  the  use  of  the  crew  on  a  fishing 
voyage,  under  the  usual  lay  oontracts,  In  the 
absence  of  any  showing  of  bad  faith  on  his 
part,  will  be  presumed  to  be  supplies  "neces- 
sary" for  the  employment  of  the  vessel,  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  Maine  statute  giving  a 
lien  for  such  supplies,  and  the  court  will  not 
undertake  to  determine  that  certain  of  the 
articles  were  "luxuries"  for  which  the  vessel 
is  not  liable.  The  term  "luxuries"  is  an  en- 
tirely relative  term.  The  Mary  F.  Chishohn, 
188  Fed.  598,  60a 

LYCHEE 

Dried  lycfaee  as  edible  fruit,  see  Edible 
Fruit 

LYiNQ 

IiTXHG  BETWESH  PXEBB 

Where  an  insurance  policy  on  a  Tsnel 
provided  that  the  company  should  not  be  lia- 
ble for  injuries  in  consequence  of  ice  except 
when  the  vessel  was  "lying  between  piers," 
the  exception  should  be  construed  as  requir> 
ing  that  the  vessrt  should  be  placed  between 
piers  sufficiently  near  to  each  other  to  afford 
protection  from  floating  ice  on  both  aides; 
and  hence,  where  the  piers  between  which 
the  vessel  was  moored  at  the  time  of  her  in- 
juries were  2,200  feet  apart,  she  was  not  "^- 
ing  between  piers"  within  the  policy.  Hunt- 
ley v.  Providence  Washington  In&,Co.,  79  N. 
Y.  Supp.  35,  36»  77  App.  Div.  196. 

LTIKG  nr  WATT 

"Lying  in  wait"  means  hiding  In  am- 
bush or  concealment  It  does  not  necessarily 
refer  to  the  attitude  of  the  body,  but  rather 
to  its  location,  and  the  purpose  of  taking  the 
person  attacked  unawares.  It  is  the  mental 
poise  of  the  wild  beast  in  quest  of  prey,  and 
necessarily  Implies  malice,  premeditation,  de- 
liberation, and  the  willful  intent  If  a  per- 
son, armed  with  a  club,  was  hiding  in  the 
darkness  with  the  purpose  of  assaulting  an- 
other when  unaware  of  danger,  he  was, 
though  standing,  technically  "lying  in  wait" 
State  V.  Tyler,  97  N.  W.  983,  985,  122  Iowa, 
125. 


LTIHG  OB  BISING  WITUIH 

Const  art  8,  fi  5,  declares  that  all  rail- 
road property  within  the  limits  of  any  city 
shall  bear  its  proportionate  share  of  munic- 
ipal taxation,  and,  if  not  previously  render- 
ed, the  city  authorities  shall  have  power  to 
require  its  rendition  and  collect  the  usual 
municipal  tax  thereon.  Section  8  declares 
that  property  of  railroad  companies  shall  be 
assessed  and  taxes  collected  in  the  several 
counties  in  which  the  property  is  situated, 
including  so  much  of  the  roadbed  and  fix- 


LTKCBnra 


2M 


LTNCBINO 


tares  as  shall  be  In  each  coonty;  and  that 
the  rolling  stock  shall  be  assessed  In  gross 
tn  the  county  where  the  principal  office  of 
the  company  is  located,  and  the  connty  tax 
paid  on  it  shall  be  apportioned  by  the  comp- 
troller in  proportion  to  the  distance  the  road 
may  run  through  any  such  county  among  the 
several  counties  through  which  the  road 
passes,  as  a  part  of  their  assets.  Held  that, 
under  Rer.  St.  1896,  art  6068,  proriding  for 
the  general  taxation  of  the  rolling  stock  of 
railroad  corporations,  and  article  600,.  pro- 
viding that  only  property  situated  within  the 
limits  of  a  city  is  taxable  by  it,  a  city  con- 
taining the  principal  office  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany was  not,  for  that  reason,  authorised  to 
levy  municipal  taxes  on  all  the  railroad's 
rolling  stock,  only  a  small  portion  of  which 
would  necessarily  be  within  the  city  on  the 
1st  day  of  January  of  each  year;  the  term 
"lying  or  being  within  the  limits  of  any  dty 
or  incorporated  town,"  etc.,  when  applied  to 
tangible  movable  property,  meaning  only  such 
property  as  is  actually  and  physically  with- 
in the  limits  of  the  dty.  City  of  I^ler  v. 
Coker  (Teoc.)  124  8.  W.  729,  780, 

LYNCHINQ 

**The  word  lyndiing*  has  bean  defined  by 
legal  BM  well  as  other  lezioograpben,  and  ac- 
cording to  such  ddlnitiona,  and  as  the  term 
is  generally  understood,  the  Ulegal  aete  com- 
monly termed  lyndiing'  cannot  be  eomadtted 
by  a  single  individual    Yet  oee  penon  alone 


eould  be  guilty  of  the  orime  of  breaking  and 
entering  a  Jail  with  latent  to  kill  under  this 
statute.  'I^Bobiag'  is  defined  by  Baplje  A 
Lawrence  as  'mob  vengeance  upon  a  person 
suspected  of  crime.'  taw  Dictionary,  778. 
It  is  'a  term  descriptive  of  the  action  of  un- 
offidal  persons,  organized  bands,  or  mobs, 
who  seize  persons  charged  with  or  suspected 
of  crimes,  or  take  them  out  of  the  custody  of 
the  law,  and  inflict  summary  punishment  on 
them,  without  legal  trial,  and  without  war- 
rant or  authority  of  law.'  Black's  Law  Dic- 
tionary, p.  737.  *A  common  phrase  used  to 
express  the  vengeance  of  a  mob  inflicting  in- 
Jury  and  committing  an  outrage  upon  a  pei^ 
son  suspected  of  some  crime.'  Worcester 
and  Webster  define  the  word  as  the  inilictlon 
of  punishment  without  legal  trial  by  a  mob 
or  by  unauthorteed  persons.  The  word  de- 
rives its  origin,  according  to  Worcester,  from 
a  Virginia  farmer  named  Lynch,  who,  having 
caught  a  thief,  instead  of  delivering  him  to 
the  ofCloers  of  the  law,  tied  him  to  a  tree  and 
flogged  him  with  his  own  hands.  Lynching 
has  no  technical  legal  meaning.  It  is  merely 
a  deseripdve  phrase,  used  to  signify  ttie  law- 
less acts  of  peraons  who  violate  established 
law  at  the  tlaoe  they  commit  the  acts^  and  la 
univenally  understood  to  signify  tiie  Illegal 
infliction  of  punishment  by  a  oombtnatioD  of 
persons  for  an  aUeged  crime."  gtate  v.  Lew- 
is,  66  &  BL  d00»  610,  au»  142  N.  a  820,  9 
Ann.  Casi  861  (iiuotiiilg  Bouv.  Law  Diet  287. 
See,  also,  State  v.  Alar,  20  a  Bw  686,  89  W. 
Va.  668). 


MAOiJXAJl. 


201 


liACHnM 


M 


MACADAM 

The  word  *^acadatn**  hta  a  Yartely  ot 
meanings.  TlniB,  wtiere  plaintiff  contracted 
to  furnish  for  two  jeara  all  tha  oruabed 
stone  needed  by  defendant  la  construction 
and  repair  of  Its  streets,  defendant  agree- 
ing to  use  said  crashed  stone  in  all  street 
construction  work  and  all  repair  work  done 
by  it  where  the  improTement  is  made  with 
"macadam,**  the  contract  was  ambiguous, 
and  plaintiff  might  show  that  the  parties, 
when  making  the  contract,  understood  that 
the  word  included  river  and  mining  gravel 
as  well  as  crashed  stone.  Viernow  v.  City 
of  Carthage,  128  S.  W.  67,  68,  139  Mo.  App. 
276. 

MACADAMIZE 

According  to  tlie  Standard  Dictionary, 
to  "macadamize*'  is  ''to  cover  or  pave,  as  a 
path  or  roadway,  with  amaU  broken  stone, 
on  either  a  soft  or  a  hard  substratum.**  Jih 
didally  speaking,  the  word  '*macadamlging" 
bas  a  fixed  and  definite  meaning,  and  refers 
not  only  to  the  kind  of  material  to  be  used 
in  covering  the  street  or  road,  bot  also  to  the 
manner  in  which  it  ia  to  be  laid.  It  means 
to  cover  a  atreet  or  road  by  a  process  Intro* 
daced  by  Macadam,  which  comista  of  the  use 
of  small  stones  of  a  unif  ora  size,  conaolidat- 
ed  and  levelled  by  heavy  rollens.  Jones  v. 
Plummer,  118  8.  W.  100,  111,  1S7  lio.  App. 
337. 

A  "nucadamized  roadway"  does  not 
mean  one  made  up  of  a  mixture  of  day, 
gravel,  limestone,  and  alag,  that  will  not  sus- 
tain an  ordinary  load  in  wet  weather.  In 
the  oomiMUi  praotftce  and  understanding  such 
a  roadway  bas  been  regarded  aa  one  covered 
with  small,  broken  atones,  ao  as  to  form  a 
smooth,  hard,  convex  snrfaee,  capable  of  sus- 
taining ordinarily  heavy  traffic.  Qage  v.  Peo- 
ple, 65  N.  £.  1084,  1086,  1066,  200  lU.  432. 

Complainants  conveyed  certain  land  to  a 
dty  for  a  street,  the  city  agreeing  to  grade 
and  ''macadamize'*  the  street  which  was  in 
ftn  outlying  district  where  It  was  well  known 
to  both  parties  that  the  city  was  in  the  habit 
of  macadamizing  only  the  center  of  the  street 
to  a  width  of  from  14  to  16  feet,  for  a  drive- 
way. Held,  that  the  contract  should  not  be 
construed  to  require  the  dty  to  macadamize 
the  street  to  its  full  width,  but  only  in  ac- 
cordance with  its  recognized  custom.  City  of 
Versailles  v.  Brown  (Ky.)  96  S.  W.  1108, 1109. 

The  term  "pave**  In  its  generic  sense 
means  to  place  some  sabstanoe  <m  the  atreet 
80  as  to  form  an  artificial  roadway  or  wear- 
ing surface  which  shall  change  the  natural 
condition  of  the  street  The  word  is  much 
more  comprehensive  than  the  tenn  ''macad- 
amize,** but  it  embraces  aU  tlMt  the  term 


"macadamise'*  covers.    Eooa  t.  Ckita%  II  8. 
W.  1107,  U09,  186  Ma  338. 


See  EQghway* 

MACHINE 

See  Elevating  Machine;    Reanteg 
chine;   Slot  Machine;   Sticker) 
Traversing  Parts  of  a  Machine ;  Ifl^ 
nowlng  Machine. 

Other  machine,  see  Other. 

"The  term  'machine'  indndea  every  ae- 
cbanical  device  or  combination  mechanical 
powers  and  devices  to  perform  some  function 
and  produce  a  certain  effect  or  result"  A 
"machine**  is  a  concrete  thing  cons! sting  of 
parts,  or  of  certain  devices  and  combination 
of  devices,  and  a  machine  is  not  a  principle 
or  an  idea.  The  mere  function  or  operation 
of  a  machine  or  other  device,  as  dtlstingatah- 
ed  from  the  machine  or  devtoe  itself,  ia  not 
patentable.  American  Steel  ft  Wire  Co.  v. 
Denning  Wire  &  Fence  Co.,  160  Fed.  108, 
111,  112  (quoting  and  adopting  deflnitionB  in 
Ck>ming  V.  Burden,  15  How.  [56  U.  S.]  252, 14 
U  Bd.  683;  Burr  v.  Durgee,  1  WaU.  [68  U. 
SJ  531,  17  L.  Bd.  650). 

In  patent  law,  a  "nwchlne^  la  a  eon* 
Crete  thing  consisting  of  parts  or  of  certain 
devices,  or  combination  of  devices.  ''A  ma- 
chine is  not  a  principle  or  an  idea."  United 
States  Gonsol.  Seeded  Raisin  Co.  v.  S^ma 
Fruit  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  0.  A.)  195  Fed.  264,  276, 
115  C.  C.  A.  234. 


Bitoaastt  mllvr»y 

A  new  method  of  handling  passengers  to 
secure  rapid  transit  in  a  large  dty,  termed  a 
'^bitranslt  railway  system,"  is  not  a  "ma- 
chine** within  the  patent  law,  and  the  patent 
therefor  is  void  for  lack  of  patentable  nov- 
elty. Fowler  v.  New  York,  121  Fed.  747,  58 
C.  C.  A.  113. 


The  term  "machine**  includes  every  me- 
chanical device  or  combination  of  mechani- 
cal powers  and  devices  to  perform  some  func- 
tion and  produce  a  certain  effect  or  result. 
A  crane  used  to  lift  molten  metal  in  a  manu- 
facturing establishment,  and  operated  by 
hand,  is  a  "machine**  within  the  factory  act 
(Acts  1899,  p.  234,  c.  142,  i  8;  Burns'  Ann. 
St  1901,  i  70871),  requiring  the  operator  of  a 
nuinufacturing  estat^diment  to  guard  vats, 
cogs,  belting,  «bc.,  or  machinery.  Crawford 
ft  McCdnunon  Co.  v.  Oose  (Ind.)  82  N.  EL 
984,  985  (Quoting  and  adopUng  tbe  definition 
in  Corning  v.  Burden,  15  How.  262,  14  L.  Bd. 
683;  Green  v.  American  Oar  4  Foundry  Co., 
71  N.  £.  268,  168  Ind.  135). 


aCAGHINS 


liACHINX 


Drop 

The  teim  "macbine"  indndes  erery  me- 
chanical device^  or  combination  of  median!- 
eal  powers  and  devioea,  to  perform  some 
function  and  prbdnoe  a  certain  effect  or  re- 
sult A  steel  hammer  of  1,500  pounds,  rest- 
ing In  the  centor  of  the  floor,  within  four 
large  upright  posts,  with  attachments  to  a 
power  for  the  purpose  of  hauling  it  to  the 
top  of  the  frame  and  letting  it  drop,  is  a  ma- 
chine, within  the  meaning  of  Burns'  Ann. 
St  1901,  I  7067,  relating  to  the  duty  of  an 
employer,  and  requiring  that  all  vats,  pans, 
saws,  and  machinery  of  every  description 
shall  be  properly  guarded.  Qreen  v.  Ameri- 
can Oar  ft  Foundry  Co^  71  N.  E.  268,  270, 
163  Ind.  135  (citing  Ck>mlng  v.  Burden,  56 
U.  S.  [16  How.]  262,  14  L.  Ed. 


A  "drop,**  a  device  consisting  of  a  fixed 
derrick  which  raises  a  large  steel  ball  to  a 
considerable  hieight  and  allow  it  to  fall  upon 
scrap  iron,  etc,  for  the  purpose  of  breaking 
it,  is  a  ^'machine."  Inland  Steel  Go.  r.  Kach- 
winski,  151  Fed.  219,  221,  80  a  0.  A.  671. 

Eatery  belt 

An  emery  belt,  used  In  a  ftictory  to  pol- 
ish metal,  is  a  "machine,"  within  Bums' 
Ann.  St.  1901,  |  70871,  requiring  machinery 
of  every  description  in  factories  to  be  prop- 
erly guarded.  La  Porte  Carriage  CJo.  v.  Sul- 
lender  (Ind.)  71  N.  B.  922,  924.  See,  also, 
Pein  V.  Miznerr,  83  N.  B.  784,  786,  41  Ind. 
App.  256,  overruling  La  Porte  Carriage  Go. 
V.  SuUender,  76  N.  E.  277, 166  Ind.  29a 

Maehiaery  dlstincuislied 

See  Machinery^ 

Xaiigle 

"A  'machine'  is  a  medianical  device  or 
combination  of  medianical  powers  and  de- 
vices to  perform  some  function  and  produce 
a  certain  effect  or  result"  A  laundry  mangle 
is  within  the  scope  of  the  factory  act  pro- 
viding that  ''all  vats,  pans,"  etc.,  and  "ma- 
chinery of  every  description,"  shall  be  prop- 
erly guarded.  Pein  v.  Miznerr,  83  N.  E.  784, 
786,  41  Ind.  App.  255. 

Pile  driver  aad  enghkm 

As  used  in  Civ.  Code,  (  1970,  providing 
that  an  employer  shall  be  liable  for  injuries 
to  a  servant  sustained  through  the  employ- 
er's negligence  or  the  default  of  a  co-employ6, 
employed  on  a  machine  or  other  appliance 
than  that  on  which  the  employ^  Injured  was 
employed,  the  word  "machine"  means  an  in- 
strument composed  of  one  or  more  of  the 
mechanical  powers,  and  capable  when  set  in 
motion  of  producing  by  its  own  operation 
certain  predetermined  physical  effects,  be- 
ing distinguished  from  all  other  mechanical 
instruments  in  that  its  rule  of  action  resides 
within  itself,  and  hence,  where  a  servant 
employed  to  steady  piles  in  front  of  a  pile 
driver  was  injured  by  the  negligence  of  the 
engineer  operating  the  engine  by  which  the 


hammer  was  lifted*  the  pile  driver  and  the 
engine  being  connected  only  by  a  rope  by 
which  the  power  was  transmitted  to  the  ham- 
mer, plaintiff  and  the  engineer  were  not 
working  on  the  same  machine  within  sudi 
section.  Korander  v.  Penn  Bridge  COi»  116 
Paa  884,  386,  16  CaL  App.  249. 

Pvoeess  disiiiicvlslied 

"A  'machine'  is  a  thing.  A  'process'  is 
an  act  or  a  mode  of  acting.  The  one  \b 
visible  to  the  eye,  an  object  of  perpetual 
observation.  The  other  is  a  conception  of 
the  mind,  seen  only  by  its  effects  when  be- 
ing executed  or  performed.  Eith^  may  be 
the  means  of  producing  a  useful  result" 
Expanded  Metal  Go.  v.  Bradford,  29  Sup.  Ct 
652,  657,  214  U.  S.  866,  53  L.  Ed.  1034;  Eastr 
ern  Extracting  Oo.  v.  Greater  New  York  Ex- 
tracting Co.,  110  N.  T.  Supp.  738,  739,  128 
App.  Div.  928  (quoting  Cochrane  v.  Deener, 
94  U.  S.  780,  24  L.  Ed.  139;  Tllghman  t. 
Proctor,  102  U.  S.  707,  26  L.  Ed.  279) ;  Kirch- 
berger  v,  American  Acetylene  Burner  Co., 
124  Fed.  764,  776. 

The  term  "madilne"  includes  eveiy  me- 
chanical device  or  combination  of  mechani- 
cal powers  and  devices  to  perform  some 
function  and  produce  a  certain  effect  or  re- 
sult But  where  the  result  or  effect  is  pro- 
duced by  chemical  action,  by  the  operation  or 
application  of  some  element  or  power  of  na- 
ture, of  one  substance  to  another,  such 
modes,  methods,  or  operations  are  called 
"processes."  A  new  process  is  usually  the 
result  of  a  discovery;  a  machine,  of  inven- 
tion. But  the  term  "process"  is  often  used  in 
a  more  vague  sense  in  which  it  cannot  be 
the  subject  of  a  patent  Ttoa  we  say  that  a 
board  is  undergoing  the  process  of  behig 
planed,  grain  of  being  ground,  iron  of  being 
hammered  or  rolled.  Here  the  term  is  used 
subjectively  or  passively  as  applied  to  the 
material  operated  on,  and  not  to  the  method 
or  mode  of  producing  that  operation,  which 
is  by  mechanical  means,  or  the  use  of  a 
machine,  as  distinguished  from  a  process. 
In  this  use  of  the  term  it  represents  the 
function  of  a  machine,  or  the  effect  produced 
by  it  on  the  material  subjected  to  the  action 
of  the  machine.  But  it  is  well  settled  that 
a  man  cannot  have  a  patent  for  the  function 
or  abstract  effect  of  a  machine,  but  only  for 
the  machine  which  produces  it  Denning 
Wire  &  Fence  Co.  v.  American  Steel  &  Wire 
Co.,  169  Fed.  795,  796,  95  O,  a  A.  259. 

Bailroad  switoh 

A  railroad  switch  Is  not  a  "machine"  for 
the  construction  of  waterworks,  within  the 
statute  providing  that  persons  furnishing; 
machinery  to  erect  waterworks  may  have  a 
lien  thereon.  Potter  Mfg.  Oo.  v.  A.  B.  Mleyer 
&  Co.,  86  N.  B.  837,  839,  171  Ind.  613,  131 
Am.  St  Rep.  267. 

As  struotttre 

See  Structure 


MACHINE 


203 


MAOHIN£BT 


Traat  railroftd 

A  tram  rallnmd  Is  not  a  "JMehlne," 
within  Rev.  St  1889,  I  848e»  taxing  manu- 
f^ctnrera  on  tools,  machinery,  and  appli* 
anoea  State  ez  leL.  Western  Tie  ft  Timber 
Co.  T.  PolUman,  135  S.  W.  443,  444,  283  Mb. 
229. 


KAGHIHi:  imriBR 

The  term  ^'machine  finished"  Is  nsed  In 
the  manufacture  of  paper  to  represent  sized, 
glazed,  and  snpercalendered  paper.  Jadcson 
y.  Grissom,  94  S.  W.  268,  264,  196  Mo.  624. 

MACHIlfSRY 

See  Dangerous  Machinery;  Defective 
Machinery;  Domestic  Machinery ;  Pat- 
terns for  Machinery;  Steam  Machin- 
ery; Ways,  Works,  Maclilnery,  or 
Plant 

9ther  maddnery,  see  Other. 

A  mortgage  trust  deed  covering  the  "ma- 
chinery" belonging  to  a  cotton  print  works 
company  included  the  copper  roUs  on  which 
the  designs  to  be  printed  on  the  cloth  were 
engraved,  which  were  not  a  part  of  the  print- 
hig  presses,  but  were  purchased  In  the  mar- 
ket separate  from  the  presses  for  use  there- 
in, and  were  m^vailable  for  use  except  in 
the  presses.  According  to  Bouvier's  Law 
Diet,  ''machinery**  is  a  more  comprehensive 
term  than  **machine"  and  includes  the  ap- 
purtenances necessary  to  the  working  of  a 
machine.  According  to  Webster's  Interna- 
tional Dictionary,  second  definition^  "ma- 
chinery" is  the  working  parts  of  a  machine, 
engine,  or  Instrument.  According  to  the  Cen- 
tury and  the  Standard  Dictionaries,  "ma- 
chinery" Is  the  parts  of  a  machine  considered 
collectively,  or  any  construction  of  mechan- 
ical means  designed  to  work  together  to  ac- 
complish a  given  end.  Doty  v.  Oriental  Print 
Works  Co.,  67  Ati.  586,  591,  28  B.  I.  872 
(citing  Seayey  v.  Central  Mut  Fire  Ins.  Co., 
Ill  Mass.  540;  Buchanan  v.  Exchange  Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  61  N.  Y.  26,  33;  Brewer  v.  Ford,  12 
N.  T.  Supp.  621,  59  Hun,  17 ;  State  v.  Avery, 
44  Vt  629 ;  Brower  v.  Locke.  67  N.  B.  1015, 
31  Ind.  App.  353,  358). 

As  all  macliliiery 

The  word  "machinery,"  in  Labor  Law 
(Laws  1897,  c.  415)  I  81,  imposing  on  the 
owner  or  person  in  charge  of  a  factory  the 
duty  to  properly  guard  specified  parts  of 
"machinery,*'  including  shafting  by  name 
and  "machinery  of  every  description,"  means 
machinery  which  needs  to  be  and  can  be 
Snarded  for  the  safety  of  the  employes. 
Poole  V.  American  Linseed  Co.,  103  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1047,  1048,  119  App.  Dlv.  136. 

The  factory  act,  providing  that  "all 
vats,  pans,"  etc,  and  ''mac^dnery  of  every 
description,"  shall  be  properly  guarded,  re- 
^res  all  dangerous  ma<dilnery  to  be  guard- 
ed, Including  a  laundry  mangle;  the  quotp 
ed  phrase  not  being  limited  by  the  enumera- 
tion of  vat9»  pans»  etc.,  since  that  enumera- 


tion Is  not  an  ^lameratlon  of  machines,  and 
the  genus  of  those  words  is  not  of  the  same 
nature  as  of  ''machinery  of  every  descrip- 
Uoa"  Pein  v.  Misnerr,  83  N.  B.  784,  41 
Ind.  App.  255,  overruling  La  Porte  Carriage 
Co.  V.  SuUender,  76  N.  E.  2TT,  281,  165  Ind. 
290. 

A  "machine"  consisting  of  rollers  and 
knives  revolving  at  a  high  rate  of  speed,  and 
set  immediately  below  an  opening  in  a  floor, 
and  used  for  the  purpose  of  mixfhg  sawdust, 
damp  clay  and  dirt  thrown  into  the  opening, 
is  not  within  the  factory  act,  providing  that 
in  all  manufacturing  establishments  "all  vats, 
pans,  saws,  planers,  cogs,  gearing,  belting, 
set  screws,  and  machinery  of  every  descrip- 
tion therein"  shall  be  guarded.  National 
Fire  Proofing  Co.  v.  Rdper,  77  N.  B,  B70- 
372,  38  Ind.  App.  600. 

Castlacs 

Iron  castings  from  10  to  24  feet  In 
length,  known  as  "sill  castings  or  channels," 
were  furnished  to  a  tobacco  company  with 
the  necessary  bolts  for  use  in  Its  factories, 
to  support  tobacco  presses.  Most  of  them 
were  used  for  supporting  presses  or  tables 
connected  therewith,  without  being  fastened 
to  the  floor  and  without  being  put  under  all 
the  presses.  Some  were  used  for  other  pur- 
poses, such  as  skids,  and  "dunnage";  that 
is,  were  put  under  goods  to  raise  them  above 
the  floor.  Those  under  presses  and  tables 
could  be  readily  removed,  and  were  In  tatct 
taken  from  one  building  to  another.  There 
was  no  proof  that  they  were  customarily  tfiiis 
placed  in  tobacco  factories,  or  were  in  any 
way  necessary  to  carry  on  the  work,  or  that 
it  could  not  be  done  as  well  without  them. 
Held,  that  the  castings  were  not  "material" 
or  "machinery,"  within  Rev.  St  1899,  i 
4203  (Ann.  St  1906,  p.  2277),  giving  a  lien 
to  a  person  furnishing  the  same  for  a  build- 
ing. Banner  Iron  Works  v.  Mtna  Iron 
Works,  122  S.  W.  762,  763,  143  Mo.  App.  1. 

GonTeyor 

A  conveyor,  consisting  of  a  long,  cylin- 
drical, rotating  rod,  fo  which  flanges  are 
attached,  is  a  shafting  or  "machinery,"  with- 
in the  factory  act  (Acts  1899,  p.  234,  c.  142, 
8  9;  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  f  70871),  providing 
that  all  shafting  and  "machinery"  shall  be 
guarded.  United  States  Cement  Co.  v. 
Cooper  (Ind.)  82  N.  B.  981,  983. 

Onuie 

Under  Code  Supp.  1907,  |  4909a2,  re- 
quiring "ma^lnery"  in  factories  to  be  guard* 
ed,  a  traveling  crane  is  a  machine,  and.  If 
injury  is  reasonably  to  be  apprehoided  there- 
from to  those  working  in  its  vldnlty,  It 
should  be  provided  with  proper  guards.  Mc- 
Camey  v.  Bettendorf,  Axle  Ck>«  (Iowa)  186  R 
W.  920,  925. 

Derrick  and  appUmnoes 

Where,  on  the  sale  of  a  derrick,  the 
president  of  the  seller  corporation  wrote  the 
buyer,  "We  fully  guarantee  matiilnery,  and 


MAOHINBRT 


264 


HACHDnar 


ir  tbe  Mitte  gives  out  throogli  any  favlt  of 
oun,  we  will  replace  It,**  the  term  ^^maohin- 
eiT**  was  mactontly  heoAd  to  Incinde  the 
whole  of  the  defrlok  and  appliances  foiv 
ntehed  by  the  seller.  Mffler  ▼.  F.  R.  Patch 
Mfg.  Co.,  91  N.  T.  Snpp.  870,  871,  101  App. 
Dlv.  22. 

Cmery  wheel 

An  emery  wheel  used  as  a  part  of  a 
factory  equipment  to  grind  tools  is  not  with- 
in the  phrase  "machinery  of  every  descrip- 
tion," In  the  factory  act  (Acts  1899,  p.  234. 
c.  142,  I  9;  Bums*  Ann.  St  1901,  f  7087i), 
providing  that  "all  vats,  pans,  saws,"  etc., 
and  "machinery  of  every  description,"  shall 
he  properly  guarded.  National  Drill  Go.  v. 
Myers,  81  N.  ».  U03,  40  Ind,  App.  322  (cit- 
ing La  Porte  Carriage  Co.  v.  SuUender,  75 
N.  EL  277,  165  Ind.  290, 


A  hammer  used  by  a  track  hand  on  a 
railroad  was  not  a  part  of  the  "machinery'* 
of  the  railroad  company  within  the  meaning 
of  a  statute  declaring  that  such  a  company 
shall  be  liable  for  any  damage  done  by  the 
running  of  the  locomotives  or  cars  or  other 
machinery  thereon.  Williams  v.  Garbutt 
Lumber  Ck).,  64  S.  B.  65,  70,  132  Oa.  221 
(quoting  Georgia  Railroad  ft  Banking  Co.  v. 
Nelms,  9  a.  EL  1049,  83  Ga.  70,  20  Am.  St 
R^  308). 


The  harness  of  a  horse  attached  to  a 
delivery  wagon  which  an  employ^  was  driv- 
ing was  not  a  part  of  the  employer's  "ma- 
chinery," within  Rev.  Laws,  c.  106,  S  71,  cl.  1, 
giving  an  employ^  the  same  right  of  action 
against  his  employer  for  personal  injuries 
by  a  defect  in  the  ways,  works,  and  machin- 
ery connected  with  the  employer's  business, 
as  if  he  had  not  been  an  employ^;  "machinery", 
only  including  such  machines  or  mechanical 
devices  as  are  in  use,  and  such  appurtenances 
thereof  as  are  used  incidental  to  the  use  of 
the  machine.  Murphy  v.  O'NeU,  90  N.  E.  406, 
407,  204  Mass.  42,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  146. 

Seatims;  boiler 

Ky.  St  S  2463,  provides  that  a  person 
who  furnishes  materials  in  the  erection  or 
repairing  of  a  house,  or  for  any  fixture  or 
machinery  therein,  or  for  the  improvement  of 
real  estate  by  contract  with,  or  by  the  writ- 
ten consent  of,  the  owner,  contractor,  sub- 
contractor, or  authorized  agent,  shall  have  a 
lien  thereon,  etc.  Held,  that  a  heating  boil- 
er  purchased  by  a  contractor  and  installed 
in  defendant's  residence  constitated  a  "fix- 
ture" and  "machinery,"  within  the  statute, 
and  also  an  improvement  of  the  property, 
within  the  section,  00  as  to  enhtle  the  seller 
to  a  materialman's  lien  therefor.  Menne  v. 
American  Radiator  Co.,  150  a  W.  24,  25, 
160  Ky.  151. 

As  improTeBieBt  of 

i     Bee  ImpTOTemeat 


Kiln  doors 

Whcie  a  contvacO  to  fttmiah  ^^machinery 
aa  follows*  anuaaefatas  among  other  articles 
kiln  doors,  such  doors  are  "ma<diinei7f"  far 
the  parposes  of  the  contract  Thomas  C^ilna 
C3a  r,  C.  W.  Raymond  Co.,  136  Fed.  25,  29, 
67  O.  0.  A  629. 

HaohiM  dlstiasiilshod 

The  word  "machinery,**  in  a  fire  poli- 
cy insuring  a  laundry  and  machinery,  in- 
cluded the  boiler,  pipes,  and  fittings;  steam 
being  used,  not  only  as  a  motive  power,  but 
for  providing  heat  for  drying  purposes,  etc. 
According  to  Webster's  International  Dic- 
tionary a  "machine"  is  aj^  mechanical  con- 
trivance, while  "maehinery"  is  the  means  and 
appliances  by  which  anything  la  kept  in  ac- 
tion or  a  dealred  resuU  is  obtained;  a  com- 
plete system  of  parts  adapted  to  a  purpose. 
More  narrowly  and  technically,  ''machinery" 
is  said  to  be  the  working  parts  of  a  machine, 
engine,  or  instrument  arranged  and  con- 
structed so  as  to  apply  and  regulate  force. 
Tubbs  V.  Mechanics'  Ina  Cto.,  108  N.  W. 
324,  326,  131  Iowa,  217. 

As  porsonal  pv#portr 

See  Feraonal  Property. 
Bailroad  track  i 

Labor  Law  (Laws  1897,  p.  480,  C  415,  i 
81)  requires  that  all  vats,  pans,  saws,  plan- 
ers, cogs,  gearing,  belting,  shafting,  set 
screws  and  "machinery  of  every  description" 
shall  be  properly  guarded.  Held,  that  other 
mechanical  appliances  constituting  similar 
hazards  were  included  in  the  words  "machin- 
ery of  every  description,"  but  that  they 
did  not  include  a  railroad  track  some  three 
feet  above  the  floor  of  a  gallery  In  a  ma- 
chine shop,  on  which  trucks  were  operated; 
there  being  no  inherent  danger  in  the  track, 
nor  reasonable  ground  to  believe  that  an  em- 
ploye in  falling  would  be  injured  by  putting 
his  hand  in  front  of  the  wheel  of  a  truck 
which  was  being  operated  on  the  track. 
Wynkoop  v.  Ludlow  Valve  Mfg.  Co.,  89  N.  E. 
827,  828,  196  N.  Y.  324,  30  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  36. 

Water  nudiui  and  plves 

Pipes  and  water  mains  of  waterworks 
company  are  not  taxable  as  "machinery  em- 
ployed In  manufactures,"  within  Rev.  Laws, 
c.  12,  f  23,  providing  for  the  taxation  of  such 
machinery  within  the  state.  Coffin  v. 
Artesian  Water  Co.,  79  N.  B.  262,  263,  193 
Mass.   274. 

MA0HIKI8T 

The  term  "machinists"  does  not  Include 
plumbers,  painters,  plasterers,  and  such  like 
artisans.  Hence  a  plumber  furnishing  the 
labor  and  materials  to  eonnect  a  soda  fbun- 
taln,  gas  dmia,  and  generator,  etc.,  la  n<A  a 
"machinist"  within  Laws  1906,  p.  1S7,  c  72, 
paovldlng  that  every  machinist  wlio  expends 
labor,  skill,  and  materials  on  any  chattel 
shall  have  a  lien  for  his  servioea.  Modem 
Plumbing  &  Heating  Co.  ▼;  American  Soda 


HACHIKIfiPT 


205 


MAD» 


Fountain  Co.,  106  Pftc.  026,  929^  07  Wash. 
148,  135  Am.  St  Rep.  976. 

In  an  action  by  a  passenger  against  a 
street  car  company,  wllere  the  declaration  al- 
leged that  plaintiff  was  a  maphlnist  when  lie 
was  injured,  the  fact  that  the  evidence  show- 
ed that  he  was  a  tool  maker  did  not  prevent 
btm  from  recovering  damages  for  decreased 
earning  capacity  as  a  skilled  workman,  the 
proof  showing  that  tool  makers  were  machinr 
ists,  as  the  word  ''machinist'*  was  broad 
enongh  to  cover  skilled  machinists.  FllUnip- 
bam  v.  Michigan  United  Bys.  Ck>.,  117  N.  W. 
635,  636,  IM  Mich.  233. 

MACKEREL 

Evidence  la  admissible  to  show  a  trade 
custom  conatmlng  the  word  'Mackerel"  to 
mean  clear  and  not  rusty  mackereL  Procter 
V.  Atlantic  FlBh  CkMk,  M  N.  B.  281,  208  Mass. 
351. 

MADE 

See  Duly  Givoi  or  Made;  Dvly  Madik 
Sea,  al0o,  ICaka 

The  words  "k>  made,"  in  Code,  i  S49 
(Gen.  St  1897;  c.  96,  |  099;  Gen.  St  1899,  | 
4S43),  which  after  providing  fiDr  the  making 
and  service  of  the  case  and  the  suggestion  of 
amendments,  provides  that  the  case,  **when 
80  made,**  shall  be  settled,  certtfled,  and  sign- 
ed by  the  Judge,  making  no  mention  of  the 
service  of  the  case,  evidently  include  all  the 
preliminary  steps  to  the  presentation  of 
the  case  to  the  judge  fbr  settlement  But- 
ler V.  Scott,  76  Pac.  496,-497,  68  Kan.  612 
(citing  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  By.  (3o.  T.  Guild,  69 
Pac  283,  61  Kan.  213). 

Oeaiplaition  Imported 

The  word  "made»"  as  ordinaxtly  used, 
"applies  to  completed  transactions  but  not 
necessarily  so."  A  father's  guaranty  to  a 
bank  against  any  loss  on  personal  loans 
"made*'  to  his  son  or  on  account  of  any  busi- 
ness paper  discounted  to  amounts  dei^gnated, 
at  a  time  when  the  bank  had  already  made 
personal  loans  to  the  son  and  discounted 
paper  for  an  amount  less  than  that  fixed  by 
the  guaranty,  was  a  continuing  guaranty  cov- 
ering not  only  past  but  future  transactions. 
National  Bank  of  Chester  County  v.  Thomas, 
69  Ati.  813,  814,  220  Pa.  360. 

DeUrevy  laiported 

A  conveyance  is  ''made  or  given^"  within 
iectlon  67e  of  the  bankruptcy  act  of  July  1, 
1S98,  relating  to  conveyances  made  within 
four  months  prior  to  the  filing  of  a  petltloii, 
when  it  is  delivered.  Underleak  v.  Scott,  134 
N.  W.  731,  732,  117  Minn.  136. 

Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes  &  St  |  2198,  pro- 
vides that  the  board  of  appraisers  or  commla- 
sioners  of  pubUc  lands  may  review  and  re- 
consider any  of  Its  official  acts  relating  to 
lands  of  the  state  lintil  such  time  as  the 


leaae  or  CMitract  for  any  of  svdilasdB- shall 
have*  been  ma«e>  eateeated,  aad  signed  by  tbe 
oenmlsslofier  of  public  lands,  or^  by  tbe  board 
lt»alt  and  PferosTs  Cede  1909,  f  8178a  (Lam 
1903,  p.  113,  c.  7^,  dedarea  that  any  sale  or 
lease  of  state  lands  made  by  mistake,  or  not 
in  accordanoe  with  law  or  made  by  mlsrep- 
resentMlonr  shall  be  volA  Beld  tkat^  wliere 
affidavits  alleging  fraud  in  the  sale  of  certadn 
tide  landa  were  presented  to  the  board  of 
public  land  comnUssionera,  after  the  execu- 
tion of  a  deed  but  before  its  delivery,  the 
board  had  power  to  suspend  the  delivery  of 
the  deed,  and  investigate  the  charges.  The 
court  said:  "Respondent  contends  that  the 
expression  'made,  executed,  and  signed*  is 
equivalent  to  the  words  'made,  executed, 
and  delivered,'  which  are  commonly  found  In 
deeds  of  conveyance,  and  urges  that  the  deed 
is  not  'made  and  executed'  until  it  is  'draft- 
ed, signed,  acknowledged,  and  delivered,'  and 
that  it  was  not  the  intention  of  the  Legisla- 
ture to  deprive  the  ofllcera  of  the  state  of  the 
power  to  deal  with  the  subject  as  long  as  the 
deed  was  not  actually  delivered.  Whether 
this  contention  of  respondent  can  be  upheld 
in  its  entirety,  we  are  not  now  called  upon  to 
decide;  but  we  think  that  his  position  is 
tenable,  to  the  extent  that  ISie  land  commis- 
sioner or  tbe  board  of  state  land  commission- 
ers nmy  at  any  time  refuse  to  deliver  a  deed 
wtken  matters  are  brought  to  his  or  their  at- 
tention whi<^  give  reason  to  believe  that 
said  deed  is  being  obtained  by  means  of 
ftraud."  State  ex  rel.  Shores  t.  Boss,  87  Pac. 
262,  268,  44  Wash.  246. 

As  oommiuaioAted 

"Made"  signifies  action:  but,  when  a 
pcprson  has  "oommunicated*  to  anuther  a 
written  stateoeilt  by  reading  it  to  him  and 
delivering  it  to  him,  that  statement  has  been 
"made  te^'  such  otber  peMon,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  law.  Hie  words  "made  to" 
do  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  one  com- 
municating and  using  the  statement  also 
composed  it  or  made  it  up.  '*Make  known" 
is  a  synonym  of  "communicate,"  according 
to  Soule's  Dictionary  of  BagUsb  Synonyms, 
84.  Tbe  verb  "make"  has  many  significa- 
tions and  conveys  many  meanings,  among 
which  is  "to  pot  forth;  giv^  out;  deliver/' 
Also,  "to  biform;  apprise."  Century  Dic- 
tionary. Thus  when  a  person  seeking  credit 
hands  to  a  merchant  a  materially  fiUse  writ- 
ten statement  concerning  his  financial  condi- 
tion, no  matter  who  composed  and  signed  it, 
if  it  be  one  calculated  to  deceive,  and  then 
reads  it  to  sucb  merchant,  and  thereby  ob- 
tains property  from  him  on  credit,  he  has 
oMiained  property  on  credit  upon  a  material- 
ly false  statement  iU'  writing  "made  to"  such 
person.    In  re  Aldrigde,  168  Fed.  93,  d8,  99. 

Acettiesed  «m  do«toe 
Under  Pen.  Code,  1 1428,  revolving  a  joa- 
tice  of  the  peace  to  keep  a  docket  in  which 
most  be  entered  eacb  acttoa  and  all  proceed- 


VADB. 


206 


MAQISTRATB 


IngB  therein,  an  order  holding  accused  to  an- 
swer is  in  fact  and  law  "madTS"  when  it  is 
entered  on  the  Justice's  docket,  so  that  a 
failure  to  indorse  the  same  on  the  complaint 
or  depositions  does  not  deprive  the  order  of 
Its  validity  nor  affect  def«idant's  substantial 
righta  People  v.  Sacramento  Butchers*  Pro- 
tective Aas'n,  107  Paa  712,  716,  12  Oal^  App. 
471- 

As  filed 

The  word  "made,"  in  the  statute  provid- 
ing that  where  the  term  does  not  continue 
longer  than  30  days  the  motion  for  new  trial 
must  be  "made"  during  the  term,  is  synony- 
mous with  "filed,**  and  the  word  "made**  can- 
not be  construed  as  meaning  simply  to  pre- 
pare and  present  to  the  Judge  such  motion, 
and  a  motion  which  has  not  been  so  filed  must 
be  dismissed,  though  the  Judge  before  whom 
the  case  is  tried  may  have  granted  a  rule 
nisi  during  the  term  and  within  the  term 
fixed  by  law  for  filing  the  motion,  and  this  is 
true  though  counsel  for  the  successful  party 
may  have  consented  to  a  continuance  of  the 
hearing  of  the  motion ;  the  same  having  been 
returnable  in  vacation.  Hilt  v.  Young,  43  S. 
B.  76,  77, 116  Ga.  708. 

The  word  "made,"  as  used  in  Gbde  Civ. 
Proc  f  1296,  providing  that  the  superior  court 
of  that  county  in  which  application  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  an  administrator  is  "first  made** 
has  exclusive  Jurisdiction  of  the  settlement 
of  the  estate,  has  reference  to  the  time  of 
filing  the  application  with  the  derk  of  the 
superior  court  Dungan  v.  Superior  Ck>urt  of 
Fresno  County,  84  Pac  767,  760,  149  Cal.  98, 
117  Am.  St  Rep.  119. 

As  maintained 

As  used  in  Act  Cong.  Feb.  25,  1886,  c. 
149,  i  1,  23  Stat  321  (U.  S.  Comp.  St  1901, 
p.  1524),  declaring  illegal  all  indosures  made, 
erected,  or  constructed  on  lands  to  any  of 
which  the  person  making  the  same  had  no 
claim  at  the  time  the  indosure  was  made, 
and  declaring  unlawful  "the  maintenance, 
erection,  construction  or  control  of  any  such 
Inclosnre,*'  the  word  "made"  has  a  more  com- 
prehensive meaning  than  the  words  "con- 
structed** or  "erected."  A  person  ''makes*' 
an  indosure  so  long  as  he  maintains  it 
Since  the  statute  was  violated,  where  a  per- 
son maintained  the  indosure  of  land  to 
which  he  had  no  claim,  an  indictment  charg- 
ing such  an  indosure  was  not  defective  for 
failure  to  allege  that,  at  the  time  the  indo- 
sure was  made,  defendant  had  no  claim  or 
color  of  title  to  the  land  made  or  acquired  in 
good  fUth  or  a  right  thereto  asserted  with  a 
view  to  entry.  Birdier  v.  United  States,  160 
Fed.  589,  691,  96  a  O.  A.  87. 

As  sworn  to 

Act  March  4,  1904,  c  394,  providing  tiiat 
proofs,  afildavits,  and  oaths  required  under 
the  public  land  laws  may  be  made  before 
any  United  States  Commissioner,  and  that 


the  fees  for  entries  and  for  final  proof» 
when  made  before  hUn  shall  be  for  each  affi- 
davit 25  cents,  for  each  deposition  of  claim- 
ant or  witnesses  when  not  prepared  by  the 
officer  25  cents,  and  for  each  deposition  pre- 
pared by  the  officer  |1,  and  making  it  a  mis- 
demeanor to  demand  or  receive  a  greater 
sum,  fixes  the  fees  of  United  States  Commis- 
sioners for  administering  the  oath  and  atr 
taching  the  Jurat  to  affidavits  required  under 
the  land  laws,  but  it  is  not  part  of  their  duty 
to  draft  affidavits,  in  whole  or  in  part  and  a 
United  States  Commissioner  who  drafts  an 
affidavit  6t  any  part  thereof,  or  who  com- 
pletes the  application  part  of -a  combined 
application  and  affidavit  under  the  land  laws, 
may  charge  compensation  therefor  as  serv- 
ices beyond  his  offldal  duty ;  an  affidavit  be- 
ing "made'*  before  an  officer  when  subscribed 
and  sworn  to  before  him  by  whomsoever 
drafted.    In  re  James,  195  Fed.  981,  9S3. 

MADE  AOQUAHTTED 

A  certificate  of  acknowledgment  of  a 
married  woman  that  she  was  "made  ac- 
quainted'* with  the  contents  of  the  deed  Is 
equivalent  to  a  certificate  that  the  contents 
were  made  known  and  explained  to  her. 
Chauvin  v.  Wagner,  18  Mo.  681, 644. 

MADE  OUT  IK  ITEMS 

Civ.  Code  1902,  {  806,  requires  that  all 
claims  against  counties  shall  be  "made  out 
In  items,**  and  section  808  provides  that  no 
claim  shall  be  valid  and  payable  unless  it  be 
presented  to  and  ffied  with  the  county  board 
during  the  fiscal  year  in  which  it  is  contract- 
ed or  the  next  thereafter.  Held,  that  a 
claim  is  not  properly  "made  out  in  items" 
which  does  not  indicate  the  year  in  which  it 
arose,  so  as  to  indicate  that  it  accrued  within 
the  period  prescribed.  State  ex  rel.  People's 
Bank  of  Greenville  v.  Goodwin,  62  S,  IS.  1100, 
1105.  81  S.  C.  419. 

MAGAZINE 

"Magazines"  are  defined  by  Webster  as 
pamphlets  published  periodically,  containing 
miscellaneous  papers  or  compositions.  They 
are  "periodical  publications*'  entitled  to  the 
privileges  of  second-class  mail  matter. 
Houghton  V.  Payne,  24  Sup.  Ct  690,  692, 
194  U.  S.  88,  48  L.  Ed.  88& 

MAGIC 

Healer  by  magic  as  physician,  see  Phy- 
sician. 

MAOIC  I.A1ITEBN 

Not  dutiable  as  optical  instruments,  see 
Optical  Instrument 

MAGISTRATE 

Removal  of  magistrate  as  special  pro- 
ceeding, see  Special  Proceeding. 


MAQISTRATB 


207 


HAIL  ORDSB 


A  "magtstrate**  Is  an  "officer  liaTlng 
power  to  isstie  a  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  a 
person  diarged  with  a  public  offense."  Peo- 
ple V.  Swain,  90  Pac  720,  722,  S  (M.  Ap^. 
421  (Citing  Pen.  Code,  i  807). 

"A  'magistrate'  \a  an  officer  having  pow- 
er to  issue  a  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  a  per- 
son charged  with  the  commission  of  a  crime. 
The  following  persons  are  magistrates:  (1) 
The  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court;  (2)  the 
judges  of  the  Circuit  Court;  (8)  the  county 
Judges  and  justices  of  the  peace ;  (4)  all  mu- 
nicipal officers  authorized  to  exerdse  the 
powers  and  perform  the  duties  of  a  justice 
of  the  peace.**  Wallowa  County  r.  Oakes, 
78  Pac  892,  46  Or.  88. 

The  clerk  of  the  county  court  having  no 
antborlty  to  issue  a  warrant  for  a  misde- 
meanor is  not  a  **magistrate'*  within  Sny- 
der's Comp.  Laws,  f  6575,  providing  that  a 
''magistrate'*  is  an  officer  having  power  to' is- 
sue a  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  a  person 
charged  with  a  public  offense.  Bowen  v. 
State,  U5  Pac.  876,  6  Okl.  Cr.  605. 

The  word  "Magistrate,**  as  used  in  Rev. 
St  e  138,  I  17,  providing  for  appeals  from 
the  decisions  or  sentences  of  magistrates,  in- 
cludes judges  of  municipal  courts  as  well  as 
trial  justioesL  Bprague  r.  Inhabitants  of  An- 
droscoggin County,  71  AtL  1090, 1091, 104  Me. 
352. 

Code  1907,  I  7519,  providing  that  judges 
of  dty  courts,  etc.,  are  "magistrates,"  within 
the  meaning  of  the  chapter  ("Proceedings  to 
Preserve  the  Peace"),  and  authorized  to  re- 
quire persons  to  give  security  to  keep  the 
peace,  etc.,  refers  only  to  affidavits  and  war- 
rants under  that  chapter,  and  not  in  prosecu- 
tions for  illegal  liquor  selling.  Herring  v. 
State,  48  South.  476,  477,  158  Ala.  81. 

IMstriet  attoMey 

The  district  attorney  to  whom  a  confes- 
sion is  made  is  not  a  magistrate  before  whom 
accQsed  is  brought  for  a  judicial  hearing, 
and  required  by  Code  Or.  Proc.  9f  188,  196, 
to  advise  him  that  he  is  entitled  to  the  aid 
of  coonsel,  and  to  inform  him  that  he  has 
the  right  to  make  a  statement  in  relation  to 
the  affair.  People  v.  Randazzio,  87  N.  B. 
112,  116,  194  N.  Y.  147. 

At  Jndse 

See  Judge. 

Hotary  publle 
Where  a  notary  public  was  authorized 
by  state  law  to  issue  a  warrant  of  arrest  for 
misdemeanor,  and  on  sudi  affidavit  the  gov- 
ernor of  the  state  had  instituted 'requisition 
proceedings,  the  notary  was  a  "magistrate** 
within  Rev.  St  |  5278,  governing  interstate 
extradition,  and  providing  that  the  same 
Diay  be  based  on  *  magistrate's  warrant 
Compton  V.  State  of  Alabama,  29  Sup.  Ct 
W,  606,  214  U.  &  1,  58  L.  Ed.  885,  16  Ann. 
Caai098. 


MAGNETISM 

See  IBlectfo— Magnetism. 

MAHOGANY 

Bee  San  Domingo  Mahogany. 

MAIL 

See  By  Mail;  Fast  Mail;  Fraudulent 
Use  of  the  Mails;  Send  by  MaiL 

Service  1^  mall,  see  Service  (In  Prac- 
tice). 

Use  of,  as  commerce,  see  Commerce. 

*The  term  'mail*  is  perhaps  tmiversally 
comprehended  as  being  that  over  which  the 
government  has  the  management  for  the 
purposes  of  conveyance  and  distribution.** 
Searight  r.  Steves,  8  How.  151«  185^  U  L. 
Ed.  637. 

iSAWT.  OABBIE& 

As  dvil  officer,  see  Civil  Officer. 
As  officer,  see  Officer. 

Tiff  ATT.    OIiEBX 

As  passenger,  see  Passenger. 

MAH.  MtATTEB 

A  post  office  superintendent  discovered 
a  misboxed  letter,  which  had  been  placed  in 
a  "dead"  pigeonhole  at  the  top  of  the  case, 
where  defendant,  a  clerk,  was  engaged  in 
sorting  mail.  OThe  letter  was  removed  by  the 
superintendent  and  handed  to  a  post  office  in- 
spector, who  took  it  to  the  addressee,  and, 
without  delivering  it,  obtained  permission  to 
open  it  He  then  returned  it  to  the  post  office, 
unsealed  the  letter,  and  took  from  it  an  ex- 
press order  for  f2,  a  statement  of  account, 
and  a  letter  from  the  sender  of  the  money 
order.  After  making  a  copy  of  the  letter,  he 
placed  it  in  the  envelope  with  two  marked  (1 
bills,  and  forwarded  the  money  order  and  the 
statement  to  the  addressee.  The  envelope 
containing  the  letter  and  bills,  having  been 
duly  sealed,  was  returned  to  the  dead  pigeon- 
hole, and  a  short  time  thereafter  was  embes- 
zled  by  defendant  Held,  that  the  letter  at 
the  time  it  was  returned  by  the  inspector  to 
the  dead  pigeonhole  had  not  ceased  to  be 
"mail  matter/'  and  that  defendant  was  there- 
fore properly  convicted  of  embezzling  a  let- 
ter containing  indosures,  in  violation  of  Rev. 
St  I  5467.  Ennis  v.  United  States,  154  Fed. 
842,  843, 83  C.  a  A.  478  (citing  Montgomery  v. 
United  States,  16  Sup.  Ct  797,  162  U.  S.  410, 
40  L.  Ed.  1020 ;  Scott  v.  U.  S.,  19  Sup.  Ct  209. 
172  U.  S.  343,  43  I*  Ed.  471;  Goode  v.  U.  S., 
16  Sup.  Ct  136,  159  U.  S.  668,  40  U  Ed.  297). 

MAIL  OBDER 

The  chief  element  of  the  "mail  order" 
method  of  doing  business  consists  in  dealing 
directly  with  the  customer  or  c<msumer  by 
means  of  placing  in  his  hands  a  printed  cata- 
logue containing  a  description  of  the  articles 
of  merchandise  otfered  for  sale  and  the  price 


l^ILED 


208 


MAIN  UNA 


thereof.  An  association  of  retail  dealers  can 
lawfully  agree  aiAong  tbemselves  ttiat  they 
will  not  purchaae  iimfffiannUnn  fcom  whole- 
salers and  Jobbers  who  sell  to  mall  order 
houses  and  to  Inform  each  other  aa  to  what 
wholesalers  and  Jobbers  do  sell  to  such 
houses.  Montgomery  Ward  A  Oo.  v.  South 
Dakota  Betail  Merchants'  &  Hardware  Deal- 
ers' Ass'n,  160  Fed.  413,  410. 

Whe  wo«a  ''iBailad,"  9B  used  In  tlie  speci- 
fications on  which  a  contract  for  the  sale 
of  coal  was  mad«»  raQulring  notice  of  a  fail- 
ure to  deliyer  to  be  "mailed,"  being  used  in 
its  ordinary  sense,  referred  to  mailing  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  ordinary  method  of  busi- 
ness, and  did  not  contemplate  the  sending  of 
a  notice  by  registered  mail*  so  that  the  mere 
delivery  to  the  postal  authorities  and  regis- 
tration of  a  notice  did  not  put  the  seller  in 
default  Price  ▼.  City  of  New  Yodc,  93  M. 
Y.  Supp.  067,  9(70, 104  App.  Dlr.  108. 

The  general  statement  of  one  that  he 
*'malled"  a  letter  to  another  is  sufficient  evi- 
dence that  he  did  everything  necessary  to 
raise  the  presumption  that  it  was  received  In 
due  course  of  mail,  and  thereby  show  that 
the  addressee  had  notice  of  matters  therein 
stated.  To  be  properly  -mailed"  a  letter 
must  be  addressed,  stamped,  and  deposited  in 
the  proper  place  for  the  receipt  of  mail,  and, 
since  the  word  "mailed"  implies  the  doing  of 
all  these  acts,  a  general  statement  that  a  let- 
ter was  ."mailed"  is  sufficient.  Ward  v.  D.  A. 
Morr  Transfer  &  Storage  Co.,  05  S.  W.  064, 
065, 110  Mo.  App.  83  (citing  Pier  v.  Helnrichs- 
hoffen,  67  Mo.  163,  20  Am.  Hep.  501;  Rolla 
State  Bank  v.  Pezoldt,  95  Mo.  App.  404,  60 
S.  W.  51). 

Prepayateat  «f  p<»8iA8e 

The  word  "mailed,"  when  applied  to  a 
letter,  means  that  it  was  properly  prepared 
for  transmission  by  mall,  and  was  placed 
in  the  custody  of  the  officer  whose  duty  it 
was  to  forward  the  mall.  Southern  Engine  & 
Boiler  Works  v.  Yaughan,  135  S.  W.  018,  915, 
98  Ark.  888,  Ann.  Cas.  1912D,  1062. 

In  testimony  that  a  letter  containing  a 
notice  was  mailed,  the  word  "mailed"  Implies 
the  payment  of  the  necessary  postage.  City 
of  Omaha  v.  Yancey,  135  N.  W.  1044,  1047, 
91  Neb.  261. 

The  single  Word  "mailed,"  as  used  by  a 
notary  In  his  certificate,  is  held  to  imply  that 
the  requisite  iwstage  was  preimld.  Cutting  v. 
Harrington,  71  Atl.  374,  377,  104  Me.  96,  129 
Am.  St  Rep.  378  {citing  Rolla  State  Bank  v. 
Pezoldt,  69  a.  W.  51,  95  Mo.  App.  404). 

MAIM 

"Maiming"  te  to  deprive  a  person  of  s<Hne 
member  of  his  body.  Cooper  v.  State,  132  S. 
W.  355,  366,  60  Tex.  Or.  B.  411« 


In  an  affidavit,  ^kich  chareed  that  de- 
fendant unlawfully,  wantonly,  or  mallclouBly 
mUed  or  maimed  a  cow,  followed  the  Code 
form  lior  an  Indictment  for  wanton  and  mali- 
cious Injury  to  animals  (Code  1007,  If  6230, 
7161,  form  71),  except  that  the  word  "maim- 
ed" was  substituted  for  the  word  "injured," 
the  word  "malm"  Implied  a  deprivation  of  a 
necessary  part,  a  crippling,  disabling,  or  per- 
manent Injury,  and  was  more  than  equivalent 
In  meaning  to  the  word  'injure,"  and  includ- 
ed the  meaning  of  the  word  "injure."  Hence 
the  affidavit  sufficiently  charged  the  statu- 
tory offense.  Richmond  v.  State,  58  South. 
073,  074,  4  Ala.  App.  130  (citing  5  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  427Q. 

To  "malm"  an  animal,  within  the  mean- 
ing of  a  statute  making  it  an  offense  to  kill 
or  malm  cattle,  is  to  be  understood  in  its 
technical  signification,  and  the  person  who  in- 
filets  upon  an  animal  injury  of  a  character 
less  than  that  which  would  deprive  it  of  or 
render  useless  one  or  more  of  Its  useful  mem- 
bers, is  not  guilty  of  an  offense  under  the 
statute,  and  the  owner  of  the  animal  Is  re- 
mitted to  his  action  for  damages.  But  one 
who  injures  one  of  the  nsefal  members  of 
an  animal,  such  as  its  members  of  locomotion, 
or  sach  as  are  useful  to  the  owner  of  the  ani- 
mal, violates  the  statute.  Brown  t.  State, 
66  8.  E.  405,  406,  127  Ga.  287. 

White's  Ann.  Pen.  Ck>de,  art  612,  pro- 
vides that  **to  malm"  Is  to  willfully  deprive 
a  person  of  the  hand,  arm,  finger,  toe,  foot, 
leg,  nose,  or  ear;  to  put  out  the  eye,  or  de- 
prive a  person  of  any  member  of  his  body. 
Article  614  provides  that  "to  disfigure"  is  to 
willfully  place  any  mark  on  the  face  or  other 
part  of  the  person.  Article  604  provides  a 
punishment  for  assault  with  intent  to  com- 
mit the  offense  of  maiming  or  disfiguring. 
Held,  that  a  charge  of  maiming  and  disfigur- 
ing carries  with  it  a  charge  of  assault  with 
intent  to  maim  and  disfigure.  Pool  v.  State, 
129  S.  W.  1135,  1136,  50  Tex.  Or*  B.  482. 

MAIN 

MAIN  OHAHiraX 

The  "main  channel"  of  the  Mississippi 
river  means  the  princ^Md  navigable  and  nav- 
igated channel,  the  one  customarily  followed 
in  steamboat  navigation.  Frandni  v.  Lay- 
land,  07  N.  W.  409,  602,  120  Wis.  72.  See, 
also,  State  v.  Muncie  Pulp  Oa,  104  S.  W.  437, 
442,  119  Tenn.  47. 

IffAIir  I.XNE 

The  words  "main  line,"  In  municipal  or- 
dinances granting,  respectively,  the  right  to 
construct  a  small  extension  to  the  Garden 
Street  branch  of  the  (Cleveland  street  railway 
system  and  the  right  to  lay  a  second  track 
on  a  portion  of  that  branch,  to  terminate 
with  the  expiration  of  the  grant  for  the 
main  line,  must  be  deemed  tp  refer  to  the  rest 
of  the  Garden  Street  branch,  and  jiot  to  the 


HAIK  BRA 


809 


UAIX  8TXM 


KucUd  Aremie  line.  Cleveland  Clectilc  Ry. 
Co.  T.  City  of  Gleveland,  27  Sop.  Qt  202-210, 
204  U.  S.  U6,  81  Ll  Bd.  SOO. 


"Malii  sea**  and  ''hl^  sea**  are  synony- 
mous. United  States  t.  Newark  Meadows 
Imp.  Co^  173  Fed.  426,  428. 

MAJM  VWMXT 

She  wi»d  ^^haft,"  as  ased  In  connection 
with  or  api^Ued  to  Victories,  Is  a  revolving 
btrto  convey  tbe  force  which  Is  generatsd  by 
some  pdne  morer  to  the  different  working 
machines,  and  a  ^llne  or  main  shaft"  is  a 
bar  of  considerable  length,  and  nsoally  bear- 
ing a  nomber  of  pulleys  by  wliidi  power  is 
transmitted  to  countershafts.  Hobenstein- 
Harmets  Furniture  Co.  v.  Matthews,  92  N.  B. 
196,  109,  46  Ind.  App.  6ia 

XAXa  STEM 

The  term  *'maln  stem,**  as  used  In  the 
New  Jersey  statute  relatijog  to  taxation  of 
railroads,  is  expressly  defined  to  include  the 
niadbed  not  exceeding  100  feet  in  width  with 
its  rails  and  sleepers  and  structures  thereon 
not  Including  passenger  or  freight  boildlnsi. 
The  original  statute  made  passenger  depots 
a  part  of  tbe  main  stem.  United  New  Jersey 
R.  k  Canal  Co.  v.  Parker,  69  AU.  289,  248»  75 
N.  J.  Law,  771. 

Under  Act  1888  (Oen.  St  p.  8825,  i  214) 
as  amended  (P.  L.  1006,  p.  220,  c.  122),  de- 
fining the  "main  stem"  of  a  railroad  for  pur- 
poses of  taxation  as  *'the  'roadbed'  not  ex- 
ceeding one  hundred  feet  in  width  with  Its 
rails  and  sleepers,  and  all  structures  erected 
thereon  and  used  in  connection  therewith, 
not  including,  however,  any  passenger  or 
freight  buildings  erected  thereon,**  does  not 
extend  beyond  the  ''roadbed,"  although  such 
loadbed"  be  less  in  width  than  lOO  feet 
Tbe  court  said:  "  'Boadbed'  signUes  the  bed 
or  foundation  upon  which  rests  the  super- 
structure  of  rails  and  sleepers.  Qiving  doe 
effect  to  the  word  'main'  in  the  phrase  'main 
stem,'  tbe  'roadbed'  that  is  to  constitute  'main 
stem'  must  be  deemed  tbe  bed  or  foundation 
of  the  principal  tracks  of  ttie  railroad  at  the 
place  in  question.  The  width  of  100  feet,  as 
used  in  the  statute,  is  a  measure  of  Umita- 
tioQ,  not  of  extension;  and  the  fact  that  a 
railroad  company  at  any  place  on  its  Hoe 
owns  land  of  the  width  of  100  feet  or  more 
docs  not  extend  *niaiB  stem'  to  the  width  of 
100  feet,  unlecB  the  IXMidbed'  of  its  principal 
tracks  at  the  place  in  question  extends  to 
that  width."  In  le  New  York  Bay  B.  Co., 
67  AtL  lOtt,  1061,  76  V.  J.  Law,  880  (quoting 
and  adopting  deflnAtlon  In  re  United  New  Jer^ 
■sy  BaHroad  4  Canal  Co.,  67  Aa  1075,  75 
N.  J.  Law,  886). 

The  act  of  1888  (Gen.  St  p.  3325,  pax. 
214),  relating  to  the  taxation  of  railroad  and 
canal  property,  declares  that  the  *'main  stem" 

3  Wos.4  PJ2o  SSB.— 14 


of  a  .railBo^d,  the  assessment  of  whioh  shall 
be  made  by  tiie  state  authorities,  shall  Include 
"the  ^NMLdbed;  not  exceeding  100  feet  in 
width  with  its  rails  and  sleepers,  (and)  depot 
building  used  for  passengers  connected  there- 
with." A  supplement  to  such  act  (P.  L.  1806, 
pi  226)  dedaiee  that  "main  stem"  shall  here- 
after be  held  to  include  the  "roadbed*'  not 
exceeding  100  feet  In  width  with  its  rails 
and  sleepers,  and  all  structures  erected  there- 
on and  used  in  connection  therewith,  not  in- 
cluding, jbowerer,  any  passenger  or  freight 
buildings  erected  thereon.  The  term  "road- 
bed" is  of  plain  import  and  signiflcance,  the 
bed  or  foundation  on  which  rests  the  super- 
structure of  rails  and  sleepers.  By  giving 
due  effect  to  the  word  "main"  in  the  phrase 
"main  stem,"  the  "roadbed"  that  is  to  con- 
stitute "main  stem"  must  be  deemed  the  bed 
or  foundation  of  the  principal  tracks  of  tbe 
railroad  at  the  place  in  question.  In  re  Unit- 
ed New  Jersey  R.  &  Canal  Ck>.,  67  Atl.  1075, 
1076,  75  N.  J.  Law,  385. 

Act  April  S,  1906  (P.  L.  1906,  pp.  122, 
220),  proYlding  a  method  for  the  taxation  of 
railroad  property,  defines  the  "main  stem"  of 
a  railroad  as  the  roadbed,  "not  exceeding 
100  feet  in  width,  with  its  rails  and  sleepers, 
and  all  structures  erected  thereon  and  used 
in  connection  therewith,  not  Including,  how- 
ever, any  passenger  or  freight  buildings 
erected  thereon."  The  statute  has  made  a 
distinction  between  the  strictly  essential  right 
of  way  of  a  railroad,  the  existence  of  which 
is  indispensable  to  its  operation  and  the  re- 
maining land  of  the  company  used  for  rail- 
road purposes,  and  this  distinction  rests  upon 
the  ground,  not  that  these  different  classes  of 
property  are  put  to  different  uses,  but  upon 
the  dependence  of  the  seyeral  companies  up- 
on local  police  protection,  and,  as  compensa- 
tion for  that  protection,  the  local  municipal 
governments  are  permitted  to  tax  that  part  of 
the  railroad  property  not  Included  within  the 
"main  stem"  of  the  railroad.  Central  R.  Co. 
of  New  Jersey  v.  State  Board  of  Assessors, 
67  Aa  672,  674,  680,  681,  76  N.  J.  Law,  120. 

A  "main  stem,"  as  the  term  is  used  in 
P.  L.  1884,  p.  142,  as  amended  by  P.  L.  1888, 
p.  269,  providing  for  the  taxation  of  rail- 
roads, includes  the  roadbed  not  exceeding  100 
feet  in  width,  with  its  rails  and  sleepers,  de- 
pot buildings  used  for  passengers  connected 
therewith,  and  must  always  exist  in  every  In- 
corporated railroad  operated  for  the  trans- 
portation of  freight  and  passengers,  or  either. 
Jersey  City  v.  State  Board  of  Assessors,  68 
AtL  227,  228,  74  N.  J.  Law,  720. 

Land  on  which  railroad  tracks  are  main- 
tained, which  originally  formed  a  part  of  tbe 
main  line,  and  which  were  left  out  of  the 
main  line  by  a  straightening  of  tracks,  but 
are  continised  in  opesation  for  isilnMid  pur- 
poses, do  not  form  parts  of  tbe  "main  stem" 
of  the  principal  line  of  the  railroad,  and  are 
not  branch  railroads  having  their  own  main 


MAIN  TRACK 


210 


MArNTAlW 


stem,  but  are  in  contemplation  of  law  tlie 
same  as  a  "sidlnif."  Jersey  City  v.  State 
Board  of  Assessors,  60  AtL  200,  201,  75  N.  J. 
Law,  STL 

XAIirTRAOK 

A  short  piece  of  railroad  track  nsed  only 
for  freight,  to  which  defendant's  trains  were 
deflected  by  a  switch,  admitting  them  to  de- 
fendant's freight  depot,  and  ending  at  a  post, 
was  not  defendant's  "main  track,"  within 
Laws  1907,  p.  475,  (  1,  relating  to  railroad 
crossings,  and  providing  that  any  railroad 
company  desiring  to  cross  the  main  track  of 
another  railroad  company  should,  before  con- 
structing any  such  crossing,  apply  to  the  rail- 
road and  warehouse  commission  for  permis- 
sion so  to  do,  and  comply  with  certain  pro- 
ceedings therein  specified.  Chicago,  P.  &  St 
L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Jacksonville  Ry.  ft  Light  Co., 
91  N.  B.  1024,  1027,  245  lU.  155. 

In  the  Revenue  Act,  |  89  (Laws  1903,  pp. 
414r^l8,  c  73),  relating  to  assessment  of  rail- 
roads, and  providing  that  the  valuation  of 
each  mile  shall  be  determined  by  dividing  the 
whole  value  by  the  number  of  miles  of  the 
''main  track"  of  each  road  or  line,  the  words 
"main  track"  are  clearly  used  to  distinguish 
from  side  or  second  track,  and  turnout,  spur, 
and  warehouse  tracks,  and  not  to  distinguish 
the  main  line  from  the  branch  line.  State 
ex  rel.  Platte  County  v.  Sheldon,  118  N.  W. 
208,  210,  79  Neb.  455. 

MAIHUUrD 

The  word  "mainland,"  in  Revisal  1905, 
(  3474,  forbidding  anchoring  of  a  floathouse 
for  fishing  or  hunting  wild  fowl  in  shoal  wa- 
ter not  more  than  300  yards  from  the  main- 
land on  the  west  side  of  Currituck  Sound, 
means  the  principal  land,  as  opposed  to  is- 
land. State  V.  Barco,  63  S.  B.  673,  674,  150 
N.  O.  792. 

MAINS 

Water  mains  as  personal  property,  see 
Personal  Property. 

By  the  word  "mains,"  in  Laws  1890,  c. 
566,  p.  1148,  §  65,  providing  that  any  owner 
or  occupant  of  any  premises  within  100  feet 
of  any  main  laid  down  by  any  gas  light  cor- 
poration may  require  it  to  supply  him  with 
gas,  were  intended  those  pipes  through  which 
the  company  distributed  the  gas  that  was 
designed  to  be  taken  therefrom  into  the 
buildings  to  be  lighted.  Moore  v.  Champlaln 
Electric  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  Supp.  37,  89,  88  Aw). 
Dlv.  289. 

MAINTAIN 

Bee  Establish  and  Maintain. 
Keep  and  maintain,  see  Keep. 

The  word  "maintain"  has  been  defined  as 
meaning  to  support  that  which  has  already 
been  brought    into    existence.    Kendrick   & 


Roberts  ▼.  Warren  Bros.  Co.,  72  AtL  461,  464, 
110  Md.  47. 

"Maintain"  is  defined  to  mean  to  hold  or 
ke^  in  a  particular  state  or  condition,  eege- 
cially  In  a  state  of  efllciency ;  to  support,  sus- 
tain, not  to  suffer  to  decline.  Kovachoff  v. 
St  Johns  Lumber  Co.,  121  Pac.  801,  803,  61 
Or.  174. 

The  power  to  "maintain  and  operate^ 
waterworks  and  electric  light  plants  is  not 
necessarily  incident  to  or  implied  in  tiie 
power  to  "purchase  or  construct"  waterworks 
or  electric  light  plants.  The  word  "main- 
tain" does  not  mean  to  provide  or  ooostruct, 
but  to  keep  up  and  preserve.  State  ez  r^ 
City  of  ChiUicothe  t.  Wilder,  98  S.  W.  46S, 
467,  200  Mo.  97. 

Where  a  boom  company  agreed  with  a 
riparian  owner,  during  the  continuance  of  a 
license  granted  such  company  by  the  owner 
to  use  the  river  and  maintain  therein  piles 
and  booms  convenient  in  its  business  and 
releasing  the  company  from  all  claims  for 
future  damages  to  plaintiff's  land  by  acts  of 
defendant  in  the  management  of  its  business, 
to  maintain  a  boom  of  logs  along  the  bi^nk 
on  the  owner's  land  to  protect  the  banks  from 
injury,  the  word  "maintain,"  as  used  in  the 
contract,  meant  to  keep  up  in  a  particular 
state  or  condition,  and  did  not  bind  the  com- 
pany to  indemnify  the  landowntf  against 
loss,  where  such  maintenance  became  impos- 
sible for  a  time  because  of  an  unprecedented 
fiood,  which  carried  away  the  boom,  where  the 
company  had  constructed  a  boom  and  exercis- 
ed due  care  in  its  maintenance,  and  renewed  it 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  flood. 
Coleman  v.  Mississippi  &  Rum  River  Boom 
Co.,  131  N.  W.  641,  642,  114  Minn.  443,  35  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1109. 

Civ.  Code,  I  651,  which  provides  that  no 
canal  can  be  laid  out,  constructed,  or  main- 
tained so  as  to  obstruct  any  public  highway, 
and  that  the  one  so  maintaining  or  using  such 
a  canal  must  repair  the  bridges,  etc.,  was  en- 
acted in  its  present  form  in  1906.  Before 
that  it  provided  that  every  water  or  canal 
corporation  must  construct  and  keep  in  good 
repair  at  all  times  for  public  use  across  their 
canal,  fiume^  etc.,  all  the  bridges  that  the 
county  may  require.  This  section  was  based 
on  prior  statutory  provisions,  passed  nearly 
half  a  century 'before.  Pol.  Code,  |  2694,  pro- 
vides that  when  highways  are  laid  across 
canals  on  public  lands  those  using  the  canals 
must  prepare  them  so  that  the  highway  may 
cross  without  danger,  and  section  2737,  pro- 
viding penalties  for  obstructing  or  injuring 
highways,  contains  provisions  for  bridging 
ditches  which  cross  pre-existing  highways- 
Held  that,  in  view  of  these  provisions  the 
original  act  did  not  impose  upon  the  owners 
of  canals  the  duty  of  bridging  them  whenever 
the  public  should  lay  out  a  road  over  them, 
and  that  the  present  section  does  not  impose 
that  duty,  for  the  word  "maintain,"  which  is 


MAINTAIN 


2U 


MAINTAIN 


tbe  basis  of  fhe  daini,  sboiild  be  eonstmed 
merely  as  a  proMbition  against  maintaining 
a  canal  In  sacb  a  way  that  it  would  injure 
an  existing  blgbwaj.  City  of  Madera  ▼.  Ma- 
dera Canal  &  Irrigation  Co.,  116  Pac  030» 
938,  150  CaL  749. 

As  elMUi 

The  cleaning  of  streets  is  "^epairing^  ox 
''maintaining"  them  within  Laws  1883,  p. 
262,  c.  264,  authorizing  the  street  and  park 
commissioners  to  build,  construct,  repair,  and 
maintain  highways  in  the  city,  in  view  of 
Laws  1803,  c  59,  requiring  towns  to  keep 
their  highways  in  good  repair,  suitable  for 
travel  thereon,  and  creating  a  liability  for 
fine  and  responsibility  for  damages  sulfered 
by  travelers  from  defects  in  highways;  tor 
tbe  presence  of  rubbish,  dirt,  and  ashes  in  a 
street  may  cause  it  to  be  in  a  bad  state  of  re- 
pair and  in  an  unsuitable  condition  for  trav- 
el, and  any  act  that  is  reasonably  necessary 
to  put  or  keep  the  street  in  good  repair  suit- 
able for  travel  thereon  is  ^'repairing^  or 
"maintaining"  the  street  Connor  v.  Ctiy  of 
Manchester,  00  Atl.  4S6»  487,  73  N.  H.  233. 

As  e—fB—  am  aetlom 

The  word  "maintained"  In  the  Bmploy- 
ers'  liability'  Act,  providing  that  no  action 
for  injuries  thereunder  shall  be  ''maintained" 
nnleas  notice  of  the  time,  place,  and  cause  of 
injury  is  given  to  the  employer,  is  synony- 
mous with  the  word  *'begun"  or  "commenced" 
and  tbe  statute  makes  the  giving  of  such 
notice  a  condition  precedent  to  the  bringing 
of  an  action  under  it  Grasso  v.  Holbrook, 
Cabot  A  Daly  Contracting  Co.,  92  N.  Y.  Sopp. 
101,  103,  102  App.  Div.  49  (citing  Burbank 
V.  Inhabitants  of  Auburn,  31  Me.  500 ;  Boutil- 
ler  V.  Steamboat  Milwaukee,  8  Biinn.  97,  105 
[GIL  72];  Smith  v.  Lyon,  44  Conn.  178; 
Byera  v.  Bourret,  04  CaL  73,  28  Pac.  61; 
Merta  v.  aty  of  Brooklyn,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  778, 
aflirmed  128  N.  Y.  617,  28  N.  B.  253). 

The  word  "maintain"  in  a  statute  in  ref- 
erence to  actions  comprehends  the  institu- 
tion as  well  as  the  support  of  the  action, 
though  it  may  be  used  to  express  a  meaning 
corresponding  to  its  more  restricted  defini- 
tion. National  Mines  Co.  v.  Sixth  JudicUl 
Dist  Court  Humboldt  County,  116  Pac.  906, 
1000,  34  Nev.  67. 

A  prohibition  against  "maintaining"  an 
action  impUes  a  prohibition  against  beginning 
it,  for  the  beginning  of  the  action  is  one  of 
the  necessary  steps  in  maintaining  it  A  for- 
eign corporation,  incapacitated  from  suing  at 
the  time  of  an  Institution  of  a  suit  by  it  on 
the  ground  that  it  has  not  obtained  the  li- 
cense required  by  Rev.  St  1890,  H  1025, 1026 
(Ann.  St  1906,  pp.  888,  890),  cannot  cure  the 
incapacity  by  thereafter  taking  out  a  license. 
Amalgamated  Zinc  A  Lead  Co.  v.  Bay  State 
Zinc  Min.  Co.,  120  S.  W.  31,  34,  221  Mo.  7,  23 
U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  402. 


As  eomtlauie  am  aotleK 

The  word  ''maintained,'*  as  used  In  sec- 
tion 64,  c.  66^  R.  8.,  means  to  prosecute  to  a 
conclusion  an  action  already  begun.  Shurtr 
leff  V.  Bedlos,  82  Aa  64fi,  648^  109  Me.  62. 

The  verb  'Maintain"  in  pleading  has  a 
distinct  technical  signification.  It  signifies 
to  support  what  has  already  been  brought 
into  existence.  Under  a  statute  requiring 
partnerships  transacting  business  under  a 
designatiou  not  showing  the  persons  interest- 
ed to  file  a  certificate  stating  the  names  of  all 
the  members,  and  to  publish  it  once  a  week 
for  four  weeks,  etc.,  and  providing  that  per- 
sons doing  business  as  partners  contrary  to 
the  statute  shall  not  maintain  any  action 
until  they  have  filed  the  certificate  and  made 
the  publication  therein  required,  where  an 
action  is  brought  by  a  partnership,  the  firm 
name  of  which  does  not  indicate  all  the  part- 
ners, failure  to  file  the  required  certificate  is 
matter  of  defense,  and  must  be  set  up  in  the 
answer  by  way  of  abatement;  but  if  the 
requirement  as  to  the  filing  and  publication 
are  complied  with  before  the  defense  is  in- 
terposed, it  will  be  sufficient,  even  though 
the  publication  was  not  completed  at  tbe 
time  the  action  was  commenced.  Nicholson 
V.  Auburn  Gold  Mln.  A  Mill.  Co.,  92  Pac.  651, 
6  Cal.  App.  547  (quoting  California  Savings 
A  Loan  Soc.  v.  Harris,  43  Pac.  625,  111  Cal. 
133,  138). 

The  statute  requiring  foreign  corpora- 
tions to  file  a  designation  of  a  person  on 
whom  process  may  be  served  within  60  days 
after  commencing  business  within  the  state, 
and  providing  that  unless  it  does  so  it  shall 
not  "maintain"  any  action  in  the  courts  of 
the  state,  does  not  deprive  foreign  corpora- 
tions of  the  right  at  any  time  to  commence 
an  action  for  the  protection  of  its  property 
or  the  enforcement  of  its  rights,  and  It  is 
within  its  power  at  any  time  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  action  to  comply  with  the 
statute  and  thereafter  maintain  such  action. 
Black  T.  Vermont  Marble  Co.,  82  Pac.  1060, 
1062,  1  Cal.  App.  718. 

It  was  held  in  Ckrson-Band  Co.  v.  Stem, 
31  &  W.  772.  129  Mb.  381,  32  L.  R.  A,  420. 
that  the  word  "maintain"  meant  literally  *'to 
hold  by  the  hand,"  and  in  its  ordinary  use, 
"to  uphold."  "to  sustain,"  "to  keep  up";  and 
in  pleading  it  means  "to  support  what  has 
already  been  brought  Into  existence."  Tri- 
State  Amusement  Co.  v.  Forest  Park  High- 
lands Amusement  Co.,  90  S.  W.  1020,  1022, 
192  Mo.  404,  4  L.  R  A.  (N.  S.)  688,  111  Am. 
St  Bep.  511,  4  Ann.  Cas.  806. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  "no  ac- 
tion shall  be  'maintained' "  by  a  foreign  cor- 
poration so  long  as  It  fails  to  comply  with 
the  law,  when  considered  In  connection  with 
other  provisions  of  the  act  imposing  penal- 
ties on  ofilcers  and  corporations  for  failing 
to  comply  with  the  law,  and  providing  that  a 
failure  to  comply  shall  not  affect  the  valid- 


MAINTAIN 


212 


MAINTAIIf 


Ity  of  contracts  made  by  sacb  oorporatloxis, 
an  actfon  hf  m  flofeign  eoiporatton  mwt  be 
stayed  during  tbe  peziod.  of  ita  noncompli- 
ance with  the  law»  on  DOBOompUaace  being 
properly  pleaded  in  abatement;  the  word 
"maintain"  carrying  a  different  meaning 
from  "institate"  or  "begin,"  and  implying 
that  an  action  has  been  begun  before  it  can 
be  maintained.  National  Fertilizer  CSb.  v. 
Fall  River  Five  Gents  Sav.  Bank,  82  N.  SL 
671,  672,  106  Mass.  458,  14  lU  R.  A.  (N.  SO 
561,  13  Ann.  Gas.  510. 

The  worda  ''may  mgtntihi  an  acttoB," 
as  generally  used,  mean  may  soeceasflilly 
maintain  an  action.  Qreentiee  v.  Wallace, 
83  Pac.  696,  58»,  77  Kan.  149  (citiBg  and  dto- 
tinguishing  In  re  Ma«ey,  42  Pac.  866,  66 
Kan.  120). 

As  liaTliic  eoatrol  and  onstody  of  plaee 

A  hotel  porter  who,  for  a  gnest  of  the 
hotel,  receiyed  and  stored  in  a  room  of  the 
house  a  barrel  of  bottled  beer  belonging  to 
the  guest,  and  who  afterwards,  as  required 
by  the  guest,  iced  the  liquor  and  served  it  at 
the  guest's  room,  where  it  was  drunk  by  him 
and  his  friends,  was  guilty  of  maintaining 
a  place  where  persons  were  permitted  to  re- 
sort for  the  purpose  of  drinking  intoxicating 
liquor  as  a  beverage,  contrary  to  the  provi- 
sions of  Laws  1901,  c.  232,  f  1  (Gen.  Stat 
1909,  I  4387).  State  V.  Boss,  121  Pac.  906, 
909,  86  Kan.  799. 

As  •veetioB 

The  word  "maintain^  ordinarily  means 
to  preserve  something  which  is  already  in 
existence;  but,  considering  that,  by  the  use 
of  the  words  "unless  one  of  than  chooses  to 
let  his  land  lie  without  fencing,"  Giv.  Gode, 
I  1301,  declaring  that  coterminous  owners 
are  mutually  bound  equally  to  maintain  the 
boundaries  and  monuments  between  them 
and  the  fences  between  them,  unless  one  of 
them  chooses  to  let  his  land  lie  without  fenc- 
ing, applies  to  land  not  fenced,  it  is  compre- 
hensive enough,  in  the  light  of  the  subject- 
matter,  to  include  the  erection,  as  well  as  the 
maintenance,  of  the  fences.  Hoar  t.  Hen- 
nessy,  74  Paa  452,  464,  455,  29  Mont  253. 


Xeo]^ 

See  Keep. 

As  keep  la  repair 

Where  plaintiff,  under  a  contract  with 
abutting  property  owners,  constructed  a 
pavement  and  agreed  to  "maintain  and  keep 
it  in  repair"  for  a  period  of  five  years,  and 
after  the  pavement  was  completed  it  was 
torn  up  and  damaged  by  the  bursting  of  a 
water  main  beneath  the  surface  of  the  street, 
plalntiff*s  contract  to  "maintain  and  keep 
in  repair"  did  not  impose  on  it  the  duty  of 
repairing  a  damage  of  the  kind  in  question, 
but  merely  contemplated  such  repairs  as 
use  and  wear  ml^t  render  necessary.  Hence 
in  repairing  the  pavement  plaintiff  was  a 
mere  volunteer  and  could  not  recover  dam- 


ages of  Uie  dty.  Gteen  Blver  AspHalt  Co. 
y.  aty  of  9t  Loola,  87  &  W.  986,  966^  188 
Ho.  576. 

The  word  "maintain,**  within  Gen.  St 
1902,  i  888,  requiring  widows  to  "maintain" 
and  keep  in  repair  the  property  set  apart  to 
them  as  dower,  does  not  mean  "to  provide" 
or  "construct,"  but  means  to  "keep  up,  not 
to  suffer  to  fftil  or  declihe";  'Hteep  in  repair" 
and  "maintain**  as  used  in  the  statute  being 
synonymous.  Ferguson  v.  Rochfeid,  79  Alt 
177, 178,  84  Cbnn.  202,  Ann.  Gas.  1912B.  1212. 

The  word  "maintain"  la  practically  the 
same  thing  as  "repair,"  which  means  to  re- 
store to  a  sound  or  good  8tate»  after  decay, 
injury,  dilapidation,  os  partial  deetroction, 
aad,  when  used  in  lefereace  to  railroad  right 
of  way,  Inolndea  the  idea  of  keeping  the  right 
of  way  in  soeh  a  condition  that  It  can  be 
used  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  waa  In- 
tended. MLwouri,  K.  A  T.  R«  Go.  of  Texas  v. 
Bryan  (Tax.)  107  S.  W.  672,  676  (citing  Yer- 
din  y.  aty  of  St  Louis  [Mo.]  27  &  W.  447). 


See  Make. 

As  operattoar 

The  word  "matntain,**  as  need  in  a  con- 
tract by  which  the  owners  of  an  adjoining 
office  building  agreed  od  a  common  entrance 
and  hallway  on  the  center  line  dividing  the 
premises,  and  to  pay  the  expense  of  keeping 
up  and  "maintaining"  common  conveniences 
including  an' elevator,  was  held  to  Inctnde  the 
operation  of  such  elevator,  and  not  simply  to 
mean  to  put  it  in  and  have  it  stand  idle  at 
the  behest  of  one  of  the  parties,  which  was 
contrary  to  the  constmetion  given  the  con- 
tract by  sharing  the  expense  of  operation. 
Globe  Ins.  Go.  v.  Wayne,  80  N.  B.  13»  18, 
76  Ohio  St  461. 

PennaaeBoe 

Defendant  railroad  in  May,  1848,  cove- 
nanted with  plaintiffs'  predecessors,  their 
heirs  and  assigns,  to  construct  and  maintain 
a  turnout  and  side  track  at  Dorse/s  Run,  to 
take  up  and  set  down  at  the  siding  by  de- 
fendant's passenger  cars  all  persons  going  to 
and  from  the  farm  then  occupied  by  the  first 
parties  and  to  leave  at  the  siding  to  be  un- 
loaded all  freight  weighing  at  least  3,000 
pounds  shipped  to  the  first  parties  on  which 
the  cost  of  transportation  had  been  paid  at 
the  place  of  loading.  Defendant  complied 
with  its  covenant  until  1907,  when  it  con- 
structed a  cut-off  on  its  main  stem  by  which 
a  large  part  of  the  right  of  way  over  plain- 
tiff's land  was  abandoned,  when  it  discontin- 
ued the  turnout,  and  refused  longer  to  main- 
tain a  station  at  tliat  point  Held,  that  the 
word  ''maintain"  as  used  in  such  covenant 
did  not  require  defendant  to  continue  the 
turnout  and  station  permanently,  and  that 
the  length  of  time  during  which  the  covenant 
had  been  complied  with  constituted  a  sub- 
stantial  performance   thereof^  so  that   the 


MA  INTAIK 


213 


HAIKTEVrANCV 


railroad  cempany  was  not  tffthle  for  dam- 
•gee  tor  Its  breach.    Whalen  ▼.  Baltlmoro 

AO.  R.  Co.,  76  Aa  lee,  lar,  xn  Ud  isr. 

As  retaild  or  roeosstmet 

The  word  ^'maintain**  in  a  ooiitraet  for 
tbe  exteDfilon  of  a  railway  biaach  from  a 
railroad  company's  railroad  to  the  minea  of 
a  mining  company,  whereby  the  mining  com- 
pany agreed  to  construct  the  sabstracture^ 
and  the  railroad  company  to  lay  the  track  of 
the  branch  railroad,  and  to  "maintain**  and 
operate  tt%  same,  leqaires  the  railroad  com- 
pany to  reconstruct  a  bridge  oonttnieted  by 
tbe  mintng  company  after  the  bridge  was 
washed  away  by  an  eztraoidlnaiy  flwshet, 
thoogh  the  bridge  would  become  the  mining 
company'a  property  after  being  completed 
under  the  contnict  whtch  coatemplated  that 
the  stmctnre  shonld  remain  the  mining  com* 
pany's  property.  LonlsTille  ft  N.  R.  Ck>.  v. 
United  States  Iron  Go*.  101  8.  W.  414,  419, 
118  Temi.  194. 

As  sapplyias  feed 
Laws  1906,  p.  14t  &  IS,  approprlaftlng 
money  tor  *^ahitalBlng^  the  ezeentive  real* 
dence,  does  not  authorise  the  employment  of 
any  part  of  the  anm  so  appropriated  for  the 
pnrduLse  of  provisions  to  be  used  these. 
Bailey  ▼.  Kelly,  79  Pac  788,  TO  Kan.  809. 

XAimfEifAJfOB 

The  Kingston  dty  charter  created  a 
board  of  water  connnlfistoners,  with  power, 
with  the  consent  of  the  common  conndl,  to 
constmct  and  maiptain  a  waterworks  sys- 
tem. Section  98  provided  that  the  monaya 
derived  therefrom  should  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  the  cost  of  maintaining,  operat- 
ing, and  extending  the  waterworks,  and  to 
the  payment  of  prlnoJipal  and  Interest  on 
bonds  as  they  fall  due.  The  board,  by  section 
d9,  was  given  power  to  keep  the  system  in 
operation  independent  of  the  city  council, 
aod  to  fix  and  collect  water  ratea^  and  make 
and  enforce  rules  and  regulations.  By  sec- 
tion 101  the  moneys  derived  from  water  rates 
and  penalties  were  required  to  be  paid  to  the 
dty  treasurer,  to  be  credited  to  the  water 
fund  and  applied  to  the  payment  of  expenses 
of  ordinary  maintenance  and  management, 
the  balance,  if  any,  to  the  payment  of  prin- 
cipal and  interest  on  bonds,  and  any  surplus 
still  remaining  to  be  used  for  any  lawful 
city  purpose.  Held,  that  additional  filters, 
requiring  an  expenditure  of  $16,235,  was  not 
an  ordinary  "maintenance**  expense,  and  that 
the  board  had  no  power  to  incur  such  ex- 
pense without  the  consent  of  the  city  council. 
Coykendall  v.  Harrison,  134  N.  Y.  Supp.  440, 
450,  150  App.  Div.  46. 


Oreatiom  of  wmmd 

Const  art  8,  |  9,  provldlBg  that  the  Lep- 
ialatm-e  may  pass  local  1b\vs  tor  the  ^'mainte^ 
nance^  of  public  roads  wifhont  the  local  no- 
tice ordlaafrtly  required  fbr  special  Ikws,  is 
APPUcaMe*  to  thw  Shelby  oounty  special  road 


law,  which  provides  for  the  creation  as  well 
aa  maintenance  of  a  road  aystoOL  Be  parte 
Cboks  (Tex.)  186  8.  W.  180,  UL 

BstaMlshme&t  of  liiclkwar 

Oonst  art  3, 1  56,  snbd.  6,  dedares  that 
the  Legislature  shall  not,  excetpt  as  other- 
wise iMPOvlded  In  the  Oonatltution,  pass  any 
local  or  speoial  laws  authoilxlng  the  laying 
out,  <q;>enlng,  altering,  or  maintaining  of 
roads.  Artlde  U,  |  2,  doclatw  that  tbe  lay- 
ing oat»  constructing,  and  repairing  oC  county 
roads  shall  be  provided  for  by  general  lawa 
Article  8,  i  9,  declares  that  the  Legislature 
may  authorize  an  additional  ad  valorem  tax 
for  the  further  maintenance  of  the  public 
roads,  and  that  the  legislature  may  pass 
local  laws  for  the  maintenance  of  public 
roads  or  highways  without  the  local  notice  re- 
quired by  special  or  local  laws.  Section  9, 
art  8,  was  added  to  the  other  provisions  by 
amendment  Held,  that  the  word  "mainte- 
nance" as  used  in  article  8,  i  0,  Induded 
the  laying  out  and  constructing  of  roads,  and 
hence  Acts  24th  Leg.  (Laws  1895)  p.  213,  c. 
132,  creating  a  road  system  of  Dallas  county, 
was  not  unconstitutionaL  Dallas  County  v. 
Plowman,  91  8.  W.  221.  222,  99  Tex.  509. 

As  relnUld  om  veeoAstmot 
Ky.  St  i  1840,  giving  the  ilaeal  cowt 
power  to  appropriata  county  funds  Ihnr  the 
maintenance  of  hlgbwaya,  and  aeetton  4806» 
giving  the  fiscal  court  general  diarge  and 
supervision  of  tKb  pubtte  roads  with  anttier- 
Itgr  to  repair  samh,  the  fiscml  court  had  power 
to  raeoBfllaiiet  a  turnpike  road*  Hanlon  v. 
Gleary,  181  &  W.  968, 964^  142  Ky.  46. 

State  iAsUtutiom 

The  provision  for  ''maintenance,"  In 
Laws  1907,  p.  18,  c.  28,  maklag  appropria- 
tions for  the  Institution  of  the  Feeble-Minded 
at  Grafton,  does  not  Include  employe's  wages, 
fhel,  etc.,  for  which  spedflc  sums  were  ap- 
propriated, but  does  Include  the  cost  of  food 
and  clothing  of  inmates;  there  being  no  spe- 
dflc appropriation  for  these  items.  State  v. 
Lewis.  119  N.  W.  1037, 1039,  18  N.  D.  125. 

MAHrTBH AHOB    (Of  Kaaual    Trainliig 
Seliool) 

A  will  recited  that  it  was  the  purpose  of 
the  husband  of  testatrix  to  found  an  institu- 
tion wherein  sound  business  principles  might 
be  taught,  and  where  pupils  might  be  fitted 
for  maimfxturing  and-  buslnesB  careers,  and 
that  to  carry  out  his  wlshea  she  made  a  do- 
nation to  prepare^  construct,  and  maintain  a 
manual  training  school  to  teach  cooking,  sew- 
ing, and  domestic  economy  to  girls,  and  all 
things  of  mechanical  and  other  technical 
work  to  young  men,  and  to  teach  both  boys 
and  girls  such  things  as  are  usually  taught 
in  modern  manual  training  schools,  and  re- 
quired the  dty  to  raise  a  specified  gum  fbr 
the  purpose,  and  provided  that  thereupon  the 
property  should  be  transferred  to  the  dty  to 
perpetually  matotalo  the  school.    WM,  that 


MAmXENANCE 


214 


MAINTEKAKOB 


the  will  contemplated  the  "maintenance  of 
a  manual  training  scboor'  within  St  18d8,  | 
496b,  as  amended  by  Laws  1007,  c.  503,  and 
the  charter  of  the  city  (Laws  1891,  c.  59),  au* 
thorlzlng  the  maintenance  of  schools  of  man- 
ual training,  so  that  the  dty  could  accept 
the  donation  and  comply  with  the  conditions. 
Maxcy  r.  aty  of  Oahkosh,  128  N.  W.  899, 
905,  144  Wis,  238,  81  L.  E.  A.  (N.  S.)  787. 


BCAniTENAirOB  (Of  OAee) 

Under  Stock  Corporation  Law  (Consol. 
Laws  1909,  c.  59)  (  33,  which  provides  that 
every  foreign  stock  corporation,  having  an 
office  for  the  transaction  of  business  In  the 
state,  shall  keep  therein  a  stockbook,  con- 
taining the  names  of  stockholders,  the  num- 
ber of  shares  held  by  them,  and  the  amounts 
paid  thereon,  which  shall  be  open  for  the  In- 
spection of  stockholders,  Judgment  creditors, 
and  certain  authorized  state  officers,  and 
that.  If  any  such  foreign  stock  corporation 
has  a  transfer  agent,  such  stockbook  may  be 
deposited  with  such  agent,  to  be  open  to  the 
same  Inspection,  subject  to  a  penalty  on  re- 
fusal, Imposes  such  duty  only  upon  stock 
corporations  having  an  office  for  the  trans- 
action of  business  In  this  state;  and  the 
mere  fact  that  a  foreign  corporation,  whldi 
does  not  own,  rent,  or  occupy  an  office  of  Its 
own  within  the  state,  has  a  transfer  agent 
for  the  convenience  of  stockholders,  does  not 
constitute  "the  maintenance  of  an  office  for 
the  transaction  of  business,"  and  hence  the 
transfer  agent  is  not  subject  to  a  p^ialty  up- 
on refusal  to  allow  Inspection  of  the  stock- 
book.  Wadsworth  ▼.  Equitable  Trust  Oo. 
of  New  York,  138  N.  T.  Supp.  842,  153  App. 
Dlv.  737. 

MAINTENAKOE  (Of  Persona) 

Klrby's  Dig.  §  3803,  requiring  a  guard- 
ian to  give  bond  to  faithfully  conduct  a  sale, 
etc.,  applies  only  to  sales  for  reinvestment, 
and  a  sale  to  discharge  a  mortgage  on  other 
land  was  not  a  sale  for  reinvestment,  though 
the  petition  and  order  for  sale  designated  it 
as  such;  the  words  "education"  and  "mainte- 
nance" In  another  statute  authorizing  sales 
being  broad  enough  to  authorize  a  sale  to 
protect  the  ward's  estate.  Harper  v.  Smith, 
116  S.  W.  674,  675,  89  Ark,  284,  131  Am.  St 
Rep.  93. 

Testator  devised  land  to  her  husband, 
with  power  to  sell  and  to  have  the  proceeds, 
but  charging  the  land  or  its  proceeds  with 
the  maintenance  of  a  nephew,  14  years  old 
when, the  will  was  made,  and  with  the  ex- 
pense of  preparing  him  for  "any  profession 
he  may  wish"  or  testatrix's  husband  might 
"think  best,"  and  reciting  that  it  was  suppos- 
ed that  the  charge  would  take  ail  the  land  or 
its  proceeds,  but  that,  If  it  did  not,  the  re- 
mainder was  left  to  the  husband  to  give  to 
the  nephew  or  "to  dispose  of  as  he  may 
wish."  Held,  that  the  husband  took  a  fee- 
simple  title  subject  only  to  the  charge  for  the 


nephew's  maintenance  and  education;  that 
the  nephew  took  no  Interest  in  the  surplus 
proceeds;  that  the  "maintenance"  contem- 
plated was  maintenance  during  the  nephew's 
minority;  and  that  he,  having  reached  his 
majority  before  testatrix's  death,  is  only  «i- 
titled  to  such  part  of  the  proceeds  of  the  land 
on  the  husband's  death  as  may  be  necessary 
to  educate  him  for  a  profession,  if  he  in 
good  faith  desires  to  be  so  educated.  Knlgbt 
V.  Collins  (Ky.)  118  S.  W.  181,  133. 

PerauuM&t  alimony  symomymoaji 

"  'Maintenance'  and  'permanent  alimony' 
are  synonymous  terms  and  mean  an  allow- 
ance in  money  to  be  recovered  on  decree  of 
divorce  from  the  party  in  fsvlt  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  Innocent  party."  Huffman  v. 
Huffman,  86  Pae  598,  095^  47  Or.  eiO,  U4 
Am.  St  Rep.  948. 

As  support 

The  "maintenance'*  of  dependents  is  such 
support  as  consists  In  the  furnishing  of  food, 
clothing,  lodging,  or  education.  ''Bfalnte- 
nance^'  in  the  matter  of  clothing  does  not  re- 
fer to  occasional  gifts  of  dotiilng,  but  such 
a  regular  supply  of  Nothing  as  may  be  rea- 
sonably necessary  to  make  the  body  oomfortr 
able.  Western  Oommerdal  Travelers'  Ass'n, 
V.  Tennent,  106  8.  W.  1073,  1077,  128  Mo. 
App.  541  (quoting  Alexander  v.  Parker,  83 
N.  B.  183,  144  riL  855,  19  Ia  R.  A«  187). 

MAIHTEKJJfOE  <Of  Suits) 

See,  also,  Champerty. 

Maintenance  is  an  officious  intermed- 
dling in  a  suit  that  in  no  way  belongs  to  ooe 
by  assisting  either  party,  with  money  or  oth- 
erwise, to  prosecute  or  defend.  It  is  said 
to  be  an  offense  against  good  morals,  in  that 
it  keeps  alive  strife  and  perverts  the  remedial 
powers  of  the  law  into  an  engine  of  oppres- 
sion. Lacey  v.  Davis  (Iowa)  98  N.  W.  366, 
367  (quoting  6  Cyc  p.  850) ;  Smith  v.  Hart- 
seU,  63  S.  E.  172.  174,  150  N.  C.  71,  22  L.  R 
A.  (N.  S.)  203;  Qelo  v.  jPflster  &  Yogel  Leath- 
er Oo.,  113  N.  W.  69,  70,  132  Wis.  575  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  Andrews  t. 
Thayer,  30  Wis.  228,  233) ;  Mud  Valley  Oil 
&  Gas  Co.  V.  Hitchcock,  81  N.  B.  Ill,  112,  40 
Ind.  App.  105  (citing  Anderson's  Law  Diet; 
4  Black.  Ck)mm.  135).  'rThe  terms  of  this 
definition  obviously  do  not  Include  all  kinds 
of  aid  in  the  prosecution  of  defenses  of  an- 
other's cause,  and  it  has  therefore  always 
been  held  not  to  extend  to  persons  having  an 
interest  in  the  thing  in  variance,  nor  to  pe^ 
sons  acting  in  the  lawful  exercise  of  their 
profession  as  counsel  or  attorneys  at  law. 
Nor  does  the  doctrine  of  the  common  law  as 
to  maintenance  apply  to  persons  who  either 
have  a  legal  interest  in  the  suit  prosecuted  by 
them,  or  who  act  under  the  bona  fide  belief 
that  they  have."  Qelo  v.  Pflster  &  Yogel 
Leather  Co.,  113  N.  W.  69,  70,  132  Wis.  575 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Davles  v. 
Stowell,  47  N.  W.  870,  78  Wiai  336, 10  L.  B. 


mahttenakgb 


21fi 


MAJORITY 


A.  19(9.  Such  contractB  are  unenforceable  at 
common  law,  as  theiy  tend  to  perTert  the  pro- 
cess of  the  law  Into  an  engine  of  oppression. 
Mod  YaXksy  OU  4  Gas  Oo.  ▼.  Hltcboodk,  81  N. 
IL  lU,  112,  40  Ind.  App;  lOB. 

Satire  want  of  iatorest 

''Maintenance'*  is  an  offidoua  intermed- 
dling in  a  suit  that  in  no  wise  belongs  to  one, 
by  maintaining  or  assisting  either  party  with 
money  or  otherwlae»  to  prosecute  or  defend 
it  ''Champerty/'  which  la  a  ^ecies  of  main- 
tenance^ iB  the  unlawful  maintaining  of  a 
suit  in  consideration  of  some  bargain  to  hare 
a  iHurt  of  the  thing  In  dispute  or  some  profit 
out  of  it ;  the  champertor  agreeing  to  carry 
on  the  suit  at  hla  own  expense.  Where^  how- 
evtf,  the  person  promoting  the  suit  of  an« 
other  has  any  interest  in  the  subject-mattert 
he  is  Justified  in  participating  and  la  not 
guilty  of  oflicious  intermeddling  within  the 
definition  of  "champerty"  or  "maintenance." 
Finlen  ▼.  Ueinze,  73  Pac.  123,  127,  28  Mont 
548. 

Ohaatpevty  dtoilaiisvielied 

'Maintenance"  is  d^taied  as  an  ''officious 
intermeddling  in  a  suit  that  no  way  belongs 
to  one,  by  assisting  dther  party,  witiH  money 
or  otherwise,  to  prosecute  or  def^id."  The 
offoise  nuiy  be  committed  by  stepping  in  aft- 
er litigation  has  been  begun,  as  by  encourag- 
ing and  aiding  ita  origin.  "Champerty"  is 
generally  treated  in  connection  with  "main- 
tenance." The  champertor  has  in  yiew  a 
profit  to  himself  in  a  share  of  the  spoils  ot 
the  litigation.  The  maintalner  is  more  of  a 
voluntary  intermeddler  and  stirs  up  the 
Btrife  for  the  love  of  it  He  is  described  as 
an  officious  intermeddler.  In  other  words, 
he  interferes  where  he  has  no  business. 
Breeden  y.  Frankford  Marine,  Accident  ft 
Plate  Glass  Ins.  Co.,  85  S.  W.  930,  931,  110 
Mo.  App.  312  (citing  Duke  y.  Harper,  66  Mo. 
51,  37  Am.  Rep.  314). 

Aldlas  poov  aaa 

The  law  of  "maintenance,"  as  I  under- 
stand it,  upon  the  modem  construction,  is 
confined  to  cases  where  a  man  improperly, 
tor  the  purpose  of  stirring  up  litigation  and 
strife,  encourages  others  either  to  bring  ac- 
tions or  to  make  defenses  which  they  haye 
no  right  to  make.  To  giye  financial  aid  to 
a  poor  suitor  who  is  prosecuting  a  meiltoil- 
ous  cause  of  action  does  not  constitute 
"maintenance,"  in  the  absence  of  any  bar- 
gain to  share  the  recoyery,  and  is  not  yiola- 
tive  of  law  or  public  policy.  Jahn  y.  Cham- 
pagne Lumber  Co.,  157  Fed.  407,  418  (citing 
Davles  y.  Stowell,  47  N.  W.  371,  78  Wis.  334, 
338^  10  Ia  B.  A.  190). 

MAJOR  LEAGUE 

0%ree  organicationa,  the  National  League, 
the  American  League,  and  the  National 
Association,  include  In  their  membership 
practically  eyery  professional  baseball  dub 


In  ih»  United  States.  The  first  two  are 
known  as  the  "ma|Jor  leagues,"  and  the  last 
as  the  "minor  league."  Kelly  r.  Herman, 
155  Fed.  S87,  888. 

MAJORITY 

See  Requisite  Majority. 
SeOb  also.  Votes  Cast 

By  the  word  "majority''  la  meant  the 
greater  number;  more  than  half  of  the  whole 
number  or  a  glyen  number  or  group.  A  ma- 
jority of  yoters  is  a  greater  part  of  sudi 
yoters.  MUls  y.  Hallgren,  124  N.  W.  1077, 
1079,  146  Iowa,  215. 

L.  O.  L.  I  4052,  subd.  14,  authorizing 
selection  of  a  school  building  site  by  a  *'ma- 
Jorlty  of  the  yoters  pre^nt"  at  a  school  meetr 
Ing,  requires  a  yote  of  more  than  one-half 
of  those  present,  and  not  a  mere  plurality. 
Baxter  y.  Davis,  113  Pac.  438,  58  Or.  109 
(citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4286). 

Whereyer  the  words  **the  council  for 
the  time  being  shall,  by  a  majority  vote  of 
all  the  members  elected,"  or  words  of  like  im* 
port,  occur  In  the  charter  of  a  municipal 
corporation,  relatlye  to  the  membera  of  the 
common  council  thereof,  they  will  be  con* 
strued  to  mean  a  majority  of  the  whole  num- 
ber of  members  to  which  the  common  coun- 
cil is  entitled  under  the  charter.  Wood  y. 
Gordon,  62  S.  E.  261,  262,  58  W.  Va.  321  (dis- 
tinguishing Osburn  y.  Staley,  5  W.  Va.  85,  13 
Am.  Rep.  640). 

In  a  will  devising  property  to  four  trus- 
tees named  "and  to  the  survivors  of  them," 
and  empowering  them  to  act,  "or  the  'major- 
ity* of  them,"  "the  term  'majority*  has  ref- 
erence to  a  majority  of  the  survivors  and  not 
to  a  majority  of  the  full  number  of  trustees.** 
Bascom  v.  Weed,  105  N«  Y.  Supp.  459,  466, 
58  Misc.  Bep.  496. 

Under  chapter  841,  p^  624,  Laws  1889, 
the  word  "majority**  means  a  majority  of  all 
votes  cast  at  tiie  caucus,  including  blank  bal- 
lots. State  ex  rel.  Dietrich  y.  Patterson,  96 
N.  W.  1185, 119  Wis.  62. 

As  majority  of  entiro  body 

As  used  in  Ky.  St  1903  (Charter  of  Clt- 
ies  of  the  Second  Class)  i  3044,  providing 
that  a  majority  of  members  elect  of  both 
the  board  of  aldermen  and  the  general  coun- 
cil shall  constitute  a  quorum  for  the  transac- 
tion of  business  in  Joint  session,  a  "majority 
of  both  boards**  means  a  majority  of  the 
members  taken  as  a  whole,  and  not  a  majori- 
ty of  each  board  considered  separately.  Dav- 
is y.  Clans,  100  S.  W.  263,  265,  125  Ky.  4. 

As  autjovity  of  tikoso  aotliis  as  m  body 
im  sossioa 

.  Where  a  city  charter  provided  that  the 
mayor  should  nominate  all  appointive  officers, 
and  that  his  appointment  should  be  final  un- 
less within  five  days  thereafter  a  "majority 
of  the  common  council**  should  file  objections 


MAXORITT 


216 


MAJORITY 


In  wiitiug,  the  term  "majority  ci  tbe  conunoa 
councir'  did  not  mean  the  common  council 
acting  aa  a  bo<l7  in  session,  but  the  prorlsion 
was  satisfied  by  the  filing  of  objectloiM  by  a 
majority  of  the  body  without  reference  to 
the  time  or  manner  of  their  action.  State 
ex  rel.  Panlette  t.  Bandel,  97  S.  W.  222,  223, 
121  Mo.  App.  616. 

The  statute  authorizing  majority  of  the 
board  to  hii*  a  teacher  means  a  majority 
acting  at  a  legal  meeting,  and  not  a  majority 
of  the  directors  acting  separately.  Johnson 
T.  Dye,  127  S.  W.  413,  414,  142  Mo.  ^p.  424. 

As  majority  of  those  entitled  to  Toto 

The  words  '^majority  of  the  Qualified 
voters  and  taxpayers  of  any  school  district,'* 
as  used  in  Rey.  St  1899,  S  9772  (Ana  St  1906, 
p.  4488),  providing  that  when  a  majority  of 
the  qualified  voters  and  taxpayers  of  any 
school  district,  at  any  annual  or  special  meet- 
ing called  for  that  purpose,  shall  deem  it 
necessary  to  have  additional  ground  for 
sdiool  purposes,  the  board  of  directors  may 
proceed  to  condemn,  eta,  meant  that  tiie 
proposition  must  receive  a  majority  of  all 
the  qualified  voters  and  taxpayers  of  the  dis- 
trict and  that  a  mere  majority  of  all  those 
present,  unless  it  also  be  a  majority  of  all 
the  qualified  voters  and  taxpayers  of  the  dis- 
trict, is  insufficient  School  District  Mo.  3  v. 
OelUen,  108  8.  W.  629,  530,  209  Mo.  464. 

As  majoritj  of  losal  TOtes  oast 

Under  St  1912,  c.  659,  pt  3,  i  1,  revising 
the  charter  of  the  city  of  Salem,  which  pro- 
vided that  the  act  should  be  submitted  to  the 
registered  voters  at  the  state  election  in  1912, 
for  a  vote  primarily  on  the  question  whether 
the  present  charter  should  be  repealed,  and 
secondarily  on  the  question  whether,  If  it  was 
repealed,  the  new  charter  should  be  plan  1  or 
plan  2,  and  that  if,  on  a  "majority  of  the  bal- 
lots cast,"  the  votes  should  be  for  a  repeal, 
the  plan  receivinir  the  largest  number  of 
votes  cast  should  be  adopted  as  the  city  char- 
ter, the  ballot  on  which  the  questions  were 
printed  contained,  besides  tiie  names  of  a 
large  number  of  candidates  for  state  and 
national  offices,  questions  upon  the  adop- 
tion of  constitutional  amendments,  and  the 
total  number  of  ballots  cast  was  6,966,  of 
which,  on  the  question  of  repealing  the  char- 
ter 1,676  were  blank,  2,240  were  against  re- 
peal, and  3,050  were  for  repeat  Held  that. 
In  view  of  the  legislative  i)olicy  to  make  an 
acceptance  of  a  dty  charter  turn  upon  the  af- 
firmative votes  of  a  majority  of  those  voting 
on  the  question,  the  word  "ballots"  was  syn- 
onymous with  "votes,"  and  that  only  the 
ballots  carrying  votes  on  the  question  of  re- 
peal vfera  to  be  eounted,  and  hence  that,  «s 
there  was  a  "majority  of  the  iMillets  cast"  in 
favor  of  repeal,  the  old  charter  was  repealed, 
and  the  plan  receiviBg  the  larger  number  of 
votes  was  adopted  as  the  new  charter. 
Cashman  v.  Bntwiatle,  100  N.  B.  68^  69,  218 
Mass.  163. 


ne  **nkajorlty  of  ballots"  necessary,  un- 
der Rcrr.  St  1898,  |  866,  to  determine  the 
question  of  tecorporatiosi  of  a  village  means 
the  majoEitj  of  the  legal  ballots  cast  on  tho 
proposition  and  not  a  majority  of  those  who 
vote  or  attempt  to  vote  but  whose  ballots  are 
properly  rejected  because  illegal.  State  ex 
rel.  Town  of  Holland  v.  Lammers,  86  N.  W. 
677,  679,  89  N.  W.  601,  113  Wis.  398. 

Am  9naJo«l*y  of  aworutt 
Under  a  by-law  of  a  sooifil  oovporation 
proividing  that  aa  assessment  eoold  be  made 
by  a  majority  of  the  executive  oommittee, 
which  consisted  of  20  members,  6  of  whom 
constituted  a  quorum,  by  a  "majority  of  the 
committee^*  was  meant  a  majority  of  the 
whole  connulttee,  and  not  a  majority  of  a 
quorum  of  6.  Rogers  v.  Boston  Club,  91  N. 
B.  321,  322,  826,  206  Mass.  261,  28  U  B.  A. 
(N.  B.)  748. 

Where  an  orphan  asylum  claimed,  for 
support  of  children  committed  to  Its  care  by 
a  county  after  the  adoption  of  a  resolution  by 
a  majority  vote  of  a  quorum  of  the  board  of 
supervisors,  that  such  children  be  removed 
therefrom,  and,  after  demand  for  the  children 
and  refusal  to  surrender,  no  recovery  could 
be  had,  since  Laws  1895,  c  267,  t  2,  authoris- 
es a  county,  by  a  majority  vote  of  its  county 
board  of  supervisors,  to  remove  such  children, 
to  the  support  of  which  it  contributes,  and 
Rev.  St  S  665,  declares  that  a  majority  of  the 
supervisors  entitled  to  a  seat  constitute  a 
quorum  for  the  transaction  of  business,  and 
make  all  questions  determinable  by  a  majori- 
ty of  the  supervisors  present,  unless  other- 
wise provided.  St  ^milianus  Orphan  Asyl- 
um V.  Milwaukee  County,  82  N.  W.  704,  705, 
107  Wis.  80. 

As  majority  of  those  present  and  vot- 
ins 

Rev.  St  1899,  §  9750,  subd.  11  (Ann.  St 
1906,  p.  4470),  providing  that  in  each  case  a 
"majority  vote  of  the  voters  who  are  resident 
taxpayers"  of  the  district  shall  be  necessary 
to  remove  a  site  nearer  the  center  of  the  dis- 
trict means  a  majority  of  the  taxpayers  of 
the  district  present  and  voting  in  the  elec- 
tUHL  Tucker  v.  McKay,  lU  &  W.  867,  868, 
131  Mo.  App.  72& 

As  majority  of  those  Totias 

The  phrase  "majority  vote  of  legal  vot- 
ers," in  Sp.  Act  Feb.  26,  1903,  providing  that 
it  shall  take  effect  when  approved  by  a  ma- 
jority vote  of  the  legal  voters  within  the  dis- 
trict, means,  according  to  Act  March  18, 
1903,  a  majority  vote  of  the  legal  voters  vot- 
ing. Ii'oy  V.  Gardiner  Water  Dist,  56  Atl. 
201,  202,  98  Me.  82. 

"A  majority  of  the  registered  voters  of 
the  dty,"  as  used  in  Acts  1889,  c.  8963,  S  12, 
means  a  majofity  of  tiifr  qualified  electors 
who  actually  voted  at  the  election  in  ques- 
tion, and  not  a  majortty  of  all  the  voters  wbo- 
had  the  right  to  vote;  those  voters  who  are 


MAiORlTT 


MT 


MAJORITY 


fiilent  being  supposed  to  assent  that  the  ^ech 
tion  shall  be  determined  by  those  who  vote. 
Bell  ▼.  atj  of  Ocala,  60  Sooth.  68S,  684,  62 
Fla.  431. 

OonBt  art  10,  t  Ot  does  not  provide  the 
procedure  for  levying  a  tax  for  sdiool  dia- 
trlct  pnrpoaea  In  excess  of  five  mills  on  the 
dollar,  and  not  exceeding  ten  additional 
mllla,  bat  leates  tiie  same  to  be  provided  for 
by  tbe  Legislature,  provided  that  a  tax  In 
excess  of  five  mills  shall  not  be  levied  except 
on  condition  that  a  majority  of  the  voters 
of  the  district  voting  at  aa  election  of  the 
district  vote  fer  same.  Ckmst  art  10^  t  ^ 
does  not  require  that  a  levy  in  excess  of  five 
mills  on  the  dollar  in  any  year  for  scheol 
district  porpoeae,  not  exceeding  fifteen  mills, 
shall  receive  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the 
voters  in  the  district,  but  only  a  majority 
of  said  voters  voting  at  the  election.  Tllley 
V.  Overton,  116  Pac  945,  948,  29  Okl.  292. 

Const  f  41,  providing  that  no  county 
leat  shall  be  removed  except  by  a  "majority" 
▼ote  of  the  qualified  electors  of  the  county, 
does  not  mean  a  majority  of  all  the  qualified 
electors,  but  merely  a  majority  of  the  votes 
cast  Bz  parte  Owens,  42  South.  676,  148 
Ala.  402,  8  Ia  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  888,  121  Am.  St 
Rep.  67. 

Oonst  art  IS,  |  6,  provides  that  no  coun- 
ty shall  incur  any  indebtedness  or  liability 
for  a  single  purpose  to  an  amount  exceeding 
$10,000  without  the  approval  of  a  majority  of 
the  electors,  voting  at  an  election  to  be  pro- 
vided by  law.  Rev.  Codes,  |  2983,  declares 
tbat  county  boards  shall  not  borrow  money 
for  any  single  purpose  to  an  amount  exceed- 
ing $10,000  without  the  approval  of  a  major- 
ity of  the  electors  of  the  county  and  without 
first  having  submitted  the  question  of  a  loan 
to  a  vote  of  such  electors;  and  section  2067 
declares  that,  if  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast 
are  in  favor  of  the  loan,  then  the  board  may 
make  the  loan  and  issue  the  bonds.  Hild, 
that  the  amctmeiit  ef  section  2988  was  not 
httended  to  add  any  raquirement  to  that  pre- 
■erlbed  by  tbe  Oonstitutlon,  and  that  the 
words  "majority  of  the  electors  of  the  ooun- 
ty,"  as  uaed  therein,  sboold  toe  censtmed  to 
mean  "a  nuijority  of  the  votes  cast"  Merse 
V.  Granite  County,  119  Pac.  286,  891,  44 
Mont  T& 

As  Mftjevity  vetliic  en  pAvtiewlav  Issue 

Where  the  language  of  an  act  is  "a  ma- 
jority of  the  votes  cast,"  or  ••a  majority  of 
all  votes  cast,"  it  meani  a  majority  of  the 
votes  cast  on  the  question  submitted;  and 
that,  Aether  the  votes  are  cast  at  a  general 
or  special  Section.  Territory  ex  rel.  Mc^ 
Otilre  V.  Board  of  Trustees  for  High  School 
«f  Logan  County,  76  Pac  166,  167,  18  Ckl. 
606. 

As  used  hi  Const  |  111,  providing  that 
county  emrtB  shall  have  Juilsdictien  of  cer- 
tahi  civn  and  ertminal  causes  ^'whenever 
tbe  voters  of  any  caantr  having  a  pepulatioB 


of  two  tlieasand  or  over  shall  dedds  by  a 
majority  vote  that  they  desire  the  Jurisdic- 
tion of  that  court  increased,"  the  words  "ma- 
jority vote^  mean  a  majority  of  all  votes  cast 
on  the  question  of  increased  Jurisdiction,  and 
not  a  majority  of  all  the  votea  east  at  the 
election.  State  v.  Fabrkk,  121  N.  W.  66,  66, 
18  N.  D.  402. 

As  used  in  Const  f  168,  providing  that 
changes  in  the  boundaiiee  of  organised  coun- 
ties Shan  be  submitted  to  the  electors  of  the 
county  or  counties  to  be  affected,  and  be 
adopted  by  a  '%iaJority  of  all  the  legal  votes 
cast"  at  such  election,  the  phrase  "votes 
cast"  means  the  total  of  the  separate  votes, 
or  expressions  of  voters^  preference  for  or 
against  such  a  Aange,  and  should  be  limited 
to  mean  the  votee  cast  on  that  propositiOfL 
To  effect  such  dbange  requires  merely  a  ma- 
jority of  the  votes  cast  upon  the  question  of  a 
change,  and  not  a  majority  of  the  highest 
number  of  votes  cast  for  any  candidate,  or 
upon  any  proposition  voted  upon  at  the  elec- 
tion, since  to  hold  otherwise  would  be  to 
give  as  mudi  effect  to  the  act  of  an  elector 
who  did  not  vote  on  such  change  as  that  of 
one  who  voted  in  the  negative.  State  v. 
Blaisdell,  119  N.  W.  860,  861,  18  N.  D.  SI. 

Pub.  Laws  1903,  p.  327,  I  73,  provides  for 
submission  to  the  voters  of  a  dty,  at  the  next 
principal  election  after  a  resolution  of  the 
city  council  for  issue  of  bonds,  of  the  ques- 
tion of  approval  of  the  resolution,  and  states 
that  the  election  ofBcers  shall  report  the  num- 
ber of  votes  in  favor  of  Issuing  the  bonds 
and  the  number  against  such  issue,  and  that, 
if  it  shall  be  found  that  the  resolution  has 
been  approved  by  "a  majority  of  the  voters 
voting  at  such  election,"  the  bonds  may  be 
issued.  Gen.  Election  liaw  (P.  L.  1806,  p. 
319),  1 185,  provides  that,  when  the  approval 
of  a  "inajority  of  the  legal  voters"  is  re- 
quired by  a  statute  before  a  proceeding  un- 
der it  tfiall  be  lawful,  the  meaning  of  the 
wards  'lepd  voten"  in  the  etatvte  ahaU  be 
"persona  entitled  to  vote  and  who  do  vote 
*  *  ^  on  the  queatton  or  proposition  sub- 
mitted," and  that  the  persons  who  do  not 
vote  at  such  eleetkm  shall  not  be  considered 
on  the  question  of  what  Is  a  majority  of  the 
legal  voters  with  respect  to  the  propositton 
sQbmitted.  Held,  that  "a  majority  of  the 
voters  voting  at  such  election"  required  for 
approval  of  a  resolution  for  bond  issue  means 
only  a  majority  of  the  persons  voting  on  so^ 
proposition,  and  not  a  majority  of  the  per- 
sons voting  at  sucft  Section  on  that  and  other 
queetlons.  Mnrpliy  ▼.  City  of  homg  Branch 
(N.  J.)  61  Att.  693,  694. 


By  "majority"  le  meant  a  majeaity  of  the 
whole  number  of  electors  voting  at  the  elec- 
tion, and  not  a  majority  of  the  votes  recorded 
for  or  against  license.  In  re  BHection  Con- 
teet,  186  N.  W.  1031,  1062,  118  ^iinn.  871. 

Where  a  qucattois  la  rsquiied  to  be  sub- 
mitted at  a  certain  regular  election,  and  ia 


UAJOBITT 


218 


MAKS 


mad^  to  det>end  on  a  "majority  of  the  YOtes 
cast  iEit  such  election,"  a  majority  of  all  the 
votes  cast  at  the  election  Is  meant*  and  not 
merely  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  on  that 
particular  question.  Santa  Rosa  v.  Bower, 
75  Pac  829,  830,  142  CaL  289. 

The  words  *'8uch  election,"  as  used  in 
the  section  of  the  Constitution  which  pro- 
vides how  constitutional  amendments  shall  be 
passed  through  the  General  Assembly  for  sub- 
mission to  the  people,  and  for  publication 
for  at  least  six  months  'Immediately  preced- 
ing the  next  general  election  for  Senators 
and  Representatives,  at  which  time  the  same 
shall  be  submitted  to  the  electors  of  the  state 
for  approval  or  rejection,  and,  if  a  majority 
of  the  electors  voting  in  such  election  adopt 
such  amendments,  the  same  shall  become  a 
part  of  the  Constitution,*'  evidently  refer  to 
the  general  election  for  Senators  and  Rep- 
resentatives, and  the  "majority"  necessary 
to  adopt  an  amendment  must  be  the  major- 
ity of  electors  voting  at  the  general  election 
for  Senators  and  Representatives,  and  not 
a  mere  majority  voting  on  the  subject  of  the 
amendment  Rice  v.  Palmer,  96  S.  W.  396, 
400,  78  Ark.  432  (citing  Knight  v.  Shelton, 
134  JFed.  423;  State  ex  rel.  McClurg  v.  Pow- 
ell,  77  Miss.  645,  27  South.  927,  48  L.  R.  A. 
662). 

Laws  1905,  p.  669,  c  397,  {  10,  providing 
for  submission  of  the  proposition  of  establish- 
ing county  high  schools,  and  that,  when  "a 
majority  of  the  voters  voting"  in  any  coun- 
ty shall  be  in  fb.vor  of  such  proposition,  the 
provisions  of  that  act  shall  apply  thereto, 
requires,  where  the  election  is  a  general  one, 
a  majority  of  all  the  voters  voting  on  any 
office  or  proposition  at  such  election.  Board 
of  Education  of  City  of  Humbolt  v.  Klein, 
99  Pac  222,  223,  79  Kan.  209. 

As  determined  Iby  easting  vote  of  pre-i 
■tdlns  officer 

Stamford  City  Charter  (18  Sp,  Laws,  p. 
1152),  I  8,  creates  a  board  of  appropriation 
and  apportionment  for  the  condemnation  of 
land  required  by  the  dty,  consisting  of  eight 
members;  the  mayor  being  a  member  ex 
officio  and  president  of  the  board,  with  pow* 
er  to  vote  only  in  case  of  a  tie.  14  Sp.  Laws 
1905,  p.  858,  I  6,  provides  that  the  taking  of 
land  for  park  purposes  shall  be  by  a  "ma- 
jority" vote  of  all  the  members  of  the  board, 
both  present  and  absent.  Held,  that,  in 
case  of  a  tie,  when  all  the  members  of  the 
board  were  present  and  voted,  the  mayor's 
vote  was  sufficient  to  make  a  majority.  Bo- 
hannan  v.  City  of  Stamford  67  Atl.  872,  878, 
80  Conn.  107. 

HAJORTTY  OF  8TOOKHOX<DEB8 

An  election  to  be  held  by  a  "majority 
of  stockholders"  means  a  majority  in  Inter- 
est In  re  P.  B.  Mathiason  Mfg.  Co.,  99  S. 
W.  502,  504,  122  Mo.  App.  437  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  2  Cook  Corp.  [5th  Ed.] 
i  608). 


MAKE 

See,  also.  Made. 
As  laalntaln 

A  covenant  in  a  conveyance  of  land  for 
a  right  of  way  that  the  railroad  would  *'make 
and  maintain"  a  wire  fence  on  both  sides  of 
the  land  conveyed,  "and  also  make"  a  farm 
crossing,  in  pursuance  of  which  the  railroad 
did  supply,  maintaiUt  and  keep  in  repair  a 
crossing  for  a  number  of  years,  obligated  the 
railroad  not  only  to  make,  but  also  to  main- 
tain, the  crossing.  Pittsburg,  C,  a  &  St  L 
By.  Co.  V.  Wilson,  72  N.  B.  666^  668,  34 
Ind.  App.  324. 

Compel  synoiiymovui 

Where  defendant's  mother  stated  that  de- 
fendant's brother  said  he  would  "make"  de- 
cedent apologize,  an  instruction  that  defend- 
ant was  guilty  of  murder  if  he  armed  him- 
self with  the  Intention  of  "compelling"  dece- 
dent to  apologize,  and  on  his  failing  to  do 
so  killed  him,  was  not  erroneous;  "com- 
pelled" being  substantially  synonymous  with 
"make."  Pipkins  r.  State,  97  S.  W.  61,  63, 
80  Ark.  617. 

A  book 

See  Bookmaklng. 
Effort 

Where  defendant  accepted  plaintiff^  of- 
fer to  make  ice  cans  at  a  certain  price,  on 
condition  that  they  were  made  and  shipped 
within  30  days,  and  plaintiffs  accepted  the 
order  and  promised  to  "make  every  effort" 
to  have  the  cans  delivered  at  the  time  indi- 
cated, the  assurance  must  be  construed  as 
the  expression  of  purpose  to  comply  with 
the  s^ongly  emphasized  requirement  for 
shipment  in  30  days,  and  not  as  a  modifica- 
tion thereof.  Wall  v.  St.  Joseph  Artesian 
Ice  &  Cold  Storage  Co.,  87  S.  W.  574,  575, 
X12  Mo.  App.  659. 

FiOse  entry 

Concealment  by  the  president^  of  a  na- 
tional bank  firom  the  bookkeeper  of  facts  nec- 
essary to  enable  the  latter  to  make  accurate 
entries  in  the  books  of  the  bank,  by  reason 
of  which  fact  he  made  false  entries,  does  tiot 
constitute  the  making  of  false  entries  by  the 
president  which  is  made  a  criminal  offense 
by  Rev.  St  i  5209.  United  States  v.  McGUr- 
ty,  191  Fed.  523. 
Falae  writing 

There  is  a  distinction  between  falsely 
making  a  certiflcate  of  acknowledgment  and 
•'making  a  false  certificate."  The  former 
term  contemplates  a  certificate  which  is  not 
genuine,  while  the  latter  Importo  a  genuine 
certificate,  the  contento  or  allegations  of 
which  are  false.  Territory  y.  Gutierres,  84 
Pac.  526,  626,  13  N.  M.  312,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  &) 
875- 

"Make",  lias  many  signiflcatlonB  4ind  con- 
veys many  meanings,  among  which  is  "to  put 
forth;  give  out;  deUver;"  also  "to  inforim 


MAXX 


MAKIKG  SALES 


apprise."  Cent.  Diet  Thus  wben  a^^person, 
seeking  credit,  bands  to  a  merchant  a  mate- 
rially false  written  statement  concerning  his 
financial  condition,  no  matteir  who  coii4>osed 
and  signed  it,  if  it  be  one  calculated  to  de- 
ceive, and  then  reads  it -to  such  merc^nt, 
and  thereby  obtains  property  from  him  on 
credit,  he  has  obtained  property  on  credit  up- 
on a  materially  false  statement  In  writing 
''made  to^'  such  person.  In  re  Aldrlgde^  168 
Fed.  03,  96,  99. 

Fromttlc»te  distinguished 

The  word  ''make,"  as  used  in  Act  Cong. 
Maidi  3, 1906,  c  1496, 13,  which  requires  the 
Secretary  of  Agzicultnre  to  "make"  and  ''pro- 
mulgate^' rules  and  regulations  foyemlng  the 
method  and  manner  ef  shipment,  inspection, 
and  dellTery  of  cattle  from  quarantined  ter- 
ritory, is  not  synonymous  with  '*promulgate," 
and  means  only  the  writing  and  official  sign- 
ing of  such  rules;  the  '*promulgation"  of 
tliem  rsquiilng  notice  to  the  officers  of  trans- 
portation companies,  etc.,  and  their  publica- 
tion In  the  selected  newspapers  within  the 
aflTected  district  United  States  y.  LouisTille 
&  N.  R.  Co.,  166  Fed.  936,  939. 

In  a  trial  tor  murder,  the  court  instruet- 
ed  that  It  is  the  duty  of  one  engaged  in  a 
quarrel  to  avoid  an  attack,  and  not  to  be- 
come the  aggressor,  unless  other  means  are 
onavailable,  and  that  if  defendant,  after  be- 
ing engaged  in  a  quarrel  with  deceased,  de- 
scended to  the  street,  knowing  that  deceas- 
ed was  in  the  street,  with  intent  to  continue 
the  quarrel,  and  in  order  to  make  "his  quar- 
rel effective,'*  took  witii  him  a  dangerous 
weapon,  and  sought  out  deceased,  and  stab- 
bed him,  his  action  was  not  Justiiiable  hom- 
icide, though  deceased  drew  a  reyolver,  was 
not  ernmeous,  whether  the  phrase  "making 
the  quarrel  effective"  meant  that  defendant 
took  the  weapon  with  intent  to  take  the  life 
of  deceased,  or  meant,  if  defendant  renewed 
the  quarrel,  whether  with  or  without  in- 
tent to  take  life,  the  killing  was  not  justifi- 
able; People  ▼.  Filippelli,  66  M.  B.  402,  406, 
173  N.  Y.  600. 


Where  a  clerk  of  a  Circuit  Court  makes 
and  certifies  a  record  In  response  to  a  writ  of 
error  or  appeal,  he  is  not  merely  making  a 
transcript  or  copy,  but  is  "making  a  record." 
within  Rev.  St  i  828,  providing  that  a  clerk 
of  the  Circuit  Court  shall  be  entitled  for 
making  a  record  to  15  cents  a  folio.  Hoys- 
radt  V.  Delaware,  L.  &  W,  E,  B.,  182  Fed. 
880,882.      . 

Rale 
In  Act  Cong.  March  8,  1906,  a  1496,  |  8, 
requiring  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture  to 
"make"^  and  "promulgate"  rules  governing  the 
inspection,  delivery,  and  shipment  of  cattle 
from  a  quarantined  state  into  any  other 
fitate,  and  section  1  requiring  publlcati(m  of 


notice  of  quarantine  and  the  giving  of  notice 
to  the  proper  officers  of  carriers  doing  business 
in  any  quarantined  state,  the  words  "make" 
and  "promulgate"  are  not  synonymous,  and 
the  duty  to  "make"  rules  was  sufficiently 
accomplished  by  writing  them  and  signing 
them  officially,  but  to  "promulgate"  them  re- 
quired the  giving  notice  thereof  to  the  offi- 
cers of  carriers,  etc.,  and  their  publication  in 
the  selected  newspapers  within  the  affected 
district.  United  Stotes  v.  LouisvUle  &  N. 
R.  Co:,  165  Fed.  936.  939. 


The  words  "to  sell"  or  "to  make  a  sale," 
as  used  in  a  communication  from  the  owner 
of  real  estate  to  a  broker  with  respect  to 
the  sale  thereof,  are  often  used  as  meaning 
to  negotiate  or  arrange  for  a  sale.  Brown 
V.  Gilpin,  90  Pac  267,  271,  76  Kan.  778. 

SiCMtwe 

Under  a  statute  making  a  writing,  not 
signed  in  the  presence  of  witnesses,  invalid 
as  a  will,  unless  testatrix  acknowledged  the 
"making  thereof,"  the  phrase  quoted  refers 
to  the  making  of  the  signature  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  witnesses.  Manners  t.  Manners, 
66  Aa  683,  684,  72  N.  J.  Bq.  864. 


Of  note 

See  Accommodation  Maker;    Comaker; 

Joint  Maker ;   Principal  Maker. 
Indorser  distinguished,  see  Indorser. 

"One  not  before  a  party  to  a  note,  who 
signs  his  nayne  on  the  back  of  it  in  blank,  is 
prima  facie  a  'maker,'  and  assumes  the  same 
obligation  as  if  he  wrote  his  name  upon  the 
face  of  the  instrument"  Lyndon  Savings 
Bank  V.  International  Co.,  62  Atl.  50,  52,  78 
Vt.  169,  112  Am.  St  Rep.  900  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Lyndon  Savings  Bank 
V.  International  Co.,  64  Atl.  191,  76  Vt  224). 

Where  a  note  reciting,  "I  promise  to 
pay,"  was  signed  on  the  face  by  two  persons, 
they  were  both  "makers."  UUery  v.  Brohm, 
79  Pac.  180,  20  Colo.  App.  389. 

The  transferror  of  a  nonnegotiable  writ- 
ten contract  does  not,  by  signing  his  name 
on  the  back  of  it,  make  himself  liable  as 
"maker,"  "guarantor,"  or  'indorser,"  within 
Rem.  &  BaL  Code,  i  6250,  providing  that 
the  discounting  of  commercial  paper,  where 
the  borrower  makes  himself  liable  as  maker, 
guarantor,  or  Indorser,  shall  be  considered  as 
a  loan  for  the  purpose  of  the  dbapter  relating 
to  usury.  Thomson  v.  Koch,  113  Pac.  1110, 
1111,  62  Wash-  438. 

MAxnro 

''Making*  is  defined  as  the  action  of  one 
Who  makes.  Town  of  Checotah  v.  Town  of 
Eufaula,  119  Pac.  1014,  1017,  81  Okl.  85. 


XAKnro 

See  Salesmen  Making  Sales. 


MAUPJBASANCOi 


MAL 

See  Petit  HaL 

MAJLA  VIBS  PU»0HA8S& 

"A  person  who  purchases  an  estate,  al- 
though for  a  valaable  consideration,  with  no- 
tice of  a  prior  equitable  right,  makes  himself 
a  *mala  fide  purchaser,'  and  will  lilmself 
even  be  held  a  trustee  for  the  b^iefit  of  the 
person  whose  right  he  sought  to  defeat*' 
Mansfield  v.  Wardlow  (Tex.)  91  &  W.  869, 
863  (citing  Pom.  Bq.  Jur.  |  669). 


See  C!ontract8  Mala  In  fie. 

A  distinction  is  nade  between  acta  which 
are  "mala  in  se,"  which  are  goierally  re- 
garded aa  absolutely  Told,  In  tha  senae  that 
no  right  or  claim  can  be  derived  from  them, 
and  acts  which  are  mala  prohlblta,  which 
are  void  or  yeldable^  according  to  the  na- 
ture or  effect  of  the  act  prohibited.  Pet- 
terson  y.  Berry,  125  Feu.  902,  906,  00  O.  O. 
A.  610  (citing  Bwdl  v.  Daggs,  2  Sup.  Gt  408, 
106  U.  S.  148,  27  L.  Bd.  082);  In  le  T.  EL 
BrnvAi  €k>.,  180  Fed.  619,  82T. 

MAJLA  PROHIBITA 

See  Mala  in  Se. 

MAiuLBMunarnAnoir 

Aa  applied  to  public  offloera,  ''maladmin- 
istration" Is  not  in  ordinary  use  distinguish- 
ed from  mlsadmlnistratlon.  Territory  t. 
Sandies,  94  Pac  964,  966»  14  K.  M.  49S,  20 
Ann.  CsLB.  109. 

MAXiOOHBirOT 

The  reoeption  of  Illegal  yotea  at  an  elec- 
tion for  a  public  office  is  not  "malconduct" 
on  the  part  of  the  election,  officers,  within 
Oode  dr.  Proa  S  2010,  authorizing  an  elector 
to  contest  an  election  for  malconduct  on  the 
part  of  the  Judges  of  election,  but  constitutee 
a  separate  ground  for  contest  under  the  ex- 
press provisions  of  the  section.  Ck>leman  t. 
Kerr,  83  Pac.  398,  804,  83  Mont  196. 

An  officer  who  violates  his  public  obliga- 
tion, and  betrays  his  trust  by  selling  his  offi- 
cial Influence  or  vote.  Is  guilty  of  "malcon- 
duct In  office."  Btzler  v.  Brown,  50  South. 
416,  41T,  68  Fla.  221,  188  Am.  St  Bep.  118. 

MAUmA 

"Malaria"  is  "a  morbid  condition  produc- 
ed by  exhalations  from  decaying  vegetable 
matter  in  contact  with  moisture,  girlng  rise 
to  fever  and  ague  and  many  ether  symptoms 
characterized  by  their  tendency  to  recur  at 
Jefiolte  and  usually  uniform  intervals."  City 
of  St  Louis  V.  Qalt,  77  8.  W.  876,  879,  179 
Mo.  8,  68  L.  B.  A.  778  (qoodng  WetNiter 
Diet). 


MALE 


SaeHdia  Uatab 

MALFEASANCE 

"  'Ualfeaaanoe^  la  the  unjust  perftyrmanoe 
of  some  act  which  the  party  bad  no  fig^t,  or 
whi<A  he  bad  contracted  not  to  do."  Dudley 
V.  Flemingsburg,  72  S.  W.  327,  116  Ky.  6,  60 
li.  R.  A.  575,  106  Am.  St  B^.  263,  1  Ann. 
Gas.  958. 

"MaU^aaanoa"  is  the  doing  of  am  act 
which  a  person  ougbt  not  to  do  at  alL 
Where  an  «aoer  either  tbtongb  Igneranceb 
inattention,  or  maUoe  ieea  that  wtaicfa  he 
baa  no  legal  light  to  do  at  all,  or  acta  with- 
out any  authority  wfaaterer,  or  eKeeeta,  Ig- 
norea,  or  abvaes  his  powera,  he  la  guilty  of 
'"malfeasance."  State,  to  Uae  ot  Oasdln,  v. 
McCl^Uan,  86  S.  W.  267,  268,  US  Teon.  610. 
8  Ann.  Gaa.  I 


The  taking  of  the  property  of  one,  by  a 
coroner,  on  a  writ  against  another,  la  a  '"mal- 
feasance  in  ofilce,"  constituting  a  breach  of 
his  bond  given  for  ''the  faithful  peiformance 
of  the  duties  of  bis  oflloe^"  Harrla  ▼.  Hanson, 
11  Me.  241,  246. 

Permission  by  a  sheriff  to  a  prisoner  to 
escape  is  "malfeasance,"  within  Kirby's  Dig. 
I  7993,  providing  for  removal  of  county  of- 
ficers on  conviction  of  an  offense  amountlDg 
to  malfeasance.  Houpt  v.  State,  140  8.  W. 
294,  297,  100  Ark.  409,  Ann.  Gas.  1913Q  690. 

While  to  oonvlet  an  oAcer  of  the  felony 
denounced  by  Oomp.  Lawa  1907,  I  4068,  pan- 
iahing  every  person  who  with  intent  to  de- 
fraud, preaents  for  allowance  and  payment  a 
fraudnleBt  dalm,  the  proof  moat  abow  that 
he  presented  the  claim  with  intsnt  to  de- 
fraud, yet  aucfa  ivoef  la  not  caaeBtial  to  sos* 
tain  a  conviction  fbr  malfeaaanoe  In  a  pro- 
cocding  Ibr  his  removal  vmAer  section  4666; 
the  tern  "malfeasance^'  meaning  the  oom- 
miaslon  of  an  act  whicb  la  poalttvely  unlaw- 
ful. Law  V.  Smith,  98  Pac  800,  807,  84  Utah, 
894. 

"WhUe  'malfeasance  In  office'  is  defined 
generally  to  be  the  wrongful  or  unjust  doing 
of  some  official  act,  which  the  doer  has  no 
right  to  perform,  or  which  he  has  stipulated 
by  contract  not  to  do.  It  ia  essential  that  an 
evil  intent  or  motive  must  accompany  tbe 
act,  or  that  it  must  have  been  done  with  such 
gross  negligence  aa  to  be  equivalent  to  fraud." 
An  indictment  of  a  county  clerk  for  unlaw- 
fully issuing  a  license  to  sell  liquor  in  a 
local  option  precinct,  which  f&ila  to  aner  that 
hia  actiou  was  froaa  a  corrupt  motive  or 
fraudulent,  or  that  he  knew  at  the  time  that 
It  was  unlawful  for  him  to  issue  the  Uoense, 
ia  iasufflcient  CommonweaKh  v.  Wood,  76 
S.  W.  842,  843,  116  Ky.  748  (citii«  Bishops 
New  Or.  Law,  H  972,  884|. 


HAIil^EASANCB 


fit 


MAUCflB 


"MaJf eastmce**  i»  the  doing  of  «n  aet 
wUch  is  positiyely  onlawfal  or  wrongful 
wiiich  one  ongbt  not  to  do  at  alL  It  la  an 
act  wholly  wrongful  and  unlawful.  It  la 
taid  that  misconception  of  one^s  rights  af- 
fords no  ground  for  a  conclusion  of  malfoa- 
sanoe.  It  Is  not  malfeasance  In  office,  for 
whicb,  under  Highway  Law,  N.  T.  (OonsoL 
Laws  1909,  c.  25)  {  30,  a  county  sBperUitend- 
ent  of  highways  may  be  removed  by  the 
county  flupervisora,  that  he  presents  to  a 
town,  and  has  paM,  a  personal  Mil  ftor  pie- 
psiing,  under  emj^oyment  by  it,  plaas  and 
spedflcstloBs  for  an  arenue  therein,  ttie  work 
mx  which  was  done  by  his  prirate  employes 
In  his  bustnesB  of  eiril  ^iglneer,  as  not 
only  under  sections  88,  48,  relatlTe  to  his  du- 
ties, is  the  county  superintendent  under  no 
absolute  duty  to  do  such  work,  but,  even  tf 
he  cannot  legally  present  a  claim  against  the 
town,  such  aetien  would  be  wrongful  to  the 
town  only,  wheveas  the  malfeasance  justify- 
ing his  removal  must  be  such  as  aftects  his 
perfonnanee  as  county  superintendent,  and 
he  having  at  most  misconc^ved  his  rights, 
in  supposing  there  was  no  legal  objection  to 
his  rendition  of  the  aocount,  which  affords 
no  ground  for  a  conclusion  of  malfeasance. 
JPeople  ex  reL  Seaman  v.  Cocks,  134  N.  T. 
8npp.  808,  810. 140  App.  Div.  883  (citing  Omt 
Diet;  BeU  y.  Josselyn,  8  Gray  [00  Mass.] 
309,  63  Ant  Dec  741;  Ooite  t.  Lynes,  33 
Conn.  100;  Stokes  y.  Stokes,  48  N.  T.  8um>. 
722,  23  App.  Diy.  668). 

Hoaf  easaaee  dl^tlaguisl&ed 

'There  is  a  distinction  between  non- 
feasance and  misfeasance  or  malfeasance; 
and  this  distinction  is  often  of  great  impor- 
tance in  determining  an  agent's  Uabillty  to 
third  persons.  In  this  connection,  'nonfea- 
sance' means  the  total  omission  or  failure  of 
an  agent  to  enter  upon  the  performance  of 
some  distinct  duty  or  undertaking,  wl^ch  he 
has  agreed  with  his  principal  to  do.  'Misfea- 
sance' means  the  improper  doing  of  an  act 
which  the  agent  might  lawfully  do,  or,  in 
other  words,  it  is  the  performing  of  his  duty 
to  his  principal  in  such  a  manner  as  to  in- 
fringe upon  the  rights  and  privileges  of  third 
persons;  and  'malfeasance'  is  the  doing  of 
an  act  wliich  he  ought  not  to  do  at  all.  It  is 
not  every  omission  or  failure  to  perform  a 
dnty  that  will  constitute  a  nonfeasance,  but 
only  an  omission  to  perform  such  di^nct 
duties  as  he  owes  to  his  principal,  as  distin- 
gnldied  from  those  which  he  owes  to  third 
persons,  or  the  public  in  general  as  a  member 
of  society.  Nonfeasance  does  not  extend  to 
the  omission  or  failure  to  do  some  act,  where- 
in a  tiitrd  person  is  injured  after  he  has 
once  entered  upon  the  performance  of  his 
contractual  obligations.  For  example,  if  an 
•gent  undeitakes  tx>  petf orm  cestain  acts  for 
another,  and  he  reDuses  or  flails  to  enter  upon 
iDdi  performance,  it  Is  nonfeasance;  but  if 
ke  once  begins  the  performance  of  such  acts, 
tnd  in  doing  so  fails  or  omlta  to  do  certain 


acta  w^dh  he  should  have  dona,  wherelur  a 
third  person  is  injured.  It  Is  not  a  nonfea- 
sance^ but  a  misfeasance.  Blisfeasance  may 
involve  the  omission  to  do  something  which 
ought  to  be  done,  as  where  an  agent  engaged 
In  the  performance  of  his  undertaking,  omits 
to  do  something  which  it  is  his  duty  to  do 
VBdcr  tho  dvcumslanoes,  as  when  he  does 
not  exaiclse  that  degree  of  care  which  due 
reganl  for  the  Tights  of  others  requires." 
Ovcntt  y.  Century  Bldg.  Co.,  00  S.  W.  1082, 
1068,  201  lao.  424,  8  Ia  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  929 
(quoting  and  adopting  deflnitlon  in  Olark  & 
Skyle%  Law  of  Agency,  |  609. 

MALICE 

See  Constsuetlye  Malice;  Espnm  Mal- 
ice; Implied  Malice;  Premeditated 
Malice;  Universal  MaHee;  With  Mal- 
ice Aforethought;  Without  Previoua 
MaUce. 

Absence  of,  see  Voluntary  Manslaughter. 

Implied  from  willful  or  willfully,  see 
Willful— WUlfully. 

As  known  to  the  law,  "maUce"  la  a 
wrongful  act  done  IntentionaUy,  without  just 
cause  or  excuse.  Lea  veil  v.  Leavell,  99  S.  W. 
460,  401,  122  Mo.  App.  654;  Hathaway  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.)  82  S.  W.  400,  402;  Oon- 
nell  V.  States  81  S.  W.  746.  747,  46  Tex.  Or. 
R.  259 ;  London  Guarantee  &  Accident  Co.  v. 
Horn,  69  N.  E.  626,  530,  206  111.  493,  99  Am. 
St  Rep.  186;  Schonwald  v.  Regains,  122 
Paa  203,  2U,  82  OU.  223,  80  L.  &.  A.  (N.  S.) 
864;  MdTadden  v.  Lane^  60  AtL  806,  367,  71 
N.  J.  Law,  624. 

<«Malice"  Is  not  necessarily  personal  hate 
or  ill  will,  but  la  a  state  of  mind  which  is 
reckless  of  law  and  the  legal  rights  of  dti- 
sens.  Bowles  v.  Lowery,  69  South.  606,  697, 
5  Ala.  App.  655. 

"Malice"  in  law  does  not,  as  is  generally 
understood,  meui  spite  or  ill  will,  but  means 
the  Intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful  act  Wil- 
liams T.  WUliams,  111  S.  W.  837,  888,  132 
Mo.  App.  200. 

An  instruction  defining  "malice"  as  the 
doing  of  a  wrongful  act  Intentionally  is  cor- 
rect Butdier  v.  HofTman,  78  S.  W.  266,  268, 
90  Mo.  App.  239. 

"'Malice'  has  always  been  divided  Into 
two  kinds:  Implied  malice,  or  malice  in  law, 
and  express  malice,  or  malice  in  fact"  Lau- 
der V.  Jones,  101  N.  W.  907,  915,  13  N.  D. 
525  (quoting  and  adopting  Gambrill  t.  School- 
ey,  52  Aa  500,  608,  95  Md.  260,  63  L.  R.  A. 
427). 

"MaUee"  la  not  necessarily  personal  hate, 
but  Is  rather  an  intent  and  dIapoaitiMi  to  do 
a  wrongful  act  greatly  Injurious  to  another. 
Chicago,  ft.  I.  4  P.  By.  Oo.  v.  Whltten,  119 
S.  W.  836,  837,  90  Ark.  462,  21  Ann.  Oas.  726. 

"MaUce"  oompcehenda  Ul  will,  a  wicked- 
nesB  of  (Hspoaitigp,  croelty«  cecklessness,  a 


^▲LIOE 


MALIOfi 


mind   regardleiss  of  social  duty.    Brett  r. 
State,  47  Soutb.  781,  783,  94  Miss.  669. 

"Malice"  is  the  expression  of  a  widted 
and  depraved  heart  and  mind  and  of  a  cruel 
disposition.  State  v.  Harmon  (Del.)  00  Atl. 
860-868,  4  Pennewill,  580. 

"Legal  malice*'  is  defined  as  an  act  grow- 
ing out  of  the  wicked  or  mischlerous  inten- 
tion of  the  mind;  an  act  showing  a  wanton 
inclination  to  mischief,  an  intention  to  injure 
or  wrong,  and  a  depraved  Inclination  to  dis- 
regard the  rights  of  others.  Morasca  v. 
Item  Co.,  52  South.  565,  560,  126  La.  420, 
30  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  315. 

"Malice"  in  a  trespass  need  not  be  HI 
will  or  hatred;  it  being  sufficient  that  the 
trespass  be  intentional  and  in  known  viola- 
tion of  the  owner's  rights.  Southern  Ry.  Go. 
V.  McEntire,  63  South.  158,  159.  109  Ala.  42. 

"Malice"  implies  wickedness,  or  the  will- 
ful and  intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful  act, 
without  just  cause  or  excuse,  and  is  implied 
from  an  unlawful  act,  willfully  done,  till  the 
contrary  is  shown.  State  v.  Murphy,  08  S. 
B.570,  80  8.  0.208. 

"Malice"  Is  Implied  by  law  from  every 
deliberate  cruel  act  committed  by  one  person 
against  another,  no  matter  how  sudden  such 
an  act  may  be,  as  the  law  construes  that  he 
who  does  a  cruel  act  voluntarily  does  it  ma- 
liciously. State  V.  Mills  (Del.)  09  Atl.  841, 
842,  0  Pennewill,  497. 

Hatred,  ill  will,  or  actual  malice  towards 
the  injured  party  is  not  a  necessary  ingredi- 
ent of  legal  malice  as  applied  to  torts,  nor 
is  it  necessary  that  the  act  complained  of 
proceed  from  a  spiteful,  malignant,  or  re- 
vengeful disposition.  If  it  be  wrongful,  un- 
lawful, and  intentional,  and  the  natural  and 
probable  result  of  the  act  is  to  accomplish 
the  injury  complained  of,  "malice"  is  im- 
plied. Flandermeyer  v.  Ooper,  98  N.  B.  102, 
108,  85  Ohio  St  327,  40  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  300, 
Ann.  Oas.  1913A,  983. 

"Legal  or  implied  malice,"  as  distin- 
guished from  ill  will  or  malice  in  the  vernacu- 
lar sense  of  the  word,  is  defined  to  be  the 
intentional  doing  of  a  wrong  act  without  just 
cause  or  excuse.  Ickenroth  v.  SL  Louis 
Transit  CJo.,  77  S.  W.  102,  100,  102  Mo.  App. 
597. 

Where  the  court  charged  that  "malice" 
meant  wickedness,  and  that,  when  a  man  did 
a  thing  with  a  malicious  heart,  it  meant  a 
heart  devoid  of  social  duty  and  fatally  bent 
on  mischief,  a  charge  defining  malice  as  the 
willful  and  intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful 
act  by  one  knowing  the  act  to  be  against  the 
law,  and  by  one  doing  it  willfully,  was  not 
objectionable  as  insufficiently  defining  "mal- 
ice." State  V.  Orosby,  70  S.  R  440,  442,  88 
S.  a98. 

"Malice,"  in  the  law,  means  the  inten- 
tional d(Hng  of  a>  wrongful  act  without  Justi- 


fication or  excoae.  A  ••wrongful  act,**  within 
the  meanfog  of  this  definition,  is  any  act 
which,  in  the  ordinary  course,  will  infringe 
upon  the  rights  of  another  to  his  damage,  ex- 
cept it  be  done  In  the  exercise  of  an  equal 
or  superior  right  Brennan  v.  United  Hatr 
ters  of  North  America,  Local  No.  17,  05  AtL 
105,  171,  73  N.  J.  Law,  729,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.) 
254,  118  Am.  St  Rep.  727,  9  Ann.  Oas.  098. 

"la  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4298,  'mal- 
ice' is  defined  as  follows:  'Malice,  in  com- 
mon acceptation,  means  ill  will  against  a  per- 
son; but  in  Its  legal  sense  it  means  a  wrong- 
ful act  done  intentionally  without  just  cause 
or  excuse.'  Bouvier  defines  malice  as  b^ng: 
*A  wicked. intention  to  do  an  injury.'  Web- 
ster defines  the  word  to  mean:  'Extreme  en- 
mity of  heart;  malevolence;  a  disposition  to 
injure  others  without  cause,  from  mere  per- 
sonal gratification,  or  from  a  spirit  of  re- 
venge,' etc"  I^nch  v.  People,  187  XU.  App. 
444,440. 

In  general  a  malicious  act  Involves  all 
that  is  usually  understood  by  the  term  "wUl- 
ful,"  and  is  further  marked  by  either  hatred 
or  ill  will  toward  the  party  injured  or  by 
such  utter  recklessnss  and  disregard  of  the 
rights  of  others  as  denotes  a  corrupt  or  ma- 
levolent disposition.  It  is  true  that  "malice" 
may  be  and  is  often  implied  or  presumed 
from  the  willfulness  of  the  wrongful  act 
State  V.  WilUng,  106  N.  W.  855,  850,  129 
Iowa,  72. 

"Lawful  competition  that  may  injure  the 
business  of  another,  even  though  successfully 
directed  to  driving  that  other  out  of  business, 
is  not  actionable.  Nor  would  competition  of 
one  set  of  men  against  ^another  set,  carried 
on  for  the  purpose  of  ga&,  even  to  the  extent 
of  intending  to  drive  from  business  that  oth- 
er set,  and  actually  accomplishing  that  re- 
sult, be  actionable  unless  there  was  actual 
malice.  'Malice,*  as  here  used,  does  not  mere- 
ly mean  intent  to  harm,  but  means  an  in- 
tent to  do  a  wrongful  harm  and  injury.  An 
intent  to  do  a  wrongful  harm  and  injury 
is  unlawful,  and,  if  a  wrongful  act  is  done  to 
the  detriment  of  the  right  of  another,  it  la 
malicious,  and  an  act  maliciously  done  with 
the  intent  and  purpose  of  injuring  another  is 
not  lawful  competition."  O'Brien  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Kellogg  Switchboard  &  Supply  Co.,  75 
N.  B.  108,  115,  210  111.  354,  108  Am.  St  Bep. 
219,  3  Ann.  Gas.  900  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Doremus  v.  Hennessy,  52  N.  E. 
924,  925,  170  lU.  008,  43  L.  R.  A.  797,  88  Am. 
St.  Rep.  203) ;  Everett  Waddey  CJo.  v.  Rich- 
mond Typographical  Union  No.  90,  53  S.  E. 
273,  270,  105  Va.  188,  5  L,  R.  A,  (N.  S.)  792, 
8  Ann.  Ca&  79a 

Whatever  is  done  willfully  and  purpose- 
ly, whether  the  motive  is  to  injure  accused,  to 
gain  some  advantage  to  prosecutor,  or 
through  mere  wantonness  or  carelessness,  if 
at  the  same  time  wrong  or  uiilawf  til  within 


MALICB 


223 


UA^m. 


tbe  kiipwl^dge  of  the  actor,  is  done  jnaUdons- 
ly,  and  personal  ill  will  or  decdre  for  revenge 
is  not  essential  to  the  existence  of  "malice." 
Gulsby  ▼.  Louisrille  ft  N.  R.  Co.,  62  South. 
382,  394,  ler  Ala.  122. 

"Malice/*  in  legal  proceedings,  does  not 
necessarily  mean  personal  111  will  or  spite. 
It  means  a  wrongful  act  done  intentionally 
without  Just  cause  or  excuse.  Pittsburg,  J., 
E.  &  E.  R.  Co.  y.  Wakefield  Hardware  Co., 
50  S.  E.  571,  573,  138  N.  0.  174,  3  Ann.  Oaa. 
720. 

An  instruction,  defining  legal  "malice"  as 
where  a  party  has  ill  will  toward  another, 
bad  feeling,  bad  blood,  something  of  that 
kind,  held  proper.  State  7.  Reeder,  61  S.  £. 
702,  703,  72  S.  C.  223. 

The  term  "malice,"  in  its  ordinary  sense, 
hnplies  hatred,  spite,,  or  ill  will ;  but  in  legal 
parlance  it  is  frequently  used  in  a  different 
sense,  depending  on  the  connection,  and  may 
mean  "a  wrongful  act  done  intentionally 
without  just  cause  or  excuse."  In  legal  par- 
lance, malice  "may  be  actually  implied  when- 
ever there  is  a  deliberate  intention  to  do  a 
grleTous  wrong  without  legal  Justification  or 
excuse.  In  ciyil  controversies,  the  very  es- 
sence of  malice  is  a  disposition  or  willful- 
ness to  do  a  wrongful  act  greatly  injurious 
to  another."  Kavanaugh  v.  Mclntyre,  112  N. 
Y.  S.  ©87,  990,  128  App.  Div.  722  (quoting  5 
Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4298  et  seq.). 

Any  malice  w^ich  is  an  ingredient  in 
a  tort  consisting  of  an  act  the  direct  object 
of  which  is  to  injure  another's  property  is 
malice  in  law;  that  is,  the  intent  to  injure, 
as  distinguished  from  the  intent  to  do  an 
act  which  may  incidentally  injure.  Albro  J. 
Newton  Co.  v.  Erickson,  126  N.  T.  Supp.  949, 
953,  70  Misc.  Rep.  291. 

"Malice"  in  common  acceptation  means 
ill  will  against  a  person,  but  in  its  legal  sense 
it  means  a  wrongful  act,  done  int^itionally, 
without  Just  cause  or  excuse.  .  McGu^k  v. 
Cronenwett,  85  N.  E.  576,  577,  199  Mass.  457, 
19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)   561. 

The  term  "malice,^'  as  used  la  Hurd's 
Rev.  St  1905,  c.  72,  S  2,  authorizing  the  dis- 
charge of  persons  arrested  in  civil  actions 
except  when  '^malice"  is  of  the  gist  of  the  ac- 
tion, signifies  a  wrong  inflicted  on  another 
with  an  evil  intent  or  purpose.  Kellar,  Et- 
tinger  &  Fink  t.  Norton,  &L  N.  S.  1087,  1036, 
228111.  366. 

''Malice"'  excludes  passion,  and  passion 
presupposes  the  absence  of  malice.  State  v. 
Edmunds,  104  N.  W.  1115,  1116,  20  S.  D.  135. 

"By  'malice'  or  'malicious' .  is  meant  a 
wish  or  desire  to  vex,  harass,  or  annoy  an* 
other."  Kerley  V.  Qerinscheid,  106  N.  W.  136, 
137,  20  8.  D,  3^. 

"Malice^  -arises  troxn  the  yokintary  do- 
ing or  saving  something  without  Just  cause  or 
acuse,,  whi<di.  If^  Hktiif  to  inj.ure  another,  and 


which  jShows  a.  spirit  lacking  in  proper  re- 
gard for  social  duty  and  the  rights  of  others, 
even  when  said  or  done  without  particular 
ill  wiU.  Israel  v.  Israel,  84  S.  W.  453,  456, 
109  Mo.  App.  366. 

In  an  action  of  tort,  an  instruction  de- 
fining "malice"  as  "the  doing  of  any  act"  in- 
jurious to  another  without  Just  cause  is  er- 
roneous for  omitting  the  word  "intentional" 
before  the  word  "doing."  Hanley  v.  Blandino 
(Tex.)  89  S.  W.  1108,  U09. 

To  make  the  conduct  of  a  fraternal  as- 
sociation, in  expelling  a  member,  actionably 
malicious  it  is  not  necessary  that  "malice" 
in  the  sense  of  hatred  or  ill  will,  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant  toward  appellant,  be  shown. 
"Malice"  in  such  case  would  be  sufficiently 
shown  if  it  were  proven  that  they  acted 
knowingly  apd  willfully  in  the  violation  of 
the  rights  of  appellant  and  to  his  injury. 
Thompson  v.  Grand  International  Brother- 
hood of  Locomotive  Engineers,  91  S.  W.  834, 
839,  41  Tex.  Civ.  App.  176. 

"Malice,"  as  usually  understood,  has  its 
foundation  in  ill  will,  and  is  evidenced  by  an 
attempt  wrongfully  to  vex,  injure,  or  ahnoy 
another.  This  is  "malice  in  fact,"  and  is  that 
referred  to  in  Pen.  Code,  §  7,  subd.  4,  declar- 
ing that  the  words  "malice"  and  "malicious- 
ly" Import  a  wish  to  vex,  annoy,  or  injure  an- 
other person.  There  is  another  sort  of  mal- 
ice, the  presumption  of  the  existence  of  which 
isi  raJbed  by  the  law  in  certain  cases  on  cer- 
tain proofs,  and  this  is  the  malice  described 
in  the  same  section  as  "an  intent  to  do  a 
wrongful  act,  established  either  by  proof  or 
presumption  of  law."  This  is  a  malice  of 
pleading  and  proof  made  necessary  hy  the 
exigencies  of  definitions  of  offenses  against 
the  law,  and  may  exist  with  malice  in  fact, 
but  may  also  exist  independent  thereof,  and 
in  some  instances  is  conclusively  presumed 
against  a  defendant,  while  in  others  the  pre- 
sumption is  rebuttable.  Davis  v.  Heatst,  116 
Paa  680,  537,  160  Cal.  143. 

As  Jnstlfyias  pwdtlre  damages 

I^egal  malice,  as  distinguished  from  actu- 
al malice,  will  Justify  an  awa;cd  of  punitive 
damages.  The  "malice"  which  would  Justify 
an  award  of  punitive  damages  merely  implies 
the  intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful  act  with- 
out Just  cause  or  excuse,  Lamport  v.  Judge 
&  Dolph  Drug  Co.,  141  S.  W.  1095,  1098,  238 
Mo.  409.  37  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  533,  Ann.  Cas. 
1913A,  351. 

"Blalice"  essential  to  justify  pnnitlve 
damages  does  not  mean  ill  will  against  a  per- 
son, but  a  wrongful  act  done  intentionally 
and  without  Just  cause  is  done  with  malice. 
McMiUen  v.  Blder,  140  S.  W.  917,  919,  160 
Mo.  App.  399. 

S3xemplary  damages  are  allowed  in  en- 
hancement merely  of  ordinary  damages,  the 
propriety  of  allowing  the  same  depending  en- 


MAlilOR 


iu 


MALICA 


tirely  on  the  malice  or  wantomieflt  of  tb%  de- 
fendant, '*mallce"  In  thBt  nense  meaning  not 
general  malice,  nor  malice  exhibited  in  other 
matters  or  at  other  times,  but  malice  in  the 
very  matter  he  ia  found  liable  for.  Moore  t. 
Duke,  80  AtL  194,  197,  84  Y  L  401. 

The  term  "malice,"  as  used  in  tiie  rule 
that,  wherever  an  injury  complained  of  had 
been  inflicted  with  malice  or  wantonly  and 
with  circumstances  of  contumely  or  indig- 
nity, the  Jury  are  not  limited  to  the  ascer- 
tainment of  a  simple  comp^raatlon  for  the 
wrong  committed  against  the  aggrieved  per- 
son, is  not  merely  the  doing  of  an  unlawful 
or  injurious  act,  but  the  word  implies  that 
the  act  complained  of  was  conceired  in  a  q^ir- 
it  of  mischief  or  a  criminal  indifference  to 
eivil  obligation*  Philadelphia*  B.  ft  N.  B. 
Go.  y.  Qreen,  71  Atl.  966,  989,  UO  Md.  32. 

In  order  to  Justify  the  imputation  of 
"malice,"  within  the  rule  of  punitiye  dam- 
ages, the  injury  must  have  been  oonceiVed  in 
a  spirit  of  mischief  and  partake  of  a  crim- 
inal or  wanton  nature.  Baxter  y.  Campbell, 
97  N.  W.  386,  387,  17  S.  D.  475. 

For  the  purpose  of  determining  wheth- 
er exemplary  damages  are  properly  allowed, 
the  word  '^malice"  means  that  tiie  act  done 
must  hare  been  without  right  or  justiilable 
cause.  Smith  y.  Morgautown  Ice  Ck>.,  74  S. 
E.  961,  963,  159  N.  <3.  151. 

"Malice,"  in  2  «ap.  ft  L.  Law  Diet  p. 
784,  is  defined  as  follows:  *  'Malice,'  in  com- 
mon acceptation,  means  ill  will  against  a 
person;  but,  in  its  legal  sense,  it  means  a 
wrongful  act  done  intentionally,  without  Just 
cause  or  excuse."  In  2  Bony.  Law  Diet 
(Bawle^s  Ed.)  p.  296,  it  is  defined  as  fol- 
lows: "A  malicious  act  is  a  wrongful  act 
intentionally  done  without  cause  or  excuse." 
In  defining  "malicious,"  Black,  in  his  Law 
Dictionary  (page  746),  says:  "Byincing  mal- 
ice; done  with  malice  and  an  evil  design; 
wiUfuL"  An  instniction  that  "by  'mali- 
cious,* as  used  in  this  instruction,  is  meant 
a  doing  of  •  the  wrongful  act  without  legal 
right"  was  wrong  as  authorizing  exemplary 
damages  fbr  any  entry  without  legal  right 
on  the  premises  of  another.  The  instruction 
should  have  used  the  word  "intentional." 
Ohio  Valley  Tel.  Oo.  v.  Meyer  (Ky.)  56  S.  W. 
678,  674. 

In  an  action  by  a  street  car  passenger 
for  injuries  caused  by  an  assault  by  the  con- 
ductor, the  charge  that,  if.  the  jury  found 
for  plaintiff,  then,  in  assessing  damages,  they 
were  not  limited  to  physical  injury  inflicted, 
if  any,  but  in  addition  thereto,  if  they  found 
that  the  wrongful  acts  of  the  conductor  were 
"malicious"  (t  e,  the  intentional  doing  of 
a  wrongful  act  without  eauae  or  excuse), 
they  might  allow  sudi  punitive  damages  as 
would  be  a  punishment  and  a  wholesome 
warning  to  others,  in  the  absence  of  a  re- 
quest fbr  a  more  specfflc  instruction  on  t3ie 
measure  of  damages^  was  not  objectibnable  as 


misleading.     Mlllk  v.  MetifopeHtan  8t  Ity. 
Co.,  137  S.  W.  1006»  1007,  157  ICo.  App-  529. 
la  sUeMAtUa  of  afleetieM 

"The  term  'malice,'  as  applied  to  torts, 
does  not  necessarily  mean  that  whi4fli  must 
proceed  from  a  spiteful,  malignant,  or  re- 
vengeful disposition,  but  a  conduct  injurious 
to  another,  though  proceeding  from  an  ill- 
regulated  mind,  not  sufficiently  cautious  be- 
fore it  occasions  an  injury  to  another." 
Hence  the  law  implies  malice,  where  de- 
fendant unwarrantedly  alienated  the  affec- 
tions of  plaintiiTs  husband.  SIckler  v.  Man- 
nix,  93  N.  W.  1018,  68  Neb.  21  (citing  Weck- 
erly  v.  G^er  [Pa.]  11  Serg.  &  R.  89). 

In  an  action  for  alienation  of  a  wife's 
affections,  the  term  "malice"  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  tbut  wldch  must  proceed  from 
a  spiteful,  malignant,  or  revengeful  dispo- 
sition, but;  if  the  conduct  was  unjustiflable 
and  actually  caused  the  injury,  malice  in 
law  will  be  implied.  Bolaad  v.  Stanley,  115 
S.  W.  163,  166,  88  Ark.  562,  129  Am.  St  Repi 
114. 

Xb  iMULkraptey  act 

The  provision  of  the  bankruptcy  act,  ex- 
cepting from  the  operation  of  a  discharge 
Judgments  for  ''malicious  injuries,"  etc,  con- 
templates something  more  restricted  tban 
"malice"  in  the  broader  sense.  Flanders  v. 
Mullin,  66  AtL  789,  80  Vt  124,  12  Ann.  Gas. 
1010. 

The  term  "malicious,**  as  used  in  Bankr. 
Act  July  1,  1898,  c  541,  |  17,  30  Stat  550, 
providing  that  a  discharge  in  bankruptcy 
shall  relieve  the  banjcrupt  from  all  his  prov- 
able debts,  except  Judgments  in  actions  for 
willful  and  malicious  injuries  to  the  person 
or  property  of  another,  means  nothing  more 
than  that  disregard  of  duty  which  is  involv- 
ed in  the  intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful 
act  to  the  injury  of  another.  McOhristal  r. 
Glisbee,  76  N.  &  611,  190  Mass.  120,  3  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  702,  5  Ann.  Ca&  769. 

The  word  'NHllful,''  as  used  in  Bankr. 
Act  July  1,  1898,  c  541,  t  IT,  as  amended 
by  Act  Feb.  5,  1968,  a  487,  |  5,  82  Stat  796 
(IT.  S.  Oomp.  St  Sopp.  1907,  p,  1026),  provid- 
ing that  a  disciiarge  in  bankruptcy  shall  re- 
lieve the  bankrupt  from  all  pirowble  debts 
exc^  liabUHieB  for  obtaining  property  bf 
false  pretenses,  or  iklse  representsrtbons,  or 
for  "wlllfal  and  malidlbus^  injuries  to  the 
person  or  property  of  another,  means  nothing 
ntore  than  intentional;  wUle  the  word  "msl- 
ioe,"  as  there  used,  is  intended  to  ioqdy 
nothing  more  than  a  disregard  of  duty  whlcb 
is  involved  in  the  intentional  doing  of  a  will- 
ful act  to  the  injury  of  another.  fi!avanaugb 
V.  Mclntyre,  112  N.  Y.  Supift.  087,  990,  128 
App.  0iv.  722. 

Where  a  lessee  assigned  his  lease  to  Us 
wifb  with  the  consent  of  the  landlord,  and 
the  landlord  subsequently  instituted  summt- 
ry  proceedings  to  dispossess  tHe  lessee' witb- 


MALIOB 


MALICS 


out  making  the  wife  n  parky,  and  nndet 
the  judgment  of  dispossession  ttie  landlord, 
through  agents,  took  possession  of  the  prem- 
ises and  removed  the  wife's  property  and  for- 
cibly removed  the  wife,  a  judgment  for  the 
wife  for  damages  for  the  actf^.of  the  land- 
lord was  based  on  "willful*'  and  "malicious*' 
acts,  within  Bankruptcy  Act  July  1,  1888,  c. 
541,  S  17,  providing  that  a  discharge  in  bank- 
ruptcy does  not  release  the  bankrupt  from 
judgments  for  willful  and  malicious  injuries 
to  the  person  or  property  of  another;  the 
word  "wiUfnl"  meaning  nothing  more  than 
^tentional,"  and  the  word  "maUoe^*  in  its 
legal  sense  meaning  a  wrongful  act  done  in- 
tentionally,  without  just  cause  or  excuse. 
In  re  Munro,  196  Fed.  817,  828  (citing  5 
Words  and  Phrases,  pp.  42d8-4312). 

"Malice,  in  common  acceptation,  means 
ill  will  against  a  person;  but  in  its  legal 
sense  it  means  a  wrongful  act,  done  inten- 
tioDally,  without  just  cause  or  excuse.  If  I 
give  a  perfect  stranger  a  blow  likely  to  pro- 
duce death,  I  do  it  of  malice,  because  I  do 
it  intentionally  and  without  just  cause  or 
excuse.  If  I  malm  cattle  without  knowing 
whose  they  are,  If  I  poison  a  fishery  without 
knowing  the  owner,  I  do  it  of  malice^  be- 
cause it  is  a  wrongful  act  and  done  inten- 
tionally. If  I  am  arraigned  of  felony  and 
willfully  stand  mute,  I  am  said  to  do  It  of 
malice,  because  it  is  intentional  and  without 
Just  cause  or  excuse.  If  I  traduce  a  man, 
whether  I  know  him  or  not,  and  whether  I 
intend  to  do  him  an  injury  or  not,  I  appre- 
hend the  law  considers  it  as  done  of  malice, 
because  it  is  wrongful  and  InteotionaL  It 
equally  works  an  injury,  whether  I  meant 
to  produce  an  injury  or  not."  The  law  will 
imply  that  degree  of  malice  in  an  act  of 
criminal  conversation  which  is  sufficient  to 
bring  a  judgment  for  damages  therefor  with- 
in the  exception  mentioned  in  Bankr.  Act 
Jnly  1,  1898,  c.  541,  S  17,  subd.  2,*  80  Stat 
650,  declaring  that  judgments  for  willful 
and  malicious  Injuries  to  the  person  or  prop- 
erty of  another  shall  be  exempted  from  a 
discharge  in  bankruptcy.  Tinker  v.  Colwell, 
24  Sup.  Ct  505,  606,  193  U.  S.  473,  48  L.  Ed. 
751 

Ib  erttnliial  law 

"Malice"  is  an  essential  Ingredient  of 
the  crime  of  murder  of  either  degree,  and  It 
is  a  condition  of  the  mind  or  heart,  not  be- 
ing restricted  to  spite  or  malevolence  toward 
the  particular  person  slain,  but  also  includ- 
ing that  general  malignity  and  reckless  dis- 
regard of  human  life  whidi  proceed  from  a 
heart  void  of  a  just  sense  of  social  duty  and 
ffttally  bent  on  mischief.  State  v.  Underbill 
(Del.)  ^AU.  880, 882,  6  Pennewill,  491;  State 
V.  Wiggins  (DeL)  76  Atl.  632,  684,  7  Penne- 
wiU,  127;  State  v.  Brown  (DeL)  61  Atl.  1077, 
1078,  5  Pennewill,  389;  State  v.  Watson 
a>eL)  82  AtL  1086,  1087;  State  v.  Tilghman 
Qkl)  63  AtL  772,  773,  6  Pennewill,  44;  State 

3  WDS.&  P.2D  SSB.— 15 


V.  Jdhns  (Det)  66  AIL  763,  TSi,  f  PmiifewlU, 
174;  Stote  v.  Honey  (Del.)  65  AtL  764^66, 
6  Pennewill,  148;  State  v.  PoweU  (Del.)  61 
AtL  966,  971,  5  Pennewill,  24 ;  SUte  v.  Brown 
(Del.)  80  Atl.  146,  149,  2  Boyce,  406;  State 
V.  Bell  Pel.)  62  AtL  147,  148,  .5  Pennewill, 
192;  Stete  v.  Roberts  (DeL)  78  Atl.  305,  309, 
2  Boyce,  140;  Stete  v.  Russo  pel.)  77  Aa 
743,  745,  1  Boyce,  538;  State  v.  Reese  (DeL) 
79  Atl.  217,  220,  2  Boyce,  434;  Stete  v.  Todd, 
92  S.  W.  674,  676,  194  Mo.  377;  Stete  v.  Mc- 
Oarver,  92  8.  W.  684,  686,  194  Mo.  717. 

•*l&[aUce*'  is  the  ingredient  that  cbarao- 
torizes  murder,  and  distinguishes  It  from 
homicide  of  other  grades.  It  is  express  when 
admitted  or  asserted,  or  may  be  impUed  from 
any  unlawful  acte  of  the  assailant  which  In 
iteelf  denotes  a  wicked  heart  fatelly  bent  on 
mischief,  or  a  reckless  disregard  of  human 
Ufe.  Stete  V.  De  Paolo  (Del.)  84  Aa  213, 
214. 

In  criminal  law  "malice"  may  denote 
that  condition  of  the  mlnd'^hlch  is  manifest- 
ed by  the  intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful  act 
without  just  cause  or  excuse.  Alt  v.  Stete^ 
129  N.  W.  432,  436,  88  Neb.  259,  36  U  B.  A. 
(N.  fl.)  1212. 

"MaUce,"  as  used  In  the  law  of  homicide, 
means  a  wrongAil  act  done  Intentionally 
without  just  cause  or  excuse.  Stete  ▼.  Kin- 
der, 83  8.  W.  964,  969,  184  Mo.  276. 

'*MaUce*'  is  a  deliberate  Intention  unlaw- 
fully to  take  human  life.  Robinson  ▼.  State, 
68  8.  B.  642,  848,  129  (H.  886. 

Legal  "malice"  is  the  Intent  unlawfully  to 
teke  human  life  in  cases  where  the  law  nei- 
ther mitigates  nor  justifies  the  killing.  Mann 
V.  Stete,  53  S.  B.  324,  326,  124  Ga.  760,  4  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  934 ;  Tucker  v.  Same,  66  8.  D. 
250,  251,  133  Ga.  470. 

"Malice,"  which  is  a  necessary  element  of 
murder  in  the  first  and  second  degrees,  means 
a  killing  without  legal  excuse,  and  is  pre- 
sumed from  kllllDg  with  a  deadly  weapon. 
Stete  V.  Roberson.  64  8.  B.  182,  186, 150  N.  C. 
837. 

The  law  Implies  malice,  where  there  is  a 
homldde  with  a  deadly  weapon,  and  there 
are  no  c&rcumstanees  of  mitigation,  justifica- 
tion, or  excuse.  Glardy  ▼.  Stete,  131  8.  W. 
46»  47,  96  Ark.  62. 

"Malice,"  in  homicide.  Is  a  condition  of 
the  mind  or  heart,  and  is  not  restricted  to 
spite  or  malevolence  toward  decedent,  and  in- 
cludes that  general  malignity  and  reckless 
disregard  of  human  life  which  proceeds  from 
a  heart  fatelly  bent  on  mischief.  Stete  v. 
Brooks  (Del.)  84  Aa  225.  227. 

"MaUce,"  legally  speaking,  in  relation  to 
murder,  Is  a  conscious  violation  of  law  to 
the  prejudice  of  another ;  evil  design  in  gen- 
eral ;  the  dlctetes  of  a  wicked,  depraved,  and 
maUgnant  heart  United  States  v.  Hart,  162 
Fed.  192, 194.    ' 


UAXslOE 


HAhicm 


/::  .  Tbfmgti  one's  beatt  omy  be  tpfji  of  sIb, 
jit  Is  not  legally  malicious^  unless  it  prompts 
tbe  willful  or  Intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful 
act  witbont  Just  cause  or  excuse.  State  t. 
Ferguson,  74  S.  B.  602,  005,  91  8.  G.  235. 

"Legal  malice,"  as  applied  to  bomidde, 
Is  not  HI  will  or  batred,  but  is  an  unlawful 
intention  to  kill  witbout  Justification  or  miti- 
gation existing  at  tbe  time  of  killing.  Tbe 
intention  need  not  exist  for  any  lengtb  of 
time  before  tbe  killing,  and  a  man  may  form 
tbe  intention  to  kill,  do  tbe  killing  instant- 
ly, and  regret  tbe  deed  as  soon  as'  done. 
Long  y.  State,  66  S.  E.  444.  446,  127  6a.  350 
(citing  Bailey  v.  State,  70  6a.  617  [29]; 
Weeks  v.  State,  3  S.  £.323  [4],  79  6a.  87). 

"Malice,"  in  bomidde,  includes  not  only 
anger,  batred,  and  revenge,  but  every  otber 
unlawful  and  unjustifiable  motive.  Malice 
is  not  confined  to  ill  will  towards  an  individ- 
ual, but  is  intended  to  denote  an  action  flow- 
ing from  any  wicked  and  corrupt  motive,  a 
tbing  done  witb  a  wicked  mind,  wbere  tbe 
fact  bas  been  attended  witb  sucb  circum- 
stances as  evince  plain  indications  of  a  beart 
regardless  of  social  duty  and  fatally  bent  on 
miscbief.  Malice  is  implied  from  any  delib- 
erate or  cruel  act  against  anotber,  however 
sudden,  wbicb  sbows  an  abandoned  and  ma- 
lignant beart  Parsons  v.  People,  76  N.  E. 
993,  996,  218  IlL  386. 

"Malice"  in  law  does  not  necessarily 
mean  bate  or  ill  will,  but  is  tbat  mental  con- 
dition wbicb  prompts  tbe  willful  doing  of  an 
unlawful  act;  and  so,  in  a  prosecution  for 
killing  an  ofilcer,  an  instruction  tbat  if  tbe 
accused,  being  subject  to  arrest,  merely  kill- 
ed tbe  ofilcer  to  escape  arrest  tbe  killing  is 
malicious,  is  proper.  McGuflin  v.  State  (Ala.) 
59Soutb.  635,636. 

"Malice"  in  common  acceptation  means  ill 
will  against  a  person,  but  in  its  legal  sense 
it  means  a  wrongful  act  done  intentionally 
witbout  Just  cause  or  excuse.  Bromage  v. 
Prosser,  10  E.  0.  L.  321.  In  law  "malice" 
is  a  term  of  art,  importing  wickedness,  and 
excluding  a  Just  cause  or  excuse.  State  v. 
Doig  (S.  G.)  2  Rich.  182.  Tbere  can  be  no 
doubt  tbat  malice  is  presumed  from  an  inten- 
tional killing,  tn  tbe  absence  of  facts  or  cir- 
cumstances in  evidence  tending  to  sbow  want 
of  malice.  State  v.  McDaniel,  47  S.  E.  384, 
387,  68  S.  C.  304,  102  Am.  St  Rep.  661. 

"Malice"  is  not  restricted  to  spite  or 
malevolence  toward  tbe  deceased  in  particu- 
lar, but  in  its  legal  sense  it  is  understood  to 
mean  the  general  malignity  and  recklessness 
of  tbe  lives  and  personal  safety  of  others, 
which  proceed  from  a  heart  void  of  a  Just 
sense  of  social  duty  and  fatally  bent  on  mis- 
chief. Malice  is  implied  by  law  from  every 
deliberate,  cruel  act  colnmitted  by  one  per- 
son against  anotber,  no  matter  bow  sudden 
.such  act  may  be ; .  for  the  law  considers  that 
be  who  does  a  cruel  act  voluntarily  does  it 


malidouidy.    State  v.  Brinte:(I>el;)  68  Aa 
^58,  262,  4  Pennewill,  551. 

In  the  statute  declaring  it  murder  in  the 
first  degree  for  any  person  to  purposely  and 
in  bis  deliberate  and  premeditated  malice 
kill  another,  "malice"  is  not  confined  to  ill 
will  toward  an  individual,  but  it  is  intended 
to  denote  an  action  flowing  from  any  wicked 
and  corrupt  motive.  A  thing  done  with  a 
wicked  mind,  and  attended  with  such  drcum- 
stances  as  plainly  indicate  a  heart  regardless 
of  social  duties  and  fully  bent  on  miscbiet 
indicates  malice,  within  tbe  meaning  of  the 
law.  Malice  may  be  either  expressed  or  im- 
plied. Express  malice  may  appear  from  all 
the  evidence  and  circumstances  of- the  alleged 
killing.  ImpUed  malice  may  appear  where 
there  is  no  Just  cause  or  excuse  of  tbe  al- 
leged killing.  State  v.  Undgrind,  74  Pac. 
565,  566,  33  Wash.  440. 

"MaUce,"  which  is  a  condition  of  the 
mind,  and  is  not  restricted  to  spite  or  malev- 
olence toward  a  particular  person,  but  in- 
cludes general  malignity  and  reckless  disre* 
gard  of  human  life,  is  an  essential  to  the 
crime  of  murder.  State  v.  Short  (DeL)  82 
Atl.  239,  241,  2  Boyce,  491. 

"'Malice'  in  homicide  does  not  mean 
mere  spite  or  ill  will,  as  generally  under- 
stood, but  signifies  an  unlawful  state  of  the 
mind,  and  such  state  of  the  mind  as  one  is 
in  who  intentionally  does  an  unlawful  act." 
State  v.  Brown,  79  S.  W.  1111,  1112.  181  Mo. 
192. 

"Malice,"  in  homicide  "does  not  mean 
mere  spite  or  ill  will,  as  it  is  ordinarily  un- 
derstood, but  means  tbat  condition  of  the 
mind  which  prompts  one  person  to  take  the 
life  of  another  without  Just  cause  or  Justi- 
fication, and  it  signifies  a  state  or  disposi- 
tion which  shows  a  heart  regardless  of  so- 
cial duties  and  fatally  bent  on  miscbiet" 
State  V.  Atchley,  84  S.  W.  984,  989,  186  Mo. 
174. 

"  *Malice'  is  a  condition  of  tbe  mind  or 
heart."  As  used  in  the  definition  of  murder, 
the  term  is  not  restricted  to  spite  or  malevo- 
lence toward  the  particular  person  slain,  but 
includes  that  reckless  disregard  of  human 
life  which  proceeds  from  a  heart  void  of  a 
Just  sense  of  social  duty  and  fatally  bent  on 
mischief.  Wherever  the  fatal  act  is  done  de- 
liberately or  without  adequate  cause,  tbe  law 
presumes  that  it  was  done  with  "maUce," 
and  the  burden  is  on  the  prisoner  to  show 
that  the  act  was  not  so  done.  State  v.  Powell 
(Del.)  61  Atl.  966,  971,  5  Pennewill,  24. 

"Malice,"  in  law,  is  manifested  by  the  in- 
tentional doing  of  a  wrongful  act  to  tbe  in- 
Jury  of  another,  without  Just  cause  or  ex- 
cuse; and  in  tbe  law  of  homicide  It  may 
mean  either  an  intent  to  do  either  serious 
bodily  barm  or  to  take  life.  State  v.  SUverio, 
76  Atl.  1069,  1072.  T9  N.  J.  Law,  482. 

"Malice"  is  the  chief  and  disthiguish- 
ing  chacacteristic  of  murder,  is  either  express 


MALICB 


227 


MAIiIOB 


or  implied,  sod  may  be  proven  by  a  deliber- 
ately fonned  design  to  kill,  by  tiie  prepara* 
tion  of  tbe  weapon  or  other  means  for  doing 
great  bodUy  harm,  by  drcunstances  of  bra- 
tality  attending  tbe  act,  or  by  previous  hos- 
tility, or  threats  and  dedazatlons  of  Inten- 
tion to  kill,  or  to  do  serious  Injnry.  Bster- 
Une  V.  State,  66  AU.  269,  270,  105  Md.  629. 

The  ''malice"  ess^itlal  to  constitute 
murder  Is  not  restricted  to  spite  or  malevo- 
lence towards  decedent,  but  means  that  gener- 
al malignity  or  recklessness  which  proceeds 
from  a  heart  devoid  of  a  jnst  sense  of  social 
dnty  and  fittaUy  bent  on  mischief,  and  Is  tan- 
plied  by  law  from  every  deliberate  cmel  act 
committed  by  one  person  against  another; 
and  where  the  act  from  which  death  ensues 
asypears  prima  fade  to  have  been  committed 
deliberately,  the  law  presumes  that  it  was 
done  in  malice,  and  accused  must  show  that 
the  offense  is  of  a  mitigated  character  and 
does  not  amount  to  murder.  State  v.  Black- 
Jmrn  (Del.)  75  Ati.  636,  539,  7  Pennewlll,  479. 

Undor  the  statute  making  any  person 
who  wllifull/  and  xnalidously  bums  any 
dwelling  house,  etc.,  guilty  of  arson,  etc^  the 
malice  Intended  by  the  law  signifies  the  In- 
tent from  which  flows  the  unlawful  act.  com- 
mitted without  legal  Justification ;  and  when 
the  act  constituting  the  attempt  is  proved 
to  have  been  done,  and  to  have  been  done  will- 
fully, it  is  then  Inferred  to  have  been  done 
maliciously.  State  v,  Lockwood  (Del.)  74  Atl. 
2,  3, 1  Boyce,  28. 

The  ''malice"  which  would  mftke  an  act 
murder  may  be  proved  by  direct  evidence,  or 
may  be  implied  from  any  unlawful  act,  in- 
dicating a  wicked  heart  bent  on  mlsehlet  or 
a  reckless  disregard  of  human  life,  such  as  the 
deliberate  selection  and  use  of  a  deadly  weap- 
on.   State  T.  Jackson  (DeL)  82  Atl.  824,  825. 

In  a  prosecution  for  murder,  "malice" 
may  be  implied  from  any  unlawful  act  denot- 
ing a  wicked  heart  bent  on  mischief,  and  so 
tbe  deliberate  selection  and  use  of  a  deadly 
weapon  upon  another  is  evidence  of  malice. 
State  V.  Stockley  (DeL)  83  AU«  1078,  1079. 

Where  a  killing  is  accomplished  with  a 
deadly  weapon,  malice  is  presumed,  In  the  ab- 
sence of  evidence  to  the  contrary.  State  v. 
Primrose  (Del.)  77  AtL  717,  719,  2  Boyce, 
164;  Same  v.  Busso  (DeL)  77  Aa  743,  745,  1 
Boyce.  638. 

Wherever  murder  Is  done  deliberately  or 
without  adequate  cause,  the  law  presumes 
tbat  it  was  done  with  malice;  and  the 
burden  is  on  the  prisoner  to  show  that  the  act 
was  not  malicious.  State  v.  Brown  (Del.) 
80  Aa  146,  149,  2  Boyce,  405;  Same  v.  Bell 
(DeL)  62  Aa  147,  148,  5  PennewlU,  192; 
Same  v.  Primrose  (Del.)  77  AtL  717,  719, 
2  Boyce,  164;  Same  v.  Roberts  (DeL)  78  Atl. 
305,  309,  2  Boyce,  140 ;  Same  v.  Busso  (DeL) 
77  Aa  743,  745r  1  Boyce,  538. 


^'MaHoe,"  essential  to  murder  of  the  sec- 
ond degree,  is  implied  by  law  from  every  un- 
lawful and  cruel  act  committed  by  one  person 
against  another,  so  that,  where  the  killing  is 
done  with  a  deadly  weapon  likely  to  produce 
death  it  Is  presumed  to  have  been  done 
maliciously.  State  v.  Roberts  (DeL)  78  Atl. 
305,  310,  2  Boyce,  14a 

"Malice,**  in  the  law  of  homicide,  is  a 
condition  of  the  mind  or  heart,  which  may  be 
shown  by  the  deliberate  selection  and  use  of 
a  deadly  weapon,  or  by  antecedent  menaces 
or  threats,  such  as  disclose  a  purpose  on  the 
part  of  accused  to  commit  the  act  charged. 
Malice,  in  the  law  of  homicide,  may  be  im- 
plied from  any  unlawful  act,  such  as  in  it- 
self denotes  a  wl<^ed  heart  fatally  bent  <m 
mischief,  or  a  reckless  disregard  of  human 
life,  mr  from  an  act  from  which  death  ensues, 
unaccompanied  by  dzeumstances  of  Justifica- 
tion, excuse,  or  mitigatton,  and  on  such  act 
b^ng  shown  it  is  incumbent  on  accused  to 
show  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  that  tbe 
killing  was  not  malicious.  State  v.  Johnson 
(IM.)  78  Aa  606,  6061  2  Boyce,  48. 

"Malice"  may  be  implied  when  an  act 
which  produces  death  is  attended  by  such 
circumstances  as  are  the  ordinary  symptoms 
of  a  wicked  and  depraved  spirit,  or  from  atp 
tending  circumstances  of  atrocity  and  cruel- 
ty, or  ftom  the  unlawful  use  of  a  deadly  weap- 
on; and,  where  an  unlawful  homicide  Is 
shown  and  no  circumstances  of  mitigation 
or  excuse  appear,  malice  win  be  presumed. 
State  V.  Kritchman  (Conn.)  79  Atl.  75,  77. 

"Under  Pen.  Code,  art  4,  I  7,  defining 
tbe  werds  'malice^  and  'malieiously'  as  im- 
porting a  wish  to  veac,  anm>y,  or  injure 
another  person,  or  an  intent  to  do  a  wrongful 
act  established  eiaer  by  proof  or  presump- 
tion of  law,"  where  a  defendant  was  on  trial 
for  assault  in  the  first  degree,  the  crime  in- 
volved a  specific  intent  as  the  gist  of  the  of- 
fense, and  it  was  error  for  ae  court  to 
Instruct  aat,  when  an  unlawful  act  is  shown 
to  have  been  deliberately  committed  for  ae 
purpose  of  injuring  another,  it  is  presumed 
to  have  been  committed  with  a  malicious  and 
guilty  intent,  and  the  law  presumes  that  a 
person  intends  the  ordinary  consequences  of 
any  voluntary  act  committed  by  him.  State 
V.  Schaefer,  88  Pac.  792,  793,  35  Mont  217. 

A  charge  defining  murder  substantially 
as  it  is  defined  in  Pen.  Code,  S  188,  and  stat- 
ing that  malice  does  not  necessarily  mean 
that  the  accused  must  have  entertained  to- 
ward the  deceased  feelings  of  spite,  hatred, 
or  ill  will,  but  that  the  word  meant  more 
under  the  statute,  and  that  there  might  be 
legal  malice  where  there  was  no  spite  or 
hatred  or  ill  wUl,  and  explaining  that  an 
unlawful  act  done  Intentionally,  without 
just  cause  or  excuse^  is  an  act,  in  the  con- 
templation of  law,  done  with  malice  as  that 
word  is  understood  in  criminal  judicature, 


MAUQB 


228 


MALICB 


was  not  Brroneona.    People  r.  IfcBoberta,  81 
Pac  734»  736»  1  GaL  App.  25. 

Where,  In  a  prosecution  for  homicide, 
the  court  defined  "malice,'*  as  an  element 
of  murder,  as  a  deliberate  intention  unlaw- 
fully to  take  away  the  life  of  a  fellow  crea- 
ture, without  provocation  or  under  drcum- 
stances  showing  an  abandoned  or  malig;nant 
heart,  as  provided  by  statute,  defendant  was 
not  prejudiced  by  the  fact  that  the  court  also 
stated  that  "malice"  imported  a  wish  to  vex» 
annoy,  or  injure  another,  or  an  intent  to  do  a 
wrongtul  act,  as  provided  by  section  7; 
though  such  definition  was  inapplicable  to 
"malice"  as  an  element  to  murder.  People  y. 
Waysman,  81  Pac  1087,  1  Cal.  App.  246. 

Rev.  St  1898,  f  4053,  defines  "malice"  and 
"maliciously'*  as  importing  a  wish  to  vex, 
annoy,  or  injure  another  person,  or  an  in- 
tent to  do  a  wrongful  act  SectUm  4427  pro- 
vides that  every  person  who  willfully,  un- 
lawfully, and  maliciously  administers  any 
poison  to  an  animal,  the  property  of  another, 
is  punishable.  Under  such  sections,  the  fact 
that  the  owner  of  a  dog  polsoncSd  by  defend- 
ant was  unknown  to  defendant  did  not  pre- 
clude a  finding  that  the  poison  was  adminis- 
tered maliciously.  State  v.  Ck)Ieman,  82  Pac. 
465,  466,  29  Utah,  417. 

On  the  subject  of  murder,  and  in  defin- 
ing "malice,"  the  court  properly  (diarged  that 
it  was  a  wicked  condition  of  the  heart,  a 
wicHed  purpose,  a  performed  purpose  to  do  a 
wrongful  act  without  sufficient  legal  provoca- 
tion, .  State  V.  QaUman,  60  S.  B.  682-686,  79 
S.  C.  229. 

"  'Malice'  is  implied  when  an  act  danger* 
ous  to  others  is  done  so  recklessly  or  wan- 
tonly as  to  evince  depravity  of  mind  and  dis- 
regard of  human  life."  Where  two  persons 
fought  with  firearms  in  a  public  place,  their 
reckless  disregard  of  law  amounted  to  mal- 
ice, rendering  both  guilty  of  murder.  State 
y.  liliiston,  54  S.  B.  427,  141  N.  O.  857,  115 
Am.  St  Rep.  705. 

An  instruction  that  malice  has  been  de- 
fined to  be  a  term  of  art  importing  wicked- 
ness and  excluding  Just  cause  and  excuse  is 
not  erroneous,  on  the  ground  that  it  leads  the 
Jury  to  beUeve  that  mere  wickedness  is  mal- 
ice. State  V.  Miller,  53  S.  B.  426,  427,  73  S. 
a  277. 

An  instruction  was  held  proper  which 
defined  "malice,"  as  applied  to  assault  with 
intent  to  kill,  as  "the  intent  to  take  human 
life  unlawfully,  where  there  are  no  circum- 
stances of  Justification  or  mitigation  for  the 
act  if  the  life  should  be  taken  as  intended. 
It  means  the  deliberate,  intentional  use  of  a 
deadly  weapon  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
human  life,  from  whatever  motive  it  springs, 
if  there  are  no  circumstances  surrounding 
the  transaction  which  mitigates  or  Justifies 
the  act"  Napper  v.  State,  51  S.  B.  592,  593, 
123  Ga.  571. 


On  a  tvial  for  murder,  an  InatrnctloB 
that  "maUce  ia  the  intenUonal  killing  of  a 
person,  knowing  It  to  be  wrong,  intending  to 
do  it,  knowing  it  to  be  wrong;"  without  legal 
excuse,  is  not  wror,  eapedaUy  Allien  followed 
by  a  full  statement  of  the  law  as  to  man- 
slaughter. State  V.  Byrd,  51  S.  B.  542,  644, 
72  8.  0. 104. 

After  defining  murder  and  malice,  ex- 
press and  implied,  in  the  language  of  the 
Penal  Code  (sections  60-62),  it  furnished  no 
ground  for  reversal  that  the  court  added  that 
malice  was  an  unlawful  intention  to  kill, 
without  Justification  or  mitigation.  Leonard 
V.  States  66  S.  B.  251,  253,  133  Ga.  435. 

It  is  not  «ror  to  charge  that,  wbenevtf 
a  person  kills  anotiier  with  an  intent  to  kiU, 
that  intent  is  malice,  if  it  is  a  deliberate  in- 
tuition unlawfully  to  take  human  life. 
Rhodes  v.  State,  66  S.  B.  887, 188  Ga.  723. 

Where  a  homicide  was  committed  by  ac- 
cused with  an  instrument  which  the  Juiy 
found  was  a  weapon  likely  to  produce  death, 
the  law,  from  the  use  of  such  weapon,  pre- 
sumes malice  and  an  intent  to  kill;  there 
being  evidence  to  authorize  the  finding  of 
homicide  unaccompanied  with  circomstances 
of  mitigation.  Flanagan  t.  State,  60  8.  E. 
171, 172, 135  Ga.  221. 

In  a  murder  trial  where  there  was  evi- 
dence furnishing  a  basis  for  implied  malice, 
an  instruction:  "Malice  is  not  confined  to 
ill  will  toward  an  individual,  but  is  intended 
to  denote  an  action  following  from  any  wick- 
ed and  corrupt  motive— a  thing  done  with  a 
widced  mind— where  the  fact  has  been  at- 
tended with  such  drciimstancea  as  evince 
plain  indications  of  a  heart  regardless  of  so- 
cial duties  and  flatally  bent  on  mischief; 
hence  malice  is  implied  from  any  deliberate 
and  cruel  act  against  another,  however  sad- 
den, which  shows  an  abandoned  and  malig- 
nant heart" — was  correct  People  v.  Lucas, 
91  N.  B.  659.  664,  244  IlL  603. 

It  was  held  proper  to  instruct  the  Jury 
that  "'malice,'  in  its  legal  sense,  denotes 
that  condition  of  mind  which  is  manifested 
by  the  intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful  act 
without  Just  cause  or  excuse.  It  means  any 
willful  and  corrupt,  intent  of  mind,  and  as 
applied  to  this  case,  if  you  should  be  satis- 
fied by  all  the  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  defendant  without  Just  cause 
or  excuse  committed  the  ofTense  diarged  in 
the  manner  and  form  as  charged  in  the  in- 
dictment then  it  was  done  with  malice  or 
maUdously."  Gate  v.  State,  U4  N.  W.  942, 
944,  80  Neb.  611. 

An  instruction  defining  "murder  in  the 
second  degree"  as  the  killing  of  a  hunmn 
being  "willfully,  premedltatedly  and  with 
malice  aforethought,"  and  then  defining 
"willfully"  to  mean  intentionally,  not  by  ac- 
cident "premedltatedly"  to  mean  though t  of 
beforehand  for  any  length. of  time,  iiowever 


HALICB 


229 


MALIGB 


Abort;  ana  stating  that  "milllee*'  did  not 
mean  mere  hatred  or  dislike,  bat  that  condl* 
tion  of  mind  whlcb  prompted  a  person  to 
intentionally  take  the  llf^  of  another,  and 
that  *'mallce  aforethought**  meant  malice 
with  premeditation,  properly  defined  ''mur- 
der in  the  second  degree.*'  State  y.  Myers, 
121  &  W.  181,  185,  221  Mo.  598. 

''Malice"  means  that  condition  of  the 
mind  which  prompts  one  to  do  a  wrongful 
act  Intentionally,  and  to  take  the  life  of  an- 
other without  legal  justification  or  excuse. 
It  does  not  mean  mere  spite,  hatred,  or  ill 
wlU,  but'it  signifies  the  state  of  disposition 
which  shows  a  heart  regardless  of  social 
duty  and  fktally  bent  on  mischief.  Malice 
may  be  presumed  from  the  intentional  use 
of  a  deadly  weapon  in  a  manner  likely  to 
prodace  death.  State  v.  Vaughan,  98  8.  W. 
2.  5,  200  Mo.  1. 

In  a  prosecution  for  murder,  the  court 
charged  that  '^malice  is  also  necessary  to 
murder  hi  the  first  degree.  The  distingulsh- 
hig  feature,  so  ftir  as  malice  is  concerned,  is 
that,  in  murder  of  the  first  degree,  malice 
must  be  proTen  to  your  satisfaction  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  as  an  existing  fact,  while 
in  murder  of  the  second  degree  malice  will 
be  implied  from  the  iAct  of  an  unlawful  kill- 
hig.**  Held  that,  If  the  instructions  stood 
alone,  the  latter  part  of  the  paragraph  might 
be  erroneous,  but  as  it  was  followed  by  an 
iDstructlon  defining  malice  .as  being  that 
which  the  law  infers  from  certain  acts,  how- 
ever suddenly  done,  as  when  the  fact  of  an 
uilawful  killing  is  established  and  the  facts 
do  not  establish  maUce  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  though  they  tend  to  excuse  or  Justify 
the  act,  then  the  law  implies  malice,  and  the 
murder  is  murder  of  the  second  degree,  and 
also  that  if  the  killing  is  unlawful  and  done 
with  implied  malice  aforethought,  it  would 
be  murder  in  the  second  degree,  the  instruc- 
tioQg  taken  together  were  correct  Bggle- 
8ton  T.  State  (Tex.)  128  S.  W.  1106,  1109. 

The  term  "malice*'  does  not  mean  mere 
hatred  or  HI  will,  as  the  term  is  commonly 
miderstood,  but  it  means  the  intentional  do- 
hig  of  a  wrongful  act,  and  signifies  that 
state  of  the  mind  or  disposition  that  would 
prompt  one  man  to  take  the  life  of  another, 
or  do  him  some  great  bodily  harm,  without 
Just  cause  or  excuse.  State  ▼.  Bond,  00  S. 
W.  830,  831,  191  Mo.  555. 

The  distinguishing  feature  in  the  degrees 
of  murder,  so  far  as  the  element  of  malice  is 
concerned,  is  that,  in  murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree, "malice"  must  be  proved  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  jury  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
as  an  existing  fact,  while  in  murder  in  the 
second  degree  "malice"  will  be  implied  from 
the  fact  of  the  unlawful  killing.  McLln  v. 
State,  90  S.  W.  1107,  1108,  48  Tex.  Cr.  K.  549. 

"Malice,"  as  used  in  defining  murder, 
does  not  memn  mere  q;>ite  or  Ul  will,  as  gener^ 


ally  understood,  but  signifies  an  unlawful 
state  of  the  mind,  and  such  state  of  the  mind 
as  one  is  in  who  intentionally  does  an  unlaw- 
ful act  State  v.  Hottman,  94  8.  W.  237,  239, 
196  Mo.  110. 

"Malice"  does  not  mean  mere  spite  or 
ill  will,  as  the  term  is  commonly  understood, 
but  means  the  intentional  d<^g  of  a  wrong- 
ful act,  and  signifies  that  state  of  mind  or 
disposition  which  would  prompt  one  person 
to  take  the  life  of  another  or  do  him  some 
great  bodily  harm  without  just  cause  or  ex- 
cuse. State  T.  Tetrick,  97  S.  W.  564,  565,  199 
Mo.  100. 

Where  one  intentionally,  willfully,  with- 
out justification  or  excuse,  and  while  his 
mind  was  cool  enough  to  realize  the  nature  of 
his  acts,  shot  another  with  intent  to  kill,  he 
was  actuated  by  "malice."  Williams  v.  State, 
135  S.  W.  552,  553,  61  Tex.  Gr.  R.  589. 

"Malice,"  as  an  ^ment  of  murder,  con- 
templates wickedness  and  excludes  a  just  or 
legal  cause  of  excuse.  It  is  "expressed" 
where  there  is  positlTs  direct  evidence  show- 
ing that  at  the  time  of  the  killing,  it  was 
really  entertained  and  "implied,"  where  the 
evidence  does  not  directly  show  that  the  mal- 
ice was  entertained  at  that  time  but  is  neces- 
sarily indirectly  implied  from  the  circum- 
stances and  facts  which  have  been  proved. 
State  Y.  Lee,  60  S.  E.  524,  525,  79  S.  G.  223. 

▲  charge  on  a  trial  for  murder  that  mal- 
ice included  not  only  anger,  hatred,  ill  will, 
and  desire  fbr  revenge,  but  every  other  un- 
lawful and  unjustifiable  motive ;  that  a  thing 
done  with  a  wicked  mind  and  attended  with 
su<di  circumstances  as  plainly  indicated  a 
heart  regardless  of  social  duty  and  fully  bent 
on  mischief  indicates  malice  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  law;  and  that  the  existence  of  mal- 
ice is  inferred  from  acts  committed  or  words 
spoken — was  not  erroneous,  nor  was  the  sub- 
stltuUon  of  the  word  "fully"  for  "fatally" 
prejudicial.  Maynard  v.  State,  116  N.  W. 
53,  57,  81  Neb.  801. 

As  respects  the  offense  of  willfully  and 
maliciously  burning  property  of  another, 
the  "malice"  must  have  as  its  object  some 
person,  ordinarily  the  owner  of  the  property, 
and  not  the  property  itself ;  but  it  Is  not  nec- 
essary that  the  offender  knew  who  the  own- 
er was,  it  being  enough  that  he  was  bent  on 
mischief  against  the  owner,  whoever  he  might 
be.  State  v.  Leslie,  115  N.  W.  897,  898,  138 
Iowa,  104,  128  Am.  St  Rep.  160. 

In  a  prosecution  for  assault  with  intent 
to  kill,  a  charge  that  if  the  jury  believed 
from  the  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
that  accused  intentionally  and  maliciously 
shot  at  prosecuting  witness  with  a  gun  with 
the  intent  to  kill  her,  he  should  be  convicted, 
and  defining  malice  as  including  not  only  an- 
ger, hatred,  and  revenge,  but  every  unlawful 
and  unjustifiable  motive  used  by  a  person  in 
the  commission  of  an  act  was  not  erroneous 


MAUOB 


230 


MALIOB 


Id  vievr  of  Snyder's  Comp.  Laws  19O0»1  230T, 
providing  that  every  person  who  intentionally 
and  wrongfully  shoote,  shoots  at,  or  attempts 
to  shoot  at  another  with  any  kind  of  a  fire- 
arm, with  intent  to  kill  any  person,  is  punish- 
able, Bartell  v.  State,  111  Pac,  669,  670,  4 
Okl,  Cr.  135. 

''Malice"  in  law  does  not  necessarily 
mean  hate  or  ill  will,  but  is  defined  as  any 
unlawful  act,  willfully  done,  without  Just 
cause  or  legal  excuse.  It  is  that  mental 
state  or  condition  which  prompts  the  doing  of 
an  unlawful  act  without  legal  justification  or 
extenuation.  Patterson  v.  State,  47  South. 
52,  54,  156  Ala.  62. 

An  instruction  that  "malice**  signifies  a 
condition  of  the  mind  void  of  social  duty  and 
fatally  bent  on  mischief,  or  an  unlawful  in- 
tention to  kill  or  do  some  great  bodily  harm 
to  another  without  just  cause  or  excuse,  is 
correct  State  v.  Forsha,  88  S.  W.  746,  751, 
100  Mo.  296^  4  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  576. 

Where  the  court  at  the  request  of  the 
jury  In  a  homicide  case,  returning  for  further 
instructions,  read  a  definition  of  "malice**  in 
a  law  book  as  not  necessarily  hatred  or  ill 
will,  but  as  an  intentional  doing  of  an  un- 
lawful act,  and  that  malice,  as  an  ingredient 
of  murder,  was  the  killing  of  a  human  being 
without  justification,  excuse,  or  extenuation, 
and  then  stated  that  malice,  as  an  Ingredient 
of  murder,  did  not  necessarily  mean  hatred  or 
ill  will,  but  was  the  unlawful  and  willful  kill- 
ing of  a  human  being  without  any  legal  ex- 
cuse or  justification,  the  definition  adopted  by 
the  court  was  proper,  and  the  definition  read 
from  the  law  book  was  not  calculated  to  con- 
vey to  the  jury  the  impression  that  it  was 
adopted  as  a  part  of  the  definition  requested. 
Coates  V.  State,  56  South.  6,  8, 1  Ala.  App.  85. 

The  "malice"  essential  to  convict  of  mur- 
der may  be  ascertained  from  previous  threats 
and  measures  taken  in  preparation,  and  it 
may  also  arise  suddenly  and  be  implied  from 
circumstances,  as  from  the  intentional  use  at 
the  outset  of  a  deadly  weapon.  Brown  v. 
State,  54  South.  305,  98  Miss.  786,  84  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  S.)  811. 

"Malice"  essential  to  constitute  murder, 
as  distinguished  from  manslaughter,  includes 
all  those  states  of  the  mind  In  which  a  homi- 
cide is  committed  without  legal  justification, 
extenuation,  or  excuse,  and  where  an  unlaw- 
ful homicide  is  shown  to  have  been  commit- 
ted, and  its  attending  circumstances  disclose 
nothing  to  mitigate,  extenuate,  or  excuse  the 
act,  "malice"  on  the  part  of  the  slayer  is 
presumed.  State  v.  Marx,  60  Atl.  690,  692, 
78  Ck>nn.  18. 

In  libel  and  alaadev 

"Malice**  in  the  law  of  slander  is  used  in 
a  popular  sense.  Hubbard  v.  Allyn,  86  N.  E. 
350,  359,  200  Mass.  166,  22  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
780. 


While  it  Is  true  that  in  slander  "oial- 
ice"  Is  the  gist  of  the  action,  yet  the  term 
"malice**  is  always  used  In  such  cases  in  a 
legal  sense.  Weller  v.  Western  State  Bank 
of  Waukomis,  00  Pac.  877,  882, 18  Okl.  47& 

The  word  "maUce,**  as  used  in  the  law  of 
libel  and  slander,  does  not  mean  hatred  or  ill 
will,  but  the  want  of  legal  excuse  for  the  pub- 
Ucation.  Sheibley  v.  Nelson,  121  N.  W.  458, 
460,  84  Neb.  893. 

"Malice"  in  ftict  may  be  defined  as  a 
spiteful  or  rancorous  disposition  which  caus- 
es an  act  to  be  done  for  mischief.  Implied 
malice  Is  sufllclent  to  support  an  action  for 
slander,  where  the  other  elemaits  exist 
Proof  of  express  malice  authorizes  punitive 
damages.  Where  one  diarges  another  with 
larceny,  the  law  imputes  malice.  Lee  v. 
Orump,  40  South.  609,  610, 146  Ala.  655  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  In  Ghilders  v.  San 
Jose  Printing  &  Publishing  Co.,  38  Pac.  903, 
105  Gal.  284,  45  Am.  St  Rep.  40). 

"'Malice'  is  presumed  from  the  making 
by  one  person  of  derogatory  statements  with 
reference  to  another  in  regard  to  his  compe- 
tency or  fitness  for  his  trade  or  profession, 
and  such  derogatory  language  Is  slanderous 
per  se.*'  Vial  v.  Larson,  109  N.  W.  1007,  132 
Iowa,  208  (citing  Newell,  Slander  &  Libel  [2d 
Ed.]  182,  898). 

Malice,  as  used  in  cases  of  slander  and 
libel,  does  not  necessarily  imply  actual  evil 
intent  but  rather  the  want  or  absence  of 
any  legal  excuse  for  the  speaking  or  publi- 
cation of  the  injurious  words.  Where  slan- 
derous words  are  actionable  per  se,  malice  is 
presumed.  McDonald  v.  Nugent,  98  N.  W. 
506,  508,  122  Iowa,  651. 

Where  words  are  spoken  which  are  slan- 
derous per  se,  malice  is  presumed;  but  the 
malice  which  Is  thus  presumed  is  known  aa 
legal  malice,  as  distinguished  from  actual  or 
express  malice,  or  malice  in  fact  In  an  ac- 
tion for  slander,  the  absence  of  actual  malloe 
will  not  defeat  the  action,  and  the  party  in- 
jured may  recover  his  actual  damages;  but 
where  actual  malice  is  charged  in  a  com- 
plaint, and  more  than  compensatory  dam- 
ages are  claimed  for  the  injury,  the  actual 
motive  or  intent  with  which  the  publication 
was  made  becomes  an  important  fact  from 
which  to  determine  the  amount  of  damages 
to  be  awarded.  Wrege  v.  Jones,  100  N.  W. 
705,  707,  13  N.  D.  267,  112  Am.  St  Rep.  679, 
3  Ann.  Gas.  482. 

"The  term  *mallce,*  as  employed  in  the 
definition  of  libel  per  se,  is  often  misunder- 
stood by  the  general  reader,  and  is  sometimes 
misapprehended  by  lawyer&  It  does  not 
necessarily  mean  personal  hatred  or  ill  will 
toward  the  person  at  whom  the  libel  is  di- 
rected. Legal  malice  in  the  publishing  of  a 
libel  is  not  inconsistent  with  honesty  of  par- 
pose  and  good  motive.  *  *  *  In  other 
words,  malice  Is  the  want  of  legal  «zcii8e  tat 


MAUOB 


231 


MAIilOB 


an  act  done  to  the  injtiry  of  another.  Who- 
ever glvefi  currency  to  libelous  matter  (not 
protected  as  being  privileged)  must  be  pre- 
pared to  prove  its  truth,  tf  he  would  avoid 
liability  to  the  party  hijured."  Morse  ▼. 
Times-Republican  Printing  Oo^  100  N.  W. 
867,  871,  124  Iowa,  707. 

Where,  In  libel  for  newspaper  articles, 
some  of  which  did  not  refer  to  plalntifT,  and 
some  of  which  were  not  libelous  per  se,  there 
was  no  averment  of  extrinsic  facts  that  the 
articles  referred  to  plaintiff  or  any  innue'hdo 
from  which  it  could  be  inferred  that  they 
charged  plaintiff  with  such  ccmduct  as  to  ren- 
der it  libelous  per  se,  an  instruction  that 
"malice'*  means  the  intentional  doing  of  k 
wrongful  act  without  excuse,  and  that  if  the 
articles  published  were  libelous  in  whole  or 
in  part,  and  were  published  concerning  plain- 
tiff, and  were  not  true,  the  law  presumed 
that  tbey  were  published  maliciously,  and  it 
was  not  necessary  to  i>rove  any  malice  to 
warrant  a  verdict  for  plaintiff,  was  erro- 
neous, because  it  did  not  confine  the  presump- 
tion of  malice  to  the  articles  which  were 
libelous  per  se.  Flowers  v.  Smith,  112  8. 
W.  490,  SOO,  214  Mo.  08  (citing  and  adoptiag 
Mitchell  ▼.  Bradstreet  Co.,  22  &  W.  802,  116 
Ho.  loc.  cit  240,  20  Ia  B.  A.  188,  88  Am.  St 
R^  602). 

An  averment  of  "malice,"  in  an  action 
for  libel,  is  not  equivalent  to  a  charge  that 
defendant  wrote  the  libel  knowing  it  was 
untrue.  Dickinson  v.  Hathaway,  48  South. 
136,  137,  122  La.  644,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  33. 

"The  unprivileged  publication  in  writing 
or  print  of  a  fiilse  charge  that  another  is 
gnilty  of  a  crime,  or  of  a  false  charge'which 
tends  to  expose  another  to  public  hatred  or 
contempt,  entitles  the  person  thus  defamed 
to  recover  of  the  publisher  full  compensa- 
tion in  damages  for  all  the  injury  to  his 
reputation,  business,  and  feelings  which  the 
defamatory  publication  caused.  A  written 
or  printed  article  of  this  character  is  libel- 
ous in  itself.  From  its  publication  the  con- 
clusive presumption  of  actual  damages  to 
its  victim,  and  of  'legal  malice*  (that  is  to 
say,  of  'an  act  done  wrongfully  without  legal 
justification  or  excuse*),  at  once  arises.  The 
fact  that  the  publisher  was  without  malioe, 
in  the  popular  acceptation  of  that  term  (that 
la  to  say,  without  ill  will,  bad  motive,  hatred, 
or  intent  to  injure  his  victim),  constitutes  no 
defense  to  the  latter's  claim  for  compensa- 
tory damages,  and  no  evidence  to  mitigate 
or  reduce  their  amount,  because  the  actual 
damages  to  the  party  libeled  are  the  same 
whether  they  are  inflicted  by  the  publisher 
with  a  good  or  an  evil  intent,  and  the  victim 
is  as  clearly  entitied  to  full  compensation  for 
a  wrong  inflicted  with  a  laudable  motive,  or 
through  mistake  or  inadvertence,  as  for  one 
perpetrated  with  a  diabolical  purpose  or  in- 
tend The  intent  or  purpose  with  which  such 
a  publication  is  made  is  immaterial  in  the 
trial  of  the  claim  for  the  actual  or  compensa- 


borr  damages  whldh  Che  party  liijtired  may 
seek.  It  is  important  only  when  a  claim  for 
exemplary  damages  is  to  be  considered." 
Post  Pub.  Co.  V.  Butier,  137  Fed.  723,  726, 
71  01  G.  A.  800  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion given  in  Palmer  v.  Mahen,  120  Fed. 
737,  741,  67  C.  a  A.  41,  45). 

'^By  'legal  malice,'  as  explained  by  Bay- 
ley,  J.,  in  Bromage  v.  Prosser,  4  B.  &  C.  28S 
(E.  O.  Ly  R.  vol.  10),  is  meant  no  more  than 
the  wrongful  intention  which  the  law  always 
presumes  as  accompanying  a  wrongful  act, 
without  any  proof  of  malice  in  fact  •  •  • 
In  a  legal  sense,  any  act  done  willfully  and 
purposely  to  the  prejudice  and  injury  of  an- 
other, which  is  unlawful,  is,  as  against  that 
person,  malicious.  It  is  not  necessary,  to 
render  an  act  malicious,  that  the  party  be 
actuated  by  a  feeling  of  hatred  or  ill  will 
towards  the  individual,  or  that  he  entertain 
and  pursue  any  general  bad  purpose  or  de- 
sign^ On  the  contrary,  he  may  be  actuated 
by  a  general  good  purpose,  and  hav€  a  real 
and  sincere  design  to  bring  about  a  reforma- 
tion of  manners ;  but  if,  in  pursuing  that  de- 
sign, he  willfully  inflicts  a  wrong  on  others, 
which  is  not  warranted  by  law,  such  act  is 
malicious."  Star  Pub.  Ck>.  v.  Donahoe  (Del.) 
68  Ati.  613,  617,  66  L.  R.  A.  980  (quoting  and 
adopting  deflnitlon  in  Oommonwealth  v. 
SnelHng  [Mass.]  16  Pidc.  340). 

The  kind  of  "malice^*  which  ''overcomes 
and  destroys  the  privileges  is,  of  course, 
quite  distinct  from  that  which  the  law,  in 
the  first  instance,  imputes  with  respect  to 
every  defamatory  charge,  irrespective  of  mo- 
tive. It  has  been  defined  to  be  an  'indirect 
and  wicked  motive  which  induces  the  de- 
fendant to  defame  the  plaintiff.'*'  Denver 
Public  Warehouse  Oo.  v.  Holloway,  83  Pac. 
131,  183,  34  (}olo.  482,  8  Ii.  R.  A.  (N.  &)  696, 
114  Am.  St  Rep.  171,  7  Ann.  Gas.  840  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  Hemmens  v.  Nelson,  84 
N.  SX  342,  138  N.  Y.  624,  20  L.  B.  A.  440; 
Odgers,  L.  &  S.  267). 

Pen.  CSode,  |  242,  defines  criminal  libel 
as  a  malicious  publication,  section  244  pro- 
vides that  a  publication  having  such  tend- 
ency is  deemed  malicious  if  no  justification 
or  excuse  is  shown,  and  section  718,  subd.  3, 
provides  that  the  terms  "malice"  and  "ma- 
licious** each  import  an  evil  intent,  wish,  or 
design  to  annoy  or  injure  another.  Held, 
that  a  corporation  may  be  convicted  of  crim- 
inal libel;  the  evil  intent  of  its  agents  who 
published  the  libel  being  attributed  to  it 
People  V.  Star  Co.,  120  N.  Y.  Supp.  408,  600, 
136  App.  Div.  617. 

Cttv.  Code,  I  47,  defines  a  "privileged 
communication*'  as  one  without  malice,  to  a 
person  interested  ther^n,  by  one  who  iff.  al- 
so interested;  one  who  stands  in  such  rela- 
tion to  the  person  interested  as  to  afford  a 
reasonable  ground  for  supposing  the  motive 
innocent,  or  who  is  requested  by  the  person 
interested  to  give  the  information;  and  seo- 


ICAIilOS 


232 


MAUCB 


tion  48  declares  that  the  ''malioe"  so  referred 
to  is  not  inferred  from  the  communication 
or  publication.  Held,  that  "malice"  as  used 
in  section  47  meant  malice  in  fact,  or  a  libel 
published  with  an  actnal,  malicious  intent 
Davis  T.  Hearst,  U6  Pac.  580,  540,  160  Oal. 
143. 

"By  'malice*  is  not  meant,  necessarily, 
spite  or  ill  will,  but  it  is  also  meant  the  do- 
ing of  a  wrongful  act  Intentionally,  without 
Just  cause  or  excuse;  and  if  an  article  com- 
plained of  was  published  of  and  concerning 
plaintiff,  and  was  not  true,  and  was  a  libel 
on  him,  then  the  law  presumes  it  was  pub- 
lished maliciously.  *  **  Only  legal  mal- 
ice is  exacted,  and  on  analysis  this  sinks  in- 
to a  myth  or  fiction,  for  so  much  malice  as 
is  necessary  to  afford  compensation  for  ac- 
tual damages  is  inferred  from  the  fact  that  a 
false  writing  was  published  concerning  plain- 
tiff, although  in  truth  the  publisher  felt  no 
ill  will,  and  believed  he  was  telling  the  tiruth. 
This  result  elimtnates  malice  from  actions 
for  libel,  as  a  practical  factor,  save  as  a 
reason  for  awarding  more  than  compensative 
damages  or  overcoming  the  defense  of  priv- 
ileged communication."  What  is  meant  by 
^'malice"  in  these  actions  is  that  the  publi- 
cation of  the  false  matter  was  without  legal 
excuse,  or,  to  present  the  rule  in  a  perfectly 
definite  and  intelligible  form,  that  it  was  un- 
privileged. If  it  was  a  privileged  communi- 
cation, no  malice  is  inferred  from  the  publi- 
cation, and  the  case  fails,  unless  malice  is 
otherwise  proved,  and  where,  through  a  mis- 
take as  to  identity,  plaintiff's  picture  was 
published  in  connection  with  an  actide  which 
was  false  and  libelous  as  to  him,  it  was  ma- 
licious. Farley  v.  Evening  Chronicle  Pub. 
Co.,  87  S.  W.  565.  568,  113  Mo.  App.  2ia 

In  malloloiis  mischief 

^fallce,  as  an  element  of  malicious  mis- 
chief, is  not  restricted  to  ill  vdll  or  revenge 
against  the  owner  or  possessor  of  the  prop- 
erty injured ;  but  a  willful  or  wanton  injury 
to  property,  under  circumstances  Indicating 
a  malignant  spirit  or  mischief,  is  sufi^dent 
to  constitute  malicious  mischief,  and  such 
malice  may  be  either  expressed  or  implied. 
State  V.  Wrfght  (DeL)  70  Atl.  399,  400,  2 
Boyce,  393. 

On  a  trial  for  malicious  mischief  in  vio- 
lation of  Rev.  Pen.  Code,  §  712,  an  instruc- 
tion that  such  acts  in  relation  to  the  property 
of  another  as  evince  a  disposition  of  wan- 
ton deviltry  and  reckless  disregard  of  the 
rights  and  property  of  another  are,  in  law, 
malice,  together  with  the  charge  that  to  Jus- 
tify a  conviction  the  Jury  must  find  not  only 
that  accused  willfully  and  intentionally,  but 
that  he  wantonly  and  in  a  spirit  of  revenge, 
injured  the  property  of  another,  sufficiently 
describes  "malice,"  as  defined  by  section  811 
as  importing  a  wish  to  annoy  or  injure  an- 
other. State  V.  Tarlton,  118  N.  W.  706,  708, 
22  S.  D.  495. 


Za  malieiMU  proa^eutlos 

"Malice"  is  a  wrongful  motive  which 
prompts  a  wrongfol  act  The  institution  of 
criminal  proceedings  .with  any  oth«r  motive 
than  that  of  bringing  a  guilty  person  to  Jus- 
tice is  a  malicious  prosecution.  Bulison  v. 
CoUins,  82  S.  W.  748.  750,  5  Ind.  T.  282 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Addison, 
Torts  [Wood's  Ed.]  i  853;  Johns  v.  Marsh, 
52  Md.  323;  Garvey  v.  Wayson,  42  Md.  178; 
Harpham  ▼.  Whitney,  77  IlL  32). 

*  The  malice  required  to  be  shown  is  the 
wrongful  motive  prompting  the  prosecution, 
and  may  be  established  by  proof  of  any 
motive  other  than  that  of  bringing  a  guilty 
party  to  Justice.  Moneyweight  Scale  Ca  v. 
McCormick,  72  AtL  537,  540,  109  Md.  170. 

In  an  action  for  malicious  prosecutioD,  a 
definition  of  malice  as  a  "disposition  to  do 
the  person  prosecuted  a  wrong  without  legal 
excuse"  was  not  prejudicial  to  plaintiff. 
Gaither  v.  Carpenter,  65  8.  B.  625,  626,  143 
N.  0.  240. 

The  malice  essential  to  sustain  an  action 
for  malicious  prosecution,  does  not  mean  per- 
s<mal  ill  will,  but  a  wrongful  act,  knowingly 
and  intentionally  done,  without  Jnst  cause, 
constitutes  malice.  Stanford  v.  A.  F.  Mes- 
sick  Grocery  Co.,  55  8.  B.  815,  817,  143  N. 
C.  419. 

"Malice**  need  not  indicate  anger  or  vin- 
dictiveness,  but  it  imports  bad  taltti  in  a 
malicious  prosecution,  or  the  want  of  sincere 
belief  that  the  tSLCtn  and  circumstances  Jus- 
tify the  prosecution.  Griswold  ▼.  Griswold, 
77  Pac.  672,  678,  143  OaL  617. 

The  fact  that  an  action  was  commenced 
and  prosecuted  without  probable  cause  may 
be  considered  by  the  Jury  on  the  question  of 
malice.  Actual. malicious  purpose  or  personal 
ill  will  is  not  essential  to  constitute  the  legal 
malice  which  must  be  shown  to  support  an 
action  for  malicious  prosecution.  The  malice 
required  to  support  the  action  may  be  infer- 
red by  the  Jury  from  the  want  of  probable 
cause.  Connelly  v.  White,  98  N.  W.  144, 145, 
122  Iowa,  391. 

"MaUce,"  in  law,  is  the  intentional  doing 
of  a  wrongful  act  without  Just  cause  or 
excuse.  It  is  not  sufficient,  to  sustain  an 
action  for  malicious  prosecution,  to  prove 
that  the  afildavit  upon  which  th^  arrest  was 
made  was  false.  It  must  also  appear  tbat 
the  affiant  either  knovra  it  was  false,  or  did 
not  have  reasonable  and  probable  cause  to 
believe  it  to  be  true.  Izzo  v.  Viscount,  64 
Atl.  953,  954,  74  N.  J.  Law,  65  (quoting  and 
adopting  McFadden  v.  Lane,  60  AtL  867,  71 
N.  J.  Law,  630). 

"Malice,**  in  its  legal  sense,  aa  used  in 
actions  for  malicious  prosecution,  "is  not  to 
be  considered  in  the  sense  of  spite  or  hatred 
against  an  individual,  but  of  mains  animus, 
and  as  denoting  that  the  party  is  actuated 


MALlCff 


333 


MAIilOB 


by  Improper  and  Indirect  motives,*^  or,  as 
defined  by  Newell,  Mai.  Pros.  c.  71,  |  7,  p. 
239,  it  means  •%  general  wickedness  of  In- 
tent; a  depraved  Inclination  to  do  harm,  or 
to  disregard  tbe  rights  or  safety  of  mankind 
generally."  CampbeH  ▼.  Baltimore  ft  O.  H. 
Co.,  55  Atl.  532,  97  Md.  841  (quoting  Johns 
r.  Marsh,  f52  Md.  828). 

"Legal  malice,"  as  distinguished  from 
"express"  or  "actnal  malice,"  and  which  Is 
sufficient  to  support  an  action  for  maliciously 
suing  out  process,  but  not  to  support  an 
award  of  punitive  damages,  consists  in  a 
wrongful  act  intentionally  done,  without  just 
and  lawful  cause  or  excuse.  Wright  ▼.  Har- 
ris, 70  8.  E.  489,  492,  160  N.  O.  542. 

In  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution, 
an  instruction  that:  ••  'Malice'  is  defined  as 
any  indirect  motive  of  wrong;  •  •  • 
and,  in  the  legal  sense,  any  unlawjPuI  act, 
which  is  done  willfully  and  purposely  to  the 
injury  of  another,  is,  as  against  that  person, 
malicious;  and  by  malice  is  meant  not  the 
act,  but  the  motive  which  prompts  the  act 
It  consists  of  a  bad  motive,  or  sudi  recklesB 
disregard  of  tbe  rights  of  others  as  to  show 
evil  intent  It  is  an  action  based  upon  an 
Improper  motive,  and  does  not  necessarily 
presuppose  persMial  hatred,  ill  will,  or  re- 
venge. The  improper  motive  or  want  of 
proper  motive  inferable  from  a  wrongful 
act,  based  upon  no  reasonable  ground,  con- 
stitutes of  itself  all  the  malice  deemed  es- 
sential In  law  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
action.  The  malice  necessary  to  be  shown 
in  order  to  maintain  this  action  is  not  nec- 
essarily revenge  or  other  base  and  malignant 
passion;  whatever  is  done  willfully  and 
purposely,  if  it  be  at  the  same  time  wrong 
and  unlawful,  and  that  known  to  the  party, 
is,  in  legal  contemplation,  malice.  If,  how- 
ever, the  accused  is  in  fact  guilty  of  the 
offense  charged,  that  would  be  a  complete 
defense  in  this  action,  and  it  would  be  im- 
material whether  the  proceedings  complained 
of  were  malicious  or  not" — was  correct. 
Miles  V.  Walker,  92  N.  W.  1014,  1016,  68 
Keb.  728. 

"Malice,"  as  an  element  of  malicious 
prosecution,  does  not  necessarily  mean  anger, 
wrath,  or  vlndlctiveness,  but,  while  any  such 
ill  feeling  may  constitute  malice,  it  need  be 
no  more  than  the  antithesis  of  bona  fides,  and 
hence  particular  malice  or  malicious  or 
wrongful  purpose,  in  the  sense  of  personal  111 
will  or  malevolence  existing  toward  the  per- 
son prosecuted  by  the  prosecutor  is  not  re- 
qnlred.  Downing  v.  Stone,  68  S.  B.  9,  10, 
152  N.  C.  525,  136  Am.  St  Rep.  841,  21  Ann. 
Gas.  753. 

Under  Civ.  Code  1910,  i  4451,  providing 
that  malice  may  consist  in  personal  Sl;)lte, 
or  in  a  general  disregard  of  the  right  con- 
sideration of  mankind  directed  by  chance 
against  the  individual  injured,  a  charge,  in 
an  action  for  illegal  arrest  and  malicious 


prosecution,  that  to  constitute  malice  It 
would  not  be  necessary  to  show  HI  will  or 
hatred  to  the  person  injured,  but  that  malice 
may  be  inferred  from  any  offensive  act,  or 
any  act  of  an  offensive  nature,  which  would 
show  disregard  of  the  person  injured  and 
a  violation  of  proper  consideration  of  him, 
was  too  broad,  and  made  the  definition  turn 
rather  on  whether  the  act  was  offensive  to 
the  person  injured  than  on  the  intent,  pur- 
pose, or  state  of  mind  of  the  actor.  McPher- 
son  ▼.  Chandler,  72  8.  B.  948,  949,  187  Oa. 
129. 

In  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution, 
held,  that  it  was  proper  to  instruct  the  Jury 
that:  "*Malice'  in  law  means  an  act  done 
wrongfully  and  willfully  without  reasonable 
or  probable  cause,  and  not  necessarily  an 
act  done  from  ill  feeling  or  spite  or  a  de- 
sire to  injure  another.  It  is  enough  if  de- 
fendant be  actuated  by  improper  or  sinister 
motives.  *  *  *  If  the  purpose  of  the 
arrest  was  anything  else  than  to  vindicate 
the  law  and  punish  crime,  then  they  might 
infer  that  defendant  had  a  malicious  motive 
in  causing  the  same."  Hackler  v.  Miller,  114 
N.  W.  274,  276,  79  Neb.  209. 

HecUSMoe  4latla««Uh#d 

The  doing  of  an  act  without  that  ordi- 
nary prudence  and  discretion  which  persons 
of  mature  mind  and  sound  Judgment  are 
presumed  to  have  constitutes  "negligence," 
but  will  not  alone  warrant  an  Inference  of 
'^malice."  Malice  is  distinguishable  from 
mere  negligence  in  that  it  arises  from  some 
purpose,  while  negligence  arises  from  ab- 
sence of  purpose.  The  characteristic  of  neg- 
ligence Is  Inadvertence  or  an  absence  of  an 
Intent  to  injure.  This  does  not  imply  that 
the  act  was  done  Involuntarily  or  uncon- 
sciously, but  merely  that  the  person  doing 
It  was  not  conscious  that  the  act  consti- 
tuted a  want  of  reasonable  care.  Jenkins 
V.  Gllligan,  108  N.  W.  237,  238,  131  Iowa, 
176,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1087  (citing  Pickens 
V.  South  Carolina  &  G.  R.  Co.,  32  S.  E. 
567,  54  S.  C.  498). 

ZAok  of  prolmUe  eaiue  distinguished 

"'Malice*  and  'lack  of  probable  cause' 
are  not  convertible  terms.  Neither  follows 
as  a  legal  presumption  from  the  other.  The 
jury  may  infer  malice  as  a  fact  from  proof  of 
want  of  probable  cause;  but  they  cannot 
infer  a  lack  of  probable  cause  from  proof  of 
malice.  Both  must  be  proved.  Honesty  of 
purpose  precludes  malice.  Malice  Is  auy  im- 
proper or  siuister  motive  for  instituting  the 
suit  It  need  not  spring  from  any  spirit  of 
malevolence,  or  be  prompted  by  any  malig- 
nant passion."  While  many  authorities  hold 
that  probable  cause  is  a  reasonable  ground  of 
suspicion  supported  by  circumstances  suffi- 
ciently strong  in  themselves  to  warrant  a 
cautious  person  in  the  belief  that  there  were 
grounds  for  the  attachment,  the  better  rule 
and  the  one  approved  is  that  belief  and  rea- 


MALICE  AFORETHOUaHT 


234 


MAIilOE  AFORKTHOTJaHT 


sonable  grounds  must  unite  to  cbnstitate 
probable  cause.  However,  the  distinction 
may  be  more  metaphysical  than  real.  Foster 
y.  Pitts,  88  8.  W.  1114,  63  Ark.  887  (citing  to 
the  quotation  Lemay  y.  Williams,  82  Ark« 
166;  Oooley,  Torts,  p.  185;  Spengler  y.  Da- 
vy, 15  Grat.  [56  Va.]  881;  Burkhart  y.  Jen- 
nings, 2  W.  Va.  242 ;  Commonwealth  y.  Snell- 
ing,  16  Pick.  [32  Mass.]  837;  Mitchell  v.  Wall, 
111  Mass.  492;  Stewart  y.  Sonnebom,  96  U. 
S.  187,  25  Ia  Bd.  116;  Williams  y.  Hunter,  14 
Am.  I>ec.  597,  note;  Bozeman  y.  Shaw,  87 
Ark.  160;  Frowman  y.  Smith,  12  Am.  Dec 
265,  notes;  and  citing  to  the  rule  approved 
King  y.  Colvin,  U  B^  L  582,  584;  NeweU, 
Mai.  Pros.  p.  2CK2). 

MAUCE  AFORETHOVOHT 

As  applied  to  murder,  "malice  afore- 
thought" is  a  condition  of  the  mind  which 
shows  a  heart  regardless  of  social  duty  and 
fatally  bent  on  mischief,  the  existence  of 
which  is  inferred  from  acts  done  or  words 
spoken.  Oonnell  v.  State,  81  S.  W.  746,  747, 
46  Tex.  Or.  R.  259. 

The  term  "malice  aforethought"  involved 
in  second-degree  murder,  within  Code,  {4727, 
providing  that  whoever  kills  any  human  be- 
ing with  malice  aforethought  is  guilty  of 
murder,  does  not  necessarily  require  an  in- 
tent to  murder,  and  may  be  implied  where 
there  is  no  intent  to  kill,  such  as  an  intent 
to  commit  a  felony  from  which  death  results. 
State  V.  Gibbons,  120  N.  W.  474,  475,  142 
Iowa,  96. 

Under  Code,  |  4728,  providing  that  all 
murder  perpetrated  by  means  of  poison  is 
murder  in  the  first  degree,  the  administration 
of  poison  to  another  unlawfully,  and  with 
bad  intent,  constitutes  malice  aforethought, 
without  a  specific  intent  to  kill;  and  hence 
an  Instruction  that,  if  defendant,  with  bad 
intent,  caused  poison  to  be  taken  by  deceased, 
which  caused  her  death,  he  was  guilty  of 
murder  in  the  first  degree,  otherwise  he  was 
not  guilty,  was  not  objectionable  on  the  the- 
ory that  such  act  might  constitute  man- 
slaughter. State  v,  Thomas,  109  N.  W,  900, 
902,  135  Iowa,  717. 

The  use  of  the  words  "malice  of  fore- 
thought" in  place  of  the  words  "malice  afore- 
thought,'* as  provided  by  the  form  set  out  in 
the  Code,  does  not  impair  the  validity  of  the 
indictment  as  charging  murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree, under  Code  1907,  |  7136,  declaring  the 
use  of  words  conveying  the  same  meaning  as 
those  in  the  statute  sufficient  Flowers  v. 
State,  56  South.  98,  100,  2  Ala.  App.  65. 

The  malice  which  is  an  essential  element 
in  the  offense  of  murder  has  always  been 
described  as  "malice  aforethought."  It  ia 
descriptive  of  the  state  of  mind  of  the  slayer 
preceding  and  at  the4nstant  of  the  unlawful 
act  of  kilUng.  Although  no  definite  or  appre- 
ciable space  of  time  in  law  is  required  to  be 


shown  for  the  existence  of  malice,  yet  it 
must  be  aforethought;  that  is,  it  must  be  re- 
lated to  the  unlawful  act  in  the  nature  of 
cause  and  effect  An  indictment  for  murder 
in  the  second  degree,  charging  that  defend- 
ant "unlawfully  and  with  malice  aforethought 
did,  etc.,"  was  objectionable  for  failure  to 
charge  that  the  act  was  done  with  "malice 
aforethought"  Etheridge  v.  State,  87  South. 
837,  141  Ala.  29. 

The  phrase  "malice  aforethought"  was 
properly  defined  as  "the  voluntary  and  intui- 
tional doing  of  an  unlawful  act,  with  the  pur- 
pose, means,  and  ability  to  accomplish  the 
reasonable  and  probable  eonsequoioes  of  it, 
done  In  a  manner  showing  a  heart  regardless 
of  sodal  duty  and  fatally  bent  on  mischief, 
by  one  of  sound  mind  and  discretion,  the  evi- 
dence of  which  is  inferred  from  acts  commit- 
ted or  words  spoken."  Barr  v.  States  120  S. 
W.  422.  56  Tex.  Cr.  B.  872. 

A  charge  in  question  requiring  the  homi- 
cide to  have  been  committed  "unlawfully,  and 
with  a  mind  which  shows  a  heart  regardless 
of  sodal  duty  and  fatally  bent  on  mischief, 
the  existence  of  which  may  be  Inferred  from 
acts  committed  or  words  spoken  and  In  the 
perpetration  of  robbery,  and  with  'malice 
aforethought,' "  etc,  embraces  suffidoitly  the 
definitions  of  ''malice  aforethought"  Jones 
v.  State,  96  S.  W.  980,  931,  50  Tex.  Gr.  R. 
329  {citing  Martines  y.  State,  16  S.  W.  767. 
30  Tex.  App.  129,  28  Am.  St  Rep.  895;  Hed- 
rick  V.  States  51  S.  W.  252,  40  Tex.  Or.  E. 
582;  Rupe  v.  SUte,  61  S.  W.  929,  42  Tex.  Cr. 
R.  477). 

"'Malice  aforethought'  means  a  thing 
done  with  a  wicked  and  corrupt  motive.  It 
is  not  confined  to  anger,  hatred,  and  revenge 
by  one  against  another,  although  it  evidences 
a  thing  done  through  anger,  hatred,  or  re- 
venge. It  also  evidences  any  other  unjusti- 
flable  motive  with  which  the  act  is  done. 
Hence  malice  is  not  confined  to  ill  will  which 
one  individual  holds  toward  another,  but  it 
is  intended  to  denote  any  action  fiowing  from 
a  wicked  and  corrupt  motive.  A  thing  done 
with  a  wicked  mind,  when  the  act  has  been 
attended  with  such  drcnmstances  as  evince 
plain  indications  of  a  heart  whidi  regards 
not  its  sodal  duty,  and  which  is  fatally  bent 
on  mischief,  is  done  with  malice."  State  v. 
Wetter,  83  Pac.  341,  846,  U  Idaho,  438. 

The  mere  fact  that  a  killing  has  he&i 
accomplished  by  means  of  poison  does  not 
show  "malice  aforethought,"  within  the  def- 
inition of  murder  as  the  unlawful  killing  of 
a  human  being  with  "malice  aforethought" 
State  V.  Phlnney,  89  Pac.  634,  13  Idaho,  307, 
12  li.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  935,  12  Ann.  Cas.  1079. 

"Malice,"  within  the  definition  of  murder 
in  Pen.  Code,  1 187,  as  the  unlawful  killing  of 
a  human  being  with  "malice  aforethought," 
may  be  express  or  implied.  People  y.  Frank, 
83  Pac.  578,  579,  2  CaL  App.  283. 


MALICE  AFOBJSTHOVOBT 


235 


MALICE  ▲TORETHOUGBT 


D«U%er«tlom  •v  pr«ai«dit»tlom  implied 

"Malice  aforethoiii^t"  means  that  the 
act  was  done  with  malice  and  premeditation. 
State  y.  Yanghan,  96  &  W.  2»  5,  200  Mo.  1. 

The  i>hra8e  ''malice  aforethought^'  means 
a  predetennlnation  to  do  the  act  of  killing 
without  legal  ezcnse,  and  it  Is  immaterial 
how  suddenly  or  recently  before  the  killing 
such  determination  was  formed.  Hill  ▼. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.)  91  8.  W.  1128,  1124 
(quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  in  Clark 
y.  Cbmmonwealth  [Ky.]  03  S.  W.  740). 

"'Malice  aforethought  means  in  law 
that  it  has  been  thought  of  beforehand,  so 
that,  to  constitute  murder,  the  eyidence  must 
show  that  the  defendant  thought  of  it  be- 
for^iand,  but  as  to  the  length  of  time  it  is 
immaterial."  Green  y.  United  States,  104  S. 
W.  U69,  lieo,  7  Ind.  T,  733, 

"Express  malice  aforethought"  is  shown 
where  one  person  kills  anotiier  with  a  sedate, 
deliberate  mind  and  formed  design.  State  y. 
Watson  (DeL)  82  AU.  1086»  1087. 

"MaUce  aforethought,**  as  it  ezlsta  in 
mnrder,  is  a  deliberate  and  formed  design 
to  kill,  which  may  be  manifested  by  a  Ijring 
in  wait,  antecedent  threats,  former  grudge, 
iU  will,  spite,  hatred,  or  any  circumstances 
that  show  the  accused's  intent  toward  his 
victim  at  the  time  of  the  killing.  SUte  v. 
Primrose  (DeL)  77  AtL  717,  719,  2  Boyce,  104. 

In  a  prosecution  for  murder,  it  was  er* 
ror,  in  attempting  to  define  "malice  afore- 
thought," to  charge  the  Jury:  "If  the  thought 
came  to  the  mind  (of  the  defendant),  'I  will 
kUl,'  and  he  did  kUl  Immediately  after  that, 
it  is  thought  of  beforehand ;  that  is,  'malice 
aforethought' " — si^nce  it  made  the  confltelous 
act  of  the  defendant  malicious,  regardless 
of  the  fact  whether  he  was  acting  In  self-de- 
fense or  otherwise.  Green  y.  United  States, 
101  Pac.  112,  114,  2  Okl.  Cr.  55. 

To  constitute  an  "assault  with  intent  to 
murder"  within  Gen.  St  1140,  the  assault 
must  be  made  with  malice  aforethought,  and 
when  an  assault  is  actuated  by  malice,  no 
matter  how  short  a  time  it  existed  preyious 
to  the  forming  of  the  intent  to  kill,  the  malice 
is  '"malice  aforethought"  State  y.  McGuire, 
80  AtL  701,  766,  84  Oonn.  470,  38  Ia  B.  A. 
(N.  S.)  1045. 

An  instruction,  defining  "malice  afore- 
thought" as  a  predetermination  to  do  a 
wrongfol  act  without  lawful  excuse,  and 
that  it  was  immaterial  how  suddenly  or  how 
recently  such  predetermination  was  formed 
is  the  mind,  was  not  objectionable  as  includ- 
ing a  predetermination  to  do  a  wrongful  act 
in  general  without  requiring  that  the  wrong- 
ful act  be  to  kill  decedent  Howard  v.  Ck>m- 
monwealth,  189  S.  W.  844,  845,  144  Ky.  644. 

The  phrase  "malice  aforethought"  as 
Qsed  in  an  indictment  charging  willful  mur- 
da  and  in  the  instruction  defining  willful 
murder  and  yoluntazy  manslaughter,  means 


a  predetermination  to  do  the  act  of  killing 
without  legal  excuse,  and  it  is  immaterial 
at  what  time  before  the  killing  such  a  de- 
termination was  formed.  Ball  y.  Ck)mmon- 
wealth,  101  S.  W.  950»  960,  125  Ky.  601. 

On  a  trial  for  murder,  it  is  proper  to  ad- 
yise  the  Jury  that  "malice  aforethought" 
means  a  predetermination  to  do  the  act  of 
killing  without  a  legal  excuse,  and  it  Is  im- 
material as  to  what  time  before  the  killing 
such  a  determination  was  formed.  Burns 
y.  Conmionwealth,  124  S.  W.  409,  412,  136 
Ky.  468. 

On  a  trial  for  murder,  the  court  should 
instruct  that  the  words  "malice  afore- 
thought" mean  a  predetermination  to  do  the 
act  of  killing  without  legal  excuse,  and  that 
it  is  immaterial  how  suddenly  or  recently 
before  the  killing  such  determination  formed. 
Ewing  y.  Commonwealth,  111  8.  W.  852»  865, 
129  Ky.  287. 

An  instruction  that  the  words  "with  mal- 
ice," as  used  in  the  instruction,  denoted  a 
wrongful  act  intentionally  done,  and  tha£  the 
term  "aforethought"  as  used,  meant  a  prede- 
termination to  do  the  act,  howeyer  suddenly 
or  recently  formed  before  the  act  was  done, 
sufficiently  defined  "malice  aforethought,"  es- 
pecially when  taken  in  connection  with  an- 
other instruction  defining  "feloniously"  as 
meaning  to  proceed  from  an  evil  heart  or  pur- 
pose, done  with  the  deliberate  intention  to 
commit  a  crime^  though  tke  definition  of 
malice  aforethought  did  not  require  that  the 
act  be  done  "without  legal  excuse."  Pot- 
ter y.  Commonwealth,  134  S.  W.  462,  142  Ky. 
378. 

The  phrase  "malice  aforethought"  in  an 
instruction  declaring  that  where  the  act  of 
killing  is  done  willfully,  fielonlously,  and  with 
malice  aforethought,  accused  is  guilty  of  mur- 
der, means  a  predetermination  to  do  the  act 
of  killing  without  legal  excuse,  and  it  is  im- 
material how  suddenly  or  recently  before  the 
killing  such  determination  was  formed. 
Combs  y.  Commonwealth  (Ky.)  112  S.  W.  658, 
660. 

Bey.  Laws,  c.  207, 1 1,  declares  that  mur- 
der committed  with  deliberately  premeditated 
malice  aforethought  or  in  the  commission 
or  attempt  to  commit  any  crime  punishable 
with  imprisonment  for  life,  or  committed 
with  extreme  atrocity  or  cruelty,  is  murder  in 
the  first  degree,  and  punishable  with  death, 
In  a  prosecution  for  such  offense,  the  court 
charged  that  the  words  "deliberately  pre- 
meditated malice  aforethought"  meant  simply 
"thought  upon,  resolyed  upon  beforehand,  not 
a  thing  done  suddenly,  not  a  thing  that  comes 
into  the  mind  of  a  sudden,  and  is  done  before 
there  is  time  to  think  about  it,  but  a  thin^ 
thought  upon  or  planned  some  time  before,  or 
thoui^t  upon  long  enough  before  the  act  is 
done  so  that  it  can  reasonably  be  said  to  haye 
become  a  purpose  of  the  mind,"  that  "no  par- 
ticular length  of  time-  Ifl  necessary"  and  11- 


MALICE  AFOBBTHOUGHT 


MALTCB  IK  LAW  OR  FACT 


Instrated  the  same  by  stating  that  If  a  rob- 
ber with  a  dirk  or  pistol  turns  a  corner  and 
meets  a  bank  messenger  with  a  roll  of  bills, 
and  determines  in  one  moment  to  get  It,  and 
the  next  shoots  or  stabs  the  messenger  dead, 
takes  the  package,  and  flees,  his  malice  was 
deliberately  premeditated,  though  it  occupied 
only  a  few  seconds  to  accomplish.  Held, 
that  both  the  definition  and  illustration  were 
proper.  Commonwealth  v.  Tucker,  76  N.  E. 
127,  138,  140,  141,  189  Mass.  457,  7  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  105e. 

An  instmction,  in  a  prosecution  for 
murder,  that  "malice  aforethought"  means 
with  malice  and  premeditation  is  correct 
State  V.  McCarver,  92  S.  W.  684,  686,  194 
Mo.  717. 

"Malice  aforethought,"  as  it  exists  in 
murder,  is  a  deliberate  and  formed  de^gn  to 
kill,  which  may  be  manifested  by  a  lying  in 
wait,  antecedent  threats,  former  grudge,  ill 
will,  spite,  hatred,  or  any  circumstances  that 
show  the  accused's  intent  toward  his  victim 
at  the  time  of  the  killing.  State  y.  Primrose, 
(Del.)  77  Ati.  717.  719,  2  Boyce,  164. 

m  wtU  impUed 

"Malice  aforethought,"  either  expressed 
or  implied,  is  manifested  by  the  doing  of  an 
unlawful  and  felonious  act  intentionally  and 
without  legal  cause  or  excuse.  It  does  not 
imply  a  pre-existing  hatred  or  enmity  toward 
the  individual  injured.  People  ▼.  Balk  well, 
76  Pac.  1017,  iei9,  14S  Cal.  259. 

The  Intent  essential  to  constitute  an  "as- 
sault with  intent  to  murder*'  relates  to  the 
condition  of  the  mind  of  accused,  and  it  may 
arise  from  improper  motives,  as  from  hatred 
toward  the  person  assaulted,  or  from  an  evil 
design  in  general,  a  wanton  and  depraved 
spirit,  a  mind  devoid  of  social  duty  and  fa- 
tally bent  on  mischief.  To  constitute  an  "as- 
sault with  intent  to  murder"  within  Gen.  St 
§  1146,  the  assault  must  be  made  with  in- 
tent to  kill,  and  when  an  assault  Is  actuated 
by  malice,  no  matter  how  short  a  time  it  ex- 
isted previous  to  the  forming  of  the  intent 
to  kill,  the  assault  committed  is  assault 
with  intent  to  murder.  State  v.  McGuire,  80 
Ati.  761,  84  Conn.  470,  88  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1045. 

"Malice  aforethought'*  is  manifested  by 
the  doing  of  an  unlawful  or  felonious  act  in- 
tentionally and  without  legal  cause  or  excuse. 
It  does  not  imply  a  pre-existing  hatred  or 
enmity  towards  the  individual  injured.  Peo- 
ple V.  Fallon,  86  Pac.  689,  690,  149  Cal.  287. 

Malloioiuly  distiiiBnialied 

In  a  prosecution  for  mayhem,  a  request 
for  a  charge  that  before  the  accused  could  be 
convicted,  the  jury  must  be  satisfled  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  act  was  done  un- 
lawfuly,  intentionally,  and  with  malice  afore- 
thought, was  properly  refused,  since  the  term 
"malice  aforethought"  is  not  necessarily  syn- 
oo^mous  with  "maliciously/'  as  used  by  the 


statute  defining  mayhem.  Green  v.  State,  44 
South.  194,  195,  151  Ala.  14,  125  Am.  St  Rep. 
17, 15  Ann.  Cas.  8L 

"MaUdously"  and  ""maUce  aforethought** 
do  not  mean  the  same  thing.  Malice  com- 
prehends ill  will,  a  wickedocM  of  disposition, 
cruelty,  recklessness,  a  mind  regardless  of 
social  duty,  etc.,  while  "malice  aforethought" 
or  "premeditated"  design  has  a  more  intoise 
meaning.  They  comprehend,  not  only  what  is 
included  within  the  term  "malice,"  but  in  ad- 
dition thereto  mean  "premeditated  malice.** 
Butt  V.  State,  47  South.  781,  783,  94  Miss.  669 
(citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4304;  1 
Bish.  Cr.  Law  [8th  Ed.]  p.  261 ;  Patterson  v. 
State,  66  Ind.  185;  Tutt  v.  Commonwealth, 
46  S.  W.  675,  104  Ky.  299;  State  v.  Green,  7 
South.  793,  42  La.  Ann.  644 ;  State  ▼.  Curtis. 
70  Mo.  58^ ;  Cravey  v.  State,  35  S.  W.  658, 
36  Tex.  Cr.  R.  90,  61  Am.  St  Rep.  833). 

icAuoE  nr  I.AW  on  faot 

Malice  in  law  is  not  personal  hate  or  ill 
wiU  of  one  person  towards  another.  It  refers 
to  that  state  of  mind  which  is  reckless  of  law 
and  the  legal  rights  of  the  citizens  in  a  pe^ 
son's  conduct  towards  that  dtiaen.  Foley  v. 
Northrup,  105  S.  W.  229,  230,  47  Tex.  Gr. 
App.  277. 

"Malice  in  fact**  is  a  spiteful  or  rancor- 
ous disposition  which  causes  an  act  to  be 
done  for  mischief,  and  is  always  a  question  of 
fact  for  the  jury.  Walker  y.  Cbanslor,  91 
Paa  606,  606,  153  Cal.  118,  17  L.  R.  A  (N. 
S.)  455,  126  Am.  St.  Rep.  61. 

In  an  action  for  slander,  "malice  in 
law*'  may  be  implied  from  facts  proved,  while 
•malice  in  fact"  is  actual  malice.  Davies  v. 
Starrett,  55  Ati:  516,  618,  07  Me.  668. 

"Malice  in  fact,*'  in  common  acceptatioii, 
means  ill  will  against  a  person,  while  malice 
In  law  is  a  wrong  done  against  a  person  in- 
tentionally. An  instruction,  in  an  action  for 
malicious  prosecution,  that  there  are  two 
kinds  of  malice,  malice  In  fact  and  malice  in 
law,  that  the  former  means  ill  will  against 
a  person,  and  the  latter  means  the  doing  of  a 
wrongful  act  intentionally,  and  that  if  de 
fendants  or  eltiier  of  them  were  moved  by 
ill  will  against  plaintiff,  or  the  prosecution 
of  him  was  wrongfully  caused  or  maintained 
by  them,  the  Jury  should  find  that  the  prose- 
cution was  malicious,  was  not  err^meous,  as 
permitting  a  recovery  if  the  prosecution  was 
wrongfully  maintained,  where  the  petitioD 
claimed  damages  for  the  malicious  continu- 
ance of  the  prosecution.  Carp  v.  Queen  Ins. 
Co.,  101  S.  W.  78,  97,  203  Mo.  295. 

''Malice,'*  as  usually  understood,  has  its 
foundation  in  ill  will,  and  is  evidenced  by  an 
attempt  wrongfully  to  vex,  injure,  or  annoy 
another.  This  is  "malice  in  fact,**  and  is 
that  referred  to  in  Pen.  Code,  i  7,  sabd.  4, 
declaring  that  the  words  '^malice**  and  "ma- 
liciously** import  a  wish  to  vex,  annoy,  or  in- 
jure another  person.   Thereis  another  sort  of 


MALICE  IN  LAW  OR  FACTT 


287 


MALICIOUS 


mflUce,  the  presumption  of  the  ezlstenoe  ot 
which  is  raised  by  the  law  in  certain  cases  on 
certain  proofs,  and  this  la  the  malice  describ- 
ed in  the  same  section  as  '*an  intent  to  do  a 
wrongful  act,  established  either  by  proof  or 
presumption  of  law."  This  la  a  malice  of 
pleading  and  proof  made  necessary  by  the  ex- 
igencies of  definitions  of  offenses  against  the 
law,  and  may  exist  with  malice  in  fact,  but 
may  also  exist  independent  thereof,  and  in 
fiome  instances  is  conclusively  presumed 
against  a  defendant,  while  In  others  the  pre- 
sumption Is  rebuttable.  Davis  v.  Herirst,  116 
Pac.  630,  687,  160  OaL  14& 

**Mallce  which  Is  presumed,'*  or  ''malice 
in  law,**  as  distinguished  from  "malice  In 
fact,*'  'is  not  personal  hate  or  111  will  of  one 
person  toward  another;  it  refers  to  that 
state  of  mind  which  is  reckless  of  law  and 
of  the  legal  rights  of  the  citizen  In  a  person's 
c  nduct  toward  that  citizen."  Shoemaker  ▼. 
Sonju,  106  N.  W.  42,  44,  15  N.  D.  518,  11 
Ann.  Cas.  1173. 

One  has  an  Inherent  right  to  dispose  of 
his  labor,  which  can  only  be  lawfully  inter- 
fered with  by  one  acting  in  the  exercise  of  an 
equal  or  superior  right  which  comes  In  con- 
flict therewith,  and  an  Intentional  interfer- 
ence with  such  right  without  lawful  Justifi- 
cation is  "malicious  In  law,"  even  if  it  springs 
from  good  motives  and  is  without  express  mal- 
ice. Berry  v.  IXonovan,  74  N.  E.  608,  604,  188 
Mass.  353,  5  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  899,  108  Am.  St 
Rep.  499,  8  Ann.  Cas.  738. 

In  an  action  for  alienation  of  a  husband's 
affections,  malice  Is  a  Jury  question  of  fact, 
and  not  one  of-  law.  Kelso  v.  Kelso,  86  N.  B. 
1001,  43  Ind.  App.  115. 

MAUOIOVS 

"The  legal  meaning  of  the  term  'mall- 
dons'  is  the  unintentional  doing  of  a  wrong- 
ful act  without  just  cause  or  excuse."  Mc- 
Namara  v.  St.  Louis  Transit  Co.,  81  S.  W. 
880,  881,  182  Mo.  676,  66  L.  R.  A.  486. 

Whatever  is  done  >vlllf  ully  and  purpos^y, 
be  it  at  the  same  time  wrong  and  unlawful, 
is,  in  legal  contemplation,  malicious.  Ander- 
son V.  International  Harvester  Ck>.  of  Ameri- 
ca, U6  N.  W.  101, 102,  104  Minn.  49,  16  L.  B. 
A.  (N.  S.)  440. 

Any  unlawful  act,  done  willfully  and 
parposely,  to  the  injury  of  another,  as  against 
that  person  is  "malicious"  in  a  legal  sense,  as 
such  term  is  used  in  the  law  of  malicious 
prosecution.  Plunimer  v.  Collins  (Del.)  77 
Aa  750,  751,  1  Boyce,  281. 

Kirby's  Dig.  i  1655,  provides  that  if  any 
person  shall  maliciously  gr  contemptuously 
disturb  or  disquiet  any  congregation  assem- 
bled in  any  churoh  for  religious  worship,  etc., 
he  shall,  on  convlc^bn,  be  fined,  etc.  Held, 
tluit  th^  words  "mallck>^"^and  "eont^ptu* 
ous^  refer  to*  the  manner  of  disturbance,  find 
not  to  the  intent  with  .which  tte  disturbance 


was  effected.    Walker  v..  State,  146  B.  W. 
862,  864,  108  Ark.  886. 

Under  the  Bankruptcy  Act  excepting 
from  liability  released  by  a  disdiarge  in 
bankruptcy  those  Incurred  for  "malicious"  in- 
jury to  the  property  of  another,  a  judg- 
ment for  taking  cattle  without  the  consent  of 
the  owner  and  appropriating  them  to  the 
bankrupt's  own  use  is  not  released.  Bever  v. 
Swe<ter,  116  N.  W.  704,  705,  706,  138  Iowa, 
72L 

In  a  legal  sento,  malice  lias  a  meaning 
different  from  its  popular  signification.  Acts 
willfully  and  designedly  done,  which  are  un- 
lawful, are  "malicious"  in  respect  to  those 
to  whom  they  are  injurious.  One  may  pros- 
ecute a  laudable  purpose  with  an  honest  in- 
tention, but  in  such  a  manner,  and  in  such 
disregard  of  the  rights  of  others,  as  to  render 
his  acts  unlawfuL  Prosecutions  may  be  in- 
stituted and  pursued  with  pure  motives,  to 
suppress  crimes,  but  so  regardless  of  estab- 
lished forma  of  law,  and  of  judicial  proceed- 
ings, as  to  render  the  transactiona  Illegal  and 
malidoua.  The  general  motive  may  be  up- 
right and  commendable,  while  the  particular 
acts  in  reference  to  others,  may  be  malicious, 
in  the  legal  acceptation  of  the  term,  so  that 
an  act  may  be  malicious  in  a  legal  sense, 
which  is  not  prompted  or  characterteed  by 
malevolence  or  corrupt  design.  Page  v. 
Cushing,  38  Me.  523,  526. 

In  a  prosecution  under  a  statute  making 
willful  and  malicious  misconduct  in  office 
a  misdemeanor,  the  cHulsslon  of  the  word 
"malicious"  from  the  information  is  immate- 
rial, when  the  acts  complained  of  neeessarily 
Involve  a  willful  disregard  of  the  obliga- 
tions owed  by  the  officer  to.  the  public.  State 
V.  Dlxen,  103  Pac  ISO,  131,  80  Kan.  650, 

Pen.  Code,  |  242,  defines  criminal  libel 
as  a  malicious  publication,  section  244  pro- 
vides that  a  publication  having  snch  tendency 
is  deemed  malicious  if  no  justification  or  ex- 
cuse is  shown,  and  section  718,  subd.  8,  pro- 
vides that  the  terms  "malice"  and  "mali- 
cious" each  import  an  evil  intent,  wish,  or  de- 
sign to  annoy  or  injure  another.  Held,  that 
a  corporation  may  be  convicted  of  criminal 
libel ;  the  evil  Intent  of  its  agents  who  pub- 
lished the  libel  being  attributed  torit  Peo- 
ple V.  Star  Co.,  120  N.  Y.  Supp.  498,  500,  135 
App.  Dlv.  517. 

"The  term  'malicious,'  used  In  this  con- 
nection [procuring  a  breach  of  contract],  is 
to  be  given  a  liberal  meaning.  The  lict  Is 
malicious  when  the  thing  done  is  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  plaintiff's  rights,  and  with 
the  intent  to  interfere  therewith.  It  is  a 
wanton  interference  with  another's  contrac- 
tual rights.  Ineffective  persuasion  to  Induce 
another  to  violate  his  contract  would  not  of 
itself  be  actionable,  but  if  the  peiuuasion  be 
used  for  the  purpose  of  injuring  the  plaintiff 
or  benefiting  the  defendant  at  the  expense  of 
the  plaintiff  I  with  a  knowledge  of  the  subsist- 


MALICIOUS 


239      MALICIOUS  ABUSE  OF  PROCESS 


«ace'of  the  contriict,  it  beoomes  a  maUdoas 
act,  and,  if  injury  en^nes  from  It,  a  cause 
of  action  accrues  to  the  injured  party."  Em- 
ploying Printers'  Club  v.  Doctor  Blosser  Co., 
60  S.  E.  363,  356,  122  Ga.  509,  69  L.  R.  A 
90, 106  Am.  St  Rep.  137,  2  Ann.  Cas.  694. 

The  word  "malidous,"  in  Rev.  St  1899, 

1  1959  [Ann.  St  1906,  p.  1325],  which  makes 
it  a  misdemeanor  for  any  one  to  "willfully 
and  maliciously,  or  wantonly  and  without 
right,"  enter  the  premises  of  another  and  de- 
stroy any  tree,  etc.,  means  an  unlawful  act, 
willfully  or  purposely  done  to  the  injury  of 
another,  and  to  authorize  the  conviction  of  one 
for  willfully  and  maliciously  injuring  trees 
of  another,  the  malicious  intent  must  he 
found.  State  v.  Graeme,  108  S.  W.  1131, 
1133,  130  Mo.  App.  138. 

The  word  "malicious,"  as  used  in  Or. 
Code,  div.  1,  I  203  (Kurd's  Rev.  St  1908,  p. 
762,  c.  38),  prohibiting  the  malicious  wound* 
Ing  of  any  domestic  animal,  the  property  of 
another,  is  not  used  in  the  sense  of  "wrong- 
fully, intentionally  and  withont  just  cause 
or  excuse,"  but  as  importing  actual  malice 
towards  the  owner,  as  distinguished  from 
a  spirit  of  cruelty  toward  the  animaL  Peo- 
ple V.  Jones,  89  N.  E.  752,  756,  241  111.  482,  16 
Ann.  Cas.  832  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases, 
p;  4307). 

Under  Rev.  St  1887,  |  7153,  making  the 
"malicious"  killing,  maiming,  or  wounding  of 
a  dog  an  offense,  the  word  "malicious,"  as 
used,  is  not  equivalent  to  the  word  "wrong- 
ful," as  used  in  the  law  of  torts.  The  former 
word  means  more  than  the  latter.  It  neces- 
sarily involves  crime,  while  the  latter  does 
not  necessarily  do  so.  State  v.  Churchill,  98 
Pac.  863,  867,  15  Idaho,  645,  16  Ann.  Cas. 
947  (citing  Chappell  v.  State,  35  Ark.  345; 
State  V.  Hussey,  60  Me.  410, 11  Am.  Rep.  209 ; 

2  Wharton's  Crlm.  Law,  §|  1068-1070;  State 
V.  Phipps,  64  N.  W.  411,  95  Iowa,  491;  Unit- 
ed States  V.  Gideon,  1  Minn.  292  [Gil.  226] ; 
State  V.  Rector,  34  Tex.  565). 

"Willful,"  hi  a  statute  against  libel,  is 
covered  by  "malicious"  in  an  indictment; 
the  latter  meaning  all  that  the  former  does, 
and  more.  Glover  v.  People,  68  N.  B.  464, 
466,  204  111.  170  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  1  Bishop,  (Mm.  Proc.  [3d  Ed.]  i  613). 

Under  section  245  of  the  Penal  Code, 
providing  that  any  malicious  publication  by 
picture,  effigy,  or  sign,  which  exposes  a  per- 
son to  contempt,  ridicule,  or  obloquy,  is  a 
libel,  "maliclouc^'  means  simply  "intention- 
al and  willfuL"  Roberson  v.  Rochester  Fold- 
ing Box  Co.,  64  N.  B.  442,  448,  171  N.  Y. 
538,  59  L.  R.  A  478,  89  Am.  St  Rep.  828. 

The  word  "malicious,"  as  ordinarily  em- 
ployed in  criminal  statutes,  is  the  equivalent 
of  wrongful,  intentional,  and  without  Just 
cause  or  excuse;  but,  as  used  in  many  stat- 
utes directed  against  the  unlawful  destruc- 
tion of  property.  It  is  held  to  have  a  restrict- 


ed meaning  peculiar  to  such  statutes,  imply- 
ing that  the  act  to  which  it  relates  must  have 
resulted  from  actual  111  will  or  revenge.  The 
special  meaning  noted  had  its  origin  in  Eng- 
land In  prosecutions  under  the  "Black  Act" 
(St  9  Geo.  I,  a  22),  enacted  in  1722,  so  caUed 
because  it  was  designed  to  repress  the  depre- 
dations of  marauders  calling  themselves 
"blacks."  The  act  provided  that,  if  any  per- 
son or  persons  shall  unlawfully  and  mali- 
<:liously  kill  or  wound  any  cattle,  etc.,  sodi 
persons  shall  be  adjudged  guilty  of  felony. 
It  was  ^eld  that  in  prosecutions  under  this 
act  for  injuries  to  cattle,  in  order  to  bring 
an  offender  within  the  law,  the  malice  must 
be  directed  iagainst  the  owner  of  the  cattle, 
and  not  merely  against  the  animal  itself. 
In  the  United  States  most  statutes  prescrib- 
ing a  penalty  for  the  malicious  destruction  of 
property  are  sufficiently  like  those  of  England 
to  warrant  the  inference  that  they  were  mod- 
eled on  them,  and  for  this  reason  they  have 
generally,  but  not  always,  been  given  the 
same  constructioa  But  the  effect  of  Crimes 
Act,  I  112  (Gen.  St  1901,  {  2105),  providing 
that  every  punishment  and  forfeiture  impos- 
ed on  any  person  maliciously  committing  any 
offense  prohibited  by  the  provision  of  pre- 
ceding sections  shall  equally  apply  and  be  in 
force,  whether  the  offense  shall  be  committed 
from  malice  conceived  against  the  owner  of 
property  in  respect  to  which  it  shall  be  com- 
mitted or  otherwise,  is  to  take  from  the  word 
"malicious"  the  specific  meaning  that  had 
been  attributed  to  it  in  laws  against  the  de- 
struction of  property,  and  restore  it  to  the 
usual  sense  in  which  it  is  used  In  criminal 
statutes.  State  v.  Boic«,  74  Pac.  680, 68  Kan. 
167,  Ann.  Caa  491. 

BCAI.ICIOV8  ABV8E  OF  FBOGE8S 

See,  also.  Abuse  of  Process. 
Malicious  prosecution  distinguished,  see 
Malicious  Prosecution. 

Begular  use  of  civil  process  does  not  be- 
come an  actionable  malicious  abuse  of  process 
by  being  used  with  a  bad  intent  TO  es- 
tablish actionable  malicious  abuse  of  dvll 
process,  there  must  appear  an  ulterior  par- 
pose  and  the  improper  use  of  process.  K^th- 
ley  V.  Stevens,  87  N.  E.  875,  876,  288  Dl.  199, 
128  Am.  St  Rep.  120. 

The  "malicious  suing  out  of  an  attach- 
ment" contemplates  a  wrongful  motive  in  the 
securing  of  the  issuance  of  the  attachment 
from  want  of  probable  cause  or  other  reasoo, 
while  an  *'abuse  of  process"  contemplates  the 
use  of  it  after  its  issue  for  a  wrongful  pur- 
pose, and  a  party  cannot  have  damages  for 
the  latter  offense  unless  the  process  issued 
was  perverted  to  a  purpose  not  intended  or 
contemplated  by  the  law.  Wright  v.  HarilB, 
76  S.  B.  489,  492,  160  N.  C.  642. 

The  regular  i^nd  legitimate  use  of  pro- 
cess, though  with  a  bad  intent  is  not  a 
"malicious  abuse  of  procesa"    Two  elements 


MAt/ICHOITS  AB08B  OF  PROOfiSS      23a 


MAUOIOOS  ntOBBODTIOH. 


are  oecessair  to  constitate  malidons  abuse 
of  legal  process :  First,  tbe  existence  of  an 
ulterior  purpose;  and,  second,  an  act  In  the 
use  of  a  process  not  proper  In  the  regular 
prosecution  of  the  proceeding.  To  constitute 
''malicious  abuse  of  process"  lawftOly  issued, 
it  must  be  used  for  a  purpose  not  intended 
by  law.  Ingalls  ▼.  Christopherton,  114  N. 
W.  TOi,  706^  21  &  D.  674  (quoting  1  CkH>l^. 
Torts  E3d  Bd.]  954). 

An  action  for  "malicious  use  of  process'* 
lies,  though  the  process  was  lawfully  Issued 
on  a  valid  judgment  for  a  Just  cause,  and  is 
ralid  in  form;  the  wrong  being  the  illegal 
and  malicious  abuso  of  the  power  conferred 
by  the  Judgment  and  the  writ  Gonsouland 
r.  Rosomano,  176  Fed.  481,  486,  100  O.  C.  A. 
97. 

KAUOIOUS  AOT 

In  general  a  malicious  act  InvolTes  all 
that  is  usually  understood  by  the  term  **will* 
fal,"  and  is  further  marked  by  either  hatred 
or  111  will  toward  the  party  Injured,  or  by 
snCh  utter  recklessness  and  disregard  of  the 
lights  of  others  as  denotes  a  corrupt  or 
maleyolent  dlqpocitlon.  State  ▼.  Willing,  106 
N.  W.  356^  856»  129  Iowa,  72. 

KALICXOnS  ▲TTAGHMEKt 

"Malldoufl  attachment*'  of  corporate  prop- 
erty is  not  a  personal  tort,  but  gives  rise  to 
a  cause  of  action  for  injury  to  property, 
which  passes  to  the  trustee  in  bankruptcy  of 
the  corporation.  Hansen  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
Wyman,  Partridge  &  Co.,  117  N.  W.  »26.  927, 
105  Minn.  491, 31  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  727. 

MAUCXOVS  HrjURT 

See  willful  and  Malicious  Injury. 

To  constitute  an  offense  under  Rev.  Pen. 
Code,  i  712,  punishing  the  *'maliclous  injury 
or  destruction  of  property,"  the  act  must  not 
only  be  done  willfully,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
avenging  some  wrong  sustained  by  the  per- 
son charged  with  the  offense.  One  who,  on 
becoming  angry  without  cause,  destroyed 
without  Justification  and  in  a  spirit  of  wan- 
touiess  the  property  of  another,  violated  Rev. 
Pen.  Code,  |  712,  punishing  the  malicious  In- 
jury or  destruction  of  property.  Stete  y. 
Tarlton,  118  N.  W.  706,  708,  22  S.  D.  495. 

A  willful  act  is  one  done  subject  to  the 
volition  and  will  of  the  doer  and  intentional- 
ly, and  a  willful  or  malicious  injury  is  one 
caused  by  design.  Willfulness  and  malice 
alike  import  intent,  and  the  characteristic 
element  of  "willful"  or  "malicious  injury*' 
Is  tbe  design  to  injure,  either  actually  en- 
tertained or  to  be  Implied  from  the  conduct 
and  circumstances.  Sharkey  ▼.  Skilton,  77 
AtL  950,  951,  83  Conn.  503. 

XALICXOUS  mSCHIBF 

Malice  in  malicious  mlschlet  see  Malice. 

Malicious  mischief  Includes  all  malicious 
physical  injuries  to  the  righto  of  another, 


whl^  imilair  utlHty  or  materially  diminish 
value.  Malice,  express  or  implied,  is  a  nec^ 
easary  ingredient  of  the  offense  of  malicious 
mischief,  though  the  malice  need  not  be 
spedflcally  to  the  owner  of  the  property  de- 
stroyed or  injured.  Willful  or  wanton  cruel- 
ty, or  injury  to  or  destruction  of  property, 
ffltminftted  under  such  circumstances  as  to 
indicate  a  malignant  spirit  of  mischief,  is 
suffldent  to  oonstltuto  the  offense  of  mall- 
douB  mlschlet  In  a  prosecution  for  mall- 
clous  mischief,  malice  may  be  shown  by  proof 
of  willful  and  wanton  acts,  or  it  may  be  in- 
ferred from  attendant  facte  and  drcumstanc- 
ea.  The  sawing  down  of  telegrai^i  poles  by 
defteidante  themselves,  or  by  some  unknown 
person  through  their  procurement,  would 
constitute  malicious  mischl^;  but  if  they,  ei- 
ther aa  principal  or  accomplice,  did  not  de- 
stroy or  injure  the  poles  or  wires  of  the  com- 
pany, acte  of  resistance  or  interference^ 
which  they  may  have  committed,  would  not 
be  sufficient  to  constitute  the  offense.  State 
V.  McCalllster  (DeL)  76  Aa  226»  229, 7  Penne- 
will,  301. 

Under  Revisal  1906,  |  8621,  making  It  a 
felony  for  one  to  maliciously  assault  another 
with  a  deadly  weapon  by  waylaying,  etc.,  and 
section  3291,  defining  a  misdemeanor  as  an 
offense  not  punishable  by  death  or  imprison- 
ment in  the  stete's  prison,  and  Acte  1870-71, 
p.  94,  e  48,  punishing  by  flue  or  imprison- 
ment a  person  convicted  of  an  assault,  with 
or  without  intent  to  klU,  a  prosecution  for  an 
assault  with  a  deadly  weapon  with  Intent  to 
kill  is  a  prosecution  for  a  misdemeanor,  and 
not  for  malicious  mischief;  deffned  by  section 
2676  as  willfully  injurii^^  personal  property 
with  malice  to  the  owner,  and  is  barred  in 
two  years  by  section  8147,  providing  that  all 
misdemeanors,  except  for  ''maUclous  mis- 
chief, and  other  maHdous  misdemeanors," 
diall  be  presented  within  two  years  after  the 
commission  of  tiie  same,  the  words  ''other 
malicious  misdemeanors"  being  Intended  to 
describe  an  off^se  of  which  malice  is  a 
necessary  ingredient,  as  in  the  case  of  mali- 
cious mischief.  Stete  v.  Frisbee,  66  8.  E. 
722,  724, 142  N.  a  67X 

KAIiZCXOnS  PR08ECIJTI0K 

Malice  in  malicious  prosecution,  see  Mal- 
ice. 

"Malicious  prosecution,*'  as  a  ground  of 
action,  must  be  both  malicious  and  without 
probable  cause.  Kendrick  v.  Cypert,  10 
Humph.  (29  Tenn.)  291,  294;  Hegan  Mantel 
Co.  V.  Alf ord  (Ky.)  114  &  W.  290,  29L 

A  malicious  prosecution  is  one  begun  in 
malice  without  probable  cause  to  believe  that 
it  can  succeed,  and  which  finally  fails. 
Schmidt  V.  Medical  Society  of  New  York 
County,  127  N.  Y.  Supp.  366,  867,  142  App. 
Dlv.  635;  Burt  v.  Smith,  73  N.  £.  495,  496, 
181N.  Y.  l«2An|],0as.  576.   . 


KALTCSOUfl  J»OS0OUTIOIC: 


340 


MALICIOUS  PROSEOUTIOH 


'  To  iecotet  tor  malieioaB  proselctitionf'  U 
must  be  averred  aUd  proved  that  tbe  pro^iecv- 
tion  was  instituted  maliciQusly  and  without 
probable  canae.  Webmeyer  v.  MalvibUl,  130 
S.  W.  681,  683,  150  Mo.  App.  107. 

To  constltdte  malicious  prosecution,  the 
arrest  complained  of  mnst^bave  been  made 
by  legal  process  and  the  prosecution  must 
have  been  Instigated  by  malice  and  without 
probable  cause.  Melntosb  v.  Bullard,  Eam- 
heart  &  Magness,  120  £k  W.  80,  87,  96  Ark. 
22T. 

In  order  to  recover  in  an  action  for 
"malicious  prosecution,"  plaintiff  must  allege 
and  prove  that  there  was  a  prosecution;  that 
it  terminated  in  his  favor;  that  defendants 
Were  the  prose<?utors;  '  that  they  were  actu- 
ate by  mailice ;  that  theve  was  want  of  proba- 
ble cause,  and  the  damages  sustained  by 
plaintiff.  Russell  v.  Chamberlain,  85  Pac 
026,  927,  12  Idaho,  209;  0  Ann.  Oas.  1173. 

To  maintain  an  action  for  malicious 
prosecution,  plaintiff  must  show  that  the 
prosecution  was  instigated  by  defendant, 
that  it  has  been  determined  in  plaintiff's  fa- 
vor, tiiat  there  was  no  probable  cause,- and 
that  defendant  acted  from  malice.  Orefice 
V.  Savarese,  118  N.  Y.  Supp.  175, 176,  61  Misc. 
Rep.  88. 

To  sustain  a  motion  for  ''malicious  pros- 
ecution," plaintiff  must  show  that  he  was 
prosecuted  for  a  criminal  offense  at  the  insti- 
gation  of  defendant,  who  had  no  probable 
cause  for  the  prosecution,  and  who  acted 
with  malice,  and  that  the  prosecution  termi- 
nated in  an  aoanittaL  A  sufficient  termina- 
tion of  the  prosecution  in  favor  of  plaintiff 
is  established  when  he  is  discharged  by  a 
magistrate,  either  because  of  insufficiency  of 
evidence,-  or  because  defendant  withdrew  the 
prosecution  or  failed  to  make  any  complaint 
or  to  appear.  Lack  of  probable  cause  is  not 
shown  by  the  abandonment  of  the  prosecu- 
tion, by  the  dismissal  of  the  charge  by  the 
prosecutor,  by  the  voluntary  discontinuance 
of  the  prosecution^  or  by  the  dismissal  for 
want  of  prosecution.  Sasse  v.  Rogers,  81 
N.  B,  600,  591.  40  Ind.  App.  107  (citing  Cott- 
rell  V.  CJottrell,  25  N.  E.  906,  126  Ind.  184; 
Sayles  v.  Briggs,  4  Mete.  [45  Mass.]  421; 
Moyle  V.  Drake,  6  N.  E.  520,  141  Mass.  238; 
Brown  v.  Randall,  36  Conn.  56,  4  Am.  Rep. 
35 ;  Cockfleld  v.  Braveboy  [S.  C]  2  McMul. 
270,  30  Am.  Dec.  123;  Flickinger  v.  Wagner, 
46  Md.  580). 

"In  an  action  for  'malicious  prosecution,' 
it  is  incumbent  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show 
that  there  was  no  probable  cause  for  the 
prosecution,  and  also  that  the  defendant  was 
actuated  by  malice  in  instituting  such  prose- 
3Ution.  There  must  he  want  of  probable 
cause  and  malice.  If  probable  cause  is 
shown,  then  the  question  of  malice  becomes 
immaterial,  because,  there  being  probable 
cause,  one  of  the  essential  elements  neces- 
sary to  maintain  the  action  is  disproved." 
Miller  v.  Lai,  71  Atl.  63,  77  N.  Jw  Law^  135. 


'Malicious  proseeution''  i»  '*a  wanton 
prosecution  made  by  a  prosecutor  in  a  crim- 
inal jproceeding,  without  probable  cause,  by 
a  regular  process  and  prooeeding,  which  the 
facts  do  not  warrant,  as  appears  by  the  re- 
sult" Harrington  v.  Tibbet,  76  Paa  816, 
817, 148  GaL  78  (quoting  Bouv.  Diet  [Bawles' 
Revised  Ed.]). 

Proof,  or  evidence  tending  to  prove  the 
following  facts,  is  essential  to  auttiorixe  the 
submission  of  a  cause  for  "malicious  prosecu- 
tion" to  a  jury :  First,  the  institution  or  pros- 
ecution by  the  defendant  of  the  proceedings 
complained  of;  second,, that  the  proceedings 
have  finally  terminated  in  favor  of  the  plain- 
tiff; third,  want  of  probable  cause  on  the 
part  of  defendant  to  believe  plaintiff  guilty 
of  the  offense  charged ;  fourth,  malice  on  the 
part  of  defendant  in  instituting  or  continu- 
ing the  prosecution.  Where  a  street  car  pas- 
senger tendered  a  defaced  nickel,  which  was 
all  the  money  he  had,  and  the  conductor  re- 
fused to  receive  it,  and  started  to  eject  him, 
and  the  passenger,  on  reaching  tiie  door,  of- 
fered resistanoe  and  prevented  his  removal 
by  a  scuffle,  but  without  fighting  or  oitering 
to  fight,  or  violent  language,  and  the  cou- 
ductor  called  a  policeman  and  had  the  pas- 
senger arrested  upon  the  charge  of  disturb- 
ing the  peace,  the  question  of  legal  malice, 
which  might  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that 
the  prosecution  was  intentional,  wrongful 
and  without  Justification  or  excuse,  was  for 
the  Jury.  Ruth  v.  St.  Louis  Transit  Co.,  71 
S.  W.  1055,  1068,  08  Mo.  App.  1. 

"Malice  and. the  want  of  probable  cause 
must  both  c6n(:ttr  to  support  the  charge  of 
'malicious  prosecution.'  Neither  is  alone  suffi- 
dent"  A  verdict  for  exemplary  damages 
for  a  wrongful  sequestration  is  authorized 
only  where  the  writ  was  sued  out  wrongful- 
ly, maliciously,  and  without  probable  cause. 
Lynch  v.  Burns  (Tex.)  79  S.  W.  1084,  1086 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Culbert- 
son  V.  Cabeen,  29  Tex.  256). 

Malice  and  want  of  probable  cause  ar^ 
essential  elements  which  must  concur  in  an 
action  for  ''malicious  prosecution,"  although 
the  former  may  be  an  inference  from  proof  of 
f^cts  establishing  want  of  probable  causa 
Jordan  v.  Chicago  A  A,  Ry.  Co.,  79  S.  W. 
1155,  1158.  105  Mo.  App.  446  (citlrig  Stubbs 
V.  Mulholland,  67  S.  W.  650,  168  Mo.  47; 
Sharpe  v.  Johnston,  50  Mo.  557). 

"Malicious  prosecution"  has  been  defined 
in  England  as  '*the  malicious  Institution 
against  another  of  criminal,  bankruptcy,  or 
liquidation  proceedings  without  reasonable 
and  probable  cause,"  and  not  confined  to  the 
malicious  institution  of  proceedings  strlctlj 
criminal.  K^ing  v.  D.  Sullivan  &  Co.  (Tex.) 
92  S.  W.  51,  52  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  Eraser,  Torts,  121). 

To  maintain  an=  action  for  ^malicious 
prosecution,"  thrf>e  things  are  necessary  to 
be  made  out  by,  the  plaintiff :  First,  a  want 


ICAUOIOUB  PROSEGfUTION 


341 


HAI4ICIOU8  PROaiSOUTIOl^ 


of  proWible  cause;  second,  maUoe  of  the  de- 
fendant; and,  tliird,  damage  to  plaintiff — 
and  tbat  malice  may  be  implied  from  the 
want  of  probable  cause,  but  this  implication 
maj  be  explained  and  repelled  by  facts  and 
ctrcnmstancea.  Jones  ▼.  Lonlstflle  ft  N.  B. 
Co.  (Ky.)  96  S.  W.  703  (dtlng  Wtied  ▼.  Weir 
[Ky.]  5  B.  Mon.  544). 

Halioe  and  want  of  probable  cause  must 
coexist  to  warrant  an  action  for  '^malldoas 
proeecntion/'  and,  where  it  is  shown  that 
the  prosecutor  consulted  the  prosecuting  at- 
torney in  good  faith,  communicated  to  him 
all  the  ascertainable  facts,  and  acted  on  his 
advice  in  instituting  the  criminal  proceeding, 
he  should  be  exonerated.  Pinsen  v.  Gamp- 
bell,  101  S.  W.  621,  624,  124  Mo.  App^  260. 

To  support  an  action  fOr  '"malicious  pros- 
ecntlon/'  plaintiff  must  show  that  the  one 
procuring  his  arrest  not  only  acted  mali- 
ciously but  without  probable  cause.  Malice 
may  be  inferred  from  want  of  probable 
cause,  but  probable  cause  cannot  be  inferred 
from  anything  else.  Where  one,  before  pro- 
curing the  arrest  6t  another,  laid  all '  the 
facts  on  which  he  based  his  prosecution  be- 
fore a  competent  attorney,  obtained  his  ad- 
vice that  the  prosecution  was  legal,  and  in 
good  faith  acted  on  the  advice,  it  is  a  com- 
plete defense  to  an  action  for  malicious 
prosecution.  National  Life  &  Accident  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Gibson  (Ky.)  101  S.  W.  805,  897,  12 
L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  717. 

To  Justify  an  action  for  "malicious  pros^ 
ecatiori,"  it  must  be  shown,  not  only  that 
there  was  a  lack  of  probable  cause  for  the 
criminal  prosecution  complained  of,  but  that 
it  was  instigated  maliciously.  Van  Meter  v. 
Bass,  90  Pac.  687,  638,  40  Colo.  78. 

In  a  suit  for  malicious  prosecution,  the 
essential  elements  are  the  commencement  or 
continuance  of  a  criminal  or  dvil  proceed- 
ing, that  defendant  caused  it  to  be  instituted 
or  continued,  its  bona  fide  termination  in 
favor  of  plaintiff;  the  absence  of  probable 
cause,  the  presence  of  malice,  and  damages  to 
defendant  Sawyer  v.  Shick,  120  Pac.  681,  30 
Okl.  353. 

In  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution, 
plahitiff  is  bound  to  prove  that  there  was  a 
prosecution  instituted  against  him  by  de- 
fendant as  alleged,  that  it  was  malicious  and 
without  probable  cause,  that  It  terminated  in 
plaintiff's  f^vor,  and  that  by  reason  thereof 
he  sustained  damage.  Plummer  ▼.  Collins 
(Del)  77  Atl.  760r  751,  1  Boyce,  281. 

FalM  imprlsoiiment  distinguished 

There  is  a  well-marked  distinction  be- 
tween an  action  for  false  Imprisonment  and 
an  action  for  "malicious  prosecution."  An 
action  for  false  Imprisoiuuent  may  be  main- 
tained wh^n  the  imprisonment  is  without  le- 
gal authority,  but,  where  there  Is  a  valid  or 
apparently  v^lid  power  to  arrest,  the  remedy 
is  by  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution. 
8  WDS.dc;  P.2d  Sbb.— 16 


The  want  of  lawful  authority  is  an  essen- 
tial element  in  an  action  for  false  imprison- 
ment Malice  and  wan^  of  probable  cause 
are  the  essentials  in  an  action  for  malicious 
prosecution.  Roberts  v.  ThomaSr  121  S.  W. 
961,  062,  135  Ky.  63,  21  Ann.  Caa.  4fia 

The  distinction  between  '^Ise  imprison- 
ment"  and  '"malicious  prosecution"  is  nhat 
'falae  imprisonment'  is  some  interf^:«noe 
with  the  personal  liberty  of  the  plaintiff 
wlii^  is  absolutely  unlawful  and  without 
authority.  'Malicious  prosecution'  is  in  pro- 
curing the  arrest  or  prosecution  under  law- 
ful proceos  on  the  forms  of  law,  but  from 
malicious  motives  and  without  probaible 
cause."  A  presiding  judge  of  an  election, 
who,  without  autliority,  arrests  and  detains  a 
voter,  is  liable  for  false  imprisooment,  though 
he  is  a  judidai  ofldcer  and  has  a  judicial  dia- 
cfetton  wltbla  prescribed  limita.  Smyth  v. 
Stote,  Mtt  8.  W.  880,  001,  61  Tez.  Cr.  R.  406 
((luotlng  and  adopting  the  definition  in  Her- 
zog  T.  Graham,  9  Lea  [77  Tenn.]  102). 

An  amendment  of  a  count  of  a  complaint 
for  "malicious  prosecution"  by  striking  out 
an  allegation  that  plaintiff  was  arrested  on 
a  warrant,  and  substituting  an  allegation 
that  she  was  arrested  and  held  without  a 
warrant,  changed  the  cause  of  action  stated, 
under  the  law  of  Alabama,  from  one  in  case 
for  "malicious  prosecution"  to  one  in  trespass 
for  "false  imprisonment,"  and  rendered  the 
charge  of  the  court,'  based  on  the  theory 
that  the  count  was  for  ''malicious  prosecu- 
tion," misleading  and  erroneous.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Go.  v.  Thompson,  144  Fed. 
678,  680,  75  O.  0.  A.  334. 

"False  imprisonment"  is  distinguished 
firom  "malicious  prosecution"  in  that  it  is,  as 
defined  by  Pen.  Code,  {  236,  an  unlawful  vio- 
lation of  another's  personal  liberty,  an  un- 
lawful arrest  or  detention  of  one  without 
warrant  or  by  an  illegal  warrant,  or  a  war- 
rant illegally  executed,  while  if  the  iVnprlson- 
ment  is  under  legal  process,  but  the  action 
has  been  commenced  and  carried  on  mali- 
ciously and  without  probable  cause.  It  is  a 
malicious  prosecution.  Donati  v.  Righetti, 
97  Pac.  1128,  1129,  9  Cal.  App.  46. 

Where  a  peace  officer  arrests  a  person 
without  process  and  takes  him  before  a  magis- 
trate, before  whom  be  files  a  written  com- 
plaint against  the  prisoner,  describing  no  of- 
fense against  the  law,  and  after  bearing  the 
person  is  set  at  liberty,  an  action  for  "ma- 
licious prosecution"  does  not  lie,  but  the  par- 
ty has  immediate  cause  of  action  for  false 
imprisonment.  Ilackler  v.  Miller,  112  N.  W. 
303,  79  Neb.  206. 

The  two  actions  ai  "fUse  imprisonment" 
and  "malicious  prosecution"  are  quite  die* 
tlnct  and  different.  "False  Imprisonment  is 
the  unlawful  violation  of  the  personal  liber- 
ty of  another"  (Pen.  Code,  i  236),  the  inter- 
ference with  the  personal  liberty  of  the  plain- 
tiff in  a  way  wpldoL  is  absolutely  unlawful 


MALICIOUS  PROSECUTION 


242 


MAIilCIOUSIiY 


and  without  authority.  "Malidons  proseca- 
tlon"  to  procuring  the  arrest  or  prosecution 
of  another  under  lawful  process,  but  from 
malicious  motives  and  without  probable  cause. 
The  provocation,  motive,  and  good  faith  of 
the  defendant,  in  an  action  for  tnlBe  impria- 
onment,  constitute  no  material  element  in 
the  case,  and  can  be  considered  only  where 
punitive  or  exemplaiy  damages  are  asked, 
and  then  only  as  affecting  the  meajsure  of 
such  damages.  On  the  other  hand,  malice 
and  want  of  probable  cause  are  the  gist  of 
the  action  for  malicious  prosecution.  With- 
out allegation  and  proof  of  both,  the  action 
will  faiL  No  one  can  recover  damages  for  a 
legal  arrest  and  conviction.  Therefore,  in 
cases  of  malicious  prosecution,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  await  the  final  determination  of 
the  action.  But  the  same  principle  does  not 
apply  to  an  action  for  false  imprisonment, 
as  the  form  of  action  is  based  upon  an  illegal 
arrest,  and  no  matter  ex  post  facto  can  le- 
galize an  act  which  was  illegal  at  the  time  it 
was  done.  From  this  it  will  be  seen  that 
one  of  the  essential  elements  of  a  complaint 
for  malicious  prosecution  is  that  the  pro- 
ceeding upon  which  it  is  based  has  finally 
terminated  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  while 
it  is  equally  apparent  that  this  is  not  a  nec- 
essary or  proper  allegation  In  an  action  for 
false  imprisonment  Neves  v.  Costa,  89  Pac 
860,  863,  6  CaL  App.  lU. 

MaUoiovs    ftlmse    of    prooess    dlstlnf- 
snlslied 

An  action  for  "malicious  prosecution" 
Is  distinguished  from  one  for  abuse  of  pro- 
cess in  that,  in  the  former,  malice*  want  of 
probable  cause,  and  termination  of  the  form- 
er proceedings  must  be  shown,  and  in  the 
latter  none  of  these,  but  an  ulterior  purpose 
and  an  act  in  the  use  of  the  process  not 
proper  in  the  regular  prosecution  of  the  pro- 
ceeding, must  be  shown.  Pittsburg,  J.,  E.  & 
E.  R.  Co.  V.  Wakefield  Hardware  Co.,  55  S. 
E.  422,  423,  143  N.  C.  64  (citing  Pittsburg,  J., 
E.  &  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Wakefield  Hardware  Co.,  50 
S.  B.  671,  138  N.  a  174,  3  Ann.  Cas.  720 ;  1 
Cooley,  Torts  [3d  Ed.]  354 ;  1  Jaggard,  Torts, 
I  203 ;  Hale,  Torts,  9  185 ;  Mayer  v.  Walter, 
64  Pa.  283;  Jackson  v.  American  Telephone 
A  Telegraph  Co.,  51  S.  B.  1016,  139  N.  C.  356, 
70  L.  R.  A.  738) ;  Pittsburg,  J.,  B.  &  E.  R. 
Co.  V.  Wakefield  Hardware  Co.,  50  S.  B.  571, 
573, 138  N.  C.  174,  8  Ann.  Cas.  720. 

There  is  a  clear  distinction  between  the 
malicious  prosecution  of  an  action  so  as  to 
interfere  with  another's  property  or  business, 
and  the  malicious  abuse  of  process,  which  is 
the  willful  and  wrongful  use  of  the  process 
itself,  and  does  not  require  a  termination 
of  the  suit  in  which  the  process  issued  to  be 
available  as  a  cause  of  actioa  Ludwick  v. 
Penny,  78  S.  B.  228,  231,  158  N.  C.  104. 

The  principal  distinction  between  an  ac- 
tion for  malicious  abuse  of  process  and  one 
for  malicious  prosecution  Is  that,  while  the 
former  lies  for  an  Improper  use  of' process 


after  It  Issues,  the  latter  is  grounded  on  a 
malicious  suing  out  of  the  process  without 
probable  cause.  Brantley  r.  Rhodes-Haverty 
Furniture  Co.,  62  8.  B.  222,  225,  181  Ga.  276. 

MAUmOVB     SETBR.AHOE     FBOK 
FRBSHOIiD 

The  words  "malicious  severance  from  the 
freehold,"  in  Kirby's  Dig.  1 1901,  prohibiting 
the  malicious  severance  from  the  freehold  of 
another  of  anything  attached  thereto,  do  not 
cover  the  act  of  a  tenant  in  removing  from 
the  outside  of  a  window  a  for  rent  sign  plac- 
ed there  by  the  landlord,  but  the  words  refer 
to  the  severance  of  things  attached  to  the 
freehold  as  a  part  thereof,  sach  as  produce 
of  the  soil,  timber,  structures,  or  fixtures 
thereto.  Whipple  v.  Gorsuch,  101  8.  W.  735, 
737,  82  Ark.  252,  10  I^  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  1133,  12 
Ann.  Cas.  38. 

BCAI.ZOZOV8  TRESPASS 

8ee  Injury  and  Malicious  Trespass  to 
Property. 

'^Malicious  treBDaaa^  or  injury  to  prop- 
erty has  been  defined  by  the  Legislature  to 
mean  a  wrongful,  intentional,  and  willful  in- 
Jury,  and  is  not  confined  to  cases  where  the 
ofl^ender  is  actuated  by  an  evil  animus  against 
the  owner  of  the  property  or  the  property 
itself  (Rev.  St  1809,  (  1989,  Ann.  8t.  1906.  p. 
1332).  State  v.  McKee,  104  8.  W.  486,  487, 
126  Mo.  App.  524. 

Crimes  Act,  1 107  (Gen.  8t  1901,  I  2100), 
defining  "malicious  trespass,"  reads:  "Eveej 
person  who  shall  willfully,  unlawfully  and 
maliciously  break,  destroy  or  injure  the  door 
or  window  of  any  dwelling  house,  shop,  store 
or  other  house  or  building,  or  sever  there- 
from or  from  any  gate,  fence  or  indosure,  or 
any  part  thereof,  any  material  of  which  it  is 
formed,  or  sever  from  the  freehold  any  prod- 
uce thereof,  or  anything  attached  thereto, 
or  shall  pull  down,  injure  or  destroy  any 
gate,  post  railing,  or  fence  or  any  part  there- 
of, or  cut  down,  lop,  girdle  or  otherwise  in- 
jure or  destroy  any  fruit  or  ornamental  or 
shade  trees,  being  the  property  of  another, 
shall,  on  conviction,  be  adjudged  guilty  of 
a  misdemeanor."  State  v.  Boies,  74  Pac.  630, 
68  Kan.  167,  1  Ann.  Caa.  491. 

KAUOIOVSLY 

"Maliciously"  means  and  implies  an  in- 
tention to  do  an  act  which  is  wrongful,  to 
the  detriment  of  another.  State  v.  Van  Pelt, 
49  S.  B.  177,  187,  136  N.  a  633,  68  L.  R.  A. 
760,  1  Ann.  Cas.  495. 

By  the  word  "maiiciously,**  as  used  In  an 
Indictment  for  slander  by  imputing  to  a  wo- 
man a  want  of  chastity,  is  meant. that  the 
words  must  have  been  so  uttered  as  to  imply 
by  defendant  an  evil  intent  or  legal  malice, 
or  without  reasonable  grounds  for  Ijelieving 
that  the  words  uttered  were  true.  Rainwa- 
ter V.  State,  81  S.  W.  88,  89,  46  Tex.  Cr.  R 
49a 


MALICIOUSIiT 


243 


HALICI0U8LT 


Where,  soon  after  a  strike  was  declared, 

the  employer  secured^  men  to  take  the  place 
of  the  strikers^  and  has  ever  since  had  an 
adequate  force,  and  is  not  taking  any  new 
meD«  and  of  the  eleven  men  who  left  the  env* 
ployment  eight  soon  secured  other  employ- 
ment in  the  same  kind  of  work,  and  three 
bave  left  the  commonwealth,  and  the  interna- 
tional organization  with  which  the  strikers' 
labor  nnion  was  affiliated  ceased  to  aid  their 
efforts  any  farther,  the  strike  was  ended  so 
that  thereafter  driving  a  wagon  through 
the  streets,  bearing  a  placard  announcing 
the  existence  of  a  strike,  was  manifestly 
intended  to  tn)ure  the  employer,  and  was 
done  "malicioasly*'  within  the  legal  meaning 
of  that  word.  M.  Steinert  ft  Sons  Ck>.  v. 
Tagen,  03  N.  B.  684,  686,  207  Mass.  804,  82 
U  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  1018. 

Bev.  St  1896,  |  4053,  defines  "maUce" 
and  ''maliciously'*  as  importing  a  wish  to  vex, 
annoy,  or  injure  another  person,  or  an  intent 
to  do  a  wrongful  act  Section  4427  provides 
that  every  person  who  willfully,  unlawfully, 
and  maliciously  adniinisters  any  poison  to  an 
animal,  the  property  of  another,  is  punish- 
able. Under  such  sections,  the  fact  that  the 
owner  of  a  dog  poisoned  by  defendant  was 
unknown  to  defendant  did  not  preclude  a 
finding  that  the  poison  was  administered  ma- 
liciously. State  y.  Coleman,  82  Pac.  465,  466, 
29  Utah.  417. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  every  per- 
son who  shall  maliciously  administer  or 
cause  to  be  administered  or  taken  any  de- 
structive substance,  with  intent  to  cause 
death,  shall  be  punished,  etc,  and  who  shall 
use  or  cause  to  be  used  any  instrument  with 
the  intention  to  procure  a  miscarriage  shall 
be  imprisoned,  etc.,  the  word  "maliciously^ 
is  not  applicable  to  the  offense  of  abortion  as 
thei^  defined.  Johnson  v.  People,  80  Pa& 
133, 135,  33  Ck>lo.  224, 108  Am.  St  Rep.  85. 

"Under  Pen.  Code,  art  4,  |  7,  defining  the 
words  'malice'  and  'malidoualy'  as  importing 
a  wish  to  vex,  annoy,  or  injure  another 
person,  or  an  intent  to  do  a  wrongful  act 
established  either  by  proof  or  prestunption 
of  law,"  where  a  defendant  was  on  trial  for 
assault  in  the  first  degree,  the  crime  involved 
a  specific  intent  as  the  gist  of  the  offense, 
and  it  was  error  for  the  court  to  instruct 
that,  when  an  unlawful  act  is  shown  to  have 
been  deliberately  committed  for  the  purpose 
of  injuring  another,  it  is  presumed  to  have 
been  committed  with  a  malicious  and  guilty 
intent,  and  the  law  presumes  that  a  person 
intends  the  ordinary  consequences  of  any 
iroluntary  act  committed  by  him.  State  v. 
Schaefer,  88  Pac.  T92,  793,  35  Mont  217. 

The  term  "maliciously  injuring,"  within 
Wis.  St  1898,  I  4466a,  which  imposes  pun- 
ishment or  fine  on  any  two  or  more  persons 
who  shall  combine  for  the  purpose  of  will- 
fully or  "maUdoosly  injuring"  another,  etc., 
is  intended  to  add  something  to  the  word 


"wtUfidly^'*  and  imports  doing  a  harm  ma- 
levolently for  the  sake  of  the  harm,  as  an  end 
in  itself,  and  not  as  a  means  to  some  further 
end  legitimately  desired.  Aikens  v.  Wiscon- 
sin, 25  Sup.  Ct  3,  6,  195  U.  S.  104,  49  L.  Ed. 
154. 

"The  word  'maliciously'  imports  'an  in- 
tent to  do  a  wrongful  act,' "  and  its  absence 
from  an  accusation  under  Pen.  Code,  §  415, 
for  disturbing  the  peace,  is  fully  supplied  by 
the  charge  that  defendant  willfully  and  un- 
lawfully disturbed  the  peace  by  fighting.  La- 
rue V.  Davies,  97  Pac  903,  904,  8  CaL  App. 
750. 

Where  a  statute  provides  that  every  per^ 
son  who  shall  willfully  and  maliciously  kill, 
maim,  or  disfigure  horses,  etc.,  shall  be  pun- 
ished, the  word  "maliciously"  Imports  a  crimi- 
nal motive,  intent,  or  purpose.  Roberts  v. 
United  States,  126  Fed.  897,  903,  61  C.  C.  A. 
427  (citing  Commonwealth  v.  Brooks,  9  Gray 
[75  Mass.]  303). 

''Maliciously,'*  as  used  in  Acts  1897,  p. 
267,  c.  106,  making  it  a  felony  for  any  one 
to  "maliciously"  cut  and  remove  timber,  for 
the  purpose  of  marketing,  from  the  lands  of 
another  without  the  owner's  consent,  does  not 
mean  actual  malice  toward  the  owner,  but 
is  used  in  the  broad  legal  sense  of  criminal 
intention  to  define  that  state  of  mind  of  a 
person  who  does  a  wrongful  act  intentionally 
or  willfully  and  without  legal  Justification 
or  excuse.  The  word  "feloniously"  fully  cov- 
ers the  meaning  of  "maliciously"  as  so  used, 
and  "feloniously,'*  as  defined  in  the  Century 
Dictionary,  means  "with  deliberate  Intent  to 
commit  a  wrongful  act  the  act  being  in  law 
such  as  constitutes  a  crime  of  the  class  term- 
ed 'felonies,'"  and  in  Webster's  Dictionary. 
"In  a  legal  sense,  done  with  the  intent  to 
commit  a  crime."  In  comparing  the  Judicial 
definitions  of  the  words  "felonious"  and  "fe- 
loniously" in  Words  and  Phrases  Judicially 
Defined,  vol.  3,  p.  2731  et  seq.,  with  the  defi- 
nition of  the  word  "malicious,"  in  volume  5 
of  the  same  work,  at  page  4307,  It  Is  found 
that  the  words  are  often  construed  to  have 
the  same  meaning,  namely,  "with  criminal 
intent,"  or  "with  intent  to  commit  crime." 
State  V.  Smith,  105  S.  W.  68,  69,  70, 119  Tenn. 
521. 

In  an  action  by  an  employ^  against  a 
third  party  for  wrongfully  causing  plaintifTs 
discharge  in  violation  of  contract,  the  decla- 
ration must  show  that  defendant  knew  of  the 
existence  of  such  contract  and  such  fact 
cannot  be  inferred  from  an  allegation  that  he 
"maliciously"  caused  plaintiff's  discharge, 
which  means  no  more  than  he  acted  willfully 
and  intentionally.  McGurk  v.  Cronenwett 
85  N.  B.  576,  577,  199  Mass.  457,  19  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  561. 

"Maliciously"  in  the  law  means  *1nten- 
tionally."  It  is  aot  sufficient,  to  sustain  an 
action  for  malicious  prosecution,  to  prove 
that  the  affidavit  upon  which  the  arrest  was 


MALIClCjUSLY 


244 


MALPRACrriCB 


made  was  false.  It  must  also  appearthat  the 
affiant  either  knows  it  was  ftilse,  or  did  not 
have  reasonable  and  probable  cause  to  be- 
lieve it  to  be  true.  Izzo  v.  Visconnt,  04  AtL 
95S,  954,  74  N.  J.  Law,  95. 

The  words  "willfully,"  "unlawfully," 
"feloniously,"  and  "maliciously"  import  only 
that  criminal  intent  which  is  the  necessary 
part  of  every  felony,  or  other  crime,  but  they 
<lo  not  necessarily  include  the  specilic  "pur- 
pose" to  do  the  act  which  is  an  element  of 
the  crime  charged,  Whether  the  Indictment 
is  on  a  statute  or  at  the  common  law,  it 
is  a  rule  universal  and  without  exception 
that  every  intent,  like  everything  else,  which 
the  law  makes  an  element  of  the  offense  must 
be  alleged,  for  otherwise  no  prima  facie  case 
appears.  Newby  r.  State,  106  N.  W.  1009, 
1100,  75  Neb.  88. 

Under  1  Mills'  Ann.  St  |i  1424, 1425,  pro- 
viding that,  if  any  person  shall  maliciously 
drive  cattle  from  their  usual  range,  he  shall 
be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and  shall  be  lia- 
ble to  the  party  injured,  the  word  "ma- 
liciously" means  wrongful  act  done  intention- 
ally, without  just  cause  or  excuse.  Richards 
V.  Sanderson,  89  Pac.  709,  771,  89  Colo.  270, 
121  Am.  St  Rep.  107. 

Under  Rev.  St  1899,  providing  that  it 
shall  not  be  necessary  to  show,  in  the  trial 
of  an  offense  for  malicious  injury  to  prop- 
erty specified  in  that  article,  that  the  of- 
fense was  committed  from  malice  conceived 
against  the  owner  of  the  property  or  against 
the  animal  or  property  itself,  but,  if  the  act 
was  wrongfully,  intentionally,  and  willftilly 
done,  it  may  be  inferred  it  was  done  mali- 
ciously, the  state  is  relieved  from  proving 
that  malice  was  held  toward  either  the  owner 
or  the  property,  but  in  both  secticms  1988 
and  1989  (Ann.  St  1906,  pp.  1332,  1833)  gen- 
eral malice  is  retained  as  an  element  and, 
though  it  may  be  inferred  from  certain  facts, 
it  is  not  necessarily  to  be  so  inferred,  and 
the  prohibited  offense  is  not  "willfully  and 
maliciously"  committed  unless  the  animal  is 
maimed,  beaten,  or  tortured  from  an  evil  im- 
pulse springing  from  a  state  of  mind  render- 
ing the  perpetrator  indifferent  to  the  suffer- 
ings of  the  animal  and  the  wrongful  quali- 
ty of  the  act  State  v.  Prater,  109  S.  W.  1047, 
1049,  130  Mo.  App.  348. 

ni  will  impUed 
Rev.  Codes  1905,  |  9315,  provides  that 
every  person  who  maliciously  injures,  defac- 
es, or  destroys  any  real  or  personal  property 
not  his  own  is  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor. 
Held,  that  the  word  "maliciously,"  as  so  used, 
should  have  a  restricted  meaning,  and  im- 
ports actual  ill  will  or  revenge  and  an  intent 
to  annoy  the  owner  of  the  property  injured. 
Stote  V.  Minor,  117  N.  W.  528,  17  N.  D.  454,' 19 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  278. 

As  wiili  malloe  aforetfcouglit 

In  a  prosecution  for  mayhem,  a  request 
for  a  charge  that,  before  the  accused  could  be 


convicted,  the  jury  must  be  satisfied  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt  that  the  act  was  done  xm- 
lawfuUy,  intentionally,  and  with  malice  afore- 
thought, was  properly  refused,  since  the  term 
"malice  aforethought"  is  not  necessarily 
synonymous  with  "maliciously,"  as  used  by 
the  statute  defining  mayhem.  Oreen  v.  State, 
44  South.  194,  195,  151  Ala.  14,  125  Am.  St 
Rep.  17, 15  Ann.  Cas.  81. 

"Maliciously"  and  "malice  aforethought- 
do  not  mean  the  same  thing.  Malice  compre- 
hends ill  will,  a  wickedness  of  disposition, 
cruelty,  recklessness,  a  mind  regardless  of  so- 
cial duty,  etc.,  while  "malice  aforethought" 
or  "premeditated"  desipi  has  a  more  intense 
meaning.  They  comprehend,  not  only  what 
is  included  within  the  term  "malice,"  but  in 
addition  thereto  mean  "premeditated  malice." 
Brett  V.  State,  47  South.  781,  788,  94  Miss.  068 
(citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4304;  1  Bish. 
Cr.  Law  [8th  Ed.]  p.  261;  Patterson  v.  State, 
66  Ind.  185;  Tutt  v.  Commonwealth,  46  S.  W. 
675,  104  Ky.  299;  State  v.  Green,  7  South. 
793,  42  La.  Ann.  644;  State  v.  Curtis,  70  Mo. 
594;  Cravey  v.  State,  35  S.  W.  658,  86  Tex. 
Cr.  R.  90,  61  Am.  St  Rep.  I 


MALIGNANT  PUSTULE 

As  disease,  see  Disease. 

"Malignant  pustule"  is  the  result  of  an 
infection  from  coming  in  contact  with  poison- 
ous animal  matter.  Delaney  v.  Modem  Acci- 
dent Club,  97  N.  W.  91,  94,  121  Iowa,  528,  63 
L.  R.  A.  603  (citing  Bacon  v.  United  States 
Mut  Ace.  Ass'n,  25  N.  £.  399,  123  N.  X.  304, 
9  L.  R.  A.  617,  20  Am.  St  Rep.  749. 

MALINGER 

The  term  "malinger"  means  to  f^gn  or 
induce  sickness,  and  a  malingerer  is  one  who 
feigns  or  induces  illness  to  avoid  service  or 
shirk  duty,  especially  a  soldier  or  sailor. 
Wells  V.  Missouri-Edison  Electric  Co.,  84  S. 
W.  204,  207,  108  Mo.  App.  607. 

MALPOSITION  OF  THE  JAW 

See   Correction   of  Malposition   of  the 
Jaw. 

MALPRACTICE 

Attorney 
Under  Code  Civ.  Proa  I  67;  providing 
that  any  attorney  guilty  of  any  deceit,  mal* 
practice,  crime,  or  misdemeanor  shall  be  dis- 
barred, an  attorney  who,  to  secure  his  fee, 
settles  with  a  party  against  whom  he  was  re- 
tained to  enforce  claims,  and  assigns  his  con- 
tracts with  his  clients  to  enforce  such  claims, 
and  notifies  them  to  settle  directly  with  the 
other  party,  agreeing  to  facilitate  any  settle- 
ment that  such  other  party  may  desire  to 
make,  is  guilty  of  "malpractice."  In  re  Clark, 
77  i^.  E.  1,HM64  N.  Y.  222.      ^ 


MALPRAOTICB 


24S 


MALT  LIQUOR 


An  attorney  yfho  persuades  a  client,  wlio 
cannot  nnderatand  BngHah,  to  repndiate  a 
settlement  in  an  action  and  to  rerlfy  a  reply 
eettlns  up  the  settlement,  when  tlie  attorney 
had  no  reasonable  expectation  of  supporting 
the  pleading  with  proof,  and  before  judgment 
is  rendered  against  his  client  brings  a  gar^ 
nlshment  suit  against  the  cUent*  who  does 
not  learn  of  the  suit  until  Judgment  is  taken 
against  him,  is  guilty  of  "malpractlGe.''  In 
re  Thatcher,  190  Ted.  969, 1010. 

FhyslelAm 

"'Malpractice'  is  the  had,  professional 
treatment  of  disease  or  bodily  injuries,  from 
reprehensible  ignorance  or  carelessness  or 
with  criminal  intent"  Where  a  patient,  be- 
fore an  operation,  is  not  suffering  f rmn  a  dis- 
location of  the  hip,  and  the  physician  diagno- 
ses the  patlait*s  trouble  as  a  partial  dislo- 
cation and  treats  her  for  such  dislocation, 
thereby  causing  great  pain  and  permanent  in- 
jury, the  physician  is  quUty  of  "malpractice." 
Grainger  v.  StlU,  85  8.  W.  1114.  1119,  187 
Mo.  197,  70  L.  R.  A.  49. 

MALT 

MALT  UQXrOB 

See  Fermented  and  Malt  Li<]iion;   Sub- 
stitute for  Malt  Liquor. 
See,  also,  Spirituous  Liquors. 

Where  a  beyerage  contained  no  alcohol, 
preservatives,  or  saccharine,  and  was  nonin- 
tozicating,  but  did  contain  6.73  per  cent  malt» 
it  was  a  "malt  liquor,"  within  Acts  1908,  c. 
115>  1 1.  prohibiting  the  sale  within  the  state 
of  any  vinous,  alcoholic,  malt,  intoxicating, 
or  spirituous  liquors.  Purity  Bxtract  &  Tonic 
Co.  V.  Lynch,  56  South.  316, 100  Miss.  660. 

Ky.  St  1909,  (  2557,  making  it  unlawful, 
after  a  local  option  election  resulting  in  a 
▼ote  against  sale  of  "spirituous,  vinous,  or 
malt  liquors,"  to  sell  any  such  liquors,  is  not, 
in  view  of  prior  judicial  construction  of  the 
words  in  prior  statutes  on  the  subject  violat- 
ed by  sale  of  malt  liquor  containing  less  than 
2  per  cent  of  alcohol,  and  nonintoxlcaiing  in 
the  largest  quantity  in  which  it  may  be 
di^nk.  City  of  Bowling  Green  v.  McMullen, 
122  S.  W.  823.  1S4  Ky.  742,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

m. 

The  words  **malt  liquor**  are  words  in 
common  and  ordinary  use  and  did  not  re- 
quire definition  in  a  prosecution  for  selling 
intoxicating  liquors.  It  was  not  necessary,  in 
prosecution  under  a  statute  forbidding  sale  of 
malt  liquor,  to  prove  that  malt  liquor  was 
Intoxicating.  State  v.  O'Connell,  58  Atl.  59, 
60, 99  Me.  61. 

Under  a  statute  imposing  a  tax  upon  the 
business  of  trafiOcking  in  spirituous,  vinous, 
malt,  or  other  intoxicating  liquors,  "malt  liq- 
uors," whether  inroxicatiug  or  not,  are  sub- 
ject to  the  tax.  La  Follette  v.  Murray,  81 
N.  £.  294,  295,  81  Ohio  St.  474. 


"Mal^  Bquors"  include  nonintozicating, 
as  well  as  intoxloating,  liquors.  Common- 
wealth T.  Goodwin,  64  &  n.  64,  66^  109  Va. 


The  generic  term  ''malt  liquors'*  in- 
cludes liquor  containing  any  percentage  of 
alcohol  as  the  product  of  malt  brewing, 
whether  the  product  is  intoxicating  or  not. 
La  FoUette  v.  Murray,  91  N.  B.  294,  295,  81 
Ohio  8t  474. 

"Malt  rose**  is  a  beverage  made  to  Imitate 
lager  beer,  having  the  same  general  color, 
taste,  and  appearance,  and  containing  from 
.74  to  1.18  per  cent,  of  alcohol.  It  is  a  fer- 
mented or  malt  liquor  within  liquor  tax  law 
(Laws  1897,  p.  207,  c.  312),  regulating  the 
sale  of  fermented  or  malt  liquors.  People  v. 
€ox,  94  N.  Y.  Supp.  526,  529,  106  App.  Div. 
299. 

The  term  "malt  liquors,**  as  used  in  Acts 
1910  (Ex.  Sees.)  No.  4,  to  define  the  meaning 
of  the  term  "grog  or  tippling  shop,**  in  prohi- 
bition districts,  includes  only  malt  liquors 
that  are  intoxicating.  State  y.  Maroun,  55 
South.  472,  473,  128  La.  829. 

"Malt  liqttors**  are  the  iwoduct  of  a  pro- 
cess by  which  grain  is  steeped  in  water  to  the 
peint  of  germination,  the  starch  being  thus 
converted  into  saccharine  matter,  which  is 
kiln  dried,  then  mixed  with  hops,  and  by  a 
further  process  of  brewing  made  into  a  bever- 
age; porter,  ale,  beer,  etc,  being  embraced 
within  the  expression.  Marks  v.  State,  48 
South.  864,  868,  159  Ala.  71,  133  Am.  St 
Rep.  20. 

The  term  "malt  liquors,**  as  used  in  the 
provision  of  article  229  of  tlie  (Constitution, 
whidi  reads,  "This  restriction  shall  not  apply 
to  dealers  in  distilled,  alcoholic  or  malt  liq- 
uors,** and  whereby  political  corporations, 
throughout  the  state,  are  left  free  to  impose 
license  taxes  upon  the  dealers  thus  mention- 
ed, without  regard  to  the  action  or  nonaction 
of  the  state  in  such  cases,  must  be  regarded 
as  applying  to  malt  liquors  which  are,  or  may 
be,  used  as  beverages,  and  which  are  intoxi- 
cating, and  as  having  no  application  to  malt 
liquors  which  are  not,  or  may  not  be,  so  used, 
and  are  not  intoxicating.  City  of  Shreveport 
V.  Smith,  57  South.  652,  653, 130  La.  126. 

Act  Sept  5,  1908  (Acts  1908,  p.  1112),  pro- 
viding a  revenue  for  the  development  and 
conduct  of  the  penitentiary  system,  and  to 
buy  farm  lands  and  equipment  as  needed  in 
the  management,  control,  and  employment  of 
convicts  by  requiring  a  license  of  all  persons 
manufacturing,  selling,  or  distributing  any 
imitation  of  beer,  ale,  wine,  whiskey,  or  other 
spirituous  or  malt  liquors,  as  used  In  that  ar- 
ticle providing  that  the  tax  on  malt  liquors 
shall  be  devoted  to  the  support  of  the  common 
schools,  has  referrence  to  and  is  intended  to 
Include  only  such  malt  liquors  as  are  intoxi- 
cating in  their  nature.  Carroll  v«  Wright,  63 
a  E.  260,  268,  131  Ga.  728. 


MALT  LIQUOft 


249 


MAN 


St.  1898,  c  1565c,  prohi^biUngtOkB  sale  of 
any  spirituous,  malt,  ardent,  or  into^lcatliig 
liquors  or  drinks  in  no-llcense  territory,  wben 
considered  in  connection  with  section  1565, 
as  amended  by  Laws  1905^  p.  520,  c.  d41,  pro- 
viding tbat  proof  of  the  sale  of  any  malt, 
spirituous,  Tinous,  or  distilled  liquor  shall  be 
deemed  proof  of  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liq- 
uors, etc,  is  violated  by  a  sale  of  malt  liq- 
uors or  drinks  which  are  the  product  where 
the  alcohol,  produced  by  fermentation,  of 
which  malting  is  a  preliminary  process,  re- 
mains in  the  liquor  drawn  off  from  the  malt, 
or  by  a  sale  of  spirituous  liquors  or  drinks 
which  are  the  product  where  the  alcohol  Is 
separated  by  distillation  so  that  the  liquor 
separated  contains  a  percentage  of  alcohol, 
or  by  a  sale  of  ardent  liquors  or  drinks,  or  by 
a  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  or  drinks,  and 
hence  a  sale  of  malt  liquor  containing  alcohol 
is  an  offense,  though  the  beverage  is  a  non- 
Intoxlcant.  Pennell  v.  State,  123  N.  W.  116, 
116, 141  Wis.  35. 

Under  Ky.  St  i  2557,  prohibiting  the 
sale  of  spirituous,  vinous,  and  malt  liquors 
in  local  option  territory,  a  sale  of  malt  liq- 
uor whether  it  intoxicates  some  people  or 
not  or  is  only  a  mild  intoxicant,  or  whether 
accused  believed  that  it  was  an  innocent  soft 
drink,  is  an  offense.  Flanders  y.  Ck>mmon- 
wealth,  180  S.  W.  809,  811,  140  Ky.  88. 

Byrd  Law  (Acts  1908,  pp.  27&-287,  c.  189) 
i  23Hf  defines  "malt  beverage''  a  nonintoxi- 
cating  liquor,  and  requires  the  manufacturer 
to  pay  a  special  license  tax  and  give  a  bond. 
Section  28  provides  that  the  act  shall  not  af- 
fect municipal  charter  provisions  respecting 
licenses.  Manassas  Charter  (Acts  1901-2,  p. 
216,  c  215;  Acts  1906,  p.  204,  c  128)  i  14, 
requires  the  payment  of  license  to  sell  "malt 
liquors.''  Held,  that  "malt  beverage"  is  a 
malt  liquor  within  the  charter  provision,  and 
that  compliance  with  the  Byrd  law  does  not 
avoid  necessity  for  complying  with  the  char- 
ter provision.  Commonwealth  v.  Qoodwin,  ({4 
S.  E.  64,  56,  109  Va.  82a 


The  term  "beer"  being  presumed  to  refer 
to  a  malt  liquor,  a  charge  of  illegally  selling 
malt  liquors  is  supported  by  evidence  of  the 
sale  of  beer,  although  the  specific  kind  of 
beer  is  not  shown.  Wilson  v.  State,  57  South. 
503,  3  Ala.  App.  158. 

The  courts  will  take  Judicial  notice  that 
lager  beer  is  a  "malt  liquor,"  the  sale  of 
which  is  prohibited  by  statute.  Purcell  v. 
State,  66  South.  847,  848,  61  Fla.  43. 

The  term  "malt  liquor,"  as  used  in  the 
Uquor  tax  law  (Laws  1897,  p.  207,  c.  312), 
regulating  the  sale  of  malt  liquors,  includes 
lager  beer.  Cullinan  v.  McGovern,  94  N.  Y. 
Supp.  526,  526. 

Common  beer  is  a  malt  liquor  within  Ky. 
St  I  2557,  prohibiting  the  sale  of  malt  liq- 


uors in  local  option  territoiy,  and  its  sale  Is 
prohibited  irrespective  of  the  label  on  the 
bottles  or  the  name  adopted.  Flanders  v. 
Commonwealth,  130  S.  W.  609,  811,  140  Ej. 

sa 

An  affidavit  diarging  accused  with  the 
nnlawfol  sale  of  a  "pint  of  beer'*  snfflcientlr 
alleged  a  sale  of  malt  liquor  so  as  to  render 
the  afildavit  sufllcient;  "beer"  being  a  f^r- 
mented  liqnor  or  a  malt  liquor  made  from 
malted  grain  or  hops  or  other  bitter  flavorsL 
Turner  v.  State,  93  N.  B.  225,  226,  175  Ind.  L 

Under  an  indictment  for  the  illegal  sale 
of  "malt  liquor,"  where  tlie  testimony  of  a 
witness  was  that  he  bought  "beer,"  it  suffi- 
ciently appeared  that  the  word  was  used  by 
the  witness  in  the  sense  of  malt  liquor. 
Locke  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.)  74  8.  W.  654, 
656;  State  v.  Gibbs,  128  N.  W.  810, 109  MiDO. 
247,  26  L.  E.  A.  (N.  &)  449. 

Older 

ader  is  not  a  "malt  liquor.**  Malt  liq- 
uors are  intoxicating  but  cannot  be  classed  as 
sjplrltuous.  Donithan  t.  Commonwealth,  61 
S.  E.  1050, 109  Va.  846. 

As  iatozieAtliiC  liqtunp 

See  Intoxicating  Llqaor« 

See  Liquor. 

MAIiT  B08E 

As  liquor,  see  Liquor;  Malt  Liquor. 

MALUM  IN  SE 

Acts  "malum  in  se^'  are  generally  regard- 
ed as  absolutely  void  in  the  sense  that  no 
right  or  claim  can  be  derived  from  thenu  In 
re  T.  H.  Bunch  Co.,  180  Fed.  519,  627. 

MAN 

See  Confidence  Man;   Reasonable  Man; 

Signal  Man. 
Bilan  in  charge  of  train,  see  (Conductor. 
Men  as  meaning  one,  see  Men. 

"Man"  is  a  term  to  designate  a  male  per- 
son over  21  years  of  age.    Hartsell  v.  State, 

116  S.  W.  1159,  55  Tex.  Cr.  R.  889;  White 
V.  Same  (Tex.)  161  S.  W.  826. 

An  instruction,  on  the  trial  of  a  man  for 
murder,  that  to  establish  the  defense  of  self- 
defense  it  must  appear  that  the  drcumstanc- 
es  were  sufficient  to  excite  the  fears  of  a 
reasonable  "man**  or  one  reasonably  coura- 
geous and  reasonably  self-possessed,  and  not 
of  a  coward,  is  not  erroneous  for  the  use  of  the 
word  "man/'  which  is  used  in  its  generic 
sense.    Anderson  v.  State,  43  S.  B.  835,  836, 

117  Ga.  266. 

Minor 

Under  Pub.  St  1901,  c.  278,  i  16^  provid- 
ing  that,  if  any  man  shall  unlawfully  and 
carnally  know  any  woman  child  undo:  the 


MAK  OF  OTBAW 


247 


MAXAOBMXNT: 


age  of  16  yean»  he  sliall  be  ImiiriflOBed,  ete.» 
tbe  word  "man**  tnclndes  persoDe  of  tbe  male 
sex  who  are  capable  of  eommitting  rape,  and 
la  not  limited  to  adult  males.  8tate  t.  Burt, 
71  Aa  30^  75  N.  H.  64,  Ann.  Oaa.  1912A,  282. 

KAH  OF  8TBAW 

See  Straw  Man. 

MANAGE 

See  InTeet  and  Manage;    Mismanage — 
Mismanagement 

The  general  power  to  "manage"  their 
**real  or  personal  estate  as  if  sole  "  given  to 
married  women  by  Rev,  St  c.  61,  i  1,  in- 
cludes that  of  submitting  to  arbitration  a 
question  of  damages  for  the  flowage  of  their 
s^mrate  lands,  and  of  covenanting  to  abide 
the  award.  Daren  t.  QetcheU,  66  Me.  2il» 
248. 

The  phrase  "managed  and  cared  for  by 
them*'  hi  a  will  whereby  testator  gave  his 
lesidaary  estate  to  his  son  to  be  held  in 
trust  by  his  execntors  and  "managed  and 
cared  for  by  them"  for  his  son's  benefit,  un- 
til he  arrived  at  a  designated  age,  eta,  im- 
plies that  the  executors  should  receive  the 
rents  and  profits.  Higglns  v.  Downs,  91  N. 
Y.  Supp.  087,  038,  101  App.  Div.  110. 

As  eoadvet  ov  earry  on 

The  words  "manage,  control,  invest  and 
reinvest"  as  used  in  a  will  whereby  testator 
conferred  on  his  executors  power  to  "man- 
age, control,  invest  and  reinvest"  the  resid- 
uaiy  estate  and  the  Income  thereof,  and  sell 
or  convey  all  or  any  part  thereof,  with  or 
without  covenants,  in  their  discretion,  did  not 
warrant  the  executors  in  carrying  on  the 
business  of  a  corporation  in  which  testator 
had  invested,  so  that  he  owned  nearly  all 
of  its  stock  and  bonds,  especially  in  view  of 
a  codicil  commanding  the  executors  to  incur 
no  debts  except  in  liquidation  of  debts  ou^ 
standing  at  testator's  decease.  In  re  Gor- 
bin's  Will,  01  N.  Y.  Supp.  707,  700.  101  App. 
Dlv.25. 

As  eomtvol 

Under  Civ.  Gode^  i  857,  subd.  1,  author- 
izing a  trust  to  sell  realty  and  apply  or  dis- 
pose of  the  proceeds,  in  accordance  with  the 
trost  instrument  where  a  trust  deed,  besides 
empowering  the  trustee  to  sell  the  property 
to  obtain  money  for  the  payment  of  the  in- 
debtedness, also  emi)owered  him  to  manage 
tlie  same,  the  word  "manage"  gave  only  such 
control  of  the  property  as  was  proper  in  the 
lawful  execution  of  a  trust  created  as  securi- 
ty for  an  indebtedness.  Younger  v.  Moore, 
103  Fac..221,  223,  155  CaL  767. 

The  word  "manage"  means  to  direct  con- 
trol, govern,  administer,  or  oversee.  Under 
ClT.  Code,  i  857,  subd.  3,  authorizing  the 
cieatlon  of  a  trust  to  receive  rents  and  prof- 
its of  real  property  and  pay  them  to  or  apply 
them  to  the  use  of  apy  person,  and  section 


883,  proHAing  that  when  a  trust  is  created 
the  whole  estate  is  vested  in  the  trustee^  snb> 
Ject  to. the  trust  a  trust  may  be  created  to 
'^manage"  property  and  to  collect  the  income, 
issues,  and  profits  thereof  and  pay  them  to 
specific  persons,  though  the  word  *'manage" 
is  not  mentioned  In  the  section  authorizing 
the  creation  of  the  trust  In  re  Heywood's 
Estate,  82  Pac  755,  757,  148  CaL  184. 

MANAGEMSarr 

See  Exclusive  Management  and  Ck)ntrol; 
Fraud  in  Management;  Sole  Manage- 
ment; Under  the  Ck)ntrol,  Management 
or  Operation. 

Intrusted  with  management  see  Intrust 

Since  a  conviction  of  a  violation  of  Act 
April  26,  1000  (Laws  1000,  c.  106),  punishing 
one  who  shall  engage  or  assist  In  operating  or 
managing  any  house  of  prostitution,  cannot 
be  had  unless  it  is  shown  that  accused  had 
control  of  and  conducted  or  assisted  in  the 
management  and  operation  of  the  affairs  of 
the  house  in  some  manner,  or  that  he  was 
able  to  bring  about  or  assist  In  bringing 
about  prostitution,  a  charge  that  If  accused 
in  any  manner  aided  or  abetted  a  third  pei^ 
son  In  the  management  of  the  house  he  is 
guilty  is  erroneous;  the  word  ''management" 
meaning  the  act  of  managing;  the  manner  of 
treating,  directing,  carrying  on,  or  using  for 
a  purpose.  Trozzo  v.  People,  117  Pac.  150, 
154,  51  Colo.  823. 

Managft'ient  aad  emtrol 

The  words  "management  and  control," 
as  used  in  Rev.  St  1887,  i  2408,  relating  to 
the  management  and  control  by  a  husband 
of  his  wife's  separate  property,  have  a  well- 
defined  meaning,  and  under  the  provisions  of 
section  15  must  be  construed  according  to 
the  context  and  approved  usage  of  the  lan- 
guage. The  power  to  manage  implies  the 
power  to  controL  To  manage  money  is  to 
employ  or  invest  it  The  word  "control" 
means  to  have  authority  over  a  particular 
matter  or  thing,  and  the  phrase  "manage- 
ment and  control"  implies  the  possession  of 
the  thing  managed  or  controlled,  or  the  right 
to  the  possession  thereof.  Sencerbox  v.  First 
Nat  Bank  of  Idaho,  03  Pac.  360,  371,  14  Ida- 
ho, 05  (citing  2  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  1540; 
5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4317). 

Maumgeiaent  of  Tessel 

The  unloading  of  cargo  in  the  port  of 
discharge  by  stevedores  has  no  relation  to  the 
"management  of  the  vessel"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  third  section  of  the  Barter  Act 
(Act  Feb.  13, 1803,  c.  105,  26  St  445),  not  being 
an  act  done  with  any  view  of  such  manage- 
ment, but  relates  to  the  care  or  delivery  of 
cargo  within  the  meaning  of  the  first  sec- 
tion. The  Germanic,  124  Fed.  1, 4,  5,^50  C.  G. 
A.  521. 

The  negligent  failure  of  the  master  of  a 
vessel  to  make  proper  use  of  the  ventilating 
apparatus  during  the  course  of  a  9ye  months' 


UANAaEMSNT 


248 


ICANAOEE  Tt 


Toyag€,  by  rea^n  of  which,  and^the  pres- 
ence in  the  cargo  of  a  large  quantity  of  coke, 
the  wicker  or  straw  coverings  on  a  large 
nnniber  of  wine  bottles  were  sweated  and 
ruined,  was  not  a  fault  or  error  in  the  man- 
agement of  the  Tessel,  within  the  meaning  of 
Harter  Act  Feb.  13,  1893,  c.  106,  §  3,  but 
''negligence,  fault,  or  failure  in  proper 
♦  ♦  •  care  of  ♦  ♦  ♦  merchandise  or 
property"  within  section  1,  for  which  the 
owner  of  the  vessel  is  liable.  The  Jean  Bart, 
107  Fed.  1002,  1005. 

Where  a  ship  was  at  the  commencement 
of  a  voyage  in  all  respects  seaworthy  and 
properly  manned  and  supplied^  damage  to  a 
sugar  cargo  from  fresh  water  which  escaped 
into  the  hold  where  the  sugar  was  stowed 
wliile  the  cargo  was  being  discharged,  by  rea- 
son of  a  valve  having  been  improperly  left 
open  while  water  from  the  river  was  being 
pumped  into  the  engine  tank,  was  due  to  a 
fault  in  the  "management"  of  the  vessel,  for 
which  she  is  exempt  from  liability  by  section 
3  of  the  Harter  act  (Act  Feb.  18,  1803,  c.  106, 
27  Stat  446,  providing  that,  if  the  owner  of 
any  vessel  transporting  merchandise  or  prop- 
erty to  or  from  any  port  in  the  United  States 
shall  exercise  due  diligence  to  make  the  ves- 
sel seaworthy  and  properly  manned,  equip- 
ped, and  supplied,  neither  the  vessel,  her 
owner  or  owners,  agent  or  charterers,  shall 
be  responsible  for  the  damage  resulting  in 
the  management  of  the  vessel.  The  Wild- 
croft,  130  Fed.  621,  627,  06  C.  0.  A.  145:  Id., 
124  Fed.  031,  037. 

The  action  of  the  master  of  a  vessel  in 
permitting  whale  oil,  which  leaked  from  bar- 
rels, to  remain  in  the  bilges,  with  the  object 
of  saving  it  at  the  end  of  the  voyage,  did  not 
pertain  to  the  "management  of  the  vessel/' 
within  section  8  of  the  Harter  act  (Act  Feb. 
13,  1803.  c.  105,  27  Stat  44^9;  but  injury  to 
other  cargo  from  such  oil  arose  from  "failure 
in  proper  care  of  the  cargo,"  within  section  1, 
for  which  the  vessel  was  liable.  The  Per- 
siana,  185  Fed.  806,  397, 107  G.  G.  A.  416. 

The  tipping  of  a  vessel  by  the  head  by 
the  master  while  discharging  cargo  for  the 
purpose  of  examining  her  propeller,  and  hav- 
ing nothing  to  do  with  the  discharge  of  the 
cargo,  was  an  act  of  management  of  the  ship 
within  section  3  of  the  Harter  act  (Act  Feb. 
13,  1803,  c.  105,  27  Stat  445),  and,  where  the 
owner  had  complied  with  the  requirements 
of  said  section  at  the  commencement  of  the 
voyage  neither  he  nor  the  vessel  Is  liable  for 
%  resulting  injury  to  the  cargo.  The  Indra- 
ni,  177  Fed.  014,  915,  101  G.  G.  A.  194. 

Operation  and  control  •jnonjia.onm 

In  an  action  against  an  abutting  owner 
for  injuries  from  defects  in  the  cover  of  a 
coal  hole.  Where  the  complaint  predicates 
negligence  of  the  defendant  in  the  manage- 
ment, operation,  and  control  of  the  sidewalk, 
and  in  keeping  the  coal  hole  in  defective  or- 
der, and  in  failing  to  provide  proper  warning 


as  to  the  defective  state  of  the  coal  hole  cov- 
er, there  is  no  legal  differentiation  between 
the  terms  ''management"  "operation,'*  and 
"control,"  and  any  <m^  of  them  would  be  suf- 
ficient to  Justi^  the  admission  of  testimony 
to  sustain  a  delinquency  intended  to  be  cliarg- 
ed.  Maldosky  ▼•  Germania  Bank,  127  N.  Y. 
Supp.  202,  208. 

MANAGER 

See  General  Manager;  Mine  Blanager. 

Since  a  conviction  of  a  violation  of  Act 
April  26,  1000  (Laws  1900,  c.  196),  punishing 
one  who  shall  engage  or  assist  in  operating 
or  managing  any  house  of  prostitution,  can- 
not be  had  unless  it  is  shown  that  accused 
had  control  of  and  conducted  or  assisted  in 
the  management  and  operation  of  the  affalr» 
of  the  house  in  some  manner,  or  that  he  was 
able  to  bring  about  or  assist  in  brlnglug 
about  prostitution,  a  charge  that  if  accused 
in  any  manner  aided  or  abetted  a  third  per- 
son in  the  management  of  the  house  he  Ls^ 
guilty  is  erroneous;  the  word  ^'management" 
meaning  the  act  of  managing;  the  manner 
of  treating,  directing,  carrying  on,  or  using 
for  a  purpose;  and  the  word  ^operate^'  mean- 
ing to  put  into  or  to  continue  in  operation  or 
activity;  the  word  ''manager"  meaning  one 
who  has  the  conduct  or  direction  of  anything: 
and  the  phrase  *'to  carry  on,"  when  applied 
to  business,  meaning  to  prosecute,  to  help  for- 
ward, to  continue,  etc.  Trozzo  v.  People,  117 
Pac.  150,  154,  51  Colo.  323. 

Sess.  Acts  1001,  p.  210,  I  1,  requires  tbe 
owner,  proprietor,  lessee,. or  "keeper"  of  of- 
fice buildings,  etc.,  more  than  three  stories 
high,  to  provide  fire  escapes.  Section  & 
makes  the  owner,  proprietor,  lessee,  or  "man- 
ager" of  a  building,  required  to  be  equipped 
with  fire  escapes,  who  neglects  for  60  days 
after  the  act  becomes  effective  to  comply 
with  the  act  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.  Acts 
1003,  pp.  251,  252,  repealed  the  first  three  sec- 
tions of  the  act  and  enacted  new  sections  in 
their  place,  but  section  1  of  the  act  as  amend- 
ed required  the  owner,  proprietor,  lessee  or 
keeper  of  such  buildings  to  provide  escapes 
as  in  the  original  act.  Section  2  provided 
that,  if  a  fire  escape  was  found  upon  inspec- 
tion to  be  unsafe,  the  owner,  proprietor,  les- 
see, or  keeper  should  repair  it,  and  section  5 
remained  unchanged.  Held,  that  the  words 
"manager  of  a  building"  did  not  necessarily 
mean  the  same  as  '^keeper  of  a  building,"  or 
denote  any  particular  duties  in  relation  to 
the  building,  and  one  charged  as  manager  of 
a  building  with  violating  the  act  could  not 
be  convicted,  In  the  absence  of  evidence 
showing  that  his  duties  made  him  a  keeper 
of  the  building.  State  ▼.  Gook  (Mo.)  128  S. 
W.  212,  213. 

Condnetor  and  manager 

The  words  "conductor"  and  "manager," 
used  in  Ky.  St  i|  705-800,  requiring  segre- 
gation of  white  and  negro  passengers,  and  re- 
quiring the  conductor  or  manager  to  see  tbat 


MANAGSR 


fi49 


MANAGING  ▲GBNT 


the  statute  is  obeyed,  mean  the  same  person, 
except  where  one  not  designated  as  condoc- 
tor  Is  in  charge  of  a  train.  Lonis^ille  ft  N. 
IL  Go.  y.  R^ifro's  Adm'r,  135  S.  W.  266^  268, 
142  Ky.  S90,  83  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  138. 

As  eatployt  or  laborev 

See  Etoploy^;  Laborer. 
As  mi»Mg<«g  ftSMtt 

See  Managing  Agent 
As  olftoer  of  oorporatlom 

See  Officer  (OC  Corporation). 
As  workauia 

See  Workman. 


ger  of  oovporatlom 

The  word  "manager"  imports  agency, 
control,  and  authority  presumptively  soffl- 
cient  to  bind  a  corporation  on  a  bond  given  on 
certiorari  to  review  a  Judgment  of  a  Justice 
of  the  peace.  The  term  ''manager/'  as  ap- 
plied to  a  private  corporation,  Indicates  one 
who  has  the  general  direction  and  control  of 
its  affairs,  ancl,  when  used  in  connection 
with  the  seal.  Imports  authority  to  sign  in 
behalf  of  the  corporation.  American  Inv. 
Go.  V.  Gable  Co.,  60  S.  B.  1037,  1038,  4  Ga. 
App.  106. 

The  president,  treasurer,  and  secretary 
of  a  stodc  corporation  governed  by  General 
Corporation  Law  (Consol.  Laws  1000,  a  28) 
fi  3,  34,  43,  and  Stock  Corporation  Law 
(Consol.  Laws  1909,  c.  09)  I  30,  vesting  the 
management  of  such  corporations  In  a  board 
of  directors  with  authority  to  appoint  officers 
with  defined  powers  and  duties,  are  not  In 
the  absence  of  evidence  of  their  powers  and 
duties,  within  Pen.  Code,  i  246,  making  every 
manager  of  a  corporation  by  which  a  libel  is 
published  chargeable  with  the  publication 
thereof,  though  under  sections  242  and  244 
it  may  be  conceded  that  the  intent  to  publish 
a  libelous  article  constitutes  the  criminal  in- 
tent essential  to  constitute  criminal  liability, 
for  the  term  "manager"  does  not  embrace  the 
officers  of  a  corporation  as  sudi  with  au- 
thority to  pi^vent  a  libelous  publication  and 
to  publish  a  disavowal  thereof.  People  ex 
reL  Carvalho  v.  Warden  of  City  Prison,  128 
N.  Y.  Supp.  837,  -840,  144  App.  Div.  24. 

The  term  "manager"  is  defined  as  •'a 
person  appointed  or  elected  to  manage  the  af- 
fairs of  another.  The  term  is  applied  to 
those  officers  of  a  corporation  who  are  au- 
thorized to  manage  its  affairs."  State  v. 
Eyermann.  90  S.  W.  1168,  1169,  116  Mo.  App. 

ceo. 

Laws  1901,  p.  73,  provides  that  the  man- 
ager, etc.,  of  any  building  or  establishment 
from  which  dense  smoke  is  emitted  shall  l>e 
deemed  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.  Held,  that 
one  who  was  the  secretary  and  purchasing 
agent  of  a  company,  and  who  had  charge  of 
its  manufacturing  department,  and  exercised 
BQperrislon  over  the  engine  room,  and  who 
was  regarded  by  other  employes  and  officers 


as  a  de  facto  president,  was  ''manager^  of 
the  concern  within  the  statute.  State  v. 
Hemenover,  87  8.  W.  482,  188  Mo.  381,  483. 

Managw  of  tkeater 

A  ticket  taker  at  a  theater  is  not  a  *'per- 
son  who  manages  the  theater"  in  part  with- 
in Pen.  Code,  I  290,  declaring  a  person  who 
permits  to  remain  in  any  theater  owned,  kept, 
or  managed  by  him  in  whole  or  in  part  any 
child  under  the  age  of  16  years,  unless  accom- 
panied by  its  parent,  guilty  of  a  misdemean- 
or. People  ex  rel.  Jacques  v.  Flaherty,  107 
N.  Y.  Supp.  415,  416,  122  App.  Div.  878;  Id., 
84  N.  E.  1118,  191  N.  T.  625. 

PvUlskev  syaonymoi&s 

The  fact  that  a  person  making  an  affida- 
vit of  publication  of  process  in  a  newspaper 
signs  himself  ''publisher"  instead  of  "editor,** 
"proprietor,"  or  "manager,"  does  not  make 
proof  of  publication  defective,  though  the 
statute  requires  that  the  proof  shall  be  made 
by  the  "editor,"  "proprietor,"  or  "manager" 
of  the  newspaper;  the  word  "publisher"  be- 
ing used  in  the  sense  of  proprietor  or  man- 
ager. Stuart  V.  Cole,  92  S.  W.  1040, 1042,  42 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  47& 

MAMAODie 

See  Running,  Conducting,  or  Managing. 

MAXAODIO  AOBMT 

"Managing"  means  to  have  under  control 
and  direction;  to  guide;  and  employes  in 
charge  of  the  stopping  and  starting  of  a  train 
are  "managing"  it,  within  Mills'  St  i  1608. 
Whittle  V.  Denver  k  R.  O.  R.  Co.,  118  Pac 
971,  972,  61  Colo.  382. 

Where  a  domestic  corporation  has  onl,\ 
one  agent  residing  in  this  state,  he  will  bv 
held  to  be  its  "managing  agent"  within  Rev. 
St  §  2637,  subd.  10,  providing  that  in  an  ac- 
tion against  a  domestic  corporation  the  sum- 
mons may  be  served  on  its  managing  agent 
Wickham  v.  South  Shore  Lumber  Co.,  61  N. 
W.  287,  288,  89  Wis.  23. 

Service  on  one  as  managing  agent  of  a 
corporation  not  authorized  to  receive  service 
is  void,  regardless  of  whether  he  delivers  the 
process  to  the  corporation,  and  defendant 
may  insist  that  it  will  not  be  bound  thereby, 
especially  where  it  promptly  repudiates  such 
service.  Kramer  v.  Buffalo  Union  Furnace 
Co.,  116  N.  T.  Supp.  1101,  1102,  132  App.  Div. 
415. 

A  "managing  agent"  of  a  foreign  corpora- 
tion for  purpose  of  service  of  process  must 
be  some  person  vested  by  the  corporation 
with  general  powers  involving  the  exercise  of 
Judgment  and  discretion,  as  distinguished 
from  an  ordinary  agent  or  attorney  who  acts 
in  an  inferior  capacity,  and  under  the  direc- 
tion and  control  of  superior  authority,  both 
in  regard  to  the  extent  of  his  duties  and  the 
manner  of  executing  it  Ritchie  v.  Illinois 
Cent  R.  Co.,  128  N.  W.  35,  37,  87  Neb.  631 
(quoting  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4320). 


MANAOINO  AGBNT 


260 


MANAGIXa  AG£NT 


Where  a  foreign  corporation  has  an  of- 
fice In  the  state,  in  charge  of  the  person  who 
acts  for  the  corporation,  doing  business  for  it, 
he  is  a  "managing  agent,"  within  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  i  432,  on  whom  service  of  process  could 
be  had.  Russell  y.  Pittsburgh  Life  &  Trust 
Go.»  115  N.  Y.  Supp.  950,  953,  62  Misc.  Rep. 
403. 

One  who  succeeded  to  the  business  of  a 
firm,  and  in  Its  name  corresponded  and  main- 
tained business  relations  with  a  foreign  cor- 
poration without  Its  ever  having  heard  of 
him,  he  renting  and  maintaining  his  own  of- 
fice, and  merely,  transferring  to  the  corpora- 
tion bucket  shop  business  which  he  was  un- 
willing or  unable  to  handle,  was  not  its  man- 
aging agent,  within  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Neb.  §1 
73,  75,  authorizing  service  of  process  on  sudi 
an  agent  Swarts  v.  Christie  Grain  &  Stock 
Co.,  166  Fed.  338,  844. 

The  term  "managing  agent,"  as  used  In 
section  4144,  Rev.  Codes,  relating  to  the  serv- 
ice of  process  on  domestic  corporations,  is  a 
generic  term,  and  does  not  refer  to  any  par- 
ticular person  or  officer,  like  the  words  "pres- 
ident," **Becretary,"  etc.  Densel  v.  Atlanta 
Mercantile  Co.,  106  Pac.  2,  3,  17  Idaho,  432. 

An  employ^  of  a  foreign  corporation  en- 
gaged in  the  sale  of  merchandise  under  a 
mall  order  system,  with  the  duty  of  deliver- 
ing such  orders  to  manufacturers  and  Jobbers 
in  New  York  City  as  are  transmitted  to  him 
from  the  home  office  and  who  receives  the 
mall  of  the  corporation  at  Its  New  York  office 
and  transmits  it  to  the  home  office,  and  who 
has  no  supervision  over  the  correspondence  or 
over  the  business,  and  who  is  employed  on  a 
weekly  salary  paid  by  check  from  the  home 
office,  Is  not  a  "managing  agent"  of  the  cor- 
poration within  Municipal  Court  Act  (Laws 
1902,  c.  580)  i  31,  providing  that  service  of  a 
summons  on  a  corporation  may  be  made  by 
delivering  a  copy  to  the  president,  secretary, 
cashier,  or  "managing  agent"  Doykos  v. 
Montgomery,  Ward  &  Co.,  127  N.  Y.  Supp. 
227,  22& 

A  "managing  agent"  must  be  in  charge, 
and  have^the  management  of  some  depart- 
ment of  the  corporation's  business,  the  man- 
agement of  which  requires  the  exercise  of  an 
Independent  Judgment  and  discretion.  While 
he  may  be  under  the  general  direction  of  the 
corporation,  yet,  in  the  management  of  his 
particular  department,  he  should  have  au- 
thority to  manage  and  conduct  it  as  his  Judg- 
ment and  discretion  direct  He  must  be  In 
the  exclusive  and  Immediate  control  and  man- 
agement of  that  department  or  of  the  entire 
works  conducted  at  the  place  where  he  is  in 
charge.  Federal  Betterment  Co.  v.  Reeves, 
84  Pac.  560,  562,  73  Kan.  107,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  460. 

An  agent  of  a  foreign  corporation,  whose 
contract  of  agency  demands  of  him  the  exer- 
cise of  Judgment  in  the  business  matters  of 
his  principal,  and  who  has  charge  of  the 


business  of  his  principal  In  the  territory  cov- 
ered by  his  contract,  is  a  "managing  agent " 
within  the  meaning  of  sections  1074  and  1076, 
Cobbey'8  Ann.  St  1903^  providing  for  the 
service  of  summons  upon  the  "managing 
agent"  of  a  foreign  corporation.  Ord  Hard- 
ware Co.  V.  J.  I.  Case  Threshing  Mach.  Co., 
110  N.  W.  551,  563,  77  Neb.  847,  8  L.  R.  A 
(N.  S.)  770  (dtlng  Words  and  Phrases.  4321). 

To  constitute  a  "managing  or  business 
agent"  upon  whom  service  of  summons  could 
be  made,  the  agent  must  be  one  having  in  ef- 
fect a  representative  capacity  and  derivative 
authority,  and  not  one  created  by  construc- 
tion or  Implication  contrary  to  the  intention 
of  the  parties.  Kams  v.  State  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  101  Pac.  664,  565,  666.  31  Nev.  170  (quot- 
ing Doe  v.  Springfield  Boiler  &  Mfg.  Co.,  101 
Fed.  687,  44  O.  O.  A.  130). 

The  term  "managing  agent,"  as  used  in 
Code  Civ.  Proa  1 411,  providing  for  service  of 
summons  in  a  dvil  action  against  a  foreign 
corporation  doing  business  in  the  state  and 
having  a  managing  agent  within  the  state,  by 
delivering  a  copy  to  such  agent,  means  the 
agent  who  Is  managing  that  business.  While 
plalntilf  was  In  Oregon,  he  received  a  letter 
from  the  S.  Saw  Co.  writt^i  from  San  Fran- 
cisco in  the  name  of  the  company  signed  by 
J.  S.,  who  was  president  of  that  corporation, 
offering  employment  as  a  traveling  salesman 
for  goods  carried  by  the  company.  The  offer 
was  accepted.  The  S.  Saw  Co.  was  a  dealer 
in  manufactured  articles  of  various  kinds, 
which  it  purchased  from  different  manufac- 
turers ;  the  8.  Saw  Co.  was  one.  Goods  pur- 
chased by  the  Saw  Co.  from  the  manufactur- 
ing company  became  the  Saw  Company's 
property  and  was  sold  by  it  for  its  own  ac- 
count, and  plaintiff  was  employed  by  it  to 
sell  them  for  Its  account,  and  he  accounted 
to  it  for  whatever  sales  he  made.  His  salary, 
however,  was  paid  by  the  S.  Mfg.  Co.,  be- 
cause, as  it  was  explained,  the  Saw  Co. 
might  to  that  extent  be  aided  in  meeting  the 
expenses  of  pushing  the  S.  Mfg.  Co.'s  goods. 
Letter  heads  of  the  S.  Saw  Co.  bearing  a  Ust 
of  articles  of  different  manufacturers  in 
which  it  dealt,  and  underneath  the  name  of 
the  S.  Mfg.  Co.  was  the  word  "agendes,"  be- 
neath which  there  were  several  places  of  ad- 
dress in  different  states,  the  last  of  which 
was  S.  Saw  Co.,  San  Frandsco*  Cal.  Held, 
that  the  facts  stated  did  not  constitute  a  do- 
ing business  In  the  state  by  the  S.  Mfg.  Co., 
for  "while  it  might  be  held  that  a  traveling 
salesman  engaged  in  selling  goods  for  a  for- 
eign corporation  for  its  account  would  be  re- 
garded as  a  transaction  of  business  by  such 
corporation,  the  employment  under  a  delegat- 
ed authority  from  such  corporation  to  act  as 
such  salesman  would  not  of  Itself  be  regard- 
ed as  doing  business  by  the  corporation.*^ 
Jameson  v.  Simonds  Saw  Co.,  84  Pac.  289, 
200,  2  CaL  App.  582. 

General  asent  distl]isiiisk«d 

See  General  Agency  or  Agent; 


MAafTAQIKO  AGENT 


261 


MAKAGINO  A»ENT 


A  director,  by  or  throngb  the  authority 
of  his  office,  is  not  a  "chief  officer"  or  **man- 
agLDg  agent*'  of  a  domestic  corporation,  with- 
in the  meaning  of  section  6604,  Gomp.  Laws 
1909 ;  hence  service  of  summons  on  the  cor- 
poration cannot  be  had  by  the  delivery  of  a 
copy  of  the  sunmions  to  such  director.  Okla- 
homa Fire  Ins.  Oo.  t.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.,  125  Pac  784^  7d9,  34  OkL  149. 

rfwncilml  eorrespondemt 

Under  the  statute  authorizing  service  on 
a  foreign  corporation  by  delivering  a  copy  to 
one  of  its  officers,  or  '*a  managing  agent 
thereof,  if  within  the  state,  doing  business 
for  defendant,"  held,  that  the  term  ''manag- 
ing agent"  does  not  include  a  financial  corre- 
spondent of  an  Insurance  company,  whose 
business  is  strictly  confined  to  soliciting  and 
procuring  applications  for  loans,  drafting  of 
mortgages  and  notes,  etc.,  and  collecting  such 
notes  and  mortgage  loans;  the  insurance 
commiasioner  of  the  state  having  also  been 
appointed  the  agent  of  such  company  for 
service  of  process  In  the  state.  Bauer  v.  Un- 
ion Central  Life  Ins.  Co.,  188  N.  W.  988,  990, 
22  N.  D.  435. 

Foremam 

A  foremaji  acting  under  the  direction  of 
the  superintendent  of  a  corporation  is  neither 
an  "officer**  nor  a  "managing  or  local  agent" 
of  the  corporation,  and  is  not  a  person  on 
whom  service  of  summons  on  the  corporation 
can  be  made.  Simmons  v.  Defiance  Box  €k>., 
<t2  S.  E.  435,  436, 148  N.  0.  344. 

Where  a  foreman  has  charge  of  a  local 
milk  station  or  cheese  factory  owned  by  a  cor- 
poration in  the  absence  of  any  superior  cor- 
porate authority,  and  Is  vested  with  powers 
of  nuinagement,  though  he  occasionally  re- 
ceives directions  from  the  principal  ofiice  and 
the  corporate  officers,  but  ezerdsee  discre- 
tion in  transacting  business,  he  is  a  "manag- 
ing agent"  within  €k)de  Civ.  Proc.  I  481,  au- 
thorizing the  service  of  process  by  delivery 
to  the  managing  agent  of  a  corporation. 
Wesley  T.  Beakes  Dairy  Co.,  131  N.  Y.  Supp. 
212,  213,  72  Bfisc.  Rep.  200. 

Manager 
Under  Rev.  Codes,  |  4144,  providing  that 
summons  must  be  served  on  a  domestic  cor- 
poration by  delivering  a  copy  to  the  presi- 
dent, or  other  head  of  the  corporation,  secre- 
tary, cashier,  or  managing  agent,  where 
proof  of  service  recites  that  the  summons 
was  served  on  the  '^manager"  of  the  corpora- 
tion named.  It  was  prima  facie  evidence  of 
service  on  the  corporation ;  it  being  presum- 
ed that  the  manager  was  the  "managing 
agent*'  thereof  Densel  v.  Atlanta  Mercantile 
Co.,  106  Pac.  2,  3,  17  Idaho,  432. 

Bailroacl  eompany 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  73,  provides  that  sum- 
moBs  against  a  corporation  may  be  served 
upon  its  chief  officer,  ar  if  he  is  not  found 


in  the  county  then  upon  its  n^naglfig^  ajgehft, 
etc.  Section  75  provides  that,  when  defend- 
ant is  a  foreign  corporation,  having  a  man- 
aging agent  in  the  state  service  may  be  up- 
on hiuL  Comp.  St  1909,  e.  72,  art.  1,  i  4, 
proTides  that  service  upoa  railroad  com- 
panies may  be  made  as  on  other  corpora- 
tions, or  by  living  a  copy  of  the  summons 
with  a  station  agent,  or  other  officer  of  the 
company,  within  the  state,  etc.  Held,  that 
a  railroad  company  selling  a  coupon  ticket 
in  the  usual  form,  authorising  the  buyer  to 
travel  over  the  seller's  line,  from  a  point 
within  the  state  to  a  point  in  an  adjoining 
state,  and  thence  over  the  line  of  another 
railroad,  the  connecting  line  having  no 
part  of  its  track  witliin  the  state,  nor  any 
place  of  business,  nor  agency,  the  railroad 
selling  the  ticket  was  not  a  "managing 
agent*'  of  such  connecting  Une  u^n  whom 
service  of  summons  on  such  connecting  lin^ 
could  be  made:  Ritchie  v.  Illinois  Cent  R 
Co.,  128  N.  W.  35,  38,  87  Neb.  631. 

Municipal  Court  Act  (Laws  1902,  c  580) 
i  31,  provides  that  in  actions  against  cor- 
porations the  summons  must  be  served  on 
the  president,  etc.,  or  'Managing  agent" 
Held,  that  a  mere  salesman,  who  solicited 
and  received  orderef  and  sold  merchandise 
on  behalf  of  defendant,  was  not  such  "man- 
aging agent,**  within  the  meaning  of  such 
section.  Oleich  v.  Ontario  Button  Co.,  129 
N.  T.  Supp.  407,  408. 

Bolioitor 

A  soUdtor  who  had  been,  but  at  the 
time  of  service  of  process  upon  him  had  ceas- 
ed to  be,  a  solicitor  of  applications  in  a  com- 
pany which  sold  sick,  accident,  and  funeral 
benefits,  was  not  "a  managing  agent"  of  such 
company,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Ohio 
statute  authorizing  service  of  process  upon 
the  managing  agent  of  a  foreign  corporation. 
Splker  V.  American  Relief  Soc,  103  N.  W. 
611,  612,  140  Mich.  225. 

TmTeUac  acea* 

Under  the  statute  permitting  service  ot 
process  on  a  "managing  agent,"  where  a  for- 
eign corporation  is  doing  iHisSness  in  the 
state,  no  fixed  rule  or  criterion  can  be  laid 
down  for  determining  who  are  and  who  are 
not  managing  agents;  but  where  a  foreign 
corporation  has  appointed  no  agent  on  whom 
service  may  be  made,  has  no  fixed  place  of 
business  in  the  state,  and  does  no  business 
in  the  state  except  that  of  selling  machinery 
on  orders  receired  by  maU,  or  such  as  may 
be  taken  by  their  traveling  agent,  the  court 
should  certainly  hohl,  tf  possible,  that  such 
agent,  being  the  only  person  in  the  state 
through  whom  the  company  does  business,  is, 
for  the  purpose  of  litigation  growing  out 
of  such  business  transacted  within  the  state, 
a  proper  agent  for  the  service  of  papers. 
Ohristlerson  v.  Hendrie  ft  Bolthoff  Mfg.  Sup- 
ply Co.,  128  N.  W.  <93,  604^  600,  20  S.  D.  5ia 


ICANDAMUS 


262 


MANDAMUS 


MANDAMUS 

Return  to  wilt,  siee  Retnm. 
Writ,  return,  or  demurrer  m  pleading, 
see  Pleading. 

The  office  of  a  writ  of  mandamus  la  to 
require  a  lower  court  or  Judge  to  act,  and  not 
to  correct  error  or  reverse  judicial  action, 
though  it  may  be  Issued  to  enforce  a  dear 
right.  Ex  parte  Dickens,  00  South.  218,  221, 
162  Ala.  272. 

To  authorize  the  Issuance  of  a  writ  of 
"mandamus,"  the  petitioner  must  show: 
First,  a  legal  right  in  himself  to  have  the 
act  done  which  is  sought  by  the  writ;  and, 
second,  that  it  is  the  plain  legal  duty  of  de- 
fendant to  perform  the  act,  without  discre- 
tion to  do  or  refuse.  State  ex  rel.  Gibson  v. 
Malheur  County  Court,  81  Pac.  368,  869,  46 
Or.  519. 

The  ofDce  of  a  *Vrit  of  mandamus"  is  to 
compel  the  performance  of  a  duty  resting  up- 
on the  person  to  whom  the  writ  is  sent  The 
duty  may  have  <Higinated  in  many  ways; 
but,  no  matter  out  of  what  facts  or  relations 
the  duty  has  grown,  what  the  law  regards, 
and  seeks  to  enforce,  Is  the  personal  obliga- 
tion of  the  individual  to  whom  it  addresses 
the  writ.  If  he  be  an  officer  and  the  duty  be 
an  official  one,  still  the  writ  is  aimed  ex- 
clusively  against  him  as  a  person,  and  he 
only  can  be  punished  for  disobedience.  The 
writ  does  not  reach  the  office  and  cannot  be 
directed  to  it  It  is  therefore,  in  substance, 
a  personal  action  and  rests  upon  the  averred 
and  assumed  fact  that  defendant  has  neg- 
lected or  refused  to  perform  a  personal  duty, 
to  the  performance  of  which  by  him  the  re- 
lator has  a  clear  right  State  ex  rel.  Stran- 
ahan  v.  Board  of  State  Canvassers,  79  Pac 
402,  32  Mont  18,  4  Ann.  Cas.  73. 

The  function  of  a  "writ  of  mandamus" 
is  to  compel  the  performance  of  a  plain  min- 
isterial duty.  It  is  not  the  plain  ministerial 
duty  of  the  board  of  assessors  to  assess  a 
tract  of  land  as  belonging  to  an  individual, 
and  as  having  a  certain  measurement  and 
as  having  certain  boundaries,  when  the  title 
exhibited  by  him  falls  to  show  that  he  owns 
any  property  answering  such  description. 
State  ex  rel.  Burke  v.  Sewerage  ft  Water 
Board,  37  South.  878,  880, 113  La.  924. 

The  "writ  of  mandamus"  does  not  super- 
sede legal  remedies,  but  rather  supplies  the 
want  of  a  legal  remedy.  Hence  two  requisites 
must  exist  to  warrant  a  court  in  granting 
this  extraordinary  remedy:  First,  it  must 
appear  that  the  relator  has  a  clear,  legal 
right  to  the  performance  of  particular  duties 
by  the  respondent;  and,  second,  that  the 
law  affords  no  other  adequate  or  spedflc 
remedy  to  secure  the  performance  of  the 
duty  which  it  is  sought  to  coerce.  State  ex 
rel.  Ellis  V.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.,  44 
South.  230,  231,  63  Fla.  711. 


A  'Mandamus"  proceeding  I0  one  In 
court,  as  contradistinguished  from  a  proceed- 
ing before  the  Judge  at  chambers,  and  it  is 
so  framed  that  an  issue  of  fact  therein  may 
be  tried  by  a  Jury,  and  a  money  Judgment 
for  damages  awarded  as  a  part  of  the  relief. 
It  is  a  Judicial  investigation,  the  object  of 
which  is  a  determination  of  dvU  rights,  the 
same  as  any  ordinary  proceeding.  State  ex 
rel.  BllllngB  v.  Lamprey,  106  Pac.  601,  602, 
67  Wash.  84. 

"Mandamus"  is  an  appropriate  remedy  at 
the  hands  of  superior  courts  to  set  in  motion 
the  machinery  of  inferior  courts.  It  does  not 
direct  how  such  courts  shall  act  or  to  what 
effect  they  shall  exercise  their  powers,  but 
merely  compels  action  when  they  refuse  to 
act  at  all,  and  have  come  to  a  standstill 
State  ex  rel.  McDonald  ▼•  Stelner,  87  Pac. 
66.  67,  44  Wash.  150. 

The  word  "mandamus"  implies  superior 
power,  the  power  of  a  superior  authority 
to  compel  an  official  or  inferior  Judicature 
to  act  The  writ  issues  only  from  a  superior 
court  to  an  inferior  court  to  do  those  acts 
which  clearly  pertain  to  their  duty.  When 
duties  are  imposed  on  a  Judge  of  a  superior 
court  as  an  official,  another  Judge  of  the 
superior  court  has  no  power  to  issue  a  man- 
damus compelling  performance  of  such  du- 
ties. Shreve  v.  Pendleton,  58  S.  B.  880,  881, 
129  Ga.  374,  12  Ann.  Cas.  563. 

"Mandamus"  and  certiorari  rest  on  dis- 
tinct and  opposite  principles.  The  former 
compels  an  unperformed  ministerial  duty,  the 
latter  reviews  a  performed  Judicial  duty, 
while  neither  operates  to  control  discretion. 
The  former  never  goes  to  control  Judgment, 
while  the  latter  never  goes  except  to  review 
and  control  Judidal  Judgment  State  ex  reL 
RawUnson  v.  Ansel,  57  S.  BL  185, 192,  76  S.  C. 
395,  11  Ann.  Cas.  613. 

The  primary  object  of  the  writ  of  "man- 
damus" is  to  compel  action.  It  neither  cre- 
ates nor  confers  power  to  act,  but  only  com- 
mands the  exercise  of  powers  already  ex- 
isting, when  it  is  the  duty  of  the  person  or 
body  proceeded  against  to  act  without  its 
agency.  While  it  may  require  the  perform- 
ance of  a  purely  ministerial  duty  in  a  par- 
ticular manner,  its  command  is  never  given 
to  compel  the  discharge  of  a  duty  involving 
the  exercise  of  Judgment  of  discretion  in  any 
specified  way,  for  that  would  substitute  the 
Judgment  or  discretion  of  the  court  issuing 
the  writ  for  that  of  the  person  or  persons 
against  whom  the  writ  was  issued.  In  such 
cases,  the  sole  function  is  to  set  in  motion 
without  directing  the  manner  of  perform- 
ance. People  ex  reL  Besserer  y.  Collier,  67 
N.  B.  309,  311.  175  N.  T.  196  (quoting  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Harris  v.  Commissioners  of  Land 
Office,  43  N.  B.  418,  149  N.  Y.  26). 

The  writ  of  "mandamus"  is  in  the  nature 
of  a  final  writ  issuing  out  of  the  court  of 
law  after  a  trial  by  the  court,  to  an  executive 


MAKDAMU3 


SS3 


VANPAM08 


oflloer  commanding  him  to  do  an  official  act, 
which  It  Is  claimed  he  has  wrougfuUj  refused 
and  neglected  to  do.  Hager  v.  New  South 
Brewing  Go.  (Ky.)  90  8.  W.  e06k  609. 

"Mandamus**  is  a  command  Issuing  from 
a  court  of  law,  in  the  name  of  ibe  state,  di- 
zected  to  some  inferior  court,  officer,  corpora- 
tion, or  person,  requiring  the  doing  of  a  par- 
ticalar  thing  specified«  which  appertains  to 
their  office  or  duty.  Macholdt  v.  Pender- 
gast,  128  N.  X.  Supp.  1069,  1071.  144  App. 
IMt.252. 

A  writ  of  ''mandamus'*  to  an  Inferior 
court  issued  by  a  court  of  appellate  Jurisdic- 
tion is  in  the  nature  of  an  exercise  of  ap- 
pellate Jurisdiction.  "In  England  the  writ 
of  mandamus  is  defined  to  be  a  command 
issued  in  the  king's  name  from  the  Court  of 
King's  Bench,  and  directed  to  any  court  or 
corporation  or  inferior  court  of  Judicature 
within  the  king's  dominions,  requiring  them 
to  do  some  particular  thing  therein  specified 
which  appertains  to  their  office  and  duty  and 
which  the  Court  of  King's  Bench  has  pre- 
viously determined,  or  at  least  supposes  to 
be  consonant  to  right  and  Justice."  Black- 
stone  adds:  "That  it  issues  to  the  Judges  of 
any  inferior  court  commanding  them  to  do 
justice  according  to  the  powers  of  their  office 
whenever  the  same  is  delayed;  for  it  is 
the  peculiar  business  of  the  Court  of  King's 
Bench  to  superintend  all  other  Inferior  tribu- 
nals, and  therein  to  enforce  the  due  exercise 
of  the  Judicial  or  munidpal  powers  with 
which  the  crown  or  Legislature  have  invested 
them,  and  this  not  only  by  restraining  their 
excesses,  but  also  by  quickening  their  negli- 
gence and  obviating  their  denial  ot  Justice." 
"A  mandamus  to  an  officer  is  held  to  be  the 
exercise  of  original  Jurisdiction,  but  manda- 
mns  to  an  inferior  court  of  the  United  States 
is  in  the  nature  of  appellate  Jurisdiction." 
State  ex  reL  ISuhanks  v.  Cole,  109  Pac.  736, 
742,  4  OkL  Oi.  26  (quoting  and  adopting  defi- 
nition in  Re  Crane^  5  Pet.  190,  8  L.  Ed.  92;  8 
Black.  Com.  Jur.). 

"The  action  of  ^mandamus,'  as  well  as  ev* 
ery  other  civil  action,  should  under  the  stat- 
utes of  Kansas,  where  no  special  provision  is 
otherwise  made^  be  brought  and  prosecuted 
hi  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  interest 
*  *  *  At  common  law  the  proceeding  by 
Inandamus'  was  in  no  sense  an  action  by 
the  relator.  Neither  the  writ  nor  the  re- 
turn was  in  any  case  nor  in  any  sense  a 
pleading.  No  issues  of  fact  were  raised  by 
the  writ  and  the  return.  No  trial  could  be 
bad  in  the  case,  and  no  final  Judgment  could 
be  rendered  therein  between  the  parties — ^the 
relator  and  the  respondent  The  writ,  wheth- 
er alternative  or  peremptory,  was  merely  a 
writ,  and  nothing  more.  It  was  purely  a 
prerogative  writ  soldiy  within  the  discretion 
of  the  court  (never  a  writ  of  right),  and 
was  issued  in  the  king's  name,  or  in  the  name 
of  the  sovereign  authority,  commanding  some 
particular  act  to  be  done.    The  return  was 


merely  an  answw  made  by  the  respondent  to 
the  writ,  stating  that  he  had  performed  the 
act,  or  giving  some  excuse  or  Justification 
why  he  had  not  performed  it  It  was  never 
a  pleading,  and  could  never  be  traversed  or 
controverted  by  the  relator,  or  by  any  one 
else,  but  was  always  taken  as  absolutely 
true,  however  false  it  might  be  in  its  state- 
ments of  fact  The  only  remedy  that  the 
relator  had  when  he  wished  to  controvert  the 
truth  of  the  return  was  to  institute  a  sepa- 
rate and  independent  action  on  the  case  for 
a  false  return.  In  such  an  action  the  rda- 
tor  became  the  plaintilt,  the  req;)ondent  be- 
came the  defendant  the  proper  pleading» 
were  filed  by  the  parties,  the  proper  issues 
were  made  up,  the  proper  trial  was  had,  and 
the  proper  Judgment  was  rendered  in  the 
action  between  the  parties.  If  the  Judgment 
was  for  the  plaintiff,  he  recovered  his  dam- 
ages and  costs,  •  •  •  and  the  court  then 
issued  a  peremptory  writ  of  mandamus 
against  the  defendant  If  the  Judgment  wan 
for  the  defendant  he  recovered  his  costs. 
*  ^  ^  But  this  old  common-law  mode  or 
procedure  for  mandamus  has  been  materially 
changed  by  statute,  not  only  in  Kansas  but 
in  nearly  every  other  state,  and  in  England. 
The  present  action  of  mandamus  is  not  only 
the  old  common-law  proceeding  of  mandamus, 
but  it  is  also  the  old  common-law  action  on 
the  case  for  the  ftilse  return.  It  is  the  two 
proceedings  combined.  The  alternative  writ 
is  now  not  merely  a  writ  as  formerly,  but  it 
is  also  a  pleading.  The  return  is  now  not 
merely  a  response  to  the  writ  as  formerly 
(which  return  could  not  formerly  be  traversed 
or  denied),  but  it  is  also  a  pleading;  and 
the  facts  therein  stated  may  now  be  con- 
troverted the  same  as  they  may  on  any  other 
pleading.  Issues  are  now  made  up  by  the 
writ  and  the  return.  A  trial  may  be  had  on 
sudi  issues,  and  Judgment  rendered  for  the 
plaintiff,  or  for  the  defendant  the  same  as 
in  any  other  civil  action;  and  the  action  is 
now  considered  almost  an  action  of  right  aa 
any  other  civil  action,  •  •  •  Our  stat- 
utes everywhere  seem  to  recognize  the  pres^ 
ent  proceeding  by  mandamus  as  a  dvil  ac- 
tion, with  the  relator  as  the  plaintiff,  and  the 
respondent  as  the  defendant'*  State  ex  rel. 
Atchison,  T.  ft  S.  F.  R.  CJo.  v.  Jefferson  Coun- 
ty Com'rs,  11  Kan.  67.  68,  69  (citing  and 
adopting  State  ex  rel.  Wells  v.  Marston,  6 
Kan.  524,  532;  Napier  v.  Poe,  12  Ga.  170,  178; 
Harrington  v.  Berkshire  County  Com'rs,  22 
Pick.  [39  Mass.]  263,  268,  33  Am.  Dec.  741; 
Kendall  v.  Stokes,  3  How.  U.  S.  100;  Arberry 
V.  Beavers,  6  Tfex.  467,  464.  65  Am.  Dec.  791: 
Tidd's  Prac.  949;  Bacon's  Abr.  Mandamus: 
Oomyn's  Dig.  Mandamus;  Stephen's  Nisi 
Prius,  Mandamus;    and  Jacob's  Law  Diet.). 

A  "proceeding  in  mandamus"  is  a  judl 
cial  investigation,  the  object  of  which  is  the 
determination  of  civil  rights,  the  same  as  iu 
ordinary  proceeding— not  only  the  determina- 
tion of  rights,   but  their  determination  in 


MAKDAMM 


264 


IfAKDAMUd 


sacli  a  way  as  to  culminate  In  an  effective 
jndgrment  In  tlie  WasMngton  practice  man- 
damns  is  nothing  more  than  one  of  the  forms 
of  procedure  provided  for  the  enforcement 
of  rights  and  the  redress  of  wrongs,  and  the 
procedure  has  in  it  all  the  elements  of  a 
dyil  action.  The  right  to  sue  out  the  writ  is 
not  made  to  depend  on  the  character  of  the 
dispute,  but  on  what  answer  is  given  to  the 
question:  Can  the  ordinary  courts  of  law 
afford  a  plain,  speedy,  and  adequate  remedy? 
If  such  a  remedy  is  furnished,  the  writ  will 
not  issue;  otherwise,  it  will.  It  was  to  avoid 
circuity  of  action,  thus  doing  away  with  the 
necessity  of  resorting  to  more  than  one  pro- 
ceeding for  the  enforcement  of  a  right,  that 
the  law  was  framed.  State  ex  rel.  Brown 
V.  McQuade,  79  Pac  207,  208,  86  Wash.  679. 

As  un  aiMilllary  proeeediss 

Mandamus  is  a  legal  proceeding,  and  a 
mandamus  issued,  after  judgment  against  a 
county,  to  compel  the  levy  of  a  tax  to  pay 
the  same,  la  in  the  nature  of  an  execution 
to  enforce  satisfaction.  Carter  County  v. 
Schmalstig,  127  Fed.  126,  127,  62  C.  O.  A. 
78  (citing  Ri^s  V.  Johnson  County,  73  U.  S. 
[6  Wall.]  166,  18  L.  Bd.  768;  Heine  v.  Levee 
Com'rs,  89  U.  S.  [19  Wall.]  665,  22  U  Ed. 
22a). 

As  a  disovetlimavy  writ 

"Maadamus"  is  a  discretionary  writ,  is- 
suing only  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  Judicial 
discretion.  Automatic  Weighing  Mach.  Co. 
V.  Carter,  128  S.  W.  557.  668,  95  Ark.  118; 
Drew  ▼.  Sdiool  Township  of  Madison,  125 
N.  W.  815,  837,  146  Iowa,  721;  State  ex  r^. 
Porter  v.  Hudson,  126  S.  W.  733,  740,  226 
Mo.  239;  State  ex  rel.  Mary  Frances  Realty 
Co.  V.  Homer,  130  S.  W.  510,  612,  160  Mo. 
App.  826. 

"Mandamus"  is  a  discretionary  writ  and 
will  he  allowed  in  furtherance  of  Justice  upon 
a  proper  case  presented,  but  vrill  not  be  al- 
lowed where  the  relator  has  instigated,  au- 
thorized, approved,  or  brought  about  the 
very  state  of  things  of  which  he  complains. 
State  ex  rel.  Donovan  v.  Barret,  81  Pac  349, 
350,  30  Mont.  203. 

"Mandamus"  is  not  a  writ  of  right,  but 
the  granting  of  it  rests  largely  in  the  discre- 
tion of  th/d  conrt,  and  it  will  not  be  granted 
when  it  will  work  injustice,  or  introduce  con- 
fusion and  disorder,  nor  where,  if  issued,  it 
would  prove  unavailing.  Bibb  y.  Gaston,  40 
South.  936,  937,  146  Ala.  434. 

The  writ  of  "mandamus"  is  a  discre- 
tionary VTTit,  and  where  an  information  for 
larceny  was  quashed  after  the  Jury  on  a  trial 
had  disagreed,  and  where  it  did  not  appear 
that  a  different  result  would  be  reached  on 
another  trial,  "mandamus"  to  compel  the 
court  to  set  aside  the  order  quashing  the 
information  would  be  denied.  Clute  v.  Ionia 
Circuit  Judge,  102  N.  W.  843,  844,  139  Mich. 
837. 


Whether  a  writ  of  "mandamus  be  re- 
garded as  a  prerogative  writ  or  a  writ  of 
tight,  it  will  only  be  granted  in  the  exercise 
of  sound  legal  discretion.  State  ex  reL  Crow 
V.  BoonviUe  Bridge  Co.,  108  S.  W.  1062, 1066. 
1067»  206  Mo.  74. 

Mandamus  lies,  in  the  discretion  of  Uie 
court,  to  compel  performance  of  a  ministerial 
duty  clearly  imposed  by  law  in  behalf  of  one 
whose  right  to  its  performance  is  legally  es- 
tablished and  unquestioned,  where  there  is 
no  other  adequate  remedy.  Dennett  ▼.  Acme 
Mfg.  Co.,  76  Ati.  922,  923,  106  Me.  476. 

Am  aa  extraordlmaary  remedy 

"Mandamus"  is  an  extraordinary  writ, 
and  can  be  resorted  to  only  when  other  rem- 
edies fail.  State  v.  Thompson,  102  S.  W. 
349,  351,  118  Tenn.  571,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1 
(citing  B3x  parte  Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  131  V.  S.  dxxx,  appx.,  26  L.  Bd.  561;  2 
Spelling,  InJ.  &  Other  Extra.  Rem.  H  1368, 
1369;  High,  E2xtra.  Leg.  Rem.  [3d  Bd.]  {  39). 

A  writ  of  mandamus  is  an  extraordinary 
writ,  to  be  issued,  not  to  vindicate  a  merd 
abstract  right,  but  only  when  necessary  to 
secure  some  substantial  relief  or  benefit  Bd- 
wards  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Farrington,  66  AtL  300, 
310,  102  Me.  140. 

Mandamus  is  one  of  the  extraordinary 
remedies.  The  writ  may  issue  in  those  cases 
only  "to  compel  the  performanoe  of  any  act 
which  the  law  specially  enjoins  as  a  duty 
resulting  from  an  office,  trust,  or  station,** 
but  "it  cannot  control  Judicial  discretion.'' 
Davis  T.  Jewett,  77  Pac.  704,  706,  69  Kan. 
661. 

Mandamus  is  an  anergency  writ,  and  its 
purpose  is  to  furnish  a  speedy  remedy  for 
some  apparent  wrong.  It  must  be  issued  in 
all  cases  where  there  is  not  a  plain,  speedy, 
and  adequate  remedy  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  the  law.  State  ex  reL  Beach  v.  District 
Court,  Department  No.  1,  Lewis  and  Clarke 
County,  74  Pac.  498,  501,  29  Mont  266. 

"The  writ  of  mandamus  is  an  extraor- 
dinary remedy,  to  be  applied  only  under  ex- 
ceptional conditions,  and  is  not  to  be  extend- 
ed beyond  its  well-established  limits.  It  lies 
to  compel  the  performance  of  a  public  duty, 
or  one  Imposed  by  public  authority,  and  for 
the  nonperformance  of  which  there  is  no  oth- 
er specific  or  adequate  remedy  at  law,  bat 
not  for  the  enforcement  of  merely  private 
obligations,  such  as  those  airiring  from  can- 
tracts."  Lahiff  V.  St  Joseph's  Total  Absti- 
nence &  Benevolent  Sodety,  67  Atl.  692,  e&8, 
76  Conn.  648,  65  L.  R.  A.  92,  100  Am.  St 
Rep.  1012  (citing  Hartford  v.  Hartford  St 
R.  Co.,  60  Ati.  393,  74  Conn.  194;  Bassett  ▼. 
Atwater,  32  Aa  937,  65  Conn.  356,  32  L  E. 
A.  576 ;  Tobey  v.  Hakes,  7  AtL  661,  64  Conn. 
274,  1  Am.  St  Rep.  114;  Parrott  y.  aty  of 
Bridgeport,  44  Conn.  180,  26  Aul  Rep.  439; 
American  Asylum  for  BSdtitcation  and  Instnic- 
tion  of  Deaf  and  Dumb  v.  President,  etc.,  of 
Phoenix  Bank,  4  Conn.  172^  10  Am.  Dec  112). 


MANDAMUS 


MANDAMUS 


"Mandaipne**  is  a  remedy  only  to  be  ap- 
plied in  extraordinary  cases  where  there  Is 
DO  other  adequate  remedy,  and,  where  the 
applicant  has  an  adequate  remedy  by  action, 
the  writ  will  not  be  allowed.  It  lies  to  com- 
pel the  performance  of  a  public  duty  pre- 
Bcilbed  by  statute  and  to  keep  subordinate 
and  inferior  bodies  and  tribunals,  exercising 
public  functions,  within  their  jurisdiction, 
and  to  compel  in  proper  cases  the  perform- 
ance of  specific  duties  imposed  by  law.  The 
writ  will  not  be  issued  to  enforce  the  per- 
formance of  a  contract  wnAi  as  the  contract 
of  an  educational  institute  to  grant  a  di- 
ploma on  fulfillment  of  certain  conditions  by 
a  student  for  which  an  action  for  breach  of 
contract  will  lie.  State  ex  rel.  Burg  t.  Mil- 
waukee Medical  College,  106  N.  W.  116,  118, 
128  Wis.  7,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  1115,  U6  Am. 
St  Rep.  21,  8  Ann.  Oas.  407. 

Injvmetloii  dUtiasuUhed 

"An  Injunction'  is  essentially  a  preven- 
tiTe  remedy;  'mandamus**  a  remedial  one. 
The  former  is  usually  employed  to  prevent 
future  injury;  the  latter,  to  redress  past 
grievances.  The  functions  of  an  injunction 
are  to  restrain  motion  and  to  enforce  inac- 
tion ;  those  of  a  mandamus,  to  set  in  motion 
and  to  compel  action.  In  this  sense  an  in- 
junction may  be  regarded  as  a  conservative 
remedy;  mandamus,  as  an  active  one.  The 
former  preserves  matters  in  statu  quo,  while 
the  very  object  of  the  latter  is  to  change 
the  status  of  affairs  and  to  substitute  action 
for  inactivity.  The  one  is  therefore  a  posi- 
tive or  remedial  process;  the  other  a  nega- 
tive or  preventive  one.  And  since  mandamus 
is  in  no  sense  a  preventive  remedy,  it  cannot 
take  the  place  of  an  injunction,  and  will  not 
be  employed  to  restrain  or  prevent  an  im- 
proper interference  with  the  rights  of  relat- 
ors. *  ^  *  Mandamus  and  injunction 
should  not  be  confounded.  The  latter  is  used 
to  prevent  action,  to  maintain  affairs  in  statu 
quo.  The  former  is  compulsory,  commanding 
something  to  be  done.  An  injunction  is  pre- 
ventative and  protective  merely,  and  not  re- 
storative. It  interposes  between  t&e  com- 
plainant and  the  injury  he  fears  or  seeks  to 
avoid.  If  the  injury  be  already  done,  the 
writ  can  have  no  operation,  for  it  cannot 
be  corrective  so  as  to  remove  it  It  Is  not 
used  for  the  purpose  of  punishment,  or  to 
Gomp^  persons  to  do  right,  but  simply  to 
prevent  them  from  doing  wrong.  •  •  • 
Mandamus  is,  however,  compulsory,  and  re- 
(piires  doing  the  act"  Gallagban  v.  McQown 
CTex.)  90  S.  W«  319,  324  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  High,  Bxtraordinary  Legal 
Remedies  [3d  Ed.]  I  6). 

An  injunction  is  a  preventive  writ  which 
restrains  motion  and  enforces  inaction,  while 
mandamus  is  a  remedial  writ  which  compels 
action  and  coerces  the  performance  of  a  prop- 
tt  ATigt^Tig  diity,  and  hence  a  writ  whereby 
persons  were  restrained  from  Intruding  them- 
selves  qn  U^e  county  committee  of  the  Demo- 


crattc  party,  and  members  ot  the  committes 
were  restrained  from  attempting  to  include 
the  intruders  as  members,  is  an  injunction. 
Ware  v.  Welch  (Tex.)  149  8.  W.  203,  264. 

As  maadftte 

See  Mandate. 

As  »  p«««oK»tiTe  wHi 

"The  'writ  of  mandamus'  was  originally 
a  prerogative  writ,  which  the  Ckiurt  of  King's 
Bench  was  wont  to  Issue  to  any  part  of  the 
realm  for  the  prevention  of  disorder,  from 
failure  of  justice  or  defect  of  poUce."  Ham- 
lin V.  Higglns,  67  Aa  625,  628,  102  Me.  SIO. 

"Mandamus"  is  not  a  prerogative  writ 
running  in  the  name  of  the  sovereign,  but  is 
an  ordinary  process,  available  to  any  private 
citizen,  to  protect  a  private  right  when  it  is 
an  appropriate  remedy,  and  therefore  the  use 
of  the  name  of  the  state  In  such  cases  is  a 
mere  form,  and  may  be  treated  as  surplusage. 
State  ex  rel.  Watts  v.  Cain,  58  S.  E.  937,  938, 
78  S.  C.  848. 

The  writ  of  "mandamus"  is  of  most  an- 
cient origin.  It  issued  from  a  common-law 
court  to  afford  extraordinary  legal  relief  in 
cases  where  the  ordinary  remedy  at  law  was 
inadequate.  Originally  it  was  a  prerogative 
writ,  so  called  from  the  fact  that  it  proceed- 
ed from  the  king  himself,  in  his  Court  of 
King's  Bench,  and  was  granted  where  one 
was  entitled  to  an  office  or  function  and  there 
was  no  other  remedy.  It  stiU  preserves  many 
of  its  prerogative  features  in  England,  but 
in  this  state  it  is  a  writ  of  right  Southern 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Atlanta  Stove  Works,  57  S.  E. 
429,  433,  128  Ga.  207  (citing  High,  Ex.  Leg. 
Rem.  i  9). 

"Mandamus"  is  a  prerogative  writ  of  a 
remedial  nature,  and  it  is  issued  in  all  cases 
where  the  party  has  a  right  to  have  anything 
done  and  has  no  other  spedflc  means  of  com- 
pelling performance,  and  it  lies  to  restore  one 
to  the  enjoyment  of  an  office  or  position  of 
trust  of  a  public  nature  from  which  he  has 
been  wrongfully  removed;  but  one  cannot 
by  mandamus  litigate  and  determine  title  to 
an  office.  State  ex  reL  Guion  v.  Miles,  109  S. 
W.  595,  606,  210  Mo.  127. 

"  *BCandamu8'  is  no  longer  treated  as  a 
purely  prerogative  writ  In  its  use  in  an 
original  proceeding  in  modem  practice  the 
writ  has  come  to  be  considered  as  merely  an 
action  at  law  between  the  parties.  The  right 
to  the  writ,  and  the  power  to  issue  it,  has 
ceased  to  depend  upon  any  prerogative  power. 
It  is  nothing  more  than  the  ordinary  process 
of  a  court  of  justice  to  which  every  one  is 
entitled  where  it  is  the  appropriate  process 
for  asserting  the  right  he  claims.  •  •  • 
Mandamus,  although  it  is  an  extraordinary 
legal  remedy,  is  in  the  nature  of  an  equitable 
interference,  supplementing  the  deficiencies 
of  the  conmion  law.  It  will  ordinarily  be  is- 
sued where  a  legal  duty  is  established  and 
no  other  sufficient  means  exists  for  enforcing 


MANDAMUS 


256 


MANDAMUS 


It  •  •  •"  Where  one  has  a  snbstanttal 
right  to  protect  or  enforce,  and  there  is  no 
other  adequate  remedy  at  law,  he  Is  entitled, 
aa  a  matter  of  right,  to  mandamus,  or,  at 
least,  it  is  an  abuse  of  discretion  to  refuse  it 
The  courts  of  the  state  will  entertain  an 
action  of  mandamus  by  a  foreign  private  cor- 
poration against  one  of  its  officers,  resident 
of  this  state,  of  whom  it  cannot  obtain  Juris- 
diction in  its  own  domicile,  to  compel  such 
officer  to  turn  over  books,  papers,  etc.,  belong- 
ing to  the  corporation  notwithstanding  the  ti- 
tle to  the  office  may  be  incidentally  involved. 
Potomac  Oil  Co.  v.  Dye,  102  Pac.  677,  678,  10 
Gal.  App.  634  (citing  and  adopting  Marbury 
V.  Madison,  1  Cranch,  137,  176,  2  L.  Ed.  60; 
Kendall  v.  United  States  ex  rel.  Stokes,  12 
Pet  524,  616.  9  L.  Ed.  1181;  Kentucky  v. 
Dennlson,  24  How.  66, 08, 16  L.  Ed.  717 ;  Unit- 
ed States  ex  rel.  Riggs  v.  Johnson  County, 
6  WalL  166,  198,  18  L.  Ed.  768). 

"Mandamus"  is  not  a  creative  remedy, 
and  does  not  call  into  existence  any  new  lia- 
bility or  duty,  and. never  commanded  the  per- 
formance of  an  act  which  was  unauthorized 
in  the  absence  of  the  writ  The  origin  of  this 
ancient  writ  is  very  obscure.  It  has  un- 
dergone many  changes  during  the  generations 
in  which  it  has  been  in  use.  It  was  original- 
ly a  high  prerogative  writ,  and  the  king's 
prerogative  was  part  of  the  common  law  of 
England.  It  was  the  aggregate  of  the  king's 
special  powers  and  privileges — ^what  Brac- 
ton  calls  "privilegla  regis,"  and  Britton  "le 
droit  le  roy** — the  personal  rights  or  powers 
of  supreme  character  exercisable  without 
question  and  without  responsibility.  In  re 
Lauritsen,  109  N.  W.  404,  408,  99  Minn.  813. 

The  ancient  wilt  of  "mandamus"  was  a 
writ  prerogative  of  the  king,  and  issued  only 
at  his  pleasure.  It  was  an  attribute  of  sov- 
ereignty, and  a  citizen  could  not  as  a  right 
invoke  its  aid ;  but  even  at  common  law  its 
scope  became  enlarged,  and  it  could  be  in- 
voked by  the  private  citizen  to  compel  the 
performance  of  a  legal  duty  on  the  part  of 
the  courts  and  other  tribunals ;  but  the  defi- 
nition of  the  ancient  writ  is  inapplicable 
under  the  Code,  which  prescribes  the  use  of 
the  writ  and  makes  it  simply  one  of  the 
methods  of  procedure  for  the  enforcement  of 
rights  or  the  redress  of  wrongs.  State  ex 
reL  Barto  v.  Board  of  Drainage  Com'rs,  90 
Pac.  660,  46  Wash.  474. 

Formerly  "mandamus"  was  regarded  as 
a  prerogative  right  and  issued,  not  as  of 
right  but  at  the  pleasure  of  the  sovereign  or 
state  and  in  his  or  its  name  as  an  attribute 
of  sovereignty;  but  we  say  the  writ  is  not 
in  any  sense  a  prerogative  writ  or  a  writ  to 
be  issued  at  the  discretion  of  the  court  It 
is  a  procedure  under  the  Code,  and  any  per- 
son who.  has  a  cause  that  calls  fbr  its  in- 
vocation has  the  same  right  to  sue  out  the 
writ  as  he  has  to  commence  a  civil  action  to 
redress  a  private  wrong.  State  ex  rel.  Chea- 
lander  v.  Carroll,  106  Pac.  748,  750,  57  Wash. 


202  (quoting  and  adopting  deihiftion  In  State 
ex  reL  Brown  ▼•  McQuade,  79  Pac  208,  36 
Wash.  679). 

"Originallj  the  writ  of  mandamus  was  a 
prerogative  of  the  EDgllsb  crown,  and  issued 
in  its  name  from  the  Court  of  King's  Bench, 
requiring  the  performance  of  some  specified 
duty  which  that  court  had  previously  deter- 
mined, or  at  least  supposed,  to  be  consonant 
to  right  and  justice.  In  modem  times  it  is- 
sues as  a  judicial  process  in  actions,  oftiien 
between  private  parties,  in  which  a  court  of 
competent  jurisdiction  has  previously  ad- 
judged or  commanded  the  performance  by 
the  defendant  therein  of  some  qiedfled  duty, 
which  under  the  law  he  should  perform,  and 
is  the  means  by  which  such  judgment  or  coio- 
mand  is  enforced."  A  Circuit  Court  of  the 
United  States  is  without  jurisdiction,  ^ther 
original  or  by  removal  from  a  state  court  of 
an  action  for  a  V^ilt  of  mandamus,  which  is 
not  necessary  for  the  exercise  by  it  of  a  ju- 
risdiction which'  it  has  otherwise  previously 
acquired;  the  writ  of  mandamus  not  behig 
a  suit  of  a  dvil  nature  at  law  or  in  equity, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  acts  of  Congress 
creating  the  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United 
States  and  defining  their  jurisdiction.  Mys- 
tic MlUing  Co.  V.  Chicago,  M  &  St  P.  By.  Co., 
132  Fed.  289,  291. 

As  a  civil  aetioa  or  proeeedisff 

As  suit  of  civil  nature^  see  Suit  of  GivU 
Nature. 

Mandamus  is  a  '^rsonal  acdon*  withhi 
Rev.  Code  1852,  amended  to  1893,  p.  787,  c 
106,  S  2,  declaring  that  all  personal  actions 
with  specified  exceptions  shall  survive,  and 
is  a  suit  at  law  within  Const  art  4,  |  26, 
providing  that  no  suit  at  law  shall  abate  at 
the  death  of  a  party  where  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion survives.  State  v.  Jessup  &  Moore  Pa- 
per Co.  (DeL)  80  Aa  850,  351. 

Mandamus  is  a  common-law  action. 
People  ex  reL  Bauman  v.  Gest  1^  HL  Apik 
560,  565. 

**Mandamqa^  proceedings  are  dvil  a^ 
tions  within  Pub.  Acts  1906,  p.  483,  No.  S09, 
providing  for  changes  of  venue  in  such  ac- 
tions. Woodworth  v.  Old  Second  Nat  Bank, 
107  N.  W.  906,  144  Ifich.  338,  8  Aim.  Oas. 
310. 

A  proceeding  in  mandamus  is  a  dvil 
proceeding  which  may  be  in  the  name  of  tbe 
state  at  the  relation  of  an  individual  or  sim- 
ply in  the  name  of  an  individual  as  plaintiff. 
Rader  v.  Board  of  Education  of  Beaver  Dist. 
60  S.  B.  240,  242,  67  W.  Va.  220. 

A  "mandamus"  proceeding  is  an  action 
at  law,  and  under  the  practice  in  this  state 
the  complaint  takes  the  place  of  the  alterna- 
tive writ  the  answer  takes  the  place  of  tbe 
return,  and  subsequent  pleadings  wUI  be  bad 
until  an  issue  is  Joined  for  trial  on  the  me^ 
its,  and  the  complaint  answer,  and  subse- 
quent pleadings  are  governed  by  the  rules  of 


XAKPAMT3S 


267 


UAJStDAUVB 


the  common  law  and  must  contain  In  aub- 
itance  the  easentlala  of  good  pleading  in  an 
ordinary  action  at  law.  Clement  ▼.  Oraham, 
63  Aa  14e,  160.  78  Yt  290»  Ann.  Gaa.  1918E, 
120a 

^'Statntea  everywhere. aeem  to  recognise 
the  present  proceeding  by  'mandamna*  as  a 
dTil  action  with  the  r^ator  as  the  plaintiff 
and  the  respondent  as  the  defendant"  State 
ez  reL  Atchison,  T.  ft  S.  F.  R.  Co.  ▼.  Jeffer- 
son Connty  Corn'ri*  11  Kan*  67,  6fi^  6II» 

ProliiUtlom  coiiipmre4 

See  Prohibition. 


As  speetol; 

See  Special  Proceeding: 

Blasts  — foFsealils 

Mandamus  lies  to  compel  the  perform- 
ance of  an  act  which  the  law  spedfically  «i- 
Joins  as  a  duty  resulting  from  an  office.  Bell 
T.  Thomaa,  lU  Pac.  76,  78,  49  Colo.  78,  81 
U  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  684. 

A  writ  of  ''mandamus"  is  a  '^wrlt  Is- 
toed  in  the  name  of  the  state  to  an  Inferior 
tribunal,  a  corporation,  board,  or  person 
commanding  the  performance  of  an  act 
which  the  law  espedaUy  enjoins  as  a  duty 
resulting  from  an  office,  trust  or  station." 
State  ex  reL  Irvine  ▼.  Brooks,  84  Pac.  488» 
^1,  14  Wyo.  398,  6  L.  E.  A.  (9.  8.)  TOO,  7 
Ann.  Oaa.  U08  (quoting  Ber.  St  1899,  i  4194). 

The  office  of  a  writ  of  mandamus  is  to 
compel  spedflc  action  in  the  exercise  of  pure- 
ly ministerial  functions.  If  the  performance 
of  an  official  act  inyolves  discretion,  courts, 
although  they  have  power  to  demand  action, 
have  no  right  to  say  that  it  must  be  In  a 
particular  way.  People  ex  rel.  Qulnn  v. 
Voorhla,  100  N.  T.  Supp.  717,  721,  115  App. 
DIv.  118. 

Under  the  statute,  ''mandamus*'  la  in- 
tended to  compel  performance  of  any  act 
which  the  law  specifically  enjoins  as  a  duty 
resulting  from  an  office,  trust,  or  station. 
It  is  intended  as  a  speedy  remedy,  and  may 
be  granted  by  the  court  In  term  time  or  by 
the  judge  at  chambers.  Beadles  v.  Fry,  82 
Pac.  1041,  1042,  15  Okl.  428,  2  L.  B.  A.  (N. 
S.)85S. 

At  common  law  the  writ  of  "mandamus" 
ifl  a  writ  of  right  every  day  made  use  of  to 
oblige  Inferior  courts  to  do  Justice  but  it 
wlU  not  be  made  use  of  to  control  the  exer- 
cise of  discretion.  In  general,  it  lies  where 
one  has  been  refused  admittance  to  or  turned 
out  wrongfully  from  any  office  or  franchise. 
Matney  v.  King,  98  Pac.  737,  746,  20  OkL  22. 

nie  remedy  by  "mandamus,"  though  ap- 
propriate to  compel  the  performance  of  a 
legal  duty,  canhot  be  invoked  to  compel  one 
to  complete  the  making  of  a  contract  Put- 
nam Foundry  ft  Machine  Co.  v.  Town  Coun- 
cil of  Town  of  Barrlngton,  67  AtL  788,  786, 
28R.I.  422. 

8Wn0.ftP^8XB.— 17 


To  support  the  remedy  of  "mandamiis" 
a  plain  and  unambiguous  duty  which  It  is 
designed  to  enforce  must  already  have  been 
imposed  by  law.  Where  any  person  has  a 
right  to  demand  the  exerdse  of  a  pnbllc 
function,  and  there  la  an  ofla4ser  or  set  of  of- 
tc«a^  authorised  to  exerdae  that  function, 
there  the  right  and  the  authority  give  rise  to 
the  duty;  but  when  the  right  depends  upon 
the  grant  of  the  authority,  and  that  author- 
ity Is  diseretionary,  no  legal  duty  la  im- 
posed. Cav^  v.  Coleman»  101  S.  W.  199,  200, 
100  Tex.  467  (citing  Carr  v*  Northern  Liber- 
tle0»  85  Pa.  824,  78  Am.  Dec.  842). 

The  writ  of  "mandamua"  will  not  lie  ex- 
cept to  compel  performance  of  an  act  which 
the  law  specifically  enjoins  as  a  duty,  re- 
sulting from  an  office,  trust,  or  station,  and 
it  will  not  lie  to  comp^  a  district  Judge  to 
enter  of  record  in  the  district  court  of  a 
certain  county  in  his  district  an  alleged  or- 
der admitting  defendant  to  ball,  where  It 
appears  that  the  same  ia  not  there  properly 
entitled  to  record.  State  ex  rel.  Stevenson  v. 
RusseU,  96  Pac  468, 1  OkL  Cr.  165. 

Bev.  St  1899,  |  4194,  defines  "manda- 
mus" aa  a  writ  iasnad  in  the  name  of  the 
state  to  an  inferior  tribunal^  corporations, 
boards,  or  persons*  commanding  the  perform- 
ance of  an  act  which  the  law  specially  en- 
Joins  aa  a  duty  resulting  froman  office,  trust, 
or  station.  State  ex  reL  Wyoming  Agricul- 
tural College  V.  Irvine,  84  Pac  90,  91,  14 
Wyo.  318. 

The  writ  of  "mandamus"  is  an  order  of 
a  court  of  competent  and  original  Jurisdic- 
tion, commanding  an  executive  or  ministerial 
ofilcer  to  perf<Mrm  an  act,  or  omit  to  do  an 
act,  the  performance  or  omission  of  which  la 
enjoined  by  law;  and  It  la  granted  on  the 
motion  of  the  party  aggrieved,  or  of  the  com- 
monwealth when  the  publie  Interest  la  af- 
fected. It  is  not  a  proper  remedy  to  compel 
a  telephone  company  to  install  an  instru- 
ment. Williams  V.  Maysvllle  Tel.  Co.,  82  S. 
W.  095,  996,  119  Ky.  33  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  Civil  Code  of  Prac.  |  477). 

The  object  of  a  "mandamus"  is  ta  en- 
force spedflc  relief,  and  it  is  the  inadequacy, 
rather  than  the  absence  of,  other  legal 
remedies,  coupled  with  the  danger  of  a  fail- 
ure of  Justioe  without  the  aid  of  a  manda- 
mus, which  lysually  determines  the  propriety 
of  relief  by  mandamus.  Mandamua  is  the 
proper  remedy  for  enforcing  performance  by 
a  traction  company  of  ita  duty  to  pave  a 
street  pursuant  to  the  terms  of  the  ordinance 
granting  to  its  predecessor  the  right  to  lo- 
cate tracks  in  such  street  Borough  of 
Butherford  v.  Hudson  Blver  Traction  Co.,  63 
Aa  84,  90,  73  N.  J.  Law,  227. 

Under  the  express  provisions  of  Code 
Civ.  Proc  §  1066,  "mandamus"  can  only  be 
issued  to  compel  the  perfonnanoe  of  an  act 
required  by  law,  or  to  compel  the  admiasfton 


G^Wt^I*'  ^^tf^t^k  aW 


*99S 


J«4WA^« 


ot  a  party  't9.)tlie  eujoynrenl}  of  a  .rist^t  or 
office  to.  .which  he  is  entitled  and  from  which 
he  I9  unlawfully  excluded.  Maxwell  v. 
Boaid  iof  Fire  Copi*i»  of  City  and  County  of 
San  Fran^co,  72  Pac.  806,  997,  189.0aL  229. 

Under  Rev.  8t  1899,  i  4194,  defining 
"mandamus"  iad  a  writ  issued  in  the  name  of 
the  state  to  an  inferior  tribunal,  eorpora- 
tion,  board,-  or  persons,  commanding  the  per- 
formance of  an  act  which  the  law  specially 
enjoins  as  a  duty  resulting  from  an  office, 
trust,  or  station,  and  section  4197,  providing 
that  the  writ  must  not  be  issued  where  there 
Is  a  plain  and  adequate  •  remedy  1^  law, 
"m^jdamus"  to  compel  an  officer  of  a  pri- 
vate corpowktiop  ,to  permit  the  inspection  of 
books,  papers,  and  effects  in  his  possession 
and  control,  is  the  proper  form  of  remedy 
to  enforce  the  right  of  stockholders  to  in- 
spect the  books  and  records  of  the  corpqra- 
tion,  where  the  officer  having  the  custody 
denies  the  stockholder  accesis  thereto.  Wyo- 
ming Coal  Min.  Co.  v.  State  ex  reL  Kennedy, 
87.  Pac.  984,  985,  15  Wyo.  97. 

Mandamus  Uesr  tp  compel  an  inferior 
board  or  person  to  do  or  not  to  do  an  act, 
the  performance  or  oniission  of  which  the 
law  enjoins  as  a  dVity  from  an  office,  trust,  or 
station,  and,  when  discretion  is  left  to  such 
board  or  person,  mandamus  may  compel  it  to 
act  in  some  way;  but  cannot  control  such  dis- 
cretton  under  the- express  provisions  of  Code, 
i  4341/  State^  v:  Parker;  126  N.  W.  866,  864, 
147  iowa,  69.' 

**The  province  of  a  writ  of  mandamus  is 
to  afford^  redress  where  a  party  has  a  right 
to  have  anything  done  and  has  no  other  sp€f- 
^fic  means  of  compelling  its  performance. 
Th^*  writ  is  also  applicable  in  certain'  cases 
whbre  a  duty  is  imposed  by  statute  for  the 
benefit  of  an  individual.'?  Staiie'  ex  rel. 
Guenther  v:-  Charleston  Light  ft  Wat»r  Co., 
47  S.  B.  979,  988,  68  S.  C  640. 

"The  modem  writ  of  mandamus  may  be 
defined  as  a  command  issuing  from  a  com- 
mon-law court  of  competent  Jurisdiction,  in 
the  name  of  the  state  or  sovef  elgn,  directed 
to  ioine  corporation,  officer,  or  inferior  court, 
requiring 'the  performance  of  a  particular 
duty  therein  specified,  which  duty  results 
from  the  official  station  of  the  party  to  whom 
the  writ  is  directed,:  or  from  operation  of 
-law.^'  Mllster  v.  City  Council  of  Spartan- 
burg. 47.  S.  E.  141,  68  S.  C.  248  (quoting  High, 
Bxtr.  Leg.  Rem.  4);  State  ex  rel.  Huebler  v.' 
•Board  of  Police  Comers,  82  S.  W.  960,  962, 
108  Mo.  App.  98. 

The  statutory  duty  of  the  trial  judge 
to  settle  and  sign  a  bill  of  exceptions  may 
be  enforced  by  "mandamus,"  where  he 
arbitrarily  refuses  to  act,  though  he  cannot 
be  required  to' perform  the  duty  in  a  particu- 
lar r  manner  by  sign^ig  a  particular  bilL 
State,  ex  rel.  Columbus  St.  Ry.  &.  lA^t  Co. 
Vv  t>eup]»e,  81  N.  B.  678,  679,  40  Ind*  App. 


^  9ode^  i'  ]^7|  provides  that  the  board  c^ 
supervisors  shall  direct  the  treasurer  to  re- 
fund any  tax.  erroneously  or  illegally  exacted 
or-  paid,  with',  all  .  interest  actually  paid 
thereon.  Section  4341  defines  "mandamus" 
as  an  action  to  compel  an  inferior  board  to 
do 'an  act,  the  performance  of  which  the  law 
enjoins  as  a  duty  resulting  from  an  office, 
and  provides  that  mandamus  cannot  con- 
trol discretion.  Held,  that  there  could  be 
no  recovery  in  mandamus  to  compel  a  board 
of  supervisors  'td'  order  the  payment  of  in- 
terest on  taxes  erroneously  exacted  founded 
on  section  1417;  the  section  providing  mere- 
ly for  the  return  of  interest  paid;  and  the 
word  "refund"  meaning  to  pay  back, .  to 
restore.  Home  Sav.  Bank  v.  Morris,  120  N. 
W.  100,  141  Iowa,  660.  • 

"The  function  of  'mandamus  la  to  com- 
pel the  pefformance  of  a  legal  duty,  to 
command  action,  not  to  review  action,  to 
complete  the  unfinished.  It  is  the  remedy 
for  nonfeasance.  *  *  ^  It  doea  not  lie 
to  correct  mistakes  that  have  been  made  or 
to  remedy  wrongs  that  have  been  done." 
Kenney  v.  State  Board  of  D^tistry,  59  Aa 
932,  933,  26  R.  I.  638  {quoting  Corbett  v.  Nay- 
lor,  67  AtL  304,  25  R.  I.  622). 

"'Mandamus*  will  not  enforce  the  per- 
formance of  official  duty,  unless  the  duty 
sought  to  be  oiforced  is  clearly  within  the 
scope  of  su<A  officer's  duty."  Where  twto  peti- 
tiona  are  pending  asking  for  the  sale  of  the 
same  tract  of  school  land,  one  of  which  re- 
quests that  it  be  sold  as  leased  land,  and 
the  other  to  an  actual  settler,  and  appraisers 
are  appointed  and  qualified  to  appraise  the 
land  as  leased  land,  they  cannot  be  compel- 
led by  mandamus  to  act  as  appraisers  under 
the  other  petition.  Wilson  v.  Winfrey,  84 
Pac.  123,  72  Kan.  468. 

"Mandamus"  is  a  writ  issuing  in  the 
name  of  the  people*  originally  instituted  for 
the  purpose  of  correcting  oflicial  inaction 
and  to  compel  the  performance  of  some  legal 
duty;  and  although  it  has  been  extended  by 
the  court  from  time  to  time,  and  has  been 
held  to  lie  where  formerly  it  was  thought 
not  to  apply,  it  has  not  been,  nor  should  it 
be,  extended  to  obtain  property  or  to  fumlsli 
evidence  of  title  to  property,  that  the  owner 
may  be  more  certainly  possessed  of  it,  or 
that  it  may  be  more  conveniently  transferred 
by  him.  People  ex  rel.  Rottenberg  v.  Utah 
Gold  &  Copper  Mines  Co.,  119  N.  Y.  Supp. 
862,  863,  136  App.  DiT.  418. 

"Mandamus"  does  not  lie  against  a  pri- 
vate citizen.  In  other  words,  where  the  writ 
is  sought  to  be  invoked,  the  proper  inquiry 
is:  Does  the  duty  sought  to  be  enforced 
clearly  result  from  an  office^  tmat,  or  sta- 
tion? If  so,  the  writ  should  run;  otherwise 
not.  This  is  the  common  Ittw  and  is  em- 
bodied in  Wilson's  Rev.  4  Ann.  St  1903,  I 
(4884)  686,  which  is  as  follows:  "The  writ 
of  .maii^ai^jis^ay  be  issued  by  the  Supreme 
Court  or  the  district  court,  or  any  Justice  or 


ilANt>A&itM 


2S9 


UAisa>xiiOB 


jiidgii  tiiereM,  during:  term  oir  at  «hliiiibers,  to 
any  inferior  tribunal,  oortwration,  t)oard  or 
person,  to  compel  the  performance  of  any 
act  which  the  law  specially  enjoins  as  a 
duty,  resulting  from  an  office,  trust  or  ata- 
tlon.  •  •  ••»  Eberle  V.  King,  93  Pac. t4», 
753.  20  OkL  49  (citing  26  Cjrc.  pp.  1«3,  1(54). 

According  to  IDer.  .  St  18d9,  i  4194, 
"  ^mandamus*  la  a  writ  issued  in  the  name  of 
the  state  to  an  inferior  tribunal,  a  corpora- 
tion, board,  or  persohs,  demanding  the  per- 
formance of  an  act  which  the  l^w  specially 
enjoins  as  a  duty  resulting  frona  an  office, 
trust  or  station,"  and,  according  to  'section 
4197,  **the  writ  must  not  be-  issruM  in  a 
case  when  there  is  a  plain  and  adequate  rem- 
edy in  the  ordinary  course  of  the  law.**  Wy- 
omhig  Coal  Mining  Co.  ▼.  State  ex  rel.  Ken- 
nedy, 87  Pac.  887,  338,  15  Wyo.  97,  128  Am. 
St  Bep.  1014. 

It  is  the  special  office  of  the  writ  of 
"mandamus"  to  compel  a  ministerial  officer 
to  perform  the  duties  of  his  office,  and  the 
writ  will  lie  though  the  duties  of  the  officer 
are  of  a  quasi  judicial  character,  and  con- 
sist of  a  discretion  which  cannot  be  review- 
ed by  the  courts,  where  the  object  sought  is 
to  compel  an  exercise  of  the  discretion. 
State  ex  rel.  Howe  v.  Kendall,  87  Pac.  821, 
822.  44  Wash.  542. 

''Mandamus"  is  a  l^^al  remedy,  and  lies 
for  the  enfioroonent  of  legal  rights  onlj,  and 
ander  Bums'.  Ajul  St  1908,  §  12^,  provid- 
ing thi^t  wTil^  of  ma9d^tc(  ids^  bo  Issued 
to  any  inferior  tribunal,  corpozBtion,  board, 
or  person,  to  compel  the  performance  of  an 
act  which  the  law  specially  enjoins,  or  a 
duly  resulting  from  an  oQce,  trust,  or  sta* 
tion,  to  justify  the  issuance  of  the  writ  it  is 
essential  that  the  relator  have  a  clear  legal 
right  to  the  thing  demanded,  and  that  it  be 
the  imperative  duty  of  the  respondent  to 
perfonn  the  required  act.  State  ex  rel.  Hat^ 
field  V.  Cummins,  85  N.  S.  359,  360,  171  Ind. 
112,  36  U  E.  A-  (K.  S.)  945. 

In  Ohio  "mandamus"  is  not  used  for  the 
redress  of  pfivate  wrongs,  but  only  in  mat- 
ters relating  to  the  public.  The  writ  is 
the  proper  remedy  to  restore  a  party  to  the 
possession  of  an  office  from  which  he  has 
been  illegally  removed.  State  ex  rel.  Moyer 
T.  Baldwin,  83  N.  B.  907,  908,  77  Ohio  St. 
532.  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S^  49,  12  Ann.  Cas.  10. 

Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  |  1182,  provides 
that  "writs  of  mandamus  may  be  Issued 
to  any  Inferior  tribunal,  corporation,  board 
or  person,  to  compel  the  performance  of  an 
act  which  the  law  specially  enjoins,  or  a  duty 
resulting  from  an  office,  trust  or  station.'* 
This  statute  Is  substantially  declaratory  of 
the  common-law  doctrine.  •'Mandamus"  is 
in  no  sense  an  equitable  proceeding,  but  is  a 
coQunon-law  remedy  to  compel  performance 
of  a  legal  duty,  and  the  relator  must  have 
a  clear  legal  right  to  the  thing  demanded, 
&nd  it  must  be  the  Imperative  duty  of  the 


reepdndent  to'  pertornr'  the  a<5t  required.  It 
either  the  right  or  the  duty  be  doubtful,  the 
writ  will  hot  be  issued.  A  duty  arising  out 
of  statute  must  not  be-  merely  |>ermi8sive  oi' 
discretionary;  but  the  statute  must  require 
the  act  to  be  dbn^,  Or  It  #111  not  be  enforced 
by  mandamus.  State  ▼•  Jackson,  81  N.  B. 
^  «3,  168  ma  884. 

A  ''writ  of  mandamus"  Is  a  command 
issuing  from  a  court  of  law  of  competent 
Jurisdiction,  in  the  name  of  the  state,  direct- 
ing some  inferior  court,  officer,  corporation, 
or  person  to  some  particular  thing  therein 
spedfled  #hich  pertains  to  his  office  >or  duty. 
It  wUl  not  lie  against  one  who  does  not  oc- 
cupy jan  official  or  quasi  official  position, 
but  it  will  lie  not  only  against  public  officers, 
but  against  private  officers  in  certain  cases, 
and  against  pvbUc  and  private  corporations. 
It  will  lie  to  enforce  a  public  duty,  and  tbe 
officials  of  a  railroad  company  can  be  com- 
pelled to  perform  certain  duties  by  manda- 
mus on  the  theory  that  they  owe  those 
dutiea  to  the  state  and  are  subject  to  its 
visltorlal  powers.  Gas,  water«  and  telephone 
companies  can  -also  be  competed  by  manda- 
mus to  discharge  their  duties  to\the  public. 
Rouse  V.  Thompson,  81  N.  El  1109,  1120,  228 
111.  522  (citing  Mechem,  Public  Officers v& 
Agents,  i  920;  People  ex  rel.  Hempstead  v. 
Chicago  4  A.  R.  Ck).,  55  IlL  95,  8  Am.  Rep. 
681 ;  Chicago  d:  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Suffern,  21  N. 
B.  824,  129  IIL  274;  People  ex  rel.  Cantrell 
V.  St  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.,  62  N.  B.  292, 
176  nL  512,  35  LL  R.  A.  656;  LUehfleld  &  M. 
Ky.  Co.  V.  People,  78  N.  B.  589,  222  111.  242; 
People  V.  Chicago,  I.  ft  L.  Ry.  Co.,  79  N.  B. 
144,  228  lU.  581,  7  Ann.  Cas.  1;  2  SpelUng, 
Injunctions  &  Other  Bxtraordinary  Reme- 
dies [2d  Bd.]  i  1592). 

Though  '^mahdamus'*  will  not  general- 
ly lie  to  compel  performance  of  a  power,  the 
exercise  of  which  is  in  the  discretion  of 
the  officer  against  whom  the  wilt  is  sought, 
the  remedy  is  available  if  the  action  of  the 
officer  is  capricious,  arbitrary,  unreasonable, 
or  based  on  false  Information.  People  ex  rel. 
Empire  City  Trotting  Club  v.  State  Racing 
Commission,  82  M.  B.  723,  190  N.  Y.  81. 

"Mandamus"  cannot  be  rightfully  in- 
voked to  settle  a  doubtful  claim  to  an  office, 
or  to  have  the  title  to  an  office  adjudicated 
upon  as  between  adverse  claimants,  but  'In-' 
formation  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto** 
affords  the  proper  remedy!  Where  the  re- 
lator holds  a  prima  facie  and  uncontested 
title  to  the  office,  or  his  title  has  been  ad- 
judicated upon  and  finally  established  by  a 
competent  tribunal,  a  writ  of  "mandamus" 
may  be  Issued  to  put  him  in  possession  of 
the  office  as  well  as  of  the  books,  papers,  and 
other  property  pertaining  to  it.  Hoy  v.  State 
ex  rel.  BUchisinan,  81  N.  B.  509,  512,  168  Ind. 
506,  11  Ann.  Cas.  944  (citing  Mannlx  v.  State 
ex  rel.  Mitchell,  17  N.  m  565,  115  Ind.  245). 

"Mandamus"  does' not  lie  to  compel  the 
payment  of  an  unliquidated  unadjudicated 


MANDAMUS 


260 


MANDAMUS 


clainr  tbat  Is  disputed.  Howell  t.  State  ez 
rel.  Edwards,  45  South.  458,  454,  54  Fla.  199 
(citing  Whitesides  y.  Stuart,  20  S.  W.  245, 
91  Tenn.  710;  Hicka  y.  Board  of  Auditoia  of 
Wayne  Ck>a]it7,  57  N.  W.  188,  97  Mich.  Oil; 
State  Board  of  Bducatlon  r.  West  Point,  50 
Miss.  088). 

''Mandamus,"  as  defined  by  Oiy.  Code 
Prac.  i  477,  and  the  courts,  is  a  writ  com- 
manding the  performance  of  some  duty,  in 
the  performance  of  which  the  applicant  for 
the  writ  is  interested,  or  by  the  nonperform- 
ance of  which  he  is  aggrieyed  or  injured. 
Louisyille  Home  Telephone  Go.  y.  City  of 
LouisyiUe,  118  S.  W.  855,  857,  130  Ky.  611. 

Mandamus  may  not  be  inyoked  to  reyiew 
a  judicial  or  quasi  Judicial  decision.  Hie 
primary  object  of  the  writ  of  mandamus  is 
to  compel  action.  It  neither  creates  nor  con* 
fers  power  to  act,  but  only  commands  the 
exercise  of  powers  already  existing;  whoi  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  person  or  body  proceeded 
against  to  act  without  its  agency.  While  it 
may  require  the  performance  of  a  purely 
ministerial  duty  in  a  particular  manner,  its 
command  is  neyer  giyen  to  oon4>el  the  dis- 
charge of  a  duty  inyolying  the  exercise  of 
Judgment  or  discretion  in  any  specified  way, 
for  that  would  substitute  the  Judgment  or 
discretion  of  the  court  issuing  ttie  writ  for 
that  of  the  person  or  persons  against  whom 
the  writ  wa3  issued.  People  ex  rel.  McCabe 
V.  Matthies,  87  N.  Y.  &  196,  198,  92  App. 
Diy.  16  (Citing  People  ex  reL  Harris  y.  Ck>m- 
missioners  of  Land  Oflice,  48  N.  H  418,  149 
N.  Y.  26). 

Ky.  St  i  3855,  requires  a  personal  repre- 
sentatlye  of  a  decedent's  estate  to  return  an 
inyentory  within  a  certain  time  after  qualify- 
ing. Section  8857  provides  that  any  person- 
al r^resentatiye  f&iling  to  return  an  in- 
yentory within  six  months  after  qualifying 
shall  be  fined  by  the  county  court,  and  be 
required  to  make  such  inyentory  upon  a  day 
fixed  by  it,  and  upon  failure  to  do  so,  shall 
be  fined  for  each  subsequent  delinquency,  and 
section  3858  requires  eyeiy  personal  r^re- 
sentative  to  haye  his  accounts  settled,  and 
all  settlements  and  voudiers  returned  to  the 
county  court  within  a  certain  time,  and  as 
often  thereafter  as  the  court  requires,  dy. 
Code  Prac.  i  477,  defines  the  "writ  of  manda- 
mus" as  an  order  of  a  court  commanding  an 
executiye  or  ministerial  officer  to  perform  or 
omit  an  act,  the  performance  or  omission 
of  which  is  enjoined  by  law,  which  shall  be 
granted  on  the  motion  of  the  party  aggrieved 
or  of  the  commonwealth  when  the  public 
interest  is  affected.  Held,  that  the  duty  of  a 
county  Judge  to  require  executors  and  admin- 
istrators to  file  inventories  and  make  settle- 
ments was  mandatory,  and  not  a  matter  of 
Judicial  discretion  which  could  not  be  oiforced 
by  mandamus.  Commonwealth  y.  Peter,  124 
S.  W.  896,  897,  136  Ky.  689. 

"The  'writ  of  mandamus'  is  in  form  a 
command  in  the  name  of  the  state,  directed 


to  some  trilnmaL  corporation,  or  public  of** 
fleer,  requiring  them  to  do  some  particular 
thing  therein  specified,  and  which  the  court 
has  previously  determined  that  It  is  the  duty 
of  such  tribunals  or  other  person  to  perform. 
^  *  ^  It  does  not  lie  to  correct  the  errors 
of  inferior  tribunals  by  annulling  what  they 
have  done  erroneously,  nor  to  guide  their 
discretion,  nor  to  refrain  them  from  exer- 
cising power  not  delegated  to  them ;  but  it 
is  emphatically  a  writ  requiring  the  tribunal 
or  person  to  whom  it  is  directed,  to  do  some 
particular  act  appertaining  to  their  public 
duty,  and  which  the  prosecutor  has  a  legal 
right  to  have  done.  •  •  •  The  'writ  of 
mandamus'  is  the  counterpart  of  the  writ  of 
prohibition,  and  is  so  designated  in  some 
states  by  statute.  'Mandamus*  is  a  legal 
remedy  to  compel  action  in  accordance  wltk 
legal  duty,  while  ^prohibition*  is  a  legal  reme- 
dy to  restrain  action  in  excess  of  legal  au- 
thority." State  ex  reL  Pelton  v.  Roes,  81 
Pac  865,  867,  39  Wadi.  899  (quoting  and 
adopting  the  definition  in  Dunklin  County 
y.  Dunklin  County  District  Court,  28  Mo.  454). 

**  'Mandamus*  is  a  command  Issued  from 
a  court  of  law  of  competent  Jurisdiction  in 
name  of  the  state  directed  to  some  inferior 
court,  olficer,  corporation,  or  person  requir- 
ing them  to  do  some  particular  thing  ther^ 
spedfled,  which  appertains  to  their  office  or 
duty."  It  lies  in  cases  involving  merely  the 
performance  by  a  county  ofllcial  of  his  plain, 
ministerial  duty  of  payment  of  a  warrant 
drawn  by  lawful  and  proper  authority  upon 
a  fund  In  his  custody,  legally  applicable  to 
its  payment,  and  requiring  the  exercise  of  no 
official  discretion  on  his  part  In  view  of 
Rev.  St  1899,  c.  49,  prescribing  the  pleading 
and  procedure  in  mandamus,  but  not  enlarg- 
ing the  scope  or  ampIU^ing  the  application 
of  the  remedy,  such  a  proceeding  cannot  be 
converted  into  an  equitable  suit  by  the  re- 
spondent, a  county  treasurer,  answering  that 
he  holds  the  fund  subject  to  the  conflicting 
claims  of  relator  and  others  and  an  order  of 
court  requiring  such  other  claimants  to  ap- 
pear and  answer.  State  ex  rel.  Hixon  v.  Ne^ 
zy,  79  S.  W.  993,  991,  995,  105  Mo.  App.  45& 

rrhe  writ  of  ^mandamus*  beHng  Justly 
regarded  as  one  of  the  highest  writs  known 
to  our  system  of  Jurisprudence,  it  issues  only 
where  there  is  a  clear  and  specific  legal  right 
to  be  enforced,  or  a  duty  which  ought  to  be 
and  can  be  performed,  and  where  there  is  no 
other  specific  and  adequate  legal  remedy. 
Since  the  object  of  a  mandamus  is  not  to 
supersede  legal  remedies,  but  rather  to  sup- 
ply the  want  of  them,  two  prerequisites  must 
eidst  to  warrant  a  court  in  granting  thi* 
extraordinary  remedy:  First,  it  must  be 
shown  that  the  relator  has  a  clear,  legal  right 
to  the  performance  of  a  particular  act  or 
duty  at  the  hands  of  the  respondent;  and, 
second,  it  must  appear  that  the  law  affords 
no  other  adequate  or  specific  remedy  to  se- 
cure the  enforcement  of  the  ^ight  and  the 


MAKDAHU8 


861 


MANPATX 


perfonnanee  of  ^e  duty  wbich  it  Is  sonfl^t 
to  coeioe.  The  test  to  be  applied*  therefore, 
In  detenniiiliig  upon  the  rlfi^t  to  relief  by 
mandamuB,  is  to  inquire  whether  the  party 
aggrieved  has  a  clear,  legal  rii^t,  and  wheth- 
er he  has  any  other  adequate  remedy,  since 
the  writ  belongs  only  to  those  who  have  legal 
rights  to  enforce,  who  find  themselvee  with- 
out an  appropriate  legal  remedy."  State  ex 
reL  Qleeson  ▼.  Jumbo  Ki  tension  Mining  Ck)., 
U  Pac  74.  7d,  30  Nev.  102,  188  Am.  St  Bep. 
715^  16  Ann.  Cas.  896  (quoting  and  adopting 
deflnitloQ  In  High,  Bxtraordinary  Legal 
Remedies,  p.  9). 

It  is  a  fundamental  principle  that  ''man- 
damus" lies  to  compel  the  performance  of  a 
purely  ministerial  duty,  involTing  no  discre- 
tionary right  and  not  requiring  the  ezerelse 
of  Judgment  It  does  not  lie  where  perform- 
ance of  a  trust  is  sought  whidti  is  discretiOD- 
ary,  or  Involyes  the  exercise  of  jugdment  It 
is  also  elementary  that  the  writ  cannot  usurp 
the  functions  of  a  writ  of  error,  or  take  the 
iHace  of  an  appeal,  nor  will  it  lie  against  a 
court,  unless  it  be  deaiiy  tihown  that  Bach 
court  has  refused  to  perform  some  manifest 
duty.  Under  a  statute  proTidIng  that  the 
writ  of  mandamus  may  be  Issued  to  an  in- 
terior tribunal  to  compel  the  performance  of 
in  act  which  the  law  specially  enjoins  as 
a  duty  resulting  from  an  office,  mandamus 
out  of  the  district  court  would  not  Ue  to  com- 
pel the  county  court  to  enter  a  judgment  in 
a  dlYoiee  proceeding  different  from  the  Judg- 
ment which  had  been  rendered;  this  being  an 
attempt  to  review,  annul,  and  modify  the 
judgment,  and  being  in  this  regard  an  at* 
tempt  to  usurp  the  functions  of  an  appeal 
from  or  writ  of  error  to  such  Judgment,  and 
also  an  attempt  to  control  the  discretion  and 
judgment  of  the  county  court  Llndsey  ▼. 
Carlton,  96  Pac.  997,  999,  44  Colo.  42. 

"'Mandamus'  lies  to  compel  an  inferior 
court  to  hear  and  determine  a  cause  or  ma^ 
ter  properly  triable  before  it,  which  the  lower 
court  fails  or  refuses  to  try  on  the  ground 
that  it  has  no  Jurisdiction,  or  that  the  Judge 
1b  incompetent,  or  for  other  reasona'*  Hence 
mandamus  Is  the  proper  remedy  to  compel  a 
county  court  to  take  Jurisdiction  of  and 
hear  a  proceeding  by  the  state  revenue  agent 
for  the  reassessment  or  back  assessment  of 
taxes  on  the  property  of  a  street  railway. 
State  y.  T^iylor,  104  8.  W.  242^  246,  119  Tenn. 
229. 

The  process  of  "mandamus"  will  not  is- 
*ne  against  a  public  officer,  unless  to  compel 
the  performance  of  an  act  clearly  defined  and 
enjoined  by  law,  and  which  Is  therefore  min- 
l«terlal  in  its  nature  and  neither  inyolyes  the 
•xerdse  of  discretion,  nor  leaves  any  alter- 
native. Oayen  y.  CJoleman  (Tex.)  96  8.  W. 
^4,  776  (citing  Glasscock  y.  Commissioner  of 
General  Land  Office,  8  Tex.  61 ;  Arberry  y. 
Beavers^  6  Tex.  467,  66  Am.  Dec  791;  San- 


som  y,  Mercer,  68  Tex.  492,  6  8.  W.  62,  2 
Am.  8t  R^.  60C9. 

While  election  Inspectors  cannot  be  com- 
pelled by  mandamus  to  make  their  return  in 
any  particular  manner,  they  may  be  compel- 
led to  make  a  true  return  of  the  result  ac- 
cording to  their  count,  if  the  return  made 
was  incorrect,  irrespective  of  the  provisions 
of  the  election  law;  "mandamus"  being  th« 
proper  remedy  to  oompel  a  pubUc  official  to 
perform  his  official  duty,  where  he  ffeiils  to 
do  so.  Pe<H>lo  ex  reL  Henness  y.  Douglass, 
126  N.  T.  Supp.  908,  909,  142  App.  Div.  224. 

MANDATARIES 

A  '^mandatary"  whose  engagement  la 
mer^y  gratuitous  Is  bound  only  to  ordinary 
negligence,  and  liable  only  for  gross  neglect 
or  breach  of  good  faith.  Marshall  v.  Nash- 
vtlle  By.  ft  light  CJo.,  101  8.  W.  419,  420,  118 
Tenn.  264,  9  U  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  1246,  12  Ann. 
Gas.  670. 

MANDATE 

See  Special  Mandate. 

The  word  "mandate,"  la  Civ.  Code^  art 
298(^  relating  to  personal  mandate,  whereby 
one  person  appoints  another  his  special  ag^t, 
or  whereby  one  person  gives  power  to  an- 
other to  transact  fdr  him  and  in  his  name 
one  or  several  affairs,  does  not  refer  to  the 
business  of  agency  carried  on  under  a  char- 
ter adopted  under  the  act  of  188a  State  ex 
rel.  Le  Blanc  ft  Bailey  y.  Michel,  86  South. 
869,  870,  113  La.  4. 

MAHDATB  (Im  Pvaetiee) 

Bxeo«ti<Mi 

An  execution  on  a  Judgment  is  a  ''man- 
date," as  provided  by  Code  Civ.  Proc.  I  3343, 
and  the  only  mandate  by  which  a  Judgment 
creditor  Is  entitled  to  enforce  it  Belfer  v. 
Ludlow,  126  N.  Y.  Supp.  180,  18%  69  Misc. 
Bep.  486. 


The  "writ  of  mandate,**  as  defined  by 
Bev.  St  1898,  H  8640,  3641,  denominating  the 
writ  of  mandamus  a  writ  of  mandate,  and 
authorizing  its  issuance  to  any  Inferior  tri- 
bunal to  oompel  the  performance  of  an  act 
specially  enjoined  by  law,  is  designed  to 
compel  action  where  the  law  enjoins  it,  and 
the  tribunal  refuses  to  act  in  accordance 
therewith.  Hoffman  v.  Lewla,  87  Paa  167, 
170.  81  Utah,  179. 

By  CkKle  Oiv.  Proc.  i  1086,  the  "writ 
of  mandate"  Is  issued  by  any  court,  except 
a  Justice's  or  police  court,  to  any  inferior 
tribunal,  oorporatlon,  board,  or  person,  to 
compel  the  performance  of  an  act  which  the 
law  specially  enjoins,  as  a  duty  resulting 
from  an  office,  trust  or  station.  Howe  v. 
Southrey.  78  Paa  260,  144  CaL  767. 


HCANDATB 


MANDATORY  INJCTKCTION 


Under  Code  Civ.  Proa  |  3343;  subd.  2, 
deflning  the  word  "mandate*'  to  Include  a 
writ  Issued  out  of  a  court,  commanding  an 
officer  to  do  or  to  refrain  from  doing  an  act 
therein  specified,  and  Greater  New  York 
Charter  (Laws  1901,  c.  466)  |  1001,  authorlz- 
Ing  the  court,  on  application  of  any  person 
to  whom  an  award  has  been  made  In  proceed- 
ings to  acquire  land,  to  require  the  comptrol- 
ler to  pay  the  award,  and  to  enforce  the  man- 
date as  other  mandates  are  enforced,  the 
court  may  by  mandamus  compel  the  comp- 
troller to  pay  an  award,  and  the  fkct  that 
costs  are  more  than  they  would  be  If  the 
applicant  for  mandamus  had  been  content 
with  an  order  Is  a  matter  which  may  not  be 
considered,  when  he  wag  denied  the  award, 
to  which  he  was  legally  entitled.  Macholdt 
▼.  Prendergast,  128  N.  Y.  Supp.  1069,  1070, 
144  App.  Dlv.  252. 

The  word  ''mandate^"  In  Wilson's  Bey. 
&  Ann.  St  1903,  $  1882,  providing  that  in  aU 
cases  In  the  probate  court  the  probate  judge 
shall  have  power  to  allow  Injunctions,  "man- 
dates," writs  of  prohibition,  etc.,  is  not  syn- 
onymous with  the  word  "mandamus"  in  the 
Organic  Act  of  the  territory  conferring  on 
the  Supreme  and  district  courts  power  to 
grant  writs  of  mandamus  and  habeas  cor- 
pus in  all  cases  authorized  by  law,  and  in 
section  4884,  providing  that  the  writ  of  man- 
damus may  be  issued  by  the  Supreme  Court 
or  the  district  court,  or  any  justice  or  judge 
thereof,  during  term  or  at  chambers,  etc., 
and  the  probate  courts  of  the  territory  are 
not  authorized  to  hear  and  determine  origi- 
nal proceedings  in  mandamus.  Starkweath- 
er T.  Kemp,  88  Pac.  1045,  1046,  18  OkL  28. 

Bemittitnr 

The  word  "remittitur,"  used  In  Supreme 
Court  rule  34  providing  that,  when  a  judg- 
ment of  a  District  Court  of  Appeal  becomes 
final  therein,  the  remittitur  shall  not  be  is- 
sued until  after  the  lapse  of  30  days  there- 
after, unless  otherwise  ordered,  designates 
the  judgment  of  the  appellate  tribunal  which 
is  authenticated  to  the  court  from  which  the 
appeal  is  taken,  and  corresponds  to  "man- 
date," used  in  the  practice  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  Noel  v.  Smith,  88 
Pac  167,  169,  2  Cal.  App.  158. 

SubpOBAA 

Code  Civ.  Proc  S  8,  authorizes  a  court  to 
punish  for  criminal  contempt  one  guilty  of 
willful  disobedience  of  its  lawful  mandate. 
Section  3343  provides  that  the  word  "man- 
date" Includes  a  writ,  process,  etc.,  made  pur- 
suant to  law  by  a  judicial  officer,  and  com- 
manding the  person  named  therein  to  do  the. 
act  therein  specified,  and  Code  Cr.  Proc.  | 
619,  provides  that  disobedience  of  a  subixsna 
may  be  punished  as  for  a  criminal  contempt 
Held,  that  a  subpoena  issued  by  the  district 
attorney  requiring  a  witness  to  appear  be- 
fore a  grand  jury  was  a  "mandate,"  within 
section  8,  so  as  to  make  one  willfully  advis- 


ing disobedience  guilty  of  criminal  contempt 
People  ex  reL  Drake  ▼.  Andrews,  90  N.  B. 
347,  848,  197  N.  Y.  08, 18  Ann.  Oaa.  317. 

MANDATORY 

Directory  statute  distinguished  from 
mandatory  statute,  see  Directory  Stat^ 
ute. 

A  mandatory  provision  of  a  statute  la 
one  the  omission  to  perform  whldi  renders 
proceedings  void;  whUe  a  directory  provi- 
sion is  one  the  observance  of  which  is  not 
necessary  to  the  validity  of  proceedings. 
Bond  V.  City  of  Baltimore,  84  AtL  258,  2G0, 
118  Md.  159. 

A  statute  providing  that  appointment  of 
a  special  administrator  may  be  made  at  any 
time,  and  must  he  made  by  entry  upon  the 
minutes  of  the  court  spedtying  the  powers 
to  be  exercised  by  him,  was  not  '^mandatory" 
as  to  entry  of  a  minute  order,  and  the  ap- 
pointment was  complete  when  the  order  was 
signed,  and  failure  of  the  clerk  to  enter  it 
on  the  minutes  would  not  invalidate  it  Mc- 
NeU  V.  Morgan,  108  Paa  69,  71,  157  Cal.  373. 

The  term  "mandatory"  is  applicable  al- 
most entirely  to  statatory  requirements  In- 
tended for  the  protection  of  the  citizen  and 
to  prevent  a  sacrifice  of  his  property,  and 
by  a  disregard  of  which  his  rights  might  be, 
and  generally  would  be,  injuriously  affected. 
It  does  not  apply  to  statutory  requirements 
intended  for  the  guide  of  officers  In  the  con- 
duet  of  business  devolved  on  them  and  de- 
signed to  secure  order,  system  and  dljq[Mtch 
in  proceedings,  and  by  a  disregard  of  which 
the  rights  of  the  parties  cannot  be  injuriona- 
ly  affected.  French  v.  Edwards,  ft  WalL  506, 
[80  U.  S.]  511,  20  L.  Ed.  702. 

MANDATOBT  INJUNCTIOll 

Injunctions  are  "mandatory"  or  pre- 
ventive, according  as  they  command  the  de- 
fendant to  do  or  refrain  from  doing  a  par- 
ticular thing.  The  issuance  of  a  "mandato- 
ry injunction"  Is  exercised  with  extreme 
caution,  and  is  confined  to  cases  where  conits 
of  law  are  unable  to  afford  adequate  redress, 
or  where  the  injuiy  cannot  be  compensated 
in  damagea  In  determining  whether  to 
grant  relief  by  way  of  "mandatory  injunc- 
tion," courts  of  equity  wUl  take  Into  consid- 
eration the  relative  convenience  or  Incon- 
venience which  would  result  to  the  parties 
from  granting  or  withholding  relief,  and  will 
be  governed  accordingly.  Mason  v.  Byrley 
(Ky.)  84  S.  W.  767,  770  (citing  High,  Inj.  | 

A  "mandatory  injunction"  is  one  which 
compels  affirmative  action  by  defendant  It 
an  injunction  compels  one  affirmatively  to 
surrender  a  possession  which  under  the  facts 
alleged  by  him  he  is  entitled  to  hold,  it  Is  a 
'•mandatory.**  Clute  v.  Superior  Court  of 
City  and  County  of  San  Francisco,  99  Pac. 
8C2,  368,  155  CaL  15,  132  Am.  St  Rep.  54. 


MANBATOKT  INJUNCTION 


MAN7FESTLT  INTEND 


It  Is  error,  on  an  Interlocatorr  liearing 
of  an  equitable  petition  seeking  frpeciflc  pex^ 
fonsanee  and  injunction,  to  order  tbe  deliv- 
ery by  defendant  of  tbe  personal  property 
in  controversy  to  the  petitioner ;  such  order 
being  in  legal  effect  a  mandatory  injunction. 
Rudolph  Wurlitzer  Co.  t.  Jaduon,  67  S.  B. 
879,  880^  134  6a.  333. 

A  ''mandatory  injnnotion*'  compels  the 
afilnnatlye  performance^  while  a  prey^itiTe 
injunction  restrains  the  commission  of  an 
act  Carver  v.  San  Pedro,  etc,  B.  Co.  161 
Fed.  334,  33a 

MANGANESE 

See  Borate  of  Ifanganese, 

1CAHOANE8E  AXXOT 

See  Iron  and  Manganese  Alloy. 

MANGE 

''Mangel'  is  a  cattle  disease,  otherwise 
known  as  splenic  or  Spanish  fever.  State  v. 
Missouri  Pac  B.  Co.,  gl  Pac  212,  213,  71 
Kan.  613. 

MANGLE 

As  machine,  see  Machine. 

A  *^angle"  is  a  large  roller,  used  in  a 
laundry,  through  which  the  clothes  are  run. 
Rosfr-Parls  Co.  v.  Brown,  90  S.  W.  568,  121 
Ky.  82L 

MANHATTAN  COCKTAIL 

See  Cocktail. 

As  intoxicating  Uqnor,  see  Intoxicating 
Liquors. 

MANHOLES 

A  "manhole^  is  a  round  opening  Into  a 
sewer  large  enough  to  permit  a  man  to  enter 
for  the  purpose  of  cleaning  or  repairing. 
Comstock  V.  City  of  Eagle  Grove,  111  N.  W. 
51,  52,  133  Iowa,  589. 

MANIFEST 

The  word  "evident"  means  ''clear  to  the 
▼ision,  especially  dear  to  tbe  understanding, 
and  satisfactory  to  the  Judgment."  Its  syn- 
onyms are:  ''Manifest;  plain;  clear;  obvi- 
oTw;  visible;  apparent;  conclusive;  indu- 
bitable; palpable;  notorious."  State  v. 
KanlTman,  108  N.  W.  246,  20  8.  D.  620  (quo^ 
ing  with  approval  from  Webster's  Diet). 

MANIFEST  I>AHO£B 

Even  if  the  claims  of  the  plaintifC  weie 
of  such  a  diaracter  that  the  property  in  eon- 
troversy  was  either  legally  or  equitably 
charged  with  their  payment,  the  fact  that 
the  building  is  insured,  and  in  the  event  of 
its  destruction  by  fire  the  land  could  not  be 
sold  for  a  sum  sufficient  to  pay  the  amount 


dafmed  by  the  plaintiff,  does  not  constitute 
such  a  ^'manifest  danger  of  loss  or  destruo 
tion"  of  the  property  as  would  warrant  the 
appointment  of  a  receiver  to  take  charge  of 
the  same  and  impound  the  rents  therefrom. 
Ray  V.  Carlisle,  54  8.  B.  119, 120,  125  Ga.  81& 

MAHI7E8T  EBBOB 

A  manifest  clerical  error  in  a  liquida- 
tion made  within  one  year  after  original  en- 
try cannot  be  corrected  more  than  one  year 
after  such  entry,  because  not  within  the  pro- 
vision in  Customs  Administrative  Act  June 
10,  1890,  c  407,  I  24,  authorizing  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  to  correct  such  errors 
''within  one  year  from  the  date  of  such  entry," 
as  the  term' "entry,"  as  there  used,  refers  to 
the  document  filed  by  the  importer  on  entry. 
Inasmuch  as  Customs  Administrative  Act 
June  10,  1890,  c.  407,  I  24,  relating  to  the 
correction  of  "manifest  clerical  errors,"  Is 
the  latest  deliverance  on  that  subject  and  re- 
lates most  specifically  thereto,  it  controls 
over  Act  June  22,  1874,  c  391,  |  21,  relative 
to  the  "settlement  of  duties,"  and  Act  March 
3,  1875,  c  136, 1  1,  relative  to  the  "correction 
of  errors  in  liquidation."  Where,  in  liquida- 
tion, the  clerk  miscalculated  the  number  of 
square  yards  in  an  imported  fabric,  this  con- 
stituted a  "manifest  clerical  error,"  within 
the  meaning  of  Customs  Administrative  Act 
June'lO,  1890,  c.  407,  fi  24.  United  States  v. 
F.  R  Vandegrlft  ft  Co.,  175  Fed.  772,  773, 
99  C.  C.  A.  598. 

Section  16  of  the  oounty  law  (Consol. 
Laws.  c.  11),  providing  that  the  board  of 
supervisors  could  correct  any  "manifest  cler^ 
leal  or  other  error*'  in  any  assessment,  and 
cause  to  be  refunded  taxes  illegally  or  im- 
properly assessed,  refers  to  such  errors  as 
are  manifest  from  an  inspection  of  the  as- 
sessment roll  itself  without  argument  or  evi- 
dence. In  re  Trustees  of  Village  of  Delhi, 
124  N.  y.  Supp.  487,  489,  139  App.  Div.  412. 

lCAHirESTI.T 

The  term  **manife8t]y*'  is  a  common 
word  whidi  may  be  assumed  to  be  under- 
stood in  the  common  meaning  by  an  ordinary 
jury  without  definition.  Commonwealth  v. 
Bnckley,  86  N.  E.  9ia,  911,  200  Mass.  346, 
22  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  225, 128  Am.  St  Bep.  425. 

KANIFESTLT  DAKGEBOUS 

That  one  has  committed  homicide  and 
been  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity 
justifles  the  cpnduslon  that  he  is  *'manif estly 
dangerous,"  within  BalUnger's  Ann.  Codes 
&  St.  1 6959  (Pierce's  Code,  |  2208),  providing 
for  the  commitment  of  persons  who  are  deem- 
ed manifestly  dangerous  after  having  been 
acquitted  of  crime  on  the  ground  of  insanity. 
State  ex  rel.  Thompson  v.  Snell,  89  Pac.  931, 
938,  46  Wash.  827,  9  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1191. 


MANZFBSTLT  UTTEND 

Section  70  of  the  Georgia  Penal  Code  of 
1895  Justifles  tbe  killing,  in  defense  of  one's 


KANIPULATB 


264 


MANKJCB 


peiBon,  of  one  who  is  "maxilfestly  Intending" 
or  endeaTorlng  by  violence  or  surprise  to 
commit  a  felony  on  the  person  of  the  slayer. 
"To  'manifestly  intend*  an  act  implies  more 
than  mental  resolution  to  do  the  act  The 
mental  resolution  must  find  some  form  of 
expression  before  it  becomes  manifest  In 
cases  involTing  force,  the  slightest  manifes- 
tation of  intent  to  do  the  act  would  be  an 
attempt  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  act" 
Taylor  ▼.  State,  48  S.  B.  808,  807,  121  Qa. 
348. 

MANIPULATE 

Where  a  petition  in  an  action  for  in- 
juries to  a  servant  by  defects  in  an  elevator 
alleged  that  the  cable  would  often  catch 
and  become  fast  so  that  it  would  not  re- 
spond to  the  usual  and  proper  force  neces- 
sary to  move  it,  that  at  the  time  of  the  in- 
Jury  plaintiff  found  the  cable  fast,  and  while 
attempting  to  "manipulate**  it  the  cable,  be- 
cause of  the  elevator's  defective  condition, 
suddenly  became  loose,  and  caused  the  eleva- 
tor to  suddenly  and  violently  start,  etc.,  the 
term  "manipulate"  should  be  construed  as  in- 
cluding both  the  ordinary  pull  first  applied 
by  plaintiff  in  his  effort  to  move  the  elevator 
and  the  more  forcible  one  which  followed,  so 
that  an  Instruction  that  if,  when  plaintiff  un- 
dertook to  use  the  elevator,  the  cable  had  be- 
come caught  owing  to  its  defective  condition, 
so  ihat  it  became  necessary  for  him  to  pull  on 
the  cable,  and  while  so  pulling  the  cable  sud- 
denly loosened  and  moved,  causing  him  to 
fall,  etc.,  was  not  erroneous  as  presenting 
issues  not  specified  in  the  petition.  Zongker 
V.  People's  Union  Mercantile  Co.*  86  8.  W. 
486,  488,  110  Ma  Appi  382. 

MANNER 

See  Best  Manner;  Due  Manner;  Forci- 
ble Manner;  Good  and  Workmanlike 
Manner;  In  a  Manner;  In  Due  Man- 
ner;  Same  Manner. 

Any  manner,  see  Any. 

In  Uke  manner,  see  like  Manner. 

No  general  definition  of  the  word  "man- 
ner," as  used  in  a  contract  or  statute,  can  be 
framed.  Its  meaning  must  be  determined 
in  the  light  of  the  particular  contract  or  stat- 
ute in  which  it  is  used.  "The  'manner'  of 
doing  a  thing  has  reference  to  the  way  of 
doing— to  the  method  of  procedure — and  the 
element  of  time  does  not  seem  to  be  in- 
volved.** Melsheimer  v.  Mci^iiight,  46  South. 
827,  829,  92  Miss.  886  (quoting  definition  in 
Bankers*  Life  Ins.  Ck).  v.  Bobbins,  80  N.  W. 
484,  59  Neb.  170). 

"The  word  'manner*  is  usually  defined 
as  meaning  'way  of  performing  or  execut- 
ing, method,  custom,  habitual  practice,*  etc.*' 
Livesley  v.  litchfleld,  88  Pac  142,  143,  47 
Or.  248,  114  Am.  St  Be|K  920  (quoting  and 


adopting  People  ez  r^  Ahrens  t.  English, 
29  N.  B.  678,  189  ni.  622, 15  L.  B.  A.  131). 

Amendatory  Act  of  1872,  No.  81,  p.  79, 
prescribing  the  ^'manner"  of  adopting  chil- 
dren, was  intended  to  cover  the  whole  sab- 
ject-matter.  It  says  so  expressly  in  its  title, 
''An  act  proyiding  for  the  manner  of  adopt- 
ing children."  Succession  of  Dupr6,  41  Sooth. 
824,  826^  116  La.  109a 

The  use  of  Uie  word  ''manner,"  in  Laws 
1907,  p.  426,  c.  267, 1 1  (Qen.  St  1901,  |  6974), 
empowering  the  board  of  railroad  commis- 
sioners to  determine  whether  there  Is  any 
necessity  for  a  railroad  crossing  by  a  street 
car  line  and,  if  so,  the  place  thereof,  and 
in  other  respects  the  "manner"  of  such  cross- 
ing, fairiy  implies  the  right  to  make  any 
reasonable  requlremeat  having  relation  to 
the  safe  crossing  of  both  roads.  State  v. 
Parsons  St  Ry.  ft  Electrical  Ck).,  105  Pac. 
704,  705,  81  Kan.  430,  28  L.  B.  A.  (N.  &)  1082 
(citing  88  Gyc.  p.  296). 

Under  Bev.  St  Ohio  1880,  H  8270,  3281, 
8288,  which  invest  railroad  companies  direct- 
ly with  the  right  to  appropriate  and  use 
the  streets  of  a  dty  for  railroad  purposes 
by  condemnation  proceedings,  unless  the  com- 
pany and  the  municipal  authorities  agree 
"upon  the  manner,  terms,  and  conditions 
upon  which  the  same  may  be  used  or  occu- 
pied,*' construed  in  the  light  of  the  settled 
rule  in  Ohio  that  municipal  corporations  pos- 
sess such  powers  only  as  are  expressly  grant- 
ed by  statute  or  are  implied  as  essential  to 
the  exercise  of  granted  powers,  and  of  sec- 
tion 8875,  authorhdng  railroad  companies 
for  hauls  of  less  than  30  miles  to  receive  sach 
rates  as  may  be  from  time  to  time  fixed  by 
the  company  or  by  law,  the  power  given  to  a 
municipal  corporation  by  section  3283  to 
agree  upon  the  manner,  terms,  and  conditions 
upon  which  streets  may  be  used  is  limited 
to  such  agreement  as  relates  directly  to  such 
use  and  occupation,  and  a  provision  in  an 
ordinance  prescribing  rates  to  be  charged  by 
a  belt  line  road  for  hauls  over  its  entire 
line,  less  than  30  miles  long,  as  a  condition 
to  granting  right  of  way  over  the  streets 
for  a  part  of  its  line,  is  ultra  vires  and  void. 
T.  B.  Townsend  Brick  ft  Oontracting  Go.  v. 
Central  Trust  Ck>.  of  New  Tork,  187  Fed. 
68,  67, 109  a  a  A.  881. 

As  extent 

The  term  "extent"  does  not  ordinaziU 
mean  "manner."  Hence  under  Laws  1901,  p- 
294,  c.  125,  S  8,  providing  that,  if  any  pQ^ 
chaser  of  public  land  shall  tsM  to  reside  np- 
on  and  improve  it  in  good  fiiith,  he  shall  for- 
feit it  and  all  paymoits  to  the  same  extent 
as  for  non  payment  of  interest,  the  mere  fail- 
ure to  reside  on  and  Improve  the  land  does 
not  work  a  forfeiture  ipso  facto,  as  was  bad 
under  Laws  1895,  c.  47,  |  11,  p.  67,  providing 
that,  if  Mich  purchaser  shall  fall  to  reside 
upon  and  improve  in  good  faith  public  land 
purchased  by  him,  he  shall  forfeit  It  in  the 


ICAKKER 


ICAmnCB 


same  maimer  as  tor  noDpeyment  of  Inter- 
est Adama  ▼.  Terrell,  107  S.  W.  687,  688» 
101  Tex.  381. 

Ai  aetlLod  or  way 

The  word  "manner'*  In  the  Australian 
ballot  law,  regulating  the  "manner*'  of  hold- 
ing elections,  has  the  ordinary  meaning  of 
mode,  method,  way  of  effecting  a  result. 
Getty  v.  Holcomb,  09  Pac.  218,  219,  79  Kan. 
224. 

In  Ck>n8t  art  7,  |  6,  proriding  that  each 
county  may  sell  or  dispose  of  its  lands  in 
whole  or  in  part  in  manner  to  be  provided 
by  the  commissioner's  court  of  the  county, 
** 'manner'  is  the  controlling  word  in  the 
phrase  and  designates  what  the  commission- 
er's court  might  provide  for.  Webster  de« 
fines  'nuinner'  as  *mode  of  action,  way  of 
performing  or  effecting  anything,  method'; 
and  the  courts  have  given  to  that  word  its 
slgniflcation  as  defined  by  Webster."  Logan 
▼.  Stephens  County,  83  B.  W.  866,  367,  98 
Tex.  283  <citLng  People  ex  rel.  Ahrens  v. 
EDgUsh,  29  N.  E.  678, 139  III.  629,  15  L.  R.  A. 
131 ;  Wells  V.  Bain,  75  Pa.  54,  15  Am.  Rep. 
563;  Brown  v.  O'Connell,  86  Conn.  447, 4  Am. 
Rep.  89). 

Rev.  St  1899,  |  5496,  provides  that  it  is 
not  permissible  to  question  the  correctness  of 
the  action  of  the  grand  jury  in  finding  a  bill 
of  indictment,  or  of  a  petit  Jury  In  the  trial 
of  a  case,  or  of  any  court  or  judge  while 
acting  within  their  legitimate  province  in  a 
lawful  manner,  by  habeas  corpus.  Held, 
that  the  word  "nuCnner"  had  reference  to 
the  method  of  acting,  and  not  to  the  degree 
of  perfection  or  correctness  in  the  results 
arrived  at,  unless  the  judgnient  pronounced 
was  absolutely  void.  Hovey  v.  Sheffner,  93 
Pac.  305,  308,  18  Wyo.  254,  15  L.  B.  A.  (N. 
S.)  227,  125  Am.  St.  Rep.  1037,  15  Ann.  Cas. 
318. 

Webster  defines  "manner"  as:  "Mode 
of  action;  way  of  performing  or  effecting 
anything;  method;  style;  form  or  fashion." 
The  Century  Dictionary,  as:  "The  way  in 
which  an  action  is  performed ;  method  of  do- 
ing anything;  mode  of  proceeding  in  any 
case  or  situation;  mode;  way;  method." 
In  a  statute  the  expression  in  permitting  in- 
troduction of  an  instrument  whether  proved 
or  acknowledged  in  such  "manner"  or  not 
was  intended  to  have  the  same  force  and 
effect  as  the  same  expression  had  in  an  old 
Btatste  which  was  superseded,  where  it  had 
been  held  to  apply  not  only  to  the  formal- 
ity of  certifying  what  was  done  by  the  officer 
but  as  well  to  the  power  of  the  officer  to  take 
the  acknowledgment  Bledsoe  v.  Haney, 
122  S.  W.  455,  457,  57  Tex.  Civ.  App.  285. 

The  word  "manner,"  in  a  will  authorize 
log  testator's  daughter  by  her  will  to  dispose 
of  a  fand  to  and  among  his  grandchildren 
In  sQch  shares  and  in  such  manner  as  she 
shall  think  right  and  proper,  does  not  imply 
a  power  of  sheeting,  but  has  reference  to 


tbe  way  in  which  it  shall  be  enjoyed,  wheUi- 
er  diisctly  int  in  trust.  Immediately  or  at  a 
postponed  date,  and  other  like  matters,  and 
hence  the  provision  of  her  will  excluding 
two  grandchildren  in  a  per  capita  distribu- 
tion of  the  fund  was  invalid.  Cameron  v. 
Crowley,  65  Atl.  875,  877,  72  N.  J.  Eq.  681. 

The  word  "manner"  means  tbe  handling 
of  a  thing,  and,  as  used*  in  the  constitutional 
provision  which  directs  the  allowance  of  ap- 
peals from  Justifies  "in  such  manner  as  may 
be  prescribed  by  law^"  means  that  appeals 
from  judgments  of  justices  shall  be  allowed 
by  such  handling  of  the  subject  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  law.  Duncan  v.  Baltimore  ft 
O.  R.  Co.,  69  8.  B.  1004,  1006.  68  W.  Va.  2»3, 
Ann.  Cas.  1912B,  272. 

The  petition  in  an  action  for  injuries  to 
a  servant  by  derailment  of  a  train  alleged 
that  plaintiff's  injuries  were  caused  by  de- 
fendant's negligence,  in  that  the  engine  and 
train  were  old,  worn,  out  of  repair,  and  un- 
suited  for  the  purposes  for  which  they  were 
being  used,  and  also  in  the  manner  and  way 
the  engine  and  cars  were  being  operated 
Held,  that  the  words  "manner  and  way" 
imported  either  the  speed  of  the  train,  or 
something  connected  with  the  management 
and  operation  thereof,  and  that  the  words 
"were  being  operated"  necessarily  referred 
to  that  which  was  being  done  by  the  em- 
ployte  on  the  engine  and  cars  at  the  time 
of  the  accident,  so  that  such  allegations  were 
insufficient  to  justify  the  submission  of  an 
issue  of  negligence  on  defendant's  part  in 
directing  the  train  to  be  run  over  the  road 
as  fast  as  10  miles  an  hour.  Missouri,  K. 
ft  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Poole  (Tex.)  133 
S.  W.  239,  240. 

The  word  "manner,"  in  the  specifica- 
tions of  an  article  sought  to  be  patented  that 
"in  making  brushes  by  my  improved  method 
above  described,  the  brush-back  or  frame 
may  be  made  of  any  desired  material  and  in 
any  known  'manner,'"  refers  to  the  form 
and  shape  of  the  brush-back  or  frame  when 
completed,  and  not  solely  to  the  way  in 
which  it  is  made.  Universal  Brush  Co.  v. 
Sonn,  146  Fed.  517,  520. 

An  information  charging  that  defendant 
unlawfully,  in  the  presence  and  hearing  of 
D.,  did  curse  and  swear  at  him,  and  did  abuse 
him  "in  a  manner"  reasonably  calculated  to 
provoke  a  breach  of  the  peace,  suffldeutly 
diarged  an  offense  under  Pen.  Code  1895, 
art  509,  prohibiting  any  person  from  abus* 
ing  another,  "under  circumstances"  reason- 
ably calculated  to  provoke  a  breadi  of  the 
peace.  Tresevant  v.  State,  84  S.  W..  828,  47 
Tex.  Or.  R.  502. 

Of  appointment  or  expulsion 

The  legislative  authority  given  by  Const 
Or.  art  6,  §  7,  td  prescribe  the  time  and 
"manner"  in  which  municipal  officers  may  be 
elected  or  appointed,  does  not  Include  the 
power  to  determine  the  qualifications  of  a 


ICAKNEE 


ICAKNXB 


l€gal  TOter  authorized  to  vote  toi  svdi  offl- 
cere.  Llyesley  y.  Litchfield,  88  Paa  142,  144, 
47  Or.  248,  114  Am.  St  Bep.  920. 

In  insurance  law,  i  70,  providing  that 
the  charter  of  an  insurance  company  shall 
state  the  mode  and  "manner"  in  which  its 
corporate  powers  are  to  be  exercised,  the 
"manner"  of  electing  its  directors,  officers, 
etc,  the  word  "manner/'  while  more  com- 
prehensire  In  its  meaning  and  uses  than 
either  the  word  "method"  or  "mode,"  may 
with  much  reason  be  held  to  mean  in  that 
connection  the  procedure  of  electing  directors 
and  officers,  rather  than  a  definition  of  the 
classes  in  whom  the  suffrage  should  lie. 
Lord  y.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.,  96  N.  Y. 
Supp.  10,  27,  109  App.  Div.  252. 

Oen.  St  1901,  i  7502,  proyides  that  all 
property  not  expressly  exempted  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  taxation  "in  the  manner  proyided  in 
this  act"  Laws  1907,  c.  408,  S  1,  defines 
the  word  "property"  as  used  in  the  act  re- 
lating to  taxation  to  include  eyery  kind  of 
property  subject  to  ownership.  Held,  that 
the  clause  'In  the  manner  proyided  in  this 
act"  relates  to  the  method  of  imposing  taxes 
upon  property  already  declared  to  be  subject 
to  taxation,  and  does  not  limit  the  taxation 
to  the  kinds  of  property  specially  named  in 
the  act,  and  the  finished  product*  of  manu- 
facturers, not  being  exempted,  is  taxable 
though  not  mentioned  in  the  act  State  y. 
Holcomb,  106  Pac.  1030.  1033,  81  Kan.  879, 
28  L.  U.  A.  (N.  S.)  25L 

Am  applieaUe  to  time 

The  word  "manner,"  in  Court  and  Practice 
Act  1905,  p.  139,  §  490,  providing  that  notice 
of  the  filing  of  bills  of  exceptions  shall  be 
giyen  to  the  adverse  part  "in  such  manner" 
as  the  court  shall  by  rule  prescribe,  is  broad 
enough  to  include  "time."  Court  and  Prac- 
tice Act  1905,  p.  139,  §  490,  provides  that  no- 
tice of  the  filing  of  bills  of  exceptions  shall 
be  given  to  the  adverse  party  '*in  such  man- 
ner" as  the  <x>urt  shall  by  rule  prescribe,  and 
section  34  authorizes  the  Supreme  and  su- 
perior court  to  promulgate  rules  regulating 
practice  in  matters  not  expressly  provided  for 
by  law.  Superior  Court  Rule  32  declares 
that  notice  in  writing  of  the  filing  of  a  bill 
of  exceptions  shall  be  given  by  the  party 
filing  the  same  to  the  adverse  party  within 
two  days  thereafter,  which  shall  be  served 
on  the  adverse  party's  attorney  of  record  in 
the  manner  specified.  Held,  that  a  failure 
to  serve  notice  of  the  filing  of  a  bill  of  excep- 
tions within  the  time  prescribed  by  rule  32 
was  a  jurisdictional  defect  justifying  a  dis- 
missal of  the  bill  under  section  491,  p.  140, 
declaring  that  in  any  case  of  deil^ult  in  tak- 
ing such  procedure,  judgment  shall  be  enter- 
ed or  sentence  imposed  as  if  notice  of  in- 
tention to  prosecute  a  bill  of  exceptions  had 
not  been  filed.  Smith  v.  William  H.  Haskell 
Mfg.  Co.,  65  AtL  610,  611,  28  B.  L  91. 


In  rsonit  II  15,  16,  art  7  (Sunn's  Ed.  H 
167,  188),  proTidlxig  that  appeals  shall. be 
taken'  from  the  county  court  to  the  Supreme 
Court  in  the  same  "manner"  as  appeals  from 
the  district  court,  the  word  "manner"  as  so 
used,  as  well  as  in  different  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  and*  the  statutes,  may  mean 
"time"  or  would  include  "time."  Atchison, 
T.  k  S.  F.  By.  Co.  v.  Love^  90  Pae.  1061, 
1086,  28  OkL  192. 

Whether  the  word  "manner"  or  the 
phrase  in  the  same  manner  may  include  the 
elements  of  time  has  been  answered  by  the 
courts  both  in  the  affirmative  and  in  the 
negative.  The  word  as  used  in  the  phrase 
"in  the  same  manner,"  in  Act  Cong.  March  3, 
1905,  c.  1479,  I  12,  does  not  include  the  ele- 
ment of  time.  Porter  t.  Brook,  97  Pac  645, 
647,  648,  21  OkL  885. 

The  phrase  "manner  of  performance"  as 
used  in  the  labor  law  (Laws  1906,  p.  1395, 
a  506)  i  3,  limiting  a  day's  work  on  public 
work  by  or  for  municipal  corporations  to 
eight  hours,  and  prohibiting  municipal  offi- 
cers from  paying  "for  work  done  upon  any 
contract,  which  in  its  form  or  manner  of 
performance  violates  the  provisions  of  said 
section,  refers  among  other  things,  to  the 
number  of  hours  per  diem  that  laborers  aie 
allowed  to  work.  People  ex  reL  Williams 
Engineering  &  Contracting  Co.  y.  Metz,  85 
N.  B.  1070,  1078,  193  N.  Y.  148,  24  L.  R,  A 
(N.  S.)  201,  order  affirmed  on  rehearing 
(1909)  86  N.  £2.  986,  194  N.  T.  145. 

Act  Cong.  Feb.  20,  1907,  c  1134,  I  2,  pro- 
vides for  the  exclusion  from  the  United 
States  of  various  classes  of  persons,  includ- 
ing idiots,  insane  persons,  beggars,  persons 
afflicted  with  dangerous  contagions  diseases, 
persons  having  been  convicted  of  crime  or 
misdemeanor  involving  moral  turpitude,  po- 
lygamists^  anarchists,  prostitutes,  or  persons 
coming  into  the  United  States  for  the  pur- 
pose of  prostitution,  and  persons  who  are 
supported  by  or  receive  part  of  the  proceeds 
of  prostitution.  Section  8  in  the  original  act, 
and  as  amended  (Act  March  26,  1910,  c.  128, 
8  2),  relates  ezdusively  to  the  importation  of 
aliens  for  the  purposes  of  prostitution,  or 
other  immoral  purposes,  tlie  holding  of  such 
persons  for  such  purposes  in  pursuance  of 
such  importation,  and  aliens  found  inmates 
of  houses  of  prostitution  after  they  have 
entered  the  United  States,  or  who  derive 
benefit  from  the  earnings  of  the  same.  Sec- 
tions 20  and  21  provide  that  such  persons 
shall  be  deported  if  proceedings  therefor  are 
begun  within  three  years,  and  both  sections 
2  and  8  contain  the  remedy  to  be  applied, 
viz.,  deportation  "in  the  manner  provided" 
in  sections  20  and  21.  Held,  that  the  words 
"in  the  manner  provided"  did  not  include  the 
three-year  limitations  contained  in  sections 
20  and  21,  and.  Congress  having  eliminated 
such  limitation  from  section  8,  aliens  within 
such  aection  were  subject  to  di^ortation. 


MAKNBR 


96T 


MANSLAyC^HTEi^ 


thoagb  arrested  after  they  bad  been  In  the 
country  more  than  three  years.  Cbamel  y. 
Inited  States,  102  Fed.  U7,  118, 112  0.  a  A. 
161. 

Of  Totlas 

Th/i  constitntloniil  authority  given  the 
Legislatare  to  prescribe  the  "time  and  man- 
ner" in  which  municipal  officers  may  be 
elected  or  appointed  does  not  include  the 
power  to  determine  what  shall  constitute  a 
legal  Yoter.  lirestey  y.  litchfleld,  83  Pac. 
U2, 143,  47  Or.  248,  114  Am.  St  Rep.  020. 

MAHHEB   OIBSOTED   OB  PBESORIB- 
ED  BTUkW 

Under  Oode  ld04,  art  08,  |  88,  which  de- 
clares that  In  granting  administration  with 
the  will  annexed  the  residuary  legatee  or 
legatees  shall  be  perferred,  and  directs  the 
orphans'  court  to  proceed  in  the  manner  di- 
rected by  law  with  respect  to  executors  with- 
in the  state  before  administration  with  the 
will  annexed  shall  be  granted  to  any  other 
person,  the  phrase  'In  the  manner  directed 
by  law"  relates  to  the  provisions  of  sections 
32  and  33,  relative  to  notice;  and,  where 
the  executor  named  in  the  will  declined  to 
act  the  residuary  legatee  was  the  person 
next  entitled,  and  a  person  who>  in  addition 
to  a  bequest  of  the  residue  of  the  estate  after 
the  death  of  another,  was  given  a  remainder 
hi  a  spedflc  pert  of  the  estate,  is  a  "residu- 
ary legatee,"  and  hence  on  petitions  by  such 
legatee  and  by  a  creditor  the  court  could  not 
grant  administration  to  the  creditor.  Mc- 
Canghey  v.  Byrne,  80  Atl.  663,  654,  115  Md. 
85. 

The  term  ''manner  prescribed  by  law,"  as 
used  in  the  Constitution  of  Washington,  giv- 
ing the  owner  of  property  sought  to  be  con- 
demned the  right  to  have  the  amount  of  his 
compensation  determined  by  a  Jury,  unless  a 
Jury  be  waived,  as  in  other  civil  cases,  in  the 
'Wnner  prescribed  by  law,**  means  that  the 
law  in  force  at  the  time  the  condemnation 
proceedings  are  instituted,  and  not  that  in 
force  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Con- 
stitntlon,  is  to  be  resorted  to  in  determining 
whether  a  Jury  trial  is  waived  or  not.  Che- 
lan County  V.  Navarre,  80  Pac.  845,  847,  S8 
Wash.  684. 

MANSLAUGHTER 

See  Assault  with  Intent  to  Oomndt  Man- 
slaughter; Involuntary  Manslaughter; 
Voluntary  Manslaughter. 

Willful  manslanghter,  see  Willfal— Wlll- 
fuDy. 

See,  also,  under  the  Inunediate  Influence 
of  Sudden  Passion. 

"Manslaughter"  Is  the  unlawful  killing 
of  a  human  being  without  malice,  either  ex- 
press or  Implied.  State  v.  Bmory  (Del.)  68 
Aa  1036,  1038,  5  PennewiU,  126;  State  v. 
Ireland,  83  Pta  lOSO,  1038»  72  Kan.  265; 


State  V.  Reese  (Deh)  79  Atl.  217,  221^  2  Boyce^ 
434 ;  l^&te  v.  Collins  (Del.)  62  Atl.  224,  226, 
5  PennewiU,  263;  State  v.  Bell  (DeL)  62  AtL 
147,  148,  6  PennewiU,  192;  State  v.  Brown 
(Del.)  61  Atl.  1077,  1079,  6  PennewiU,  339; 
State  V.  Miele  (Del.)  74  Ati.  8,  10,  1  Boyce, 
33;  State  v.  Tinkler,  88  Pac  830,  831,  72 
Kan.  262 ;  SUte  v.  Phinney,  89  Pac.  634,  18 
Idaho,  307,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  935,  12  Ann. 
Cas.  1079;  State  v.  Uzzo  (Del.)  65  AU.  775^ 
777,  6  PennewUl,  212 ;  State  v.  Lance,  63  S. 
E.  198,  200,  149  N.  C.  551;  State  v.  Short 
(Del.)  82  Atl.  239,  242,  2  Boyce,  491 ;  Mixon 
v.  State,  68  S.  E.  315,  316,  7  Ga.  App.  805. 

"Manslaughter"  is  defined  to  be  the  un- 
lawful kllUng  of  another  without  malice,  ei- 
ther express  or  implied,  and  without  premed- 
itation. SUte  V.  Brinte  (Del.)  58  Aa  258^ 
262,  4  PennewUl,  551. 

The  term  '^manslaughter^  has  become  A 
generic  term,  covering  two  specific  offenses  or 
degrees  of  homicide,  punishable,  the  one  un- 
der the  statute  by  confinement  in  the  peni- 
tentiary, and  the  other  under  the  common 
law,  by  fine  and  imprisonment  in  Jail.  The 
common-law  learning  of  the  text- writers  upon 
the'  offense  of  "manslavghter"  can  have  no 
place  in  the  definition  of  the  two  degrees  of 
homicide  which  have  been  carved  out  of  man- 
slaughter by  the  effect  of  our  statute,  how- 
ever apt  Bucb  learning  may  have  been  under 
the  ancient  practice*  when  the  punishment  of 
both  grades  was  a  matter  resting  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  Judge.  Brown  v.  Common- 
wealth, 92  S.  W.  542,  544,  122  Ky.  626. 

Rev.  St.  1899,  |  1825,  declaring  any  one 
who  shaU  administer  drugs  to,  or  shall  em- 
ploy an  instrument  on,  a  pregnant  woman, 
with  intent  to  destroy  the  foetus  or  child  of 
said  pregnant  woman,  guilty  of  manslaugh- 
ter, is  invalid  in  so  far  as  it  attempts  to  de- 
clare manslaughter,  which  necessarily  im- 
ports a  homicide  to  have  been  committed, 
when  the  death  of  neither  the  chUd  nor  the 
mother  results  from  the  act  charged.  State 
▼.  Hartiey,  84  S.  W.  910,  185  Me.  669,  106 
Am.  St  Rep.  608. 

As  f  eloBiou  kemlelde 

See  Felonious  Homiddei 
Voluntarj  kllHiig 

"Manslaughter"  is  the  unlawful  klUing 
of  a  human  being  without  maUce  either  ex- 
press or  implied,  and  must  be  voluntary  upon 
a  sudden  heat  of  passion,  caused  by  a  provo- 
cation apparently  sufl)cient  to  make  the  pas- 
sion irresistible.  Duckworth  v.  State,  97  S. 
W.  280,  281,  80  Ark.  360 ;  State  v.  Primrose 
(Del.)  77  Atl.  717,  719,  2  Boyce,  164 ;  State 
v.  Brown,  60  S.  E.  945,  946,  79  8.  C.  390; 
State  V.  BorrelU  (Del.)  76  Aa  605,  607,  1 
Boyce,  849;  Commonwealth  v.  Ourdo,  60  AtL 
792-794,  216  Pa.  880;  State  v.  Farter,  45  8. 
B.  1,  3,  66  S.  C.  469. 

"Mauiiiaughter"  is  where  one  person  kills 
another  without  maUce,  as  In  a  sudden  af- 


MAKSLAtFGHTEB 


268 


HANSLAUdfiTER 


fray,  \n  the  heat  of  blood,  or  In  a  tansport 
of  passion,  without  cooling  time  or  time  for 
reflection.  Stete  ▼.  Russo  (Del.)  77  AtL  743, 
746,  1  Boyce  538;  State  ▼.  Roberta  (Dd.)  78 
Atl.  305,  310,  2  Boyce,  140 ;  State  v.  Adams 
(Del.)  05  Ati.  510,  511,  6  Pennewill,  178; 
State  V.  Underbill  (Del.)  09  Atl.  880.  882,  6 
Pennewill,  491;  State  ▼.  Jackson  (Del.)  82 
AU.  824,  826. 

"Manslaughter"  is  the  unlawful  killing 
of  a  human  being  without  malice,  express 
or  implied,  and  without  any  mixture  of  de- 
liberation wbatever.  It  must  be  voluntary, 
upon  a  sudden  heat  of  passion,  caused  by  a 
provocation  apparently  sufficient  to  make  the 
passion  irresistible.  In  "voluntary  man- 
slaughter" there  must  be  a  serious  and  high- 
ly provoking  Injury  inflicted  upon  the  per- 
son killing,  sufficient  to  excite  an  irresistible 
passion  in  a  reasonable  person,  or  an  at* 
tempt  by  the  person  killed  to  commit  a  serl- 
Qus  personal  injury  on  the  person  killing. 
The  killing  must  be  the  result  of  that  sud- 
den, violent  impulse  of  passion  supposed  to 
be  irresistible.  People  v.  Bissett,  92  N.  B. 
949,  951,  246  lU.  5ia 

Where  the  act  of  killing  another  is  done 
in  sudden  heat  and  passion,  or  sudden  affray, 
and  without  previous  malice  and  not  in  nec- 
essary self-defense,  accused  is  guilty  of  man- 
slaughter. Combs  y.  Commonweath  (Ky.) 
112  S.  W.  658,  659. 

"Manslaughter"  is  voluntary  homicide 
committed  under  the  immediate  influence  of 
sudden  passion  arising  from  an  adequate 
cause,  but  neither  Justified  nor  excused  by 
law.  Sue  V.  State,  105  S.  W.  804,  809,  52 
Tex.  Cr.  R.  122. 

A  homicide  in  sudden  passion  excited  by 
sufficient  provocation  without  malice  is  "man- 
slaughter," not  because  the  law  supposes 
that  the  passion  made  the  slayer  unconscious 
of  what  he  was  about  to  do,  but  because  it 
presumes  that  passion  disturbs  his  reason. 
McBryde  v.  State,  47  South.  302,  305, 156  Ala. 
44. 

Every  killing  upon  a  rash  and  incon- 
siderate impulse  is  not  "manslaughter" ;  an 
adequate  cause  rendering  the  mind  incapable 
of  cool  reflection  being  essential  to  reduce 
an  unlawful  killing  to  manslaughter.  Potts 
V.  State,  118  S.  W.  535,  538,  56  Tex.  Cr.  R. 
39. 

To  reduce  a  killing  which  would  other- 
wise be  murder  to  manslaughter,  there  must» 
under  the  statute,  have  been  both  passion 
and  adequate  cause  to  produce  it  Hatchell 
V.  State,  84  S.  W.  234,  236,  47  Tex.  Cr.  R. 
380. 

Und^  Pen.  Code,  I  264,  homicide  is 
^manslaughter^*'  when  perpetrated  without  a 
design  to  effect  death,  and  in  heat  of  pas- 
HlOh:  State  v.  Stumbaugh,  132  N.  W.  666, 
668,28  &  D.  00. 


A  killing  wholly  the  result  of  passion 
and  without  malice  is  manslaughter.  Brew- 
er y.  State,  49  South.  836,  |39,  160  Ala.  66. 

If  there  was  a  sadden,  impulsive  killing, 
due  to  passion  suddenly  aroused — ^furor  brev- 
is— it  was  "manslaughter."  SUte  v.  Taylor, 
50  8.  Q.  247,  252,  57  W.  Va.  228. 

Manslaughter  is  where  the  homicide  is 
willful  and  unlawful,  but  is  committed  un- 
der such  circumstances  of  provocation  or  al- 
leviation as  to  rebut  the  implication  of  mal- 
ice. State  V.  Harmcm  (Del.)  60  AtL  866-868, 
4  Pennewill,  58a 

"The  distinguishing  quality  of  'man- 
slaughter*  is  that  the  mind  most  be  so  agi- 
tated by  reason  of  the  conduct  that  it  is  in- 
capable of  cool  reflection."  Venters  v. 
State,  83  S.  W.  832,  886,  47  Tex.  Cr.  R.  280. 

"Manslaughter**  is  defined  by  the  stat- 
ute in  Indian  Territory  as  a  voluntary  act 
upon  a  sudden  heat  of  passion  caused  by 
provocation  apparently  sufficient  to  make  the 
passion  irresistible,  and  it  is  further  describ- 
ed as  a  killing  in  the  commiis^on  of  an  un- 
lawful act  without  malice  or  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  a  lawful  act  without  due  caution  and 
circumspection.  Carney  v.  United  States, 
104  S.  W.  606,  7  Ind.  T.  247. 

"Intentional  killing  is  'manslaughter'  it 
it  is  committed  under  and  by  reason  of  a 
passion  caused  by  what  the  law  deems  suf- 
ficient provocation.  The  law  does  not  mere- 
ly look  to  see  if  a  man  was  provoked  and  en- 
raged, and,  if  80,  reduce  his  crime  to  man- 
slaughter; but  it  also  looks  at  the  provoca- 
tion, and  does  not  excuse  him  at  all  if  it  was 
inadequate  to  excite  his  passion.  The  provo- 
cation must  be  sufficient,  in  the  eye  of  the 
law,  or  it  is  murder."  State  v.  White,  51  S. 
E.  44,  50,  138  N.  C.  704  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Clark,  Cr.  Iaw,  p.  198). 

An  instruction  that  "manslaughter**  is 
the  unlawful  killing  of  another  without  mal- 
ice, express  or  implied,  and  that  the  per- 
son committing  the  act  must  not  be  in  fault, 
is  not  erroneous,  where  the  Judge  further 
charged,  in  other  words,  that  the  killing 
must  be  on  sufficient  provocation.  State  v. 
Reeder,  51  S.  B.  702,  703,  72  S.  C.  223. 

"Manslaughter^  is  the  killing  of  another 
in  the  heat  of  passion  without  malice  by  the 
use  of  a  dangerous  weapon  without  authority 
of  law  and  not  a  necessary  self-defense. 
This  was  the  definition  given  by  the  trial 
court  and  held  not  erroneous  on  appeal 
Moore  y.  State,  88  South.  504,  606,  86  Miss. 
160. 

Where  one,  under  the  influence  of  sud- 
den passion  arising  from  some  adequate 
cause,  and  not  actuated  by  malice,  while  nof 
acting  in  self-defense,  and  intending  to  kill 
another,  kills  a  different  person,  the  offense 
is  manslaughter.  Mc(Dullough  v.  State,  136 
S.  W.  1055,  1056,  62  Tex.  Cr.  R.  126. 


MANSLAUaHTBR 


20 


MAKBLAJJOWrtM 


Unaer  Pen.  Oode  1911,  art  1128,  de- 
flnisg  '^manslfttighter^  as  rolmitary  bomldda, 
committed  under  the  immediate  inflnenoe 
of  sudden  passion  arising  from  adequate 
cause,  tf  either  sudden  passion  or  adequate 
cause,  is  lacking,  the  homicide  la  not  man- 
slaughter.   Bums  ▼.  State  CTex.)  145  S.  W. 

356,  aei. 

The  tnie  nature  of  ""manalaiigliter^  la 
that  it  la  a  homicide  mitigated  oot  of  tender- 
ness to  the  frailty  of  hnman  nature.  Brery 
man,  when  assailed  with  Tlolence  or  great 
rudeness,  la  insfpired  with  a  sadden  impnlae 
of  anger,  which  puts  him  upon  reslatanoa 
before  time  for  cool  v^lection.  If  daring 
tbat  period  he  attadca  his  aasailant  with  a 
weapon  likely  to  endanger  life,  and  death 
ensues,  it  la  regarded  aa  done  through  heat 
of  blood,  and  violoice  of  anger  and  not 
through  malice.  The  same  rale  applies  to  a 
bomidde  in  mntoal  combat,  which  la  attrib- 
uted to  sadden  and  violent  anger  occasioned 
by  the  comhat,  and  not  to  mallee.  Where 
two  meet,  not  intending  to  qnanel,  and  angry 
words  suddenly  arise,  and  a  conflict  springs 
up,  in  which  blows  are  given  on  both  aides,  it 
Is  a  mutual  combat,  without  much  regard 
to  who  Is  the  assailant ;  and  if  no  unfUr  ad- 
vantage be  taken  In  the  outset,  and  an  occa- 
sion Is  not  sought  for  the  purpose  of  gratify- 
ing malice,  and  one  seizes  a  weapon  and 
strikes  a  deadly  blow,  it  is  regarded  aa  hdmi- 
dde  in  the  heat  of  blood,  and  under  our  stat- 
ute is  manslaughter  in  the  flrst  degree.  Rob- 
inson V.  Territory,  86  Pac.  451,  466^  16  Okl. 
24L 

In  a  prosecution  for  homicide,  where  the 
court  discuased  at  length  the  difference  be- 
tween murder  and  ''manalanghter'*  resulting 
in  def enae  of  one's  dwelling,  and  gave  numer- 
ous illustrations  so  that  the  Jury  could  not 
have  been  misled,  an  Instruction  that  "it  is 
'manslaughter*  if  sudden  heat  and  passion 
be  aroused  because  of  the  wrongful  trespass 
of  another  upon  his  home,  and  if  he  slays  in 
sudden  beat  and  passion  that  is  'manslaugh- 
ter/ "  if  not  technically  correct,  is  harmless 
error.  State  v.  Klbler,  00  S.  B.  438,  440,  79 
8.  C.  17a 

One  who  provokes  a  difficulty  without 
any  Intention  of  killing  or  doing  any  aeiious 
bodily  harm,  and  suddenly  and  without  de- 
liberation and  under  the  immediate  influence 
of  sodden  passion  arising  from  an  adequate 
cause  kills  another,  la  goilty  of  '*manslaugh- 
ter."  OomelluB  v.  State,  112  S.  W.  1050, 
1066,  54  Tez.  Or.  R.  178. 

A.  charge  defining  "manslaughter"  as 
voluntary  homicide  committed  under  the  im- 
mediate influence  of  sudden  passion  arising 
from  an  adequate  cause,  but  neither  Justified 
iK»'  excused  by  law,  defining  the  meaning  of 
its  phrases,  and  stating  what  was  neoessary 
to  reduce  voluntary  homicide  to  the' grade  of 
manslaughter,  is  not  erroneous.  Pratt  v. 
State,  127  S.  W.  827.  881,  60  Tex.  Or.  R  167. 


'Vanslaughter"  waa  properly  defined  as 
"the  unlawful  kUUng  of  iT  huhian  being  with- 
out malice,  without  that  black  condition  of 
the  heart,  ^  ^  *  but  in.  sudden  heat  of 
passion,  on  a  legal  provocation  offered  by 
deceased.  That  la  to  say,  if  deceased  as- 
saulted defendant,  and  defendant  became 
hot  and  passionate,  and  in  that  condition  of 
the  heart  he  struck  and  killed  deceased,  in 
sadden  heat  and  passion,  the  law  denomi- 
nates that  sort  of  killing  'manslaughter.'" 
State  V.  Hunter,  88  8.  B.  685,  687,  82  8.  a 
108. 

'Offanslsugtitet^  exists  where  one  per- 
son unlawfully  kills  another  without  nuUice^ 
aa  where  one  in  a  sudden  affray,  in  the  heat 
of  blood,  or  in  a  transport  of  passion,  with- 
out malice,  inflicts  a  mortal  wound,  without 
time  for  reflection  or  for  the  paaslon  to  cooL 
State  V.  Brehiwskl  (DeL)  84  Aa  900,  962. 

Where  the  evidence  showed  that  accused 
struck  deciedent,  riding  in  a  wagon,  with  a 
six-foot  binding  pole,  and  that  decedent  was 
either  knocked  off  the  wagon  or  fell  from  it 
and  was  fatally  injured  by  a  wheel  running 
over  him,  the  court  properly  charged  on  man- 
alaughter  in  the  language  of  the  statute,  and 
that  the  jury  could  convict  accused  if  they 
believed  that  he  stnu&  decedent  and  knock- 
ed|  him  off  the  wagon,  or  caused  decedent  to 
fail  ftom  the  wagon,  and  that  a  wheel  ran 
over  him,  and  that  he.  died  in  oonaequenoe 
ct  such  strikiiig  and  being  nm  over.  Gil- 
more  V.  State,  122  8.  W.  488,  484,  92  Ark. 
206. 

In  the  prosecution  of  an  officer  for  kill- 
ing deceased  while  resisting  arrest,  an  in- 
struction that  if  defendant  in  good  faith  her 
lieved  that  he  had  a  right  to  execute  a  capias 
pro  fine  under  which  he  waa  seeking  to  ar- 
rest deceased  on  Sunday,  then  they  should 
find  defendant  guilty  of  mantfaughter,  was 
erroneous.  Kammerer  v.  Oonunonwealth,  126 
8.  W.  783,  724,  187  Ky,  816. 

An  instruction  that  if  accused  was  in 
such  a  state  of  excitement  that  his  reason 
was  dethroned,  that  he  was  driven  by  an  un- 
controllable impulse  so  that  he  was  not  taio- 
rally  or  legally  accountable  for  his  conduct, 
so  that  he  did  not  realize  his  crime  or  what 
he  was  doing  or  where  he  was,  and  had  gone 
some'  distance  from  the  scene  before  he  waa 
able  to  recover  himsetf  and  his  senses,  then 
he  would  be  guilty  of  no  higher  crime  than 
manslaughter,  was  erroneous,  as  the  degree 
of  mental  disturbtance  required  was  equiva- 
lent to  insanity^  People  v.  Poole,  128  N.  W. 
1093,  1094,  169  Mich.  860,  IM  Am.  St  Bep. 
722: 

Under  Bev.  8t  XT.  8.  I  fSSH,  declaring 
that  every,  person  who  uitlawfully  and  will- 
fully but  without  malice  shoots  at  or  other- 
wise injures  another,  of  which- 'sliooting  or 
other  injury  the  pwaoh  diss,  iis  guilty  of 
manslaughter,  an  .inatrhctkm  AsfliUng  man- 
aOaughter  and  omitting  the  isenL' *%iuailly" 


KAKSLA^UdHTJSR 


8f« 


MANSliUlrUOHTPII 


wasf  >erroneoii&  O'Barr  v :  -  United :  BMmft  105 
Pac.  988,  989,  8  Okl.  Or.  819,  139  Am.  St. 
Rep.  959. 

"  A  charge  on  'nsknslaugbter  In  tbe  Ian- 
gtrage  of  the  statute  that  every  person  who 
shall  unlawfully  kill'iany  human  being,  with- 
out mallei,  express  or  implied,  either  volun- 
tarily upon-'  a.  sudden  heat  or  InvoluntArUy, 
but  in  the  commission  of  some  unlawful  act, 
shall  be  guilty  of  manslaughter  is  sufficient; 
the  statute  containing  no  tilctmical  terms, 
and  being  plain  and  unambiguous,  and  easily 
understood  by  a  juror  of  ordinary  Intelli- 
gerice.  State  v.  Quinn^  105  Piic.  818,  821,  56 
Wash..  295. 

Defendant,,  a  fraU  feeble  man  62  years 
pf  age,  after  having  been  severely  beaten  by 
deceased,  went  to  his  residence,  obtained  a 
liistol,  and,  returning,  fired  two  shots,  the 
se<»nd  of  which  struck  deceased  while  he 
was  advancing.  Deceased  took  the  pistol 
away  from  defendant,  and  beat  him  with  it 
into  InsensibiUty,  after  which  deceased  died 
from  his  wound.  Held,  that  an  instructloB 
that  if  defendant  with  a  deadly  weapon  or 
instrument  reasonably  calculated  to  produce 
death  by  the  mode  or  manner  of  its  use,  in 
a  sudden  transport  of  passion  aroused  .by 
adeauate  caiise,  and  not  in  defiense  of  him- 
self against  an  unlawful  attack.  £^sonably 
producing  a  rational  fear  or  expectation  of 
death  or  serKous  bodily  harm,  shot  deceased 
as  charged,  he  was  guUty  of  manfilaughter, 
wai  ptdpet'tLoA  warraiited  by  the  evidence. 
Sartin  v.  State,  103  S.  W.  875,  876,  51  Tex. 
Or.'-R.-6Tlv  :.;-►  cr;  ^  .  .     -  ■•  •      •    •   •  :  - 

•  Defeddaaat,  keeper  of  a  bagnio,  had  trou- 
ble with  a  man  therein,  and  he  went  out,  be- 
!iig  Immediately  followed  by  deceased  and  his 
iJarty.  The  testimony'  for  the  state  was 
'that  the  defendant  then  called  for  a  pistol, 
aimed  it  towards  the  party,  and  fired,  tuiy- 
Infc  **RuD  you  •  ♦  •  run,"  and  that  on 
her  going  inside,  being  asked  if  they  ran, 
^he  said,  "Yea."  She  and  her  witnesses  tes- 
tiHedlthat  no  sfiQt.was  fired  from  the, house. 
Held,  that  "negligent  homicide"  was  not  in 
the  case,  but  ''manslaughter,"  of  which  she 
was  convicted,  wjas  the  lowest  grade  of  homi- 
cide of  which  she  could  be  found  guilty,  so 
that  any  error  in  the  instruction  thereon  Was 
harmless.  Clifton  v.  State,  84  S.  W.  237, 
239,  47  Tex.  Gr.  E,  472. 

The  mere  belief  by  defendant  thi^t  .he 
was  in  danger  of  having  some,  injury  inflict- 
ed upon  him,'  witbovt  any  rec^soiuible  grounds 
fi^r  entertaining  such  belief,  has  never  been 
recognized  by  the  courts  of  this  sti^te  or  any 
other  state  to  which  our  attention  has  been 
called  as  beUig  suffidoit  to  re^ce  the  grade 
of  the  crime  from  /'murder^  iii  the  first  or 
second  degree  to  ''manslaughter.**'  State  v. 
Clay,  100  S.  W.  439^  442,  201  Mo.  679.; 

**Maniaau|^ter,"  as  defimed  by  the  stat- 
utes of  the  United  States,  consist»:ln  thet  un- 
lawful and.wiUfuL'kiUing  of  another. by:  strik- 


lag,  sM^bbingt  wounding,  shootiiig,  .or  other- 
wise injuring 'him,  resuting  in  his  death, 
without  malice.  State  v.  Collingsworth,  92 
N.  B.  22.  8^2  Qhio  St  154,. 28  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
770,  137  Am.  St  Rep.  776;  Miller  ▼.  State. 
107  Pac.  948,  8  Okt  Cr.  575. 
Saaie— CooUkc  time  •• 

^'Manslaughter"  Is  the  unlawful  killing  of 
a  human  being  wiOiout  malice,  -jeither  ex- 
I^ress  or  imi^ed,  and  Is;  eomniitted  when  the 
death  wound  is  given  \hy  accused  without 
maIi<Qe,  on  sudden  provocation,  in  the  heat  o£ 
blood  or  in  a  tranfKK>rt  of  passion,  on  suffi- 
cient provoeation  without  tipie  tor  reflectioo 
and  deliberation  and.  for  the  blood:  to  cool 
State  V.  Moore  (Del.)  74  AU.  1112,  .U14,  1 
Boyce,  142. 

If  thete  idiould  appear  to  liave  been  an 
interval  between  the  assault  or  prorocatioD 
given  and  the  killing  sufficient  for  the  voice 
of  reason  to  be  heard,  the  killing  shall  be  at- 
tributed to  deliberate  revenge,  and  punished 
as  murder.  People  v.  Bissett  92  N.  E.  949, 
951,  246  lU.  516.       • 

In  determining  whether  a  homicide  is  re- 
duced from  murder  to  maiislaughter,  the 
question  is  not  only  whether  accused's  pas- 
sion, engendered  by  a  sufficient  provocation, 
did  in  fact  cool,  but  also  whether  the  time 
intervening  between  the  giving  of  tbe  provo- 
cation ^nd  the  killing  was  sufficient  for  tbe 
passion  pf  a  reasonable  man  to  cool;  an  af- 
firmative, answer  to  either  question  preclud- 
iDji  a  Reduction  to  manslaughter.  A  killing 
coinmilted  upon  a  provocation  given  9  or  10 
months  before  is  not  reduced  to  manslaugb- 
tef  by  the  passion  engendered  by  sndi  provo- 
cation. Ex  parte  Fraley,  109  Pac  295,  296, 3 
OkL  Cr.  719,  139  Am.  St  Bep.  988. 

To  reduce  homicide  from  the  degree  of 
murder  to  that  of  manslaughter  it  must  have 
been  committed  upon  A  sudden  quarrel  or 
heat  of  passion,  and,  where  a  person  who  Is 
su^dently  wronged  by  another  to  arouse  Ib 
him  that  heat  of  passion  which,  if  life  wero 
taken  immediately,  would  make  the  crime 
manslaughter,  after  sufficient  cooling  time  has 
intervened,  kills  deceased,  the  homicide. will 
be  deemed  the  result  of  deliberation;  and 
where  defendant  was  informed  by  his  wife 
that  she  had  committeid  adultery  with  de- 
ceased, the  first  time  under  violence,  search- 
ed for  deceased,  took  a  journey  by  train  to 
his  home,  and  shot  him  17  hours  after  he 
had  been  first  informed,  there  had  been  a 
sufficient  cooling  time  and  his  acts  could  wA 
be  said  to  have  been  Cbmmittedta  such  'iieot 
of  passion*'  as  would  reduce  the  homicide  to 
manslaughter.  People  v.  Ashland,  128  Pac. 
798,:  80i;  20  CaL  App.  168. 

8im!D--Iiitemt    :  - 

To  reduce  homicide  to  manrtaoghter,  tf 
is  not  necessary  th^t  the.int^t  to  kill  be 
formed  in  a  sudden  transport  of  .passion,  op 
adequate  cause,  but  it  is  enoqgb  that  t)^ 
jDifi^M.^cited  and  not  capable  of  cool  re- 


momuioaBPtKm 


SL 


mactier  ▼.  Static  lIU  &  W.  SB8,  2tt,  01  TUl 

The  rule  is  well  settled  that  to  confttittite 
'*maiidaiighter''^lt  Is  not  necessary  tliai  the 
perpetrator  should  ha^e  Intended  and  witted 
the  death  of  the  person  killed.  OnewliowUl-' 
folly  uses  a  deadly  weapon  upon  anotiier 
will  be  deemed  to  Intend  tiie  neoeasaiy  and 
probable  eonswiuences  of  his  act  The  text- 
writers  dMde  manstetighter  Into  two'de> 
gree9,  Yolnntaxy  and  Inyolnntary.  Tyner  ▼. 
United  States,  108  Paa  1057, 1068,  »  OkL  Oc 
688. 

Int^t  Is  not  an  essentlali  element  of  the 
sUtntory  definition  of  ''manslaughter"  when 
committed  by  culpable  negUgence,  and  charg- 
es predicated  upon  the  theory  that  intent  is 
in  ev^ry  case  essential  to  the  statutory  crime 
of  "mansUughter**  are  properly  refused. 
Kent  T.  State,  43  South.  77^  774,  53  Fla.  51. 

Sand,  ft  H.  Dig.  |  1060,  providing  that  the 
killing  of  a  human  being  without  design  to 
effect  death*  in  the  heat  of  passion,  but  in  a 
cruel  and  unusual  manner,  unless  it  be  imder 
circomstances  that  would  constitute  excusa- 
ble or  justifiable  homicide,  shall  be  adjudged 
manslaughter.  Is  not  applicable  to  a  Idlling 
with  a  pistol;  the  statute  being  evidently  in- 
tended to  cover  a  case  of  homicide  committed 
anintentionally,  but  with  itch  wanton  sav- 
agery and  cruelty,  and  in  such  an  unusual 
manner,  as  to  imply  recklessness  of  design.' 
In  one  sense,  it  is  true,  all  killing  Is  cruel ; 
but,  in  the  sense  of  this  statute,  killing  with 
such  a  common  or  effective  instrument  of 
death  as  a  pistol  cannot  be  regarded  as  cruel ; 
still  less  is  this  manner  of  death  unusual. 
Tanks  v.  State,  75  a  W.  851,  852,  71  Ark. 
459. 

In  "manslaughter"  there  may  be  an  In- 
tent to  kiU  ezlating  in  the  mind  of  the  slayer 
at  the  time  the  fatal  shot  is  fired.  Kelgans 
▼.  State;  41  South.  880,  887,  52  Fla.  67. 

Where  the  intent  was  merely  to  inflict 
chastisement,  and  death  results  from  some 
peculiarity  in  decedent's  constitution  or  oth- 
^r  unexpected  incident,  the  killing  is  man- 
slaughter only.  Hosemond  v.  State,  110  S.  W. 
229,  230,  86  Ark.  100.. 

"ManalaughteE"  Is  the  unlawful  killing 
of  another  without  malice,  and  under  certain 
conditions  this  crime ,  may  be  established, 
though,  the  killing  has'  been  both  unlawful 
and  Intentional.  State  v.  Baldwin,  68  S.  SI 
148,  151,  152  N.  a  822, 

If  the  Intfltttion  to  km  was  formed  in 
defendant's  ndnd,  through  passion,  with  ade- 
quate cause,  and  tiie  homielde  oecuered  while 
Uie  mind  was  in  that  condition,  it  was  no 
hi^er  olf&se  than  manslaughter.  Dixoi^  v. 
State.  103  S.  W.  390,  401,  51  Tex.  Cr.  H.  565. 

"  ICanslaughter*  is  voluntary  homicUte 
tommlttsd  tOider  the  Inunedlate  lnflnance..of 


UAHBLAJMXBOm 


.^^uslsn,  aiMng  from^aa  jidequa^ 
causes  bat  neither  >  Justified  nor'  excused  by 
law.  BythaexiHMstoa  under 'fho^iosnediate* 
iiiflii«doe  or'AiHldsii'passtim.ir^nefmtr  0) 
Thait  tXto  peovocatfim  must arlsetit  the  same- 
time  of  the  commission  of  thst  offense»  a«d 
that  the  pasaion  is  not  the  result  ot  a,  former 
provo^tidn.  (2)  That  the  act  must  be  di- 
rectly caosed  by  the  passion  arising  out  of 
the  provocation.  It  is  not  enough  that  the 
mind  is  merely  agitated  by  passion  arising 
from  some  other  pixivocation.  (8)  The  pas- 
sion intended  is'.ei^ther  of  tbe  emptions  of  tliei 
mind  known  aa. anger,  rage,  sudden  resent- 
n^nt,  or  terror  Tendering  it  incapable  of  cool 
reflection."  Sue  v.  State,  105  S».  W.  80i,  800, 
52  Tex.  Cr.  BC122.  * 

"  'Manslaughter'  is  where  one  persoin  un- 
la^wfuUy  kills  another  without  malicei  In 
order  to  reduce  the  crime  to  manslaughter, 
the  provocation  must  be  vefy  great — so  great 
as  to  produce  such  a  transport  of  passion  as 
to  render  the  person  for  the  time  being  deaf 
to  the  voice  of  reason."  State  v.  Powell 
(Dei)  ei  Att  966,  071,  5  PannewlU,  24^  State 
V.  TDghman  (DeL)  68  AH  772,  778,  6  Fenn^ 
win,  54;  State  v.  Johns  (DeL)  65  AtL  768, 
766,  6  Pennewlllt  174;  State  v.  Wiggins  (DeL) 

76  AQ.  682,  636,  7  PennewOl,  127. 

'To  'redtce  tinUwftU' killing  from  *mar- 
deif  to  *nuunlaaghtisr,'  two  thing»ittcuft  con- 
tat.:  First,  conditions  must  be  iliown  to  ex* 
ist  wMch.  w0ul4  \i0  icalculated  to'prOduce»  in 
the  mind  of  a  'iferson  of  -ordinary  prbdenoe 
and  self-control,  such  rage,  fury,  or  terror  as 
would  render  the  mind  of  the  defendant  in- 
capable of  forming  a  premeditated  design  to 
effect  tlw  deaHi  of  the  persoin  alliln,  bf  «t  an# 
other  htmuin  beifig;  second,  it  most  also  be 
shown  that  the  defendant  was  In  fact,  at  tibe 
time  of  the  homicide,  laboring  under  such 
rage,  fury,  or  terror.^  Bx  parte  Smith,  90 
Pae.  803,  900,  2  OkL  Or.  24. 

To  reduce  t  homicide  ttoth  murder  to 
"manslaughter,''  it  must  be  committed  in  a 
heat  of  passion,  on  a  reasonable  provocation, 
without  maUCe  and  without  premeditation, 
and  under  drcumstanoes  ttiat  will  not  be  Jus- 
tlfiable.or  excusable  homicidei.  Tlie  passion 
which  win  reduce  taonddde  to  -the  degree  of 
nmnslaui^ter  lean  exelted  sfista  of  mind  pro? 
dueed  by  some  lawful  provocation,  such  as^a 
blow  or  an  assault  of  any  kind  upon  the  per* 
mm.  ''Mansiaiii^iter,*'  In  the  fovrtti  degree* 
Includes  every  Itomidde  not  Justifiable  or  el-> 
cnsable  wUleh  «^  laanslaiii^ter  iit  common 
law,  and  which  Is  not  excusable  or  Jnatifia- 
ble,  or  declared  by  statute  to  be  manslaugh- 
ter in  some  other  degree.    State  v.  Weakley, 

77  S.  W.  525,  527,  178  Ma  .413  (auoOng  and 
adopting  the  definitions  1^  Bev.  3t  1899,  i 
3477),  - 

j^Ulpg,'  the  ranilt  off  9aMeii:.yrodiiced 
by  Ugltit;  Is  ^inamrtangtiter"  if  thSe  person  up* 
on  .whQm.:iA  assaiA  is  made  with'  Violence 
resent  it  immidlafiay.:by:JkIlliag.«htt  aggree- 


KAlTOLAUaHTEK 


2X2 


UARSLAJSQBTmm 


0or,  and  acitherem  In  heat  of  Uaodiand  imt 
exclnalT^  In  hla  own  detaiae.     State  ▼. 

QoK^  M  &  n.  i68»  lea,  ii(k  iso  n.  c.  820 

Cdtlng  Stater.  MUler.  17  &B.  ie7yll2  N.  a 
878t  State  T.  Gran«»  96  K.  0.  61A;  State  t. 
Tackett,  8  N.  a  210). 

Hie  mere  belief  by  defendant  that  he 
waa  in  danger  of  having  some  injury  Inflicted 
npon.  him,  without  any  reaJBOnable  grounds 
for  entertaining  such  belief,  has  never  been 
recognized  by  the  courts  of  this  state  or  koj 
other  state  to  which  our  attention  has  been 
called,  as  being  sufficient  to  reduce  the  grade 
of  the  crime  from  ''murder'*  in  the  first  or 
second  degree  to  '^manslaughter.**  State  v. 
aay,  fob  S.  W.  439,  442,  201  Mo.  679. 

.,  A  slight  assault  does  not  excuse  the.kiU- 
ini^  6f  an  assailant  with  a  deadly  weapon,  ao 
as  .to  reduce  the  offense  from  the  grade  of 
murder  to  that  of  manslaughter.  State  v. 
Wiggins  (DeL)  76  AtL  632,  635.  7  Pennewill, 
127;  Same  v.  BorreUi  (DeL)  76  Aa  605, 
607, 1  Boyce,  349. 

When  words  of  decedent  are  accompa- 
nied by  acts  showingr  a  purpose  to  commit  vl* 
olence  On  accused,  aa  by  raising  and  pointing 
at  him  a  gun,  accused  is  entitled  to  an  in- 
struction on  manslaughter.  State  v.  Oraw- 
ford,  66  S*  B.  110,  1J5,  66  W.  Va.  U4. 

If  tli»  prisons  Willingly  engagied  ill  a 
fight  with  the  deceased,  and  the  deceased 
threw  his  .hand  to  hia  hip  pocket,  and  ad- 
vanced, upon  the  prisoner  in  a  threatening 
manner,  and  the  .prisoner«  being  willing  to 
fight,  seUsed  a  pistol,  and  shot  the  deceased, 
and  the  deceased  died  from  the  wound  then 
inflidted  by  the  prisoner,  the  prisoner  would 
be  guilty  of  "manslaughter,**  provided  the  ap- 
pearance and  manner  of  the  deceased  were 
such  as  to  cause  the  prisoner  to  brieve  that 
the  deceaised  was  armed  with  a  deadly  weap* 
on,  and  that  the  prisoner  did  believe  he  was 
armed  with  a  deadly  weapon  and  was  about 
to  harm  him  with  it  State  V-  Exum,  56  S.  EL 
283,  289,  138  K.  0.  599. 

If  a  convict,  while  attempttng  to  prevent 
his  punishment  by  the  warden,  which  amount- 
ed to  an  aissault,  slew  a  fellow  convict  aiding 
the  warden,  who  was  the  warden's  abettor 
in  coDunittIng  the  assault,  the  homidd^  may 
be  reduced  to  voluntary  maiislaughter ;  and 
it  was  error  to  omit  to  cliarge  on  tikatoffense 
in  a  prosecution  of  the  convict  for' murder. 
Westbrook  v.  Stiate,  66  S.  E.  788,  791,  138  Ga. 
578,  26  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  591,  18  Ann.  GaS.  295. 

Where  decedent  slapped  accused,  but  did 
not  accompany  the  act  by  angry  or  insulting 
words,  a  charge,  on  inanslaughter  that,  if  ac- 
cused killed  decedent  under  the  immediate 
fnfluence  of  sudden  passion  arising  from  the 
act  of  decedent  rendering  the  mind  of  accus- 
ed tnoapabSe  of  cool  refleetton,  he  was  guilty 
of  mansiaugliter  only,  property  submitted  the 
issue  of  manslaughter.  Best  v^  States  125  S. 
W.  900,  928,  i»  l^x.  Cr.  B.  827. 


ProToeatfon  caused  by  words  only  is  not 
saflScient.  tc^  rsdnoe  a  hoviidde  fkom  murder 
to  '"manslaughter.*'  Petty  v.  SUte,  89  S.  W. 
465»  467,  76  Ark.  61& 

TestimoDy  of  a  statement  made  by  de- 
ceased to  defendant  and  to  some  of  defend- 
ant's alstera,  wlio  were  present,  that  they 
were  hitches,  or  damn  bitches,  does  not  raise 
the  issue  of  insulting  conduct  toward  a  fam- 
ily relative  of  defendant  Jirimson  v»  States 
84  «.  W.  884,  826,  47  Tex.  Cr.  B.  623. 

^  Where  accused  killed  another  under  the 
immediate  Influence  of  passion  arising  in  his 
mind  from  information  given  him  by  his  wife 
to  the  effect  that  deceased  had  used  insulting 
language  to  her,  defendant  believing  and  in 
good  faith  acting  on  th^  information,  such  in- 
formation was  to  him  an  adequate  cause,  re- 
ducing the  crime  to  manslaughter,  whether 
the  insults  had  been  in  fact  offered  or  not 
Melton  V.  State,  88  S.  W.  822,  824,  47  Tex.  Cr. 
B.451. 

In  a  prosecution  for  manslaughter,  where- 
in it  appeared  accused  killed  deceased  while 
endeavoring  to  gain  possession  of  a  house  oc- 
cupied by  the  deceased,  there  was  evidence 
that  accused,  just  before  the  killing,  sent  hia 
wife  to  demand  possession,  and  that  when 
she  did  so  deceased  asked  her  if  she  was  going 
to  take  the  place  of  her  husband,  or  it  she 
was  attending  to  his  business,  and  said  that 
there  was  no  law  that  could  put  him  out,  and 
that  then  her  husband  called  her,  and  de- 
ceased and  his  brother  followed  her,  cursing 
accused  and  calling  him  vile  names.  Held 
not  to  raise  the  issue  of  manslaughter  by 
reason  of  Insulting  conduct  towards  her,  so 
as  to  require  a  charge  thereon*  Gay  v.  State, 
125  S.  W.  896,  901,  58  Tex.  Cr.  H.  47i 

In  a  prosecution  for  homicide^  an  instruc- 
tion was  erroneous  which  required  that,  be- 
fore defendant  would  be  entitled  to  a  reduc- 
tion of  Ms  offense  to  mansiaui^ter,  the  jui7 
must  believe  both  that  he  was  led  to  commit 
the  homicide  from  learning  that  decedent  had 
insulted  his  wife,  and  also  that  the  decedent 
had  used  violent  language  to  and  threatened 
him  with  bodily  harm,  since,  where  the  law 
makes  any  given  fact,  adequate  cause  for 
homicide,  a  defendant  is  entitled  to  an  un- 
equivocal Instruction  that^  if  sudi  fact  is 
proven,  it  is  adequate  cause,  and  where  any 
one  or  more  issues  are  raised  by  the  evidence, 
either  of  which.  If  found  to  be  true,  would  as 
a  fact  constitute  adequate  cause,  the  Jury 
should  be  so  instructed,  and  it  is  error  to 
blend  the  two  and  require  tliat  the  affirmative 
of  both  be  proved.  Barbae  v.  State,  124  S.W. 
961,  967,  58  Tex.  Or.  B.  129. 

Where  a  person  committing  a  homicide 
did  so  in  the  belief  that  decedent  had  insulted 
defendant's  sisters,  the  homicide  was  **man- 
slaughter,"  if  conunitted  upon  the  lint  meet- 
ing after  defendant  was  apprised  of  the  out 
rage,  whether  decedent  actually  coDuatttei 


XAKSlftAVOHXEa 


ST8 


lfAK8X4AUOHT]BB 


tbe  limit  or  not*  if  tbe  liomielde  wm  oommlt- 
ted  Willie  cJufepdanl:  was  acting  under  the  be- 
lief tliat  decedent  was  guilty  and  wlille  labors 
Ing  under  a  passion  aroused  by  that  belief 
wbich  rendered  his  mind  incapable  of  cool  re- 
flecdon*  QiUespie  y.  SUte,  109  S.  W.  166. 
159,  53  Tex.  Or.  R  167. 

It  when  lie  Idlled  decedent,  accused  was 
Incapable  of  cool  reflection  because  of  deoe* 
denVs  insulting  language  and  conduct  toward 
accused's  wife,  knowledge  of  which  had  just 
come  to  hiffl,  or  if  the  unwarranted  ejection 
of  accused  from  decedent's  house,  accompa- 
nied by  UdKS  from  decedent,  infuriated  ac^ 
cosed  beyond  cool  reflection,  resulting  in  the 
kiUlBg,  the  killing  was  "manslaughter."  Hoi- 
comb  y.  State,  IJLg  S.  W.  7H  750^  M  Tex.  Or. 
B.486. 

'If  a  husband  finds  his  wife  commlttlas 
adultery  and  under  the  proyocatlon  instanOj 
takes  her  life,  the  homicide  is  only  'man- 
slaughter.' "  Thomas  y.  State,  43  8outh«  371, 
374, 150  Ala.  31  (citing  Hooks'  Case,  13  South. 
767,  99  Ala.  166;  McNeiU  y.  State,  15  South. 
352, 102  Ala.  121,  48  Am.  St  Bep.  17;  Dabney 
V.  State,  21  South.  211, 113  Ala.  88, 59  Am.  St 
Rep.  92;  Williams  y.  State,  30  South.  484» 
130  Ala.  107,  112). 

A  Charge  that  to  reduce  e  kUling  to 
"^manslaughter,**  where  passions  haye  been 
suddenly  aroused  on  a  sufficient  proyocatlon, 
it  must  haye  been  done  under  the  influence  of 
passion  promptly  acted  upon,  is  not  errone- 
ous. Harrison  y.  State,  40  South.  068,  670, 
144  Ala.  20. 

The  unlawful  killing  of  aaother  without 
malice  is  "manslaughter,"  as  wheie  one  kills 
another  in  a  sudden  quarrel.  In  the  heat  of 
blood,  or  in  a  tramq;K>rt  of  passion,  without 
malice,  inflicts  a  mortal  wound,  without  Ume 
for  reflection  or  for  the  passions  to  cool;  but 
to  reduce  the  offense  to  manslaughter  the 
proyocatlon  must  be  yery  great,  so  great  as 
to  produce  such  a  transport  of  passion  as  to 
raider  the  person  for  the  time  being  deaf  to 
the  voice  of  reason.  State  y.  Brooks  (DeL)  84 
Aa225,  22& 

Vol«mtarj  o»  lByol«ntery  kllllag 

"Manslaughter^'  Is  the  unlawful  kWing 
of  another,  without  malice,  upon  a  sudden 
heat,  or  Inadyertently,  but  in  the  commission 
of  some  unlawful  act  Bocbe  y.  State,  122  N. 
W.  72»  76,  84  Neb.  846. 

"Manslaughter^  Is  the  unlawful  killing  of 
another  without  malice,  either  express  or  im- 
plied, and  without  premeditation,  and  is  ei- 
ther yoluntary  or  inyoluntary.  State  y. 
Blackburn  (DeL)  76  AU.  636,  639,  7  PennewlU, 
479;  State  y.  Morahan  (Del.)  77  AU.  488,  488^ 
7  Pennewill,  494;  State  v.  Woods  (Del.)  77 
AtL  480,  401,  7  Pennewill,  499. 

"Manslaughter,^  as  defined  by  Bey.  St  | 
6341,  is  the  offense  of  unlawfully  and  will- 
fully, but  without  malice,  striking,  stabbing; 

8  WDS.&  P.2d  SKa.~18 


wounding,  or  shooting  at  ar  otherwise  Injur- 
ing another  person  in  any  fort,  arsenal,  etc, 
of  which  striking,  etc.,  such  person  dies. 
"'Manslaughter*  has  been  defined  to  be  the 
killing  o(  another  without  malice,  exprjess  or 
implied,  which  may  be  yoluntary  upon  sudden 
heat  or  involuntary  in  the  commission  of 
some  lawful  act  Any  unlawful  and  willful 
killing  of  a  human  being  without  malice  la 
manslaughter,  and  thus  defined  it  includes  a 
negligent  killing  which  Is  also  wiUfuL  'Man- 
slaughter' occupies  the  middle  ground  be- 
tween excusable,  or  justifiable,  homicide  on 
the  one  hand,  and  murder  on  the  other.** 
United  States  y.  Hart,  162  Fed.  192,  IM,  196. 

Gross  carelessness  in  the  handling  of  fire- 
arms which  results  in  killing  a  human  being 
is  at  least  "manslaughter."  State  y.  Clardy, 
63  S.  S.  483,  600,  73  S.  0.  340* 

Under  Pen.  Code,  defining  "raanslangh* 
ter^  as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  being 
without  malice  and  diyiding  it  Into  two  kinds: 
(1)  Voluntary,  upon  a  sudden  quarrel  or  heat 
of  passion;  (2)  inyoluntary  in  the  commission 
of  an  unlawful  act  not  amounting  to  a  fel- 
ony, or  in  the  commission  of  a  lawful  act 
which  might  produce  death  in  an  unlawful 
manner  or  without  due  caution  or  circum- 
spection— in  a  prosecution  for  assault  in  the 
first  degree,  It  was  error  to  instruct  that,  if 
the  jury  beileyed  that  defendant  would  haye 
been  guilty  of  manslaughter  in  case  death 
had  resulted,  then  they  should  find  him  guilty 
of  assault  In  the  flxet  degree,  since  Intent  is 
not  always  a  necessary  element  in  the  crime 
of  manslaughter,  but  Is  the  essence  of  the 
crime  of  assault  in  the  first  degree.  State 
y.  Schaefer,  88  Pac.  702,  793,  86  Mont  217. 

"Manslaughter"  is  the  unlawful  killing 
of  a  human  being  without  malice,  and  is  of 
two  kinds — yoluntary  (that  is,  upon  a  sudden 
quarrel  or  heat  of  jmssion);  involuntary,  in 
the  commission  of  an  unlawful  act  not 
amounting  to  a  felony,  or  in  the  commission 
of  a  lawful  act,  which  might  produce  death, 
in  an  unlawful  manner,  or  without  due  cau- 
tion and  circumspection.  The  instruction  was 
in  the  language  of  Pen.  Code,  |  192.  People 
y.  Lee,  108  Pac.  738,  739, 13  Cal.  App.  48. 

"Manslaughter,"  as  defined  by  Pen.  Code, 
1 192,  is  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  be- 
ing without  malice,  first,  voluntary,  upon  a 
sudden  quarrel  or  heat  of  passion;  second,  in- 
voluntary, in  the  commission  of  an  unlawful 
act  which  might  produce  death  in  an  unlawful 
manner  or  without  due  care  and  circumspect 
tion.  The  causing  of  death  while  attempting 
to  commit  an  abortion  does  not  constitute 
manslaughter  under  the  statute.  Huntington 
V.  Superior  Court  of  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  90  Pac.  141, 144,  5  CaL  App.  288. 

l%e  approved  definition  of  "manslaugfti- 
ter"  as  the  killing  of  another  witboot  mailoa, 
either  express  or  implied,  "either  unlawfully 
upon  a  sudden  quairely  or  unintentionaUy 


MANSLAUGHTER 


274 


itAimhAtdtthM 


while  the  slayer  is  In  the  unlawfur  commis- 
sion of  some  act  not  amounting  to  a  felony/* 
authorizes  an  lustmctlon  that  If  defendant 
struck  the  blow  that  killed  the  deceased,  and 
intended  only  to  make  an  assault  and  battery 
upon  his  person,  or  to  inflict  great  bodily  in- 
Jury  thereon,  but  that,  as  a  result  of  the 
assault,  the  deceased  died  without  defendant 
having  Intended  to  kill  him,  defendant  would 
be  guilty  of  manslaughter.  State  ▼•  Walker, 
110  N.  W.  925,  928, 133  Iowa,  489. 

Where  the  violation  of  a  penal  ordinance 
of  a  municipality  causes  a  death,  the  death 
is  not  an  unlawful  killing  wlthl^  a  statute 
defining  the  crime  of  "manslaughter"  and 
providing  that  if  any  person  shall  unlaw- 
fully kill  another  without  malice  he  shall  be 
guilty  of  "manslaughter."  State  v.  Collings- 
worth, 92  N.  a  22,  23,  82  Ohio  St  154,  28 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  B.)  770,  187  Am.  St  Rep.  775. 

"If  the  killing  be  In  the  commission  of 
an  unlawful  act  without  malice  and  without 
means  calculated  to  produce  death  or  the 
prosecution  of  a  lawful  act  done  without 
due  caution  or  circumspection,  it  sliall  be 
•manslaughter.' ••  Ackers  v.  State,  83  S.  W. 
909,  73  Ark.  262  (quoting  Sand.  &  H.  Dig.  | 
1657). 

Under  Balllnger's  Ann.  Ck>des  ft  St  S 
6840,  providing  that  an  information  shall 
contain  a  statement  of  the  acts  constituting 
the  offense  so  as  to  enable  a  person  of  com- 
mon understanding  to  know  what  is  intend- 
ed, an  Information  charging  that  accused, 
representing  himself  as  a  physician,  advised 
a  mother  employing  him  to  give  the  child  no 
food  except  water  and  the  Juices  of  fruit 
and  such  other  nourishment  as  he  might  di- 
rect and  that  acting  under  such  instruction 
the  mother  withheld  all  food  and  nourish- 
ment except  as  directed  by  accused,  and 
that  the  child  died  as  a  result  of  starvation, 
does  not  charge  "manslaughter,"  defined  by 
section  7042,  punishing  one  who  shall  kill  an- 
other without  malice  in  the  commission  of 
some  unlawful  act  because  it  fails  to  show 
a  connected  chain  of  facts  showing  starva- 
tion as  the  necessary  result  of  the  directions. 
State  V.  McFadden,  93  Fac.  414,  415,  48 
Wash.  269,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1140. 

Under  Mansf.  Dig.  S  1532  (Ind.  T.  Ann. 
St  1899,  S  875),  defining  "manslaughter"  as 
the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  being,  with- 
out malice  or  deliberation,  section  1533,  pro- 
viding that  it  must  be  voluntary  under  a  sud- 
den heat  of  passion  caused  by  a  provoca- 
tion apparently  sufficient  to  make  the  passion 
irresistible,  and  section  1534,  describing  the 
killing  to  be  manslaughter  if  It  be  in  the 
commission  of  an  unlawful  act  without  due 
caution,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  involun- 
tary manslaughter.  Gasney  ▼.  United  States, 
104  8.  W.  OOe,  7  Ind.  T.  247. 

An  indictment  for  manslaughter  charg- 
ing, in  the  language  of  the  statute,  Chat  de- 


fendant did  "feloniously  kill  Iqid  slay'' the 
deceased  cannot  support  a  conviction  for  ieis- 
sault  and  battery.  The  formnla  did  *felo- 
nlously  kill  and  slay'*  cbfarges  niaimlaughter 
of  either  voluntary  or  inroluntary  diaracter, 
and  Involuntary  manslaughter  may  be  com- 
mitted without  criminal  assault  and  battery. 
State  V.  Thomas,  48  AtL  1007,  1006^  65  N.  J. 
Law,  698. 

Mnrder  distlns^iilslied 

"Murder"  and  "manslaughter''  are  dis- 
tinguished, in  that  malice  is  essential  to  the 
former  offense,  and  by  absence  of  premedita- 
tion or  deliberation  in  the  latter.  Reed  v. 
State,  145  S.  W.  206,  208,  102  Ark.  626. 

The  unlawful  killing  of  another  with  mal- 
ice  is  "murder,"  as  distinguished  from  "rnaii^ 
slattghter,"  which  is  an  unlawful  killing  with- 
out such  malice.  Stat»  t.  liee,  60  S.  fiL  624, 
526,  79  S.  C.  223. 

If  the  slayer  provoked  the  combat  or 
produced  the  occasion  in  order  to  have  a  pre- 
tense for  killing  Ills  adversary,  or  doing  him 
great  bodily  harm,  the  killing  will  be  "mur- 
der," no  matter  to  what  extremity  he  may 
have  been  reduced  in  the  combat  But  if  he 
had  no  felonious  intent  intending,  for  in- 
stance, an  ordinary  battery  mer^,  the  final 
killing  in  self-defense  would  be  "manslaugh- 
ter" only ;  the  distinction  being  between  the 
right  of  perfect  and  the  ri^^ht  of  imperfect 
self-defense.  State  v.  Kelleher,  100  S.  W.  470, 
475,  201  Mo.  614  (citing  State  v.  PaiUow,  4 
S.  W.  14,  90  Mo.  608,  69  Am.  Rep.  81). 

"'Homidde^  is  murder  unless  it  be  at- 
tended with  extenuatiBg  circumstances,  which 
must  appear  to  the  satislactiou  of  the  Jury. 
If  A.  assaults  B.,  giving  liim  a  severe  blow, 
or  otherwise  making  the  provocation  great 
and  B.  strikes  him  with  a  deadly  weapon, 
and  death  ensues,  the  law,  in  deference  to 
human  passion,  says  this  is  'manslaughter.' 
*  ^  *  If  the  provocation  be  slight  and  it 
can  be  collected  from  the  weapon  used  or  any 
other  circumstances  that  the  prisons  intend- 
ed to  kill  or  do  great  bodily  harm,  and  death 
follows,  it  Is  'murder.' "  State  v.  White,  51  S. 
E.  44,  48, 138  N.  O.  704  (quoting  and  adopting 
deflnitioiL  in  State  v.  Smith,  77  N.  0,  488). 

While,  in  one  sense,  murder  and  man- 
slaughter are  separate  crimes,  yet,  in  a  broad- 
er sense,  they  involve  but  one  crime  and  are 
only  degrees  of  felonious  homicide.  Rhea  t. 
Territory,  106  Pac.  814,  816^  8  OUL  Or.  280. 

In  an  instruction  correctly  deflnlhg  mur- 
der and  manslaughter,  the  statement  that 
"You  see  by  these  definitions  that  in  murder 
malice  must  exist  but  that  manslaughter  is 
the  killing  of  a  human  t>elng  without  mal- 
ice," made  only  to  dlsMnguish  the  two,  Ifi  not 
reversible  error.  Prince  v.  United  States,  109 
Pae.  241,  242,  3  OkL  Or^  700. 

Manslaughter  Is' distinguished  from  mur- 
der by  the  absence  Of  malice  as  a  contingent 


MilNSIiAUaHrCR 


2TS 


MAl^SIiA^GHTER 


eleftient.  If,  under  the  lnilu«noe'o£  some  rlo- 
l^nt  emotion,  a  sn<lclen  intent  vas  formed, 
which  on  ad^uate  psorocation  6(Terwhelmed 
the  rea»Qii  of  the  appellant,  then  the  killing 
was  not  murder,  but  manslaughter,  ooiy. 
State  y.  Clark  77  Pac  287,  288,  69  Kan.  676. 

The  chief  distinction  between  ''murder*' 
and  ^'manslaughter"  is  deliberation  and  mal- 
ice in  murder  and  the  want  thereof  in  man- 
slaughter, and,  where  the  issue  was  whether 
accused  or  a  third  person  in^flicted  the  fatel 
wound,  the  error  In  an  ihstruction  that  if 
accused  killed  decedent  without  authority  of 
law  and  not  in  necessary  self-defense  he  was 
guilty  of  manslaughter,  arising  from  the 
omission  of  the  words  "without  malice  and 
in  the  heat  of  passion,'*  was  not  prejudicial. 
Quest  y.  State,  52  South.  211,  212,  96  Miss. 
871. 

Generally  it  is  not  ^'murder,"  but  "man- 
slaughter," to  kill  an  officer,  or  other  person, 
to  prevent  an  illegal  arrest.  Consequently, 
shooting  at  an  officer  without  killing  him,  if 
done  to  prevent  an  illegal  arrest,  is  prima 
fade  not  an  assault  with  intent  to  murder, 
but  the  statutory  crime  of  shooting  at  anoth- 
er, described  in  Code  1882,  |  4370.  Jenkins  v. 
State,  59  S.  B.  435,  436,  3  Ga.  App.  146  (quot- 
ing, with  approval,  from  Thomas  v.  State,  18 
S.  £.  305,  91  Ga.  206). 

Under  Pen. 'Code,  H  187,  189,  defining 
murder  as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human 
being  with  malice  aforethought,  and  defining 
murder  In  the  first  and  second  degreed,  and 
section  192,  defining  manslaughter  as  the  un- 
lawful killing  of  a  human  being  without 
malice,  and  dividing  manslaughter  into  vol- 
untary and  involuntary  manslaughter,  and 
section  274,  making  it  a  felony  to  perform  a 
criminal  abortion,  an  unlawful  killing  with 
malice  aforethought  is  "murder,"  and  is  also 
"manslaughter,'^  because  it  is  the  unlawfdl 
killing  of  a  human  being,  though  it  cannot  be 
logically  classed  as  voluntary  or  involuntary 
'  manslaughter,  and  under  a  charge  of  murder 
by  attempting  a  criminal  abortion,  a  verdict 
of  manslaughter  may  be  returned.  People  y. 
Huntington,  97  Pac  760,  762,  8  Cal.  App.  612. 

"Manslaughter"  Is  an  unlawful  kilUng, 
which  becomes  "murder  In  the  second  degree" 
when  it  has  the  added  element  of  maUce. 
State  y.  Fowler,  66  S.  B.  567,  151  N,  C.  73L 

''Manslaughter"  consists  oi  the  unlawful 
killing  of  a  human  being  vdthout  malice,  and 
so,  in  a  prosecution  for  assault  with  intent 
to  commit  murder,  the  accused  cannot  be 
convicted  if,  had  his  victim  died,  his  crime 
would  have  only  been'  manslatghter. '  State  v. 
Stockley  (Del.)  82  Ati.  1078,  1080. 

'^Manalaogbter"  is  a  homicide  distin- 
guished from  murder  in  that  it  Is  the  unlaw- 
ful kllltng  of  another  with  malice,  as  in  sud- 
den affray,  in  the  heat  of  blood,  or  la  a  transr 
port  ofi-paaaieii,.  wiltoont  tUne.  loor  delibera- 


tion, refiectiUm,'  or  for  the  p«u9SioxiS:^to  cooL 
State  V.  De  Paolo  (Del.)  84  AtL  213,  215w 

'^Manslaughter"  ^is  an  unlawful  killing 
in  anger  .withotit  malice.  Proof  of  prior  prov- 
ocation may  exclude  the  idea  of  malice  in 
the  homlciae,  but  does  not  exclude  the  idea 
of  unlawfulness.  ^  It  merely  substitutes  the 
element  of  anger  without  malice  for  the  ele- 
ment of  malice,  thus  distinguishing  man- 
slaughter from  murder.  C!ole  v.  State,  59  S. 
B.  24,  26,  2  Ga.  App.  734.  . 

Murder  in  the  second  degree  consists  of 
the  killing  of  another  without  a  formed  de- 
sign to  take  life,  and  without  provocation  to 
reduce  the  offense  to  '^manslaughter,"  and 
under  the  influence  of  a  wicked  or  depraved 
heart,  or  with  cruel  and  wicked  indifference 
to  human  life.  "  'Manslaughter'  is  where  one 
in  a  sudden  affray,  in  the  heat  of  blood,  or 
in  a  transport  of  passion,  without  malice,  in- 
flicts a  mortal  wound,  without  time  for  re* 
flection  or  for  the  passions  to  cool.  It  is 
where  one  person  unlawfully  kills  another 
without  malicQ.  In  order  to  reduce  the  crime 
to  'manslaughter,'  the  provocation  must  be 
yery  great,  so  great  as  to  produce  such  a 
transport  of  passion  as  to  render  the  person 
for  the  time  being  deaf  to  the  voice  of  rea- 
son. While  jnurder  proceeds  from  a  wicked 
and  depraved  heart  ^d  is  characterized  by 
malice,  'manslaughter'  results,  not  from  mal- 
ice, but  from  unpremeditated  and  unreflect- 
ing passion."  State  v*  Ctephus  (Del.)  67  Atl. 
.X50/  151,  6  Pennewlli,  160. 

When  a  killing  is  intentional  and  is  not 
lawful,  it  to  generally  "murder";  but,  under 
dreum^tances  of  provocation,  or  of  mutual 
combat,  it  may  be  reduced  to  "manslaughter." 
State  v.  Ooldsby,  114  S.  W.  500,  503,  21^  Mo. 
48  .  (citing  2  Bishop's  (Drim.  Law  [6th  BdJ 
I 


"Murder"  is  where  a  person  of  sound 
memory  and  discretion  unlawfully  kills  any 
human  being  under  the  peace  of  the  state, 
with  malice  aforethought,  either  express  or 
implied.  The  chief  characteristic  of  this 
crime  distinguishing  it  from  "manslaughter" 
and  every  other  kind  of  homicide,  and  diere- 
fore  indispensably  necessary  to  be  proved,  is 
flialioe  preconceived  or  aforethought  Staite 
y.  Brinfie  (Del)  68  AtL  258,  262,  4  Penne- 
wlli, 661. 

A  charge  that,  where  an  ofl!cer  is  shot 
and  killed  by  one  whom  he  is  seeking  legally 
to  arrest,  the  offense  is  "murder"  and  not 
"manslaughter,"  was  not  erroneous  when  tak- 
en in  connection  with  the  evidence  which  was 
sufficient  to  show  that  defendant  was  violat- 
ing the  law  in  the  presence  of  the  officer  and 
that  upon  an  effort  to  arrest  him  he  drew  a 
pistol  and  shot  the  officer.  Johnson  v.  State, 
160  S.  B.  160,  161,  130  Ga.  27. 

If  two  persons  deliberately  agree  to  fight 
with  deadly  weapons. on  a  subsequent  day  at 
a  deOiUta  Um^  JOAd  plac^.a^^^b^th,.  being 


MANSIiAUGhttTER  IK  FIRST  DEGREE      27<(     MAKSLAUGHTBR  IN  FIRST  DEGREB 


armed,  meet  by  chance  near  the  appointed 
place  and  near  the  appointed  time,  and  with- 
out any  fresh  cause  of  a  quarrel  or  other  al- 
tercation one  slays  the  other  without  Justlfl- 
cation,  the  crime  is  murder,  and  not  volun- 
tary "manslaughter.**  Bundrick  ▼.  State,  SA 
S.  B.  688,  $85,  125  Qa.  768. 

MAHSLAUOHTEB  IX  FXRST  BEOBSE 

«*Afans]aughter  in  the  first  degree"  Is  the 
unlawful  killing  of  a  human  being  without 
malice ;  that  is,  as  the  unpremeditated  result 
of  passion-heated  blood  caused  by  a  sudden, 
sufficient  provocation.  Thomas  t.  State,  86 
South.  734,  735,  139  Ala.  80. 

To  oonstltate  "manslaughter  in  the  first 
degree,"  there  must  be  either  an  intent  to 
kill  or  to  do  an  act  of  Tiolenoe  from  which 
ordinarily  death  or  great  bodily  harm  will 
result  Reynolds  v.  State,  45  South.  894, 
895,  154  Ala.  14;  Fowler  y.  Same,  49  South. 
788,  789,  790,  161  Ala.  1. 

Penal  Code,  1 189,  defines  "manslaughter 
in  the  first  degree"  as  manslaughter  commit- 
ted without  a  design  to  effect  death  either 
(1)  by  a  person  engaged  in  committing,  or 
attempting  to  commit,  a  misdemeanor,  af- 
fecting the  person  or  property,  either  of  the 
person  killed,  or  of  another;  or  (2)  in  the 
heat  of  passion,  but  in  a  cruel  and  unusual 
manner,  or  by  means  of  a  dangerous  weapon. 
People  V.  Stacy,  104  N.  Y.  Supp.  615,  619,  119 
App.  DlY.  743 ;  Same  ▼.  Huson,  79  N.  B.  835, 
187  N.  Y.  97;  Same  v.  Darragh,  126  N.  Y. 
Supp.  522,  526,  141  App.  DIy.  408. 

Rev.  St  1899,  |  1822  (Ann.  St  1906,  p. 
1266),  providing  that  one  deliberately  assist- 
ing another  in  the  commission  of  self-mur- 
der shall  be  guilty  of  manslaughter  in  the 
first  degree,  changed  the  common-law  rule 
that  if  one  counsels  another  to  commit  sui- 
cide, and  such  other  by  reason  of  the  advice 
kills  himself,  the  adviser  is  guilty  of  mur- 
der as  an  aider  and  abetter,  provided  he  is 
present  when  bis  advice  is  carried  out  State 
v.  Webb,  115  S.  W.  998,  1000,  216  Mo.  378,  20 
U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1142,  129  Am.  St  Rep.  618, 
16  Ann.  Caa.  51& 

"Manslaughter  in  the  first  degree,"  under 
Grimes  Acts,  |  12  (Gen.  St  1901,  |  1997),  is 
defined  as  the  killing  of  a  human  being  with- 
out a  design  to  effect  death,  by  the  act,  pro- 
curement or  culpable  negligence  of  another, 
while  such  other  is  engaged  in  the  perpetra- 
tion or  attempt  to  perpetrate  any  crime  or 
misdemeanor,  not  amounting  to  a  felony,  in 
cases  when  such  killing  would  be  murder  at 
the  common  law.  It  has  been  held  that  the 
act  c^  offense  which  the  accused  commits  or 
attempts  to  commit  at  the  time  of  an  unin- 
tentional killing  includes  an  assault  and  bat- 
tery, and  that  intentional  violence  to  the  per- 
son is  not  excluded.  If  one,  without  any  de- 
sign to  effect  death,  assaults  another  with 
an  ifitent  only  to  commit  assault  and  battery 
upon  him,  and  with  the  use  %f  a  tin  can.hie 


unintentionally  kills  such  person,  the  crlxne 
would  fUl  within  this  definition  and  consti- 
tnte  "manslaughter  in  the  first  degree." 
State  ▼.  MeAnamey,  79  Paa  187,  139,  70 
Kan.  6T9. 

Under  St  1893,  |  2066  (Wilson's  Rev. « 
Ann.  St  1903,  |  217Q),  defining  homicide  to 
be  "manslaughter  In  the  first  degree"  when 
perpetrated  without  a  design  to  effect  death, 
and  in  the  heat  of  passion,  in  a  cruel  or  juk- 
usual  manner,  or  by  means  of  a  dangerous 
weapon,  homicide  is  '^manslaughter  in  the 
first  degree"  when  perpetrated  without  a 
design  to  tf  eet  death  and  in  a  heat  of  pas- 
sion, and  in  a  cruel  and  unusual  manner,  and 
when  committed  without  a  design  to  effect 
death,  but  in  a  heat  of  passion,  and  by  means 
of  a  dangerous  weapon.  Rarker  v.  Territory, 
78  P.  81,  83,  15  OkL  22. 

Wilson's  Rev.  &  Ann.  St  1903,  |  2175, 
defines  ''manslaughter  in  the  first  degree"  as 
follows:  "First,  when  perpetrated  without  a 
design  to  effect  death  by  a  person  while  en- 
gaged in  the  commission  of  a  misdemeanor. 
Second,  when  perpetrated  without  a  design 
to  effect  death,  and  in  a  heat  of  passion,  but 
in  a  cruel  and  unusual  manner,  or  by  means 
of  a  dangerous  weapon,  unless  it  is  commit- 
ted under  such  circumstances  as  constitute 
excusable  or  Justifiable  homidde."  Under 
such  definition,  the  crime  of  manslaughter 
in  the  first  degree  could  not  exist  where  the 
crime  was  committed  by  lying  in  wait  and 
shooting  deceased,  and  the  shooting  was 
willful  and  deliberate,  resvlting  in .  death, 
and  the  only  defense  was  that  of  alibi.  Tbe 
language  of  the  secornd  subdivision  of  the 
statute,  defining  "manslaughter  in  the  first 
degree"  perpetrated  without  a  design  to  ef- 
fect death,  would  not  authorize  an  instruc- 
tion submitting  defendant's  guilt  of  man- 
slaughter in  such  degree  on  such  fdcts.  Reg- 
nier  v.  Territory,  82  Pac.  509, 15  Okl.  652. 

Rev.  St  I  2276,  defines  ''manslaughter  In 
the  first  degree"  as  where  a  homicide  is  per- 
petrated without  design  to  effect  death  by 
a  person  while  engaged  in  the  commission  of 
a  misdemeanor,  and  in  the  heat  of  passion, 
but  in  a  cruel  or  unusual  manner,  or  by 
means  of  a  dangerous  weapon,  or  perpetrated 
unnecessarily  either  while  resisting  an  at- 
tempt by  the  person  killed  to  commit  a  crime 
or  after  such  attempt  shall  have  failed.  Tur- 
ner V.  State,  126  Pac  452,  458,  8  OkL  O.  U; 
Kent  V.  Same,  126  Pac  1040, 1042»  8  OkL  Gr. 
188. 

Pen.  Ck)de,  I  2,  declares  that  no  act  or 
oBiission  shall  be  denned  criminal  or  punish- 
able save  as  prescribed  by  Hie  Code,  by  some 
statute  which  it  continued,  or  by  such  laws 
as  are  not  in  oonfiict  with  the  Code,  and  sec- 
tion 241  defines  manslaughter  in  the  first  de- 
gree as  a  killing  perpetrated  without  a  design 
to  effect  death  and  in  a  heat  of  passion,  but 
in  a  cruel  and  unusual  manner  or  by  means 
of  a  dangeroiis  weapon,  milesB  committed 
under  such  dxeomstonoes  astto  coatititnta  a* 


IfANSLAUGHTBBINSBGONDDEGBBnD  277   MANBLAUOHTEB  IK  FOURTH  MlORfilS 


cosable  or  jnstiflable  homicide.  Held,  tliat 
tbe  phrase  "when  perpetrated  without  a  de- 
sign to  effect  death  and  in  a  heat  of  passion" 
was  employed  to  express  the  distinction  be- 
tween homicide  In  the  first  degree  and  mur- 
der, and  where  one  kills  another  in  a  cruel 
or  unnsnal  manner,  without  excuse  or  Justifi- 
cation, or  by  means  of  a  dangerous  weapon 
under  circumstances  which  do  not  excuse  or 
Justify  the  killing,  the  crime  is  at  least  man- 
slaughter in  the  first  degree.  State  y.  Bd- 
munds,  104  N.  W.  1116,  1116,  20  S.  D.  136. 

KAHflnLAUOHTBR  T«  8EOOMD  DEOR£B 

Manslaughter  in  the  second  degree  is  the 
unlawful,  involuntary  killing  of  a  human 
b^ng.  Neilson  ▼.  State,  40  South.  221,  222, 
146  Ala.  683. 

"Manslaughter  in  the  second  degree"  is 
the  unnecessary  killing  of  another  either 
while  resisting  an  attempt  by  such  other  per- 
son to  commit  any  felony  or  to  do  any  un- 
lawful act  after  such  attempt  shall  have  fail* 
ed.  State  y.  Steyenson,  86  Pac.  707,  706,  74 
Kan.  103. 

Under  St  1803, 1  2000,  every  killing  of  a 
human  being  by  culpable  negligence  which 
under  the  chapter  on  homicide  is  not  murder 
or  manslaughter  In  the  first  degree,  nor  ex- 
cusable or  Justifiable  homicide,  is  mamAatii^- 
ter  in  the  second  degree.  Barker  v.  Territo- 
ry, 78  Pac.  81,  88,  16  OkL  22. 

St  1808,  I  4361,  makes  it  manslaufshter 
in  the  second  degree  to  unnecessarily  kill  an- 
other while  resisting  an  attempt  of  the  other 
to  commit  an  unlawful  act.  Pollock  v.  State, 
U6  N.  W.  851,  854,  136  Wis.  136. 

Rev.  St  1800,  I  1826  (Ann.  Bt  U006,  ^ 
1267),  defines  manslaughter  in  the  second  de* 
gree  to  be  the  killing  of  a  human  being  with- 
out a  design  to  effect  death  in  a  heat  of  pas- 
ilon  in  a  cruel  or  unnsaal  manner.  State  v. 
ColWn,  126  8.  W.  448,  466,  226  Mo.  446. 

Where  there  is  a  want  of  intention  or 
willfulness  in  the  doing  of  the  unlawful  act 
causing  death,  resulting  from  a  mental  sta- 
tus Incapable  of  forming  an  intent  or  purpose 
to  do  the  act,  though  produced  by  dmnken- 
uess,  the  homicide  is  reduced  to  manslaugh- 
ter in  the  second  degree.  Heninburg  v. 
State,  43  South.  050,  060,  151  Ala,  26. 

Under  Pen.  Ck>de,  f  170,  defining  homicide 
as  the  killing  of  one  human  being  by  the 
act,  procurement,  or  omission  of  ''another," 
and  section  180,  providing  that  homicide  is 
cither  murder  or  manslaughter,  and  section 
193,  subd.  3,  making  a  homicide  manslaugh- 
ter in  the  second  degvee  when  due  to  the  act, 
procurement,  or  ctdpable  negligence  of  any 
*t)erBon"  which  doed  not  constitute  murder  or 
manslaughter  in  the  first  degree,  a  ocnrpora- 
tion  may  not  be  indicted  for  manslaughter, 
ilnee  the  word  '^another"  means  another 
human  b^ng,  and  since  the  word  "person" 
does  not  include  a  corporation.  People  v. 
Bochester  By.  A  Light  Co.,  88  N.  a  22,  24, 


105  N.  T.  102,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  008,  138  Am. 
St.  Rep.  770,  16  Ann.  Oas.  887. 

Gomp.  Laws  1000,  §  2280,  defines  "man- 
slaughter in  the  second  degree"  as  every  kill- 
ing of  one  human  being  by  the  act,  procure- 
ment, or  culpable  negligence  of  another, 
which,  under  the  provisions  of  the  statute, 
is  not  murder  or  manslaughter  in  the  first 
degree  or  excusable  homicide.  Turner  v. 
State,  126  Pac.  462,  460,  8  OkL  Or.  11 ;  Kent 
V.  Same,  126  Pac.  1540,  104S,  8  OkL  Or.  188. 

maxbzjilUqhte&  zk  third  deoree 

Under  Rev.  St  1000,  §  4462,  defining 
manslaughter  in  the  third  degree  as  the  kill- 
ing of  another  with  the  design  to  tf  ect  death 
by  a  dangerous  weapon,  there  can  be  no 
manslaughter  in  the  third  degree  where  the 
killing  was  with  the  design  to  effect  death 
and  was  intentional,  but  one  may  be  guilty 
of  manslaughter  in  the  third  degree,  when  in 
the  heat  of  passion  he  struck  and  killed  the 
adversary  with  a  dangerous  weapon  under 
circumstances  authorizing  a  finding  that  he 
did  not  intend  to  kill  the  adversary  by  the 
blow.  State  V.  Hanson,  182  S.  W.  245,  248, 
281  Mo.  14. 

St  1808,  I  4354,  declares  that  any  per- 
son  who  shall  kill  another  in  the  heat  of 
passion  without  a  design  to  effect  death,  by  a 
dangerous  weapon,  in  any  case  except  such 
wherein  the  killing  of  another  is  declared  to 
be  Justifiable  or  excusable,  shall  be  deemed 
guilty  of  manslaughter  in  the  third  degree. 
Duthey  v.  State,  111  N.  W.  222,  224,  131  Wis. 
178,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  fl.)  1032;  Bradley  v. 
Same,  124  N.  W.  1024,  1026,  142  Wis.  137. 

MAHSI.AUOHTEB     IX     TOURTK     0E« 
ORSE 

Where  the  killing  is  intentional,  ''man- 
slaughter  in  the  fourth  degree"  is  defined 
as  the  intentional  killing  of  a  human  being 
in  the  heat  of  passion  on  a  reasonable  prov- 
ocation, without  malice  and  without  pre- 
meditation, and  under  circumstances  which 
wHl  not  render  the  killing  as  justifiable  or 
excusable  homicide.  State  v.  Sebastian,  114 
S.  W.  522,  528,  215  Mo.  58  (citing  State  v. 
McKenele,  76  S.  W.  1015, 177  Mo.  loc.  dt  712 ; 
State  V.  Hermann,  28  S.  W.  1071,  llV  Mo.  loc. 
dt  687 ;  State  v.  Sumpter,  66  S.  W.  76,  153 
Mo.  486;  State  v.  Meadows,  66  S.  W.  878, 166 
Mo.  110;  State  v.  Brown,  64  Mo.  367;  State 
y.  Diller,  70  a  W.  130,  170  Mo.  1;  State 
v.  Ashcraft,70S.  W.  806, 170MO.  400;  State 
V.  Kindred,  4»  S.  W.  846,  148  Ma  270;  State 
y.  Qartifell,  71  S.  W.  1046,  171  Mo.  480); 
State  v.  Darling,  07  a  W.  602,  600,  100  Mo. 
168;  State  y.  Oreave^  147  9.  W.  078,  075, 
248  Mo.  640.  As  a  general  rule  it  takes  an 
assault,  with  personal  vlc^ence^  te  constitBto 
such  provocation.  State  v.  Todd,  02  a  W. 
674,  670,  104  Mo.  877  (qooCing  and  adopting 
definition  in  State  v.  McKentie,  76  S.  W,  1015, 
177  Bfo..  600).  .  VBCanslaughter  in  the  fourth 
degree,"  under  the  statutes  of  this  state.  Is 


MANSLAUGHTBB  IN  FOURTH  DBGRBB  278 


MAKUAXi  LABOR 


tlie  intentional  killing  of  a  hiima9  Jl>eing  in 
the  heat  of  passion,  oa  a  reasonable  provoca- 
tion, without  iualice  and  without  premedita- 
tion, and  under  circumstances  which  will  not 
render  the  provocation  Justifiable  or  excus- 
able homicide,  and  as  a  general  rule  it  takes 
an  assault  with  personal  violence  to  consti- 
tute such  provocation.  State  v.  Kelleher,  100 
S.  W.  470,  475,  201  Mo.  614  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  State  v.  McKenzie,  76 
S.  W.  1019,  177  Mo.  712).  Where  deceased 
pursued  and  attacked  accused,  who  had  fled 
after  striking  deceased  with  a  stone,  accus- 
ed's act  in  killing  deceased  who  had  assault- 
ed him  and  struck  him  was  manslangrhter  in 
the  fourth  degree,  the  assault  and  battery 
being  sufl9cient  provocation  to  reduce  the 
homicide  to  that  offense.  State  v.  Wilson, 
147  S.  W.  08,  104,  242  Mo.  481. 

Gen.  St  1901,  §  2011  (Crimes  Act,  |  16), 
defines  "manslaughter  in  the  fourth  degree'* 
as  the  involuntary  killing  of  another  in  the 
heat  of  passion,  by  means  neither  cruel  nor 
unusual.  State  v.  Knoll,  83  Pac  622,  623,  72 
Kan.  237;  Same  v.  Moore,  100  Pac  629,  630, 
79  Kan.  688. 

"Manslaughter  in  the  fourth  degree"  is 
the  involuntary  killing  of  another  in  the  heat 
of  passion,  or  any  homicide  which  would  be 
manslaughter  at  common  law,  and  which  is 
not  excusable  nor  Justifiable,  or  is  not  de- 
clared to  be  manslaughter  in  some  other  de- 
gree. State  V.  Goldsby,  114  S.  W.  500,  5a3, 
215  Mo.  48  (citing  2  Bishop's  OriuL  Law  [6th 
Ed.]  §  695). 

An  instruction  that:  "If  the  defendant 
shot  and  killed  deceased  while  in  the  heat 
of  passion  aroused  by  the  striking  of  him 
with  a  stick  produced  in  evidence,  and  with- 
out malice  or  premeditation,  •  ♦  •  and 
not  in  necessary  selMefenae,  then  he  is  guil- 
ty of  'manslaughter  In  the  fourth  degree' 
•  •  •  "—was  faulty  in  that  it  did  not  re- 
quire the  Jury  to  find  that  defendant  inten- 
tionally shot  and  killed  deceased.  State  v. 
Elsey,  100  S.  W.  11,  14,  201  Mo.  561. 

A  killing  resulting  from  an  intentional 
shot,  though  Tvithout  design  to  effect  death, 
is  not  Involuntary,  within  Rev.  St  1898,  H 
4362,  declaring  that  involuntary  killing  in  the 
heat  of  passion,  etc,  shall  be  deemed  "man- 
slaughter in  the  fourth  degree."  Johnson  v. 
State,  108  N.  W.  55,  58,  69,  129  Wis.  146»  6 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  809,  9  Ann.  Cas.  923. 

Where  accused  shot  his  wife  with  a  pis- 
tol in  an  alleged  Insane  frenzy,  resulilng  from 
her  alleged  nodsconduct,  the  case  did  not  pre- 
sent a  killing  within  St  1898,  |  4368,  declar- 
ing that  every  other  killing  of  a  human  being 
by  the  act,  procurement,  or  culpable  negli- 
gence of  another,  where  sudi  killing  is  not 
justifiable  or  excusable,  or  is  not  declared  to 
be  murder  or  manslaughter  In  some  other 
degree,  shall  be  deemed  manslaughter  in  the 
fourth  degree.  Duthey  v.  State,  111  N.  W. 
222,  224,  131  Wis.  178|  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1032. 


MANUAL  DELIVERY 

"Dominion,*  as  applied  to  a  conveyance, 
means  "to  pass  the  instrument  of  wiitiDg 
from  one  man  to  another,  as  symbolic  of  hia 
transferring  the  land  to  the  person  to  whom 
it  is  delivered.  Now  the  delivery  must  be 
made.  It  must  be  had.  If  a  man  draws  a 
deed,  and  intends  to  deliver  It,  but  never 
does,  it  is  never  a  deed,  because  it  is  not  con- 
summated by  delivery,  and  that  delivery  must 
be  an  actual  delivery;  that  is,  the  maker  of 
the  deed  must  intend  to  pass  it  over  to  the 
grantee,  the  person  to  whom  it  is  made  His 
dominion  and  right  to  the  control  over  the 
property  as  set  out  in  the  deed  passes  with 
the  delivery.  Sometimes  it  is  called  'manu- 
al delivery,'  handing  it  over  to  him."  Lan- 
caster V.  Lee,  51  S.  B.  139,  141,  71  S.  C.  2S0. 

MANUAL  GIFT 

A  "manual  gift,"  which  Is  defined  by 
the  Louisiana  Code  as  the  giving  of  corporeal, 
movable  effects  accompanied  by  real  delivery, 
may  be  free,  onerous,  or  remunerative,  and, 
when  the  donor  makes  such  a  gift  omniom 
bonorum  on  condition  that  the  donation  shall 
maintain  him  for  the  rest  of  his  life,  it  will 
be  dealt  with  as  an  onerous  donation  and  not 
as  a  commutative  contract  Ackerman  y. 
Lamer,  40  South.  581,  587,  116  La.  lOL 

MANUAL  UBOR 

Hie  term  "manual  labor,'*  in  Its  ordi- 
nary and  usual  meaning  and  acceptation, 
means  labor  performed  by  and  with  the  hands 
or  hand,  and  it  implies  the  ability  for  sudi 
sustained  exerdse  and  use  of  the  hands  or 
hand  at  a  labor  as  will  enable  a  person  there- 
by to  earn  or  assist  in  earning  a  livelihood; 
Being  able  to  temporarily  use  the  hands  or 
hand  at  and  in  some  kind  of  labor,  but  witb- 
out  ability  to  sustain  such  ordinary  exerdae 
and  use  of  the  hands  at  son^e  useful  labor 
whereby  money  may  be  earned  to  substan- 
tially assist  in  earning  a  livelihood  at  some 
kind  of  manual  labor,  does  not  constitntd 
abiUty  to  perform  manual  labor.  Grand 
Lodge  Brotherhood  of  Locomotive  Firemen  t. 
Orrell,  09  N.  B.  68,  69,  206  la  208. 

When  a  person  is  employed  to  work  wltii 
his  h^nds,  as  well  as  to  exercise  superintend- 
ence, the  line  must  be  drawn  somewhere  be- 
tween what  are  acts  of  superintendence  and 
what  acts  of  "manual  labor,"  or  all  that  he 
does  must  be  regarded  as  superintendence  or 
as  manual  labor,  which  manifestly  would  be 
unjust  Though  the  principal  duty  of  an 
employ^  at  a  stone  quarry  was  that  of  supe^ 
intendenoe,  his  putting  a  can  of  powder  on 
the  edge  of  the  pit,  whence  it  was  acddenl- 
ally  kaocked  into  the  idt*  causing  an  explo* 
sion,  is  not  an  act  of  superintendence,  so  ai 
to  render  thd  maatar  liable  for  injury  to  a 
workman  from  the  explosion.  Riou  v.  Rock< 
port  Qranit«  Co.,  50  N.  £.  525,  171  Mass. 


KAKUAIi  LABOH 


279 


KAKUFAOTUBX 


162  (ddng  McCanley  ▼.  Norcioss,  dO  K  B. 
464,  155  Mass.  684;  Gashman  v.  Chase,  81 
N.  B.  4,  156  Mass.  342;  O'Brien  v.  Rldeont, 
36 N.  B.  792,  161  Mass.  170;  Dowd  t.  Bo8t<Hi 
ft  A  B.  Co.,  38  N.  B.  440,  162  Mass.  185; 
CNeU  y.  O'Leaiy,  41  N.  B.  662, 164  Mass.  387). 

The  owner  of  horses,  who  hires  them  to  a 
contractor,  the  latter  nsing  the  horses  in 
aid  of  hauling  and  banking  logs,  and  the 
owner  performing  no  "manual  labor  or  other 
services^  In  connection  with  the  logs,  is  not 
entitled  to  a  lien  on  such  logs,  under  Bev. 
Laws  1905,  |  3524.  McKinnon  y.  Bed  Biver 
Lumber  Co.,  188  N.  W.  781,  782,  119  Minn. 
479,  42  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  872. 

Any  prooeas  by  which  cmde  oi»iiim  Is 
converted  into  a  product  fit  for  smoking  oonsti- 
totes  a  ''manufiicture"  of  smoking  opium  witli- 
in  the  meaning  of  the  Internal  Reyenoe  Act 
Oct  1,  1880,  c.  1244,  U  36-iO,  which  ln«K)se 
a  tax  upon  all  opium  manufiictuied  for  smok- 
ing purposes  in  the  United  States,  and  pre- 
scribe  regulations  for  such  manufacture  to  be 
observed  under  penalty  of  criminal  prosecu- 
tion. Marks  y.  United  States,  196  Fed.  476^ 
478, 116  a  a  A.  250. 

MANUAL  TRAINING  SCHOOL 

See   Maintenance  of  Manual   Training 
School. 

MANUFACTORY 

CaitiiiiC  sad  storlnsr  lea 

A  for^gn  corporation  carried  on  a  retail 
ioe  business  in  a  town  where  it  had  Its  office 
and  transacted  all  its  business.  It  sold  only 
such  ice  as  It  cut  and  stored.  It  owned  seyer- 
al  ice  houses  on  the  shores  of  a  pond  in  an- 
other town,  where  it  had  a  steam  engine  used 
for  cutting  and  storing  Ice  there.  It  trans- 
acted no  business  in  the  latter  town,  except 
what  was  essential  for  the  cutting  and  storing 
of  ice  and  the  deliyeiy  under  orders  from  its 
office.  Held,  that  the  corporation  did  not 
"hire  or  occupy  a  manufactory,  store,  or 
shop"  in  the  latter  town,  within  Rey.  Laws 
1902,  c  12,  I  23,  cL  1,  proyldlng  for  the  taxa- 
tion of  personal  property  in  the  municipality 
in  which  the  owner  hires  or  occupies  manu- 
factories^ etc.;  but  ttie  steam  engine,  boiler, 
and  ice  stored  in  the  latter  town  were  taxa- 
ble under  St  1908,  p.  448,  c.  437,  |  71,  pro- 
Tldhig  that  eyery  foreign  corporation  shall  be 
snbject  to  taxation  on  its  machinery  and  mer- 
chandise by  the  municipality  in  which  such 
property  is  situated.  HlUiard  y.  Fells  Ice 
Co.,  86  N.  £.  773,  774,  200  Mass.  331. 

Bteaaa  aad  sas  plants 

Under  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  |  7255  (Acts 
lSd9,  p.  569,  c.  255),  proyldlng  that  contrac- 
tors, etc,  and  all  persons  performing  labor, 
etc,  for  the  erection,  altering,  repairing,  etc., 
any  house,  mill,  manufactory,  etc.,  may  haye 
a  lien  on  .the  house,  mill,  manufactory,  etc., 
a  bnilding  equipped  with  machinery  for  the 


generation  of  steam  to  be  distributed  under 
a  municipal  franchise  through  pipes  laid  in 
the  streets,  and  supplied  for  heating  purpos- 
es, is  a  ''manufactory.'*  A  gas  company  Is 
also  a  mannfiictory  within  such  act  Wells 
y.  Christian,  76  N.  B.  518,  519,  165  Ind.  662 
(citing  Bates  Mach.  (3o.  y.  Trenton  &  N.  B. 
B.  Co.,  58  Ati.  935,  70  N.  J.  Law,  684,  103 
Am.  St.  Bep.  811;  Burke  y.  Mead,  64  N.  B. 
880,  169  Ind.  252,  260;  Commonwealth  y. 
liOweU  Gas  Light  0>.,  12  Allen  [94  Mass.]  75). 

MANUFACTURE 

See  Building  for  Trade  or  Manufacture; 
Place  of  Manufacture. 

Any  trade  mannfticture  or  btislness,  see 
•  Any. 

As  to  specUlc  industries  wlilch  are  eft- 
gaged  In  manufacture,  see  Subtitie 
ManafSctorer. 

Gontxact  of  sale  or  manufftctore,  see 
Contract  of  Sale. 

Manufacture  or  otherwise,  see  Otherwise. 

What  constitutes  manafactared  articles, 
see  ManufMtnres  and  Manufactured 
Articles. 

The  word  **manufacture"  is  not  a  tech- 
nical word,  but  has  a  common,  ordinary 
meaning.  Sharpe  y.  Hasey,  114  N.  W.  1118, 
1119, 134  Wis.  618. 

To  manufacture  is  to  modify  or  to  change 
natural  substances,  so  that  they  become  ar- 
ticles of  yalue  or  use.  Baltimore  k  O.  S.  W. 
B.  Co.  y.  Cavanaugh,  71  N.  E.  239,  241,  35 
Ind.  App.  32. 

The  process  of  manufacture  is  supposed 
to  produce  some  new  article  by  the  applica- 
tion of  skill  and  labor  to  the  raw  material. 
The  broad  Interpretation  which  the  courts 
haye  always  giyen  the  word  "manufacture" 
must  include  the  construction  of  buildings 
and  bridges.  In  re  Niagara  Ck)ntracting  Co,^ 
127  Fed.  782,  783. 

The  Century  Dictionary  defines  ''manufac- 
ture" as  the  production  of  articles  for  use 
from  raw  or  unprepared  materials  by  giying 
these  materials  new  forms,  qualities,  proper- 
ties, or  combinations,  whether  by  manual 
labor  or  machinery.  State  y.  G.  H.  Tichenor 
Antiseptic  Co.,  43  South.  277,  278,  118  La. 
685. 

Rolllnc  elgarettes 

The  word  "manufacture,"  as  used  in  the 
anti-cigarette  law,  is  used  in  the  sense  of 
'to  engage  in  and  carry  on  the  business  of 
manufacturing."  It  is  the  manufacturiog 
for  traffic  that  is  prohibited.  Hie  act  of 
"rolling  cigarettes"  from  one's  own  materials 
and  for  one's  own  use  is  so  connected  with 
the  use  as  to  be  a  part  of  such  use^  and  this 
it  was  not  intended  to  prohibit  Dempsey 
y.  Stout,  107  N.  W.  235,  76  Neb.  162. 

Bslins  eotion 

The  word  "manufacture,"  as  defined  in 
Worcester's  Dictionary,  is  a  process  of  uiak* 


UA^fnOFACTUBS 


KANUFACTURSB 


log  anjrthing  by  art  or  reducing  materlaJB 
Into  a  form  fit  for  use,  by  hand  or  by  ma* 
cfalnery,  and  in  tbe  Standard  Dictionary  la 
"the  making  of  wares  or  other  products  by 
hand  or  by  machinery  or  by  other  agencies." 
Under  these  definitions,  a  cotton  press,  the 
effect  of  the  operation  of  which  is  only  to 
compress,  rebind,  re^sover  original  bales  of 
cotton  so  as  to  diange  the  form,  size,  and 
condition  of  the  bales  to  make  them  more 
convenient  for  transportation,  is  not  con- 
sidered a  "manofactare."  City  of  Memphis 
v.  St  Louis,  &  S.  F.  E.  Oo.,  183  Fed.  629, 
638,  106  O.  a  A.  76. 

Liqiiov 

The  word  /'mannfactnre"  as  nsed  in  act 
March  2,  1009  (26  St  at  Large,  p.  60)  §  1, 
prohibiting  the  manufacture  of  liquor,  means 
the  process  of  making  by  art,  or  reducing 
materials  into  form  fit  for  use,  by  hand  or 
machinery.  State  ▼.  Bavan*  74  &  £.  600, 
601,  91  S.  a  266. 

MAVUFAOTUBiai 

See  Sole  Manufacturer. 

A  "manufacturer^  is  one  engaged  in 
making  materials,  raw  or  party  finished,  in- 
to wares  suitable  for  use.    Chattanooga  Plow 

00.  V.  Hays,  140  «.  W.  1068,  1069,  126  Tenn. 
148  (citing  And.  Law  Diet;    Webst  Diet). 

A  corporation  which  makes  something 
for  profit  is  a  "manufacturer"  of  that  some- 
thing within  the  meaning  of  Bankr.  Act  July 

1,  1898,  c.  641,  §  4b,  and  it  makes  no  differ- 
ence whether  the  thing  so  made  or  manufac- 
tured is  affixed  to  the  realty  or  a  part  of  the 
realty  or  is  a  mere  chatteL  In  re  Church 
Ck>nst  Co.,  167  Fed.  296. 

Code  1887,  |  2486,  provides  that  "all  per- 
sons furnishing  supplies  to  a  mining  or  man- 
ufacturing company,  necessary  to  the  opera- 
tion of  the  same,  shall  have  a  prior  lien," 
etc.  A  corporation  was  empowered  by  its 
charter  to  acquire  and  operate  "the  works, 
property,  franchise,  stock  and  bonds,  rights, 
privileges,  and  immunities  of  any  individual- 
firm,  or  corporation,  operating  or  owning 
a  machine  shop,  dock,  or  shipyard,  or  manu- 
fficturing  railroad  or  marine  equiiMnoit,  or 
machinery  of  any  description."  The  corpora- 
tion owned  a  large  plant  composed  of  vari- 
ous departments  and  shops,  in  which  many 
kinds  of  machinery  were  used.  The  plant 
consisted  of  a  machine  shop,  in  which  ma- 
chinery and  tools  of  different  sorts  were 
made  and  fitted  for  use;  a  punch  shop,  in 
which  plates  were  sheared  and  punched  for 
riveting;  a  pattern  shop,  in  which  all  sorts 
of  patterns  were  made  from  wood ;  a  black- 
smith shop,  containing  large  steam  ham- 
mers, and  also  a  number  of  smiths'  forges, 
for  the  forging  of  billets  and  the  perform- 
ance of  all  sorts  of  smith  work;  a  furnace 
shop,  for  the  bending  and  shaping  of  frames 
and  plates;  a  carpenter  shop,  in  whidi  many 
kinds  of  woodwork  was  done ;  a  Joiner  shop^ 


equipped  with  special  machineiy,  in  wbidi 
furniture  was  mannfactared  and  the  finer 
woodwork  done;  a  paint  shop,  in  which 
paints  were  mixed;  a  copper  shop^  in  which 
sheet  copper  was  manufactured  into  pipe, 
steam  connections,  ventilators,  brass  and 
copper  castings,  and  other  forms,  and  where 
galvanizing  was  done;  a  boiler  shop,  for  the 
manufacture  of  boilers;  a  foundry,  in  which 
iron  and  brass  castings  were  made  out  of 
raw  materials.  Large  quantities  of  raw  ma- 
terials of  all  sorts  were  purchased  by  the 
company  and  converted  into  finished  prod- 
ucts. The  company  manufactured  ships  of 
all  sorts  and  sizes  and  all  necessary  fittings 
and  furniture  therefor,  and  it  also  did  a  con- 
siderable amount  of  original  and  repair  work 
for  other  manufacturing  oonoems.  The  word 
^•manufacture"  is  defined  by  Webster's  Dic- 
tionary: **Tb  make  [wares  or  other  products] 
by  hand,  by  maehinery,  or  by  other  agency. 
To  work,  as  raw  or  partly  wrought  materials, 
into  suitable  forms  for  use."  By  the  Stand- 
ard Dictionary:  'To  make  or  fashion  by 
woricing  on  or  combining  material.  To  form 
or  produce  by  some  industrial  process;  fash- 
ion by  hand  or  machinery,  especially  when 
done  in  considerable  quantities  and  r^ular 
business.  To  work  or  fashion  by  labor  into 
useful  or  desirable  forms."  And  the  Century 
Dictionary:  "To  make  or  fabricate  anything 
for  use,  especially  in  considerable  quantities 
or  numbers,  or  by  the  aid  of  many  hands, 
or  by  machinery;  work  materials  into  the 
form  of."  Held,  that  the  corporation  was 
engaged  in  the  manufacturing  business,  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  statute.  First  Nat 
Bank  of  Richmond  v.  Wm.  B.  Trigg  Co.,  56 
S.  E.  158,  161,  106  Va.  327,  7  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
744. 

The  term  "manufacturing,"  as  used  in 
the  bankruptcy  act  of  1898,  authorising  in- 
voluntary bankruptcy  against  corporations 
engaged  in  manufacturing,  embraces  only 
such  corporations  as  are  engaged  in  manu- 
facturing as  a  business  and  selling  their 
wares  on  the  market,  doing  those  things  usu- 
ally done  by  those  who  not  only  manufac- 
ture their  wares  and  goods,  but  place  them 
on  the  market  for  sale  either  by  wholesale 
or  retalL  Walker  Boofing  &  Heating  Oo.  t. 
MCerchant  &  Evans  Go^  173  Fed.  771,  773, 

d7  a  a  A.  4d6. 

Evidence  held  to  show  that  a  corporation 
was  principally  engaged  in  manufacturing, 
and  hence  was  subject  to  adjudication  as  a 
bankrupt  In  re  Georgia  Mfg.  &  Public  Serr- 
ice  Ca,  166  Fed.  964,  968. 

Under  Bankr.  Act  July  1«  1898,  c.  641, 
providing  that  any  corporation  engaged  prin- 
cipally in  ''manufacturing"  or  mercantile  pur- 
suits may  be  declared  a  bankrupt,  a  corpora- 
tion organised  for  the  purpose  of  manufactur- 
ing paper  from  wood  pulp,  which  had  pur- 
chased woodland  and  other  pnqperty  for  tb« 
commencement  of  its  business,  was  subject  to 
bankruptcy  proceedings,  within  the  statute^ 


MAKUFACTUREB 


881 


MANX7VA0TUBBB 


though  it  had  never  In  fftct  started  its  Vic- 
tory; the  intent  being  that  *%  corporation 
pnnoing,  through  its  formative  stagea,  a  traai- 
ness  of  the  kind  described  by  the  sUtote 
shonld  be  anbject  to  the  operation  of  the 
law.**  In  re  White  Mountain  Paper  Ck>^  127 
Fed.  180»  182. 

The  term  '^engaged  principally/'  aa  used 
in  Bankrupt  Act,  providing  that  any  corpora- 
tion engaged  principally  in  ''mannfftctoring" 
poisnita  may  be  adjndged  an  involuntary 
iNuiknipt,  refers  not  to  the  objects  of  pnrsait 
set  oot  In  the  charter  bat  to  those  tn  which 
the  company  was  actually  oigaged.  In  re  O. 
Moeneh  &  Sons  Co.,  ISO  Fed.  686,  086,  66  a 
C.  A.  37. 

In  the  phrase  "engaged  in  manufactur- 
ing,** as  used  in  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1866,  c. 
541,  S  4b,  the  word  "engaged"  means  occu- 
pied, employed,  busy,  and  the  word  "manu- 
fiicturing"  means  the  making  of  an  article, 
either  by  hand  or  machinery,  into  a  new  form 
capable  of  being  used  in  ordinary  life,  or  the 
fashioning  of  raw  materials  into  a  change  of 
fonn  for  use;  and  a  corporation  which  al- 
though authorised  to  manufacture  an  article 
of  commerce^  has  not  the  means  for  such 
manufacture^  and  has  taken  no  step  in  the 
process  of  manufacturing,  is  not  engaged  in 
any  proper  sense  in  the  manufacturing  of 
rach  article,  and  is  not  subject  to  adjudica- 
tion as  an  involuntary  bankrupt  under  said 
section.  In  re  Toledo  Portland  Cement  Co., 
186  Fed.  88,  86. 

Dealers  sad  atereliABts  distJagulshed 

The  term  "manufacturer,**  in  its  ordinary 
acceptation,  denotes  one  who,  through  bis 
skill  and  labor,  shapes  or  combines  material 
into  a  new  product,  the  term,  under  various 
statutes,  such  as  tax  laws,  being  named  to 
include  others  for  the  purpose  of  such  laws, 
and  where  a  firm  merely  ordered  from  a  for- 
eign manufacturer  a  given  quantity  of  waists 
of  a  certain  pattern,  a  sample  of  which  had 
been  previously  furnished  them  by  the  manu- 
facturer, the  firm  was  merely  a  dealer  and 
not  a  manufacturer.  Remy,  Schmidt  &  Pleiss- 
ner  v.  Healy,  126  N.  W.  202,  203,  161  Mich. 
266,  29  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  139,  21  Ann.  Cas.  74. 

A  "manufacturer"  is  one  engaged  in  mak- 
hig  materials,  raw  or  partly  finished,  into 
wares  suitable  for  use.  A  ''merchant"  is  dis- 
tinguished from  a  manufacturer,  in  that  he 
aells  to  earn  a  profit,  and  the  manufacturer 
•ells  to  take  profit  already  earned.  Chatta- 
nooga Plow  Co.  T.  Hays,  140  S.  W.  1068, 1069^ 
125Tenn.l4& 

The  words  'Merchants"  and  "dealers," 
according  to  common  understanding,  mean 
somethiug  different  from  the  word  "manufac- 
turers.** The  former  are  generally  employed 
to  designate  persons  engaged  in  the  business 
of  buying  and  selling  merchandise  or  other 
personal  property  in  the  usual  course  of 
trade;  the  latter  to  designate  those  engaged 
hi  the  business  of  OMking  or  producing  arti- 


cles fbr  use  or  sale.  Union  County  I^at 
Bank,  Uberty,  Ind.,  v.  Ozan  Lumber  Co.,  179 
Fed.  710,  716,  103  C.  a  A  684. 


«f MtSMS  distiacvlshetf 
Laws  1912,  c  167,  prohibiting  any  person, 
firm,  or  corporation,  engaged  "in  manufactur- 
ing or  rspalring,"  to  work  employes  mere 
than  10  hours  per  day,  is  sufllciently  definite; 
for  '^manufacturing**  is  the  system  of  indua- 
try  which  produces  manufactured  articles, 
and  '^manufacture^  is  the  production  of  arti- 
des  for  use  from  raw  or  prepared  materials, 
by  giving  them  new  forma,  qualities,  and 
propttrtiea,  or  combinations,  and  "lepalzlng" 
is  the  making  or  restoring  of  an  article  or 
thing  lo  its  completenesa  State  v.  J.  J. 
Kewman  Lumber  Co.  (Miss.)  69  South.  923, 
926;  46  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  861. 

An  Information,  diarging  accused  with 
having  in  his  possession  nonalcoholic  drinks 
bearing  the  names  of  "manufacturers**  other 
than  himself.  Is  Insufllcient  under  Laws  1911, 
pp.  261,  262,  ii  1«  4,  nmking  it  unlawful  for 
any  person  to  have  nonalcoholic  drinks  bear- 
ing, the  name  or  brand  of  "manufacturers'* 
other  than  himself;  "manufactures**  and 
"manufacturers**  not  being  idem  sonans,  but 
separate  and  distinct  terms  with  separate 
and  distinct  meanings.  State  v.  Murphy,  147 
S.  W.  620,  621,  164  Mo.  App.  204. 

AvtoatoMle  repalvlau;  eompaay 

The  conducting  by  a  corporation  of  a 
shop  for  the  repairing  of  automobiles,  which 
repairing  consisted  chiefly  in  the  adjusting  of 
parts  purchased  from  other  persons,  was  not 
a  manufacturing  pursuit,  within  the  meaning 
of  Bankr.  Act  1898,  c.  641,  |  4b,  which  sub- 
Jected  the  corporation  to  proceedings  in  bank- 
ruptcy. Cate  V.  Connell,  173  Fed.  446.  447, 
97  C.  C.  A.  647. 

Bakevy  eoaapaay 


A  corporation  organised  to  make  bakers' 
goods  and  restaurant  supplies,  and  sell  same 
at  wholesale  and  retail,  was  organized  for 
"manufacturing  and  mercantile"  purposes,  aa 
those  terms  are  uaed  in  the  revenue  statute ; 
and  the  act  of  the  state  board  of  equalisation 
in  assessing  its  capital  stock  and  franchise  in 
excess  of  the  valuation  of  its  tangible  prop- 
erty, which  had  been  assessed  by  the  local 
assessors,  was  unauthorized.  H.  H.  Kohlsaat 
A  Ca  V.  O'Connell,  99  N.  B.  689,  690,  266  IlL 
271. 

Brewlas  eompaay 

A  brewing  company,  which  has  done 
nothing  except  In  preparation  for  its  business 
by  constructing  a  brewing  plant,  taking  out 
a  brewer's  license,  and  hiring  a  hrewmaster, 
although  it  has  never  made  any  beer  nor 
bought  materials  therefor,  is  a  "corporation 
engaged  principally  in  manufkcturing,*'  and 
subject  to  proceedings  in  involuntary  bank- 
ruptcy. In  re  Bloomsborg  Brewing  Co.,  172 
Fed.  174, 17& 


MAMXTBTACTUBBR 


38a 


)£AKUFApTyR£B 


TliB  words  "manufacturer,"  "such  manu- 
faoturer,"  and  "said  niaiiufacturer,"  as  used 
in  Acts  1908,  p.  281,  c.  189,  §  16,  providing 
that  a  licensed  manufacturer  may  sell  the 
products  of  his  brewing  at  any  place  within 
the  state,  except  where  such  manufactory  Is 
situated  in  no-license  territory,  but  such  man- 
ufacturer mny  sett  the  product  of  his  brewing 
to  be  delivered  to  a  common  carrier  to  be 
transferred  to  any  place  where  the  same  may 
be  legally  sold,  and  the  said  manufacturer 
may  sell  the  products  of  his  brewing  in  quan- 
tities not  less  than  one  gallon  at  the  place  of 
manufacture,  except  in  no-lioense  territory, 
mean  any  manufacturer,  whether  located  In 
license  or  no-license  territory;  the  only  dif- 
ference between  the  two  classes  of  manufac- 
turers Intended  by  the  statute  being  that 
the  manufacturer  located  in  license  territory 
can  sell  and  deliver  not  less  than  one  gallon 
at  the  place  of  manufacture,  while  the  manu- 
facturer located  In  no-license  territory  can 
msike  no  sale  and  delivery  at  such  place. 
Bobert  Portner  Brewing  CJo.  v.  Southern  Ex- 
press Co.,  63  S.  E.  6,  7,  109  Va.  22. 

A  corporation  which  has  taken  active 
steps  to  engage  in  manufacturing,  and  in 
pursuit  of  such  business  has  Incurred  debts 
and  committed  acts  of  bankruptcy,  is  "en- 
gaged In  manufacturing,"  in  the  sense  con- 
templated by  Bankruptcy  Act  A  corporation 
organized  to  build  and  equip  a  brewery  and 
to  manufacture  and  sell  beer  was  engaged 
principally  in  manufacturing  pursuits  and 
subject  to  adjudication  as  a  bankrupt  before 
its  plant  had  been  completed  or  any  machin- 
ery purchased  or  Installed,  and  before  any 
beer  had  been  made.  Bollinger  v.  Cent  Nat 
Bank,  177  Fed.  609,  610,  101  CO.  A.  235  (cit- 
ing In  re  White  Mountain  Paper  Co.,  127  Fed. 
180,  affirmed  in  White  Mountain  Paper  Co.  v. 
Morse,  127  Fed.  643,  62  O.  C.  A.  369,  and  In 
re  Bloomsburg  Brewing  Co.,  172  Fed.  174X 

Bulldlns   amd  oonstmetlon   eovk-ptoiieu 

The  word  "manufacture"  is  ordinarily 
used  to  denote  an  article  upon  the  material  of 
which  labor  has  been  expended  to  make  the 
finished  product  It  is  hard  to  conceive  of 
any  human  action  more  accurately  corre- 
sponding to  tlils  description  or  definition  than 
the  building  of  a  house ;  and  one  of  the  defi- 
nitions of  "build,"  found  in  the  Century  Dic- 
tionary, is  to  "form  by  uniting  materials  in- 
to a  regular  structure."  An  allegation  in  a 
petition  in  bankruptcy  against  a  corporation 
that  it  "is  engaged  in  the  business  and  was 
incorporated  for  the  purpose  of  building 
houses,"  as  against  a  demurrer,  is  sufficient 
to  bring  the  corporation  within  the  scope  of 
the  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  S  4b,  c.  541,  as 
one  engaged  in  "manufacturing."  In  re  Rut- 
land Realty  Co.,  157  Fed.  296. 

A  corporation  engaged  in  constructing 
houses  on  its  own  land  was  not  subject  to  ad- 
judication as  a  banJIcrupt  under  Bankr.  Act 
July  %  1898,  c  541,  §  4b,  as  amended  by  Act 


Feb.  6,  1903,  authorizing  an  adjudication 
against  a  corporation  engaged  principally  In 
"manufacturing,"  the  term  "manufacturing" 
belAg  used  in  its  ordinary  meaning,  viz.,  the 
making  of  articles  of  commerce  ordinarily 
the  subje^  of  bargain  and  sale,  which  does 
not  include  building  or  construction.  In  re 
Kingston  Realty  Co.,  160  Fed.  445,  446,  87  a 
C.  A.  406. 

A  construction  company  engaged  In  con- 
structing bridges,  wharves,  bulkheads,  and 
driving  pltes  for  foundations  for  buildings, 
etc.,  cannot  be  adjudged  a|i  involuntary  bank- 
rupt under  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  f 
4b,  as  a  corporation  engaged  in  "manufactur- 
ing, trading,  or  mercantile  pursuits."  In  re 
MacNichol  Const  Co.,  134  Fed.  979,  980. 

A  eorporation  whose  principal  business  is 
making  and  constructing  arches,  walls,  and 
abutments,  bridges,  buildings,  etc.,  out  of  con- 
crete^ in  carrying  on  wMch  business  it  buys 
and  combines  together  raw  materials,  and 
supplies  the  necessary  labor,  machinery,  and 
appliances,  is  a  "corporation  engaged  princi- 
pally in  manufacturing,"  within  the  meaning 
of  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c  541,  §  4b,  30 
Stat  547,  as  amended  by  Act  Feb..  5,  1903,  c 
487,  §  3,  32  Stat  797,  defining  the  persons  or 
corporations  which  may  be  adjudged  involun- 
tary bankrupts,  although  such  company 
makes  its  product,  and  gives  it  form  and 
shape,  at  the  place  where  it  is  to  remain. 
Friday  v.  Hall  &  Kaul  Co.,  30  Sup.  Ct  261, 
^16  tr.  S.  449,  54  L.  Ed.  562,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  476. 

The  word  "manufacturing"  is  a  generic 
term  of  broad  significance,  used  to  include 
many  species  of  corporations,  and,  as  used  in 
section  4b  of  the  Bankruptcy  Law  (Act  July 
1,  1898,  c.  541,  80  Stat  547,  as  amended  by 
Act  Feb.  5,  1903,  c-  487,  §  8,  82  Stat  798),  hi- 
cludes  many  species  of  corporations,  and  its 
comprehensive  meaning  ought  not  to  be  whit- 
tled away  by  fine  distinctions.  Derivatively 
meaning  making  with  the  hand,  its  ordinary 
significance  is  producing  a  new  article  of  use 
or  ornament  by  the  application  of  skill  and 
labor  to  the  raw  materials  of  which  it  is  com- 
posed. Pin  makers,  pen  makers,  shoe  makers, 
furniture  makers,  steel  makers,  boot  makers, 
rail  makers,  engine  makers,  and  cement  mak- 
ers are  undoubtedly  engaged  in  manufkLctnr 
Ing,  so  also  is  a  corporation  which  is  princi- 
pally engaged  in  building  concrete  arches 
and  bridges,  and  dressing  stone  is  a  "mana- 
facturing  corporation,"  and  may  be  adjudged 
a  bankrupt  under  section  4b  of  the  Bankrupt- 
cy Law.  In  re  First  Nat.  Bank,  152  Fed.  64, 
67,  81  C.  a  A.  260,  11  Ann.  Cas.  355  (citing 
Columbia  Iron  Works  v.  National  Lead  Co^ 
127  Fed.  99,  102.  62  C.  C«  A.  99,  102,  64  L 
R.  A.  645 ;  In  re  Niagara  Contracting  Co.,  127 
Fed.  782;  In  re  Marine  Const  &  Dry  Dock 
Co.,  130  Fed.  446,  64  C.  C.  A.  648;  In  re 
Matthews  Consol.  Slate  Co.,  144  Fed.  737, 
738,  75  C.  C.  A.  603;  In  re  Quincy  Granite 
Quarries  Oo^  147  Fed.  27^ ;  In  jre  H.  B.  Leighr 


kANUFACTUREB 


MANUFAOTURBR 


ton  &  Co^  147  Fed.  311,  81S;  In  TO  Troy 
Steam  Laandertiig  Co.,  182  Fed.  208 ;  White 
Moantaln  Paper  Oo.  v.  Morse  &  Co.,  127  Fed. 
M3,  644,  02  O.  G.  A.  869,  870). 

A  construction  company,  whose  boBlneflS 
U  the  building  by  contract  of  piers  and  abut- 
ments for  railroad  bridges,  made  Qt  con- 
crete, wtai(di  is  mixed  on  the  ground  aa  the 
w(vk  progresses^  with  the  necessary  inciden- 
tal work,  is  not  a  ''corporation  engaged  prin- 
cipally in  manufacturing,"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  |  4b^ 
and  is  not  subject  to  proceedings  in  involun- 
tary bankruptcy.  In  re  T.  SL  Hill  Co.,  148 
Fed.  832,  834,  78  G.  G.  A.  522  (citing  Golnmbla 
Iron  Works  y.  National  Lead  Go.,  fi2  G.  0.  A. 
99, 127  Fed.  99,  102,  64  L.  R.  A.  645). 

The  word  "numufacture*'  means  "to  make 
wares  or  other  products  by  hand,  by  ma- 
diinery,  or  by  other  agency,  as  to  manufac- 
ture doth,  nails,  glass,  etc. ;  to  work,  as  raw 
or  partly  wrought  materials  into  suitable 
forms  for  use,  as  to  manufacture  wool,  cot- 
ton, silk,  or  iron."  A  corporation  engaged  In 
the  business  of  building  bridges,  wharves, 
bulkheads,  and  driving  pilee,  under  contract, 
which  has  no  plant  where  it  manufactures 
bridges  for  the  noarket,  but  does  all  of  its 
work  on  the  ground  after  contracting  there- 
for, is  not  engaged  in  manufacturing,  within 
the  meaning  of  Bankr.  Act  July  1, 1898,  a  641, 
f  4b,  30  Stat  547,  and  is  not  subject  to  be 
adjudged  an  involuntary  bankrupt  thereun- 
der. BuU  Y.  G.  F.  MacNichol  Gonst  Go.,  140 
Fed.  840,  841,  72  G.  G.  A.  252  (quoting  and 
adopting  the  definition  in  Webst  Int  Diet). 

A  corporation  whose  business  as  actually 
conducted  consists  of  installing  heat  and 
power  plants,  constructing  conduits,  water- 
works, and  sewers,  buying,  selling,  and  erect- 
ing steam  engines,  and  occasionally  making 
reports  with  reference  to  the  proposed  con- 
struction of  electric  light  and  power  plants 
ia  engaged  principally  in  "manufacturing, 
trading,  or  mercantile  pursuits,"  within 
Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  S  4b,  as 
amended  by  Act  Feb.  5,  1903,  c.  487,  §  3,  and 
may  be  adjudged  an  involuntary  bankrupt 
I'nited  Surety  Co.  v.  Iowa  Mfg.  Go.,  179  Fed. 
55,  57,  102  G.  G.  A.  623. 

Making  a  paving  compound  is  the  pro* 
Auction  of  a  new  and  distinct  substance^ 
which  constitutes  ''manufacturing,"  within 
tbe  meaning  of  Xaws  1896,  p.  857,  c  908,  | 
183,  as  anoended  by  Iaws  1897,  p.  817,  &  785, 
exempting  from  the  franchise  tax  manufac^ 
taring  corporations  to  the  extent  of  tbe  capi- 
tal actually  employed  in  this  state  in  mann* 
facturing;  but  the  preparation  of  a  street 
^or  the  laying  of  the  pavement  and  placing 
the  pavement  thereon,  is  not  "manufactur- 
es/* within  the  meaning  of  such  section. 
People  ex  rel.  Fruin-Bambridt  Par.  Oo.  ▼. 
Kiilght,  90  N.  Y.  Bupp.  587,  638,  0»  App.  DiT. 
^  (quoting  and  adopting  People  ex  rel.  Bast" 
em  Bermudez  Asphalt  Paving  Oo.  v.  Morgan, 
70  N.  T.  8upp.  516,  61  App.  Btv.  873;  People 


ex  r^  Syracuse  Imp.  Go.  y.  Morgan,  69  N* 
Y.  Supp.  268,  59  App.  Div.  802). 

A  paving  and  construction  company  in- 
corporated to  do  a  manufacturing  business 
and  primarily  engaged  in  making  cement  and 
asphalt  floors,  pavements,  roadways  and 
structural  concrete,  is  engaged  in  a  "manu- 
facturing" business  witmn  Act  June  8,  1893, 
exempting  from  the  capital  stock  tax  the  cap- 
ital stock  of  a  manufacturing  corporation. 
Gommonwealth  v.  Filbert  Paving  &  Gonstruc- 
tion  Go.,  78  AtL  104,  105,  229  Pa.  231. 

A  corporation  engaged  in  constructing 
bnildlngs  and  bridges  by  contract,  furnish- 
ing the  labor  wlille  others  furnish  the  mate- 
rials, is  a  manufacturing  corporation,  and 
subject  to  be  adjudged  an  involuntary  bank- 
rupt under  Bankruptcy  Act  In  re  Niagara 
Gontractlng  Go.,  127  Fed.  782,  788. 

Canning  eompany 

One  putting  up  apples  in  cans  for  sale  Is 
a  "manufacturer,'*  within  the  rule  that  where 
goods  are  sold  by  sample,  and  the  seller  is 
also  the  manufacturer,  there  is  an  Implied 
warranty  on  his  part  that  they  are  free  from 
any  latent  defects  that  could  not  be  discover- 
ed from  examination.  Nlxa  Gannlng  Go.  v. 
Lehmann-Higglnson  Grocer  Co.,  79  Pac  141, 
142,  70  Kan.  664,  70  L.  B.  A.  653. 

Cliemieal  eompany 

"A  'manufacturer*  •  •  •  la  one  who 
gives  new  shapes,  new  qualities,  new  com- 
binations, to  matter  which  lias  already  gone 
through  some  artificial  process."  ^'Nearly 
all  artificial  products  of  human  industry, 
nearly  all  such  materials  as  have  acquired 
changed  conditions  or  new  and  spedflc  com- 
binations, whether  frood  the  direct  action  of 
the  human  hand,  from  chemical  processes 
derived  and  directed  by  human  skill,  or  by 
the  employment  of  machinery,  •  •  •  are 
now  commonly  designated  as  'manufactur- 
ed.' •*  The  Gentury  Dictionary  defines  "man- 
ufacture" as  "the  production  of  articles  for 
use  from  raw  or  unprepared  materials,  by 
giving  these  materials  new  forms,  qualities, 
properties,  or  combinations,  whether  by  man- 
ual labor  or  machinery."  Under  these  defini- 
tions one  who,  by  extracting  the  medicinal 
properties  from  various  drugs  and  making 
a  chemical  combination  in  which  the  ingre- 
dients lose  their  identity,  creates  a  distinct 
product,  which  for  years  is  offered  to,  and  ac- 
cepted by,  the  public  for  distinct  uses,  may 
be  regarded  as  a  "manufacturer."  State  v. 
G.  H.  Tlchenor  Antiseptic  Co.^  43  South'.  277, 
278,  118  La.  685  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  city  of  New  Orleans  v.  T^  Blanc,  34 
La.  Ann.  596;  Gity  of  New  Orleans  v.  Ernst, 
35  La.  Ann.  746;  quoting  Carlin  v.  (Vestern 
Assur.  Go.  of  Toronto,  57  Md.  526,  40  Am. 
Rep.  440). 


A  corporation  organised  to  ''plant,  har- 
vest, storey  purchase,  manufactare,  market, 


MAKUFACTUKER 


284 


MANUFAOTUBBB 


sell,  and  deal  In  ehlcory"  is  a  "mannfactnrlng 
corporation.*'  Bolton  y.  Nebraska  Chicory 
Co.,  96  N.  W.  148,  09  Neb.  681. 

Oold  atoms*  eoatpMty 

A  corporation  was  chartered  'Yor  the 
purpose  of  conducting  the  business  of  a  cold 
storage  warehouse,  •  •  «  furnishing  cold 
storage  for  meats,  produce,  fruits,  and  other 
perishable  merchandise."  The  business  actu- 
ally done  by  it  was  tiie  conducting  of  a  cold 
storage  warehouse  in  which  produce,  etc., 
was  preserved  for  others  for  hire,  by  means 
of  brine  circulated  through  pipes ;  and  it  also 
operated  a  pipe  line  running  through  the 
street  and  connected  with  storage  rooms  of 
others,  whidi  it  refrigerated  by  means  of  the 
brine  pumped  through  the  pipes  and  circu- 
lated in  such  rooms,  returning  to  the  tank  In 
its  own  plant  For  this  service  it  charged  in 
proportion  to  the  sise  of  the  rooms  cooled, 
and  it  constituted  the  larger  part  of  its  busi- 
ness. The  brine  was  made  in  its  plant  by 
mixing  calcium  chloride  in  water  at  a  certain 
temperature  to  a  certain  consistency.  The 
calcium  chloride  was  a  manufactured  product 
sold  in  the  market,  which  it  purchased  in 
cases,  and  the  brine  was  made  by  ordinary 
workmen  under  direction  of  a  superintendent 
Held,  that  such  corporation  was  not  "engag- 
ed principally  in  manufticturlng,  trading,  or 
mercantile  pursuits,"  within  the  meaning  of 
Bankruptcy  Act,  and  was  not  subject  to  be 
adjudged  an  involuntary  bankrupt  In  re 
PhUadelphia  Freezing  Co.,  174  Fed.  702,  703. 

Coalyard 

A  coalyard,  wherein  coal  mined  by  its 
owner  is  cleaned,  assorted,  and  stored  and 
from  which  it  is  sold,  is  a  ''mercantile  insti- 
tution or  establishment,"  within  Child  Labor 
Act  (Hurd*s  Bev.  8t  1911,  c.  48),  prohibiting 
the  employment  of  a  child  under  the  age  of 
14  years  in  any  mercantile  institution  or  es- 
tablishment and  is  also  a  manufacturing  es- 
tablishment factory,  or  workshop,  since  that 
phrase  as  used  in  the  statute  has  the  mean- 
ing given  to  it  by  the  Child  Labor  Act  of 
June  9,  1897  (Laws  1897,  p.  90),  defining  the 
words  "manufacturing  establishment  factory, 
or  workshop"  to  mean  any  place  where  goods 
or  products  are  manufactured  or  repaired, 
dyed,  cleaned  or  sorted,  stored  or  packed  for 
sale.  Purtell  v.  Philadelphia  &  B.  Coal  & 
Iron  Co.,  99  N.  B.  899,  902,  256  HI.  110,  43 
L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  193,  Ann.  Cas.  1913B,  835. 

Oreosotinc  ooatpany 

The  process  of  creosoting  railroad  ties, 
which  is  done  by  pressing  tar  and  other  sub- 
stances, whidi  are  formed  into  a  concoction, 
two  or  three  inches  into  such  ties  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preservation,  does  not  constitute  a 
"manufacturing"  of  articles  of  wood,  hut  is 
a  mere  process  for  the  preservation  of  ar* 
tides  of  wood  already  mannftictured.  Shreve- 
port  Creosoting  Co.  v.  City  of  Shrevepart  44 
South.  325,  327, 119  La.  687. 


^An  electric  light  plant  is  a  'mannfactQ^ 
ing  establishment' "  Lucas  v.  Ashland  light, 
MiU  &  Power  Co.,  138  N.  W.  761,  763,  02  Neb. 
650  (Qvotlng  Lambom  ▼.  Bell,  82  Pac  989, 18 
Colo.  346,  20  L.  B.  A  241). 

One  engaged  in  generating  electricity  for 
distribution  and  sale  is  oigaged  in  '^manuf  ac- 
tnrlng,"  within  Const  |  170,  and  Ky.  8t  f 
2980a,  authorixlng  municipalities  to  exempt 
manufacturing  establishments  from  taxation. 
KentudEy  Blectric  Co.  v.  Buechel,  143  S.  W. 
58,  59,  146  Ky.  660,  88  U  R.  A.  (N.  a)  907, 
Ann.  Gas.  1913C,  714. 

A  corporation  engaged  in  generating 
electricity,  transmitting  it  and  selling  power 
or  light  to  consumers,  is  neither  a  "manu£ft^ 
turing"  nor  a  "mercantile"  corporation  with- 
in the  meaning  of  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898, 
c  541,  I  4b,  30  SUt  647,  as  amended  by  Act 
Feb.  5,  1903,  c.  467,  §  8,  82  Stat  797,  and  f» 
not  subject  to  adjudication  as  an  involuntary 
bankrupt  A  gas  and  electric  company,  o^ 
ganized  under  the  transportation  laws  <rf 
New  Tork,  having  a  franchise  to  maintain 
pipes  and  wires  ill  the  streets  of  a  village  and 
a  contract  for  lighting  its  streets,  wfaidi 
manufactures  gas  and  purchases  or  generates 
electricity,  both  of  which  it  transports  or 
transmits  and  sells  to  its  customers,  its  elec- 
trical business  exceeding  its  gas  business  in 
volume  and  revenue,  is  not  "engaged  princi- 
pally in  manufacturing,  etc.,  pursuits,"  witli- 
in  the  meaning  of  Bankruptcy  Act  In  le 
Hudson  Biver  Blectric  Power  Co.,  173  Fed. 
934,940. 

EngraTsr 

In  its  business  of  engraving  bank  bills 
the  government  is  a  manufacturer  and  en- 
titled to  no  more  consideration  than  any 
other  engraver  and  printer;  but  is  entitled 
to  no  less.  Harley  v.  United  States*  39  Ct 
0.106,114. 

F«rtilisev  eompaay 

"The  word  'manufacturer*  has  been  de- 
fined substantially  as  the  operation  of  making 
or  producing  an  article  for  use  from  raw  or 
prepared  materials  by  giving  these  materials 
new  form,  qualities,  properties,  or  combina- 
tions." The  capital  and  other  property  em- 
ployed in  the  manufacture  of  fertilizers  and 
chemicals  are  exempt  from  parodiial  and 
munidpal  taxation  under  the  Louisiana  Con- 
stitution, whether  at  the  establishment  of  tba 
company  or  at  its  domicile.  Planters'  T&> 
tilizer  &  Chemical  Co.  v.  Board  of  Assessors 
for  Parish  of  Ozleans,  40  SoutA.  1088, 116  La. 
687. 

TiMh  eoatpaay 

A  corporation  organised  tor  carrying  on 
the  business  of  catching  and  preserving  by 
salt  and  marketing  salt  water  fish,  and  which 
owns  and  operates  a  plant  for  the  preparing, 
preserving,  and  paddng  <tf  such  fish,  is 
'•principally    engaged    in    manufactaring," 


MANUFAOrnilBB 


286 


MAJbiUFAOXlTBJBlE 


within  tbe  mamhig  of  Bankr.  Act  July  1, 
1896,  §  4b,  c.  641,  and  Is  subject  to  adlndica- 
tion  as  an  Involuntary  bankrupt  In  re  Alas- 
ka-American Fish  Co.,  102  Fed.  498. 

Qmm  ea«p««y 

A  "gas  company"  is  a  '^anufftctorlng 
corporation''  within  the  letter  as  well  as  the 
spirit  of  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  |  7255  (Acts 
1899,  p.  660,  c.  266),  proTiding  that  contrac- 
tors, etc.,  and  all  persons  performing  labor, 
etc.,  for  the  erection,  altering,  repairing,  etc., 
any  house,  mill,  nuurafactory,  etc.,  may  baTe 
a  Uen  on  tha  house,  mill,  manufactory,  ate. 
Wells  Y.  GhiiBtian,  76  N.  H  518,  519, 165  lad. 
662  (citing  Commonwealth  t.  Lowell  Gas 
Light   Co.,  12  Allen  [94  Mass.]  T9). 

lee  eempaalea 

A  corporation  organised  to  buy,  gather, 
store,  and  preserve  Ice^  to  ship  and  vend  the 
same,  and  which  carried  on  Its  business  by 
renting  small  bodies  of  water  from  which  It 
cat  the  Ice  which  It  stored,  shipped*  and  sold, 
only  two  or  three  times  in  a  number  of  years 
buying  small  quantities  of  ice  when  Its  own 
supply  ran  short,  is  not  engaged  principally 
in  "mannfiacturixig,  trading,  or  commercial 
pursuits,''  within  the  meaning  of  Bankr.  Act 
July  1,  1898,  c.  641,  |  4b,  80  Stat  647,  and 
Is  not  subject  to  involuntary  proceedings  in 
bankruptcy.  In  re  New  York  &  New  Jersey 
Ice  Lines,  147  Fed.  214,  215,  77  O.  C.  A.  440 
(citing  In  re  Woodslde  Coal  Co.  [D.  C]  106 
Fed.  66;  In  re  Keystone  Coal  Co.,  109  Fed. 
872;  In  re  H.  J.  Qulmby  Freight  Co.,  121 
Fed.  141;  First  Nat  Bank  v.  Wyoming  Valley 
loe  Co.,  186  Fed.  46Q. 


ImumAtj  OS 

A  corporation  conducting  a  laundry,  the 
largest  part  of  its  business  being  the  wash- 
hig,  starching  and  ironiog»  and  poHshing  of 
collars,  cuffs,  etc,  for  manufacturers  before 
they  are  put  on  the  market,  is  engaged  prln- 
dpaUy  in  manufacturing,  within  tha  mean- 
ing of  the  national  bankruptoy  act,  and  is 
•abject  to  proceedings  in  Involuntary  bank- 
ruptcy. In  re  Troy  Steam  Laundering  Co., 
132  Fed.  266,  268. 

IfUk  deaUvs 

The  Pioneer  Pasteurizing  Company,  au- 
thorized by  its  articles  of  incorpomtlon  to 
engage  In  the  business  of  buying,  manufiic- 
taring,  and  dealing  in  milk,  cream,  butter, 
dieese,  and  other  dairy  i^oducts,  and  pas- 
trarldng  and  treating  said  milk,  and  pack- 
hig,  storing,  handling,  and  srillng  said  prod- 
acts  so  pasteurized  and  treated,  is  not  ex- 
dasiv^  a  manufacturing  or  mechanical  cor- 
poration, within  Const  art  10,  |  88,  and  its 
•toddioldtts  are  therefore  liable  for  its  debts. 
Meen  v.  Pioneer  Pastsurizing  Co.,  9T  N.  W. 
UO,  141,  90  Iflnn.  601. 

lOillas 
The  term  "manufacturing^  is  aynony* 
■tons    with    "milling."    Lucas    v.    Ashland 
light.  Hill.  ^  Power  Go.,  138  N.  W.  761,  763, 


92  Neb.  660  (citing  lambom  v.  Bell,  32  Paa 
989,  18  Colo.  346,  20  L.  R.  A.  241). 

MiMmrml  water  eoatpany 

A  corporation  organized  to  *'manufac- 
ture"  and  sell  mineral  and  other  waters,  own- 
ing a  well  firom  which  mineral  water  was 
pumped,  and  machinery  and  appliances  for 
carrying  on  the  business  of  bottling  the  water 
and  carbonating  it  so  as  to  form  ginger  ale, 
root  beer,  etc.,  was  a  "manufacturing  cor- 
poration," within  a  statute  providing  that  the 
directors  of  a  manufacturing  corporation 
shall  have  no  power  to  incumber  the  plant  or 
madiinery  until  authorised  by  a  majority  of 
the  stockholders.  Carlsbad  Water  Co.  v. 
New,  81  Pac.  34, 35, 38  Colo.  889  (dting  defini- 
tion in  Oarlln  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.  of 
Toronto,  67  Md.  615,  40  Am.  Bep.  440; 
Bchriefer  v.  Wood,  5  Blatchf.  215,  Fed.  Caa. 
No.  12,  481;  Lambom  v.  Bell,  32  Pac.  989, 
18  Colo.  846»  20  L.  B.  A.  241). 

OleomargaHne  dealers 

Oleomargarine  Act  1886  (Act  Aug.  2, 
1886,  c.  840,  I  3,  24  Stat  209,  as  amended  by 
Act  May  9,  1902,  |  2,  32  Stat  194)  defines  a 
manufacturer  of  oleomargarine  as  any  person 
wbo  sells,  vends,  or  furnishes  oleomargarine 
for  use  or  consumption  by  others  who  shall 
add  to  or  mix  any  artificial  coloration  so  as 
to  make  it  resemble  butter.  Held,  that  the 
actual  selling,  vending,  or  furnishing  of  ole- 
omargarine for  use  and  consumption  by 
others  is  not  one  of  the  necessary  components 
of  a  manufacturer  as  contemplated  by  such 
act,  so  as  to  reguire  proof  of  actual  selling, 
vending,  or  furnishing  of  some  of  the  product 
to  constitute  the  elCeosa;  the  term  **Bianu- 
facturer"  as  so  used  brtng  oonstmed  to  mean 
one  engaged  in  the  business  of  selling,  vend- 
ing, or  fumiaiilng  oleomargarine  for  consump- 
tion of  others.  Yennont  v.  United  States,  174 
Fed.  792,  794,  98  a  a  A.  600. 

Oleomargarine  Act  Aug.  2,  1886,  c.  840, 
I  17,  providing  that  any  person  engaged  in 
carrying  on  the  business  of  manufacturing 
oleomargarine,  who  defrauds,  or  attempts  to 
defraud,  the  United  States  of  the  tax  on  oleo- 
margarine produced  by  him,  etc.,  shall  be 
fined  and  imprisoned,  was  applicable  to  one 
who  did  not  manufacture  white  oleomarga- 
rine and  therefore  was  not  a  manufacturer 
within  the  definition  contained  in  the  original 
act,  but  who  mixed  white  oleomargarine  with 
artificial  coloration  so  as  to  make  it  look  like 
butter  and  thereby  became  a  "manufacturer** 
within  the  definition  as  extended  by  Act 
Cong.  May  9,  1902,  c  784.  May  v.  United 
States,  199  Fed.  42,  44,  117  a  C  A.  420. 

Vftper  eompaiiy 

A  corporation  organized  for  the  purpose 
of  manufacturing  and  dealing  In  paper  and 
pulp,  which  had  bought  laass  tracts  of  tim- 
bfr  land  and  expended  some  9500,000  in  the 
erection  and  equipment  of  buildings  for  pa- 
per and.pulp  mills,  and  which  had  hired  cut 


MANUFACTUKiai 


286 


MANDFAOTURBR 


several  tl^ousand  cords  of  wood  in  lengths 
suitable  for  tiie  usie  in  the  mannfactnre  of 
paper,  was  "engaged  in  manufacturing" 
within  Bankruptcy  Act,  and  subject  to  pro- 
ceedings in  involuntary  bankruptcy,  though 
it  had  never  operated  its  mills  nor  completed 
the  manufacture  of  either  paper  or  pulp, 
where  it  had  engaged  in  no  other  business. 
White  Mountain  Paper  Ck).  v.  Morse  &  Co., 
127  Fed.  643,  644. 

Printing  and  publishing  iHimpany 

Within  a  law  imposing  a  franchise  or 
license  tax  upon  certain  corporations  and  ex- 
empting manufacturing  companies,  a  com- 
pany organized  to  carry  on  the  business  of 
printing  and  publishing  a  daily  newspaper 
and  general  jobbing,  printing,  and  publishing, 
whose  capital  is  wholly  employed  in  publish- 
ing a  newspaper  for  circulation,  is  not  a 
'*manuflacturing  company";  but  a  company 
organized  to  conduct  the  business  of  book 
and  Job  printing,  engraving,  electrotyping, 
and  lithographing,  whose  capital  is  invested 
in  the  prosecution  of  that  business,  and 
which  manufactures  on  orders  only,  is  a 
"manufacturing  company."  State  v.  State 
Board  of  Assessors,  47  N.  J.  Law,  87,  42,  54 
Am.  Rep.  114  (citing  and  adopting  Nassau 
Gaslight  Co.  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  89  N.  T. 
409;  Dudley  v.  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  Co., 
100  Mass.  183 ;  Byers  v.  Franklin  Coal  Co.  of 
Lykens  County,  106  Mass.  131 ;  In  re  Chand- 
ler, 1  Lowell,  478,  6  Fed.  Cas.  443 ;  In  re  Ken- 
yon  &  Fenton,  6  N.  B.  R.  238,  80  Fed.  Cas. 
90;  In  re  Capitol  Pub. 'Co.,  18  Nat.  Bank. 
Reg.  319 ;   Seeley  v.  Gwillim,  40  Conn.  106). 

Befrigeratur  ooaipAny 

Where  a  Massachusetts  coi^poration  was 
organized  to  deal  in  and  manufacture  re- 
frigerators, reftigerator  cars,  and  accessories, 
appliances,  etc.,  but,  at  the  time  an  involun- 
tary bankruptcy  petition  was  filed  against  It, 
it  had  never  manufactured  anything,  or  be- 
gun business,  beyond  authorizing  its  directors 
to  make  an  endeavor  to  get  contracts,  it  was 
not  subject  to  adjudication  as  a  corporation 
"engaged  principally  in  manufacturing," 
within  Bankruptcy  Act,  prior  to  its  amend- 
ment by  Act  Cong.  June  25,  1910,  c  412,  36 
Stat  838.  In  re  CooUdge  Refrigerator  &  Car 
Co.,  190  Fed.  908,  909. 

Itostaiirant  eonpany 

A  corporation  engaged  in  operating  a  res- 
taurant is  not  subject  to  adjudication  as  a 
bankrupt,  under  Bankr.  Act  July  1,.1898,  c. 
941,  30  Stat.  544,  authorizing  an  adjudication 
against  any  corporation  engaged  principally 
in  "manufacturing";  a  cook  not  being  regard- 
ed as  a  manufacturer  within  the  meaning  of 
the  term  as  so  used.  In  re  Wentworth  Lunch 
Co.,  159  Fed.  413,  414,  86  C  0.  A.  893. 


Shingle 

Under  Sand.  &  H.  Dig.  |  6444,  relating  to 
taxation,  ahd  providing:  "Every  pers<Mi  who 
shall  purchase,  receive  or  hold  personal  pr^>- 


erty  of  any  descriptioki  for  the  purpose  of 
adding  to  the  value  thereof  by  process  of 
manufacturing  or  by  combination  of  dif- 
ferent materials,  with  a  view  of  making  a 
gain  or  profit  by  so  doing,  shall  be  hald  to  be 
a  'manufi^cturer,' "  etc. — a  company  engaged 
in  making  shingles  is  a  "manufacturer.*'  Ar- 
kansas Cypress  Shingle  Co.  v.  Lpnoke  Coun- 
ty, 84  S.  W.  1029,  1030,  74  Ark.  2& 

Bliip  oonstmotion  oonpany 

A  corporation  chartered  to  construct  and 
repair  vessels,  carry  on  a  general  shipbulld* 
ing  and  ship  repairing  business,  construct 
and  operate  a  marine  dry  dock,  etc.^  and 
whose  mala  business  consisted  in  the  building 
of  large  steel  vessels  and  in  repairing  others, 
is  a  corporation  engaged  principally  in  man- 
ufacturing and  mercantile  pursuits,  within 
Bankrui^tcy  Act,  providing  that  such  a  cor- 
poration may  be  adjudged  an  involuntary 
bankrupt  Columbia  Iron  Works  v.  National 
Lead  Co.,  127  Fed.  99,  102,  62  0.  C.  A.  99, 
64  L.  B.  A.  645. 

A  corporation  incorporated  to  do  a  gen- 
eral manufacturing  business,  and  to  manu* 
f&cture,  construct,  repair,  and  equip,  and 
buy  and  sell  ships  and  vessels  of  all  Jdnds^ 
and  parts  and  furniture  therefor,  and  which 
since  its  organization  has  carried  on  the  busi- 
ness of  constructing  completed  boats,  and 
parts  and  furniture  for  vessel^,  such  as  boil- 
ers, masts,  tanks,  desks*  tal^lee^  etc.,  for.  the 
most  part  made  from  raw  material  in.  its 
own  shops,  Is  enga|[Qd  piineipally  in  mano- 
i^cturing  pursuits  wi^in  Bankruptcy  tAct^ 
and  subject  to  proceedings  in  involuntary 
bankruptcy.  In  re  Marine  Const  &  Dry 
Dock  Co.,  180  Fed.  446,  447,  64  O.  a  A.  648. 

As  anboontittotsv 

See  Subcontractor. 

mMatvioal  cofBLprnmy 

A  corporation  organized  "^  lease,  pro- 
duce, and  exploit  plays  and  other  theatrical 
and  dramatic  productions,  to  produce  and 
sell  theatrical  costumes  and  properties,**  and 
which,  up  to  the  time  a  portion  was  filed 
against  it,  had  actually  engaged  only  in  pro- 
ducing ajplay,  is  not  one  "engaged  principally 
in  manufacturing,  trading,  *  ^  .  *  or  mer-» 
cantil^  pursuits,"  \^ithln  Bankr.  Act  Julj  1, 
1898,  c.  541,  §  4b,  and  is  not  subject  to  bank-, 
niptoy  proceedings.  In  re  J.  J.  R^slee 
Amusegment  Co.,  171  Fed.  283. 

Tool  polishing  oompany 

A  corporation  engaged  in  "polishing*' 
tools  foY  t))oee  who  Ji^ake  th^  tools  for  use  or 
sale  is  as  much  engaged  in  manufacture  tm 
those  who  take  the  prior  sjtoni  ia  Conning 
and  shaping  the  iron  and  wood  into  such 
tools.  The  fact  that  this  final  touch  is  called 
"polishing*'  does  not  take  it  out  of  the  realm 
of  "manufacturii^g.**  In  te  Troy  Steam 
I^aundering^  Oo;,  lSi2  Fed.  206,  268. 


,  j}fA^P^AGpVBfl;^ 


287      MANUFAOTJJI^^S-MANIJFACTUKED 


Pipe^  and  water  maUm  belosaglng  to  a 
water  company  are.  not  taxable  ag  "macliln- 
ery  employed  Jn  manufactures,"  ifvlthin  Bev, 
Laws,  c.  12, 1  23,  providing  for  the  taxation 
of  such  machinery  within  the  state,  though 
belonging  to  a  foreign  corporation.  Coffin 
V.  Artesian  Water  Co.,  79  N.  E.  262,  263,  193 
Mass.  274  (citing  Dudley  v.  Jamaica  Pond 
Aqueduct  Corp.,  100  Mass.  183;  Wellington 
T.  Inhabitants  of  Belmont,  41  N.  W.  62,  164 
Mass.  142). 

MAHUFACTUBEfll  mm.  MAKtTTAOTUTLED 
ABTIOXJESS 

See  Completed  Manufacture^  Article; 
Domestic  Manufactures;  Mining  and 
Manufactniing;    Principally  Bnga^ed. 

Other  ^articles  distinguished,  see  Other. 

Whenever  labor  la  performed  upon  an 
article  which  results  in  its  assuming  a  new 
form,  possessing  new  qualities  or  new  com- 
binations, the  process  of  "manufacturing" 
has  taken  pl&ce,  whether  the  thing  produced 
be  a  floftall  article  of  conmierce  or  a  struc^ 
tore,  such  as  a  house,  road,  or  bridge.  Do- 
lese  ft  Shepard  Go..r.  O'.OonneU,  100  N.  10. 
230,  236,  257  m.  43. 

One  definition:  of  f'manufactoze^'  1b  to 
make  or  fabricate,  especially,  in  considerable 
quantitie8»  or  by  tho  aid  of  many  hands  or 
mfl<*htnery,  .though  the  t>i^ima]7  meaning  of 
the  word  is  something  made  by  hand,  as 
distinguished  from  the  natural  growth ;  and 
a  corporation  organized  to  manufacture  and 
sell  bakers'  godds  was  orgftntsed  for  manu- 
facturing purposes,  within  the  tar  law.  H. 
H.  Kohlsaat  &  Co.  ▼.  O'Connell,  99  N.  B. 
689,  265  ni.  271. 

A  "manufacture**  is  "anything  made 
from  raw  Dpiaterials  by  the  hand,  by  machin- 
ery, or  by  art,  as  cloths,  iron  utensils,  shoes, 
machineiy,  saddlery,  etc.  United  States  v. 
F.  W.  Myers  &  Co.,  139  Fed.  344,  348  (citing 
Webst  Diet;  see,  also,  Worcest  Diet; 
Brandes,  Enc. ;  Tide  Water  Oil  Co.  ▼.  United 
States,  18  Sup.  Ct.  837,  171  U.  S.  210,  43  L. 
IDd.  189;  United  States  v.  Schoverllng,  18 
Sup.  Ct  24,  146  U.  S.  76,  36  I*  BJd. 


"Ordinarily,  the  fact  that  an  article  in 
tbe  process  of  manufacture  takes  a  new 
name  is  indicative  of  a  distinct  manufactui^' 
•  •  •  A  new,  manufacture  is  usually  ao- 
oompanied  by  a  .change  of  name,  but  a 
change  of  name  does  not.  always  indicate  a 
new  manufacture.  Where  a  manufactured 
article,  such  as  sawed  lumber,  Is  usable  for 
a  dozen  different  purposes,  it  does  not  ordi- 
narily become  a  new  manufacture  until  re- 
duced to  a  condition  where  it  is  used  for  one 
thing  only.**  United  States  v.  Dudley,  19 
Sup.  Ct  801,  174  U.  S.  672,  678,  48  L.  Ed. 
^129. 

The  term  "manufactured  articles"  must 
be  understood  In  its  popular  sense,  and  does 
not  mean  all  articles  produced  from  the  raw 


state  by.  manual  skill  or  labor,  but  those  ar- 
ticles only  which  are  made  in  what,  in  popu- 
lar language,  are  called  manufactories.  To 
call  a  farmer  who  cultivates  his  land  and 
reaps  and  markets  his  crops  a  manufacturer, 
as  he  is  in  the  scientific  signification  of  the 
term,  would  do  violence  to  language  in  the 
construction  of  a  statute.  A  farm  building 
commonly  called  a  tobacco  shed,  and  u^ed 
by  a  farmer  to  dry,  cure,  and  fit  for  market 
tobacco  grown  on  the  farm,  is  not  a  build- 
ing for  trade  or  manufacture,  within  St. 
1898,  §  1263,  providing  that  no  public  high- 
way shall  be  laid  out  through  any  building 
other  than  a  building  used  for  the  purpose 
of  trade  or  manufticture.  fiharpe  v.  Hasey, 
114  K.  W.  1118,  1119,  184  Wis.  618. 

"Nearly  all  artificial  products  of  hu- 
man industry,  nearly  aU  such  materials  as 
have  acquired  changed  conditions  or  new 
and  specific  combinations,  ^whether  from  the 
direct  action  of  the  human  hand,  from  chem- 
ical processes  derived  and  directed  by  hu- 
man skill,  or  by  the  employment  of  machln- 
«ry,'  ^  *  ^  are  now  comiponly  designated 
as  ^amifactured.' "  The  Century  Diction- 
ary defines  "maaufbcture*'  as  "tiie  produo 
tion  of  artities  for  use  from  raw  or  unpre- 
pared materials,  by  giving  these  materials 
new  forms,  qualities,  properties,  or  com- 
binations, whether  by  manual  labor  or  ma- 
chinery." State  V,  G.  H.  Tlchenbr  Antisep- 
tic. Co.,  43  South.  277,  278,  118  La.  GS5  (quot- 
ing from  Carlin  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.  of 
Toronto,  ^7  Md.  526,  4  Am.  Rep.  440). 

Held,  that  an  article  which  has  been 
advanced  through  one  or  more  processes  into 
a  completed  commercial  article,  known  and 
recognized  in  trade  by  a  specific  and  dis- 
tinctive name  other  than  the  name  of  the 
material  from  which  it  is  made,  and  is  put 
into  a  completed  shape,  designed  and  adapt- 
ed for  a  particular  use  to  which  the  material 
in  its  original  form  is  not  adapted,  is  to  be 
deemed  a  manufacture,  although  its  com- 
ponent materials  are  unchanged.  United 
States  y.  George  Meier  &  Co.,  136  F.  764,  765, 
69  C.  a  A.  421  (citing  Erhardt  T.  Hahn,  55 
Fed.  273,  6  a  C.  A.  99;  Dejonge  r.  Magone, 
16  Sup.  Ct  119,  159  U.  S.  662,  40  Ii.  Ed.  260; 
Qrempler  r.  United  States,  107  Fed.  687,  46 
CX  CX  A.  657;  United  States  v.  Blnney,  82 
Fied.  992,  27  O.  a  A.  347;  Boker  v.  United 
States,  97  Fed.  206,  38  C.  C.  A.  114;  United 
States  V.  (Leonard,  108  Fed.  42,  47  C.  C.  A. 
181;  Marsohing  t.  United  States,  IIB  Fed. 
1006). 

Small  pieces  of  soapstone,  cut  in  regular 
sizes  for  gas  tips  and  burners,  have  been 
"manufactured,"  and  are  dutiable  as  un- 
enumerated  "manufactured"  articles,  under 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  §  6.  M. 
Kirschberger  &  Co.  v.  United  States,  166 
Fed.  1012,  1013. 

Where  marble*  waste^  a  comparatively 
valueless  material,  has  been  converted  into 


MANXn^AGTUBES-MAKUFACTDBED      288      MAKUFAOTURES-MAinTVAGTURED 


a  commodity  of  use  and  valae  by  a  special 
manafactaring  process,  whereby  it  bas  ae- 
quired  a  new  name  and  a  new  use,  it  ceases 
to  be  a  crude  mineral  and  becomes  a  "manu- 
factured" one.  United  States  v.  Graser^ 
Rothe,  164  Fled.  205,  207. 

Articles  produced  incidentally  to  the 
manufacture  of  other  articles,  and  which  are 
themselves  ready  to  be  used  for  various  puiv 
poses  without  further  treatment,  are  under 
the  tariff  laws  subject  to  classification  as 
"manufactured,'*  rather  than  as  ''waste." 
Shallus  V.  United  States,  155  Fed.  213,  215. 

Soluble  grease,  a  preparation  of  tallow 
used  in  the  process  of  dyeing  cotton  cloth 
for  softening  the  fiibrlc  after  the  applica- 
tion of  the  dye,  is  not  dutiable  under  Tariff 
Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  §  1,  Schedule  A, 
par.  32,  30  Stat  153,  as  an  alizarin  assist- 
ant, but  under  section  6  <30  Stat.  205)  as  an 
"unenumerated  Manufactured  article."  Ab- 
ram  De  Ronde  &  Co.  y.  United  States,  140 
Fed.  92,  93. 

Orange  flower  water  and  rose  water 
are  not  dutiable  as  medidnal  preparations, 
under  Tariff  Act  1897,  but  as  "unenum^ated 
manufactured  articles."  *  Buler  y*  United 
States,  147  Fed.  765,  766. 

Sweet  crackers,  known  as  wafers  and 
biscuits,  in  which  the  proportion  of  the 
sweetened  centers  to  the  pastry  envelopes 
is  large,  but  in  which  flour  is  used  to  a  sub- 
stantial extent,  are  not  dutiable  as  ^con- 
fectionery," under  Tariff  Act  1897,  but  are 
dutiable  as  "unenumerated  manufactured 
articles."  United  States  t.  Thomas  Meadows 
A  Co.,  147  Fed.  757. 

A  liquid  extract  of  the  coffee  bean  held 
not  to  be  dutiable  under  Tariff  Act  July  24, 
1897,  c.  11.  (  1,  Schedule  G,  par.  283,  30  Stat 
172,  relating  to  "articles  used  as  coffee,  or  as 
substitutes  for  coffee,"  but  under  section  6, 
80  Stat  205,  as  an  "unenumerated  manufac- 
tured article."  B.  C.  Hazard  &  Co.  v.  United 
States,  164  Fed.  907,  908. 

Articles  of  hone  stone,  which  are  used 
in  polishing  marble  and  lithographic  stones, 
and  which  are  not  shown  to  be  known  com- 
mercially as  "hones,"  are  not  ftee  of  duty  as 
"hones,"  under  the  Tariff  Act,  but  are  duti- 
able as  "unenumerated  manufactured  arti- 
cles." R.  J.  Waddell  &  Ca  v.  United  States, 
135  Fed.  211,  213. 

Persian  berry  extract,  which  Is  used  in 
staining  food  products,  and  also  as  a  dye* 
stuff  for  coloring  fabrics,  is  not  dutiable  un- 
der Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  U,  |  1, 
Schedule  A,  par.  58,  30  Stat  154,  as  a  color, 
not  belonging  to  the  "paints,  colors,  pig- 
ments," etc.,  therein  enumerated,  nor,  by 
similitude,  under  paragraph  20  or  22,  30 
Stat  152,  relating  respectively  to  berries  ad- 
vanced in  value  and  to  extracts  of  barks, 
etc.,  used  for  dyeing,  but  is  dutiable  as  an 
^'unenumerated  manufactured  article"  under 


section  6^  80  Stat  206.     United   States  v. 
Berlin  Aniline  Wortn,  164  Fed.  025,  926. 

The  Japanese  alchollc  beverage  known 
as  sak6  Is  dutiable  as  an  ^'unenumerated 
manufactured  article,"  under  section  6,  Tar- 
iff Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11,  30  Stat  205. 
United  States  v.  Nishlmlya,  187  Fed.  396^ 
897,  69  G.  O.  A.  688. 

Fruit  in  spirits,  consisting  of  cherriei 
in  maraschino,  is  not  dutiable  as  "fmlts  pre- 
served in  sirup,"  but  as  "unenumerated  man- 
ufactured articles."  Relss  &  Brady  ▼.  United 
States,  186  Fed.  248^  249. 

As  nAterlals 

See  Materials. 

In  patests 

A  house,  or  a  room  In  a  house.  Is  not  t 
"manufacture,"  within  the  meaning  of  Rev. 
St  §  4886,  which  authorizes  the  granting  oT 
patents  for  "any  new  and  useful  art,  ma- 
chine, manufacture,  or  composition  of  ma^ 
ter,"  and  a  particular  form  ofoonstructioD 
of  a  room,  or  portion  of  a  room,  in  a  bouse,  ii 
not  patentabla  American  Disappearing  Bed 
Go.  ▼.  Amaelsteen,  182  Fed.  824,  826,  106  a 
G.  A.  40. 

A  saroopbagns  monument  Is  a  '*mana- 
f^ctnie"  within  the  meaning  of  Rer.  St  f 
4929,  and  a  proper  subject  for  a  design  patent 
Grier  v.  Innee,  170  Fed.  824,  826,  95  a  a  A 
508. 

Of  acate 

Small  pieces  of  agate,  garnet,  etc.,  ad- 
vanced from  their  natural  state  by  cuttinf 
process,  for  the  purpose  of  fitting  them  for 
use  as  setting  for  Jewelry,  and  known  com- 
mercially as  agates,  garnets,  etc.,  are  more 
spedflcally  provided  for  as  ''predous  stonef 
advanced,"  under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897, 
c.  11,  i  1,  Schedule  N,  par.  435,  than  ai 
"manufactures  of  agate,  garnet)  etc.,"  under 
Schedule  B,  par.  115,  30  Stat  159.  United 
States  T.  Albert  Lorsch  &  Go.,  172  Fed.  277. 

Small  pieces  of  agate,  fitted  for  use  as 
scale  bearings  by  being  cut,  polished,  asd 
grooved,  are  dutiable  as  manufactures  of 
agate,  under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11, 
I  1,  Schedule  6,  par.  115,  and  not  as  '^n- 
clous  stones,"  under  paragraph  435,  Schedule 
N,  30  Stat  192.  Smith  v.  Computing  Scale 
Go.,  147  Fted.  890,  891  (citing  Bthardt  ▼. 
Hahn,  65  Fed.  273,  6  G.  G.  A.  99;  Hahn  v. 
United  States,  40  G.  G.  A.  622,  100  Fed.  635; 
Hahn  v.  United  States,  121  Fed.  152). 

The  provision  for  precious  stones  cat, 
but  not  set,  in  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  e. 
11, 1 1,  Schedule  N,  par.  435,  is  not  limited  to 
stones  used  otherwise  than  for  Industritl 
purposes;  and  cut  pieces  of  agate  used  u 
scale  bearings  are  dutiable  under  said  pro- 
visions rather  than  as  "manufactures  of 
agate,"  under  Schedule  B,  par.  116,  30  Stat 
159.  United  States  ▼.  Albert  Loxsch  ft  Co, 
152  Fed  691.  692. 


XAKUFAOTUREfiKMAKUFACrrURED      28^      ICAKUFACTUlUBB-MAinJFACTUlUED 


Wliere  Congreaa,  having  provided  to  gwr 
eral  terms  tor  a  gionp  of  artlclM»  wblcb  in- 
dndes  many  dUCerent  sitecies,  as.  ^^reciomi 
Btones,**  selects  by  name  one  of  those  qpedes 
and  prescribes  that  manafactnres  of  that 
particolar  species  shaU  be  dntlable  at  a  dif- 
ferent rate,  as  ''manufactures  of  agate,  not 
specially  provided  for,"  It  has  so  clearly  In- 
dicated its  Intention  to  withdraw  the  article 
from  the  general  group  as  soon  as  It  becomes 
a  completed  manufacture  that  the  absence 
of  the  limiting  clause,  "not  specially  provid- 
ed for,"  from  the  group  provision,  is  not 
particularly  significant  United  States  v. 
Albert  Lorsch  &  Co.,  158  Fed.  808,  899,  86 
G.C.  A84. 

Of  fAmXh 

The  article  produced  by  the  artificial 
precipitation  of  chalk,  and  bolting  and  pack- 
ing It  in  bags,  is  not  "manufactures^  of 
chalk,  within  the  meaning  of  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1897,  c  11.  (  1,  Schedule  A,  par.  18, 
but  Is  chalk  itself,  and  Is  dntlable  under 
the  provision  In  the  same  paragraph  for 
-chalk  artificially  precipitated."  While,  in 
the  provision  in  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c 
11,  §  1,  Schedule  A,  par.  18,  for  chalk  "pre- 
piu^  for  toilet  purposes,"  the  preparation 
referred  to  is  not,  perhaps,  such  as  Is  nec- 
essary to  make  a  completed  toilet  article, 
there  must  be  advancement  toward  use  for 
toilet  purposes,  by  the  admixture  of  flavor- 
ing or  other  ingredieots,  or  oti^rwlse ;  and 
dialk  that  has  been  merely  predirftated 
artificially,  bolted,  and  packed  in  bags  is  not 
within  that  provision.  United  SImtes  v.  P. 
B.  Anderson  k  Ckk,  170  Fed.  961,  902,  90 
a  0.  A.  451. 

Of  eUp 

Baskets  made  of  twisted  hinoki  wood 
ihaTlngs  held  dutiable  as  "manufactures  of 
chip,"  under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11, 
i  1,  Schedule  'N,  par.  449.    Morimura  Bros. 

V.  United  States,  107  Fed.  687. 

Of  Mrk 

Small  pieces  of  cork,  which  have  been 
produced  by  grinding  the  refuse  «f  cork 
beik  fbr  convenioioe  in  handling,  and  which 
need  further  pr^iaration  before  becoming  lit 
for  its  ultimate  use  in  the  manafbcture  of 
ttnolenm,  etc,  is  dutiable  as  "waste,"  and 
not  as  a  "manufacture"  of  cork.  OudewUl 
k  BncknaU  v.  United  States,  142  Fed.  214. 

Ot««ttom 

Goods  c«Hnposed  in  part  of  wool,  but  in 
<^ef  value  of  cotton,  are  more  spedflcally 
ennmerated  in  Tariff  Act  Oct  1, 1890,  c  1244, 
i  1,  Schedule  I,  par.  865^  as  "manufactures  of 
cotton**  than  in  the  provision  in  Schedule  K, 

VI.  892,  for  "manufactures  of  every  descrip- 
tion •♦  ♦  in  part  of  WOOL"  A  provision 
tot  '*aU  manufactures  of  ooiton"  and  one  for 
"all  manufactures  of  every  deecriptioa  ^  •  • 
^  part  of  wool"  are  not  OQually  applieable  to 
cloth  composed  in  part  of  wool  hot  in  dUaf 
value  of  cotton;  the  latter  belns  lei 

8WnMbP.2DSnb-10 


than  the  fermur.  Therefore  they  are  not 
controlled  by  the  provision  in  Tariff  Act  Oct 
1,  1800,  c.  1244,  I  5,  that,  "if  two  or  more 
rates  of  duty  shall  be  applicable  to  any  im- 
ported article,  it  shall  pay  duty  at  the  high- 
est of  such  rates."  The  provision  for  "manu- 
factures of  cotton,"  in  Tariff  Act  Oct  1, 1890, 
c.  1244,  1 1,  Schedule  I,  par.  855,  held  to  in- 
clude materials  composed  in  chief  value  of 
cotton  and  in  part  of  another  substance. 
Benolt  V.  United  States,  150  Fed.  687,  688. 

The  provision  in  the  Tariff  Act  for  "la- 
bels for  garments  or  other  articles,  composed 
of  cotton,**  does  not  Include  strips  of  cotton 
containing  certain  words  woven  therein  in 
silk,  which  are  intended,  when  properly  cut, 
to  be  attached  to  the  top  of  shoes.  Such  ar- 
ticles are  dutiable  as  "manufactures  of  cot- 
ton," under  said  act  Herzog  v.  United 
States,  185  Fed.  919. 

Cotton  damask  doilies,  napUBs,  and  table 
covers  or  cloths,  in  a  completed  oonditlon, 
ready  for  use,  are  dutiable  under  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1807,  c.  U,  1 1,  Schedule  I,  par.  822, 
as  "manufkctures  of  cotton  not  specially  pro- 
vided for,*'  and  not  under  paragraph  821  of 
said  act  as  "ootton  table  dajpuMk."  Douglass 
&  Berry  v.  United  States,  128  Fed.  998,  904. 

XleotHelty 

Electricity  generated  for  the  purpose  of 
furnishing  light,  heat,  and  power  is  a  product 
of  "manufacture**  and  a  oommerdal  com- 
modity. IB  re  caiarics  Town  light  k  Power 
Co.,  188  Fed.  160, 168. 

Conceding  that  Flowage  Act  (Pub.  St 
1901,  c  142)  1 12,  was  passed  to  encourage  the 
establishment  of  manufactories  operated  by 
water  power,  the  production  of  electricity 
by  means  of  water  power  will  be  deemed  a 
"manufactured  product**  within  the  meaning 
of  the  statute,  though  the  use  of  electricity 
was  not  contemplated  when  the  act  was  pass- 
ed. HcBCillan  v.  Noyes,  72  Aa  750,  762,  75 
N.  H.  258. 

Of  fw 

So-called  "beaver  strips,"  whidi  are  in 
the  form  of  rectangular  strips  or  bands  of 
various  sizes,  consisting  of  rabbit  fur  and 
woolen  cloth,  used  in  the  making  of  hats,  the 
fur  being  the  component  material  of  chief 
value,  are  dutiable  as  a  "manufacture  of  fur,** 
under  paragraph  450  of  the  Tariff  Act  of 
July  24,  1807,  c  11,  |  1,  Schedule  N,  and  not 
under  paragraph  870,  Schedule  K,  as  ar- 
ticles of  wearing  apparel  composed  wholly  or 
in  part  of  wool,  nor  under  paragraph  482, 
Schedule  N,  as  "hats  or  bonnets  or  forms 
therefor  composed  in  diief  value  of  fur.'* 
Herrmann  v.  United  States,  ms  Fed.  848. 

OAA 

OM'JU 

Of  sel«tlm 

The  provision  in  Tariff  Act  July  24, 1807, 
o.  11,  I  It  Schedule  N,  par.  406,  for  "articles 
•  •  •  composed  ♦  •  •  in  part  of 
see   anaMiMnadooC   •  •   •  getetlii*'' 


MAVUFACTUKB&kMAKUFACTUKED      290      MANtTFACTCRES-MAKCFACTtTRED 


being  more  spedflc  than  tbat  In  paragraph 
460,  for  "mannfactares  of  gelatin,"  hat 
crowns  composed  chiefly  of  gelatin  spangles 
are  dnitable  under  the  former  proTlsion.  Lou- 
la  Metzger  &  Ck>.  y.  United  States,  140  Fed. 
132,  76  O.  O.  A.  568. 

Of  Klass 
In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1887,  a  U,  |  1« 
Schedule  B,  par.  100,  the  term  "blown  glass- 
ware" includes  articles  blown  In  a  mold  as 
well  as  freehanded.  Articles  in  chief  value 
of  blown  glass,  but  in  part  of  other  glass 
or  other  material,  are  not  within  the  provi- 
sion for  "blown  glassware"  in  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1807,  c.  11,  I  1,  Schedule  B,  par.  100,  but 
are  dutiable  as  manufactures  of  glass  under 
paragraph  112,  80  Stat  168.  In  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1807,  c  11,  J  1,  Schedule  B,  par.  100, 
the  provision  for  "articles  of  glass  •  ♦  ♦ 
ornamented,  decorated,  or  ground  (except 
such  grinding  as  is  necessary  for  fitting  stop- 
pers)," is  not  limited  to  articles  in  which/the 
grinding  is  done  for  ornamental  or  decorative 
purposes,  but  includes  plain  goods  ground 
for  utility  purposes  only.  In  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1897,  e.  11,  |  1,  Schedule  B,  par.  09,  the 
term  "molded,"  as  applied  to  glassware,  is 
synonymous  with  ''pressed."  United  States 
V.  Hell  Chemical  Co.,  178  Fed.  637,  540,  102 
C.  a  A.  47. 

Merchandise  consisting  of  thermometers 
Is  dutiable  under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c. 
II,  i  1,  par.  112,'  as  "manufactures  of  glass." 
United  States  v.  D.  S.  Hesse  &  Bro.,  141 
Fed.  492,  493. 

Of  India  rabliev 

Wearing  apparel,  consisting  of  dress 
shields,  and  composed  in  chief  value  of  rub- 
ber, and  in  part  of  cotton,  are  dutiable  as 
manufactures  in  chief  value  of  India  rubber, 
under  paragraph  460,  Tariff  Act  Oct  1,  1890, 
c.  1244,  §  1,  Schedule  K,  and  not  under  para- 
graph 349  of  said  act  (section  1,  Schedule  I), 
relating  to  wearing  apparel  composed  of  cot- 
ton, or  in  chief  value  thereof,  and  to  such 
wearing  apparel  "having  India  rubber  as  a 
component  material."  Darlington,  Runk  & 
Co.  V.  United  States,  136  Fed.  716,  717. 

In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  |  1, 
Schedule  J,  par.  339,  the  provision  for  braids 
"wholly  or  in  chief  value  of  ♦  •  ♦  cotton, 
•  *  *  whether  composed  In  part  of  India 
rubber  or  otherwise,"  applies  only  to  braids 
in  which  cotton  Is  the  chief  or  only  compo- 
nent Braids  in  part  of  cotton  and  in  chief 
value  of  rubber  are  dutiable  under  Schedule 
N,  par.  449,  as  "manufactures  in  chief  value 
of  India  rubber."  Horrax  v.  United  States, 
167  Fed.  626,^527,  93  a  a  A.  22. 

liuraranoe 

Insurance  is  not  an  article  of  merdian- 
dlse,  or  "manufacture,"  or  one  of  the  the 
necessaries  of  life,  within  the  laws  against 
engrossing  prohibiting  oombinations  among 
dealera  in  merchandise,  or  manufacture,  or 


necessaries  of  life.  Harris  v.  Ck)mmonwealtli, 
78  S.  B.  561,  063,  113  Va.  746,  38  L.  B.  A 
(N.  S.)  468,  Ann.  Gas.  1918E,  597. 

Of  Iron 

So-called  "iron  sand,"  a  completed  article 
produced  by  a  series  of  manufacturing  iwo- 
cesses  from  cast  iron  and  steel  scrap^  Is  not 
within  the  provlsl<»i  for  "all  iron  In  •  •  • 
forms  less  finished  than  iron  in  bars,  and 
more  advanced  than  pig  iron,"  in  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  §  1,  Schedule  C,  par.  12i 
but  is  dutiable  as  "iron  manufactured,"  under 
paragraph  193.  Harrison  Supply  Go.  v.  Uhlt- 
ed  States,  164  Fed.  155,  156. 

In  construing  the  provision  in  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  1 1,  Schedule  0,  par.  12i 
for  "all  iron  in  •  •  ♦  forms  less  finished 
than  iron  in  bars,  and  more  advanced  tbau 
pig  iron,"  held,  that  the  test  is  the  degree 
of  advancement  in  manufacture,  rather  than 
in  refinement  or  quality,  and  that  iron  sand, 
a  finished  manufactured  article,  Is  not  within 
said  provision,  but  is  dutiable  as  "manufac- 
tures of  iron,"  under  paragraph  193.  Harri- 
son Supply  Go.  V.  United  States,  171  Fed.  406, 
407,  96  G.  G.  A.  362. 


Of  Iv 

As  lumber,  see  Lumber. 

Of  metal 

The  article  commercially  known  as  'Ot- 
ters," produced  from  the  thin  sheets  which 
constitute  the  composition  metal  of  commerce, 
by  a  process  of  manufacture  that  makes  it  no 
longer  available  tot  the  uses  to  which  oom- 
position  metal  of  trade  is  put,  but  adapts  it 
for  other  uses,  is  not  free  of  duty  as  "com- 
position metal,"  under  Tariff  Act  July  2i 
1897,  c  11.  (  2,  Free  List,  par.  533,  but  Is  du- 
tiable as  manufactures  of  metal  under  para- 
graph 193,  (  1,  Schedule  G,  of  said  act  Unit- 
ed States  V.  George  Meier  &  Go.,  136  Fed.  7^ 
765,  69  C.  G.  A.  421  (citing  Erhardt  v.  Hahn, 
55  Fed.  273, 5  G.  G.  A.  99;  Dejonge  v.  Magone, 
16  Sup.  Gt  119,  159  U.  S.  562,  40  L.  Bd.  260; 
Grempler  v.  United  States,  107  Fed.  687,  46 
G.  G.  A.  557;  United  States  v.  Binney,  82 
Fed.  992,  27  G.  G.  A.  847;  Boker  v.  United 
States,  97  Fed.  206,  88  G.  a  A.  U4;  United 
States  V.  Leonard,  108  Fed.  42,  47  G.  G.  A 
181;  ICarsching  v.  United  States,  113  Fed. 
1006) 

Slides  or  buckles,  made  of  steel  or  a  base 
metal,  some  ornamented  with  rhinestones  and 
some  colored  in  imitation  of  precious  metals, 
and  used  in  ornamenting  slippers,  are  not 
dutiable,  under  the  Tariff  Act  as  "articles 
commonly  known  as  jewelry,"  but  are  dutia- 
ble as  manufactures  of  metal,  not  spedallj 
provided  for.  B.  H.  Bailey  &  Go.  v.  United 
States,  135  Fed.  917,  918. 

"Manufactures  of  metal,'*  under  para- 
graph 107,  Sdiedule  G,  |  1,  c.  349,  Tariff  Act 
Aug.  27,  1894,  would  include  bronze  candela- 
bra and  bronze  statues,  and  they  were  not 
fMe  iiBder  paragraph  462,  Free  List,  |  2,  of 


MANUFACTURES-MANUFAGTUIIEO      291      MANUFAGTUBBfi-MANUPACTUEBD 


said  act  relating  to  old  oopper  fit  only  for 
QULBufacture^  dipping  from  new  copper,  etc. 
Tiffany  v.  United  SUtes,  142  Fed.  282,  283. 

Wbtfe  steel  parts  iiave  been  assembled 
and  united  into  complete  window  sashes,  they 
baTe  been  too  far  advanced  in  manufaicture 
to  permit  their  inclusion  within  the  provision 
of  the  Tariff  Act,  relating  to  **stnictaral 
sbapes"  of  iron  or  steel  fitted  for  nse,  but 
must  be  rated  as  **manufactares  of  metaL" 
Ackerson  v.  United  States,  172  Fed.  808. 

Of  totlieyf-i^—gl 

Tariff  Act  July  24, 18d7,  a  11, 1 1,  Sched- 
ule N,  par.  450,  covering  "manufactures'*  of 
mother-of-pearl  held  to  include  mother-of- 
pearl  made  into  slabs  by  cutting  or  grinding, 
which  are  designed  for  use  in  the  manufac- 
ture of  knife  handles  and  similar  articles. 
Morris  European  ft  American  Express  Go.  t. 
United  States,  100  Fed.  60a 

Of  aeedles 

Needle  cases,  in  which  steel  needles  con- 
stitute the  element  of  chief  value,  should  be 
considered  as  "manufactures  in  chief  value 
of  needles,"  rather  than  as  "articles  com- 
posed in  part  of  steel,**  under  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1897,  c.  11,  f  1,  Schedule  G,  par.  193,  and 
as  needles  are  on  the  free  list,  and  there  is 
no  tariff  provision  for  manufactures  of  nee- 
dles, such  articles  are  dutiable  as  unennmer- 
ated  manufactured  articles  under  section  0. 
Dieckerhoff,  Baffloer  &  Oa  t.  United  States, 
151  Fed.  957. 

Of  Biokel 

In  construing  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c. 
11,  S  1«  Schedule  G^  par.  185,  relating  to 
Dldcel,  nickel  oxide,  and  nickel  alloy,  'in 
vAgB,  ingots,  bars,  or  sheets,*'  held  (X)  that 
only  nickel  in  one  of  the  forms  enumerated  is 
included;  (2)  that  the  provision  for  "sheets,** 
therefore,  does  not  include  anodes  consisting 
of  nickel  plates  about  12  indies  long,  Q\i 
inches  wide,  and  less  than  a  half  inch  thick, 
a  "sheet"  being  broad,  thin»  and  expanded; 
and  (3)  that  soeh  anodes  are  dutiable  as  man- 
ufactures of  nickel  under  paragraph  193. 
Hermann  Boker  ft  Go.  v.  United  States,  152 
Fed.  589. 

Of  oU 

The  refining  process  which  constitutes 
what  is  called  the  "manufacture  of  oil,"  re- 
lating to  cocoanut  oil  of  commerce,  merely 
removes  from  it  the  impurities  due  to  the 
manner  in  whi(^  the  kernel  is  handled  and 
dried  and  to  its  partial  decay.  United  States 
▼.  Oriental  American  Go.,  129  Fed.  249,  251. 

Of  opium 

The  mere  mixing  of  smoking  opium  with 
the  residue  of  opium  that  has  been  smoked, 
and  heating  the  same^  is  not  a  "numufacture 
of  (9lum  for  smoking  purposes**  within  the 
meaning  of  Internal  Bevenue  Act  Oct  1, 1890, 
c  12M,  H  36,  87,  26  Stat  620,  621,  imposing 
t  tax  on  smoking  opiun^  and  regulating  the 


business  of  its  manufactoreK    Shelley  v.  Unit- 
ed States,  198  Fod.  88,  89, 117  O.  G.  A.  294. 

Of  palaa  leaf 

As  to  palm  leaves  whidi  have  been  sub- 
jected to  processes  that  restine  their  natural 
appearance  and  prevent  decay,  Imd  some  of 
which  have  been  arsanged  in  wreaths  on 
wire  frames  held  that,  aa  there  had  be^ 
no  advance  in  manufacture  that  destroyed 
the  original  articles  or  made  them  useful  for 
other  purposes  or  altered  their  trade  designa- 
tion, they  still  remained  dutiable  as  'leaves,** 
under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  a  11,  |  1, 
Schedule  N,  par.  425,  rather  than  as  "manu- 
iCactures**  of  palm  leaf,  provided  for  in  para- 
graph 45a  Kreshower  v.  United  States,  162 
Fed.  485. 

Of  paper 

Paper  bags  with  incidental  printing 
thereon  are  "manufactures  of  paper,**  within 
the  meaning  of  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c. 
11,  i  1,  Schedule  M,  par.  407.  Kraut  v.  Unit- 
ed States,  130  Fed.  392. 

Articles  composed  of  cardboard  on  which 
lithographic  prints  have  been  pasted,  and 
which  is  cut  into  forms  adapted  to  be  folded  in- 
to pockets  to  hang  on  walls,  some  of  them  hav- 
ing pincushions  or  calendars  attached,  are  not 
dutiable  as  "lithographic  prints,**  under  Tariff 
Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  {  1,  Schedule  M, 
par.  400,  but  as  "manufactures  of  paper,** 
under  paragraph  407.  Knauth,  Nachod  A 
Kuhne  v.  United  States,  165  Fed.  144, 146. 

So-called  lace  paper  doilies,  covers,  tops, 
eta,  used  in  packing  confectionery,  etc.,  which 
are  composed  of  paper  perforated  with  orna- 
mental designs  and  printed  with  the  names 
and  addresses  of  merchants,  are  not  dutiable 
ias  paper,  under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c. 
11,  I  1,  Schedule  M,  par.  402,  but  as  '*manu- 
factures  of  paper,**  under  paragraph  407. 
United  States  v.  Hensel,  Bruckmann  &  Lor^ 
bacher,  152  Fed.  578,  579. 

So-called  duplex  lithographic  transfer  pa- 
per, which  is  used  in  transferring  decalco- 
manla  designs  to  pottery,  and  is  produced 
by  pasting  together  two  sheets  of  paper,  one 
coated  with  a  gummy  substance  and  the  other 
uncoated,  is  '*paper,*'  rather  than  "manufac- 
tures of  paper,"  under  Tariff  Act  July  24, 
1897,  c.  11,  f  1,  Schedule  M,  pars.  403,  407. 
B.  F.  Drakenf eld  &  Go.  v.  United  States,  167 
Fed.  798,  799,  93  G.  G.  A.  188. 

Plain  paper  was  stamped  by  a  single  op- 
eration into  shapes  with  lacelike  effects, 
which  are  known  as  tops  or  dollies,  and  are 
used  for  placing  on  the  tops  of  packages  of 
candy,  fruit  etc,  or  under  finger  bowls.  Plain 
paper  might  have  been  used  for  the  same 
purpose,  exc^t  that  it  would  not  have  been 
so  pleasing.  Held  that,  as  the  improvement 
of  the  original  material  had  not  interfered 
with  its  distinguishing  characteristics,  it  was 
dutiable  as  "paper,**  rather  than  as  *'manu- 
factures  of  paper/'  under  Tariff  Act  July  24» 


MAKtTFAOTURES-MAKUFAOTURBD      292      MAmTFACTURXS-MANUFACTUREa) 


1897,  0.  11,  I  1,  Sdiedule  Bf ,  pars.  408,  407. 
Hamilton  y.  United  States,  107  KM.  796,  798» 
93  G.  G.  A.  ISd. 

Of  FMte 

So-called  ililDeBtonea,  arti<des  eompoBed 
of  metal  and  paete^  the'  latter  being  the  more 
valuable  component,  which  are  merely  naed 
to  decorate  and  ornament  women's  outer  ap- 
parel, are  dutiable  as  manufactures  of  paste, 
not  specially  provided  for,  under  the  Tariff 
Act  B.  Blumenthal  4  Co.  t.  United  States, 
135  Fed.  264. 

Tariff  legislation  having  distinguished  be- 
tween glass  and  form  of  It  known  as  paste, 
articles  in  dilef  value  of  paste,  cut,  are  not 
within  the  provision  in  Tariff  Act  July  24, 
1897,  a  11,  I  1,  Schedule  B,  par.  100,  for 
goods  in  chief  value  of  cut  *'glass,"  but  are 
dutiable  as  manufactures  of  ''paste,'*  under 
paragraph  112.  United  States  v.  New  York 
Merchandise  COb,  167  Fed.  684. 

Of  vook  orystal 

In  construing  the  provision  In  the  Tariff 
Act  for  ''precious  stones  advanced  in  condi- 
tion or  value  from  their  natural  state  by 
cleaving,  splitting,  cutting,  or  other  process," 
in  reference  to  intaglios  incised  in  rock  crystal 
(a  precious  stone),  which  have  been  attrac- 
tively and  skillfully  painted,  the  value  and 
salability  of  the  articles  being  chiefly  attribu- 
table to  the  painting,  the  words  ''or  other 
process"  include  such  process  of  painting, 
and  such  intaglios  are  dutiable  under  said 
provision,  rather  than  as  "manufactures  of 
rock  crystal,"  not  specially  provided  for. 
Benedict  &  Wlamer  r.  United  States,  136 
Fed.  242. 

Of  MUUl 

Under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  e.  U,  i 
2,  Free  List,  par.  671,  relating  to  "sand,  crude 
or  manufactured,"  "crude  sand"  is  such  as  is 
found  in  nature,  and  "mani]tfactured  sand" 
is,  though  manufactured,  substantially  the 
same  asi  crude  sand;  and  pulverised  corun- 
dum, which  is  not  produced  from  crude  sand, 
is  therefore  not  sand  of  either  kind  within 
the  meaning  of  the  act  F.  W.  Myers  &  Ga 
T.  United  States,  155  Fed.  602,  503. 

Ground  corundum  ore,  that  has  been  ad- 
vanced in  value  by  processes  of  manufacture 
for  a  specific  use,  is  not  a  "crude  mineral," 
within  the  meaning  of  Tariff  Act  July  24, 
1897,  c.  11,  S  2,  Free  list,  par.  614,  nor  "man- 
ufactured sand,"  within  the  meaning  of  para- 
graph 671,  but  is  dutiable  as  emery  by  si- 
militude, under  section  1,  Schedule  N,  par.  419. 
F.  W.  Myers  &  Go.  v.  United  States,  178  Fed. 
462,  463. 

Of  sUk 

A  powder  made  from  raw  silk,  which 
is  used  in  the  manufacture  of  wall  paper 
and  artificial  flowers,  is  dutiable  under  para- 
graph 391,  Schedule  L^  t  1.  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1897,  c.  11,  as  "manufactures  of  sUk,"  or 
is  at  least  so  dutiaUe  by  similitade^  cinder 


section  7  of  said  act  W.  W.  Thomas  &  Go. 
V.  United  States^  145  VML  1028,  74  G.  a  A. 
682. 

So-called  remanit,  in  the  form  <rf  rope^ 
braids,  and  mats,  which  has  been  manufac- 
tured from  silk  produced  by  carbonising  rags 
containing  silk,  held  to  be  a  "manufbctore  of 
silk,"  within  the  mflsning  of  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1897,  c  U,  «  1,  par.  391,  Schedule  L. 
Frank  v.  United  SUtes,  149  Fed.  1022.  79  a 
G.  A.860. 

Silk  ribbons,  of  whkHx  some  were,  and 
others  were  not.  In  the  nature  of  trimmings, 
but  which,  however  used  for  trimmings,  are 
required  to  be  further  fashioned  for  sudi 
use,  and  which  are  not  in  fact  or  commercial- 
ly within  the  class  of  goods  known  as  *'trim- 
mings,"  are  not  dutiable  as  "silk  trimmings," 
under  paragraph  390,  Tariff  Act  1897,  c.  U,  i 
1,  Schedule  L,  but  as  "manufactures  of  silk*' 
not  specially  provided  for,  under  paragraph 
391,  of  said  act  Gartner  ft  Friedenhelt  v. 
United  States,  IBl  Fed.  674,  676. 

Ribbons  composed  chiefly  of  sUk,  but  in 
part  of  cotton,  are  not  "ribbons  ^  *  *  of 
cotton,  •  •  •  whether  composed  in  part 
of  India  rubber  or  otherwise,"  under  Tarlif 
Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  |  1,  ScAedule  I,  par. 
320,  for  the  word  "otherwise"  is  there  used 
with  the  meaning  of  "nbt,**  and  not  as  relat- 
ing to  other  materials  than  India  rubber. 
Such  ribbons  are  properly  assessed  as  "man- 
ufactures of  silk,**  under  paragraph  391  of 
Schedule  L.  Gartner,  Sons  4  Go«  r.  United 
States,  164  Fed.  967,  968. 

In  eonstruing  the  provision  In  Tariir 
Act  July  24,  1897,  e  11,  |  2,  Free  list  par. 
660,  for  "silk,  raw,  or  as  reeled  fh>m  the  co- 
coon, but  not  *  *  *  advanced  In  manu- 
facture In  any  way,**  held:  (1)  That  the  pro- 
vision does  not  cover  any  form  of  raw  silk 
advanced  beyond  the  condition  of  skeins; 
(2)  that  silk  known  as  'Isingles'*  or  "silk  on 
tubes,"  which  has  be«ii  wound  from  the  fftetss 
onto  tubes,  tiie  effect  of  this  process  being  to 
advance  the  sUk  a  stage  Ih  preparation  for 
its  ultimate  use,  has  been  ''advanced  in  manu- 
facture"; and  (3)  that  silk  In  this  form  is 
not  free  of  duty  under  this  provision,  bnt 
dutiable,  under  paragraph  384  (section  1, 
Schedule  U  of  said  act),  as  "silk  •  •  • 
not  further  advanced  or  manufactured  than 
carded  or  combed  silk."  Klots  v.  United 
States,  139  Fed.  606,  607,  71  a  a  A.  690. 

Raw  tussah  silk,  in  the  same  condition 
as  when  reeled  from  cocoons,  except  that  it 
has  beean  transferred  from  the  large  reels  on 
which  it  was  taken  from  the  cocoons  to  small 
reels,  the  result  of  this  process  not  being 
any  change  in  the  condition  of  the  8l!k  othef 
than  to  adapt  the  skeins  11ms  produced  to 
American  spinning  madilnes;  is  h€Ad  not  to 
be  dutiable  as  "sUk  partially  manufactured 
from  cocoons,"  under  paragraph  384,  Tariff 
Act  July  04,  1897,  e.  11,  |  1,  Schedule  L,  bnt 
to  be  ffee  of  duty  under  pitfagraph  €60,  as 


MAKUFAOTURES-MAKUFACTXTBfiD      298      MAKUFAOTUABd-MAiraFAaraBED 


*'8Uk,  rawt  or  as  re^ed  from  the  cocoob,  tmt 
not  *  ^  *  advanced  In  any  way**  (<diap- 
ter  11,  S  2,  Free  Llat).  '*By  Ihe  very  langaage 
of  parasrapli  660  It  will  be  observed  that 
'manufactored'  silk  does  not  refer  to  the 
method  or  form  of  puttfng  np  tlie  raw  silk« 
but  refen  to  doabling  or  twisting,  or  some 
other  process  of  manufacture  whidi  (Changes 
the  character  of  the  silk  itself."  United 
SUtes  V.  Stewart,  188  Fed.  811,  812  (quoting 
from  O.  A.  6,482). 

Of  straw 

Straw  lace  sewed  with  thread  which  con- 
stitutes a  substantial  element  of  its  cost,  and 
without  which  the  material  could  not  be  held 
together  or  be  a  merchantable  article,  is  not 
within  the  provision  in  paragraph  400,  Tariff 
Act  July  24,  1807,  c  11,  {  1,  Schedule  N,  for 
lace  composed  "wholly"  of  straw,  but  is  duti- 
able as  a  '"manufacture  in  diief  value  of 
straw,*'  under  paragraph  440  of  said  act 
Kurtz,  Stuboeck  St  Ck>.  v.  United  Stotes,  186 
Fed.  268,  260. 

F*»ai  tim  vUto 

Disks  cut  as  a  by-product  from  tin  plate^ 
which  are  reduced  by  the  process  to  only 
About  one>flfth  of  the  value  of  the  plate  from 
which  they  were  made,  aie  not  ''manufactur- 
ed from  tin  plate,*'  within  the  meaning  of 
Tariir  Act  July  24,  1807,  c  11,  |  1,  Schedule 
0,  par.  106.  '"Manufacture"  inplies  addition 
to,  and  not  subtraction  from,  and  an  arti<te 
cannot  be  said  to  have  been  manufactured 
which  results  from  a  process  that  reduces  its 
value.  Shallus  v.  United  Stotes,  162  Fed. 
653,  656,  80  C.  0.  A.  440. 

Of  wrlllvw 

Under  Olltrifr  Act  July  24, 1807,  e  11, 1 1, 
Sdiednle  D,  par.  206,  relating  to  "willow  pre- 
pared for  basket  makers'  use,  •  •  ^  man- 
ufactures of  •  •  •  willow,"  it  was  the 
intention  for  the  final  clause  to  cover  com- 
pleted manufactures  from  the  '"prepared"  wil- 
low enumerated  in  the  preceding  clause; 
and  baskets  made  from  willow  chip  would  be 
dutiable  thereunder  rather  than  as  "manu- 
factures of  chip"  under  Schedule  N,  par.  440. 
Theodore  Olleshelmer  ft  Bro.  v.  United  States, 
158  Fed.  077,  078,  86  O.  a  A.  181. 

Of  wive 
In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,  c.  U,  |  1, 
Schedule  O,  p.  137,  the  provision  tot  "arti- 
cles manufactured  from  •  •  •  wire" 
cannot  be  restricted  to  manufactured  articles 
which  contain  the  round  wire  in  its  integrity; 
and  "steel  wool"  consisting  of  filaments  shav- 
ed from  steel  wire,  and  constituting  a  finish- 
ed commercial  artU^,  is  embraced  in  said 
provision.  Buehne  Steel  Wool  Go.  v.  United 
States,  IfiO  Fed.  107,  106,  86  O.  a  A.  207. 

Of  WDoa 

"Fireproofed  lumber"  is  produced  by  sub- 
jecting ordinary  "sawed  lumber"  to  a  fire- 
proofing  process  which  dianges  its  chemical 
crastruction  and  flti  It  far  parposes   for 


Whidi  It  would  not  otherwise  be  suitably 
but  does  not  produce  a  particularly  noticea- 
ble change  In  its  appearance.  Such  lumber 
is  not,  however,  "sawed  lumber,"  within  the 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,  c.  11,  |  1,  Schedule 
D,  par.  106,  but  Is  a  "manufacture  of  wood," 
as  enumerated  in  paragraph  206.  United 
States  V.  F.  W.  Myers  4  €}o.,  180  Fed.  844, 
845,  847. 

Manicure  sUdcs,  being  completed  articles 
of  wood,  several  inches  long,  pointed  at  one 
end  and  beveled  off  at  the  other  to  form  a 
cutting  edge,  are  "manufactures  of  wood," 
and  dutiable  as  such  under  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1807,  c.  11,  I  1,  Sdiedule  D,  par.  208.  B. 
B.  Bates  ft  Sons  v.  United  States,  176  Fed. 
082. 

Lumber  which  has  been  subjected  to  a 
fireproofing  process  that  largely  increases  its 
value,  but  which  can  still  be  applied  to  the 
ordinary  uses  of  sawed  lumber,  is  not  dutia- 
ble as  "manufactures  of  wood,'*  not  spe- 
cially provided  for,  under  paragraph  208, 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,  c.  11,  S  1,  Schedule 
D,  but  as  "sawed  lumber,"  under  paragraph 
105.  F.  W.  Myera  &  Co.  v.  United  Stetes, 
147  Fed.  204,  206,  77  0.  a  A.  480. 

Dyers'  sti<du  of  hard  wood,  whidi  have 
been  trimmed  and  peeled,  and  had  the  rough 
edges  removed,  and  the  ends  rounded,  are  not 
dutiable  as  "manufactures  of  wood,"  under 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,  c.  11,  {  1,  Schedule 
D,  par.  208,  but  as  wood,  unmanufactured,  un- 
der paragraph  108.  United  States  v.  Knlp- 
scher  &  Maas  Silk  Dyeing  Co.,  152  Fed.  500, 
501. 

Under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,  c  U,  « 
1,  Scbedule  Jj,  par.  887,  providing  for  ailk 
fabrics  wtien  "in  the  gum"  and  when  "boiled 
off,"  held,  that  fabrics  which  on  boiUng  lost 
from  18  to  27  per  cent  in  weight  were  classi- 
ble  under  the  former,  rather  than  the  latter, 
dause;  H.  Mendelson  *  Co.  v.  United  States, 
154  Fed.  88,  84,  88  C.  C.  A.  146. 

The  provision  for  "house  or  cabinet  fur- 
niture, of  wood,  wholly  or  partly  finished, 
and  manufactures  of  wood,"  in  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1807,  c  11, 1 1,  Schedule  D,  par.  208, 
is  intended  to  cover  all  finished  manufactur- 
ed wooden  articles,  however  different  they 
may  be  in  natura  or  appearance  from  "house 
or  cabinet  furniture";  and  wood  flour,  a  com- 
pleted product,  already  prepared  for  use,  is 
therefore  not  to  be  excluded  under  the  rule 
of  ejnsdem  generis.  Nairn  Linoleum  Co.  v. 
United  States,  151  Fed.  065,  066. 

Of  wool 

Goods  of  silk  and  wool,  the  latter  being 
the  minor  component,  are  within  the  purview 
of  Tariff  Act  August  27,  1804,  e.  340,  f  1, 
Schedule  K,  par.  207,  deferring  until  January 
1,  1805,  the  reductioin  in  duties  provided  in 
said  act  on  "manufactures  of  wool."  Bobin- 
son  V.  United  SUtes,  148  Fed.  010. 


KANUFAOTUBBS-MANUFACrryBBI)     Jg94     MANUFACTURING  BSTABLI8HMENT 


The  proviflloii  in  the  silk  schednle  in  Tar- 
iff Act  July  24.  1897,  c.  11,  §  1,  Schedule  L, 
par.  dOl,  'that  all  manufactures,  of  which 
wool  is  a  component  material,  shall  be  classi- 
fied, and  assessed  for  duty  as  'manufactures 
of  wool,*  *'  is  limited  to  goods  of  which  silk  is 
a  component,  and  does  not  include  flaz-wool 
fabrics.  United  States  v.  Charles  A.  John- 
son &  Co.,  167  Fed.  754,  755,  86  C.  C.  A.  147; 
Same  v.  Walsh,  154  Fed.  749  (citing  Hart- 
ranft  v.  Meyer,  10  Sup.  Ct  751, 135  U.  S.  237, 
34  L.  Bd,  110). 

CameVs-hair  press  cloth  is  dutiable  as 
"manufactures  of  wool'*  under  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  §  1,  Schedule  K,  pars, 
366,  383,  rather  than  as  "hair  press  cloth" 
under  Schedule  N,  par.  431.  Oberle  &  Henry 
y.  United  States,  165  Fed.  63,  91  C.  0.  A.  139. 

The  provision  in  Tariff  Act  July  24, 1897, 
c.  11.  S  1,  Schedule  L,  par.  891,.  "that  aU 
'manufactures  of  which  wool  is  a  component 
material'  shall  be  classified  and  assessed  for 
duty  as  manufactures  of  wool"  is  limited  to 
said  schedule,  which  relates  to  goods  con- 
taining silk,  and  the  classification  of  fab- 
rics of  flax  and  wool  should  be  determined 
without  regard  to  said  provision.  United 
States  V.  B.  De  F.  Wilkinson  Co.,  154  Fed. 
751,  752  (citing  United  States  v.  Walsh,  154 
Fed.  749;  United  States  t.  Slaaenger,  113 
Fed.  524). 

In  construing  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897, 
c.  11, 1 1,  Schedule  L,  par.  891,  relating  to  "all 
manufactures  ^  ^  ^  of  which  silk  la  the 
component  material  of  chief  value,"  and  con- 
taining a  proviso  that  "all  manufactures  of 
which  wool  is  a  component  material  shall  be 
classified  and  assessed  for  duty  as  manufac- 
tures of  wool,"  held,  that  the  ordinary  rule 
should  be  applied  that  a  proviso  at  the  close 
of  an  independent  paragraph  like  this  should 
be  construed  as  limiting  only  what  precedes 
it,  and  that  the  words  "all  manufactures"  in 
the  proviso  have  no  broader  relation  than  the 
same  words  in  the  beginning  of  the  para- 
graph. United  States  v.  Walsh,  154  Fed.  770, 
83  C.  C.  A.  472  (citing  United  States  v.  Q. 
Falk  &  Bros.,  27  Sup.  Ct  191,  204  U.  S.  143, 
149,  150,  51  L.  Ed.  411). 

CSattle-hair  goods  are  dutiable  by  simili- 
tude as  "manufactures  of  wool,"  under  Tariff 
Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11,  i  1,  Schedule  K, 
par.  366,  being  similar  in  quality,  use,  and 
texture.  F.  Rosenstern  &  Co.  v.  United 
States,  171  Fed.  71,  72,  96  C.  C.  A.  175. 

In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  {  1, 
Schedule  L,  par.  391,  the  proviso  that  "all 
manufactures,  of  which  wool  is  a  compo- 
nent material,  shall  be  classified  and  assess- 
ed for  duty  as  'manufactures  of  wool'"  is 
not  limited  to  the  goods  containing  silk  which 
are  the  subject  of  said  paragraph,  but  ex- 
tends to  all  silk  and  wool  goods;  and  dress 
goods  in  chief  value  of  silk,  but  in  part  of 
wool,  become,  by  virtue  of  this  proviso,  sub- 
ject to  the  duty  on  wool  goods,  rather  than 


that  on  silks.  United  States  v.  Scruggs,  Vaa- 
dervoort  &  Barney  Dry  CKhmIb  Co.,  156  Fed. 
940,  942,  84  a  a  A.  44a 

KAHUFAOTUBIHG    AMD    XECHAHIC- 
AI.  BVUHBBS 

A  domestic  corporation,  formed  for  tbe 
purchase  of  the  capital  stock,  evidences  of 
indebtedness,  and  assets  of  another  domestic 
corporation,  and  for  the  further  purpose  of 
manufacturing  and  selling  implements  aud 
machinery,  is  one  organized  for  a  purpose 
other  than  that  of  carrying  on  any  kind  of 
'^manufacturing  or  mechanical  business,"  and 
is  therefore  not  within  the  exception  as  to 
the  liability  of  stockholders  made  by  Const 
Minn,  art  10,  {  3,  in  favor  of  corporations  of 
that  kind.  Bemh^mer  v.  Converse,  27  Sap. 
Ct  755,  767,  206  U.  S.  516,  61  L.  Ed.  1163. 

BCAKITPAOTUBIirG  OOBPORATION 

See  Manufacturer. 

See,  also.  Mechanical  Corporation. 

MAirorAOTUBIirG    ESXABUSHMEirr 

A  sawmill  at  which  lumber  is  sawed  for 
sale  on  the  market  is  a  "manufacturing  esr 
tablishment,"  within  Ky.  St  1903,  K  2487. 
2488,  giving  laborers  in  manufacturing  bb- 
tablishments  a  Uen  for  wages  superior  to 
that  of  mortgages.  Graham  v.  Magann, 
Fawke  Lumber  Co.,  80  S.  W.  799,  800,  US 
Ky.  192,  4  Ann.  Cas.  1026  (citing  Bogard  t. 
Tyler's  Adm'r,  65  S.  W.  709,  119  Ky.  637). 

The  furnishing  of  electric  light  and  pow- 
er and  distributing  it  is  not  manufacturing, 
within  Pub.  St  1901,  C.  66,  {  U,  providing 
that  towns  may,  by  vote,  exempt  for  certain 
time  from  taxation  any  "manufacturing  es- 
tablishment" proposed  to  be  erected  or  put 
in  operation.  Williams  v.  Park,  66  Aa  463^ 
464,  72  N.  H.  306,  64  li.  B.  A.  33. 

Act  March  2,  1899  (Acts  1899,  d.  234; 
Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  9  70671;  Homer's  Ann. 
St  1901,  i  6169k),  declaring  that  the  words 
"manufacturing  and  mercantile  eetabllBb- 
ments"  mean  any  mill,  factory,  place  of  trade, 
or  other  establishment  where  goods  are  man- 
ufactured, or  offered  for  sale,  is  not  confined 
in  its  operaticm  to  places  where  goods  are 
manufactured  for  or  offered  to  the  public 
market,  and  a  machine  shop  maintained  by 
a  railway  company  for  Its  own  repairs  and 
the  making  of  materials  for  its  own  use  is 
within  the  statute.  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  B. 
Co.  V.  Cavanaugh,  71  N.  B.  239,  241,  36  Ind. 
App.  32. 

A  plant  for  the  generation  of  electricity 
is  a  '^manufacturing  establishment,"  as  af- 
fecting the  owner's  liability  for  death  of  an 
employ^  resulting  from  his  failure  to  guard 
machinery,  as  required  by  Bums'  Ann.  St 
1908,  ii  8021,  8029.  Angola  By.  &  Power  Co. 
V.  Butz  (Ind.)  98  N.  B.  818,  820. 

A  flouring  mill  is  a  "manufacturing  e^- 
tabllshmrat,"  wiJ^n  Ky.  St  1903,  S  2487,  glv- 


MANUFACTUBlirO  ISrrABIiI8HAi£NT     28S 


MAKtJFAOTURIira  PLANT 


log  a  Boi  upon  t)ropert3r  of  bwnen  or  open- 
tors  of  any  rolling  mill,  foundry,  or  other 
manufacturing  establiBhmait  aBsigned  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors,  to  one  famishing 
materials  or  sopplles  to  ran  sadi  bvslness. 
W.  H.  Hall  &  Son  r.  J.  T.  Guthrie's  Sons 
(Ky.)  103  S.  W.  721,  722, 

A  concern  engaged  In  the  boslness  of 
manufitctoring  engines,  pumps,  fans,  and  the 
like  is  a  "manofacturing  establishment,*' 
within  the  factory  act  (Acts  1809,  p.  234,  a 
142,  I  9;  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  |  70671),  re- 
quiring operators  of  ^'manufactaring  estab- 
lishments" to  guard  machinery.  Crawford  A 
McCrlnmion  Ck>.  T.  Gose  (Ind.)  82  N.  E.  984, 
98S. 

In  an  action  fdr  injuries  to  a  serrant, 
where  the  complaint  alleged  that  defendant 
was  engaged  in  manufacturing  brashes,  and 
had  a  machine  saw,  which  was  connected 
with  the  steam  power  and  revolved  with 
great  speed  when  in  use,  and  that  plaintiff 
was  injured  while  operattog  the  saw,  etc.,  it 
directly  averred  that  the  saw  was  operated 
in  a  '*manufiicturing  establishment  within 
the  state,"  and  that  plaintiff  was  engaged  at 
work  in  a  "manufacturing  establishmenf 
owned  and  operated  by  defendant  when  the 
Injury  was  rec^ved,  within  the  factory  act, 
which  requires  a  saw  used  in  a  manufacture 
Ing  plant  to  be  guarded.  Holcomb  v.  Nop^ 
man,  91  N.  B.  625,  629,  47  Ind.  App.  87. 

In  a  statute  making  a  place  where  arti- 
cles in  a  raw,  unfinished,  or  incomplete  fitate 
are  converted  into  a  new,  improved,  or  dif- 
ferent form  a  "manufacturing  establishment," 
the  word  "raw"  is  a  relative  term,  and 
means  not  yet  changed  by  some  process  of 
treatment  or  fabrication.  The  words  **uafln- 
Ished"  and  "incomplete"  likewise  refer  to  a 
state  or  condition  not  yet  attained  and  mean 
not  fully  fashioned  to  meet  some  design. 
Factory  Act  (Laws  1903,  c.  356)  {  7,  provides 
that  an  establishment  wherein  any  natural 
products  or  other  articles,  in  a  raw,  incom- 
plete, or  unfinished  condition,  are  converted 
iDto  a  new  improved  or  different  form,  is  a 
manufacturing  establishment,  within  the  act 
Held,  that  an  establishment  wherein  railroad 
iron,  old  stoves,  waste  and  scrap  Iron  of 
every  description,  is  cut  into  lengths,  known 
as  grade  No.  1,  grade  No.  2  and  busheling 
scrap,  by  machines  known  as  alligator  shears, 
operated  by  power,  to  meet  standing  specifi- 
cations of  mills  which  purchase  the  product. 
Is  a  manufacturing  establishment  within  the 
act  Gasper  v.  Lewin,  109  Pac.  667,  659,  82 
Kan.  604. 

A  gasoline  engine,  used,  in  connection 
with  machinery  consisting  of  belts,  pulleys, 
and  cog-wheels,  to  pump  water  through  pipes 
to  supply  the  inhabitants  of  a  dty,  is  not  a 
"manufacturing  establishment"  or  a  "mill," 
within  the  meaning  of  theee  terms  in  section 
4682,  Gen.  St  1909.  Ward  v.  €ity  of  Norton, 
122  Pac.  881,  86  Kan.  906w 


*  Pub.  Laws  1909,  No.  28fc,  1 12,  which  re- 
quires the  owner,  ag^it,  or  lessee  of  any  man- 
uftictorlng  establishment  to  provide  auto- 
matic gates  for  elevator  shafts,  imposes  the 
duty  upon  an  ovraer  of  a  building  who  leases 
a  floor  of  the  building;  the  term  "manufac- 
turing establishment^'  as  used  in  the  sectioi) 
meaning  premises  on  whidi  a  manufacturing 
business  is  conducted.  Barfoot  v.  White  Star 
Une^  136  N.  W.  437,  441,  170  IClch.  349. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  towns 
may,  by  vote,  exempt  from  taxation  any 
"manufacturing  establishment"  proposed  to 
be  erected  therein  and  the  capital  to  be  used, 
the  term  "manufacturing  establishment"  re- 
fers to  the  property  of  the  proprietors  of  the 
industry  who  receive  the  benefit  conferred  by 
the  statute,  and  not  the  property  of  others 
having  no  interest  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
business,  and  therefore  the  statute  does  not 
confer  authority  to  exempt  an  owner  of 
property  who  is  not  entitled  to  such  exemp- 
tion from  taxation  on  the  same  because  it  is 
leased  to  another  who  is  so  entitled.  Ports- 
mouth Shoe  Oo.  V.  Caty  of  Portsmouth,  66 
Atl.  1046,  74  N.  H.  222. 

St  1902,  c.  435,  i  1,  as  amended  by  St 
1909,  a  514,  i  48^  prohibits  the  employm^t  U 
women  and  children,  except  as  permitted, 
and  declares  that  every  employer  shall  post 
in  a  consfpicuous  place  in  every  room  in  which 
such  persons  are  employed  a  printed  notice 
stating  the  hours  of  labor,  etc.  The  act  ap- 
plies only  to  "manufacturing  and  mechanical 
establishments,"  which  are  defined  by  section 
17  to  include  those  places  popularly  known 
as  "mills"  and  "shops,"  where  continuously 
operating  machinery  and  constant  service  by 
attendants  throughout  the  whole  day  are  not 
essential  to  economical  manufacture,  and 
where  ordinary  machin^y  is  stopped  for  the 
noon  hour.  Held,  that  such  act  does  not  ex- 
tend in  that  reject  to  stores,  or  to  branches 
of  industry,  where  continuity  of  labor  by 
some  person  Is  necessary  from  the  beginning 
to  the  end  of  the  woricday;  other  provisions 
having  been  ma^e  for  those  classes  of  employ- 
ment by  chapter  514,  H  47,  68-70.  Common- 
wealth V.  Riley,  97  N.  B.  367,  870,  210  B£ass. 
387,  Ann.  Cas.  1912D,  388. 

MAmnPACTinuxG  njkxr 

Acts  Tenn.  1903,  c.  110,  i  1,  granting  au- 
thority to  any  company  operating  a  railroad 
in  the  state  to  build  lateral  roads  not  exceed- 
ing 15  miles  in  length,  extending  from  the 
main  stem  or  any  branch  of  its  line  "to  any 
mill,  quarry,  mine,  manufacturing  plant  or 
to  the  bank  of  any  navigable  stream,  without 
the  making  of  any  amendment  to  the  charter 
of  said  railroad,"  does  not  confer  the  right 
on  a  railroad  company  to  the  exduslon  of  the 
municipal  authorities  to  build  a  branch  track 
within  the  limits  of  a  city  to  a  connection 
with  the  private  tracks  of  a  cotton  compress 
company  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  a  river,' 
the  compress  being  500  feet  from  the  river 


MANUFACXUBIKO  PURPOSES 


MARBLB 


and  having  no  track  connection  therewith, 
cm  the  ground  that  it  i«  a  lati»al  road  to 
the  bank  of  a  "navigable  stream,"  nor  oa  the 
ground  that  the  compreBs  is  a  "mannf  actur- 
Ing  plant,**  within  the  meaning  of  the  stat>- 
Qte;  it  not  being  such  a  plant  within  anj 
just  or  recognized  definition  of  the  t^m. 
City  of  M^nphis  v.  St  I40UIS  ft  S.  F.  B.  Co., 
183  Fed.  629,  536,  106  0.  a  A.  7S. 

MANTTFACTUBING  PURPOSES 

See  Water  Famished  for  Manufacturing 
Purposes. 

The  production  and  control  of  electric 
power  by  mechanical  means,  and  its  adapta- 
tion for  use  upon  a  trolley  system,  is  a  '*man- 
ufacturing  purpose,"  within  the  meaning  of 
section  8  of  the  mechanic's  lien  law.  Bates 
Mach.  Co.  ▼.  Trenton  A  N.  B.  B.  Co.,  58  AtL 
935,  936,  70  N.  J.  Law,  68i,  103  AuL  St  Bep. 
811. 

Where  a  corporation  was  organised  for 
"manufacturing  purposes,"  such  term  could 
not  be  extended  so  as  to  include  the  power  of 
the  corporation  to  acquire  and  convey  its  own 
stock.  Maryland  Trust  Co.  v.  Naticmal  Me- 
chanics' Bank,  63  Atl.  70,  74,  102  Md.  608. 

MAirUFACTUBIirO  FUBSUIT8 

See  Manufacture. 

MANURE 

The  word  '^manure'*  has  no  tedinical 
meaning,  nor  has  it  acquired  a  commercial 
one  differing  from  its  ordinary  one.  Manure 
is  a  conmion  article,  well  known  to  all  man- 
kind, and  hence  an  ambiguity  cannot  arise 
from  the  use  of  the  term.  Where  defendant 
contracted  In  writing  to  remove  all  the  ma- 
nure that  might  accumulate  at  plaintifTs 
stable  every  day  for  a  year,  it  was  no  de- 
fense, to  an  action  for  breach  of  sudi  con- 
tract, that  plaintiff  changed  the  (diaracter  of 
the  bedding  during  the  continuance  theeof, 
by  reason  of  which  the  manure  was  less  val- 
uable to  defendant  Keyes  A  Watldns  liv- 
ery Co.  V.  Freber,  76  S.  W.  698,  699,  102 
Mo.  App.  315. 

MANY 

Four  persons  are  sufficient  to  constitute 
"many  persons,"  under  Code  Civ.  Proc.  { 
448,  providing  that,  "where  the  question  is 
one  of  a  common  or  general  interest  of  many 
persons,  •  •  •  one  or  more  may  sue 
•  •  *  for  the  benefit  of  all.*'  CUmax 
Specialty  Co.  v.  Seneca  Button  Co.,  103  N.  Y. 
Supp.  822,  824,  54  Misa  Bep.  152. 

As  muob 

The  word  "many,"  in  a  provision  of  a 
dty  charter  that  notice  of  the  Introduction  of 
^  ordinance  shall  be  published  at  least  as 
many  as  tea  4Ays  before  the  adoption  of 
such  ordinance,  meant  the  same  as  though 
the  word  "much"  had  heem  used  and  required 


merely  that  the  notice  be  pabllahed  ten  da:pB 
before  the  action  was  taken,  but  did  not  re- 
quire that  It  be  published  every  day  for  tea 
days.  Smith  ?.  Atlanta,  51  &  &  741,  742, 
123  0*.  877. 

MAHT  PEBSOirS 

See  Great  Many  PersonsL 

RAAP 

"A  'map^  means  not  only  a  dtiineatloB 
giving  a  general  idea  of  the  land  taken,  but 
also  such  full  and  accurate  notes  and  data 
as  are  necessary  to  fumlirii  complete  meaos 
for  identifying  and  aacertaintng  the  precise 
position  of  every  part,  with  courses  and  dis- 
tances, so  that  every  part  can  be  found." 
Hollister  v.  State,  77  Pac  839,  345,  9  Idaho^ 
651  (quoting  Mill.  Em.  Dom.  {  U7)» 

MAPLE  SUGAR 

See  Imitation  Maple  Sugar; 

MAPLE  SYRUP 

The  popular  recognized  definition  ci 
"maple  syrup"  is,  that  it  is  the  syrup  re- 
duced from  boiling  down  the  sap  that  flows, 
in  the  spring  of  the  year,  from  live  maple 
treea  United  SUtea  v^  Scanlon,  180  Fed. 
485,  486. 

MARASCHINO 

Fruit  In  maraschino  aa  edible  fruit,  see 
Edible  PnUt 

MARASQUE  WATER 

The  article  known  as  ''marasque  water^ 
or  "ean  de  marasque,"  which  is  produced  by 
distilling  the  Juice  of  crushed  cherries,  di- 
luted somewhat  with  water  used  in  the  dis- 
tilling process,  is  not  dutiable  as  cherry  juice, 
under  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  I  1, 
Schedule  H,  par.  299,  80  Stat  174,  but  as 
an  unenumerated  manufactured  article  under 
section  6,  30  Stat  205.  Leerburger  Broa  y. 
United  States,  141  Fed.  1023. 

MARBLE 

Hautevllle  stone^  and  various  other 
stones  of  substantially  the  same  character, 
which  are  susceptible  of  a  high  polish  and  are 
used  as  an  interior  decorative  stone,  are  not 
the  kind  of  limestone  that  is  "marble,"  with- 
in the  meaning  of  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897, 
a  11,  S  1,  Schedule  B,  par.  114,  but  are  duti- 
able as  "limestone,"  under  paragraph  117. 
United  States  v.  a  D.  Jackson  A  Co.,  175 
Fed.  884,  885;  Bockmann  v.  United  states, 
158  Fed.  807,  86  a  a  A.  67. 

So-called  Mexican  onyx  is  dutiable  as 
"onyx"  rather  than  as  "marble,"  under  Tariff 
Act  July  24, 1897,  c.  11,  i  1,  Schedule  B,  par. 
114.  Blochmw  Banking  Go.  v.  Blaks^  168 
Fed.  572. 


MABE 


1897 


MARINER'S  S15HV1CK 


MARE 

Under  a  stetiite  making  It  grand  laroeBy 
to  steal  a  "maia,"  tto  stealing  of  a  female 
eolt  is  grand  laicenj.  Miller  r.  Tenitoiy, 
80  Paa.  321,  S22,  9  Aria.  128. 

"It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge 
and  obserration  tbat  among  our  people  tbe 
word  'mare/  when  nsed  without  a  word  of 
qualification,  is  imderstood  to  mean  a  female 
of  the  horse  spedea.  We  appreheiid  that  ane 
rarely,  if  ever,  hears  the  expression  *a  niare 
horse'  eniployed  to  describe  a  ftoiale  of  tbe 
species  horse,  but  that  the  term  nniversally 
used  in  this  state  for  this  purpose  is  the  sin- 
gle word  'mare.'  On  the  other  hand,  when 
a  female  of  the  q;>ecies  mule  is  intended, 
the  expression  nsed  is  'a  mare  niule,*  and, 
when  a  finale  of  the  species  ass  is  intended, 
the  word  'jenny*  is  used."  McLamb  ft  Go.  ▼. 
Lambertson,  d2  S.  B.  107,  109,  4  Ga.  App. 
095  (qnoting  Teal  T.  States  46  fk  B.  0M,  119 
Ga.  104). 

As  horwm 

See  Horses 

MARGIN 

"Margin,**  as  a  brokerage  term,  signifies 
a  sum  of  money  or  its  value  in  securities 
deposited  with  the  broker  to  protect  him 
against  loss  in  buying  or  selling  for  his  prin- 
dpaL  Where  a  broker  was  inatmcted  to 
"hedge  when  margin  about  exhaostad,"  tka 
instmctioiis  oovezed,  not  only  the  partUmlar 
margin  at  the  time,  but  any  nuiigln  in  the 
bands  of  the  broker  at  any  time  before  the 
close  of  the  trades.  Winston  v.  F.  A.  Long- 
shore &  Oo.,  40  South.  517,  518,  116  La.  21 
(qnothdg^  and  ad<H?tlng  definition  in  Stimd. 
Diet). 

*^rhe  meaning  of  the  word  "margins,' 
as  ordinarily  nsed  in  connection  with 
stock  sales,  has  long  been  well  understood. 
As  most  frequently  employed  in  this  state  at 
the  time  of,  and  for  many  years  prior  to, 
the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  it  meant 
the  sum  deposited  by  the  purchaser  of  stock 
with  his  broker,  being  a  certain  percentage  of 
the  purchase  price  of  the  stock,  the  broker 
agreeing  to  advance  the  balance  of  the  pur- 
chase price  upon  condition  that  he  should 
hoM  the  stock  as  security  for  his  advance, 
with  the  right  to  sell  it,  in  case  of  deprecia- 
tion and  teilure  of  the  purchaser  to  keep  the 
Wtghi*  good  r  ^  *  •  but  it  was  also  em- 
ployed to  describe  deposits  made  by  sellers 
and  pttrchasers  of  stock  for  future  delivery 
In  various  ways."  Conradt  v.  Lepper,  81  Pac 
307,  311,  13  Wyo.  478  (qnoting  and  adopting 
the  definition  in  Sheehy  v.  9hinn,  87  Pac  398, 
105  Oal.  878). 

XA&enr  of  KATfiROAP 

A  deed  calling  for  "the  margtn  of  ttie 
railroad'*  at  a  point  where  there  is  a  cut 
tiie  topaf  tba  cot,  aad  not  tbe  bass 


or  a  l)olnt  midway  np  it ;  and  tbe  BArgIn  of 
a  railroad  where  there  is  ifiut  or  a  fin  is 
the  top  of  the  cut  or  the  base  of  the  fill. 
Louisville  A  N.  a.  Co.  v.  EUiston  (ff.)  10$ 
a  W.  858,  860. 

MARINE 

Mercantile  Marine. 

MABIHE  XK8URAH0B 

.  ▲  "marine  insurance"  is  an  insurance 
against  risks  connected  with  navigation  to 
which  a  ship,  cargo,  freight,  or  other  insur- 
able interest  in  such  property  may  be  ex- 
posed during  a  certain  voyage  or  a  fixed  pe- 
riod of  time.  Soelberg  v.  Western  Assur.  Co. 
of  Toronto,  Can.,  119  Fed.  23,  28,  55  C.  C.  A. 
601. 

A  contract  for  the  insurance  against  fire 
of  a  vessel  while  lying  moored  and  in  use 
as  a  hospital  is  not  maritime,  and  the  meas- 
ure of  liability  for  a  loss  by  fire,  which  par- 
tially destroyed  the  vessel,  is  not  governed 
\fy  file  TQiBS  of  "marine  insorance,"  but  by 
Chose  ot  fire  insurance,  and  is  limited  to  fb^ 
amount  whkdi  tte  value  of  the  property  was 
depreciated  by  the  fire,  not  exceeding 'the  sum 
sned  for.  Olty  of  Detroit  v.  Gmmmond,  121 
Fed.  968,  971,  68  C.  O.  A.  801. 


nrvuBAHOB  BuaimM 

The  business  of  issuing  ordihary  fire  in- 
surance policies  upon  boats  navigating  the 
Great  Lakes  and  the  high  seas  is  "marine 
insurance  business,"  within  Laws  1896,  p. 
392,  c.  175,  relating  to  the  organization  of 
marine  insurance  companiea.  Dwianell  t. 
Minneapolis  Fire  &  Marine  Mut  Ins.  Co.,  97 
N.  W.  110,  111,  00  Minn.  383. 

MABINS  lOLSS 

"The  log  waa  invented  abont  the  same 
time  which  inaugurated  measuring  of  the 
sea  or  marine  miles,  known  as  'EQglish 
geographical'  miles.  The  sea  mile,  knot,  geo- 
graphical, or  marine  mile  measures  6,086.7 
feet  on  the  sea,  on  the  scale  of  60  geographi- 
cal or  sea  miles  to  a  degree."  In  the  Muscon- 
gus  Grant  by  the  council  of  Plymouth  in  Dev- 
on, Bug.,  made  between  1620  and  1635,  aft- 
er the  inauguration  of  the  geiigraphlcal  or 
"marine  mile,"  granting  certain  land,  etc., 
within  thr^  miles  of  the  main  land,  the 
three-mile  limit  is  to  be  measured  by  the  geo- 
graphical or  marine  mile  or  knot,  and  not 
by  the  statute  mile.  Lazell  v.  Boardman, 
69  Ati.  97,  99,  103  Me.  292,  13  Ann.  Cas. 
678  (citing  Rockland,  Mt  D.  ft  S.  S.  Co. 
T.  Pessenden,  8  Atl.  550,  79  Me.  140). 

MARIirE&*8  SSRTI€»B 

See  Maritime  Service. 

Services  rendered  to  a  domestic  vessel 
after-  it  has  been  laid  up  at  a  wharf  for  the 
winter.  In  pumping  it  out,  attending  to  its^ 
Unes,  etc,  are  aot  "mariner's  services"  and* 


MABITAIi 


^198 


HABITIMB  IiIE3r 


cannot  be  made  the  basis  of  a  maritime  lien. 
The  Jamea  T.  Fnrber»  157  Fed.  12^  12& 

MARITAL 

aCABITAI.  OOKPAHIOHBHIP 

As  property,  see  Property. 

MABITAL  BIGHTS. 

See^  also,  Right  Acquired  by  Marriage. 

The  rights  acquired  by  marriage  of  the 
gaUty  party  under  a  divorce  decree,  which 
are  forfeited  by  Code,  {  8181,  are  not  limited 
to  rights  and  obligations  owed  to  the  guilty 
party  by  his  spouse,  forfeiture  of  which 
would  inure  to  the  benefit  of  such  spouse 
alone,  and  the  section  has  no  bearing  on  ali- 
mony. Hamilton  ▼.  McNeUl,  129  N.  W.  480, 
485,  150  Iowa,  470,  Ann.  Oas.  1912D,  004. 

MARITIME 

BCABimiE  BELT 

'rrhe  ^maritime  belt*  is  that  part  of  the 
sea  which,  in  contradistinction  to  the  open 
sea,  is  under  the  sway  of  the  riparian  states, 
which  can  exdtfslTcdy  reserve  the  fishery 
within  their  respective  maritime  belts  for 
their  own  citizens,  whether  fish,  or  pearls,  or 
amber,  or  other  products  of  the  sea."  State 
of  Louisiana  v.  Mississippi,  26  Sup.  Ot  408, 
422,  202  U.  a  1,  50  U  Ed.  018. 

MABITIME  OA8B 

See  avil  Maritime  Casa 

KABimiE  OOBTBAOT 

Where  a  storage  contract  is  incidental 
to  the  transportation  by  water  of  the  goods 
stored,  as  where  they  were  stored  by  the  car- 
rier for  delivery  to  the  consignee.  It  is  "mari- 
time." Evans  v.  New  York  &  P.  S.  S.  Co., 
145  Fed.  841,  842. 

A  ''maritime  contract"  must  concern 
transportation  by  sea,  and  relate  to  naviga- 
tion and  to  maritime  employment  It  must 
be  one  of  navigation  and  commerce  on  navi- 
gable waters.  Not  every  contract  having  ref- 
erence to  a  ship  Is  within  the  admiralty  ju- 
risdiction, but  only  such  as  relate  to  mari- 
time employment,  such  as  pertain  to  the 
navigation  of  a  ship  or  assist  the  vessel  in 
the  discharge  of  a  maritime  obligation.  It  is 
not  enough  that  the  service  Is  to  be  done  up- 
on the  sea  or  with  respect  to  the  ship.  Bow- 
ers Hydraulic  Dredging  Co.  v.  Federal  Con- 
tracting Co.,  148  Fed.  290,  293  (citing  The 
Richard  Wlnslow,  71  Fed.  426,  18  O.  O.  A. 
844;  In  re  Hydraulic  Steam  Dredge  No.  1, 
80  Fed.  545,  25  C.  C.  A.  028). 

To   give  the  court  jurisdiction  over  a 

contract  as  ''maritime,"  it  must  relate  to  the 

trade  or  business  of  the  sea,  or  must  be 

essentially  maritime  In  its  character.     The 

'most  enlarged  interpretatloju  of  .  the  term 


"maritime,"  as  applied  to  JurisdictloB,  hat 
not  been  extended  beyond  subjects  or  eo- 
gagementB  which  are  necessarily  connected 
with  services  to  be  rendered  on  tide  waters, 
or  supplies  furnished  to  vessels  in  aid  of  a 
voyage,  or  labor,  or  materials,  or  cash  ad- 
vanced to  obtain  such  supplle&  The  Maiy 
F.  Chisholm,  129  Fed.  814,  817  (dtlng  Scott  v. 
The  Morning  Glory,  21  Fed.  Cas.  845;  The 
Perseverance,  19  Fed.  Ca&  807). 

Cktuetmr  pmvij 

A  bond  given  by  the  charterer  of  a  ves- 
sel to  Secure  his  performance  of  the  condi- 
tions of  the  charter  party,  which  neither  re- 
quires nor  authorizes  the  surety  to  perform 
such  contract  in  case  of  the  default  of  the 
principal,,  but  merely  to  respond  In  damages 
for  its  breach,  is  not  a  "maritime  contract 
Pacific  Surety  Co.  v.  Leatham  &  Smith  T.  k 
W.  Co.,  161  Fed.  440,  444,  80  C.  a  A.  070. 

Bepairs  tm  Teasel 

A  contract  for  repairs  to  be  furnished  to 
a  canal  boat  engaged  in  navigating  the  Erie 
Canal  and  Hudson  river  is  a  "maritime  con- 
tract," and  proceedings  to  enforce  a  Uen  for 
the  repairs  furnished  are  within  the  exclu- 
sive admiralty  Jurisdiction  of  the  Xederal 
courts,  though  such  repairs  were  made  in  dry 
dock.  Perry  v.  Haines,  24  Sup.  CL  8,  10, 191 
U.  S.  17,  48  L.  Bd.  78. 

Wlutrf  ace  eoatraet 

A  contract  relating  to  wharfage,  as  un- 
derstood in  the  laws  and  usages  of  maritime 
affairs,  is  clearly  a  "maritime  contract"  The 
James  T.  Furber,  129  Fed.  808,  8ia 

MABimCE  T^Tigy 

A  "maritime  lien"  enables  a  creditor, 
without  notice  to  the  debtor  and  without  giv- 
ing him  the  protection  of  the  bond  for  il- 
legal proceedings,  to  attach  and  seize  a  ves- 
sel, though  she  is  loaded  with  freight  and 
passengers  and  about  to  proceed  on  a  voyage. 
One  who  makes  repairs  on  a  vessel  in  a  fo^ 
elgn  port  under  a  contract  with  the  known 
owner  then  present  is  not  entitled  to  a  mar 
Itlme  lien  therefor,  in  the  absence  of  a  con- 
tract for  a  lien,  express  or  Implied,  or  a  mu- 
tual understanding  that  the  repairs  were  far- 
nished  on  the  credit  of  the  vessel,  and  the 
burden  of  proving  such  contract  of  under- 
standing resta  on  the  party  asserting  the  lien. 
The  CUnton,  160  Fed.  421,  422,  87  C.  C.  A 
373. 

A  provision  of  a  bill  of  lading  issued  by 
a  steamship  company  that  "the  carrier  shall 
have  a  lien  on  the  goods  for  all  freights, 
primages,  and  charges"  does  not  affect  or 
change  the  nature  of  the  lien,  which  Is  sim- 
ply the  "maritime  lien,"  as  understood  In  the 
jurisprudence  of  the  United  States,  to  pre- 
serve which  the  retaining  of  possession  is 
essential,  although  such  provision  may  in 
some  cases  preserve  the  lien  where  it  would 
otherwise  be  deemed  waived  by  other  prori- 
sions  to  the  time  and  mamiar  of  paying  the 


MABITfME  LISSK 


299 


1CAEKBB|> 


freight.  Portland  Flouring  -MUI0  Co.  r.  Port- 
land ft  Asiatic  S.  S*  Co,  145  Fed.  687,  602. 
"^pon  an  ordinary  contract  of  aflr^tat 
moit,  tbe  lien  of  tbe  shipper  is  a  'maritimo 
lien,'  and  a  proceeding  in  rem  to  enflorce  It 
is  within  the  ezcLosiTe  original  cognizance  of 
courts  of  admiralty."  John  Meonior  Oun  Ca 
y.  liChigh  VaUey  Transp.  Co.,  101  N.  W.  886. 
388,  123  Wis.  143  (quoting  and  adopting  defi- 
nition in  The  BeUast»  7  Wall  6^  10  L.  Bd. 
266). 

Credit  of  Tossel 

"Owing  to  the  underlying  necessities 
of  commerce,  and  to  the  wandering  charac- 
ter of  a  ship,  courts  of  admiralty  will  infer, 
in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary,  that, 
where  supplies  necessary  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  ship's  voyage  are  furnished  in  a 
foreign  port  on  the  order  of  the  captain  of  a 
flbip,  or  the  ship's  ^gent,  and  even  under  some 
circumstances  by  the  owner,  they  are  fur> 
Dished  on  the  credit  of  the  ship.  ^  *  ^ 
These  fbcts  and  conditions  being  proved,  are 
held  ground  for  the  reasonable  presumption 
of  credit  to  the  ship  and  a  consequent  lien. 
The  same  presumption  is  held  to  arise  as  to 
certain  maritime  services  rendered  to  a  ship, 
hidependently  of  its  character  as  domestic 
or  foreign.  The  lien  to  which  the  ship  is 
thus  subjected  is  created,  not  so  much  for 
the  benefit  of  the  creditor,  but  for  tbe  bene- 
fit of  commerce.  ^  ^  ^  It  would  be  an 
abase  of  tlie  administration  of  the  law  of 
maritime  lien  to  decree  a  lien  for  servioes 
not  clearly  proved  to  have  been  entirely  mar- 
itime and  rendered  to  the  particular  res  upon 
which  the  lien  is  claimed.  A  lien  does  not, 
and  should  not,  attach  for  a  supposed  credit 
given  to  a  vessel,  unless  the*  service  or  sup^ 
pUes  are  clearly  shown  to  have  been  ren- 
dered or  furnished  to  the  particular  vessel 
to  which  the  credit  is  given."  The  owner  of 
a  tug  which  was  verbally  hired  by  the  day 
by  the  owner  of  three  dredges  to  "wait  upon" 
sndi  dredges  while  engaged  on  certain  work, 
the  services  rendered  being  the  carrying  of 
coal  and  water  to  the  dredges,  the  towing  of 
scows,  and  of  the  dredges  themselves  when 
necessary,  is  not  entitled  to  a  "maritime  lien*' 
on  all  or  any  of  such  dredges  for  a  balance 
due  on  the  contract  which  was  not  one  for 
ordinary  towage  services  to  the  vessels  them.- 
selves.  The  Allegator,  161  Fed.  87, 88,  40, 41, 
42,  88  O.  0.  A.  201. 

Pomeasion 

In  a  suit  to  enforce  a  Hen  against  a  tug, 
the  trial  court  in  its  opinion,  in  stating  that 
a  party  could  not  authorize  the  repair  of  the 
tug  In  such  manner  as  to  give  the  person  re- 
pairing it  a  maritime  Uen  thereon,  used  the 
words  "maritime  lieh'"  in  a  general  or  non- 
technical sense  as  b^ng  a  lien^  the  subject- 
matter  of  whidi  was  a  vessel,  and  not  in  its 
techmcci  seB8e,-a8  dtetbigoished  from  a  eom- 
mon-law  or  ponoceoory  lien.  The  Robert  R. 
Kirkhind,  153  Fed.  8681  866»  88  a  0.  A.  46. 


MABimCE  SSBVXCS  - 

.  See  ICartnera'  Servlca. 

Services  in  making  repairs  on  a  ship  or 
vessel,  Miether  in  or  out  of  the  water,  are 
"maritime  services.**  Simmons  v.  The  Jeffer- 
son, 30  Sup.  Gt  54,  58,  216  U.  &  130,  54  L. 
Ed.  125,  17  Ann.  Gas.  907  (citing  I^eyrouz  v. 
Howard,  7  Pet  [82  U.  S.]  824,  8  L.  Ed.  700). 

MARK 

See  Distinguishing  Mark;  High-Water 
Mark;  Invoiced  as  Per  Gost  Mark; 
Low-Water  Mark;  Trade-Mark;  Val- 
id Voting  Mark ;  Visible  Mark. 

As  sisBatnve 

See  Sign>-8ignatura. 
As  snbsertytiom 

See  Subscribe— Subscription. 
Stook 

Under  Pen.  Gode  GaL  t  857,  making  any 
one  guilty  of  a  criminal  offense  who  marks 
or  brands,  or  alters  or  defaces  the  mark  or 
brand,  of  horses  or  cattle,  with  intent  there- 
by to  steal  the  same  or  to  prevent  identifica- 
tion thereof  by  the  true  owner,  one  who  slit 
the  ears  of  a  colt  owned  by  another  thereby 
"marked"  the  same  if  the  act  is  done  with 
intent  to  prevent  its  identlficatioh  by  the 
owner,  although  the  mark  so  placed  upon 
the  animal  may  not  be  a  conventional  one, 
indicative  of  ownership.  People  v.  Strom- 
beck,  78  Pac  472,  473,  145  GaL  lia 

KABX  OF  PUHCTUATIOV 

See  Punctuation. 
As  word,  see  Word. 

MABKEP  BALLOT 

See  Distinguishing  Marks. 

MARKED  COBKER8 

"Marked  comers"  (L  e.,  those  clearly 
identified,  and  which  are  notorious  objects) 
are  the  most  satisfectory  evidence  of  the 
location  of  a  patent  Morgan  v.  Renfro,  99 
S.  W.  311,  813,  124  Ky.  314. 


MABXEDLTKB 

Where  bearing  trees  are  called  for  at 
the  eastern  end  of  a  northern  boundary  line 
of  a  survey  and  a  stake  at  the  western  ter- 
minus^ there  is  a  presumption  that  the  line 
was  actually  surveyed,  and  the  comers  iden- 
tified by  the  bearing  trees  and  the  stake 
making  the  line  a  "marked  line."  Qoodson 
V.  FiUsgerald  (Tex.)  135  8.  W.  696,  698. 

MAKKlsn  OFF 

When  a  case  is  "marked  off/*  it  i3  meant 
that  it  would  again  appear  on  the  call  cal- 
endar after  causes  on  that  calendar  had  been 
disposed  of.  Hoberman  v.  Diamond,  130  N. 
T.  Supp.  13d. 


Side  lights  on  a  caboose^  showing 
in  fro9t  and  red  bdiind,  are  desigaefl  as 


VARE» 


800 


MARKET  TAIiUB 


'markers**  for  fbe  esgineer  and  front  brako- 
man,  so  that,  if  thB  train  parts  at  night,  it 
can  he  readily  discovered.  Texas  &  N.  O. 
R.  Ck).  V.  Stewart^  71  8.  W.  830,  3S1,  80  Tez. 
Glv.  App.  40& 

MARKET 

See  Free  Market;  Open  Market;  Prin- 
cipal Market 

Am  puhlie  plaee  for  sale 

The  term  "market"  as  used  in  Sanitary 
God[e,  City  of  New  York,  §  82,  providing  that 
no  person  shall  kill  or  dress  any  animal  or 
meat  in  any  market,  includes  and  applies  to 
any  premises  exclusively  devoted  to  market 
purposes,  and  hence  applies  to  premises  con- 
veyed to  the  city  of  Brooklyn  and  known  as 
the  wallabout  market  lands.  Bird  y.  Grout, 
94  N.  Y.  Supp.  127,  128,  106  App.  Div.  159. 

A  ^)ace  under  the  approach  of  a  bridge, 
occupied  by  fish  ];>eddlers  pursuant  to  the 
permission  of  the  commissioner  of  bridges, 
In  consideration  of  payments  made  by  them 
to  the  city  of  New  York,  is  a  "market,** 
though  not  formally  so  declared,  as  author- 
ized by  Greater  New  York  Charter,  |  47,  and 
it  is  under  the  control  of  the  comptroller  and 
his. department,  as  authorized  by  section  151, 
and  not  under  the  management  of  the  bridge 
commissioner,  under  sections  595  and  596. 
Sorgen  v.  Prendergast,  123  N.  Y,  Supp.  765, 
766,  68  Misc.  Rep.  189. 

MARKET. PBXOB 

See  Current  Market  Price. 

The  measure  of  damages  for  breach  of 
contract  to  deliver  bonds  of  a  corporation, 
the  consideration  for  which  has  been  paid, 
is  the  value  of  the  bonds  at  the  time  they 
should  have  been  delivered  under  the  con- 
tract with  interest,  and  such  value  is  prima 
facie  their  face  value,  but  "market  price" 
stands  as  a  criterion  of  value,  and  in  such 
cases  what  is  called  the  "market  price**  or 
the  quotation  of  the  articles  for  a  given  day 
is  not  the  only  evidence  of  value,  and  the 
true  value  may  be  drawn  from  other  sonrcea. 
Henry  v.  North  American  Ry.  Const  Co.,  158 
Fed.  79,  81,  85  C.  C.  A.  400. 

In  the  absence  of  a  definite  agreement  in 
a  contract  of  sale,  the  "market  prlce^'  of 
goods  to  be  delivered  is  the  price  prevailing 
at  the  time  and  place  of  delivery,  but,  if 
there  is  no  market  price  at  the  place  of  de- 
livery, the  value  of  the  goods  should  be  de^ 
termined  at  the  nearest  place  where  they 
have  a  market  value  by  the  addition  or  de- 
duction of  the  diifference  in  the  cost  of  de- 
livery. South  Gardiner  Lumber  Co.  v.  Brad^ 
street,  63  Ati.  1110,  1111,  97  Me.  165. 

The  measure  of  damages  for  failure  to 
deliver  coal  sold  by  a  wholesaler  to  a  re- 
taller  is  the  excess,  if  any,  of  the  whole- 
sale "market  pries"  ofi  tha  ooal  at  the  place 
ot  deUvery  ait  tha  date  fizAd^r  deliveiy,  and 


tlia  prtoe  agreed  on  between  the  parties^ 
when  tbere  Is  a  wholesale  market  price  at 
the  place  of  delivery,  which  market  price  is 
the  wholesale  price.  Righter  r.  Clark,  60 
Aa  741,  742,  78  Conn.  9, 112  Am.  St  Rep.  84. 

Where  plaintiff  purchased  ooal  of  de- 
fendant, and  defendant  failed  to  furnish  it 
the  "market  price"  was  the  price  at  which 
plaintiff  could  have  obtained  otiier  coal  of 
like  kind  in  that  region,  and  the  measure  of 
damages  was  the  difference  between  the  con- 
tract price  and  this  market  price  of  the  coal 
at  the  time  it  should  have  been  delivered, 
but,  if  there  was  no  available  market  in 
which  plaintiff  could  purchase  coal  of  the 
same  description,  on  defendant's  refusal  to 
perform  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover  the 
difference  between  the  price  at  which  he 
had  contracted  to  buy  the  coal  and  wKat  he 
was  to  receive  therefor  from  his  vendee. 
Wtimoth  ▼.  Hamilton,  127  Fed.  48,  63,  61 
O.  O.  A.  584. 

As-  fixed  by  buyii&s  and  sellinc 

The  "market  price*'  of  an  article  is  the 
usual  standard  for  measuring  its  value;  it 
being  worth  what  it  may  be  reasonably  sold 
for.  Burke  Hollow  Coal  Co.  v.  Lawson,  151 
S.  W.  657,  151  Ky.  305. 

The  market  price  of  an  article  oom- 
monly  dealt  in  is  the  sum  fixed  by  the  con- 
sensus of  buyers  and  sellers  dealing  in  the 
article,  and  proof  of  the  price  obtained  at 
an  actual  bona  fide  auction  sale,  though 
there  is  but  one  bidder,  is  competent  on  the 
question  of  market  value;  fOr  tha  term 
*'maiket"  assumes  the  existenoe  of  trade, 
and  price  is  fixed  in  trade  by  the  highest 
bidder  and  the  lowest  offerer.  Carey  Lith- 
ograph Co.  V.  Magazine  &  Book  Co.,  127  N.  Y. 
Supp.  300,  302,  70  Misc.  Rep.  541. 

As  price  In  market  with  open  eompetl- 
tion 

One  suing  for  breach  of  contract  to  let 
to  him  a  contract  to  print  advertising  litho- 
graphs,'  provided  it  met  the  market  price, 
must  show  affirmatively  that  it  met  the  ''mar- 
ket price,"  which  is  the  price  fixed  by  buyer 
and  seller  in  an  open  market  in  the  usual 
and  ordinary  course  of  lawful  trade  and 
competition.  Carey  Lithograph  Co.  v.  Maga- 
zine &  Book  Co.,  127  N.  Y.  Supp.  300,  302, 
70  Misc.  Rep.  541. 

MARKET  PUBPOSB 

The  erection  and  maintenance  of  a 
slaughter  house  is  not  a  "market  purpose" 
within  the  meaning  of  a  conveyance  to  a 
city  of  land  "for  market  purposes,  and  for 
ships,  canals,  and  piers  and  other  public 
works,  in  connection  with  such  market  pur- 
poses." Bird  V.  Grout,  94  N.  Y.  Supp.  127, 
128.  106  App.  Div.  159. 

MARKET  VAIiITB 

See  Actual  Maricet  Value;.  Oaab  Market 

.  YalUe;   Curr^t  Mvtket  Value;    IWr 

Mark^  Value;  Hltfieat  Market  Valoa 


MABKET  YALJm 


301 


HARKBT  VALUX 


"rrhe  words  ^maricet  Talne^  haTft  a  plain, 
definite,  and  well-nndentood  meaninc;  aa  in- 
teUiglble  to  tlie  Jury  aa  to  the  court"  Hance 
an  attempt  by  the  eonrt  to  maka  tbam  dear- 
er by  d^lnition  would  tend  to  ooafoae  ratbw 
than  to  enlighten.  Atlantic  Baggage  Co.  ▼• 
Mizo,  61  8.  B.  844,  847.  4  Oa.  App.  407. 

**Martiet  yalne"  la  no  otlier  than  the 
fair  yalne  of  property  as  between  one  deelr- 
ing  to  pnrchase  and  another  desiring  to  selL 
Hetland  t.  BUstad*  U8  N.  W.  422.  42S»  140 
Iowa,  411. 

^'Market  valne"  la  said  to  be  siieh  sum 
of  money  as  the  prop^ty  Is  worth  in  the 
market  generally  to  the  persons  who  would 
pay  the  Just  and  full  Talue  for  what  the 
property  would  bring  at  a  fair  sale,  where 
one  party  wants  to  sell  and  the  oilier  to 
boy.  Bedhead  Bros.  v.  Wyoming  Cattle  Inv. 
Co.,  102  N.  W.  144.  147,  126  Iowa,  410  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  Little  Rock 
Junction  By.  v.  Woodruff.  5  S.  W.  702,  40 
Ark.  300,  4  Am.  St  Bep.  51;  Low  v.  Ball- 
road,  3  AtL  789.  63  N.  H.  6G7;  Bsch  ▼. 
Chicago,  M.  &  8t  P.  By.  Co..  39  N.  W.  129. 
72  Wis.  231;  Kansas  City.  W.  &  N.  W.  B. 
Co.  v.  Fisher.  30  Pac  111.  49  Kan.  17;  Law- 
rence y.  City  of  Boston,  119  Mass.  128). 

In  Tiew  of  the  difficulty  of  forming  a 
proper  conception  of  the  word  ''ralue"  and 
of  ascertaining  what  is  called  ''market  val- 
ue,** where  there  is  no  open  market  recording 
numerous  transactions,  courts  have  adopted 
as  the  equiyalent  of  "market  value'*  the 
phrase  'Vhat  the  property  is  worth  or  wUl 
sell  for  as  between  <me  who  wants  to  pur- 
chase and  one  who  wants  to  selL**  Milwau- 
kee Trust  Co.  V.  City  of  Milwaukee.  138  N. 
W.  707.  710,  151  Wis.  224. 

Since  the  word  "market**  conveys  the 
idea  of  selling,  the  term  "market  value*' 
would  seem  to  mean  the  selling  value.  It 
is  the  price  which  an  article  will  bring  when 
offered  for  sale  in  the  market  It  is  the 
hi^est  price  which  those  having  the  ability 
and  occasion  to  buy  are  willing  t6  pay. 
Brown  v.  W.  T.  Weaver  Power  Co.,  62  S.  B. 
954,  955.  140  N.  C.  333  (citing  Little  Bock 
Junction  By.  v.  Woodruff,  5  S.  W.  792,  49 
Ark.  381,  4  Am.  St  Bep.  51). 

The  "market  value"  of  land  is  the  price 
that  would  in  all  probability  result  from  fair 
negotiation,  where  the  stiler  is  willing  to  sell 
and  the  buyer  desires  to  buy.  Maxon  v. 
Gates,  116  N.  W.  758,  765,  136  Wis.  270. 

The  term  "market  value,**  as  applied  to 
goods  Is  the  price  at  which  the  goods  can  be 
replaced  for  money  in  the  market  Bosen- 
kranz  v.  Jacobowitz,  99  N.  T.  Supp.  469,  470, 
50  Misc.  Bep.  580  (citing  W^le  v.  Havlland, 
69  N.  Y.  448). 

"Bonvtor  defines  'market  value*  as  a 
price  established  by  public  salee  in  the  way 
of  ordinary  business,  and  in  ^loan  v.  Baird, 
56  N.  E.  758,  162  K  X.  830.  tha  Court  of 


Appeals  said  that  the  market  value  of  prop- 
erty la  eatabliahed  when  other  property  of 
the  same  kind  has  been  the  subject  of  pur- 
ohaae  or  sale  to  so  great  an  extent  and  in 
so  many  instances  that  the  value  becomes 
fixed.**  Ban  v.  Seidenberg,  104  N.  Y.  Supp. 
798.  799.  53  Misa  Bep.  386. 

The  "market  value**  of  an  article  of  mer- 
chandise is  the  price  at  which  its  owner  or 
producer  holds  it  for  sale;  the  price  at 
which  it  ia  freely  offered  in  the  market  to 
all  the  world;  such  price  as  dealers  in  the 
artl<de  are  willing  to  receive  and  purchasers 
are  required  to  pay.  when  the  goods  are 
bought  and  sold  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
trade.  Under  a  clause  of  a  charter  party 
for  a  steamer,  which  required  the  charterer 
to  pay  for  the  coal  in  the  vessel's  bunkers 
at  the  time  of  her  delivery  at  the  current 
"market  price.**  the  price  actually  paid  by  the 
charterer  in  the  port  of  delivery  for  coal 
bought  in  the  open  market  to  fill  the  bunk- 
ers, and  also  for  other  vessels  at  the  same 
time*  will  be  accepted  as  fixing  the  market 
price  rather  than  the  price  given  the  own- 
ers on  mere  inquiries  without  any  attempt 
to  purchase.  Glasoow  Steam  Shipping  Co.  v. 
Tweedie  Trading  Co..  154  Fed.  84,  85  (citing 
Cliquot's  Champagne,  8  WaU.  [70  U,  S.]  114, 
125.  18  L.  Ed.  116). 

The  "market  value"  of  gooda  la  the  price 
at  which  the  owner  or  producer  holds  them 
for  sale;  the  price  at  which  they  are  freely 
offered  in  the  market;  euch  pricea  aa  deal- 
ers in  the  gooda  are  willing  to  receive  and 
purchasers  are  made  to  pay  when  the  goods 
are  bought  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade. 
British  &  Foreign  Idarine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mai- 
donado  &  Co..  162  F.  744,  748.  106  C.  a  A. 
122. 

In  an  action  againat  a  railroad  company 
for  bumiug  plaintiff's  grass,  a  witness  testi- 
fied that  the  grass  had  a  "market  value"  and 
that  the  witness  had  a  ''pretty  good  idea*' 
thereof.  He  was  then  asked  what  the  mar- 
ket value  was,  and  answered  that  consider- 
ing the  number  of  cattle  on  the  land  at  the 
time  and  what  it  was  used  for  and  was 
going  to  be  used  for,  the  grass  was  worth 
from  $1.50  to  f2  per  acre.  He  then  stated, 
after  objection,  that  he  wanted  to  state  what 
kind  of  cattle  plaintiff  had  there,  and  what 
he  was  using  it  for,  and  again  stated  that 
under  such  conditions  the  grass  was  worth 
from  11.50  to  $2  per  acre.  Held,  that  such 
evidence  was  inadmiasible  aa  not  showing 
'^market  value;"  Texas  A  P.  B.  Co.  v.  Pem- 
berton,  96  &  W.  1089,  48  Tex.  Civ.  App.  291. 

In  an  action  against  a  railroad  company 
for  damages  to  a  shipment  of  cattle,  where 
it  appeared  that  cattle  of  that  kind  were  not, 
during  the  season  of  shipment,  bought  or 
sold  at  the  point  of  dellvecy.  evidence  of  the 
price  paid  for  the  cattle  at  the  point  of 
shipment  is  admissible  on  the  question  of 
their  actual  value,  there  being  no  competent 
evidenoe  af  tb^r  "market  value/'  whldx  can 


MARKET  VAIiCA 


302 


MARKET  YALUV 


be  established  only  by  showing  ikhat  cattle 
of  like  quality  had  been  bought  and  sold  at 
that  place  daring  the  season  In  sufficient 
quantitieB,  and  often  enough  to  establish  a 
market  price.  Houston  &  T.  O.  R.  Co.  t. 
Crowder  (Tex.)  152  S.  W.  183,  184. 

In  an  action  for  the  destruction  of  a 
house  by  fire  from  a  railroad  engine,  the  court 
instructed  that,  as  to  the  dwelling  house, 
plaintiff's  measure  of  damages  was  the  "rea- 
sonable cash  value"  of  the  dwelling  When  de- 
stroyed, and  the  measure  of  damages  for 
destruction  of  the  household  goods  was  the 
'reasonable  value"  of  said  goods  at  the  time 
of  the  destruction.  Held,  that  the  instruction 
was  not  erroneous  for  using  the  words  "cash 
value"  instead  of  **market  cash  value"; 
**market  value"  being  the  cash  value  for 
which  an  article  wlU  sell  for  in  cash  on  the 
market,  and  reasonable  "cash  value"  being 
equivalent  to  reasonable  "market  cash  val- 
ue." Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v. 
Murray  (Tex.)  150  S.  W.  217,  2ia 

Where  a  wholesaler  bought  coal  not  for 
sale  in  the  retail  market,  but  to  dealers  only, 
the  market  value  was  the  wholesale  price 
and  not  the  retail  one,  as  between  the  parties 
to  the  sale.  Tuttle-Ghapman  Ooal  0>.  v. 
Coaldale  Fuel  Co.,  118  N.  W.  827,  830,  136 
Iowa,  382. 

The  "market  ralu^'  of  an  advertising 
contract  probably  means  the  net  value,  or 
the  difference  between  the  stipulated  price 
and  the  cost  of  d<^g  the  work.  In  an  ac- 
tion against  a  newspaper  for  breach  of  con* 
tract  for  the  insertion  of  advertising  matter 
to  be  used  in  the  year  as  the  advertiser 
might  require,  rate  cards  showing  the  rates 
for  advertisements  of  a  given  length  for  a 
given  number  of  times,  but  not  showing  rates 
for  such  a  contract  as  the  one  in  question, 
are  inadmissible.  Boston  Outfitting  (3o.  v. 
People  &  Patc^ot  Co.,  63  AtL  229,  230,  73  N. 
H.  506. 

Since  the  market  value  of  the  land  con- 
demned should  be  determined  from  sales  ac- 
tually made  so  as  to  necessitate  a  demand, 
it  was  proper  for  an  instruction  defining 
"market  value"  to  include  a  demand  for  the 
land  as  a  requisite  to  the  existence  of  a  mar- 
ket value.  Denver  N.  W.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Howe.  112  Pac  779,  781,  49  Colo.  256  (dUng 
5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4383). 

The  "market  value  of  land^'  is  generally 
based  upon  its  extent,  the  character  of  the 
improvements,  its  productive  qualities,  ^nd 
upon  sales  of  property  in  the  vicinity.  Reed 
V.  Pittsburg,  0.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  59  Ati.  1067, 
1068,  210  Pa.  211  (citing  Pittsburgh,  V.  &  C. 
R.  Co.  V.  Vance,  8  Atl.  7W,  115  Pa,  325). 

"  'Market  value,'  as  defined  by  section  19 
of  the  customs  administrative  act,  shall  be 
construed  to  mean  the  export  price  whenever 
goods,  wares,  and  merchandise  are  sold 
wholly  for  export,  or  sold  in  the  home  mar- 


kets only  in  limited  quantities,  by  reason  of 
which  fSftcts  there  cannot  be  established  a 
market  value  baaed  upon  the  sale  of  such 
goods,  wares,  and  merdiandise  in  usual 
wholesale  quantittes,  packed  ready  for  ship- 
ment to  the  United  States."  United  States 
V.  Havlland  &  Co.,  167  Fed.  414, 417. 

The  "market  value"  of  merchandise  im- 
ported from  France,  as  defined  in  Customs 
Administrative  Act  June  10,  1890,  c  407,  { 
19,  does  not  include  the  amount  of  certain 
internal  revenue  imposts  of  that  country 
known  as  the  "octroi  tax"  and  the  "droit  de 
vlUe,"  which  are  not  general  in  their  appli- 
cation, but  vary  with  the  locality,  and  which 
are  not  collected  if  the  merchandise  is  ex- 
ported. United  States  v.  R.  F.  Downing  & 
Co.,  131  Fed.  653,  654. 

The  "market  valued'  of  logs  was  tiie 
amount  which  buyers  generally  agreed  to 
pay  at  the  time  and  place  In  questlan,  though 
all  logs  then  being  sold  at  that  place  were 
sold  on  30,  60,  and  90  days'  time  and  not 
for  cash.  Rurr's  Ferry,  R.  &  O.  Ey.  Co.  v. 
AUen  (Tex.)  149  S.  W.  368,  861. 

While  dogs  are  regarded  as  property  in 
this  state,  they  are  not  generally  placed  on 
the  market  for  sale,  and  ordinarily  have 
no  "market  value,"  though  they  may  be  in 
some  Instances  of  value  to  the  owner.  Oult 
C.  ft  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Blake^  96  &  W.  583, 
694,  48  Tex.  Civ.  App.  180. 

As  pvlee  At  or  near  tine  or  place 

"'Market  value*  is  said  to  mean  the 
price  or  sum  for  whldi  an  equivalent  could 
be  reasonably  and  fairly  purchased  at  or 
near  the  place  where  the  property  stiould 
have  been  delivered  and  within  a  reasonable 
time  after  a  refusal  to  deliver."  Redhead 
Bros.  V.  Wyoming  Cattle  Inv.  Co.,  102  N.  W. 
144, 147,  126  Iowa,  410  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  BuUard  v.  Stone,  8  Pac  17,  67 
Cal.  480;  Little  Rock  Junction  Ry.  v.  Wood- 
ruff. 5  S.  W.  792,  49  Ark.  390,  4  Am.  St 
Rep.  51). 

The  market  value  of  an  article  at  any 
given  time  Is  fixed  by  sales  made  at  or  about 
that  time,  and  the  price  as  fixed  by  specific 
contracts  previously  Altered  into  is  inadmis- 
sible. Carle  v.  Nelson,  130  N.  W.  467,  468, 
145  Wis.  593. 

Iiitriiisie  vmlwe  distlasiiiflhed 

WhUe  the  term  "market  value"  is  not 
synonymous  with  '^intrinsic  value" — ^the  one 
meaning  the  actual  price  at  which  the  com- 
modity Is  commonly  sold  and  the  other  its 
true,  inherent,  and  essential  value,  independ- 
ent of  accident,  place  or  person,  the  same  ev- 
erywhere and  to  every  one — ^yet  the  latter  if 
so  generally  a  factor  in  the  former  that  a 
thing  which  has  no  intrinsic  value  Is  gener- 
ally without  market  value,  and  therefore, 
where  a  party  was  prepared  to  meet  an  Issne 
as  to  the  market  value  of  animals,  the  re- 
fusal of  a  continuance  to  procure  evidence 


MARKET  VALUS 


808 


ICARKST  VAIiUB 


to  meet  an  tane  m  to  tbelr  Intiliurie  Taliie 
pres^ited  by  a  trial  amendment  was  not  pr^* 
udidaL  Ghicaso,  R.  I.  A  P.  By.  Co.  ▼.  Olem- 
entB  A  CanoU.  115  &  W.  064^  006^  08  Tex. 
Civ.  ApiK  148. 

Pxioe  at  f  oroeA  sale 
'^The  'market  value'  of  land  la  naoally 
declared  to  be,  not  wbat  the  land  would 
bring  at  a  forced  aale^  but  what  it  would 
bring  In  the  hands  of  a  prudent  seller, 
at  liberty  to  fix  the  time  and  conditions  of 
sale.  What  property  would  bring  at  a  fiiir 
public  sale  where  one  party  wanted  to  sell 
and  another  wanted  to  buy  may  be  taken  as 
a  criterion  of  its  market  valua"  Madison- 
yiUe,  £L  A  B.  B.  Co.  V.  Ross»  108  S.  W.  880, 
831,  126  Ky.  138,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N.  a)  420. 

The  ''market  value''  of  land  is  not  the 
price  it  would  bring  at  public  auction  and 
forced  sale  fbr  cash,  but  such  price  as  could 
be  obtained  for  it  from  the  usual  and  ordi- 
nary terms  of  private  sale.  Metropolitan  St 
By.  Co.  V.  Walsh,  M  &  W.  880,  868,  197  Mo. 
3d2  (citing  and  approving  the  definition  in 
Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter,  20  &  W.  668, 
112  Mo.  869). 

Pirioe  »t  free  sales 

"  'Market  value'  means  the  fair  value  as 
between  one  who  wants  to  purchase  and  one 
who  wants  to  sell ;  not  wh^t  could  be  obtain- 
ed for  it  under  peculiar  circumstances  when 
a  greater  than  its  fair  price  could  be  obtain- 
ed, nor  ite  q>eculative  value,  nor  a  value  ob- 
tabied  from  necessity  of  another,  but  ite 
present  value  at  a  sale  which  a  prudent  own- 
er would  make  if  he  had  the  power  of  elec- 
tion as  to  the  time  and  terms."  Madlson- 
yUle,  H.  A  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Ross,  103  S.  W.  830, 
126  Ky.  188,  13  Ii.  R.  A.  (N.  B.)  420  (quoting 
and  adopting  the  definition  in  15  Cyc.  p.  685). 

The  "market  value"  of  property  Is  de- 
fined as  "the  price  which  it  will  bring  when 
It  is  offered  by  sale  by  one  who  desires  but 
Is  not  obliged  to  sell  and  is  bought  by  one 
who  is  under  no  necessity  of  having  it" 
Guyandotte  Valley  Ry.  Co.  v.  Buskirk,  60  S. 
E.  621,  626,  67  W.  Va.  417,  110  Am.  St  Rep. 
785  (citing  Stewart  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  18 
a  B.  604,  38  W.  Va.  438;  Lewis,  Em.  Dom. 
478;  Pitteburgh,  V.  ft  0.  Ry.  Co,  v.  Vance,  8 
Aa  764,  116  Pa.  325;  Lawrence  v.  City  of 
Boston,  119  Mass.  126;  Little  Rock  Junction 
Ry.  V.  Woodruff,  6  8.  W.  702.  49  Ark.  381,  4 
Am.  St  Rep.  51;  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p. 
4383) ;  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  v.  Chamblin, 
60  8.  B.  727,  729,  106  Va.  42;  Idaho-Western 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Columbia  Conference  of  Evangel- 
ical Lutheran  Augustana  Synod,  119  Pac.  60, 
62,  20  Idaho,  668,  38  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  497;  In 
re  New  York,  W.  ft  B.  Ry.  Co.,  136  N.  Y. 
Snpp.  234,  239, 161  An).  Div.  50;  In  re  Block 
Bounded  by  Avenue  A  ft  First  Ave.,  122  N. 
T.  Supp.  S21,  383,  66  Misc.  Rep.  488;  Calor 
OU  ft  <3as  Co.  V.  Franzell,  109  S.  W.  328,  882, 
128  Ky.  715,  86  L.  R.  A*  (N.  S.)  456. 


The  value  which  the  law  giveo  tn  fixing 
damages  for  the  destruction  of  property  is 
''market  value,"  which  is  that  reasonable 
sum  whidi  the  property  will  bring  on  a  fair 
sale  when  sold  by  a  man  willing,  but  not 
obliged,  te  sell,  to  a  man  willing,  but  not 
compelled,  to  buy.  Allen  v.  Chicago  ft  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co..  129  M.  W.  1094,  1096, 145  Wis.  263. 

In  the  absence  of  proof  that  articles  in 
controversy  furnished  by  claimant  for  dece- 
dent's funeral  were  not  sold  under  fair  trade 
conditions,  or  that  competition  had  been  sti- 
fled or  prices  otherwise  Inflated,  their  reason- 
able value  was  their  ''market  value"  at  the 
place  where  they  were  sold,  by  which  Is 
meant  the  prices  which  the  articles  cus- 
tomarily brought  at  the  time.  Wagoner  Un- 
dertaking Co.  V.  Jones,  114  S.  W.  1049,  1051, 
184  Mo.  App.  lOL 

Our  seneral  tax  act  practleally  defines 
the  "market  value  of  land"  aa  the  price  it 
would  sell  for  at  a  fair  and  bona  fide  sale 
by  private  contractor."  Long  Dock  Co.  v. 
State  Board  of  Assessors,  78  AtL  68,  67,  78 
N.  J.  Law,  44. 


Piiee  in 


rket 


The  "market  value"  of  secondhand  goods 
is  what  it  will  cost  one  to  purchase  them  in 
the  open  market,  and  the  testimony  of  a  sec- 
ondhand dealer  that  he  had  examined  sec- 
ondhand furniture,  and  that  it  was  worth  a 
specified  sum,  when  new,  and  a  specified  sum 
in  the  condition  it  was  in,  without  stating 
whether  he  meant  what  he  would  give,  or 
what  he  would  ask  for  it,  does  not  prove 
market  value.  Souther  v.  Hunt  (Tex.)  141  8. 
W.  359,  861. 

Code,  i  1306,  provides  that  all  property 
subject  to  texation  shall  be  valued  at  its  ac- 
tual value,  which  means  ite  value  in  the  mar- 
ket in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade.  Held, 
that  the  market  value  in  "ordinary  course  of 
trade"  can  have  reference  to  nothing  but  the 
selling  value;  that  is,  the  sum  which  in  all 
probability  can  be  realised  therefrom  if  ex- 
posed for  sale  on  the  open  market  First  Nat 
Bank  of  EsthervUle  v.  City  Council  of  Bs- 
therviUe,  112  N.  W.  829,  832.  136  Iowa,  203. 

In  the  stetement  of  the  rule  that,  where 
a  common  carrier  fails  to  deliver  merchan- 
dise within  a  reasonable  time,  the  measure  of 
damages  is  the  depreciation  in  the  market 
value  between  the  date  on  which  the  delivery 
should  have  been  made  and  the  date  on  which 
it  was  made^  the  term  "market  value"  means 
the  value  at  which  the  article  would  be  sold 
in  the  open  market  in  the  auAntitles  as  car- 
ried, and  where  the  articles  shipped  are  mer- 
chandise in  large  quantities,  it  is  improper 
to  measure  the  damages  by  the  market  value 
of  such  merchandlBe  when  sold  at  retell. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  ft  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Broe,  86  Pac. 
441,  443,  16  Okl.  25. 

"Market  value"  is  the  highest  price  ob- 
teinable  in  the  open  market  for  cash,  and  aji 


MAMCfeT  VALUB 


804 


ICABEfiT  VAIiCT 


Instmctloii  tlutt  the  market  TahM  of  Umd  is 
the  highest  price  which  the  land  wUl  hrtng 
in  the  market  regardless  of  the  eanses  that 
contribute  to  its  value  is  Incorrect  Lands 
may  bring  in  the  market  under  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances and  on  very  favorable  terms 
much  more  than  a  fair  cash  value.  Dadjr  v« 
Ck>ndit,  70  N.  B.  1088,  1002,  209  lU.  488. 

▼alne  syaLoaymotts 

Value  as  importing  market  value,  see 
Value. 

The  words  "value"  and  "market  value" 
are  often  used  Interchangeably,  and  both  as 
being  the  equivalent  of  "actual  value"  and 
"salable  value."  Hetland  v.  Bilstod,  118  N. 
W.  422,  428, 140  Iowa,  41L 

The  words  "market  value,"  as  used  in 
Pol.  Ck)de,  I  8627,  providing 'that  the  propor- 
tionate value  of  the  stock  of  domestic  cor- 
porations for  purposes  of  assessment  or  tax- 
ation should  be  Its  **market  value,"  are  syn- 
onymus  with  the  terms  "value"  and  "fall  cadi 
value"  as  used  ^  section  8617.  Crocker  v. 
Scott,  87  Pac  102,  106, 149  Gal.  676. 

.  "Market  value"  is  synonymous  with  the 
terms  "value"  and  'Mrull  cash  value*"  defined 
by  Pol.  Ck>de,  t  8617,  as  the  amount  at  which 
the  property  would  be  taken  in  payment  of  a 
just  debt  from  a  solvit  debtor,  and  the  mar- 
ket value  of  stock,  fairly  represents  its  full 
cash  value  in  absence  of  exceptional  cir- 
cumstances giving  it  an  abnormal  value,  so 
that  any  inference  of  fraud  by  the  placing  of 
an  excessive  valuation  on  stock,  taken  as  a 
basis  for  assessing  a  corporate  franchise,  is 
rebutted  by  a  showing  that  the  value  of  the 
franchise  was  ascertained  by  the  approved 
method  of  deducting  from  the  aggregate  mar- 
ket value  of  its  stock,  the  value  of  its  tangi- 
ble property,  and  taking  the  difference  as  the 
franchise  value.  City  of  Los  Angeles  v.  West- 
em  Union  OU  Co.,  118  Pac.  720,  721,  161  CaL 
204. 

The  expressions  "reasonable  worth"  or 
"reasonable  value"  are  not  so  broad  as  "mar- 
ket value."  Alcon  v.  Koons,  82  N.  E).  02,  06, 
84  N.  B.  1104.  42  Ind.  App.  687. 

The  two  expressions  "reasonable  selling 
value"  and  "market  value"  are  in  some  meas- 
ure synonymous,  but  the  usage  of  trade  has 
afilxed  a  technical  meaning  to  "market  vul- 
ue."  The  selling  value  of  an  articde  is  often 
equivalent  to  its  actual  value,  and  should  be 
so  regarded  in  the  case  of  a  seller  suing  to 
recover  for  stoves  specially  made  for  a  buy- 
er, and  which  the  latter  refused  to  accept; 
that  being  necessary  in  order  that  the  seller 
may  be  reimbursed  fully.  St  Louis  Range 
Co.  V.  Kline-Drummond  Mercantile  Co.,  96  B. 
W.  1040,  1043,  120  Mo.  App.  488. 

When  applied  to  property,  and  no  qual- 
ification is  expressed  or  implied,  "value" 
means  the  price  which  the  property  could 
command  In  the  market.  By  the  term  "value 
of  stock"  is  usually  meant  market  valuer 


Tezt-wiitsrs  use  the  t«nns  '^value^  and  "mar- 
ket valued'  as  interehasgeahle,  and  both  as 
being  equivalents  of  actual  value,  salable 
viKlue,  and,  in  proper  cases,  rental  value. 
In  an  action  against  a  railroad  oompany  for 
killing  horses,  plaintiff  alleged  that  at  the 
time  they  were  killed  "they  were  then  and 
there  each  respectively  of  the  reasonable  val- 
ue as  follows,  vis.:  One  •  •  •  was  of 
the  value  of  $376,  and  the  other  •  •  • 
was  of  the  value  of  $176."  Held  that,  in  the 
absence  of  an  exception  thereto,  proof  either 
of  the  market  value  of  the  horses  or  of  tbe 
intrinsic  value  was  admissible,  but  that  in 
the  absence  of  any  showing  that  they  had  no 
market  value  nor  real  value,  and  that  they 
cannot  be  reproduced  or  replaced,  it  was  er- 
ror to  admit  evidence  as  to  the  value  of  the 
horses  to  plaintiff.  Miaaouri,  K.  ft  T.  Ry. 
Co.  of  Texas  v.  Crews,  120  8.  W.  1110^  1111, 
64  Tex.  Civ.  App.  648  (quoting  and  adopting 
definitions  in  8  Words  and  Phrases,  pp.  7278, 
7279). 

"Market  value"  is  aynonymous  with  the 
actual  money  value  of  property.  All  artides 
of  personal  property,  however,  do  not  have 
an  established  "market  value"  fixed  by  cor^ 
rent  sales  of  such  property  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  business,  so  that  the  price  current- 
ly realised  can  be  looked  to  In  asoertainmeat 
of  the  actual  value.  Hie  "market  value"  of 
property  is  established  when  other  property 
of  the  same  kind  has  been  the  subject  of  pnr 
chase  or  sale  to  so  great  an  extent,  and  in 
so  many  instances,  that  the  value  becomes 
fixed.  Hie  damages  for  wrongful  attach- 
ment of  a  stock  of  goods,  so  far  as  they  ars 
concerned,  is  not  what  they  brought  at  the 
sale  under  the  attadiment,  or  what  they 
would  have  sold  at  retail,  but  their  actual 
value  at  the  time  and  place  of  seizure,  which 
to  the  extent  that  the  goods  were  new,  is  the 
cost  of  replacing  them  (that  is,  their  whole- 
sale price,  plus  freight);  such  cost,  however, 
being  only  a  relevant  circumstance  as  to  the 
value  of  old  and  shopworn  goods,  which  have 
no  "market  value,"  so  that  an  instruction  fix- 
ing the  damages  at  the  "market  value^"  and 
defining  this  as  the  value  of  the  goods  when 
sold  in  the  way  of  ordinary  business  for  cash 
in  the  dty  of  the  seizure,  is  erroneous.  State 
ex  rel.  Clark  v.  Parsons^  84  &  W.  1010,  1021, 
100  Mo.  App.  432  (citing  State,  to  Use  of  Hay- 
den,  V.  Smith,  31  Mo.  666;  Walker  v.  Bo^ 
land,  21  Mo.  280;  Spencer  v.  Vance,  67  Mo. 
427;  Watson  v.  Harmon,  86  Mo.  443;  SUte 
ex  rel.  Rogers  v.  Gage,  62  Mo.  App.  464; 
State  ex  rel.  Copening  v.  Ryley,  76  Mo.  App. 
412,  416 ;  Simpson  v.  Alexander,  11  Pae  171, 
36  Kan.  226;  2  Joyce,  Damages,  S  1086;  Gray 
V.  Central  R.  Co..  62  N.  B.  556, 167  N.  Y.  483; 
Sloan  V.  Balrd,  66  N.  B.  752,  162  N.  X.  ^27). 

In  an  action  against  a  carrier  to  reco^^r 
for  damages  to  a  car  load  of  cattie,  an  <7 
struction  was  given  that  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages proper  to  be  applied  was  the  difference 
between  the  market  value  of  the  eattie^  had 


UAXKBT  VALUl 


MABXBTABIJB 


flftey  Iwea  dftU^ered  In  vmgvr  coniMoB,  «nd 
fbe  amkit  Yalue  1b  Hm  oindltloB  la  wbleh 
they  wara  ^Uvwed.  Held,  tiiat  tbe  IsBtnio- 
tlOQ  was  not  oioBeous  as  asliig  the  tem 
'^matket  Talae,"  ftw,  aa  ai^Uad  te  cattle,  ttie 
market  Talne  la  the  actual  valiie;  neither 
waa  It  erreneeve  becauee  It  did  not  lUnlt  tte 
Tight  of  recovery  to  siich  daaages  aa  were 
doe  to  defBhdanf 8  fault*  where  there  was  no 
proof  that  the  damagee  were  not  all  doe  to 
defendant* a  fault.  Oolsch  t.  Chicago,  M.  A 
St  P.  Rjr.  Co.  (Iowa)  117  N.  W.  281,  284. 

An  Instruction  that  the  damages  for  land 
mot  taken  should  be  determined  by  ascertain- 
ing tlie  "market  value"  of  the  part  not  taken 
aa  it  waa  when  the  remainder  was  taken,  and 
deducting  therefrom  its  market  yalae  after 
the  taking,  which  was  punuant  to  Code  Civ. 
Proc  I  1249,  except  that  the  quoted  words 
were  sabstltuted  for  '"actual  value**  used  In 
the  statute,  was  not  objectionable  for  utfng 
the  substituted  words;  the  law  holding  the 
market  value  as  equivalent  to  the  actual  val- 
ue. Sacramento  Scrathem  R.  Co.  v.  Hellbron, 
104  Pac.  970,  982,  166  Cal.  406. 

In  condemnation  proceedings  to  obtain 
property  for  a  bridge,  an  instruction — that 
the  '^market  value**  of  the  property  means  its 
actual  value.  Independent  of  the  location  df 
plaintiff's  bridge  and  approaches  thereon; 
that  is,  the  fair  value  of  the  property  as  be- 
tween one  who  wants  to  purchase  and  the 
one  who  wants  to  sell  it;  not  what  It  could 
be  obtained  for  in  peculiar  circumstances, 
when  greater  than  its  fair  price  could  be  ob- 
tained, not  its  speculative  value;  not  the  val- 
ue obtained  through  the  necessities  of  anoth- 
er, nor,  on  the  other  hand.  Is  It  to  be  limited 
to  that  price  which  the  property  would  bring 
when  forced  off  at  auction  under  the  ham- 
mer— Is  correct  Southern  Illinois  St  M. 
Bridge  Co.  t.  Stone,  92  S.  W.  476»  477,  194 
Mo.  175. 

Act  Bfay  20,  1890  (Ky.  St.  1908,  |  3915), 
prohibiting  trusts  to  regulate  the  price  of 
any  article  or  to  limit  the  amount  of  any 
article,  and  Acts  1906,  p.  429,  c.  U7,  legalis- 
ing the  pooling  of  farm  products,  when  con- 
strued In  connection  with  Const  |  198,  re- 
quiring the  Legislature  to  pass  laws  to  pre- 
vent trusts,  pools,  etc.,  to  depreciate  any  ar- 
ticle below  its  '^al  value,"  or  to  enhance  its 
cost  above  its  real  value,  are  not  invalid  be- 
cause uncertain,  for  the  standard  fixed  is 
**real  value,"  which  is  "market  value,**  at  a 
sale  under  normal  conditions,  unaffected  by 
any  combination  or  producers  or  dealers 
whose  object  is  to  create  an  abnormal  con- 
dition In  the  market,  and  is  susceptible  of 
proof  by  proof  of  pie-existing  facts.  The 
court  In  distinguishing  this  holding  from  a 
previous  decision  declaring  a  statute  prohib- 
iting railroads  from  charging  "more  than  a 
just  and  reasonable  rate  of  toll*'  onoonstltu- 
tional,  because  of  uncertainty  in  determin- 
ing what  would  be  a  Just  and  reasonable  rate 
8  Wns.ft  P.2o  Seb.— 20 


of  tolL  ""Xhare  la  a  aurked  dlftetanee  be- 
tween the  qfaalitles  of  the  'real  value'  of  aa 
article^  and  'reasonable  compensation'  for  a 
SMiiuj.  The  latter  may  depend  alone  upon 
the  oplniott  of  the  trier  of  the  fact;  the  for- 
mer is  Itself  a  fact  susceptible  of  proof  and 
exact  ascertainment"  Commonwealth  v.  In- 
ternational Harvester  Co.,  115  S.  W.  708,  711, 
712,  131  Ky.  a&l,  ISa  Am.  St  B^  266. 
Value  tor  any  use  * 

In  estimating  the  market  value  of  prop- 
erty, all  capabilities  of  the  property  and  all 
uses  to  which  it  may  be  applied  are  to  be 
considered.  Seaboard  Air  Use  By.  ▼.  Cham- 
blln,  eO  S.  S*  727,  729, 108  Va.  42. 

'The  'market  value  of  property*  Is  its 
value  for  any  use  to  which  it  may  be  adapts 
ed,  and  in  estimatiDg  its  value  all  the  uses 
of  which  the  property  is  susceptible  should 
be  considered,  and  not  merely  the  condition 
in  which  it  may  be  at  the  time  and  the  use 
to  which  it  may  have  been  put  by  the  own- 
«.'*  In  re  Westiake  Ave.,  9Z  Pac.  279,  281, 
40  Wash.  144  (quoting  and  adopting  the  def- 
Itiition  In  Seattle  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Murphine, 
aO  Pac.  720,  4  Wash.  448). 

**Market  value,'*  within  the  meaning  of 
tlie  rule  In  cKpropriation  proceedings  by  a 
railway  company  that  the  criterion  of  value 
ia  the  fair  market  value  of  the  property  at 
the  date  of  the  Institution  of  the  suit,  in 
view  of  any  and  all  uses  to  which  it  may  be 
applied  or  adapted,  exclusive  of  any  increase 
in  value  caused  by  the  construction  of  the 
proposed  railroad  through  the  property,  does 
not  mean  speculative  value,  but  the  fair  val- 
ue of  tbe  property  as  it  stands,  between  one 
willing  tO'  purchase  and  one  willing  to  sell. 
Opelousas,  O.  A  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradford,  48 
South.  79,  80,  118  La.  600  (citing  Orleans  ft 
J.  R.  Co.  V.  Jefferson  A  L.  P.  R.  Co.,  26  South. 
278,  61  La.  Ann.  1016;  Louisiana  Ry.  A  Nav. 
Co.  V.  Xavier  Realty  Co.,  89  South.  1, 115  La. 


Valve  detenalaed  Vj  sttaatioB,  oeadi- 


While  the  "market  value"  of  property  is 
the  price  for  which  It  may  be  sold  in  the 
market,  it  is  often  difficult  to  determine 
"market  value,**  because  there  may  be  no  gen- 
eral demand  for  the  property,  or  it  may  be 
such  as  is  only  valuable  for  a  specified  pur- 
pose because  of  its  formation,  location,  or 
other  specific,  natural  or  artificial  adaptibil- 
ity  to  a  particular  use,  so  that,  where  no 
general  market  value  can  be  ascertained, 
such  elements  may  be  considered  In  arriving 
at  its  general  value.  Portneuf-Marsh  Valley 
Irr.  Co.  V.  Portneuf  Irrigating  Co.,  114  Pac. 
19,  20,  10  Idaho,  48S. 


KABKBTABUB 

"Marketable**  and  ''merchantable^*  are 
practically  synonymous.  In  an  action  for 
breach  of  contract  to  purchase  hay,  defend- 
ants.alleged  that  plaintiff  agreed  to  sell  them 


MASKETABIiB  TITLE 


806 


MARKBTABI^B  TITLES 


merehantable  liay,  and  that  the  hay  shipped 
was  not  as  represented.  Held,  that  a  request 
by  plaintiff  to  an  expert  witness:  "State 
whether  or  not  this  hay  yon  saw  there  is  con- 
sidered as  marketable  hay  here  in  Baker 
City,  compared  with  other  kind  that  is  sold 
here" — was  not  objectionable;  the  persons 
who  "considered**  the  hay  merchantable  be- 
ing himself  and  tho86  who,  according  to  his 
previous  testimeny,  he  had  seen  purchasing 
such  hay  at  Baker  City.  Eaton  v.  Black- 
burn, 88  Pac.  303,  304,  49  Or.  22  (citing 
Webst  Int  Diet). 

BtARKETABIiE  TITLE 

See  Qood  and  Marketable  Title. 

A  "marketable  title*'  is  one  free  from 
reasonable  doubt.  Connely  t.  Putnam,  111 
S.  W.  164,  105,  61  Tex.  Civ.  App.  233 ;  Cum- 
mlngs  V.  Dolan,  100  Pac.  980,  991,  62  Wash. 
496,  132  Am.  St  Rep.  986;  Wadick  y.  Mace, 
103  N.  Y.  Supp.  889,  893,  118  App.  Div.  777; 
Sprickerhofl  v.  Ctordon,  105  N.  Y.  Supp.  586, 
688,  120  App.  Div.  748;  Russell  v.  Wales,  100 
N.  Y.  Supp.  785,  788;  Howe  v.  Coates,  107 
N.  W.  397,  403,  97  Minn.  385,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  1170,  114  Am.  St.  Rep.  723;  Wanser  y. 
De  Nyse,  80  N.  B.  1088,  188  N.  Y.  878,  117 
Am.  St  Rep.  871  (quoting  and  adopting  def- 
inition in  Fleming  y.  Bumham,  2  N.  JS.  905, 
100  N.  Y.  1,  10). 

A  "marketable  title"  is  one  that  is  free 
from  reasonable  doubt;  one  that  a  prudent 
person  with  full  knowledge  of  all  the  facts 
would  be  willing  to  accept  Hubachek  y. 
Mazbass  Security  Bank,  134  N.  W.  640,  642, 
117  Minn.  163,  Ann.  C^as.  1913D,  187. 

A  "marketable  tiUe"  is  a  title  not  sub- 
ject to  such  reasonable  doubt  as  would  cre- 
ate a  just  apprehension  of  its  validity  in  the 
mind  of  a  reasonable^  prudent,  and  intelli- 
gent person;  one  that  a  person  of  reasonable 
prudence  and  intelligence,  guided  by  compe- 
tent legal  advice,  would  be  willing  to  take 
and  pay  the  fair  value  of  the  land  for.  Sum- 
my  y.  Ramsey,  101  Pac  606,  507,  63  Wash. 
93  (quoting  Eggers  v.  Busch,  89  N.  S2.  619, 
164  IlL  604). 

A  "marketable  title**  is  one  that  is  free 
from  reasonable  doubt  There  is  reasonable 
doubt  when  there  is  uncertainty  as  to  some 
defects  appearing  in  the  course  of  its  deduc- 
tion, and  the  doubt  be  such  as  affects  the 
value  of  the  land,  or  will  interfere  with  its 
sale.  Qrifflth  v.  Maxfleld,  39  S.  W.  852,  63 
Ark.  551. 

The  books  define  a  marketable  title,  as 
one  that  is  not  only  good,  but  indubitable, 
Ormsby  v.  Graham,  98  N.  W.  724,  727,  123 
Iowa,  202  (citing  Swayne  y.  Lyon,  67  Pa.  [17 
P.  F.  Smith]  436;  Vought  y.  WUllams.  24  N. 
B.  196,  120  N.  Y.  253,  8  L.  R.  A.  691,  17  Am. 
St  Rep.  684;  Tomlin  v.  McOhord's  Repre- 
sentatives, 28  Ky.  [5  J.  J.  Marsh.]  135). 

Promise  to  convey  a  "marketable  titie^* 
In  an  executory  land  contract  ocmtemplates 


a  title  free  from  reasonable  doubt,  wUdi  is 
not  only  valid  in  fact,  bat  which  can  be  again 
sold  to  a  reasonable  purchaser  or  mortgaged 
to  a  ];)er8on  of  reasonable  pmdenoe.  A  UUe 
will  not  be  considered  unmarketable  unless 
the  danger  of  litigation  is  real  or  apparent 
and  to  be  apprehended  because  of  some  ir- 
regularity in  l^al  proceedings  or  sale  there- 
of, or  because  of  some  matter  of  fact  the  real 
truth  as  to  which  cannot  be  ascertained  with 
reasonable  certainly.  Cowdery  y.  Greenlee, 
55  S.  B.  918,  920,  126  Ga.  786^  8  K  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  137  (citing  Swayne  v.  I^ron,  67  Pa.  436; 
Vought  y.  Williams,  24  N.  B.  195,  120  N.  Y. 
253,  8  L.  R.  A.  591, 17  Am.  St  Rep.  634). 

A  "marketable  titie*'  In  equity  is  one  In 
which  there  is  no  doubt  involved  either  as 
a  matter  of  hiw  or  fact  A  titie  need  not  in 
fact  be  bad  in  order  to  make  it  unmarket- 
able, and  it  is  unmarketable  if  a  reasonably 
prudent  man,  familiar  with  the  fkcts  and 
apprised  of  the  question  of  law  involved, 
would  not  accept  the  titie  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  business;  it  being  sofflelent  that 
there  was  a  doubt  or  uncertainty  snlBcient 
to  form  the  basis  of  litigation.  In  an  action 
to  recover  back  purchase  money  for  failure 
of  the  vendor  to  furnish  a  marketable  titie, 
where  the  parties  whose  possible  claims  may 
affect  the  titie  are  not  before  the  court,  the 
question  of  law  on  which  the  title  turns  will 
not  be  determined,  but  the  titie  will  be  deem- 
ed unmarketable  if  the  question  is  one  on 
which  it  is  aiyparent  that  other  courts  might 
entertain  a  different  opinion.  Williams  v. 
Bricker,  109  Paa  998,  999,  83  Kan.  53,  30  L. 
a  A.  (N.  S.)  343. 

''A  ^marketable  titie*  is  one  that  is  free 
from  reasonable  doubt  The  purchaser  is  not 
compelled  to  take  property  the  possession  of 
which  he  may  be  compelled  to  defend  by  liti- 
gation. He  should  have  titie  that  will  enable 
tim  to  hold  his  land  in  peace,  and,  if  he 
Ishes  to  sell,  be  reasonably  sure  that  no 
flaw  or  doubt  will  arise  to  disturb  its  market 
value.'*  Hence  a  titie  which  depends  upon 
the  part  payment  of  interest  on  a  mortgage 
and  the  bar  of  limitations  is  not  free  from 
reasonable  doubt.  Godfrey  v.  Rosenthal,  97 
N.  W.  365,  366.  17  S.  D.  452  (dtlng  Vought 
V.  Wmiams,  24  N.  E.  195,  120  N.  Y.  253,  8 
L.  R.  A.  591,  17  Am.  St  Rep.  634). 

A  title  is  not  "marketable,"  when  it  ex- 
poses the  party  holding  it  to  litigation. 
Russell  V.  Wales,  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  785,  788 
(quoting  Salisbury  v.  Ryon,  94  N.  Y.  Supp. 
352,  106  App.  Div.  448). 

As  "marketable  titie**  is  one  about  which 
there  can  be  no  fair^and  reasonable  doubt, 
a  titie  in  litigation  is  not  a  "marketable'* 
one.  Corbett  v.  McGregor  (Tex.)  84  S.  W. 
278,  279. 

To  constitute  "marketable  titie,**  the  titie 
should  put  the  purchaser  in  all  reasonable 
security  and  protect  him  against  annoying 


MABKBTABUS  TITLE 


80T 


MABKBTABIiD  TITUS 


though  tinsnccessfnl  salts,  and  sadi  titto  as 
will  enable  him  not  only  to  hold  his  land 
but  to  sell  it  and  to  be  reasonat)ly  sore  that 
no  flaw  will  come  np  to  distnrfo  its  market- 
able yalne.  Hewitt  v.  Parsley,  60  AtL  619» 
820,  101  Md.  200. 

A  "marketable  title"  is  one  appearing  to 
be  snch  by  the  recoixi  of  conveyances  or  other 
public  memorial,  and  not  one  resting  in 
paroL  I/>ckhart  v.  Ferrey,  115  Pac.  431,  433, 
50  Or.  179. 

"A  'marketable  title'  in  equity  is  one  in 
which  there  is  no  doubt  involred,  either  as 
to  matter  of  law  or  fact'*  Where  the  ven- 
dor's title  rested  upon  a  deed  executed  by  a 
foreign  assignee  noU^  by  virtue  of  an  order 
of  a  court  in  the  state  of  Iowa,  and  before 
the  action  was  tried  the  vendor  obtained  a 
judgment  quieting  his  tittle  upon  service  by 
publication  against  the  foreign  assignor,  the 
assignee^  and  the  party  to  whom  the  assignee 
had  conveyed,  and  asked  for  specific  per- 
formance against  the  purchaser,  the  title 
tendered  is  not  a  "marketable  tlUe."  McNutt 
V.  l>feUans,  108  Paa  834,  886,  82  Kan.  424. 

A  title  is  not  "marketable*'  where  error 
in  the  name  of  a  grantee  In  the  vendor's 
chain  of  title  can  be  proven  by  paroL 
Walters  v.  MitcheU,  02  Pac.  316,  317,  6  GaL 
App.  410. 

Where  a  corporation's  deed  of  real  es- 
tate, though  only  prima  facie  evidence  of 
title,  has  remained  unquestioned  for  more 
than  seven  years,  it  is  sufficient  to  evidence  a 
"marketable  title,"  since,  to  render  a  title 
marketable,  it  is  only  necessary  that  it  diall 
be  free  from  reasonable  doubt,  and  the  pur- 
chaser is  not  entitled  to  demand  a  title  ab- 
Bolutely  free  from  every  technical  suspicion, 
but  can  only  demand  such  title  as  a  reason- 
ably well  informed  and  intelligent  purchaser 
acting  upon  business  principles  would  be  will- 
ing to  accept  Milton  v«  Crawford,  118  Paa 
32,  36^  65  Wash.  145. 

A  vendor  whose  lands  were  subject  to  an 
easement  to  another  to  enter  on  the  land  and 
construct  water  ditches  or  water  pipes  from 
or  across  the  land,  under  which  a  water  pipe 
was  maintained  across  the  land,  did  not  pos- 
sess a  marketable  title;  "marketable  title" 
being  defined  as  a  term  which,  when  applied 
to  real  estate,  is  used  to  designate  a  title 
free  from  reasonable  doubt  Where  a  vendor 
agreed  to  convey  "full  fe»«imple  title  to  the 
land,"  which  he  could  not  do  because  of  the 
existence  of  an  easement,  the  question  of 
"marketable  title"  was  not  involved.  Win- 
gacd  V.  Ck>peland,  116  Paa  670,  672,  64  Wash. 
214. 

A  vendor  agreed  to  give  a  "marketable 
title.*^  The  premises  consisted  of  a  comer  lot 
in  a  city  on  which  a  building  stood.  The 
lower  portion  of  the  building  was  of  stones 
The  outer  surface  of  tae  stonework  projected 
two  inches  over  the  stnet  Una  and  within 


that  of  the  sidewalk,  which  might  be  with- 
drawn from  the  use  of  the  public.  1'tte  eu- 
croachment  did  not  affect  easements  of  light, 
air,  and  access  possessed  by  adjoining  prop- 
erty ownera  The  building  had  been  standing 
for  about  five  years  without  objection  from 
the  city.  Held,  that  the  possibiUty  of  ac- 
tion by  the  city  to  remove  the  encroachment 
was  so  remote  that  it  should  be  disregarded 
in  determining  the  marketability  of  the  titla 
Bmpire.Realty  Corp,  v.  Sayre,  95  N.  T.  Supp. 
371,  374,  107  App.  Div.  415. 

Where  one  having  a  leasehold  estate 
mortgaged  the  land  and  thereafter  acquired 
the  fee,  and  on  foreclosure  all  persons  who 
could  claim  under  him  were  made  parties 
and  the  surplus  was  distributed  to  all  en- 
titled to  It  as  representing  the  mortgagor's 
interest,  the  foreclosure  title  was  a  "market- 
able" one.  Hirth  v.  Zeller,  05  N.  T.  Supp. 
747,  748,  108  App.  Div.  198. 

A  contract  of  sale  of  land,  requiring  a 
conveyance  by  "a  good  and  sufiicient  general 
warranty  deed,  in  fee  simple,"  is  satisfied  by 
the  giving  of  a  good  and  "mai^etable  title," 
which  is  a  title  not  open  to  reasonable  doubt ; 
and  such  is  a  title  by  prescription,  with  ir- 
regularities in  the  title  only  prior  to  the 
commencement  of  the  period  of  limitations ; 
and  an  "indubitable  title" — that  is,  one  open 
to  no  possible  objection,  however  trivial — is 
not  required.  Jackson  v.  Greek,  94  N.  B.  416, 
421,  47  Ind.  App.  541. 

Where  a  vendor  tendered  title  under  the 
foreclosure  of  a  first  mortgage,  leaving  out- 
standing a  sheriff's  deed  to.  a  third  person, 
executed  on  foreclosure  of  the  second  mort- 
gage, such  deed,  being  a  claim  under  Judicial 
sale  and  not  showing  its  invalidity  on  its 
face,  or  in  connection  with  its  first  foreclo- 
sure, constituted  a  cloud,  and  rendered  the 
vendor's  title  unmarketable.  Stack  v.  Hickey, 
138  N.  W.  1011, 1012,  151  Wis.  347. 

The  pendency  of  an  action  for  partition 
against  vendors  under  contract  to  convey  real 
estate,  commenced  by  service  of  summons  on 
them,  in  which  a  Us  pendens  was  filed  with 
a  verified  complaint,  averring  that  the  deed 
and  will  of  a  former  owner  through  which 
the  vendors  derived  title  were  induced  by 
fraud  and  undue  infiuence,  is  a  doud  on  the 
title  of  the  vendors,  continuing  until  the  time 
has  expired  within  which  an  appeal  may  be 
taken  from  a  Judgment  dismissing  the  action 
or  until  a  second  action  begun  before  the  ex- 
piration of  that  time  has  been  disposed  of, 
and  the  purchaser  is  not  bound  to  accept  title 
from  them  at  his  peril  or  to  seek  out  the  evi- 
dence of  the  validity  or  invalidity  of  the  title. 
Whalen  v.  Stuart,  108  N,  Y.  Supp.  355,  357, 
123  App.  Div.  446. 

Under  Acts  1896,  c.  810,  relative  to  tax- 
ation and  sales  for  taxes  by  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, and  requiring  that  after  the  sale 
and  payment  of  taxes,  penalties,  and  costs, 
the  treasurer. shall  delivsr  to  the  purchaser 


MARKBTABI/B  TITLE 


308 


KARBIAOB 


ft  certificate  of  purdiafle  and  the  mayor  glvo 
a  deed  unless  the  properly  diall  be  redeemed 
within  one  year  from  the  day  of  sale  and 
there  is  no  record  of  the  proceedhiga  of  snch 
sale  save  the  certificate  and  deed,  a  title 
based  alone  on  such  certificate  and  deed  is 
not  such  "marketable  title*'  at  a  purchaser 
can  be  compelled  to  accept  in  a  suit  for 
specific  performance.  A  mere  possibility  that 
notice  of  the  sale  of  land  for  taxes  was  not 
given  the  o?mer  as  expressly  required  by 
Laws  1885,  p.  699,  c.  406,  f  7,  is  not  sufiadent 
to  render  the  marketability  of  the  title  doubt- 
ful. Rosenblum  y.  Eisenberg,  108  N.  Y.  Supp. 
350,  352,  123  App.  Dlv.  896  (dting  Maupin, 
MarkeUbiUty  of  Tltie,  p.  707). 

A  notice  of  lis  pendens  reciting  that  an 
action  had  been  commenced  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  on  certain  land  did  not  render  the 
owner's  title  unmarketable,  where  the  con- 
tract provided  that  the  property  was  to  be 
taken  subject  to  the  mortgage  sought  to  be 
foreclosed,  and  where  consult  to  the  discon- 
tinuance of  the  foreclosure  suit  had  been  de- 
livered to  the  vendor  and  an  order  of  dia- 
continuance  entered.  Weissberger  v.  Wal- 
lach,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  887,  888,  124  App.  Div. 
382. 

The  boundary  lines  of  a  city  lot  were  lo- 
cated as  early  as  1822,  and  have  since  been 
acquiesced  in  by  the  owners  of  the  adjacent 
lots  on  both  sides.  For  over  60  years  the 
owners  and  their  predecessors  in  title  have 
been  in  actual  peaceable  possession  of  the 
entire  premises,  and  during  that  time  no- 
body else  has  claimed  any  interest  to  any 
part  thereof,  nor,  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
owners  or  of  a  contract  purchaser,  is  there 
any  person  who  can  have  any  claim  of  title 
against  the  owners.  Held,  that  the  owners 
have  a  good  and  marketable  title  to  the  prem- 
ises, though  a  deed  in  1822  erroneously  de- 
scribed the  lot  as  one  foot  narrower  than 
it  really  was,  and  the  mistake  was  repeated 
in  subsequent  conveyances.  Taub  v.  Spec- 
tor,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  723,  124  App.  Dlv.  168 
(citing  Wentworth  v.  Braun,  79  N.  Y.  Sopp. 
489,  78  App.  Div.  634,  affirmed  67  N.  B.  1091, 
175  N.  Y.  515;  Well  v.  Radley,  62  N.  Y. 
Supp.  398,  31  App.  Div.  25,  affirmed  57  N. 
B.  1128,  163  N.  Y.  582;  Katz  v.  Kaiser,  48 
N.  B.  532,  154  N.  Y.  294;  Meyer  v.  Boyd,  4 
N.  Y.  Supp.  328,  51  Hun,  291). 

Where  a  title  depended  on  foreclosure 
proceedings,  in  which  jurisdiction  of  the 
owners  of  the  equity  was  not  obtained  be- 
cause of  failure  to  comply  with  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  §  442,  prescribing  the  requisites  of  an 
oirder  for  publication  of  summons,  it  was  un- 
marketable. Fink  V.  Wallach,  95  N.  Y.  Supp. 
872,  873,  47  Misc.  Rep.  247. 
As  yerfeot  titla. 

See  Perfect  Title. 

BCARKETERS 

The  term  "marketers,**  as  tised  in  an 
order  for  good^i  reading,  <'If  reasonable  ^ip 


to<mM*row  ThuriMiay  foar  to  six  loads  *mar- 
keters,' "  is  to  be  construed  a«  meanizig  cat- 
tla  sudi  at  the  person  sending  the  order 
would  want  to  sell  to  the  reti^  trade.  The 
term  distinguishes  tlie  cattle  for  that  trade 
from  those  which  are  to  be  exported.  *'Mar^ 
keters"  are  supposed  to  weigh  about  1,200 
pounds  and  "exporters"  about  1,400  pounds. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  N.  Lehman 
&  Bro.,  67  Aa  241,  242, 106  Md.  818|  14  Ann. 
Gas.  786. 

MARRED  PHYSICALLY 

The  words  "marred  physically^  mean 
the  same  as  the  word  "disfigurement.'*  Cul- 
len  V.  Higgins,  74  N.  B.  606-TOO,  21«  IlL  T8. 

MARRIAGE 

Bee  Celestial  Marriage;  Oommon-Law 
Marriage;  Contract  of  Marriage ;  Dar- 
ing Marriage;  Moral  Marriage;  Pa- 
triarchal Marriage;  Plural  Marriage; 
Polygamous  Marriage ;  Prohibited  Mai^ 
riage;  Putative  Marriage;  Bight  Ac- 
quired by  Marriage. 

See,  also,  Bonds  of  Bfotrimony;  Matri- 
mony. 

"Marriage**  is  the  union  of  opposite  sex- 
es, and  sexual  intercourse  is  the  distinguish- 
ing feature  of  the  union.  Williams  y.  Wil- 
liams, 99  S.  W.  42,  44,  121  Mo.  App.  349 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  In  Nelson, 
Dlv.  &  Sep.). 

"  'Marriage*  being  in  Its  nature  p^ma- 
nent  and  the  most  important  of  all  dvil  re- 
lations, the  law  will  not  lightly  allow  tbe 
inducements  which  bave  led  up  to  it  to  be 
disturbed.''  Wel<di  V.  Mann,  92  8.  W.  98, 
101,  193  Mo.  304  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  Cohen  ▼.  Knox«  27  Pac.  215,  90  CU. 
266,  18  li.  B.  A.  711). 

When  a  man  and  woman  intend  to  marry 
and  live  together  as  husband  and  wife,  but 
their  intention  is  frustrated  by  the  existence 
of  some  unknown  impediment,  and  after  the 
Impediment  is  removed  the  same  Intent  con- 
tinues and  the  parties  continue  to  live  to- 
gethepr  as  husband  and  wife,  an  actual  '*mar- 
riage"  results.  Chamberlain  v.  Chamberlain, 
62  AU.  680,  681,  68  N.  J.  Bq.  736,  8  L^  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  244,  lit  Am.  St  Bep.  658^  6  Ann.  Caa 
488. 
As  a  oiril  eooLtraet 

"Marriage'*  is  a  formal  declaration  or 
contract  by  which  act  a  man  and  woman 
join  in  wedlock.  Lynch  v.  Knoop,  43  South. 
252,  253,  118  La.  611,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  480, 
118  Am.  St.  Rep.  391,  10  Ann.  Cas.  807. 

"'Biarriage^  in  this  state  is  a  dvil  con- 
tract by  one  man  and  one  woman  compietent 
to  contract,  whereby  they  are  mutually  bound 
to  each  other  so  long  as  th^  both  shall  live 
for  the  discharge  to  each  otiier  and  to  the 
public  of' tha  duties  and  obUgatlona  which 


MABRIAOB 


80B 


KARBIAaB 


b7  the  law  flow  from  said  contract**  In  re 
Imbodoi's  Estate,  86  S.  W.  268,  266^  lU  Mo. 
App.  220  (dtlng  Banks  y.  Galbraith,  01  8. 
W.  106,  149  Mo.  636;  State  y.  Bittick,  15  8. 
W.  325,  108  Mo.  188,  11  L.  R.  A.  587,  23  Am. 
St  Rep.  869;  Dyer  ▼.  Brannock,  66  Mo.  801, 
27  Am.  Rep. 


Marriage,  wbile  from  its  very  nature  a 
sacred  obligation,  is  neyertheless,  in  most 
dvilized  nations,  a  civil  contract  and  nsnally 
regalated  by  law.  Upon  it  society  may  be 
said  to  be  bnilt  &nd  out  of  its  fmits  spring 
social  relations,  and  sodal  obligattons  and 
duties,  with  which  government  is  necessarily 
required  to  deal.  In  re  De  Laveaga's  Estate, 
75  Pac.  790,  795,  142  OaL  158  (citing  Rey- 
nolds v.  United  States,  96  U.  8. 145,  25  L.  Ed. 
244). 

Marriage  is  a  civil  contract  and  the  wife 
owes  to  the  husband  the  same  full  perform- 
ance of  marital  duties  that  he  owes  to  her. 
Richardson  v.  Richardson,  114  N.  Y.  Supp. 
912,  014. 

Aa  between  the  immediate  parties,  "mar- 
riage" is,  in  law,  a  civil  contract  Nelson  v. 
Brown,  51  South.  860,  368,  164  Ala.  897,  137 
Am.  St  Rep.  61. 

Code,  I  3139,  defines  ''marriage'*  as  a 
civil  contract  P^g  v.  Pegg,  115  N.  W.  1027, 
1028,  138  Iowa.  572. 

As  a  civftl  isMtitatlMi 

Marriage  is  a  social  institation  or  status, 
in  which,  because  the  foundations  of  the 
family  and  the  domestic  relations  rest  upon 
it,  the  commonwealth  has  a  deep  Interest  to 
see  that  its  integrity  is  not  jaopardised. 
Coe  V.  mil,  86  N.  BL  040,  060,  201  Mass.  15. 

'"Marriage*  is  an  Institution  in  which 
the  public  have  an  interest**  This  is  shown 
by  the  safeguard  which  the  statute  has 
thrown  around  the  contract  and  its  dissolu- 
tion. Bacon  v.  Bacon,  86  N.  E.  1080,  48  Ind. 
App.  218. 

As  a  etvU  relatAra 

"The  'marriage  contract*  onoe  entered 
into  becomes  a  relation  rather  than  a  con- 
tract and  invests  each  party  with  a  status 
toward  the  other  and  society  at  large,  in- 
volving duties  and  responsibilities,  whi<di 
are  no  longer  matt^  for  private  regulation 
Imt  concern  the  commonwealth.'*  Coy  v. 
Humphreys,  125  8.  W.  877,  879,  142  Mo. 
App.  92. 

As  a  eliil  stains 

In  (jhristian  nations  marriage  la  not 
treated  as  a  mere  contract  to  be  susp^ided 
^r  dissolved,  at  pleasure,  but  rather  as  a 
status  based  on  public  necessity,  and  con- 
trolled by  law  for  the  benefit  of  society  at 
large.  People  v.  Oese,  89  N.  B.  638,  640,  241 
111.  279,  25  li.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  578. 

Marriage  is  a  status  resulting  from  a 
^iontract  to  marry  entered  into  by  a  man  and 
'vomaa  a^pable  of  making  auoh  a  contnct 


and  cohabitation  does  not  of  itself  oonstitnte 
marriage.  Ctompten  v.  Benham  (Ind.)  85  N. 
EL  866,867. 

Under  Ck>nst  art  16,  f  51,  and  Rev.  St 
1895,  art  2396,  defining  a  homestead,  the 
homestead  right  of  a  married  woman  rests 
upon  the  fact  that  she  has  the  status  of  a 
wife,  and  that  as  such  she  actually  used  and 
occulted  the  200-acre  homestead  for  the  pur- 
pose of  a  home^  at  the  time  of  its  attempted 
alienation,  and  did  not  join  in  the  execution 
of  the  conveyance  or  in  any  way  assent 
thereto;  the  term  "marriage^*  meaning  the 
civil  status  of  a  man  and  woman  lawfully 
united  in  the  relation  of  husband  and  wif^, 
and  "wifehood"  being  defined  as  the  state  of 
being  a  wtfe.  McGradcen  v.  Ta^or  (Tex.) 
146  8.  W.  693,  695. 

Oontraet  distlBffaislied 

Wilson's  Rev.  A  Ann.  St  1908,  c  51,  art. 
1,  I  ],  par.  3482,  provides  that  marriage  is 
a  personal  relation  arising  out  of  a  civil  con- 
tract differing  from  all  other  contracts  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  rule  that  prohibited 
contracts  are  void  does  not  apply  thereto. 
Hunt  v.  Hunt  100  Pac.  541,  543.  23  Oki  490, 
22  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1202. 

Wilson's  Rev.  A  Ann.  St  1908,  c  51,  art 
1,  i  8,  par.  3484,  prohibits  any  male  under 
the  age  of  18  years,  and  any  female  under 
the  age  of  15  years,  to  marry.  Chapter  51, 
art  1,  I  16,  par.  8497,  makes  it  criminal  to 
solemnise  or  enter  into  a  marriage  contrary 
to  foregoing  provisions.  Held,  that  while  a 
marriage  of  a  youth  of  16  and  a  girl  of  14 
was  illegal,  it  was  voidable  only,  and  not  void. 
Hunt  V.  Hunt  100  Pac.  541,  548,  28  Okl.  490, 
22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1202. 


ie-<lapaelt7  of  yavtiea 
"Marriage  is  not  a  civU  contract  SKcept 
in  so  ftir  aa  the  relation  is  based  on  the 
agreemJBUt  of  the  parties.  It  is  true  the  stat- 
ute (section  7289,  BumsT  Ann.  St  1901)  de- 
clares marriage  to  be  a  dvil  contract  but 
the  statute  itself  takes  it  out  of  the  clause 
of  simple  contracts  by  providing  that  it  may 
be  entered  into  by  persons  under  age."  El- 
kenbury  v.  Bums,  70  N.  B.  837,  888,  33  Ind. 
App.  69. 

In  an  action  by  parents  to  recover  for 
the  death  of  a  child  13  years  old,  it  is  un- 
necessary to  allege  that  the  child  was  unmar- 
ried; Rev.  St  1890,  |  4311,  providing  that 
marriage  is  in  law  a  civil  contract  to  which 
the  consent  of  parties  capable  In  law  of  con- 
tracting is  essential,  not  giving  the  right  to 
parents  or  guardians  to  contract  marriages 
between  males  under  the  age  of  14  years 
and  females  under  the  age  of  12  yeara  Bel- 
lamy V.  Whitsell,  100  S.  W.  514,  515^  128  Mo. 
App.  610. 


ImteMsi  of  stata 

Marriage  is  more  than  a  mese  dvil  eon- 
traet  for  the  estabUabmant  and  maimbepance 
by  the  parties  to  It  of  certain  j?elations  to 


UARBIAaB 


310 


MABRIAOB 


each  other.  It  involves,  except  at  modiflecl 
by  statate,  an  intimate  personal  union  of 
those  participating  in  it  of  a  character  un- 
known to  any  other  human  relation,  and 
creates  a  civil  status,  the  maintenance  of 
which  in  its  integrity  is  vital  to  the  moral 
welfare  of  society.  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  69 
Atl.  632,  634,  108  Md.  129. 

While  our  law  defines  marriage  as  a  dvil 
contract,  it  differs  from  all  other  contracts  in 
its  consequences  to  the  body  politic,  and  for 
that  reason,  in  dealing  with  it,  or  with  the 
status  resulting  therefrom,  the  state  never 
stands  indifferent,  but  is  always  a  party 
whose  interest  must  be  taken  into  account 
WlUits  v.  WiUits,  107  N.  W.  379,  380,  76 
Neb.  228»  5  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  767,  14  Ann.  Gas. 
888. 

''Marriage'*  is  more  than  a  dvil  contract, 
for  it  can  only  be  entered  into  in  a  manner 
recognized  by  law,  and  can  only  be  dissolved 
in  a  like  manner.  The  state  is  the  third 
party  to  the  contract  and  has  a  direct  in- 
terest therein.  Grover  t.  Zook,  87  Pac.  638, 
642,  44  Wash.  489,  7  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  582,  120 
Am.  St  Bep.  1012,  12  Ann.  Gas.  192  (cit- 
ing Blank  v.  Nohl,  20  S.  W.  477,  112  Mo. 
167,  18  L.  B.  A.  350;  State  v.  Bitttck,  15  S. 
W.  326,  103  Mo.  183,  U  L.  B.  A.  587,  23 
Am.  St  Bep.  869). 

The  "marriage"  contract,  once  entered  in- 
to, becomes  a  relation,  rather  than  a  contract, 
and  invests  each  party  with  a  status  towards 
the  other,  and  sodety  at  large,  involving 
duties  and  responsibilities  which  are  no  longer 
matter  for  private  regulation,  but  concern  the 
commonwealth,  and  in  this  aspect  is  a  dvil 
or  sodal  institution,  being  the  foundation  of 
the  family  and  the  origin  of  domestic  rda- 
tions  of  the  utmost  importance  to  dviliza- 
tion  and  social  progress;  hence  the  state  is 
deeply  concerned  in  its  maintenance  in  pu- 
rity and  integrity.  Coj  y.  Humphreys,  125 
S.  W.  877,  879.  142  Mo.  App.  92. 

Creation  of  relation— Capacity  of  par- 
ties 

"Marriage"  is  a  contract  and  nothing 
else,  which  presupposes  the  meeting  of  two 
minds  on  the  subject-matter  of  it  If  one  of 
the  parties  when  the  ceremony  was  per- 
formed was  so  far  under  the  influence  of 
liquor  as  to  be  unable  to  understand  the  con- 
tracting of  such  marital  relation,  then  in  law 
the  proceeding  amounted  to  nothing,  because 
the  meeting  of  minds  presupposes  suffldent 
intelligence  to  determine  whether  tiie  con- 
tract shall  be  made.  Unless  there  shall  be 
present  this  degree  of  intelligence  at  the 
time  the  marital  relation  is  entered  into, 
then  there  is  no  contract.  Allen  v.  Allen, 
110  N.  T.  Supp.  303,  305,  126  App.  Div.  838. 

Under  the  express  provisions  of  Gode^  § 
3139,  marriage  Is  a  dvil  contract,  requiring 
the  consent  of  parties  capable  of  entering 
into  other  dvil  contracts,  and  hence  without 
such  consent  no  marital  rights  are  acquired 


nor  marital  duties  imposed*  and.  If  one  or 
both  of  ^e  parties  be  insane  and  therefore 
incapable  of  giving  consent,  there  is  no  mar- 
riage, but  in  the  interest  of  good  order  the 
courts  will  assume  jurisdiction  to  decree  the 
annulment  of  the  union  though  annulment  is 
not  necessary  to  clothe  the  parties  with  all 
the  rights  of  unmarried  persons.  Floyd 
County  v.  Wolfe,  117  N.  W.  32,  34,  138  Iowa. 
749. 

Under  the  statutory  definition  of  mar- 
riage in  Missouri  as  a  dvil  contract  to  which 
the  consent  of  parties  capable  in  law  of  con- 
tracting is  essential,  there  could  be  no  mar- 
riage in  legal  contemplation  between  slaves 
in  that  state,  who  had  no  capadty  to  con- 
tract; and  hence,  where  a  man  and  woman, 
slaves,  "took  up  with  eadi  other**  in  Mis- 
souri, with  their  mistress'  consent,  accord- 
ing to  the  custom  of  slaves,  the  relation  be- 
ing merely  temporary  and  subject  to  termi- 
nation at  any  time,  dther  by  tiieir  own  act 
or  that  of  their  mistress,  there  was  no  sudi 
marriage  as  would  permit  their  diildren  to 
inherit  from  their  father.  In  re  Oampbdl's 
Bstate,  108  P.  069,  673,  12  OaL  App.  707. 

Same— Consent  of  state 

"A  'marriage'  is  a  dvil  contract  made 
in  due  form,  by  which  a  man  and  woman 
agree  to  take  eadi  other  for  husband  and 
wife  during  their  joint  lives,  unless  it  is  an- 
nulled by  law,  and  to  disdiarge  towards  each 
other  the  duties  Imposed  by  law  upon  sach 
relation.  Bach  must  be  capable  of  assenting, 
and  must  in  fact  consent  to  form  this  new 
relation.  If  a  statute  forbids  the  solemniza- 
tion of  marriage  without  a  license,  still,  in 
the  absence  of  a  dause  of  nuUity,  the  mar- 
riage will  be  good,  though  no  license  was  had. 
No  particular  form  of  words  is  necessary  to 
constitute  a  common-law  marriage.  If  what 
is  done  and  said  evidences  an  intention  by 
the  parties  to  assume  the  nuirriage  status* 
and  the  parties  thereupon  enter  into  the  re- 
lation of  husband  and  wife»  that  is  suffident, 
whatever  may  be  the  form  of  expression 
used."  Heymann  v.  Heymann«  75  N.  £.  1079, 
1080,  218  111.  686. 

game  "Solemnliation 

Marriage  la  a  dvil  contract,  the  consent 
of  the  parties  to  it  being  all  that  is  required 
by  natural  public  law.  It  is  true  that  in 
most,  if  not  all,  of  the  states  of  the  Union, 
there  are  statutes  regulating  the  manner  of 
forming  the  marriage  contract,  providing  for 
the  performance  of  ceremonies,  and  naming 
those  persons  who  can  perform  the  ceremo- 
nies or  cdebrate  the  rites  of  matrimony; 
but  it  is  held  in  a  number  of  the  states  that, 
in  the  absence  of  positive  statutes  dedaring 
all  marriages  void  that  are  not  performed  as 
directed  by  law,  any  marriage  made  accord- 
ing to  the  common  law  would  be  a  valid  mai^ 
riage.  Sudi  marriage  may  be  proved  by  r^ 
utation,  dedaratioQs,  and  conduct  of  the 
parties,  and  other  drcumstanoea  usually  ao- 


MARBIAQJI 


8U 


MARRIAaS 


rwniwmjing  tbat  rdatioiL  Edelatein  y. 
Brown,  80  8.  W.  1Q27»  35  Tex.  Civ.  Am>.  625. 

'TTwo  CBscntialg  to  a  valid  'marriage'  are 
capacity  and  consent  Marriage  la  a  drll 
contract,  and  no  ceremonial  la  Indispensably 
re<iQt8lte  to  its  creation.  A  contract  of  mar- 
riage made  per  verba  de  pnes^iti  amounts 
to  an  actual  marriage  and  la  valid."  Trav- 
ers  V.  Beinhardt,  27  Snp.  Ct  563,  568>  206 
U.  8.  423,  438»  51  h.  JSd.  865  (quoting  Voor- 
heee  v.  Voorhees,  19  Atl.  172,  173,  46  N.  J. 
Sq.  411,  413,  414,  19  Am.  St  Rep.  404,  406). 

"Marriage'*  in  a  legal  sense  Is  a  civil 
contract  It  Is  not  Indispensable  that  a 
clergyman  sbonld  be  present  to  antborize  and 
confirm  the  contract  to  give  validity  to  the 
marriage.  Statutes  which  direct  that  a  li- 
cense most  be  Issued,  that  only  certain  per- 
•ons  shall  perform  the  ceremony,  that  a  cer- 
tain number  of  witnesses  shall  be  present, 
that  a  certlflcate  of  marriage  shall  be  re- 
turned and  recorded  and  the  person  violating 
tbe  conditions  shall  be  guilty  of  a  criminal 
offense,  are  directory  merely,  and  in  no 
wise  affect  the  validity  of  the  marriage  con- 
tract, unless  they  contain  an  express  pro- 
vision to  that  effect.  Reeves  v.  Reaves,  82 
Pac  490,  492,  498,  494,  15  OkL  240,  2  L.  R. 
A  (N.  8.)  853  (citing  Gibson  v.  Gibson,  39 
N.  W.  460,  24  Neb.  394). 

A  present  agreement  between  competent 
persons  to  take  each  other  for  husband  and 
wife  constitutes  a  valid  "marriage,"  though 
there  be  no  witnesses.  Dietrich  v.  Dietrich, 
112  N.  Y.  Supp.  968,  970,  128  App.  Dlv.  664. 

"That  there  may  be  a  valid  'marriage' 
without  solemnisation  by  minister,  priest,  or 
officer  is  not  questioned  in  this  cotmtry  ex- 
cept where  the  statute  forbids,  and  It  once 
was  so  understood  in  England.  •  <  • 
Marriage  Is  recognized  as  a  status  brought 
about  by  civil  contract,  and  it  may  be  con- 
tracted by  the  parties  themselves,  as  any  oth- 
er contract,  without  even  tbe  presence  of 
witnesses.    •    •    •    We  have  already  shown 

•  •  •  that  It  need  not  be  followed  by 
cohabitation,  either  In  the  sense  of  living  to- 
gether or  of  sexual  intercourse.  Mutual 
consent,  expressed,  is  the  requisite."  ''Mar- 
riage," as  distinguished  from  an  agreement 
to  marry  and  from  the  act  of  becoming  mar- 
ried, is  the  dvll  status  of  one  man  and  one 
woman,  legally  united  for  life.  "The  contract 
makes  the  marriage,  and  the  status  Is  the 
marriage.  Hence  it  is  said  that  marriage 
Is  a  status  which  arises  oat  of  the  contract 

*  *  *  That  a  contract  of  marriage  to 
prsesentl  is  itself  a  marriage — that  Is,  produc- 
es the  marriage  status  without  anything 
more— is  stated  by  all  commentators  on  the 
common  law  and  by  all  adjudications  ttieie- 
of  in  this  oonntry/'  Davis  v.  Stouffer^  112 
8.  W.  282,  285,  286,  132  Mo.  App.  555  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  Yardley's  Estate,  75  Fa. 
207;  1  Bishop,  Marriage  &  Divorce^  1 11,  and 


and  dtlng  and  adopting  Dyer  v.  Bran- 
nock,  66  Mo.  391,  27  Am.  Rep.  369). 

An  iBstmctlon  that  ^marriage"  is  a  dvll 
eontraet  entered  into  between  a  man  and  a 
woman,  both  of  whom  are  equally  competent 
to  enter  Into  the  relationship,  and  that  it 
may  be  consummated  by  a  form  prescribed 
by  statottt,  or  by  some  other  formal  method, 
or  by  a  formal  agreement  between  the  par- 
ties, and  that  some  of  these  methods  are 
necessary  to  eonstitiite  '"marriage,"  la  incor- 
rect, since  whatever  be  the  form  of  the  cere- 
mony or  If  there  be  no  ceremony,  if  the  par- 
ties agree  presently  to  take  each  other  for 
husband  and  wlfb,  and  from  that  time  on 
live  profoascdly  in  that  relation,  proof  of 
these  fkcts  would  be  snfflcient  to  constitute 
proof  of  a  marriage  binding  on  the  parties, 
which  would  subject  them  to  legal  penalties 
for  a  disregard  of  the  obligation.  Darling 
V.  Dent,  100  8.  W.  747,  748,  82  Ark.  76  <elting 
Hntchlna  v.  Klmmell,  31  MleK.  130,  18  Am. 
Rep.  164). 

SvUlemee  of 

•*  "Where  parties  have  cohabited  together, 
and  held  themselves  out  as  man  and  wife, 
and  there  are  circumstances  from  which  a 
present  contract  may  be  inferred,  the  law  out 
of  charity,  and  in  favor  of  innocence  and 
good  morals,  will  presume  matrimony.  The 
law  in  general  presumes  against  vice  and  im- 
morality, and  on  this  ground  holds  acknowl- 
edgment, cohabitation,  and  reputation  pre- 
sumptive evidence  of  marriage.  Mere  co- 
habitation is  not  usually  considered  suffi- 
cient' Bishop  lays  down  the  doctrine  that 
'cohabitation  and  the  reputation  of  being 
husband  and  wife  are  usually  considered  to- 
gether in  questions  concerning  the  proof  of 
marriage;  the  one  being  in  a  certain  sense 
the  shadow  of  the  other.  Some  of  the  au- 
thorities fftvor  the  idea  that  reputation  of 
itself  may  be  received  as  sufficient  proof 
prima  fade,  but  it  must  be  uniform  and  gen- 
eral; if  there  is  a  conflict  in  the  repute,  it 
will  not  establish  the  marriage.  On  the  oth- 
er hand,  its  sufficiency  in  any  case  has  been 
denied,  unless  there  be  accompanying  proof 
of  cohabitation.'  1  Bishop,  Marriage  &  Di- 
vorce (5th  Bd.)  483.  'Cohabitation  and  rep- 
utation are  at  best  only  presumptive  proofs, 
and,  when  one  of  these  foundations  is  with- 
drawn, what  remains  is  too  weak  to  build  a 
presumption  on.  There  is  good  sense  In  the 
Scotch  law,  by  whi^  cohabitation  alone  is 
considered  insufficient,  and  which  requires  In 
addition  habit  and  repute,  because  it  is  said 
that  the  partlea  may  eat,  live,  and  sleep  to- 
gether as  mistress  and  keeper  without  any 
intention  of  entering  into  marriage.'  It  is 
well  established  in  this  state  that  a  marriage 
without  observing  the  statutory  regulations, 
if  made  according  to  the  common  law,  is  a 
valid  marriage,  and  that  by  the  common  law, 
if  the  contract  be  made  per  verba  de  prssentl 
it  is  sufficient  evidence  of  a  marriage,  or  if  it 
be  made  per  verba  de  future  cum  copula*  the 


MARRIAQX 


813 


MARBIAOS  PfiOMISB 


cohabitation  is  presnmed  to  be  on  the  flaitli 
of  the  marriage  promise.  That  is,  howeyer, 
merely  a  rule  of  evidence,  and  it  is  always 
competent,  In  sach  cases,  to  show  by  proof 
that  the  fiicts  are  otherwise.  Under  our  law, 
'marriage'  is  a  ciyil  contract  by  which  a 
man  and  a  woman  agree  to  take  eadi  other 
for  husband  and  wife  during  their  Joint  lives, 
unless  it  is  annulled  by  law,  and  to  discharge 
towards  each  other  the  duties  imposed  bylaw 
upon  such  relation*  Bach  must  be  capable 
of  assenting  and  must,  in  fact,  consent,  to 
form  this  new  relation.  When  the  consent 
to  marry  is  manifested  by  words  de 
prsesentl,  a  present  assumption  of  the  mar- 
riage status  is  necessary."  On  the  issue  as 
to  a  common-law  marriage,  the  woman  testi- 
fied that  viiille  she  and  the  man  were  riding 
together  he  said  she  was  his  wife,  and  that  a 
marriage  ceremony  was  unnecessary,  if  they 
should  hold  marriage  relations,  and  that 
she  agreed  to  hold  such  relations,  and  that 
afterwards  he  acknowledged  her  as  his  wife, 
but  that  they  did  not  live  openly  together 
until  five  months  thereafter.  It  appeared 
that  subsequently  their  neighbors  and  the 
woman  Insisted  that  a  ceremony  be  perform- 
ed, and  that,  because  of  the  man*s  refusal 
to  have  a  ceremony,  a  difficulty  arose  between 
the  man  and  the  woman's  son,  in  which  the 
latter  killed  the  former.  Held  that  the 
facts  were  insufficient  to  show  a  marriage. 
Topper  V.  Perry,  95  S.  W.  208,  207,  107  Mo. 
631,  114  Am.  St  Rep.  777  (citing  Carglle  v. 
Wood,  63  Mo.  loc.  cit  612;  State  v.  Blttick, 
16  S.  W.  325,  103  Mo.  loc  dt  191,  11  L,  R. 
A.  587,  23  Am.  St  Rep.  809 ;  State  y.  Cooper, 
16  S.  W.  327,  103  Mo.  271;  Dyer  v.  Bran- 
nock,  06  Mo.  391,  27  Am.  Rep.  359;  Cart- 
wright  V.  McGown,  12  N.  B.  737,  121  IlL  388, 
2  Am.  St  Rep.  105;  Hants  v.  Sealy  [Pa.]  6 
Bin.  406 ;  Blzas  v.  Elzas,  49  N.  B.  717, 171  lU. 
635). 

As  used  in  Rey.  Code,  |  2611,  defining  it 
as  a  personal  relation  arising  out  of  a  civil 
contract  to  which  the  consent  of  the  parties 
is  necessary,  and  that  consent  alone  will  not 
constitute  it,  but  it  must  be  followed  by  a 
solemnization  or  by  mutual  assumption  of 
marital  rights,  duties,  and  obligations,  was 
fully  proven  by  evidence  that  the  parties  In 
this  case  had  been  married  by  a  minister  on 
authority  of  a  certificate  issued  by  law  and 
had  lived  together  for  28  years  as  man  and 
wife,  though  Jit  the  time  of  the  ceremony  a 
prior  spouse  of  one  of  the  parties  was  alive; 
there  being  a  presumption  of  divorce.  Huff 
V.  Huff,  118  Pac.  1080,  1083,  20  Idaho,  460. 

Civ.  Code,  I  66,  declaring  that  marriage 
is  a  personal  relation  arising  out  of  a  dvil 
contract,  but  consent  alone  will  not  constitute 
a  marriage,  and  it  must  be  followed  by  a 
mutual  admission  of  marital  rights,  does  not 
modify  the  requirements  of  the  common-law 
rule  that  the  repute  and  cohabitation  neces- 
sary to  create  a  presumption  of  marriage 
must  be  uniform,  general,  and  open,  and 


there  most  be  evidence  that  the  parties  as- 
sumed the  relation  of  faasband  and  wife, 
treating  each  other  as  married,  and  so  con- 
ducting themselves  as  to  have  full  repute 
among  their  friends  and  associates  to  be  mar- 
ried. In  re  Baldwin's  BsUte,  123  Pac.  267, 
276,  162  Cal.  471. 

As  matter  ov  tldac 

See  Matter  or  Thing. 
Ome  person  sreateA 

"Marriage"  is  a  contract  by  which  t 
social  union  is  established;  and  the  status 
of  each  spouse,  and  his  or  her  rights  in 
tiie  common  property,  are  fixed  by  special 
provisions  of  law  applicable  to  that  relation 
alone.  It  will  not  be  lust  to  say  that,  because 
the  personal  identity  of  the  husband  or  wife 
is  the  same  after  as  before  marriage,  there 
has  been  no  loss  or  surrender  of  those  legal 
characteristics  affected  by  the  assumption  of 
the  relation.  There  is  in  many  respects  t 
complete  merger  of  identities  and  a  total  loss 
of  the  separate  individual  rights  that  former- 
ly existed.  Clark  y.  Brown  (Tex.)  108  S.  W. 
421,  443. 

As  ¥»lva1ile  eoulderatloA 

Bee  Valuable  Consideration. 


MABBIAOE  BOND  BEOOBD 

A  book  known  as  the  "Marriage  Bond 
Record**  is  a  book  kept  in  the  county  derks* 
offices  in  Kentucky,  containing  the  names  of 
persons  who  obtained  licenses  to  marry  and 
other  evidence  touching  their  age  and  resi- 
dence; Pace  r.  Cawood  (Ky.)  110  8.  W.  414, 
416. 

ICABBIAOE  BROKERAGE 

A  contract  based  on  a  money  consldeni* 
tion  to  aid  a  woman  in  securing  a  husband, 
the  services  contracted  for  being  in  oomiec- 
tion  with  efforts  already  being  made  by  her 
to  secure  such  man,  was  nothing  less  than 
that  known  as  "marriage  brokerage"  and 
was  invalid  by  common  law  as  against  public 
policy.  Wenninger  v.  Mitchell*  122  S.  W. 
1180,  1132, 130  Mo.  App.  420. 

MARRIAOE  PER  VERBA  BE  rUTURA 
OUM  OOPUIiA 

See,  also,  Common-Law  Marriage. 

"Marriage  per  verba  de  future  cum  copu- 
la" is  not  consummated,  unless  the  copula  is 
had  in  fulfillment  ol  the  future  agreanent 
An  existing  agreement  between  a  man  and 
a  woman  to  marry  at  a  future  day  concln- 
sively  negatives  the  claim  of  a  marriage  per 
verba  de  preesenti  between  the  same  parties. 
Sorensen  y.  Sorensen,  100  N.  W.  930,  033,  6S 
Neb.  483. 

MARRIAGE  PROMIBB 

Breadi  of  as  personal  injury,  see  Pe^ 
sonal  Injury. 

Seduction  induced  by,  see  Seduce— Se- 
duction. 


MARBIA«£  RELATION 


813 


MABItHATiINfl-  ABBBSB 


MABBIAOE  BEI.ATI0V 

See  Property  Qrowlng  Oat  of  Marriaffe 
Belatioii. 


A  woman,  to  be  'Marriageable,*'  maflt  at 
the  time  be  able  to  bear  children  to  her  hue- 
band,  and  a  representation  to  this  effect  I0 
implied  in  ttie  yery  nature  of  tb»  contract 
Baker  ▼.  Baker,  13  OaL  87, 106. 

MARRTISB  WOKAX 

As  pnblle  merchant,  see  Pablic  Merdiaat 
As  stockholder,  see  Stockholder. 

In  Domestic  Relations  Law  (ConsoL 
Laws  1909,  c.  14)  |  81,  providing  that  a 
married  woman  is  a  Joint  guardian  of  her 
children  with  her  husband,  the  term  ''mar- 
ried woman'*  does  not  refer  to  one  married 
to  another  than  the  living  father  of  the 
child  after  divorce  from  him,  but  only  to  the 
mother  married  to  the  father  of  the  Infant 
In  re  Wagner,  185  N.  Y.  Supp.  678,  688,  75 
Kisc  Bep.419. 

MATtRTlSTI  WOMAM'S  flBPAKATS  BS- 
TATB 

See  S^arate  Batata 

KABJIY 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  1889,  i  2169^  dedaiv 
ing  that  every  person,  having  a  husband  or 
wlf^  living,  who  ''shall  marry  another  pei^ 
son**  without  this  state  in  any  case  whese 
such  marriage  would  be  punishable,  is  con- 
tracted or  solemnised  within  the  state,  or 
shall  thereafter  cohabit  with  such  person 
within  the  state,  shall  be  adjudged  guilty  of 
bigamy,  should  be  taken  to  mean  the  going 
''through"  the  form  and  ceremony  of  mar- 
riage with  another  person,  regardless  as  to 
the  validity  of  the  second  marriage  as  a  mat^ 
ter  of  law.  State  v.  Stuart,  92  S.  W.  878, 
882,  194  Mo.  345,  112  Am.  St  Rep.  629,  5 
Ann.  Gas.  963. 

XABBTIN O  AGAIN 

Testator  devised  real  estate  described  to 
bis  wife,  and  gave  to  another  woman  named 
other  described  real  estate,  to  be  held  by  her 
for  the  support  of  herself  and  testator's  chil- 
dren by  her,  and  provided  that,  in  the  event 
of  her  "marrying  again,"  the  gift  to  her 
should  become  void,  and  the  property  should 
go  to  such  children.  A  provision  In  similar 
language  was  made  in  fiivor  of  a  third  woman. 
The  woman  so  named  was  testator's  polyga- 
mous wife.  Testator  and  she  were  members 
of  the  Mormon  Church  and  beUeved  in  its 
doctrines,  including  the  doctrine  of  polyga- 
my. Held,  that  the  words  "marrying  again" 
hidnded  the  entering  into  a  polygamous  mar- 
rtage,  and  the  gift  to  such  woman  was  with- 
hi  Gomp.  Laws  1907,  f  2795,  providing  that  a 
conditional  dlsi^altlon  is  one  whidi  dn>ends 
on  the  occurrence  of  some  uncertain  event 
by  whicdi  It  is  either  to  take  effect  or  be  de- 


feated, and  on  bet  entering  into  a  polyga- 
mous marriage  the  gift  to  her  terminated. 
In  re  Poppleton's  Estate,  97  Pac  138k  140,  34 
Utah,  286. 

MARSH  UND 

The  drainage  act  of  1881  (Laws  1881, 
pi  286,  c.  51)  confers  the  power  upon  county 
authorities  to  create  drainage  districts  for 
the  purpose  of  draining  ''marsh  or  swamp 
lands"  alone,  and  does  not  confer  power  to 
change  the  channel  or  divert  surface  water 
drains  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  the  lands 
of  riparian  proprietors  lower  down  the 
stream  trom  periodical  overflows  in  seasons 
of  freshet  The  term  ''marsh  or  swamp 
lands,*'  as  used  in  said  act,  has  a  wider  sig- 
nificance tlian  the  terms  "marshes"  or 
"swamps."  The  power  is  conferred  by  this 
act  to  drain  lands  which  are  not  strictly 
^peaking,  "marshes**  or  "swamps,**  but  whIdi 
are  "marsh  or  swamp  lands,**  meaning  there- 
by lands  which  are  so  situated  as  to  be  ren- 
dered difficult  or  incapable  of  successful  cul- 
tivation by  reason  of  retaining  in  the  soil  or 
carrying  on  the  surface  an  excessive  quantity 
of  water  during  certain  portions  of  the  year, 
even  though  at  other  times  they  may  be  as 
solid,  dry,  and  firm  as  lands  in  general. 
Campbell  y.  Youngson,  114  N.  W.  415,  417, 
418,  80  Neb.  822. 

MARSHAL 


Aseltr 

See  aty  Offlcec 


See  Peace  Offlcei; 


See  Person. 

MABSHAUVQ  ASSBTt 

The  doctrine  of  "marshaling  assets'*  is 
defined  as  follows:  "It  is  a  settled  principle 
that  when  there  are  two  classes  of  creditors 
and  two  funds,  and  one  class  of  creditors 
can  only  go  against  one  fund  while  t)ie  other 
can  go  against  both,  the  court  will  marshal 
the  assets,  restricting  the  creditors  who  have 
a  double  security  from  touching  the  fund  ap- 
plicable to  the  ilrst  class  of  creditors  until 
they  are  paid  in  full."  In  re  Teruis,  175  Fed. 
495,  497. 

The  rule  that  he  who  has  two  ftmds  for 
the  satisfaction  of  his  daim  shall  not  by 
electing  to  resort  to  the  doubly  charged  fund, 
disappoint  him  who  has  that  fund  only  to 
resort  to,  is  subject  to  quaUflcations,  and 
among  them  is  the  Qualiacatlon  that  both 
funds  must  be  within  the  Jurisdiction  and 
control  of  the  court  except  In  the  rare  cases 
in  which  it  Is  clear  that  the  creditor  of  the 
two  funds  will  sustain  no  loss,  delay,  or 
additional  expense  If  veaulred  to  resort  first 
to  the  fund  without  the  JurisdicOon.    Stem- 


iC^BSHALINa '  ASSJCTO 


814 


UABTSa 


berger  y.  Sussman,  eo  AtL  195,  196,  60  N. 
J.  Eq.  199. 

Where  a  creditor  of  A.  has  a  right  to 
satisfy  his  debt  out  of  two  funds,  X  and  Y, 
to  but  one  of  which,  Y,  another  creditor,  can 
resort,  the  first  creditor  must  be  compelled 
to  exhaust  X  before  resorting  to  Y.  Where  a 
mortgagor,  as  further  security,  assigned  a 
claim  for  money  due  under  insurance  policies, 
and  the  mortgagee,  without  knowledge  of  a 
subsequent  mortgagor,  and  pursuant  to  a 
supplemental  agreement  with  the  mortgagor, 
applied  the  money  collected  on  the  policies 
to  a  general  and  unsecured  indebtedness  of 
the  mortgagor,  the  subsequent  mortgagee  was 
not  entitled  to  have  the  money  applied  in  sat- 
isfaction of  the  mortgage.  Weldemann  v. 
Springfield  Breweries  CJo.,  63  AtL  162,  164, 
78  Conn.  660. 

The  doctrine  of  marshaling  assets  will 
not  be  applied  in  favor  of  one  having  an  ad- 
equate remedy  at  law.  Farmers*  Loan  & 
Trust  Co.  V.  Kip,  85  N.  B.  59,  64,  192  N.  Y. 
266. 

MASON 

MASOMIO  SO0IET7 

As  charity,  see  Charity, 

MASONBT 

See  Inspector  of  Masonry. 

A  contract  sufficiently  fixes  the  date  for 
the  completion  of  the  work  where  such  con- 
tract includes  excavating,  concrete  founda- 
tions, rubble  stone  work,  pressed  brick  and 
cut  stone  work,  etc.,  and  provides  the  date 
for  cdmpleting  the  "entire  masonry,"  inas- 
much as  the  term  "masonry"  is  generic  and 
includes  all  the  prior  specifications  of  the 
contract  as  recited.  Joseph  N.  Eisendrath 
Co.  V.  Gebhardt,  124  111.  App.  825,  881. 

MASS 

As  public  charity,  see  Public  Charity. 
As  superstitious  use,  see  Superstitious 
Use. 

"A  'mass'  is  not  peculiarly  a  part  of  a 
funeral  service,  like  unto  the  ofilce  for  the 
dead.  It  is  the  sacrament  of  the  Eucharist, 
and  a  low  mass  is  one  said  and  not  sung. 
In  the  religion  of  tljie  Holy  Roman  Church 
^masses'  are  celebrated  for  the  good  of  those 
who  are  dead,  but  in  no  sense  is  a  mass  so 
celebrated  necessarily  a  part  of  the  funeral 
service."  In  re  McAvoy's  Estate,  98  N.  Y. 
Supp.  487,  488,  112  App.  Div.  377  (citing 
Cent  Diet). 

MASSAGE 

As  practicing  medicine,  see  Practice  of 

Medicine^ 


MASSES  OF  MEN 

The  words  "masses  of  men,**  in  a  plead- 
ing alleging  that  the  letters  "Inc."  are  an 
abbreviation  and  are  9o  understood  by  the 
''masses  of  men,"  mean  the  principal  or 
main  body,  and  is  an  admission  tliat  there 
are  some  men  or  a  portion  of  the  public  who 
do  not  so  understand  it  Commonwealth  r. 
American  Snuff  Co.,  101  S.  W.  864,  366,  125 
Ky.  850. 

MASSEUR 

As  physician,  see  Physician. 
As  practicing  medicine,  see  Practice  of 
Medicine. 

MASTER 

The  master  la  the  one  who  has  the  direc- 
tion and  control  of  the  servant,  and  the  test 
is  whether  in  the  particular  service  the  serv- 
ant continues  liable  to  the  dlrectipn  and  con- 
trol of  his  master,  or  becomes  subject  to  the 
party  to  whom  he  la  loaned  or  hired.  Grace 
&  Hyde  Co.  v.  Probst,  70  N.  E.  12,  14,  206 
111.  147  (citing  Consolidated  Fireworks  Co. 
v.  Koehl,  60  N.  E.  87,  190  111.  145). 

A  **master"  is  one  who  stands  to  another 
in  such  relation  that  he  not  only  controls  the 
result  of  the  work  of  that  other,  but  also 
may  direct  the  manner  in  which  it  shall  be 
done.  McColllgan  v.  Pennsylvania  It  Co.,  ^ 
Atl.  792,  793.  214  Pa.  229,  6  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
544,  112  Am.  St  Rep.  789. 

•*The  fact  that  the  party  to  whose 
wrongful  or  negligent  act  an  injury  may  be 
traced  was  at  the  time  in  the  general  em- 
ployment and  pay  of  another  person  does 
not  necessarily  make  the  latter  the  'master/ 
and  responsible  for  his  acts.  The  'master* 
is  the  person  in  whose  business  he  is  engaged 
at  the  time,  and  who  has  the  right  to  control 
and  direct  his  conduct"  Wleber  ▼.  New 
York  Cent  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  N.  Y.  Supp. 
28,  80,  109  App.  Div.  81  (quoting  Higgins  y. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  50  N.  E.  500,  156 
N.  Y.  76,  66  Am.  St  Rep.  537). 

A  servant  is  one  who  is  employed  to 
render  personal  service  to  his  employer  oth- 
erwise than  in  the  pursuit  of  an  independent 
calling,  and  who  in  such  service  remains  en- 
tirely under  the  control  and  direction  of  the 
latter,  who  is  called  the  ''master."  Giaco- 
minl  V.  Pacific  Lumber  Co.,  89  Pac  1059, 
1060,  5  Cal.  App^  218  (citing  Civ.  Code,  i 
2009). 

A  "master"  is  one  wlio  not  only  pre- 
scribes to  the  workman  the  end  of  his  work, 
but  directs  or  at  any  moment  may  direct  the 
means  also,  or,  as  it  has  been  put,  retains 
the  power  of  controlling  the  work.  Kellog 
V.  Church  Charity  Foundation  112  N.  Y. 
Supp.  666,  569,  128  ^pi  Div.  214  (dttag  FoL 
Torte  [4th  Ed.]  p.  72). 


ICASTBR  AND  SERVAKT 


815 


MABTBR  IN  OH  AKGBKBT 


MASTER  AHB  SERVAHT 

The  common  onderstanding  of  the  words 
''master  and  servanf  *  and  the  legal  under- 
standing are  not  the  same.  The  latter  Is 
broader,  and  comprehends  some  cases  In 
which  the  parties  are  master  and  servant 
only  in  a  peculiar  sense,  and  for  certain  por^ 
poses — ^perhaps  only  for  a  single  purpose. 
In  strictness,  a  "servants*  is  one  who,  for  a 
valuable  consideration,  engages  in  the  serv- 
ice of  another,  and  undertalies  to  observe 
his  directions  in  some  lawful  business. 
*  *  *  It  could  not  all  depend  on  whether 
the  noaster  was  to  pay  anything,  nor  wheth- 
er the  service  was  permanent  or  temporary. 
His  control  of  the  action  of  the  other  is  the 
important  circumstance,  and  the  particulars 
of  his  arrangement  are  immaterial.  The 
plaintiff  not  being  employed,  controlled,  or 
paid  by  the  defendant,  would  seem  not  to  be 
their  servant,  so  that  they  would  be  liable 
for  his  acts,  or  their  liability  to  him  be  gov- 
erned by  the  rules  applicable  as  between 
master  and  servant.  Where  defendant  en- 
gaged J.  to  sink  a  shaft,  paying  him  so  much 
per  foot,  and  J.  hired  plaintifT  to  help  him, 
and  agreed  to  pay  him  one-third  of  the  com- 
pensation received  from  defendant,  J.  hav- 
ing the  exclusive  right  to  employ,  control, 
and  discharge  his  helpers,  plaintiff  was  not 
defendant's  servant  Kiser  v.  Suppe,  112 
S.  W.  1005,  1007,  183  Mo.  App.  19  (quoting 
and  adopting  Cooley,  Torts,  pp.  681,  582). 

The  relation  of  master  and  servant  ex- 
ists where  the  employer  has  power  to  direct 
the  nature  of  the  work  and  the  manner  of 
dohig  it,  with  power  to  employ  and  dis- 
charge, and  a  switch  tender,  employed  and 
controlled  by  defendant,  but  one-third  of 
whose  wages  was  paid  by  plaintiff's  company, 
which  ran  over  defendant's  tracks  at  the 
switches,  was  not  a  servant  of  plaintiff's 
company,  nor  was  defendant  its  servant;  the 
latter  only  having  the  right  to  complain  to 
defendant  as  to  the  manner  of  performing 
his  duties.  Yeates  v.  Illinois  Cent  B.  Co., 
89  N.  B.  388,  841,  241  HI.  205. 

The  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior  ap- 
plies only  where  the  relation  of  master  and 
servant  exists  between  the  wrongdoer  and 
the  person  sought  to  be  held  liable  for  the  in- 
jury, and  the  master  is  he  in  whose  business 
the  servant  is  engaged  at  the  time,  and  who 
bas  the  right  to  control  and  direct  the  serv- 
ant's conduct  Harding  v.  St  Louis  Nat 
Stockyards,  90  N,  B.  205,  207,  242  111.  444. 

**The  relation  of  'master  and  servant' 
exists  whenever  the  employer  retains  the 
right  to  direct  the  manner  in  which  the 
business  shall  be  done,  as  well  as  the  result 
to  be  accomplished,  or,  in  other  words,  not 
only  what  shall  be  done,  but  how  it  shall  be 
done."  Atchison,  T.  A  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dick- 
ens, 103  S.  W.  750.  753,  7  Ind.  T.  16  (citing 
Shiger  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rahh,  10  Sup.  Ct  175. 
132  U.  S.  518,  88  L..Bd.  4^;  Uppington  v. 
City  of  New  York,  59  N.  E.  91, 165  N.  Y.  222, 


58  L.  R.  A.  550;  Pow«n  v.  Virginia  Const 
Ca,  18  8.  W.  691,  88  Tenn.  692,  17  Am.  St 
Bep.  925;  Carlson  v.  Stocking,  66  N.  W.  58, 
91  Wis.  482;  Robinson  v.  Webb,  11  Bush  [74 
Ky.]  464;  Harrison  r.  Collins,  86  Pa.  158, 
27  Am.  Bep.  699). 

The  relation  of  <^aster  and  serv- 
ant" subsists  between  an  accident  insurance 
company  and  its  medical  officer  empowered 
to  examine  the  person  or  body  of  insured  in 
respect  to  any  injury  or  cause  of  death,  in 
such  manner  and  at  such  times  as  he  may 
require,  in  the  exercise  of  such  right  of  ex- 
amination, and  the  company  is  answerable 
for  injuries  resulting  from  the  negligence 
or  misconduct  of  the  medical  officer,  and,  be- 
tween the  medical  officer  and  insured,  the 
law  governing  the  relations  of  physician  and 
patient  does  not  apply.  Tompkins  v.  Pacific 
Mut  life  Ins.  Co.,  44  S.  E.  489,  444,  53  W. 
Va.  479,  62  L.  R.  A.  489,  97  Am.  St  Rep.  1006. 

MA8TEB  m  OKAVCERT 

"A  'master  in  (Aancery*  is  an  offleer  ap- 
pointed by  the  court  to  assist  in  various  pro- 
ceedings incidental  to  the  progress  of  a 
cause  before  it,  and  is  usually  employed  to 
take  and  state  accounts,  to  take  and  report 
testimony,  and  to  perform  sucb  duties  aa 
raqalie  compntatlDn  of  Interest  the  value 
of  annuities,  the  amount  of  damages  in 
particular  cases,  the  auditing  and  ascertain- 
ing of  liens  on  property  involved,  and  similar 
services.  The  information  which  he  may 
communicate  by  his  findings  on  such  cases  on 
the  evidence  presented  to  him  is  merely  ad- 
visory to  the  court  which  it  may  accept  and 
act  upon  or  disregard  in  whole  or  in  part 
according  to  Its  own  Judgment  as  to  the 
weight  of  the  evidence.  In  practice  it  is 
not  usual  for  the  court  to  reject  the  report 
of  a  master  with  his  findings,  where  the 
matters  refer  to  him  unless  exceptions  are 
taken  to  them  and  brought  to  its  attention 
and  on  examination  the  findings  are  found 
unsupported  or  defective  in  some  essential 
particular.  Metzker  v.  Bonebrake,  2  Sup. 
Ct  351,  108  U.  S.  66,  27  L.  Ed.  654;  Tllgh- 
man  v.  Proctor,  8  Sup.  Ct  894,  125  U.  S.  136, 
149.  81  li.  Ed.  664;  Callaghan  v.  Myers,  9 
Sup.  Ct  177.  128  U.  S.  617,  666,  82  L.  Ed. 
547.  It  is  not  within  the  general  province 
of  the  master  to  pass  on  all  the  issues  in  an 
equity  case,  nor  is  it  compet^it  for  the  court 
to  refer  the  entire  decision  of  the  case  to  him 
without  the  consent  of  the  parties.  It  cannot 
of  ita  own  motion,  or  upon  the  request  of 
one  party,  delegate  its  duty  to  determine  by 
its  own  Judgment  the  controversy  presented 
and  devolve  that  duty  upon  any  of  its  offi- 
cers; but  when  the  parties  consent  to 
the  reference  of  a  case  to  a  master  or  other 
officer  to  hear  and  decide  all  the  issues  there- 
in and  report  his  findings  both  of  fact  and  of 
law,  and  such  reference  is  entered  as  a  rule 
of  the  court,  the  master  is  clothed  with  ver> 
different  powers  from  those  which  he  exer- 
cises upon  ordinary  reference  without  such 


MASTER  OF  A  SHIP 


816 


MATERIAL  AJLLBG^ATIOlf 


consent;  and  bis  detormlnatlonB  are  .not  anb- 
ject  to  be  set  aside  and  dlsiegarded  at  tbe 
mere  discretion  of  ttie  court  A  reference 
by  consent  of  tbe  parties  of  the  entire  case 
for  a  determination  of  all  its  issues,  tbongb 
not  strictly  a  submission  of  tbe  controversy 
to  arbitration:— a  proceeding  wbicb  la  gov- 
erned by  special  roles — ^is  a  submission  of  tbe 
controversy  to  a  tribunal  of  tbe  parties'  own 
selection  to  be  governed  in  its  conduct  by 
tbe  ordinary  rules  applicable  to  the  admin- 
iBtration  of  Justice  in  controversies  estab- 
lished by  law.  Its  findings,  like  those  of  an 
Independent  tribunal,  are  to  be  taken  as  cor- 
rect, subject  indeed  to  be  reviewed  under  the 
reservation  contained  in  tbe  consent  and  or- 
der of  tbe  court,  when  there  bas  been  mani- 
fest error  in  the  consideration  given  to  the 
evidence,  or  the  application  of  the  law,  but 
not  otherwise.  The  reference  of  a  whole 
case  to  a  master  <  •  •  has  become,  in 
late  years,  a  matter  of  more  common  occur- 
rence than  formerly,  tbougb  it  has  always 
been  within  the  power  of  the  court  of  chan- 
cery, with  the  consent  of  the  parties,  to  or- 
der a  reference."  Locust  v.  C^uruthera,  100 
Pac  520,  522,  28  OU.  378  (quoting  Kimberly 
V.  Arms,  0  Sup.  Gt  855,  120  U.  8.  855,  82  L. 
Ed.  764;  citing  Basey  v.  GaUagher,  20  Wall. 
[87  U.  8.]  670,  22  L.  Ed.  452;  Quimly  v.  Gaor 
Ian,  104  U.  8.  420,  424,  26  L.  Ed.  SOO). 

MASTER  OF  A  SHIP 

As  laborer,  see  Laborer; 

MASTER  PLTTMBER 

Laws  N.  T.  1896,  c.  808,  after  soaking  it 
unlawful  for  any  person  to  carry  on  the 
business  of  an  employing  or  "master  plumb- 
er" unless  tbe  name  and  address  of  such  per- 
son shall  have  been  registered  as  provided  in 
section  6,  provides  that  a  master  or  employ- 
ing plumber  within  the  meaning  of  the  act 
is  any  person  who  hires  a  person  or  persons 
to  do  tbe  plumbing  work.  Bcbnaier  A  Co. 
V.  Grigsby,  113  N.  Y.  gupp.  548,  549,  61  Misc. 
Rep.  325. 

**Master  plumbers"  and  "employing 
plumbers"  are  one  and  the  same — those 
who  do  not  hold  themselves  out  as  personally 
doing  the  work,  but  as  contracting  to  furnish 
the  materials  and  to  do  the  work  through 
others,  while  "Journeyman  plumbers"  are 
those  skilled  in  the  calling  and  holding  them- 
selves out  as  able  and  willing  to  do  the  work 
themselves.  Felton  r.  Atlanta,  61  8.  E.  27, 
28,  4  Ga.  App.  183. 

MATE 

As  laborer,  see  Laboi6E» 

MATERIA 

See  In  Pari  Materia, 


MATERIAL 

"Material"  is  defined  by  Webster  to 
mean  something  essentiaL  Faulkner  v.  Brid- 
get, 86  8.  W.  483,  110  Mo.  App.  877. 

Webster  defines  '^materiid"  to  be  some- 
thing '*of  solid  or  weighty  character;  sub- 
stantial ;  of  consequence;  not  to  be  dispensed 
with;  important;  spedflc;  especially  law, 
sudi  as  does  or  would  affect  the  determina- 
tion of  a  case,  the  effect  of  an  instrumoit, 
or  the  like;  constituting  a  matter  that  is  en- 
titled to  consideration;  such  as  must  be  con- 
sidered In  deciding  a  case  on  its  merits." 
Thompson  v.  State,  117  Pac.  216,  22S,  6  OkL 
Or.  50. 

Ck>de  Supp.  1007,  |  3060al4,  provides 
that,  where  a  negotiable  instrument  is  want- 
ing in  any  "material  particular,"  the  person 
in  possession  has  pilma  fade  authority  to 
complete  it  by  filling  up  the  blank  therein, 
etc  Held,  that  the  word  '^material"  was  not 
there  used  as  synonymous  with  "necessaiy." 
so  as  to  restrict  the  right  to  filling  in  an 
omission  essential  to  the  completion  of  a  ne- 
gotiable instrument,  but  included  all  omitted 
matter  usually  found  in  such  instruments. 
Johnston  v.  Hoover,  117  N.  W.  277,  278,  139 
Iowa,  143. 

To  Justif;^  a  reversal  of  a  conviction  on 
the  ground  of  error,  the  error  must  have 
been  of  a  material  character,  and  must  have 
derived  accused  of  a  substantial  right,  tbe 
word  ''material"  meaning  something  of 
weighty  character,  substantial,  of  conse- 
quence, not  to  be  dispensed  with.  Campbell 
V,  Territory  (ArisB.)  125  Pac  717,  721. 

Tbe  words  "material"  and  **not  materW 
al"  are  absolutely  contradictory,  in  that  they 
exclude  all  middle  ground,  and  together  in- 
clude everything  thinkable  Bennett  v.  Ware, 
61  S.  E.  546,  550,  4  6a.  App.  293  (dissentbf 
opinion  by  Powell,  J.). 

MATERXAX.   AIXEOATIOV 

Under  Giv.  Ck>de  Prac  |  126,  providing 
that  material  allegations  against  infants 
must  be  proved,  though  not  denied,  and  sec- 
tion 127,  defining  a  material  allegation  to  be 
one  necessary  to  support  the  action,  and  sec- 
tion 429,  requiring  a  petition  in  a  suit  to 
settle  a  decedents  estate  to  state  the  amount 
of  debts,  the  nature  and  value  of  the  prop- 
erly of  decedent,  and  providing  that,  if  tbe 
personal  property  is  insufficient  to  pay  debts, 
so  much  of  the  real  property  as  may  be  nec- 
essary may  be  sold,  a  sale  of  an  entire  tract 
before  tbe  value  of  the  personal  property  had 
been  ascertained,  and  before  it  bad  been  as- 
certained, at  least  approximately,  what  tbe 
claims  against  decedent's  estate  amounted  to, 
and  without  any  showing  that  the  land  was 
indivisible^  was,  as  to  inf^t  heirs,  void. 
Carter  v.  Growls  Adm*r,  112  &  W.  1098, 1009, 
130Ejr.41. 


ICiLTEBIAIi  AIXSOATION 


817 


MATKRIAL  ALTERATKOr 


A  «teat»lal  aU^atfon"*  te  one  wM^  te 
for  tlie  BtateHie&t  or  soppoft  of  a 
cause  of  action  or  detauo.  LoulayUl*  4  K. 
R.  Ck>.  y.  Paynter's  Aclm'x  (Ky.)  82  S.  W«  412, 
413  (qnotiiig  and  adopting  deflnitlons  in  OKt. 
€k>de  Praa  i  127). 


.TXBZAZ.  AZiTEBATTOK 

Any  alteratloa  of  a  witttaa 
Is  '^material,'*  if  It  aHMs  Ilia  idantlly  of  tbt 
imtrameiit,  or  tba  rlgbta  and  obllgatlaitt  of 
tbe  parties  to  it  Widur  ▼.  lonea,  74  a  B. 
801,   80S,  100  N.  a  108,  40  K  a  A.  (N.  8.) 

ea. 

The  teat  wlietber  an  tnstmment  has  been 
mat^ally  altered  is  wbether  tbe  <diange  or 
addition  injnrionsly  affected  the  complaln- 
ins  parties  or  conld  have  nnder  any  proba- 
ble Gircomstances  enlarged  tiielr  bnrden. 
Hoiaionse  ▼.  State,  07  N.  11180, 182,  49^  Ind. 
App.  17a 

^niatever  dEianges  the  legal  effect  of  an 
instrument  Is  a  material  alteration.  'Tlie 
test  Is,  not  whether  an  alteration  increases 
or  rednces  a  party's  liability,  bnt  whether 
the  instrument  expresses  the  same  contract 
— whether  it  will  hare  the  same  legal  effect 
and  operation  after  the  alteration  as  before.'* 
White  T.  Harris,  48  S.  B.  41,  48,  08  8.  0.  OS, 
104  Am.  St  B^.  701. 

A  material  alteration  of  a  written  instra* 
ment  is  an  intentional  act,  after  it  haa  been 
folly  executed  by  one  party  without  the 
consent  of  the  other,  which  changes  the  legal 
effect  of  the  Instrument  in  any  way.  The 
cross-marking  of  a  material  proTlslon  of  a 
written  instrument,  after  its  eancation  by 
one  of  the  parties,  without  the  consent  of 
the  other,  with  intent  of  erasing  it,  is  a  ma- 
terial alteration.  O.  N.  Bull  Ramedy  Oa  ▼. 
Boyer,  124  N.  W.  20,  21,  100  Minn.  306,  82 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  610, 18  Ann.  Gas.  413. 

Under  Bern.  A  Bal.  Code,  |  3R14,  provid- 
ing that,  where  a  negotiable  instrument  is 
materially  alteroil  without  the  assent  of  all 
persons  liable  thereon,  it  is  ayolded,  except 
as  against  a  party  who  made,  authorized,  or 
assented  to  the  alt^ation  and  subqeqnent  In- 
dorses, and  section  8516,  proyiding  that  an 
alteration  which  (Ganges  the  number  or  re- 
lations of  the  parties  Is  a  ''material  altera- 
tion,'' where,  after  the  indorsement  of  a 
iMyte  by  an  accommodation  party,  and  before 
it  was  negotiated,  without  hia  knowledge  or 
consent,  other  parties  signed  it  as  maker, 
he  was  discharged  of  Uabltity  thereon.  Hand- 
nker  T.  Pedersen,  128  Paa  230,  281,  71  Wash. 
218. 

As  a  rule,  any  ctaanga  in  the  pefsonaUty, 
Bomber,  or  relation  of  the  parties  to  a  wilt- 
tttk  contract  Is  a  material  alteiation  there- 
of, so  as  to  avoid  it  as  to  the  nonconsenting 
ptrties,  so  that  the  erasure  of  the  name  of 
MM  of  the  obUgors  in  a  contract  is  a  aiate- 
Hal  alteration.  Mataoh  i.  Jarvla  CTex.)  188 
8.  W.  041^048. 


nie  addition  to  a  note  by  the  payee  with- 
out the  knowledge  of  the  maker  of  the  words 
'*with  Interest  6  per  cent"  is  a  material  al- 
teration of  the  note  within  Negotiable  In- 
struments Law  (ConsoL  Laws  1000,  c  88)  | 
206,  subd.  2,  declaring  that  any  alteration 
changing  the  sum  payable  either  for  inter- 
est or  principal  is  material.  (Columbia  Dis- 
tilling Ck>.  ▼.  Bech,  136  N.  T.  Supp.  206,  207, 
161  App.  Div.  12a 

It  la  a  material  alteration  of  an  instru- 
ment to  change  the  time  from  wliich  the  In- 
terest is  to  run,  either  by  the  insertion,  al- 
teration^ or  erasure  of  words,  whether  the 
time  is  thereby  accelerated  or  delayed.  Bald- 
win T.  6askeU  Nat  Bank,  133  S.  W.  864,866, 
104  Tex.  122. 

Where,  after  the  delivery  of  a  note  con- 
taining an  unfilled  blank  for  the  place  of 
payment,  the  payee  filled  the  blank  as  au- 
thorized by  Code  Supp.  1007,  f  30e0al4.  such 
note  was  not  within  sections  3060al24  and 
S060al26,  providing  that  any  alteration  in 
the  time  or  place  of  payment  shall  consti- 
tute a  material  alteration  and  that  a  mate- 
rial alteration  will  avoid  the  note.  John- 
ston V.  Hoover,  117  N.  W.  277,  278, 180  Iowa, 
148. 

Whether  an  alteration  of  a  note  Is  mate- 
rial does  not  depend  upon  whether  it  in- 
creases or  reduces  the  maker's  liability,  but 
upon  whether  the  instrument  after  altera- 
tion expresses  the  same  contract,  and,  if  the 
change  enlarges  or  lessens  the  liability,  it  is 
materiaL  Coaunonwealth  Nat  Bank  of  Dal- 
las, Tex.,  V.  Baughman,  111  Pac.  332,  333,  27 
ML  176. 

The  altering  of  the  figures  in  two  places 
In  an  order  for  money,  to  make  it  read  $38 
instead  of  $30,  but  leaving  the  written 
amount  aa  It  orlglnaUy  was,  was  a  "material 
alteration,"  tending  to  indicate  that  it  was 
thb  maker's  Intention  to  pay  $38»  and  waa 
therefore  apparently  capable  of  effectlag  a 
fraud.  White  v.  Stats^  102  8.  W.  710,  716, 
88  Ark.  86. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  a  mate- 
rial alteration  of  a  negotiable  instrument  Is 
one  which  changes  the  date,  the  sum  pay- 
able, the  time  or  place  of  payment,  the  num- 
ber or  relations  of  the  parties,  or  the  me- 
dium or  currency  in  which  payment  is  to  be 
made,  a  valid  agreement  between  the  holder 
and  principal  debtor  for  an  extension  of  time 
of  payment  is  not  a  "material  alteration" 
discharging  an  accommodation  maker  of  a 
note;  the  statute  referring  to  Changes  in  the 
instrument  itself  and  not  the  contract  Rich- 
ards V.  Market  Exch.  Bank  Co.,  00  N.  m  1000. 
1005,  81  Ohio  St  848,  26  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  00. 

Under  a  statute  providing  Oat  any  al- 
teration ^ii«tig<"g  the  date  or  any  change 
whi4ai  alters  ttoe  efflaet  of  a  negotUMe  in- 
stilment is  a  "material  alteration,"  ttM 
drawing  of  a  hand  thronsli  the  figures  **1- 


MATBRIAIi  ALTERATION 


sia 


KATERIAIi  EVIBENGE 


8-^*'  in  a  note  written  on  a  blank  torm,  dat- 
ed October  24,  1892,  payable  one  year  from 
date,  reciting  that  it  was  due  October  24, 
1903,  and  writing  above  the  flguies  "1-9-0" 
BO  as  to  make  the  date  October  24,  1902,  was 
not  a  "material  alteration,''  since,  as  the 
written  figures  control  the  printed  ones^  the 
alteration  did  not  change  the  data  Lombar* 
do  V.  Lombardini,  106  Pac.  907,  908,  67  Wash. 
352,  32  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  615. 

Under  Rev.  St  f  3176p,  declaring  that 
a  "material  alteration"  of  a  negotiable  in- 
stmment  consists  in  an  alteration  which 
changes  the  date,  the  sum  payable^  either 
for  principal  or  interest,  the  time  or  place 
of  payment,  the  number  or  the  relation  of 
the  parties,  the  medium  or  currency  in  which 
payment  is  to  be  made,  or  which  adds  a 
place  of  payment  wher^  no  place  of  payment 
was  9)ecifled,  or  any  other  change  or  addi- 
tion which  alters  the  eilect  of  the  instru- 
ment in  any  respect,  the  term  is  limited  to 
the  alteration  of  the  instrument  itself  and 
was  not  fulfilled  by  an  extraneous  contract 
between  the  holder  and  the  principal  maker 
extending  the  time  of  payment  Richards 
V.  Market  Exch.  Bank  Co.,  90  N.  E.  1000, 
1005,  81  Ohio  St  348,  26  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  99. 

MATEBIAI.   DEFENDAHT 

Under  CJode  1907,  H  3093,  6110,  provid- 
ing that  bills  must  be  filed  in  the  district  in 
which  the  defendants  or  a  material  defend- 
ant reside,  a  material  defendant  being  a 
necessary  or  indispensable  party,  the  husband 
is  the  only  material  defendant  to  a  suit  by 
a  wife  for  divorce  and  alimony,  and  hence 
a  bill  for  divorce  and  alimony  cannot  be  fil- 
ed in  a  district  other  than  that  in  which  he 
resides.  Puckett  v.  Puckett,  66  South.  686, 
587,  174  Ala.  316. 

A  "material  defendant,"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute,  requiring  that  an 
original  bill  be  filed  in  the  district  in  which 
the  defendants  or  a  "material  defendant**  re- 
side, has  been  held  to  be  a  defendant  who 
is  a  necessary  party,  really  interested  in  the 
result  of  the  suit  and  against  whom  a  de- 
cree is  sought ;  one  whose  interest  is  antag- 
onistic to  the  complainants  and  against  whom 
relief  is  prayed.  '  Railroad  Commission  of 
Georgia  v.  Palmer  Hard;(vare  Co.,  53  S.  E 
193,  197,  124  Ga.  788  (citing  Gay  v.  Brier- 
field  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  17  South.  618,  106  Ala. 
615;  WaddeU  v.  Lanier,  64  Ala.  440). 

MATEBIAI.  DEGREE 

One  of  the  meanings  of  the  term  mate- 
rial is  'in  an  important  degree"  (Webster, 
Diet),  and  this  is  the  meaning  which  would 
properly  be  attached  to  it  as  used  in  an  in- 
struction that  a  passenger  on  a  street  car 
could  not  recover  if  she  contributed  to  her 
injury  in  a  material  degree,  and  hence  the 
instruction  was  erroneous,  because  import- 
ing that  there  might  be  a  degree  of  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  plaintiff^  contributing 


to  Che  injury,  which  would  not  defeat  a  re- 
covery. Root  V.  Des  Bioines  Ry.  Oo^  98  N. 
W.  291,  293,  122  Iowa,  469. 

The  words  "material  degree,"  in  an  in- 
0truction,  in  an  action  for  injuries,  to  the 
effect  that  if  the  plaintiff  was  injured  as  the 
direct  result  of  defendant's  negligence,  and 
was  "in  no  manner  or  to  any  material  de- 
gree negligent  himseli^  or  in  no  manner  or 
to  any  extent  contributed  to  his  own  injury,** 
he  was  entitled  to  recover,  rriated  to  the 
amount  of  care  reciuired,  and  not  to  the  ex- 
tent of  contribution  to  the  injury  by  reason 
of  failure  to  ezercLae  such  care,  and  hence 
the  instruction  was  not  erroneona.  Camp  v. 
Chicago  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  99  N.  W. 
736,  738,  124  Iowa,  28& 

MATEBIAI.  DEPABTUBB 

On  September  26th  the  court  ordered 
the  issuance  of  a  venire  of  160  names,  re- 
turnable on  October  5th,  and  names  to  that 
number  were  regularly  drawn  and  the  venire 
issued.  On  September  30th,  the  court  vacated 
the  order  of  September  25th,  and  directed 
that  the  names  in  the  venire  then  in  process 
of  being  served  be  restored  to  the  trial  jury 
box,  and  that  150  names  be  drawn  from  the 
trial  jury  box,  and  a  venire  issued  for  those 
persons  to  attend  October  7th  to  complete 
the  panel  in  the  case;  seven  jurors  having 
been  passed.  Thereafter  on  the  same  date 
tlie  160  names  were  returned  to  the  box,  and 
the  judge  and  deilL  of  court  drew  therefrom 
150  names  to  complete  the  panel,  and  a  ven- 
ire was  issued  to  serve  the  names  so  drawn. 
Held  that,  conceding  irregularity,  there  was 
not  a  "material  departure*'  from  the  forms 
provided  by  statute,  expressly  made  ground 
for  challenge  to  the  panel  by  Comp.  Laws 
Nev.  I  4288;  "material  departures"  being 
only  snc^h  as  affect  tte  substantial  ri^ts  of 
a  defendant  in  securing  an  impartial  jury. 
State  V.  Jackman,  104  Pac.  IB,  14|  16,  SI 
Nev.  611. 

MATEBIAXi     EVIBEKCE     0&     TE8TI- 

Momr 

Testimony  of  the  accused,  in  a  bastardy 
proceeding,  that  he  had  not  had  sexual  in- 
tercourse with  the  complainant,  held,  to  be 
"material"  on  his  indictment  f6r  perjury, 
although  he  had  also  sworn  that  he  was 
not  the  father  of  the  child.  State  v.  Brown, 
79  N.  0.  042,  043. 

False  testimony  is  ''material,^  ao  as  to 
be  the  subject  of  an  assignment  for  perjury, 
when  it  is  su<di  as  to  be  substantially  im- 
portant and  to  have  influence  on  the  issues, 
especially  as  distingnished  from  a  mere  for- 
mal requirement,  and  capable  of  properly  in- 
fluencing the  result  of  the  trial.  People  ▼. 
Schweidtiler,  117  Pac.  939,  940,  16  OaL  App. 

78a 

In  Code  Civ.  Proa  f  870  et  aeq.,  and 
general  rule  of  pradttoe  82,  requiring,  for 
the  examination  of  an  adversie  party  before 


KATEKIAL  irVIDSNCB 


ti» 


tf  ATERIAIi  MATTER 


trial,  a  sbowlng  by  allldaTlt  that  the  testl- 
mony  is  material  and  neceesaiy,  the  words 
'*inateriar'  and  ''necessary"  aie  not  nsed  syn- 
oDymonsly,  even  If  the  word  "necessary** 
does  not  mean  indispensable  to  the  making 
of  an  lasoe.  KopUn  t.  Hoe,  106  N.  Y.  Snpp. 
e02,  003,  123  App.  DlT.  827. 

An  instruction  that  the  burden  of  proof 
was  on  plaintiff,  and  that  she  could  not  re- 
corer  until  she  showed  the  facts  by  a  pre- 
ponderance or  a  material  part  of  the  evi- 
dence, was  error  because  not  tte  equlTalent 
of  a  "preponderance.**  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  ft 
S.  Ry.  Ck).  V.  Woodruff,  115  S.  W.  053.  056, 
89  Ark.  0. 

MATEBIAI.  FACT 

A  fiict  is  "material"  to  the  risk  assumed 
by  an  underwriter  when  it  would  have  caused 
him  to  have  refused  the  risk  if  known  or 
would  have  been  a  reason  for  his  demanding 
a  higher  premium.  Where  an  afSdavit  of 
defense,  in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  insurance 
Issued  by  a  company  which  insured  married 
women,  alleged  that  the  fact  that  insured 
was  pregnant  was  material  but  did  not  allege 
in  what  way  it  was  material  nor  that  the  in- 
surer would  have  refused  the  risk  or  increas- 
ed the  premium  if  that  fact  had  been  known, 
the  affidavit  was  insuiflcient  McCaffrey  v. 
Knights  &  Ladies  of  Ck>lumbia,  08  Atl.  180, 
213  Pa.  000. 

The  law  of  England,  as  of  other  coun- 
tries, requires  an  applicant  for  marine  insur- 
ance to  make  a  full  disclosure  of  all  the  ma- 
terial tSLCts  known  to  him  at  the  time  af- 
fecting the  risk  which  the  insurer  is  to  as- 
sume, but  he  is  not  required  to  disclose  facts 
unknown  to  him  at  the  time,  nor  immaterial 
facts,  nor  matters  of  common  and  general 
knowledge  among  those  engaged  in  the  insur- 
ance business  at  the  place  of  the  contract 
"Material  facts*'  are  only  such  as  are  likely 
to  influence  the  mind  of  a  reasonable  under- 
writer in  deciding  whether  to  accept  the  risk 
and  in  fixing  the  rate  of  premium  to  be  charg- 
ed, and  the  question  of  materiality  is  one  of 
fact  to  be  decided  upon  consideration  of  all 
the  circumstances  and  oonditionB  affecting 
the  transaction.  Northwestern  8.  8.  Co.  v. 
Marithne  Ins.  Co.,  101  Fed.  100,  178. 

The  existence  of  an  unfiled  chattel  mort^ 
gage  on  a  stock  of  goods  as  security  for  a 
guaranty  of  a  debt  of  the  mortgagor  is  a  fact 
material  to  the  risk  in  a  contract  to  insure 
goods,  though  the  instrument  contains  a 
clause  that  it  shaU  not  be  valid  until  filed. 
Where  an  unfiled  <diattel  mortgage  on  the 
itock  of  goods  exists,  and  the  applicant  for 
Insurance,  when  asked  whether  the  property 
is  mortgaged  or  incumbered,  answers  in  the 
negative,  it  is  a  concealment  of  a  material 
fact,  within  a  policy  providing  that  it  shall 
be  void  if  insured  had  concealed  or  misrepre- 
sented any  material  fact  concerning  the  in- 
surance^ and  avoldB  the  eontraot  •  Madaen  v. 


Fhrmehi'  it  Merchants'  Ins.  Ca,  120  N.  W. 
1060, 1088,  87  Neb.  107,  20  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  07, 
Ann.  Ca&  1012A,  08S. 

As  used  in  the  law  relating  to  fraud,  re- 
quiring that  false  representations,  in  order 
to  be  actionable  must  relate  to  "material 
facts,"  means  a  fact  or  facts  necessarily  hav- 
ing some  bearing  on  the  value  of  the  subject 
of  the  negotiation.  Champion  Funding  & 
Foundry  Co.  v.  Heskett,  102  8.  W.  1050,  1054, 
125  Mo.  App.  510. 

Under  the  rule  that  the  Jury  may  reject 
the  whole  or  any  part  of  a  witness'  testimony 
if  they  believe  such  witness  has  sworn  falsely 
as  to  any  material  fact,  by  the  term  ''mate- 
rial fact"  is  meant  any  fact  which  tends  to 
prove  or  disprove  the  defendant's  guilt  or 
innocence.  State  v.  McCarver,  02  8.  W.  084, 
087,  104  Mo.  717. 

During  a  trial  to  a  Jury  the  legal  suf- 
ficiency of  the  '^material  facts" — ^L  e.,  the 
facts  constituting  a  part  of  plaintiff's  case  as 
he  presents  it-— put  in  issue  by  allegations  of 
the  complaint  and  denials  of  the  answer,  can- 
not be  questioned.  Elie  v.  C  Cowles  A  Co., 
73  Aa  258,  250,  82  Conn.  230. 

Where  a  person  conducting  a  business  re- 
quiring a  license,  but  who  is  not  alleged  to 
be  the  owner  of  one,  pays  money  to  a  person 
not  shown  to  have  any  official  relation  to  the 
bureau  of  licenses  of  New  York,  or  to  any 
person  employed  in  such  bureau,  such  fact  is 
not  ''material"  within  Pen.  Code!  N.  Y.  |  00^ 
relating  to  perjury  on  an  investigation  under 
Greater  New  York  Charter,  f  110  (Laws 
1001,  p.  40,  c.  400),  by  the  commissioner  of  ac- 
counts, into  the  methods  of  the  ofllce  of  said 
bureau.  People  v.  Tillman,  118  N.  Y.  Supp. 
442,  03  Misc.  Rep.  401. 

MATEBIAIi  FRAUD 

The  term  "material,"  in  the  phrase  "^at 
fraud  to  be  actionable  must  be  material," 
means  that  without  the  fraud  the  transaction 
would  not  have  been  made,  and  means  a 
statement  of  an  alleged  existing  fact  or  facts, 
and  not  merely  of  some  future  or  contingent 
event,  or  an  expression  of  opinion,  and  the 
person  to  whom  the  statement  is  made  must 
rely  on  its  truth  and  must  have  the  right  aa 
a  person  of  ordinary  business  prudence  to 
rely  on  it  Boulden  v.  8tilwell,  00  Atl.  000, 
010,  100  Md.  543,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  25& 

MATBBIAIi  MATTEB 

Only  contradictory  statements  as  to  "ma- 
terial matters'*  can  be  used  tor  the  purpose 
of  impeachment,  and  by  "material  matters" 
are  meant  matters  competent  to  prove  one 
side  or  the  other  of  the  issue,  and  admissible 
for  that  purpose.  Luke  v.  Cannon,  02  8.  E. 
110, 112, 4  Qa.  App.  538. 

False  testimony  by  defendant,  in  a  civil 
suit  in  support  of  a  set-off  tor  money  loaned, 
that  no  negotiable  note  was  given  or  accepted 


MATERIAL  MATTSB 


S20      MATBBIAli  BSPKSBENTATION 


therefbr,  !b  testUnony  *^  a  material  nuLt^ 
ter/*  within  Ray.  8t  a  123,  f  1,  and  la  per- 
jury. Where  a  person  charged  with  perjnry 
because  he  set  up  a  claim  for  money  loaned 
In  defense  to  an  action  by  way  of  set-off,  and 
testified  in  support  of  It,  and  the  testimony 
was  false,  the  fact  that  he  need  not  hare 
done  so,  because  of  another  available  defense, 
did  not  make  the  claim  Immaterial  matter. 
State  V.  Berllawsky,  76  AU.  938,  039,  106  Me. 
606. 

The  words  '*material  matter,**  as  used  in 
Rev.  St  §  5392,  which  denounces  as  perjury 
the  stating  or  subscribing  to  any  material 
matter  which  the  person  does  not  believe  to 
be  true  after  he  has  taken  oath,  etc.,  apply  to 
nonjudicial  matters  in  the  same  general  sense 
as  to  judicial  matters  and  import  some  issue 
or  right  to  which  the  oath  relates  rather  than 
to  a  mere  inquiry  or  investigation  to  be  made 
for  the  detection  of  violattons  of  law  by 
third  persons,  and  aa  the  requirement  of 
Oleomargarine  Act  May  2,  1902,  f  6,  that 
wholesale  dealers  shall  keep  such  books  and 
render  such  returns  as  the  commissioner  of 
internal  revenue  may,  by  regulation,  requixe 
under  prescribed  penalties  for  its  violation, 
has  no  relation  to  the  tax  to  be  assessed  on 
sudi  dealer,  It  is  not  such  a  "material  mat- 
ter" that  a  false  return  will  support  a  prose- 
cution for  perjury  though  an  oath  is  required 
thereto.  United  States  v.  Lamson,  165  Fed. 
80,84. 

MATEBIAIi  mSBEPRESEKTATIOX 

A  misrepresentation,  as  the  basis  of  re- 
scission, must  be  material;  but  it  can  be 
material  only  when  it  is  of  such  a  character 
that,  if  it  had  not  been  made,  the  contract 
would  not  have  been  entered  Into.  The  mis- 
representation, it  is  true,  need  not  be  the 
sole  cause  of  the  contract ;  but  it  must  be  of 
such  nature,  weight,  and  force  that  the  court 
can  say,  "Without  it  the  contract  would  not 
have  been  made."  Oppenhelmer  v.  Clunie, 
76  Pac.  899,  901,  142  CaL  313  (citing  Colton 
V.  Stanford,  23  Pac.  16,  28,  82  Gal.  351,  399, 
16  Am.  St  Rep.  137). 

Whether  a  misrepresentation  is  material 
to  the  risk  essential  to  make  the  same  avail- 
able as  a  defense  to  a  policy,  as  provided  by 
Act  Pa.  June  23,  1885  (P.  L.  184),  d^[)ends 
on  whether  it  was  of  such  substantial  im- 
portance that  the  insurer,  but  for  the  mia- 
representation,  would  not  have  made  the  con- 
tract Miller  V.  Maryland  Casualty  Co.,  193 
Fed.  343,  349,  113  0.  O.  A.  267. 

MATEBIAI.  PABTICUUkB 

In  Code  Supp.  1907,  f  8060al4,  provid- 
ing that,  where  a  negotiable  instrument  is 
wanting  In  any  ''material  particular,"  the 
person  in  i)os8ession  has  prima  facie  author- 
ity to  complete  it  by  filling  up  the  blank 
therein,  etc.,  the  word  '^matertaT  was  not 
used  MS  synonymoua  with  '^necessary'*  so  as 
to  restrict  the  right  to  filling  in  an  omiasion 


easentlal  to  ttie  eoaiAellon  of  a  ntgotiable 
instrument,  but  ineloded  all  omitted  matta 
usually  found  la  audi  iastnunentfl^  and  where 
a  negotiable  note  waa  deUverad  to  the  payee 
complete,  except  lor  the  filling  of  a  blank 
left  for  the  place  of  payment^  the  payee  had 
prima  fade  authority,  before  indorsing  it  to 
a  bona  fide  holder,  for  value  before  maturity, 
to  fill  the  blank  so  as  to  make  the  note  pay- 
able at  a  place  other  than  that  where  the 
maker  resided.  Johnston  v.  Hoover,  117  2L 
W.  277,  278,  139  Iowa,  143. 

MATERIAX  POBTIOK  OF  WHX 

In  Civ.  Code  1910,  i  3919,  providing  thai 
the  intention  to  caned  a  will  will  be  presum- 
ed from  the  obliteration  or  canceling  of  a 
material  portion  of  the  wlU,  "material"  does 
not  mean  easentlal^  but  means  important; 
more  or  lesa  necessary ;  having  influence  or 
effect;  going  to  the  merits;  having  to  do 
with  matter,  aa  distinguished  from  form. 
Hartz  V.  Sobel,  71  S.  B.  996, 1001, 136  Ga.  565^ 
38  U  a  A.  (N.  8.)  797,  Ann.  Caa.  1912D,  165. 

MATEBIAI.  KBPBE8ENTATIOK 

The  word  "material,"  aa  used  in  2  Re- 
vlaal,  f  4646,  providing  that  no  repres^ta- 
tion,  unleas  '^laterial,''  aihall  prevent  a  re- 
covery on  an  insurance  policy,  is  not  restrict- 
ed to  a  misr^reaentation  as  to  a  defect 
which  contributes  in  some  way  to  the  loss  or 
damage  for  which  the  tademnlty  is  daimed, 
but  a  representation  is  ''material"  where  it 
would  naturally  affect  the  Judgment  of  tiie 
insurer  in  accepting  the  risk.  "Bvery  fact 
untruly  asserted  or  wrongfully  suppressed 
must  be  regarded  as  'material'  If  the  knowl- 
edge or  ignorance  of  it  would  naturally  infla- 
ence  the  judgment  of  the  underwriter  in  mak- 
ing the  contract  at  all,  or  in  estimating  tbe 
degree  and  character  of  the  risk,  or  in  fixing 
the  rate  of  premium.''  Fishblate  v.  Fidelity 
A  Casualty  Co.,  63  &  B.  354,  356,  140  N.  a 
689. 

Within  the  meaning  of  Ky.  St  i  63^ 
providing  that  no  representations  in  an  ap- 
plication for  an  inaaraAce  policy,  unless  "ma- 
terial" or  fraodnlent,  shall  prevent  recovei7t 
a  representation  la  material  when  the  policy 
would  not  have  been  iasued  if  the  truth  had 
been  known.  United  States  Casualty  Co.  t. 
OimpbeU,  146  S.  W.  1121,  1123,  148  Ky.  664. 

A  statement  In  an  application  for  life  tor 
anranoe  that  applicant  had  never  had  any 
disease  of  the  kidneys  is  a  "material  repre- 
sentatloir  within  Bev.  N.  O.  1905,  i  4808,  as 
such  representation  undoubtedly  haflueooed 
the  action  of  the  company  in  accepting  tbe 
risk.  Alexander  v.  MetropoUtan  Life  loa 
Co.,  64  B.  B.  432,  438,  160  N.  C.  086. 

The  aasuced's  statement  of  his  age»  efen 
though  not  a  warranty,  is,  aa  a  matter  of 
law,  a  mateilaL  representatiQA  In  an  applica- 
tion fur  an  afiddant  InauxaiMa  policy*   Oea- 


MATERIAIi  REPKSSBMTATIOH       321 


MATBRIAIi  VARIANCE 


ml  Aec.  Ins.  Oo.  t.  Spenee^  128  IlL  App. 
32,  45. 

A  statemmit  that  ixurored  had  nerer  had 
cancer  is  a  statement  material  to  the  risfc* 
and  its  falsity  a  good  defense  to  the  policy. 
Brison  ▼.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Oo.  (Ky.) 
115  S.  W.  785,  788. 

''Representations''  of  the  sdler  of  a  oaiOi 
register  that  the  same  will  sare  the  expense 
of  a  bookkeeper,  and  that  books  can  be  k^t 
thereapon  in  half  the  time  that  the  books 
could  otherwise  be  kept,  and  tliat  the  ma- 
chine can  be  operated  by  any  one  of  ordinary 
hitdUgenoe^  are  not  ''representations  as  to 
material  fhcts,"  and,  thoogh  false,  are  not 
groimd  f6r  a  resdstion  by  the  bnyer  of  the 
contract  of  sale.  National  Cash  Register  Cio. 
T.  Townsend  Grocery  Stoie,  00  8.  B.  808,  807, 
187  N.  C.  862,  80  8.  B.  808,  70  U  R.  A.  848. 

XATBRZAX.  BIOKV 

The  right  of  a  defendant  to  challenge 
peremptorily  is  a  '^material  right"  Betts 
T.  United  States,  182  Fed.  228,  228,  285^  86 
a  G.  A.  452. 

MATEBZAX  VABXANOB 

A  yariance  Is  not  ''material**  nnless  it  is 
BO  misleading  as  to  prejndioe  the  party  in 
maintaining  his  action  or  defense  on  the  mer- 
its.   Ostrom  T.  Woodbury,  122  Pac^  825,  827. 

A  complaint  by  an  injured  brakeman 
alleged  that  the  WiBeer  negligently,  and 
without  any  warning,  applied  the  steam,  and 
violently  Jerked  the  slack  out  of  the  train, 
causing  plaintiff  to  miss  his  footing,  whereby 
he  was  thrown  between  the  cars,  etc,  and 
that  when  the  engineer  started  the  train  he 
was  working  on  top  in  the  act  of  stepping 
from  one  car  to  another,  and  that  as  the 
train  was  started  and  the  cars  were  Jerked 
apart  he  fell  between  them  and  was  injured. 
Held,  that  there  was  no  Tarlanoe  between  the 
comi^int  and  evldenoe  that  the  enginer 
started  the  train  at  a  high  rate  of  speed,  and 
that  if  there  was  it  was  immaterial,  in  view 
of  Rerisal  1905,  |  515,  providing  no  variance 
shall  be  deemed  material  unless  the  adverse 
party  is  actually  misled  to  his  prejudice  in 
suing  on  the  merits.  Coore  v.  Seaboard  Air 
Line  Ry.  Co.,  88  S.  B.  210,  152  N.  O.  702. 

The  variance  betweoi  an  Indictment 
charging  the  forgery  of  a  deed  of  trust  set 
out  according  to  its  tenor,  and  the  deed  of 
trust  offered  in  evidence,  consisting  of  cleri- 
cal inaceoracies,  such  as  describing  the  land 
in  one  instroment  as  ^eighty  (80)  acKs"  and 
in  the  other  as  "80  acres,"  the  use  of  the 
words  "party  of  the  first  part"  in  one  instru- 
ment and  the  words  "flnt  party"  in  the  oth- 
er, and  the  word  "fails"  in  one  instrument 
and  the  word  "failed"  in  the  other,  is  imma- 
terial within  Rev.  8t  1908,  |  5114,  providing 
that  variance  between  the  Indictment  and 
the  evidenoe  in  spedfled  cases  shall  not  be 
ground  for  an  acquittal  nnless  the  court  shall 

8  WDS.ft  P.2n  Sbb.— 21 


find  that  the  variance  Is  material  and  pr^- 
didal  to  the  defense^  State  v.  Wltherspoon, 
188  &  W.  828,  828,  281  Ma  708. 

The  variance  between  an  information  al- 
leging a  sale  to  "F.  H.  LesUe'*  and  the  evi- 
dence of  a  aate  to  "Frank  W.  LesUe"  is  not 
material  or  prejudicial,  within  Oomp.  St 
1010,  I  8188,  f oibidding  an  acqniteal  for  a 
variance,  unless  found  by  the  court  to  be  "ma- 
terial" to  the  merits  or  "preiudicial"  to  de- 
fendant Bggart  T.  State,  118  Pac  454,  465, 
19  W^o.  286. 

Plaintiff  alleged  that  while  she  was  a 
passenger  in  defendant's  cab  defendant  neg- 
ligently so  managed  its  team  and  cab  tliat 
the  team  took  fright  and  ran  with  the  cab, 
and,  on  account  thereof,  she  was  thrown 
down  in  the  cab,  and  was  injured  in  her  an- 
kle, ba<^  etc.  The  answer  was  a  general 
denial,  with  the  plea  of  contributory  negli- 
g^ce.  Plaintiff  introduced  evidence  without 
objection  showing  that,  after  she  entered  the 
cab,  the  team  became  frightened  and  started 
to  run  with  the  cab,  but  the  testimony  did 
not  show  whether  the  injury  was  caused  by 
being  thrown  from  her  seat  to  the  floor  of 
the  cab  or  while  trying  to  get  out  of  the  cab 
while  the  team  was  running  away,  her  testi- 
mony showing  that  she  made  an  attempt  to 
get  out  of  the  cab  while  the  team  was  run- 
ning, and  that  her  injury  might  have  been 
caused  thereby.  Rev.  St  1899,  i  658  (Ann.  St 
1908,  p.  874),  provides  that,  when  the  vari- 
anoe  between  pleading  and  the  proof  is  not 
material,  the  court  may  direct  the  fscts  to  be 
found  according  to  the  evidence,  or  may  order 
an  immediate  amendment  without  costs. 
Held,  that  the  vailanoe  between  the  allegation 
that  she  was  injured  by  being  thrown  down 
in  the  cab  and  the  evidenoe  that  she  was  in- 
jured while  attempting  to  get  out  of  the  cab 
was  immateilal,  and  that  dataidant  by  ftUI- 
ing  to  object  to  the  testimony  waived  his  ob- 
jection to  ftt,  so  that  a  charge  forbidding  re- 
covery if  plaintiff  was  injured  while  attempt- 
ing to  get  out  of  the  oab  while  the  team 
was  running  away  was  error.  Daley  v.  Bed- 
bum,  127  S.  W.  924,  925,  148  Mo.  App.  653. 

In  an  action  against  a  carrier  to  recover 
for  the  death  of  one  alleged  to  have  been  a 
passenger,  there  can  be  no  recoveiy  on  the 
ground  of  ordinary  negligence  of  defendant 
in  injuring  a  person  not  a  passenger.  Where 
a  complaint  alleged  that  plaintiff's  decedent 
at  the  time  of  his  negligent  killing  by  de- 
fendant carrier  was  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duties  as  a  railway  mail  clerk,  a  recovery 
may  be  had,  though  the  evidence  establishes 
that  decedent  at  the  time  of  the  fatal  ac- 
cident was  not  in  the  discharge  of  his  du- 
ties as  a  mail  derk,  but  was  a  gratuitous 
pass^ger,  as  a  carrier  owes  the  same  degree 
of  care  in  the  transportation  of  a  gratuitous 
passenger  as  in  the  case  of  a  passenger  for 
hire;  and  hence  the  variance  was  not  ma- 
terial within  the  meaning  of  Oomp.  I4iws 
1907,  II  8001-8008,  providing  that  no  vari- 


Mi^TSElAIi  i^ARIA^gB 


<^S^      flAT^niAULT  WAlJBa$  STAT^SMEKT 


finco  between. tto:aUegatloii8. and  <be. proof 
is  to  be  deeine^  materiai  unless  It  tms  actual- 
iy  misled  th^  adyevse  .party  to  his  prejudi^ 
Schuyler  v.  Southern  Pac.  Coi,  109  Pac.  458, 
465,  37  Utah,  681. 

The  variance  between  a  oomplaiot  setting 
forth  a  cause  of  action  on  an  open,  corrent, 
and  mutual  account,  and  tl^e  piroof  of  a  stat- 
ed account,  was  Immaterial  within  Code  Cly. 
Proe.  I  460,  providing  that  no  variance  be- 
tween the  pleading  and  the  proof  shall  be 
deemed  material  unless  it  has  actually  mis* 
led  the  adverse  party,  where  defendant  was 
not  misled  as  disclosed  by  his  answer  in 
denying  the  existence  of  the  account  made  a 
part  of  the  complaint,  but  merely  tendering 
an  issue  on  the  question  whether  the  account 
was  mutual,  open,  and  current  between  lilm* 
self  and  plaintiff's  assignor.  Culver  v.  New- 
hart,  123  Pac.  975,  978^  18  CaL  App.  614. 

MAUBBIAIiITT 

The  test  of  "materiality"  is  whether  the 
statement  made  could  have  IniBiuenced  the  tri- 
bunal upon  the  questibn  at  Issue  before  It 
Any  statemejQts  made  in  a  Judicial  proceed- 
ing for  the.  purpose  of  affecting  the  deci- 
sion, and  upon  whidi  the  Judge  act^,  are  ma- 
terial.  McLaren  v.  State,  62  S.  fi.  138,  139, 
4  (^a.  App.  643  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases, 
pp.  5309,  6310). 

BaLATEBIAIXT 

"Materially"  is  defined  in  Black's  Law 
Dictionary  as  "immediately;  more  or  less 
necessary;  having  influence  or  effect;  going 
to  the  merits;  having  to  do  with  matter  as 
distinguished  from  form;**  An  instruction 
that>  one  may  recover  for  injury,  the  prozi' 
mate  result  of  the  negli^^^nce  of  another, 
providing  he  himself  did  not  contribute  there- 
to, materlallx  by  negligence,  .is  not  erroneous 
because  of  the  use  of  the  word  ''nUaterialiy." 
Indianapolis  &  M.  Rapid  Transit  Co..  v.  Ed- 
wards, 74  N.  B.  683,  534,  86  Ind.  App.  202. 

A  court  may  at  any  time  correct  a  Judg- 
ment as  to  immaterial  matters  occasioned  by 
inadvertence;  but  this  right  does  -not  exist 
where  such  am^idment  materially  affects  the 
rlghtif  of  litigants  objecting  thereto,  using 
the  word  "materially"  to  mean  affecting  the 
rights  of  objecting  litigants.  OaUdns  v.  Mon- 
roe, 119  Pac.  680,  17  Cal.  App.  324. 

In  Instructing  upon  a  city's  liability  f6r 
damage  to  property  by  the  overflow  of  a 
stream  by  changing  the  grade  of  a  street,  it 
is  usual  to  instruct  that  the  volume  of  water 
niust  have  been  "materially  and  unduly"  in- 
creased ;  "unduly"  meaning  disproportionate- 
ly, and  not  being  synonymous  with  "materi- 
ally." Waltei-s  V.  City  of  Mal-shalltown,  120 
N.  W.  1046,  1048,  145  Iowa,  457,  26  L.  R,  A. 
(N.  S.)  199.         .. 

,  The  error,  if  aoy,  in  the  admission  of  a 
deposition,  on  the  ground  that  the  pari:yi  offer- 
ing ^it,  had  failed  to  show  the  nontesld^nce  of 


fb^  wiitnQSSy  was  harm^esii;  ^  where  his  testi- 
mony only  tended  to  prove  a  fact  otherwise 
established  by  competent ^n(l  uncontroyerted 
evidence,  and  the  error  dlh  hot  "materially" 
affect  the  merits  of  the  action,  and  the  court 
could  not,  under  Rev.  St  1899,  f  865,  reverse 
the  Judgment  on  that  ground.  O'Keefe  t. 
United  Rys.  Co.  of  St  Louis,  101  S.  W.  1144, 
1147, 124  Mo.  App.  618. 

BSATISBIAIXT  TAJLBB  BTATBMEHT 

A  banltmptj  wtio  obtained  credit  for  ad- 
ditional goods  on  a  materially  false  state- 
ment of  his  financial  condition,  and  who  sub- 
sequently to  the  purchase  ef  the  additional 
goods  on  credit  made  payments  on  earlier 
purchases^  so  diat  the  amount  owed  by  him 
at  the  time  he  went  into  bankruptcy  was  less 
than  the  amount  of  his  indebtedness  at  the 
time  ^f  thft  maldng  of  the  false.  statesneDt, 
was  guilty  of  making  a  materially  false  state- 
ment, defeating  his  il^t  to  a 'discharge  in 
ba2ikTu|»tcy;  tmder  Bankruptcy  Act  July  1, 
1896,  c.  Ml,  I  14b,  as  amended  by  Act  Feb.  9, 
1903,  c.  487,  I  4.  In  1^  Arenson,  195  Fel 
609,  610. 

A  ''materially  false  statement**'  wlthls 
thQ  meaning,  of  Bankr.  Act  1898,  |  14b  (3) 
(Act  July  X,  1898,  c.  541,  30  Stat  550,  as 
amended  by  Act  Fob.  5,  1903,  c.  487,  I  4,  32 
Stat  79*0,  which  makes  it  a  ground  for  denj- 
ing  a  discharge  to  a  bankrupt  that  he  has 
obtained  propei*ty  on  credit  from  any  person 
on  a  materially  false  statement  in  writing 
made  to  such  person  for  the  purpose  of  ob- 
taining such  property  on  credit  must  hat% 
been  made  with  knowledge  that  it  was  untroe 
and  with  fraudulent  intent;  and  a  statement 
made  by  on^  partner  from  facts  stated  to 
him  by  his  copartner,  who  was  to  furnish  the 
entire  capital  for  the  bus)ness»  although  In 
fact  untrue,  will  not  defeat  the  right  of  tb^ 
partner  making  it  to  a  discharge,  where  the 
untruthfulness  of  the  material  statements  so 
made  was  not  known  to  him.  W.  S.  Peck  Go. 
V.  Lowenbeln,  178  Fed.  178,  180,  101  0.  a  A 
49a 

The  torm  "materially  false  statements  in 
writing,"  as  used  in  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1S98, 
c.  641,  §  14b,  subd.  3,  as  amended  by  Act  Feb. 
5,  1903,  c.  487,  f  4,  which  bars  a  discharge 
where  the  bankrupt  obtained  property  on 
credit  trota  any  person  on  "a  materially  false 
statement  in  writing"'  made  fbr  the  purpose 
of  obtaining  such  property  on  credit  ^ 
plies  a  statoment  knowingly  false  or  made 
recklessly  without  an  •  honest  belief  in  its 
truths  and  with  a  purpose  to  mfsleafl  or  de- 
ceive and  thereby  obtain  property  upon  credit 
from  the  person  to  wbon)  it  Is  inade.  Drafts 
drawn  by  the  assistant  t^ashlor  oif  a  bapkrapt, 
operating  a  private  bank,  after  he  was  insol- 
vent and  without  his  knowledge,  and  whicb 
were  not  paid  in  accord  with  the  bankrupt's 
custom  to  exchange  drafts  with  another  bank 
on  daily  settlements,  do  not  constitute  a 
Immaterially'!  false  statement  in  writing  wIUh 


UATEBIALMAK 


MATEBIAIiMAK 


in  the  baiikriiptcy  act    Vtreitoiia  t.  Harvey, 
174  Fed.  574,  577. 


MATERIALMAN 

The  mechaiiic's  lien  act  of  1888  (Acts 
1888,  p.  140,  d  116)  and  amendments  there- 
to (Barns'  Ann.  dt  1908,  H  8295-^07; 
Bnms'  Ann.  St  1901,  |§  7255-7267),  giving  a 
Qefn  to  ''mechanics,  laborers,  and  material- 
men," does  not  give  a  Uen  to  contractors  or 
subcontractors.  Fleming  y.  Greener,  87  N.  B. 
719,  90  N.  B.  73,  75,  178  Ind.  260,  140  Am. 
St  R^.  254,  21  Ann.  Ofts.  950. 

The  tens  "materialman"  does  Include  a 
snbcontEactor  who  es^cavated  the  cellar  of  a 
bonding  with  his  teame  and  laborers  at  a 
specified  price-  per  cubic  yard.  McNab  A 
Harlin  MXg.  Go.  ▼*  Paterson  Bldg.  Go.  <N.  J.) 
63  AtL  709,  717. 

lien  Law  (Laws  1897,  p.  516,  c  41$)  |  2, 
defines  a  "subcontractor"  as  one  who  enters 
into  a  contract  for  the  Improvement  of  real 
property  with  a  contractor,  and  defines  a 
"materialman"  as. any  person  other  than  a 
contractor  who  furnishes  material  for  the  im- 
provement field,  that  one  agreeing  with  con- 
tractor to  install  a  system  of  temperature 
regulation  In  a  building,  involving  both  the 
performance  of  labor  and  furnishing  of  ma- 
terials, was  a  subcontractor  wUhin  the  stat* 
nte.  A  company  which  merely  sold  steam  ra- 
diators to  the  coDtracton;  bat  performed  no 
work  on  the  building,  was  a  **materialmaiU^ 
and  not  a  "sebeontiaetor,"  within  Lien  Law 
(Uws  1807»  p«  516^  a  418)  |  2,  defining  those 
termsL  Heiman  A  Grace  ▼.  Olty  of  New 
York,  114  N.  T.  fitapp.  1107,  1112,  V»  App. 
Dlv,  681.      • 

A  Written'  o)rder  tor  oak  flooring,  placed 
with  defendant  by  the  general  'contractor, 
otttaiiiA  the  Wbnfla  ^'Cbarge  oontraet  1,981— 
G-^,**  and  another  oid^r  to  d^fehdaat  ssi^ 
dted  that  tt  catered  the  fnmlshdlig  aiid  de- 
livery St  the  ownei'g  switch  of  oak  lioorlng 
for  a  contract  knbwn^ln  the  contractor's  of- 
fice as  '*1,981«"  wbldi  ^as  the  contract  be^ 
tween  the  general  contmctor  and  the  owner. 
Uen  Law  (Laws  1807,  p.  516,  c  418)  |  2,  de- 
fines a  *'8Ubconitractor"  i[b  one  who' toters  Into 
a  contract  \Mth  a  ^ntradtokr  for  the  Improve^ 
ment  of  real  property,  and  defines  a  "materi- 
alman** as  apy  person  other  than  a  contractor 
wbo  furnishes  material  for  such.- imiprove- 
ment  Held,,  that  defendant  was  a.material- 
tnan,  and  not  a  subcontra!ctor ;  the, mere 
knowledge  that  the  material  Was  U9ed  by 
the  contractor  in  the  perforn^ance  of  a  cer- 
tain contract  being  insufficient  tp  make  him 
a  subcontractor.  .  Hedden,  Const  Ca  v.,  Proc- 
tor &  Gamble  Co.,  114  K,'t.  Supp^  llQa,.U06, 
62  Misc.  ^^.  IS^     •      ,'^ 

Where  complainant  conttaeted.Wltlilde* 
fendant,  the  owner  of  certain  premises,  to 
famish  mining  machinery, 'af^pflanced, 'and 
mteriala».^uiA.il«iMI  Ib^Mweiln  a  nttl  to 


be  erected  at  defendant's  mines  and  ooi>* 
ctmcted  by  defendant,  without  any  other  con- 
tractor, h6  was  an  original  contractor,  and 
not  a  ''materialman,*'  within  Cutting's  Ck)mp. 
Laws  Neb.,  |  3885,  and  therefore  was  enti- 
tled to  60  days  within  which  to  file  his  claim 
for  a  lien.  Salt  Lake  Hardwai-e  Co.  v.  Chain- 
man  Mining  A  Electric  Co.,  128  Fed.  ,509,  510. 

UndMT  Laws  N.  Y.  1897,  p.  514,  c.  418,  |  8, 
giving  a  lien  to  a  "eontractor,  subcontractor, 
laborer,  or  materialman,  who  performs  labor 
or  fomlAeB  material  fOr  the  Improvement 
of  real  property,"  the  terms  ''contractor," 
"soboontfactoi;''  "labomr,**  and  "material- 
man," while  they  refer  primarily  to  the  man 
who  has  a  formal  contract  with  the  owner, 
or  a  subcontractor,  with  the  contractor,  or 
who  performs  manual  labor  or  furnished  ma- 
terial, also  embrace  the  man  who  buys  the 
labor  and  material  which  enter  into  the  im- 
provement Kerwln  v.  Post,  104  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1005,  1007,  120  App.  Dlv.  179. 

A  contract  for  the  carpenter  work  of  a 
building  required  "Davis  or  other  equal  steel 
stitfeners"  for  window  frames.  The  contrac- 
tor sublet  the  contract  for  the  installation  of 
the  window  frames,  and  relator  agreed  to 
furnish,  but  not  to  install,  the  stiffeners  in 
accordance  with  measuremente  furnished  him 
by  the  subcontractor,  and  not  in  accordance 
with  the  specifications  of  the  original  con- 
tract Held,  that  relator  was  a  "material- 
man," and  not  a  subcontractor,  and  was 
i  therefore  entitled  to  recover  on  the  contrac- 
tor's bond  given  under  Comp.  Laws,  Sf  1074^- 
10745,  requiring  contractors  of  public  build- 
ings to  give  security  for  the  payment  of  ma- 
terial furnished  therefor.  People,  for  Usq  of 
Davis,  V.  Campfleld«  U4  N.  W.  659,  6bO,  150 
Mich.  675. 

Code  Oly.  Proa  1 1188,  provides  that  eon« 
tracts  between  the  owner  and  the  contractor 
for  Improvements  exceeding  $1,000  in  co^t 
shall  be.in  writing  and  filed  In  the  oflke  uf 
the  county  recorder,  otherwise  the  contraot 
shall  be  void,  and  no  recovery  shall  be  had 
thereon  by  either  party^  Plalntiif  contracted 
with  a  lessee. to  raise  a  number  of  old  buUdT 
ings  above  the  street  level  and  remodel  then^ 
and  "furnish  i^U  <^  the  nee^Bfi^j  labor. ani4 
material  to  be  used  to  fully  complete ,  tb^ 
work,"  plaintiff  to  receive  the  actual  cost  of 
the  materials  ant  labor,  plMT' 10  t^r  cent  and 
the  reasonable  Value  of  the  work,  to  be^idib- 
termliied  by  the  amount  of  work  and  labor 
dene  when  It  we»  comifieted.  Held,  that  the 
labor  to  be  perfiormed  was  not  mer^  inCF^ 
dMitai  ^  the  famishing  of  the  aiateriais^  afid 
hen<ie  plaintiff  was  an  origlnkl  contractoi' 
wHhln  the  meaning  ot  the  irtatute,  and  not  a 
materidUndn;  and  was  not  entitle  to  a  me^ 
ehanlc's  lien  where  thcf  contract  was  not  Is 
writing  and  filed  with  the  ceimty  recorder; 
the  fact  tha%  the  contract  did  ndt  qM^ify  the 
price  or  total  valne  of  the  labor  and:  mate* 
rials  no*  excusLng  the;partlea  firona  redndag. 


HATERIALMAK 


824 


MATBRIAIiMAJT 


it  to  wrtOiig,  it  b^ng  appartot  that  the  cost 
of  the  work  would  ezoeed  «1,000.  Petenon 
r.  Freiermuth,  121  Pac.  299,  800»  17  OaL  App. 
e09. 

One  contracting  with  the  agent  of  the 
owner  erecting  a  building  for  decoratiye  plas- 
ter work,  supplying  both  labor  and  material, 
is  not  a  materialman  within  Bern,  ft  BaL 
Code,  1 1138,  requiring  a  materialman  to  send 
to  the  owner  a  duplicate  statement  of  the  ma- 
terials furnished  to  the  contractor,  which  only 
covers  a  situation  where  three  persona  are 
involved,  and  where  the  owner  has  no  con- 
tractual relatLoA  with  the  one  fomisUnc  ma- 
terials. 

A  materialman  who  delivers  materials  to 
the  owner  under  a  contract  with  him  through 
his  agent  need  not  send  to  the  ownef  the  du- 
plicate statement  required  by  Rem.  ft  BaL 
CkMle,  I  1183.  Architectural  Decorating  Co, 
V.  Nicklason,  119  Pac.  177,  66  Wash.  19& 

Under  lien  Law  (Ck>n8ol.  Laws,  c.  83)  I 
2,  defining  a  contractor  as  one  entering  Into  a 
contract  with  the  owner  of  real  property  for 
the  Improvement  thereof,  and  defining  a  ma- 
terialman as  any  person  other  than  the  con- 
tractor furnishing  materials  for  such  im- 
provement, and  defining  the  term  "improve- 
ment" as  Including  the  erection,  alteration, 
or  repair  of  any  structure  on  real  estate,  and 
any  work  done  on  the  property  or  materials 
furnished  for  its  improvement,  a  contract  re- 
quiring one  to  furnish  all  the  window  frames, 
sash,  glass,  and  trim  in  and  to  buildings  in 
course  of  construction  for  a  lump  sum,  pay- 
able in  installments  as  the  work  progressed, 
and  requiring  him  to  make  a  large  part  of 
the  materials  according  to  plans,  is  a  con- 
tract for  the  permanent  improvement  of  real 
estate  within  the  lien  law,  and  he  is  entitled 
to  a  li^i  for  the  materials  famished  and  work 
done.  Western  Sash,  Door  ft  Lmnber  Cow  t. 
Gaul  Ck>nBt  Ca,  126  N.  Y.  Bnw.  UIO,  lUl. 

One  furnishing  to  a  contractor  sashes, 
doors,  and  glass  for  a  building  is  not  a  sub- 
contractor, but  is  a  "materialman,**  within 
Laws  1969,  c  45,  requiring  persons  furnishing 
materials  to  a  contractor  to  deliver  to  the 
owner  a  duplicate  statement  of  such  mate- 
rials. Finlay  t.  Tagholm,  113  Pac  1683, 1684, 
62  Wash.  341. 

Oode  Civ.  Proc  1 3414,  makes  a  laborer's 
or  materialman*s  lien  prior  to  a  oontractor*s. 
Lien  Law  (ConsoL  Laws,  e.  38)  |  2,  definea  a 
"contractor"  as  one  who  ccmtracts  with  an 
owner  of  land  to  in^rove  it,  a  "materialman*' 
as  one,  other  than  a  contractor,  who  fundsl^ 
es  material  for  such  improvement,  and  an 
"improvemoit*'  as  including  work  done  on 
property  or  "materials  furnished  for  its  per- 
manent improvement"  Held,  that  the  lien  of 
one  who  installed  plumbing,  of  one  who  fur- 
nished trim  fbr  the  building  under  contract 
with  the  owner,  and  of  one  who  sold  brick 
and  mason's  building  materials  to  the  owner 


for  use  in  the  bulling,  are  all  on  equality, 
being  entitled  to  preference  in  the  order  of 
time.  Jackson  t.  JEgm,  94  N.  B.  211,  266  N. 
Y.  496. 

Laws  1969,  c  267,  I  1«  requires  any  mu- 
nicipal council  contracting  for  city  work  to 
take  from  the  contractor  a  bond  with  sure- 
ties for  the  performance  of  the  contract  and 
for  the  payment  of  all  subcontractors  and  ma- 
terialmen. Section  2  provides  that  a  failure 
to  require  such  bond  shall  make  the  dty  lia- 
ble to  the  persons  mentioned  in  section  L 
Held,  that  the  statute  requiring  municipal 
corporations  to  take  such  bonds  from  its  con- 
tractors is  an  independent  enactment  and 
that  Mechanic's  Lien  Law  <Law8  1969,  c  45) 
I  1,  providing  that  the  materialman  shoold 
deliver  or  mail  to  the  owner  of  property  t 
duplicate  statement  of  the  material  furnish- 
ed or  contracted  for,  had  no  application.  Gate 
City  Lumber  Co.  v.  City  of  Montesano,  111 
Paa  799,  866,  66  Wash.  586. 

One  who  furnished  galvanized  iron  and 
solder  to  a  manufacturer,  which  was  made 
by  the  latter  into  guttering  and  spouting,  and 
delivered  to  a  contractor,  for  a  building,- was 
not  a  "materialman"  within  the  meaning  of 
a  condition  of  the  contractor's  contract  and 
bond  requiring  him  to  satisfy  the  dainos  of 
laborers  and  "materiahuen.**  Berger  Mf^.  Ca 
V.  Lloyd,  91  8.  W.  468,  469, 113  Mo.  App.  205. 

Under  Llea  Law,  Laws  1897,  pi  515.  e. 
418, 1 2,  defining  a  materialman  to  be  one  otb- 
er  tiian  a  contractor  who  fumirtieB  materialfl 
for  an  imisrovement,  persons  who  contracted 
directly  with  the  owner,  though  solely  to  fa^ 
nish  Huiterials,  aoe  original  independent  con- 
tractors, and  not  ''materialmen,"  entitled  to 
a  preference  under  section  18.  Hall  v.  Thom- 
as, 111  N.  Y.  Supp.  979,  962. 

Materialmen,  as  used  in  Meehantes*  Lien 
Law  (P.  L.  1898,  p.  638),  is  hot  limited  to  one 
who  has  fnmislied  materials  only,  that  Is, 
who  simply  supplies  to  the  b^MlDjg  materials 
which  some  one  else  Is  to  incorporate  by  bis 
labor,  but  includes  as  well  one  who  furnish- 
es both  labor  and  materials  combined,  or  who 
furnishes  materials  installed  in  the  building, 
including  the  labor  of  installation.  Beckhard 
V.  Rudolph,  68  AtL  766,  766,  68  N.  J.  Bq.  74a 

Subcontractors,  such  as  plumbers,  plaste^ 
ers,  and  painters,  who  supply  the  material 
and  put  it  into  the  building,  are  not  "mate- 
rialmen** within  the  meaning  of  Laws  1898,  V- 
638,  c.  226,  i  8,  providing  that  when  a  con- 
tractor shall  refuse  to  pay  any  person  who 
has  furnished  materials  for  the  erection  of  t 
building,  for  which  contract  has  been  filed,  It 
shall  be  the  duty  of  such  ''materialman"  to 
give  written  notice,  etc.,  in  order  to  procon 
aUen.  Beckhard  v.  Rudolph,  69  AtL  253,  256b 
68  N.  J.  Bq.  816. 


As  eontraetov 

See  Ck>ntractor; 


UATKAIAIA 


826 


MATBBIA116 


MATEfflALS 

See  Borate  Material;  Bidldiiif  Material ; 
Claim  for  Labor  or  Material;  Forest 
Material;  Labor  and  Material ;  Light- 
er Material;  Single  Oomponent  Mate* 
rial. 

Famishing  materials,  see  Famish. 

Kind  of  material,  see  Kind. 

Other  good  material,  see  Other. 

Other  material,  see  Other. 

Raw  material,  see  Raw. 

Similar  mattflal,  see  Similar. 

Under  the  Uen  laws*  generally,  ''mate- 
lial"  is  deemed  to  be  something  that  goes  In- 
to, and  becomes  a  part  of  the  finished  strac* 
tare,  soeh  as  lumber,  nails,  glass,  hardware* 
etc.,  which  are  necessary  to  the  completion  of 
a  building.  Gilbert  Hunt  Co.  y.  Parry,  110 
Paa  541,  648,  69  Wash.  646,  Ann.  Gas.  1912B, 
225. 

The  word  "material,"  as  used  in  a  statute 
declaring  that  every  person  famishing  mate< 
rials  has  a  lien  thereon  for  the  same,  has  a 
well  defined  and  onderstood  lagal  significanoe. 
It  is  deemed  to  be  something  that  goes  into 
and  becomes  a  part  of  the  finished  structnre^ 
such  as  lamber*  nails,  glass,  iiardware,  and 
a  tboosand  other  things  that  might  be  meant, 
which  are  necessary  to  the  completed  elec- 
tion of  a  boUdlng  oje  stractare.  Webster  de- 
fines the  word  as  the  sabstanee  <Mr  matter  of 
which  anything  is  made  or  may  be  made. 
The  word  supplied  Is  broader  than  the  word 
"materials,**  bat  It  cannot  py  any  fair  eon- 
stroction  be  oonstroed  so  as  to  indade  ma- 
terials famiabed.  Tsatakawa  ▼«  Kamameto* 
101  Pac.  869,  870,  871,  58  Wash.  281. 

"Materials,''  within  lien  Law  (Oonsol. 
Laws  1909,  c.  88)  §  6,  glTlng  a  lien  for  ma- 
terials ftimlshed  to  a  municipal  contractor, 
means  matter  intended  to  be  need  In  the  crea- 
Uon  of  a  mechanicsl  strnctnre;  the  sabstanee 
of  which  anything  is  made  (citing  Words  and 
Phrases  Jodidally  Defined).  Fsople  es  reL 
Troy  Pablle  Works  Go.  t.  Qlty  of  TonkesSp 
129  N.  T.  Snpp.  920*  921, 146  App.  DIt.  62T. 

Tbe  wc^  ''materials**'  In  a  bond  of  a  gor- 
eroment  contractor  onder  a  contract  for  the 
coDstmetlon  of  a  sewer, .  conditioned,  as  re- 
quired by  act  of  Oongress,  on  his  making 
payment  to  an  persons  supplying  1dm  '^bor 
tnd  materials^*  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
vork,  does  not  Incliide  posts,  lumber,  and 
snTel  famished  hlm;^  the  same  being  eqoip' 
loeats  osed  In  the  performance  <tf  the  con- 
ttact  United  States  to  Use  of  Lanham  t. 
Jacoby  (DeL)  61  AtL  871,  6  PennewiU*  676^ 

''Material**  is  tiie  substance  or  matter  of 
which  anything  is  made  or  to  be  made.  The 
ommeratlon  In  paragraph  11,  TarllT  Act  July 
24. 189T,  c.  11,  of  ••other  borate  material,"  re- 
fen  only  to  borate  materials  fbond  in  natare 
in  a  raw  condition,  soch  as  the  "borates  of 
Ume  or  soda"  Inclnded  in  the  same  proTl- 
•ion,  and  does  not  embrace  borate  of  man- 


ganese, or  bormangan,  widdi  Is  a  manufac- 
tored  article  made  firom  manganese  and 
borates  of  lime  or  soda,  and  which  is  held 
to  be  dutiable  as  a  chemical  compound  or 
salt  under  paragraph  8  of  said  act  Hemp- 
stead ▼.  Thomas,  129  Fed.  90T,  908,  64  C  a 
A.  889. 

The  word  ''material"  has  a  well  defined 
and  understood  legal  significance.  Under  the 
lien  laws  generally  "material**  is  deemed  to 
be  something  that  goes  into  and  becomes  a 
part  of  the  finished  structure,  suA  as  lum- 
ber, nails,  l^lass^  hardware,  and  a  thousand 
other  things  that  might  be  mentioned,  whUA 
are  necessary  to  the  omiplete  creation  of  a 
buUdlag.  Webster's  definition  of  "matertal** 
Is  "the  substance  or  matter  of  wlileh  any- 
thing Is  made  or  BMty  be  made."  Material 
has  not  the  same  significance  as  proTlslons, 
which  is  defined  by  Webster  aa  a  stock  of 
food  collected  or  stored,  and  Laws  1893,  p. 
82,  c.  2i  I  1,  entitled  "An  act  creating  and 
providing  for  the  enforcement  of  liens  fbr 
labor  and  material,"  whereby  a  lien  is  glT- 
en  fbr  proTlslona  famished  to  a  contractor 
<m  a  railroad,  etc.,  is  void,  under  Gonst  art 
2;  1 19,  providing  that  no  bill  shall  embrace 
more  than  one  subject,  which  shall  be  ex- 
pressed Ih  the  title.  Armour  A  Go.  t.  West- 
em  Constmctlon  Co^  78  Pac  1106,  1107,  36 
Wash.  629. 

Act  Aug.  18,  1894,  c  280,  28  Stat  278,  r^ 
QUIres  a  contractor  for  a  poblic  building  to 
gtre  bond  to  promptly  pay  for  all  labor  and 
materials  sopped  to  him  for  the  work.  A 
contract  provided  that  the  contractor  should 
furnish  "materials  for  the  construction  of* 
certain  buildings  for  the  United  States  gov- 
ernment, "all  in  accordance  with  the  plans 
and  spedflcations'*  made  a  part  of  the  agree- 
ment The  condition  of  the  contractor's  bond 
was  for  performance  of  the  covenanta  and 
agreementa  In  the  contract  and  for  the 
prompt  payment  for  all  labor  or  materials 
supplied  to  the  contractor  for  the  work. 
Held,  that  the  bond  contained  two  distinct 
ooveoantfl^  one  tor  the  performance  of  the 
contract  and  the  other  for  the  protection  of 
persons  supplying  labor  and  materials,  and 
the  latter  should  be  interpreted  in  the  light 
of  the  former,  and  the  meaning  of  the  "ma- 
terials" in  the  bond  should  be  ascertained 
from  the  contract,  incldding  the  QMcifica- 
tions,  construed  in  view  of  the  work  to  be 
performed  and, in  the  light  of  the  drcum- 
stanees  surrounding  the  transai^on.  United 
iStates,  to  Use  of  BUas  Lyman  Coal  Oa,  v. 
United  States  Fidelity  A  Guaranty  Go.,  71 
Aa  1106,  1107t  82  y  t  94. 

Rev.  Laws,  c.  104, 1 1,  authorising  certain 
dties,  for  the  prevention  of  fire,  to  regulate 
the  inspection,  materials,  construction,  altera- 
tion, and  use  of  buildings,  does  not  authorize 
an  ordinance  prohibiting  reshingling  of  a 
roof,  since  the  section  does  not  comprehend 
repairs ;  the  word  "constmctlon"  being  used 
to  mean  the  erection  of  a  new  building  or  an 


KATBBIALS 


826 


UAIEHIULB 


additioa  to  an  old  one,  the  word  ''alteration." 
to  denote  a  change  or  substitution  in  a  par- 
ticular of  one  iNirt  of  a  building  for  a  build- 
ing different  in  that  particular,  the  word 
"use"  indicating  the  purpose  for  which  the 
building  maj  l^  occupied,  and  the  word  "ma- 
terials" being  a  word  of  general  signiflca- 
tion,  and  necessarily  ancillary  to  the  other 
more  definite  terms  employed  in  the  statute. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hayden,  97  N.  B.  783,  784, 
i!ll  Mass.  296. 

Appliamees 

There  is  a  wide  dtstilnction  between 
^material"  and  "applianoe."  The  term  '*ap* 
plianoe"  refers  to  machinery  and  all  the  in- 
struments used  in  operating  it  "Materials" 
include  everything  of  wUch  ahything  la 
made.  A  master  must  use  'ordinary  care  In 
instructing  a  serrant  as  to  the-nse  of  materi- 
als furnished  and  is  only  required  to  uae  or- 
dinary care  in  furnishing  materlalB  to  be 
manufactured.  Oallman  t.  Union  Hard- 
ware Mfg.  Co.,  48  S.  D.  524,  625,  «0  &  CL 
192  (citing  in  support  of  deflrittton  Bodle  ▼• 
Charleston  tft  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  89  8.  m.  716,  61 
a  C.  480). 

Electrical  appliances  furnished  to  a 
light  and  power  plant  are  not  "materials,** 
within  Revisal  1905,  i  2016,  giving  a  lien  for 
materials  furnished  in  the  brectloi;i  and  re- 
pair of  buildings,  where  none  of  the  appli- 
ances ever  became  any  part  of  the  plant,  and 
where  transformers  and  wires  supplied  were 
merely  strung  on  electric  light  polea  Palp 
&  Linville  T.  KemersYllle  Light  &  Power  Co., 
72  S.  B.  869»  167  N.  C.  167. 

Aroliltect'fl  plavis  a^tui  speolfloatlons 

Plans  and  specifications  drawn  by  an  ar- 
chite<^  for  the  erection  of  a  building  are  not 
"materials,**  within  the  purview  of  Revisal 
1905,  I  2016,  giving  a  mechanic's  lien  upon 
buildings  for  materials  furnished.  Stephens 
V.  Hicks,  72. S,  E.  813,  315»  156  N.  a  239,  36 
L.  R.  A.  <N.  S.)  354,  Ann.  Cas.  1913A,  272. 

Oasttacs' 

Iron  t;astlngs  from  10  to  24  feet  in 
length,  known  as  "sill  castings  or  diannels,'* 
were  furnished  to  a  tobacco  company  wltii 
the  neces^ry  bdlts  for  use  In  its  factories, 
to  support  tobacco  presses.  Most  of  them 
were  used  for  supporting  presses  or  tables 
connected  therewith,  without  being  tiofstened 
to  the  floor  and  without  being  put  under  all 
the  pres^fes.  Some  were '  used  foir  other  pur- 
poses, such  as  skids,  and  '^dunnage**;  that 
is,  were  put  under  goods  to  ralsie  them  above 
the  floor.  Those  under  presses  and  *  ta- 
bles could  be  readily  removed,  and  were  in 
fact  taken  from,  one  building  to  i^Qother. 
There  was  np  proof  that  they  wer^  .custom- 
arily thus  placed  in  tobacco  factories,  or 
were  in  any  way  necessary  to  carry  on  the 
work,  or  that  it  could  not  be  done  as  well 
without  them.  Held^  that  the  castings  were 
not  "material**  or  "machinery,"  within  Rev. 
^t  1899,  S  4203  (Ann.  St,.  1906,  P..  2277)»  givr 


ing  a  lien  to  a  person  fnmis|itng  t^e  same 
for  a  building.  Banner  Iron  Works  v.  Mtna. 
Iron  Works,  122'  &  W.  762,  763,  143  Ma 
App.  1. 

Coal  and  oil 

Coal  used  by  a  building  contractor  to 
heat  buildings,  covered  by  speriflcations  re- 
quiring him  to  proYlde  fuel  for  heating  while 
the  work  Js  going  on,  is  "material,**  within 
the  implied  terms  of  the  contract,  which  he 
is  bound  to  furnish,  and  hence  within  the 
scope  of  his  bond,  required  by  the  federal 
statute  (Act'  Aug.  i3,  1894,'  c  280,  28  SUt 
278K  for  the  protection- of  persons  supplying 
materials.  United  States,  for  Use. of  Blias 
Lyman  Coal  Coi,  v.  United  States  Fidelity  & 
OBaranty  Co.,  76  Aa  280,  281,  88  Vt  278. 

A  contract  with  the  United  States  go?- 
emment  tq  furnish  all  labor  and  materials 
necessary  for  buildings  at  a  fort  prorided 
that  all  materials  should  be  subject  to  the 
acceptance  or  fejectlon  of  an  ofllcer  in 
(Hharge,  and  any  materihl  rejected  riiould  be 
^t'Once  removed  and  replaced  by  the  con- 
tractor. The  contractor  gave  bond  for  per- 
fbrmanee  of  tiie  contract  tod  for  the  prompt 
payment  for  all  labor  ot  materials  supplied 
to  him  for  the  work,  as  expressly  required 
by  Act  Aug.  18,  1894,  c.  280,  28  Stat  278. 
Held,  that  coal  fnrnished  fbr  use  in  the  heat- 
ing t)lants  and  in  certain  <tf  the  buildings  for 
heating  purposes  white  work  of  plastering, 
laying  floors,  paintlngj  and  ▼amishlng  was 
b€^  dbhe  wa^  not  '^materialai**  within  tte 
bond  or  the  statute.  United  States,  to  Use  of 
Blias  tiyman-  Ooal  Co.,  v.  United  States  |!l- 
dellty  ft  Guaranty  Co.,  7i  AtL  1106,  1108,  82 
Vt  94. 

Where  a'  csntractor  for  the  construction 
of  a  water  reservoir  for  a  city  entered  Into 
a  IxHid  coadStlDned  that  all  ciainis  fbr  labor 
and  materiEBls  fundsheaand  supplied  or  pe^ 
formed  in  and  about  the  work  should  be 
promptly  paid,  the  slgnos  of  the  bond  were 
not  UaUa  on  a  claim  for  coal  fttmished  to 
a  sabcoiftractor  and  used  in  g^ierating  steam 
to  ran  a  steam  *sh<Wel  aiid  locomotive  used  in 
making  excaivi|tlons.  City  of  Philadelpbia 
y.  Malone-,  63' AtL  CSSi,  641, 214  Pa.  90. 

Conpumablie  supplies  furnished  to  a  ves- 
sel, siiich  as  gas<Hiae  for  a  motor  boat,  are 
not.witbtD  Oode  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  MA.  1904, 
an^  63,  I  43,  giving  a  lien  on  domestic  ves- 
sels "for  materials  fnrnisbed  er  work  done 
in  the  buUding,  repairing  or  eqnipplng  tbe 
same.!'  The  PriAces8»  186  Fed.  218,  219. 
•V  <  A  claim  against  a  railroad  for  furnish- 
ing'deal  and  oil  and'toola  wa^  not  within 
Styles;. %i(.  Civ.  St  art.3294,glringaliento 
the  furnisher  of  ''material'*  for  the  construc- 
tion or  repair  of  ^^  railroad.  ..WateFS-Pleroft 
on  Co.  v«  United  States  &  Mej^can  Trust  Go, 
99  S.  W.  212,  214,  M  Te^s.  GLv.  AW-  397. 

A  person  fumishtng  coal  oonsnmed  bi 
the  operation  ol  a: steam  shovel  used  by  s 
cpAtiraetpr  la  the;  ooostcnction  of.  a..iBiiroad 


IfATERIAia 


S27 


MATKRIAILS 


is  not  entitled  to  a  lien  o»  the  rl|^  of  way 
and  fraiK^ilaea  of  tfie  railroad  company,  un- 
der Bams'  Ann.  St  1901, 1  7266,  giving  audi 
lien  for  labor  or  "mateaiala*'  used  in  tbe  con- 
struction or  repair  of  any  railroad*  Clpcin- 
oaU,  B,  ft  M.  B.  B.  T.  Sbera,  73  N.  B,  2B6,  86 
Ind.  AW"  315. 

"Materials,**  as  nsed  in  a  statnte  giving 
a  lien  on  the  property  of  railroads  for  ma- 
terials famished  fat  the  conetmction  of  ttie 
road,  does  not  include  gasoline,  gasoline 
torches,  and  coal  oil  used  for  Hghtlng  a 
railroad  tonnel  while  in  process  of  constmc- 
Uon,  packing,  cotton  waste,  electric  light 
supplies,  carts,  tools,  shovels,  spades,  black- 
smith tools,  wagons,  scrapers,  plows,  ma- 
chines, machinery,  dfirrickg,  derrick  crabs, 
cables,  and  repairs  for  all  these.  The  te^t  is 
not  wliether  the  article  furnished  was  -con- 
smned  in  its  use^  either  instantly,  as  in  ease 
of  explosivea,  or  by  degrees  from  long  and 
hard  use.  If  lien  ie  ^owed  for  tools  and 
machinery^  and  horses  t^id  mulee,  for,  ccon- 
plete  destruction,  on  the  8ai;ne  principal  It 
should  be  allowed  for  deterioration  in  value 
pro  tanto,  when  not  completely  destroyed. 
S.  B.  Luttrell  A  Ck).  v.  Knoxvllle,  Ia.  «  J.  B. 
Co.,  106  8.  W.  565^.  671,.  119  Tenn-  492. 

Dvatp  ears  aad  deirlolui 
Dump  eu»  aad  derrkkg  are  In  the  na- 
ture of  to<^  and  apyUances  used  by  a  een- 
tnictor  for  hia  own  convenience  in  executing 
the  contract  and  are  not  ^'materials"  wUhia 
the  provision  of  a  contractor's  bond.  City 
of  Philadelphia  ▼•  Malone,  63  AtL  689,  MO, 
214  Pa.  90  (citing  United  filtates  v.  Morgan, 
lU  Fed.  474). 

A  claim  for  rental  of  scrapers  is  neither 
for  "labor  performed"  nor  '^material  furnish- 
ed,'' within  Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes  A  St  I 
5902,  giving  one  who,  at  the  owner's  request, 
grades,  etc.,  land  or  a  street  in  front  thereof, 
a  lien  for  the  labor  performed  and  the  mate- 
rials furnished.  Hall  y,  Cowen,  98  Paa  670, 
671,  51  Waah.  296. 


Under  Revisal  N.  O.  1905,  |  ^16,  which 
gtves  a  lien  on  a  vessel  for  all  debts  contract- 
ed '*for  woA  done  on  the  same  or  material 
famished,"  one  who  furnished  an  engine  to 
be  installed  in  a  gas  boat,  relying  on  the  cred- 
it of  the  vessel,  is  entitled  to  a  lien  therefor 
as  "material,*'  on  compliance  with  the  stat- 
ute as  to  recording;  and  it  Is.  immaterial 
that  by  the  contract  it  reserved  title  to  the 
engine  until  paid  for*  The  Pead,  189  Fed. 
640,542.      ' 

EzploslTes 

A  municipal  waterworks  contractor's 
bond  to  secure  payment  for  "material"  under 
St  1904,  c  349,  covers  dynamite  used  in  the 
work  and  fuses  used  to  explode  it.  B.  I.  Du- 
pont  De  Nemours  P^w^r  Co.  ▼.  Oulgln-Pace 
Oontracting  06^  92  N.  B.  102%  1025^  206 
Maaa  686.        . 


Explosives  Used  fa  blasting  rock  in  grad- 
ing and  tunneling  for  a  railread  are  ''mate- 
rials**  fior  Which  the  furnisher  is  entitled  to  a 
lien  under  Acta  1883,  p.  296,  c.  220,  as  amend- 
ed by  Acts  1801,  p.  216,  c.  98.  Bercules  Pow- 
der Ca-  V.  Knoxvine  Ia  ft  J.  B.  Co.,  88  S.  W. 
354,  857,.  118  Tenn.  882,  67  L.  R  A.  487,  106 
Am.  St  Rep.  836  (citing  Rapauno  Chemical 
Co.  V.  Greenfield  A  N.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App.  6; 
Simmons  v.  Carrier,  60  Mo.  681;  Hazard 
Powder  Co.  t«  Byrnes  [N.  Y.}  21  Bow.  Prac. 
189;  Wood  F.  Donaldson  [N.  Y.]  17  Wend. 
660;  McDermett  t.  Palmer,  8  N;.  Y.  388;  Key- 
stone Mining  Co.  r.  Gallagheiv  6  Colo.  23; 
Blliott,  Railroads,  p.  1697,  I  1068;  Giant 
Powder  Oo.  v.  Oregon  Pac.  By.  Co.,  42  Fed. 
474,  8  L.  B.  A«  790). 

'  I^d«  liaws  1897,  p.  616,  c.  418  (Gen. 
Laws,  c  49),  providing  that  "a  contractor, 
isubcootractor,  laberer,  or  materialman  who 
performs  labor  of  furnishes  material  for 
improvwnent  of  real  property  with  the  con- 
sent or  at  the  reiiuaBt  of  the  owner  thereof 
«  t  .  ^  sbaU  have  a  Uen.  ^  ^  « "  A 
.lien  is  authorised  for  dynamite  ftmished  to 
and  nsed  by  a  auboontractor  for  blasting  leck 
for  the  excavation  a&d  building' of  a  roadbed 
of  a  railway,  aa  tiiat  is-  included  in  tbe  term 
''materials."  Explosives  used  tor  such  pur- 
pose enter  into  and  form  a  part  of  the  perma* 
nent  stfdcture,  as  well  as  the  earth,  rails, 
ties,  coirerls,  anft  hsidgis.  .  Sdiaghtiooke 
Powder  Co.  v.  Greenwich  A  J.  By.  Co.,  76  N. 
B.  153,  164,  166,  183  N.  Y.  306,  2  L.  B.  A.  (N. 
S.)  288,  111  Am.  St  Bep.  761,  6  Ann.  Cas.  443. 

Blasting  powder,  dynamite,  fuse,  and 
caps,  necessarily  used  by  contractors  In  build- 
ing a  sewer,  are  "materials,"'  within  the 
meaning  of  a  guaranty  that  the  contractors 
would  pay  fbr  material  used  in  the  work. 
Kansas  City,  to  Use  of  Kansas  City  Hydrau- 
lic Press  Brick  Co.  r.  Youmans,  112  8.  W. 
228,  282,  218  Mo.  16L 

The  word  "materials,"  in  Pub.  St  1882, 
c  16,  I  64,  requiring  the  contractor  for  a 
public  work,  on  which.  Uens  might  attach  for 
materials  if  it  was  for  4L  private  owner,  to 
give  bond  for  payment  for  such  materials, 
and  chapter  191,  |  1,  giving  a  lien  for  mate- 
rials used  in  the  erection  of  a  structure,  etc, 
Includes  gunpowder  used  by  a  contractor  for 
an  aqueduct  for  a  water  supply  in  blasting 
for  the  trench,  where  the  greater  part  of  the 
material  excavated  was  used  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  aqueduct,  but  does  not  include  coal 
burned  in  engines  used  on  the  work.  George 
H.  Sampson  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  88  N.  B. 
911,  912.  202  Masa.  326. 

Bxplosives  used  in  grading  a  tunnel  for 
a  railroad  are  materials  for  which  the  fur- 
nisher is  entitled  to  a  lien,  under  the  act 
conferring  a  lien  for  work  and  materials  fur- 
nished in  the  construction  and  repair  of  rail- 
roads (Acts  1888,  p.  297,  C.  220,  i  3,  as  amend- 
ed by  Acts  1891,  p.  216,  ci  98,  i  1),  giving  such 
lien  to  materialmen  "for  the  delivery  of  ma- 


MATSRIALS 


828 


MATERIALS 


teriar  to  a  mibcontractor  "who  peif orms  any 
part  of  the  work  in  grading  any  railroad  com- 
pany's roadway,  or  who  constmctB  or  aids  in 
the  construction  or  repairs  of  its  CQlrerts  or 
bridges,  «  •  •  or  who  aids  in  the  laying 
of  its  triK^**  8.  B.  Lnttrell  ft  Co.  t.  Knoz- 
TUle,  L.  ft  J.  B.  Ck>..  105  &  W.  066,  070,  119 
Tenn.  402. 

Feed 

Neither  an  article  of  necessity  famished 
for  the  use  of  the  family,  nor  feed  for  horses 
set  apart  as  a  part  of  the  homestead,  is  ''ma- 
terial famished  for  the  benefit  of  the  home- 
stead" within  the  constitational  provision 
that  homestead  property  may  be  sold  for 
material  famished  therefor.  McLamb  ft  Co. 
▼.  Lambertson,  02  8.  B.  107,  100,  4  Ga.  App. 
553. 

Under  Ber.  8t  1900^  |  S208,  providing 
that  a  person  fumishing  materials  for  the 
construction  of  a  railroad  shall  have  a  Hen 
for  the  payment  of  the  same  on  such  rail- 
road, the  term  "materials,"  as  therein  used* 
includes  snch  articles  only  as  are  famished 
for  the  construction  of  the  road,  and  a  per- 
son who  famishes  feed  to  a  contractor  for 
the  keep  of  teams  employed  in  working  on 
such  railroad  is  not,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  section,  famishing  materials.  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.  V.  Mehalfey,  80  N.  S.  1T7,  170,  75 
Ohio  St  482,  lie  Am.  8t  B^^  746^  0  Ann. 
Cas.  305. 

OrmTol 

The  charter  of  Low^l  created  a  depart- 
ment of  supplies,  with  a  chief  elected  annual- 
ly, and  section  9  requires  all  materials  and 
supplies  for  the  city  to  be  purchased  by  the 
head  of  such  department,  subject  to  the  may- 
or's approval,  and  provides  that,  so  far  as 
practicable,  such  purchases  shall  be  made 
after  public  advertisement  and  under  con- 
tract approved  by  the  mayor.  Section  6  pro- 
vides that  heads  of  departments  shall  have 
general  charge  of  matters  relating  thereto, 
and  shall  execute  all  contracts,  except  for  pur- 
chase of  material  and  supplies;  and  section  7 
forbids  the  dty  council,  or  any  committee  or 
member,  from  making  contracts,  purchasing 
material,  etc.,  or  expending  public  money, 
except  to  defray  inddental  expenses  of  the 
council.  Held,  that  the  provision  relating 
to  purchase  of  supplies  and  material  in  sec- 
tion 3  could  not  be  constraed  so  as  to  limit 
the  word  •'purchase"  to  a  purchase  for  mon- 
ey, the  word  ''supplies"  to  artides  of  food, 
or  the  word  "material"  to  that  which  the  dty 
has  on  hand  for  manufacture  of  other  things, 
BO  that  pnrdiase  of  gravel,  to  be  removed  by 
the  dty  and  used  on  the  streets  and  paid  for 
by  other  filling  deposited  on  the  lot  from 
which  it  was  taken,  was  a  purchase  of  mate- 
rial, which,  under  section  6,  the  superintend- 
ent of  streets  had  no  authority  to  make. 
Bartlett  v.  City  of  Lowell,  87  N.  B.  105,  106, 
201  Mass.  151. 


Bay  aad  sraim 
Bev.  St  1906,  I  8211,  ^irtille  it,  in  terms, 
extends  the  provisions  of  the  above  section 
8208,  to  such  persons  as  famish  hay,  grain, 
etc;,  on  the  order  of  a  contractor  or  sabcon- 
tractor,  for  their  use  or  for  use  of  persons  em- 
ployed by  them,  or  either  of  them,  wlille  fa^ 
nishing  material  and  labor  for  or  in  the 
oonstmction  of  such  railroad,  does  not  extend 
or  enlarge  the  meaning  of  the  word  "materi- 
als"; nor  does  it  impose  upon  the  railroad 
company*  a  personal  liability  for  the  artides 
thus  furnished,  if  no  lien  therefor  be  taken 
and  perfectsd.  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Mehaf- 
fey,  80  N.  B.  177,  180,  76  Ohio  8t  432,  116 
Am.  8t  Bep.  746, 9  Ann.  Cas.  805. 

The  lighting  of  a  candle  wrapped  with 
paper  and  com  husks,  and  placing  it  in  some 
hay  in  a  bam  with  Intent  to  set  fire  to  the 
hay  and  bum  the  bam,  but  which  never  set 
fire  to  the  bam  itself  or  anything  in  the  barn, 
was  a  setting  fire  to  "material"  within  Bev. 
6t  1860,  f  4227,  declaring  that  if  any  per- 
son set  fire  to  any  building,  etc.,  or  to  any 
material  with  intention  to  bum  any  sach 
building,  he  shall  be  punished.  Hence  a 
count  so  alleging  charged  a  crime.  State  v. 
Johnson,  19  Iowa,  281,  282. 

Hire  of  tmmma 
The  hire  of  teams  ftonislied  a  sabcoo- 
txactor  for  use  in  repairing  a  railroad  is  not 
within  Kirby's  Dig.  i  6661,  giving  a  person 
who  famishes  any  "material,  madiinery,  flz- 
tures,  or  other  things"  towards  the  con8t^l^ 
tion  or  equipment  of  a  railroad  a  lien.  St 
Louis,  I.  M.  ft  &  By.  Co.  T.  Love,  86  S.  W. 
395,  397,  74  Ark.  528. 

Mutvf  aetmred  soods 

Ky.  8t  i  2487,  provides  that,  when  tbe 
property  of  the  operator  of  a  manufadurlng 
establishment  shall  be  assigned  for  the  benefit 
of  creditors,  persons  who  shall  furnish  mate- 
rial and  supplies  to  carry  on  the  business 
shall  have  a  lien  on  the  assets  therefor.  The 
bankrapt  was  a  leather  manufecturer,  and 
also  conducted  a  Jobbing  business  in  the  same 
line  as  another  department,  in  which  it 
bought  and  sold  leather  goods.  Held,  that 
manufactured  goods  so  purchased  for  resale 
were  not  "materials  and  supplies"  for  ca^ 
rying  on  the  bankrapt's  manufactuiing  busi- 
ness, and  hence  the  creditors  furnishing  tbe 
same  were  not  entitled  to  a  lien  therefor.  In 
re  Starks-UUman  Saddlery  Co.,  171  Fed.  83i 
835,  96  a  a  A.  506. 

Btatioaevr  aad  priatlac 

A  claim  for  stationery  and  printing  is 
not  a  daim  for  "materials,"  within  V.  S.  3803 
(P.  8.  4888),  relating  to  preferred  creditors. 
Bell  V.  8t  Johnsbury  ft  li  a  B.  Co.,  56  Aa 
105,  76  Vt  42. 

Steam  shovel 

Lien  Law  (Consol.  Laws  1909,  e.  83)  1 6, 

giving  a  lien  for  labor  or  "materials"  fur- 
nished a  municipal  contractor,  does  not  give  4 


MATHEBiAtlCAL  DSMONBTRATIOM     320 


MATTK&'IK  DWPXrtm 


lien  for  the  charge  for  a  steam  shovel.  Troy 
Public  Works  Co.  v.  Olty  of  Tonkers,  1M  N. 
Y.  Supp.  020,  921, 146  App.  DiT.  027. 

MATHEMATICAL  DEMONSTRATION 

A  "mathematical  demonstration"  la  whol- 
ly different  from  a  "moral  certainty/'  Bvl- 
denoe  of  demonstration  relates  to  necessary 
truths,  truths  as  to  which  the  supposition  of 
the  contrary  Involves  not  merely  what  is  not 
and  cannot  be  true,  but  what  is  also  absurd, 
whereas  moral  evidence  is  the  basis  of  con- 
tiiigent  truth.  It  follows  obviously  that  the 
convictions  which  these  distinct  and  dissim- 
ilar classes  of  evidence  are  capable  of  produc- 
ing are  necessarily  of  very  different  natures. 
In  the  one  absolute  certitude  is  the  result,  to 
which  moral  certainty,  the  highest  degree  of 
assurance  of  which  truths  of  the  latter  class 
admit,  is  necessarily  inferior.  Wills,  Cir. 
Et.  5.  Moral  certainty  is  that  full  and  com- 
plete assurance  which  admits  of  no  degrees, 
and  induces  a  sound  mind  to  act  without 
doubt  upon  the  conclusions  to  which  it  natu- 
rally and  reasonably  leads.  2  Stewart's  Ele- 
ments, c.  ii,  I  4.  It  is  apparent,  then,  that 
the  precision  attainable  in  the  one  case  Is  of 
a  nature  of  which  the  other  does  not  admit 
Bowman  v.  LitUe,  01  AtL  1084, 1080^  101  Md. 

27a. 
MATRIMONY 

See  Bonds  of  Matrimony. 
See,  also,  Marriage. 

"Matrimony^  contemplates  a  mutual  per^ 
formance  of  tihe  correlate  duties  which  the 
law  saperinduces  upon  the  marriage,  and, 
while  one  does  his  part,  the  other  Is  not  au- 
thorized to  withdraw  and  live  in  separation. 
Uassey  v.  Massey,  81  N.  B.  782,  788,  40  Ind, 
App.  407  (citing  Bishop,  Marriage  A  Pivorce). 

MATRON 

As  offioer,  see  Officer. 

MAUER 

See  Collateral  Matter;  County  Matters; 
Immaterial  Matter;  Mail  Matter;  Ma- 
terial Matter;  Printed  Matter. 

All  probate  matters,  see  All. 

Any  other  matter,  see  Any  Other. 

Other  nsatter,  see  Other. 

Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  46,  forbidding  a  Judge 
to  dt  or  take  part  in  the  decision  of  a  "cause 
or  matter"  in  which  he  has  been  an  attorney 
or  counsel,  refers  only  to  actions  or  special 
proceedings  in  which  a  Judge  might  take 
part;  the  word  ''cause"  meaning  a  cause  of 
actloQ,  and  the  word  "matter**  referring  to 
Home  jndlcial  proceeding  which,  under  the 
("^t  is  in<duded  in  special  proceedings  for 
tlie  enforcement  of  dvil  rights.  Keeffe  v. 
TWrd  Nat  Bank  of  Syracuse,  00  N.  B.  008, 

504,  m  N.  Y.  ao& 


MATT&BS  ASMOXG  SUBSBHUSmr  TO 


within  the  rule  that  Mills*  Ann.  St  I 
2484,  avftherlidUig  a  claimant  of  an  irrigation 
priority  at  any  tioie  within  four  years  from 
a  final 'decvee  in  a  statntory  adjudication 
proceeding  to  bring  a  suit  hitherto  allowed 
by  tile  proper  court  to  determine  the  pcioElty, 
antherisee  such  an  action  by  parties  to  that 
proceeding  only  when  their  right  of  action  ac^ 
crues  out  of  "matters  arising  ssbseiiuent  to 
the  decree,"  the  quoted  phrase  means  claims 
of  priority  for  an  appropriation  made  subse- 
quent to  the  lowest  appropriation  Included 
in  the  decree.  Broad  Run  Inv.  Co.  v.  Deuel 
O.  Snyder  Imp.  Co.,  106  Pac  700,  7S8,  47 
Colo.  073. 

ICATTER  nr  ABATEMEXT 

The  defense  that  plaintiff,  a  foreign  cor- 
poration, has  not  complied  with  Gen.  Laws 
1890,  c.  258,  I  37,  by  appointing,  by  written 
power  of  attorney,  a  competent  person  re- 
siding in  the  state  as  its  attorney  on  whom 
to  serve  process,  is  strictly  ''matter  in  abate- 
ment,*' and,  having  been  pleaded  in  bar,  can- 
not be  considered.  Russia  Cement  Co.  v 
Whitmarsh  ^  Brown  (R.  I.)  87  Atl.  400  (citing 
Weaver  Coal  k  Coke  Co.  v.  Rhode  Island  Co- 
operative Coal  Co.,  01  AtL  420,  27  R.  I. 
104). 

BSATTEB  nr  oomntovmuBT 

The  words  "matter  in  controversy,'*  as 
used  in  Hurd's  Rev.  St  1905,  c  110,  (  88,  au- 
thorizing the  appellate  court  to  recite  in  its 
final  decree  the  facts  as  found  by  it,  where 
the  final  determination  of  a  cause  "shall  be 
made  by  the  appellate  court  as  the  result 
wholly  or  in  part  of  the  fludlng  of  the  facts 
concerning  the  'matter  in  controversy,*  differ- 
ent from  the  finding  of  the  court  from  which 
such  cause  was  brought  by  appeal,  or  writ  of 
error,"  means  the  matters  of  fact  in  con- 
troversy. Oilmore  v.  City  of  Chicago,  TO  N. 
B.  590,  008,  224  IlL  480. 

KATTEB  nr  DUFVTB 

"By  'matter  In  dispute*  is  meant  the  sub- 
ject of  llttgatlon--the  matter  f6r  which  the 
suit  Is  brought— and  upon  which  issue  is  Join- 
ed, and  in  relatfom  to  which  Jurors  are  called 
and  witnesses  examined."  Or,  'the  ^matter  In 
dispute,*  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute, 
is  not  the  principle  involved,  but  the  pecnn- 
lary  consequence  to  the  individual  party, 
dependent  on  the  litigation.**  Shewalter  v. 
Lexington,  143  Fed.  101,  108  (quoting  Lee 
V.  Watson,  1  WalL  [08  U.  S.]  339,  17  U  Bd. 
507;  Whelessv.  Bt  Louis,  21  Sup.  Ct  402, 408, 
180  U.  S.  870,  882,  40  L.  Ed.  588);  McDanlel 
V.  Traylor,  123  Fed.  888,  339  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Lee  v.  Watson,  1  WalL 
[08  U.  8.1  337,  17  L.  Bd.  067);  Oallagher  v. 
Asphalt  Co.  of  America,  56  Atl.  259,  209,  85 
N.  J.  fiq.  268  (quoting  Lee  v.  Watson,  1  WaU. 
[08  U.  S.]  837,  17  L.  Ed.  067);   Baltimore  ft 


IMTTSR  .I«  J^SBUTMi 


380 


MATTBB  IK  iaW]B 


O.  R.  Oo.  T.  Bjan,  .68  N.  B.  928»  934,  81  lud. 
App.  687  (qnotiog  Lee  ▼.  Watson,  1  WalL  887, 
17  L.  Bd.  657). 

In  n  sQlt  to  enjoin  railroad  companies 
from  estabUsMng  a  nmr  echedule  of  rates, 
the  matter  in  dispute  is  the  ri^t  of  the  de- 
f endants  to  enforce  soch  proposed  rates,  and, 
where  the  Talne  of  sndi  right  exceeds  ^000, 
a  federal  court  has  Jurisdiction.  Northern 
Pac  By.  Co.  ▼•  Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.' 
Ass'n,  185  Fed.  1, 11,  91  a  O.  A.  89. 

The  right  to  remove  an  action,  wherein 
a  money  Judgment  is  demanded,  to  the  fed- 
eral court  is  determined  by  the  sum  de- 
manded as  appears  by  the  record  at  the 
time  the  petition  for  remoral  is  filed;  and, 
where  an  amendment  is  made,  the  sum  last 
demanded  is  "the  matter  in  dispute."  Mc- 
Oulloch  y.  Southern  By.  Co.,  62  8.  B.  1096, 
1097,  149  N.  C.  305. 

"By  'matter  in  dispute*,  is  meant  the 
subject  of  litigation,  the  matter  upon  which 
the  action  is  brought  and  issue  is  Joined,  and 
in  relation  to  which,  if  the  issue  be  one  of 
fact,  testimony  is  taken.  It  is  conceded  that 
the  pecuniary  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute 
may  be  determined,  not  only  by  the  mon-, 
ey  Judgm^it  prayed,  where  such  is  the  case, 
but  in  some  cases  by  the  increased  or  dimin- 
ished value  of  the  property  directly  affected 
by  the  relief  prayed,  or  by  the  pecuniary  re- 
sult to  one  of  the  parties  Imme^^tfij  from 
the  Judgment  Thus  a  suit  to  quiet  the  ti- 
tle to  parcels  of  real  property,  or  to  remove 
a  cloud  therefrom,  by  which  their  use  and 
enjoyment  by  the  owner  are  Impaired,  is 
brought  within  the  cognizance  of  the  court, 
under  the  statute,  only  by  value  of  the  prop- 
erty affected."  Way  v.  Clay,  140  Fed.  352, 
853  (quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  of 
Justice  Field  in  Smith  v.  Adams,  9  Sup.  Ct 
566,  130  U.  8.  167,  32  L.  Ed.  898). 

''By  'matter  in  dispute'  is  meant  the 
subject  of  litigation,  and  the  matter  upon 
which  the  action  is  brought  and  issue  is 
Joined  and  in  relation  to  which,  if  the  issue 
be  one  of  fact,  testimony  is  taken.  It  is 
conceded  that  the  pecuniary  value  of  the 
matter  in  dispute  may  be  determined,  not 
only  by  the  money  Judgment  prayed,  where 
such  is  the  case,  but  in  some  cases  by  the 
increased  or  diminished  value  of  the  proper- 
ty directly  affected  by  the  relief  prayed,  or 
by  the  pecuniary  lesult  to  one  of  the  par- 
ties immediately  from  the  Judgment"  In  an 
action  to  recover  a  piece  of  land  on  which  a 
railroad  had  located  its  depot  the  value  of 
the  land  to  the  railroad  company,  according 
to  its  present  situation  and  use,  is  the  val]qe 
to  be  considered  in  detennining  whether  the 
amount  involved  in  the  litigation  is  su^- 
cient  to  oonfer  Jurisdiction  on  the  federal 
courts.  King  v.  Southern  B.  Co.,  119  Fed. 
1016,  1017  (quoting  definition  in  Smith  v, 
Adams,  9  Sup.  Ct  666,  130  U.  8.  167,  82  L. 
Bd.895). 


The  lArase  "matter  ip  dispute,"  as  used 
in  the  Code  of  the  District  of  ColombU  (Act 
March  3,  1901,  e  «54,  |  238  (81  Stat  1227), 
providing  that  any  final  Judgment  of  the 
Court. of  A|ipealB  may  be  re-examined  aod 
aflirmed,  reversed,  or  modified  by  the  Sa- 
preme  CX>urt  of  the  United  States,  on  writ  of 
error  or  appeal,  in  all  cases  in  wliich  tbe 
paatter  in  dispute,  exclusive  of  costs,  shaU 
exceed  the  sum  of  $5,000,  means  money,  or 
some  right  the  value  of  which  can  be  esti- 
mated and  ascertained  in  money,  and  whldi 
appears  by  the  record  to  be  of  the  requisite 
pecuniary  value;  and,  assuming  tiiat  tiie 
term  ''matter  in  dispute^  may  embrace  a 
right  to  have  a  daim  against  a  foreign  gov- 
ernment presented  through  the  political  de- 
partment of  the  United  States,  and  that  tiie 
value  of  BuCfa  a  right  may  be  gauged  by  tbe 
possible  pecuniary  injury  which  may  be  sus- 
tained if  no  such  action  is  taken,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  a  claim  for  damages  from  the  C^- 
man  Empire  in  redress  of  an  alleged  wrong- 
ful imprisonment  in  that  country  is  one  hav- 
ing a  merely  conjectural  value.  Hence  the 
value  of  the  matter  in  dispute  in  a  proceed- 
ing to  compel  by  mandamus  the  Secretaiy 
of  State  to  seek  to  obtain  $500,000  damages 
from  the  Qerman  Empire  jln  redress  of  peti- 
tioner's alleged  wrongful  Imprisonmtot  while 
on  a  visit  to  that  country  dbes  not  exceed 
the  sum  of  $5,000.  United  States  ex  rel 
fiolzendorf  v.  Hay,  24  Sup.  Ct  681,  682, 194 
U.  S.  378,  48  L.  Ed.  1025. 

MATTEB  ZH  ISSUE 

The  ^'matter  in  issue**  in  a  former  ac- 
tion is  that  on  which  plaintUts*  cause  of  ac- 
tion is  based,  and  which  defendant  denies  by 
his  pleadings.  Kerr  v.  Blair,  118  S.  W.  191* 
783,  55  Tex.  Ov.  App.  349. 

The  issues  in  a  cause  are  the  points  1b 
dispute  between  the  parties  on  which  they 
put  their  cause  to  trial,  and  the  matter  in  is- 
sue is  that  matter  on  which  plaintiff  proceeds 
by  his  action,  and  which  defendant  contro- 
verts by  his  pleading.  Bowen  v.  W.  0.  Ea- 
ton ft  Co.,  80  N.  E.  061,  964,  46  Ind.  App.  65. 

Tile  first  essential  of  the  rule  of  res  in- 
dieata  is  tiie  identity  of  the  '^matter  in  is- 
sue," which  Is  defined  to  be  that  matter  on 
which  plaintiff  proceeds  by  his  action,  and 
which  dtfendant  controverts  by  his  plead- 
ings. Leroy  v.  Collins,  180  N.  W.  685,  636, 
166  Mich.  380. 

The  matters  which  plaintiff  must  allege 
in  his  declaration  and  the  defendant  deny 
in  his  plea  are  necessary  ^'matters  in  Issue." 
In  an  action  on  a  liquor  dealer's  bond,  wheth- 
er the  dealer's  failure  to  comply  with  the 
provisiona  of  the  statute  in  applying  for  a 
license  was  a  "matter  in  issue**  is  to  be  de- 
termined by  deciding  whether  the  licensee's 
faUiire.  .to.  comply  with  the  provisions  is  a 
matter  the  state  must  allege  and  the  licensee 


MATTBBS  nr  STATUTE 


S81 


M ATTXB  OF  FOBM 


State  T.  CoxTon.  62  AtL  1044^  lOBOit 
73  N.  H.  494i  6  Ann.  Ga&  489. 

MATTEBS  HI  B^AtUTB 

As  nsed.ln  Const  art  4^  |  id»  proY^ding 
that  eveiy  act  shall  '*embraoe  but  one  aub- 
ject  and  matters  properly  connected  there^ 
with,  wblch  subject  shall  be  expressed  In 
the  UUe,"  the  word  "subject"  indicates  the 
thing  about  which  the  legislation  Is  had,  and 
the  word  "matters"  the  incident  or  second- 
ary things  necessary  to  provide  .for  its  com- 
plete enforcement  iBoard  of  Com'rs  of  Ma- 
rion County  T.  Scanlan,  98.N.  fl.  801,  802, 
178  Ind,  142. 

As  Qse^  la  a  constlkutioiial  rwrnisemeat 
that  every  act  ^lall  embrace  but  <me  subject 
and  matters  properly  oonnected  ther«dth, 
which  subject  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title, 
the  word  "subject"  refers  to  the  thing  about 
which  the  legislatioa  is  had*  and. the  word 
"matters"  includes  sabordipate  and  indden* 
tal  things  relating  to  the  same  general  sub- 
ject The  title  of  an  act  was  ^'An^  act  to 
ameDd  sections  1,  4,  and  (S,  of  an  act  entitled 
*An  act  ecmceming  street  railroad  companies, 
granting  additional  rights  and  powers  there* 
in  specified  and  matters  relating  thereto,  and 
declaiing  an  emergency.'  ^  *  ^"  It  em- 
braces  the  general  subject  of  street  railroad 
companies  and  gave  power  to  acquire  ground 
for  the  construction  of  lines  for  the  trans- 
mission of  electricity  for  light,  beat  and 
power,  and  was  not  vlolatiye  of  the  consti- 
tutional proyision.  MnU  y.  Indianapolis  A  O. 
Traction  Co.,  81  N.  K  667,  659,  169  Ind.  214 
{citing  State  y.  Gerhardt  44  N.  B.  469,  145 
Ind.  439,  33  L.  R.  A.  313;  Maule  Coal  Co.  y. 
Partenhelmer,  85  K.  E.  751,  57  N.  B.  TIG,  155 
Ind.  101 ;  Parks  y.  State,  64  N.  B.  863^  159 
Ind.  211,  59  L.  R.  A.  190). 

XATTiat  or  ADMiinsTRATioar 

The  power  to  compel  an  administrator  to 
fulfill  a  contract  of  conveyance  of  real  estate 
of  his  Intestate  ih  a  '^matter  of  administra- 
tion/' wltliln  the  Constitution,  defining  the 
JQrisdlctlon  of  the  probate  court.  Servls 
y.  Beatty,  82  Miss.  52,  87. 

New  York  Charter  (Laws  1897,  p.  1,  c 
378),  creating  a  number  of  departments, 
among  which  was  the  department  of  high- 
ways, by  section  458  (page  160)  proyides  that 
the  commissioner  at  the  head  of  each  depart- 
ment "may  organize  such  bureaus  as  he  shall 
from  time  to  time  deem  necessary."  Great- 
er New  York  Charter  (Laws  1901,  p.  166;  c. 
466)  i  388,  yested  in  tlie  dty  of  New  York  aU 
the  powers  and  duties  c<mferred  oa  the  com* 
mlssioner  of  highways  of  the  city  of  l4ew 
York  by  the  charter  of  1897,  and  deyolyed 
npon  the  pteeidsnt  at  the  borough  aa  "matter 
of  adminiatratloD'*  certain  powers  and  duties 
to  be  executed  pursuant  to  the  provlaionB  of 
the  act  Laws  1901,  p.  686,  c  46B,  |  1043, 
proyides  that  no  head  of  a  bureau,  holding 
a  position  In  the  <dasslfled  municipal  ciyll 


serytoa  ,s«bject  to  oompetitiye  ^^aminatlonj 
shnll  be  remayed,  unless  he  has  been  allowed 
an  importunity  o{  making  an  explanation. 
Bieldt  that  the  ebarter  of  li901  conferred  on 
the  piMidMikt  cft  the  fogrongh-  of  Manhattan 
the  same  powers  possessed  by  the  commis- 
sioner of  highways  under  the  charter  of  1897; 
that  the  organization  of  bureaus  U  "matter 
of  adfidnistFation''  within  the  meanHIng  of  the 
chartar  •f  ;1901,  ^and  under  such  charter  the 
piwldent.  ^f  the  boreugh  of  Manhattan  had 
power  to  ocgante  a  bureau  of  highways,  and 
t»  appolot  a  head  tbetefor;  and  that  one 
aiH;x>lnted  as  bead  of  such  bureau  was  not 
subject  to  remoyml,  exeept  under  the  restrict 
tions  of  section  KM8.  People  ex  m.  Collins 
y.  Ahearn,  86  N.  B.  474,  475,  198  N.  Y.  441. 

j|CATT£B  OF  OOWtBACT 

The  term  "matters  of  contract,"  as  used 
in  Const  art  7,  I  40,  which  declares  that 
Justices  of  the  peace  shall  haye  Jurisdiction 
exclusiye  of  the  circuit  court,  In  all  matters 
of  contract  where  the  amount  In  eontroyersy 
does  not  exceed  $100,  embraces  an  action  for 
unliquidated  damages  for  a  breach  of  con- 
tract Smith  y.  rr^ylor,  134  8.  W.  684,  97 
Ark.  424. 

MATTSB  OF  OOUXTSBOIiAIM 

Under  a  pIsa  of  payment  In  an  action 
for  piioe-  of  piintinff  defendant  oannot  show 
what,  under  a  lease,  was  due  him  fh>m  plain- 
ttff  fbr.exctts  power  furnished;  this,  under 
Code  Cty.  Proc.  ||  600,  601,  being  ''matter  of 
e^unterclaim,"  to  be  pleaded  as  audi.  T.  J. 
Hayes  Printing  Co.  y.  Springer,.  123  N.  Y. 
Supp.  240,  242. 

BSATTEB  OF  FAOT 

.  The  word  '*fact,''  as  used  In  the  propo- 
sition that  representations  must  consist  of 
"mattezB  of  fact,"  distinguishes  '"fact"  from 
mere  matters  of  opinion.  Brown  y.  South 
JopUn  Lead  A  Zinc  Mhi.  Co.,  92  Sw  W.  699, 
704,  194  Mo.  681. 

MATTEB  OF  FOBV 

The  dellyery  of  an  indictment  to  the 
court  by  the  foreman  of  the  grand  Jury  in 
the  absence  of  the  other  Jurors,  tf  a  defect 
at  all,  is  "in  matter  of  form  on^,**  within 
the  meaning  of  V.  S.  Rey.  Stat  f  1025,  pro- 
ylding  that  no  Indictment  presoited  by  a 
grand  Jury  shall  be  deemed  InautDdent  nor 
the  trial,  Judgment,  or  other  proceeding  there- 
on be  affected  by  any  su^i  defect  which  ahall 
not  tend  to  the  prejudice,  of  the  defendant, 
it  not  being  disputed  but  that  the  indictmrat 
was  found  and  returned  into  court  as  a  true 
bill.  Breese  y.  United  States,  38  S.  Ct  1* 
8,  226  U.  S.  1,  57  L.  Ed.  97. 

The  omission  of  the  signs  for  dollars  and 
eents,  in  th»  reeltals  of  aUeged  false  entries 
in  reports,  and  misnomer  of  the  reports  in 
an  iBdlotment  oharging  dlfeetof»e<  a  nation- 
al banking  association  with  making  false  en- 
tries ifi  a  PH>ort  to  the  Comptroller  of  the 


MATTBB  OF  IMPRB88ION  OB  OPINION    382 


MATURITT 


Currency,  within  the  denunciation  of  Rev. 
St  §  5209,  are  matters  of  form  within'  the 
meaning  of  Bev.  St  1 1025,  for  whkdi  the  in- 
dictment la  not  to  ^be  deemed  inaufBdent'* 
United  States  ▼.  Potter,  66  BM.  88,  95. . 

BSATTEB  OF  IMPBE88IOV  OB  OPXX- 
lOK 

"Bvidenee  which  la  diaracteariaed  aa 
'matter  of  opinion'  is  predicated  upon  the  ex- 
istence or  nonexistence  of  a  fact,  while  'mat- 
ter of  impression'  or  'understanding'  is  only 
a  deduction  drawn  from  the  assumption  of 
that  fact,  so  that,  while  the  former  may  rise 
to  the  standard  of  evidence^  the  lattw  is 
universally  rejected  as  sutdL"  Cross  ▼.  Aby, 
46  South.  820,  822,  66  Fla.  311  (quoting  and 
adopting  the  definition  in  Chaires  ▼.  Brady, 
10  Fla.  808;  citing  1  Wigmore,  By.  H  658, 
726-728;  4  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  8444; 
Tait  ▼.  Hall,  12  Pac.  881,  71  GaL  149). 

BSATTEB  OF  IXDUOEMEVT 

See  Inducement 

MATTER  OF  UkW 

Befusal  of  a  judge  sitting  in  bankruptcy 
to  sanction  an  arrangement  between  the 
bankrupts  and  certain  of  their  creditors  and 
persons  who  had  reoeiyed  preferential  trans- 
fers of  the  bankrupts'  proper^,  in  the  legit- 
imate fexerdse  of  discretion,  did  not  present  a 
"matter  of  law"  reyiewaUe  on  a  petition  for 
review  authorised  by  Bankr.  Act  July  1, 
1898,  c.  541,  I  24b,  80  Stat  658.  Mtflford  y. 
Fourth  Street  Nat  Bank,  167  Fed.  897,  85 
O.  a  A  225. 

BSATTEB  OF  LEOAI.  AVOIDANCE 

The  term  "matters  of  legal  ayoidance,** 
as  used  in  the  statement  that  a  recognizknce 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  conditional  Judgment, 
subject  only  to  sucdi  matters  of  legal  ayoid- 
ance as.  may  be  shown  by  plea,  ot  to  su<di 
matters  of  relief  as  may  induce  the  court  to 
remit  or  mitigate  a  forfeiture,  refers  to  such 
matters  as  are  entirely  consistent  with  the 
truth  of  the  facts  stated  In  the  record  and 
furnish  a  legal  excuse  for  the  failure  of  the 
defendant  to  appear  according  to  the  con- 
dition of  his  recognizance.  The  sureties,  for 
example,  show,  in  answer  to  the  scire  facias, 
the  death  of  the  principal  before  the  time  for 
his  appearance  had  arrived,  or  that  he  had 
been  arrested  under  otiier  process  issued  at 
the  instance  of  the  state,  or  that  he  had  be- 
come insane.  All  pleas  of  this  kind  are  not 
only  consistent  with  the  truth  of  what  is 
af  erred  in  the  record,  but  they  are  predicated 
on  the  assumption  of  such  truth.  State  y. 
Morgan,  48  S.  B.  604,  606,  136  N.  0.  593. 


MATTER  OF  FB|>9A^ 

"The  proceeding  to  establish  or  prove 
the  claim  against  the  executors  is  esBenlially 
aA  independent  suit  inter  partes  and  not  a 
'matter  of  pure  probate  Jurisdiction.'" 
Farmers^  Bank  of  Cub*  CUty«  Wi&»  t^  Wright, 


168  Fed.  841, 860  {citing  and  adopting  Broder- 
ick's  Will,  21  Wall.  [88  U.  &]  608,  22  L.  Kd. 
599:  FareU  v.  O'Brien,  25  Sup.  Ct  727,  199 
U.  S.  89,  110,  60  I^  Bd.  101). 

Code  Civ.  Proc  i  1678,  authoriring  t 
court  of  probate  to  order  distribution  of  a  de- 
cedent's estate,  though  some  of  the  heirs, 
legatees,  or  devisees  had  conveyed  their 
shares,  applies  only  where  no  question  arises 
on  the  distribution  as  to  the  conveyanosB 
having  been  made;  and,  where  the  fact  of 
conveyance  ia  disputed  or  its  validity  is  In 
issue,  the  question  is  not  within  probate  Ju- 
risdiction; '*matter«  of  probate"  including 
the  determination  of  the  persons  succeeding 
to  the  estate  of  a  decedent,  either  aa  heir, 
devisee,  or  legatee,  the  amount  to  which  each 
is  entitled,  and  the  construction  of  the  will, 
but  not  including  a  determination  of  daima 
against  heirs  or  devisees  for  their  portion 
arising  subsequent  to  decedenf  a  death.  In 
re  Howe's  Bstate,  118  Pac.  616^  617,  161  CsL 
162. 

Code  Civ.  Proc.  1 1639,  providing  that  on 
the  death  of  an  executor  his  accounts  may  be 
presented  to  and  settled  by  the  court  In  whlcb 
the  estate  of  which  he  was  executor  ia  being 
administered,  and  that  upon  petition  of  his 
successor  such  court  may  compel  tb.0  person- 
al representatives  of  the  deceased  executor  to 
render  an  account  of  the  administrator  of 
their  testator,  and  to  settle  such  account  ss 
in  other  cases,  is  a  "matter  of  probate,"  Ju- 
risdiction of  which  may,  under  Ccmst  art 
6,  I  6,  be  conferred  upon  the  superior  conr^ 
sitting  in  probate.  King  v.  Chase,  116  Pac 
207,  209,  169  Cal.  420. 

MATTER  OF  F0BI.IO  OOVOBBV 

See  Public  Concern. 

MATTEB  OB  THlliO 

Within  the  rule  that  a  court  has  no 
power  to  acquire  Jurisdiction  of  a  party  by 
service  of  notice  outside  its  territorial  limits 
except  where  the  court  is  dealing  with  some 
''matter  or  thing"  within  its  territorial  Ju- 
risdiction, it  has  been  held  that  marriage  ia 
such  a  "matter  or  thing,"  so  that,  if  a  sponse 
is  a  bona  fide  resident  and  the  other  sponse 
is  absent,  the  court  may  require  Jurisdiction 
by  extraterritorial  service.  Watkinson  v. 
Watkinson,  58  Aa  384.  389,  67  N.  J.  Eq.  142. 

MATURED 

ICATtJBIHO 

See  Debt  Maturing  in  the  Tear. 

BSATTTRITT 

See  Prior  to  Maturity. 

Defendants,  In  payment  of  property 
bought  of  plaintiiff,  transferred  bonds  ma- 
tzirlng  November  27,  1913,  and  secured  by  a 
trust  deed  of  Iowa  property,  and  by  a  con- 
tract of  guaranty  agreed  '*if  said  bonds  were 
not  paid  ht  maturity/'  and  the  tsuat  deed  was 


MATURITY 


838 


MAT 


foreclosed,  to  be  present  at  the  sale  and  Ud 
a  specified  amount  for  the  property.  In  the 
bonds  was  a  reservation  of  the  rli^t  to  pay 
them  before  maturity,  and  in  the  trust  deed 
it  was  provided  that,  if  default  was  made  in 
the  payment  of  interest,  the  piiacipal,  as  wall 
as  the  interest,  should  become  due  at  the 
election  of  the  trustee.  On  the  back  of  ihs 
bonds  was  a  trustee's  certificate  that  the 
bonds  were  issued  in  conformity  with  the 
trust  deed.  The  word  ^'maturity,'*  as  used 
In  the  agreement,  was  the  maturity  as  fixed 
by  the  trust  deed,  and  not  the  one  specified 
in  the  bonds.  Bins  t.  Hyatt,  96  8.  W.  687, 
200  Mo.  299. 

A  note  payable  with  interest  from  ma- 
turity contained  a  blank  spaos  after  the 
word  "maturity/*  and  the  payee  after  ezecu- 
tion  filled  up  such  space  by  writing  therein 
the  word  "date,"  so  thst  the  note  called  for 
Interest  after  ''maturity  date.**  Held,  that 
the  alteration  was  not  a  material  change 
which  would  prevent  reeoTery  on  the  note. 
''Maturity"  and  ''maturity  date^'  mean  the 
same  thing.  Baldwin  ▼.  Haskdl  Nat  Bank 
(Tex.)  124  a  W.  44S. 

Where  a  note  bearing  a  given  date  was 
payable  f6ur  months  after,  it  readied  its 
"maturity"  four  months  after  date.  Beabury 
V.  Sibley,  66  N.  B.  608,  188  Mass.  lOCk 


MATUBITT  l>Am 

See  Maturity. 

MAUSOLEUM 

As  tmprovenwnt 
provement 


of  veal  estats^  ssa  Im- 


MAXIM 

A  "maxim,"  says  Goke^  'is  so  called  be- 
cause its  dignity  is  chlefest,  and  its  author- 
ity the  most  certain,  and  because  it  is  univer- 
laUy  approved  by  all.''  Ooke,  litt  11a. 
Again  he  says :  "A  maxim  is  a  proposition  to 
be  of  all  men  confessed  and  granted  with- 
out proof,  argument,  or  discourse."  Id.  67a. 
"Haxlms,"  says  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  "are 
the  condensed  good  sense  of  nations.*'  Chris- 
man  V.  linderman,  100  S.  W.  1090,  1092,  202 
Ho.  006, 10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  1206,  119  Am.  8t 
Rep.  822. 

"A  'maxim'  is  a  proposition  to  be  of  all 
men  confessed  and  granted  without  proof, 
argument,  or  discourse."  Felver  v.  Central 
Electric  By.  Co.,  115  S.  W.  980,  968,  216  Mo. 
Id5  (quoting  Lord  Coke). 

Justinian  said  that  the  "maximk  of  the 
law'*  are  ^ese :  "To  live  honestly,  to  hurt  no 
man,  and  to  give  every  one  Ms  due"  City 
Trust,  Safe-Deposft  A  Surety  Co.  of  Phila* 
delphla  V.  American  Brewing  Co.*  67  N.  E. 
«2.  174  N.  y.  486. 


MAXIMUM 

Tbe  word  ^'maximum"'  la  defined  as 
nwanlng  the  greatest,  superlative  of  great; 
the  greatest  quantity  or  value  attainable  in 
a  given  case.  Manaca  v.  Ionia  Circuit  Judge, 
110  N.  W.  76,  77,  146  Midi.  60T. 


The  term  ^*nmximum  rate,**  as  used  in 
a  statute  authorizing  the  fixing  of  a  **maxi- 
mum  rate^  to  be  charged  for  gas  and  elec^ 
tricity,  means  a  '^reasonable  rate  with  per- 
mission to  tilie  party  famishing  the  service 
to  do  business  at  an  kuidequats  profit  or  at 
a  loss,  if  he  desires."  Trustees  of  Village  of 
Saratoga  Springs  ▼.  Saratoga  Qa%  Bleetric 
Ught  ft  Powar  Co.,  107  N.  Y.  Supp.  841,  861, 
122  App.  tHv.  206  (dtsssnttng  opinion  of 
Judge  Kellogid- 

MAY 

Must  construed  as  may,  see  Must 
Shall  construed  as  may,  see  ShalL 

The  word  "may**  is  usually  only  permis- 
sive or  discretionary.  State  v.  Stepp,  59  8 
B.  1068,  1070,  68  W.  Va.  264. 

The  word  "may"  means  "^ust"  when- 
ever third  persons  or  the  public  have  an  In 
terest  in  having  the  act  done  or  have  a  claim 
de  Jure  that  the  power  shall  be  exercised. 
Smalley  t.  Paine,  116  B.  W.  88,  89,  102  Tex. 
804. 

"The  word  'may'  is  construed  to  meau 
'shall*'  whenever  the  right  of  the  public  or 
third  persons  depends  upon  the  exercise  of 
the  power  or  performance  of  the  duty  to 
which  it  refers."  Montgomery  v.  Henry,  3U 
South.  507,  509,  144  Ala.  629,  1  L.  R.  A  (N. 
S.)  656,  6  Ann.  Cas.  965  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  Wheeler  v.  Chicago,  24  111. 
106,  76  Am.  Dec.  786). 

"May"  does  not  mean  "Aall,"  and  is  not 
so  construed  in  private  contracts.  It  is  only 
In  the  case  of  statutes  by  which  public  rights 
are  involved  that  this  construction  is  some- 
times adopted  ex  debito  Justitis.  Northwest- 
em  Travellug  Men's  Ass^n  v.  Crawford,  126 
ni.  App.  468,  480. 

It  is  true  tliat  "may"  oftentimes  means 
"must,"  but  it  always  retains  its  primitive 
meaning  unless  common  fairness  and  the 
rights  of  the  parties  litigant  demand  that  it 
be  supplanted  by  "must,"  or  unless  it  is  used 
in  a  sentence  which  creates  an  exception  in 
favor  of  the  public  Chicago,  W.  A  V.  Coal 
Co.  V.  People,  114  lU.  App.  75,  112;  Id.,  73 
N.  E.  770,  214  IlL  421. 

In  a  contract  for  the  oonstmctlon  of 
part  of  a  sewer,  a  daugs  pnwided  that  "if 
an  emergency  demands  *  ^  *  he  (the  en- 
gineer in  charge]  may  make  alterations  in  any 
part  of  the  work."  Held,  that  this  clause  was 
for  the  benefit  of- the  oonnaonwealth  alone. 


MAT: 


884 


MAT 


and  that  the  word  "may"  was  to  be.oonstraed 
according  to  Its  usual  meaning,  and  not  to 
mean  "shcHl."^  Kationai  Contracting  GO.  y. 
Commonwealth,  06  N.  D.  689,;  640;  64JU  188 


Same— Deed 

A  bargain  and  sale  deed  to  a  half  Interest 
in  a  mine  in  consideration  of  |1  and  tb6  do* 
ing  of  necessary  assessment  work  to  hold  the 
claim  at  the  grantees'  expense  alao  provided 
that  the  grantees  might  wortc  and  develop 
the  mine  at  their  own  cost,  and  that  all  gold 
or  proceeds  taken  therefrom  for  20  years 
should  be  divided  equally  among  the  parties; 
that  is,  each  to  have  dne-third  thereof.  Held, 
that  the  provision  for  working  the  mine 
apart  from  the  doing  of  the  assessment  work 
was  a  mere  license  to  be. exercised  by  the 
grantees,  or  not,  at  their  election ;  the  word 
*'may"  not  being  construed  to  mean  "must" 
Shaw  V.  Caldwell,  U5  Pac.  941,  942,  16  CaL 
App.  1. 

Oh  the  satne  day  that  a  testator  executed 
his  will  he  made  a  deed  to  a  trust  company, 
executor  under  the  will,  conveying  all  of  |iis 
real  estate  on  certain  trusta  The  ninth 
clause  of  the  deed  provided  that  after  the 
testator's  death  the  trustee  "may"  uae  as 
much  of  the  income  from  the  property,  or  the 
proceeds  of  its  sale,  as  may  be  necessary  in 
defending  any  proceedings  hrought  to  invali- 
date the  trust.  The  will  was  made  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  deed,  with  a  scheme 
for  the  disposition  of  the  property  conveyed 
by  the  deed  if  it  should  be  set  aside.  Testa- 
tor had  a  substantial  amount  of  personal 
property  which  was  disposed  of  by  the  wiH. 
No  proceedings  were  brought  to  set  aside  the 
deed,  except  so  far  as  its  validity  was  involv- 
ed in  the  controversy  as  to  the  validity  of 
the  will.  Held,  that  a  contention  that  items 
in  the  executor's  account  for  payments  made 
by  the  executor  for  expenses  of  defending  the 
estate  from  claims  which  were  deemed  unjust, 
of  proving  the  will,  and  resisting  an  attack  on 
it,  should  not  be  allowed  out  of  the  personalty, 
because  the  word  "may"  in  the  ninth  clause 
of  the  deed  means  '*must,"  reQuiring  such  ex- 
penses to  be  paid  from  the  trust  estate,  Is  un- 
tenable, in  view  of  other  clauses  of  the  deed, 
in  which  the  grantor  drew  distinctions  be- 
tween "may"  ax^d  "shall."  Hampden  Trust 
Co.  V.  Leary,  72  N.  E.  88,  89,  186  Mass.  577. 


A  provision  in  the  constitution  and  laws 
of  a  mutual  benefit  association  that  a  certain 
amount  shall  be  paid  on  the  death  of  a  mem- 
ber of  a'cettain  grade,  and  one-half  of  the 
amount  '^ay"'  be  paid  to  a  member  of  that 
grade  who  shall  become  permanently  disabled 
from  attending  te  his  business  or  gaixiing  a 
livelihood,  and.  Is  destitute  of  means  of  sup- 
port when  he  shall  arrive  at  the  age  of  ez- 
pectanoy,  Is  mandatory  as  te  the  payment  of 
the  permanent  disability  benefit ; .  the  word 
•<maQ^"  to  be  ceadr  aa  "shalLV    flupieme  Coun- 


cil Catholic  Benevolent  Legion  v.  Grove,  96 
N.  E.  159,  162,  176  Ind.  356,  36  Lu  B.  A.  (N. 
S.)  913. 


An  Instruetloii,  in  on  action  to  reo>ver 
an  aeddent  benefit,  that  mn  accidental  cauae 
is  sileh  as  "may"  happen  by  dumee  is  er- 
roneous, as  suggesting  that  chance  Is  not  tl< 
ways  necessary.  Smouse  t.  Iowa  State  Tcav- 
^ng  Men's  Ass'n,  92  N.  W.  S8,  M,  118  Iowa, 
«6. 

The  word  "may,"  In  an  Instruction  in 
a  personal  Injury  case  that  the'  jury  may  al- 
low plaintiff  for  pain.  Inconvenience,  or  im- 
pairm^it  of  enjoyment  for  such  time  as  the 
same  may  continue  In  the  future  as  shown  by 
the  evidence  is  capable  of  being  construed  by 
the  jury  to.  mean  '*might,"  and  therefore  tn* 
thorlsed  them  to  allow  plaintiff  for  pain,  in- 
convenience*  and  impairment  of  the  enjoy- 
ment whldi  the  evidence  showed  might  coo- 
tinue  in  the  fotnre,  which  was  merely  possi- 
ble,, not.  fcMT  what  the  evld^ice  ^owed  was 
reasonably  certain  to  continue. ;  Such-  an  in- 
structl(«  Is  erroneous.  Haas  t.  8t  Lonls  & 
S.  By.  Co.,  90  S.  W.  1155,  1157,  lU  Mo.  App. 
706  (following  Ford  v.  dij  of  Des  Moines,  75 
N.  v.  630,  106  loWa,  94). 

The  word  '"may,"  in  an  Instruction  oo 
the  measure  of  damages  for  personal  Injuries 
that  the  jury  will  award  plaintiff  such  sum 
as  shall  compensate  him  for  the  mental  and 
bodily  pain  and  suffering*  endured  by  him  con- 
sequent on  the  injury  and  for  the  mental  and 
bodily  pain  which  "may"  be  suffered  by  him 
in  the  future  by  reason  of  such  injuries,  it 
any,  and  for  any  permanent  injuries  suffered 
by-  plaintiff,  It  he  has  eufleied  any  sueh  per- 
manent Injury,  means  "must^V.and  the  in- 
struction does  not  permit  the  jury  to  award 
compensation  for  future  pain  and  permanent 
injury,  unless  the  same  is  reasonably  certain 
to  follow  aa  a.  result  of  the  injury.  O'Keefe 
V.  United  Rys.  Co.  of  St  Louis,  101  S.  W. 
1144v  1147, 124  Mo.  APP.  613. 

Where,  in  a  personal  injury  caaev  the  evi- 
dence shows  tbat  plaintiff  will  be  wholly  dis- 
abled from  performing  the  work  in  the  basl- 
nees  In  which  he  was  engaged  at  the  time  ot 
the  aeddent,  an  Instruction  that  plaintUE,  if 
^titled  to  recotver,  is  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion for  loss  of  time  in  l^is  business  wbicb 
"he  may  hereafter  lose,  if.  any,  by  reason  or 
the  injuries,  is  proper,  for  the  word  "niay"  i 
means  "shall"  Caplin  v.  St  Louis  Transit 
Co.,  89  S.  W.  338,  339. 1 14  Mo.  App.  256.  j 

PossiUUty  indieated 

"  'May'  comprehends  the  fdea  of  probabil- 
ity, and  aliso  the  thought  of  what  is,  witb 
more  or  less  certainty,  to  be  expected."  It 
also  comprehends,  in  one  of  its  usable  sens- 
es, the  Idea  of  possibility*  &nd»  so  qs^  be- 
comes efiualvalent  to  the  ewreasion  "mlgbt 
possibly";  hence  an  instruction  anthoriziag 
a  rejcov^ry  for  suffering  "which  plaintiff  nugr 
hereafter  suffer  and  endure^"  •  if  any,  "as 


ilAt 


S85 


ITAT- 


shown  by  the  erldenee  on  account  of  hts  said 
iojuries,**  was  not  obJectlonaMe  ou  tim  ground 
tbat  the  word  ''may*'  based  tho  recovery  on 
p6sstt>le  Instead  of  probable  suffering.  Dean 
V.  Kansas  City,  St  L.  ft  G.  R.  Oo.,  07  8.  W. 
910,  918,  109  Mo.  886  (onotlng  Reynolds  ▼. 
St  Louis  TilEUiflIt  Co.,  88  8.  W.  I$D,  188  Mo. 
loc.  dt  421,  107  Am.  St  R^.  ISM)). 

In  an  action  for  injuries,  an  instruction 
authorizing  tte  Jury  to  award  damages  re- 
sulting from  sue)!  suffering  as  the  injuries 
"may"  cause  plaintiff  was  not  erroneous  by 
the  use  of  the  word  *'may*';  the  same  being 
definitiTe  of  the  proper  rule  that  such  dam- 
ages may  be  allowed  as  are  reasonably  cer* 
tain  to  follow  the  injury.  Halley  ▼.  8t  Jos- 
eph Ilc^t,  Heat  ft  Power  Co.,  91  8.  W.  168, 
115  Mo.  Am>.  662. 

In  an  action  for  injuries,  an  instruction 
allowing  damages  for  such  pain  and  anguish 
as  plaintiff  had  Already  suffered,  and  which 
"he  may  hereafter  suffer,*'  was  not  erroneous 
by  reason  of  the  use  of  the  word  '*may,"  on 
the  ground  that  it  gave  room  for  speculation 
and  conjecture.  Robertson  y.  Hammond  Pack- 
ing Go,  91  a  W.  161,  162,  115  Mo.  App.  520. 

An  instructton  tiiat  plaintiff,  tf  she  estab- 
lishes her  right  to  recover,  will  be  Entitled  to 
recorer  such  damages  "as  she  may  have  re- 
ceived," is  not  erroneous  in  the  use  of  the 
word  ''may" ;  it  being  used  by  the  judge  to 
express  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of 
snch  damages,  not  including  any  element  of 
probability.  Henry  v.  Omaha  Packing  Oo., 
115  N.  W.  777,  780,  81  Neb.  237. 

The  word  "may,**  used  as  an  auxiliary 
rerb,  has  a  wide  scope  of  meaning,  into  which 
the  idea  of  mere  possibility  enters;  but  it 
also  comprehends  the  idea  of  probability,  and 
also  the  thought  of  what  is  with  more  or  less 
certainty  to  be  expected,  and  whether  it  is 
to  carry  the  one  thought  or  the  other  often 
depends  on  the  context  In  an  action  for  in- 
juries, an  instruction  that  in  estimating  the 
damages  the  Jury  may  coivsider  plaintiff*s 
diminished  capacity  for  earning  money,  if 
any,  and  on  account  thereof  make  such  allow- 
ance as  may  be  fidr  and  just  for  any  loss 
they  may  believe  from  the  evidence  he  has 
sustained  in  the  past  by  reason  thereof,  and 
for  any  loss  they  may  believe  he  may  sustain 
in  his  future  earnings  by  reiason  of  su<A  di- 
mlDlshed  earning  capacity.  Is  not  erroneous, 
for  the  reason  that  "may"  means  ''possibly 
might,"  so  as  to  authorise  a  recovery  for  loss 
.  of  time,  and  also  for  dimiuished  earning  ca- 
pacity during  the  same  period,  and  for  loss 
of  what  he  *'may'*  sustaih  in  the  future. 
Reynolds  v.  8t  Louis  Transit  =Ck>.,  88  S.  W. 
50.  03^  189  Mo.  406,  107  Am.  St  Rep.  860. 

An  instruction  in  a  personal  injury  ac- 
tion that  the  jury,  in  assessing  the  damages, 
may  consider  the  character  of  the  injury,  if 
any,  sustained  by  plaintiff,  the  pain  and  Of- 
fering, If  any^  -endured,  and  *'which  will  .be 


ettdared***  if  itayv  as  the  result  of  tiia  injuries; 
if  any,  etc.,  properly  limits  a  recovery  for  the « 
suiEering  endured,  and  for  auch.  suffering 
as  the; evidence  discloses  he  will  endure  in 
the  future,  since  the  word  ''will,^  as  em- 
ployed in  the  instruction,  must  have  been 
understood  in  its  proper  sense  as  referring 
to  the  unconditional  existence  of  the  fact 
and  not  in  the  sense  of  "may,^  which  im- 
ports a  mere  possibility.  Scally  v.  W.  T. 
Garrett  ft  Oo^  lOi  Paa  825,  826»  882,  11  tiaL 
App.  188. 

MAT  (fm  OoBStttnttoms  as  PermlssiTe  or 
Xaadatory) 

In  .  constitutional  proviaious,.  "mayV 
should  \»  ^sead  "must"  wlien  the^inteption  so 
requires,  and  should  be^  interpreted  as  |nan< 
datory  and  not  directory.  Henry  v.  State,  30 
South.  858,  883k  87  Miss.  1. 

The  word  "may,"  as  used  in  Oonst  8.  D. 
art  5, 1 18,  providing  that  writs  of  error  and 
appeals  may  be  aUowed  under  such  regulii- 
tions  as  may  be  prescribed  by  law,  was  eyi- 
dently  used,  in  |ts  proper  sense,  aa  perml^- 
sive^  and  not  in  the  sense  of  must  or  shall. 
Mau  V.  Stoner,  83  Pac.  218,  220,  14  Wyo.  183 
(citing  McCffaln  v.  WiUiiims,  78  N.  W.  72, 
10  8.  D.  882,  48  L.  B,  A.  287,  289). 

Const  art  4,  f  25%,  prp^vidlng  ttiat  the 
Legislature  "may**  provide  tor  ihe  divisiop  of 
the  state  into  fish  and  game  districts  and 
"may"  enact  appropriate  lectsUtkm  fdr  the 
protection  of  fish  and  game  therein,  is  man* 
datory,  and  conunands  the  lisgislatare  to 
enact  necessary  legislation  toiiddag  the  care 
and  custody'  of  game  with  reference  to  local: 
conditiona.  wliich  require  special  legislation 
fior  particular  localities.  Bx  parte  Prlndle, 
^  Pac.  871,  873,  7  Cal.  Unrep.  Gas.  223. 

Const  I  188,  provides  that  each  county 
having  a  dty  of  20,000  and  a  population,  in- 
cluding the  city,  of  40,000  or  more  may  con- 
stitute a  judicial  district;  and  when  its  pop' 
ulation.  reaches  75,000  the  General  Assembly 
may  provide  that  it  shall  have  an  additional 
judge,  and  such  district  may  have  a  judge  for 
each  additional  '50,000  above  100,000.  Held, 
that  the  word  "may,"  as  used  in  such  section, 
was  not  to  be  construed  "must,"  so  as  to 
make  the  section  mandatory ;  the  Legislature 
being  required,  in  creating  a  new  district  un- 
der such  section,  to  haVe  due  regard  to  the 
business,  as  well  as  the  territory  and  popula- 
tion. Scott  T.  McOreary,  147  S.  W.  803,  004, 
148  Ky.  791. 

The  words  "shalT  and  "may,**  as  used  in 
the  Utah  Constitution,  providing  Oiat  certain 
officers  *^hall  be  conservators  of  thepeaosk 
and  may  hold  preliminary  examinatfuns," 
are  used  advisedly,  and  each  is  to  be  under- 
stood in  its  usual  and  ordinary  sense,  and  a 
statute  conferring  jurisdiction  on  other  of- 
ficers to' act  as  committing  magistrates  is  not 
in  conflict  with-th^x:oii8tituCion.  State  v. 
Shockley,  80  Pac.  886,  868,'  28  Oftah,  25,  110 


MAT 


S86 


MAY 


Am.  St  S«p.  680  (quoting  and  adopttag  8 
Qye  p.  58<9. 

Tbe  word  ''may,"  where  it  appears  in  tiie 
Const  art  10,  H  223-22(^  relative  to  tbe 
penitentiary  and  prisons,  forbidding  tbe  leas- 
ing or  biring  of  convicts,  anthorlzlng  tbe  em- 
ployment of  convicts  on  public  works,  and 
providing  tbat  tbe  legislature  "may  place 
tbe  convicts  on  a  state  farm  or  farms  and 
bave  tbem  work,  tbereon  under  state  super- 
vision exclusively  •  ♦  ♦  and  may  buy 
farms  for  that  purpose^"  is  not  mandatory, 
and  tbe  Legislature  is  not  required  to  place 
convicts  on  a  state  farm  noif  to  buy  a  farm 
for  tbat  purpose,  and  it  is  within  Its  power 
to  work  tbe  convicts  on  leased  lands.  State 
V.  Henry,  40  South.  152,  154,  158,  87  Hiss. 
125,  5  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  340. 


MAT  (Ib  Statutes  mm  PermlssiTe  or 
datorr) 

Tbe  word  "may,"  when  used  in  a  Btat> 
ute,  is  sometimes  construed  as  mandatory, 
but  more  frequently  as  directory.  State  ez 
reL  Coleman  v.  Blair,  151  S.  W.  148,  151, 
245  Mo.  680. 

Wb^  the  word  "may"  is  in  a  statute 
made  for  the  benefit  of  persons,  it  is  not 
simply  permissive  but  mandatory  or  com- 
pulsory. Trail  V.  Trail,  49  S.  E.  43i,  434,  56 
W.  Va.  594. 

The  word  "may"  in  statutes  usually  in- 
dicates that  the  act  to  which  it  refers  is  dis- 
cretionary, rather  than  mandatory,  and  will 
be  so  construed,  unless  tbe  context  indicates 
a  different  meaning.  Halfacre  v.  State,  79 
S.  W.  182,  188,  112  Tenn.  609. 

Whenever  third  persons  or  the  public 
have  an  interest  in  having  done  tbat  which 
is  prescribed  by  the  Legislature,  then  tbe  act 
is  mandatory,  even  though  words  permissive, 
as  ''may,"  are  used.  Instead  of  words  man- 
datory, as  "shall."  Lapsley  v.  Merchants' 
Bank  of  Jefferson  aty,  78  S.  W.  1095,  1096, 
106  Mo.  App.  98. 

The  word  "may"  when  used  in  a  statute 
means  "must,"  whenever  third  persons  or  tbe 
public  have  an  interest  In  having  the  act 
done,  or  bave  a  claim  de  jure  that  the  power 
shall  be  exercised.  Smalley  v.  Paine,  116  S. 
W«  88,  89, 102  Tex.  804. 

Where  permissive  words,  such  as  *lt 
shall  be  lawful,"  or  "may,"  are  used  In  a 
statute  in  respect  to  courts  and  officers,  such 
words  will  be  regarded  as  imperative,  in  cas- 
es where  the  public  or  Individuals  have  a 
right  to  demand  the  exercise  of  the  power  con- 
fenred.  Bx  parte  Young,  96  S.  W.  98, 102,  49 
Tex.  Cr.  R.  536;  (citing  Lewis'  Sutherland, 
Stat  Const  f  636;  Tarver  v.  Commissioners* 
Court  of  Tallapoosa  County,  17  Ala.  527; 
MitcheU  V.  Duncan,  7  Fla.  13 ;  David  ▼.  Levy, 
24  South.  689,  119  Aku  241;  Smith's  Petition, 
5  Pa.  Dist  B.  465). 


The  word  "may"  is  peremptory,  when 
in  a  statute  where  the  public  or  an  in- 
dividual has  a  rigtit  de  jure,  that  the  powers 
conferred  by  the  act  should  be  exercised. 
Graham  v.  City  of  Tuscumbia,  42  South.  400, 
401,  402,  146  Ala.  449  diuoting  and  adopting 
Tarver  v.  Commisslontf  s*  Court  of  Tallapoo- 
sa County,  17  Ala.  527). 

Ordinarily  the  word  "may''  is  employed 
in  a  statute  to  express  the  idea  that  a  dis- 
cretion may  be  exercised,  and  that  tbe  perfo^ 
manoe  of  tbe  act  Is  not  imperative^  or  tbat 
the  power  or  authority  conferred  is  not  ex- 
clusive, but  cumulative  and  permissive;  and 
whether  it  is  to  be  construed  as  mandatory  U 
to  be  determined  from  the  apparent  inten- 
tion; but  the  word  "may"  will  be  constraed 
to  mean  "shall"  whenever  the  rights  of  the 
public  or  third  persons  depend  on  the  exercise 
of  the  power  or  tbe  performance  of  tbe  duty 
to  which  it  refers,  and  such  is  its  meaning  in 
all  cases  where  the  public  interests  and 
rights  are  concerned,  or  a  duty  is  imposed  on 
public  officers  and  the  public  or  third  persons 
have  a  claim  de  jure  that  tbe  power  shall  be 
exercised.  Demtng  v.  Metropolitan  Bnglneer- 
ing  ft  Construction  Co.,  186  S.  W.  740,  742, 
154  Mo.  Ai^.  540  (citing  5  Weeds  and  Phras- 
es, p.  4421). 

"May"  sometimes  is  equivalent  to  "must*' 
or  "shall,"  and  is  then  mandatory,  but  it 
usually  denotes  permission  or  discretion.  To 
decide  between  these  meanings  in  any  given 
case,  the  context  and  whole  leglslatiTe 
scheme  must  be  taken  into  consideration. 
Bass  V.  Doughty,  63  S.  B.  516,  517,  5  Ga.  App. 
458  (citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4420,  et 
seq.). 

The  words  ''authorize"  or  "may,"  as  used 
in  a  statute,  are  sometimes  construed  as  man- 
datory in  effect,  though  permissive  In  form,  as 
where  a  statute  provides  for  tbe  doing  of 
some  act  required  by  Justice  or  public  duty; 
but,  where  they  confer  or  recognize  a  dis- 
cretionary power,  a  mandatory  constrnction 
will  not  be  given  to  them.  Whltiey  v.  State. 
68  S.  B.  716,  723,  134  Ga.  758. 

Tbe  word  ''may*'  should  primarily  be 
taken  In  its  ordinary  meaning  and  be  regard- 
ed as  permissive  only,  but  its  meaning  is  to 
be  determined  in  each  case  from  tbe  appar- 
ent Intent  of  the  statute  in  which  it  is  em- 
ployed, so  that  in  al^  remedial  statutes,  or 
whenever  tbe  rights  of  the  public  or  of  third 
persons  depend  on  the  exercise  of  tbe  power 
of  a  court  or  public  officer  or  the  performance 
of  a  duty  and  a  claim  de  Jure  that  the  power 
may  be  exercised  exists,  it  should  be  oon- 
strued  to  mean  "shall,"  State  ex  reL  Mcom- 
en  Boom  Co.  v.  North  Shore  Boom  A  Driying 
Co.,  103  Pac.  426,  429,  55  Wash.  1  (citing  5 
Words  and  Phrases,  p)p.  '4420--1447). 

"May,"  as  primarily  and  ordinarily  used 
in  a  statute,  la  permissive,  and  not  peremp- 
tory;   but  it  may  be  given  the  imperative 


HAT 


887 


MAY 


meuiliig  If  that  wms  the  ob^kma  intentloa. 
State  y.  School  Dist*  No.  1,  Edwards  Oonxity, 
lOB  Pac  136,  80  Kan.  667. 

While  the  eonrta  hare  hotot  hesitated  to 
coDBtnie  "may^  as  "must,"  or  "shall,"  when 
the  context  and  policy  of  the  law  demanded 
that  Interpretation,  the  legislatiTe  Intention 
mnst  plainly  appear  before  each  Judicial 
correction  wHl  be  madei  Ostrander  y.  Oity 
of  Richmond,  101  Pac.  462,  468,  166  Cal.  46& 

Ordinarily  the  word  "may,"  in  constru- 
ing the  statute,  is  permisslye,  but  it  is  often 
coQstraed  to  \ie  mandatory,  and  generally  so 
when  it  is  employed  to  delegate  a  power,  the 
exercise  of  which  is  important  for  the  protec- 
tion of  public  or  priyate  interests.  Queeny 
y.  Higgins,  114  N.  yf.  61,'l36  Iowa,  673. 

The  word  "may"  in  a  statute  will  be  con- 
strued to  mean  "shall,"  wheneyer  the  rights 
of  the  public  or  third  parties  depend  on  the 
exercise  of  the  power  or  duty  to  which  It  re- 
fers, and  such  is  its  meaning  in  all  cases 
where  public  interests  and  rights  are  concern- 
ed, or  a  public  duty  is  imposed  on  public  offi- 
cers, and  the  public  or  third  persons  haye  a 
claim  de  jure  that  the  power  shall  be  exer- 
cised. Binder  y.  Langhorst,  86  N.  B.  400,  402, 
234  III.  583. 

Where  neither  the  dear  intent  of  the 
Legislature  nor  public  policy  requires  that 
the  language  of  a  statute  shall  be  glyen  a 
mandatory  construction,  the  word  "may" 
therein  is  not  equiyalent  to  "must"  Town 
of  Hempstead  y.  Lawrence,  122  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1037,  1040,  138  App.  Diy.  478. 

Words  like  "may."  "must,"  "shall,"  etc, 
are  constantly  used  in  statutes  without  in- 
tending that  they  shall  be  taken  literally,  and 
In  their  construction  the  object  eyidently  de- 
signed to  be  reached  limits  and  controls  the 
literal  import  of  the  terma  and  phrases  em- 
ployed. Fields  y.  United  SUtes,  27  App.  D. 
a  433,  440. 

The  word  "may"  ordinarily  denotes  per- 
mission and  not  command.  But  where  used 
hi  a  statute  concerning  the  public  interest,  or 
affecting  the  rights  of  three  persons,  it  will 
be  construed  to  mean  "must"  or  "shall." 
Georgia,  F.  ft  A.  R.  Go.  y.  Sasser,  60  8.  E. 
907,  130  6a.  304  (citing  Birdsong  y.  Brooks, 
7  Ga.  88;  Weems  y.  Farrell,  33  Ga.  419). 

In  constmini;  statutes,  the  term,  "may" 
may  be  considered  as  mandatory  and  as 
meaning  "shall"  or  "must,"  and  "shaU**  or 
"most"  may  be  construed  as  directory  only, 
hi  order  to  effectuate  the  leglslattye  latent 
In  re  Ghadboume's  Estate,  114  Pac.  1012, 
1014,  16  CaL  App.  363  (citing  Estate  of  Bal- 
lentlne,  45  GaL  600;  Hayes  y.  Gounty  of  Los 
Angeles,  33  Pac  766,  09  Gal.  74;  Suth.  St 
Const  684;  Wallace  y.  Feeley  [N.  Y.]  61 
How.  Prac  225;  Merrill  y.  Shaw,  5  Minn. 
148  [GIL  113];  In  re  Thurber's  Estote,  56 
K.  S.  631,  162  N.  Y.  244;  Stone  y.  Pratt,  35 
N.  Y.  Supp.  610,  90  Hun,  30;  First  Nat  Bank 
3  WD8.A  P.2n  Skb.— 22 


of  Sweca  y.  X^man,  58  Pac  120, 09  Kaa  410; 
Gooke  y.  Spears,  2  GaL  409,  56  Am.  Dec.  348 ; 
People  ex  reL  Cfalperfleld  y.  Sanitary  Dist  of 
Ghlcago,  56  N.  E.  953, 184  111.  597). 

In  a  statute  the  word  ''may"  may  be  con- 
stmed  In  a  mandatory  sense  only  where  sudi 
construction  Is  necessary  to  glye  effect  to  the 
clear  policy  and  intention  of  the  LeglslatUK : 
and,  whtfe  there  is  nothing  in  the  connection 
of  the  language  or  in  the  sense  or  policy  of 
the  proyision  to  require  an  unusual  interpre- 
tation, its  use  is  merely  permissive  and  dls* 
cretionary.  Where^  by  the  use  in  other  pro- 
yisions  of  the  statute  of  the  word  "shall"  or 
"must,**  it  appears  that  the  Legislature  in- 
tended to  distinguish  between  these  words 
and  "may,"  "may"  will  not  be  construed  as 
imperatiye.  Garlin  y.  Freeman,  75  Pac.  26, 
27,  19  Golo.  App.  884. 

Adoptiom  of  bytJawt 

The  word  *'may,"  as  used  in  Hordes  Bey. 
Stat  1908,  p.  478,  |  6,  proyldlng  ttiat  the  di- 
rectors or  managsrs  of  a  corporation  "may 
adopt  by-laws  for  the  goyemment  of  the  oiB- 
cers  and  affairs  of  the  company,"  means 
"must";  the  words  "may"  and  "shall"  are 
frequently  used  interchangeably  in  order  to 
express  the  leglslatiye  intent;  and  one  may 
be  used  for  the  other,  if,  by  so  doing,  the 
legislatiya  Intention  can  be  determined. 
Manufiictnrers*  Exhibition  Bldg.  Go.  y.  Lan- 
day,  76  N.  B.  146,  148,  219  111.  168  (dttng 
Wabash,  St  L.  ft  P.  By.  0>.  y.  BInkert,  106 
IlL  298). 


Appotmtatent  to 

As  used  In  Laws  1903,  p.  202,  c.  118,  f  4, 
providing  that  city  goyernment  shall  be  yest- 
ed  in  a  mayor  and  ooundl,  to  consist  oi  five 
members,  a  clerk,  treasurer,  marshal,  and  po- 
lice Ju4ge,  who  "may"  be  one  of  the  Justices 
of  the  peace  of  the  precinct  in  which  the 
town  is  situated,  the  word  "may"  should  not 
be  construed  to  mean  "shall"  or  "must" 
Henoe  the  mayor  of  a  dty  of  the  third  class 
was  not  limited  to  the  elected  Justices  of  the 
peace  for  his  selection  of  a  police  Justice. 
State  ex  reL  Pnrdin  y.  Oault,  106  Paa  242, 
243,  56  Wash.  140  (dting  5  Words  and 
Phrases,  p.  4420). 

The  word  "may,"  as  used  in  Bankr. 
Act  July  1,  1808,  c.  541,  |  45,  providing  that 
trustees  may  be  (1)  indiyiduals  who  are  re- 
spectiyely  competent  *  *  *  and  reside 
in  or  have  an  office  In  the  Judicial  district 
within  which  they  are  appointed,  or  (2)  cor- 
porations •  *  •  haying  an  office  In  the 
Judicial  district,  etc.,  is  equiyalent  to  "shaU," 
in  the  sense  that  the  section  allows  a  trustee 
to  be  chosen  from  but  two  classes,  yia.,  per- 
sons of  a  certain  sort  or  corporations,  making 
the  proyisions  mandatory.  In  re  Seider,  163 
Fed.  18& 

Ky.  St  I  4313,  proyldlng  that  the  fiscal 
court  of  any  county  wherein  the  roads  are 
worked  by  taxation  "may,"  at  Its  first  regu- 


5^AY' 


388 


m>a¥' 


lat  term  after  the  act  takes  effei^  knd  every 
tvo  years  thereafter,  appoint  n  Bupervlsor  of 
rbads^  does  not  make  the  appointment  of  the 
supervisor  mandatory,  bnt  leaver  the  matter 
to  the  discretion  of  the  fiscal  court,  which 
discretion  cannot  be  controlled  hy  mandamus. 
O'Connor  ▼.  Weissinger,  184  S.  W.  1127, 1129, 
142^  Ky.  462. 

The  word  *'may,''  as  used  in  OIt.  Ck)de 
Praa  |  298,  providing  that  the  appointment 
of  a  receiver  "may"  be  done  on  motion  of  a 
party  to  an  action  who  shows  a  right  to*  the 
property  involved,  and  that  it  is  in  danger  of 
being  lost  or  removed,  is  not  equivalent  to 
"must-  McClure  t.  McGee,  108  S.  W.  841, 
842,  128  Ky.  464. 

Bicban^s  Prlma^ry  Bill  (Laws  1911,  c 
201)  S  112,  provides  that  any  party  elector 
wishing  to  become  a  candidate  for  an  ap- 
pointive government  position  may  file  his 
written  appUcation  for  the  official  party  in- 
dorsement with  the  secretary  of  state  sSt&t 
any  primary  election  date  and  before  the  fol- 
lowing general  election  date.  Section  118  re- 
quires the  secretary  of  state  to  keep  a  record 
of  such  applications,  and  prepare  and  mall 
lists  thereof,  within  10  days  after  the  gen- 
eral election  date,  to  each  member  of  the 
party  state  central  committee.  Section  114 
requires  the  party  state  central  committee 
to  meet  on  the  second  Tuesday  of  December 
to  determine  who  shall  receive  the  official 
party  indorsement  for  appointive  positions, 
and  certify  such  indorsement  to  the  appoint- 
ing officer  and  the  secretary  of  state.  Held, 
that  the  provision  of  section  112  that  any 
candidate  may  file  his  application  before  the 
general  election  date  is  mandatory,  and  a 
party  committee  cannot  give  the  official  party 
indorsement  to  a  candidate  filing  his  applica- 
tion after  the  general  election,  or  who  files 
no  application,  since  the  provisions  of  the 
law  are  not  for  the  benefit  of  candidates, 
but  to  promote  and  protect  the  public  wel- 
fare; and  "may"  means  "mustf'  when  third 
parties  or  the  public  have  an  interest  In 
having  the  act  done  authorised  by  the  per- 
missive language.  State  ex  rel.  Cook  v.  Pol- 
ley,  139  N.  W.  118,  121,  30  S.  D.  528. 

▲sseuments  on  stock 

The  word  "may,*'  as  used  in  Rev.  Code,  | 
2750,  providing  that  the  directors  of  any  cor- 
poration formed  or  existing  under  the  laws 
of  the  state,  after  one-fourth  its  capital  stock 
has  been  subscribed,  may,  for  the  purpose  of 
paying  expenses,  conducting  business,  or  pay- 
ing debts,  levy  and  collect  assessments  upon 
the  subscribed  capital  stock  thereof,  etc., 
does  not  mean  "must."  Wall  v.  Basin  Mln. 
Ck).,  101  tac.  738,  738,  16  Idaho,  313,  22  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  1013. 

Assignment  of  mortgage 

"In  a  statute  the  word  *ma3P;'  can  be  con- 
strued only  in  a  mandatory  sense,  where  such 
construction  Is  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the 
policy  and  Intention  of  the  Legislature;  and, 


where  there  is  nothing  In  connection  with  the 
language  nor  in  the  sense  or  poit^  of  the 
provision  to  require  an  unusual  Interpreta- 
tion, its  use  Is  merely  permlaBlve  and  discre- 
tionary." B.  ft  O.  Gomp.  f  5362,  provides 
that  mortgages  '*may"  be  assigned  by  an 
instrument  in  writing,  and  reoorded,  etc 
Section  5367  provides  that  a  note  secured  by 
a  mortgage  on  real  property  ean  be  transfer- 
red by  indorsement,  and.  If  the  mortgage  was 
recorded,  the  same,  on  i>ayment  of  the  note, 
may  be  transferred  of. record  by  the  owner 
of  the  note  by  proving  the  fact  to  the  satis- 
faction of  the  recorder,  and  delivering  the 
note  to  such  officer.  Section  5368  provides 
that  no  mortgage  shall  be  satisfied  except 
by  the  person  appearing  on  the  records  to 
be  the  owner  thereof.  Held,  that  the  use 
of  the  word  ^may,"  In  section  S862,  showed 
a  design  not  to  repeal  section  6867;  the  a^ 
tion  simply  prescribing.  In  section  5868,  the 
method  for  recording  assignments  by  sepa- 
rate writings.  Barringer  v.  Loder,  81  Pac 
778,  780.  47  Or.  228. 

▲ntborUing  anlt 

The  word  "may,"  used  in  Code  Civ.  Proc 
I  782,  providing  that  any  person  aggrieved 
"by  waste  may  bring  an  action  therefor,  is 
not  a  mandatory  term,  except  when  it  is  con- 
strued to  mean  "must";  and  it  in  never  thus 
construed  where  there  is  nothing  in  the  con- 
nection of  the  language  or  in  the  sense  or 
policy  of  the  provision  to  require  an  unusual 
interpretation.  Isom  v.  Rex  Crude  Oil  Co., 
.74  Pac  204,  140  Cal.  678. 

In  Act  AprU  10,  1879  (P.  L.  17)  |  5,  pro- 
viding that  in  case  of  nonpayment  of  install- 
ments of  stock,  premiums,  dues,  or  interest 
by  borrowing  stockholders  for  six  months, 
their  payment  may  be  enforced  by  proceeding 
on  their  securities  according  to  law,  the  word 
"may"  should  be  construed  as  a  word  of  per 
mission.  Workingman's  Loan  &  Building 
Ass'n  of  Altoona  v.  Heaton,  82  Atl.  78,  80, 
283  Pa.  178; 

Appeal 

"May"  should  be  construed  in  a  manda- 
tory sense  in  a  statute  providing  that  any 
person  aggrieved  by  a  decision  or  order  of  the 
board  of  school  directors  may,  within  30  days 
after  the  rendition  of  the  decision  or  order, 
appeal  to  the  county  superintendent,  and  such 
appeal  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  right  of 
a  teacher  to  sue  for  breach  of  his  contract 
by  the  board  of  directors.  Van  Dyke  ▼. 
School  Dist  No.  77  of  Lewis  Oountyr  86  Pac. 
402,  403,  43  Wash.  235. 

ThjB  word  "mayi"  in  Cokle,  i  254,  provid- 
ing that  the  judge,  on  accused  showing  his 
inability  to  pay  for  ^  transcript  on  appeal, 
"may"  order  the  same  at  the  exp&ose  of  the 
county,  should  be  read  "mlist,"  in  view  of  the 
change  made  in  the  farmer  statute  as  embod- 
ied in  Code  1888,  f  Sp29,  by  («nittlng  the 
words  "if  in  the  opinion  pf  the  judge  Justice 
will  be  thereby  proihoted,"  and  the  judge 


¥AT 


S89 


MAT 


must  order  the  transcript  at  the  expense  of 
the  county  on  accused  sbowlng  bis  inability. 
State  y.  GoodeeU*  113  N.  W.  826,  827,  136 
Iowa,  .44^. 

Calllnc  immnj  meetlasr 
Under  article  1341  of  tlM  Ofvil  Code»  le- 
fenlnff  to  the  family  meeting  to  be  lield  lo  fix 
on  behalf  «f  minors  tbe  teems  of  sale,  and 
providing  that,  at  the  Instance  of  the  tutors 
and  cnrators  of  each  minors,  the  judge  may 
call  a  family  meeting;  the  fact  that  the  Judge 
''may"  at  the  instance  of  the  tntorB  and  cura- 
tors, caU  the  meeting  was  not  Intended  as 
exduding  antliority  in  the  Jndge  to  do  so  at 
the  instance  of  othor  parties  in  intesest  or 
of  bis  own  motion.  ToUn  ▼«  United  States 
Safe  Deposit  *  SaTincs  Bank,  30  Sonth.  33, 
35, 115  La.  36a. 

Compensatiom  f  ov  services  aaid  expemdi** 


Under  a  statute  prorldlng  tiiat  the  guar- 
dian ad  litem  for  an  Infant  party  ^may"  be 
allowed  compensation  for  his  services  and 
necessary  expenditures  in  litigation,  to  be 
fixed- by  the  court,  and  to  be  paid  out  of  the 
body  of  the  estate  or  property  in  controversy, 
if  the  Infant  has  no  ayailable  property  out  of 
which  such  payment  can  be  directed  by  the 
court,  the  word  ''may**  should  not  be  con- 
strued as  "must,"  but  should  be  held  to  confer 
on  the  court  a  broad  discretion  as  to  whether 
an  allowance  Aould  be  made  and  to  what 
extent  In  le  McNaughton's  Will,  US  N.  W. 
907,  1004,  138  Wis.  179. 

The  goieral  rule  that;  where  public  au- 
thorities are  authorized  to  perform  an  act  for 
the  benefit  of  the  pvbUc,  or  for  an  individual 
who  has  a  right  to  its  performance,  the  word 
"may"  is  Interpreted  as  meaning  ''must"  has 
no  application  to  Gen.  Laws  1901,  |  8024, 
providing  that  eounty  treasurers  shall  be 
allowed  by  the  board  of  county  commis- 
sioners of  their  respective*  counties,  as  full 
compensation  for  their  services  for  the  coun- 
ty, the  following  salaries,  etc.,  provided,  that 
the  county  <K>mmis8ioner8  "may**  allow  the 
following  sum  or  as  much  as  they  deem  nec- 
essary for  clerk  hire,  where  a  county  treas- 
urer employed  a  deputy  to  assist  him,  as 
the  question  of  public  benefit  through  an  ap- 
propriation for  clerk  hire  can  be  determined 
by  nobody  but  the  board  of  county  commis- 
sioners. Both  V.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Ness 
County,  77  Pac  694,  69  |:an.  667  (dtlng 
Phelps  V.  Lodge,  66  Pac.  840,  60  Kan.  122). 

Costs 

The  word  "may,"  as  used  in  New  York 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  i  ^247,  making  the  person 
beneficially  interested,  in  an  action  brought, 
liable  for  costs  to  the  same  extent  as  if  plain- 
tiff, and  providing  that,  where  costs  are 
awarded  against  plaintiff,  the  court  may  by 
order  direct  the  person  so  liable  to  pay  them, 
means  the  same  thing  as  the  word  "shall,** 
and  the  liability  of  the  person  beneficially  in- 
terested for  costs  is  absolute.    NeUigan  v. 


Grotli,  no  N.  Y.  Supp.  610,  620, 126  App.  DlT. 
444  (citing  People  v^  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Otser 
go  County,  51  N.  Y.  401). 

Detnehatemt  of  mimicipal  territory  ' 

A  statute  providing  for  detaching  unplat- 
ted land  from  the  corporate  limits  of  a  city, 
which  provides  that,  if  the  codrt  shall  find 
the  existence  of  the  necessary  facts  and  con- 
ditions, it  "may"  grant  the  decree,  "falls 
within  the  rule  that,  whenever  public  inter- 
ests or  individual  rights  call  for  the  exercise 
of  a  i>ower  given  to  courts  or  other  public 
officers,  the  language  used  in  conferring  the 
power*  although  perndssirve  in  forip,  la  in  ef- 
fect mandatory/*  Hunter  v.  City  of  Tracy, 
116  N.  W.  922,  924, 104  Minn.  378. 

Dismissal  of  aetlom 

'TThe  word  'may'  is  sometimes  permissive 
only;  sometimes  it  is  imperative.  Legisla- 
tive intent  determines  whether  it  Is  directory 
or  mandatory.  According  to  its  natural  and 
usual  signification,  the  word  'may'  is  enabling 
and  permissive  only,  and  so  It  must  be  inter- 
preted where  no  right  of  or  benefit  to  the 
public,  nor  right  of  persons  other  than  the 
one  upon  whom  the  permission  is  conferred, 
depends  upon  giving  to  it  the  obligatory 
meaning;  but  the  word  is  interpreted  to 
mean  'shair  or  'must*  whenever  the  rights 
of  the  public  or  of  third  persons  depend  upon 
the  exercise  of  the  power  or  performance  of 
the  duty  to  which  it  refers.  In  those  cases 
where  the  public  or  persons  possess  the  right 
to  require  that  the  power  conferred  by  the 
word  'may*  be  exercised,  the  word  is  impera- 
tive and  mandatory,  being  the  equivalent  of 
•shall'  or  'musf'  Code  Oiv.  Proc.  Mont 
1895, 1 1094,  subd.  6,  providing  that  an  action 
'^may"  be  dismissed  by  the  court,  when,  after 
verdict  or  final  submission,  the  party  entitled 
to  Judgment  neglects  to  demand  and  have  it 
entered  for  more  than  six  months,  is  manda- 
tory. State  ex  reL  Stiefel  v.  District  Court, 
96  Pac  337,  338,  340,  37  Mont.  298  (quoting 
and  adopting  definition  in  Montana  Ore  Pur- 
chasing Co«  ▼.  Undsay,  63  Pac.  715,  25  Mont. 
24). 

DiToree 

Th^  word  "may,"  as  used  in  section  18,  c. 
64,  Code  1906,  providing  that  in  certain  cases, 
where  divorce  from  bed  and  board  is  decreed, 
an  absolute  divorce  **may"  be  granted  after 
certain  requirements  are  fulfilled,  means 
"shalL"  Chapman  v.  Chapman,  74  8.  E.  661, 
664,  70  W.  Va.  622  (citing  5  Words  and  Phras- 
es, 4420). 

HmtortiMM  orders  of  eoatmisslom 

In  a  statnte  providing  that  the  .orders 
of  a  commission  "may"  be  enforced  by  man- 
damus, and  that,  upon  proof  tliat  an  order  has 
been  made  and  has  not  been  complied  with 
after  notice  thereof,  the  court  "may"  issue  a 
mandamus  to  enforce  It,  the  word  "may" 
means  "must."  Trustees  of  Village  of  Sara- 
toga Springs  V.  Saratoga  Gas,  Electric  Light 
&  Power  Cto.,  107  N.  Y.  Supp.  341,  366,  122 


MAT 


340 


MAT 


Apj).  Dlv.  208  (dissenting  (V>lnlo]i  of  Judge 

Kellogg). 

lanboldev's  license 

An  innholder*s  license,  granted  In  May 
instead  of  the  month  of  April,  is  valid ;  the 
provisions  of  Rev.  Laws  1902,  e  100,  I  12, 
and  chapter  102,  |  4,  providing  that  licenses 
'*may"  be  granted  in  April,  to  take  effect  on 
the  Ist  of  May,  being  directory.  Cheney  v. 
Goughlin,  87  N.  B..  744,  745,  747,  201  Mass. 
204. 


Rev.  St  1898,  |  1962,  provides  that  life 
insurance  companies  whose  members  are  en- 
titled to  share  in  the  surplus  cumulations 
"may"  make  distribution  thereof  annually  or 
once  in  two,  three,  four,  or  five  years,  and  in 
determining  the  amount  of  surplus  to  be  dis- 
tributed there  "shall"  be  reserved  an  amount 
equal  to  the  net  value  of  the  outstanding  poli- 
cies. The  section  is  the  same  as  Laws  1870, 
p.  107,  c.  59,  i  14,  the  purpose  of  which,  as 
appears  from  instructions  to  the  legislative 
committee  which  reported  the  bill,  was  to 
afford  proper  "protection  to  policy  holders'* 
by  safeguard  against  insolvency  of  insurance 
companies  by  requiring  the  cumulation  of  the 
reserve  fund.  Held,  that  the  use  of  the  word 
"shair  in  the  section  in  relation  to  the  re- 
serve fund  is  imperative,  while  "may"  in  re- 
lation to  distribution  of  the  surplus  is  per- 
missive, and  having  been  so  construed  by 
the  state  officials  and  insurance  companies 
for  more  than  30  years,  the  license  of  an 
insurance  company  will  not  be  revoked  for 
deferring  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  more 
than  five  years.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc 
V.  Host.  102  N.  W.  579-TO4,  124  Wis.  657,  4 
Ann.  Cas.  41B. 

Jury  trial 

Rev.  Laws,  c  189,  I  16,  in  its  literal 
wording  plainly  leaves  the  option  of  a  Jury 
trial  to  the  discretion  of  the  court  But  when 
read  in  connection  with  its  legislative  origin, 
supplemented  by  the  practice  that  prevailed 
under  the  original  statute^  if  a  Jury  trial  is 
seasonably  claimed,  "may"  should  be  con- 
strued to  mean  "shaU."  Hubbard  *v.  Lam- 
bum,  75  N.  B.  707,  709,  189  Mass.  296. 

The  word  "may,"  In  the  borough  act  of 
April  24,  1897  (P.  L.  p.  291),  providing  that 
in  all  cases  where  a  fine  or  penalty  shall  ex- 
ceed (20,  eta,  there  may  be  a  trial  by  Jury, 
is  mandatory  in  effect,  and  not  permissive 
only.  Borough  of  Vineland  v.  Denoflio,  65 
Atl.  887.  838,  74  N.  J.  Law,  326. 

Iiioenso  to  praotloe  profession 

The  right  to  practice  law  given  by  Code 
1906,  c.  119,  is  not  a  de  Jure  right,  and  the 
word  "may"  employed  therein,  in  the  provi- 
sion that  the  Supreme  Court  "may  on  pro- 
duction ot  a  duly  certified  copy  of  the  order 
of  the  county  court  grant  a  license,"  win  not 
be  construed  as  synonymous  with  "shall," 
and,  whete  on  application  it  is  shown  on  ob- 


jection thereto  that  applicant  Is  not  of  good 
moral  character,  his  applicaticHi  will  be  de- 
nied. In  re  Application  tot  license  to  Prac- 
tice Law,  67  S.  E.  597,  601,  67  W.  Ya.  2ia 

In  Rev.  Codes,  |  1842,  as  amended  by 
Laws  1909,  p.  182,  providing  that  the  board 
of  medical  ^uuninera  may,  either  with  or 
without  examination,  grant  a  license  to  any 
physician  Ueensed  to  pvactlce  by  a  shnllar 
board  of  any  other  state^  who  tiolds  a  certi- 
ficate of  registration  showing  that  an  examiii; 
ation  has  been  made  by  the  proper  board  of 
any  state  in  whidh  an  average  grade  of  not 
less  than  80  per  cent  was  awarded,  and  trtio 
Is  the  holder  of  a  diploma  from  a  medical 
college  In  good  standing,  the  word  "may"  is 
not  to  be  construed  as  equivalent  to  '^ust" 
Barton  v.  Schmershall,  122  Pae.  386^  888,  21 
Idaho,  562. 

The  word  ''may,"  as  used  In  Revised 
Anoended  Greater  New  York  Charter,  i  1Q89 
(Laws  1901,  p.  1774,  c.  718),  providing  that 
at  the  dose  of  a  teacher's  third  year  of  cod- 
tlnuous  socoessful  service  the  dty  superin- 
tendent "may"  make  a  license  permanent, 
is  not  used  in  the  sense  of  "must*'  It  Is  used 
In  a  permissive  and  not  a  mandatory  saisa 
People  ex  rel.  Flnlgan  v.  Board  of  Education 
of  aty  of  New  York,  94  N.  Y.  Supp;  61,  62, 
106  App.  Dlv.  lOL 

The  word  "may^  in  P.  L.  1898,  p.  122, 
I  6,  as  amended  by  P.  L.  ik  896,  |  2,  providing 
that  the  State  Board  of  Registration  and 
Examination  in  Dentistry  shall  register  as 
licensed  dentists  all  persons  who  shall  snc- 
cessfully  pass  the  examination,  and  that  tlie 
board  "may"  also  without  examination  isBoe 
Its  license  to  any  applicant  furnishing  satis- 
factory proof  that  he  has  been  duly  Ueensed 
in  any  state  after  full  compliance  with  its 
dental  laws.  Is  not  synonymous  with  the  word 
"shall,"  but  Is  permissive,  and  whether  the 
board  will  license  an  applicant  without  tn 
examination  Js  discretionary.  Saxenmeyer 
V.  State  Board  of  Registration  and  Examina- 
tton  In  Dentistry,  75  AtL  175,  174,  79  N.  J. 
Law,  427. 

Iiimitatioiis 

Comp.  Laws  1897,  i  2921«  provides  that 
if,  at  any  time  after  the  Incurring  of  an 
indebtedness  or  liability  or  the  accrual  of  a 
cause  of  action  against  him  or  the  entry  of 
Judgment  against  him,  the  debtor  shall  have 
been  or  shall  be  absent  from  or  out  of  the 
territory,  the  time  during  which  he  "may" 
have  been  or  may  be  out  of  the  territory 
shall  not  be  included  In  computing  limita- 
tions. Held,  that  the  use  of  "may**  in  con- 
nection with  "have  been"  precludes  the  ap- 
plication of  the  terms  to  anything  future 
'They  are  the  equivalent  of  has  been;  the 
only  dllterence  being  that  in  one  case  the 
expression  is  in  the  certain  or  indicative 
form,  and  in  the  other  in  the  contingent  or 
potential  form.  They  botii  refer  to  a  con- 
dition completed  In  present  time,"  and  the 


MAT 


841 


HAT 


statute  is  retrospectlTe  In  operatton.  Onnan 
T.  van  Arsdell,  78  Pa«.  48,  49,  12  N.  M.  844^ 
67  L.  R.  A.  438. 

Geou  St  1902,  i  llBl,  providing  that, 
in  case  of  the  death  of  plaintiff,  bis  executor 
and  administrator  "may  enter"  within  six 
months  and  prosecute  a  suit,  is  not  an  abso- 
lute Limitation  on  the  discretionary  power 
of  the  court  to  permit  an  entry  to  be  made 
after  that  time  upon  good  cause  shown. 
Hatch  T.  Busby,  59  Aa  422,  4^  77  Ck)nn. 
347. 


Under  WUson's  Ber.  ft  Ann.  St  1903,  | 
709,  proTiding  tliat  luggage  may  consist  of 
any  ardeles  Intended  for  the  use  of  a  pas- 
senger while  traveling  or  fbr  his  personal 
equipment,  the  term  '*may"  is  used  in  the 
aense  of  '^tiat"  or  '*shaU.'*  GhocUw,  O. 
k  G.  B.  Co.  V.  Zwirts,  78  Paa  941,  942,  13 
OkL  411. 

Act  June  10,  1898  (P.  L.  480)  f  22,  pro- 
vides that  the  elector  "shall"  prepare  his  bal- 
lot by  marking  a  cross  above  the  name  of  a 
party  if  he  desires  to  vote  fbr  every  can- 
didate of  that  party,  otherwise  by  a  mark 
opposite  the  party  named:  As  amended  by 
Act  April  29,  1903  (P.  L.  840),  the  section 
now  reads:  "If  he  desires  to  vote  for  every 
candidate  of  a  political  party,  he  may  make 
a  cross,"  etc.  Held,  that  the  employment  of 
the  word  "may^  in  the  amending  clause  gives 
no  larger  privilege  as  to  the  way  of  mark- 
ing the  ballot  than  the  word  ''shall"  in  the 
original  clause.  Appeal  of  Dailey,  81  AtL 
655,  850,  232  Pa.  640. 


In  Comp.  St.  1907,  c.  62,  |  8,  providing 
that  every  judge  and  Justice  of  peace,  and 
every  preacher,  authorized  by  the  usages  of 
the  church  to  which  he  belongs  to  solem- 
nize marriages,  may  perform  marriage  cere- 
monies, the  word  "may"  Is  mandatory  as  to 
Justices  of  the  peaee  who  are  given  a  fee 
therefore  by  section  11,  c.  28,  but  Is  per- 
missive as  to  clergymen  and  Judges  of  the 
blgher  courts.  The  ordinary  meaning  of  the 
word  "may"  is  perml««ive,  and  it  should  re- 
ceive that  interpretation,  unless  the  rights 
of  the  public  or  third  persons  depend  upon 
the  power  conferred,  or  it  is  necessary,  to 
Rive  effect  to  the  clear  Intention  of  the  Leg- 
islature, that  it  should  be  construed  as  man- 
datory. Douglas  County  v.  Vlnsonhaler,  118 
N.  W.  1058,  1002,  1063.  82  Neb.  810. 


XMtlBCS  of 

The  word  ••may,"  in  Gen.  St.  1901,  | 
8122,  providing  for  calling  special  meetfhgs 
by  a  district  board  or  on  petition  of  10  resi- 
dent taxpayers,  is  permissive.  State  v.  School 
Dist.  No.  1,  Edwards  County,  108  P.  136,  80 
Kan.  667. 


The  word  "may**  Is  used  in  a  permissive 
not  a  mandatory,  sense  in  Mills'  Ann.  St.  i 
3162,  providing  that  the  relocator  of  an  aban- 
doned lode  claim  may  sink  the  original  shaft 
deeper  than  it  was  at  the  time  of  abandon* 
m^t  Carlin  v.  Freeman,  76  Paa  26,  27,  19 
Colo.  App.  884. 


Under  the  statute  (Code  Oiv.  Proc  |  2386), 
providing  that  the  afildavit  of  lervlee  on  the 
mortgagor  of  notice  of  foredosnre  sale  by 
advertisement  "may"  be  made  by  the  person 
making  the  service^  such  person  alone  can 
make  the  affidavit  Deutsch  v.  Haab,  119  N. 
T.  Supp.  911,  912,  136  App.  Div.  766. 

M«aiel9al  eKpeadituee 

It  is  a  familiar  doctrine  that,  where  a 
statute  confers  a  power  to  be  exercised  tor 
the  benefit  of  the  public  or  of  a  private  per- 
son, the  word  '*may"  is  often  treated  as  Im- 
posing a  duty,  rather  than  conferring  a  dis- 
cretion. The  word,  as  used  in  E2itra  Sees. 
Acts  La.  1877,  p.  47,  providing  that  aU  the 
revenues  of  a  city  of  each  year  shall  be  de-' 
voted  to  the  expenditures  of  that  year,  pro- 
vided that  any  surplus  of  said  revenues 
"may"  be  applied  to  the  indebtedness  of 
former  years,  is  merely  permissive  as  to  the 
surplus,  and  does  not  contractually  dedicate 
the  surplus  of  any  year  to  payment  of  claims 
of  years  prior  to  that  year  but  subsequent  to 
1877.  The  word,  in  such  act,  is  used  in 
special  contradistinction  to  the  word  "shall." 
United  States  v.  Thoman,  16  Sup.  Ct  378, 
380,  156  U.  S.  363,  39  L.  Bd.  460. 

Ketiee  of  MAmmt  of  moto 

li.  O.  L.  f  6929,  provides  that  the  notice 
of  dishonor  of  a  note  may  be  In  writing  or 
oral,  and  section  6936  requires  such  notice, 
where  the  person  giving  and  the  person  to 
receive  reside  in  the  same  place,  to  be  sent 
the  day  following  dishonor,  while  section 
6946  provides  that  delay  in  giving  notice  is 
excused  when  caused  by  circumstances  be- 
yond the  control  of  the  holder.  Held,  that 
the  word  "may"  in  the  first  section  should 
be  construed  as  "must,"  and  that  the  person 
giving  the  notice  must  give  it  in  writing  or 
orally,  and  hence  the  impossibility  of  giving 
oral  notice  does  not  under  the  last  section 
excuse  delay;  notice  by  mail  being  prac- 
tlcableu  Prioe  v.  Warner,  118  Pac:  178,  174, 
60  Or.  7. 

Powers  of  trttsteo 
Laws  1896,  p.  673,  a  647,  |  86,  provides 
that  a  trustee  of  property  during  the  life 
of  the  beneficiary  "may"  execute  a  lease  of 
real  property  for  a  term  not  exceeding  five 
years,  without  application  to  the  court  It 
Is  also  declared  that,  if  any  sudi  trustee 
has  leased  property  before  June  4,  1896,  for 
a  longer  period  than  five  years,  the  Supreme 
Court  on  the  trustee's  application  "may" 
confirm  the  lease  by  an  order  binding  on  all 


¥Ay 


843 


MAY 


persons  interested  in  the  trust  esta4^-  H^d, 
tliiit  the  legislatlye  intent  in  the  ffrst  provi- 
sion  was  to  extend  rather  than  restrict  the 
powers  of  the  trustee,  so  that  a  flve-year 
lease  executed  in  1900  by  a  trustee, of  the 
lif0  beneficiary  containing  an  option  for  re: 
n^wal  was  enforceable  against  the  trustee 
and  could  not  be  construed  a»  though  it 
read:  ''A  trustee  shall  not  execute  and  de- 
liver a  lease  of  such  real  property  tw*B.  term 
exceeding  five  years  without  application  to 
the  court."  Weir  y.  Barker,  88  N.  Y.  Supp. 
782,  734,  104  App.  Dir.  112. 

PxlTate  way 

Pub.  St.  1882,  c.  189.  |  20,  providea  that 
a  party  desiring  to  have  a  private  way  laid 
out  shall  file  a  petition  with  the  county  com- 
missioners. Section  25  provides  that,  wben 
the  premises  are  situated  .entirely  ii^  one 
town,  the  petition. may  be  made  to  the  select- 
men,  or  mayor  and  aldermen,  thereof.  The 
word  "may,"  in  the  last  section,  does  not 
mean  "must"  Eldredge  v.  Hortoik  Ck)unty 
Com'rs,  7a  N.  E.  36,  37,  185  Masa  180. 

FroKate  pvoeeedliics 

Code,  S  141,  providing  that  any  person  in- 
terested under  any  will  filed  In  the  office  of 
the  register  of  wills  prior  to  June  8,  1898, 
"may  offer  the  same  for  probate  as  a  will 
of  real  estate,"  is  permissive,  and  not  mand- 
atory. Young  V.  Norris  Peters  Co.,  27  App. 
D.  C.  140,  145. 

The  power  of  modification  or  revocation 
conferred  by  Gen.  St  1902,  |  203,  providing 
that  any  court  of  probate  "may"  modify  or 
revoke  any  order  or  decree  made  by  it  e;x 
parte,  before  any  appeal  therefrom,  and,  if 
made  before  the  final  settlement  thereof, 
upon  the  written  application  of  any  person 
interested  therein,  etc.,  is  one  that,  on  an  ap- 
plication in  a  prescribed  manner,  "may,"  not 
must,  be  exercised.  Appeal  of  Murdoch,  72 
Ati.  290,  291,  294,  81  Conn.  681,  12»  Am. 
St  Rep.  231. 

The  word  "may,"  as  used  in  West  Vir- 
ginia Code  1906,  i  8259,  providing  that  if, 
after  administration  is  granted  to  a  creditor 
or  other  person  than  a  distributee,  any  dis- 
tributee, who  shall  not  have  before  refused, 
shall  apply  for  administration,  there  may  bef 
a  grant  of  probate  or  administration  in  like 
manner  as  if  the  former  grant  had  not  been 
made,  means  "must"  Butcher  v.  Kunst,  64 
S.  B.  967, 971, 66  W.  Va.  884  (qdoting  Hutche- 
son  V.  Priddy,  12  Grat  [53  Va.]  85). 

Comp.  Laws  1897,  I  9310,  provides  that, 
when  a  will  shall  have  been  duly  proved  and 
allowed,  the  probate  court  shall  issue  letters 
testamentary  to  the  person  named  executor 
therein,  if  he  is  legally  competent,  and  shall 
accept  the  trust  and  give  bond.  Section  9317 
provides  that  if  an  executor  shall  reside  out 
of  the  state,  or  shall  neglect  to,  render  his 
account  or  perform  any  decree  of  the  courl;, 
or  abscond,  etc,  the  probate  court  "may"  re* 
move  such  executor.     Section  50,  subd.  1, 


reqidres  words  and  phrases  used  in  statutes 
to  be  construed  and  understood  according  to 
the  common  and  approved  use  of  language. 
Held,  that  a  nonresident  alien  is  not  abso- 
lutely disqualified  from  serving  aa  executor, 
but  his  nonresidence  is  ground  for  the  exer- 
cise of  a  discretion  in  the  probate  Judge  in 
the  matters  of  appointing  him  or  revoking 
his  letters,  and  the  word  "may"  should  not 
be  held  to  mean  "shall."  Breen  v.  Kehoe, 
105  N.  W.  28,  29,  142  Mich.  58,  1  L.  R,  A. 
(N.  S.)  349,  113  Am.  St  Rep.  558. 

Proeeediass  agatast  lasolTomt  debtor 

The  word  "may"  is  used  ordinarily 
as  a  word  of  p«rml8aion»  rathrer  than  of 
command,  bankruptcy  Act  (Act  U.  S.  1898, 
a  541»  i  11),  providing  that  a  suit  founded  on 
a  claim  from  which'  a  dischaj^e  would  be  a 
n^ease,  pending  against  a  person  when  a 
petition  is  filed  against  him,  shall  be  stayed 
until  after  an  adjudieation  or  dismissal  of 
the  petition,  and,  if  he  is  adjudged  a  bank- 
rupt, such  action  may  be  further  stayed  until 
12  months  after  the  adjudicatloii  or  until  tbe 
question  .of  disci^rge  is  determined,  effects 
a  peremptory  stay  only  until  the  adjudica- 
tion is  made,  and  leaves  the  further  8ta7 
within  the  discretion  of  the  court  in  which 
the  action  is  pending.  If  Congress  had  in- 
tended that  a  further  stay  in  case  of  an 
adjudication  should  be  peremptory,  tbe  use 
of  tjtie  word  "shall"  instead  of  "may"  would 
have  made  its  n^e^ing  clear.  Rosenthal  t. 
Nove,  56  N.  S.  884,  885,  175  Biass.  559,  78 
Am,  St  R^.  512. 

The  clUuse  ia  2  Gen.  St  1895,  p.  1728, 1 
11,  proviMng  that  the  court  •'may"  direct 
the  diischarge  of  an  insolvent  debtor  on  mat- 
ing and  filing  an  assignment  of  his  property 
as  therein  provided,  is  regarded  as  man- 
datory. Compton  V.  Calvert,  72  Atl.  29,  30, 
77  K.  J.  Law,  358  (citing  Weeks  v.  Buderus, 
39  N.  J.  Law,  448). 

Prooeedlncs  relating  to  sobool  dlstrictft 

Acts  81st  Leg.  a  12,  §  50,  requires  county 
commissioners,  in  organized  c6unties  not  sab- 
divided,,  to  divide  their  counties  into  conven- 
ient school  districts,  so  that  no  district  shall 
be  thereafter  created  havinur  an  area  of  les» 
than  16  square  miles  or  more  than  one  school 
for  white  children  and  one  for  colored  cbil- 
dren  for  each  16  square  miles  of  territory  or 
major  fraction  thereof,  except  that  the  com- 
missioners "may"  reduce  the  area  of  any 
common  school  district  and  create  such  ad- 
ditional districts  as  may  be  necessary,  pro- 
vided that  no  district  shall  be  reduced  to 
contain  less  than  0  square  miles  of  territory, 
and  that  no  new  district  shall  thereafter  be 
created  having  a  less  area  than  9  square 
miles,  and  that  the  area  of  school  districts 
having  an  .outstanding  bonded  indebtednesa 
shall  not  be  reduced  until  after  such  indebt- 
edness has  been  fully  discharged.  Held,  that 
the  word  "may,"  as  so  used,  did  not  confer 
a  mere  discretion,  but  imported  aa  lmpe^ 


MAT 


343 


UATT' 


adve  obUcatiOB,  and  bence  a  diflirion  of  a 
county  in  ni€li  a  manner  as  to  itface  In  the 
district:  containing  tlie  oovnty  aeat  200  aec- 
Uons  of  land,  making  that  dlstriet  20  mUes 
long,  and  including  the  best  of  the  lands  in 
the  county,  when  the  territory  did  not  ex- 
ceed 00  scholastics  in  numberi  and  giving  to 
no  other  district  more  than  85  sections  of 
land,  constituted  an  illegal  exercise  of  power 
which  was  subject  to  review  by  the  courts. 
McLaughlin  y.  Smith,  148  a  W.  288,  288,  105 
Tex.  330. 

Piimarily  and  as  ordinarily  used  in  a  stat- 
ute, the  w<nrd  "may"  is  permissive  rather 
than  per^nptory,  but  it  is  sometimes  regard- 
ed as  synonymous  with  "must,"  as,  for  in- 
stance, where  public  officers  are  authorized 
to  perform  an  act  for  the  benefit  of  the  pub- 
lic or  for  an  individual  who  has  a  right  to 
its  performance.  In  the  statute  relating  to 
school  district  meetingib  which  provides  spe- 
cial meeting  may  be  oilled  by  the  district 
board  or  upon  a  petition  signed  by  ten  resi- 
dent taxpayers  of  the  district,  the  word 
"may**  is  used  in  its  permissive  sense.  The 
word  should  always  be  given  its  ordinary 
meaning,  unless  the  other  terms  and  provi- 
sions of  the  statute  compel  the  other  view. 
State  V.  School  Dist  No*  1,  Edwards  County, 
103  Pac.  136,  80  Kan.  667  (quoting  Phelphs 
V.  Lodge,  55  Pac.  840,  60  Kan.  122). 

Provlac  ownenlilp  of  estray 

In  Rev.  Codes  1809,  §  1575,  providing 
that  the  person  taking  up  an  eatray  and  the 
claimant  of  th^  property  may  go  before  a 
Justice  of  the  peace  to  have  determined  the 
rights  of  the  parties,  the  use  of  the  word 
"may"  is  not  decisive  of  the  meaning  of  the 
statute,  and  the  word  "may"  will  be  con- 
strued to  mean  "shallt''  when  the  context  or 
purpose  of  the  statute  requires  it  It  wbb 
the  object  of  the  section  to  provide  a  conven- 
ient and  qpeedy  method  of  proving  ownership 
and  at  the  same  time  protect  the  person 
holding  the  estray  from  liability  for  errone- 
ous decision  as  to  ownership.  Mills  v.  For- 
tune, 105  N.  W.  235,  236,  14  N.  D.  460. 

PabUe  laftproreaMats 
The  word  '^may,"  as  used  in  1  Starr,  ft 
C.  Am.  St  (2d  Ed.)  p.  858,  c.  24,  par.  430, 
providing  that  a  sidewalk  ordinance  may  re- 
quire all  owners  of  abutting  lots  to  construct 
a  sidewalk  in  front  of  their  respective  lots, 
etc.,  should  be  read  "shalL"  Pierson  v.  Peo- 
ple, eS  N.  B.  383,  886,  204  IlL  456. 

"Words  which,  in  their  ordinary  accep- 
tation, and  when  interpreted  exclusive  of 
tbe  context  and  the  subject-matter,  imply  a 
discretion  or  powers  such  as  'may,'  It  shall 
be  lawful,*  and  the  like,  become,  in  the  con- 
stniction  of  statutes,  mandatory,  where  such 
is  the  legislative  intent"  Under  a  gtatute 
providing  that,  on  making  changes  of  a 
street,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  mnnidpal 
authorities  in  any  such  city  to  make  or  cause 
to  be  made,  a  proper  award  for  damages, 


etc.,  the  duty  of'  the  city  to  ihak»  the  award 
in  such  case  la  mandatoryv  ClArk  v.  City  of 
BUaabeth,;  40  AU.  616,  622,  61  N.  J.  Law,  565 
(citing  and  adopting  Maxwell,  Interp.  of  St 
218,  218,  Board  of  Sup*rs  of  Bock  island 
County  V.  United  States  ex  reL  State  Bank, 
4  WalL  435,  446,  18  U  £d.  410). 

dr.  Code  1902,  I  1881,  provides  that  the 
county  sapervlaor  "may'*  advertise  for  ^'blds 
for  working  hi^ways  by  contract"  Held  to 
give  sndx  officer  discretion,  and  the  dty 
council  of  a  city  under  a  general  charter  giv- 
ing it  the  same  powers  over  streets  as  coun- 
ty officers  have  over  highways  is  not  requir- 
ed to  advertise  for  bids  in  county  news* 
papers  for  the  paving  of  streets.  Dilling- 
ham V.  City  of  Spartanburg,  56  &  B.  881, 
382,  75  &  C.  549,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  &)  412,  117 
Ana.  St  Rep.  917,  9  Ann.  CSas.  829  (citing 
Minor  V.  Mechanics'  Bank,  1  Pet  [26  U.  S.] 
46,  7  U  Ed.  47). 

^e  Vrooman  Act  (St  1885,  p.  147,  c. 
153),  as  amended  by  St  1905,  p.  63,  c  67, 
provides  that  whenever  a  contemplated  im* 
provement  -in  the  opinion  of  the  dty  council 
is  of  more  than  local  or  ordinary  publie< 
benefit  or  whenever  the  total  estimated  costs 
exceed  one-half  the  total  assessed  value  of 
the  lots  fronting  on  such  proposed  work,  the 
city  council  ^may"  make  the  expense  diarge* 
able  on  a  district  As  originally  drawn,  the 
act  required  the  trustees  of  the  city  to  order 
payment  of  a  portion  of  the  expense  from  the 
ci^  treasury  if  the  estimated  cost  of  the  im- 
provement exceeded  one-half  the  assessed 
value  of  the  property.  St  1889,  pp.  159, 
160,  170,  c  151,  amended  the  act  ao  as  to 
confer  discretionary  power  on  city  councils. 
The  amendments^  of  1891  (St  1891,  p.  196 
et  seq.,  c  147)  sire  similar  in  this  respect 
Held,  that  the  Legislature  intended  to  con- 
fer a  wide  discretionary  power,  and  that  the 
word  ''may"  would  not  be  construed  to  mean 
''shall,"  so  as  to  require  the  expense  of  a 
street  improvement  to  be  made  chargeable 
on  a  district  where  the  estimated  cost  ex- 
ceeds one-half  the  assessed  value  of  the  lots 
fronting  on  the  proposed  work.  Ostrander 
V.  City  of  Richmond,  101  Paa  452,  453,  155 
CaL,468. 

St  1896,  a  40a,  subc.  42,  |  925~-223»  pro- 
vides that  when  a  city  council  shall  order 
paving  or  repaving  of  a  street  in  which  gas, 
water  mains,  or  sewers  have  been  previously 
laid,  the  council  "may"  require  service  pipes 
to  be  first  laid  to  the  curb  Une,  and  that  no 
street  shall  be  paved  or  repaved  by  order  of 
the  council  .unless  the  water,  gas  mains,  serv- 
ice pipes,  neceasary  sewers,  and  connections 
shall,  as  required  by  the  council,  be  first  laid 
in  that  portion  of  the  streeC  ao  to  be  paved 
or  repaved.  Held,  that  the  word  *hnay^* 
should. be  treated  as  permissive  amd  not  man- 
datory, and  that  a  dty  council  therefore  had 
power  to  order  ttxt  paving  of  a  street  with*, 
out  requiring  water,  gas,  service  pipes;  and 
sewer  connections  to  be  laid  before  the  pave- 


MAT 


344 


UAT 


meat.    Barber  Asphalt  Ck>.  r.  Oltj  of  Osh* 
toah,  121  N.  W.  603,  140  W1&  68. 

"Whether  the  word  'may/  In  a  statute, 
is  permissive  or  obligatory  depends  In  a 
great  measure  on  the  true  Intent  and  object 
of  the  L^rlslature  in  making  the  enactment 
It  means  'must'  whenever  third  persons  or 
the  pnbUc  have  an  interest  In  having  the  act 
done  or  have  a  dalm  de  jure  that  the  power 
shall  be  exercised."  The  provisions  of  Acts 
24th  Leg.  Sees.  (Laws  1885,  p.  213,  c.  132), 
constituting  a  eipecial  road  law  for  certain 
coanties,  that  the  oommlsstoners'  court  "may" 
condemn  land  in  the  same  manner  that  a 
railroad  company  can  condemn  land  for  a 
right  of  vray  is  mandatory,  and  does  not 
merely  confer  on  the  commissioners'  court  a 
discretiLonary  power  to  proceed  under  the 
railroad  law.  Plowman  v.  DaUas  County 
(Tex.)  88  S.  W.  262,  256  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  Rains  v.  Herring,  68  Tex. 
468,  6  S.  W.  869). 

The  word  "may"  Is  not  to  be  oonstmed 
as  "must"  or  "shall*"  but  merely  as  permis* 
sive  and  discretionary  with  the  dty,  in  an 
ordinance  providing  that  the  grade  of  alleys, 
not  otherwise  fixed,  at  the  points  of  Inter- 
section with  streets  whose  grades  are  estab- 
lished by  the  ordinance,  shall  be  the  same  as 
said  streets,  and  continuous  from  one  street 
to  tiie  next,  but  between  any  two  adjacent 
streets  along  the  line  of  the  alley  vertical 
curves  of  grade  "may"  be  used,  when  neces- 
sary to  facilitate  drainage  or  afford  better 
access  to  property  along  the  line  of  said  al- 
ley, eta,  for  in  interpreting  statutes  and  or- 
dinances the  word  "may"  should  not  be  con- 
strued to  mean  "must"  or  "shall,"  for  the 
purpose  of  creating  or  determining  the  char- 
acter of  private  rights.  Kelley  v.  City  of 
Cedar  FaUs,  99  N.  W.  056,  557, 128  Iowa,  660. 

Under  Acts  1891,  p.  323,  c.  118  (Burns* 
Ann.  St  1901,  i  4291),  providing  that  after  re- 
ceiving bids  for  the  improvement  of  a  street, 
in  case  all  bids  are  rejected  as  unsatisfac- 
tory, then  the  common  council  "may"  order 
work  to  be  done  by  the  street  commissioner, 
the  total  cost  of  the  work  not  to  be  in  excess 
of  the  lowest  bid  or  that  the  common  council 
"may**  readvertise  for  bids  for  the  work,  the 
council  must  either  order  the  work  done  by 
the  commissioner,  or  readvertise  for  bids  for 
the  work,  and  they  are  not  at  liberty,  after 
accepting  one  of  the  number  of  bids  submit- 
ted, for  street  wofk,  on  subsequent  recon- 
sideration and  rejection  of  the  bid,  to  accept 
the  proposal  of  another  bidder  submitted  at 
the  same  time  as  the  bid  rejected,  but  with 
a  change  of  material,  all  of  whidi  was  done 
without  readvertiaement  for  bids.  Where 
power  is  given  to  public  oflaoers,  and  the 
public  Interest  or  Individual  rights  called  for 
ItR  exercise,  the  language  used,  though  per- 
missive in  form,  is  in  fact  peremptory,  and 
the  intent  of  the  Legislature  in  such  cases 
IS  not  to  declare  a  mere  direction,  but  to  im- 
pose a   positive   and    absolute  duty«    Zom 


▼.  Wanvn-Scharf  Asphalt  Paving  Co«  G&d.) 
81  N.  B.  672,  675  (citing  Bode  Island  Comity 
V.  United  States  ez  r^  State  Bank,  4  Wall. 
485^  18  L.  Ed.  419). 

A  waterworks  system  In  a  village  of  the 
fourth  class  was  extended  to  supply  aU  the 
Inhabitants  except  four.  Relator  was  the 
only  one  of  the  four  to  Insist  that  it  be  ex- 
tended to  supply  him,  and  he  sued  for  man- 
damus. The  cost  of  the  extension  would  be 
less  than  $500.  Village  Law  (Laws  1897,  p. 
434,  c  414)  art  9,  |  224,  as  amended  by 
Jaws  1903,  p.  807,  c.  131, 1 1,  provided  that  a 
system  of  waterworks  established  under  the 
article  shall  be  under  the  control  of  the 
board  of  water  commissioners,  and  that  tbe 
board  shall  keep  it  in  repair,  and  "may"  ex- 
tend the  mains  within  the  village,  if  the  ex- 
pense in  any  one  year,  In  a  village  of  the 
fourth  class,  shall  not  exceed  $600,  and  that 
a  board  "may,"  in  lieu  of  extending  tbe 
mains,  etc.,  use  the  amount  q>eclfled  in  im- 
proving the  existing  system.  Ttie  original 
cost  of  the  system,  which  was  met  by  an  Is- 
sue of  bonds,  relator  being  taxed  for  interest 
thereon,  was  $20,000,  and  there  were  160 
residency  or  places  of  business.  The  board 
had  no  money  on  hand  to  make  the  exten- 
sion. Held,  that  the  word  "may,"  as  used  in 
the  phrase  "may  extend'*  in  any  one  year, 
etc.,  though  permissire,  would  be  construed 
"must,**  especially  in  view  of  the  permissive 
character  of  "may**  used  in  the  last  sentence 
of  the  statute,  giving  an  alternative  use  of 
the  money.  People  ex  rel.  Hllllker  v.  Pierce^ 
119  N.  Y.  Supp.  21.  23,  64  Misc.  Rep.  627. 

The  term  *'may,"  as  used  in  Laws  1900, 
p.  1.302,  c.  571,  providing  that  the  city  of 
Buffalo  "may"  enlarge  and  embank  the  Buf- 
falo river,  implies  a  discretion  in  the  dty 
find  places  no  absolute  duty  on  it  of  improv- 
ing such  river.  White  v.  C^ty  of  BulTalo,  115 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1021,  1028,  131  App.  DIv.  581. 

The  word  ''may**  must  be  construed  as 
*'8hall,"  when  an  act  of  the  Legislature  can 
be  thereby  upheld,  If  a  contrary  construction 
would  render  it  obnoxious  to  a  constitutional 
inhibition.  The  conTerse  cf  this  must  be 
likewise  true,  and  Denver  City  Charter,  art 
7,  I  31,  providing  that  the  dty  council  shall 
pass  an  assessing  ordinance  after  recommen- 
dations of  the  council  for  improvements  have 
beai  reviewed  by  the  board  of  public  works, 
is  to  be  construed  as  meaning  that  tbe  coun- 
cil may  pass  such  an  ordinance,  (3ty  of. 
Denver  V.  Londoner,  80  Pac.  117, 121,  33  CJolo, 
104  (citing  Board  of  County  Ck>m*rs  of  Pueblo 
County  V.  Smith,  45  Pac.  357.  22  Colo.  534). 

The  words  "may**  and  "shall,"  when 
used  in  a  statute,  will  sometimes  be  read  in- 
terchangeably, as  will  best  express  the  legis- 
lative Intent  Tbe  word  ''may"  will  be  con- 
strued to  mean  "shaU,"  wlien  Uie  pnblle  ar 
third  person  have  a  dalm  that  the  power 
ought  to  be  exercised;  but,  when  ttie  word 
"shall'*  is  used  where  no  right  or  benefit  to 


IIAT 


846 


MAT 


any  one  depends  on  Its  imperatli^  use,  that 
word  may  be  htid  diieetory  maraly,  and  by 
legislative  intention  to  be  used  synonymoae- 
ly  with  the  wozd  "may."  Act  Kay  20,  1889, 
entitled  "An  act  to  cieate  sanitary  districts 
and  to  remove  obstructions  in  the  Des  Plaines 
and  Illinois  riyers"  (section  28),  provides  that 
the  sanitary  district  constructing  a  channel 
to  carry  water  ftom  Lake  Michigan  may  cor- 
rect, modify,  and  remove  obstructions  in 
the  Des  Plaines  and  Illinois  rivers,  where- 
ever  it  shall  be  necessary  so  to  do  to  prevoit 
overflow  or  damage  along  such  rivers,  and 
"shall'*  remove  the  dams  at  Henry  and  Cop- 
peras creek,  in  the  Illinois  river,  before  any 
water  shall  be  turned  into  the  said  canal; 
also  that  if  the  canal  commissioners  "find  at 
any  time  that  an  additional  supply  of  water 
has  been  added  to  either  of  said  livers*  by 
any  drainage  district  or  districts,  to  main- 
tain a  depth  of  not  less  than  six  feet  from 
and  dam  ofwned  I7  the  state^  to  and  into  the 
first  lock  of  the  mtntAB  and  Michigan  Canal 
at  Lasalle,  without  the  aid  of  any  such  dam, 
at  low  water,  then  it  shall  be  the  duty  of 
said  canal  commissioners  to  cause  sodi  dam 
or  dams  to  be  rttnoved."  The  dams  were 
oonstnlcted  by  the  canal  commissloneffs  at  a 
great  expense,  and  their  destruction  would 
greatly  injure  navigation.  It  was  held  that 
the  word  "shall"  should  be  construed  as 
"may,"  so  that  the  removal  of  the  dams  at 
Henry  and  Copperas  creek  by  the  sanitary 
district  is  not  mandatory,  but  depends  on  the 
qnestion  of  necessity,  and  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  canal  commissioners  to  preserve  and 
protect  the  dams  until  the  conditions  stated 
result  Canal  Com'rs  v.  Sanitary  Dlst  of 
Chicago,  66  N.  B.  963,  966,  184  IlL  697. 

PwasliaieBt  of  erlnriiiftls 

Beformatory  Act  (Hurd's  Rev.  St  1909, 
c  118)  1 10,  divides  persons  who  may  be  sen- 
tenced thereunder  into  two  classes,  viz., 
males  between  10  and  16  years  of  age*  and 
males  between  16  and  21.  Section  U  pro- 
vides that  a  boy  between  10  and  16  years 
of  age  "shall  be  committed"  to  the  reforma- 
tory; while  section  9  provides  that  both 
classes  "may  be  sentenced"  to  the  reforma- 
toiy.  Section  10  declares  that  in  all  oriminal 
cases  tried  by  a  Jury,  where  it  is  found  that 
the  defendant  is  betwe^  10  and  21  years  of 
age,  the  Jury  shall  not  fix  the  punishment, 
unless  it  shall  also  appear  that  defendant 
has  been  previously  sentenced  to  the  peniten- 
tiary, or  that  the  offense  is  a  capital  one, 
and  Parole  Law,  f  1  (Hurd's  Rev.  St  1909, 
c  38,  i  498),  excepts  from  its  appUcation 
treason,  murder,  rape^  and  kidnai^^King.  Held, 
that  the  parole  law  was  not  intended  to  de- 
stroy by  imiHication  the  application  of  the 
reformatory  act  to  males  between  the  ages 
of  10  and  21,  convicted  of  rape;  but  that  the 
word  "may,**  in  section  9  of  the  reformatory 
act,  diould  be  construed  to  mean  "must"; 
and  hence  a  boy  of  19,  on  being  convicted  of 
rape^  could  not  be  properly  sentenced  to  tiie 


penitentiafy.    PMple  ▼•  Smith,  97  V.  B.  649, 
660,  268  IlL  288. 

Code  1899,  e  160,  |  2,  providing  that  in 
any  other  criminal  cases  than  in  cases  of 
sentence  to  death  or  to  the  penitentiary  the 
court  "may  postpone"  the  execution  of  the 
Judgment,  where  a  writ  of  error  lies,  the 
word  "may"  means  "shall,"  and  a  person 
convicted  of  misdemeanor  is  entitled  as  mat- 
ter of  right  to  suspension  of  the  execution 
of  the  Judgment  pending  application  for  a 
writ  of  error.  Bx  parte  Doyle,  67  S.  B. 
824,  62  W.  Va.  280. 

The  word  "may,"  in  Bev.  Codes  1899,  | 
8246,  providing  that,  where  the  punishment 
imposed  by  the  Jury  in  the  verdict  is  under 
the  limit  prescribed  by  law  for  the  offense 
of  which  defendant  is  found  guilty,  the  court 
"may"  receive  the  verdict  and  render  Judg- 
ment for  the  lowest  limit  prescribed  by  law, 
is  mandatory,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  trial 
Judges  to  receive  su<di  a  verdict  and  enter 
Judgment  thereon.  State  v.  Barry,  103  N. 
W.  687,  689,  640,  14  N.  D.  816. 

The  word  "may,"  as  used  in  Acts  1897, 
p.  78,  &  68,  i  8,  providing  that  the  board  of 
managers  of  the  Indiana  reformatory  may 
terminate  the  imprisonment  of  certain  in- 
mates when  the  rules  and  requirements  of 
such  reformatory  have  been  obeyed  and  per- 
formed according  to  the  provisions  of  the 
act,  must  be  understood  in  its  usual  acc^Ha- 
tion  and  as  granting  to  such  board  permis- 
sion, Uberty,  or  discretion  to  terminate  such 
imprisonment,  and  not  as  imposing  on  the 
board  a  duty  to  be  performed  in  all  case», 
whether  such  board  believes  the  person  im- 
prisoned entitled  to  his  discharge  or  other- 
wise. Should  the  clause  of  the  act  be  con- 
strued as  mandatory,  all  discipline  in  the 
institution  would  inevitably  be  overthrown, 
and  the  board  be  exposed  to  iimumerable  and 
constantly  recurring  legal  controversies  with 
the  inmates  over  the  question  of  the  right  to 
a  discharge.  Terry  v.  Byera,  68  N.  B.  696, 
698,  161  Ind.  860. 

BeoeiTegship 

In  Bev.  Codee,  i  4881,  providing  that  the 
court  may  require  an  undertaking  from  an 
applicant  for  a  receivership,  "may"  does  not 
mean  "must"  Lee  v.  Stevens,  127  Paa  680, 
681,  22  Idaho,  670. 

Beferemeo 
The  word  "may,"  as  used  in  Bev.  St 
1898, 1  2864,  providing  tHat  aU  or  any  of  the 
issues  in  an  action  may  be  referred,  is  not 
used  with  reference  to  public  rights  or  inter- 
ests, or  where  the  publie  or  a  third  penoo 
have  a  dahn  de  Jure  that  the  power  shaU  be 
exercised.  So  it  is  not  an  instance  where  by 
the  rules  of  statutory  construction  a  permis- 
sive word  shall  be  given  the  mandatory  sig- 
nificance of  "must"  or  "shalL"  When  a  per- 
missive word  is  not  so  used  In  the  statute, 
it  must  be  taken  in  its  liteml  sense.  The 
privilege  of  the  statute  in  question  is  design- 


liAT 


S46 


>ULT 


^*f6i  the-^uveBl^et  of  both  Oie  court  and 
parties.  Hence  the  statute  duthdrlzes  a  Tef- 
erence  in  the  discretlan  of  the  court,  and 
does  not  entitle  a  party  to  a  reference  as  a 
(natter  of  right  Hart  v,  Glodkln«  100  N.  W. 
1067, 1068,  122  Wis.  646. 

Rea:nlatioai  of  freigl^t  rates     ' 

Under  a  railroad  charter  providing  that, 
when  the  aggregate  amount  of  di\:ldends  de- 
clared shall  amount  to  the  full  sum  Invested 
and  10  per  centum  per  annum  thereon,  the 
Legislature  "may"  so  regulate  the  tolls  and 
freights  that  not  more  than  16  per  centum 
per  annum  shall  be  divided  on  the  capital  em- 
ployed, and  the  surplus  profits,  if  any,  etc., 
the  word  "may*'  is  permissive.  Terre  Haute 
&  i.  R.  Co.  V.  Indiana  ex  rel.  Ketcham,  24 
Sup.  Ct  767,  760,  194  U.  S.  679,  48  L.  Ed. 
1124. 

Under  Loa  Laws  1847,  p.  77,  creating  a 
corporation  with  power  to  construct  a  rail- 
road between  certain  points,  and  with  the 
right  to  fix  its  transportation  rates  untU  the 
stockholders  had  received  in  dividends  an 
ajnount  equal  to  the  sum  invested  and  10 
per  cent,  per  annum  thereon,  when  the  Leg- 
islature may  regulate  the  rates,  the  word 
"may"  cannot  be  construed  to  mean  "shall." 
Terre  Haute  A  I.  R.  Co.  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Ketcham,  66  N.  B.  401,  406,  159  Ind.  438.    . 

Sj^eoifio  perfom&Aiioe 

Under  Civ.  Code,  art.  1926,  the  obligee  In 
a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land  is  entitled  to 
damages,  or  specific  performance,  at  his  op- 
tion, and  by  article  1927  he  Is  entitled  only  to 
damages  in  ordinary  cases,  but  "may"  be 
awarded  specific  performance  In  cases  where 
damages  would  be  inadequate  relief..  Con- 
struing these  two  articles  together  and  read- 
ing the  word  "may"  in  conjunction  with  the 
word  "entitled,"  to  which  it  stands  in  core- 
lation,  the  word  "may"  piust  be  given  the 
meaning  of  "shall."  Glrault  v.  Feucht,  41 
South.  672,  573,  117  La.  276. 

Tazatioii 

^  In  Pol.  Code,  i  8804,  requiring  that  any 
taxes  paid  more  than  once,  or  erroneously  or 
illegally  collected,  may  by  order  of  the  boiard 
of  shpervisors  be  refunded  by  the  county 
treasurer,  the  word  "may"  means  "shall." 
Stewart  Law  ft  Collection  Co.  v.  Alameda 
County,  76  Pac.  481,  482, 142  Gal.  660. 

1*01.  Code,  i  11804,  proTldea  that  any 
taxes,  penalties,  and  costs  paid  more  than, 
once,  or  erroneously  or  illegally  collected, 
may,  by  order  of  the  supervisors,  be  refund- 
ed. Held,  that  the  duty  to  refund  was 
mandatory ;  the  word  'teay"  being  ccmstrued 
to  mean  "must,"  under  the  rule  that,  where 
persons  or  the  public  have  an  interest  in  hav- 
ing an  act  done  by  a  public  body,  the  word 
*"may*'  la  to  be  so  •  construed:  Brenner  v. 
City  of  Los  Angles,:  116  Pad;  397,  400,  160 
CaL  72.. 


'  JsL  O.L.  I  987,  gives  thlg  county  court  the 
ahOuHrity  and  powers  of  county  commissloD- 
ers  to  transact  county  business.  It  Is  au- 
thorized by  subsections  8  and  4  to  establish, 
vacate,  or  alter  highways,  and  provide  for  the 
erection  of  bridges.  By  subsection  7,  to  de- 
termine the  amount  of  revenue  to  be  raised 
for  county  purposes,  and  to  levy  the  rate 
necessary  therefor ;  and  by  subsection  9  it  U 
given  the  general  management  of  county 
property,  funds,  and  business,  where  the  law 
does  not  othenvise  provide.  Acts  1903,  p. 
262,  wbidi  remodeled  the  entire  road  system 
of  the  state,  repealing  all  previous  legislation 
on  the  subject,  did  not  in  terms  repeal  section 
937;  but  tt  was  amended  by  Acts  1909,  p.  296. 
so  as  to  provide,  in  section  34  (L.  O^  L.  |§ 
6820,  6321),  that  the  county  court  "may"  levy 
a  tax,  not  to  exceed  10  mills  on  the  dollar, 
which  shall  be  set  apart  as  a  general  road 
fund.  Held  that,  while  the  word  "'may," 
when  referring  to  a  ministerial  public  duty,  te 
often  construed  as  "shair  or  **must,"  the  or- 
dinary import  of  the  word  is  directory,  and 
as  the  later  legislation  does  Hot  in  terms  a^ 
tempt  to  Infringe  on  the  authority  of  the  coun- 
ty court  Its  provisions  must  be  regarded  as 
merely  cumulative,  and  it  rests  within  the 
discretion  of  the  county  court  to  make  tbe 
levy  provided  for  in  section  34.  Kime  t. 
Thompson,  118  Pac,  174,  176,  60  Or.  188. 

The  word  /*may/'  as  used  in  a  statute 
providing  that  a  tax  collector  "may"  noti^ 
a  nonresident  taxpayer  of  the  time  and  place 
at  which  he  will  receive  pa^^ment  of  tlie 
tax,  and  that  the  time  shall  not  be  less  tban 
20  or  more  than  40  days  from  the  time  when 
the  notice  is  mailed,  in  view  of  the  summary 
method  of  proceeding  against  property  for 
taxes,  la  used  in  the  mandatory  sense  of 
"must."  Brash  v.  Watson,  69  AtL  141,  142, 
81  Vt  43. 

It  is  well  settled  that  the  word  "may" 
or  the  words  "it  shall  be  lawful"  are  peremp- 
tory when  used  in  a  statute  conferring  au- 
thority to  do  certain  acts,  where  the  public 
or  an  individual  has  a  right  de  Jure  that  tbe 
powers  conferred  by  the  act  should  be  ex- 
ercised. Where  a  Judgment  was  obtahied 
against  a  city  on  a  debt  which  arose  prior 
to  the  Constitution  of  1876,  pursuant  to  a 
statute  authorizing  the  city  to  levy  taxes  to 
pay  the  debt,  the  dty  must  levy  a  tax  to  pay 
a  Judgment  within  the  limitation  as  to  tbe 
amount  of  levy  provided  by  Const  1901,  } 
216,  and  on  its  refusal  the  Judgment  creditor 
is  entitled  to  compel  thie  levy  by  mandamus. 
Graham  t.  City  of  Tuscnmbia,  42  South.  400, 
402, 146  Ala.  449  (quotiug  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  Tarver  v.  Oommissionerflr  Ck)urt  of 

Tallapoosa  County,  17  Ala.  627). 
'  «  i    * 

In  a  statute  whi^h  provided  that  a  board 
of  supervisors  "may,  if  deemed  advisable," 
levy  a  special  tax  to  pay  a  cartain  indebted- 
ness, tbe  language  was  Qeremptory.  Where 
power,  is  given  to  public  offlcor^  In  such  Ian- 


HAT 


8U 


MAT 


goage»'if  tli^  paWt  lateretft/or'laAlvidiial 
rights  eall  tor  its  exerdse,  the  tsn^poag^ 
thonflth  pemiaiaTe  In  fbrm,  is  In  ttict  peramfH 
torj,  and  what  they  are  eiapowsend  to  do  for 
a  third  perton  the  Uiw  requires  shall  he  don^ 
The  power  Is  given,  not  for  their  benefit*  but 
for  his.  It  Is  placed  with  the  depositary  to 
meet  the  demands  of  rlt^t  and  to  prevent  a 
failure  of  Justice.  It  is  given  as  a  remedy 
to  those  entitled  to  invoke  its  aid  who  would 
be  otherwise  remediless  in  aU  such  ea3es« 
The  intent  of  the  Legislature  which  is  the 
test  is  not  to  devolve  a  mere  discretion  but 
to  impose  a  positive  and  absolute  duty.  tJuit^. 
ed  States  v.  Cornell  Steamboat  Co.,  137  Fed, 
455,  458,  69  C  C.  A.  603  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  given  in  Bock  Island  Counjty  v, 
United  States  ex  rel.  S^te  Bank,  4  WalL  [71 
n.  8.]  4^  Ig  L.  Ifi^d.  419). 

The  word  '•may/'  in  a  statute,  will  be 
construed  to  mean  ''shall,**  where  the  Imbject- 
matier  ik^toe  in  which  the  public  bav^  an 
interest  to  be  protected  or  promoted  by  thd 
ezerdse  of  a  power  or  the  performance  of 
a  prescribed  duty  by  a  public  officer,  unleds 
the  context  shows  that  the  word  was  used  fn 
its  primary  signification.  However,  as  use^ 
in  Galveston  city  charter,  section  56,  provid- 
ing that  laAt  taHty  be  brouglkt  to  C6nb<«t  taxes, 
is  not  mandatory.  Bmmmer  v.  City  o^  ^1- 
veston,  76  8.  W.  4S28,  429,  97  Tex.  99  (dtlng 
ismisson  V.  JStkte,  9  8.  W.  lU,  71  T^x.  2^)/'  > 

THal 

The  word  'Wy^"  in  R^v.  6t  1899,  | 
748,  providing  that  upon  ttie  conclusion  of  the 
evidence  either  party  "miiy*'  move  the  court 
to  instruct  and  the  court  "may**  of  its  own 
motion  give  instructions,  is  not  used  in  a 
mandatory  sense,  and  the  court  Is  not  requir- 
ed to  give  Instructions  in  a  dVfl  action, 
where  no  instructions  are  requested.  Hall  vi 
St  Louis  k  8.  By.  Oo.,  101  8.  W.  1137,  1140, 
124  Mo.  App.  661. 

The  word  "may,**  as  used  in.Eev.  St. 
1899,  I  748,  providlDg  that  the  court  **may»* 
of  its  own  motion  give  instructions  on  any 
point  of  law  arising  ip  the  cause,  ia  permis- 
stye  and  not  mandatory.  Wilson  v.  Kansaa 
aty  Southern  By.  Co.,  99  8.' W.  465,  466, 
122  UTo.  App.  667; 

Where  the  statute  ^provided  tbat  the 
court  of  chancery  "may,"  in  Mil.  contest 
BQits,  direct  an  issue  of  fact  as  in  other  cases; 
the  word  "may"  Is  equivalent  to  "mu.9t"  and 
the  court, Is  required  to  direct  an  issue  of  de- 
ylsavlt  vil' non\Vh6nevef  demanded;  the 
word  "may,**  in  a  statute,  when  it  cdricerns 
the  public  interest  or  th'^  tights  6t  indlVldu-' 
ate,  being:  mandatory  a^d  equivalent,  ,  tb' 
•^musf*  or  -shalL-  Hill  v.  Barge.  12  AI4.  «8T, 
693.  ■      *       •'• 

"liay  *  ils  used  is  a  statute  providing 
tirnt  a  trial  court  ^*may  order  a  view,"  ete.j 
huplies  a  discretion. '  Commonwealth  y. 
Chance,  64  :N.  fi.  661, -552,  174  Mass.  246,  Ttf 
Am.  8t.'R<^p.  396  (dtlBg  'and- adopting  Gom-> 


m6nwealtti  t.  Webster,  6'  CoidL  t69  Mass.) 
296,296»299,62Am.Dec.711)w    ; 

'  TrjiuM  title  to  ottee 

Where  an  individual  seekb  reli^  of  a  pri- 
vate nature  nndef  Hurd's  R6v.  St  1905,  c. 
112,  f  1;  providing  that,  when  a  person  un- 
lawfully holds  an  otfioe  in  a  corporation 
created  by  the  state,  '*tbe  Attorney  General 
or  state's  attorney,  either  of  his  own  accord 
tfr  at  the  instance  of 'an  Individual,  "may* 
present «•  petition  te'kny  coait  of  record  of 
competent  jurisdiction"  for  leave  to  file- «n 
toformatiQD'in  the  aatara  of  aumq  warrimto, 
it  waa  he)d  lii^t  tlM  on)y  fUaoetlon  vested  in 
tfie  pvoseei|tibi|g^aiQcer.is  to  detennUie  wheth- 
er; Ui(9  documentia  9«e9ento4  to  )iiip  aj^.in 
proper  legal  form,  and  ^wbetb#r  ev^wice- Is 
preseatcyl  sn^l^t.  W  9stabUBh  the  fieraop^s 
pj^ma  fac^,  right  to. the  raUef^  It  was  urged 
that,  any  anch  ponstructien.  -WPQ14  result  Jkn 
hpidlng  t^at.the.wo^id  *'Jaa%f»y.  ^  t]kie.lwg\iago 
quoted,  means  "may''  in  cases  wh^re.op^vtlia 
public  interest  is  at  stal^e,  and.  means  "shall" 
where  private  interests  afe  Involved,  and  that 
It  would  be  an  anomaly  to  hold  that  th^  same 
word  in  the  same  sentence  of  a  statute  may 
mean  oiie  thing  when  applied  to  one  class  of 
oases  knd-  another  thing  when  applied^' to 
anothet:  class,  butt  the  court  was  of  the  qpln- 
ion  that  thiir^  presented  no  serious  diflfctiltV^ 
stating  that,  '^hen  the  iJetjjtslature  extended 
the  right 'to  pi^vate  Inditiduats  to  assert  pri- 
vate rights  by  .tills  preceding,  it  is  ap]>arent 
that  it  was  Intended  that  tl(ey  sh6i^1d,haye,an 
opportunity  to  seek.r^ress  for.  their  wron^ 
by  making  a^Ucatloh  to  a  cout^t,  or  Judge 
thereof,  /or'  l^ave.  to  file  an  infbrm^tiou; 
th^t'the  duty  re^tihg  on  the  state's  attoirney 
to  sign  and  present  a  petition  for  teave  to 
file  an  information  .in- ^  .mUure  of  a.^io 
warranto,  where  evidence  of  faets  is  properly 
presented  to  him  by  a  proposed  relator,  whlc^ 
shows  prima  fade  that  the  rector  l^  legal- 
ly entitled  to  the  relief,  In  reference  to  a 
private  right,  which  would  be  afforded  >  Mm 
by  a  Judgment  in  his  favor  in  a  quo  warranto 
proceeding,  is  an  absolute. one.  and  it  foilpw-. 
ed,  therefore,  that,  where  he  declines  to  act 
fiortany  reason  other  than  U^at.the  fac^,  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  which  is  presented, 
to  him»  do  not  warrant  th^  relief  which  the 
proposed  relator  seeks,  or  that  the  petition 
and  affidavit  or  affidavits  presented  to  him 
are  not  in  proper  leiial  fbrm,'  his  declaration 
Is  an' abuse  bf  his  discretldn,  conceding  that 
Ms  cofistructicftt  of  the  statute  be  correct,  and 
such  an  abuse  of  discretion  as  amounts  to  a 
reJHisal  on  his  p'Art  to  exercise  his  dlscreftoii* 
at  all  and  to  a  refusafl  to  t»rfonn  the  dutir 
enjoined  upon  him  by  the  law.  People  v. 
If ealy.  82,  N.  0. 699,  602,  239  UL  280, 16  L.  R. 

▼eiaiae 

The  word  "nHKy*"  as  lised  in  Gen.  8t 
1^94,  I  6I861  which  ptovldes  that,  Wherd  de- 
fendant Is  a  nonresidettt  and  l>latntlff  pro- 
deeds  by  atlachl&g  his-  ptfopisrty,  the  action' 


BCAT 


S48 


MATBB 


may  be  bronfirlit  in  any  county  wbere  de- 
fendant has  property  liable  to  attachment,  is 
not  mandatory,  and  cannot  be  construed  as 
meaning  "must"  Clements  v.  Utley,  08  N. 
W.  188,  188,  91  Minn.  852. 

The  words  "may  be  bronght,"  as  used  in 
Kirby's  Dig.  i  6067,  providing  that  an  action 
against  a  corporation  "may  be  brought"  in 
certain  counties,  have  the  meaning  ot  "shall 
be  brought,"  and  are  mandatory.  Spratley 
V.  Louisiana  ft  A.  By.  Ck>^  96  a  W.  776^  777; 
77  Ark.  412. 

The  words  "may  be  brought,"  as  used  in 
Kirby's  Dig.  f  6068,  protidlng  that  an  action 
against  a  railroad  company  or  an  owner  of  a 
line  of  mall  coaches  or  other  coaches,  for  in- 
Jury  to  person  or  property,  may  be  brought 
in  any  county  through  or  Into  which  the  road 
or  line  passes,  have  the  meaning  of  "shall  be 
brought,"  and  are  mandatory.  Chicago,  B.  I. 
ft  P.  B.  Co.  ▼.  Jaber,  107  8.  W.  U70,  1171, 
86  Ark.  232. 

The  word  "may,"  as  used  In  Code,  I  8214, 
subd.  7,  providing  that  where  a  circuit  court 
Judge  is  interested  in  a  case  which,  but  for 
such  interest,  would  be  within  the  Jurisdic- 
tion of  his  court,  the  action  may  be  brought 
In  any  county  in  an  adjoining  circuit,  was  not 
used  in  the  fienae  of  "may  only,"  or  "must," 
but  thereunder  a  circuit  court  Judge  may 
bring  an  action  in  the  circuit  court  of  any 
county  in  his  circuit  in  which  the  defendants 
reside.  Harrison  v.  Wissler,  36  S.  E.  982,  983, 
98  Va.  597  (quoting  and  adopting  Thompson  v. 
Roe  ex  dem.  Carroll,  22  How.  [68  U.  S.]  422, 
434,  16  li.  Ed.  391,  and  citing  and  adopting 
Minor  v.  Mechanics'  Bank,  1  Pet  (26  U.  8.] 
46,  64,  7  li.  Ed.  65). 


Ae— Cnuuige  of 

Gen.  St  1909,  |  5660,  provides  that  where 
it  shall  be  made  to  appear  that  the  Judge  is 
Interested  in  the  subject-matter  or  is  other- 
wise disqualified,  the  court  may,  upon  ap> 
plication  of  either  party,  change  the  place  of 
trial.  Held,  that  "may,"  as  used,  means 
"must"  and,  where  the  necessary  fiicts  have 
been  made  to  appear,  a  change  of  venue  Is 
not  a  matter  of  discretion  of  the  court  but 
a  right  In  tbe  party  applying  therefor.  Jones 
V.  American  Cent  Ins.  Co.,  109  Paa  1077, 
1080,  83  Kan.  44. 

The  word  "may"  In  Bev.  Codes  1899, 
I  6652,  providing  that  a  Justice  of  the  peace 
may  before  trial,  on  motion,  change  the  place 
of  trial  in  certain  cases,  should  be  construed 
to  mean  "must"  Walker  v.  Maronda,  106 
N.  W.  296,  297,  16  N.  D.  68. 

Under  Laws  1891,  c.  60,  amending  sec- 
tion 7312,  Comp.^  Laws,  providing  that  a  crim- 
inal action  prosecuted  by  indictment  may, 
at  any  time  before  trial  is  begun,  on  the  ap- 
plication of  defoidant  be  removed  from  the 
court  in  which  It  is  pending,  whenever  it 
3hall  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court 
by  affidavit  that  a  fair  and  impartial  trial 


cannot  be  had,  (be  word  ^inay**  will  be  eo 
strued  as  imperative,  whece  an  affidavit 
presented   by   accused    sufficiently    allegti 
prejudice  of  the  presiding  Judge.     State 
Hennlng,  64  N.  W.  686,  688,  8  8.  IX  492. 

The  Legislature,  by  using  the  term  "sha 
grant  a  change  of  Judge,"  in  Sess.  Lav 
1907-08,  c  68,  art  1,  f  10,  p.  592,  Instead  ( 
the  term  "may,  on  application  of  eith< 
party,  change  the  place  of  trial  to  some  cou 
ty  where  such  objection  does  not  exist"  1 
view  of  the  construction  of  the  word  "ma] 
in  the  case  of  Kansas  Pacific  By.  v.  Reynold 
8  Kan.  680,  did  not  render  the  statute  in  tfai 
respect  any  more  mandatory,  and  there  ca 
be  no  spedal  significance  in  the  use  of  tl 
word  "shall"  instead  of  the  word  "may 
State  ex  reL  Smith  v.  Brown,  103  Pac.  76 
766,  24  Okl.  433. 

Wil&drawal  of  plea 
Code,  I  5337,  providing  that  at  any  tin 
before  Judgment  the  court  "may"  permit 
plea  of  guilty  to  be  withdrawn  and  other  pic 
or  pleas  substituted,  is  mandatory.    State 
Hortman,  97  N.  W.  981,  982»  122  Iowa,  10 

MATBB 

The  teem  ''may  be,"  in  a  will  piovidii] 
that  the  trust  "may  be"  ended  whoi  the  te 
tator's  eldest  child  comes  to  21  years  of  agi 
or,  being  a  daughter.  Is  married.  Implies  nei 
essarlly  that  the  trust  may  or  not  be  the 
terminated.  Hence,  until  it  has  been  tei 
mlnated  by  the  act  of  the  parties  or  of 
court  of  competent  Jurisdiction,  the  trust  wl 
endure  so  as  to  conserve  the  title  and  intei 
est  devised,  to  the  ends  intended  by  the  set 
tlor.    Davis  ▼.  Dovey  (Ky.)  85  S.  W.  725.  72( 

The  rule  appears  to  be  settled  that  wbei 
the  term  "may  be"  is  used  in  statutes,  unlefi 
the  contrary  appears  from  the  context  it  i 
to  be  construed  as  meaning  in  the  futun 
Bohart  v.  Anderson,  108  Pac.  742,  743,  744, 2 
OkL  82,  20  Ann.  Cas.  142  (citing  Board  o 
Commissioners  of  Pitkin  County  v.  Aspe 
Mining  &  Smelting  Co.,  32  Pac  718,  3  Cole 
App.  223 ;  Shoemaker  v.  Smith,  37  Ind.  128 
6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4447). 

Civ.  Code,  f  3193,  provides  that  an  ac 
ceptance  of  a  bill  of  exchange  must  be  ii 
writing,  and  "may  be  made"  by  the  accepto 
writing  his  name  across  the  f^ce  of  the  bill 
with  or  without  other  words.  Held,  that  th( 
phrase  "may  be  made"  Indicates  that  the  sec 
tion  is  permissive,  only,  and  that  any  otlie 
written  acceptance  clearly  disclosing  tb< 
drawee's  Intention  to  accept  will  coi^stltut 
an  acceptance.  Hughes  Bros.  v.  Bawhid< 
Qold  Mining  Co.*  116  Pac  969,  971«  16  Gal 
App.  298. 

Where  testator  bequeathed  a  sum  to  Ui 
daughter,  but  provided  that  the  amount  sb< 
"may  be"  owing  on  his  books  should  be  de 
ducted  therefrom,  and  about  $20,000  was 
charged  against  her  at  the  time,  but  no  ad 


MATBB 


M» 


ICAT  HAYB 


fuioeiiMnta  were  made  tbenaftet  tbe  words 
quoted  referred  to  adyancemente  already 
made.  In  re  Breder'e  Estate.  119  N.  W.  1104, 
1107, 166  MJtelL  607. 

""May  be  reTlTed,**  in  equity  role  60,  pre- 
acribing  the  procednre  to  refine  a  snit  on  the 
death  of  a  iMtrty,  the  expreeaion  ''may  be  ve> 
TiTod**  afaoold  be  read  «*nrast  b^  or  ''ahaU 
be/*  and  one  entitled  to  reriTe  a  suit  in  eq- 
nity,  which  has  abated  by  the  death  of  a 
party,  la  not  authorised  to  proceed  therefor 
by  motion,  bnt  must  follow  the  proeedure  pre- 
scribed by  rule  60  by  filing  a  bill  of  roTiTor, 
or  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  leTivor. 
Dillard's  Adm'r  t.  Central  Virginia  Iron  Co., 
125  Fed.  167,  160. 

MAT  BEOOXB 

*The  phrase  'may  become*  prima  facie 
refers  to  the  future."  Haspel  v.  0*Brien,  07 
AtL  128,  218  Pa.  140,  U  Ann.  Oas.  470. 

MAT  OOMB 

Code,  S  841,  describing  embeszlem^t  by 
a  receiver  as  the  fraudulent  conversion  to  bis 
own  use  of  property  which  "may  come**  into 
his  possession  by  Tirtae  of  his  employmeit, 
eompr^ends  property  In  the  hands  of  the  re* 
ceiver  before  the  passage  ef  the  act,  bnt 
embesKled  thereafter.  Fields  r.  United 
States,  27  App.  D.  C.  438,  488. 

MAT  oomnnix  nr  SBsnov 

The  expression  '*may  continue  In  ses- 
sion," etc,  in  Baltimore  City  Charter  (Laws 
1898,  p.  800,  e.  128)  I  210,  declaring  that  the 
dty  council  shall  meet  on  the  Thursday  next 
after  the  third  Monday  in  May,  1800,  and 
upon  the  same  ^ay  in  each  year  thereafter, 
and  may  continue  in  session  for  120  days, 
and  no  longer,  in  each  year,  provided  that 
they  nmy  so  arrange  their  sittings  that  the 
same  may  be  held  coattniioiisly  or  otherwise, 
does  not  mean  that  at  the  end  of  the  120 
days,  or  at  the  end  of  the  year  during  which 
the  council  meet  that  number  of  days,  all 
unfinished  business  must  come  to  an  end,  and 
be  again  gone  over  from  the  beginning  to 
give  it  effect  Bond  v.  City  of  Baltimore,  74 
AtL  14, 10,  111  Md.  304. 

MATDZDUCT 

Though  the  words  "may  deduct***  as  used 
in  Gbde  Civ.  Proc  i  1903,  as  amended  by 
Laws  1904,  p.  1286,  c  61J5.  providing  that,  in 
an  action  for  wrongful  death,  plaintiff  "may 
deduct**  from  the  amount  recovered  the  ex- 
penses of  the  action,  the  reasonable  funeral 
expenses  of  the  decedent,  and  his  conunis- 
dons  upon  the  residue,  confer  a  mere  power, 
the  power  is  given  without  limitation  as  to 
the  persons  in  whose  favor  it  may  be  exer- 
cised, and  the  observance  of  the  statute  Is 
therefore  not  merely  discretionary  but  is 
rendered  necessary  by  the  scope  of  the  stat- 
ate  and  its  dear  intent  and  purpose.  In  re 
McDermotf  ■  KsUte,  90  N.  T.  Supp.  829,  49 


Misc.  Rep.  402  (citing  PeUeCler  r.  8auBdei% 
07  N.  C.  201;  In  re  Thornton's  Bstate,  6  Ohio 
Dec.  151). 


The  provision  in  the  state  Constitution 
that  cities  of  a  spedfled  class  ''may  frame 
a  charter  for  its  own  government^  means  that 
a  dty  of  such  dass  may  frame  a  diarter  for 
the  government  of  itself  as  a  dty,  which 
indudes  all  that  is  necessary  or  inddent  to 
the  government  of  ttie  munidpallty,  but  not 
all  the  power  that  the  state  has  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  rights  and  regulation  of  the 
duties  of  the  inhabitants  in  the  dty,  as  be- 
tween themselves.  Nor  does  the  Constitu- 
tion confer  unlimited  power  on  the  dty  to 
regulate,  by  its  charter,  all  nmtters  that  ace 
strictly  local,  for  there  are  many  matters 
that  are  local  to  a  dty,  requiring  govern- 
mental protection  which  are  fordgn  to  the 
scope  of  munidpal  government  State  ex 
rel.  Gamer  ▼.  Missouri  ft  K.  Telephone  Co., 
88  S.  W.  41,  48, 180  Mo.  83. 


Where  a  witness  replied  to  a  question 
(Concerning  his  flormer  testimony,  "1  don't 
know;  I  may  have,**  the  words  '"may  have" 
w^e  not  necessary  or  even  probably  intended 
as  a  statement  that  his  best  reoollection  was 
that  he  had  so  testified,  but  rather  that  he 
had  no  recollection  whatever  about  it  The 
answer  seems  to  be  a  statement  that  he  did 
not  know  and  Imd  no  recollection.  Higgins 
T.  Shepard,  70  N.  B.  1014,  1016,  180  Mass.  67. 

Plaintiff  gave  defendant  railroad  compa- 
ny a  receipt  reciting  that  it  was  in  full  sat- 
isfaction of  all  claims  and  demands  whatso- 
ever whidi  plaintiff  "has  or  noay  have** 
against  defendant  by  reason  of  damages  to 
plalntUTs  land  from  the  overflow  of  water, 
etc.,  for  all  expenses  caused  by  the  overflow, 
for  the  conveyance  of  a  parcel  of  land  over 
which  the  overflow  was,  and  for  a  general 
release^  and  providing  that  a  deed  and  re- 
leaae  ahoold  be  executed.  Held,  that  the  re- 
ceipt only  provided  for  the  release  of  tiie  ex- 
isting dalm  for  damages  eaoeed  by  the  over' 
flow,  and  not  for  future  claims  for  such  dam* 
ages.  McCabe  v.  New  Tork  Cent  ft  H.  B.  EL 
Co.,  124  y.  T,  Supp.  062,  0S4,  ISO  App.  DIv. 
008. 

^  'May  have  suff ersd*  Is  a  form  of  the 
verb  to  suffer,'  descriptive  of  completed  ac- 
tion, and,  so  far  as  tense  is  concerned,  is  the 
equivalent  of  the  past  tense.  Indicative  mood, 
*has  suffered.'  This  latter  form  of  tiie  verb 
may  be  substituted  for  that  used  without 
change  of  meaning.**  An  instruction  author- 
izing the  Jury  to  allow  damages  for  any  per- 
manent injuries  plaintiff  *'*may  have  suf- 
fered' by  reason  of  the  injury  in  question,  if 
any,**  was  not  objectionable  as  p^mitting  the 
allowance  of  such  damages  based  on  mere 
probability  or  conjecture.  Ballard  v.  Kansas 
City,  80  S.  W.  479,  480^  110  Mo.  App.  391. 


MAT  HOLD  CX>tRT 


S56 


«kir<>ik' 


The  Words  "may  bold  court,**  aa  nsM  in 
Const  art  7,  S  lit  empowering  the  Legisla- 
ture to  authorize  judges  of  dreait  courts  to 
^old  court  fox  each  other,  do  not  limit  the 
power  of  circuit  Judges  to  the  exchange  only 
to  hold  a  regular  term  of  the  circuit  court, 
but  permit  .the  Legislature  to  autt^orlze  a 
Judge  of  one  circuit  to  make  orders  at  cham-r 
bers  in  anothe^r  circuit,  and  conduct  generally 
the  business  in  such  circuit  which  a  Judge 
is  authorised  by  law  to  transact  In  re 
Southern  Wisconsin  Power  Ck>^  122  N.  W. 
801,  808,  140  Wis.  24$. 

MAT  UaOT 

The  words  **may  limit,**  as  used  in  the 
New  York  Motor  Vehicle  Law,  which  prohib- 
its the  operation  of  motor  vehicles  in  closely 
built  up  districts  at  a  greater  speed  than 
a  mile  in  six  minutes,  and  provides  that  the 
municipal  authorities  may  limit,  by  ordi- 
nance, the  speedT  of  motor  yehicles  on  public 
highways,  are  equivalent  to  the  words  "may 
still  further  restrict"  A  dty'OV  Tillage  Is 
thus  authiorised  to  enact  an  ordinance  pre- 
scribing a  lower  rate  of  speed  within  Its  ter- 
ritorial Jurisdiction  than  that  permitted  by 
the  general  law  itself,  «nd  the  driver  qt  a 
motor  vehicle  at  a  speed  in  excess  of  the 
lower  rate,  but  not  in  excess  of  a  mile  In-  six 
minutes,  is  subject  to  prosecution,  for  viola- 
tlon  of  the  ordinanee  only ;  but  a  perfikon  epr 
erating  an  automobile  at  a  greater  speed 
than  a  mile  in  siX'  minutes,  though  within  the 
limits  of  the  municipality,  is  stUl  liable  to 
punishment  under  the  general  law.  people 
ex  rel.  Hainer  v.  Keeper  of  Prison  of  Seventh 
District  MagistratesV  Ck)urt  of  City  of  New 
York,  83  N.  JB.  .44,  4^,  190  N.  Y,  S15. 

MAT  HEBD 

See  As  She  May  Need. 

MAT  PEBMIT 

'  -  The  term  ♦♦mliy  permit,*  Jin  effulty  rdle 
67,  as  tt  Btood'prfor  to  the  amendment  of  May 
15,  1893,  as  given  In  14/^  U.  8.  793,  18  Sup. 
Ot  III,  cannot  properly  beheld  to  mean  '*may 
require"  or  '*may  compel,*'  and  thse-nile,  as 
amended,  providing  that  on  due  notice  given, 
as  prc8D^ib(Bd  by  pifevlouB  order,  the  ^  court 
may,  In  its  discretion,  permit  the  whole' or 
any  part  of  \tbe  ehridenoe  to  be  addatied  oral- 
ly* in  open  court  on  final  hearlngr  does  not 
require  the  court  to  reqalre  an  Unwilling 
party  to  so  adduce  evidence  and  forego  his 
right  to  Use  the  methods  prescribed  by  the 
rule  prloir  to  the  amendment  Hyams  v. 
Federal  Coal  ft  Coke. Co.,  KS2  BM.  070;  073, 
82  CO;  A.  824. 

MAT  THEK  BE 

See  As  It  May  Then  Be* 

MAT  irSB 

An  agreement  by  one  par^  to  fhmlsh 
and  by  the  other  party  to  purchase  all  the 


coal  of  a  stated  lOhir  tAe  (Mdia'  party  '^a 
use**  in  the  operation  of  a  mine  and  reda 
tlon  works  during  a  limited  time  is  vaU< 
and  binds  the  purchaser  to  take  from  tk 
seller'  all  the  ooal  that  may  be  needed  or  n 
quired  in  the  conduct  of  such  business  dui 
Ing  the  time  specified.  Golden  Cycle  Mlnln 
Co.  V;  Bapson  Coal  Mining  Co.,  188  Fed.  171 
188, 112  a  a  A.  OS. 

MAT  WX8H 

See  As  She  ¥ay  Wlsh^ 

MAY  1ST,  2'FER  CENT,,  OR  JUL1 
■     NET'  *  ■  '  •  ^  "■/    . 

Terms  of  sale,  '*May  Isti  2  per  cent,  o 
July  net,"  mean  that  the  purchaser  may  pa; 
on  or  before  the  earlier  date  and  save  th 
discount,  that  if  he  doe?  not  care  to  do  b( 
by  losing  the  <nseount  he  has  additional  tlm 
wlttdn  which  to  pay,  and  that  the  bill  Is  no 
due  except  at  option  of  purchaser  until  Jul; 
1st  Howes  Sc  Howes  ▼.  Union  Mfg.  Co.  (Ky. 
113  SL  W.  612,  503. 

MAYHEJM 

Slee.  also,  .Malnt 

Under  Code  1890,  |  6095»  providing  tba 
one  who  '^unlawfully,  maliciously  and  Inten 
tlonally  cuts,  lyltSB-^ar  vtrtkes  off  an  ear  o 
another  person  is  guilty  of  "mayhem,"  tb( 
Injury  to  the  ear  must  be  such  as  disfigures  U 
ordinary  observation,  as  distlxiguiahed  fioa 
a  wounding  which  sUnply  mar»  the  membei 
Green  v.  State,  44  South.  194,  151  Ala.  14 
125  Am.  St  Bep.  17,  Ifi  Ann.  Cas.  81. 

MAYOR 

As  Judicial  ollleer^  see  Judicial  Ofllcer. 

•^e  wo^  'mayoi^  first  occurs  In  Engllsl 
history  In  1189,  when  Blch^rd  I'substltutet 
a  mayor  for  the  two  haillffb  of  London.  Th< 
Romans  styled  such  officer  *prefectu8  urbl, 
and  originally  .the.  Engil^  title  for  such  of 
fi6er  was  either  *balllir. or  *portreeve,*  Just  ai 
the  sheriff  was  'shlrereeve*;  i.  e.,  sheriff/ 
"It  Is  said  that  the  word  'mayor*  oomes  froa 
the  old  JSpglish  word,  *maler,'  which  meaoi 
•poweirj'  'authority,'  and  not  from  the  Latli 
'major,*  meaning  greater.  He  represents  thi 
power. and  authority  ,of  the  town,  and  th( 
duty  of  presiding  at  meetings  of  the  towi 
commisslbners  is  only  one.  of  the  duties  lu 
exercises.  While  the  power  and  duties  ol 
'mayor*  may  vary  according  to  the  chartei 
of  the  town  or  the'  laws  of  the  state,  it  la 
probably  without  any  exception  his  duty  tc 
execute  the  laws  and  local  regulations  of  h]i 
dty  and  to  supervise  the  discharge  of  tbeii 
duties  by^  the  subordinate  oflU'cers  of  the  dtj 
government"  State  v.  Thomas,  53  S.  B.  52^ 
623,  141  N.  C.,7dl  (quoting  5  Words  anjd 
Phrases,  p.  4450).   "^   *  ' ''    ' 


MAYOR 


881 


.UBATSD^tJVffi 


Tb«  gaieral  mnnlciiMa  act  of  If  arch  18„ 
1&S3  (St  1$S3,  p.  03,  c.  49),  divides  cities  into 
six  classes,  piovides  for  a  major  Ui  the  first 
four,  makes  blm  ia  tib^e  fourth  class  a  member 
of  the  oouodl,  with  the  right  to  vote  only 
In  case  of  a  tie,  and  in  the  last  two  classes 
requires  the  council  to  elect  one  of  its  mem- 
bers president,  imposing  on  him  the  duty  of 
signing  all  ordinances  preliminary  to  publica- 
tion, but  giving  him  no  veto  power,  and  not 
requiring  him  to  perform  the  duties  of  a 
mayor.  Act  March  27, 18d7  (St  1897,  p.  190, 
c  129),  entitled,  *'An  act  to  require  ordinance 
and  resolution  passed  by  the  city  council  or 
other  legislatire  body  of  any  municipality  to 
be  presented  to  the  mayor,  or  other  chief  ex- 
ecutive officer  of  such  municipality,  for  his 
approval,"  provides  (section  1)  that  every  ordi- 
nance Imposing  a  penalty  passed  by  the  coun- 
cil shall  before  it  takes  effect  be  presented 
to  the  mayor  for  his  approval,  and  that,  if  It 
fails  to  rec^ve  his  approval,  it  shall  be  lost, 
imless  on  its  return  it  receives  the  votes  of 
three-fourths  of  all  the  members,  ''provided 
that  •  •  •  this  section  shall  not  apply 
to  cities  In  which  the  mayor  is  a  member  of 
the  dty  council,  or  other  governing  body,'* 
and  provides  (section  4,  p.  191)  that  in  mu- 
nicipalities In  which  there  la  no  maybr  the 
duties  imposed  on  said  officer  1^  tlie  provi- 
sions of  the  act  shall  be  performed  by  the 
president  of  tb%  board  of  trustees^  ot  other 
chief  executive  officer  of  tiie  municipality. 
Held,  that  to  prevent 'in Justlee  and  absurdity, 
the  proviso  in  section  1  Idiould  be  made  to 
read  ''mayor  or  other  chief  executive,'*  or  the 
word  "mayor"  should  be  held  to  include  all 
executive  officers  similarly  situate  and  thus 
prevent  a  eonstmction  giving  the  veto  power 
to  the  president  of  the  board  of  tmstees  of 
cities  of  the  fifth  and  sixth  classes,  when  it 
is  denied  to  the  mayor  of  cities  of  the  fourth 
daas.  GIty  of  San  Buenaventura  v.  McGuire, 
97  Pac.  628,  G2T,  8  OaL  App.  497. 

MAYORDOMO 

A  '^nuiyordomo"  is  an  officer  in  charge  of 
an  irrigation  ^fater  system  under  the  laws 
of  New  Mexica  Gandekrla  v.  Yallejbs,  81 
Pac  689,  696,  18  N.  M.  14& 

MEADOW 

The  term  ^'meadow"  included  salt  marsh- 
es and  beaches.  Sandlf ord  v.  Town  of  Hamp- 
ateaa,  90^Nw^  Z.  Smw^  7^  81^  83,  97  Apm  Div. 

163. 

MEAL 

See  GoarM  Healt 

If  a.  single  aandwidi  satisfies  the  desires 
of  a  person,  it  constitutes  a  "meal,**  and  the 
deeper  of  a  hotel  has  the  right  to  serve  liq- 
uors to  him  with. such  meal,  ^nier  Laws 
1897.  p..  234,  c.  315,  |  81,  cl.  •%**  providing 
that  the  keeper  of  a  hotet  being  the  holder. 


of  a  Uauor  tax  certificate,  joay  sell  liquor 
on  Sunday  to  his  guests  with  their  meals. 
In  re  (Dulllnan,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  660,  662,  9^ 
App.  Div.  427. 

In  the  manufacture  of  com  meal  for 
culinary  purposes,  the  com  is  first  kiln-dried, 
then  cracked  or  ground  between  rollers,  and 
afterwards  bolted.  A  product  made  by  the 
same  rollers  but  set  farther  apart  so  as  not 
to  crush  the  grain  so  finely,  and  with  the. 
com  not  kiln-dried,  and  the  product  not  bolt- 
ed, but  merely .  passed  between  the  rollers 
and  then  loaded  in  the  cars,  and.  variously 
known  as  "cracked  com,*'  *'chop,^  "coarse 
meal,"  was  not  in  the  ordinary  acceptation 
of  the  term  "meal,**  and  was  properly  dis- 
tinguished frohi  meal  in  apportioning  cars 
among  shippers.  State  ex  rel.  Crandall  v. 
Chicago.  B.  A  Q.  B.  Co.,  101  N.  W.  23,  24, 
72  Neb.  642. 


MEAN  TIME 


^UetLU  solar  time^'  Is  arrived  at  by  the 
motion  of  a  fictitious  sun  called  the  "mean 
sun,**  which  is  imagined  to  move  with  per- 
fect uniformity,  being  sometimes  b^ind  the 
tme  sun  and  sometimes  in  advance  of  It 
This  time  changes  with  the  longtttnde,and,  in 
a  country  of  the  magnitude  of  the  United 
Btates,  the  difference  of  time  between  places 
caused  much  difficulty  in  the  regulation  of 
the  movements  of  railway  trains.  About  the 
year  1883  the  principai  railroads  of  the  Unit- 
ed States  adopted  an  arbitrary  standard  for 
the  purpose  of  securing  uniformity  in  the 
operation  and  connection  of  their  trains.  Un- 
der this  system  the  country  was  divided  into 
four  sections,  eastern,  central,  mountain,  and 
Padflc,  approximately  16  degrees  in  width 
from  east  to  west,  and  the  time  of  the  cen- 
tral meridian  of  each  section  was  adopted 
as  the  uniform  railroad  time  for  the  entire 
section.  Globe  A  Rutgers  Fire  Ins.  Go.  v. 
David  Moffat  Go^  164  Fed.  18,  20,  83  0.  C. 
A.  9L 

MEANDER 

**Meander  comers*'  hold,  as  dedLaied  by 
the  rules  of  the  United  States  Land  Office, 
the  peculiar  position  of  denoting  a  point  on 
line  between  ifauidowners  without  nstmlly  be- 
ing the  legal  terminus  or  comer  of  the  land 
owned. .  Where  meander  comers  of  a  govem- 
ment  survey  are  lost  or  obliterated,  they  must 
be  re^ored  in  accordance. with  the  citeulars 
of  the  United  States  Laud  Office.  Kleveo  v. 
Qunderson,  104  N.  W.  4»  6»  96  Minn.  246. 

MEAHDEB  Lmfi. 

•  Generally  "meander  lines'*  are  Hues 
which  course  the  banks  of  navigable  streams 
or  other  navigable  waters.  Chapman  A  Dew- 
ey Land  Co,  V.  Bigelow,  92  S.  W.  63^  637, 
77  Ark.  338.  .   . 


MEANDBR  UKB 


862 


BCBAiro 


The  point  to  which  the  water  of  a  navi- 
gable stream  iiBually  rises,  in  an  ordinary 
season  of  high  water,  is  the  "meander  line^' 
which  forms  the  boundary  of  the  title  of  the 
government.  State  v.  Portland  General  Elec- 
tric Ck>^  88  Fac  lOa  102,  62  Or.  602. 

**▲  'meander  line*  is  not  a  line  of  bound- 
ary, but  one  designed  to  point  ont  the  sinuosi- 
ty of  the  bank  or  shore  and  a  means  of  ascer- 
taining the  quantity  of  land  in  the  fraction 
which  is  to  be  paid  for  by  the  purchaser." 
Sherwin  v.  Biteer,  106  N.  W.  1046,  1047.  97 
Minn.  262  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Whitaker  v.  McBride,  26  Sup.  Gt  681,  197 
U.  8.  610,  49  L.  Ed.  867). 

A  '^meander  line"  is  not  a  boundary  line, 
but  is  designed  to  point  out  the  sinuosities 
of  the  bank  or  shore  of  a  river  to  ascertain 
the  quantity  of  land  in  a  fractional  subdivi- 
sion, except  where  such  line  is  run  and  mon- 
uments erected,  so  tliat  in  the  absence  of 
such  monuments  the  fact  that  a  stream  has 
been  meandered  does  not  limit  the  title  of  a 
grantee  of  the  riparian  land  to  the  meander- 
ed line  instead  of  to  the  thread  of  the  stream. 
People  V.  Economy  Light  &  Power  Ck>.,  89  N. 
B.  760,  767,  241  IlL  200. 

''Meander  lines"  are  run  in  surveying 
fractional  portions  of  the  pablic  lands  border- 
ing upon  navigable  rivers,  not  as  boundaries 
of  the  tract,  but  for  the  purpose  of  defining 
the  sinuosities  of  the  banks  of  the  stream. 
Seabrook  v.  Ooos  Bay  Ice  Co.,  89  Pac.  417, 
418,  49  Or.  287. 

"The  'meander  lines*  run  along  or  near 
the  margin  of  waters  are  run  by  the  govern- 
ment surveyors  for  the  purpose  of  ascertain- 
ing the  exact  quantity  of  the  upland  to  be 
charged  for,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  limit- 
ing the  title  of  the  grantee  to  such  meander 
lines."  McDade  v.  Bossier  Levee  Board,  83 
South.  628,  630,  109  La.  626  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  11 
Sup.  C%.  811,  838, 140  U.  S.  880,  86  L.  Ed.  428). 

A  "meander  line"  is  not  established  as  a 
boundary,  but  is  a  line  drawn  along  the  shore 
of  water  disregarding  its  minor  sinuosities, 
and  is  not  used  to  mark  the  limits  of  land, 
but  to  determine  tte  number  of  acres  for 
which  the  government  will  demand  payment; 
and,  when  payment  for  such  acreage  is  made, 
the  purchaser's  title  exists  to  the  water's 
edge,  though  there  be  small  unmeasured 
tracts  lying  outside  the  meander  line.  Bar- 
ringer  V.  Davis,  120  K.  W.  66,  68,  141  Iowa, 
419. 

"A  'meander  line,'  in  an  official  surv^, 
is  not  a  line  of  boundary,  but,  as  said  in 
Home  v.  Smith,  16  Sup.  Gt  988,  169  U.  S.  40, 
40  L.  Ed.  68,  is  used  'as  a  means  of  ascer- 
taining the  quantity  of  land  in  the  fraction 
which  is  to  be  paid  for  by  the  purchaser.'  ** 
Tolleston  Glub  of  Ghicago  v.  Lindgren,  77 
N.  B.  818,  820,  89  Ind.  App.  44a 

A  "meander  line"  is  not  a  boundary  line, 
where  it  substantially  represents  a  water 


Une^  and  the  surveyed  tracts  actnally  at 
on  a  body  of  water  proper  to  be  meandei 
under  the  rules  governing  public  survey,  a 
in  such  case  the  title  of  the  abutting  owi 
extends  to  the  actual  watar  line,  at  least 
it  existed  at  the  time  the  survey  was  ma< 
Owners  of  land  bounded  on  a  nonnavigal 
lake  or  ona  body  of  vrater,  the  banks  of  whi 
were  meandered  in  the  original  govemme 
survey,  have  no  title  to  the  submerged  b 
of  such  lake  or  body  of  water.  Wright 
Gity  of  OouncU  Bluffs,  104  N.  W.  492,  41 
180  Iowa,  274,  114  Am.  St  B^.  412. 

The  court  judicially  knows  that  "mea 
der  lines"  are  unsatisfactory  as  the  basis  t 
determination  of  boundaries.  The  "mea 
der  lines"  running  along  or  near  the  marg 
of  waters  are  run  for  the  purpose  of  asce 
taining  the  quantity  of  the  upland  to  be  char 
ed  for  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  limitii 
the  title  of  the  grantee  to  such  meander  line 
Kleven  v.  Uunderson,  104  N.  W.  4,  6,  1 
Minn.  246  (citing  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  11  Sa 
Gt  806, 140  U.  S.  871,  86  L.  Ed.  428;  St  Pai 
&  P.  By.  Go.  V.  Schurmeier,  7  WalL  [74  U.  8 
272,  19  U  Ed.  74;  6  Words  and  Phrases, ; 
4462). 

A  government  survey  or  plat  of  a  towi 
ship  selected  by  the  state  ondnr  the  swan 
lands  act  (Act  Ooi^  Sept  28,  1860,  c.  84. 
Stat  619)  showed  that  a  certain  part  of  ti 
survey  was  not  laid  ont  into  sections  an 
subdivisions,  and  Umt  tlis  surveyed  part  wi 
separated  from  the  imsnrv^red  part  by 
meandered  line,  the  unsurveyed  part  beio 
designated  as  "sank  lands"  and  in  the  sui 
veyor's  field  notes  described  as  low,  w( 
lands.  The  township  was  patented  to  tli 
state  according  to  the  official  plats  of  tb 
survey.  Held,  that  a  "meandered  ttne,"  b< 
ing  an  ordinary  line  bounding  a  body  of  lan^ 
there  was  nothing  to  show  tliat  the  soni 
lands  was  a  body  of  water,  though  temporarl 
ly  covered  with  water,  and  under  the  paten 
the  entire  /township  passed  to  the  state  a 
swamp  lands.  Ghapman  A  Dewey  Lumbe 
Go.  V.  Board  of  Directors,  St  Frauds  Lere 
Dist,  139  S.  W.  626,  628,  100  Ark.  94 

MEANING 

See  Plain  Meaning. 

MEANS 

See  Bzteraal,  Ylolent  and  Acddenta 
Means;  Mechanical  Means;  Beason 
able  Means;   Safe  Means. 

Any  means,  see  Any. 

Any  other  means,  see  Any  Other. 

Other  means,  see  Other. 

In  an  interference  involving  the  ioTea 
tion  of  a  machine  for  mechanically  tran» 
ferring  a  dgar  "bunch"  from  the  mould  tc 
a  wrapping  mechanism  by  whidi  the  wrap 
per  is  applied  to  the  dgar  "bunch,"  and  is 
which  the  machines  of  the  parties  showed 


MXiMt 


85S 


MSASURX 


durerent  vecto  of  transferiUig  dtfrte^  the 
tenn  **iiieaiiB»'*  in  the  issues  calling  for  the 
combination  with  the  wrapping  mechanism 
Hi  "means  for  transferring  the  bonches  from 
the  mould  to  the  wrapping  mechanism,"  was 
a  generic  t&cm,  and  applicable  alike  to  the 
transf^nlng  devioe  of  each  party.  Leeroix 
T.  Tybeig,  83  App.  D.  O.  580,  691. 

"Means^  signiiles  a  plan  or  method  of 
procednre.  Texas  it  P.  Ry.  Co.  ▼.  Beeid^, 
101  S.  W.  1051,  1052,  46  Tex.  €»▼.  App.  108. 

In  a  patentee's  claim  reading,  '^n  a  sew- 
ing machine  a  back  goide,  around  which  the 
goods  are  adapted  to  be  held,  a  needle  co- 
operating with  said  bade  guide,  means  for 
reciprocating  said  needle  longitudinally  and 
•means  for  causing  said  needle  to  recede  lat- 
erally from  said  back  guide  after  its  point  has 
entered  the  material,"  the  word  "means," 
describing  the  word  needle  as  an  element  of 
the  combination,  refers  to  some  mechanism 
other  than  the  needle^  the  latter  being  sep- 
arately ^pecUied  as  one  element,  so  that  the 
daim  is  not  Infringed  by  a  machine  em- 
bodying all  the  elements  of  the  comblnatiMi, 
but  in  which  def  aidant's  needle  is  slightly  in- 
clined, and  the  path  in  which  its  point  recip- 
rocates passing  the  back  guide  is  nearer 
thereto  than  is  the  like  path  of  its  shaft,  and 
the  reciprocation  of  which  is  longitudinaL 
Lewis  Blind  Stitch  Mach.  Go.  y.  Premium 
Hfg.  Co.,  103  Fed.  960,  955,  90  0.  0.  A.  310. 

The  word  "means,"  as  used  in  Rev. 
Codes  1899,  i  8042,  providing  tiiat,  when  an 
offense  may  be  committed  by  the  use  of 
different  "means>"  the  "means  may  be  al- 
leged in  the  altematiye  in  the  same  count," 
is  to  be  defined  as  synonymous  with  the 
word  "agency**  or  "instrumentality."  The 
fraudulent  appropriation  of  property  or  the 
secreting  of  it  with  a  fraudulent  intent  to 
Appropriate  it  as  described  in  Rev.  Codes 
X899,  I  7462,  defining  "embezzlement,'*  are 
different  acts  or  facts  that  may  constitute 
the  crime  of  "embezzlement,"  and  are  not 
tbe  "means"  of  committing  the  offense. 
State  y.  Lonne,  107  N.  W.  624,  626,  16  N. 
D.  275. 

A  wall  in  course  of  construction  is  not 
"works,"  "ways,"  nor  "means,"  within  the 
New  York  Employers*  Liability  Act  (Laws 
1902,  p.  1748,  c  000),  maldng  an  employer 
liable  for  injuries  caused  by  defecttye  works, 
ways,  or  means.  Bipp  y.  Fuchs,  US  N.  T. 
8npp.  881,  364,  129  App.  Diy.  821. 

In  Rey.  St.  f  5444,  proyiding  that  eyery 
officer  of  the  reyenue,  who,  by  any  means 
whatever,  knowingly  admits  or  aids  in  ad- 
mitting any  goods  on  payment  of  less  than 
the  amount  of  daty  legally  due  thereon,  shall 
be  punished,  if  the  "means'*  adopted  by  him 
was  to  accept  a  duty  that  did  not  belong  to 
bim,  and  to  take  advantage  of  his  knowl- 
edge that  his  performance  of  that  duty 
vottid  be  reoognlMd  by  his  superior  oiOoer, 
that  would  be  quite  as  arach  of  a  "aManSt" 

8  Wns.&  P.2n  Skb.— 23 


wftiiiB  tho  meaning  off  the  sta^te^  as  If  he 
had  departed  from  a  duty  regularly  laid  on 
^im.  United  States  ▼.  RosMithal  126  Fed. 
766,  774. 

The  expression  "means  at  his  cominand," 
used  in  a  charge  in  a  prosecution  for  murder 
asserting  the  proposition  that,  in  order  to 
Justify  a  killing  under  a  claim  of  self-de- 
fense, the  slayer  must  haye  resorted  to  all 
reasonable  "means  at  his  command,"  con- 
sistent with  his  own  safety,  to  ayoid  the 
necessity  of  taking  human  life,  is  equiyalent 
to  the  expression  "means  in  his  power." 
King  y.  State,  44  South.  941,  942,  54  Fla.  47. 

A  system  of  perforated  pipes  In  a  build- 
ing, connected  with  yalyes  outside  the  boild- 
tng  for  the  use  of  firemen,  constitute  a  '*means 
of  preventing  and  extinguishing  fires,**  with- 
in the  provisions  of  Greater  New  York  Char- 
ter, Laws  1897,  p.  263,  c  378,  |  762,  providing 
that  the  owners  of  manufactories,  office  build- 
ings, etc.,  shall  provide  such  fire  hose,  fire  ex- 
tinguishers, and  other  means  of  preventing 
and  extinguishing  fires  as  the  fire  commis- 
sioners may  direct  Lantry  v.  Hoffman,  105 
N.  Y.  Supp.  353,  854,  55  Misc.  Rep.  261. 

MEAHS  OF  KHOWZEDOfB 

See  Equal  Means  of  Knowledge. 

'"Means  of  knowledge^  plainly  within 
reach  of  stodtholders  by  the  exercise  of  the 
slightest  dlHgenoe  is  in  legal  effect  equiyalent 
to  knowledge.**  Cole  ▼.  Birmingham  Union 
Ry.  Co.,  89  South.  403, 405, 148  Ala.  427  (quot^ 
ing  and  adopting  definition  in  Jesup  v.  Illi- 
nois G.  R.  Co.,  48  Fed.  488). 

The  existence  of  public  records  of  deeds» 
access  to  whicdi  is  easy,  and  which  would 
disclose  that  a  trustee's  representaaoh  that  he 
had  sold  trust  property  worth  (2,200,  so  as  to 
net  less  than  $600,  was  fraudulent,  since  the 
"means  of  knowledge*'  are  equivalent  to 
knowledge.  A  clue  to  the  fact,  which,  if  fol- 
lowed up  diligently,  would  lead  to  a  discov- 
ery, is,  in  law,  equivalelit  to  discovery,  equiv- 
alent to  knowledge  Irwin  y.  Holbrooke  78 
Pac  860,  363,  82  Wash.  349. 

MEASURE 

See  Board  Measore. 

Under  a  statute  giving  mayors  of  cer- 
tain cities  power  to  veto  any  measure  passed 
by  the  board  of  aldermen,  a  mayor  has  no 
power  to  veto  the  election  of  a  police  justice 
by  the  board  of  aldermen,  since  such  an  elec- 
tion is  not  a  measure.  Rich  v.  McLaurin, 
86  South.  337,  83  Miss.  95. 

The  word  •'measure^**  in  Const  art  4, 
1 1,  proyiding  that  an  initiative  petiUon  shaU 
'Hndude  the  fnU  text  of  the  •measure,'  **  and 
as  it  is  used  in  Laws  1907,  p.  400,  |  2.  pro- 
viding that  the  initiative  petition  "shall 
be  attached  to  a  full  and  correct  copy  of  the 
title  and  text  of  the  'measure^^'*  etc.,  means 
an  act  as  It  comes  from  the  hands  of  the  Leg- 


ilEASUBS 


SSA 


MJBQHAIVO 


80  far  as  it  is  0ODGer9je4i  and  does  not  neces- 
sarily iQclpde  the  title  of  the  act  Palmer  y. 
Benson,  91  Pac  679,  581,  50  Or.  277.     , ; 

Const  art  5^  |  6,. providing  that  any 
measure  rejected  by  the  people  through  the 
powers  of  the  initlatiye  and  referendum  can- 
not be  proposed  by  the  initiative  within  three 
years  thereafter  by  less  than  25  per  cent  at 
the  legal  voters,  relfites  to  constitutional 
amendments  proposed  by  the  Legislature  or 
initiated  by  petitiim  of  the  people  and  bills 
or  acts  initiated  by  the  Legislature  or  by  the 
people  by  an  initiative  petition ;  and  a  quesr 
tion  submitted  to  the  electors  for  acceptance 
or  rejection  by  means  of  a  joint  resolution 
of  both  houses  of  the  Legislaturoj  being  nei- 
ther a  constitutional  amendment  nor  initiated 
bill,  is  not  a  measure  rejected  by  the  people 
through  the  ixiwer  of  the  initiative  and  ref- 
erendum, as  contemplated  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, so  as  to  prevent  the  initiation  of  sub- 
stantially the  same  measure  within  three 
years  by  less  than  25  per  cent  of  the  legal 
voters.  In  re  Initiative  Petition  No.  2,  "The 
New  Jerusalem"  Proposition,  100  Pac  823, 
824,  26  Okl.  548. 

MEASURE  OF  DirTT 

See  Legal  Measure  of  Duty. 

MEASURED  ZH  THE  WAIX 

In  an  action  for  brides  sold  for  the  con* 
struction  of  a  building,  plaintiff  claimed  that 
they  were  sold  to  be  ''measured  in  the  wall/' 
defendant,  that  they  were  to  be  counted  in 
the  wall;  the  number  of  rows  being  multi- 
plied by  the  number  of  bricks  in  a  row. 
Held,  that  it  was  competent  to  show  by  the 
testimony  of  persons  in  the  trade,  what  the 
expression  "measured  in  the  wall'*  meant, 
and  that  the  measurement  allowed  21^ 
bricks  to  a  cubic  foot  of  wall;  this  not  b&i 
ing  an  attempt  to  establish  a  custom.  Welsh 
V.  Huckestein,  25  AtL  138,  152  Pa.  27* 

MEASUREMENT 

'     Bee  Proportional  Measurement 

MEAT 

See  Cured  Meat;   Fredi  Meat 

In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  18©7,  c.  11,  |  1, 
Schedule  O,  par.  275^  30  Stet  172,  the  pro- 
vision for  ''meats  of  all  kinds  prepared  or 
preserved,'*  includes  cooked  poultry  and  game, 
in  tins,  and  also  goose  livers,  prepared  as 
pftt^  de  foie  graa  James  P.  Smith  &  Co.  v. 
United  States,  168  Fed.  462. 

Duck  meat  in  tins,  some  salted  and 
dried,  and  some  packed  in  oil,  is  not  ''poultry 
?  ^  ^  dressed,"  within  the  meaning  of  Tar- 
iff Act  July  24,  1807,  c.  11,  |  1,  Schedule  G, 
par.  278,  30  St^t  172,  but  is  rather  classifi- 
able as  '*meats  of  all  kinds,  prepared  or  pro- 
served,"  und^r  par.  275,  30  SUt  172.  Kwong 
Xuen  Shing  v.  United  States,  1.77  Fed.  605, 
606.  ..      . 


I«ECHAIIIIC 

,   Laborers  or  mechanics,  see  Laborers. 

"Mechanic;"  onee  synonymous  with  "ar> 
tlsan,"  is  now  comnwnly  restricted  to  a 
workman  who  is  skilled  In  constructing,  re- 
pairing, or  using  machinery.  State  v.  City 
of  Ottawa,.  118  Pac  S»h  393,  84  Kas.  100. 

In  its  broadest  sense,  a  "ttiechauic^*  is 
any  one  who  Is  a  skilled  worker  with  toola 
Jackson  v.  State,  117  S.  W.  818,  810,  55  Tex. 
Cr.  B.  557. 

Arohiteet  or  dz»f  tsnaii. 

Under  Revlsal  1906»  |  2016,  giving  me- 
chanics and  laborers  lien  for  work  done  upon 
buildings,  an  architect  Who  famished  plana 
and  specifications  for  a  building  is  not  en-' 
titled  to  a  lien,  having  neither  performed  la- 
bor  upon  It,  nor  being  a  '^mechanic";  the 
term  as  used  in  the  lien  laws  meaning  a 
person  skilled  in  the  practical  use  of  tools. 
Stephens  v.  Hicks,  72  S.  fi.  313,  314,  166  N. 
O.  289,  36.  L.  R.  A.  <N.  S.)  354,  Ann.  Caa. 
1918A,  272  (citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p^ 
4457). 

Barber 

A  barber  is  a  "mechanic,"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  exemption  laws.  Ex  parte 
Caldwell,  118  N.  W.  133,  136,  82  Neb.  544; 
Terry  v.  M.cDaniel.  53  S*.  W.  732,  733,  103 
Tenn.  415,  46  U  R.  A.  559. 

OlTil  eaclneer 

A  dvil  engineer  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien 
for  wages  earned  by  him  in  the  construction 
of  a  railroad,  und»  Rev.  St  art  3312,  be- 
ing neither  a  "mechanic,'*  "laborer,**  nor 
"operative.**  Gulf  &  B.  V.  R.  Ca  v.  Berry, 
72  8.  W.  1049,  1050,  31  Tex.  av.  App.  408. 

Contractor  or  niaster  bnilder 

Under  Const  1898,  art  229,  providing 
that  "all  persons,  associations  of  persona) 
and  corporations  pursuing  any  trade,  profes- 
sion, business  or  calling,  may  be  rendered  lia- 
ble to  such  tax  (a  license  tax)  except  derka, 
laborers  clergymen  and  school-teachers,  those 
engaged  in  mechanical,  agricultural  and  min- 
ing pursuits,**  the  phrase  "those  engaged  In 
mechanical,  agricultural  and  mining  pur- 
suits" includes  a  corporation  engaged  in  such 
pursuits,  since  the  article  of  the  Constitution 
applies  to  both  persons  and  corporations. 
According  to  Worcester's  Dictionary,  a  'Me- 
chanic*' is  one  employed  in  mechanical  or 
manual  labor,  and  "mechanical**  is  defined  to 
be  ''employment  in  manual  labor."  Taking 
the  phrase  "engaged  in  mechanical  pursuita*' 
according  to  these  definitions,  it  is  dear  that 
the  Constitution  is  to  be  construed  as  intend- 
ing tO/  relieve  from  Ueense  thoae  persona 
who  are  engaged  from  day  to  day  in  tbm 
performance  of  manual  labor,  in  mechanical 
or  agricultural  pursuits,  and  that' the  master 
builders  and*  contractors  who  employ  men  ta 
do  the  work  which  tbay.  merely  superintend* 
ed.ahould^.  like:  other  protessional  men,  pay 


MECHAKIC 


866        MRCHANIGAI>  OOKTBlVAlflCS 


tlie  license  tax.  State  t«  O.  a  Hartwell  Go., 
41  Soutb.  444,  447,  U7  La.  144  (citing  Tbeo- 
balds  T.  Conner,  7  South.  090,  42  la.  Ann. 
789;  State  y.  McNally,  12  SouUl  117,  45  La. 
Ann.  45;  City  of  New  Orleans  ▼.  O'Nell,  10 
^ntlL  246,  43  La.  Ami.  1182;  BoT  y.  Scbuff, 
24  South.  788,  51  La.  Anh.  86;  City  of  New 
Orlea2is  ▼.  Bayley,  85  La.  Ann.  545;  City  of 
New  Orleans  y.  Lagman  ft  Son,  10  South. 
244,  43  La.  Ann.  1180;  Stote  y.  Dlelehschnel- 
der,  U  South.. 82%  44  La.  Ann.  1U6;  Stete 
y.  Comptolr  National  D'Elscompte  de  Paris, 
26  South.  91,  51  La.  Ann.  1272). 

The  mechanic's  Uen  act  of  1883  (Acts 
1883,  p.  140,  e  115)  and  amendments  thereto 
(Burns'  Ann.  St  1908»  M  8295-8307),  giying  a 
lien  to  **meehanics,  laborers,  and  material- 
men,"  does  not  giye  a  lien  to  contractors  or 
subcontractors.  Fleming  y.  Greener  (Ind.) 
MN.  B.78,.75. 

Painter 

The  term  "medianlcs"  includes  painters. 
A  lire  insurance  policy  is  not  made  void  by 
the  use  of.  a  gasoline  torch  by  a  painter  for 
the  purpose  of  burning  off  paint  from  the 
building  insured,  where  the  work  has  contin- 
ued for  less  than  the  15  days  allowed  by  the 
policy  for  repairs.  Garrebrant  y.  Continent- 
al Ins.  Co.»  67  AtL  90,  92,  75  N.  J.  law,  577, 
.12  Lw  B.  A.  (N.  a)  443. 


Defendant  was  a  contractor  engaged  in 
constructing  for  the  United  States  Jetties 
near  Cape  May  harbor,  extending  from  the 
shore  into  the  open  sea.  The  jetties  were 
built  up  with  stone,  thrown  overboard  from 
barges,  which  were  towed  across  Delaware 
Bay,  anchored,  and  as  needed  towed  to  the 
Jetties  and  warped  along  while  being  dis- 
charged. As  crews  of  such  barges  defendant 
employed  engineers,  boatmen,  and  bookmen, 
selected  for  their  seafaring  experience,  who 
operated  the  barges  and  also  discharged  their 
cargoes.  The  work  done  and  the  time  requir- 
ed to  do  it  depended  on  tide,  wind,  and 
weather,  wl4ch  ordinarily  required  variable 
hours  of  service  on  the  part  of  the  men. 
Held,  that  such  men  were  seamen,  with  the 
rights  of  sach,  including  the  right  to  a  lien 
on  the  yessel:  for  their  wages,  and  could  not 
be  classed  as  labcHrers  or  mechanics,  within 
the  meaning  of  Act  Aug.  1,  1892,  c  852»  S  1, 
which  makes  it  unlawful  for  any  contractor 
for  government  w<»k  to  reqaire  or  permit 
any  laborer  or  mechanic  employed  by  him 
thereon  to  work  more  than  eight  hours  in 
any  calendar  day,  except  in  case  of  extraor- 
dinary emergency.  Breakwater  Co.  v.  United 
States,  183  Fed.  112,  114,  105  a  C  A.  404. 


The  mechanic's  lien  act  of  1883  (Acts 
1883,  p.  140,  c.  115)  aiid  amendments  thereto 
(Barns'  Ann.  St  1908,  »  8295-8307;  Bums' 
Ann.  St  1901,  ff  7265-7267),  giving  a  Uen 
to  ''mechanics^  laboren,  and  •  malerlahuen," 
does  not  give  a  lien  to  contractors  or  subcon- 


tractors.   Fleming  y.  Greener  (Ihd.)  90  N.  B. 
73,  75. 

MEOHAKIO  ABm 

ESmployed  in  mechanic  arts,  see  Employ^. 

MEOHAiaOAI.  BUSIHSSS 

See  lianufacturing  and  Mechanical  Busi- 


MEOKANIOAX.  COITTBIVANOE 

See  Vehicles  and  Other  Mechanical  (3on- 
tzivances. 

Tlie  words  ''scaffolding"  and  "mechani- 
cal contrivance"  include  any  contrivance 
made  of  parts  erected  or  used  for  support  in 
or  about  the  particular  kinds  of  work  men- 
tioned in  the  statute.  Koepp  v.  National 
Enameling  &  Stamping  Co.,  139  K.  W.  179, 
184,  151  Wis.  302. 

Box 

A  box  or  floor  in  which  concrete  is 
spread  in  laying  concrete  floors  is  a  "me- 
chanical contrivance,"  within  Iaws  1897,  p. 
467,  c«  415,  I  18,  providing  that  persons  em- 
ploying or  directing  another  to  perform  labor 
in  the  erection,  repairing,  or  altering  of  a 
building  shall  not  furnish,  for  the  perform- 
ance of  such  labor,  any  mechanical  contri- 
vance which  is  unsafe.  Michael  v.  Standard 
Concrete  Steel  Co.,  105  N,  X.  Supp.  131,  132, 
55  Blisc  Rep.  255. 


A  "buiggy,"  consisting  of  a  tongue  about 
14  feet  long,  with  two  large  wheels  at  its 
rear  end,  connected  by  an  axle,  used  to  move 
iron  beams  in  the  construction  of  a  building, 
is  not  a  ''mechanical  contrivance,"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Employers'  Liability  Act 
(liaws  1897,  Pb  467,  c.  415, 1 18),  requiring  per- 
sons employing  others  to  perform  labor  in  the 
erection  of  a  building  to  furnish  safe  and 
suitable  mechanical  contrivances.  Pluckham 
V.  American  Bridge  Ck>.,  79  N.  E.  1114,  .186 
N.  Y.  561;  Id.,  93  N.  Y.  Supp.  748,  750,  104 
App.  Dlv.  404. 

Jaek 

Labor  Law  (ConsoL  Laws  1909,  c.  31)  | 
18,  provides  that  a  person  employing  or  di- 
recting another  to  perform  labor  in  the  re- 
pairing of  a  house,  building,  or  "structure" 
siiall  not  furnish,  erect,  or  cause  to  bb  fur- 
nished or  erected,  for  such  labor,  scaffolding, 
'^hoists,"  stays,  or  other  mechanical  contriv- 
ances wliich  are  unsafe,  and  wliich  are  not 
such  as  to  give  proper  protection  to  a  per- 
son BO  employed  or  engaged.  Held  that, 
where  a  car  repairer  was  injured  by  the 
breaking  of  the  handle  of  a  ratchet  Jack  with 
which  the  body  of  a  freight  car  had  been 
hoisted  to  permit  repairs  on  the  trucks,  as 
the  body  was  bcdng  lowered,  the  Jack,  while 
not  a  '*hoist"  within  the  statute,  is  neverthe- 
less a  "medianical  contrivance"  furnished  by 
the  railroad  company  for  plaintiff's  use,  and 
the  car  was  a  **8tnicture"  as  to  which  the 


i    'i 


MSX^HAHZCAZ.  GORPOAATIOK        856 


MECHANIQAIi  PUBSUIT 


Jack  was  being  used;  and  hence  tbe  detecttve 
jack  was  within  the  statute.  Oorbett  y.  New 
Tork  Gent  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  185  N.  Y.  Snpp. 
137,  139,  151  App.  DiT.  150. 

MEOKANIOAI.  COBPORATIOH 

The  Pioneer  Paatenrisiag  Oompany,  au- 
thorized by  its  articles  of  inoocporatlon  to 
engage  in  the  bnsinees  of  buying^  siannfiic- 
turing,  and  dealing  in  milk,  cream,  butter, 
cheese,  and  other  dairy  products,  and  pas- 
teurising and  treating  said  milk,  and  pack- 
ing, storing,  handling,  and  selling  said  prod- 
ucts.so  pasteurised  and  treated,  is  not  ez- 
dusively  a  manufacturing  or  mechanical  cor- 
poration, within  Const  art  10,  i  38,  and  its 
stockholders  are  therefore  liable  for  its  debts. 
Meen  ▼*  Pioneer  Pasteurising  Co.,  87  N.  W. 
140,  Ul,  90  Minn.  501. 

mechahioax.  equxvaiant 

A  ''mechanical  equlyalent'*  is  a  thing 
which  performs  the  same  function,  and  per- 
f4)rms  that  function  in  substantially  the 
siune  manner,  as  the  thing  to  which  it  is  al- 
leged to  be  an  equiyalent  Maunula  y.  Bunell, 
155  Fed.  535,  539  (quoting  and  adopting  the 
definition  in  Walk.  Pat  [4th  Ed.]  I  354,  and 
dting  National  Hollow  Brake  Beam  Co.  y. 
Interchangeable  Brake  Beam  Co.,  106  Fed. 
693,  45  C.  C.  A.  554;  New  Departure  Bell  Co. 
V.  Bevin  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.,  64  Fed.  859;  Na- 
tional Typographic  Co.  y.  New  York  Typo- 
graph  Co.,  46  Fed.  114;  Columbus  Watch  Co. 
y.  Bobbins,  64  Fed;  S84»  12  C.  O.  A.  174;  Ide 
y.  Trorlicht,  Duncker  &  Renard  Carpet  Oo^ 
115  Fed.  137,  149,  68  O.  €.  A.  841;  Shelby 
Steel  Tube  Co.  y.  Delaware  Seamless  Tube 
Co.,  151  Fed.  64). 

The  term  "mechanical  equiyalent,"  as 
used  in  the  patent  law,  means  that  each  of 
Ihe  ingredients  comprising  the  inyention  coy- 
ers  eyery  other  ingredient  which  in  the  same 
arrangement  of  the  parts  will  perform  the 
same  functions,  if  that  was  well  known  as 
a  proper  substitute  for  the  one  described  in 
the  specification  at  the  time  of  the  patent. 
Denning  Wire  &  Fence  Co.  y.  American  Steel 
A  Wire  Co.  of  New  Jersey,  169  Fed.  793,  803, 
96  C.  C.  A.  259;  American  Steel  &  Wire  Co. 
y.  Denning  Wire  4b  Fence  Co.,  160  Fed.  108, 
120. 

"The  term  'mechanical  equiyalent'  when 
applied  to  the  Interpretation  of  a  pioneer  pat- 
ent has  a  broad  and  generous  signification. 
When  a]H>lied  to  a  slight  and  almost  imma- 
terial improyement  It  has  a  yeiy  narrow 
and  limited  meaning.  When  applied  to  that 
great  majority  of  Inyentlons  which  falls  be- 
tween these  two  extremes*  its  significance  is 
proportioned  to  the  character  of  the  ad- 
vance or  inyention  under  conMderation,  and 
it  Is  so  interpreted  by  the  courts,  as  to  pro- 
tect the  Inyentor  against  piracy  and  the  pub- 
lic against  unauthorized  monopoly."  Uni- 
yersal  Brush  Co.  y.  Sonn,  146  Fed.  517,  529 
(quoting  National  HoUow  Brake  Beam  Co.  y. 


Interchangeable  Brake  Beam  Co.,  106  F< 
698,  45  C.  a  A.  544);  Simmons  Mtg.  Co. 
Southern  Spring  Bed  Co.,  140  Fed.  606,  e( 
72  C.  C.  A.  174  (quoting  and  adopting  t 
delinltlon  of  Judge  Sanborn  in  National  H< 
low  Brake  Beam  Co.  y.  -Intercdiangeal 
Brake  Beam  Co.,  106  Fed.  710,  45  C.  a 
561):  Sanders  t.  Hancodt  128  Fed.  424,  42 
68  a  a  A.  166;  IfaUon  y.  William  C.  6i«i 
ft  Co.,  187  Fed.  68,  79,  60  0.  a  A.  48. 

The  rule  applicable  to  the  determlnati< 
of  equiyalency  under  the  patent  laws  depen 
upon  the  importance  and  the  breadth  of  tl 
original  inyention,  and  does  not  depend  np< 
the  question  whetiier  it  was  the  flist  in  ti 
field  relating  to  that  subject,  tout  upon  the  d 
gree  of  adyancement  which  the  inyenti( 
has  made  in  newness  of  dlscoyery  and  nt 
Ity,  for  there  may  be  as  much  merit  in  brin 
Ing  on  a  large  illumination  teom  a  feeb 
start  as  in  the  conception  of  the  first  bedou 
ed  idea  which  may  haye  originated  in  ti 
course  of  study  and  dlscoyery  along  that  lis 
American  Can  Co.  y.  Hlckmott  Asparagi 
Canning  CJo.,  142  Fed.  141,  145,  73  C.  C.  - 
359  (quoting  and  adopting  Penfield  y.  (}hai 
bers  Bros.  &  Co.,  92  Fed.  630,  638,  84  C  < 
A,  579). 

MBOHAHIOAXr  ESTABUSHMEHT 

As    manufacturing    establishment    a 
Manufacturing  Establishment 

KECHANIOAX.  MBAKS 

The  phrase  "by  mechanical  or  otb( 
means,**  as  used  in  the  statute  making  it 
misdemeanor  for  any  person  not  licensed  i 
record  or  register,  by  mechanical  or  oth( 
means,  bets  or  wagers  on  trials  of  spee 
etc,  embraces  something  outside  the  m 
chanical  class,  and  covers  the  registration  < 
such  bets  by  means  of  the  initialB  or  prLyal 
marks  of  the  parties  written  on  cards.  Stal 
y.  Villlnes,  81  S.  W.  212,  213,  107  Mo.  Ap; 
593. 

MBCBAHIOAX.  PIAHO  FIiATEB 

As  musical  instrument,  see  Musical  Ii 
strument 

MBOKANIOaii  FimSUXT 

Work  on  a  turpentine  farm  is  not  a  "um 
chanical  pursuit"  within  the  meaning  of  Pei 
Code  1895,  I  1039,  proyldlng  that  conyicl 
shall  not  be  employed  in  such  mecbanici 
pursuits  as  will  bring  the  products  of  th^ 
labor  into  competition  with  tiie  product  c 
free  labor.  McDonald  y.  State,  64  S.  E.  11(M 
1118,  6  GkL  App.  339  (citing  5  Words  id 
Phrases,  p.  4462). 

The  trade  of  a  barber  is  a  "mechanici 
pursuit"  within  the  meaning  of  Const  art  i 
§  1,  exempting  perscms  engaged  in  mechanics 
pursuits  from  an  occupation  tax ;  and  bene 
Acts  80th  Leg.  1907,  p.  273,  c.  141,  imposin 
a  Hcaase  tax  on  barbm,  Is  Inyalld.  Jaduoi 
y.  StatSp  117  &  W.  8i8ft  814,  56  Tex.  (3r.  J] 
567. 


MBOHANIOAL  WnSUlT 


wt 


ME0IA  ANNATA 


Accoraiiig  to  Worcester's  Dictionary,  a 
'^echanic^  Is  one  employed  in  mecbanical  or 
manual  labor,  and  '*meclianlcar'  is  defined  to 
be  "employment  in  manual  labor,**  and  it  has 
been  held  that  master  builders  and  contrac- 
tors who  employ  m«i  to  do  the  work  which 
they  merely  superintended  are  not  engaged  in 
*^echanieal  pursuits."  ETtate  v.  G.  C.  Hart- 
well  Ck>.,  41  South.  444,  447,  117  l4L  144  (cit- 
ing Theobalds  v.  Oonxier,  7  Soutti.  690,  42  La. 
AmL  788). 

MECHAiao's  Luar 

See  Incumbrance;  Public  Beoord. 
Filing,  see  File. 

A  mechanicf s  lien  is  in  the  nature  of,  and 
hss  been  likened  to,  a  notice  of  lis  pendens 
and  to  an  attachment  Sawyer  t.  Shidc,  120 
Pac.  581,  582,  30  Okl.  353. 

Mechanics'  liens  are  purely  a  creation  of 
statute  in  this  country,  and  were  unknown  to 
tbe  common  law,  and  the  principle  on  which 
the  statutes  were  originally  enacted  was  to 
subject  land  to  a  lien  for  material  and  labor 
expended  in  the  construction  of  buildings 
which  haye  by  being  placed  on  the  land  be- 
come a  part  thereof.  Joplin  Supply  Co.  ▼. 
West,  130  S.  W.  156, 150, 149  Mo.  App.  73. 

A  ''mecfaanicfs  lien"  is  a  purs  creation  of 
itatute,  and  cmnplianee  with  statutory  re* 
qxiirements  is  necessary  to  its  validity. 
Tenth  Nat  Bank  of  Philadelphia  y.  Smith 
Const  Co.,  67  Ala.  872,  873,  218  Pa.  681  (cit- 
ing Wharton  y.  Real  Estate  Iny.  Go.,  36  AtL 
725, 180  Pa.  725,  57  Am.  St  Bep.  629;  Knelly 
T.  Horwath,  57  Aa  957,  208  Pa.  487). 

A  mechanic's  lien  is  purely  a  statutory 
creation,  and  can  only  be  maintained  by  a 
substantial  observance  or  compliance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  statute.  Whatever  is 
made  necessary  to  the  existence  of  the  lien 
mnst  be  performed,  or  the  attempt  to  create 
It  wlU  be  futile.  A  substantial  adherence  to 
the  terms  of  the  statute  in  the  notice  of  lien 
\i  indispensable.  Russell  v.  Hayner,  130  Fed. 
90,  92,  64  G.  C.  A.  424  (citing  PhUUps»  Mech. 
Uens  [3d  Ed.]  I  9). 

A  mechanic's  lien  is  at  most  only  a  ten- 
tative charge  against  the  property  it  purports 
to  bind,  and  is  liatde  to  be  defeated  for  lack 
of  technical  sufficiency,  as  well  as  by  show- 
ing that  the  f^ndebtedness  or  some  consid- 
erable part  thereof  is  not  owing.  Beebe  v. 
Redward,  77  Pac.  1062,  1055.  35  Wash.  615. 

"A  'mechanics^  lien'  is  a  statutory  lien 
upon  buildings  and  other  Improvements  on 
realty,  favoring  certain  classes  of  workmen; 
to  secure  them  priority  or  preference  of  pay- 
ment of  compensation  for  work  or  materi- 
als.'* Tommasi  v.  Archibald,  100  N.  T.  Supp. 
367,  372,  114  App.  Dlv.  838. 

A  ''mechanic's  lien"  Is  a  modem  statu- 
tory right  created  to  encourage  the  erectlosn 
of  improvements,  and  to  protect  those  whose 
labor  and  material  enter  into  the&r  oonstruo- 


tlon.    Hammond  v.  Darlingtozi,  34  8.  W.  44%, 
449,  109  Mo.  Al9.  333. 

The  ''mechanics'  lien"  is  a  creature  of 
the  statute.  It  exists  on  certain  conditions, 
independent  of  any  special  contract.  It  is 
unknown  to  the  common  law,  and  is  a  cumu- 
lative remedy  which  may  be  concurrently 
pursued  in  connection  with  the  ordinary  ac- 
tions for  the  collection  of  debts.  Filing  the 
claim  does  not  create,  but  simply  establishes, 
the  lien.  It  changes  an  inchoate  and  defeasi- 
ble right  to  a  lien  into  a  fixed  and  definite 
incumbrance.  A  mechanic  who  files  a  claim 
for  Hen  does  not  thereby  release  his  debtor 
from  personal  liability.  So,  too,  a  subcon- 
tractor, to  whom  the  contractor  has  given 
an  order  on  the  owner,  may  still  enforce  his 
rights  under  such  order  after  he  has  filed  his 
claim.  It  is  a  cumulative  remedy  which  may 
be  concurrently  pursued  in  connection  with 
the  ordinary  actions  for  the  collection  of 
debts.  Albert!  v.  Moore,  93  Pac.  543,  547,  20 
OkL  78,  14  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1036  (citing  Bh- 
iers  v.  Elder,  51  Miss.  495 ;  Boisot,  Mechan- 
ics' Uens,  496;  PhilUps,  Mechanics'  Uens,  I 
9;  27  Oya  p.  432). 

''A  'mechanic's  lien'  is  a  statutory  quasi 
mortgage  founded  upon  consent."  Cununings 
V.  Consolidated  Mineral  Water  Ck>.,  61  Ati. 
368,  855,  27  B.  I.  195  (citing  Brlggs  v.  Titus, 
13  a  I.  138 ;  Blackmar  v.  Sharp,  50  AtL  852, 
23  B.  L  412). 

"A  'mechanics'  lien'  is  additional  securi- 
ty given  by  statute  on  certain  conditions,  but 
does  not  in  any  way  abrogate  the  contract 
between  the  workman  and  his  employer. 
^  ^  ^  The  lien  proceedings  are  in  rem 
against  the  land,  and  the  common-law  action 
is  in  personam  against  the  employer ;"  and  a 
subcontractor  may  prosecute  a  petition  for  a 
mechanic's  lien  simultaneously  with  an  ac- 
tion at  law  against  the  contractor.  Hunt  v. 
DarUng,  59  Aa  898,  309,  26  B.  I.  4fi0,  60  L. 
B.  A.  497,  3  Ann.  CSaa  1098. 

A  "mechanlcfs  Hen"  is  a  secorfty  for  "ex^ 
tras"  supplied. under  the  terms  of  the  con« 
tract,  though  the  original  contract  price,  in- 
dependent of  such  extras,  has  been  paid. 
Zoliars  V.  Snyder  A  Uroey,  94  8.  W.  1096, 
1097,  48  Tex.  Oiv.  App.  120. 

"A  mechanic's  lien  on  diattels,  as  on 
real  estate,  is  simply  a  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  a  debt  Without  indebtedness  to 
the  mechanic  there  can  be  no  lien.  •  <  • 
The  lien  is  commensurate  with  the  amount 
due."  Tenney  v.  Anderson  Water,  Ught  & 
Power  Co,,  48  S.  B.  457,  458,  69  S.  0.  430 
(quoting  Phillips,  Mech.  Uens,  |  493). 

MEOHAHO-llEUBAIi  THEBAPT 

Practice  of  science  as  practice  of  medi- 
cine^ see  Practice  of  Medicine. 

MEDIA  ANNATA 

The  "media  annata"  (Spanish)  were  not 
sents  payable  half-yearly  and  incident  only.  t» 


f 


i 


.MEUCAHi. 


966         MSMCISAJj  nUEFABATIOK 


t 


grants  by  oomposltion,  but  were  the  half  of 
the  estimated  ftDcome  or  rent  for  the  first  year; 
and  they  were  chargeable  not  only  on  compo- 
sition,  but  on  all  grants,  titles,  and  offices 
whatever.  Trevino  t.  Fernandez,  13  Tez. 
630,659. 

MEDICAL 

MEDIOAIi  ATTENDANCE 

As  family  ext^nae,  see  Family  Expenses. 
As  necessaries,  see  Necessaries. 
As  support,  see  Support 
Expenses  of  medical  attendance,  see  Ex- 
penses. 

To  constitate  a  medical  attendance  it  is 
not  requisite  that  a  physician  shall  attend  the 
patient  at  his  home,  as  an  attendance  at  Ids 
ofiSce  is  sufficient  Gilligan  v.  Suiweme  Ooun- 
dl  of  Boyal  Arcanum,  28  Ohio  Gir«  CLR,  42, 
48. 

MEDIOAI.  OOIJJBOE 

As  public  institution,  see  Public  Institu- 
tion. 

MEDIOAI.  DEGREE 

The  words  •'without  having  legally  re- 
ceived the  medical  degree,"  in  section  153  of 
the  public  health  laws  (Laws  1893,  p.  1547,  a 
661,  as  amended  by  Laws  18d5,  p.  257,  c.  398, 
and  Laws  1905,  p.  994,  c  455),  providing  that 
one  shall  be  guilty  of  misdemeanor  who  shall 
append  the  letters  '*M.  D.'*  to  bis  name  or  as- 
sume or  advertise  the  title  of  doctor,  so  as  to 
convey  the  impression  that  he  is  a  legal  prac- 
titioner "without  having  legally  received  the 
medical  degree,"  or  without  having  received  a 
necessary  license,  mean  without  having  re- 
ceived a  medical  degree  such  as  legally  enti- 
tled the  holder  to  practice.  People  v.  Somme, 
104  N.  Y.  Supp.  946,  947,  120  App.  Div.  20. 

MEDIOAIi  EXAMINATION 

A  "medical  examination'*  of  an  applicant 
for  life  insurance  within  a  receipt  of  the  first 
annual  premium,  which  recites  that  an  appli^ 
cation  has  been  made,  that  the  first  annual 
premium  has  been  collected,  provided  the  ap- 
plication is  approved,  and  in  that  event  the 
insurance  will  be  in  force  from  the  date  of 
the  medical  examination,  is  a  final  examina- 
tion, and  not  an  examination  to  be  retained 
by  the  examiner,  under  an  agreement  with 
the  applicant,  contemplating  a  subsequent  ex- 
amination, but  the  applicant  may  decline  to 
submit  to  another  examination,  and  there- 
by make  the  examination  final.  Northwest- 
ern Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Neafus,  140  S.  W. 
1026,  1028,  145  Ky.  563,  86  L.  a  A.  (N.  S.) 
1211. 

MEDIOAI*  EXAMINER 

As  State  officer,  see  State  Officer. 

MEDIOAIi  INSANITT 

"Moral  insanity**  or  ''medical  insanify"  is 
a  perversion  of  the  SNentii^ont.  and  a|Ieption& 


Taylor  v.  McCUntock,  112  8.  W.  40Q,  41% 
Ark.  343. 

MEDIOAI.  PBAOTITIONER 

See  Practice  of  Medicine^ 

MEDIOAI.  TREATMENT 

As  accident,  see  Accident— AcddentaL 

MEDICINAL  PREPARATION 

The  expression  "medicinal  preparatioo 
as  used  in  Tariff  Act  March  8,  1863,  c:  1 
Schedule  A,  22  Stat  494,  means  such  artic 
as  are  of  use,  or  believed  by  the  prescriber 
user  fairly  and  honestly  to  be  of  use,  in  c 
ing  <Hr  alleviating,  or  palliating  or  preve 
ing;  some  disease  or  affection  of  the  hum 
frame.  Dodge  k  Oloott  ▼.  United  States,  J 
Fed.  624,  625. 

Ad«ps  Imnm  ankydvovs 

The  term  ''medicinal  preparations,*' 
Tariff  Act  July  24, 1897,  c.  11, 1 1,  Schedule 
par.  68,  includes  adeps  lauA  anhydrous  a 
adeps  lanffi  cum  aqua,  which  are  highly  f 
ished  products  of  wool  grease,  are  used  pri 
dpaUy  in  therapeutics,  are  sold  generally 
the  drug  trade,  and  are  used  to  some  eztc 
in  salves  and  medicinal  soaps.  Zinkeisen 
Go.  T.  United  States,  167  Fed.  S12,  313, 
O.  a  A.  624. 

Oreolin-Pearsott 

Creolin-Pearson  is  not  a  medicinal  pre; 
ration  within  the  meaning  of  Tariff  Act  Ju 
24,  1897,  c.  U,  I  1,  Schedule  A,  par.  ( 
Merck  4c  Co.  ▼.  United  States,  147  Fed.  896. 

OluTM^robla. 

"Chxysarobtn"  is  dutiable  as  a  drug  a 
vanced  in  value,  under  Tariff  Act  July  2 
1897,  c  U,  I  1,  Schedule  A^  par.  20,  and  n 
as  a  ''medicinal  preparation,*'  under  par 
graph  6&    Levi  y.  United  States,  140  Fed.  12 

Fruit  Jtdoe 

iYuit  juice  which  has  been  concentrati 
and  medicated  but  is  not  used  by  itself  as 
medicine,  but  as  an  ingredient  in  the  prepar 
tion  of  a  medicine,  is  not  dutiable  as  a  medk 
nal  preparation  under  paragraph  75,  Tari 
Act  Oct  1,  1890,  c.  1244,  |  1,  Schedule  ^ 
26  Stat  570.  O.  B.  Richard  4  Oow  ▼.  UnlU 
States,  147  Fed.  891,  892. 

Gaduol 

The  commercial  meaning  of  the  ter 
"medicinal  preparation"  is  the  same  as  i 
ordinary  meaning,  viz.,  a  substance  used  sol 
ly  in  medicine  and  prepared  for  the  use  < 
the  apothecary  or  physician,  to  be  admiol 
tered  ad  a  remedy  in  disease.  Gaduol,  an  e: 
tract  of  cod  liver  oil,  which,  in  the  form  1 
which  imported,  is  not  prepared  for  the  m 
of  the  apothecary  or  physician,  and  which 
not  dispensed  in  that  form,  is  not  a  "medi 
inal  preparation,"  onder  the  Tariff  Act,  b< 
is  dutiable  as>a ' 'chemical  compound."  Unite 
States  Y.  Merck. A  Co.»  136 Jl!ed.  817,  68  a  C 


MEDICINUti .  PBIS  ARATIOK 


MGDIODiB 


A.  472;  Mer^  r.  UnitBd  States^  126  F^  438, 
439. 


GeUtim  Ml 
Gelatin  capsules  eontaining  balsam  ars 
dutiable  as  "medlcbial  preparations,"  nnder 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,  c  11,  |  1,  Schednle 
A,  par.  68.  United  States  y.  Lehn  ft  Fink, 
172  Fed.  171,  178. 


"Guarana,"  a  medicinal  drug  consisting 
of  a  dried  paste  in  the  form  of  sausage-shaped 
rolls,  this  being  the  crudest  state  in  which  it 
Is  ever  imported,  and  which  before  being  used 
as  a  medicine  must  be  further  prepared,  is 
not  dutiable  as  a  'Medicinal  preparation," 
under  paragraph  68,  Schedule  A,  |  1,  c.  11, 
Tariff  Act  July  24, 1887,  but  is  free  nnder  the 
provisions  of  paragraph  648,  Free  List,  i  2, 
c  11,  of  said  act,  for  articles  *'whioh  are 
drugs  and  not  edible  and  are  in  a  crude 
state."  Cowl  ▼.  United  States,  124  Fed.  476^ 
476L 

Glyeevopltosplwte  of  liate 

Glycerophosphate  of  lime,  though  occa- 
sionally dispensed  medicinally,  is  almost  al- 
ways used  with  other  drugs  in  preparing  elix- 
irs. Held,  not  a  "medicinal  preparation/^  but 
a  ''chemical  compound,"  within  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  |  1,  Schedule  A,  para  8, 
67.  A.  KUpstein  &  Co.  ▼.  United  States,  167 
Fed.  $35,  536,  93  a  a  A.  67. 

HezaaaetliyleAtetranltt 

Hexamethylentetramin  is  a  'Medicinal 
preparation"  in  the  preparation  of  which 
alcohol  is  not  used,  within  the  meaning  of 
paragraph  68,  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11, 
I  1,  Schedule  A.  Lehn  ft  Fink  y.  United 
States,  147  Fed.  640. 

ParaldebTde 

Paraldehyde,  though  produced  from  alde- 
byde,  which  is  a  by-product  in  the  distillation 
of  alcohol,  but  contains  no  alcohol,  is  a  "me- 
dicinal preparation"  in  the  preparation  of 
which  alcohol  is  not  used,  within  the  mean- 
ing of  Tariff  Act  Jnly  24,  1897,  c.  11,  |  1, 
Schedule  A,  par.  68.  Merck  ft  Co.  ▼.  United 
States,  147  Fed.  895. 
Bom  water 

Orange  flower  water  and  rose  water  are 
not  dutiable  as  medicinal  preparations  under 
paragraph  68,  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11, 
i  1,  Schedule  A,  but  as  unenumerated  manu- 
factured articles  under  section  6  of  s^d  act 
£nler  ft  Eobeson  y.  United  States,  147  Fed. 
765,  766. 


Scammony  resin,  pr^Dared  from  gum* 
icammony,  or  scammony  root,  and  used  prin- 
cipally in  compounding  medicines,  is  dutiable 
as  a  "drug  advanced  in  yalue  or  condition,*' 
nnder  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  U,  |  1, 
Sd^ule  A,  par.  20^.  rather  than  as  a  '*medie* 
inal  preparation,'*  under  paragraph  67.  Unit* 
ed  States  y.^lCgrtin.  155  Fed.  264. 265. 


MEDICINE 

As  soieaee 

See  Practice  of  Medicine;  Practice  of 
Medicine  and  Surgery;  Practice  of 
Medicine,  Surgery,  and  Osteopathy. 

Practice  of  medicine  as  business,  see 
Business. 

^'Medicine'  is  an  experimental,  not  an 
exact,  science.  All  the  law  can  do  is  to  reg- 
ulate and  safeguard  the  use  of  powerful  and 
dangerous  remedies.'*  Bennett  y.  Ware,  61 
S.  B.  546,  548,  4  Qa.  App.  298  (quoting  with 
approyal  from  State  y.  Biggs,  46  S.  E.  401, 
133  N.  0.  729,  64  U  B.  A.  139,  96  Am.  St 
BepL  741). 

As  reaaedlal  substaaee 

See  Domestic  Medicines;  Family  Medi- 
cines ;  Patent  Medicine. 

As  necessaries,  see  Necessaries. 

Medicinal  preparations  as  intoxicating 
liquor,  see  Intoxicating  liquor. 

Proprietary  medicine,  see  Proprietary. 

"^ 'Medicine^  in  the  popular  sense  is  a 
remedial  substance."  State  y.  Heffeman,  66 
AtL  284»  287,  28  B.  I.  20  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing the  definition  in  State  y.  Mylod,  40  AtL 
763,  755,  20  a  I.  632,  637,  41  L.  B.  A.  428). 

Sane— AraisA,  iodlmey  aiid  sMRplior 

Tincture  of  iodine,  tincture  of  arnica,  and 
spirits  of  camphor,  when  sold  in  sealed  bot- 
tles, though  commonly  used  as  domestic  rem- 
edies, are,  neyertheless,  ''medicines,"  within 
Pharmacy  Law  (Laws  1900,  a  667)  |  200  (now 
Public  Health  Law  [Consol.  Laws,  a  45J),  pro- 
hibiting, under  penalties,  the  sale  of  medi- 
cines or  poisons  except  in  the  presence  and 
nnder  the  superylslon  of  a  licensed  pharma- 
cist State  Board  of  Pharmacy  y.  Matthews, 
90  K.  a  966,  967,  197  N.  Y.  853,  26  Lu  R.  A. 
(N.  8.)  1013. 

Same— Cigairs  and  toliaooo 

"Tobacco'*  "in  its  manufactured  form  of 
cigars,  cigarettes,  smoking  tobacco,  chewing 
tobacco,  snuff,  and  the  like,  cannot  be  said 
to  be  in  any  sense  a  drug  or  medicine,"  so 
as  to  be  a  proper  subject  of  sale  on  Sunday. 
Penniston  y.  City  of  Mewnan,  45  S.  B.  65,  66, 
117  Ga.  702. 


The  fact  that  the  substance  employed  as 
a  remedial  agent  may  haye  yalue  as  a  food, 
and  a  tendency  to  build  up  and  restore  wast- 
ed or  diseased  tissue,  will  not  depriye  it  of 
its  character  as  a  'Medicine,'*  If  it  is  ad- 
ministered and  employed  for  that  purpose 
Stete  y.  Bresee,  114  N.  W.  45,  47,  137  Iowa, 
673,  24  L.  R.  A.  (S.  S,)  103. 

A  "condiment"  is  a  'food"  and  not  a 
•'medicine.*' .  The  ''InCemational  stock  food** 
is  a  *food  or  oendiment**  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Kentucky  pure  food  law  (Laws  1906, 
p.  282,  c.  48)»  and  its  sale  is  subject  to  regn* 
lation  thereunder*  Sayage  t.  Scoyell,  171 
JM.566. 


uedichkx 


860 


MSMBETR 


8mb«— XntmleatlBs  liqvom 

A  registered  pharmacist  may  Bell  drags 
and  medicine  containing  intoxicating  liquor 
or  alcohol  without  a  license  authorizing  him 
to  sell  liquor,  provided  the  drugs  and  medi- 
cines are  so  compounded  that  they  cannot  be 
used  as  a  beverage.  Tonic  bitters  containing 
30  per  cent  alcohol,  and  capable  of  being 
used  as  a  beverage,  held  a  beverage,  and  not 
a  medicine,  and  hence  could  not  lawfully  be 
sold  by  a  pharmacist  without  a  license  to  sell 
intoxicating  liquors.  McNlel  v.  Horan,  133 
N.  W.  1070, 1071,  lfi3  Iowa,  630. 

MEDIUM 

Many  scholars  and  successful  business 
men  sincerely  believe  In  spiritualism,  and  of 
being  able,  not  by  all,  but  through  the  in- 
strumentality of  a  particular  few  naturally 
qualified  persons  called  "mediums/*  to  con- 
verse with  and  be  advised  by  the  spirits  of 
departed  friends,  and  believe  they  recognize 
the  voices  and  handwriting  of  the  dead.  It 
has  been  held  that  the  mere  ftict  that  one 
entertains  such  belief  is  not  evidence  of  want 
of  testamentary  capacity.  Walt  ▼«  Westfall, 
68  N.  E.  271,  276, 161  Ind.  64a 

MEET— MEETING 

See  Adjourned  Meeting;  Annual  Meet- 
ing; Galled  Meeting;  Gamp  Meeting; 
District  Meeting;  Legal  Meeting; 
Regular  Meeting;  Same  Meeting; 
Stated  Meeting. 

Any  subsequent  meeting,  see  Any. 

Meeting  as  assemblage,  see  Assemblage. 

Under  article  588,  Pen.  Gode,  1879,  pro- 
viding that,  in  order  to  reduce  a  homicide  to 
manslaughter  by  reason  of  insulting  words 
or  conduct  of  the  person  killed  towards  a 
female  relative  of  the  party  guilty  of  ithe 
homicide,  it  must  appear  that  the  killing  took 
place  immediately  upon  the  happening  of  the 
insulting  conduct,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as 
the  party  killing  may  meet  with  the  person 
killed  after  having  been  informed  of  the  in- 
sult, the  word  **meet"  signifies  that  the  par- 
ties were  brought  Into  such  proximity  as 
would  enable  the  defendant,  to  act  in  the 
premises,  whether  he  was  armed  or  unarmed. 
Gillespie  V.  State,  109  S.  W.  158, 159,  63  Tex. 
Cr.  H.  167. 

aOSETING  FOR  PmSLIC  WORSHIP 

See  Public  Worship. 


MEETm O  OF  CREDITORS 

See  First  Meeting  of  Greditorsi 

aOSETIKO  OF  MINDS 

An  assent  is  evidenced  by  a  proposition 
emanating  fr<»m  one  side  and  acceptance  of  It 
on  the  other,  such  proposition  and  acceptance 
together  constituting  what  is  called  a  meet- 
ing of  the  minds,  and,  where  a  meeting  of  the 
minds*  does  not  appear,  there  is  no  contract 


Wm.  J.  Lemp  Bvewing  Go.  ▼.  Seeor,  96  Pa 
686,  639,  21  OkL  537. 

A  '^meeting  of  minda^  imonntlnl  to  co 
stitute  a  contract  is  the  agreement  reach< 
by  the  parties  and  expressed,  and  the  "mee 
ing  of  minds"  is  not  determined  by  the  s 
cret  intention  of  the  parties,  but  by  their  e 
pressed  intention,  which  may  be  wholly  i 
variance  with  the  former,  and  the  unde 
standing  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the  agre 
ment  is  ImmateriaL  Hudson  v.  Golumbla 
Transfer  Go.,  100  N.  W.  402,  408,  137  Mic 
255,  109  Am.  St  Rep.  679  (citing  Breviingtc 
V.  Meeker,  51  Mo.  App.  348;  9  Gya  pp.  24 
578). 

KEETZNO  POINT 

A  contract  under  whidi  defendant  ca: 
rled  United  States  mail  required  it,  at  ''mee 
ing  pc^ts,"  to  transfer  to  connecting  trail 
the  mail  wliich  was  to  be  forwarded  by  sue 
trains.  Held,  that  a  "Meeting  point*'  m 
one  where  the  defendant's  mail  route  m 
another,  as  established  by  the  govemmen 
and  not  a  station  upon  the  defendant's  rout 
sei)arated  by  a  half  mUe  from  another  ma 
route,  although  trains  from  the  latter  ra 
over  said  half  mile  to  the  station  and  thei 
connected  with,  and  received  mail  from,  tb 
trains  of  the  defendant  Johnson  v.  Bosto 
ft  M.  R.  Go.,  88  AU.  267,  69  Vt  521,  522. 

MEETIN O  WrmSSSES  FAOE  TO  FAO 

See  Face  to  Face. 

MELANCHOLIA 

See  Simple  Melancholia. 

MEMBER 

See  Active  Member. 
Of  dtr  eoamoil 

A  provision  in  the  charter  of  a  city  tha 
the  legislative  authority  of  the  dty  shall  b 
vested  in  a  council,  consisting  of  a  mayoi 
two  aldermen  elected  from  each  ward,  an< 
the  city  recorder,  made  the  various  officer 
named  "members"  of  the  city  council  witbi 
the  meaning  of  other  statutory  provisioiu 
Blain  V.  Ghippewa  Gircuit  Judge^  108  N.  \V 
440,  444,  145  Mich.  69  (dissenting  opinion). 

Of  Oongress 

''When  we  speak  of  a  member  of  Con 
gress,  we  refer  to  one  who  is  a  componen 
part  of  the  Senate  or  House  of  Rrepresenta 
tlves;  one  who  is  in  office — not  out  of  office 
one  who  is  sharing  the  responsibilities  ani 
privileges  of  membership.**  The  word 
"member  of  Gongrees,"  as  used  in  the  firs 
provision  of  Rev.  St  i  1781,  making  it  ( 
criminal  offense  for  a  member  of  Gongresi 
or  any  officer  or  agent  of  the  government,  t 
agree  to  receive  or  receive  a  bribe  for  procoi 
ing  or  aiding  to  procure  for  another  any  coo 
tract,  office,  or  place  from  the  government,  d< 
not  include  a  person  elected  to  the  office  a 


nlJSW  II  MtWk 


861 


WKirauR 


Senator  of  tlie  United  Statas  until  be  Iw 
been  aco^^rtMl  48  member  by  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States  and  baa  aaevned  the  duties 
of  tlie  office.  United  Statee  ▼.  Dietrich,  126 
Fed.  676,  678,  68X. 

Of  eozporatlom 

A  resolution  of  the  board  of  directed  of 
a  corporation  which  empowers  the  corpora- 
tion to  sell  its  lands  to  ''members**  of  the 
corporation  authorizes  a  sale  to  the  share- 
holders who  are  not  directors  and  is  valid. 
Davis  V.  Nueces  Valley  Irr.  Co,,  128  S.  W. 
4,  6,  103  Tex.  243. 

GonsoL  Laws,  p.  1381,  c.  23,  f  d,  subd.  8,' 
proYides  that  the  term  **member  of  a  corpo- 
ration*' shall  include  evei^  person  haring  a 
right  to  vote  for  the  election  of  directors, 
other  than  a  person  having  the  right  to  Tote 
only  on  a  proxy.  Section  28  provides  that, 
"unless  otherwise  provided  fa  the  certificate 
of  incorporaflon,**  every  stockholder  shall  be 
entitled  at  every  meeting  to  one  vote  fbr 
every  share  standing  in  his  name  on  the 
books.  Section  24  provides  that  the  certifi- 
cate of  incorporation  may  provide  that,  at 
all  elections  of  directors,  each  stockholder 
shall  be  entitled  to  as  many  votes  as  will 
equal  the  number  of  his  shares  multiplied  by 
the  number  of  directors  to  be  elected,  and 
that  he  may  cast  all  of  such  votes  for  a  single 
director,  or  may  distribute  them  among  the 
number  to  be  voted  for,  or  any  two  or  more 
of  them,  as  he  may  see  fit,  which  right,  when 
exercised,  shall  be  deemed  cumulative  voting. 
Held,  that  the  phrase  "unless  otherwise  pro- 
Tided  in  the  certificate  of  incorporation,"  at 
the  beginning  of  section  23,  does  not  relate 
only  to  cumulative  voting  permitted  by  sec- 
tion 24,  but  permits  the  certificate  of  incor- 
poration to  provide  what  voting  right  classes 
of  stockholders  shall  possess;  and  as  it  is 
lawful  for  different  classes  to  agree  that  one 
class  shall  have  no  right  to  vote  on  ques- 
tions relating  to  the  management,  and  such 
agreement  does  not  contravene  public  policy, 
the  Legislature  did  not  intend  to  compel 
every  class  to  hold  the  right  to  vote,  or  pro- 
hibit formation  of  a  corporation  depriving 
preferred  stockholders  of  voting  power.  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Browne  v.  Keonlg,  118  N.  Y.  Supp. 
136,  137,  133  App.  DIv.  756. 


Of  ftttdlFc 

Person  of  the  family  synonymous,  see 
Person. 

The  "members'*  of  a  man*s  family  are 
bis  ^Ife  and  children.  The  phrase  certain- 
ly does  not,  as  usually  understood.  Include 
the  servants  who  may  be  casually  employed 
in  his  kitchen.  Grand  Lodge,  A.  O.  U.  W., 
of  New  Jersey,  ▼.  Gandy,  68  AtL  142,  147,  63 
N.  J.  Bq.  6d2. 

A  member  of  a  fraternal  beneficiary  so- 
ciety lived  with  friends/  neaeof  whom  wekre 
dependent  en  him;  and,  while  he  paid  no 
board,  ttiey  expected  eoapensatlon  at  bis 


deatH.  Hsia,  tbat  the  wlie  of  the  pecson  in 
whose  home  the  member  lived  was  not  a 
member  of  his  faaiily,  wMhin  Laws  iSiS,  p. 
440,  c  86^  •  1,  telittng  So  payment  of  death 
benefits.  Supreme  Oommandery,  U.  O.  G.  O., 
V.  Benaghey,  72  AtL  419,  70  N.  H.  197. 

A  party  to  be  a  member  of  a  family 
within  the  meaning  of  the  homestead  article 
of  the  Constitution  must  be  a  member  in 
good  faith.  A  man  and  his  wife  purchased 
two  lots,  not  exceeding  half  an  acre.  In  a 
city,  in  1886,  and  resided  there  nntU  their 
death,  in  1896.  They  had  two  daidren,  one 
a  s6n,  married  in  1876^  and  the  other  a 
danghter,  married  in  1887,  and  who  resided 
with  her  parents  nntU  her  death,  in  1889, 
leaving  two  children.  Her  husband  with  one 
child  removed  to  a  home  of  hie  own,  but  his 
daughter  r«nained  with  her  grandparrats 
under  the  understanding  that  they  were  to 
educate  and  8Uiqk>rt  her  as  long  as  she  lived, 
which  they  did  until  the  death  of  the  grand- 
mother in  February,  1898,  and  the  grandfa- 
ther in  Sept^nber  of  the  same  year.  There 
was  no  legal  adoption  of  such  granddaughter 
by  either  of  her  grandparents.  Held,  that 
such  granddaughter  was  a  member  of  the 
family  of  her  grandfather  at  the  time  of  his 
death.  Adams  v.  Clark,  37  South.  734,  736, 
48  Fla.  205. 

The  oonetitatian  of  a  fraternal  order  pro- 
vided that,  on  the  death  of  a  member,  the 
person  designated  as  beneficiary  should  be 
entitled  to  the  benefit  fund,  provided  the  ben- 
efidaiy  should  "be  one  or  more  members  of 
his  family  or  •  •  •  reUted  to  or  *  •  * 
dependent"  on  him.  A  certificate  issued  to 
a  member  designated  his  wife  as  beneficiary. 
Snbsequently  the  parties  were  divorced.  The 
member  died  without  exercising  his  right  to 
change  the  beneficiary.  Held,  that  the  wife 
was  entitled  to  the  benefit  fuad.—Schmidt  v. 
Hauer,  Ul  N.  W.  966,  967,  139  Iowa,  631. 

The  word  "person"  as  ns^  in  Rev.  St 
Mo.  1899,  t  870,  providing  for  service  of  a 
summons  by  leaving  a  copy  of  the  petition 
and  writ  at  defendant's  usual  place  of  abode 
with  some  person  of  his  family,  is  synony- 
mous with  the  word  "member^  as  used  in  a 
return  showing  that  a  copy  of  the  writ  and 
petition  was  left  with  a  member  of  defend- 
ant's family.  The  words  may  be  used  inter- 
changeably. One  could  not  be  a  person  of  a 
family  without  being  a  member,  nor  could 
he  be  a  member  without  being  a  person. 
Colter  V.  Luke,  108  8.  W.  608,  609.  129  Mo. 
App.  702, 

Of  Mrm  ^epaetietat 
Undtf  Civil  Service  Law  (Iaws  1899,  p. 
809,  c.  870)  i  21,  as  amended  by  Laws  1904, 
p.  1094,  c.  697,  providing  that  no  person  hold- 
ing a  position  who  shall  have  been  a  member 
of  a  volunteer  fire  department  shall  he  re^ 
moved  tKom  such  position  exo^t  fbr  caase 
shown. after  hearing,  a  coroner's  clerk,  who 
became  a  membw  of  the  flee  department  fer 


MZMOBAKDUM 


8M 


ICfiMORT 


prospective  purchaser  for  earnest  nmnegr  la 
not  a  note  or  memorandum  In  writing,  as  re* 
quired  by  the  statute  of  frauds.  Koenlg  t. 
Dobm,  70  N.  B.  1061, 1004,  200  IlL  468. 

Defendant  gave  plaintiff  an  order  for 
goods  amottnting  to  1329.60,  NoTember  25, 
1910,  having  previously  given  two  other  or- 
ders, and  also  one  of  later  date.  There  was 
no  sufficient  memoranduin  to  satisfy  the 
statute  of  frauds,  because  not  signed  by  de- 
fendant On  January  11,  1911,  defendant 
by  letter  requested  plaintiff  not  to  ship  any 
goods  before  March  10,  1911,  or  some  time 
later,  and  on  receiving  a  bill,  dated  March 
27, 1011,  again  wrote  requesting  plaintiff  not 
to  ship  any  goods  for  the  present  stating 
that  tlie  amount  called  for  by  the  bill  was 
more  than  he  had  ordered  or  would  want 
and  requested  shipment  of  one-half  of  the 
amount  with  the  September  dating;  other- 
wise, he  could  not  accept  the  goods.  Held, 
that  such  letters,  not  being  physically  at- 
tached to  the  memorandum,  could  not  be 
used  in  connection  therewith  to  make  out  a 
sufficient  ''memorandum*'  of  the  sale  within 
the  statute  of  frauds.  Roaring  Spring  Blank 
Book  Co.  V.  Lesser,  133  N.  Y.  Supp.  1032, 
1083,  76  Misc.  Rep.  617. 

A  letter  from  a  vendee  to  a  vendor 
stating  but  a  part  of  the  terms  of  a  parol 
contract  for  the  sale  of  land  is  not  a  "mem- 
orandum of  the  oral  contract,"  which  will 
take  the  contract  out  of  the  statute  of  frauds. 
Bogigian  v.  Booklovera'  Library,  70  N.  E. 
769,  770,  193  Mass.  444. 

Where  letters  from  the  vendors*  agent 
to  a  person  who  represented  the  purchaser 
in  some  capacity,  either  as  agent,  broker,  or 
go-between,  and  from  the  vendors'  agent  to 
a  bank  which  was  to  hold  the  deed  in  es- 
crow, contained  the  names  of  the  parties  to 
the  sale,  the  description  of  the  property,  the 
consideration,  and  all  the  terms  and  condi- 
tions of  the  sale,  the  letters  constituted  a 
sufficient  "memorandum^  to  satisfy  the  stat- 
ute of  frauds.  Bronx  Inv.  Ck).  v.  National 
Bank  of  Commerce  of  Seattle,  92  Pac  880, 
381,  47  Wash.   566. 

Where  letters  passing  between  buyer  and 
seller  of  certain  goods  did  not  disclose  the 
kind  or  quantity  of  goods  or  purchase  price, 
and  contained  no  reference  either  to  mem- 
orandum made  by  salesman  at  the  time  he 
received  an  order  or  to  an  invoice  made  by 
the  seller  when  the  goods  were  shipped,  and 
it  was  impossible  from  the  letters  to  ascer- 
talh  the  terms  of  the  saie^  they  cwere  insuffi- 
cient to  constitute  a  ."ifteviorandara«" :  wftth- 
in  the  statute  of  frauds.  JDvans  v.  Pelta,  181 
N.  X.  Supp.  4U,  412,  146  App.  mv.  740. 

Letters  addressed  to  a  third  person,  stat- 
ing and  affirming  a  contract,  may  be  used 
against  the  writer  as  a  *'memor%ibdum"  of 
the  contract,  and  are  sufficient  evidence  of 
tite  contract  to  wavraaft  the  conrt  in  giving 
eCleettoit.   NldMlaMLV*  Doiver,,58  S.  E.444, 


446,  146  N.  O.  18,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  167  (d 
lag  Brown,  Statute  of  Frauds,  1 854a ;  Mize 
V.  Burnett,  40  N.  a  254,  69  Aul  Dec  744). 

A  letter  admitting  an  oral  agreement  t 
buy  land  is  insufficient  under  Rev.  St.  a  11' 
S  1,  par.  4,  requiring  such  contracts  to  b 
evidenced  in  writing,  where  it  falls  to  se 
up  the  terms  previously  agreed  upon,  ani 
particularly  omits  any  reference  to  the  pui 
chase  price.  Under  Rev.  St  c.  113,  1 1,  pai 
4,  requiring  a  contract  for  a  sale  of  lands  t 
be  evidenced  in  writing,  signed  by  the  part 
to  be  charged,  or  his  duly  authorized  ageni 
all  essential  terms  of  the  contract  must  ap 
pear.  Including  the  amount  of  the  purchasi 
price  where  the  contract  contains  a  stipula 
tlon  as  to  price,  so  that  no  part  of  the  agree 
ment  need  be  proved  by  parol  evidence 
Thurlow  V.  Perry,  77  AtL  641,  642.  107  Me 
127. 

The  entry  In  the  seller's  account  book  h 
not  a  memorandum  signed  by  the  party  to  N 
charged  within  Gen.  St  1906,  |  2518,  mak 
Ing  contracts  for  sale  of  goods  void,  in  tlu 
absence  of  certain  circumstances,  including  i 
memorandum  in  writing  of  the  contract  sign 
ed  by  the  party  to  be  charged.  United  Hard 
ware-Furniture  Co.  v.  Blue,  52  South.  364 
366,  59  Fla.  419,  85  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  103a 

The  note  or  memorandum  required  bj 
Rev.  St  c.  113,  I  4,  to  make  a  sale  valid  as 
against  the  statute  of  frauds,  need  not  be  ii 
a  single  writing,  but  it  is  sufficient  if  letten 
signed  by  the  party  to  be  charged  or  his 
agent  contain  by  direct  statement  or  by  ret 
erence  to  letters  written  by  the  other  partj 
all  the  essential  parts  of  the  bargain.  Wey- 
mouth T.  Goodwin,  75  AtL  61,  62,  105  Me 
510. 

Meohanio's  Ilea 

The  word  ''memorandum,"  as  used  in  a 
statute  requiring  a  mechanics'  lien  clahnanl 
to  file  a  written  memorandum  signed  by  him 
asserting  his  claln:|,  lias  no  peculiar  mean 
ing.  The  statute  means  no  more  than  "a 
writing  signed  by  him  asserting  his  claim.' 
Nor  does  the  use  of  the  word  "claim"  signi 
fy  that  the  particulars  of  the  contract  oi 
items  of  the  account  are  to  be  set  forth 
This  word  obviously  refers  to  the  claim  ol 
a  lien.  Tlie  date  when  the  job  was  com 
pleted  or  the  pay  became  due  need  not  ap- 
pear in  the  absence  of  statutory  require- 
ment. The  object  of  the  memorandum  re 
quired  to  be  filed  in  the  clerk's  office  is  to 
give  notice  to  the  owner  and  persons  deal- 
ing with  the  property  that  it  stands  charg- 
ed with  the  payment  of  the  bUls  for  labor 
and  material  which  went  Into  It  under  sncb 
a  contract  as  entitles  the  claimant  to  his 
Uen.  Baldwin  v.  Spear  Bros.,  64  Aa  235, 
236,  237,  79  Vt  43. 

MJEMORY 

flee  Disposing  Mind  and  Memoiy;  Seand 
liind  and  Memory* 


MBMOBT 


MB      BCBNTAXi  AOONT  OR  AKOUJSH 


"Memory**  to  the  power  of  retaining 
knowledge  In  the  mind.  State  ▼.  Ooyne,  114 
S.  W.  8,  12,  214  Mo.  344,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.) 
903. 

The  regularly  kept  and  original  books 
of  a  corporation  identified  as  snch  hy  the 
proper  cnstodians,  and  constituting  the  rec- 
ords of  the  bnsinesa  transactions  of  the  cor- 
poration, required  by  OIt.  Gode,  |  877,  to  be 
kept  by  all  corporations  tor  profit,  are  admis- 
sible in  an  action  between  other  parties 
without  farther  preliminary  proof,  as  consti- 
tuting the  ''memory*'  of  the  transaction  of  the 
corporation.  Hnrwita  y.  Gross,  91  Paa  100» 
111,  5  OaL  App.  ei4. 

MEN 

See  BuDoo  Men;  Business  Men;  Masses 
of  Men. 

Rer.  Codes,  |  8536,  requires  Iron-bonnet- 
ed safety  eages  with  doors  in  mine  shafts 
over  300  feejt  deep  to  be  used  in  lowering 
and  hoisting  the  employ^  thereof,  and  that 
the  doors  must  be  closed  "when  lowering  or 
hoisting  the  men.'*  Held,  that  the  words 
"the  men"  imported  the  singular  as  well, 
and  that  the  statute  required  the  closing  of 
the  doors  during  the  hoisting  or  lowering  of 
one  or  more  of  the  men  in  the  coarse  of  his 
employment,  and  was  not  complied  with  by 
a  closing  of  the  doors  only'  when  the  shifts 
of  moi  employed  in  the  mine  were  being 
lowered  or  hoisted  at  the  usual  time  of 
dianging  the  workmen.  Osterholm  ▼.  Bos- 
ton ft  Montana  Oonsol.  Gopper  it  Silver  MIn- 
tag  Co.,  107  Pac.  409,  802,  40  Mont  OOa 

MENACE 

As  threat,  see  Threat 

"Menace"  Is  defined  as  the  show  of  an 
intent  to  Inflict  eyil;  a  threat;  indication 
of  probable  evil  or  catastrophe  to  come ;  that 
which  menaeea ;  an  Impen^ng  evIL  Worl^ 
T.  State,  71  8.  B.  158,  156,  186  Ga.  231. 

A  ^'menace"  Is  defined  to  be  the  show  of 
tn  intention  to  Inflict  evil.  It  is  to  act  in  a 
threatening  manner,  and  any  overt  act  of  a 
threatening  character,  short  of  an  actual  as- 
sault, is  a  ^'menace."  Rossi  y.  State,  68  8. 
E.  56,  58,  7  Ga.  A».  732;  Price  y.  State^  72 
8.  £.  908,  910,  187  Ga.  71  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing the  definition  In  Gumming  ▼.  State,  27  B. 
B.  177,  99  Ga.  662). 

To  call  a  man  a  Uar  and  raise  a  stidc  to 
strike  him,  If  in  anger,  is  a  menace  of  vio- 
lenoe,  and  constitutes  a  breach  of  a  bond  to 
keep  the  peace,  under  Pen.  Code  1895,  H 
1238, 1239.  Rumsey  y.  Bullard,  68  a  B.  921, 
5  6a.  App.  802. 

"Metmxx^*  Is  generally  regarded  as  syn- 
<mymous  with  nhreat*"  It  may  have  otiier 
meanings.  On  a  prosecution  for  murder,  an 
instmction  that  mere  words  or  menaces,*^  Ir- 
^pectlve  of  how  aggravating,   do  not  of 


themselves  constitute  provocation  for  the 
commission  of  murder  In  any  degree,  was 
not  objectionable  on  the  theory  that  the 
word  "menaesa"  waa  equivalent  to  an  overt 
act,  espedaUy  In  yiew  of  an  instruction  In 
which  the  proper  diatinetlon  between  words 
and  threats  and  overt  acts  waa  dearly 
drawn.  I^mch  v.  People,  79  Paa  1015,  88 
Colo.  12& 

av.  Code,  I  1569,  defines  '"duress"  as  (1) 
the  unlawful  confinement  of  a  person;  (2) 
unlawful  detention  of  the  property  of  any 
audi  person;  (8)  confinement  of  such  per- 
son, lawful  In  form,  but  fraudulently  ob- 
tained. Section  1570  defines  "menace^*  as  ctm- 
slsting  of  the  duress  specified  In  subdivisions 
1  and  2,  and  unlawful  and  yiolent  injury  to 
the  person  and  property  of  such  person,  or 
injury  to  his  character.  Defendant  denuind- 
ed  the  right  to  purchase  boxes  from  plain- 
tiff at  an  alleged  contract  price,  which  con- 
tract. In  f^ct,  did  not  exist,  but  plaintilf  re- 
fused to  sell  at  less  than  practically  the 
market  price,  which  was  higher  than  the  al- 
leged contract  price.  It  was  practically  im- 
possible to  then  buy  the  boxes  elsewhere, 
and  they  were  essential  to  the  continuance 
of  defendant's  business,  and  defendant  claim- 
ed It  was  coerced  into  paying  the  price  charg- 
ed therefor.  Held,  that  some  element  of 
compulsion  or  threatened  exerdse  of  power 
over  the  person  or  property  to  compel  pay- 
ment must  be  present  to  constitute  duress, 
and  defendant  was  not  compelled  hy  duress 
to  purchase  and  pay  the  price  charged  for 
the  boxes.  Standard  Box  Co.  v.  Mutual  Bis- 
cuit Co.,  108  Pac.  938,  943,  10  CaL  App.  746. 

MENINGITIS 

See  EJucephalo  MeningltlSL 

MENS  REA 

"Mens  rea'*— guilty  mind— while  a  neces- 
sary element  of  most  criminal  offenses,  is,  in 
some  offenses,  presumed  from  the  facts  prov- 
ed. Brown  v.  State  (Del.)  74  AtL  836,  837,  7 
PennewlU,  158,  25  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  66L 

MENTAL 

MENTAX.  AOOHY  OR  AKGinSK 

Anguish  as  Including,  see  Anguish. 

*^ental  anguish"  la  a  high  degree  of 
mental  suffering,  and  not  mere  disappoint- 
ment or  regret.  Geroch  v.  Western  Union 
T>elegraph  Co.,  60  S.  R  637,  646,  147  N.  C.  1 ; 
Hancock  v.  Western  Union  TeL  Ca,  49  S.  S. 
952,  953,  137  N.  C.  497,  69  L.  R.  A.  403. 

The  term  **mental  angrrtsh,'*  recognized 
by  statute  as  a  groiuitf  of  action  against  a 
telegraph  company,  apptlea  only  to  sodal  and 
persona]  matters,  and  not  to  business  af- 
fairs. The  statute  doea  not  authorise  recov- 
ery fitNr  vexation  caused  the  aendev  of  a  tel- 
egram because  of  dishonor  ^  a  ctoolc  iMr  lall*' 


Umi^£!L  kCKIKT  OB  iLM^msH      368: 


MENTAIr  CAPACITY 


ure  to  deliver  thef  tetegram  In  tima  Gapers. 
V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co;,  SO  S.  EL  S37,  63Sk 
71  S.  C.  29.  Nor'  for  worry  orer  the  possible 
loss  of  a  position.  Western  Ubion  Telegraph 
Co.  ▼.  Sbenep,  104  S.  W.  164,  155,  8a  Ark. 
470,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  886,  110  Am.  St  Rep. 
14S. 

Mental  anguish  or  suffering,  as  used  in 
the  statute  authorizing  a  recovery  of  dam- 
ages for  mental  anguish  or:  suffering,  means 
distress  or  serlou«  pain  as  distinguished  from 
annoyance,  regret,  or  yezation.  Mental  an- 
guish is  Intense  mental  suffering.  .  Johnson  v. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  62  S.  E.  244, 
245,  81  S.  O.  235, 17  L.  B.  A  (N.  S.)  1002, 128 
Am.  St  Rep.  905. 

In  order  to  recover  damages  imder  the 
"niental  anguish"  doctrine,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  mental  anguish  suffered  be  real  and 
with  cause,  and  not  merely  the  result  of  a 
too  sensitive  mind  or  a  morbid  imagination. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  ▼.  Archie,  121 
S.  W.  1045,  1046,  92  Ark.  59. 

Mental  worry,  distress,  grief,  and  mortifi- 
cation are  proper  elements  of  mental  suffer- 
ing for  which  an  ii^Jured  person  can  recover ; 
recovery  not  being  limited  to  the  form  of 
mental  suffering  described  as  physical  pain. 
Merrill  v.  Los  Angeles  Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  Ill 
Pac.  534,  540,  158  Cal.  499,  81  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
559,  139  Am.  St  Rep.  134. 

Allegations  in  a  petition,  In  an  action 
against  a  sheriff  and  his  deputy,  that  they 
wrongfully  and  unlawfully  entered  into  a 
house  and  premises  occupied  by  plaintiff  un- 
der a  lease  i^nd  dispossessed  him,  and  put  his 
household  goods  and  personal  property  in  the 
public  highway,  and  so  put  plaintiff  to  great 
trouble  and  distress,  properly  authorize  a  re- 
covery for  humiliation  and  mortification,  or 
any  phase  of  "mental  anguish,"  since  the 
word  ''distress,"  being  a  genetic  term,  in- 
cludes anguish  or  suffering,  both  of  mind  and 
body,  and  since  "humiliation"  and  mortifica- 
tion are  simply  phases  of  mental  anguish. 
Perkins  y.  OgUvle,  146  S.  W.  785^  788,  148 
Ky.  309. 

Allegations  that  plaintiff  was  humiliated, 
mortified,  and  shamed  by  being  put  off  a  train 
at  a  place  where  she  was  compelled  to  expose 
her  person  in  alighting  showed  "mental  dis- 
tress," though  that  was  not  alleged  in  terms. 
International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hood,  118  S. 
W.  1119,  1122,  55  Tex.  av.  App.  834. 

"Mental  suffering"  will  be  implied  from 
illness  accompanied  by  physical  pain.  Inter- 
national ft  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  95  S.  W. 
595,  596,  48  Tex.  Civ.  App.  147  (citing  Texas 
ft  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Curry,  64  Tex.  85 ;  Houston, 
B.  ft  W.  T.  R.  Oo.  T.  Simpson  [Tex.]  81  S.  W. 
858;  Brown  v.  ^nlUvan,  10  S.  W.  288,  71  T». 
470;  Galveston,  H.  ft  8.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Rubio 
[Tex.]  65  S.  W.  1127).  See,  also,  Ousley  v. 
Hamper  105  N.  W;  122»  128, 128  Iowa,  675. 

Thera  is  a  clear  distinction  between 
'^mental  aQflertng"  and  ^Imi^airment  of  the 


mental  faci^es^^'-    Gagnlerv.  Fargp,  96  N. 
W{  1841,848,  12  N.D.219L 

MENTAZi  OftPAOXTT 

"Mental  capacity"  to  execute  a  deed  does 
not.  mean  that  the  grantor  Qon^rehends  the , 
legal  effect  of  the  words  employed;  but,  if 
the  nature  and  effect  of  the  instrument  as  a . 
conveyance  of  property  is  understood,  he  pos-. 
sessea  sufficient  mental  capacity,  and  mere 
weakness  of  intellect  from  slcicness  or  old  age 
is  no  ground  for  avoiding  a  deed  in  the  ab- 
seaos;  of  fraud  or  undue  Influence.  Moor- 
head  V.  Scovel,  ^  Aa  18,  15,  210  Pa.  446. 

The  test  of  "capacity"  to  diake  a  deed  !»' 
whether  the  grantor  at  the  time  fully  under- 
stood, realized,  and  appreciated  the  probable 
result^  and  consequences  of,  the  transaction. 
Corporation  of  Members  of  Church  of  Jesus 
Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints  v.  Watson,  83 
Pac.  781,  788,  80  Utah,  126. 

The  test  of  "mental  capacity"  necessary 
to  make  a  valid  deed  is  that  the  grantor  is 
capable  of  understanding  in  a  reasonable 
manner  the  nature  and  effect  of  the  act  in 
which  he  is  engaged.  The  requisite  mental 
capacity  is  present  where  the  grantor  is  ca- 
pable of  understanding  in  a  reasonable  man- 
ner the  nature  and  effect  of  the  deed,  and  of 
comprehending  and  protecting  his  own  inter- 
ests in  ordinary  business  affairs.  Fitzgerald 
V.  Allen,  88  N.  B.  240,  243,  240  111.  80  (citing 
Ring  V.  Lawless,  60  N.  B.  881,  190  111.  520). 

No  particular  degree  of  mental  capacity 
is  essential  to  enable  one  to  execute  a  deed, 
the  test  being  whether  the  grantor  had  at 
the  time  suffld^at  mental  capacity  to  under- 
stand the  nature  of  the  transaction,  find  asr 
sent  thereto.  Wampler  v.  Harrell,  72  S.  ]^' 
135,  138,  112  Va.  635. 

To  render  A  deed  void  on  the  ground  of 
the  grantor's  mental  incapacity,  it  must  ap^ 
pear  that  his  mental  Infirmity  rendered  him 
incapable  of  understanding  the  nature  of 
his  act,  and  mere  infirmity  of  mind  or  body^ 
not  ^.mounting  to  such  incapacity  to  under- 
stand, is  insufficient  Du  Bose  v.  KeD,  71 
S.  S.  371,  376,  90  S.  G.  196. 

That  a  grantor  was  advanced  in  years 
and  somewhat  enfeebled  in  mind  by  sickness 
is  not  sufficient  to  make  him  mentally  Ib-^ 
competent  to  execute  a  deed,  where  he  had 
sufficient  mental  capacity  to  comprehend 
naturally  the  transactions  fn  which  he  was 
engaged  at  the  time  the  deed  was  executed. 
McLaughlin  v.  McLaughlin,  89  N.  E.  ^^ 
647,  241  IlL  866. 

One  who  is  capable  of  exercising  thought^ 
reflection,  and  judgment,  who  knows  what  he 
is  doing,  and  has  sufficient  memory  and  un« 
derstandlng  to  comprehend  the  nature  and 
cbaracter  of  the  trausacCiitti,  has  suffideiit 
"mental  capacity"  to  make  a  valid  notei 
Rogers  v.  Rogers  (Del)  66  AtL  374,  875^'^ 
PemiewiU,  267. 


UESTAlr  CAPACITY 


MT 


MBHTAL  JKCAPAGnnr 


Hie  assignment  by  a  flLther  of^lili  In- 
turestrln'bls  life  policy  to  bis  son.  a  law  days 
before  death  is.  akin  to  a  testamentacy  act; 
and  tbe  mles  ir^gaidlng  mental  capacity  a^d 
undue  Influence  appUcable  to  a  teatator 
ooght  to  be  apidled.  M^ital  capacity  of.  in* 
sored  tp  make  an  assignment  ot  life  insar* 
ance  means  intelligence  sufficient  to  onder- 
stand  the  act  he  is  about  to  perform,  the 
property  he  possesses,  what  disposition  he  is 
making  of  it,  and  the  persons  and  objects  of 
his  bounty.  Borchers  y.  Baxckers,  122  S.  W. 
357,  360,  143  Mo.  App.  72. 


OoMtvifetttovy 

'^The  word  ^experience*  means  to  have 
practical  acquaintance  with,  which  is  equira- 
lent  to  knowledge,  and  the  word  'capacity,* 
in  the  sense  in  which  it  was  used  (In  an  in- 
structioa  requiring  of  a  boy  the  exercise  of 
care  and  prudence  equal  to  hli9  capacity,  etc.)* 
means  capability  or  skill  as  applied  to  the 
business  In  which  he  was  engaged."  And 
an  instruction' requiring  a  finding  that  plain- 
tifT  did  not  use  such  caie^and  preoautlon  as 
a  person  of  his  age  and  experience  would 
haye  ordinarily  used  under  the  circumstances 
as  a  prerequisite  to  the  finding  of  contribu- 
tory negligence^  was  prpper,  and  not  pbjec- 
tionable  for  failure  to  use  the.  words  '*capacl- 
ty,**  "age,**  "knowledge,**  and  "experience.** 
Stanley  y.  Chicago,  M.  &  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  87 
8.  W.  112,  118,  112  Mo.  App.  601. 

An  instruction  on  contributory  negli- 
gence of  a  child  having  experience  as  to  the 
dangers  of  playing  upon  a  bumtable,  which 
requires  the  Jury  to  consider  ''her  age,  in- 
telligence, and  capacity,"  is  bad  as  omitting 
the  element  of  "experience";  this  element  not 
being  included  in  the  term  "capacity."  Lake 
Erie  ft  W.  R.  Co.  t.  Klinkrath,  81  N.  B.  877, 
378,  227  lU.  439. 

The  word  "capacity**  does  not  include 
experience;  and,  when  used  with  ^reference 
to  mentality  in  an  instruction  on  the  law  of 
ordinary  care  gOTemlng  children,  it  means 
ability  to  learn  by  experience.  Fowler  t. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.,  85  N.  BL  298,  299, 
234  IlL  619. 

RespoBsililUty  for  eriata 

The  test  of  mental  capacity  to  commit 
crime  is  the  power  to  distinguish  moral  or 
legal  right  from  moral  or  legal  wrong,  and 
to  recognize  the  particular  act  charged  as 
pooral  or  legal  wrong.  State  ▼.  Jackson,  69 
8.  B.  883,  886,  87  S.  C.  407. 

Tastaittemtary  eapaelAy 

The  words  ''mental  capacity,"  while  more 
goieral  and  perhaps  less  definite,  necessarily 
include  the  idea  expressed  in  the  phrase 
**sufllcient  strength  of  mind  and  memory." 
Barricklow  ▼.  Stewart,  72  N.  B.  128,  180, 
163  Ind.  43& 

The  test  of  whether  testator  had  suffi- 
cient mental  capacity  to'  execute  a  valid 
win  is  whether  at  the  time  he  understood 
tlie  nature  of  the  transaction,  and  Intelligent* 


ly  assented  to  the  profusions  of  tii«  will, 
Wampler  t.  Hanel],.72  &  B.  185^:188,.  112 
Va,  68a. 

^e.  test  of  "mental  capacity*^'  su'st&lnlngr 
a  will  lig  sufficient  understanding  to  com- 
prehend the  nature  of  the  transaction,  the 
nature  and  extent  of  one's  property,  and  to 
whom  he  desires  to  Sfive  it  Glbony  y.>  Fos- 
ter, 180  S.  W.  314,  322,  230  Mo.  106. 

WaSKTAL  COMPETEKOY 

See^  also,  Mental  Qwadlty, 

^Mental  competency**  in  a  testator  does 
not  require  the  sagacity^  analytical  powers, 
astuteness,  and  soundness  of  judgment  requi- 
site to  the  making  of  Just  such  a  contract, 
in  eyeiy  instance,  as  an  experienced,  skillful, 
and  shrewd  man  would  make.  It  suffices 
that  a  person  in  making  a  will  or  executing 
an  instrument. to  operate  as  one  knows  what 
property  he  has,,  and  what  he  wants  to  do 
with  it  Mere  Infirmity  of  mind  and  body 
is  insufficient  to  overcome  the  legal  presump- 
tion of  mental  capacity  in  one  who  has  ex- 
ecuted a  will,  deed,  contract  or  other  in- 
strument Bade  V.  Feay,  61  S.  B.  848,  850,. 
63  W.  Va.  166. 

Where  in  a  will  contest  it  was  claimed 
that  proponent  who  was  the  residuary  lega- 
tee, had  exercised  undue  influence  over  tes- 
tatrix in  procuring  the  will,  and  it  appeared 
that  he  superintended  the  making  of  tbe  will 
ieind  obtained  therefrom  a  large  portion  of 
testatrix's  estate,  though  he  was  not  of  kin 
to  her,  to  the  exclusion  of  many  of  her 
relatives,  the  term  "mental  competency" 
under  such  circumstances  Included  the  abili- 
ty of  testatrix  to  understand  the  meaning 
and  effect  of  the  residuary  clause  of  the 
will  Cooper  v.  Harlow,  128  N.  W.  269,  261, 
163  Mich.  210. 

MEMTAI.  l>ISQirAIiIFI0AnOir 
Witness 

A  witness  who  has  a  ^'mental  disquali- 
fication" is  one  who  has  not  the  capacity  to 
receive,  to  record,  and  to  recall  impressions 
and  to  testify  intelligently  concerning  them; 
Batterton  v.  State,  107  S.  W.  826,  827,  52 
Tax.  Cr.  R.  881  (quoting  and  adopting  the 
definition  in  2  EUiott  Bv.  |  750). 

MElfTAIi  BISTBESS  AND  IKJUBY 

Bee  Mental  Agony  or  Anguish. 
As  cruelty*  see  Cruelty. 

MENTAX.  FACULTIES 

.  See  Impairment  of  Mental  Faculties. 

MEITTAX.  IKOAPAOITT 

See,  also.  Mental  Capacity. 

No  definite  rule  can  be  laid  down  de- 
fining *'m«atal  incapacity**  which  will  apply 
in  all  cases  and  on  which  the  court  can  rely 
as  a  f6undati<m  for  granting  or  refusing  the 
prayer  of  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  conveyance. 
The  mentU  inciy^acityy'  however,  as  «  sole 


ifBNTAIj  SUFJrSBINa: 


8«8 


UJE^TlOJi 


groxmd  tor  setting  aside  a  oonTeyaace,  must 
be  sudi  as  learea  tba  penon  aitected  with- 
out understanding  to  know  the  consefluenoes 
of  his  own.  act  Allen's  Adm'r  v.  Allen's 
Adm'rs.  64  AtL  UIO,  1U5,  79  Vt  173. 

MENTAii  smPFEitnro 

See  Mental  Agony  or  Anguish. 

As  personal  injury,  see  Personal  Injury. 

KENTAIi  UKSOUiroifESB 

"Mental  unsoundness"  which  exempts 
from  responsibility  for  what  otherwise  would 
be  an  oifense  denotes  a  mind  so  far  devoid  of 
understanding  that  it  is  unable  to  distinguish 
between  right  and  wrong,  and  is  therefore 
without  freedom  of  moral  action.  Common- 
wealth T.  HalloweU,  72  AtL  845,  846,  223  Pa. 
494. 

BCENTAIXT   nfCOMPETEKT 

The  phrases  •'incompetent,"  "mentally  in- 
competent," and  "incapable,'^  as  used  In  arti- 
cle 15,  c.  86,  {§  5485,  5486,  Comp.  Laws  1909, 
mean  any  person  who,  though  not  insane,  is, 
by  reason  of  old  age,  disease,  weakness  of 
mind,  or  from  any  other  cause,  unable,  unas- 
sisted, to  properly  manage  and  take  care  ot 
himself  or  his  property,  and  by  reason  thereof 
would  be  likely  to  be  deceived  or  imposed 
upon  by  artful  or  designing  persons.  Shelby 
V.  Farve,  126  Pac.  764,  765,  33  Okl.  651. 

The  term  "mentally  incompetent  to  have 
the  charge  and  management  of  his  property," 
within  the  statute  relating  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  guardiansi  means  mental  incapabil- 
ity to  do  so.  In  re  Streiff,  97  N.  W.  189,  191, 
119  Wis.  566,  100  Am.  St  Rep.  903  (citing 
In  re  Leonard's  EsUte^  95  Mich.  295,  54  N. 
W.  1082). 

MENTION 

Any  way  mentioned,  see  Any. 
Of  dutUMe  artiolos 

At  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  claimant  at 
the  port  of  New  York  as  a  passenger  frotn  a 
foreign  country,  a  treasury  regulation  provid- 
ed that  merchandise  intended  for  sale  and  of 
the  value  of  $500  or  over  could  not  be  ex- 
amined on  the  pier,  but  must  be  regularly  en- 
tered at  the  custom  house  and  appraised. 
Claimant  in  her  declaration  made  on  landing 
listed  certain  articles  and  "one  trui^  for  pub- 
lic stores";  that  being  the  place  where  im- 
ported merchandise  goes'  for  examination  and 
appraisal.  Later  she  filed  regiUar  written 
entry  at  the  custom  house,  and  with  it  dupli- 
cate consular  invoice  of  the  contents  of  the 
trunk,  which  consisted  of  dutiable  merchan- 
dise of  over  1500  in  value.  Held,  that  the 
description  in  daimant's  declaration  was  suf- 
ficient, and  :that  her  filing  of  the  invoice  at 
the  custom  house  later  was  a  compliance  with 
Rev.  St  I  280%  which  reQuires  aU  dutiable 
articles  to  be  "mentioned  to  the  collector"  "at 
the  time  of  making  entry."  United  States  v. 
Que  Trunk,  184  Fed.  317, 318, 106  a  0.  A.  469. 


2  Reiv.  Sts.  <l8t  Bd.)  pt  2,  e  6,  ttt.  1,  a 
3,  I  48,  as  amended  by  Laiws  1809,  p.  40, 
22,  provides  that  a  ehUd  bom  after  the  nu 
ing  of  his  parent's  will,  not  "provided  for  d 
in  any  way  mentioned  in  sudi  will,"  shi 
take  as  if  the  parent  died  intestate.  He! 
that  the  words  "in  any  way  mentioned"  tm 
cate  that  the  expression  was  to  be  used  in  t 
broadest  possible  sense,  so  as  to  cover  ai 
form  of  reference  that  showed  that  a  testat 
had  in  mind  the  possibility  of  after-boi 
children,  and  where  a  testator  gave  his  esta 
to  his  wife  to  her  own  use^  and  that  of  h 
heirs  forever,  and  provided  that  in  case 
her  death  during  the  lifetime  of  the  testate 
leaving  issue,  the  issue  would  take  the  estat 
and,  if  the  wife  should  4iie  leaving  no  lawf 
issue,  the  estate  should  be  divided  in  accor 
ance  with  the  intestate  laws,  and  testator  \ 
the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  will  waa 
married  man,  but  had  no  ciiildrea,  a  chil 
bom  after  testator's  death  was  mentioned  i 
the  wiUf  and  he  vfas  bound  by  it,  and  conl 
not  take  as  if  the  testator  had  died  intestat 
Stachelberg  v.  Stachelbe^,  101  N.  Y.  Supi 
178,  180,  52  Misc.  Rep.  22. 

A  testator,  when  without  children,  ex< 
cuted  a  will,  which,  after  making  certai 
specific  legacies,  left  the  residue  of  his  estal 
to  his  wife,  and  after  the  birth'  of  a  son,  be 
before  the  birth  of  two  daughters,  he  added 
codicil  directing  what  disposition  should  t 
made  of  his  property  "in  the  event  of  th 
death  of  myself,  wife,  and  child  or  childre 
at  one  and  the  same  time."  Held,  that  thei 
was  no  such  **mention"  of  an  after-bom  chil 
as  was  contemplated  by  Rev.  St  (1st  Ed.)  p 
2,  a  6,  tit  1,  art  3, 1  49,  as  amended  by  La^ 
1869,  p.  40,  c.  22,  providing  that  whenever 
testator  shall  have  a  child  bom  after  tb 
making  of  his  last  will,  and  shall  die  leavlo 
it  unprovided  for,  such  child  shall  succeed  t 
the  same  portion  that  he  would  be  entitled  t 
if  his  parent  had  died  intestate,  and  bene 
the  surviving  daughters  .  were  entitled  t 
share  in  his  estate  as  the  statute  providei 
Tavshanjian  v.  Abbott,  115  N.  Y.  Supp.  93i 
940,  130  App.  Div.  863. 

Where  a  will  made  prior  to  the  blrtl 
of  any  children  devised  testator's  propert; 
to  his  wif^,  and  provided  that  in  case  sh 
should  have  any  children  at  testator's  deatl 
the  will  should  remained  unchanged,  a  chil< 
bom  prior  to  testator's  death  was  "men 
tioned"  in  the  will  within  the  meaning  of  Kj 
St  1903,  I  4847,  providing  that  a  will,  mad 
prior  to  the  birth  of  a  child,  wherein  an: 
child  testator  might  have  is  not  provided  foi 
or  mentioned,  shall  be  construed  as  if  the  de 
vises  therein  had.  been  limited  on  the  dead 
of  the  child  under  the  age  of  21  years,  no 
married  and  without  issue,  eai;»ecially  in  viev 
of  sections  4842  and  4848,  providing  that  cer 
tain  classes  of  dilldren  and  gcandiildren  wb( 
are  neither  provided  for  n9r  expressly  exdud 


umimim 


UMBCAiimim 


ed  by  tte  wU,  hat  only  iwetemfttM,  abiOl 
Inherit  as  in  case  ot  intestacy.  Logaa  y« 
Bean's  Adni'r,  87  8.  W.  UIO,  120  K>.  712. 

Under  Eefr.  St  1806,  art.  6845,  profiaiiig 
that  a  will  made  when  testator  had  no  child 
living,  wherela  any  child  he  might  liaTe  is 
not  proTlded  for  or  mentioned,  shall  be  Toid 
on  tlie  bitth  of  a  child,  etc.,  whether  the  un- 
born ddld  is  m^itioned  in  the  will  is  to  he 
determined  by  construing  its  language  with 
reference  to  the  circumstances  and  knowledge 
of  the  testator,  the  word  ^'mentioned**  mean- 
ing ''referred  to,**  rather  than  designated  by 
aaniBk  and  tlie  f ailwe  to  make  provisLon  must 
be  accidental  to  avoid  the  will;  and  henoe 
the  win  of  a  wife,  executed  when  in  an  ad* 
vanoed  state  of  pregnaney,  whidi  deyised  the 
bulk  of  her  realty  to  hn  husband,  and  de- 
vised her  undivided  interest  in  her  fath^ 's 
homestead  to  persons  named,  which  devise 
was  to  be  void  in  case  of  living  issue  bom  of 
her  body*  meotioned  the  unborn  ehild»  for 
she  must  have  known  the  practical  certainty 
that  a  child  would  be  bom  to  her,  and  the 
provision  that  the  device  is  to  be  void  in  case 
of  issue  born  obviously  refers  to  the  expected 
child.  Pearce  v.  Pearce,  184  8.  W.  210,  214, 
104  Tex.  78. 

MERCANTILE 

The  word  "mercantile,"  in  its  ordinary 
acceptation,  means  pertaining  to  the  business 
of  merchants,  and  is  concerned  with  trade  or 
the  buying  and  selling  of  commodities.  Peo- 
ple V.  Federal  Security  Co.  99  N.  B.  668,  660, 
255  ni.  061;  H.  H.  Kohlsaat  ft  Go.  v.  (yCon- 
nell,  90  N.  E.  689,  690,  255  111.  271. 

"Mercantile"  is  defined  thus:  **0t  or  per- 
taining to  merchants,  or  the  traffic  carried  on 
by  merchants,  having  to  do  with  trade  or 
commerce;  trading;  commerciaL"  Carr  v. 
Riley,  84  N.  B.  426,  42S,  198  Mass.  70. 

The  term  "mercantile  pursuits''  in  Bankr. 
Act  July  1, 1808,  c.  541,  I  4b,  making  corpora- 
tions principally  engaged  in  sudi  pursuits 
subject  to  the  act,  is  to  be  given  its  common 
and  generally  understood  meaning,  and  in- 
cludes only  corporations  engaged  in  the  buy- 
ing and  selling  of  commodities.  Zugalla  v. 
International  Mercantile  Agency,  142  Fed. 
»27,  980, 74  C.  O.  A.  97. 

Bakery 

The  word  "mercantile"  means  having  to 
do  with,  or  engaged  in,  trade,  or  the  buying 
of  commodities ;  and  a  corporation  organized 
to  make  bakers'  goods  and  restaurant  sup- 
plies, and  sell  them,  was  organized  for  "mer- 
cantile purposes,"  within  the  tax  law.  H.  H. 
Kohlsaat  ft  CJo.  v.  CConneU,  99  N.  E.  689, 
690,  256  m.  271  (dting  6  Words  and  Phrases, 
p.  4477). 

BaildiBS  and  taisi  assooiatiam 

The  phrase  "engaged  principally  in.  man- 
ufacturing,    trading,    printing,     publishing, 

8  Wbs.ft  P.2D  Skb.— 24 


mining  or  mercantile  pursuits,"  as  used  in 
Bankr.  Act  1898,  limiting  corporationa  which 
I  may  be  forced  into  bankraptcy  to  such  as 
'  are  engaged  principally  in   manufacturing, 
trading,  printing,  publishing,  mining,  or  mer- 
cantile pursuits,  is  to  be  taken  in  its  natural 
and   usual    meaning,   and   any   corporation 
;  which  does  not  come  within  such  meaning 
•  cannot  be  put  into  bankruptcy.    A  building 
'  and  loan  association  organised  to  accumulate 
a  fund  from  contributions  of  its  members 
I  from  which  loans  were  to  be  made  to  assist 
'  members   in   purchase   of   real   estate,   the 
profits  of  which  business  were  divided  among 
its  members^  is  not  a  corporation  engaged 
principally  in  trading  or  mercantile  pursuits 
within  the  act     In  re  New  York  Building 
lioan  Banking  Ck>.,  127  Fed.  471,  472. 

Buylag  and  selllas  stoelui 

A  corporation  engaged  in  bnylng  and 
I  selling  stocks  and  bcmds  is   engaged  in   a 
;  "mercantile  pursuit,"  within  section  108  of 
I  the  Revenue  Law  (Hurd's  Bev.  St  1911,  c 
120),  prohibiting  the  state  board  of  equaliza- 
tion from  assessing  companies  organized  for 
mercantile  purposes.    People  v.  Federal  Se- 
curity C!o.,  99  N.  B.  668,  660,  256  lU.  061. 

Ooalyard 

A  coalyard,  wherein  coal  mined  by  its 
owner  is  cleaned,  assorted,  and  stored  and 
from  which  it  is  sold,  is  a  "mercantile  in- 
stitution or  establishment,*'  within  Child  La- 
bor Act  (Hurd's  Rev.  St  1911,  c  48),  pro- 
hibiting the  employment  of  a  child  under  the 
age  of  14  years  in  any  mercantile  institutton 
'  or  establishment  and  is  also  a  manufactur- 
I  lEig  establishment,  factory,  or  workshop,  since 
I  that  phrase  as  used  in  the  statute  has  the 
I  meaning  given  to  it  by  the  Ohild  Labor  Act 
of  June  9,  1897  (Laws  1887,  p.  90),  defining 
'  the    words    "manufacturing    establishment 
factory,  or  workahop"  to  mean  any  place 
I  where  goods  or  products  are  manufactured 
'  or  repaired,  dyed,  cdeaned  or  sorted,  stored 
i  or  packed  for  sale.    Purtell  v.  Philadelphia 
ft  Reading  Goal  ft  Iron  Co.,  99  N.  B.  899,  902, 
206  111.  110,  48  L.  B.  A.  (N.   8.)  183,  Ann. 
Oas.  1918B,  836. 

ProduotSon  and  supply  of  eleotrloity 

I  A  corporation  engaged  in  generating  elec- 
tricity, transmitting  it  and  selling  power  or 
light  to  consumers,  is  neither  a  "manufactur- 
ing" nor  a  "mercantile"  corporation  within 
the  meaning  of  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c. 
541,  f  4b,  as  amended  by  Act  Feb.  6,  1903, 
c.  487,  f  8,  and  is  not  subject  to  adjudication 
as  an  Involuntary  bankrupt  In  re  Hudson 
River  Klectric  Power  Co.,  178  Fed.  934,  941. 

Productioa  and  traasportatiom  of  gas 

Bouvier  thus,  defines  "merchandise":  A 
term  Including  all  those  things  which  mer- 
chants sell,  either  wholesale  or  retail,  as 
dry  goods,  hardware,  groceries,  drugs,  etc. 
It  is  usually  applied  to  personal  chattels 
only,  and  to  those  which  are  not  required  for 


MSBCANttliB 


S76 


MMMAi^riLs 


food  01^  iniinedlate  support,  but  Biidi  as  re- 
nialii  after  having  been  used,  or  which  are 
QSed  only  by  a  slow  consumption.  The  Gen- 
tory  Dictionary  defines  it:  In  general,  any 
morable  object  of  trade  or  traffic;;  that 
which  is  passed  from  hand  to  hand  by  pur- 
chase or  sale;  specifically,  the  objects  of 
commerce;  a  commercial  commodity  or  com- 
mercial commodities  in  general;  the  staple 
of  a  mercantile  business;  commodities, 
goods,  or  wares  bought  and  sold  for  gain. 
A  gas  company  which  makes,  transports 
through  pipes,  and  sells  gas  to  special  cus^ 
tomers  within  il  limited  area  is  not  prin- 
cipally engaged  in  mercantile  pursuits,  with- 
in the  meaning  of  Bankr.  Act  July  1, 1888,  a 
641,  I  4b,  as  amended  by  Act  Feb.  5,  1003, 
c.  487,  I  8.  In  re  Hudson  Biver  EUeetrle 
Power  Co.,  173  Fed.  834,  952. 

Oridakt  bonfl,  and  stook  Inroker 

Where  a  corporation  was  organised  to 
carry  on  a  general  stock,  bond,  grain,  and 
brokerage  business  and  was  authorized  to 
trade  on  its  own  behalf  in  stocks,  bonds, 
grains,  etc.,  and  lease  and  dispose  of  real 
and  personal  property,  it  was  subject  to  ad- 
judication as  a  bankrupt  corporation  en- 
gaged in  "trading  or  mercantile  business." 
In  re  H.  B.  Leighton  &  Co.,  147  Fed.  311,  314 
(citing  Coll.  Law  &  Pr.  Bankr.  [5th  Ed.]  p. 
64;  In  re  Surety  Guaranty  &  Trust  Co.,  121 
Fed.  73,  56  C.  C.  A.  654 ;  In  re  Padflc  Coast 
Warehouse  Co.,  123  Fed.  740;  In  re  Cam- 
eron, 06  Fed.  756;  In  re  New  York  Build- 
ing^Loan  Banking  Co.,  127  Fed.  471;  In  re 
Snyder  &  Johnson  Co.,  133  Fed.  806;  In  re 
United  States  Hotel  Co.,  134  Fed.  225,  67  C. 
C.  A.  153,  68  L.  R.  A.  588). 

The  business  of  a  stockbroker  may  be 
carried  on  by  a  limited  partnership,  within 
Code  Pub.  Gen.  Laws,  art  78,  I  1,  authoriz- 
ing the  formation  of  limited  partnerships  for 
the  transaction  of  any  "mercantile,  mechani- 
cal, manufacturing  or  banking  business,"  and 
declaring  that  the  provision  shall  not  au- 
thorize any  such  partnership  for  the  purpose 
of  making  insurance;  -for  sales  and  purchase 
es  of  bonds,  stocks,  and  other  securities  are 
mercantile  transactions.  Safe  Deposit  & 
Trust  Co.  y.  Cahn,  62  Aa  810,  825,  102  Md. 
530. 

Hotel 

A  corporation  engaged  principally  in 
running  hotels  is  not  engaged  principally  in 
"mercantile**  pursuits,  so  as  to  be  liable  to 
be  adjudged  an  involuntary  bankrupt  Toz- 
away  Hotel  Co.  v.  J.  L.  Smathers  &  Co.,  80 
Sup.  Ct  263,  264,  216  U.  S.  430,  54  L.  Ed. 
558;  In  re  United  States  Hotel  Co.,  134 
Fed.  225,  227,  67  C.  C.  A.  153  (citing  Hall 
V.  Cooley,  11  Fed.  Cas.  217). 

lAwwy  and  Wardims  stable 

A  "merchant"  is  a  person  who  is  en- 
gaged in  the  business  of  buying  and  selling, 
one  who  buys  in  order  to  sell.    A  corporation 


organized  to  conduct  a  general  ll¥4i^':  kiiA 
boarding  stable  business,  and  ettgaifed  ia 
buying,  keeping,  and  hiring  ltd  horses  and 
vehicles  for  profit  and  Ipe^pinjg,  feeding,  and 
caring  for  the  horses  and  vehtole^  of  others 
for  hire,  not  b^ng  engaged  in  buying  and 
selling  horses  ,and  vehicles  or  feed  aa  a  busi- 
ness, is  not  a  trading  corporation  or  one  en- 
gaged chl^y  in  "mercantile"  pursuits  with- 
in Bankr.  Act  July  1, 1808,  c  541,  |  4,  cL  '  V' 
providing  that  such  corporations  may  be- 
come bankrupt  Gallagher  y.  De  Lanoey 
Stables  Co.,  158  Fed.  381. 882. 

A  corporation,  the  principal  busliieaB  of 
which  is  the  keeping  of  a  boarding  stable  to 
feed  and  care  for  horses  for  hire,  is  not  sub- 
ject to  adjudication  as  a  corporation  engaged 
principally  in  mercantile  and  trading  pur* 
suits;  such  term  embracing  corporations 
whose  principal  bnsinees  Is  the  baying  and 
selling  of  goods  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
trade.  In  re  ^^Uis  Cab  ft  Aotomobtte  Oo., 
178  Fed.  118,  1.14. 

Lumber  dealer 

A  firm  engaged  in  buying  standing  tim- 
ber in  large  quantities,  and  cutting  and  saw- 
ing the  same,  and  selUng  the  lumber,  is  en- 
gaged in  a  "trading  or  mercantile  business," 
within  Gen.  St  1002,  |  2842,  providing  for 
the  assessment  of  the  property  of  any  trad- 
ing or  mercantile  business;  *'to  trade"  being 
to  engage  in  the  purchase  or  sale  of  mer- 
chandise, and  the  word  "mercantile"  being 
defined  as  of  or  pertaining  to  merchants,  or 
the  trafiSlc  carried  on  by  them.  Jackson  v. 
Town  of  Union,  73  AtL  773,  774,  82  Conn. 
266. 

Beal  estate  dealer 

The  term  "mercantile  pursuits,"  as  used 
in  Bankr.  Act  1808,  I  4b,  c.  541,  does  not  in- 
clude dealing  in  real  estate.  In  re  Kingston 
Realty  Co.,  160  Fed.  445,  447,  87  0.  a  A. 
406,  reversing  157  Fed.  200. 

Rentiiis  fllma  for  moria^;  piotures 

A  oorporation  engaged  principally  In  the 
business  of  renting  films  for  moving  pictures 
is  not  engaged  in  trading  or  a  mercantile 
pursuit  which  rendera  it  subject  to  adjudica- 
tion as  an  involuntary  bankrupt  under  Bankr. 
Act  July  1,  1808,  c  541,  I  4b,  30  Stat  547,  as 
amended  by  Act  Feb.  5,  1003,  c.  487,  |  4,  82 
Stat  707.  In  re  Imperial  Film  Exchange. 
108  Fed.  80,  81,  117  C.  0.  A.  188. 

Restaurant 

A  corporation  operating  a  restaurant  Is 
not  subject  to  adjudication  as  a  bankrupt  un- 
der Bankr.  Act  July  1, 1808,  c.  541,  authoriz- 
ing an  adjudication  against  corporations  en- 
gaged in  "mercantile  pursuits";  the  dishes 
furnished  not  being  merchandise»  nor  the 
proprietor  a  merchant  engaged  in  "mercan- 
tile pursuits."  In  ra  Wentworth  Lunch  Co:^ 
150  Fed.  418,  415,  86  O.  a'  A.  803w 

A  restaurateur  is  not  a  "trader,'*  nor,  so 
far  as  his  business  of  cooking  and  selling 


VmWMU'JilL^  A&mfqY: 


371 


)CB^P¥[:A;^QIS9i 


fbod  l8  conc0med«  U'.lie  engaged  In  "mercan- 
tile puTBuits,"  within  Bankr*  Act  ^uly  1, 
1£98,  c.  541,  authorizing  involnntaigr  proceed- 
ings against  traders  and  persons  so  engaged. 
In  re  Excelsior  Ga£6  Po.,  175  Fed.  2H,  296. 

MEBCAimiiE  AQJSHCT 

Ab  publisher,  a^  Publisher. 

HEROANTHiE   tjjfSTTSVnOft    OB    E8« 
TABLXSHltENT 

See  Manufacturing  Establishment;  Mer- 
cantille. 

MEBOAMTLLE  XiAW 

See  Commercial  Law. 

XEBCAHTZLE  MABUVB 

Rev.  St  I  4233,  providing  that  steam  ves- 
sels, when  .towing  other  Tessels,  shall  carry 
two  bright,  white  masthead  lights,  vertically, 
in  addition  to  their  side  lights,  which  shall 
be  of  such  a  character  as  to  be  visible  on  a 
dark  night  with  a  dear  atmosphere  for  at 
least  5  miles  and  show  a  uniform  unbroken 
light  over  an  arc  of  the  horizon  at  20  points 
of  the  compass,  applies  only  to  the  navy  and 
mercantile  marine  of  the  United  States, 
"mercantile  marine"  being  used  to  mean  tlie 
mmvhant  service  or  business  of  commerce  at 
sea,  and  does  not  apply  to  steam  vessels  en- 
gaged in  ttfwing  on  inland  rivers*  Beck  v.. 
Johnson,  169  Fed.  154,  164. 

mSBOAHTIZiE  PUBStriTS 

Bee  Mercantile. 

XEBOAHTHiE  BPEGIALTT 

See  Specialty. 

MERCHANDISE 

See  Dutiable  Merchandise;  Lawful  Mer- 
chandise; Stock  of  Goods,  Weres,  and 
Merchandise;  Stock  of  Merchandise. 

Any  article  of  imported  merchandise, 
see  Any. 

Goods,  waxes,  and  merchandise,  see 
Gooda 

Other  merchandise,  see  Other. 

"Merchandise"  has  a  very  extended 
miming  and  usually  means  personalty  used 
by  merchants  in  the  course  of  trade,  but 
may  include  every  article  of  traffic.  Mara  v. 
Brand!  (Tex.)  136  S.  W.  661,  662;  Whitewa- 
ter Mercantile  Co.  v.  Devore,  109  S.  W.  808, 
809, 180  Mo.  App.  880. 

"Merchandise"  is  defbied  as  anything 
movable,  customarily  bought  and  sold  for 
profit.  H.  H.  Kohlsaat  &  Co.  v.  0*Connell, 
09  N.  B.  689,  690,  255  III.  271  (citing  6  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  4482). .. 

Bev.  St  I  2766^  provides  that:  '*The 
word  *merrhandlfle'  as  need  in  this  title  may 
iadude  goods,  wares  and  chattels  of  every 
toqription  capable  of  b^g  Imported."  Unlt- 
^  States  V.  Fifty  Waltham  Watch  Move- 
awnt»,ia0F€4.;29i,294. 


As  baggage^  see  Baggage. 

In  Rev.  St  f  8082,  prescribhig  a  penalty' 
for  importing  or  bringing  Into  the  United 
States  any  merchandise  coittrary  to  law,  the 
term  "merchandise"  is  not  restricted  to  gen- 
eral merchandise  as  di^^gulshed  from  per- 
sonal baggage,  especially  in  view  of  sec- 
tion 2766,  declaring  that  the  word  "merchan* 
dise"  may  include  goods,  wares,  and  chat- 
tels of  every  description  capable  of  being  im- 
ported, and  sections  2799  and  i2802,  showing 
that  wearing  apparel  and  other  personal  bag- 
gage are  embraced  within  the  term.  United 
States  V.  Chesbrough,  176  Fed.  778,  781. 
OanriUiKes,  wasoBS»  etc. 

The  term  "merchandise"  in  the  Bulk 
Sales  Law  does  not  Include  wagons  or  other 
appliances  used  in  a  retail  coal  business. 
Bowen  v.  Quigley  130  N.  W.  feoo,  165  Mich. 
337,  34  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  218. 

Frait 

Fruit  is  "merchandise^*  within  Code  Miss.. 
1906,  I  1367,  prohibiting  the  keeping  open  of 
a  store  on  Sunday  for  the  purpose  of  dispos- 
ing of  wares  or  merchandise.  This  term  cov^ 
ers  all  kinds  of  personal  property  which  is 
ordinarily  bought  and  sold.  City  of  Qulfport 
V.  Stratakos,  43  South.  812,  90  Miss.  489,  13 
Ann.  Oas.  855  (citing  Blackwood  v.  Cutting 
Packing  Co.,  18  Pac.  248,  76  Cal.  212,  9  Am. 
St.  Rep.  199). 

..  Fnmiture  and  fiztures 

A  fire  policy  on  a  stock  of  merchandise 
for  a  specified  sum,  and  on  store  and  fur- 
niture and  fixtures  for  a  specified  sum  which 
stipulates  that  the  entire  policy  shall  be 
void  if  the  subject  of  insurance  be  incum- 
bered by  chattel  mortgage,  is  not  invalidated,' 
as  to  the  insurance  on  the  furniture  and  fix- 
tures, by  the  execution  of  a  chattel  mortgage 
on  the  "stock  of  merchandise"  and  improve^ 
ments,  the  mortgage  not  covering  the  fur- 
niture and  fixtures;  "stock,"  in  mercantile  law, 
being  defined  as  "the  goods  which  a  trades- 
man holds  for  sale  or  trafiSc^"  and  "merchan- 
dise" being  defined  to  be  "the  objects  of 
commerce."  Spring  Garden  Ins.  Co.  of  Phil- 
adelphia V.  Brown  (Ttex.)  148  S.  W.  292. 

Horse  or  stallioa 

A  sale  of  horses,  wagons,  harnesses,  coal 
bags,  forks,  shovels,  baskets,  stoves,  sleigh 
runners,  chutes,  and  books  pertaining  to  a 
retail  coal  business  was  not  a  sale  of  ''mer^ 
chandise,"  within  Bulk  Sales  Law  (Pub.  Laws 
1905,  No.  223X  providing  that  sales  in  bulk 
of  any  part  or  ttie  whole  of  a  stock  of  mer- 
chandise, or  merchandise  and  fixtures  per< 
taining  to  a  business,  otherwise  than. in  the 
ordinary  course  of  trade,  shall  be  void,  etc. 
Bowen  v.  Quigley.  130  N.  W.  690,  165  Mich^ 
337,  34  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  218. . 
Xaswaaee 
Insurance  is  not  an  article  of  merchan- 
dUie^or  manufacture  or  one  ^f  the  necessaries 


HEROHAKBXSB 


8T2 


MEB0HANDI8S  BltOKBB 


of  life,  wltldn  the  laws  against  aigrossing^ 
problbiting  combinationa  among  dealers  in 
merchandise  or  manufacture  or  necessaries 
of  life.  Harris  ▼.  Commonwealth,  73  S.  B. 
561,  563,  113  Va.  746,  38  L.  B.  ▲•  (N.  S.)  458, 
Ann.  Ca&  1913S,  587. 

Iiabor  and  serviee* 

Code,  I  5060,  prohibiting  any  combina- 
tion to  regulate  the  price  "of  any  article  of 
merchandise  or  commodity  or  to  fix  *  ^  ^ 
the  amount  or  quality  of  any  article,  com- 
modity or  merchandise  to  be  manufactured, 
mined,  produced  or  sold,"  does  not,  when 
construed  as  required  by  section  48  by  giving 
to  the  words  and  phrases  the  meaning  of 
approved  usage  of  the  language,  cover  com- 
binations to  fix  the  price  of  skilled  or  un- 
skilled labor,  and  does  not  prevent  i^iyslcians 
from  combining  to  fix  charges  for  profes- 
sional services}  the  word  "merchandise"  re- 
ferring primarily  to  those  things  which  mer- 
chants sell,  and  the  word  "commodity*'  qual- 
ified by  the  words  "manufactured,  mined, 
produced,  or  sold,"  not  including  labor  either 
skilled  or  unskilled,  though  the  word  "com- 
modity" primarily  means  a  convenience,  prof- 
it, benefit,  or  advantage,  and,  in  reference  to 
commerce,  comprehends  everything  movable 
— that  is,  sold  or  bought— except  animals. 
Rohlf  V.  Kasemeler,  118  N.  W.  276,  277,  140 
Iowa,  182,  28  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1284,  132  Am. 
St  Rep.  261,  17  Ann.  Cas.  750. 

JmrnheTf  loss*  and  posts 

Logs  to  be  got  out  are  "merchandise" 
within  the  statute  of  frauds.  Crosby  Hard- 
Wood  Co.  V.  Tester,  63  N.  W.  1057,  1058,  90 
Wi&  412  (citing  Hanson  v.  Roter,  64  Wis. 
622,  25  N.  W.  530). 

Though  the  word  "merchandise,"  as  used 
in  Acts  1903,  p.  92,  regulating  the  sale  of 
"goods;  wares  and  merchandise"  in  bulk,  is 
not  to  be  taken  in  such  a  restricted  sense 
as  to  exclude  the  usual  and  customary  ac- 
cessories of  a  mercantile  or  trading  estab- 
lishment, when  a  sale  in  bulk  is  made  of  the 
whole,  the  statute  is  not  applicable  to  a  sale 
of  substantially  all  the  lumber  manufactured 
by  one  who  operates  a  •  sawmill  at  which 
trees  are  manufactured  into  lumber.  Cooney, 
Eckstein  &  Co.  v.  Sweat,  66  S.  R  257,  133 
Ga.  511,  25  li.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  758. 

Flaoev  sold 

The  word  "merdiandise,"  defined  in  Rev. 
St  I  2766,  as  including  goods,  wares,  and 
chattels  of  every  description  capable  of  being 
imported,  is  sufficiently  broad  to  include  pla- 
cer gold.  Six  Parcels  of  Placer  Gold  v.  Unit- 
ed States,  76  Pac.  478,  475,  8  Ariz.  389. 

Ship 

A  steamship  owned  by  a  corporation  and 
plying  between  domestic  ports  la  taxable  as 
"merchandise,"  under  St  1903,  p.  452,  c. 
437,  S  84.  The  term  "merchandise"  also  In- 
cludes general  objects  of  traffic  and  com- 
merce, together  with  stddcs  or  shares  In  in- 


corporated companies.  As  used  in  the  sta 
ute  of  frauds,  the  words  "goods^  and  "me 
chandise^  are  sufficiently  comprehensive  i 
include  promissory  notes.  The  Century  Di 
tlonary  states  that  "real  property,  ship 
money,  stocks  and  bonds  are  not  merchai 
dlse,"  but  the  word  may  be  used  in  dlfferei 
senses,  and  In  any  case  of  doubt  the  contei 
throws  much  light  on  its  meaning,  and  tt 
meaning  of  "merchandise^"  as  gathered  froi 
the  context  and  the  purpose  of  the  act  1 
which  it  occurs,  is  broad  enough  to  inclnd 
ships.  New  England  ft  Savannah  S.  S.  O 
V.  Commonwealth,  81  N.  B.  286,  288»  289,  IS 
Mass.  385,  11  Ann.  Cas.  678  (citing  Tisdal 
V.  Harris,  20  Pidc.  [37  Mass.]  9,  13;  Baldwt 
V.  Williams,  8  Mete.  [44  Mass.]  865»  367). 

Tools  aad  Impleueitts 

A  fire  policy  "on  'merchandise,*  consistlii 
principally  of  clothing  made  and  in  proces 
of  making  and  materials  for  same,"  cover 
the  stock  in  trade  and  all  articles  necessaril 
or  conveniently  used  in  the  business,  and  en 
braces  tools  and  implements  of  the  bnsines 
as  conducted  by  insured.  Oklahoma  Fir 
Ins.  Co.  V.  McKey  (Tex.)  152  S.  W.  440,  44] 

ITndertakev'B  oaslMts,  ete. 

"Merchandise,"  within  the  bulk  sales  lai 
(Pub.  Acts  1905,  No.  223),  means  such  thing 
as  are  usually  bought  and  sold  In  trade  b: 
merchants,  and  includes  caskets,  steel  vaults 
robes,  and  casket  hardware  used  in  an  no 
dertaker's  business.  People's  Savings  Ban) 
V.  Van  Allsburg,  131  N.  W.  101, 102, 165  liidi 
524. 

Wool 

Wool  owned  by  a  manufacturing  com 
pany,  bought  abroad  and  entered  for  ware 
housing  in  a  United  States  bonded  ware 
house,  is  "merchandise,"  within  St  1909,  c 
490,  pt  8,  I  41,  which  provides  for  levy  oi 
an  excise  on  domestic  corporations,  base( 
on  the  value  of  merchandise,  etc.,  which  1 
owned  by  a  natural  resident  would  be  liabK 
to  taxation.  Farr  Alpaca  Co.  v.  Common 
wealth,  98  N.  B.  1078,  1079,  212  Mass.  156. 

MEBOHAKBME  BROKER 

A  "merchandise  broker"  is  one  who  ne 
gotiates  the  sale  of  merchandise  wlthoai 
having  it  in  his  possession  or  controL  "H^ 
is  simply  an  agent  with  very  limited  powers 
and  with  reference  to  right  to  receive  pay 
ment  it  is  universally  held:  *A  broker  baa 
ordtaarily,  no  authority  to  receive  paymen 
for  property  sold  by  him  for  his  piindpal 
and  a  purchaser  who  pays  the  broker  doei 
so  at  his  own  risk.*  Such  payment  does  no 
discharge  him  from  liability  to  the  prindpal 
unless  the  authority  of  the  broker  to  receiv4 
payment  be  express  or  may  reasonably  b< 
implied  from  the  drcumstances.' "  J.  M 
Robinson,  Norton  dc  0>.  v.  Gorslcana  Cot 
ton  Factory,  99  8.  W.  306,  806,  124  Ky.  43S 
8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  474,  14  Ann.  OftS,  SOS 
(quoting  and  adopting  defltiitioA  in  Story,  Af. 


MERCHANDISE  ENTITLED 


373 


UEBOHANT 


f  34;  and  dtinff  MecOiem,  Ag.  |  M9;  Graham 
▼.  DackwaU,  8  Bush  [71  Ky.]  12;  flelpte  ▼. 
Irwlo,  80  Pa.  lUB;  HlggiiM  T.  Moore,  84  N. 
T.  417;  Basset  t.  Lederer  [N.  T.]  1  Hon, 
274;   Croeby  ▼.  Hill,  88  Ohio  St  100). 

MEBCHAyPISB    ENTITLED     TO     BS- 
BEJITUBE 

See  Entitled  to  DebeDtura 

MERCHANDISE  NOT  IN  EXISTENCE 

A  crop  of  olives,  nearly  matured  at  time 
of  contract  for  sale  thereof,  is  not  within 
GiT.  Code,  S  176S,  providing  that  one  who 
agrees  to  sell  merchandise,  "not  then  in  ex- 
istence," warrants  that  it  shall  be  sound  and 
merchantable  at  the  contemplated  place  of 
production,  and  as  nearly  so  at  the  place  of 
delivery  as  can  be  secured  by  reasonable 
care,  or  section  1771,  providing  that  one  who 
fells  or  agrees  to  sell  merchandise  'Inagces- 
Bible  to  the  examination  of  the  buyer  there- 
by warrants  that  it  is  sound  and  merchanta- 
ble. Kenney  v.  Grogan,  120  Pac  483,  436, 
17  QiL  App.  627. 

MERCHANT 

See  Commission  Merdiant;  Ck>urt  Mer- 
chant; Custom  of  Merchants;  For- 
warding Merehant;  Law  Merchant; 
Lumber  Merchant;  Permanent  Mer- 
chant; Public  Merchant;  Transient 
Merchant. 

A  "merdianf '  Is  one  who  buys  and  sells 
foods  of  an  or  any  kind.  Commonwealth  v. 
Payne  Medicine  Co.,  127  &  W.  700,  768,  188 
Ky.  164. 

"Merchant"  is  defined  as  any  one  who 
buys  and  sells  any  species  of  movable  goods 
for  gain  or  profit  H.  H.  Kohlsaat  A  Go.  v. 
O'ConneU,  99  N.  B.  689,  690,  265  IlL  271  (dt- 
iDg  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4482). 

The  word  "merehant"  is  defined  as  "one 
who  Is  engaged  in  the  business  of  buying 
commercial  commodities  and  selling  them 
again  for  the  sake  of  profit,  especially  one 
who  buys  and  sells  in  quantities  or  by  whole- 
sale," or  *'a  shopkeeper"  or  "storekeeper." 
Carr  v.  Riley,  84  N.  E.  426,  428. 198  Mass.  70. 

A  statutory  provision  empowering  cities 
to  impose  license  taxes  upon  '"merchants," 
and  to  enact  ordinances  for  the  regulation 
and  enforcement  of  such  taxes,  authorizes 
dty  councils  to  impose  penalties  upon  agents 
and  employte  of  such  merchants  who  assist 
in  carrying  on  an  unlicensed  bosiness.  City 
of  Emporia  ▼.  Becker,  90  Paa  798,  799,  76 
Kan.  181,  12  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  940. 

As  dealer 

See  Dealer. 
LaboMT  dlstSasalslied 

Within  Act  Cong.  May  6,  1892,  c.  00,  27 
8ttt  25^  providing  for  the  deportation  <tf 
Chinese  laborers  and  defining  "merchant" 
ai  a  person  engaged  la  buying  and  selling 


merchandise  at  a  fixed  plees  of 
which  business  is  conducted  in  his  name^ 
and  who  during  the  time  he  claims  to  be 
engaged  as  a  merchant  does  not  engage  in 
the  performance  of  any  manual  labor,  ex- 
cept such  as  is  necessary  in  the  conduct  of 
his  business  as  such  merchant,  a  person  who 
at  the  time  of  his  arrest  was  working  as  a 
servant  in  a  boarding  house,  and  who  since 
coming  to  the  United  States  had  worked  as 
a  cook  and  delivery  man  in  a  store  in  which 
he  had  no  interest,  was  a  laborer  and  not  a 
merchant  Mar  Sing  v.  U.  8.,  187  Fed.  875, 
877,  70  0.  C.  A,  213, 

It  has  been  held  that  a  Chinese  person 
engaged  in  keeping  a  restaurant  and  lodging 
bouse  is  a  "laborer**;  that  a  Chinese  per- 
son whose  occupation  was  that  of  a  laundry 
man  Is  a  laborer  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Chinese  Exclusion  Laws;  that  a  Chinese 
person  owning  an  interest  in  a  mercantile' 
firm,  but  not  engaged  in  conducting  it,  who 
is  also  a  cook  in  a  restaurant  of  which  he 
is  part  owner,  is  a  .laborer  and  not  a  mer- 
chant under  such  laws;  and  that  a  China- 
man who  from  the  date  of  his  landing  in 
this  country,  although  he  has  an  interest  in 
a  mercantile  business,  \a  a  laborer.  Act  Cong. 
Nov.  8,  1898,  c  14,  amending  Act  BCay  5, 
1892,  c  60,  "to  prohibit  the  coming  of  Chi- 
nese persons  into  the  United  States,"  does 
not  restrict  the  meaning  of  the  word  "la- 
borers," as  used  in  the  prior  acts,  so  as  to 
enlarge  the  privileged  classes.  United  States 
V.  Tee  Gee  You,  152  Fed.  157,  158,  169,  160, 
81  C.  C.  A.  409. 


A  farmer  selling  the  products  of  his 
farm  produced  by  his  own  labor  is  not  a 
'•merchant,  grocer,  or  dealer  in  wares  and 
merchandise,  or  a  trader  in  any  business," 
within  Pen.  Code,  art  199,  prohibiting  such 
persons  from  bartering  or  permitting  their 
places  of  business  to  be  open  for  traflic  on 
Sunday.  Hanks  v.  State,  99  8.  W.  1011, 
1012,  60  Tex.  Cr.  R.  577. 

Foreign  corporation 

A  foreign  corporation  engaged  in  the 
publication  of  school  books,  which  has  ob- 
tained a  contract  from  the  state  text-book 
oonunission  to  furnish  all  the  school  books 
of  the  state,  as  provided  by  Acts  1899,  p. 
423,  c.  205,  and  which  has  contracted  witli 
the  dealers  within  the  state  to  establish  de^ 
pots  for  the  sale  of  school  books  in  the  state 
is  a  "merchant"  doing  business  within  the 
state,  as  defined  by  Acts  1903,  p.  656,  e 
266»  I  27,  and  is  therefore  Uable  to  a  tax  on 
the  average  value  of  its  capital  invested  In 
its  stock  of  merchandise  kept  on  hand  for 
sale  within  tbe  stats;  the  term  "merchant" 
being  defined  by  the  statute  as  including  all 
persons,  copartnerships,  or  corporations  en- 
gaged in  trading  or  dealing  in  any  kind  of 
goods,  wares,  or  merchandise,  whethei:  the 
same  be  kc^t  on  hand  for  sale  or  be  purchas* 


MKROHANT 


374 


MSRCHAMT 


? 


\\ 


ed  ahtf '  dcOlrered  fbr  profit  as  ordered. 
American  Book  Go.  ▼*  Shelton,  100  S.  W. 
725,  731, 117  Tenn.  746.  A  state  la  not  pre- 
clnded  by  tb«  commerce  danse  of  the  federal 
GonstitatioD  from  imposing  a  merchants'  tax 
upon  a  nonresident  manufacturing  corpora- 
tion which  lias  selected  a  dty  of  that  state 
as  a  distributing  point,  and  has  secured  a 
local  transfer  company  to  take  charge  of  its 
products  when  shipped  to  that  point,  assort 
them,  store  them  in  a  warehouse,  and  make 
delivery  in  the  original  packages  to  the  cus* 
tomers  of  the  manufacturer,  either  as  ex- 
pressly directed  by  it,  or  under  general  di- 
rections in  favor  of  its  recognized  and 
approved  customers,  whose  names  were  fur- 
nished to  the  transfer  company,  since,  un- 
der such  circumstances,  the  goods,  when 
stored  in  the  warehouse,  were  no  longer  dn 
transit,  but  had  reached  th^lr  destination, 
and  were  held  In  the  state  for  sale.  Ameri- 
can Steel  &  Wire  Ck>.  v.  Speed,  24  Sup.  Ct 
866,  866,  192  U.  S.  600,  48  L.  Ed.  638. 

Fmii  deal«v 

The  keeper  of  a  fruit  stand,  from  which 
he  sold  fruit  on  Sunday,  was  a  merchant  en- 
gaged in  selling  merchandise,  etc.,  on  Sun- 
day, within  Code  1906,  §  1367,  providing  that 
a  merchant,  shopkeeper,  or  other  person 
shall  not  keep  open  his  store  on  Sunday  for 
the  purpose  of  disposing  of  any  wares  or 
merchandise,  goods,  or  chattels.  City  of 
Oulfport  V.  Stratakos,  43  South.  812,  90  Miss. 
489,  13  Ann.  Gas.  856. 

Itineraat  optioian. 

"Merchant"  is  defined  by  Webster,  Diet 
as  "one  who  traffics  on  a  large  scale,  espe- 
cially, with  fordgn  countries;  a  traflBcker;  a 
trader;  ^  ^  ^  one  who  keeps  a  store  or 
Shop  for  the -sale  of  goods;  a  shopkeeper." 
A  merchant  has  also  been  defined  as  **oiie 
whose  business  is  to  buy  and  sell  merchan- 
dise ;  one  who  buys  to  sell  again,  who  does 
both,  not  incidentally  or  occasionally,  but 
habitually,  as  a  business."  An  itinerant  op- 
tician, who  merely  prescribes  and  collects 
for  spectacles,  and  has  his  orders  filled  and 
charged  to  him  by  a  supply  house,  is  not  a 
merchant  City  of  Waukon  v.  Fisk,  100  N. 
W.  476,  476,  124  Iowa,  464  (quoting  Jewel  r. 
Trustees  of  Sumner  Tp.,  84  N.  W.  978,  113 
Iowa,  47,  49). 

SCaanfaotiiver 

The  words  *^merchants"  and  "dealers," 
according  to  common  understanding,  mean 
something  different  from  the  word  "manu- 
facturers." The  former  are  generally  em- 
ployed to  designate  persons  engaged  in  the 
business  of  buying  and  selling  merchandise 
or  other  personal  property  in  the  usual  course 
of  trade;  the  latter  to  designate  those  en- 
gaged in  the  business  of  making  or  produc- 
ing articles  for  use  or  sale.  Union  County 
Nat.  Bank,  liberty,  Ind.,  v.  Oaan  Lumber 
Co.,  179  Fed«  710,  716, 103  C.  G.  A.  684. 


A  "manuflactiirer"  is/ one  engaged 
makUig  tDaterlais,  raw  or  partly  itnisbed, ' 
t6  wares  suitable  for  use. .  A.  ''jDerebant** 
distinguiflihed  trom  a  mannfacturw ,  in  tti 
he  sells  to  eam  a  pfoflt,  azid.the  manufach 
er  sells  to  take  profit  already  earned, 
manufacturer  of  agricultural  ImplementB 
not  a  "dealer"  or  "merchant,"  within  A< 
1909,  c  479,  I  8,  and  Assessment  Act  19 
(Acts  1907,  c.  602)  U  8,  26,  27,  providing  f 
taxation  of  dealers  and  merchants ;  sales  I 
ing  made  only  to  jobbers  and  commissii 
men,  and  the  only  profit  taken  being  for  ma 
ufacturing  the  articles  sold.  Ghattanooi 
Plow  Go.  V.  Hays,  140  8.  W.  1068,  1069,  1 
Tenn.  148. 

A  manufacturer  of  acetylene  gas  llgl 
ing  systems  who  sells  through  solidti] 
agents  is  not  a  "merchant"  or  f  dealer"  wit 
in  Kirby's  Dig.  |  616,  which  provides  that  at 
tion  613,  which  nuikes  void  notes  given 
ordinary  form  for  the  price  of  patented  m 
chines,  etc.,  shall  not  extend  to  merchan 
and  dealers  who  sell  patented  things  in  ti 
usual  course  of  business;  the  words  "mc 
chant"  and  "dealer"  meaning  persons  engage 
in  the  business  of  buying  and  selling  mc 
chandise  or  otiier  personal  property  in  the  u 
ual  course  of  trade.  Bnslgn  v.  Coffelt,  1^ 
S.  W.  281,  234, 102  Arit  668. 

MemlMrof  flvm 

The  term  "merchant^'  is  defined  by  A 
Cong.  May  6|  1892,  c,  60,  as  am^ded  by  Ai 
Nov.  3,  1893,  c.  14,  as  a  person  engaged  1 
buying  .and  seUling  i^erchandlse  at  a  fixe 
place  of  business,  which  business  is  conductc 
in  his  name^  and  who,  du^lJQg  the  time  I 
claims  to  be  engaged  as  a  merchant,  dot 
not  engage  in  the  performance  of  any  maniu 
labor,  except  such  as  is  necessary  in  the  coi 
duct  of  his  business  as  such  merchant  Tt 
names  of  any  of  the  partners  need  not  appei 
in  the  company  name  under  which  a  Ghlnef 
grocery  is  actually  conducted  at  a  fixed  pUu 
of  business,  in  order  to  constitute  them  me 
chants  within  the  meaning  of  the  definitio] 
Tom  Hong  v.  United  States,  24  Sup.  Ct  51 
619,  198  U.  S.  617,  48  L.  Ed.  772. 

Oil  dealer 

A  "merchant"  is  a  peracm  whose  baa 
ness  it  is  to  buy  and  sell  mendiandise  an 
who  habitually  trades  in  merchandise. 
BoQV.  LsL^  Diet  166.  A  merdianf  s  liceu 
contemplates  that  the  merchant  is  to  have 
fixed  place  of  business  within  a  county  < 
city.  confiMlng  of  a  store  or  shop  for  the  sal 
of  good&  Brown's  Oas^  36rS.  B.  486,  98  Vi 
369.  An  oil  company  engaged  in  the  boa 
ness  of  refining  and  distributing  oil  and  sel 
ing  it  to  local  dealers  from  tank  wagon 
and  not  from  a  fix4d  pUioe  of  tnudness,  is  ik 
a  "merchant"' as  that  term  is  generally  unde 
stood,  and  cannot,  by  voluntarily  paying 
state  license  as  a  merchant,  prevent  the  ai 
sessment  of  a  spedAiD  tax  againat  its  bui 


uMsuMAner 


USEOBAMTABUt 


Standard  Oil  Go.  t.  aty  of  FredodoU- 
barg,  62  S.  B.  817,  820,  106  Ya.  82. 

A  oorpoiatlon  aelllng  oil  drawn  from  sta- 
tionary tanks  owne^by  it,  and  from  a  wag> 
on  tank  drlTen  about. town.  Is  a  ''mercbant," 
within  an  ordinance  defining  a  mercbant  to  be 
a  person  dealing  in  the  selling  of  goods, 
wares,  and  mercbandlse  at  any  store,  stand, 
or  place  occopied  for  that  purpose.  Ctty  of 
Troy  T.  Hants,  76  B.  W.  662,  663,  066,  102 
Mo.  App.  51. 


«s   soUcitMr   of   orders   fs» 
seeds 

Under  the  treaty  of  NoTomber  17,  1880 
<22  Stat  82S),  and  the  treaty  of  March  26, 
1894  (28  Stat  1210),  pro>Tldlng  that  Chinese 
persons  entitled  to  come  into  the  United 
States,  when  provided  with  the  certificate 
prescribed  by  Act  Cong.  JxUy  6,  1884,  c.  220, 
23  Stat  115,  are  Chinese  subjects,  being 
officials,  teachers,  students,  merchants,  or 
tiaTelers  fbr  curiosity  or  pleasure,  and  under 
Act  Not.  8,  1803,  c  14,  I  2,  28  Stat  8,  de- 
fining the  term  '^merchant,*'  as  used  in  the 
exclusion  acts,  as  a  t>erson  cagaged  In  buy- 
ing and  selling  mtf^handlse  at  a  fixsd  place 
of  business,  whUdi  business  is  conducted  In 
his  name^  and  who  does  not  engage  In  manu- 
al labor,  a  person  described  In  his  certificate 
as  a  "salesman"  is  not  a  merchant  who  is 
eatitied  to  remain  in  the  United  States;,  a 
"salesman,"  as  defined  by  the  Standard  Dic- 
tionary, being  a  man  who  seUs  goods  In  a 
shop  or  store  or  by  canvassing,  and  being  gen- 
erally accepted  to  mean  a  person  who  sells 
goods  for  a  merchant  and  not  to  mean  the 
m^chant  himself.  United  States  y.  Qln 
Hing,  76  Pac.  630,  640,  8  Aria.  41& 

Defendant  took  orders  for  groceries 
which  he  sent  to  a  wholesale  gn>cery  firm, 
which  shipped  the  goods  to  their  own  order 
and  sent  a  bill  therefor  accompanying  the  bill 
of  lading  to  their  agent  with  directions  to  de- 
Uver  only  as  paid  for.  Such  agent  received 
the  goods  and  removed  them  to  his  war^ouse, 
where  the  bulk  was  broken  and  the  dUfereat 
packages  for  each  customer  segregated  and 
delivered  to  them  through  defendant  on  their 
paying  the  price  to  defendant,  and  he  deliver- 
ed the  money  to  such  agent  Held,  that  de- 
fendant was  a  "merchant"  as  defined  by  Rev. 
St  1880,  I  8540,  declaring  every  person  who 
shall  deal  in  the  selling  of  goods,  wares,  and 
merchandise  at  any  store,  stand,  or  place  oc- 
cupied for  that  purpose  to  be  a  "merchant" 
and  w^s  therefore  within  a  town  ordinance 
prohibiting  any  "merchant'*  carrying  on  busi- 
ness without  first  having  obtained  a  license. 
Town  of  Canton  v.  McDaniel,  86  S.  W.  1092, 

,188  Mo.  207. 


A  "merdiant*'  is  one  engaged  In  the  bus!- 
oess  of  buying  commercial  commodities  and 
selling  them  again  for  the  sake  of  profit  He 
is  one  who  traffics  or  carries  on  trade,  espe^ 
clally  on  a  large  scale;  one  who  buys  goods 
to  sell  again,  and  any  one  who  is  engaged 


ha  the  purchase  or  sale  of  goods;  a  traffl<^ 
er;  a  trader.  Under  Code,  I  700^  gtring  to 
cities  and  towns  the  power  to  define  by  ordl^ 
nance  who  ahall  be  considered  transleint  mer- 
chants, and  to  regulate,  license,  and  tax  theAr 
sales,  a  dty  may  Impose  a  license  fee  on  one 
engaged  in  taking  orders  for  goods  on  his 
own  account  and  subsequently  having  the 
orders  filled  by  a  wholesale  house,  and  the 
goods  shipped  to  him  for  delivery ;  he  paying 
the  wholesale  price  and  collecting  &e  retail 
price  from  his  customers.  City  of  Cedar 
Falls  V.  Oentsler,  00  N.  W.  OO*  602,  128 
Iowa,  670. 

MEROKJJffT  APPRAISEB 

The  "merdiant  appraiser^'  appointed  by 
the  collector  of  customs  is  an  expert,  select- 
ed as  an  emergency  arises,  upon  the  request 
of  the  importer  for  a  reappraisal.  He  Is  not 
a  clerk  nor  an  agent  nor  a  person  employed 
in  the  customs  department  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  civil  service  act  nor  is  he  an  ofllcer 
of  the  United  States.  Hand  v.  Cook,  92  Pac. 
3, 10,  29  Nev.  518  (quoting  and  adopting  AufT- 
mordt  V.  Hedden,  11  Sup.  Ct  103»  137  U.  8. 
310,  34  L.  Ed.  674). 

MERQHAITTABXiB 
ICavketAUe  symeajmanis 

"Marketable^*  and  "merc9wntable^  are 
practically  synonymous.  In  an  action  for 
breach  of  contract  to  purdwse  hay,  tn  whldi 
defendants  alleged  that  plaintiflF  agreed  to  sell 
them  merchantable  hay,  and  that  the  hay 
shipped  was  not  as  represented,  a  request  by 
plaintiff  to  an  expert  witness:  "State  wheth- 
er or  not  this  hay  you  saw  there  Is  con- 
sidered as  marketable  hay  here  in  Baker  City, 
compared  with  other  kind  that  Is  sold  here" — 
was  not  objectionable ;  the  persons  who  "con- 
sidered" the  hay  merchantable  being  himself 
and  those  who,  according  to  his  previous  tes- 
timony, he  had  seen  purchasing  such  hay  at 
Baker  City.  Eaton  v.  Blackburn,  88  Pac  303, 
304,  49  Or.  22  (dtlng  Webster's  International 
Diet.). 

Oom 

The  term  'Merchantable,*'  as  used  in  the 
rale  that  a  buyer  of  com  Is  entitled  to  mer- 
chantable com,  means  com  of  such  quality 
as  to  be  Reasonably  fit  for  the  ordinary  pur- 
poses to  which  such  com  Is  put  and  free 
from  marketable  defects,  so  as  to  be  salable 
in  the  market  at  an  average  or  ordinary 
price.  Atkins  Bros.  Co.  v.  Landa,  96  B.  W. 
949,  900,  119  Ma  App.  119. 

Hay 

See  Good  Merchantable  Hay. 

Iiiuaber 

The  words  "merchantable  lumber,  mill 
run,"  are  not  in  common  use  and  have  no 
settled.  Judicial  meaning.  They  are  peculiar 
to  the  lumber  tkade  or  business  and  have  a 
special  meaning  well  understood  by  persons 
engaged  in  such  businesa»  and  in  an  action  on 


ICBBOHANTABLB 


876 


a  oantr&ct  for  tbe  purchase  of  lumber  at  a 
specified  ptioe  per  1,000  for  "merdiantable 
lumber,. mill  run,"  eTidenee  is  admissible  to 
show  the  meaning  of  the  words.  Barnes  ▼• 
Leidlgfa,  79  Pac.  51,  02, 46  Or.  43. 

Ttmbev 

The  term  "merchantable  timber,"  within 
a  contract  to  sell  land  warranted  to  contain 
100,000,000  feet  of  "mechantable  timber/' 
while  not  limited  to  timber  that  could  be  re- 
duced to  board  measure  and  numufactured  in- 
to lumber  at  a  profit,  is  limited  to  timber 
capable  of  being  measured  in  board  feet  when 
sawed  or  cut  for  the  purpose  of  utilization. 
Broad  River  Lumber  €k>.  ▼.  Middleby,  ld4 
Fed;  817,  819,  114  0.  C.  A.  621. 

'The  term  'merchantable'  means  fit 
for  the  market,  of  such  a  quality  as  will 
bring  the  ordinary  market  price."  A  deed 
of  ^'merchantable"  timber  had  reference  to 
such  timber  as  would  bring  the  ordinary 
market  price  at  the  time  the  deed  was  exe- 
cuted. Listen  V.  Chapman  &  Dewey  Lumber 
Ck).,  91  S.  W.  27,  29,  77  Ark.  116  (quoting  and 
adopting  Webst  Diet  and  Black  Law  Diet ; 
and  citing  Andrews  y.  Wade  [Pa.]  6  Atl.  43). 

A  contract  for  the  sale  of  all  merchant- 
able pine  timber,  10  Inches  In  diameter  and 
*  OTor,  on  a  described  tract  of  land,  was  not 
Told  for  uncertainty,  ''merchantable"  being 
used  to  describe  the  quality  and  determinable 
by  experts  with  approximate  certainty.  Lee 
Lumber  Go.  t.  Hotard,  48  South.  286,  287, 122 
La.  860,  129  Am.  St  Rep.  86& 

A  contract  to  sell  the  "merchantable  pine 
timber"  upon  a  certain  tract  of  land  to  be 
sawed  into  lumber  by  the  vendor  according 
to  the  directions  of  the  purchaser,  and  to  be 
delivered  at  Richmond,  is  a  contract  that  the 
lumber  shall  be  merchantable,  and  that  the 
timber  will  make  merchantable  lumber.  Rag- 
land  V.  Butler,  18  Grat  (59  Va.)  328,  335. 

Title 

The  term  ^^merchantable  title"  does  not 
necessarily  Import  a  clear  and  perfect  record 
title,  and  is  not  of  such  clear  and  definite 
meaning  that  one  contracting  to  sell  stand- 
ing timber  and  to  give  such  a  title  may  not 
assert  as  a  defense  for  not  giving  such  title 
that  he  was  Ignorant  of  its  meaning,  and 
when  the  contract  was  executed  stated  to 
the  vendee  that  if  It  meant  a  perfect  title 
or  one  good  of  record,  he  would  not  sign,  be- 
cause he  could  not  furnish  such  titie,  and 
that  thereupon  the  vendee  told  him  that  a 
general  warranty  deed  was  all  that  was 
wanted,  and  that  that  was  what  was  meant 
by  the  term,  and  that  he  signed  in  reliance 
on  such  assurance. — Hughes  v.  Adams,  119 
S.  W.  134,  136,  55  Tex.  av.  App.  197. 

MERCHAirrS'   GOODS,   WARES,    AKH 
COMMODITIES 

See  Mierchandisa 


MERE 

MEBE  UOEHSB 

See  Licepse;  Licensee 

MERE  POSSmUTT 

The  rights  of  living  remaindermen,  dil 
dren  of  the  life  tenant,  in  a  deed  to  one  U 
life  with  remainder  to  the  "beirB  of  U 
body,"  are  not  "mere  possibiUtlee"  withJ 
Civ.  Code,  |  700,  declaring  that  a  mere  posa 
blllty,  such  as  the  expectancy  of  an  heir  a] 
parent  ia  not  an  interest  of  anj  kind,  hi 
they  are  estates  in  fee  to  vest  in  the  futui 
in  such  of  them  as  survive  their  motbe 
Los  Angeles  County  v«  WinaiiB»  IM  Pa&  69 
662, 18  Gal.  App.  257. 

MERGER 

Corpomtloaa 

While  there  is  a  distinction  recognize 
by  most  authorities  between  a  ''merger"  to 
a  "consolidation"  of  corporations,  tha 
terms  are  not  always  used  witii  strict  « 
curacy.  Chicago  ds  Bu  I.  R.  Go.  t.  Doyle^  Id 
N.  B.  278,  281,  256  m.  514. 

There  is  a  distinct  difference  betwee 
a  consolidation  and  a  merger  of  two  con 
panics.  In  a  consolidation,  both  go  oat  c 
existence  as  separate  corporations,  and 
new  corporation  is  created,  which  takes  thel 
place  and  property ;  while  In  case  of  a  mei 
ger  one  loses  its  identity  by  absorption  in  th 
other,  which  remains  In  existence,  and  sw 
ceeds  to  its  property;  and  Issues  its  ow 
stock  to  the  stockholders  of  the  merged  cod 
pany.  Lee  v.  Atlantic  Coast  (Tine  B.  Co^  IS 
Fed.  775,  790.  See,  also,  Kent  v.  Oommo 
Council  of  City  of  Blnghamton,  81  N.  1 
Supp.  198,  200,  40  Mlsa  Rep.  1  (2  Bouv.  U^ 
Diet  175;  Webst  Int  Diet  914).  Irvine  ^ 
New  York  Edison  Co.,  128  N.  T.  Suppi  29^ 
299,  143  App.  Dlv.  844;  Central  Univeisit 
of  Kentucky  V.  Walters'  Bx'rs,  90  S.  \^ 
1066,  1069,  122  Ky.  65;  Wasley  v.  Chicago 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  147  Fed.  608,  614. 

The  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Railroad  Con 
pany  incorporated  in  Virginia  and  having  it 
principal  offices  in  lUchmond,  with  powe 
given  by  its  charter  to  "consolidate  with  ii 
selT'  other  corporations,  entered  into  a 
agreement  of  "consoUdatioii  and  merger 
with  a  comimny  owning  connecting  lines,  U 
corporated  in  other  states,  which  agreemei 
provided  that  the  stock  of  the  second  con 
pany  should  be  retired  and  canceled,  an 
stock  of  the  Coast  Line  Company  Issued  i 
its  place;  that  all  the  stock,  property,  an 
franchises  of  both  should  be  merged,  unltei 
and  consolidated,  "so  as  to  form  a  merge< 
united  and  consolidated  company";  tlu 
"said  merger,  union,  and  consolidation  shai 
be  into  the  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Railroa 
Company,  which  is  to  continue  the  name  o 
the  consolidated  company";  and  that  its  oi 
flee  should  remain  in  Richmond.    Under  sue 


KEROSat 


877 


ICBROBB 


agreement  Uie  stock  of  tlie  second  oompany 
was  canceled,  but  stock  prevlonsly  issued  Xfj 
the  Coast  Line  Oompany  remained  outstand- 
ings, and  sQCh  company  took  ^arge  of  and 
operated  aH  lines  previously  owned  and  oper- 
ated by  eitlier  company,  without  any  change 
in  its  management  or  control.  Held,  that 
such  agreement  effected  a  merger,  aad  not  a 
consolidation,  and  that  the  Ck»st  Line  Oom- 
pany continued  to  exist  as  a  Virginia  corpo- 
ration. Lee  T.  Atlantic  Coast  line  B.  Co., 
160  Fsd.  775,  784. 

A  consolidation  takes  place  when,  two 
companies  are  extinguished  and  a  new  one 
created  taking  over  the  holdings  of  those 
passing  out  of  existence.  It  differs  from 
'Merger,'*  which  occurs  when  a  thing  of 
lesser  Importance  is  absorbed  by  one  of 
greater  importance.  Both  merger  and  con- 
solidation, however,  are  equally  productive 
of  unloUt  which  means  agreement,  concord, 
liarmony,  and  may  exist  without  either  mer- 
ger or  consolidation.  Ramsey  v.  Hicks,  87 
N.  S.  1091,  1099,  44  Ind.  App.  490. 

Eita^es 
A  *'merger,"  at  law,  is  defined  to  be 
where  a  greater  estate  and  a  less  coincide 
and  meet  in  one  and  the  same  person,  in  one 
and  the  same  right,  without  any  Interme- 
diate estate.  The  less  estate  Is  immediately 
annihilated,  or,  in  the  law  phrase,  it  is  said 
to  be  merged — that  is,  sunk  or  drowned — in 
the  greater.  The  rule  in  equity  is  the  same 
as  at  law,  with  this  modification:  That  at 
law  It  is  invariable  and  inflexible ;  in  equity 
it  is  controlled  by  the  expressed  or  implied 
intention  of  the  party  in  whom  the  interests 
of  estete  unite.  Bagley  v.  McCarthy  Bros. 
Co.,  104  N.  W.  7,  9,  95  Minn.  286  (quoting  5 
Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4492). 

"Merger,"  in  law,  is  accomplished  when 
two  or  more  estates  comprising  the  whole 
legal  and  equitable  interest  unite  in  the  same 
person;  but  in  equity  such  union  does  not 
effect  a  merger,  unless  such  was  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties,  and  when  equity  requires 
it  Cltlzena'  Permanent  Savings  dc  Loan 
Aas'n  V.  Rampe,  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  597,  600; 
Dudley  v.  People's  Trust  Co.,  107  N.  T.  Supp. 
930,  933,  57  Misc.  Rep.  230  (quoting  Asche  v. 
Aache,  21  N.  B.  70,  113  N.  Y.  232). 

Where  a  greater  and  a  lesser  estate 
coincide  and  meet  in  the  same  person  and  in 
the  same  right,  without  any  intermediate 
Tested  estate,  the  lesser  is  immediately  anni- 
hilated, and  is  said  to  be  ''merged."  Tolsma 
V.  Adair,  73  Pac.  347,  348,  32  Wash.  383 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Ander- 
son's Law  Diet  671;  2  Bouv.  Law  Diet 
{Bawle's  Rev.]  400,  401). 

**Merger^  is  essentially  a  matter  of  inten- 
tion, and  where  the  intention  to  merge  does 
not  exist  tile  doctrtne  is  not  operative.  Four 
sisters  and  four  brothers  being  seised  in  fee 
of  a  tract  of  land,  the  sisters  conveyed  their 
nndlTided  interests  amounting  to  one-half  of 


the  fee  to  their  brothers,  three  of  whom,  be- 
ing of  age,  executed  four  several  bonds  tx> 
their  sisters  and  gave  them  collectively  a 
mortgage  on  the  premises  to  secure  a  p<Mrtion 
of  the  purdiase  money.  The  brother,  who 
was  a  minor  at  the  time  the  mortgage  was 
given  and  who  did  not  join  therein,  came  of 
age  within  two  years  after  the  giving  of  the 
mortgage,  and  lived  for  more  than  thirty 
years  thereafter  and  died,  devising  his  one- 
fourth  interest  to  his  three  brothers  who 
made  the  mortgage.  The  entire  fee  of  the 
premises  subsequently  vested  in  two  of  the 
brothers  by  virtue  of  their  individual  hold- 
ings and  under  the  will  of  their  deceased 
brother,  and  by  a  conveyance  by  their  sur- 
viving brother,  and  in  the  years  1891,  189S, 
and  1908,  made  three  mortgages  upon  the 
premlse&  One  of  the  brothers  died  intes- 
tate, and  'yhis  interest  in  the  premises  de- 
scended to  his  heirs  at  law,  who  are  his  sur- 
viving broths  and  his  nephews  and  nieces, 
diUdren  of  his  deceased  brothers  and  sis- 
ten.  The  surviving  brother  and  the  neph* 
ews  and  nieces  are  the  owners  of  the  inter- 
est in  the  mortgage  of  one  of  the  sisters,  as 
well  as  being  owners  of  the  fee.  As  against 
the  mortgages. of  1891  and  1895,  there  was 
no  "merger"  of  their  inteiest  in  the  original 
mortgage  to  the  sisters  and  the  title  to  the 
fee  in  the  lands.  Shreve  v.  Harvey,  70  Atl. 
671,  676,  74  N.  J.  Bq.  886. 

The  rule  is  absolute  at  law  that  a  "mer- 
ger^ takes  place  when  a  greater  estate  and  a 
lesser  coincide  and  meet  in  one  and  the  same 
person,  in  one  and  the  same  right,  without 
the  intervention  of  any  other  or  outstanding 
right  or  title.  Under  such  circumstances, 
the  lessor  estate  is  annihilated  or  merged 
into  the  greater.  The  doctrine  of  merger 
springs  from  the  fact  that,  when  the  entire 
equitable  and  legal  estates  are  united  in  the 
same  person,  there  can  be  no  occasion  to 
keep  them  distinct,  tor  ordinarily  it  would 
be  of  no  use  to  the  owner  to  ke^  up  a 
Charge  upon  the  estate  of  which  he  was  sela- 
ed  in  f ee  simple;  but,  if  there  is  an  out- 
standing, intervening  title,  the  fbundation 
for  the  merger  does  not  exist,  and,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  law,  it  is  so  declared.  It  therefore  ap- 
pears that,  in  order  to  effect  a  merger  so.  as 
to  extinguish  the  lesser  estate,  there  must  be 
a  union,  in  the  same  person,  of  both  the 
equitable  and  legal  titles,  without  an  inter- 
vening right  operating  to  prevent  a  merger. 
Gurry  v.  Lafon,  118  S.  W.  246,  200,  188  Afo. 
App.  163  (citing  Stantons  v.  Thompson,  49 
N.  H.  272;    Jones,  Mortg.  [6th  Ed.]  f  848). 

"'Merger*  occurs  'when  a  greater  estate 
and  a  less  coincide  and  meet  in  one  and  the 
same  person,  in  ond  and  the  same  rights 
without  any  intermediate  estate.'  Tlie  rule 
in  equity  is  the  same  as  at  law,  with  this 
modification  that  at  law  it  is  inflexible, 
whereas  in  equity  it  Is  clear  that  a  person 
may  become  entitled  to  an  estate  subject  to 
a  diarge  for  his  own  benefit,  and  if  he  diooee 


MBRaER' 


578 


M£BIT9i 


cftii  liold  the  estate  and  keep  the*  cbaiye 
alive.  It  beoamee  a  qaestion  of  intention  in 
tiie  person  in  whom  the  two  interests  are 
▼ested."  Where  a  purchaser  assumed  the 
payment  of  notes  executed  by  the  Tender,  se- 
cured by  a  mortgage  on  the  premises,  and 
oonveyed  the  premises  to  a  third  person  sub- 
ject to  the  mortgage,'  and  this  person  after- 
wards acquired  the  notes,  the  equitable  es^ 
tate  was  merged  in  the  legal  one,  thereby 
extinguishing  the  mortgage  and  the  debt  se* 
cured.  Wonderly  t.  Giessler,  93  S.  W.  1130, 
1133, 118  Mo.  App.  706  (quoting  and  adopting 
Bassett  t.  O'Brien,  51  S.  W.  108,  140  Mo. 


A  ''merger  of  estates*'  occurs,  as  de- 
clared in  GlT.  Code  1805,  {  3106,  when  "two 
estates  in  the  same  property  unite  in  the 
same  person  in  his  indiyldual  capacity,  the 
less  estate  [being]  merged  in  the  greater," 
or  where,  as  was  held  in  Lowe  ▼.  Webb,  11 
S.  B.  846,  85  6a.  731,  two  or  more  persons, 
having,  as  tenants  in  common,  a  Ufe  estate 
in  realty,  acquire  in  common  the  absolute 
fee  thereto.  *The  doctrine  of  'merger  of  es- 
tates* rests  upon  actualities,  not  upon  mere 
possibilities.  Ck>incidence  of  two  independ- 
ent estates  presently  held  by  one  and  the 
same  person  or  class  of  persons  is  a  neces* 
sary  prerequisite  to  merger.  No  merger  can 
take  place  until  such  identity  of  person  and 
of  present  interest  In  point  of  fact  exists." 
liuquire  v.  Lee,  48  a  B.  834,  838,  121  Oa. 
024  (citing  Stringfellow  v.  Stringfellow,  37 
S.  E.  767,  112  Oa.  494,  497;  Bardwell  &  Co. 
V.  Edwards,  46  S.  B.  40,  117  Ga.  825;  1 
Wash.  Real  Prop.  [6th  Ed.]  I  368;  Knowles 
V.  Lawton,  18  Oa.  476,  63  Am.  Dea  290 ;  Ck>le 
V.  Grlgsby  [Tex.]  36  &  W.  690;  Asch  v.  Asch 
[N.  Y.]  18  Abb.  N.  C.  82;  Bomar  v.  Mullins 
IS.  C]  4  Rich.  E)q.  80;  Johnson  v.  Johnson, 
7  Allen   [89  Mass.]  196,  83  Am.   Dec.   676). 

Rights  are  said  to  be  ^'merged"  when  the 
same  person  who  is  bound  to  pay  is  also  en- 
titled to  receive.  This  Is  more  properly 
called  a  confusion  of  rights  or  extinguish- 
ment. Muscogee  Mfg.  Go.  v.  Eagle  &  Phenix 
Mflls,  64  S.  E.  1028,  1031,  126  Ga.  210,  7  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  1139  (quoting  Bonvier  Law  Diet 
word  '"Merger,"  subtitte  "Of  Rights*';  and  cit- 
ing Rawle,  Ck>Tenants  [5th  Bd.]  i  223 ;  Sibley 
▼.  Beard,  6  Ga.  650;  Fields  v.  Willingham, 
49  Ga.  344;  Willis  v.  McGough,  56  Ga.  198; 
Olv.  Code  1896,  |  8106;  Ooodel  v.  Bennett, 
22  Wis.  666;  Brown  y.  Metz,  33  111.  339,  85 
Am.  Dec.  277;  Silverman  v.  Loomis,  104  111. 
137;  Waterbury  v.  Head,  12  N.  Y.  St  R. 
361). 

Offenses 

"'Merger*  in  the  criminal  law  occurs 
where  the  same  act  of  crime  is  within  the 
definition  of  a  misdemeanor  and  likewise 
a  felony,  or  of  a  felony  and  likewise  of  a 
treason ;  and  the  rule  is  that-the  lower  grade 
merges  in  the  higher.  That  is,  an  act  can- 
not be  both  a  felony  and  a  misdemeanor— a 
doctrine  which  applies  only  where  the  iden- 


tical act  consjtltuteB  both  ofleases.  *  * 
Subject  to  whatever  exception  may  be  fouD< 
in  the  doctrine  of  mergi^,  a  criminal  persoi 
may  be  holden  for  any  crime,  of  whateve 
nature,  which  can  be  legally  carved  out  o 
his  act  He  is  not  to  elect,  but  the  prosecnl 
ing  power  is.  If  the  evidiuice  shows  him  t 
be  guilty  of  a  higher  offense  than  he  stand 
indicted  for,  or  of  a  lower,  or  of  one  dlGFei 
ing  in  nature,  whether  under  a  statute  or  a 
the  common  law,  he  cannot  be  heard  to  con 
plain;  the  question  being  whether  it  show 
him  to  be  guilty  of  the  one  charged."  Stat 
V.  SmUh,  90  S.  W.  440.  444, 190  Mo.  706  (quol 
ing  and  adopting  definition- In  1  Bish.  ti 
Law  [7th  Ed.]  fit  786,  791). 

MERINO  WOOL 

In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  I  1 
Schedule  K,  par.  349,  relating  to  wools,  th 
words  *'merino  blood,  immediate  or  remote,' 
convey  an  unmistakable  meaning,  and  includ 
wool  in  which  the  presence  of  merino  bloo( 
is  marked,  though  of  inferior  quality.  Unit 
ed  States  v.  American  Express  Oo.»  177  Fed 
736,789. 

MERIT 

KEBXTORIOUS  BEFENSB 

Where  a  complaint  alleged  execution  b: 
defendants  of  a  penal  bond,  the  condition  o 
which  was  that  defendants  would  make  cei 
tain  repairs  to  a  building  for  plaintiffs  tha 
they  had  failed  to  perform,  and  a  defaol 
Judgment  was  entered  thereon,  an  answer  ad 
mitting  the  execution  of  the  bond  and  failur 
to  perform,  but  alleging  that  the  buildinj 
was  leased  to  defendants  for  gambling  ptu 
poses,  does  not  on  a  motion  to  set  aside  thi 
default  Judgment  set  up  a  "meritorious  de 
fense,"  within  Mills'  Ann.  Code,  |  75,  aufhoi 
izing  relief  under  such  circumstances.  He 
Connell  v.  Schultz,  128  Pac.  876,  877,  28  Cole 
App.  194. 

The  word  "meritorious,"  as  used  in  coo 
nection  with  a  ''meritorious  defense,**  mean 
that  the  defense  is  good  and  lawful,  and 
when  pleaded  properly  in  time,  must  be  recog 
nized  as  a  good  lawful  defense.  While  an: 
defense  given  by  statute  is  meritorious,  1 
does  not  follow  that  for  that  reason  it  bai 
merit  equal  to  any  other  defense,  thus  remov 
ing  from  the  courts  the  right  to  dlscriminati 
between  different  defenses,  so  that,  where  1 
appears  that  a  defense  otherwise  meritorion 
when  offered  for  the  first  time  in  an  amende^ 
pleading  if  allowed  would  worK  an  injustie 
instead  of  a  Justice,  the  court  should  refQ» 
it  O'Neill  V.  Jones,  123  N.  W.  495,  496,  2 
S.  D.  79. 

MERITS 

As  a  technical  legal  term,  ''merits"  ba< 
been  defined  as  a  matter  of  s^bfltanoe  in  la^ 
as  distinguished  from  matters  of  form,  a» 
as  the  real  or  substantial  grounds  of  actioi 


MERITS 


379 


MSBJTB 


or  defense,  In  contradlsd&cttott  to  wmH  teeb- 
nlcal  or  collateral  matter  raised  In  the  conrae 
of  the  salt.  Wolfe  ▼.  Georgia  By.  A  Bleotric 
Co.,  «  S.  E.  e^  eS,  4  Ga.  ^pp.  410  (dtlBg 
5  Words  &  Phrases,  p.  4403). 

"The  term  'merits'  has  been  defined  as 
meaning  the  strict  legal  rights  of  the  parties 
as  distinguished  from  those  met«  questions 
of  practice  which  every  court  regulates  for 
Itself  and  from  all  matters  which  d^iiend 
upon  the  discretion  or  fayor  of  the  court- 
matters  of  substance  in  law  as  distinguished 
from  matters  of  form/'  Smoot  v.  Judd,  83 
a  W.  481,  519,  184  Ma  508. 

The  act  of  the  trial  court  in  an  election 
contest  in  changing  the  case  from  the  Jury 
docket  to  the  nonjury  docket  at  a  subsequent 
term,  after  an  order  had  been  made  placing 
It  upon  the  Jury  docket,  but  on  the  faith  of 
which  no  steps  had  been  taken,  is  within  the 
discretion  of  the  trial  court,  since  the  rule 
that  trial  judges  cannot,  at  subsequent  terms, 
change  orders  made  at  former  terms  does 
not  apply  to  mere  practice  points,  but  only  to 
the  "merits  of  the  controversy,"  which  term 
Is  not  confined  to  points  in  actual  litigation. 
Taylor  v.  Gtfr,  141  S.  W.  745,  748,  125  Tenn. 
235,  Ann.  Caa.  1913G,  155. 

In  November,  1903,  at  the  instance  and 
request  at  plaintiff's  counsel,  a  stipulation 
was  entered  into  embracing  the  facts  rele- 
vant to  all  the  Issues  except  one.  Such  stip- 
ulation was  entered  into  in  good  faith,  with- 
ont  fraud  or  any  attempt  to  deceive  plaintiff's 
comisel,  and  after  most  careful  considera- 
tion. Defendant's  counsel  in  good  f&fth  relied 
upon  such  stipulation  for  nearly  six  years. 
In  Maicfa^  1908,  the  cause  was  tried  and  sub- 
mitted upon  such  stipulated  facta  and  certain 
testimony '  relevant  to  the  issue  not  covered 
by  the  stipulation.  In  Biay,  flawing,  the 
trial  court  made  its  findings  of  fact  and  con- 
clusions of  law  favorable  to  plaintiff,  and 
ordered  judgment  accordingly,  which  was  en- 
tered pursuant  thereto  on  liay  14, 1908.  De- 
fendant's counsel  thereafter  tfxik  steps  to  set- 
tle a  statement,  of  the  case  preparatory  to 
appealing  to  the  Supreme  Court,  and  on  July 
25, 1908,  ohappUcattonof  plaintilTs  oeunsel, 
an  order  was  made  requiring  defendant  to 
show  cause  why  an  qrder  should  not  be  made 
vacating  and  setting  aside  such  findings  of 
fact,  conc^isiotifs  of  law,  and  order  for  Judg- 
meot,  and  judgment,  and  also  why  plaintiff 
should  not  be  relieved  from  a  portion  of  such 
Btipnlation  of  factB>  or  why  such  stipulation 
of  facts  should  not  be  modified  by  eliminating 
such  portion,  or  wliy  the  parties  should  not 
be  relieved  in  toto  from  such  stipulation.  Up- 
on the  return  of  such  order  to  show  cause, 
and  after  due  hearing,  the  order  complained 
of  was  made  vacating  the  findings,  conclu- 
sions, oHfer  for  Judgment,  and  Judgment.  It 
was  held  that  such  order,  in  so  far  as  It 
vacateS'the  finding*  of  fact,  and  relieves  the 
pnrtles  from  snch  stipulation,  is  appealable 
imder  subdiviBlon-4,t»7225,  Bev.  Codes  1906, 


upon' this  ground  that  it  'nnvolves  fhe  merltB*' 
of  the  action  or  some  part  thereof.  Northern 
Pac.  By.  Co.  v.  Barlow,  126  N.  W.  238,  287,  20 
N.  D.  197,  Ann.  Ca&  1912C,  763. 

AmwMbneAt  of  plmMnm 

The  term  "merits,"  in  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
I  U,  giving  the  right  of  appeal  from  an  or- 
der involving  the  "merits,"  embraces  more 
than  the  questions  of  law  and  fact  constitu- 
ting a  cause  of  action  or  defense,  and,  when- 
ever a  substantial  right  of  a  party  to  an  ac- 
tion material  to  obtaining  a  Judgment  ia  de- 
nied, a  right  of  appeal  lies.  An  order  requir- 
ing plaintiff  to  amend  his  complaint  by  statr 
ing  what  of  the  acts  charged  were  negligent 
and  what  willful  is  appealable.  Lynch  v. 
Spartan  MUls,  44  S.  E.  93,  95.  66  8.  C.  12 
(citing  Blakely  ft  Copeland  v.  Frazier,  11  S. 
C.  122). 

Oluuage  •£  "wmrnm^ 

An  order  granting  a  diange  of  venue  tn 
a  dvil  action  involves  the  merits,  and  is  ap- 
pealable, nndter  Ber.  Oode»  1899,  |  0626^  pro- 
viding that  an  order  is  appealable  when  it 
Involves  the  merits  of  an  action  or  aome  part 
thereof.  Bobertson  Lumber  Co.  r.  Jones*  99 
N.  W.  1062,  18  N.  D.  112  (citing  White  v. 
(}hicago,  M.  ft  St  P.  By.  Cm  41  N.  W.  780,  5 
Dak.  608). 


Where  there  Is  confilcting  evidence  as  to 
a  question  of  ftict  on  which  plaintifre  right  to 
recover  dcfpends,  the  court  may  not  dismiss 
the  case  "on  the  merita"  under  Municipal 
Court  Act  (Laws  1902,  p.  1561,  c.  580,  f  249), 
authorizing  such  dlamissal  whece^  at  the  dose 
of  the  whole  case,  the  court  Is  of  the  opinion 
that  plaintiff  ia  not  entitled  to  recover  aa 
matter  of  law.  Bowen  v.  Farley*  99  N.  Y. 
Supp.  205,  113  Appw  Div.  767. 

Where  a  defendant  is  discharged  because 
there  waa  not  sufficient  evidence  to  hold  him 
for  trials  .that  is  a  "dismissal  on  the  merits" 
within  the  meaning  of  Liquor  Tax  Law,  i 
25.  People  ex  reL  J.  ft  M.  Hoffen  Brewing 
Co.  V.  Clement,  124  N.  Y.  Supp.  102,  106,  139 
App.  Div.  502. 

The  precise  meaning  to  be  given  to  the 
words  "on  the  merits"  in  an  oider  or  Judg- 
ment has  never  been  very  clearly  defined.  It 
has  been  said  that  they  are  to  be  regarded 
aa  referring  to  the  strict  legal  rights  of  the 
parties  as  contradistinguished  from  .mere 
questions  of  practice.  It  is,  however,  not  of 
controlling  importance  whether  or  not  the 
Judgment  is  declared  to  be  on  the  merits; 
the  real  question  being  whether  it  ia  in  fact 
an  adjudication  on  the  merits.  A  judgment 
dismissing  a  complaint  on  demurrer  was  one 
on  the  merits  where  there  was  no  formal  or 
technical  defect  or  omission  in  Uie  complaint 
and  it  was  obvious  that  it  contatned  every 
allegation  necessary  to  establish  a  cause  of 
action  if  the  contract  sued  on  waiT  lawful  and 
valid.   HIractihacliv.  Kltelum,.  SIN.  X.  Supp. 


MERITS 


880 


METAL 


967,  950  40  Mlac  Rep.  806  (citiDf  St  Johns 
▼.  West  IS.  Y.]  4  How.  Prac.  829). 

The  dismissal  of  a  bill  to  set  aside  cer- 
tain tax  bills  for  alleged  illegality  after  hear- 
ing and  the  awarding  of  a  judgmoit  for  costs 
in  favor  of  the  defendant  is  a  judgment  on 
the  merits,  and  is  conclusiTe  against  a  sub- 
sequent attack  on  the  validity  of  the  tax 
bills  in  a  suit  between  the  same  parties. 
Pond  V.  Huling,  101  S.  W.  116,  U7,  125  Mo. 
App.  474. 

Jvdsmemt  oa  €km  pleadings 

A  Judgment  on  the  pleadings  is  conclu- 
sive, if  it  determines  the  merits  of  the  con- 
troversy, as  distinguished  from  the  merits 
of  the  pleadings  attacked,  as  the  term 
"merits'*  is  used  in  Code  av.  Proc.  I  1005, 
providing  that  in  every  case  other  than  those 
specified  in  section  1004  the  judgment  must 
be  rendered  on  the  merits.  Glass  v.  Rasin 
&  Ray  State  Min.  Co.,  00  Pac  753,  764,  85 
Mont  567. 

Under  Code  Civ.  Proa  {  681,  prescribing 
when  an  action  may  be  dismissed  or  a  non- 
suit entered,  and  section  582,  providing  that 
in  every  other  case  judgment  must  be  render- 
ed on  the  merits,  a  judgment  on  the  pleadings 
is  a  judgment  on  the  merits,  so  far  as  its 
conclusiveness  is  concerned.  Railey  v.  iBtna 
Indemnity  Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,.  91  Pac. 
416-419,  6  CaL  App.  740. 


QvasUas  writ  •£ 
A  motion  to  quash  an  alternative  writ  of 
mandamus  on  the  ground  of  its  insufficiency 
does  not  "involve  the  merits,"  within  Code 
Civ.  Proc  §  2075,  providing  that  an  alterna- 
tive writ  cannot  be  quashed  on  motion  for 
any  matter  involving  the  merits.  People  ex 
reL  Ajas  v.  Department  of  Health  of  City  of 
New  York,  123  N.  Y.  Supp.  294,  297,  138  App. 
Div.  559. 

Btrikiiic  o«t  pleadlac 

An  order,  striking  out  most  of  defend- 
ant's answer  embracing  new  matter  relevant 
and  material,  held  an  order  "involving  the 
merits,  and  necessarily  affecting  the  judg- 
ment," within  Rev.  Codes  1905,  i  7081,  includ- 
ing in  the  judgment  roll  "all  orders  and  pa- 
pers in  any  way  involving  the  merits  and 
necessarily  affecting  the  judgment,"  and 
hence  reviewable  on  appeal  from  the  judg- 
ment State  V.  Meyers,  124  N.  W.  701,  705, 
19  N.  D.  804. 

MERRY-GO-ROUND 

One  of  the  distinguishing  features  of  the 
"merry-go-round"  is  the  inspiring  music 
which  it  furnishes.  A  "scenic  railway"  being 
a  railway  on  which  cars  are  run  for  the  pur- 
poses only  of  amusement,  where  the  track  is 
elevated  for  a  considerable  distance  at  the 
place  of  beginning  and  built  on  an  incline, 
the  cars  being  propelled  by  the  force  of 
gravity,  is  not  "8U(^  place  of  public  amuse- 


ment" as  a  ''merry-go^roiind,*'  aad  is  not  pi 
hibited  from  beUig  kept  open  on  Sunday,  1 
Aev.  Codes,  |  6825.  Bx  parte  Hull,  110  Fi 
266, 18  Idaho,  476,  80  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  466. 

MERTON 

See  Statute  of  Merton. 

MESNE 

KESKE  PBO0E88 

"Mesne  process"  is  defined  by  Bouviei 
Law  Dictionary  as  "process  which  is  isBa< 
in  a  suit  between  the  original  and  final  pi 
cess.**    Moredock  v.  Kirby,  118  Fed.  180, 1{ 

KESKE  PBOFIT8 

The  words  "mesne  profits,**  within  ti 
rule  that  ''mesne  profits**  only  and  not  du 
ages  Tor  trespass  are  recoverable,  und 
Code  1896,  {  1555,  in  ejectm^it,  mean  coi 
pensation  for  use  and  occupation.  Hen; 
V.  Davis,  43  South.  122,  123,  149  Ala.  359, : 
Ann,  Cas.  1090  (citing  Prestwood  v.  Watso 
20  South.  600,  111  Ala.  604,  610). 

The  common-law  rule  that^nly  nomb 
damages  are  recoverable  in  ejecbnent  h 
been  modified  by  statute  authorizing  a  reco 
ery  of  "mesne  profits,*'  which,  under  CI 
Code  1896,  f  1555,  are  damages  from  the  coi 
mencement  of  the  tortious  witliholding 
the  time  of  the  verdict,  except  as  modifl( 
by  sections  1535,  1540,  defining  the  liabiU 
of  a  tenant  asserting  his  right  to  possessic 
under  a  lease  and  the  liability  of  a  perse 
holding  under  color  of  title  in  good  fait 
Scott  T.  Coulson,  47  South.  60,  61,  156  A] 
450. 


MESSAGES 

See  Day  Message. 
Sending  a  tel^^ihone 


■eeSend. 


MESSENGER 

1IE88ENGEB  OOMPAirT 

As  common  carriers,  see  Common  Oi 
rier. 

KESSElf  OER  WIRES 

Wires  whidi  run  from  pole  to  pole  b 
mediately  over  telephone  cables  which  tb( 
support  are  denominated  "messenger  wiree 
Cumberland  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co. 
Metsger  (Ky.)  97  a  W.  36,  80^ 

METAL 

See  Composition  Metal;  Expanded  M( 

al;    Unwrought  Metal 
Articles  ot  see  Articles  within  TarJ 

Act 
Manufactures   ot-  toe  Manufactures 

Manufactured  Articleap 
Type  metal,  see  Type^ 


HXTALUO  dBCniT 


381 


HIBDLEMAK 


Wliere  an  electiie  curroit  txaTVls  ito  en- 
tire course  mwn  wives  wlthaut  oaailng  into 
contact  with  tbe  earth,  it  la  known  aa  a  "me- 
talUc  drcBit"  Smith  ▼.  Miaeonri  *  K.  TWe- 
phone  Go^  87  &  W.  71,  78, 118  Mo.  App.  429. 

METAIXIFEB01T8 

Mineral  synonymona,  aee  Mineral  Land. 

METALLOPHONES 

As  mnaical  Inatmrnent,  see  Musical  In- 
stmment. 

METALLURGICAL  COKE 

''Metannrgical  coke"  is  coke  soitaUe  tor 
the  smelting  of  iron.  Hotdikias  ▼.  Bon  Air 
Coal  ft  Iron  Oo^  7S  Aa  1106,  1114^  108 
Me.  84. 

METHOD 

See  Ben<3i  Metliod;   Bvainesi  Methods; 
Gatalogoe  Syatem  or  Metliod. 

METHYL  ALCOHOL 

"Methyl  alcohol"  ia  obtained  by  the  dla- 
tiUation  of  wood,  and  is  the  "wood  alcohol" 
of  commerce.  People  v.  Bowen,  74  N.  E.  488, 
4d3, 182  N.  T.  1  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  Webeter'a  International  Diet). 

METtORITE 

Aa  property,  aee  Beal  Property. 

MEXICAN  ONYX 

Dntlahle  aa  onyx,  see  Onyx 

MFG. 

The  letters  "Mfjff.**  are  an  abbreTiation 

of  the  word  manufacturing  and  a  corporate 
signature  onploying  such  letten  instead  of 
the  word  ''manufacturing"  is  sufficient  8el- 
berllng  ▼.  MiUer,  6»  N«  B.  800,  80%  207  UL 
448. 

MICANITE 

'^Micantte**  is  a  trade-name  glyen  to  a 
sabstttnte  for  mica*  which  haa  established 
for  Itself  a  recognized  place  in  the  electrical 
art  It  is  cheaper,  more  uniform  as  to  di- 
electric strength,  has  a  less  possibility  of 
flaws,  can  be  easily  molded  or  cut  so  that 
It  can  be  had  in  required  sizes  larger  than 
mica.  Mica  Insulator  Co.  t.  Union  Mica  Go., 
137  Fed.  838^  033. 

MICROPHONE  TRANSMIHER 

Every  "microphone  tranamitter«"  aa  ocun- 
rnonly  understood  in  the  telephonic  art,  is  an 
bistrument  IutIi^;  carbon  electrodes  in  loose 
or  feeble  contact     Bat  a  tranamitter  may 


stiU  be  a  microphone  without  having  carbon 
electrodes^  provided  the  electrodes  are  of  sold 
material,  and  so  capable  ef  embodying  mi- 
crophonic action.  American  Bell  TeL  Co.  v. 
National  TeL  Mfg.  Co.,  110  Fed.  803,  808»  06 
a  a  A.  423. 

MIDDLE 


The  western  boundary  line  of  Tennessee, 
dedared  and  fixed  by  treatiea  and  legislatiTe 
enactments  to  be  "the  middle  of  the  Missis- 
sippi river,"  means  a  line  along  tlie  river  bed 
equidistant  from  the  visible,  defined,  and 
substantially  established  banks  confining  the 
waters  on  either  side,  and  does  not  mean  the 
center  of  that  part  of  the  river  wliich  is  deep- 
est and  constitutes  the  channel  of  commerce. 
This  construction  has  become  a  rule  of  prop- 
erty and  should  not  be  distuiiied.  State  v. 
Munice  Pulp  Co.,  104  &  W.  487,  441,  110 
Tenn.  47. 

In  international  law  and  by  usage  of  Eu- 
ropean nations,  the  term  "middle  of  the 
stream*'  as  applied  to  a  navigable  river  ia 
tbe  same  as  the  middle  of  the  channel  of  su<^ 
stream.  State  of  Louisiana  v.  State  of  B£ia- 
sifisippi,  26  Sup.  Ct  408,  421,  202  U.  S.  1, 
50  L.  Ed.  013  (quoting  Iowa  v.  Illinois,  13 
Sup.  Ct  280,  147  U.  &  1,  87  L.  Ed.  55). 

The  middle  of  the  main  channel  of  the 
river  is  what  ia  meant  by  the  words  "the 
middle  channel  of  said  river"  in  the  act  of 
February  14,  I860,  admitting  Oregon  into 
the  Union,  with  the  Columbia  river  as  its 
northern  boundary.  State  of  Washington  v. 
Oregon,  20  Sup.  Ct  681,  682,  214  U.  &  206, 
63  L.  Ed.  069. 

The  middle  line  of  a  nonnavigable  river 
at  low-water  mark  is  not  the  center  of  the 
channel*  wliich  meana  the  continuous  course 
of  deepest  water,  but  is  a  line  equally  dia> 
tant  from  all  points  on  the  oi^oaite  banks  at 
right  angles  with  the  thread  at  low-water 
mark.  MlcelU  v.  Andrus,  120  Pac.  787,  740, 
61  Or.  7a 

MIDDIAMAir 

A  middleman  Is  a  broker  whose  dutiea 
are  limited  by  hia  contract  to  fiuding  and  pro- 
curing a  purchaser  able,  willing,  and  ready 
to  accept  his  clioitfs  terms  or  to  effect  a 
transaction  with  hia  client  on  any  terms  sat- 
isfactory to  botli,  the  t^m  "middleman**  be* 
ing  merely  descriptive  of  the  nature  of  the 
contract  of  employment,  he  being  in  no  fidu- 
ciary rdatlon  to  hia  principal  nor  under  any 
obligation  not  to  receive  compensation  from 
the  opposite  party  to  the  transactioD,  while 
a  broker,  in  addition  to  the  duties  of  a  mid- 
dleman, ia  employed  to  use  discretionary  au- 
thority for  the  benefit  of  his  employer  and  to 
act  for  his  best  interests,  and  therefore  may 
not  accept  a  secret  double  employment  or 
commissions  from  both  parties,  Langford 
V.  Issenhuth,  134  N.  W.  880,  803,  28  S.  D. 
461. 


MIDDLmOS 


882 


i'i  'i-.i^fllifc    -''•■••'' 


MIDDLINGS 

See  Wheat  Middlings. 

"AflddUngs"  are  the  parts  of  a  kernel  of 
grain  next  to  the  skin  of  the  berry,  which, 
by  the  later  milling  processes,  are  reground 
so  as  to  form  a  very  fine  floor,  with  larger 
and  more  uniform  granules  than  that  from 
the  first  grinding;  also,  the. coarser  particles 
resulting  from  milling,  Intermingled  with 
foreign  matter  used  for  stock  food.  State  y. 
Weller,  86  N.  B.  761,  762,  171  Ind.  68^ 

MIDSHIPMAN 

See  Oadet  Midshipman. 

MIDWIFE 

Both  medical  and  popular  lezicograph: 
era  define  ''midwife"  as  a  female  obstetrician. 
Commonwealth  y.  Pom,  82  N.  B.  81,  196 
Mass.  826»  17  L.  B.  ▲•  (N.  S.)  94,  IS  Ann.  Cas. 
569. 

MIDWXFEBT 

Both  medical  and  popular  lexicographers 
define  "midwifery"  as  the  practice  of  obstet- 
rics. Commonwealth  v.  Pom,  82  N.  B.  31, 
196  Mass.  326, 17  L.  B,  A.  (N.  S.)  94, 18  Ann. 
Cas.  569. 

MIGHT 

"The  word  'might,*  as  defined  by  Web- 
ster, denotes  not  alone  possibility,  but  also 
ability  and  capability.  *GouId'  denotes  abil^ 
Ity  and  capability.**  Hence  instractions 
which  used  "might**  and  "could"  interchange- 
ably held  not  erroneous^  as  allowing  the  jury 
to  enter  the  realm  of  conjecture.  Nelson  y. 
Boston  ft  Montana  OonsoL  Copper  &  Silyer 
Min.  Co.,  88  Pac  785,  786,  35  Mont  228. 

A  warning  given  by  an  officer  to  one 
in  his  custody,  which  was  in  the  usual  form, 
with  the  exception  of  the  use  of  the  word 
"might"  instead  of  "would  or  could,'*  the 
officer  telling  the  one  in  custody  that  any 
statement  he  might  make  "noighf*  be  used 
a!gatnst  him,  was  sufficient  Garrett  y.  State, 
91  S.  W.  677,  49  Tex.  Cr.  B.  235. 

In  an  action  for  assault  on  a  passenger 
by  fellow  passengers,  in  an  instruction  stat- 
ing the  duty  of  the  conductor  to  protect  the 
party  assaulted  if  he  "anticipated  that  such 
assault  might  be  made,"  it  was  not  error  to 
use  the  word  "might**  instead  of  "would,** 
since  the  law  requires  that  a  carrier  use  the 
highest  degree  of  diligence  to  protect  passen- 
gers from  assault  which  may  be  reasonably 
anticipated,  and  the  word  "might"  is  used  in 
plaoe  of  "may^  when  referring  to  past  time 
or  a  past  eyent  Louisyille  By.  Co.  y.  Well- 
ington, 126  S.  W.  970,  371,  137  Ky.  719. 

An  instruction  delhiing  the  term  "feloni- 
otisly**  as  an  intent-  to  commit  a  felony,  or 
an  intent  to  commit  a  wrongiul  act  whldi 


"might**  result  in  thecomfflfssJbn'of  a  fefloDj^, 
was  errdneouB,  as. the  jury  Wa8.itt  effect  told 
that  a  p^non  is  presumed  by  law  to  Intend 
all  the  possible,  raither  than  tbe  reasim- 
aUy  probable,  consequences  of  Ills  yoluntary 
wrongful  act  State  y.  Denny,  117  N.  Wi 
869,  870,  17  N.  D.  519. 

Acts  1905,  p.  579»  c  167,  I  123,  proyides 
that  any  person  ag^ieved  by  any  decision  of 
the  county  commissioners  in  any  proceeding 
relating  to  highways  may  appeal  therefroofr, 
etc.,  and  that  such  appeal  shall  be  tried  de 
noyo,  and  may  be  had  as  to  any  issue  tried, 
"or  that  might  haye  been  tried,*'  before  the 
county  board.  .Hekl,  that  the  last  clauae 
only  authorizes  the  trial  of  such  Issues  on 
appeal  as  might  haye  been  tried. under  is- 
sues made  before  the  board*  and  does  not 
authorifle  tJ^  trial  of  iasu^  not  presented  to 
the  board.  iBtna  life  Ins.  y.  Jone8»  89.  N. 
B.  871,  872,  874,  173  Ind.  149. 

MIOHTT  FAST 

While  the  expression  "^i^ty  fast"  is  a 
term  of  relatlye  meaning,  when  applied  to 
the  speed  of  a  street  car  it  is  sufficiently 
definite  to  enable  the  jury  to  s^y  yfh^her  or 
not  the  car  was  traveling  in  excess  of  seyen 
miles  an  hour.  In  an  action  against  a  street 
railroad  for  injuries  to  a  passenger,  eyidence 
that  the  car  was  going  'Eighty  fast"  was 
sufficient  to  render  it  error  to  exclude  an 
qpdinance  limiting  the  rate  of  speed  of  a 
street  car  to  seyen  miles  an  hour.  Moore  y. 
Northern  Texas  Traction  Co.,  95  &  W*.  662, 
653,  41  T^  Oiy.  App.  583. , 

MIKE 

"Mike**  i^  no^  nniyersaUy  recognised  ab- 
breyiation  of  "Michaiel/'  but  is,  strictly  speak- 
ing, a  mere  diminutiye  or  nickname.  -Ohl* 
mann  y.  Clarkson  Sawmill  Co.,  120  S.  W. 
1155»  115S»  222  Mo.  62,  28  L.  B.  A.  (Iff.  8.) 
482, 138  Am.  St  Bep.  606. 

MILCH  COW 

Under  Sayles*  Ann.  Ciy.  St  1897,  art 
2395,  which  exempts  to  every  family  from 
forced  sale  "five  milch  cows  and  tlseti:  oalyeii,^ 
heifers  which  had  neyer  been  milked  but 
which  were  with  calf  wh^  the  leyy  was 
made,  and  which  the  debtor,  who  was  the 
head  of  the  family,  was  keeping  ias  his  mildt 
cows,  are  exempt  Patterson  y.  Bhglish  (Tex.) 
142  S.  W.  la 

WILE 

See  Bnglish  Geographical  Miles;  Knot; 
Marine  Miles. 

"The  statute,  or  English,  'mile*  wai 
adopted  as  the  standard  of  land  measurement 
in  the  thirty-fifth  year  of  the  reign  of  Que^ 
BUzabeth,  1593.  *  •  •  The  statute  "mil^ 
measures  5,280  feet  on  the  land.**  In  the  Mus' 


vtmw 


MILIT^BT  RESEBVATION 


ooBgiurGraiil;  by  tbe  ooiiiidl  ot  Plymouth  in 
Deyon,  England,  made  l>6twe6n  1620  and 
1935,afler  tlie  Inaugoratioa. ot  tbe  geograph- 
ical OS  marine  mile,  granting  oectaln  land, 
etc,  within  three  mile^  of  the  mainland,  the 
three-mJle  limit  is  to.  be  measured  by  the 
geographical  or  marine  mile  or  Imot,  and  not 
by  the  statute  "mUe."  Lazell  t.  Boardman, 
99  AtL  97,  99,  103  Mo*  292,  13  Ann.  €as.  673 
(citing  Rockland*  M.  D.  &  S.  Steamboat  Ok 
T.  Fessenden,  8  AtL  550,  79  Me.  140) . 

In  a  prosecution  under  Code  1907,  1 7737, 
for.taUure  .to  work  on  a  public  road  after 
legal  notice  giren  to  one  living  ''withtn 
three  miles"  thereof,  the  distance,  in  view  of 
Gode  1907,  I  6804,  means  on  an  air  line, 
wbere  thm!e  are  no  barriers  between  impass- 
able by  ordinary  means,  and  not  a  computa- 
tion of  the  distance  according  to  the  practic* 
able  and  usual  way  of  travel.  Howell  y. 
State,  54  South.  642,  643»  171  Ala.  62. 

MILEAGE 

As  Fees,  see  Fees. 
As  salary,  see  Salary. 

Mileage  is  compensation  allowed  to  pub- 
lic officers  for  their  expenses  while  tra,veling 
on  public  business.  Board  of  Ck>m'rs  of  West- 
on County  V.  Blakely  (Wyo.)  123  Pac.  72,  77. 

Under  Bums'  Ann.  St.  1908,  |  7335, 
whl<±i  proyideci^  th^t  a  sheriff  shall  tax  and 
charge  the  fees  provided  by  law  on  account 
of  services  performed  by  him,  the  fees  and 
amounts  so  charged  to  be  designated  ''sher- 
iff 8  costs,"  which  shall  be  the  property  of  the 
county,  and  section  240  which  provides  that 
words  and  phrases  used  in  a  statute  shall  be 
taken  in  their  plain,  ordinary,  or  usual  sense, 
but  that  technical  words  and  phrases  shall 
be  understood  according  to  their  technical 
import  unless  such  a  construction  would  be 
repugnant  to  the  legislative  intent  or  to  the 
context  of  the  statutev  the  amounts  diarged 
and  collected  by  a  sheriff  as  statutory  mile- 
age In  the'  service  of  writs,  summonctes,  notLc^ 
es,  etc,  are  to  be  considered  as  fees  provided 
by  law  on  account  of  service  in  the  Olscharge 
of  official  duties,  and  not  ais  a  reimbursemmt 
to  him  for  expenses  inoidentally.  incurred  in 
the  service  of  such  Writs,  so  that  when  col- 
lected they  belong  to  the  county,. and  not  to 
the  sheriff  persoilally.  Roberts. v.  Board  of 
Com'rs  of  Brown  Oounty  (Ind.)/  99  N.  B. 

MILEAGE  BOOK 

*<A  *mUeage  book'  is  a  contract  of  car- 
riage having  attached  thereto  coupons,  one 
for  every  mUe;  ea^  coupon  being. in  two 
parts,  one  part  for  the  i  passenger's  fare,  the 
other  for  his  baggage^  When  the  baggage  is 
tbecked,  the  baggage  portion  of  every  cou- 
pon according  to  the  distance  is  torn  off,  and 
no  more  baggasB  can  be  checked  upon  the 
mileage  book,  nnteas.  the  remajt^der  ^  thes^ 


coupons^  representing  the  carriage  of  th^  paii* 
senger,  has  be^i  detached."  One  who  leaves 
trunks  in  a  baggageroom  by  permission  of  the 
baggage  clerk  upon  a  statement  thjat  he  will 
depart  on  a  train  the  next  day,  and  will  then 
^eck  them,  cannot  hold  the  railway  com- 
pany responsible  as  a  carrier  of  baggage  for 
the  destruction  of  the  trunks  by  fire,  though 
he  holds  a  mileage  book  good  for  transpor- 
tation on  the  railway  company's  trains. 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Rosenheim  &  Sons,  58  S. 
E«  81,  82,  1  Qa*  ApPu  766. 

MHiEAGE  RATE 

See  Ck)ntinuou8  Mileage  Rate. 

MILITARY 

mhiItart  EXPEDinoic  or  enter- 

FRISE 

The  term  "military  expedition,"  as  used 
in  Rev.  St  {  5286,  denouncing  the  organiza- 
tion of  a  military  enterprise  in  the  United 
States  to  be  carried  on  against  any  foreign 
prince  or  state,  does  not  contemplate  an  ex- 
pedition or  enterprise  in  matters  of  pleasure, 
commerce,  or  business,  of  a  civil  nature,  un- 
attended by  the  design  of  an  attack,  inva- 
sion, or  conquest,  but  rather  a  hostile  inten- 
tion connected  with  the  act  of  beginning  or 
setting  on  f got  the  expedition  or  enterprise. 
United  States  v.  Ybahez,  53  Fed.  536,  537. 

M iutart  purpose 

Armories  are  primarily  intended  for 
''military  purposes/'  but  the  term  '^military 
purposes"  must  be  understood  to  comprehend 
all  sudi  uses  as  may  be  said  to  be  incidental 
to  the  general  purpose  to  conserve  the  mili- 
tary needs  of  the  regimentail  organization. 
Military  balls  and  other  entertainments  which 
are  frequently  given  at  armories  cannot  be 
said  to  be  for  "military  purposes,*'  except  in 
the  sense  that  they  contribute  to  the  interest 
and  good  feeling  of  the  members  of  the  mili- 
tary organization.  In  that  sense  they  are 
clearly  consistent  with  the  general  pu'iposes 
for  which  the  armory  buildings  were  intend- 
ed. Oh  the  other  hand,  an  armory  cannot 
properly  be  devoted  to  a  purely  commercial 
use  in  disregard  of  military  needs.  Hamill 
V.  Dungan,  68  Ati,  1096, 1097, 74  N.  J.  Eg.  251. 

ICZUTART  RESERVATION 

In  creating  the  Lake  Superior  land  dis- 
trict in  1847,  CSongress  reserved  from  the 
lands  open  for  sale  certain  lands  for  school 
purposes,  and  also  such  reservations  as  the 
President  should  deem  necessary  for  public 
purposes.  Pursuant  to  the  authority  so  giv- 
en, the  President,  in  ordw  to  have  time  to 
ascertain  what  lands  were  necessary  for  pub- 
lic purposes,  reserved  a  number  of  tracts 
temporarily,  one  of  which,  consisting  of  half 
a  township,  included  Ft.  Brady  on  St  Mary's 
liver,,  together  with  the  reservation  on  which 
itt  stopd,  ^and  als<;i  a  small  tract  previously 


MILITABY  fiOAB 


384 


UIXJL 


I 


reserved  to  the  Indians  by  treaty  for  a  camp, 
together  with  other  lands.  By  a  subsequent 
execntive  order  In  1852,  the  reservations 
were  more  narrowly  defined,  and  all  the  re- 
maining lands  so  temporarily  reserved,  "ex- 
cept the  military  reservation  at  Pt  Brady,** 
were  released  from  reservation.  The  Indian 
right  was  extinguished  by  treaty  in  1855. 
Held,  that  the  exception  in  the  order  of  re- 
lease of  the  "military  reservation  at  Ft 
Brady"  Included  only  the  original  reserva- 
tion as  defined  prior  to  1847,  and  not  the  at- 
tire temporary  reservation  of  that  year 
which  was  the  contemporaneous  construc- 
tion of  the  order  by  the  department,  so  that 
In  any  event  the  Indian  reservation  became 
public  lands,  subject  to  disposition  by  the 
government  after  the  treaty  of  1855,  and  a 
patent  subsequently  issued  therefor  is  valid. 
United  States  v.  Ghandler-Dunbar  Water 
Power  Ck).,  152  Fed.  25,  34,  81  O.  C.  A.  221. 

MXUTABT  -ROAD 

"The  only,  'military  roads'  belonging  to 
the  United  States  within  the  states  are  in 
the  military  reservations.**  Pensacola  TeL 
Co.  V.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  96  U.  S.  1«  17,  24 
L.  Ed.  708. 

mUTABT  8ERVXOE 

See  Actual  Military  Servioa 
See,  also,  Service. 

MILITIA 

See  Organization  of  Militia. 

The  "militia"  of  the  state  is  an  arm  of 
the  state  government,  and  is  in  no  sense 
such  a  county  institution  or  establishment  as 
that  any  particular  county  can,  exclusively, 
be  required  to  Impose  taxes  for  its,  or  any 
part  of  Its,  maintenance.  State  ex  rel.  Mil- 
ton V.  Dickenson,  33  South.  514,  517,  44  Fla. 
628,  60  L.  B.  A.  539,  1  Ann.  Cas.  122. 

MILK 

See  Condensed  Skimmed  Milk;   Impure 

Milk. 
Dealer  in  milk,  see  Dealer. 

A  product  of  a  patented  chemical  process 
for  treatment  of  milk,  called  "concentrated 
milk,"  diluted  by  water,  does  not  constltutft 
"milk,"  within  Bev.  Laws,  a  56,  f  55,  prohib- 
iting the  keepini^  for  sale  of  milk  to  whidi 
water  has  been  added.  Commonwealth  v. 
Boston  White  Cross  Milk  Co.,  95  N.  B.  86, 
87,  209  Mass.  80,  Ann.  Caa  1912B,  386. 

A  provision  of  a  sanitary  code  adopted 
by  a  city  board  of  health  that  no  owner,  les- 
see, or  occupant  of  any  restaurant,  etc, 
which  shall  purchase  milk  or  cream  from 
any  person  or  corporation  not  having  obtain- 
ed a  license  as  therein  provided,  shall  use, 
sell,  or  dispose  of  any  milk,  cream,  or  ice 
cream  without  obtaining  a  license,  only  re- 


quires a  person  setting  loe'cream  to  obtain 
license  where  It  1a  made  from  mUk  or  area 
purchased  from  afi  naUietenma  person  or  oo 
poration,  and  sot  where  the  ioe  cream  ItM 
Js  so  purchased,  slnee,  wiiile  '^ce  cream'* 
mostly  cream  or  ml&.  It  is  a  manufiactarc 
article  with  other  ingredients,  and  is  not  co 
ei*ed  by  the  term  "milk  or  oream."  Syracni 
Ice  Cream  Ca  v.  City  of  Cortland,  138  N.  ^ 
Supp.  388,  888,  153  App.  Dlv.  466. 

MILL 

See  Cotton  Seed  Oil  MIU;  Public  Mill 
Boiler  Mill;  Saw  Mill;  Spinning  Mil 
Water  Mill. 

The  word  "mUl"  has  two  deOnitioiis, 
primary  and  secondary:  (1)  A  complicate 
engine  or  madilne  for  grinding  and  redudu 
to  fine  particles  grain,  fruit,  or  other  sal 
stance,  or  for  perfonning  other  operatloi 
by  means  of  wheels  and  a  circular  motion  a 
a  gristmill  for  grain,  a  coffee  mill,  dder  mil 
and  bark  mill.  The  original  puri>oae  of  mill 
was  to  comminute  grain  for  food,  but  tfa 
word  "mill"  is  now  extended  to  engines  c 
machines  moved  by  water  or  steam  for  cai 
rying  on  many  other  purposes,  as  <dl  miUi 
sawmills,  slitting  mills,  bark  mills,  fullin 
mills,  etc  (2)  The  house  or  building  tha 
contains  the  machinery  for  grinding.  Inhal 
itants  of  Norway  v.  Willis,  72  AtL  733,  73^ 
105  Me.  54  (citing  State  t.  livermore,  44  f 
H.  886,  387). 

The  word  "miir  does  not  ordinarily  li 
dlcate  a  place  or  building  in  which  goods  ai 
stored  for  hire.  McBeynolds  v.  People,  82  f 
B.  945,  917,  230  111.  623. 

Where  a  pHdntifl  purdbased  of  defeat 
ant  a  sawmill  and  all  machinery  connecte 
therewith  located  on  certain  land,  reservln 
everything  on  the  land,  except  timber,  saa 
mill,  and  machinery,  the  term  "sawmill"  wa 
limited  to  a  machine  constructed  for  the  pai 
pose  of  sawing  logs,  and  therefore  did  no 
include  the  shed  covering  the  mill.  A  saw 
mill  is  a  machine  for  sawing  logs,  whetbe 
or  not  it  is  accompanied  by  a  shed,  and  i 
shed  covering  such  a  mill  is  not  a  part  o 
the  sawmiU,  but  is  a  part  of  the  real  estat 
to  which  it  la  attached.  A  saw  is  "a  too 
for  cutting,"  and  a  "mill"  is  "a  oiacfaine  fo: 
grinding."  According  to  the  standard  led 
cographers,  the  first  meaning  of  "mill"  is  i 
machine  or  device  for  grinding,  cutting,  etc 
The  particular  purpose  for  which  it  is  dc 
signed  is  usually  designated  by  a  prefix,  mS 
as  sawmill,  gristmill,  etc.  The  term  "mill' 
necessarily  carries  with  it  the  idea  of  a  ma 
chine,  device^  or  tool,  but  it  does  not  neces 
sarily  convey  with  it  the  idea  of  a  sbed  oi 
house.  l%e  term  '^ill"  Is  frequency  use^ 
to  designate  not  only  the  machine  used  fei 
grinding,  cotthig,  etc.,  but  also  In  a  generaJ 
and  comprehensive  sense  to  designate  tiM 
house  or  shed  wh^e  BU<di  machinery  may  Im 


HItili- 


MiiiL  saxu 


Id  operation,  and  many  lezlcograpli^rs  glT» 
this  as  the  secondary  meaning  of  the  word. 
Alexander  t.  Be^man  Lumber  Oo^  96  S.  W. 
449.  451,  78  Ark.  169  (dtlnff  ISiesauras  Diet 
Eng.  Language;  Woi^cest  Diet;  Oent  Diet; 
Webst  Int  Diet). 

A  plant  tor  mixing  the  materials  nsed  In 
making  asphalt  payemeat  conalating  of  ma- 
diinery  mounted  on  an  open  or  flat  car,  mov- 
ed from  place  to  place  as  required,  is  not  a 
'factory,  mill,  or  workshop"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  Laws  Wash.  1906,  e.  84,  as  amended 
Iqr  Laws  1907,  c.  205,  providing  for  the  pro- 
tection and  health  of  eraployte  in  factories, 
mills,  and  worksibopB,  and  requiring  the  box- 
ing or  guarding  of  machinery  and  shafting 
therein,  etc  Casey  ▼.  Barber  Asphalt  Pav- 
ing Co.,  192  red.  482,  487. 

A  gasoline  engine,  used,  in  connection 
with  machinery  consisting  of  belts,  pulleys, 
and  cogwheels,  to  pump  water  through  pipes 
to  supply  the  inhabitants  of  a  dty,  is  not  a 
"manufacturing  establishment"  or  a  "miU,** 
within  the  meaning  of  these  terms  in  section 
4682,  Gen.  St  1909.  Wind  Blver  Lumber  Go. 
T.  Frankfbrt  Marine  Accident  dc  Plate  Glass 
Ins.  Go.,  196  Fed.  840,  845,  116  O.  C.  A.  160; 
Ward  T.  City  of  Norton,  122  Pac.  881,  882, 
86  Kan.  906. 

Under  section  5  of  the  act  entitled  "An 
act  concerning  private  corporations,"  as 
amended  in  1873,  which  provides  tat  the  crea- 
tion of  private  corporations  far  the  conver- 
sion and  disposal  of  agricultural  products 
by  means  of  "mills,"  etc.  (Laws  1873,  pp.  137, 
139,  subd.  86),  a  corporation  may  be  created 
"to  build  and  maintain  a  flouring  mill.** 
Glnrlck  v.  Patrons'  Mill  Co.,  21  Kan.  61,  63. 

The  title  of  the  act  of  1878  (dien.  St 
1873,  c.  44;  Comp.  SL  1911,  e.  57),  "An  act 
relating  to  mUls  and  mllldams,"  is  sufllcient- 
ly  broad  to  admit  of  legislation  in  regard  to 
mills  of  all  kinds  that  are  of  pubUc  utility 
and  having  "machinery  to  be  propelled  by 
water.**  Lucas  v.  Ashland  Light,  Mill  &  Pow- 
er Co^  188  N.  W.  761,  768,  92  Neb.  660l 

As  pnUio  plaoe 

See  Public  Place. 

Am  pvlilio  ue 
See  Public  Use  (In  Bmlnent  Domain). 

miiL  AXB  ITS  OOITTBIITS 

Where  a  contract  between  a  railroad 
company  and  plaintiff  authorised  the  latter 
to  erect  a  stave  mill  on  the  right  of  way 
and  exempted  the  railroad  company  from 
liability  for  the  destruction  of  the  "mUl  and 
its  contents"  by  fire,  the  railroad  company  is 
not  liable  for  damages  to  staves  pUed  on  the 
right  of  way  near  the  mill,  where  It  appsar- 
ed  that  the  use  of  a  part  of  the  right  of  iray 
was  necessary  for  the  plUng  of  the  staves; 
the  staves  on  the  right  of  way  appurtenant 
to  the  mill  fhlllng  under  the  designation  of 

8  Wn&&  FJ2u  Seb.— 26 


"mm  and  its  eontents.**  dndnnatl.  If.  O.  4 
T.  P.  By.  Co.  V.  Saulsbury,  90  S.  W.  684,  627, 
116  Tenn.  402,  5  Ann.  Oaa.  744. 

ifzu.  Buxu>ixa 

See  Planing  Mill  BuUding. 

imx  PBXvn.£GS 

"BOll  privilege,*'  as  contained  In  an  as- 
sessment of  property  for  taxes  described  as 
"the  mlU  privilege  at  Salmon  Falls,**  meant 
the  land  and  the  dam  situated  as  they  were, 
with  the  eapadty  to  hold  the  water  of  the 
stream  and  create  power,  but  not  the  power 
or  the  water.  Saoo  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Bux- 
ton, 56  AtL  914,  96  Me.  295. 

MILX.  BAOB 

As  used  in  a  deed  conveying  a  certain 
piece  of  land  for  a  "mill  race,*'  and  also  a 
"privilege  of  a  road  to  cross  the  said  race 
near  said  gristmill  to  the  land  thus  describ- 
ed,** may  be  construed  to  mean  either  the 
head  or  the  tall  race ;  parol  evidence  being 
admissible  to  show  what  was  meant.  Plaee 
V.  Proctor  (Pa.)  2  Penny.  264,  269. 

MILX.  SEAT 

The  word  "mill  seat"  la  synonymous  with 
''mill  site*'  and  means  where  the  mill  sits* 
''A  'mill  site'  comprehends  not  only  the  site 
of  the  mill  building  but  also  the  water  pow- 
er connected  therewith  for  milling  purposes.** 
The  granting  of  a  mill  site  conveys  by  im- 
plication the  water  power  and  the  right  to 
maintain  a  dam  for  the  beneficial  appropria- 
tion of  the  water.  State  v.  Sutton,  51  S.  B. 
1012,  139  N.  C.  574  (quoting  in  part  definition 
in  Miller  v.  Alliance  Ins.  Co.,  7  Fed.  651; 
Curtiss  V.  Smith,  85  Conn.  15S). 

As  used  In  Laws  1906^  p.  1022,  c.  824,  pro- 
vides that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  per- 
son to  hedge  or  fish  with  traps  in  the  waters 
of  a  certain  creek  between  the  mouth  of  the 
creek  and  the  "J.  mill  seat  in  L.  county," 
the  word  "mill  seat"  was  synonymous  with 
"mill  site,"  and  included  the  millhouse,  dam, 
and  appurtenances  used  for  operating  the 
mill  by  water  power  and  the  ground  on  which 
they  stood.  State  v.  Sutton,  51  a  B.  1012, 
189  N.  C.  574. 

Under  Laws  1905^  p.  1022,  c.  824,  a  per- 
son, though  entitled  to  maintain  wire  fences 
or  hedges  on  the  sheeting  of  the  mill  under  the 
roof  of  the  millhouse  to  catch  fish  coming 
out  of  the  pond,  was  not  entitled  to  maintain 
such  hedges  or  fences  in  ditches  below  the 
millhouse  &nd  on  both  sides  of  the  mlllrace, 
by  which  fish  coming  up  from  the  mouth  of 
the  creek  would  be  stopped  before  reaching 
the  dam  and  mill  seat;  and  this,  though 
the  owner  of  the  millhouse  also  owned  the 
land  for  75  yards  below  the  mill.  State  v» 
Sutton,  51  S.  IB.  1002,  1013,  189  N.  Q  574. 


muxshep 

An    Insuranee    policy 
"piled  In  mlU  buildings  on 


lumber 
under  mill 


iSlLX.  SITE 


HINS 


flIiedB  and  in  sheds  adjoining  to  said  mill 
building:"  The  ''mill  sheds"  where  lumber 
was  piled  were  situated  some  distance  from 
the  milL  The  roof  of  the  mill  itself  extended 
out  10  or  ,12  feet  over  the  tracks  on  either 
side  of  the  mill  to  protect  the  lumber  and 
men  loading  or  unloading  cars.  It  was  un- 
disputed that  these  projections  or  sheds  were 
erected  sihjply  to  cover  the  tracks,  were  open 
at  the  ends  and  sides,  and  were  not  intended 
to  be  used  as  lumber  sheds.  Held,  that  the 
words  '*mill  sheds"  in  the  policy  should  be 
construed  as  indicating  the  sheds  located 
some  distance  from  the  mill,  and  not  those 
projecting  from  the  building,  and  the  quoted 
clause  of  the  policy  should  be  construed  as 
though  it  read,  *'On  lumber  in  mill  build- 
ing; on  lumber  on  cars;  on  lumber  under 
mill  sheds  and  on  lumber  in  sheds  adjoining 
to  said  mill  building."  Wolverine  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Palatine  Ins.  00.,  102  N.  W.  901,  002, 
130  Mich.  432. 

XHiI.  SITE 

Biill  seat  synonymous,  see  Mill  Seat 

While  chapter  184,  Laws  1862,  limiting 
the  time  for  bringing  actions  for  damages  for 
flowing  lands  by  the  maintenance  of  mill- 
dams,  applies  only  to  mllldams  in  the  proper 
and  strict  sense  of  that  word,  and  although 
a  dam  which  Is  part  of  and  necessary  to  a 
general  scheme  for  the  improvement  of  the 
navigation  of  a  river,  so  as  to  make  it  a 
public  highway,  is  not  a  ''mllldam,"  although 
the  power  created  thereby  is  used  to  operate 
mills,  a  dam  erected  to  create  power  to  oper- 
ate mills,  which  power  is  used  exclusively  for 
that  purpose,  is  a  ''mllldai^,"  although  the 
ownership  of  the  dam  and  of  the  mills  may 
be  in  different  persons.  Green  Bay  dc  Missis- 
sippi Canal  Oo.  v.  Telulah  Paper  Co.,  122  N. 
W.  1062,  1065,  140  Wis.  417  (citing  Arimond 
V.  Qreen  Bay  &  Mississippi  Canal  Co.,  85  Wis. 
41). 

Mnxnro 

The  term  •'milling"  is  SEynonymous  with 
*'manuAicturing."  Lucas  v.  Ashland  Light, 
Mill  ft  Power  Co.,  138  N.  W.  761,  763,  02  Neb. 
660  (quoting  Lambom  v.  Bell,  32  Pa&  080,  18 
Colo.  840,  20  L.  R  A.  240. 

MILIJNO  IN  TRAKSIT 

"Milling  in  transit"  refers  to  cases  where 
freight  is  shipped  a  long  distance,  and  the 
carrier  will  at  his  own  oost  defray  the  ex- 
pense of  its  change  in  form  en  route,  be- 
cause of  the  easier  handling  in  the  more  com- 
pact shape.  Under  Laws  1800,  p.  301,  c.  164^ 
i  13,  providing  that  any  carrier  charg^j^;  one 
person  more  than  another  for  the  same  serv- 
ice is  guilty  of  discrimination,  a  railroad 
company  carrying  raw  material  to  factories 
cannot  charge  a  factory  which  agrees  to  ship 
the  manufactured  product  by  the  same  road 
less  for  the  same  service  than  It  charges  a 


factory  whl<di  will  make  no  sudti  agreement; 
the  carrier  not  being  in  a  position  to  justi^ 
under  "milling  in  transit"  Hilton  Lumber 
Ca  V.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.,  48  S.  B. 
813,  816,  136  N.  C.  470, 1  Ann.  C^as.  62. 

MILLINERY 
muxinert  abtioles 

Dutiable  as  articles  in  part  of  metal, 
see  Articles  Within  Tariff  Act 

imxnfEBT  ORNAMEHTS 

Not  dutiable  as  articles  commonly  known 
as  jewelry,  see  Articles  Within  Tariff 
Act 

MIMEOGRAPH  COMPLAINT 

A  "mimeograph  complaint"  may  be  de- 
scribed as  a  form  of  complaint  applicable  in 
a  general  way  to  a  particular  class  of  cases. 
It  is  therefore  nothing  more  than  a  blank 
which,  before  it  can  be  of  service  in  a  special 
instance^  must  be  properly  filled  out  Berus 
V.  New  York  City  Ry.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  Bupp. 
748,  740,  62  Misc.  Rep.  181. 

MIND 

See  Disposing  Mind  and  Memory;  Meet- 
ing of  Minds;  Sound  Mind  and  Mem- 
ory; Testamentary  Mind;  Unsound 
Mind. 

Distress  of  mind,  see  Distress. 

MIND  OF  A  KON  GOBCPOS 

The  "mind  of  a  non  compos''  is  to  be  tak- 
en prima  fade  as  insane  and  nondisposlng. 
A  person  who  is  adjudged  a  non  compos  and 
placed  under  guardianship  is  thereby  ren- 
dered prima  fade  incapable  of  making  a  will 
while  the  adjudication  remains  in  force. 
In  re  Cowdry's  Mill,  00  Atl.  141,  142,  77  Vt 
860,  8  Ann.  Gas.  70. 

MINE 

See  Coal  Mine;  Fully  Developed  Mine; 
Known  Mines. 

Appropriation  of  claim,  see  Appropria- 
tion. 

Waste  water  from  mine^  see  Waste  Wa- 
ter. 

A  "mine"  is  an  excavation  in  the  earth 
to  obtain  minerals,  an  excavation,  pvoperlj 
under  ground,  to  take  out  some  useful  prod- 
uct, and  a  mining  right  is  a  right  to  excavate 
in  the  earth  to  obtain  minerals  or  other  use- 
ful products.  People  v.  BeU,  86  N.  B.  603, 
604,  237  IlL  332,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N^  S.)  746,  16 
Ann.  Cas.  611. 

The  term  '*mlne8'*  is  not  limited  to  mere 
subterranean  excavation  oit  workings,  nor  la 
"minerals"  limited  to  the  metals  or  metal- 
liferous deposits,  whethtf  contained  in  veins 
that  have  well-defined  walls,  or  in  beds  or 
deposits  that  are  irregular  and  are  found 


icngB 


:»87 


:inKB 


at  or  near  the  surface,  or  vdMrwtiie.  Neplif 
Plaster  &  Mfg.  Co.  ▼.  Juab  Ck)unty,  98  Pac. 
53,  56,  33  Utah,  U4,  14  L.  B.  A.  (N.  6.)  1<H3. 

In  ordinary  parlance,  a  ''mine*'  \b  a  cer- 
tain part  of  the  soil  or  of  the  earth's  sarfaoe 
In  which  there  are  mln«nil  d^;>oslt8  and  In 
which  a  person  obtains  not  only  a  fall  right 
of  ownership  of  the  soil  bnt  a  right  to  re- 
moye  the  minerals  therefrom  and  to  disiiose 
of  them  as  he  sees  fit  Crichfield  t.  Julia, 
147  Fed.  65,  66,  77  a  01  A.  297. 

The  word  "mine*'  Includes  the  whole 
mass  or  vein  of  coal  contained  within  the 
laxid.  Ammons  y.  Toothman,  53  S.  B.  18,  16, 
59  W.  Ya.  165, 115  Am.  St  Rep.  908. 

In  an  action  under  the  mining  act 
(Hurd's  Rev.  St  1908,  c  93),  for  the  death  of 
an  employ^  by  defendant's  Tiolation  of  sec- 
tion 4  in  failing  to  hare  flanges  on  the  drum 
of  a  hoisting  engine  used  in  sinking  an  air 
shaft,  special  findings  that  death  was  caused 
during  the  construction  work  preparatory  to 
opening  a  coal  mine,  and  that  the  shaft  was 
not  in  use  in  connection  with  the  mining  of 
coal  or  for  ventilating  in  coal  mine  or  for  an 
escai>ement  shaft,  do  not  bring  defendant's 
property  within  section  34,  defining  "mine" 
and  "coal  mine"  as  all  parts  of  the  property 
of  a  mining  plant  which  contribute  directly 
or  indirectly  to  the  mining  of  coal,  and  de- 
fining "shaft"  as  any  opening  which  is  or  may 
be  used  for  yentilation  or  escapement,  or  for 
hoisting  men  in  connection  with  mining,  and 
are  therefore  so  inconsistent  with  a  general 
verdict  for  plaintUf  that  Judgment  for  de» 
fendant  is  proper.  Moore  y.  Dering  Goal  Ck>., 
89  N.  E.  674,  675, 242  UL  84. 

Whether  a  coal  mine  is  within  the  pro- 
ylslons  of  Ky.  St  if  2731,  2733,  requiring  the 
ventilation  of  coal  mines  to  secure  the  safety 
of  persons  employed  therein,  is  not  dependent 
on  the  fact  that  the  mine  has  progressed  to 
such  an  extent  that  coal  is  being  marketed 
therefrom  or  shipped  from  its  opening. 
When,  at  the  time  of  the  accident,  the  main 
entry  and  airway  of  a  coal  mine  had  been 
driven  about  890  feet,  and  the  first  and  sec- 
ond right  entries  about  220  feet  and  the  dis- 
tance from  the  main  airway  to  the  first 
break-through,  from  the  first  right  entry  to 
the  airway  in  which  plaintiff  was  working, 
was  about  115  feet,  and  from  the  first  break- 
through to  the  second  it  was  about  65  feet, 
while  from  the  second  break-through  to  the 
point  where  plalntlfl  was  injured  was  about 
eo  feet  the  opening  is  a  mine  within  Ky.  St 
H  2731,  2733  (Russell's  St  (9  24Q9,  2470),  re- 
lating to  the  ventilation  of  mines.  Interstate 
Coal  Ck>.  y.  Bazavenie,  137  8.  W.  859,  861, 
144  Ky.  172. 

Defendant  mining  oCMnpany  maintained  a 
hoisting  engine  at  the  top  of  an  incline  whidi 
was  used  for  the  dumping  of  rock,  dirt  ete, 
which  had  beeiL  s^)arated  from  the  coal, 
and  iater  constmcted  a  second  incline,  oyer 
which  coal  Intended  for  retail  trade  was 


hoisted  by, the  other  side  of  tfaeisame  em- 
gibe;  rock  and  coal  cars  being  often  operr 
ated  in  different  directions  at  the  same  time^ 
Thereafter  another  engine  was  substituted 
to  haul  the  rock  cars,  and  the  old  engine  was 
continued  to  haul  the  coal  cars  which  were 
permitted  to  descend  by  grayity.  Held,  that 
such  hoist,  though  outside  tiie  mine,  was  a 
part  of  defendant's  mine,  as  defined  by 
Hurd's  Rey.  St  1906,  p.  1394,  c  93,  §  34,  to 
include  all  parts  of  a  mining  plant  on  the 
surface  or  under  ground  which  contribute 
•und^r  one  management  to  the  mining  and 
handltag  of  coal,  and  was.  therefore  within 
section  16,  subd.  "d,"  making  it  the  duty  of 
the  mine  manager  to  see  that  all  dangerous 
places  aboye  and  below  were  properly  mark- 
ed and  danger  signals  displayed  whereyer 
required.  Spring  Yall^  Coal  Ck>  y.  Greig. 
80  N.  B.  1042,  1044,  226  lU.  511. 


The  terms  ''mine^'  or  deposit  yielding 
metals  or  minerals  of  any  kind,*'  as  used  in 
B.  &  0.  Comp.  f  5668,  giying  laborers  and 
materialmen  a  lien  for  the  working  or  de- 
yelopment  of  any  mine,  lode,  mining  claim, 
or  deposit  yielding  metals  or  minerals  of  any 
kind,  include  a  coal  mine,  although  the  term 
"mining  claim"  as  used  therein  may  not  do 
so.  Bscott  y.  OrescCTt  Coal  &  Nayigation 
Go.,  106  Pac.  452,  458,  56  Or.  19a 


As  land,  see  l4Uid. 
As  oU  weU 

Const  1898,  art  230,  proyldes  that  prop- 
erty employed  in  mining  operations  shall  be 
exempt  from  parochial  and  municipal  taxes 
for  a  period  of  10  years  from  January  1, 
1900.  Held,  that  a  "mining  operation"  has 
to  do  with  the  working  of  a  mine,  and  a 
"mine,"  defined  as  an  excayation  In  the  earth 
for  the  purpose  of  getting  metal  ores  or  coal, 
does  not  include  an  oil  well,  and  property 
used  in  connection  with  petroleum  wells  Is 
not  exempted  under  the  article.  J.  M.  Ouf- 
fey  Petroleum  Co.  y.  Murre]»  53  South.  705, 
711,  127  La.  466. 

Quarry  distingiiUlieil 

The  yerb  'inine"  in  Its  ordinary  accep- 
tation means  to  dig  in  the  earth  to  get  ore, 
metals,  coal,  or  precious  stones.  JThe  noun 
"mine"  means  a  pit  or  hole  in  the  earth 
from  which  metallic  ores,  precious  stones,  or 
other  mineral  substances  are  taken  by  dig- 
ging, distinguished  from  the  pita  from  which 
stones  for  architectural  purposes  are  taken, 
whi<di  are  called  "quarries."  J.  M.  Guffey 
Petroleum  Go.  y.  Murrel,  53  South.  705,  713, 
127  La.  466  (quoting  Webster's  International 
Diet). 

"A  'mine,'  properly  speaking,  is  the  pit 
or  excayation  in  the  earth  from  which  the 
ore  is  taken.  The  term  is  certainly  used  to 
include  the  bed  or  yein  of  ore  into  which  the 
pit  enters,  so  f^r  as  may  benecessa^ry  to  the 


MIKX 


888 


MINERAL 


Working  of  the  mine;  and  the  whole  series 
of  shafts  and  subterranean  passages  and  tilie 
<^iambers  connected  with  It  But  neither  In 
ordinary  parlance  nor  In  strict  technical  lan- 
guage Is  a  'mine*  understood  to  Indicate  the 
entire  ore  bed  with  whldi  the  shaft  may  be 
connected.  And  by  a  'quarry'  we  under- 
stand, not  an  Indefinite  extent  of  stone  or 
rock  whldi  may  be  worked,  but  the  spot 
where  the  rock  Is  quarried.  The  'ore*  may 
extend  Indefinitely,  but  the  'mlne^  Is  the  pit 
from  whence  It  Is  extracted.*'  Hoysradt  v. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  B.  Go.,  101  Fed.  821,  881 
(quoting  Shaw  t.  Wallace,  25  N.  J.  Law, 
462). 

Bums'  Ann.  St  1008,  |  10,259,  auUiorlz- 
ing  the  valuation  of  real  property  on  which 
there  Is  a  mine  or  quarry,  owned  by  the 
same  persons,  at  the  price  for  which  the 
property,  including  the  mine  or  quarry, 
^ould  sell  at  private,  voluntary  sale  for 
cash,  and,  in  case  the  mine  or  quarry  Is 
dwned  or  leased  by  a  person,  other  than  the 
jwner  of  the  land,  authorizing  the  valuation 
>f  the  land  and  mine  or  quarry  separat^ely, 
does  not  authorize  the  assessment  of  hidden, 
andeveloped  coal  or  other  minerals  underly- 
ing land;  a  "quarry"  being  an  excavation 
for  obtaining  stone,  slate,  or  limestone;  and 
a  "mine**  being  defined  by  section  8560  to  In- 
clude the  workings  In  every  shaft,  slope,  or 
drift  which  Is  used,  or  has  been  used,  in  the 
mining  and  removing  of  coal  from  and  b^ow 
the  surface  of  the  ground,  and  being  also 
defined  as  a  pit  or  excavation  from  which 
metallic  ores  or  other  similar  substances  are 
taken  by  digging.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Greene 
County  V.  Lattas  Creek  Coal  Co.  (Ind.)  06 
N.  B.  633,  637. 


See  Road« 

BUNS  MAivAaiat 

A  "mine  manager,**  within  the  meaning 
of  Mining  Act,  |  83,  providing  that  contribu- 
tory negligence  shall  not  bar  a  miner's  re- 
covery where  the  mine  manager  was  will- 
fully negligent,  is  a  mine  boss,  foreman,  or 
pit  boss.  Donk  Bros.  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Stroff,  66  N.  B.  20,  31,  200  UL  483. 

MINE  SHAFT 

See  Shaft 

MIME  WEIGHTS 

The  language  "mine  weights  to  govern 
settlement,"  la  a  contract  to  furnish  coal, 
means  that  the  purchaser  Is  to  pay  for  the 
coal  on  the  basis  of  the  weights  at  the  mines 
where  It  Is  deUvered  on  cars  for  transporta- 
tion. Detroit  Southern  B.  Co.  v.  Malcolm- 
son,  107  N.  W.  015,  016^  144  Mich.  172,  116 
Am.  St  Bep.  800. 

MIKEB 

As  employ^,  see  Employ^ 


'*In  speaking  of  ttie  measurementi 
water  In  use  In  California,  Mr.  WiUla 
Kent,  In  his  recent  reference  book,  for  a 
by  engineers  and  mechanics,  states  the  slto 
tlon,  thus:  The  term  "miner's  Inch"  Is  mo 
or  less  Indefinite^  for  the  reason  that  Ga 
fornla  water  companies  do  not  all  use  tl 
same  head  above  the  center  of  the  apertni 
and  the  Inch  varies  from  1.36  to  1.73  cut 
feet  per  minute  each ;  but  the  most  conmu 
measurement  is  through  an  aperture  t^ 
Inches  high  and  whatever  length  Is  require 
and  through  a  plank  1^  Inches  thid^  Tl 
lower  edge  of  the  aperture  should  be  tv 
Inches  above  the  bottom  of  the  measurii 
box,  and  the  plank  five  Inches  above  tl 
aperture,  thus  making  a  six-Inch  head  abo^ 
the  center  of  the  stream.  Eadi  square  iD< 
of  this  opening  represents  a  miner's  iiH 
(under  six-inch  pressure)  which  is  equal  to 
flow  of  1%  cubic  feet  per  minute.' "  Gar 
ner  v.  Wright,  01  Pac.  286,  207,  40  Or.  609. 

A  contract  to  furnish  a  specified  numtx 
of  miners'  inches  of  water  for  Irrigation  pn 
poses  is  sufficiently  certain  to  Justify  specli 
performance,  where  witnesses  explain  tl 
meaning  of  the  ambiguous  term  "minei 
inch"  and  show  that  at  the  time  of  the  ma 
ing  of  the  contract  it  was  commonly  node 
stood  that  the  term  meant  a  quantity  of  w 
ter  which  would  flow  through  an  orifice  i 
inch  square  under  a  four-inch  pressure,  ai 
that  a  four-inch  pressure  meant  a  head  < 
water  which  stood  four  inches  above  the  U. 
of  the  orifice,  and  such  testimony  Is  not  di 
puted.  Ulrlch  v.  Pateros  Water  Ditch  O 
121  Pac.  818,  820,  67  Wash.  82& 

MINERAL 

See  Crude  Mineral ;  Land  Valuable  t 

Minerals ;  Valuable  Minerals. 
Other  mineral,  see  Other. 
Other  valuable  minerals,  see  Other. 

The  word  "minerals,"  in  the  popoli 
sense,  means  those  inorganic  constituents  ( 
the  earth's  crust  which  are  commonly  o 
tained  by  mining  or  other  process  for  brin 
ing  them  to  the  surface  for  profit  Kansi 
Nat  Gas  Co.  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Neosl 
County,  80  Pac  750,  75  Kan.  385. 

^'Mineral,"  as  defined  in  Webster's  Di 
tionary,  is  ''any  inorganic  spedes  having 
definite  chemical  composition."  O.  G.  Hem] 
stead  A  Son  v.  Thomas,  122  Fed.  588,  5S 
50  C.  C.  A  842. 

The  term  "mines"  is  not  limited  to  me] 
subterranean  excavations  or  workings,  nor 
"minerals"  limited  to  the  metals  or  meta 
Uferous  deposits,  wfae^er  contained  in  veii 
that  have  well-defined  wtUls,  or  in  beds  ( 
deposits  that  are  irregular  and  are  found  t 
or  near  the  surface,  or  otherwise.  Nepl 
Plaster  &  Mfg.  Ca  v.  Juab  County,  03  Pa 
53,  58,  83  Utoh.  114,  14  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  IM 


MIKSRAIi 


IflNERAL 


Ifinerals  embracing  boOi  sinface  and 
gnbsurftice  minerals  include  every  constltii- 
ent  of  the  eartb's  crust  Gladys  Olty  Oil, 
Gas  &  ICfg.  Co.  y.  Rlgfat  of  Way  OU  Co. 
(Tex.)  1S7  S.  W.  171,  177  (dtlng  6  Words  and 
Phrases). 

The  word  ••minerals,"  In  conveyances  of 
"minerals,"  means  all  substances  in  the 
earth's  crust,  sought  for  and  removed  for 
the  substance  Itself,  and  is  not  limited  to 
metallic  substances,  but  includes  salt,  coal, 
clay,  stone,  etc.  McGombs  v.  Stephenson,  44 
South.  867,  889,  164  Ala.  109. 

The  term  "mineral"  found  in  a  deed, 
lease,  or  other  contract,  unqualified  and  un- 
restricted by  any  other  clause  in  the  instru- 
ment, or  by  circumstances  within  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  parties  which  may  reasonably 
be  deemed  to  have  determined  their  inten- 
tion, will  be  given  a  sufficiently  broad  mean- 
ing and  effect  to  include  prima  fiicle  every 
substance  that  can  be  gotten  from  under- 
neath the  sur&ce  of  the  earth  for  the  pur- 
pose of  profit,  and  will  include  not  merely 
such  articles  as  coal,  ironstone,  and  free- 
stone, but  fire  clay,  and  china  clay  or  porce- 
lain clay,  and  also  every  kind  of  stone,  flint, 
marble,  slate,  brick  earth,  chalk,  gravel,  and 
sand;  provided  only  that  these  articles  are 
imder  the  surfiice,  and  do  not  lie  loosely 
upon  it  Suit  V.  A.  Hochstetter  Oil  Co.,  81 
8.  B.  307,  310,  83  W.  Va.  317. 

Diunoad 

A  diamond  is  a  ''mineraL"  Kentucky 
Diamond  Mining  &  Developing  Co.  v.  Ken- 
tucky Transvaal  Diamond  Co.,  182  8.  W. 
397,  398, 141  Ky.  97,  Ann.  Caa.  1912C,  417. 

Chw 

on  and  gas  are  classed  as  ndnerals; 
that  term  not  being  confined  to  metallic  sub- 
stances.   Poe  V.  Ulrey,  84  N.  B.  48,  48,  288 

111.56. 

Natural  gas  is  a  "mineral/'  and  is  a 
part  of  the  land  until  severed.  Osbom  v. 
Arkansas  Territorial  Oil  &  Gas  Co.,  146  S. 
W.  122,  124,  103  Ark.  175. 

The  Legislature  has  now  classed  oil  and 
gas  among  minerals  of  this  state;  and  per- 
sons engaged  in  producing  these  minerals  are 
following  a  mining  pursuit  Act  No.  144  of 
1908;  Act  No.  154  of  1910;  Act  No.  172  of 
1910;  Act  No.  196  Of  1910;  Act  No.  254  of 
1910.  Etchison  Drilling  Co.  v.  Flournoy, 
69  South.  867,  872,  131  La.  442. 

Oil  and  gas  are  "minerals"  within  Act 
April  25,  1850  (P.  L.  673)  S  24,  recognizing  a 
right  of  action  by  a  tenant  in  common  against 
a  cotenant  in  sole  possession  for  a  share  of 
tile  profits  where  minerals  are  held  In  com- 
mon. Mcintosh  V.  Bopp,  82  Atl.  949,  956,  233 
Pa.  497. 

A  reservation  of  '*all  'ndnerals' "  Includes 
gas.  Weaver  v.  Richards,  120  N.  W.  818, 
819,  166  MldL  820. 


r  Under  the  broad  divisUm  of  all  matter 
into  three  classes  of  animal,  vegetable,  and 
mineral,  petroleum  and  gas  are  "minerals"; 
but  the  term  may  be  used  in  a  more  restricted 
sense.  "Mineral"  is  not  per  se  a  term  of  art 
or  trade,  but  of  general  language,  and  in 
addition  to  its  broader  scientiflc  meaning  is 
also  used  in  a  commercial  sense,  where  it 
may  include  any  inorganic  substance  found 
in  nature  having  snflicient  value,  separated 
from  its  condition  as  a  part  of  the  earth,  to 
be  ndned,  quarried,  or  dug  for  its  spedftc 
uses;  but  it  does  not  necessarily  have  so 
broad  a  meaning  or  include  all  such  sub- 
stances. A  deed  of  land  exciting  the  min- 
eral underlying  it  did  not  include  natural  gas 
within  the  exception.  Silver  v.  Bush,  62  Atl. 
832,  833,  218  Pa.  195. 

OraBlt«9  stone,  sUiea,  Mid  elaj 

A  deed  to  land  largely  covered  with  lime- 
stone and  granite,  rising  above  the  natural 
surface,  which  reserved  to  the  grantor  all 
"mines  and  minerals"  which  may  be  found 
on  the  land,  with  the  right  of  entry  to  dig 
and  carry  the  same  away,  does  not  give  a 
right  to  open  quarrying  and  blasting,  but 
such  right  passes  to  the  grantee.  Brady  v. 
Smith,  78  N.  B.  963,  964,  181  N.  Y.  178,  106 
Am.  8t  Rep.  631,  2  Ann.  Cas.  686. 

Const  art  2,  f  33,  provides  that  the  own- 
ership of  land  by  aliens  other  than  those 
who  in  good  faith  have  declared  their  inten- 
tion to  become  citizens  is  prohibited,  except 
where  acquired  by  inheritance,  under  mort- 
gage, or  in  good  faith  In  the  oidinaxy  course 
of  justice,  provided  that  the  statute  shall 
not  apply  to  lands  oontalning  valuable  de- 
posits of  "minerals,"  metals,  iron,  coal,  or 
fire  cUiy.  Held,  that  an  alien  may  acquire 
by  purchase  lands  containing  valuable  depos- 
its of  limestone,  silica,  and  clay;  the  word 
"minerals"  not  being  restricted  to  the  valua- 
ble mineral  ore  contained  in  gold  and  silver, 
etc.  State  ex  rel.  Atkinson  v.  Evans,  89  Pac. 
565,  666,  46  Wash.  219,  10  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1163. 


oypi 

Gypsum  is  a  mineral,  and  lands  con- 
taining it  are  mineral  lands,  within  the  fed- 
eral statutes.  Madison  v.  Octave  Oil  Co.,  99 
Pac.  176.  178,  164  Cal.  768. 

Gypsum  is  a  "mineral,"  and  constitutes 
a  mineral  deposit  under  the  mineral  laws. 
Nephi  Plaster  ft  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Juab  County, 
93  Pac.  53,  64,  33  Utah,  114,  14  L.  R.  A,  (N. 
S.)  1043. 

A  deed  was  executed  in  1814,  conveying 
farm  land,  but  "excepting  mines  and  minerals 
which  are  not  hereby  intended  to  be  con- 
veyed." Small  deposits  of  gypsum  had  been 
discovered  on  the  land  in  1812,  and  gypsum 
rights  had  been  leased  in  1814,  though  it  was 
first  removed  therefrom  In  1842,  at  whldi 
time  it  was  taken  out  by  open  quarrying, 
but  could  be  mined  As  found,  it  underlaid 
the  limestone  formation  at  a  depth  of  from 


JIINERAXi 


390 


tflNBRAL 


25  to  40  feet,  but  in  places  rose  to  within  a 
foot  or  18  inches  of  the  surface.  Held,  that 
an  exception  of  "minerals"  includes  all  inor- 
ganic substances  which  can  be  taken  from 
the  land  in  the  absence  of  other  words  re- 
stricting the  meaning  of  the  term,  so  that  the 
exception  in  the  deed  reserved  to  the  grantor 
all  minerals,  including  gypsum,  but  not  the 
surface  limestone.  White  v.  Miller,  02  N. 
E.  1065,  1067,  200  N.  Y.  28,  140  Am.  St  Rep. 
618. 


See  Land. 

OU 

Oil  is  a  ''mineral,"  and  as  such  is  a 
part  of  the  realty.  Isom  v.  Bex  Crude  Oil 
Co.,  82  Paa  317,  318,  147  Gal.  659. 

Oil  and  gas  are  classed  as  "minerals,** 
that  term  not  being  confined  to  metallic  sub- 
stancea  Poe  y.  XJlrey,  84  N.  E.  46,  48,  233 
lU.  56. 

Oil  and  gas  are  "minerals"  within  Act 
April  25,  1850  (P.  L.  573)  {  24,  recognizing 
a  right  of  action  by  a  tenant  In  oommon 
against  a  cotenant  in  sole  possession  for  a 
share  of  the  profits  where  minerals  are  held 
in  common.  Mcintosh  y.  Bopp,  82  AtL  949, 
955,  233  Pa.  497. 

A  reservation  of  "all  'minerals* "  includes 
oiL  Weaver  v.  Richards,  120  N.  W.  818,  819, 
156  Mich.  320. 

The  opening  of  a  new  mine  on  land  by  a 
life  tenant  amounts  to  waste,  and  this  rule 
Applies  to  oil  wells,  as  oil  is  a  mineral  and 
'  part  of  the  realty.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  ▼.  Daugh- 
etee,  88  N.  B.  818,  820,  240  IlL  861,  36  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  1108. 

The  Legislature  has  now  classed  oil  and 
gas  among  "minerals'*  of  the  state;  and  per- 
sons engaged  in  producing  these  minerals 
are  following  a  mining  pursuit  Etchison 
Drilling  Co.  v.  Floumoy,  59  South.  867,  872, 
131  La.  442  (citing  Act  No.  144  of  1908;  Act 
No.  154  of  1910;  Act  No.  172  of  1910;  Act 
No.  196  of  1910;    Act  No.  254  of  1910). 

Oil  before  its  extraction  is  a  "mineral** 
Swayne  v.  Lone  Acre  Oil  Co.,  86  S.  W.  740, 
742,  98  Tex.  597,  69  L.  R.  A.  986,  8  Ann.  Cas. 
1117;  Isom  v.  Rex  Crude  Oil  Co.,  82  Pac. 
817,  818,  147  Cal.  659. 

Petroleum 

Under  the  broad  division  of  all  matter 
into  three  classes  of  animal,  vegetable,  and 
mineral,  petroleum  and  gas  are  "minerals.** 
Silver  V.  Bush,  62  Atl.  832,  833,  213  Pa.  195. 

A  reservation  of  "all  'minerals'  **  Includ- 
ed petroleum.  Weaver  v.  Richards,  120  N. 
W.  818,  819,  156  Mich.  320. 

Hurd's  Rev.  St  1905.  p.  1399,  c.  94,  §§ 
6,  7,  declare  that  any  mining  right  or  the 
right  to  dig  for  or  obtain  iron,  lead,  copper, 
coaU  or  other  mineral  from  land  tn^s  be  con- 
veyed by  deed  or  lease^  which  may  be  ac- 


knowledged and  recorded  in  the  same  mai 
ner  as  deeds  and  leases  of  real  estate,  ai 
that  when  the  owner  of  land  shall  conve; 
by  deed  or  lease,  any  mining  right  there! 
the  conveyance  shall  be  considered  as  so  sei 
arating  such  right  from  the  land  as  to  I 
separately  taxable.  Held  that,  since  petr< 
leum  is  a  mineral,  the  right  of  the  lessee  1 
mine  for  oil  and  gas  on  certain  spedfle 
premises  is  a  mining  right,  and  separate! 
taxable  under  such  sections.  People  v.  Bel 
86  N.  E.  593,  237  lU.  332,  19  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S 
746,  15  Ann.  Cas..  511. 

.Petroleum  oil  is  a  "mineral,**  and  whij 
it  is  in  the  earth  It  forms  a  part  of  the  rea 
ty,  and  when  it  reaches  a  well  and  is  pr< 
duoed  on  the  surface  it  becomes  persom 
property  and  belongs  to  the  owner  of  tt 
welL  If  it  moves  from  place  to  place  by  pei 
eolation,  or  otherwise,  it  forms  a  part  of  tli 
tract  of  land  in  which  it  tarries  for  the  tin 
being;  and,  if  it  moves  to  the  next  adjolnin 
tract,  it  becomes  a  part  and  parcel  of  tba 
tract;  and  if  it  forms  a  part  of  the  sam 
tract,  until  it  reaches  a  well  and  is  raised  t 
the  surface  and  then  for  the  first  time,  it  b< 
comes  the  subject  of  distinct  ownership  sei 
arate  from  the  realty.  It  becomes  the  proi 
erty  of  and  belongs  to  the  person  who  read 
es  it  by  means  of  a  well  and  severs  it  froi 
the  realty.  Nonamaker  v.  Amoa,  76  N.  1 
949,  951,  73  Ohio  St  163,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8 
980,  112  Am.  St  Rep.  708,  4  Ann.  Cas.  17 
(citing  Kelley  v.  Ohio  Oil  Co.,  49  N.  B.  39f 
57  Ohla  St  317,  39  L.  B.  A.  765.  63  Am.  S1 
Rep.  721;  Northwestern  Ohio  Natural  Ga 
Co.  V.  Ullery,  67  N.  B.  494,  68  Ohio  St  259] 
As  property 
See  Property;   Real  Property. 


Sand,  aooord^g  to  the  circumstance! 
may,  or  may  not  be  a  mineral,  in  the  commei 
dal  sense  intended  by  Act  May  8,  1876  (I 
L.  142),  providing  that,  if  any  person  or  coi 
poration  shall  dig  minerals  in  the  land  o 
another  without  the  consent  of  the  ownez 
he  shall  be  liable  for  double  the  value  there 
of.  Hendler  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  58  At! 
488,  489,  209  Pa.  263. 

Under  Rev.  St  |  2329,  by  which  claim 
usually  called  placers,  including  all  forms  o 
deposits  excepting  veins  of  quartz  or  othe 
rock  in  place,  shall  be  subject  to  entry 
building  sand  is  a  "mineral**;  and  hence  lan( 
more  valuable  for  the  building  sand  it  cod 
tains  than  for  agriculture  is  mineral  land 
subject  to  placer  locations.  Loney  v.  Scott 
112  Pac  172,  175,  57  Or.  878. 

SHale 

Shale  is  a  "mineraL"  Bibby  y.  Bond 
(Ala.)  58  South.  916,  917. 

Water 

Subtetraneati  w&ters  are  considered  i 
"mineral**  In  respect  to  their  use  and  enjoy 
ment,  irrespective  of  the  cliaracter  and  quaii 


HIN»tA£h  D8M6R 


^sn 


unmm 


aty  of  salts  and*  gases  which  may  be  In  soln? 
tioiL  Hathorn  ▼.  Natural  Carbonic  Gas  Go., 
87  N.  E.  604,  608,  194  N.  Y.  326,  23  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  S.)  436,  128  Am«  St  Bflp.  666,  16  Ann. 
Caa.  089. 


MHIEBAXi  DEPOSIT 

Valuablo  mineral  deposits* 
liineials. 


Yalnable 


MIHEBAX.  ILAHB 

The  words  "said  lands  being  mineral,** 
88  used  in  Act  June  8, 1878,  c  160,  S  1,  is  not 
confined  to  any  species  of  mineral,  but  is 
synonymous  with  the  word  ''metalliferous." 
Morgan  v.  United  States,  169  Fed.  242,  248, 
94  O.  O.  A.  618  (dting  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  CJo. 
T.  Soderberg,  23  Sup.  Ct.  366,  188  U.  S.  626, 
47  L.  Ed.  575). 

Gypsum  is  a  mineral,  and  lands  con- 
taining it  are  "mineral"  lands,  within  the 
federal  statutes.  Madison  y.  Octave  Oil  Go^ 
99  Paa  176,  178,  154  CaL  768. 

Goal  lands  are  ^'mineral  lands^'  within 
the  meaning  of  that  term  as  generally  em- 
ployed in  the  laws  regulating  the  disposal  of 
the  public  domain.  United  States  y.  North- 
em  Pac.  Ry.  Go.,  170  Fed.  498,  600;  Wash- 
ington Securities  Go.  y.  United  States,  194 
Fed.  69.  66,  114  0.  0.  A.  79. 

The  term  "mineral  lands,"  as  used  in 
Rev.  St  U.  S.  I  2302,  is  one  of  broader  sig- 
nificance than  "known  mines."  It  refers  to 
a  dass  of  lands,  rather  than  specific  tracts 
easily  ascertainable,  not  only  by  the  Land 
Department,  but  by  the  applicants  them- 
BeWes.  Old  Dominion  Gopper  Mining  dc 
Smelting  Co.  y.  Haverly,  90  Pac.  333,  338, 
11  Ariz.  241. 

MDIEBAI.  X.ODB 

See,  also,  Lode. 

A  "mineral  lod^  Is  a  totally  different 
thing  from  a  placer  mine  and  not  a  mere 
state  or  condition  of  such  mine.  McGarter 
▼.  Sooy  Oyster  Go.,  76  AtL  211,  215,  78  N. 
J.  Law,  394. 

mHERAI.  SITBSTAKCnB 

Other  mineral  substances,  see  Other. 

MINIATURE  FRAMES 

Not  dutiable  as  articles  commonly  known 
as  jewelry,  sea  Articles  Within  Tar- 
iff Act 

MINIMUM 

"Minimumy"  as  applied  to  damages, 
means  the  least  possible  amount  that  may  be 
awarded  by  a  jury.  The  court  should  not 
Instruct  in  a  libel  suit  that,  if  an  honest 
mistake  is  made  in  an  honest  attempt  to  en- 
lighten the  public,  it  must  reduce  the  dam- 
ages to  a  minimum,  as  the  jury  may  under 
such  circumstances  award  much  more  than 
the  minimum  as  actual  damages.    Dauphiny 


y.  Buhne,  96  Pac.  «80,  881,  886,  108  GhiL  71P7, 
126  Am.  St.  Bep.  186. 

The  tf  ect,  if  any,  of  the  ttse  of  th* 
word  '^minimum,"  in  a  contract  relating  to 
water  rates,  is  that  the  rates  shall  not  be 
less.  Olty  of  Bit  Vernon  y.  New  York  In* 
terurban  Water  Go.,  161  N.  Y.  8uM>.  232,  233, 
115  App.  Diy.  66a 

The  term  "minimum  charge,*'  as  used  in 
water  supply  contracts,  where  the  meter  sys- 
tem obtains,  usually  signifies  rate  of  com- 
pensation for  expense  and  labor  of  being 
ready  to  supply  water  at  will  of  consumer, 
though  the  supply  be  not  used  at  all.  Gox 
y.  Abbeville  Furniture  Factory,  64  8.  S.  830, 
832,  76  S.  O.  4a 

Where  the  application  for  charter  and 
the  charter  of  tiie  corporation  name  only  one 
sum  as  the  proposed  capital  of  the  corpora- 
tion, that  sum  is  the  ^n:dnimum  capital 
stock,"  which  Olyil  Gode  1910,  f  2220,  re- 
guires  to  be  subscribed  fdr  in  order  to  re- 
lieye  the  organizers  of  the  corporation  from 
Indiyidual  liability  to  creditors  Jos.  Bosen- 
heim  Shoe  Go.  y.  Horne^  T8  8.  IL  963,  965, 
10  Ga.  App.  682. 

MINING 

See  Skillful  and  Giarefnl  Mining. 

As  public  use,  see  Public  Use  (In  Em- 

inent  Domain). 
System  of  minihg,  see  System. 

The  word  "mining,"  in  Bankr.  Act  July 
1,  1898,  I  4b,  as  amended  in  1903  (Act  Feb. 
5,  1903,  c.  487),  is  used  in  a  broad  sense  and 
includes  quarrying  as  of  slate  from  an  open 
quarry.  Burdick  v.  Dillon,  144  Fed.  737,  740, 
75  G.  G.  A.  608 ;  In  re  Mathews  GonsoL  Slate 
Go.,  144  Fed.  724,  785. 

The  form  of  coal  obtained  from  the 
strata  of  the  earth  is  a  carbonaceous  miur 
eral  substance,  commonly  known  as  mineral 
coal,  and  the  procurement  thereof  by  digging 
in  the  earth  is  termed  "mining."  Escott  y. 
Grescent  Goal  dc  Nayigation  Go.,  106  Pac.  462 
453,  66  Or.  190. 

If  the  business  of  a  corporation  formed 
to  drill  and  mine  for  natural  gas,  petroleum, 
and  other  minerals  and  to  purchase,  lease, 
and  otherwise  acquire  gas  and  petroleum 
wells  and  the  products  thereof  and  to  fumlah 
the  same  to  its  patrons  for  use  was  not  with- 
in the  classification  of  "mining,"  as  employed 
in  Burns*  Ann.  St  Ind.  1901,  S  3851,  author- 
izing the  formation  of  corporations  to  carry 
on  any  kind  of  manufacturing,  mining,  etc., 
business,  it  was  clearly  brought  within  that 
classification  by  Burns'  Ann.  St.  Ind.  1894, 
§  5099,  defining  the  term  "mining"  as  used 
in  the  former  statute  as  covering  and, includ- 
ing sinking,  drilling,  boring,  and  operating 
wells  for  petroleum  and  natural  gas.  Con- 
sumers* Gas  Trust  Go.  y.  Quinby,  137  Fed. 
862,  896,  70  G.  a  A.  220. 


MINING  AND  MANUFACTURINQ      382 


MINING  LOCATION 


lUnUfO  Ain>  XAKUFAGTfmKa 

A  corporation  engaged  in  operating  a 
granite  quarry,  which  it  owned,  and  selling 
the  stone  either  for  building  or  paving  pur- 
pc^ses  or  after  it  had  been  manufactured  and 
finished  for  monumental  or  other  purposes, 
is  chiefly  engaged  "mining  and  manufactur- 
ing" and  ifl  subject  to  bankruptcy  proceedings 
under  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  §  4b, 
as  amended  by  Act  F^b.  6,  1903,  c.  487,  S  3. 
In  re  Quincy  Granite  Quarries  Co.,  147  Fed. 
279. 

MINING  BOSS 

The  term,  ''mining  boss,**  used  in  Acts 
1881,  p.  238,  c.  170,  S  8,  requiring  a  coal  mine 
operator  to  employ  a  competent  mining  boss 
who  is  required  to  ke^  a  careful  watch 
over  the  ventilating  apparatus,  airways^ 
traveling  ways,  pumps,  sumps,  timbering,  etc., 
indicated  the  person  on  whom  is  imposed 
nondelegable  duties  of  the  master,  so  that  in 
the  performance  thereof  the  boss  will  be  re- 
garded as  a  vice  principal.  Smith  ▼.  Day- 
ton Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  92  S.  W.  62,  68,  115 
Tenn.  543,  4  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  1180. 

MINING  CLAIM 

See  Necessary  to  Hold  Mining  Claim. 

As  permanent  monument,  see  Permanent 
Monument 

As  property,  see  Property;  Real  Prop- 
erty. 

Development  of,  see  Development 

Improvement  on  mining  claim,  see  Im- 
provement 

Inspection  of  as  taking  property,  see 
Taking  (In  Eminent  Domain). 

The  term  "mining  claim"  means  in  the 
mining  country  a  portion  of  the  public  min- 
eral lands  of  the  United  States  to  which  a 
qualified  person  may  first  obtain  the  right  of 
occupancy  and  possession  by  means  of  loca- 
tion, and,  secondly,  title  by  pursuing  prescrib- 
ed methods  therefor.  Gray  v.  New  Mexico 
Pumice  Stone  Co.,  110  Pac.  603,  606,  15  N.  M. 
478. 

A  '^mining  claim*'  is  a  parcel  of  land 
containing  precious  metal  in  its  soil  or  rock. 
Creede  &  Cripple  Creek  Mining  ft  Milling  Co. 
V.  Uinta  Tunnel  Mining  &  Transportation  Co., 
25  Sup.  Ct  266,  270,  196  U.  S.  337,  49  L.  Ed. 
501  (quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  in 
St  Louis  Smelting  ft  Refining  Co.  v.  Kemp, 
104  U.  S.  636,  649,  26  L.  Ed.  875,  879). 

A  "mining  claim"  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of  the  word  is  a  "portion  of  the  public  min- 
eral lands  which  the  miner,  for  mining  pur- 
poses, takes  up  and  holds  in  accordance  with 
mining  law."  Berentz  v.  Kern  King  Oil  ft 
Development  Co.  (Cal.)  84  Pac.  45,  46  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  Morse  v.  De  Ardo,  40  Pac. 
1018,  107  Cal.  622). 

"The  location  and  sale  of  oil  land  is 
governed  by  the  mineral  laws  of  the  United 
States  applicable  to  the  location  and  sale  of 


placer  mining  claims,  and.  If  land  is  locatei 
and  held  under  this  law,  it  ia  a  ininlQi 
claim*  before  patent  in  every  sense  of  tbi 
word,  and  for  the  purpose  of  the  lien  law  i 
does  not  cease  to  be  a  'mining  claim*  when 
by  a  patent  from  the  government,  the  fee  l 
transferred  to  the  locator  or  his  assigns.' 
And  an  80-acre  tract  of  land  in  pro<*ess  oi 
development  as  an  oil  mine  is  a  "mininj 
claim"  within  Code  CJiv.  Proc.  ||  1183,  U87 
providing  that  a  miner  working  on  a  mininj 
claim  has  a  lien  on  the  entire  claim  for  hii 
wages  or  the  value  of  his  material.  Berenti 
▼.  Belmont  Oil  Co.,  8  Paa  47,  48,  148  Cal 
577,  118  Am.  St  Rep.  308. 

In  construing  a  statute  the  court  must 
look  to  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  enacted 
and  statutes  providing  for  liens  are  to  be  con 
strued  in  favor  of  the  purpose  of  the  law 
Hence  where  the  purpose  of  a  statute  was  U 
protect  laborers  and  materialmen  of  a  par 
ticular  class,  and  the  Legislature  used  tb( 
words  "mining  claim**  in  the  title,  the  words 
are  not  to  be  strictly  construed  to  determiiu 
the  right  to  a  lien,  but  they  are  to  control 
in  measuring  the  extent  of  the  lien.  Escoti 
v.  Crescent  Coal  &  Navigation  Co.,  106  Pac 
452,  454,  56  Or.  100. 

One  of  the  essential  requirements  of  i 
valid  location  of  a  mining  claim,  as  provided 
by  Oomp.  St  1910,  i  3474,  is  that  there  shall 
be  a  discovery  of  mineral,  on  the  ground 
Dean  v.  Omaha-Wyoming  Oil  Co.  (Wyo.)  12fi 
Pac,  881,  882. 

Mlimf  G  DISTRICT 

Locality  synonymous,  see  Locality. 

MINUIG  IiEASE 

Instruments  by  which  estates  or  inter 
ests  in  minerals  are  created  are  frequently 
and  without  distinction  called  ''mining  leas- 
es." Appeal  of  Sanford,  54  AtL  739,  741,  7S 
Conn.  590. 

MINING  LICENSE 

Mining    license    as    distinguished   from 
lease,  see  Lease. 

A  contract  simply  giving  a  right  to  take 
ore  from  a  mine,  no  estate  being  granted, 
confers  a  mere  "license,'*  and  licensee  ac- 
quires no  right  to  tbe  ore  until  s^;Hirated 
from  the  freehold;  but  an  instrument  de- 
mising lands  for  mining  purposes,  for  a  des- 
ignated term  of  years,  at  a  fixed  rent,  and 
giving  the  right  to  erect  all  necessary  build- 
ings, is  a  lease,  not  merely  a  mining  license. 
Bamsdall  v.  Bradford  Gas  Co.,  74  Atl.  207, 
208,  225  Pa.  338,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  614. 

MINING  LOCATION 

As  property,  see  Property. 

Extension  of,  see  EztensioiL 

Lode  mining  location,  see  Lode  LocatioD. 

The  words  "claim"  and  "location"  in  min- 
ing law  are  used  interchangeably,    Del  Montt 


MIKINO  LOCATION 


3»3 


lilKIKQ  OPBRATION  ' 


Ifln.  ft  Mill.  Co.  ▼.  Last  Obance  Mln.  ft  Mini 
Co.,  18  Sup.  Gt.  885,  902,  171  U.  8.  00,  48  L. 
Ed.  72. 

A  location  Is  not  made  by  taking  posses- 
sion alone,  but  by  working  on  the  ground, 
recording,  and  doliig  whatever  else  is  requir- 
ed for  that  purpose  by  the  acts  of  Ck>ngress 
and  the  local  laws  and  regulations.  Wright 
r.  Lyons,  77  Pac  81,  82,  45  Or.  167  (citing 
Belk  Y.  Meagh^,  104  U.  S.  279,  284,  26  L.  Ed. 
735);  Kniitson  v.  Fredlund,  106  Pac.  200,  202, 
56  Wash.  634  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion h)  Purdum  v.  Laddin,  69  Pac.  153,  154, 
23  Mont  387,  389) ;  Hickey  v.  Anaconda  Cop- 
per Mln.  Ck>.,  81  Pac  806,  811,  33  Mont  46 
(quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  in  Belk 
T.  Meagher,  104  U.  8.  279,  26  L.  Ed.  735). 

A  "mining  claim"  Is  a  pared  of  land  con- 
taining predous  metal  in  its  soil  or  sock,  and 
a  "location"  Is  the  act  of  appropriating  such 
parcel  according  to  eertaln  established  rules. 
It  usually  consists  in  placing  on  the  ground 
In  a  conspicuous  position  a  notice  setting 
forth  the  name  of  the  locator,  the  fact  that 
it  is  thus  taken  or  located,  with  the  requisite 
description  of  the  extent  and  boundaries  of 
the  parcel  according  to  the  local  custom  or, 
since  the  statute  of  1872,  according  to  the  pro- 
Tisions  of  that  act  Rot.  St.  S  2324.  The 
location,  which  is  the  act  of  taking  a  parcel 
of  mining  land,  became  among  the  miners 
synonymous  with  the  mining  claim  originally 
appropriated;  so  now,  if  a  miner  has  only 
the  ground  covered  by  one  location,  his  min- 
ing claim  and  location  are  identical,  and  the 
two  designations  may  be  indiscriminately 
used  to  denote  the  same  thing;  but  if,  by 
purchase,  he  acquires  the  adjoining  location 
of  his  neighbor  and  uses  the  ground  which  his 
neighbor  has  taken  up  and  adds  it  to  his 
own,  then  his  mining  daim  coTcrs  the  ground 
embraced  by  both  locations,  and  henceforth 
be  will  speak  of  it  as  his  claim.  Indeed,  his 
claim  may  i&dude  as  many  adjoining  loca- 
tions as  be  can  purchase,  and  the  ground  ooy- 
ered  by  all  will  constitute  what  he  claims 
for  mining  purposes,  or,  in  other  words,  will 
constitute  his  mining  claim  and  will  so  be 
designated.  Such  is  the  general  understand- 
ing of  miners  and  the  meaning  that  attached 
to  the  term.  Lockhatd  v.  Asher  Lumber  Oo., 
123  Fed.  480,  498  (quoting  St  Louis  Smelting 
&  Ref.  Ck).  ▼.  Kemp,  104  U.  S.  636,  648,  26 
L.  Ed.  875). 

"  'Location'  \s  the  act  or  series  of  acts  by 
which  the  right  of  ezclusiye  possession  of 
mineral  lands  is  vested  in  the  locator.  For 
this  the  only  reqnirement  made  by  Congress 
is  the  marking  on  the  surface  of  the  bounda- 
ries of  the  claim.  By  section  2324,  howeyer. 
Congress  reoogalzed  the  yalidity  of  any  reg- 
Qlatlons  made  Itj  the  miners  of  any  mining 
district  not  in  conflict  with  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  or  the  laws  of  the  state  or 
territory  within  which  the  district  is  situ- 


ated." Creede  k^  Cripple  Creek  Mining  *' 
Mining  Co.  T.  Uinta  Tunnel  Mining  k  Trans- 
portation Co.,  25  Sup.  Ct  266»  270,  196  U.  S. 
387,  49  L.  Bd.  SOX 

The  word  'location,"  in  its  application 
to  mining  claims,  has  two  distinct  meanings : 
First,  all  the  acts,  including  discovery,  req- 
uisite to  perfect  the  right  of  possession; 
and,  second,  the  placing  of  the  claims,  the 
posting  of  the  notice,  and  the  marking  of  the 
boundaries*  excluding  discovery.  An  agreed 
statement  of  facts,  which  stipulated  that  the 
lode  claims  of  the  plaintifr  were  'located 
in  compliance  with  law"  at  dates  anterior  to 
the  location  of  the  defendant's  tunnel  stte^ 
and  that  as  to  the  issue  made  in  the  plead* 
ings  upon  the  question  whether  mineral  in 
rock  in  place  was  discovered  in  the  plaintifrs 
daims  before  the  location  of  the  tunnel  site 
the  defendant  offered  testimony  tending  to 
negative  such  diacovMy,  which  is  on  plain- 
tifrs objection  ruled  6at  by  the  court,  and 
such  ruUng  is  excepted  to  by  the  defendant, 
used  the  word  "location"  In  its  more  restrict- 
ed sense,  excluding  discovery,  and  did  not 
estop  the  defendant  ftom  litigating  the  issue 
relative  to  the  discovery  of  mineral  in  rock 
In  place  in  the  plaintiffs  claims  prior  to  the 
location  of  the  defendant's  tunnel  site.  Uin- 
ta Tunnel,  Mln.  &  Transp.  Co.  v.  AJaz  Gold 
Mln.  Co.,  141  Fed.  563,  664,  567,  73  C.  a  A. 
35. 

Bev.  St  I  2324,  providing  that  "location" 
of  mining  claims  shall  be  distinctly  marked 
on  the  ground  so  that  the  boundaries  can  be 
readily  traced,  and  the  location  notlcie  *flled 
shall  contain  a  description  of  the  property 
by  which  it  can  be  identified,  is  mandatory 
and  must  be  compiled  with  in  order  to  secure 
a  valid  location.  A  "location"  is  not  made  by 
taking  possession  alone,  but  by  marking  on 
the  ground,  recording,  and  doing  whatever 
else  is  required  for  that  purpose  by  the  acts 
of  Congress  and  the  local  terms  and  regula- 
tions. Consequentiy,  if  there  is  no  location, 
there  can  be  no  possession  under  it  Location 
does  not  necessarily  follow  from  possession, 
but  possession  from  location.  Ware  v.  White, 
108  S.  W.  831,  834,  81  Ark.  220  (quoting  Belk 
v.  Meagher,  104  U.  S.  279,  26  L  Kd.  735). 

MINIHQ  OPEBATZON 

Const  1898,  art  230,  proTides  that  prop- 
erty employed  in  mining  operations  shall  be 
exempt  from  parochial  and  municipal  taxes 
for  a  period  of  10  years  from  January  1, 1900. 
Held,  that  a  "mining  operation**  has  to  do 
with  the  working  of  a  mine,  and  a  "mine," 
defined  as  an  excavation  in  the  earth  for  the 
purpose  of  getting  metal  ores  or  coal,  does 
not  indude  an  oil  well,  and  property  used  in 
connection  with  petroleum  wells  is  not  ot- 
empted  under  the  article.  J.  M.  Ouffey  Pe- 
troleum Co.  V.  Murrel,  08  South.  700,  711,  127 
La.  466: 


MINING  PARTNERSHIP 


394 


MINING  PARTNmaHIP 


MJJIIJIO  PABTWBBMfflP 

Trading  partnership   dlirdngnlRheil,  see 
Trading  Partnership. 

A  mining  partnership  exists  when  two 
or  more  persons,  who  own  or  acquire  a  min- 
ing claim  for  the  purpose  of  working  it  and 
extracting  the  mineral  therefrom,  actually  en- 
gage in  working  the  same.  Marks  v.  Gates,  2 
Alaska,  519,  523. 

In  order  to  constitute  a  "mining  partp 
nership"  under  the  Idaho  Revised  Statutes 
of  1887,  it  is  essential  that  the  co-owners  ac- 
tnaUy  engage  in  working  the  mine  or  in  the 
business  of  operating  the  mine.  The  co- 
tenancy of  two  or  more  persons  in  a  min- 
ing claim  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  con- 
stitute such  tenants  mining  partners.  It  is 
not  essential  that  all  the  tenants  join  in  the 
working  or  business  of  mining  in  order  to 
establish  such  partnership,  but  that  relation 
may  be  established  among  such  co-owners  as 
have  actually  engaged  in  the  working  or 
''mining  operation.*'  Those  not  so  engaging 
will  be  left  to  their  right  and  chargeable  by 
their  duties  as  cotenants  only.  Madar  t. 
Norman,  92  Pac.  672,  13  Idaho,  586. 

"A  'mining  partnership*  exists  between 
the  tenants  in  common  of  a  mine  who  work 
it  together  and  divide  the  profits  in  propor- 
tion to  their  several  interests.  Ownership 
of  shares  or  interests  in  the  mine  is  an  es- 
sential element  of  a  mining  partnership.  The 
relation  does  not  exist  between  tiie  owners 
of  a  mine  and  one  who,  under  a  contract 
with«them,  works  a  mine  for  a  share  in  the 
profits  or  proceeds.  Mere  profit  sharing  will 
not  create  a  mining  partnereOiip.  •  •  • 
A  mining  partnership  differs  from  an  ordi- 
nary partnership  in  the  fact  that  no  con- 
tract between  the  partners  is  necessary  to 
create  it,  that  there  is  no  delectus  person- 
arum,  so  that  the  death  of  a  member  of  the 
transfer  of  his  interest  does  not  operate  as  a 
dissolution,  and  that  there  are  no  rights  of 
survivorship.  Because  of  the  absence  of 
these  features,  mining  partnerships  have  been 
said  not  to  be  true  partnerships,  but  rather  a 
cross  between  tenancies  in  common  and  part^ 
nershlps  proper.*'  Blackmarr  v.  Williamson, 
50  S.  B.  254,  256,  57  W.  Va.  249,  4  Ann.  Gas. 
'265. 

A  "mining  partnership**  may  exist, 
though  all  of  the  partners  may  not  have  a 
personal  interest  in  the  property,  if  they  liave 
an  interest  in  tiie  working  of  the  property, 
and  it  is  not  essential  that  there  be  an  ex- 
press agreement  to  become  partners,  or  an  ex- 
press agreement  to  share  profits  and  losses, 
as  that  is  an  incident  to  the  prosecution  of 
the  general  business.  Bentley  v.  Brossard,  94 
Pac.  736,  743,  33  Utah,  396. 

A  "mining  partnership**  exists  where  the 
several  owners  of  a  mine  co-operate  in  work- 
ing it  .  Where  two  parties  leased  mining 
property  and  ol>tained  a  bond  for  its  con- 
veyance upon  payment  of  a  sum  by  a  certain 


date,  which  was  extended  for  a  oonsideratioii 
each  paying  half,iind  where,  under  the  bom 
and  lease,  the  parties  agreed  to  work  tii< 
property  Jointly,  each  to  bear  one-half  th 
expense,  the  defendant  putting  in  his  owi 
work  and  the  plaintiff  furnishing  a  man  t 
do  his  share  of  the  work,  they  were  eqna 
partners  in  respect  to  the  joint  enterpria 
in  which  they  were  engaged  for  the  purposi 
of  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  bou 
and  lease.  Walker  ▼.  Bruce,  97  Pac.  250,  4^ 
Colo.  109. 

A  "mining  partnership"  exists  when  tw< 
or  more  persons  who  own  or  acquire  a  mln 
ing  claim  for  the  purpose  of  working  it  anc 
extracting  the  mineral  therefrom  actually 
engage  in  working  the  same.  An  express 
agreement  to  become  partners  or  to  share  th( 
profits  and  losses  of  mining  is  not  necessan 
to  the  formation  and  existence  of  the  part 
nership.  The  relation  arises  ftom  the  own 
ership  of  shares  or  interests  in  tiie  mine  an^ 
the  working  of  the  same.  Eisenberg  v.  Gold 
smith,  118  Pac  1127,  1131,  42  Mont  56S 
(quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  in  Be? 
Codes,  ii  5535,  5536). 

"'Mining  partnerships'  are  somewhat 
peculiar  in  their  nature,  and  the  ordlnan 
rules  regarding  such  relations  do  not,  U 
seems,  apply.  Of  course,  there  may  be  a 
strict  partnership  in  a  mining  venture — foi 
Instance,  where  it  is  formed  for  the  purpose 
of  working  a  mine  by  extracting  minerals 
therefrom — and  in  such  a  case  there  musi 
be  an  accounting  in  equity.  But  parties  maj 
be  tenants  in  conunon  of  a  mining  property 
without  being  partners.  It  is  alleged  in  the 
petition  that  the  contract  in  this  case  wai 
for  prospecting,  locating,  and  developing  min- 
ing claims  on  the  public  domain  in  the  Crii^ 
pie  Creek  district  for  the  joint  and  equal 
benefit  of  the  parties,  and  each  was  to  for- 
nish  labor,  supplies,  and  money  for  this  pur- 
pose. If  by  this  it  was  meant  to  <diarge  that 
the  mine,  when  discovered  and  developed, 
should  be  worked  on  Joint  account,  doubtless 
a  partnership  would  have  been  created,  at 
least  as  to  the  working  of  the  mine.  But 
the  petition  does  not  allege  such  an  agree- 
ment, nor  did  plaintiff's  evidence  show  it" 
"Such  agreements  should  be  construed  ac- 
cording to  the  intent  of  the  parties,  and, 
while  they  may  speak  of  eadik  other  as  part- 
ners, this  tom,  as  is  well  known,  does  not 
in  all  cases  mean  that  the  parties  are  en- 
gaged in  a  joint  enterprise,  each  agreeing  to 
share  the  profits  and  to  bear  a  part  of  the 
losses  of  the  particular  business.  In  order 
to  create  a  'mining  partnership,*  it  seems  to 
be  necessary  that  there  be  an  agreement  to 
work  the  mine  for  the  joint  profit  of  the  par- 
ties. Otherwise  the  owners  of  the  property, 
acquired  in  sudi  manner  as  is  here  charged, 
are  tenants  in  conunon.'*  Doyle  v.  Bums,  99 
N.  W.  195,  197,  128  Iowa,  488  (citing  and  ap- 
proving Boucher  v.  Mulverhill,  1  Mont  310: 
Duryea  v.  Burt,  28  Oal.  569;  Hartney  v.  Gos 


MINIKa  PARTNERSHIP 


396 


.  MIHIfiXXRlAL 


liBg,  68  Pac.  1121,  10  Wy6«  115,  06  Am.  St 
Rep.  972;  Patrick  v.  Wteton,  43  Pac.  446,  21 
Colo.  73;  Anaoonda  Copper  Mining  Ca  t. 
Batte  &  Boston  Min.  Co^  48  Paa  492,  17 
Mont  519). 

Where  complainant  and  defendant,  who 
were  Jointly  Interested  in  mining  property, 
in  the  derelopment  of  which  complainant  had 
made  adyances,  entered  into  a  contract  giv- 
ing complainant  the  right  to  manage  the 
property  and  apply  the  profits,  and  also,  in 
case  of  a  sale,  the  proceeds  of  the  property 
to  the  repayment  of  such  adrances,  the  ar- 
rangement and  agreement  constituted  a  "min- 
ing partnership."  Connolly  t.  Bouck»  174 
Fed.  312,  315,  96  a  O.  A.  184. 

MUUIO  PSOPEBTT 

See  Entire  Mining  Property. 

Mnrnf o  wbmujt 

The  Legislature  has  now  classed  oil  and 
gas  among  minerals  of  this  stato;  and  per- 
sons engaged  in  producing  these  minerals  are 
following  a  mining  pursuit  Act  No.  144  of 
1908;  Act  No.  164  of  1910;  Act  No,  172  of 
1910;  Act  No.  196  of  1910;  Act  No.  254  of 
1910.  Etchison  Drilling  Ca  t.  Floumoy,  69 
Soath.  867,  872,  131  La.  442. 

Mnrni G  BEOOBDS 

The  term  "mining  records,"  as  used  in 
B.  dc  C.  Comp.  I  6668,  authorizing  Uens  on 
mines  In  favor  of  laborers  and  materialmen, 
but  proTidlng  that  It  shall  not  apply  to  the 
owner  when  the  mine  is  worked  by  a  lessee, 
if  a  copy  of  the  lease  is  recorded  in  the  min- 
ing records  of  the  county  before  the  work 
is  begun,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  defining 
sneb  term,  or  prescribing  that  such  Instru- 
ments shall  be  recorded  in  any  particular 
book,  is  sufficiently  compiled  with  by  the 
record  of  a  mining  lease  In  a  book  kept  by  the 
county  derk  for  the  recording  of  leases  and 
Instruments  affecting  the  title  to  ndning 
claims,  designated  "mining  conveyances." 
Slover  V.  Bailey,  90  Paa  665,  606,  49  Or.  426. 

Hnmro  right 

As  property,  see  Property. 

''A  'mining  right'  is  a  fight  to  enter  upon 
and  occupy  ground  for  the  purpose  of  work- 
ing it,  either  by  underground  excavation  or 
open  working;  to  obtain  from  it  the  minerals 
or  ores  which  may  be  deposited  thereunder. 
By  implication,  the  grant  of  such  a  right  car- 
ries with  it  whatever  Is  incident  to  it  and 
necessary  to  ite  beneficial  enjoyment  The 
term  may  also  include  licenses  and  the  rights 
of  the  owner  of  the  minerals."  McGraw  v. 
UuUn,  68  S.  B.  27,  28,  67  W.  Va.  385. 

A  "mine"  Is  an  excavation  in  the  earth 
to  obtain  minerals,  an  excavation,  properly 
nnder  ground,  to  take  out  some  useful  prod- 
uct, and  a  mining  right  is  a  right  to  excavate 
In  the  earth  to  obtein  minerals  or  other  use- 
fol  products.    People  v.  BeU,  86  N.  S.  593, 


594,  287  m.  882»  19  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  746,  15 
Ann.  Caa.  511. 

durd's  Rev.  St  1905,  p.  1399,  c.  94,  H  6, 
7,  declare  that  any  mining  right  or  the  right 
to  dig  for  or  obtain  iron,  lead,  copper,  coal,  or 
other  mineral  from  land  may  be  conveyed  by 
deed  or  lease,  which  may  be  acknowledged 
and  recorded  in  the  same  manner  as  deeds 
and  leases  of  real  estete,  and  that  when  the 
owner  of  land  shall  convey,  by  deed  or  lease, 
any  mining  right  therein,  the  conveyance 
shaU  be  otmsldeied  as  so  s^iMirating  such 
right  from  the  land  as  to  be  separately  taxa- 
ble. Held  that,  since  petroleum  is  a  mineral, 
the  right  of  the  lessee  to  mine  for  oil  and 
gas  on  certain  specified  luremises  is  a  min- 
ing right,  and  separately  taxable  under  such 
sections.  People  v.  Bell,  86  K.  B.  593,  694, 
237  IlL  832,  19  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  746,  15  Ann. 
Cas.  51X 

Mnmro  work 

Ab  improvement,  see  Improvement 

MINISTER 

As  profession,  see  Profession. 

A  pubUc  school  opened  with  prayer  and 
the  reading  without  comment  of  passages 
from  King  James'  translation  of  the  Bible, 
during  which  pupils  are  not  required  to  at- 
tend, is  not  a  ''place  of  worship,'*  nor  are  ite 
teachers  "ministers  of  religion,"  within  the 
meaning  of  Const  |  5,  providing  that  no  per- 
son shall  be  compeUed  to  attend  any  place 
of  worship  or  contribute  to  the  support  of  a 
minister  of  religion.  Hackett  v.  Brooksville 
Graded  School  Dist,  87  &  W.  792,  798,  120 
Ky.  606,  69  L.  B.  A.  692. 


The  term  ''ministerlar  is  generic  rathM 
than  specific,  and  includes  acte  which  are 
ministerial  only  and  involve  no  judgment  or 
discretion,  and  those  which  are  quasi  Judi- 
cial ;  a  purely  ministerial  act  being  one  which 
a  person  performs  on  a  given  stete  of  facts, 
in  a  prescribed  manner,  in  obedience  to  the 
mandate  of  legal  authority,  without  regard 
to  his  own  Judgment  on  the  propriety  of  the 
act    Stete  V.  Stutsman  (N.  D.)  139  N.  W.  83, 

8a 


The  word  "mlnisterlar  means  1;iertaln- 
ing  to  executive  offices  as  distinguished  from 
Judicial;  administrative."  An  act  in  the  per- 
formance of  a  ministerial  duty  is  imperative 
It  is  done  in  obedience  to  some  legal  mandate, 
and  it  involves  the  exercise  of  no  official  dis- 
cretion and  of  no  Judgment  as  to  the  propriety 
of  the  act  thereby  differing  entirely  from  an 
act  in  the  performance  of  Judicial  duties. 
Hamma  v.  People,  94  Pac  326,  327,  42  Colo. 
401,  15  L.  B.  A«  (N.  S.)  621,  16  Ann.  Oa&  655. 

The  words  '^ministerial  and  ''adminis- 
trattve^'  may  be,  and  fnequMiflyare,  used 
interchangeably.  An  "administrative  offloet^ 
is  frequently  classed  as  a  "ministerial  of- 


MINISTERIAL  ACT 


396 


MINISTERIAL  ACT 


fleer/'  and  vice  venuu  Bouvler  speaks  of 
"administrative*'  as  synonymous  with  "execu- 
tive/' a  "ministerial  dul^";  one  in  which 
nothing  is  left  to  discretion.  People  v.  Sals- 
bury,  96  N.  W.  936,  940,  134  Mich.  537  (citing 
State  V.  Loechqer,  91  N.  W.  874,  65  Neb.  814, 
59  L.  R.  A.  915). 

MINISTEBIAL  ACT 

A  "ministerial  act"  is  one  which  a  person 
performs  in  a  given  state  of  facts  in  a  pre- 
scribed manner,  in  obedience  to  the  mandate 
of  legal  authority,  without  regard  to,  or  the 
exercise  of,  his  own  judgment  upon  the  pro- 
priety of  the  act  being  done.  Galey  y.  Board 
of  Oom*rs  of  Montgomery  Ck)unty,  91  N.  B. 
593,  594,  174  Ind.  181,  Ann.  Ga&  19120^ 
1099;  Freund  v.  Freund,  76  N.  B.  925,  930, 
218  lU.  189,  109  Am.  St  Rep.  283;  Floumoy 
V.  aty  of  JeffersonviUe,  17  Ind.  169,  174,  79 
Am.  Dec.  468;  Pennington  v.  Streight,  54 
Ind.  376,  377;  Galey  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Montgomery  County,  91  N.  E.  593,  594,  174 
Ind.  181,  Ann.  Oas.  1912G,  1099;  Bair  ▼. 
Struck,  74  Pac.  69,  71,  29  Mont  45,  63  L.  R. 
A  481  (citing  Throop,  Pub.  Off.  |  537). 

A  "ministerial  act"  Is  an  "act,  office,  or 
power  that  is  to  be  performed  or  exercised 
uniformly  on  a  given  state  of  facts,  in  a  pre- 
scribed manner,  in  obedience  to  law  or  the 
mandate  of  legal  authority,  without  depend- 
ence on  the  exercise  of  Judgment  as  to  pro- 
priety of  so  doing/*  Metz  v.  Maddox,  105 
N.  Y.  Supp.  702,  712,  121  App.  Div.  147  (quot- 
ing Ont  Diet.). 

"A  'ministerial  act,'  as  applied  to  a  pub- 
lic officer,  i9  defined  to  be  an  act  or  thing 
which  he  is  required  to  perform  by  direction 
of  legal  authority  upon  a  given  state  of  facts, 
independent  of  what  he  may  think  of  the 
propriety  or  impropriety  of  doing  the  act  in 
the  particular  case."  The  duty  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  in  granting  a  certificate  to  a 
private  banking  corporation  being  purely 
ministerial,  mandamus  lies  to  compel  him  to 
isslie  the  certificate.  State  ex  rel.  Jones  v. 
Gook,  73  S.  W.  489,  493, 174  Mo.  100. 

A  "ministerial  act"  is  one  which  a  public 
officer  is  required  to  perform  upon  a  given 
state  of  facts,  in  a  prescribed  manner,  in 
obedience  to  the  mandate  of  legal  authority, 
and  without  regard  to  his  .own  judgment  or 
opinion  concerning  the  propriety  or  impro- 
priety of  the  act  to  be  performed.  Garff  v. 
Smith,  86  Pac.  772,  773,  31  Utah,  102,  120 
Am.  St  R^.  924  (citing  State  ex  rel.  North 
ft  South  Ry.  Co.  v.  Meier,  45  S.  W.  306,  143 
Mo.  439). 

"Official  action,  the  result  of  perform- 
ing a  certain  and  specific  duty,  arising  from 
fixed  and  designated  facts,  is  a  'ministerial 
act'"  Rainey  v.  Ridgway,  43  South.  843, 
844,  151  Ala.  532  (citing  Floumoy  v.  aty  of 
JeffersonviUe,  17  Ind.  169,  79  Am.  Dee.  466; 
Tennessee  &  C.  R.  Ck>.  v.  Moore,  36  Ala.  371; 
Morton  v.  Oomptroller  General,  4  S.  (X  430; 


Gommiasloiier  of  the  General  Land  Office  v. 
Smith,  6  Tex.  471;  life  &  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v 
Wilson,  8  Pet  291,  8  L.  Ed.  949). 

AllowABoe  of  elidm 

Prohibition  does  not  lie  to  restrain  tin 
commissioners'  court  from  proceeding  witii 
the  construction  of  a  bridge  for  the  building 
of  which  a  contract  has  been  let  by  it;  the 
allowance  of  a  daim  therefor  being  a  "mini» 
terial  act"  Goodwin  v.  State  ex  ret  Wake 
field,  40  South.  122,  123,  145  Ala.  536. 

AssesMuemt    of   oMittod    yroportx    fm 
tazAtioa 

Where  a  city  council  by  ordinance  pro 
vided  for  the  listing  of  omitted  taxes  upon 
notice  and  hearing,  the  act  of  "assessing 
omitted  property  partakes  somewhat  of  min- 
isterial and  somewhat  of  Judicial  or  quasi 
judicial  functions.  That  is  to  say,  the  act  ir 
listing  of  the  property  for  taxation  is  (dearlj 
a  'ministerial  act';  and,  as  an  incident  i< 
finds  the  fact  whether  the  property  was  in 
fact  omitted,  whether  it  belonged  to  the  al- 
leged recusant  taxpayer,  and  what  its  fail 
value  then  was.  To  hear  evidence,  and 
therefrom  to  find  whether  a  certain  fact  was 
or  was  not,  partakes  of  'Judicial  functions.* 
Still  it  is  not  necessarily  Judicial,  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  an  act  of  a  court  Many  ministe 
rial  acts  include  in  part  the  determination  ol 
pre-existing  facts,  and  the  exercising  of  the 
quality  of  Judgment  sometimes  called  *di» 
cretion*  with  respect  thereto.  •  •  •  The 
action  of  the  council  in  assessing  omitted 
property  is  purely  ministerial,  although  it 
has  mixed  certain  discretion  as  to  finding 
values  and  the  like,  which  is  not  reviewable, 
and  which  quality  is  sometimes  called  'Judi- 
cial,' though  it  is  not  Judicial  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  the  act  of  a  court"  And  hence  the 
ordinance  was  not  in  violation  of  the  consti- 
tutional limits  upon  the  part  of  the  Legisla- 
ture to  create  any  "Judicial  tribunals"  other 
than  the  courts  expressly  named  in  that  in- 
strument Muir's  Adm'r  v.  City  of  Bards- 
town,  87  S.  W.  1096,  1098,  120  Ky.  739. 

Entry  of  Jndsment 

Under  L.  O.  L.  1 185,  which  provides  that 
in  an  action  arising  upon  contract  for  the  re- 
covery of  money  or  damages  only,  if  no  an- 
swer is  filed  within  the  time  Umited,  the  clerk 
on  the  plaintiff*s  written  application  shall 
enter  the  default  and  thereupon  give  Judg- 
ment for  the  sum  demanded  against  one  or 
more  of  the  defendants  amenable  by  appear- 
ance on  service  of  process,  the  clerk  in  ente^ 
ing  such  Judgment  exercises  no  Judicial  func- 
tions, but  performs  a  "ministerial  act,"  which 
in  general  consists  in  the  discharge  of  some 
duty  enjoined  by  law  upon  one  or  more  per- 
sons, who,  in  obeying  the  rule  prescribed,  ex- 
ercise no  Judgment  or  discretion  regarding 
the  matter.  Hodgdon  v.  Goodspeed,  118  Pac 
167, 168, 60  Or.  1  (dting  5  Words  and  Phrases, 
p.  452^.    . 


IflNISTBRIAIi  ACT 


397 


MINISTERIAIi  DUTY 


The  renditioii  of  a  Jadgment  by  tbe  court 
Is  a  jndiidal  act;  but  the  entry  thereof  by  the 
derk  is  not,  but  Is  a  ''ministerial  act'*  Jaqna 
v.  Harklns,  82  N.  B.  020.  922,  40  Ind.  App.  089. 

Imwabiw  of  eertifioate  to  iMuak 
*'A  'ministerial  act'  is  one  which  a  public 
officer  or  agent  is  required  to  perform  upon  a 
given  state  of  facts  in  a  prescribed  manner 
in  obedience  to  the  mandate  of  legal  authority 
and  without  regard  to  his  own  Judgment  or 
opinion  concerning  the  propriety  or  impropri- 
ety of  the  act  to  be  performed."  The  duty  of 
the  bank  commissioner  to  issue  to  a  bank  a 
certiflcate  when  all  the  things  required  to  be 
done  have  been  done  is  not  discretionary,  and 
mandamus  will  lie  to  compel  him  to  perform 
such  duty  which  is  merely  a  ministerial  one. 
Smock  ▼.  Farmers'  Union  State  Bank,  98  Pac 
»i5,  94a  22  OkL  825  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Merrill,  Mandamus,  pw  90). 

JvdidAl  aei  distliigwislied 

See  Judicial  Act 

Keepias  ottee  aad  reeotfds  at  seat  of 

A  "ministerial  act"  is  an  act  whicb  a  per- 
son performs  on  a  given  state  of  facts  in  a 
prescribed  manner,  in  obedience  to  the  man- 
date of  legal  authority,  without  regard  to,  or 
the  exercise  of,  his  own  Judgment,  upon  the 
propriety  of  the  act  done.  The  constitutional 
provision  requiring  each  executive  officer  to 
keep  his  office  and  public  records  and  papers 
at  the  seat  of  government  requires  a  mere 
ministerial  act,  bo  that  mandatory  injunction 
will  lie  to  enjoin  the  execmtive  officers  of  the 
state  other  than  the  Governor  from  removing 
their  offices,  public  records,  etc.,  from  the  seat 
of  government,  and  expending  the  state  funds 
for  that  purpose.  State  ex  rel.  Attorney  Gen- 
eral V.  Huston,  113  Pac  190,  198,  27  OkL  006, 
34  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  380  (quoting  and  adopting 
the  definition  in  27  Gya  p.  793). 

As  proeeodiag 

See  Proceeding. 
Bejeetioii  aad  retnra  of  oloetloa  ballot 

A  moderator  of  a  voting  district,  who 
honestly  r^ects  the  ballot  of  an  elector  and 
returns  it  as  prescribed  by  statute,  is  not  lia- 
ble in  tort  to  the  elector,  though  the  act  fol* 
lowing  the  quasi  Judicial  determination  of  the 
invalidity  of  the  ballot  is  a  "ministerial  act," 
which  is  performed  in  a  given  state  of  facts 
in  obedience  to  the  law,  without  regard  to  or 
the  exercise  of  his  own  Judgment  on  the  pro- 
priety of  the  act  being  done.  Blake  v.  Mason, 
73  Atl.  782,  783,  82  Conn.  324. 


SoUovias  BilUtIa  oflloe» 

"Official  action,  the  result  of  performing 
a  certain  and  specific  duty,  arisbig  from  fixed 
and  designated  fticts,  is  a  ^ministerial  act'*" 
The  act  of  a  Governor  in  relieving  relator 
from  his  conunand  as  colonel  of  a  regiment  in 
the  state  national  guard  for  the  good  of  the 
service,  without  a  trial  or  bearing  on  charges 


preferred,  was  not  a  mialsterial  aet,  but  ooo- 
stituted  an  exercise  of  tbe  Governor's  discre- 
tion, wbldi  could  not  b«  controlled  by  manda- 
mua  State  ez  reL  HIgdon  ▼.  Jelks,  85  South. 
60,  62,  188  Ala.  115  (quottng  and  adopting 
definition  in  Ozlder  t.  Talley,  77  Ala.  424,  54 
Am.  Rep.  65;  Bz  parts  Thompson,  62  Ala.  98^. 

mXISTSBUJi  DITTT 

A  purely  ^'ministerial  duty"  la  one  ae  to 
whidk  nothing  la  left  to  discretion.  City  of 
Biddleford  t.  Yates,  72  AtL  386,  887,  104  Me. 
606, 16  Ann.  Cas.  1001. 

A  ''ministerial  duty^  Is  one  regarding 
which  nothing  is  left  to  discretion — a  simple 
and  definite  duty,  imposed  by  law,  and  arising 
under  conditions  admitted  or  prored  to  exist 
If  it  is  one  that  requires  exercise  of  Judgment 
in  its  performance,  it  is  not  ministerial  but 
discretionary.  State  y.  Howard,  74  AtL  892, 
395,  83  Vt  6. 

A  "ministerial  duty,*'  the  performance  of 
which  may  in  proper  cases  be  required,  is 
one  in  which  nothing  is  left  to  discretion.  It 
is  a  simple  definite  duty  arising  under  condi- 
tions admitted  or  proved  to  exist  and  imposed 
by  law.  State  ex  reL  Attorney  General  t. 
Huston,  118  Pac.  190,  198,  27  OkL  606,  84  L. 
B.  A.  (N.  &)  880  (quoting  and  adopting  the 
definition  in  Marbury  t.  Madison,  1  Granch, 
137,  2  L.  Ed.  60). 

Official  duty  is  "ministexlal,"  when  it  is 
absolute,  certain,  and  imperative,  involving 
merely  execution  of  a  specific  duty  arising 
from  fixed  and  designated  facta.  People  v. 
May,  96  N.  E.  999,  1000,  251  IlL  64,  Ann.  Gas. 
19120,  5ia 

"An  official  duty  Is  'mlnisteriaF  when  it 
is  absolute,  certain,  and  imperative,  involving 
merely  the  execution  of  a  set  task,  and  when 
the  law  which  imposes  it  prescribes  and  de- 
fines the  time,  mode,  and  occasion  of  its  per- 
formance with  such  certainty  that  nothing 
remains  for  Judgment  or  discretion.  Official 
action  is  ministerial  when  it  is  the  result  of 
performing  a  certain  and  specific  duty  arising 
from  fixed  and  designated  facts.**  Garff  v. 
Smith,  86  Pac.  772,  773,  31  Utah.  102,  120  Am. 
St  Rep.  924  (quoting  People  for  Use  of  Mun- 
son  V.  Bartels,  27  N.  B.  1091, 138  IlL  322). 

Where  an  officer's  duty  necessarily  re- 
quires examination  of  evidence  in  the  decision 
of  questions  of  law  and  fact,  the  duty  is  not 
ministerial,  but  Judicial  or  discretionary.  An 
act,  however,  is  none  the  less  ministerial  be^ 
cause  tbe  person  performing  it  may  have  to 
satisfy  himself  that  a  state  of  flacto  exists  un* 
der  which  it  is  his  rigfht  and  duty  to-perform 
tile  act,  though  in  doing  so  he  must  to  some 
extent  construe  the  statute  by  which  the  duty 
is  imposed.  Stephens  v.  Jones,  123  N.  W.  705, 
708,  24  S-  D.  97.  . 

.   QrtaMMK  eleetloa  eevttfte^te 

A  '"Bilnlst^rial"  duty  it  ^'ene  whl^  has 
been  positively  Imposed  by  law  and  its  per> 


MINISTERIAL  OFFICE— OFFICER      398 


MINOB 


formance  required  at  a  time  and  in  a  manner 
or  upon  conditions  wMcb  are  spedflcally  des- 
ignated; the  duty  to  perform  under  tbe  condi- 
tions spedfled  not  being  dependent  on  the  of- 
ficer's diflcertlon'*  (quoting  Mediam  on  Pub- 
Uc  Officers,  |  658).  A  "ministerial"  diuty,  the 
performance  of  which  may,  in  proper  cases, 
be  required  of  the  head  of  a  department,  by 
judicial  process,  is  one  in  respect  to  which 
nothing  is  left  to  discretion.  It  Is  simply  defi- 
nite duty  arising  under  conditions  admitted 
or  proTed  to  exist  or  imposed  by  law  (quoting 
Sullivan  v.  Shanklin.  63  Cal.  247,  251). 
"Where  the  law  prescribes  and  defines  the 
duty  to  be  performed  with  such  precision  and 
certainty  as  to  leave  nothing  to  the  exercise 
of  Judgment,  the  act  is  'ministerial' "  (quot- 
ing Commls&doner  of  the  General  Land  Office 
V.  Smith,  5  Tex.  471).  €k)nsequently,  the  duty 
Imposed  by  Rev.  St  Wyo.  1899,  |  351,  upon 
the  Oovemor  to  grant  a  certificate  of  election 
to  state  ofilcers  after  the  canvassing  board 
has  filed  Its  certificate  showing  him  to  have 
been  elected,  is  a  "mlnisterlar'  duty.  State 
ex  reL  Irvine  v.  Brooks,  84  Pac  488,  490,  14 
Wyo.  393,  6  U  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  750,  7  Ann  Cas. 
110& 

MIinSTEItlAL  OFFIOE^-OmCEB 

Assessors  of  taxes  and  county  clerks  are 
''ministerial  officers,"  and,  while  in  some  re- 
spects their  acts  may  be  construed  as  Judi- 
cial, they  are  not  "Judicial  officers"  as  that 
term  is  used  in  the  Constitution.  They  have 
no  power  to  inflict  penalties  for  violation  of 
laws  or  to  determine  whether  a  law  has  been 
violated  and  adjudge  persons  guilty.  Cleve- 
land, C,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  V.  People,  72  N.  B. 
725,  726^  212  IlL  638. 

Attorney 

Acts  1880,  p.  18,  No.  11,  making  it  unlaw- 
ful for  any  Judicial  or  "ministerial  officer" 
of  any  of  the  courts  of  the  state  to  go  ball  for 
any  prisoner,  etc.,  refers  exclusively  to  such 
officers  as  Judges,  clerks,  sheriffs,  and  their 
deputies,  etc.,  as  directly  constitute  the  ma- 
chinery of  the  court,  and  does  not  prohibit  an 
attorney  from  becoming  a  surety  on  his  cli- 
ent's ball  bond,  though  an  attorney  is  an 
jofficer  of  the  courts  generally.  State  v.  Rab- 
in, 50  South.  825,  826,  124  La.  1005,  18  Ann. 
Cas.  837. 

City  olerk 

The  dty  derk  of  Los  Angeles  is  a  purely 
"ministerial  officer"  who  must  sign  any  ordi- 
nance duly  passed,  regardless  of  any  views 
which  he  may  entertain  as  to  its  legality. 
City  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Lelande,  106  Pac.  218, 
219,  157  CaL  30  (citing  City  of  Loe  Angeles 
V.  Hance,  70  Pac.  475,  187  Cal.  490). 

Olerk  of  ooitrt 

The  clerk  of  a  court  is  essentially  a  min- 
isterial officer.  He  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  cliaracter  cr  purpose  of  papers  which  are 
tendered  to  him  to  be  fijed.     When  suit-  is 


ordered  or  process  directed  to  be  issued,  it 
his  duty  to  comply,  if  the  party  is  prii 
facie  entitled  to  it,  and  for  failure  to  do 
be  is  liable  for  any  loss;  the  measure  of  I 
liabiUty  being  the  damages  which  have  i 
suited  theref)*om.  In  an  action  on  the  offid 
bond  of  a  derk  of  the  circuit  court  for  i 
fusal  to  issue  a  smnmons,  the  plalntlflT  mn 
state,  in  his  declaration,  enough  to  show  tb 
he  had  a  good  cause  of  action  against  tj 
parties  whom  he  desired  to  sue.  He  cann 
simply  claim  as  damages  the  amount  f 
which  he  wanted  to  bring  suit  Any  ded 
ration  or  complaint  which  does  nothing  mo 
is  demurrable.  United  States  v.  Bell,  1 
Fed.  1002, 1003  (citing  7  Cyc  p.  19^. 

Poliooauui 

Under  Code  1904,  p.  1018,  cL  1,  |  1017 
iwovlding  that  officers  and  privates  in  tl 
police  force  of  cities  and  towns  of  the  coi 
mon wealth  shall  possess  such  power  and  a 
thorlty  as  now  belongs  to  the  office  of  coi 
stable  at  common  law  in  enforcing  the  crii 
Inal  laws  of  the  commonweal^  and  the  o 
dlnances  of  the  city  or  town  for  which  th< 
are  appointed  or  elected,  and  it  shall  be  tl 
duty  of  policemen  to  prevent  the  commlssic 
within  the  dty  or  town  of  offenses  again 
the  laws  pf  the  commonwealth  and  againi 
the  ordinances  of  th,e  dty  or  town,  to  obsen 
and  enforce  all  such  laws  and  ordinance 
to  detect  and  arrest  offenders  against  tl 
same,  to  preserve  the  good  order  of  the  d1 
or  town,  and  to  secure  the  inhabitants  theri 
of  from  violence  and  the  property  therei 
from  Injury,  a  policeman  is  not  a  pure) 
"ministerial  officer,"  since  a  number  of  tl 
powers  enumerated  in  the  statute  are  of  a 
executive  character,  and  therefore  a  perso 
bribing  a  policeman  is  subject  to  punlshmei 
under  Code,  |  3744,  providing  that  if  as 
person  give  or  offer  any  gift  or  gratuity  t 
any  "executive  officer"  with  intent  to  ii 
fiuence  his  act,  decision,  or  Judgment  o 
any  matter  or  question  which  is  or  may  fc 
then  pending,  or  may  be  brought  before  hii 
in  his  offidal  capadty,  shall  be  punished,  et( 
Haynes  v.  Commonwealth,  52  S.  B.  358,  35( 
104  Va.  854. 

MINOR 

Man  as  including,  see  Man. 
See^  also»  Child— Children  (In  Crlndiia 
Law).     , 

The  common-law  rule  that  a  minor  Is  o 
age  on  the  beginning  of  the  day  preceding  bl 
twenty-first  anniversary  does  not  pi^evaJ 
here,  under  Rev.  Civ.  Code,  art  37,  providin 
that  minors  are  persons  who  have  not  yet  at 
talned  the  age  of  21  years  complete,  and  i 
minor  whose  twenty-first  anniversary  doe 
not  occur  until  the  next  day  after  an  electioi 
cannot  lawfully  register  to  vote  thereai 
State  ex  rel.  Fleming  v.  Joyce,  48  South.  22J 
222, 123  La.  037, 17  Anii.  Qa^.  905. 


lONOB 


89» 


MuroR 


Tlie  term  ''minor  cbildren,'*  as  used  In 
Const,  art  18,  |  62|  declaring  tluit  the  home- 
stead shall  not  be  apportioned  among  the 
heira  of  the  decedent,  so  long  as  the  goardian 
of  minor  children  may  be  permitted  to  oc- 
cupy the  same^  and  in  Hev.  St  1896,  art 
2046,  requiring  the  setting  apart  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  widow  and  minor  children  of  prop- 
erty exempt  from  execution,  etc,  does  not  in- 
clude minor  gmndchildvoi  living  as  members 
of  the  grandmother's  family,  and  on  her* 
death,  her  property  may  be  sold  to  pay  debts. 
Ross  T.  Martin,  140  8.  W.  482,  483,  104  Tex. 
558. 

Tbe  fact  that  GIt.  Code,  H  25,  27,  defines 
minors  as  males  under  21  and  females  under 
18  years  of  age,  did  not  deprive  the  Legisla- 
ture of  the  right  to  pass  Juvenile  Court  Law 
(St  1911,  pw  658),  declaring  that  various  acts 
shall  constitute  dependency  and  delinquency, 
and  shall  apply  to  all  persons  under  21, 
whether  male  or  female.  Moore  v.  Williams, 
127  Pac.  509,  510,  19  Gal.  App.  600. 

The  words  ''minor  children,"  as  used  in 
Rev.  St  1885,  arts.  2046,  2049,  providing  for 
the  setting  apart  of  the  homestead  and  €S- 
empt  property  to  the  widow,  minor  children, 
and  nmnarried  daughters  of  the  deceased, 
were  used  in  the  sense  of  immediate  descend- 
ants of  the  deceased,  and  therefore  did  not 
include  a  grandchild  who  lived  with  the  intes- 
tate as  a  member  of  his  family.  Wilkins  v. 
Biiggs,  107  &  W.  185,  140,  48  Tez.  Civ.  Appw 
506. 

Laws  1809,  p.  298^  e.  141,  f  17,  providing 
for  the  redemption  of  real  property  of  any 
''minor  heir"  from  a  sale  for  taxes,  applies 
only  to  minors  inheriting  the  property.  Bur- 
dick  V.  Kimball,  101  Flac  845,  846,  53  Wash. 
198. 

Complainant's  mother  conveyed  certain 
Teal  estate  to  defendant  in  trust  for  com- 
plainant, to  be  conveyed  in  fee  to  him  on  his 
becoming  of  age,  with  remainder  over  on  his 
death  before  that  time.  Whoi  complainant 
became  18  years  of  age,  he  obtained  an  order 
removing  his  civil  disabilities,  and  authoriz- 
ing him  to  manage  his  property  and  to  sue 
and  be  sued,  whereupon  he  brought  a  bill  to 
compel  the  trustee  to  convey  the  estate  to 
Mm.  It  was  held  that  the  emancipation  did 
not  terminate  complainant's  minority,  so  as 
to  entitle  him  to  a  conveyance  of  the  trust 
estate,  as  Bev.  Oode  1892,  f  1506,  defines  a 
"minor'*  to  be  any  person  under  the  age  of 
21.  Ray  V.  Kelly,  35  South.  166, 166,  82  Misa 
597. 

Rev.  St  1899,  {  3009,  provides  that  every 
dramshop  keeper  who  sells  intoxicants  to  a 
minor  without  his  parent's  written  consent 
Shan  forfeit  a  certain  sum,  etc.,  and  makes 
every  dramshop  keeper  violating  such  provi- 
sion guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.  Section  8477 
provides  that  males  of  21  years  shall  be  con- 
flldered  of  foil  age,  except  as  otherwise  pro- 
vided by  law  and,  until  they  reach  such  age, 
flball  be  considered  "minors."    Held,  that  the 


fact  that  a  minor  to  wliom  Hquor  was  sold 
without  his  parent's  conaant  was  marKlsd  and 
the  head  of  a  family  would  not  prevent  a  con- 
viction of  the  offender  under  section  3000. 
State  ▼.  Seiberling,  127  S.  W.  106,  107,  148 
Mo.  App.  81& 

Section  721,  Bev.  St,  declaring  that  the 
laws  of  the  several  states,  except  when  the 
ConstituUon^  treaties,  or  statutes  of  the 
United  States  otherwise  provide,  shall  be 
the  rules  of  decisions  in  trials  at  conuuon 
law  where  they  apply,  does  not  require  the 
recognition  of  state  statutes  in  an  examina- 
tion before  an  immigration  officer  to  deter- 
mine the  right'  of  an  alien  to  enter  or  to  re- 
main in  the  United  States  under  our  immigra- 
tion statutes.  Section  3636  of  the  Revised 
Laws  of  Minnesota  of  1900,  providing  that 
the  word  "minor"  shall  mean  a  male  under  21 
or  a  female  under  18  years  of  age,  is  not 
binding  in  determining  whether  an  alien  fe- 
male attains  her  majority  when  she  reaches 
the  age  of  18  years;  but  such  officer  should 
follow  the  common-law  rule,  whidi  fixes  the 
age  of  majority  at  21  for  both  sexes.  Bx 
parte  Petteraon,  166  Fed.  536,  646. 

Under  Glv.  Coda,  |  25,  defining  ''minors'* 
to  Include  males  under  21  years  of  age  and  fe- 
males under  18  years  of  age ;  and  section  26 
providing  that  the  age  of  a  minor  must  be 
calculated  from  the  first  minute  of  the  day 
on  which  he  or  ahe  was  bom  to  the  same 
minute  of  the  ooiresponding  day  completing 
the  period  of  minority,  a  female  bom  on 
March  17,  1889,  completed  her  minority  and 
became  an  adult  at  the  commencement  of 
the  day  on  March  16, 1907,  prior  to  her  com- 
mitment on  that  day  to  a  reform  school  ms  a 
minor  delinqu^it  Bx  parte  Wood,  90  Pac 
961,  962,  5  Cal.  App.  471. 

A  "minor"  within  Act  May  27,  1908,  a. 
199,  H  1,  2,  6,  35  Stat  312,  313,  authorizing 
the  sale  of  the  allotments  of  minor  freedmen, 
includes  males  under  the  age  of  21  years  and 
females  under  the  age  of  18  years,  and  the 
marriage  of  such  minor  does  not  confer  on 
him  or  her  the  authority  to  sell  his  or  her 
allotted  lands  independent  of  the  supervision 
of  the  probate  courta  Jefferson  v.  Winkler, 
110  Pac  755,  768,  26  OkL  653. 

Within  Oomp.  Laws  OkL  1909,  |  6523, 
providing  that  the  marriage  of  a  minor  ward 
terminates  the  guardianship,  and  that  the 
guardian  may  be  discharged  by  the  county 
court  whenever  it  appears  that  the  guardian- 
ship is  no  longer  necessary,  and  Act  Cong. 
May  27,  1908,  c  199,  35  Stat  312,  providing 
that  all  lands  of  minor  allottees,  including 
mixed-blood  Indians  having  less  than  half 
Indian  blood,  shall  be  free  from  restrictions 
on  alienation,  and  section  2,  providing  that 
"the  terms  minor  or  minors  as  used  in  this 
act  shall  include  all  males  under  the  age  of 
twenty-one  years,"  the  marriage  of  a  minor 
male  ward,  a  member  of  the  Cherokee  tribe  of 
Indians,  of  less  than  one-half  Indian  blood. 


MINCm  X^B^GUB 


«0Q 


mnvTM 


does  BQ&.of  ItQcSf  temrinate  his  gntrdiansbip, 
«8  to  his  allotment^  oor  abate  the  juriadiction 
of  the  ooimty  court,  and  the  guardian  under 
such  Jurisdiction  has  authority  to  sell  the 
minor's  allotted  lands.  Kirkpatriok  t.  Bur- 
gess, 116  Pac.  764,  765,  29  OkL  121. 

MXNOB  XiEAGUE 

Tluree  organizations,  th^  National 
League,  the  American  League,  and  the  Na- 
tional  Association,  include  in  their  member- 
ship practically  erery  professional  baseball 
dub  in  the  United  States.  The  first  two 
are  known  as  the  "major  leagues,"  and  the 
last  as  the  ''minor  league."  Kelly  t.  Herr- 
man,  165  iPed.  887,  888. 

mKOB  OFFEH8X 

See,  also,  Misdemeanor. 

An  offense  punishable  by  Imprisonment 
in  the  parish  prison  er  by  hard  labor  in  the 
penitentiary  is  a  '*minor  offense,"  and  not  a 
f^ony.  State  t.  Wa^l,  62  South.  656,  559, 126 
l4|.  400. 

The  words  ••minor  offenses,"  as  used  In 
the  state  Ck>hstitution  authorizing  the  Legis- 
lature to  grade  all. ''misdemeanors  and  minor 
offenses  against  the  state", and  to  fix  the 
minimum  and  maximum  penalty  therefor, 
must  be  construed  as  meaning  minor  crimes, 
sudi  as  petty  larceny  and  the  like,  which 
may  be  punishable  by  imprisonment  in  the 
penitentiary.  The  words  were  used  to  desig- 
nate minor  crimes  which  in  the  discretion  of 
the  court  may  be  punishable  by  imprisonment 
in  the  parish  Jail  or  in  the  penitentiary,  or,  in 
other  words,  as  misdemeanors  or  as  felonies. 
Hence  the  act  grading  misdemeanors  and. mi* 
nor  offenses  is  constitntipnal  in  so  far  as  it 
grades  the  offense  of.  petty  larceny  and  makes 
'the  same  punishable  by  imprisonment  in  the 
parish  Jail.  The  contention  was  that  petty 
larceny  is  a  "felony,"  and  not,  therefore, 
within  the  purview  of  article  155  of  the  Con- 
stitution, or  of  the  title  of  Act  No.  107,  p. 
161,  of  1902.  The  court  says  that  the  word 
"felony"*in  American  law  has  no  very  definite 
or  precise  meaning,  except  in  cases  where  it 
is  defined  by  statute.  "Apart  froni  this,  the 
word  seems  merely  to  imply  a  crime  of  a 
graver  or  More  atrodoub  nature  than  a  mis- 
demeanor." Black's  Law  Dictionary.  The 
term  "felon**  does  not  appear  in  the  Ck>nstitu- 
tion  of  1898.  In  that  instrument  the  words 
"offense"  and  "crime"  are  uised  as  synony- 
mous and  "misdemeanor**  as  the  lowest  grade 
of  offenses.  Articles  9  and  12.  Hence,  in 
construing  article  155,  the  words  "minor  of- 
fenses against  the  state**  must  be  construed  as 
meaning  minor  crimes,  such  as  petty  larceny 
and  the  like,  which  may  be  punishable  by  im- 
prisonment in  the  penitentiary.  Th^,  article 
reads,  "All  misdemeanors  and  minor  offenses 
against  the  state.'*  State  ▼.  Eubanks,  38 
South.  407,  408,  114  La.  428. 


MXHOmiTT 

Real  Propeity  Law  (Laws  1896,  p.  565, 
547)  I  82,  provides  that  for  the  purposes 
the  section  a  ^'minority"  Is  deemed  a  pari 
a  Ufe,  and  not  an  absolute  term  equal  to  tl 
possible  duration  of  such  "minority.**  Tob 
y.  Orounse,  107  N.  Y.  Supp.  990,  994,  57  Mis 
Rep.  252. 

MnrOBITT  PAXtTT 

Acts  1907,  c.  435,  I  1,  providing  that  tl 
members  of  the  State  Board  of  Electioi 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  Governor,  wj 
amended  by  Acts  1909,  c.  103,  |  1,  requirii 
such  board  to  be  elected  by  the  Joint  vote 
both  houses  of  the  General  Assembly.  Sc 
tion  3  of  the  amending  act,  amending  sectic 
4  of  the  original  act,  which  fixed  the  ter 
of  office  of  the  first  members  of  the  boai 
and  made  the  term  of  their  successors  t^ 
years,  provides  that  all  successors  to  tl 
first  board  appointed  shall  be  bona  fide  mei 
hers  of  the  same  party  to  which  the  prece 
ing  members  belongs  Section  4,  amendii 
section  8  of  the  original  act,  which  prohibj 
ed  more  than  two  of  the  members  from  b 
ing  of  the  same  political  party,  provides  thi 
not  more  than  two  of  such  members  shall  b 
long  to  the  same  political  party,  reqair 
the  representatilves  of  the  majority  ai 
minority  parties  to  be  bona  fide  members  < 
su<di  parties,  and  defines  the  '*minority  parti 
as  that  which  polled  the  second  highest  nui 
b»^r  of  votes  at  the  preceding  president! 
election.  Held,  that  the  persons  appoint 
by  the  Governor  as  members  of  the  Sta 
Board  of  Elections  under  the  original  a 
could  not,  in .  proceedings  to  establish  the 
right  to  office  as  against  persons  holdii 
under  the  amending  act,  claim  that  sectioi 
3  and  4  of  the  amending  act  contravened  tl 
Constitution,  as  imposing  a  political  test  t 
a  qualification  for  oflice,  unless  the  invalidli 
of  such  sections  rendered  the  whole  act  1 
valid;  such  sections  not  imposing  any  bu 
dens,  80  as  to  give  them  an  interest  in  the 
validity  as  taxpayers,  and  not  affecting  the 
in  a  way  not  common  to  all  citizens.  Bid 
ardson  v.  Young,  125  S.  W.  664,  667,  li 
Tenn.  471. 

MINUTE 

Loosely,  a  '•minute"  is  a  short  space  < 
time.  We  all  know  well  that  it  is  commc 
parlance  to  describe  the  briefest  space  ( 
tiLie — ^a  second  or  few  seconds — as  a  "ml 
nte*'  or  a  "few  minutes.**  The  expression  * 
couple  of  minutes,**  used  by  plaintiff  in  fl 
action  against  a  railway  in  testifying  tbi 
after  getting  on  the  car  she  waited  a  coup 
of  minutes  before  attempting  to  reach  a  sea 
is  not  necessarily  a  statement  that  she  ac 
ually  desisted  for  120  seconds  In  the  act  ( 
seeking  a  seat.  McGlynn  v.  Nassau  Electr 
R.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  Supp.  119,  120^  128  App.  Di 
866. 


lONUTBS 


iOl 


MI^B^AYIOII 


MINUTES 

The  **inliMiteB"  are  the  proper  record  of 
the  conrty  and  are  under  the  eye  of  the  Judge, 
uid  are  at  least  prima  facie  correct  Dilzell 
Engineering  &  Construction  Go.  t.  Lehmann, 
(5  South.  138,  139,  120  La.  273. 

WhUe  the  'Umnutee*'  kept  by  the  Judge 
are  not  the  memorial  of  the  Judgment,  and 
sre  not  records  required  by  law  to  be  kept, 
tbey  constitute  legal  eyidence  of  what  was 
Adjudged,  and  as  such  may  serve  as  the  foun- 
dation fbr  the  correction  of  errors  of  the 
clerk  in  the  performance  of  his  duty.  The 
minutes  are  only  evidenoe  of  what  was  done. 
State  ex  rel.  Sheridan  Pub.  Ck>.  y.  Goodrich, 
140  8.  W.  020^  690,  168  Mo.  App.  422  (dt^ 
ing  Krelsel  ▼.  Snavely,  116  8.  W.  lOeO,  136 
Ho.  App.  166). 

MISADMINISTRATION 

See  Homicide  by  Misadyeiitiiiia 

MISAPPLICATION 

See     Willful     MisappUcatiOD— Willfully 
Misapply. 

To  constitute  a  "misapplication'*  of  the 
funds  of  a  national  bank,  it  must  appear 
that  the  officer  has  been  guilty  of  conversion, 
though  it  is  unnecessary  to  show  that  the 
recipient  of  the  proceeds  of  misapplication 
was  also  guilty  of  a  conyerslon.  United 
States  y.  Helnze,  31  Sup.  Ct.  98,  218  U.  S. 
532,  541,  54  L.  Ed.  1139,  21  Ann.  Cas.  884. 

It  is  not  a  "misapplication  of  the  funds" 
of  a  bank,  as  that  term  is  used  in  Rev.  St 
{  5200,  denounciug  the  willful  misapplication 
of  the  funds  of  a  national  bank,  where  an 
officer  merely  gave  credit  to  an  insolvent  per- 
son or  corporation,  or  honored  the  check  of  a 
depositor  when  there  were  no  funds  to  the 
credit  of  the  depositor,  without  any  intention 
of  defrauding  the  bank.  Flicklnger  v.  Unit- 
ed States,  150  Fed.  1,  12,  79  C.  a  A.  515. 

Embesslement  disiiaguislied 

See  Embezzlement 

mSAPPLT 

See    Willful     Misapplication— Willfully 
Misapply. 

The  word  "misapply*"  as  used  in  Rev. 
St,  I  5209,  providing  that  every  president, 
director,  cashier,  teller,  etc.,  of  any  national 
bank  association  who  embezzles,  abstracts,  or 
willfully  misapplies  any  of  the  moneys,  funds, 
etc^  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor, 
etc.,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  of- 
ficer in  charge  should  have  physical  posses- 
sion of  the  funds  misapplied.  It  is  sufficient 
if  he  have  such  "control,  directioi),  and  pow- 
er of  management  as  to  direct  an  application" 
of  the  same.  Lear  v.  U.  S.«  147  Fed.  349,  357, 
77  C.  C.  A.  627. 

8  WDS.&  P.2D  Sbb.— 26 


MISAPPROPRIATION 

See  Willful  Bflsappropriation. 

While  considered  alone,  the  word  ^^nOth 
appfopriatkm"  dpes  not  necessarily  la  all 
cases  mean  dishonesty,  yet  it  is  susceptible 
of  a  meaning  of  dishonesty,  embracing  em- 
bezzlement Johnson  v.  Turner,  47  South. 
570,  571,  159  Ala.  356  (citing  6  Words  and 
Phrases,  p.  4529). 

"Misappropriation"  means  ''wrong  ap* 
propriation;  to  turn  or  put  to  a  wrong  pur- 
pose!" As  used  in  a  provision  of  the  bank- 
ruptcy act  exempting  from  a  discbarge  debts 
created  by  "misappropriation"  while  acting 
in  a  fiduciary  capacity,  the  tenn  contemplatee 
a  conscious  "misappropriation."  Haggerty  y. 
Badkin,  66  Ati.  420,  424,  72  N.  J.  £q.  473 
(quoting  and  adopting  Webster's  Internation- 
al Dictionary  and  Ency.  Dictionary). 

Words  spoken  of  plaintiff,  that  he  had 
destioyed  a  docket  or  public  reoord  belonging 
to  the  mayor's  office  to  cover  up  evidence  of 
his  misappropriation  of  public  funds  and  fines 
belonging  to  the  town,  were  defamatory  per 
se  as  imputing  moral  turpitude,  since,  ascrib- 
ing to  the  word  "misappropriation"  the  most 
Innocent  of  its  commonly  accepted  meanings, 
the  gravamen  of  the  charge  was  that  plaintiff 
had  destroyed  evidence  of  his  wrongful  con- 
version of  or  dealing  with  the  public  funds 
and  fines,  to  cover  up,  with  the  purpose  to 
hinder,  if  not  to  render  impossible,  the  detec- 
tion of  his  misconduct,  innocent  of  peculation 
though  it  were,  and  imputed  a  species  of  dis- 
honesty of  a  higtily  depraved  character. 
Johnson  v.  Turner,  47  South.  670,  571,  159 
Ala.  356. 

Where  a  trustee  for  creditors,  who  was 
appointed  receiver  for  the  debtor,  loailed  the 
funds  in  his  possession  to  a  firm  of  which 
he  was  a  member  and  concealed  the  facts 
from  the  court  as  long  as  possible,  he  was 
guilty  of  a  "misappropriation"  of  the  funds 
within  Bankr.  Act  1898,  |  17,  providing  that 
a  disdiarge  shall  release  a  bankrupt  from  his 
provable  debts,  except  such  as  were  created 
by  fraud,  embeszlement,  misappropriation,  or 
defalcation  while  acting  as  an  officer  or  in  a 
fiduciary  capacity,  though  he  may  have  ex- 
pected that  the  loan  would  be  repaid.  Field 
y.  Howry,  94  N.  W.  218,  214,  182  Mich.  687. 

MISBEHAVIOR 

The  conduct  of  an  Indian  is  not  to  be 
held  "misbehavior,"  Justifying  his  arrest,  in 
the  absence  of  a  law,  rule,  or  regulation  so 
defining  it.  Ex  parte  Bi-A-Lil-Le,  100  Pac. 
450,  451,  12  Ariz.  150. 

The  giving  of  false,  vague,  and  evasive 
testimony  by  an  alleged  bankrupt  on  his  ex- 
amination before  a  special  commissioner, 
with  the  intention  of  misleading  the  court 
and  concealing  assets  of  his  estate,  is  a  "mis- 
behavior," and  constitutes  a  contempt,  which 
the  district  court  has  power  to  punish  under 


MISBI}HAVIOR  IN  OFFIOB 


402 


MISBRANB-MISBRANDINa 


Rev.  St  i  726,  on  a  sammary  hearing  without 
a  jury.    Ex  parte  Bick,  155  FecL  908,  909. 

MI8BEHAVIOB  IN  OiPFIOB 

Bee,  also,  Mlscondact  in  Office;    Misde- 
meanor in  Office. 

A  statute  specitying  acts  **in  respect  to 
a  court  of  Justice  or  proceedings  therein," 
constituting  contempts,  niLmlng  ''misbehavior 
in  office'*  or  other  willful  neglect  or  viola- 
tion of  duty  by  a  sheriff  or  other  person 
appointed  or  elected  to  perform  a  Judicial 
or  ministerial  service,  only  includes  misbe- 
havior done  "in  respect  to"  such  court  or 
some  proceeding  therein,  and  does  not  include 
an  unauthorised  arrest  not  shown  to  be  a 
willful  disobedience  of  any  Judgment,  order, 
or  process  of  the  court  Hutton  v.  Superior 
Oourt  of  City  and  County  of  San  Francisco. 
81  Pac.  409,  411,  147  Cal.  150. 

MISBRAND— MISBRANDING 

An  article  long  known  and  sold  under  Its 
trade-name  of  "Coca-Cola,"  cannot  be  deemed 
misbranded  within  the  meaning  of  the  Food 
and  Drugs  Act  (Act  June  30,  1906,  c.  3915,  «  8, 
[U.  S.  Comp.  St  Supp.  1909,  p.  1191]),  because 
it  does  not  contain  any  material  element  de- 
rived from  the  leaves  of  the  coca  plant. 
United  States  v.  Forty  Barrels  and  Twenty 
Kegs  of  Coca-Cola,  191  Fed.  431.  436. 

A  food  product,  labeled  "Compound; 
Pure  Comb  and  Strained  Honey  and  Com 
Syrup,"  is  not  "misbranded,"  within  the 
meaning  of  Food  and  Drugs  Act  June  30, 
1906,  c.  3915,  {  8,  so  that  its  shipment  in 
interstate  commerce  constituted  a  misdemean- 
or thereunder,  merely  because  the  percentage 
of  corn  syrup  in  the  compound  largely  ex- 
ceeds that  of  honey.  United  States  v.  Boeck- 
mann,  176  Fed.  382. 

An  article  composed  of  the  compound  of 
vanllline,  cumerin,  spirits,  sugar,  coloring, 
and  water,  and  nlainly  labeled  on  one  side 
with  the  words  "Peerless  Extract  of  Vanilla," 
and  on  the  reverse  side,  in  small  letters,  with 
the  words  "Formula  Vanllline  Cumerin  Spir- 
its Sugar  Coloring  Water,"  is  "misbranded," 
within  Agricultural  Law,  {$  164,  165,  as 
amended,  declaring  that  an  article  shall  be 
deemed  misbranded  where  it  is  an  imitation 
of,  or  offered  for  sale  under  the  distinctive 
name  of,  another  article,  and  is  not  a  mix- 
ture or  compound  known  under  its  own  dis- 
tinctive name,  and  not  included  under  the 
definition  of  misbranded  articles  of  food 
within  the  exception  in  section  165.  People 
V.  James  Butler,  118  N.  Y.  Supp.  849,  850, 
134  App.  Div.  151. 

The  Pure  Food  Law  (Act  June  30,  1906, 
c.  8915)  prohibits  misbranding  of  articles  of 
food,  and  section  8  declares  that  the  term 
"misbranded"  shall  apply  to  all  articles  of 
food,  or  articles  which  enter  into  the  com- 
position of  food,  the  package  or  label  of 
which  shall  bear  any  statement,  design,  or 


device,  regarding  su<di  article,  or  the  Ingred! 
ents  or  substances  contained  therein,  whid 
shall  be  false  or  misleading  in  any  partica 
lar.  Subdivision  4,  par.  2,  declares  that  ai 
article  of  fbod  which  does  not  contain  an] 
poisonous  or  deleterious  ingredients  shall  no 
be  deemed  misbranded  if  labeled  so  as  ti 
plainly  indicate  that  they  .are  compounds 
imitations,  or  blends,  etc,  provided  that  tin 
term  "bloid"  shall  be  construed  to  mean  i 
mixture  of  like  substances.  Held^  that  tlM 
proviso  was  not  limited  to  cases  where  th< 
blend  was  claimed  without  disclosing  the  In 
gredients,  but  applied  as  well  to  cases  when 
the  component  parts  of  the  blend  were  dis 
closed,  and  hence  a  label  attached  to  vinegar 
which  was  in  fact  distilled  vinegar  to  whid 
a  small  quantity  of  pure  boiled  apple  ddei 
had  been  added  for  coloring,  describing  tin 
substance  as  "Saratoga  Brand  vinegar,  s 
blend  of  pure  boiled  apple  dder  and  distilled 
vinegar,"  was  misbranded  as  misleading  th( 
public  to  believe  that  It  was  composed  ol 
pure  boiled  apple  dder  vinegar  and  distiUed 
vinegar.  United  States  v.  Ten  Barrels  ol 
Vinegar,  186  Fed.  899,  401. 

The  federal  pure  food  act  of  1906  (Ad 
June  30,  1906,  c.  3915,  {  2,  prohibits  the  in 
troduction  into  any  state  from  another  state 
of  food  or  drugs  adulterated  or  branded  with 
in  the  meaning  of  the  act  By  section  € 
the  term  "drug"  is  made  to  include  all  medi 
dnes  and  preparations  recognized  in  tbc 
United  States  Pharmacopoeia  or  Nationa] 
Formulary,  and  whisky  is  so  recognized  ii 
both.  By  section  7  a  "drug"  Is  to  be  deemed 
adulterated  if,  when  it  is  sold  under  a  name 
recognized  In  the  United  States  Pharma 
copceia  or  National  Formulary,  it  differs  from 
a  standard  of  strength,  quallly,  or  purity  u 
determined  by  the  test  laid  down  in  those 
publications,  unless  the  actual  standard 
thereof  be  plainly  stated  on  the  package. 
Held  that,  where  bottles  containing  intox- 
icants are  labeled  as  containing  "mono- 
gram whisky*'  and  marked  "Blend,"  and  the 
alcoholic  content  is  less,  and  the  residaun 
from  100  cubic  centimeters  is  more,  than  the 
standard  test  prescribed  by  such  act,  tbc 
liquors  are  misbranded  and  adulterated  with- 
in the  meaning  thereof.  State  v.  Intoxicating 
Uquors,  76  AtL  268,  269,  106  Me.  135. 

Defendant  manufactured  aymp  from 
cane  sugar,  flavored  to  represent  maple  syr- 
up by  the  Introduction  of  an  extract  from 
maple  wood  after  it  had  been  diopped  down 
The  syrup  was  put  up  in  bottles  labeled 
"Western  Reserve  Ohio  Blended  Maple  Syr- 
up,"  the  words  "Ohio"  and  "Maple  Syrup"  be- 
ing in  red,  and  between  them  the  word  Blend- 
ed," and  then  below  that  in  smaller  type,  the 
statement  **This  syrup  is  made  from  the 
sugar  maple  tree  and  cane  sugar."  Seld  that 
the  label  was  misleading,  in  that  purdiasera 
would  ordinarily  understand  that  the  artide 
contained  in  part  maple  syrup  made  from 
the  boiled-down  sap  drawn  from  live  maple 


BdSBRAKD-^MISBRANDINa 


403 


M^fiCARRIAGB 


trees,  and  that  defendant  was  therefore 
soilty  of  misbrandias.  United  States  t. 
Scanlon,  180  Fed.  486,  488. 

Claimants  operated  a  canning  factory  in 
Benton  Harbor,  Mich^  where  fruits  grown 
Ln  Michigan,  as  well  as  in  other  states,  were 
canned  and  prepared  for  sale.  Claimants 
canned  certain  'tepee*'  apples  and  black- 
berries, grown  in  Arkansas,  sold  nnder  a 
label  on  whicli  was  printed:  "Tepee  Apples 
[or  Blackberries,  as  the  case  might  be]. 
Packed  by  C.  H.  Godfrey  &  Son,  Benton  Har- 
bor and  Waterrliet,  Mldiigan."  There  was 
&Tidence  that  Michigan  apples  and  blackber- 
ries were  better  tlian  those  grown  in  Arkan- 
sas. Held,  that  the  labels  indicated  that  the 
fruit  was  grown  in  Michigan,  and  that  claim- 
ants were  therefore  guilty  of  misbranding 
in  violation  of  Food  and  Drug  Act  CSong. 
June  dO,  1908,  c  SQIB.  United  States  t.  100 
Cases  of  Tepee  Apples,  179  Fed.  985,  987. 

"^Salad  oU**  prima  fbde  means  olire  oil, 
and,  in  the  absence  of  eyidenoe  that  the  term 
has  recently  acquired  a  more  general  mean- 
ing to  include  other  oils,  its  use  without  fur- 
ther explanation  on  packages  of  cotton  seed 
oil  shipped  in  Interstate  commerce  consti- 
tutes a  misbranding  in  yiolation  of  Food 
and  Drogs  Act  June  80,  1906,  c.  8915,  {  2. 
Brina  v.  United  States,  179  Fed.  873,  105  a 
C.  A.  658. 

Ordinary  Groton  water  drawn,  from  the 
pipes  in  New  York  Gity  filtered  and  bottled 
after  the  addition  of  small  quantities  of  min- 
eral salts  and  carbonic  acid  gas,  is  not 
''spring  water,*'  as  the  term  is  generally  un- 
derstood, and  the  labeling  of  the  bottles  as 
spring  water  constitutes  a  misbranding  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  food  and  drugs  act 
(Act  June  30,  1906,  c.  3915,  |  8).  United 
States  T.  Morgan,  181  Fed.  587,  58a 

The  H.  Oompany,  at  B^ansas  Gity,  Mo., 
on  April  8,  1909,  contracted  to  sell  to  the  W. 
Company  at  Ft  Worth,  Tex.,  5;000  bushels  of 
No.  2  red  wheat,  according  to  the  Missouri, 
official  state  grades.  On  April  29,  1909,  the 
U.  Company  ordered  the  operator  of  a  public 
elevator  where  it  stored  its  grain  to  ship  to 
the  W.  Company  in  fnllillment  of  this  con- 
tract No.  2  red  wheat  The  operator  loaded 
and  sent  to  the  W.  Company  a  car  of  wheat 
After  this  wheat  was  loaded,  the  official  in- 
spector of  the  state  of  Missouri  at  Kansas 
City  inspected,  adjudged,  and  certified  this 
wheat  to  be  No.  2  red  wheat.  An  iUToice 
of  it  was  forwarded  to  the  W.  Company  dat- 
ed Biay  8,  1909,  Showing  that  it  was  sliipped 
under  the  contract  of  April  3,  1909,  and  sub- 
ject to  Kansas  City  weights  and  grades. 
The  wheat  arrived  in  Texas  without  change. 
The  Texas  inspector,  Hbe  federal  inspector, 
and  other  witnesses  th^  found  it  to  be,  and 
It  was,  wheat  of  another  and  less  valuable 
grade.  None  of  the  officers  or  employ^  of 
the  H.  Company  had  any  knowledge  of  this 
fact,  or  anything  ]to  do  with  the  grading  or, 


shipping,  except  to  order  the  operator  of  the 
public  elevator  to  ship  No.  2  red  wheat 
Held,  that  H.  Company  was  not  guilty  of 
misbranding  or  of  adulterating  within  the 
meaning  of  sections  7  and  8  of  the  Pure 
Food  Act  (Act  June  30,  1906,  c.  3915).  HaU- 
Baker  Grain  Go.  v.  United  States,  198  Fed. 
614,  617,  117  a  G.  A.  318;  United  States  v. 
Seventy-Five  Boxes  of  Alleged  Pepper,  198 
Fed.  934,  987. 

False  and  misleading  statements  in  the 
labels  on  a  proprietary  medicine  as  to  its 
curative  or  remedial  effects,  but  which  do 
not  import  any  statement  concerning  Iden- 
tity, are  not  "ndsbranding,"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  food  and  drugs  act  of  June  30, 
1906,  c.  3915,  I  8,  which  defines  that  term  as 
applicable  to  all  drugs  or  articles  of  food, 
the  package  or  label  of  which  shall  bear  any 
statement  design,  or  device  regarding  such 
article  or  the  Infi^^ients  or  substances  con- 
tained therein  which  shall  be  false  or  mis- 
leading in  any  particular.  United  States  v. 
Johnson,  81  Sup.  Gt  627,  221  U.  8.  488,  55  L. 
Bd.  823. 


MISCARRIAGE 

See  Debt,  Default,  or  Miscarriage  of  An- 
other. 

la    atedieal    JarlsyradeaMBe  —  Abortioa 


The  word  "Abortion,*'  when  used  in  Judi- 
cial proceedings,  necessarily  Implies  that  the 
crime  was  committed  on  a  woman  with  child, 
and  is  synonymous  with  "miscarriage**  in  its 
primary  meaning.  Marmaduke  v.  People,  101 
Pac.  337,  338,  45  Colo.  357. 

In  strictness,  abortion  is  not  of  itself  a 
crime,  since  the  word  ''miscarriage**  in  its 
legal  acceptation  does  not  necessarily  include 
the  destruction  of  the  child  before  birth ;  nor 
is  a  design  to  cause  its  miscarriage  the  same 
thing  as  a  design  to  destroy  the  child.  State 
ex  reL  Gaston  v.  Shields,  130  S.  W.  298,  301, 
230  Mo.  91. 

Decedent  having  applied  for  insurance 
in  a  mutual  benefit  society,  answered  that  she 
had  never  had  any  local  disease,  personal  in- 
jury, or  illness  of  any  kind,  but  In  answer  to 
the  medical  questions  stated  that  her  last 
confinement  was  In  1908,  and  that  she  had 
had  two  miscarriages  from  overexertion.  In 
an  action  on  the  certificate,  it  was  shown 
that  in  1903,  about  seven  years  prior  to  de- 
cedent's death,  she  suffered  Sn  abortion  when 
she  was  about  three  months  advanced  in 
pregnancy,  and  that  about  three  years  later 
another  occurred  at  about  the  same  stage. 
Held,  that  since  the  words  "abortion**  and 
"miscarriage"  are  synonymous,  both  meaning 
premature  parturition,  there  was  no  breach 
of  warranty  or  misrepresentation.  Royal 
Neighbors  of  America  v.  Bratcher  (7ex.)  151 
S.W.885,  886. 


MISOELLANT 


404 


MISOONDUOr 


MISCELLANY 

If  Storage  aooonnts  against  whisky  in 
bond  are  not  assessable  as  "accounts,"  they 
are  assessable  under  the  title  "miscellany"  of 
Ky.  -St  i  4058,  making  subject  to  taxation 
the  "value  of  all  of  the  property  not  men- 
tioned above";  that  item  being  placed  in  the 
statute  to  effectuate  section  4050,  requiring 
that,  if  there  be  no  appropriate  column  for 
the  statement  and  valuation  Qf  property,  it 
shall  be  valued  in  the  column  headed  "Mis- 
cellany." Commonwealth  v.  Kentucky  Dis- 
tilleries &  Warehouse  Co.,  136  S.  W.  1032, 
1039,  143  Ey.  314. 

MISCHIEF 

See  Malicious  Mischlet 

MISCONDUCT 

See  Official  Misconduct;  Willful  Miscon- 
duct 
His  own  official  misconduct,  see  His. 
See,  also,  Malconduct 

"Misconduct"  is  defined  as  ''wrong  con- 
duct; bad  behavior;  mismanagement"  The 
synonyms  are  "misbehavior;  misdemeanor; 
mismanagement;  misdeed;  delinquency;  of- 
fense." The  verb  "misconduct"  is  defined: 
"To  conduct  a&iss;  to  mismanage."  Bailey 
V.  Examining  &  Trial  Board  of  Police  De- 
partment of  aty  of  Helena,  122  Pac.  67%  674, 
46  Mont  197. 

"Misconduct"  is  defined  as  improper  con- 
duct, wrong  behavior.  The  sense  in  which 
the  word  is  used  in  a  threat  by  an  attorney 
to  expose  "misconduct"  of  his  client  is  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  court  Bar  Ass'n  of 
Oity  of  Boston  ▼.  Hale,  88  N.  B.  885,  887,  107 
Mass.  428. 

"'Misconduct*  of  the  prevailing  party" 
as  a  statutory  ground  for  a  new  trial  is  not 
confined  to  something  occurring  at  the  trial, 
but  includes  acts  amounting  to  misconduct, 
which,  though  they  occurred  before,  operate 
at  the  trial.  Pharea  v.  Krfaut,  91  Pac  62, 
63,  76  Kan.  23& 

Attorney 

The  attorney  for  an  administrator  had, 
prior  to  the  administrator's  appointment,  ar- 
ranged to  borrow  money  of  him,  and  after 
the  appointment  the  administrator  withdrew 
from  the  bank  funds  belonging  to  the  estate, 
which  funds  were  deposited  by  the  attorney 
in  his  own  bank  to  his  own  credit:  a  part 
being  used  to  cover  an  overdraft  The  attor- 
ney then  gave  the  administrator  a  check  for 
a  part  of  the  funds,  a  note  for  the  balance, 
and  paid  him  $50  in  cash  for  making  the 
loan.  Held,  that  the  attorney  was  guilty  of 
"misconduct"  within  Code  Civ:  Proc.  {  67,  au- 
thorizing suspension  from  practice  of  attor- 
neys therefor.  In  re  Freedman,  99  N,  Y. 
Supp.  135,  186,  113  App.  Div.  327. 


''Misconduct"  of  attorney,  as  used  in  PoL 
Code  Alaska,  |  748,  authorising  suspension  or 
disbarment  therefor,  is  not  confined  to  mis- 
conduct in  the  attorney's  relation  to  his 
client,  but  includes  as  well  misconduct  to- 
ward the  court  or  a  Judge  in  or  out  of  court 
Cobb  V.  United  States,  172  Fed.  641,  643,  96 
0.  0.  A.  477. 

For  an  attorney  to  publish  and  advertise 
a  pamphlet,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  at- 
tract nonresidents  to  the  state  to  apply  to 
its  courts  for  divorce,  through  his  agency  as 
an  attorney,  that  he  may  profit  financially 
thereby,  is  "misconduct,"  within  Comp.  Laws, 
I  2625,  providing  for  removal  or  suspension 
of  attorneys  for  misconduct  In  re  Schnitzer, 
112  Pae  848,  851,  88  Nov.  681,  88  L.  B.  ▲. 
(N.  S.)  941. 

Corporate  offloer 

The  use  of  the  word  "misconduct"  of  offi- 
cers of  a  corporation  in  an  application  for  a 
removal  of  a  receiver  does  aot  denote  person- 
al wrong,  but  merely  that  the  business  was 
not  conducted  properly;  and  while  there  may 
be  some  blame,  or  censure  connected  with  it, 
it  is  not  actionable  ag  libeL  Lebovltch  ▼.  Jos- 
eph Levy  &  Bros.  Oa,  64  South.  978^  981«  128 
La.  618. 

The  issuance  of  stock  by  officers  of  a  cor- 
poration without  authority  from  the  direc- 
tors, and  without  consideration  fiowing  to  the 
oorporations,  is  misconduct,  within  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  I  1781,  authorising  the  removal  of  of- 
ficers, etc^  for  misconduct  towards  the  cor- 
poration. People  V.  Lyon,  104  N.  Y.  Supp. 
319«  119  App.  DiT.  861;  Id.,  82  N.  B.  1130, 
189  N.  Y.  644. 

Ezeontor 

It  is  "misconduct"  rendering  the  execu- 
tor ''unfit"  for  the  execution  of  his  office,  for 
which  his  letters  may  be  revoked  (Code  Civ. 
Proc.  i  2685,  subd.  ^,  where  he  claims  the 
benefits  of  a  contract  between  himself  and 
testator,  as  to  which  there  was  strong  evi- 
dence that  testator  was  of  unsound  mind  at 
the  time  of  its  execution,  and  by  which  the 
executor  secured  great  pecuniary  advantage, 
to  the  detriment  of  the  estate.  In  re  Glea- 
son's  Estate,  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  418^  428, 17  Misc. 
Rep.  510. 

Jnror  or  Jitry 

After  the  jury  is  sworn,  misconduct  on 
the  part  of  an  individual  Juror  is  misconduct 
of  the  Jury.  State  v.  Mott,  74  Pac.  728.  730, 
29  Mont  292. 

"Misconduct"  of  a  Juror  whidi  is 
statutory  ground  for  a  new  trial  is  mis- 
conduct while  he  is  such  Juror,  and  has  no 
reference  to  what  he  has  done  before  he  la 
sworn  to  try  the  case ;  and  therefore  a  state- 
ment by  a  Juror,  before  being  sworn  as  a  Ju- 
ror, that  accused  was  guilty  and  ought  to  be 
punished,  is  not  such  "misconduct"  as  would 
be  ground  for  a  new  trial.  People  v.  Em- 
mons, 95  Pac.  1082,  1089,  7  Cal.  App.  686. 


MISOONDUOT 


406 


MISCONDUCT  IN  OFFICB 


The  fact  that  the  Jury  made  incorrect 
or  untrue  answers  to  special  interrogatories 
returned  with  their  general  verdict  is  not 
"misconduct  of  the  jury,"  within  the  meaning 
of  a  statute  providing  that  a  new  trial  may 
be  granted  for  misconduct  of  the  Jury.  BL 
O'Connor  Co.  ▼•  Gillaspy,  83  N.  B.  738,  741, 
170  Ind.  428. 

Mi800]n>voT  nr  offiob 

See,  also.  Misbehavior  in  Office;    Mis- 
demeanor in  Office. 

^'Misconduct  in  office"  includes  such  acts 
as  amount  to  a  breach  of  the  good  faith  and 
of  the  right  action  that  are  tacitly  required 
of  all  officers.  Etzler  v.  Brown,  60  South. 
4ie,  417,  418,  58  Fla.  221,  138  Am.  St  Rep. 
113. 

''Misconduct  in  office"  in  its  penal  sense 
is  any  act  or  omission  in  breach  of  a  duty 
of  public  concern  by  one  who  has  accepted 
public  ofiice,  providing  his  act  is  willful  and 
corrupt  and  is  not  Judicial.  United  States 
V.  Haas,  1B7  Fed.  211,  214  (adopting  defini- 
tion in  Bish.  New  Cr.  Law,  ((  459,  400). 

The  phrase  "misconduct  in  office"  is 
broad  enough  to  Include  any  willful  mal- 
feasance, misfeasance,  or  nonfeasance  in  of- 
fice (citing  State  ex  reL  lilley  v.  Slover, 
113  Mo.  208,  20  S.  W.  788).  It  does  not  neo- 
essarily  imply  corruption  or  criminal  inten- 
tion. The  official  doing  of  a  wrongful  act,  or 
official  neglect  to  do  an  act  which  ought  to 
have  been  done,  will  constitute  the  offense^ 
although  there  was  no  corrupt  or  malicious 
motive  (citing  Mechem,  Public  Officers,  {  457) . 
After  defining  "misconduct,"  Webster  declares 
it  to  be  synonymous  with  "misbehavior," 
"misdemeanor,"  "delinquency,"  and  "offense." 
Pen.  Code,  {  758,  provides  that  an  accusation 
against  any  municipal  officer  fbr  "willful  or 
corrupt  misconduct  in  office"  may  be  pre- 
sented by  the  grand  Jury.  Section  772  pro- 
vides for  the  summary  removal  of  public 
officers  on  an  accusation  verified  by  the  oath 
of  any  person  alleging  that  the  officer  has 
"neglected  or  refused  to  perform  the  offi- 
cial duties  pertaining  to  his  office."  Section 
335  declares  every  public  officer  who  refuses 
or  neglects  to  inform  against  and  prosecute 
persons  whom  he  has  reasonable  cause  to 
believe  offenders  against  the  chapter  on  gam- 
bling, guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.  Under  the 
definitions  and  statutory  provisions  recited 
above^  a  public  officer  who  fails  to  proseeute 
gamblers  of  whom  he  has  knowledge  is  guilty 
of  "willful  misconduct"  within  the  meaning 
of  section  758,  and  may  be  accused  by  the 
ffrand  Jury  thereunder.  Coffey  v.  Superior 
Court  of  Sacramento  County,  82  Pac.  75,  70, 
77,  147  Cal.  525. 

"Misconduct  in  office"  means  any  unlaw- 
ful misbehavior  in  regard  to  the  duties  of  an 
office,  willful  in  its  character.  A  county  com- 
missioner, who,  without  willfulness  or  a  cor- 
rupt motive,   but  through  ignorance   disre- 


gards the  provisions  of  a  statute  regulating 
the  exercise  of  his  official  duties,  is  not 
thereby  guilty  of  "misconduct  in  office,"  with- 
in the  meaning  of  section  0915»  Rev.  St,  which 
prescribes  a  fine  and  the  forfeiture  of  office 
for  such  misconduct  State  ▼.  Bair,  73  N.  E. 
514,  516,  71  Ohio  St  410. 

A  charge  against  a  chief  of  police  of 
"misconduct  in  office"  includes  any  act  in- 
volving moral  turpitude,  or  any  act  which  is 
contrary  to  Justice,  honesty,  principle,  or 
good  morals,  if  performed  by  virtue  or  au- 
thority of  office.  State  ex  rel.  Wynne  v.  Ex- 
amining and  Trial  Board  of  Police  Depart- 
ment of  City  of  Butte,  117  Pac.  77,  78,  43 
Mont  389,  Ann.  Cas.  1912C,  143. 

Where  a  policeman,  a  married  man, 
while  not  on  duty  called  upon  a  married  wo- 
man at  her  home  in  the  absence  of  her  hus- 
band, and,  the  husband  returning  unexpected- 
ly, the  policeman  secreted  himself  in  a  bed- 
room, where  he  was  found  by«  the  husband 
and  driven  from  the  house,  the  conduct  of 
the  policeman  was  "misconduct,"  within  a 
statute  providing  that  officers  will  not  be  re- 
movable at  will  for  political  reasons  or  for 
any  other  cause  than  "incapacity,  misconduct, 
nonresidence,  or  disobedience  of  Just  rules 
and  regulations."  Winters  v.  Board  of  Police 
(Dom'rs  of  Jersey  aty,  71  Aa  50,  51,  77  N.  J. 
Law,  153. 

The  complaint  against  a  police  captain, 
alleging  that  a  merchant  complained  to  the 
officer  of  an  obstruction,  consisting  of  a  stone 
step  on  the  sidewalk  in  front  of  a  certain 
house,  and  that  the  officer  told  him  nothing 
could  be  done  for  him  unless  he  would  swear 
out  a  warrant  is  sufficient  to  charge  the  of- 
fenses of  misconduct  in  office  and  incompe- 
tency, triable  under  Rev.  Codes,  |  3309,  by 
the  police  trial  board,  in  view  of  a  police  reg- 
ulation requiring  an  officer,  to  whom  com- 
plaint is  made,  to  remedy  the  matter,  or,  if 
he  cannot  do  so  at  once,  to  make  a  memo- 
randum at  police  headquarters  of  the  com- 
plaint so  that  it  may  receive  proper  atten- 
tion. Bailey  v.  Examining  and  Trial  Board 
of  Police  Department  of  City  of  Helena,  122 
Pac.  672,  573,  45  Mont  197. 

Where  a  deputy  county  auditor  in  Min- 
nesota authorized  by  law  to  act  in  the  name 
of  his  principal  and  for  whose  official  acts 
the  auditor  and  his  bondsmen  were  responsi- 
ble to  the  county,  and  to  any  person  injured 
by  his  "misconduct  in  office"  (Gen.  St  Minn. 
1894,  §1  710,  5951),  issued  spurious  refund 
orders  on  the  county  treasurer  in  favor  of 
fictitious  payees,  purporting  to  be  for  the 
refunding  of  taxes  received  through  redemp- 
tion from  tax  sales,  and  procured  the  orders 
to  be  authenticated  by  the  cbairmah  of  the 
board  of  county  commissioners  and  forged 
the  names  of  the  fictitious  payees  to  assign- 
ments thereof  and  sold  them  to  a  bank,  any 
loss  sustained  by  the  bank  through  its  pur^ 


MJSCJONDUCT  IN  OPriOJB 


406 


MISDEMBANOB 


chase  could  not  be  attrlbatable  to  tbe  ofDcial 
"misconduct  In  office**  of  tbe  deputy  in  Issuing 
tbe  same,  but  the  proximate  cause  was  his 
Individual  act  in  forging  the  assignments  and 
selling  the  orders  as  genuine,  and,  as  tiie  or- 
ders were  nonnegotlable,  the  bank  was  put  on 
inquiry,  and  acquired  no  greater  rights  than 
tiie  supposed  payees,  and  had  no  claim  to  re- 
cover any  loss  either  from  the  county  or  from 
the  sureties  on  the  auditor's  bond.  National 
Surety  CJo.  v.  State  Savings  Bank,  156  Fed. 
21,  25,  84  C.  O.  A.  187,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
155,  13  Ann.  Cas.  421. 

A  deputy  county  auditor  in  Minnesota, 
authorized  by  law  to  act  in  the  name  of  his 
principal  and  for  whose  official  acts  the  au- 
ditor and  his  bondsmen  were  responsible,  not 
only  to  the  county,  but  to  any  person  injured 
by  his  '^misconduct  in  office"  (Gen.  St  Minn. 
1894,  §S  710,  5951),  Issued  spurious  refund 
orders  on  the  county  treasurer  in  favor  of 
fictitious  payees,  purporting  to  be  for  the  re- 
funding of  invalid  tax  sale  certificates.  He 
procured  the  orders  to  be  authenticated  by  the 
chairman  of  the  county  board,  and  they  were 
presented  to  the  county  treasurer,  who  in- 
dorsed thereon  that  there  were  no  funds  avail- 
able, but  that  they  would  be  paid  v^th  7  per 
cent,  interest  when  there  was  money  in  the 
treasury  for  the  purpose.  Such  deputy  forged 
the  names  of  the  fictitious  payees  to  assign- 
ments and  sold  the  orders  to  a  state  savings 
bank,  to  which  they  were  paid  by  the  treas- 
urer with  Interest  a  year  later.  The  deputy 
auditor  bore  a  good  reputation,  and  his  integ- 
rity had  never  previously  been  questioned. 
The  bank  was  expressly  authorized  by  stat- 
ute to  invest  funds  in  such  orders,  and  had 
done  so  before  in  the  usual  course  of  busi- 
ness. On  discovering  the  forgeries,  the  coun- 
ty brought  suit  on  the  auditor's  bond  and  re- 
covered a  judgment  which  was  paid  by  the 
surety,  which  then  brought  suit  against  the 
bank.  Held  that,  although  the  orders  were 
not  negotiable,  the  bank  was  not  chargeable 
with  any  negligence  in  their  purchase,  but 
that  the  loss  was  one  caused  by  the  "mis- 
conduct in  office"  of  the  deputy  auditor  for 
which  the  surety  was  liable,  and  that  it  could 
not  recover  over  against  the  bank.  National 
Surety  Co.  v.  Arosln,  198  Fed.  605,  606,  117 
O.  0.  A,  813. 

MISDELIVERY 

"Misdelivery"  of  goods  is  the  same  as  a 
total  failure  to  deliver  them  at  all,  and  is 
deemed  a  conversion  of  the  property  by  the 
carried.  Leaving  goods  at  the  wrong  place 
may  constitute  a  misdelivery  and  conversion 
of  them,  as  well  as  delivering  them  to  the 
wrong  person.  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St  L.  By. 
Co.  V.  C.  &  A.  Potts  &  Co.,  71  N.  B.  ©85,  689, 
33  Ind.  App.  564  (citing  Elliott,  Railroads,  | 
1526;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  32 
N.  B.  476,  49  Ohio  St  489,  21  L.  B.  A.  117,  34 
Am.  St  Bep.  579 ;   Houston  ^  T.  C.  By.  Co. 


V.  Adams,  49  Tex.  748,  80  Am.  Bep.  11( 
Jetfersonville  B.  Ca  v.  White,  69  Ky.  I 
Bush]  251 ;  Claflln  ▼.  Boston  &  I4.  B.  Co.,  { 
Mass.  [7  Allen]  341). 

MISDEMEANOR 

See  Cases  of  Misdemeanor;  High  Crim( 
and  Misdemeanors. 

"A  'misdemeanor'  is  an  act  commltte 
or  omitted  in  violation  of  the  public  law,  e 
ther  forbidding  or  commanding  it"  Cod 
monwealth  v.  B.  L  Sherman  Bifg.  Co^  75  I 
E.  71,  72,  189  Mass.  76,  4  Ann.  Caa.  2( 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  4  Blad 
Com.  5). 

''Misdemeanor"  la  generally  nnderstoo 
to  mean  the  lower  criminal  offense,  as  di 
tlnguished  from  a  f^ony.  United  States  ^ 
Stevenson,  30  Sup.  Ot  35,  87,  215  U.  S.  19( 
54  L.  Bd.  153. 

A  "misdemeanor^  la  misconduct  or  01 
fense  inferior  to  a  felony.  People  ▼.  Butt 
105  N.  T.  Supp.  677,  678,  121  App.  DIt.  22( 

A  "misdemeanor^  la  a  ndnor  crime  whk 
does  not  amount  to  a  felcmy.  State  ▼.  D< 
ran,  50  AtL  440,  441,  99  Me.  829, 105  Am.  8 
B^.  27& 

A  "misdemeanor"  la  defined  to  be  an  ii 
dlctable  offense  which  does  not  amount  to 
felony.  State  t.  MeUes,  42  South.  199,  20( 
117  La.  656;  United  States  v.  Zarafonitii 
150  Fed.  97,  101,  80  C.  C.  A.  51,  10  Ann.  Cai 
290  (quoting  4  Chitty,  Blackstone,  6,  an 
note). 

A  "misdemeanor"  is  an  offense  punlshi 
ble  by  fine  or  imprisonment  in  the  count 
JaU  only.  SUte  v.  Wilson,  126  &  W.  99( 
140  Mo.  Ai^.  726. 

A  "misdemeanor"  la  defined  l^  Bev.  8 
1899,  I  2395,  to  mean  every  offense  punist 
able  only  by  a  fine  or  imprisonment  in 
county  Jail,  or  both.    State  ex  reL  Bntltf  ^ 
Foster,  86  S.  W.  245,  248,  187  Mo.  59a 

"Bflsdemeanors,"  in  the  state  of  Indiani 
are  such  wrongs  of  a  public  nature  as  ar 
punished  by  criminal  proceedings  in  tli 
name  of  the  state.  The  charges  must  be  pn 
ferred  upon  oath  in  the  form  of  an  afSdavii 
information,  or  indictment  The  process  i 
a  vrarrant,  and  it  is  served  by  arresting  tli 
person  of  the  defendant  The  poniahment  1 
all  except  capital  cases  is  by  fine  or  Imprii 
onment  or  disfranchisement,  or  by  two  0 
more  of  these,  and,  whenever  it  la  by  fln 
only,  the  defendant  stands  committed  untJ 
the  fine  la  paid  or  bail  la  entered.  Adam 
Express  Co.  t.  State,  67  N.  B.  1033,  1039, 16 
Ind.  328. 

The  word  "misdemeanor,**  aa  used  1 
Charter  of  City  of  Kingston,  |  61,  providin 
that  certain  persons  shall  be  punished  a< 
cording  to  the  provlsiona  of  the  Code  c 
Criminal  Procedure  as  for  misdemeanor,  ii 
eludes  the  whole  class  of  Crimea  bearing  tba 


MISDEMEANOB 


407 


MISDEMSANOB 


name.     People  ▼.  Schermerhorn,  112  N.  Y. 
Supp.  222,  223,  69  Misc.  Rep.  146. 

BfaUdomly  tbreatenlng  to  accnie  anoUi- 
er  of  crime  is  a  '"mlBdemeanor."  Schvltx  ▼. 
State,  116  N.  W.  259,  264,  185  Wis.  614  (dis- 
a»itins  opinion  of  Judge  Timlin,  citing  Bout. 
Uiw  Diet;  Stat  1898,  |  4880). 

To  solicit  the  commission  of  an  otfense 
whidi  is  a  fel(Hi7  is  a  ''misdemeanor"  at 
common  law,  and  it  is  immaterial  wliether 
the  offense  wMch  is  solicited  is  made  a  fel- 
ony by  act  of  Pariiament  or  by  the  common 
law.  One  who  solicits  that  he  be  bribed  so- 
licits the  commission  of  a  felony  and  is 
therefore  guilty  of  a  conmion-law  "misde- 
meanor.'* State  T.  Snilivan,  84  S.  W.  105, 
109,  no  Mo.  App.  76  (distlngalshing  State  ▼. 
Priestley,  74  Mo.  24,  State  y.  Harney,  14  S. 
W.  657,  101  Mo.  470). 

B.  A  O.  Gomp.  I  1067,  snbd.  1,  authorises 
disbarment  on  an  attorney's  conrictlon  of 
felony  or  misdemeanor  involying  moral  tur- 
pitude, and  makes  the  conviction  record  con- 
dusire  evidence.  Held,  that  the  words  "fel- 
ony" and  "misdemeanor"  were  used  in  their 
statutory  sense,  and,  there  being  no  offense 
known  to  the  state  law  as  "conspiracy  to 
suborn  perjury,"  an  attorney's  conviction  of 
such  offense  in  a  federal  court  was  not  con- 
clusive evidence,  in  a  disbannent  proceedlD'?, 
of  his  conmaission  of  an  act  warranting  dis- 
barment State  ▼.  Biggs»  97  Pae.  TLB,  714,  62 
Or.  438. 

Felony  distinsaisl&ed 

See  Felony. 

Assavlt 

Under  Bevisal  1905,  i  3621,  making  it  a 
felony  for  one  to  maliciously  assault  another 
with  a  deadly  weapon  by  waylaying,  etc., 
and  section  3291,  defining  a  misdemeanor  as 
an  offense  not  punishable  by  death  or  im- 
prisonment in  the  state's  prison,  and  Acts 
1870-71,  p.  94,  c  43,  punishing  by  fine  or  im- 
prisonment a  person  convicted  of  an  assault, 
with  or  without  intent  to  kiU,  a  prosecution 
for  an  assault  with  a  deadly  weapon  with 
intent  to  kill  is  a  prosecution  for  a  misde- 
meanor, and  not  for  malicious  mischief,  de- 
fined by  section  2676  as  willfully  injuring 
personal  property  with  malice  to  the  owner, 
and  is  bcurred  in  two  years  by  section  3147, 
providing  that  all  misdemeanors,  except  for 
''malicious  mischief,  and  other  malicious 
misdemeanors,"  shall  be  presented  within 
two  years  after  the  commission  of  the  same, 
the  words  "other  malicious  misdemeanors" 
being  intended  to  describe  an  offense  of 
which  maUce  is  a  necessary  ingredient,  as  in 
the  case  of  malicious  mischief.  State  v. 
Frisbee^  65  S.  B.  722,  724,  142  N.  C.  671. 

Contempt 

A  contempt  proceeding. is  classified  as  a 
misdemeanor,  and  not  as  a  felony.  Bullock 
Blectric  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Westlnghouse  Elec- 


tric &  Mf^  CkK,  129  Fed.  106,  107,  68  a  a 
A.  607. 

Ky.  St  I  1127,  divides  aU  crimes  into 
fdonies  and  misdemeanors,  defining  ''fislo- 
nies"  as  offenses  punishable  with  death  or 
confinement  in  the  penitentiary,  and  *'misde- 
meanors"  as  all  other  offenses,  whether  at 
common  law  or  by  statute.  Chapter  36,  art 
4,  subd.  6  (chapter  15,  art  12),  classifies  a 
contempt  as  a  misdemeanor.  Section  1188 
(section  241)  provides  that  prosecutions  by 
the  commonwealth  to  recover  a  penalty  for 
violation  of  any  penal  statute  shall  be  com- 
menced within  one  year  after  the  right  to 
such  penalty  accrued,  with  immaterial  ex- 
ceptions. Held  that,  criminal  contempt  be- 
ing a  misdemeanor,  and  the  punishment 
therefor  regulated  by  statute,  a  prosecution 
therefor  is  a  prosecution  by  the  common- 
wealth to  recover  a  penalty,  within  section 
1138,  barred  by  limitations  after  one  year 
from  the  time  that  the  penalty  accrued. 
(Gordon  v.  Commonwealth,  133  &  W.  206^ 
208,  141  Ky.  461. 

CHmlaalUba 

Criminal  libel  is  a  'Misdemeanor,*'  with- 
in Code,  i  7,  defining  a  misdemeanor  to  be 
any  public  off^ise,  the  punishment  for  which 
is  not  death  or  confinement  in  the  peniten- 
tiary, and  hence,  under  the  express  provi- 
sions of  section  184,  the  trial  may  be  had  in 
the  absence  of  defendant  Walston  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ey.)  102  S.  W.  276. 

Beievriac  wltaess  f veat  apyearias  o« 
BtvlaK  evideaee 

Rev.  St  1899,  f  2041,  provides  that  every 
person  who  shall  by  bclbery  or  other  means 
deter  a  witness  from  appearing  or  giving  evi- 
dence in  any  cause  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of 
a  misdemeanor,  and  that,  if  the  cause  be  a 
prosecution  for  a  felony,  the  person  so  offend- 
ing shall  be  punished  by  Imprisonment  in  the 
penitentiary  for  two  years,  or  in  the  county 
Jail,  or  by  fine.  Section  2393  provides  that 
the  term  *'felony"  shall  be  construed  to  mean 
any  offense  punishable  with  imprisonment  in 
the  penitentiary  or  with  death,  and  by  section 
2395  the  term  "misdemeanor"  is  to  be  con- 
strued as  Including  every  offense  punishable 
only  by  fine  or  imprisonment  In  the  county 
Jail,  or  both.  Held,  that  an  offense  within 
the  proviso  of  section  2041  is  a  misdemeanor, 
though  punishable  by  imprisonment  in  the 
penitentiary.  State  ex  rel.  Butler  v.  Foster, 
86  S.  W.  245,  248,  187  Mo.  590. 

Obstmotiag  street 
Under  Rev.  Laws,  e  215,  |  1,  defining  a 
'"felony"  as  a  crime  punishable  by  death  or 
state  imprisonment,  and  making  other  offens- 
es misdemeanors,  violation  by  a  railroad  com- 
pany of  St  1906»  c  463,  pt  2,  {  166,  by  ob- 
structing a  street,  being  punishable  by  a  fine 
only,  is  a  ''misdemeanor."  C!ommonwealth 
V.  New  York  Cent  &  H.  R.  R.O0.,  92  N.  S. 
76C,  768,  206  Masa  417,  19  Ann.  Qas.  62a 


i 


MISDEMEAKOR 


408 


MIBDEMEANOB 


PoMesslon    mmd    sale  '  of    oovAterf elt 
trade-marlui  and  labels 

The  offense  of  haTlng  in  possession  and 
selling  counterfeit  trade-marks  and  labels, 
in  violation  of  Pen.  Code,  {  364,  subd.  4,  is  a 
"misdemeanor,''  and  hence  defendants,  act^ 
ing  in  concert  in  the  commission  of  snch  of- 
fense, may  be  properly  tried  together.  Peo- 
ple T.  Strauss,  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  40,  43,  94  Appi 
DiT.  453. 

VasTiuaoy 

"Vagrancy,**  as  defined  in  Pen.  Oode,  | 
647,  snbd.  6,  declaring  guilty  of  vagrancy 
every  idle,  lewd,  or  dissolute  person,  or  asso- 
ciate of  known  thieves,  or  every  person  who 
wanders  about  the  streets,  at  late  or  unusual 
hours  of  the  night,  without  any  visible  or 
lawful  business,  though  it  cannot  be  commit- 
ted by  a  single  act  observable  at  one  time,  is 
a  "misdemeanor"  that  can  be  committed  "in 
the  presence"  of  an  officer,  so  as  to  Justify 
him,  under  sections  836-^0,  in  arresting  him 
without  a  warrant.  Defendant,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  rebutting  the  evidence  of  his  vagran- 
cy, which  was  claimed  to  have  existed  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  officer  arresting  him,  so  as 
to  Justify  the  arrest  without  a  warrant,  hav- 
ing testified  that  he  had  a  lease,  covering 
several  months  prior  and  up  to  the  time  of 
the  arrest,  of  a  certain  tenement,  which  he 
had  sublet  to  prostitutes,  and  that  he  had  in 
the  meantime  purchased  a  mining  location, 
on  which  he  intended  to  go  as  soon  as  the 
lease  expired,  may,  for  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing that  he  had  no  lawful  business,  which 
fact,  in  connection  with  his  wandering  about 
the  streets  at  late  and  unusual  hours  of  the 
night,  would  constitute  him  a  vagrant  under 
Pen.  Oode,  i  647,  subd.  6,  be  required  on 
cross-examination  to  testify  that  during  the 
running  of  his  lease  he  had  no  other  business 
except  gambling.  People  v.  Oraig,  91  Pac. 
997,  1001,  152  Cal.  42. 

ViolatioB.  of  anti-tnui  law 

St  1907,  p.  984,  c.  530,  i  1,  defining 
"trusts,"  and  for  a  violation  thereof  provid- 
ing a  fine  of  not  less  than  $50  nor  more  than 
$5,000,  or  imprisonment  not  less  than  six 
months  nor  more  than  a  year,  or  both,  pre- 
scribes a  "misdemeanor,"  since  under  Pen. 
Code,  §§  16,  17,  a  "felony"  is  a  crime  punish- 
able by  death  or  by  imprisonment  in  the  state 
prison,  and  every  other  crime  is  a  "misde- 
meanor." Union  Ice  Co.  v.  Rose,  104  Pac. 
1006,  1007,  11  Oal.  App.  357. 

Violation  of  immigration  law 

Immigration  Act  Feb.  20,  1907,  c.  1134, 
{  4,  provides  that  "it  shall  be  a  misdemeanor" 
for  any  person  to  prepay  the  transportation 
or  in  any  way  to  assist  or  encourage  the  im- 
portation of  any  contract  laborer  into  the 
United  States.  Section  5  provides  that  for 
every  violation  of  section  4  the  persons  know- 
ingly violating  the  same  "shall  forfeit  and 
pay  for  every 'such  offense  the  sum  of  $1,000, 
which  may  be  sued  for  and  recovered  by  the 


United  States  or  by  any  person  who  sha 
first  bring  his  action  therefor,"  etc  HeU 
that  section  4  defines  m  criminal  offense,  an 
that,  although  the  act  provides  no  crimini 
punishment  therefor,  an  indictment  will  U 
under  Bev.  St  {  6440,  for  a  conspiracy  t 
commit  such  offense.  United  States  v.  Tsol 
as,  163  Fed.  129,  130, 131. 

Violation  of  lioonso  law 

A  violation  of  a  license  law  is  a  "misdi 
meaner."    Perry  v.  BCan,  1  R.  I.  268,  265. 

Violation  of  liqnor  law 

The  offense  of  manufacturing,  selliiij 
bartering,  giving  away,  or  otherwise  furnist 
ing  any  intoxicating  liquor  of  any  kind,  ii 
eluding  beer,  ale,  and  wine,  contrary  to  tli 
provisions  of  the  prohibition  article  of  tti 
Constitution,  is  a  "misdemeanor."  Ex  part 
Cain,  93  Pac  974,  976,  20  OkL  125. 

Since  the  punishment  for  retailing  splri 
uous  liquors  is  that  fixed  for  a  misdemeano; 
under  Revisal  1905,  |  3291,  providing  that 
"felony"  is  a  crime  punishable  by  either  deat 
or  imprisonment  in  the  state's  prison,  an 
that  any  other  crime  is  a  "misdemeanor,"  Ui 
word  "feloniously,"  in  a  warrant  chargin 
that  accused  unlawfully,  willfully,  and  fel< 
niously  retailed  spirituous  liquors,  is  supei 
fluous.  State  v.  Shine,  62  S.  E.  1080,  10& 
149  N.  C.  480. 

An  ordinance  entitled  "An  ordinance  coi 
corning  misdemeanors"  is  sufficiently  broad  t 
cover  a  provision  prohibiting  any  one  froi 
engaging  in  any  calling  on  Sunday,  or  froi 
keeping  open  any  place  of  business,  or  froi 
permitting  persons  to  resort  thereto  for  tt 
purpo'se  of  drinking  intoxicating  liquors  o 
Sunday.  Town  of  Lovilia  v.  Cbbb,  102  N.  V 
496,  497,  126  Iowa,  557. 

Violation   of   atnnioipal   ordinaneo   a 
Fosolntion 

The  violation  of  a  municipal  ordinaD( 
is  not  a  "misdemeanor,"  within  the  meanio 
of  Pen.  Code  1895,  {|  2,  31,  defining  felony  an 
misdemeanor,  since  those  sections  of  tb 
Code  relate  only  to  offenses  against  the  pul 
lie  laws  of  the  state  and  not  to  infractions  ( 
local  laws  of  municipalitieB.  Pearson  ' 
WimMsh,  52  S.  E.  751,  755,  124  Ga.  701, 
Ann.  Cas.  501. 

The  word  "misdemeanor,"  in  statute 
conferring  power  on  municipal  corporatioii 
is  not  synonymous  with  the  same  term  t 
used  at  common  law,  or  in  general  statut< 
defining  offenses  against  the  state,  but  hi 
a  more  restricted  meaning,  and  is  limited  1 
offenses  against  the  smaller  local  goven 
ment;  and,  while  an  offense  against  a  dt 
may  also  be  an  offense  against  the  stat 
there  are  many  offenses  against  municipal 
ties  which  are  not  offenses  against  the  stat 
and  which  the  legislative  bodies  of  the  muoi< 
ipalities  are  authorized  to  define  and  declai 
by  ordinance,  subject  to  the  condition  tbi 
the  ordinance  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  Ooi 


HIBDSMEAKOR 


409 


MISFXAfiAKCB 


Btltatioii  or  general  laws,  or  the  charter,  and 
la  not  nnreasonahle.  O'Havw  v.  Montyeni- 
ery.  111  8.  W.  440,  4fi0,  120  TttUL  448,  137 
Am.  8t  Bep.  1014. 

Every  offense  punishable  by  fine  or  Im- 
prisonment, or  both,  is  at  least  a  "misde- 
meanor*' which  concerns  the  state  at  large 
and  not  specially  any  municipality.  A  viola- 
tion of  the  resolution  of  the  board  of  health 
of  a  town  in  Milwaukee  county  outside  the 
city  of  Milwaukee,  which  prohibits  the  bring- 
ing therein  of  garbage,  and  which  provides 
that  any  violation  thereof  shall  be  punishable 
under  St  1898,  §  4608,  making  any  person 
violating  any  regulation  of  any  board  of 
health  punisliable  by  imprisonment  in  the 
county  Jail  or  by  a  fine,  is  a  "misdemeanor,** 
within  Laws  1809,  a  218,  |  6,  taking  away 
from  the  Justice  of  the  peace  of  Milwaukee 
county  Jurisdiction  of  criminal  actions,  in- 
cluding misdemeanors,  arising  in  the  county, 
triable  before  a  Justice  of  the  peace.  Stolt- 
man  v.  Lake^  102  N.  W.  920,  921,  124  Wis. 
462  (citing  City  of  Oshkosh  v.  Schwartz,  18 
N.  W.  552,  65  WU  483). 

A  resolution  of  the  board  of  health  of  a 
town  in  Milwaukee  county  outside  the  city  of 
Milwaukee  prohibits  the  bringing  therein  of 
garbage,  etc.,  and  provides  that  any  violation 
thereof  shall  he  punishable  under  Bev.  St 
1886,  I  4606,  whidi  makes  any  person  who 
shall  violate  any  order  or  regulation  of  any 
board  of  health  punishable  by  imprisonment 
in  the  county  Jail  not  more  than  three  months 
or  by  a  fine  not  exceeding  $100.  Rev.  St 
1898,  c.  142, 1  8294,  provides  that  in  all  cases 
not  otherwise  specially  provided  for  by  law, 
where  a  forfeiture  shall  be  incurred,  and  the 
act  or  <Hnis8ion  for  which  the  same  is  impos- 
ed shall  not  also  be  a  misdemeanor,  such  f  or^ 
feiture  may  be  sued  for  and  recovered  in  a 
dvll  action;  that  when  such  act  or  omission 
is  punishable  by  fine  and  imprisonment,  or 
by  fine  or  imprisonment,  or  is  specially  de- 
clared by  law  to  be  a  misdemeanor,  it  shall 
be  deemed  a  misdemeanor  within  the  chapter, 
and  that  the  word  "forfeiture,"  as  used  in  the 
chapter,  shall  include  any  p^ialty  in  money  or 
goods  other  than  a  fine.  H^d,  that  a  violation 
of  the  resolution  is  a  misdemeanor,  within 
Uw8 1899,  p.  350,  c.  218,  $  5;  taking  away  from 
Justices  of  the  peace  of  Milwaukee  county 
Jurisdiction  of  criminal  actions,  including  mis- 
demeanors arising  in  the  county  otherwise  tri- 
able before  a  Justice  of  the  peace,  so  as  to 
deprive  a  justice  of  the  peace  of  Jurisdiction 
thereof  notwithstanding  the  amendment  of 
Laws  1899,  p.  859,  c.  218,  {  5,  by  Laws  1901. 
p.  80,  c.  70, 1 1,  and  Laws  1908,  p.  613,  c.  388, 
adding  thereto  that  nothing  therein  contained 
•ball  be  construed  to  deprive  any  Justice  of 
tbe  peace  of  any  town  in  Milwaukee  county, 
except  <Mily  the  dty  of  Blllwaukee,  of  juris- 
diction of  complaints  for  the  violation  of  any 
ordhiance  of  any  such  town.  Stoltman  v. 
^wn  of  Lake^  102  N.  W.  920,  921,  124  Wis. 
462. 


■MBAJfOm  ZH  omcB 

Within  a  statute  providing  that  if  any 
clerk  shall  knowingly  and  willingly  do  any 
act  contrary  to  the  duties  of  his  ofllce,  or 
diall  knowingly  and  willfully  fail  to  per- 
form any  act  or  duty  required  of  him  by  law, 
he  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  "misdemeanor 
in  ofllce,*'  and  authorising  his  removal  on  in- 
formation that  he  has  been  guilty  of  a  "mis- 
demeanor in  oflnce,"  the  circuit  Judge  is  with- 
out Jurisdicticm  to  remove  a  clerk  of  the 
circuit  court  from  ofllce  because  he  had  been 
infonned  against  for  murder  wholly  discon- 
nected with  his  office.  State  ex  rel.  Henson 
v.  Shei^>ard«  91  &  W.  477,  480,  482»  192  Mo. 
497. 

MISFEASANCE 

**  ^Misfeasance'  is  the  improper  doing  of 
an  act  which  a  person  might  lawfully  do." 
It  is  a  failure  to  use,  in  the  performance  of 
a  duty  owing  to  an  individual,  that  degree 
of  care,  skill,  and  diligence  which  the  dr- 
cumstances  of  the  case  reasonably  demanded. 
State,  to  Use  of  Cardin,  v.  McOlellan,  85  S. 
W.  267,  268, 113  Tenn.  616, 8  Ann.  Cas.  992. 

A  "misfeasance"  la  the  failure  to  do 
something  imposed  upon  the  persoQ  by  law 
as  a  reasonable  member  of  society,  or  the 
failure  to  use  reasonable  care  and  dilissnce  in 
the  performance  of  a  duty  imposed  by  con- 
tract whidi  results  in  an  injury  to  a  third 
person.  Irvin  v.  Callaway,  55  8.  B.  1089, 
1040,  127  Oa.  246  (citing  Southern  By.  Ck>.  v. 
Grizsle,  58  S.  BL  244,  124  Oa.  787,  UO  Am. 
St  Bep.  191). 

"  'Misfeasance*  is  the  performance  of  an 
act  in  an  improper  manner,  whereby  some 
one  receives  an  injury."  The  directors  of 
a  county  fair  association  failing  to  securely 
protect  patrons  of  the  grand  stand  from  in- 
juries by  a  wild  ball  pitched  or  batted  In 
the  game,  one  of  the  amusements  of  the 
county  fair,  are  not  liable  to  such  patrons  as 
for  misfeasance.  Williams  v.  Dean,  111  N. 
W.  931,  983,  134  Iowa,  210,  U  Ll  R  A.  (N.  S.) 
410. 

IVoaf  easaaee  distlsciilslied 

"Nonfeasance"  is  doing  nothing,  while 
"misfeasance"  is  doing  improperly.  Stiewel 
V.  Borman,  87  8.  W.  404,  406.  63  Ark.  30,  36. 

"Misfeasance"  is  the  performance  of  an 
act,  which  might  lawfully  be  done,  in  an  im- 
proper manner,  resulting  in  injury  to  another, 
while  "nonfeasance"  is  the  nonperformance  of 
an  act  which  should  be  performed.  Haynes' 
Adm*rs  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  C6. 
140  S.  W.  176,  179,  145  Ky.  209,  Ann.  Gas. 
1913B,  719. 

"Bilsfeasance"  is  the  improper  doing  of 
an  act,  as  distingutahed  from  "nonfeasance,** 
which  is  the  total  omission  to  do  an  act  If 
a  party  makes  a  gratuitous  engagement,  ac- 
tually enters  upon  the  execution  of  the  busi- 
ness, and  does  It  amiss  throni^  want  of  due 


lOSFEASANCE 


410 


MISFBASANGB 


care,  by  which  danger  ensues  to  the  other 
party,,  an  action  will  lie  for  misfeasance.  It 
has  been  held  that  misfeasance  may  involve  to 
some  extent  the  idea  of  not  doing,  as  where 
an  agent,  while  engaged  in  the  performance 
of  his  undertaking,  does  not  do  something 
which  it  is  his  duty  to  do  under  the  cir- 
cumstanceS;  as,  for  instance,  when  he  does 
not  exercise  that  care  which  a  due  regard 
for  the  right  of  the  other  party  requires. 
Such  negligence  as  would  be  actionable  in 
any  relation  of  life  is  "misfeasance**  by  not 
doing.  Southern  Ry.  Ck).  v.  Rowe,  59  S.  E. 
462,  466,  2  Ga.  App.  557. 

"A  distinction  ordinarily  is  taken  be- 
tween acts  of  'misfeasance,*  or  positive 
wrongs,  and  'nonfeasance,'  or  mere  omissions 
of  duty.  The  master  is  always  liable  to  third 
persons  for  the  misfeasances  of  his  servants 
in  all  cases  within  the  scope  of  his  employ- 
ment The  principal  is  also  liable  to  third 
persons  for  like  misfeasances  of  his  agent 
The  agent  is  also  liable  to  third  persons  for 
his  own  misfeasances  and  positive  wrongs, 
but  he  is  not  liable  to  third  persons  for  his 
own  nonfeasances  or  omissions  of  duty  in 
the  course  of  his  employment  His  liability, 
in  such  cases,  is  to  his  principal.  The  dis- 
tinction between  misfeasance  and  nonfeas- 
ance, between  acts  of  direct  positive  wrongs 
and  mere  neglects  of  agents  as  to  their  per- 
sonal liabilty,  seems  to  be  founded  on  this 
ground.  No  authority  whatever  from  a  su- 
perior to  an  inferior  can  furnish  the  latter  a 
Just  defense  for  his  own  positive  wrongs  or 
trespasses,  for  no  man  can  authorize  another 
to  do  a  positive  wrong.  But  in  respect  to 
nonfeasances,  or  mere  neglects  in  the  per- 
formance of  duty,  the  responsibility  therefor 
must  arise  from  some  express  or  implied  ob- 
ligation between  particular  parties  standing 
in  privity  of  law  or  contract  with  each  other, 
and  no  man  is  bound  to  answer  for  any  such 
violations  of  duty  or  obligation  except  to 
those  to  whom  he  has  become  directly  bound 
or  amenable  for  his  conduct*'  Bryce  v. 
Southern  R.  Co.,  125  Ped.  958,  962  (quoting 
and  adopting  definitions  in  Story,  Ag.  [9th  Ed.] 
tS  308,  309). 

"Misfeasance"  and  "nonfeasance,"  as 
used  in  connection  with  the  acts  of  agents, 
is  often  difficult  of  determination.  ''Mis- 
feasance** means  a  positive  wrong.  It  may 
involve  also,  to  some  extent,  the  idea  of  not 
doing,  as  where  the  agent,  while  engaged  in 
the  performance  of  his  undertaking,  does  not 
do  something  which  it  was  his  duty  to  do 
under  the  circumstances.  The  distinction  to 
be  observed  between  mere  nonfeasance  and 
misfeasance  was  considered  in  Osborne  v. 
Morgan,  130  Mass.  103  (39  Am.  Rep.  437), 
where  the  court  said:  "It  is  often  said  in 
the  books  that  an  agent  is  responsible  to 
third  persons  for  misfeasance  only,  and  not 
for  nonfeasance.  And  it  is  doubtless  true 
that  if  an  agent  never  does  anything  towards 
carrying  out  his  contract  with  his  principal, 


but  wholly  omits  and  neglects  to  do  so,  tl 
principal  is  the  only  person  who  can  mail 
tain  any  action  against  him  for  the  nonfe 
sance.  But,  if  the  agent  once  actually  uj 
dertakes  and  enters  upon  the  execution  ( 
a  particular  work,  it  is  his  duty  to  use  rei 
sonable  care  in  the  manner  of  executing  i 
so  as  not  to  cause  any  injury  to  third  persoi 
which  may  be  the  natural  consequence  of  hi 
acts ;  and  he  cannot,  by  abandoning  its  en 
cution  midway  and  leaving  things  in  a  dai 
gerous  condition,  exempt  himself  from  lii 
bility  to  any  person  who  suffers  injury  t 
reason  of  his  having  so  left  them  withoi 
proper  safeguards.  This  is  not  nonfeasane 
or  doing  nothing,  but  it  is  misfeasance,  doiii 
improperly.'*  Where  an  agent  has  complel 
control  of  a  tenement  house,  and  construd 
a  new  walk  in  the  court,  leaving  a  large  hoi 
in  the  walk,  and  plaintiff,  a  new  tenant,  wlU 
out  previous  knowledge  of  the  existence  ( 
the  hole,  stepped  into  it  after  dark  an 
was  severely  injured,  it  is  misfeasance  of  tli 
agent  rendering  him  liable,  and  not  a  mei 
nonfeasance.  Carson  v.  Quinn,  105  S.  ¥ 
1068,  1091, 127  Mo.  App.  525. 

"There  is  a  distinction  betweoi  'nonfei 
ance'  and  *misf easance'  or  'malfeasance' ;  an 
this  distinction  is  often  of  great  Importanc 
in  determining  an  agent's  liability  to  tbii 
persons.  In  this  connection  'nonfeasano 
means  the  total  omission  or  failure  of  a 
agent  to  enter  upon  the  performance  of  son 
distinct  duty  or  undertaking,  which  he  hi 
agreed  with  his  principal  to  do;  'misfei 
sance'  means  the  improper  doing  of  an  a< 
which  the  agent  might  lawfully  do,  or,  i 
other  words,  it  is  the  performing  of  his  dut 
to  his  principal  in  such  a  manner  as  to  iJ 
fringe  upon  the  rights  and  privileges  ( 
third  persons;  and  'malfeasance'  is  the  d< 
ing  of  an  act  which  he  ought  not  to  do  at  al 
It  is  not  every  omission  or  failure  to  perfon 
a  duty  that  will  constitute  a  nonfeasance,  bt 
only  an  omission  to  perform  such  distin< 
duties  as  he  owes  to  his  principal,  as  dii 
tinguished  from  those  which  he  owes  to  thir 
persons,  or  the  public  in  general  as  a  membc 
of  society.  Nonfeasance  does  not  extend  t 
the  omission  or  failure  to  do  some  act,  when 
by  a  third  person  is  injured  after  he  ha 
once  entered  upon  the  performance  of  hJ 
contractual  obligations.  For  example,  if  a 
agent  undertakes  to  perform  certain  act 
for  another,  and  he  refuses  or  fails  to  eate 
upon  sudi  performance,  it  is  nonfeasance 
but  if  he  once  begins  the  performance  of  snc 
acts,  and,  in  doing  so,  fails  or  omits  to  d 
certaiOQ  acts  which  he  should  have  don< 
whereby  a  third  person  is  injured,  it  is  d( 
a  nonfeasance,  but  a  misfeasance.  Biisfei 
sance  may  involve  the  omission  to  do  8om( 
thing  which  ought  to  be  done,  as  where  a 
agent,  engaged  in  the  performance  of  his  oi 
dertaking,  omits  to  do  something  which  i 
is  his  duty  to  do  under  the  ctrcnmstance 
as  when  he  does  not  exerdse  that  degree  c 


MISF£ASANCB 


ill      MISMAKAOI>— MISMANAGBMXNT 


re  which  due  regard  for  the  rights  of  otfa- 
I  Tequire&"  Orcatt  t.  Ceatury  Bldg.  Oo^ 
&  W.  1082^  1068,  201  Ma  424,  8  L.  B.  A. 
.  S.)  929  (quoting  and  adopting  deflnidon 
Clark  &  Skyles,  Law  of  Agency,  {  596). 

"'Nonfeasance'  la  the  total  omission  or 
Llnre  of  the  agent  to  enter  upon  the  per- 
rmance  of  a  distinct  dnty  or  ondertaktog 
dch  he  has  agreed  with  his  principal  to  do. 
Isfeasance*  means  the  improper  doing  of 

act  which  the  agent  mi^^t  lawfully  do.'* 
uthem  By.  Ck>.  ▼.  Miller,  57  S.  B.  1090, 
92,  1  Ga.  App.  616  (quoting  and  adopting 
e  definitions  in  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grizzle, 

S.  E.  244,  124  Ga.  735,  110  Am.  8t  Bepw 
1). 

The  distinction  between  "nonfeasance^ 
id  ''ndsf  easance'*  has  been  expressed  by  the 
urts  of  the  state  as  follows:  *'If  the  duty 
litted  by  the  agent  or  servant  deyolved  up- 
i  him  from  his  agency  or  employmoit,  his 
Qission  Is  only  of  a  duty  he  owes  his  prin- 
pal  or  jnaster,  and  the  master  alone  is 
ible.  While  if  the  duty  rests  upon  him  in 
s  indiTidnal  character,  and  was  one  that 
e  law  imposed  upon  him  independently  of 
8  agency  or  employment,  then  he  is  liable, 
onham  ▼.  City  Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  101 
.  Y.  Supp.  87,  89,  90,  U6  App.  Div.  584. 

The  negligence  of  a  mining  company's  su- 
rintendent  in  charge  of  its  mine  in  main- 
inlng  a  shaft  in  a  dangerous  condition,  and 
permitting  its  use  by  third  persons  una- 
ftre  of  its  dangerous  character,  is  not  a 
ionfeasance"  for  which  he  is  responsible  to 
e  company  only,  but  is  'Misfeasance^  for 
tiich  he  is  liable  when  such  negligence  la 
e  proximate  cause  of  injuries.  Hagerty  ▼. 
oDtana  Ore  Purchasing  Co.,  98  Pac  648, 
«,  88  Mont  69,  25  K  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  9S^ 

The  failure  of  a  gas  company  operating 
I  an  agent  of  a  city  under  contract  for  the 
umination  of  the  city  streets  to  perform  its 
ity  to  keep  seryice  pipes  from  its  mains  to 
e  dty  lamps  in  repair  involves  an  affirma- 
re  element  of  negligence  amounting  to  mis- 
osance,  and  it  is  liable  to  any  one  injured 

consequence  thereof,  for  an  agent  who 
idertakes  and  enters  on  the  execution  of  a 
irticular  work,  must  use  reasonable  care 
i  the  manner  of  executing  it,  and  he  cannot 
r  abandoning  its  execution,  exempt  himself 
om  liability  to  any  person  suffering  Injury 
7  reason  of  his  act,  because  that  act  is  not 
ionfeasance,"  but  is  "misfeasance."  Con- 
^lidated  Gas  Co.  of  Baltimore  City  v.  Con- 
)r,  78  AtL  726.  729,  114  Md.  140,  32  L.  B. 
.  (N.  S.)  809. 

IISFORTUNE 

Unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune,  see 
UnaToidable  Casualty. 

IISHAP 

An  injury  to  a  servant  from  a  cause 
hieh  could  not  have  been  reasonably  an- 


ticipated, or  anticipated  iind»  the  drcnm- 
stances  surrounding  the  accident,  may  be 
characterized  as  a  "mishap,'*  for  the  result 
of  which  a  master  is  not  liable.  Han  v.  Mis- 
souri &  Kansas  TeL  Co.,  124  8.  W.  567,  068, 
141  Mo.  App.  183. 

MISINSTRUCT 

Where  the  defendant  sugar  company 
agreed  that  its  agents  should  give  instruc- 
tions regarding  the  growing  and  delivery  of 
beets  to  be  raised  on  plaintifTs  land,  and 
plaintiff  sues  for  damages  because  of  mis- 
instructions,  the  word  "mlsinstruct,"  as  un- 
derstood and  used  in  charging  that  if  de- 
fendant misinstructed  plaintiff  in  the  growing 
of  beets,  etc,  the  verdict  must  be  for  plain- 
tiff, means  to  instruct  amiss  or  give  wrong 
or  improper  instructionsL  Smith  t.  Billings 
Sugar  Co.,  94  Pac.  839,  841,  87  Mont  128,  Ifi 
L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  887. 

MISJOINDER 

See,  also.  Multifariousness. 

While  not  entirely  synonymous,  the  com- 
mon-law term  "misjoinder"  and  the  equity 
term  "multifarious"  have  much  in  common. 
They  each  token  improper  joinder,  and  both 
have  reference  to  the  confusing  result 
wrought  thereby.  Neither  goes  to  the  sub- 
stance of  complainant's  claim,  but  merely  as- 
serts improper  Joinder  of  causes  of  action. 
Since  these  terms  go  only  to  form,  and  not 
to  substance,  objections  for  either  or  both 
are  not  defenses,  within  the  accepted  mean- 
ing of  that  term.  Skalns  v.  Barnes,  53  South. 
268,  270,  168  Ala.  426. 

There  is  no  "misjoinder"  of  causes  of 
action  where  a  complaint  states  a  good  cause 
of  action  against  one  defendant  but  none 
against  the  other.  Reld  v.  Hennessy  Co., 
124  Pac  273,  274,  46  Mont  462. 

MISLEADING 

See  Grossly  Misleading. 

MISMANAGE— MISMANAGEMENT 

"Mismanagement,"  as  used  in  Civ.  Code 
1902,  I  2028,  providing  that  any  person  who 
shall  receive  bodily  injury  or  damage  through 
a  defect  in  any  street,  causeway,  bridge,  or 
public  way,  or  by  reason  of  defect  or  ••mis- 
management'* of  anything  under  control  of 
the  corporation  within  the  limits  of  any  town 
or  city,  may  recover  in  an  action  against 
the  same,  means  ••mismanagement'*  in  mak- 
ing repairs  on  the  streets,  so  that  the  cor- 
poration should  be  held  liable,  not  only  for 
neglect  in  making  repairs  on  the  streets,  but 
also  for  "mismanagement**  of  anything  un- 
der the  control  of  the  corporation  in  mak- 
ing such  repairs.'  Bryant  v.  City  Council  of 
Orangeburg,  49  S.  B.  229,  231,  70  S.  a  137 
<eitlng  Dunn  t.  Town  of  BamweU,  21  &  B. 


I  H 


MISMANAGB— MISMANAGEMENT       412 


MISREPRESENTATIOK 


r?  i 


m 


M 

% 

H! 


1 


I'll! 


815,  43  S.  G.  401,  49  Am.  St  Bep.  843;  Acker 
▼.  Anderson,  20  S.  C.  495;  Brown  ▼.  Laur^u^ 
Gonnty,  17  S.  B.  21,  88  8.  G.  282;  Mawm  t. 
Spartanbnrg  Gonnty,  19  &  E.  15,  40  S.  G 
393,  42  Am.  St  Rep.  887;  Parks  t.  Glty 
Goundl  of  GreenviUe,  21  S.  B.  540,  44  S.  a 
172). 

An  allegation  in  an  application  for  re- 
moval of  a  recelrer  of  a  company  that  the 
officers  of  the  company  mismanaged  Its  af- 
fairs is  not  libelous  or  slanderous  of  the  of- 
ficers; the  word  "mismanaged"  not  denoting 
any  wrong  or  turpitude  on  the  part  of  the 
persons  managing.  Lebovitch  y.  Joseph  Levy 
&  Bros.  Go.,  54  South.  978,  981, 128  La.  518. 

Gen.  St  Kan.  1901,  {  5858,  proYldlng  that 
railroad  companies  shall  be  liable  for  dam- 
ages to  any  employ^  of  said  companies  in 
consequence  of  any  negligence  of  their  agents 
or  of  any  mismanagement  of  their  engineers 
or  other  employes  to  any  person  sustaining 
such  damage,  does  not  make  a  distinction  be- 
tween agents  on  the  one  hand  and  engineers 
and  other  employte  on  the  other,  nor  between 
negligence  and  "mismanagement,"  but  by 
the  act  a  company  is  made  rec^nsible  for 
any  mismanagement  of  its  engineers  or  other 
employes  to  any  person  sustaining  damage 
thereby.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Go.  of  Texas 
▼.  Kellerman,  87  &  W.  401*  404»  89  Tex.  Glv. 
App.  274. 

MISNOMER 

Publication  of  an  original  notice  desig- 
nating the  defendant  as  "Ghase  Marker,"  in- 
stead of  "Ghan  Marker/'  constituted  a  fbtal 
"misnomer."  Schaller  &  Son  ▼.  Marker,  114 
N.  W.  43,  44,  136  Iowa,  575. 

If  two  names  are  commonly  used  as  the 
same  name,  although  they  differ  in  sound,  if 
either  Is  used  for  the  other,  it  is  not  a  "mis- 
nomer.** Where  one  name  is  an  abbrevia- 
tion of  the  other,  but  both  are  taken  by  com- 
mon use  to  be  the  same,  both  differing  in 
sound,  the  use  of  one  for  the  other  is  not  a 
misnomer.  Where  the  two  names  are  derived 
from  the  same  source,  the  use  of  one  for  the 
other  is  not  a  misnomer;  but  this  must  be 
held  to  mean  the  same  source,  as  defined  and 
understood  in  the  English  language,  and  not 
as  including  names  derived  from  the  same 
source  in  some  other  language.  The  names 
Helen  and  Ellen  will  not  be  regarded  as  the 
same  name.  Thomas  v.  Desney,  10  N.  W. 
315,  316,  57  Iowa,  58  (citing  Trimble  v.  SUte 
[Ind.]  4  BUckf.  437;  4  Bac  Abr.  ''Mis- 
nomer"). 

MISPRISION 

See  Glerical  Misprision. 

Misprision  of  felony  at  common  law  Is  a 
criminal  neglect  ^ther  to  prevent  a  felony 
from  being  committed  or  to  bring  the  offen- 
der to  Justice  after  its  commission,  but  with 
out  such  previous  concert  with  or  subsequent 


asBistanoe  of  him  as  will  make  tbd  eonceaJ 
an  accessory  before  or  after  the  fltct  Sti 
T.  Wilson,  67  AU.  633^  80  Vt  248. 

At  common  law  it  was  one's  duty  to  pi 
vent  the  commission  of  a  felony,  with  foi 
if  necessary,  and  the  failure  to  da  so  cons 
tuted  a  misdemeanor,  called  misprision 
felony.  Snell  v.  Derricott,  49  South.  885,  9( 
161  Ala.  268,  28  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  986,  18  Ai 
Gas.  686. 

Giv.  Gode  Prac.  {  517,  defines  ''mlsprlsio 
of  a  derk  to  consist  in  the  rendition  of  Jnc 
ment  before  the  action  stands  for  trial,  or 
render  Judgment  against  an  infant,  exceptl 
married  women  or  persons  of  unsound  mii 
until  a  defense  or  report  is  filed  pursuant 
section  36,  snbsec.  3.  H^d  not  to  Include  f 
rendition  of  a  Judgment  not  in  complian 
with  a  prior  order  of  the  Gourt  of  Appeals 
an  equity  suit  after  a  retrial  erroneouE 
granted  by  the  court ;  such  error  being  Ju( 
dal,  and  not  ministerial.  Gayheart  t.  Gbii 
ers,  126  S.  W.  1085,  1087,  137  Ky.  472. 

MISREPRESENTATION 

See       Fraudulent       Misrepresentatio 

Knowingly     Misr^reseot;      Materl 

Misrepresentation. 
Element  of  fraud,  see  Fraud. 
Estoppel  by  misrepresentation,   see  1 

toppel  in  Pais. 
See,  also.  False  Bepresentation;  Fran 

Fraudulent  Bepresentation. 

A  ''misrepresentati<m"  must  be  an  afilri 
ative  statement  or  affirmation  of  some  fb( 
in  contradistinction  to  a  concealment  or  fa 
ure  to  disclose,  and  to  a  mere  expression 
opinion.  Lee  v.  Halle,  114  S.  W.  403,  405, 
Tex.  Giv.  App.  632  (citing  8  Pom.  Eq.  Jur.  a 
877). 

*'To  profess  an  intention  to  do  or  n 
to  do  when  a  party  intends  the  contrary 
as  clear  a  case  of  'misrepresentation  and 
fraud'  as  could  be  made."  Schrafft  v.  Fid 
ity  Trust  Go.,  62  Att.  033,  935,  73  N.  J.  La 
57  (quoting  and  adopting  the  language 
Bigelow,  Fraud,  484). 

A  ''misrepresentation"  as  the  basis  of  i 
scission  must  be  material ;  but  it  can  be  mai 
rial  only  when  it  is  of  such  a  character  Uu 
if  it  had  not  been  made,  llie  contract  won 
not  have  been  entered  hito.  The  misrepi 
sentatlon  need  not  be  the  sole  cause  of  t 
contract,  but  it  must  be  of  such  natui 
weight,  and  force  that  the  court  can  say  wll 
out  it  the  contract  would  not  have  been  ma( 
Greenawalt  v.  Bogers,  01  Pac.  526»  528,  1 
Gal.  630  (citing  Ck>lton  v.  Stanford,  23  Pi 
16,  28,  82  Gal.  351,  399,  16  Am.  St.  B^.  13 

A   "misrepresentation,"   the    fialsity 
which  will  afford  ground  f6r  a  UU  f or  resc 
slon  of  a  contract,  must  be  as  to  an  existl 
fact  and  an  afilrmative  statement  of  facts 
contradistinction  to  the  mere  expression 
an  opinion  which  is  ordinarily  not  presum 


HISBEPRE8ENTATI0N 


413 


MISRSPRJB8ENTATI0K 


)  deoeiTe  or  misTtpfesent    Dotson  ▼.  Kiik, 
M)  Fed.  14,  23,  108  0.  G.  A.  86a 

To  entitle  one  to  sue  for  fraud  and  de- 
dt,  it  Is  necessary  that  the  fftlse  representa- 
on  be  made  directly  to  him,  or  that  it  be 
ade  by  defendant  personally ;  it  being  sof- 
:rient  that  defendant  authorized  it  Keeler 
Seaman,  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  020,  022,  47  Misc. 
ep.  292. 

A  representation  that  a  worthless  medi- 
ne  is  a  sure  cure  for  hog  cholera  is  a  "mis- 
4;>resentation  of  fact^  and  is  actionable, 
id  the  representation  cannot  be  said  to  be  a 
lere  expression  of  opinion,  and  hence  not 
ctionable.  McDonald  ▼.  Smith,  102  N.  W. 
»,  670,  189  Mich.  211. 

While  ordinarily  a  "misrepresentation'* 
lUst  consist  of  an  assertion  or  statement 
ich  as  misleads  another  to  his  injury,  as 
Istinguished  from  an  assertion  or  statement 
hich  is  obviously  the  expression  of  an  opin- 
»n,  yet  it  is  well  settled  that  a  misrepre- 
mtation,  by  reason  of  which  injury  results, 
lay  consist  of  concealment  of  truth,  as  well 
9  of  positiTe  falsification.  United  States  t. 
terllng  Salt  Ca,  200  Fed.  593,  597. 

Moral  delinquency  is  a  necessary  element 
1  "misrepresentation."  This  immoral  ele- 
lent  consists  in  the  necessary  guilty  knowl- 
[Ige  and  consequent  intent  to  dec^re,  some- 
imes  designated  by  the  technical  term  "sd- 
nter."  The  rery  essence  of  the  legal  con- 
eptlon  is  the  fraudulent  intention  flowing 
rom  the  guilty  knowledge.  No  **misrepre- 
entation**  is  fraudulent  at  law  unless  it  is 
lade  with  actual  knowledge  of  its  falsity,  or 
nder  such  circumstances  that  the  law  must 
ecessarily  impute  such  knowledge  to  the 
arty  at  the  time  he  makes  It  Mason  ▼. 
foore,  76  N.  B.  932,  986,  73  Ohio  81  276,  4 
x  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  597,  4  Ann.  Gas.  240  (citing 
Pom.  Eq.  Jur.  |  884). 

**A  'misrepresentation  to  be  material* 
hould  be  in  respect  of  an  ascertainable  fact, 
B  distinguished  from  a  mere  matter  of  opin- 
m.  A  representation,  which  merely  amounts 
0  a  statement  of  opinion,  goes  for  nothing, 
bough  it  may  be  true,  for  a  man  is  not  justi- 
led  in  placing  reliance  upon  it"  Where  de- 
oidant,  a  machinist,  with  ample  facilities  to 
scertain  the  exact  condition  of  itn  ice  plant, 
ras  offered  erery  opportunity  to  determine 
ts  condition  before  purchasing  it  from  the 
ncceflSors  of  a  corporation  which  had  been 
mable  to  operate  it  sueoessfuUy,  of  which 
lefendant  was  fully  informed,  the  doctrine 
>t  caveat  emptor  applied,  and  defendant,  in 
m  action  for  the  price,  was  not  entitled  to  a 
let-off  and  damages  because  of  alleged  false 
^presentations  that  the  plant,  with  some  re- 
)9iin,  would  turn  out  4,400  pounds  of  ice  a 
lay.  Williamson  y.  Holt,  61  S.  BL  884,  386, 
147  N.  C.  515,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  240. 

The  word  "misrepresentation,"  in  Bey. 
St  1899,  I  8528,  •as  amended,  authorizing  the 
board  of  dental  examiners  to   revoke   the 


lloeaae  of  any  dentist  for  "fraud,  deceit,  or 
misrepresentation"  in  the  practice  of  dentist- 
ry, means  untrue,  improper,  or  unfaithful 
representation,  such  as  a  fUse  statement  of 
account  or  as  a  misrepresentation  of  one's 
motives,  and  the  words,  when  so  construed, 
prevent  the  statute  from  being  invalid  for 
uncertainty.  State  ex  reL  Williams  v.  Purl, 
128  S.  W.  196,  201,  228  Mo.  1. 

The  "misrepresentation"  whlcb<*will  viti- 
ate a  contract  of  sale,  and  prevent  a  court 
of  equity  from  aiding  its  enforcement,  must 
relate  to  a  material  matter  constituting  an 
inducement  to  the  contract,  and  respecting 
whidi  the  complaining  party  did  not  possess 
at  hand  the  means  of  knowledge,  and  it  must 
be  a  representation  on  which  he  relied,  and 
by  which  he  was  actually  misled ;  and  where 
the  means  of  knowledge  are  at  hand  and 
equally  available  to  both  parties,  and  the 
subject  of  purchase  is  alike  open  to  their  in- 
spection, if  the  buyer  does  not  avail  himself 
of  such  means,  he  will  not  be  heard  to  say 
that  he  was  deceived  by  the  representations. 
Long  V.  Kendall,  87  Pac  670,  673,  17  OkL  70. 

la  iBOTurauMe 

The  terms  '"misrepresentation"  and  "sup- 
pression of  f^ct  by  the  employer"  contained 
in  a  policy  of  guaranty  insurance,  which  pro- 
vides "that  any  material  ndsstatements  or 
suppression  of  fact  by  employer  in  any  state- 
ment or  declaration  to  the  company,  or  in 
any  daim  made  under  this  bond,  shall  render 
the  bond  void  from  the  beginning,"  mean  the 
same  thing.  BIferepresentations  is  here  used 
in  a  somewhat  more  restricted  sense  than 
ordinarily.  It  has  reference  to  misstate- 
ments, known  to  be  untrue,  or  which  are 
positively  stated  as  true  without  actual 
knowledge  by  the  insured,  and  made  under 
drcumstancee  which  call  for  such  knowledge 
as  might  be  based  upon  reasonable  care  pre- 
viously exercised.  It  is  akin  to  the  expres- 
sion "suppression  of  fact  by  the  employer," 
which  is  a  species  of  misrepresentation  as  it 
leads  the  inquirer  to  believe  what  is  appar- 
ently true  by  concealing  the  fact  which  shows 
it  to  be  not  true.  One  is  the  active,  and 
the  other  is  the  passive,  phase  of  the  same 
thing.  One  is  the  false  statement  and  the 
other  is  the  suppression  of  the  truth ;  each 
intended  to  mislead  as  to  the  matter  pertain- 
ing to  the  risk.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Go.  of 
New  York  t.  Western  Bank  (Ky.)  94  S.  W. 
1.  4. 

Under  Rev.  St  1899,  I  7890  (Ann.  St 
1906,  p.  3746),  providing  that  no  misrepre- 
sentation made  in  obtaining  a  policy  of  life 
insurance  shall  be  deemed  material  or  ren- 
der the  policy  void  unless  the  matter  mis- 
represented shall  have  actually  contributed 
to  the  contingency  or  event  on  which  the  pol- 
icy has  become  due^  the  word  "misrepre- 
sentation" embraces  statements  in  the  nature 
of  a  warranty,  which  are  introduced  into 
the  policy  as  part  of  it  Salts  v.  Prudential 
ins.  Co.,  120  S.  W.  714,  716,  140  Mo.  App. 


ui6a 


414 


MI8STATEMHNT 


142  (Citing  Jacobs  t.  Omaha  Life  AsiTn,  48 
S.  W.  462,  146  Mo.  623;  Jenkins  t.  Coyenant 
Mnt  Life  Ins.  Co.,  71  S.  W.  688,  171  Mo. 
875;  Keller  ▼.  Home  Life  Ins.  Co.,  96  S.  W. 
903,  198  Mo.  440). 

MISS 

MISSED  SHOT 

The^rm  ''missed  shots,**  as  used  In  the 
vocabulary  of  miners,  means  charges  of 
powder  that  had  failed  to  explode  at  the 
proper  time.  Bird  v.  Utica  Gold  Mining  Co., 
84  Pac.  256-259,  2  Cal.  App.  674. 

mssiHO 

Bums'  Ann.  St.  1894,  |  7618,  requires  the 
Secretary  of  State,  as  soon  as  the  acts  are 
printed  to  certify  that  he  has  compared  the 
printed  with  the  enrolled  acts  and  Joint  reso- 
lutions and  found  them  correctly  printed. 
It  also  authorizes  him  to  use  the  engrossed 
bills;  he  to  return  them  to  the  state  library 
when  the  printing  is  complete.  Held,  that  a 
certificate  showing  that  a  certain  chapter  of 
the  acts  of  a  given  year  was  compared  with 
the  engrossed  act,  **the  enrolled  bill  being 
missing,"  was  prima  facie  evidence  that  there 
was  such  an  enrolled  bill,  and  that  the  same 
was  an  existing  law,  the  word  ''missing" 
meaning  that  there  was  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  Secretary  such  enrolled  bill,  but  that  it 
was  lost  or  gone  at  the  time  he  compared  the 
printed  act  with  the  engrossed  act  State 
V.  Wheeler,  89  N.  B.  1.  8,  172  Ind.  678, 
19  Ann.  Cas.  834. 

MISSION 

MISSIONARY 

The  terms  "missionary^  and  ''missionary 
society"  are  of  common  use  and  have  a  well- 
known  meaning  which  is  the  same  whether 
the  use  is  intended  to  be  precise  and  techni- 
cal or  merely  that  of  everyday  speech.  By 
universal  acceptance  the  word  "missionary," 
whether  as  a  noun  or  as  an  adjective,  em- 
braces not  only  the  conception  of  religious, 
charitable,  or  educational  work  or  worker, 
but  also  work  done  through  philanthropic 
motives  for  the  welfare  of  others  too  poor, 
too  unappredatlve,  or  too  indifferent  to  do  it 
themselves,  and  by  persons  supported  or 
means  furnished  in  part  at  least  by  some 
agency  of  which  those  for  whom  the  work 
is  done  do  not  form  a  sustaining  part  The 
derivative  of  the  word  implies  a  sending,  and 
so  it  is  that  in  both  technical  and  common 
speech  the  idea  of  sending  forth  to  the  serv- 
ice of  others,  the  doing  of  a  work  for  oth- 
ers, is  associated  with  its  meaning.  Some- 
times it  is  used  to  characterize  the  agency 
sent,  sometimes  the  agency  sending,  but  al- 
ways there  is  associated  with  tbe  notion  of 
a  benevolent  service  for  others  that  of  such 
service  sent,  whether  far  or  near,  by  those 
who   maintained  it  to   those   who   need  it. 


There  is  no  use  of  th*  term  as  descriptii 
of  self-supporting  religious  tf  ort  in  the  mal 
tenance  by,  within,  or  for  an  ecdesiastio 
society  or  parish  of  churches,  church  servic 
Sunday  schools,  and  the  ordinary  agencies  < 
worship  or  religious  activity  according  1 
the  usual  practice,  and  especially  the  pra 
tice  of  congregational  societies  in  the  coiu 
try  towns  of  New  England.  Bulkeley 
Worthington  Ecclesiastical  Soc.,  63  Atl.  35 
354,  78  Conn.  626,  12  U  B.  A.  (N.  &)  526. 

MI8SIONABT  nOCflETIBB  OB  OOBPG 
RATION 

See,  also.  Missionary. 

A  bequest  to  a  society  incorporated  1 
advance  the  cause  of  religion  throughout  a 
unlimited  field  by  circulating  the  Bible,  prin 
ing,  establishing  Sunday  schools,  and  8en<! 
ing  out  persons  to  distribute  religious  book 
and  tracts,  being  a  bequest  to  a  "missionar 
corporation,"  was  exempt  from  a  transfe 
tax,  under  Tax  Law  (Laws  1896,  c.  908)  |  22: 
as  amended  in  1905  (Laws  1905,  c  368),  & 
empting  legacies  to  such  corporationa  In  i 
Mccormick's  Bstote,  99  N«  H  177,  178,  206  I 
T.  100. 

Testator  bequeathed  certain  property  t 
R.  for  life,  and  directed  that  on  his  deceu 
it  should  be  equally  divided  among  th 
"schools  Und  missionary  societies  mentione 
in  the  wiU.**  The  will  had  previously  be 
queathed  a  legacy  in  favor  of  the  Worthinj 
ton  Ecclesiastical  Society,  and  in  succeedini 
paragraphs  gave  various  sums  to  seven  dei 
ignated  missionary  corporations,  boards,  o 
societies.  The  ecclesiastical  society  was  i 
corporation  organized  for  the  ^read  of  re 
ligion  by  the  maintenance  and  support  o 
the  church  known  as  the  "Congregationa 
Church  at  Berlin,  Connecticut,"  of  wbid 
testatrix  and  her  ancestors  had  been  mem 
bers  and  supporters.  Held,  that  such  sodet: 
was  not  "a  missionary  society,"  entitled  t 
share  in  the  residue  so  bequeathed.  Bnlke 
ley  V.  Worthington  Ecclesiastical  Soc,  61 
Atl.  351,  354,  78  Conn.  526,  12  L.  B.  A.  (M 
S.)  526. 

MISSISSIPPI  RIVER 

As  boundary  between  states,  see  Bonn 
dary. 

The  term  "Mississippi  rtver,**  deed  ii 
the  enabling  act  (Act  Cong.  Aug.  6,  1846,  c 
89,  9  Stat  56)  descriptive  of  the  boondan 
between  Wisconsin  and  Sfinnesota,  applio 
to  the  broad  expanse  of  water  flowing  in  i 
generally  southerly  direction,  known  at  th< 
date  of  such  act  as  such  river,  not  any  ba 
you  upon  either  side  thereof!  Franzlni  ▼ 
Layland,  97  N.  W.  499,  501,  120  Wla.  72. 

MISSTATEMENT 


See  Willful  Misstatement 


MISTAKX 


415 


MISTAKE 


MISTAKE 


liistakft;   Qrom  Mistake; 


See  Clerical 

Mateilal  Miataka 

The  **mUitake"  from  wUdi  equity  will 
■elteve  may  be  eommon  to  both  parties  to  the 
ontxact  and  consist  in  either  the  expres- 
don  of  their  a^reeinent  or  of  some  matter 
»f  iiidiicement  thereto  or  to  which  it  is  to 
>•  applied.  Brlggs  t.  Watkins,  70  8.  B.  661, 
»64,  X12  Ya.  14  (dting  6  Words  and  Phrases, 
K  4&40). 

"Mr.  Pomeroy  says  that  "mistake,'  with- 
in tlie  meaning  of  equity  and  as  the  ooca- 
doii  of  juxisdictioii,  is  an  erxoneous  mental 
(audition,  conception,  or  conviction  induo- 
Bd  by  ignorance,  misanirehenslon,  or  misun- 
derstanding of  the  truth,  but  without  negli- 
gence, and  resulting  in  some  act  or  omission 
done  or  suffered  erroneously  by  one  or  both 
tbe  parties  to  a  transactiom  bat  without  its 
erroneous  <diaracter  being  intended  or  known 
at  ttte  time."  Pearson  t.  Dancer,  89  South. 
474,  476,  144  Ala.  427  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  2  Pom.  Bq.  Jur.  pp.  299,  800,  U 
839,   864). 

''Mistake,"  within  the  rule  making  it  a 
head  of  equity  jurisdiction,  has  been  defined 
as  *'8ome  unintentional  act,  omission,  or  er- 
ror, arising  from  unconsciousness,  ignorance, 
forgetfnlness,  imposition,  or  misplaced  con- 
fidence."    Where  an  instrument  Is   drawn 
and  executed,  professing  or  intending  to  car- 
ry into  execution  an  agreement  previously 
entered  into,  but  which,  by  mistake  of  the 
draftsman,  either  as  to  fact  or  as  to  law, 
does  not  accomplish  that  purpose  or  rlolates 
it,  equity   will  reUeve   from  su<^  mistake. 
Mere  neglect  or  omission  to  read  or  know 
the  contents  of  a  written  instrument  before 
execution  is  not  necessarily  a  bar  to  reforma- 
tion thereof,  but  relief  is  proper  in  such 
case,   if   the  instrument,   through   mistake, 
tails   to  accomplish   the  purpose   intended. 
Taylor  t.  Godfrey,  69  S.  S.  631,  688,  62  W. 
Va.  677. 

Under  the  rule  that  equity  will  relieve 
against  a  Judgment  for  "mistake,"  the  er- 
roneous advice  of  counsel  is  not  such  a  '*mis- 
•  take"  as  will  entitle  a  party  to  reliet  Don- 
ovan V.  MUler,  88  Pac.  82,  83,  12  Idaho,  600, 
9  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  624,  10  Ann.  Cas.  444. 

It  can  be  found  from  the  fact  that  one 
fails  to  act  because  of  a  ''mistake"  of  his 
counsel  that  he  was  prevented  from  acting 
bj  '^mlstake^"  Dame  v.  Wood,  66  AtL  484, 
74  N.  H.  212. 

Where  a  written  contract  of  insurance 
was  not  the  contract  made  by  insured  and 
the  general  agent  of  insurer,  and  Insured, 
though  knowing  that  the  policy  as  written 
did  not  accord  with  the  agreement  as  made, 
had  the  right  to  rely  on  the  representations 
made  by  the  general  agent,  and  was  led  to 
believe  that  the  misstatement  in  the  policy 
vaa  merely  formal,  and  oould  not  be  taken 


adv«nts«s  of  by  insurer,  equity  can  reform 
tlie  policy,  sinee  insured  either  acted  under 
an  erroneous  convletion  in  accepting  the  pol- 
icy containing  the  tenns  not  agreed  on,  or 
he  was  imposed  on,  and  became  a  victim  of 
misplaced  oonfldenos;  the  word  ''mistake" 
being  defined  to  be  either  the  doing  of  an 
act  under  an  erroneous  conviction,  which 
act,  but  for  such  conviction,  would  not  have 
been  done,  or  some  intentional  act  or  omis- 
sion or  error,  arising  from  ignorance,  sur- 
prise, imposition,  or  misplaced  confidence. 
Sloss-Sheffield  Steel  ft  Iron  Co.  v.  iBtna  Life 
Ins.  Go.,  70  Atl.  880,  886,  74  N.  J.  £q.  686. 

Where  a  creditor,  who  attached  the  in- 
terest in  land  descending  to  tlie  debtor  on 
the  ancestor  dying  intsstate,  knew  ot  pro- 
ceedings to  probate  the  ancestor's  will,  which 
disinherited  the  debtor,  who  took  no  steps 
to  become  a  party*  thereto,  and  the  wlU  wan* 
admitted  to  probate,  the  creditor's  failure  to 
contest  the  probate  was  not  the  result  of 
''accident,  mistake,  or  unforeseen  cause," 
within  the  statute  authorizing  the  granting 
of  a  new  trial,  where,  by  reason  of  accident, 
mistake,  or  unforeseen  cause,  judgment  was 
rendered  against  the  applicant  for  a  new 
triaL  Seward  v.  Johnson,  62  AtL  660,  670, 
27  R.  I.  396. 

An  instruction  that  if  defendant,  on  his 
express  malice  aforethought,  with  intent  to 
kill  M.,  shot  at  him  with  a  gun,  and  by  mis- 
take killed  deceased,  he  would  be  guilty  of 
murder  in  the  second  degree^  was  objection- 
able in  the  use  of  the  word  "mistake"  for 
"unintentionally";  they  not  being  synony- 
mous. Deneaner  v.  State,  127  S.  W.  201, 
204,  68  Tex.  Or.  R.  624. 

The  code  provision  that  the  court  may 
at  any  time  permit  a  pleading  or  mistake 
in  any  other  respect  to  be  amended  author- 
ises the  substitution  of  a  sufllcient  appeal 
bond  in  an  election  contest,  where  the  bond 
given  has  failed  to  comply  with  the  stat- 
utory requirements.  Galloway  v.  Bradbum, 
82  S.  W.  1013,  1016,  119  Ky.  49. 

That  land  is  sold  at  administrator's  sale 
which  is  not  embraced  in  the  petition  to 
sell,  nor  in  the  decree  of  confirmation,  is  not 
a  "mistake  in  description,"  within  Code  1906, 
i  2072  (Ann.  Code  1892,  |  1897),  providing 
that,  any  mistake  in  describing  land  of  dece- 
dent sold,  etc.,  in  any  part  of  the  proceed- 
ings, may  be  corrected  on  petition  of  the 
purchaser.  Pearson  v.  Caldwell,  47  South. 
436,  437,  93  Miss.  637. 

The  word  "mistake"  in  Oen.  Laws  1896, 
c  266, 1  21,  giving  reUef  to  a  garnishee  fail- 
ing through  mistake  to  disclose  to  the  court 
that  he  has  no  property  of  defendant  in  bis 
hands,  should  receive  a  broad  construction, 
and  an  affidavit  by  a  garnishee  that  through 
accident  and  mistake  he  neglected  to  file  bi^ 
personal  affidavit  of  no  funds  is  within  tl&e 
provision.     Marshall  v.  McCormiclL,  62  Atl- 
212,  27  B.  I.  867. 


MISTAKE 


416 


MI8TAEX 


The  mistake  of  persons  in  execoting  a 
lease  of  a  lot,  the  beUef  of  both  parties  that 
the  lot  was  not  within  the  district  where 
construction  of  wooden  buildings  was  pro- 
hibited by  ordinance,  whereas  two  days  be- 
fore the  lease  was  ezecoted  an  ordinance 
was  passed  putting  it  within  such  district, 
was  not,  as  regards  the  lessee's  right  to  re* 
sdnd,  a  mistake  caused  by  any  neglect  of 
his  legal  duty,  within  Civ.  CJode,  I  1577,  pro- 
viding, as  part  of  the  definition  of  a  *'mls- 
take,"  that  it  "was  not  caused  by  the  neg- 
lect of  a  legal  duty  on  the  part  of  the  per- 
son making  the  mistake."  Hannah  v.  Stein- 
man,  112  Pac.  1094,  1098,  159  Gal.  142. 

Ballinger^s  Ann.  Ck)des  ft  St.  |  6153,  re- 
lating to  the  modification  of  Judgments  and 
orders  and  providing  in  subsection  3  that 
the  same  may  be  modified  for  mistakes,  etc., 
of  the  clerk,  etc.,  does  not  apply  solely  to 
mistakes  of  the  clerk,  but  to  any  mistake 
warranting  a  modification  of  the  Judgment 
in  furtherance  of  Justice,  and  in  view  of 
section  4953  (section  426)  providing  that  the 
court  may,  in  furtherance  of  justice,  eta, 
amend  any  pleading,  etc.,  or  by  correcting  a 
mistake  in  any  other  respect,  the  court  had 
Jurisdiction  to  modify  an  order  of  confirma- 
tion of  a  receiver's  sale  so  as  to  confbrm 
the  same  to  the  order  of  sale.  National  Bank 
of  Commerce  v.  Ia  Kllsheimer  ft  Oo.,  110  Pac. 
16,  17,  59  Wash.  460. 

A  mortgagor's  surviving  husband,  to  pro- 
tect his  Interest  and  that  of  his  children, 
employed  F.  to  bid  for  the  property  on  fore- 
closure. One  of  the  tracts  was  worth  $1,- 
600  and  was  struck  down  to  B.  for  $610.  F. 
immediately  claimed  the  bid  was  his,  but 
the  officer  making  the  sale  declined  to  rec- 
ognize it,  and  returned  B.  as  the  purchaser. 
The  husband  thereupon  applied  to  set  the 
sale  aside  as  to  such  tract,  agreeing  on  a 
resale  to  bid  $1,600.  Held,  to  Justify  vaca- 
tion of  the  sale  for  ''mistake*'  and  inade- 
quacy of  price,  on  condition  that  the  hus- 
band give  bond  to  bid  $1,600,  pay  the  costs 
of  the  first  sale,  and  interest  on  the  purchas- 
er's deposit  Montclalr  Building  ft  Loan 
Ass'n  V.  Farmer  (N.  J.)  67  Atl.  852,  853. 

Impresston  equivale&t 

See  Impression. 
Bfistake  of  law 

The  word  *'mlstake,**  when  used  alone, 
without  any  limiting  expression,  Includes  a 
mistake  of  law  as  well  as  of  fact.  If  its 
meaning,  as  used  in  a  statute,  is  narrowed 
to  mistakes  on  questions  of  fact,  it  would 
have  been  proper  and  more  natural  for  the 
Legislature  to  say  so.  Where  a  railroad 
company  made  a  mistake  in  the  construction 
of  its  statutory  rights,  such  as  an  ordinari- 
ly prudent  person,  honestly  desiring  to  act 
within  his  rights,  might  make.  It  is  exempt 
from  the  penalty  under  Laws  1890,  p.  1095, 
c.  .565,  §  37,  as  amended  by  Laws  1892,  p. 
1392,   c    676,  providing  for  a  penalty   for 


the  exacting  by  a  carrier  of  unlawfol  ral 
of  fare,  unless  the  overcharge  was  ma 
through  tnadrerteaee  or  mistake,  not  amom 
ing  to  groM  negligence.  Goodspeed  v.  Itt 
ca  St  By.  Oa,  77  N.  B.  8d2,  398,  184  N. 
361. 

Mistakes  of  law  are  mistakes  with 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  f  473,  authorising  the  con 
in  the  furtherance  of  Justice,  to  allow  i 
amendment  correcting  mistakes  in  procec 
Ings  had  during  the  progress  of  a  trial 
the  furtherance  of  Justice.  Dent  v.  Superi 
Court  of  Los  Angeles  County,  96  Pac.  6i 
673,  7  Cal.  App.  683. 

Civ.  Code,  I  1578,  subd.  2,  provides  th 
a  mistake  of  law  constitutes  a  mistake  wil 
In  the  meaning  of  the  articde  only  when 
arises  from  (1)  a  misapprehension  of  the  li 
by  all  parties,  all  supposing  that  tiiey  kn< 
and  understood  it,  and  all  making  sut>8ta 
tially  the  same  mistake  as  to  the  law; 
(2)  a  misapprehension  of  the  law  by  one  pi 
ty,  of  which  the  othns  are  aware  at  t 
time  of  contracting,  or  whi<^  they  do  n 
rectify.  Several  sales  of  defendant's  prop< 
ty  were  made  at  the  same  time  by  the  sIm 
iff  under  executions  issued  on  various  Jud 
ments.  Defendant  redeemed  from  a  Juni 
lien,  paying  the  amount  thereof  to  the  sh< 
iff  for  plaintiff,  who  had  purchased  at  i 
the  sales,  defendant  believing  that  by  t 
acceptance  of  such  amount  plaintiff  was  < 
topped  to  deny  that  the  redemption  was  coi 
plete,  and  the  property  thereby  freed  frc 
all  prior  liens.  Plaintiff,  knowing  the  li 
and  defendant's  supposition,  accepted  t 
money  from  the  sheriff.  After  the  explrati< 
of  the  period  of  redemption  plaintiff  broug 
an  action  against  defendant  to  quiet  tit 
to  the  property.  Held  that  as  each  par 
seemed  to  have  aimed  to  obtain  an  adva 
tage  against  the  other  to  which  he  was  d 
entitled  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  the  reli 
prayed  only  on  the  condition  of  repaying 
defendant  the  amount  paid  by  the  latter  f 
redemption,  with  interest  from  the  date 
its  payment  Woods  v.  Kellerman,  89  Pa 
358,  360,  3  Cal.  App.  422. 

Hegllgenee  of  self  or  eovmsel 

The  afladavlt  of  counsel  that  owing  to 
business  engagement,  which  took  him  to  a 
other  state  after  a  stipulation  for  the  e 
tension  of  time  to  move  for  a  new  trial, 
being  engaged  in  court  the  day  the  stipul 
tion  expired,  the  serious  illness  of  his  wU 
and  the  impression  that  the  stipulation  1 
eluded  another  day,  he  neglected  to  ask  f( 
an  extension  of  time  for  such  motions  sbo^ 
"mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or  exeus 
ble  neglect'*  within  Comp.  Laws,  I  3163,  ai 
entitled  him  to  relief  against  his  default  ai 
a  further  extension  of  time.  Sherman 
Southern  Pac  Co.,  102  Pac.  257,  31  Nev.  28 

A  court  is  Justified  in  setting  aside 
Judgment  against  a  defendant  in  ejectmeo 
taken  during  the  absence  of  himself  and  h 


SaSTAXB 


417 


MI9TAKK  OF  WMXft 


eontt^  on  the  ground  of  '^mistake,  Inad* 
Tertence,  or  surprise,*'  wliero  bis  eonnsel 
left  the  court,  during  the  term  at  which  tbe 
judgment  was  rendered^  with  the  nnder^ 
standing  and  belief  that  tiie  case  was  not 
to  be  tried  at  that  term,  and  where  a  prima 
fade  valid  defense  is  shown.  Virginia,  T. 
&  C.  Steel  ft  Iron  Go.  t.  Harris,  161  Fed.  428, 
429,  80  O.  O.  A.  658. 

Onissiom. 

Laws  1906,  p.  204,  e.  184,  iworides  that 
whenever,  after  delivery  of  the  tax  roll  to 
the  treasnrer,  it  shall  be  discovered  that  any 
town  derk,  in  makiog  out  the  tax  roll,  has 
made  a  "Mistake"  therein  in  computing  or 
carrying  out  the  amount  of  the  tax,  the  clerk, 
with  the  consent  of  the  treasurer,  at  any 
time  before  the  treasurer  is  required  to 
make  his  return  of  delinquent  taxes,  may 
correct  the  errors,  etc  Held,  that  the  in- 
tent of  the  Legislature  was  not  to  cover  a 
case  where  a  tax  apportionment  was  delib- 
erately and  intentionally  omitted  by  the 
town  derk  in  making  op  the  tax  roll  deliv- 
ered to  the  treasurer,  since  such  an  omission 
is  not  a  mistake  within  the  contemplation  of 
the  statute.  State  ex  rel.  Bowe  v.  Knim- 
enauer,  U6  N.  W.  798,  80O,  186  Wis.  186. 

mSTAKE  OF  FACT 

A  ''mistake  of  fact**  may  be  defined  as 
an  unconscious  ignorance  or  fbrgetfulness  of 
the  existence  or  nonexistence  of  a  fact  past 
or  present  material  to  the  contract.  Kan- 
sas City  Packing  Box  Co.  v.  Spies  (Tex.)  109 
8.  W.  432,  434. 

A  "mistake  of  fact"  takes  place  either 
when  some  fact  which  really  exists  is  un- 
known, or  some  fact  is  supposed  to  exist 
which  really  does  not  exist  Scott  v.  Ford, 
78  Pac.  742,  746,  46  Or.  681,  68  L.  R.  A.  469. 

A  "mistake  of  fact"  extends  to  and  in- 
cludes the  case  of  a  party  who,  through 
mere  ignorance  of  the  existence  or  nonex- 
istence of  a  material  fact,  is  induced  to  do 
an  act  injurious  to  himself,  where,  if  he 
had  been  informed  of  the  existence  or  non- 
existence of  such  fact,  he  would  not  have 
performed  such  an  act  Scott  v.  Ford,  80 
Pac  899,  900,  46  Or.  631,  68  L.  R.  A.  469 
(quoting  and  adopting  Hurd  v.  Hall,  12  Wis. 
126,  180). 

A  "mistake  of  fact*'  is  a  mistake  not 
caused  by  the  neglect  of  any  legal  duty  on 
the  part  of  the  person  making  the  mistake, 
but  "which  consists  in  his  ignorance  of  some 
fact,  past  or  present,  material  to  the  trans- 
action, or  in  his  belief  In  the  existence  of 
some  fact  material  to  the  transaction  which 
does  not  exist  Such  a  mistake  may  afford 
ground  for  relief  In  a  court  of  equity." 
Steinfeld  v.  Zeckendorf,  86  Pac.  7,  11,  10 
Ariz.  221. 

"Mistake  of  fiict,'*  for  which  a  contract 
may  be  avoided,  is  defined  in  Civ.  Code,  I 
1577,  to  be  "an  unconscions  ignorance  or  for- 

8  Wns.&  P.2D  SBB.-27 


Cttfulness  of  a  fiict,  past  or  present,  material 
to  the  cpntract"  White  v.  Stevoiaon,  77 
Pac  828<  880,  144  OaL  104. 

''A  mistake  as  to  title  is  a  'mistake  of 
fact,'  even  though  arising  from  an  erroneous 
view  of  the  legal  eifect  of  a  deed."  Boslere 
V.  ReiUy,  76  N.  £.  968,  960,  189  Mass.  618. 

Under  Wilson's  Rev.  &  Ann.  St  1903,  I 
748,  a  "mistake  of  fact"  is  a  mistake  not 
caused  by  neglect  of  a  legal  duty  on  the  part 
of  the  person  making  the  mistake,  and,  where 
plaintiff  made  a  mistake  of  fact  in  paying  its 
taxes  when  it  was  not  liable,  the  mistake 
was  made  by  its  own  neglect  of  duty,  and, 
the  payment  being  voluntary,  the  law  will 
furnish  no  relief.  Louisiana  Realtj  Co.  v. 
City  of  McAlester,  108  Pac.  39^  392,  26  Okl. 
726. 

Civ.  Code,  I  1666,  defines  a  "mistake  of 
fact"  as  one  not  caused  by  the  neglect  of 
legal  duty  on  the  part  of  the  person  making 
the  mistake,  and  consisting  in:  (1)  An  uncon- 
scious ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of  a  fact 
past  or  present  material  to  the  contract,  or 
(2)  belief  in  the  present  existence  of  a  thing 
which  does  not  exist,  or  in  the  past  existence 
of  such  a  thing  which  has  not  existed.  Plain- 
tiff reinsured  part  of  its  risk  with  defendant, 
and  then,  on  the  defendant's  request,  placed 
such  reinsurance  with  another  oommenclng  on 
a  certain  day,  on  which  day  it  returned  to 
defendant  its  written  obligation.  On  the  day 
previous  unknown  to  them,  the  insured  prop- 
erty was  burned.  Held,  that  the  release,  not 
being  made  in  contemplation  of  a  prior  loss, 
was  made  under  a  mistake  of  fact,  against 
which  relief  would  be  granted.  Trader's 
Ins.  Co.  of  Chicago,  lit,  v.  Aachen  ft  Munich 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  89  Pac.  109,  110,  160  Oal.  870, 
8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  844. 

Under  Civ.  Code,  |  1689,  providing  that 
a  party  to  a  contract  may  rescind  it  if  his 
consent  was  given  by  mistake,  while  the  mis- 
take may  be  one  of  fact,  as  defined  by  section 
1577,  or  of  law,  as  defined  by  section  1678, 
in  which  latter  case  the  mistake  must  be  by 
both  parties,  not  only  must  the  mistake  be 
one  but  for  which  the  party  would  not  have 
consented  to  the  contract,  section  1568  de- 
claring that  consent  is  deemed  to  have  been 
obtained  through  mistake  "only  when  it 
would  not  have  been  given  had  such  cause 
not  existed,"  but  in  case  of  "mistake  of  fact," 
the  mistake  must  be  "material  to  the  con- 
tract," this  being  an  element  of  a  mistake  of 
fact  as  defined  by  section  1577.  Hannah  v. 
Steinman.  112  Pac.  1094,  1096,  159  Cal.  142. 

Where  plaintiff  paid  the  consideration 
for  a  deed  on  the  belief  that  defendant  had 
title  to  the  premises,  and  thereafter  it  ap- 
peared that  she  had  no  title  because  the 
conveyance  to  her  was  a  forgery,  plaintiff 
was  entitled  to  recover  the  consideration  as 
money  paid  under  a  "mistake  of  fact"  under 
Civ.  Code,  I  1677,  subd.  2,  providing  that 
mistake  of  fact  is  a  mistake  not  caused  by 


MISTAKE  OP  LAW 


418 


MITIOATE-^&nTiaATION 


neglect  of  a  legal  duty,  and  consisting  In  the 
belief  of  the  present  existence  of  a  thing  ma- 
terial to  the  contract  which  does  not  exist 
or  In  the  past  existence  of  a  thing  which  has 
not  existed.  Home  y.  Hughes,  124  Pac.  730, 
19  Gal.  App.  6. 

MISTAKE  OF  UkW 

As  mistake,  see  Mistake. 

"A  'mistake  of  law'  happens  when  a 
party,  having  fall  knowledge  of  the  facts, 
comes  to  an  erroneous  conclusion  as  to  their 
legal  effect"  Scott  v.  Ford,  78  Pac.  742,  746, 
45  Or.  531,  68  L.  R.  A.  460  (quoting  Hurd  ▼. 
Hall,  12  Wis.  125). 

A  "mistake  of  law"  is  an  erroneous  con- 
clusion as  to  I  the  legal  effect  of  known  facts, 
and  Is  no  ground  for  the  Intervention  of  a 
court  of  equity.  Stelnfeld  v.  Zeckendorf,  86 
Pac.  7,  11,  10  Arls.  221  (citing  And.  Law 
Diet). 

A  '•mistake  of  law,"  from  which  a  court 
of  equity  will  relieve,  is  defined  and  gov- 
erned by  section  2123  of  the  Civil  Code, 
which  reads:  "  'Mistake  of  law'  constitutes  a 
ndstake,  within  the  meaning  of  this  article, 
only  when  it  arises  from:  (1)  A  misappre- 
hension of  the  law  by  all  parties,  all  suppos- 
ing that  they  knew  and  understood  it,  and 
all  making  substantially  the  same  mistake 
as  to  the  law;  or  (2)  a  misapprehension  of 
the  law  by  one  party,  of  which  the  others  are 
aware  at  the  time  of  contracting,  but  which 
they  do  not  rectify."  Bottego  v.  Carroll,  77 
Pac  430,  31  Mont  122. 

Under  Code  Civ.  Proc.  f  |  2186,  3132,  pro- 
viding that  a  written  contract  supersedes  all 
oral  negotiations,  and  no  evidence  of  the 
terms  of  an  agreement  other  than  the  con- 
tents of  the  writing  shall  be  received,  except 
where  a  mistake  or  Imperfection  lis  in  issue, 
and  the  validity  of  the  instrument  is  in  dis- 
pute, and  to  establish  fraud,  and  sections 
2117,  2123,  declaring  that  actual  fraud  con- 
sists in  a  promise  made  without  any  inten- 
tion of  performing  it,  or  any  act  fitted  to 
deceive,  and  that  "mistake  of  law"  consti- 
tutes a  misapprehension  of  the  law  by  a 
party,  of  which  the  others  are  aware  at  the 
time  of  contracting,  but  which  they  do  not 
rectify,  where  plaintiff  alleged  mistake  and 
fraud,  and  the  evidence  disclosed  that  the 
inducement  held  out  to  plaintiff  to  sign  an 
agreement  was  based  on  fraudulent  repre- 
sentations of  defendants  that  a  lease  need 
not  be  mentioned  in  a  contract  of  sale  of  a 
business  and  the  lease,  evidence  was  admissi- 
ble showing  the  purchase  of  the  lease  and  de- 
fendants* fraudulent  conduct,  over  objection 
that  it  varied  the  contract  Sathre  t.  Rolfe, 
77  Paa  431,  432,  31  Mont  85. 

MISTRESS 

Where  a  single  woman  consents  to  un- 
lawfully cohabit  with  a  man  generally,  as 


though  the  marital  ration  existed  betwe 
them,  without  any  limit  as  to  the  domtion 
such  cohabitation,  and  actually  commences 
cohabit  with  him  under  that  understandii 
she  becomes  his  "concubine,"  or,  as  express 
in  modem  times,  his  '*kept  mistress."  Coy 
Humphreys,  125  S.  W.  877,  880, 142  Ma  A] 


MISTRIAL 

A  "mistrlar  is  a  nugatory  trial,  as  d 
tlnguished  from  a  new  trial,  which  recogniz 
a  completed  trial  which  for  some  suflacie 
reason  has  been  set  aside  so  that  the  issu 
may  be  litigated  de  novo.  It  Is  a  matter 
law.  A  case  does  not  result  in  a  mistrial  t 
cause  the  trial  judge  becomes  disqualified 
act  on  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  verdict  ai 
for  new  trial.  Stern  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  1 
N.  Y.  Supp.  181,  182,  52  Misc.  Rep.  12. 

It  is  a  "mistrlar*  where  there  la  no  gc 
eral  verdict,  and  the  Jury's  answer  to  sped 
questions  do  not  cover  all  of  the  facts 
issue.    Ward  v.  Qradin,  109  N.  W.  57,  61, 
N.  D.  649  (citing  Manning  t.  Monagbao,  : 
N.  Y.  539). 

MITER  BOX 

A  "miter  box^  la  a  rough  three-sided  bo 
without  top  or  ends,  into  the  two  uprigi 
sides  of  which  slits  are  sawed  at  the  prop 
angle.  Metzler  v.  McKenzle,  76  Paa  U 
115,  34  Wash.  470. 

MITIGATE— MITIGATION 

Extenuate  synonymous,  see  Extenuate 

The  term  "mitigation  of  damages*' 
properly  applied  only  to  actions  where  tl 
damages  are  not  capable  of  exact  pecuniai 
measurement  and  is  used  in  contradi8tincti( 
to  the  term  "aggravation  of  damages" ;  an 
where  matter  In  aggravation  of  damages 
proper,  matter  In  mitigation  may  be  show 
Swank  v.  Elwert,  106  Pac.  901,  907,  55  0 
487. 

There  is  a  technical  difference  betwe< 
the  "commutation  of  a  sentence*'  and  tl 
"mitigation"  thereof.  The  first  is  a  cfaani 
of  a  punishment  to  which  a  person  has  bet 
condenmed  into-one  less  severe,  while  to  mil 
gate  a  sentence  is  to  reduce  or  lessen  tl 
amount  of  penalty  or  punishment  Redudi 
sentence  of  a  court-martial,  dismissing  a  ni 
val  officer  from  service,  to  suspension  for  fii 
years  on  half  sea  pay,  with  a  reduction  ] 
rank  to  the  foot  of  the  list  of  his  grade, 
a  "mitigation  of  sentence,"  within  the  prov 
sion  of  Rev.  St  U.  S.  f  1624,  art  54,  thj 
every  officer  authorized  to  convene  a  geuen 
court-martial  shall  have  power,  on'  rerisic 
of  its  proceedings,  to  "remit  or  mitigate 
but  not  to  "oommnte,"  the  sentence  of  ai 
such  court  which  he  Is  authorized  to  appro^ 
and  confirm.    Mullan  ▼•  Uxdted  Stat^  2 


MITIOATS— MITIGATION 


419 


MIXED  BLOOD 


Ct  390, 382,  212  U.  S.  516.  521.  53  L.  Ed. 
(citing  Thomaon-Houfiton  EUectrlc  Oo.  t. 

>  Brass  0>.,  130  Fed.  549;  Perkins  Elec. 
tch  Mfg.  Oo.  T.  Bachanan*  129  Fed.  134). 
**  'Mitigating  circiinistanoeiBr  are  such  as 
Lot  constitute  a  justiflcatian  or  excuse  of 
offense  in  question,  but  whicb,  in  fairness 
mercy,  may  be  considered  as  extenuating 
educing  tbe  degree  of  moral  culpability." 
th  T.  People,  75  Pac.  914,  910,  32  Colo. 

(quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  in 
5l,  Law  Diet). 

**MI  tigs  ting  circumstances'*  are  audi  as 
\  to  an  appreciable  extent  to  proTe  the 
h  of  the  charge,  though  not  completely 
ring  it,  80  as  to  permit  an  inference  that 
^nda]\t  was  not  actuated  by  malice,  and 
t  be  connected  with  or  bear  upon  the 
lous  charge.  An  alleged  libel  consisted  of 
oagazine  article  entitled  ''Bucket  Shop 
rks/'  and  stated  that  the  business  of 
^et  shop  keeping  was  followed  by  persons 
Lng   themselves   "bankers   and   brokers" 

>  fleeced  their  customers  by  pretended 
s  and  purchases  of  stock;  that  H.  was 
of  the  members  of  plaintiff  firm  of  ''bank- 
and  brokers'* ;  that  his  picture  was  in  the 
les'  gallery;  and  that  these  were  but 
dmens  of  the  thieves  who  plied  their 
ie  as  keepers  of  bucket  shops  while  posing 
"bankers  and  brokers."  The  complaint 
led  that  H.  was  ever  a  member  of  their 
1,  or  that  they  were  brokers,  or  had  ever 
e  business  as  "bankers  or  brokers"  or  as 
^ers,  or  advertised  themselves  as  such. 
i  answer  alleged  that  H.  became  "assodat- 
^th  the  plaintiffs  in  their  business"  with- 

stating  in  what  capacity,  and  that  plain- 
}  held  themselves  out  as  "bankers" ;  their 
idpal  business  being  the  promotion  of  cer- 
ate enterprises  and  marketing  the  capital 
±  of  mining  enterprises,  which  stocks 
jitiffs  and  H.  knew  were  practically  worth- 
L  Held,  that  the  fftcts  alleged  in  the  an- 
iT  were  not  a  defense  by  way  of  mitigation 
I  reduction  of  damages,  they  not  even 
ding  to  prove  the  lib^ous  matter  in  part 
■gstrom  V.  Ridgway  Ck>.,  128  N.  Y.  Supp. 
33,  138  App.  Div.  178. 

To  an  action  of  libel  for  publishing  a 
eral  charge  of  ignorance  against  plaintiff, 
attorney,  not  limited  to  ignorance  in  the 
duct  of  the  particular  case  as  to  which 

publication  was  made,  defendant  pleaded 
a  partial  defense  the  statutory  law  relat- 

to  the  former  case  and  its  bearing  on  that 
e  and  that  plaintiff  as  attorney  therein 
led  to  raise  any  question  thereunder  be- 
ise  he  did  not  understand  and  was  ignor- 
:  of  the  law  on  that  particular  question, 
1  in  mitigation  of  damages,  that  this  was 
>wn  to  defendant  before  publication,  and 
it  the  article  was  publifdied  in  reliance 
reon  in  good  faith  and  without  malice. 
Id,  that  "ndtlgatlng  drcnmstances"  are 
>8e  which,  while  not  proving  the  truth  of 
)  charge,  tend  in  some  appreciable  degree 


toward  such  proof,  and  thds  permit  of  an  in- 
ference that  defendant  was  not  actuated  by 
malice  In  his  charge,  and  that  the  matter 
pleaded  bore  upon  and  tended  to  establish  a 
charge  of  ignorance,  and  that  the  plea  was 
good  on  demurrer.  Josephson  v.  Musical 
Courier  Go.,  180  M«  X.  8u]M>.  484,  430,  146 
App.  DiT.  2a 

MITTIMUS 

An  ordinary  '^mittimus"  directs  the  of- 
ficer to  commit  the  convict  then  in  custody  to 
JaU  or  prison,  according  to  the  sentence.  It 
contains  no  order  to  arrest  and  does  not  au- 
thorize an  arrest  of  one  at  large  and  not  an 
escaped  prisoner.  Where,  after  conviction 
and  sentence,  a  court  of  general  or  limited 
Jurisdiction  permits  the  convict  to  go  at  large 
without  day,  it  cannot  thereafter  issue  a 
mittimus  for  his  commitment,  for  in  such 
cases  the  court,  having  completed  its  judicial 
functions,  has  surrendered  all  further  con- 
trol over  the  case  and  person.  Tuttle  v. 
Lang,  00  AtL  892,  894,  100  Me.  123. 

MIX 

The  art  of  enameling  metalis  old.  Many 
difl^ient  fbrmulas  and  substances  are  used 
to  form  the  enamel,  but  the  usual  process  4a 
substantially  as  follows:  Certain  ingredients, 
usually  a  mixture  of  silica  or  sand,  and  of 
other  substances  having  a  fluxing  property 
to  produce  glass  when  mixed  with  sand,  sub- 
jected to  heat,  are  mixed  together  mechani- 
cally. This  mixture  Ib  called  by  enamelers 
the  "mix."  The  mix  is  then  subjected  to  a 
high  degree  of  heat  and  fused,  resulting  in  a 
vitrified  or  glassy  mass.  This  is  called  the 
"frit"  The  frit  is  then  put  in  a  miU  and 
ground  fine,  with  a  mixture  of  clay  and 
water,  resulting  in  a  liquid  paste.  TMs  is 
called  the  "dip."  The  metal  article  to  be  en- 
ameled is  then  dipped  in  the  paste,  dried, 
and  subjected  to  a  very  high  temperature  in 
an  oven  or  muffle.  In  some  cases  more  than 
one  dipping  and  bumlDg  takes  place.  The 
result  is,  if  the  operation  is  successful,  a 
metal  article  with  its  surface  covered  with 
an  adherent  coat  of  metal.  National  Enam- 
eling &  Stamping  Co.  v.  New  England  Enam- 
eling Co.,  151  Fed.  19,  20,  80  C.  a  A.  485. 

MIXED 

MIXED  ASSOCIATION 

An  insurance  association,  possessing 
some  features  incident  to  both  a  "stock  com- 
pany^ and  a  "mutual  company,"  but  being 
neither,  more  nearly  falls  under  the  dassifl- 
cation  of  a  "mixed  association."  State  v.  Al- 
ley, 51  South.  467,  477,  96  Miss.  720. 


MIXED  BI.OOD 

Indian  of  mixed  blood,  see  Indian. 
See,  also.  Half  Blood. 
Tbe  rule  of  the  common  law  that  diil- 
dren  of  f  reebom  parents  take  the  legal  status 


MIXED  CQMFAmr 


420 


MIXTURE 


of  the  father,  imd  therefore  children  of  a 
white  father  and  Indian  mother  must  be 
held  to  be  whites,  and  as  such  to  be  disquali- 
fied from  sharing  In  the  tribal  property  be- 
longing to  the  Indians,  does  not  apply  to 
treaties  made  with  the  Indians.  "In  the  ser- 
eral  treaties  entered  Into  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Omahas,  frequent  reference 
Is  made  to  'half  blood*  and  'mixed  blood,*  but 
In  none  Is  there  a  distinction  made  between 
those  deriving  their  Indian  blood  from  the 
mother  and  those  deriving  It  from  the  father. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  Indians, 
when  called  upon  to  agree  to  an  allotment  of 
the  lands  under  the  provisions  of  the  treaty 
of  1865  and  the  act  of  1882  had  knowledge  of 
the  artificial  rule  of  the  common  law,  which. 
If  It  was  applied  in  these  cases,  would  require 
the  ruling  that  a  half  blood  residing  with  the 
tribe,  the  child  of  a  white  father  and  an 
Indian  mother,  could  not  be  deemed  to  be  of 
mixed  Indian  blood,  whereas  a  child  of  an 
Indian  father  and  a  white  mother  would  be 
held  to  be  of  Indian  blood  and  therefore  en- 
titled to  share  In  the  tribal  property.  As 
ordinarily  understood  by  white  people,  a  per- 
son of  white  and  Indian  parentage  Is  deem- 
ed to  be  of  *mlxed  blood,"  without  regard  to 
the  source  of  the  Indian  blood."  Sloan  t. 
United  States,  118  Fed.  283,  28& 

BIIXED  COMPANY 

An  Insurance  association,  possessing 
some  features  Incident  to  both  a  "stock  com- 
pany" and  a  "mutual  company,**  but  being 
neither,  more  nearly  falls  under  the  dasslflca- 
tlon  of  a  "mixed  company."  State  v.  Alley, 
61  South.  467,  477,  96  Bliss.  720. 

"Mixed  Insurance  companies**  are  those 
which  embody  the  characteristics  of  both 
stock  and  mutual  companies.  State  t.  Wll- 
lett,  171  Ind.  296,  86  N.  B.  68,  70,  23  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  8.)  197. 

MIXED  NUISANCE 

"There  Is  a  class  of  acts  which  may  prop- 
erly be  denominated  'mixed  nuisances,'  be- 
ing both  public  and  private  In  their  effects, 
public  In  that  they  produce  Injury  to  many 
persons  or  all  the  public,  and  private  because 
at  the  same  time  they  produce  a  special  and 
particular  Injury  to  private  rights,  which  sub- 
jects the  wrongdoer  to  an  Indictment  by  the 
public,  and  to  damages  at  the  suit  of  persons 
Injured.  Ot  this  class  are  *  *  *  estab- 
lishments which,  by  reason  of  the  nature  o1 
the  business  carried  on,  produce  such  nox- 
ious smells  and  vapors  as  to  annoy  the  whole 
community,  and  are  at  the  same  time  a 
special  Injury  to  those  residing  or  doing  busi- 
ness In  their  immediate  vicinity,  by  rendering 
their  houses  untenantable,  or  their  enjoy- 
ment so  uncomfortable  that  they  sustain  a 
special  and  particular  damage,  apart  from 
and  beyond  the  rest  of  the  public'*  Acme 
Fertilizer  Co.  v.  State,  72  N.  B.  1037,  1038, 
34  Ind.  App.  346,  107  Am.  St  Rep.  190  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  In  Wood,  Nui- 


sances [3d  Bd.]  m.  84,  85,  ||  14-16,  and  ( 
Ing  Kenney  v.  Koopman,  22  South.  593,  ] 
Ala.  310,  87  L.  B.  A.  497,  67  Am.  St  R 
119). 

In    "mixed    nuisances,*'   an    actlona 
wrong  arises  in  favor  of  all  persons  ^ 
come  within  Its  effects  and  Influence  a 
whose 'rights  of  person  or  property  are 
jurlously  affected,  and  It  Is  not  required, 
sustain  such  an  action,  that  the  person 
jured  should  establish  damage  different 
kind  and  degree  from  others  In  like  drcn 
stances,   however   numerous   they    may 
The  right  of  action  In  such  case  Is  sustali 
by  showing  the  existence  of  appreciable  da 
age  to  the  plaintiff,  whether  such  damage 
special  or  otherwise.    McManus  t.  SouUm 
Ry.  Ck).,  64  8.  E.  766»  768,  150  K.  G.  655. 

HIXED  TRAIN 

*'Mlxed  trains'*  are  trains  composed 
freight  cars  and  passenger  cars.  State 
Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  117  S.  W.  1173,  11 
219  Mo.  156. 

A  '*mlxed  train'*  Is  parUy  used  for  1 
transportation  of  freight  but  also  has  a  p 
senger  car  or  ears  attached,  and  Is  held  ( 
to  the  world  as  a  regular  means  for  tm 
porting  passengers.  Southern  Ry.  Ox, 
Cunningham,  50  S.  B.  979,  981,  123  Qa.  90 

A  freight  train  with  a  passenger  cos 
attached  Is  a  *'mlxed  train."     Leach  v. 
Louis  &  S.  r.  R.  Co.,  118  S.  W.  510,  511,  1 
Mo.  App.  300. 

A  train  consisting  of  four  freight  a 
and  a  passenger  coach  Is  a  "mixed  trail 
Holland  v.  St  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  79  S. 
508,  509,  105  Mo.  App.  117. 

A  '*mlxed  train"  Is  a  train  equipped 
carry  passengers  as  well  as  freight  In 
arrangements,  the  safety  of  passengers  is 
much  looked  to  as  the  carriage  of  f  rei^t 
usually  has  two  or  more  coaches  for  passi 
gers,  and  separate  compartmoits  or  coact 
for  the  races,  and  a  baggage  compartment 
car,,  etc.,  and  runs  on  a  regular  sdiedule,  a 
subordinates  Its  freight  business  to  the  p 
senger  business  so  far  as  necessary  to  ma 
connections  with  other  pass^iger  trains 
Its  own  line  and  those  on  connecting  roa 
and  It  stops  opposite  stations  for  the  con?* 
lent  Ingress  and  egress  of  passengers.  Wh 
V.  Illinois  Cent  B.  Co^  55  South.  593,  595, 
Miss.  651. 

MIXERS 

See  Batch  Mixers;    Continuous  Mixe 


mXTUBE 

See  Intoxicating  Liquors  and  Mlxtnn 
liquid  Mixture. 

*'If  we  are  to  say  that  every  article  \i 
'mixture'  or  compound  which  has,  chemica 
considered,  more  than  one  ingredient  tli 
we  would  make  every  fruit,  of  the  earth 
compound.     Certainly  we  should  make  t 


MIXTURE 


421 


MODEL  OF  INVENnOH 


?oa  bean  a  'mixture*  or  oompooBd.  But 
arly  a  fair  Interpretation  of  the  meaning 

the  words  *mixtaze*  and  'compound'  in 
i  statute,  is  something  resolting  fr<»n  the 
ttlng  together  of  parts  or  Ingredients  other 
Ein  as  nature  has  put  them  together  in  the 
lits  of  the  earth."  The  proTisions  of  War 
venue  Act  June  18,  1898,  c  448,  |  20,  that 
B  stamp  taxes  provided  for  in  Schedule  B 
tiall  apply  to  all  medicinal  articles  com- 
anded  by  any  formula,  published  or  un^ 
blished,"  but  that  they  shall  not  apply  to 
y  uncompounded  medicinal  drug  or  chemi- 
l,  contemplate  a  compound  made  after  some 
rmula,  and  a  natural  product,  such  as  pa- 
in, which  is  prepared  from  the  Juice  of 
i  pawpaw  and  cannot  be  made  artificially, 
iiough  it  may  be  a  chemical  compound,  is 
t  '^compounded,*'  within  the  meaning  of 
i  statute,  and  is  not  taxable,  whether  used 
the  basis  of  a  plaster,  or  prepared  in  the 
rm  of  tablets  or  pills  by  being  mixed  with 

exdpient  which  has  no  medicinal  effect 
tinson  &  Johnson  ▼.  Herold,  161  Fed.  603, 
I  (quoting  and  adopting  Rose  t.  State,  11 
do  dr.  Gt  R.  87). 

The  term  intoxicating  liquors  or  "mix- 
res  thereor'  embraces  bitters.  Intoxicat- 
;  Liquor  Cases,  26  Kan.  761,  761,  87  Am. 
ip.  284,  283. 

OB 

As  public  enemy,  see  Public  Enemy. 

An  assemblage  of  a  number  of  people 
ting  in  a  tumultuous  and  riotous  manner, 
Iculated  to  put  good  citizens  in  fear,  and 
endanger  their  person  or  property,  con- 
itutes  a  "mob,"  but  it  is  not  necessary  that 
I  these  elements  must  be  present  to  have 
at  effect  Stevens  v.  Sheriff,  80  Pac.  036, 
7,  71  Kan.  434. 

In  an  action  under  Gen.  St.  1901,  |  2601, 
iklng  cities  liable  for  injury  done  by  mobs, 
1  instmction  that  "a  mob  is  an  unorganized 
semblage  of  many  persons  Intent  on  unlaw- 
1  violence,  either  to  persons  or  property," 
not  erroneous  because  making  no  reference 

a  determination  on  the  part  of  those  com- 
sing  it  to  resist  opposition.  City  of  Cher- 
vale  T.  Hawman,  101  Pac.  994,  80  Kan.  170, 

L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  646,  133  Am.  St  Rep.  196, 
I  Ann,  Cas.  149. 

The  persons  engaged  in  a  "riot,"  consti- 
te  a  "mob";  the  two  terms  being  almost 
nonymous.  Luckett-Wake  T.  Co.  v.  Globe 
Rutgers  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  171  Fed.  147, 148. 

Blot  synoiiTmoiis 

The  word  "mob,"  in  legal  use,  is  prac- 
cally  synonymous  with  "riot,"  but  the  lat- 
T  is  the  more  correct  term.  Adamson  v. 
Ity  of  New  York,  96  N.  T.  Supp.  907,  909, 
LO  App.  Div;  68  (citing  Bouv.  Law  Diet). 


MODAL  LEGACY 

"A  'modal  legacy'  is  a  beauest  accom- 
panied with  directions  as  to  the  mode  in 
which  it  should  be  applied  for  the  legatee's 
benefit;  for  example,  a  legacy  to  Titius  to 
put  him  an  apprentice."  A  legacy  to  be  ap- 
plied to  the  education  of  testator's  minor 
sons  is  a  "modal  legacy."  Heady  v.  State  ez 
rel.  Heady,  60  Ind.  316,  323  (quoting  and 
adopting  the  definition  in  2  Bout.  21), 

MODE 

See  Potential  Mode. 

The  exandnation  of  a  party  before  trial, 
authorized  by  Code  Civ.  Proa  N.  Y.  |  870, 
cannot  be  required  by  a  federal  CMreuit  Court 
sitting  in  that  state,  by  virtue  of  the  decla* 
ration  of  Act  March  9, 1892,  c.  14,  that,  in  adr 
dition  to  the  mode  of  taking  the  depositions 
of  witnesses  in  causes  pending  in  the  federal 
District  and  Circuit  Courts,  it  shall  be  Uwful 
to  take  the  depositions  or  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses in  the  mode  prescribed  by  the  laws  of 
the  state  in  which  the  courts  are  held. 
"  'Mode'  usually  means  the  manner  in  which 
a  thing  is  done,  and  this  act  relates  to  the 
manner  of  taking  'depositions  and  testimony,' 
which  the  title  treats  as  equivalent  terms, 
and  which  may  be  so  regarded  so  far  as  the 
question  before  us  is  concerned.  But  it  is 
contended  that  the  word  'mode,'  as  used  in 
the  act,  has  a  broader  significance,  and  em- 
braces the  production  of  evidence,  thereby 
qualifying  section  861,  Rev.  St,  which  pre- 
scribes the  mode  of  proof.  We  cannot  concur 
in  this  view."  Hanks  Dental  Ass'n  v.  Inter- 
national Tooth  Crown  Co.,  24  Sup.  Ct  700, 
702, 194  U.  S.  808,  48  L.  Ed.  989. 

MODEL 

While  a  model  filed  in  the  Patent  Ofllce 
will  not,  in  itself,  amount  to  an  anticipation 
which  will  invalidate  a  subsequent  patent  to 
another,  the  word  "model"  as  so  used  must  be 
understood  in  its  ordinary  sense  as  meaning 
merely  a  pattern  or  reprebentation,  and  not 
as  meaning  the  actual  machine  or  device  of 
the  invention.  American  Writing  Mach.  Ck). 
V.  Wagner  Typewriter  Co.,  151  Fed.  576,  588, 
81  C.  C.  A.  120. 

MODZX     OF     imnSNTION     AND     HC- 
PROTEICEKT 

Exact  models  of  steamships  of  improv- 
ed design,  showing  the  details  of  the  vessels, 
valued  at  about  $1,000  each,  and  intended 
for  exhibition  in  steamship  offices,  are  mod- 
els of  improvements  in  the  art  of  shipbuild- 
ing, and  are  free  of  duty  under  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  I  2,  Free  list,  par.  616, 
covering  "models  of  inventions  and  of  other 
improvements  in  the  arts."  Boas  t.  United 
States,  128  Fed.  470. 


l-i— L 


MODEL  OP  INVENTION 


422 


MODERN  APPLIANCE 


The  proYlQion  In  Tariff  Act  July  24, 1897, 
c.  11,  I  2,  Free  List,  par.  616,  for  ''models 
of  Inventions  and  of  other  Improvements  in 
the  arts,  including  patterns  for  machinery,'* 
is  not  limited  to  the  class  of  patterns  known 
as  "model  patterns,"  intended  to  show  the 
working  of  the  thing  illustrated,  but  in- 
cludes also  molders*  patterns,  which  are  used 
as  models  about  which  to  form  sand  molds 
in  which  castings  may  be  made,  and 
which  are  fitted  for  successive  use  in  that 
way.  R.  Hoe  ft  Co.  t.  United  States,  141 
Fed.  488,  480. 

MODERATE 

MODERATE  SPEED 

"Moderate  speed"  is  not  a  fixed  rate  of 
miles  per  hour,  but  something  materially  less 
than  the  vessel's  full  speed,  depending  upon 
surrounding  circumstances.  The  James  A. 
Carney,  192  Fed.  216,  217. 

"Moderate  speed,"  required  of  a  steam 
vessel  in  a  fog,  is  purely  a  relative  term; 
and  what  constitutes  such  speed  in  a  given 
case  is  to  be  determined  with  reference  to 
the  time,  place,  and  circumstances,  rather 
than  from  the  actual  speed.  Quinette  v. 
Bisso,  136  Fed.  825,  830,  60  C.  C.  A,  503, 
5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  303  (citing  The  Colorado, 
91  U.  8.  702,  23  L.  Ed.  379;  Newton  v. 
Stebbins,  10  How.  [51  U.  8.]  606,  13  L.  Bd. 
651;  The  Martello,  14  Sup.  Ct  725,  153  U. 
8.  70,  38  L.  Ed.  637 ;  The  Umbrta,  17  Sup. 
Ct  615,  166  U.  8.  417,  41  L.  Bd.  1053). 

What  constitutes  a  '^moderate  speed"  on 
the  part  of  a  vessel  in  a  fog  cannot  be  de- 
termined by  any  hard  and  fast  rule,  but  de- 
pends on  the  dangers  which  are  known  or 
should  be  anticipated  in  the  particular  case. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Goodrich  Transit  Co.,  199 
Fed.  112,  114,  U7  C.  C.  A.  362. 

The  phrase  "moderate  speed,"  in  the  act 
of  Congress  providing  that  every  vessel  shall, 
in  a  fog,  go  at  a  "moderate  speed,"  having 
careful  regard  to  the  existing  circumstances, 
means  that  a  vessel  should,  when  in  a  fog, 
so  reduce  her  speed  that  other  vessels,  free 
from  blame,  may  not  be  injured.  Smith  v. 
Norfolk  &  S.  R.  Co.,  58  8.  E.  799,  801,  145 
N.  C.  98,  122  Am.  St  Rep.  423. 

The  "moderate  speed"  required  of  a 
vessel  in  a  fog,  by  article  16  of  the  Inland 
Navigation  Rules  (Act  June  7,  1897,  c.  4), 
is  such  speed  as  under  existing  conditions 
will  enable  her  to  stop  before  coming  into 
collision  with  another  vessel  after  the  latter 
can  be  seen,  assuming  that  the  other  vessel 
also  observes  the  rule.  The  Cascades,  178 
Fed.  726,  731. 

Rule  15  of  the  navigation  rules  for  the 
Great  Lakes  (Act  Feb.  8,  1895,  c.  64),  which 
provides  that  every  vessel  shall  in  thick 
weather  go  at  a  moderate  speed  and  on  hear- 
ing a  fog  signal  ahead  slow  down  to  bare 


steerageway,  does  not  require  a  vessel  1 
stop  in  a  fog  nor  to  slow  down  to  bai 
steerageway  while  progress  appears  saf 
but  requires  running  at  moderate  speed,  con 
mensurate  with  dangers  whidi  are  elthc 
known  or  must  be  anticipated;  she  hario 
the  right  to  proceed  in  expectation  of  con 
pliance  on  the  part  of  others  with  the  law  1 
respect  of  fog  signals.  Erie  &  Westei 
Transp.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  178  Fed.  4! 
48,  101  C.  a  A.  170. 

A  steam  vessel  passing  from  Portlan 
do^n  the  Willamette  river  in  a  dense  fo 
at  a  speed  of  15  miles  an  hour,  in  view  of  tfa 
extensive  commerce  on  such  river,  was  nc 
going  at  the  "moderate  speed"  required  b 
article  16  of  the  Inland  Navigation  Rule 
(Act  June  7,  1897,  c.  4),  which  provides  tiu 
in  a  fog  a  vessel  shall  go  at  a  moderat 
speed,  "having  careful  regard  to  the  existiii 
circumstances  and  conditions."  The  Balle 
Gatzert,  179  F.  44,  47, 102  C.  C.  A,  612. 

A  steamer  at  sea,  proceeding  at  night  i 
a  dense  fog,  in  frequented  waters,  at 
speed  of  10  or  U  knots  an  hour,  is  not  goio 
"at  a  moderate  speed,  having  careful  regar 
to  the  existing  circumstances  and  condltioDfi 
as  required  by  article  16  of  the  Intemationi 
navigation  rules.  Ji  sdiooner  which,  as 
preponderance  of  the  evidence  tended  t 
show,  was  proceeding  at  night  in  a  fog  i 
a  speed  not  exceeding  8^  knots  an  hou 
held  to  have  been  going  at  a  moderate  spee 
in  compliance  with  the  rules.  Palmer  y 
Merchants*  &  Miners'  Transp.  Co.,  154  Fee 
683,  689,  709  (citing  The  Chattahoochee,  1 
Sup.  Ct  491,  494,  173  U.  a  540,  548,  43  1 
Ed.  801;  The  Btruria,  147  Fed.  216,  218,  1 
C.  C.  A.  442,  444;  The  Nacoochee,  11  So] 
Ct  122,  137  U.  8.  330.  34  L.  Ed.  687;  Tb 
Cambridge,  2  Lowell,  21,  28,  4  Fed.  CtL 
1118;  The  Louisburg,  75  Fed.  424,  21  a  ( 
A.  424;  The  Eleanora,  17  Blatchf.  88,  8  Fe( 
Cas.  420;  The  Martello,  34  Fed.  71,  74;  Tb 
Parthian,  55  Fed.  426,  432,  5  C.  O.  A.  17 
176;  McCabe  v.  Old  Dominion  Steamship  O] 
31  Fed.  234,  237 ;  Marsden,  ColUslons  [5t 
Ed.]  373;  The  Mount  Hope,  84  Fed.  91< 
29  0.  0.  A.  365). 

MODERATOR 

As  quasi  Judicial  officer,  see  Quasi  Ji 
dicUl. 

A  "moderator"  is  one  of  the  officers  pn 
vided  by  statutes  in  New  Hampshire  to  coi 
duct  the  affairs  of  a  school  district  meetlni 
State  ▼.  Waterhouse^  63  AtL  804^  71  N.  £ 

488. 

MODERN 

MODEBK  APPUANOB 

A  charge  in  an  action  for  fire  set  by  i 
locomotive,  stating  that  it  was  defendant* 
duty  to  have  its  engines  properly  eiiuippe 


MODJERN  ASPHAI/r  ROADWAY      4St 


ICOIDBRnSl  PATmOf 


ith  SQch  appliances  for  arresting  i^rks  as 
'e  in  general  and  approved  use,  not,  bow- 
er, such  as  will  prevent  any  spark  from 
caping;  bnt  mitt  as  are  in  general  and 
mmon  nse^  and  that  if  the  fire  was  caused 
r  its  fkilnre  to  properly  equip  its  engine 
Lth  a  spark  arrester  that  was  modem  and 
.  common  use,  or  by  failure  to  properly 
)erate  it,  it  was  negligent,  does  not,  by  use 
*  the  word  "modem,'"  necessarily  require 
le  latest  and  best  appliances.  Jeffress  v. 
orf  olk-Sonthem  B.  Co^  T8  8.  B.  1013,  lOie, 
»  N.  a  21fi. 

[0]>mH  A8PHLAI.T  ROABWAT 

Where,  at  the  time  a  contract  for  the 
lie  of  dty  lots,  providing  for  the  constrac- 
on  by  the  vendor  of  a  ^'modern  asphalt 
>adway,''  was  executed,  the  only  asphalt 
xeets  in  that  city  were  hot  or  sheet  asphalt 
Teets,  and  no  such  thing  as  a  "cold  Ken- 
icky  rock  asphalt  street'*  was  known,  the 
>nstruction  of  such  a  street  was  not  a 
»mpllance  with  the  contract.  Tennant  Land 
o.  y.  Nordenum,  146  8.  W.  756^  707, 148  Ky. 
51- 

lODIFY 

See  As  Modified. 

The  word  "modify,**  as  used  in  a  cor^ 
orate  charter,  providing  that,  upon  the  re- 
ort  of  commissioners  to  appraise  property 
rhich  the  corporation  seeks  to  acquire  as  a 
Ight  of  way,  the  judge  of  the  district  court 
tiall  confirm  the  report,  modify  it,  or  refer 
:  back  to  the  present  or  new  commission- 
rs,  does  not  give  the  court  authority  to  in- 
reaae  the  amount  found  by  the  commission- 
rs.  Louisiana  Western  B.  Co.  v.  Cross- 
lan's  Heirs,  35  South.  784,  785,  111  La.  611. 

Under  Civ.  Code,  I  139,  providing  that, 
rhere  a  divorce  is  granted  for  an  offense  of 
tie  husband,  the  court  may  compel  him  to 
lake  a  suitable  allowance  to  the  wife  for 
er  support  during  her  life,  or  for  a  shorter 
eriod,  and  may  from  time  to  time  modify 
ts  orders  in  such  respect,  where  a  divorce 
ecree  awarded  plaintiff  alimony  at  the  rate 
f  $75  per  month,  the  court  had  statutory 
uthority  to  "modify"  the  decree  so  as  to 
elieve  defendant  from  further  payment  of 
ucb  alimony,  though  the  decree  contained 
10  reservation  for  such  modification.  Under 
tils  section  it  may  '^modify"  its  former  order, 
ither  by  increasing  or  reducing  the  amount 
if  money  to  be  paid  at  any  one  time,  or  en- 
arging  or  diminishing  the  frequency  with 
rhich  the  payments  are  to  be  made.  Neither 
B  the  authority  to  modify  the  decree  lim- 
ted  by  the  section  to  a  mere  change  in  the 
imount  of  the  allowance  to  be  paid,  but  it 
Qcludes  a  modification  of  the  order  in  any 
espect  which,  under  the  circumstances  of 
he  particular  case,  may  seem  Just  to  the 
xmrt.  Under  such  discretionary  authority, 
t  U  within  the  power  of  the  court,  not  only 


to  change  the  amount  of  the  allowance,  but 
also  to  suspend  any  enforcement  of  the  order 
until  its  further  direction.  Boole  v.  Soole, 
87  Pac  205,  206,  4  CaL  App.  07. 

A  motion  to  correct  a  judgment  rendered 
by  a  municipal  court  Justice  is  a  motion  to 
amend  or  "modify"  the  same,  within  Munic- 
ipal Court  Act  (Laws  1902,  p.  1563,  c.  580,  | 
254).  Ryan  v.  Brown,  00  N.  Y.  Supp.  868, 
860,  51  Misc.  Rep.  67. 

The  word  "modified,"  as  used  in  Acts 
1001,  p.  608,  c.  262, 1  1,  providing  that,  on  the 
original  hearing  of  an  application  for  the  oon- 
stractlon  of  a  district  sewer,  the  "resolution 
shall  be  confirmed  or  'modified,'"  is  to  be 
given  the  meaning  intended  by  the  definition 
of  the  verb  "modify"  in  the  Bncy<4opedic 
Dictionary:  "To  change  or  alter  the  external 
qualities  or  incidoits  of  anything;  to  vary; 
to  alter;  to  give  a  new  fdrm,  character, 
force,  or  appearance  to" — and  therefore  the 
board  of  public  works,  after  hecuring  a  resolu- 
tion to  construct  a  district  sewer,  had  power, 
without  a  further  hearing,  to  modify  the  ree- 
olntton  so  as  to  provide  for  the  construction 
of  such  projected  order.  Edwards  ▼.  Cooper, 
70  N.  B.  1047,  1060,  168  Ind.  54. 

As  used  in  a  declaration  alleging  that  de- 
fendant insurance  company,  in  violation  of 
its  agreement,  modified  a  policy  so  that  it 
covered  a  part  only  of  the  goods  insured,  and 
thereby  canceled  the  policy  as  to  the  other 
goods,  the  words  "modified"  and  "canceled" 
plainly  referred  to  the  physical  changes  made 
and  to  the  effect  which  those  changes  would 
have  had  if  authorized.  Goodhue  v.  Hart- 
ford Fire  Ins.  Co,  55  N.  B.  1060,  1040^  175 
Masa  187, 180. 

MOLASSES 

See  Btocik  of  Sugar  and  Molassea 

MOLD 

See  Button  and  Button  Molds. 

MOLDED 

Pressed  syAoaymoiis 

In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,  c  11,  f  1, 
Schedule  B,  par.  00,  the  term  "molded,"  as 
applied  to  glassware,  is  synonymous  with 
"pressed."  United  States  v.  Hell  Chemical 
Co..  178  red.  537,  530,  102  C.  a  A.  47. 

HOLDER'S  PATTERN 

"Molders*  patterns"  are  intended  to  be 
placed  in  sand  in  order  to  form  the  matrix 
in  which  the  molten  metal  is  cast  The  pro- 
vision in  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,  c.  11,  I  2, 
Free  List,  par.  616,  for  "models  of  inventions 
and  of  other  improvements  in  the  arts.  In- 
cluding patterns  for  machinery,"  is  not  limit- 
ed to  the  dass  of  patterns  known  as  "model 
patterns,"  intended  to  show  the  working  of 
the  thing  illustrated,  but  includes  also  mold- 
ers'  patterns,  which  are  used  as  models  about 


MOMENTABIIiT  UKCONTROLLED      A24 


MONEY 


Which  to  form  sand  molds  in,  in  whidi  cast- 
ings may  be  made,  and  which'  are  fitted  for 
snccessire  use  in  that  way.  R.  Hoe  &  Go.  t* 
United  States,  141  Fed.  488,  489. 

MOMENTARILY  UNCONTROLLED 

Generally  it  may  be  said  that  the  event 
sought  to  be  described  by  the  phrase  ''mo- 
mentarily uncontrolled"  is  wholly  inconsist- 
ent with  a  condition  where  a  horse  is  moving 
along  the  road  in  the  coarse  of  a  struggle 
for  mastery.  It  is  substantially  limited  to 
those  spasmodic  movements  whi<^  often  oo* 
cur  while  the  horse  is  generally  within  the 
control  of  his  driver,  but  where  the  partio* 
ular  movement  is  so  quick  and  unexpected 
that  it  and  its  resulto  can  take  place  before 
efforts  to  control  can  be  exerted.  A  horse 
shied  to  one  side,  and  then  at  a  gallop  ran 
forward  60  to  90  feet,  the  driver  all  the  time 
pulling  back  on  the  lines,  so  that  the  horse 
was  drawing  the  vehicle  by  the  bit  and 
resisting  the  efforts  to  stop  him,  till  a  defect 
in  the  highway  was  reached  and  an  accident 
occurred.  The  horse  could  not  be  held  to 
have  been  only  "momentarily  uncontrolled," 
within  the  law  as  to  liability  of  a  municipal- 
ity for  defects  in  highways.  Bhleiter  v.  CSty 
of  Milwaukee,  98  N.  W.  934,  935,  121  Wis. 
85,  66  U  B.  A.  916,  105  Am.  St  Bep.  1027, 
2  Ann.  Oas.  17& 

MONDAY 

A  defendant  is  presumed  to'  know  the 
law,  and  therefore  to  know  that  venires  are 
drawn  for  the  different  we^s  of  the  term, 
and  not  for  the  different  days,  and  that  a  list 
served  on  him  headed  "Petit  Jury  for  Monday, 
October  15,  1906,"  means  for  the  week  begin- 
ning on  that  day.  State  v.  Jones,  42  South. 
967,  968,  118  La.  869. 

MONEY 

See  Bond  for  the  Payment  of  Money;  Ck>l- 
lection  of  Money;  Condemnation  Mon- 
ey; Contract  for  Payment  of  Money; 
Current  Money;  Lawful  Money;  Pub- 
lic Money;  Purchase  Money ;  Bight  to 
Becover  Money;  Smart  Money;  Suit 
Money ;  Sum  of  Money. 

Earnest  money,  see  Earnest 

My  moneys,  bonds,  etc.,  see  My. 

Proceeds  as  money,  see  Proceeds. 

Baise  money,  see  Baiae. 

See,  also^  Lawful  Currency. 

In  legal  acceptation,  the  word  "money** 
means  current  metallic  coins.  Block  v.  State, 
44  Tex.  620,  622. 

The  word  "money,"  in  its  most  strict  and 
technical  sense,  means  coined  metal,  usually 
gold  or  silver,  upon  whi<^  the  government 
stamp  has  been  impressed  to  indicate  its 
value,  but  in  its  more  popular  use  it  imports 
any  currency,  tokens,  bank  notes,  or  other 
circulating  medium  In  general  use  a$  the 


representative  of  value.    Kennedy  v.  Briere^ 

45  Tex.  805,  309. 

"Money,**  in  its  strict  tedmical  sense.  Is 
coined  metal,  gold  or  silver,  on  which  the 
government  stamp  has  been  impressed  to  in- 
dicate its  value;  but  in  its  more  popular 
sense  any  currency  token,  bank  notes,  or  oth- 
er circulating  medium  in  general  use  as  the 
representative  of  value  Is  money,  and  the 
word  designates  the  whole  volume  of  the  me- 
dium of  exchange,  regardless  of  its  charac- 
ter or  denomination.  Johnson  v.  State,  52 
South.  652,  167  Ala.  82,  140  Am.  St  Bep.  la 

"'Money,'  in  the  constitutional  sense, 
means  coins  of  gold  and  silver  fabricated  and 
stamped  by  authority  of  law  as  a  measure  of 
value,  pursuant  to  the  power  vested  in  Con- 
gress by  the  Constitution.  Coins  of  copper 
may  also  be  minted  for  small  f ractioiial  cir- 
culation, as  authorized  by  law  and  the  us- 
age of  the  government  for  eighty  years." 
Legal  Tender  Cases,  12  WalL  (79  U.  S.)  457, 
587,  20  L.  Ed.  287. 

"While  gold  coin  Is  In  one  sense  'money,' 
it  Is  in  another  an  article  of  merchandise." 
Gregory  v.  Morris,  96  U.  S.  619,  625,  24  U 
Ed.  740. 

The  word  "money,"  in  reasonable  and 
colloquial  use,  signified  whatever  customarily 
passed  current  as  a  medium  of  exchange  and 
oonunerce,  and  was  not  necessarily  confined 
to  coined  metals.  Clawson  v.  State,  109  N. 
W.  578,  579,  129  Wis.  650,  116  Am.  St  Bep. 
972,  9  Ann.  Cas.  966  (citing  State  v.  Kube,  20 
Wis.  217,  91  Am.  Dec  390). 

"Money"  includes  "whatever  is  lawfully 
and  actually  current  in  buying  and  selling, 
of  the  value  and  as  the  equivalent  of  coin." 
State  V.  Quackenbush,  106  N.  W.  953,  955,  98 
Minn.  515. 

"Money"  Is  a  generic  term,  and,  as  com- 
monly understood,  is  anything  that  circulates 
as  the  ordinary  medium  of  exchange  in  buy- 
ing and  selling  property.  State  v.  Finnegan, 
103  N.  W.  155,  157,  127  Iowa,  286,  4  Ann. 
Cas.  628. 

"Money"  is  the  medium  of  exchange  es- 
tablished by  law,  as  well  as  by  custom  amonir 
men  and  nations,  and  to  perform  its  functions 
it  must  circulate  freely,  unembarrassed  by 
suspicion  or  inquiry  as  to  its  ownership  by 
him  who  tenders  it  in  payment  of  a  debt 
or  in  any  transaction  where  its  use  is  requir- 
ed or  permitted;  and,  unless  the  one  by 
whom  it  is  received  in  any  such  transaction 
actually  knows  at  the  time  that  it  is  not  the 
money  of  him  from  whom  it  is  received,  it 
becomes  his  absolutely,  and  he  is  not  liable 
to  him  who  was  its  real  owner  before  he  re- 
ceived it  even  though  it  were  stolen,  either 
for  the  specific  money  received  or  its  value. 
Young  V.  Pecos  County,  101  S.  W.  1055,  1058, 

46  Tex.  Civ.  App.  319. 

The  term  "money"  or  "moneys,"  as  used 
in  Acts  1895,  p.  3,  c  4322^  i  5^  providing  for 


MONEY 


426 


MOKBT 


the  taxation  6f  property,  means  gold  and 
direr  coin,  United  States  tteiPniiy  and  bank 
notes,  legal  tender,  and  all  other  forms  of 
currency,  and  erery  deposit  wbich  any  per- 
son owning  the  same  or  holding  in  trust  and 
residing  in  the  state  is  entitled  to  withdraw 
in  money  on  demand.  Hunt  v.  Turner,  45 
South.  509,  518,  54  Fla.  654. 

Laws  1908,  c.  73,  8  1,  fixing  a  system  of 
public  revenue,  defines  tbe  term  ''money"  as 
Including  all  kinds  of  coin  and  all  kinds  of 
paper  issued  by  or  under  the  authority  of  the 
United  States  circulating  as  money,  whether 
deposited  in  a  bank  or  elsewhere.  State  ex 
rel.  Palmer  ▼.  iBleming,  97  N.  W.  1063,  1066, 
70  Neb.  529. 

As  used  in  Laws  1901,  p.  166,  |  2,  pro- 
hibiting the  conduct  of  games  of  chance  for 
*'money,"  checks,  credits,  or  any  representa- 
tive of  value,  or  for  any  property  or  thing 
whatever,  the  word  "money"  Includes  all 
money.  State  v.  Woodman,  67  Pac.  1118, 
1120,  26  Mont  348. 

In  Rev.  St  i  5209,  which  makes  it  a 
criminal  offense  for  any  officer  or  agent  of  a 
national  bank  to  embezzle,  abstract,  or  wUl- 
fnlly  misapply  "any  of  the  moneys,  funds, 
or  credits  of  the  association,"  the  word  "mon- 
eys" refers  to  the  currency  or  circulating 
medium  of  the  country.  United  States  v. 
Smith,  152  Fed.  542,  548  (citing  United  States 
V.  Greve,  65  Fed.  489). 

As  ImnTASO 

See  Baggage. 


"Money  or  money's  worth**  means  cash  or 
its  eaoivalent  Olllett  t.  Chicago  Title  ft 
Trust  Co.,  82  N.  E.  891,  904,  230  IlL  873. 

The  word  "money"  in  a  will,  whereby  a 
wife  gave  to  her  husband  certain  personalty, 
"money,  securities  for  money,  evidences  of 
debt,  and  of  title  and  accounts,"  etc,  does  not. 
Include  the  amount  received  by  the  wife  un- 
der a  will  executed  about  nine  years  after 
the  will  of  the  wife,  who  died  before  the 
amount  of  her  share  in  testatrix's  estate  was 
ascertained,  so  that  the  right  of  the  executor 
of  the  wife  at  the  time  of  her  death  was 
merely  a  cBose  in  action ;  the  word  "money" 
covering  only  cash  or  money  on  deposit  un- 
less the  context  gives  it  a  more  extended 
meaning.  In  re  Hendrickson,  125  N.  Y.  Supp. 
309,  813,  140  App.  Diy.  388. 

The  word  "money"  in  its  popular  sense 
signifies  cash  or  its  equivalent  used  as  a  cir- 
culating medium,  as  in  its  generic  sense  it  is 
not  confined  to  coin,  but  includes  everything 
which  by  common  consent  is  made  to  repre- 
sent property  and  passes  currently,  such  as 
gold  and  silver  coins  and  the  various  kinds  of 
paper  money  issued  by  the  federal  govern- 
ment People  V.  Clark,  99  N.  £.  866,  868,  256 
lU.  14,  Ann.  Gas.  1913B,  214. 

Ab  eluittel 
See  ChatteL 


JL*  eipedits 

See  Credits. 
As  debt 

See  Debt 
As  coeds 

See  Goods. 

As  Issal  teadev 

The  word  "money,"  as  used  In  statutes  de- 
fining embezzlement  or  larceny,  means  only 
what  is  legal  tender.  State  v.  Mispagel,  106 
S.  W.  513,  516,  207  Mo.  657  (quoting  and 
adopting  Bish.  St  Crimes,  §  346). 

As  all  personal  estate 

"The  term  'money'  can  be  used  in  a  re- 
stricted, and  also  in  an  enlarged,  sense.  In. 
one  it  is  a  standard  of  value  or  medium  of 
exchange  stamped  by  government  authority; 
and  in  the  other,  in  addition  to  this,  it  in- 
cludes stocks,  bonds,  and  other  personal  se- 
curities of  an  investment  nature."  Testatrix, 
after  certain  bequests,  gave  certain  person- 
alty to  one  H.  and  all  "money"  remaining 
after  payment  of  debts.  Testatrix  left  per- 
sonalty amounting  to  about  $5,000  and  real 
estate  worth  $1,500.  When  she  made  the 
will  she  had  $400  in  money,  and  $327  at  the 
time  of  her  death.  After  paying  expenses, 
debts,  and  legacies,  the  personal  estate,  con- 
sisting of  furniture^  mortgages,  and  railtoad 
stocks,  amounted  to  $3,839.  The  real  estate- 
which  was  not  devised  was  inherited  by  her 
brother.  Held,  that  what  remained  of  her 
perscmal  estate  passed  by  the  will  to  H.  In 
re  Blackstone's  Estate,  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  977, 
980,  47  Misc.  Rep.  53& 

As  property 

Money  as  property,  see  Property;    Per- 
sonal Property. 

Testatrix,  after  making  bequests,  gave 
the  remainder  of  her  estate  to  her  sister  B., 
and  then  provided  that  if  B.  predecease  her, 
half  of  all  ;*moneys"  belonging  to  her  estate 
should  be  paid  to  a  society,  and  the  other 
half  should  be  .divided  among  certain  persons, 
who  included  all  who  would  have  taken  un- 
der the  intestacy  laws.  Held,  that  the  word 
"moneys*'  was  used  in  the  sense  of  property, 
of  whatever  nature,  without  which  meaning 
there  would  be  a  partial  intestacy.  Mt 
Holly  Safe  Deposit  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Deacon,  81 
Att.  356,  357,  79  N.  J.  Eq.  120. 

Bank  MUs  or  liotes 

.  "Doubtless  the  word  'money'  is  often  used 
as  applicable  to  other  media  of  exchange 
than  coin.  Bank  notes  lawfully  issued  and 
actually  current  at  par  in  lieu  of  coin  are 
treated  as  money,  because  flowing  as  such 
through  the  channels  of  trade  and  commerce 
without  question."  Woodruff  v.  Mississippi, 
16  Sup.  Ct  820,  162  U.  S.  291,  300,  40  L.  Bd. 
973. 

Under  Pen.  Code  1896,  art  945,  of  the 
chapter  on  "Swindling,'*  which  provides  that 
*'.wlthln  Ibe  meaning  of  money  as  used  in  this. 


MONBT 


426 


MONET 


chapter  are  induded  also  bank  bills  or  oUier 
drcolating  medium  current  as  money/*  an 
indictment  for  swindling,  alleging  current 
money,  includes  bank  bills,  as  well  as  United 
States  treasury  notes.  Baxter  t.  State,  105 
S.  W.  1»5,  51  Tex.  Or.  R.  57ft. 


Bonds,  lioteSf  and  a&ortgages 

The  word  "money"  in  its  usual  meaning 
signifies  gold,  silver,  or  paper  money  used  as 
a  circulating  medium  of  exchange,  and  does 
not  include  notes,  bonds,  evidence  of  debt,  or 
other  property,  and  such  usual  meaning 
should  be  given  it  when  used  in  a  will,  unless 
it  appears  from  construing  the  entire  will 
that  testator  intended  it  to  include  bonds  and 
other  securities.  Pohlman  v.  Pohlman,  150 
S.  W.  829,  830,  150  Ky.  679. 

Railroad  bonds  d^osited  in  a  Circuit 
Court  as  collateral  security  by  its  order,  and 
kept  in  a  bank  vault  to  which  the  clerk  kept 
the  key,  are  not  "money,"  and  the  clerk  is 
not  entitled  to  a  oommission  thereon,  under 
Rev.  St  i  828,  when  by  order  of  the  court  he 
takes  them  from  the  bank  and  surrenders 
them  to  the  depositor;  nor  is  there  any  au- 
thority outside  of  the  statute  for  the  allow- 
ance of  such  a  commission,  liichigan  Cent 
R.  Co.  V.  Harsha,  134  Fed.  217,  221,  67  C.  C 
A.  145. 

A  conditional  sale  contract  required  pay- 
ment in  10  days  either  in  cash  or  notes,  de- 
claring that  all  notes  and  open  accounts  shall 
be  drawn  payable  at  Oklahoma  City,  with  10 
per  cent  attorney's  fees,  and  that  on  default 
in  any  installment  the  seller  might  consider 
the  entire  indebtedness  due ;  the  title  to  the 
goods  to  remain  in  the  seller  until  the  price 
had  been  paid  in  money.  Held,  that  the  word 
"money"  was  used  in  contradistinction  to 
"notes,"  and  did  not  include  notes,  so  that 
the  acceptance  of  notes  did  not  constitute  a 
payment  vesting  title  in  the  buyer.  In  re 
Gray,  170  Fed.  638,  643. 

The  provision  of  a  contract  of  sale  that 
the  title  shall  remain  in  the  vendor  until  the 
price  is  paid  "in  money"  is  not  complied  with 
by  the  giving  of  a  note  for  the  price,  and, 
while  the  giving  of  the  note  may  be  presump- 
tively a  payment  of  the  price,  it  is  not  a  pay- 
ment "in  money."  Anderson  Carriage  Co.  v. 
Hartley,  67  Ati.  567.  569,  102  Me.  492. 

Clieclu,  drafts,  and  other  bills  of  ex- 
ol&anse 

"A  check  is  a  mere  order  for  so  much 
money  to  the  credit  of  the  drawer  in  the 
bank  or  drawee,  which  it  is  bound  to  honor 
when  made  In  form  and  properly  presented." 
Where  an  indictment  charged  the  larceny 
of  money,  proof  of  the  taking  of  a  check  on 
which  the  money  was  obtained  was  not  a 
variance;  and  where  defendant  married  a 
woman  in  pursuance  of  a  scheme  to  procure 
certain  money  which  she  had  on  deposit  in 
bank,  and  later  procured  a  check  for  the 
money  on  representations  that  he  would  use 
the  money  in  making  an  investment  for  her, 


he  was  guilty  of  larceny.  Hunt  ▼.  Stat 
79  a  W.  769,  772,  72  Ark.  241,  65  I-.  R.  i 
71,  105  AnL  8t  Rep.  84,  2  Ann.  Qaa.  33. 

Where  a  draft  is  obtained  by  fftlse  pn 
tenses  in  Wisconsin,  but  is  paid  in  Iowa,  th 
crime  of  obtaining  "money"  by  false  pretem 
eB  in  violation  of  Rev.  St  1898,  |  4423,  is  con 
mitted  in  Iowa,  and  a  prosecution  therefo 
can  only  be  maintained  th^e.  Rates  \ 
State,  103  N.  W.  261,  254,  124  Wis.  612, 
Ann.  Cas.  865. 

A  bill  of  exchange  is  not  "money"  do 
legal  tender.  United  States  Health  ft  Acd 
dent  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clark,  88  N.  B.  700,  762,  4 
Ind.  App.  845. 

DeMs  and  erodits 

The  term  "money,"  in  a  gift  to  testa 
trix*s  husband  for  life,  and  thereafter  ore 
to  another,  of  "all  the  money  that  may  b 
in  the  hands  of  my  said  husband  as  trustee 
for  me  at  my  decease,"  includes  a  debt  t 
him  as  trustee  for  money  of  the  trust  turn 
which  he  has  loaned  out  Dillard  v.  Dillanj 
84  S.  B.  60,  61,  62,  97  Ta.  434. 

Issuance  of  bonds  by  a  corporation  fo 
antecedent  debts  is  not  issuance  for  "monej 
labor,  or  property,"  etc,  within  St  Wis,  189f 
i  1753,  which  prohibits  issuance  for  othe 
purposes.  Nichols  v.  Waukesha  Canning  Co 
195  Fed.  807,  812. 

Deposits  la  liaak 

Under  Rev.  Civ.  St  art  5064,  deflninj 
"money,"  as  used  in  the  provisions  relatim 
to  taxes,  to  include  deposits  which  the  owne 
is  entitled  to  ¥dthdraw  in  money  on  demand 
an  indictment  for  perjury  in  fUsely  listinj 
the  amount  of  money  deposited  in  a  bank  i 
insufficient,  which  does  not  allege  that  th 
money  was  payable  on  demand.  Parker  i 
State  (Tex.)  69  S.  W.  75,  76. 

The  word  "money,**  in  embezslemen 
statutes  relating  to  public  funds,  is  used  ii 
a  generic,  and  not  in  a  specific  sense,  viz. 
it  includes  all  actual  moneys,  credits,  an( 
funds  of  every  kind  belonging  to  tiie  public 
so  that,  where  accused  was  charged  wlti 
an  embezzlement  of  money,  proof  of  the  tak 
ing  of  public  funds  deposited  in  /i  bank  oi 
general  deposit,  by  means  of  drawing  check 
on  the  deposit,  did  not  constitute  a  variance 
Territory  v.  Hale,  81  Paa  683,  585,  13  N.  M 
181,  13  Ann.  Cas.  551. 

The  word  "money,"  defined  in  Revenu- 
Laws  1903,  p.  389,  c.  73,  §  4,  as  Including  *'al 
kinds  of  coin,  all  kinds  of  paper  issued  by  o: 
under  the  authority  of  the  United  States  am 
circulating  as  money  whether  in  possessioi 
or  deposit  in  bank  or  elsewhere,"  include 
"money"  on  general  deposit  in  a  bank  upoi 
certificates  of  deposit  payable  on  demand 
and  not  a  credit  against  which  the  depositor' 
indebtedness  can  be  offset  White  v.  City  o 
Lincoln,  112  N.  W.  369,  370,  79  Neb.  153  (cit 
ing  Critchfield  v.  Nance  County,  110  N.  V 
538,  77  Neb.  807). 


MONET 


427 


MONET  AT  JNTERE8T 


Berenue  Act  1908,  |  4,  proyldiiig  that  the 
»rd  "money,**  as  used  in  the  act  for  the  pur- 
>8e  of  listing  for  taxation  shall  iadnde 
oney  deposited  in  bank  or  elsewhere,  is  in- 
nded  to  include  money  on  general  deposit 

a  bank.    Critchfleld  t.  Nance  Ck>unt7,  110 

W.  638,  77  Neb.  807. 

Real  estate 

The  term  "money,**  when  used  to  deslg- 
Lte  the  property  embraced  in  a  residuary 
ause,  is  sufficient  to  include  real  estate, 
risen  Association  of  Virginia  v.  Russeirs 
dm'r,  49  S.  E.  966,  968,  103  Va.  563  (citing 
^houler.  Wills  [3d  Ed.]  |  622). 

Testator^s  children  signed  an  instrument 
^nowledging  having  receiyed  from  their  fa- 
ler  '^divers  sums  of  money  and  other  proper- 
,**  which  he  desired  acknowledged  in  order 
ia(  no  misunderstanding  or  confusion  might 
isult  in  the  settlement  of  his  estate.  Subse- 
lently  two  of  the  children  signed  an  instru- 
ent  admowledging  that  since  executing  the 
>oye  instrument  they  had  received  certain 
Al  estate  as  an  advancement,  and  consent- 
ig  that  the  value  of  the  same,  as  fixed  at  a 
^rtain  sum  set  opposite  their  names  therein, 
nay  be  deducted  firom  any  share  we  may 
>come  entitled  to"  in  his  estate.  The  will 
Irected  "tibat  the  sums  of  money  which  I 
Bve  advanced  and  which  I  may  hereafter 
ivance  to  my  children  shall  be  considered  as 
Ivances  and  charged  against  each;  •  •  ^ 
idk  advances  and  payment  of  money  shall 
5  taken  out  of  their  respective  shares." 
[eld,  that  the  conveyances  of  land  to  the  two 
>n8  were  to  be  deemed  *'8ums  of  money,"  or 
Ldvances  and  payment  of  money,"  within 
le  intention  of  the  will.  Vreeland  v.  Vree- 
ind,  66  Ati.  1069,  1092,  65  N.  J.  Eq.  668;  Id., 
)  AtL  1118,  66  N.  J.  Eq.  454. 

State  hmmJk  motes,  ete. 

Bank  paper  is  not  "money,**  and  hence  an 
?tion  by  petition  which  is  allowed  to  be 
rought  on  a  bond  or  note  for  the  direct  pay- 
lent  of  money  only,  would  not  lie  upon  a 
ote  payable  "in  the  money  of  this  state," 
'  it  is  intended  thereby  to  make  the  note 
eiyable  in  the  bank  paper  issued  by  author- 
y  of  the  state.  Ohambers  v.  George,  15  Ky. 
;  Litt)  335,  336. 

'*Bank  notes  payable  to  the  bearer  (or 
hen  payable  to  order,  indorsed  in  blank) 
Eu»  in  the  ordinary  intercourse  and  busi- 
ess  of  life  as'  'money,*  and  circulate  and  are 
"eated  as  money.  They  are  not,  indeed,  in 
legal  and  exact  sense,  money;  but,  for 
»nimon  purposes,  they  possess  the  attributes 
[id  perform  the  functions  of  money."  Bris- 
)e  V.  Commonwealth  Bank,  11  Pet  (36  U.  S.) 
S7,  330,  9  U  Ed.  709. 

Stock 

Certificates  of  stock  in  a  bank  on  which 
Eily  60  per  cent  has  been  paid,  and  which 
ere  held  by  the.  bank  as  security  for  the  bal- 
Qce,  are  not  moneys,  funds,  or  credits  of  the 


bank  within  Free  Banking  Act,  |  30  (Rev.  SL 
I  3821 — 85),  making  it  an  offense  for  an  of- 
ficer of  a  bank  to  embesale  moneys,  funds, 
or  credits  of  the  bank.  State  v.  Davis,  96 
N.  EL  1022,  1025,  85  Ohio  St  48. 

MOHET  AFPLIOABUB 

A  complaint  in  an  action  by  a  subcon- 
tractor to  foreclose  a  mechanic's  lien  and  for 
a  personal  judgment,  which  alleges  that  plaln- 
tiflf  contracted  with  a  third  person  to  furnish 
materials  for  a  building  on  premises  of  de- 
fendant, that  he  furnished  materials  and  re- 
ceived a  part  of  the  price,  that  the  third 
person,  for  the  balance,  executed  an  order  on 
defendant  to  deduct  from  the  final  payment 
a  specified  sum  and  pay  the  same  to  the  sub- 
contractor for  goods  delivered  and  to  be  de- 
livered by  him,  that  the  owner  accepted  the 
order,  that  at  the  time  of  the  acceptance  of 
the  order  a  contractual  relation  existed  be- 
tween the  third  person  and  defendant  who 
had  in  his  possession  money  belonging  to  the 
third  person,  that  said  money  is  in  the  hands 
of  defendant  applicable  to  the  payment  of 
the  order,  charges  facts  disclosing  the  exist- 
ence of  a  fund  against  which  the  order  was 
directed  and  states  a  cause  of  action  as 
against  a  motion  to  dismiss  treated  as  a  de- 
murrer, and  any  defect  in  the  complaint 
must  be  reacdied  by  motion  to  make  it  more 
definite  and  certain;  the  term  "money  ap- 
plicable" meaning  money  which  one  is  en- 
titled to  have  applied  in  payment  Wood 
Mfg.  ft  Realty  Co.  of  Long  Island  v.  John- 
stone, 133  N.  Y.  Supp.  422,  424,  148  App.  Div. 
747. 

MOHET  AT  IHTEREST 

The  phrase  "money  at  interest"  includes 
all  forms  of  interest-bearing  securities, 
whether  represented  by  bonds,  notes,  or 
otherwise,  unless  the  contrary  appears  from 
the  assessment  itself.  Sweetsir  v.  (Chandler, 
56  AU.  584,  586,  98  Me.  146. 

The  phrase  "money  at  interest"  as  used 
in  Rev.  St  a  9,  I  5,  imposing  taxes  on  all 
obligations  for  money  or  other  property, 
''money  at  interest,"  and  debts  due  the  person 
to  be  taxed  more  than  they  are  owing,  is 
embraced  in  the  word  "debts,"  and  therefore 
the  amount  which  the  person  to  be  taxed  is 
indebted  is  to  be  deducted  from  money  which 
he  has  at  interest  Taylor  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Town  of  Caribou,  67  Atl.  2,  3,  4,  102  Me.  401, 
10  Ann.  Cas.  1080. 

Petitioners  purchased  land  by  contract 
providing  for  delivery  of  deed  in  escrow,  to 
be  delivered  with  possession  of  the  property 
on  complete  payment  of  the  purchase  prices  to 
be  paid  in  installments,  the  last  at  the  op- 
tion of  the  vendor,  at  one  of  two  certain 
times.  It  was  also  provided  that  on  install- 
ments paid  the  purchaser  should  be  allowed 
4^  per  cent  interest  in  the  final  settlement 
Held  that  when  the  purchasers  paid  install- 
ments, ownership  of  the  money  passed  to  the 


liCONET  AT  INTERESir 


428      MONET  IN  THE  HANDS  OF  BANE 


vendors,  and  that  the  arrangement  for  pay- 
ment of  4^  per  cent  on  it  was  not  strictly 
as  interest  on  money  belonging  to  them,  so 
that  they  were  not  taicable  thereon  as 
"money  at  interest."  Williams  ▼.  City  of 
Boston,  94  N.  E.  808,  809,  208  Mass.  497. 

Where  plaintiff  advanced  money  to  the 
purchasers  of  real  estate  under  a  bond  from 
the  owner,  under  an  arrangement  whereby 
the  land  was  deeded  to  plaintiff  on  an  un- 
derstanding that  he  would  convey  to  the 
purchasers  under  the  bond  on  the  payment 
to  him  of  the  amount  advanced  and  interest, 
and  plaintiff  gave  a  bond  binding  himself  to 
convey,  and  to  those  to  whom  the  bond  was 
given,  gave  no  note,  ^  but  promised  to  pay 
plaintiff  the  amount  advanced,  plaintiff  was 
properly  taxed  on  the  amount  under  a  stat- 
ute subjecting  ''money  at  interest'*  to  tax- 
ation. Glidden  v.  Town  of  Newport,  66  Atl. 
117,  118,  74  N.  H.  207. 

MOITET  DECREE 

An  ordinary  real  estate  mortgage  fore- 
closure proceeding  is  in  part  at  least  other 
than  a  "money  decree"  within  Gen.  St  1906, 
{§  1701,  1909,  regulating  supersedeas  bonds. 
State  ex  rel.  Purvis  v.  Palmer,  48  South. 
638,  57  Fla..541.' 

MOH ET  DELIVERED 

An  advance  of  money  by  discounting  a 
church  order  for  $150  for  decedent  was  a  de- 
livery of  money,  within  section  4187,  St  1898, 
providing  that  book  account  entries  of  items 
of  "money  delivered,"  at  one  time  exceeding 
$5,  are  inadmissible  to  prove  the  account 
Dohmen  v.  Blum's  Estate,  119  N.  W.  349,  350, 
137  Wis.  560. 

MONET  DEMAND  ON  OONTRAOT 

As  defined  by  Itev.  St.  1852,  the  phrase 
"money  demands  on  contracts,"  when  used  in 
reference  to  an  action,  means  any  action  aris- 
ing out  of  contract,  where  the  relief  demand- 
ed is  the  recovery  of  money.  State  v.  Mu- 
tual Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  93  N.  E.  213, 
218,  175  Ind.  59,  42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  256. 

MONET  DEPOSITED  IN  BANK 

The  expression  "money  deposited  in 
bank,"  as  used  in  section  4  of  the  revenue 
act  of  1903  (Comp.  St  1903,  p.  1283),  is  in- 
tended to  include  money  on  general  deposit 
in  bank.  Critchfield  v.  Nance  County,  110 
N.  W.  538,  77  Neb.  807. 

MONET  DISBURSED 

Where  pledgees  of  collateral  by  the  bank- 
rupt were  entitled  to  sell  the  same  at  public 
or  private  sale  without  notice  to  the  pledgors, 
and  apply  the  proceeds  to  the  payment  of 
their  liabiHaes,  and  in  one  case  the  pledgee 
was  authorized  to  buy  the  securities  pledged 
free  from  any  right  or  equity  of  redemption 
ih'  the  pledgors,  but  after  bankruptcy  the 
trui^tee  was  permitted  to  sell  the  securities 
freie  from  lien  on  payment  of  .the  debts  by  the 


pledgees  when  the  securities  were  delivere 
to  the  purchaser,  on  which  sale  the  truste 
received  a  balance  of  $3,802.87,  representini 
the  bankrupt's  equity  in  the  securities,  sue! 
sum,  and  not  the  price  secured  from  the  pui 
chaser,  was  the  "moneys  disbursed,"  withii 
Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  i  48,  a 
amended  by  Act  June  25,  1910,  c  412,  |  9,  oi 
which  commissions  were  to  be  allowed.  Ij 
re  Meadows,  199  Fed.  304,  306. 

MONET  HAD  AND  RECEITED 

See  Assumpsit  for  Money  Had  and  Re 
ceived. 

Action  for,  as  equitable  action,  see  Eqol 
table  Action. 

The  action  for  "money  had  and  recei^ 
ed"  rests  on  an  implied  promise,  and  may  bi 
maintained  against  the  person  who  has  re 
ceived  money  from  plaintiff,  or  from  a  thiit 
person,  under  such  circumstances  that,  In  eq 
uity  and  good  conscience,  he  should  not  re 
tain  it.  Jackson  v.  Creek,  94  N.  E.  416,  41£ 
47  Ind.  App.  541. 

The  action  for  *'money  had  and  recei? 
ed"  is  governed  by  equitable  principles,  am 
generally  lies  whenever  one  person  has  re 
ceived  money  belonging  to  another  which  u 
justice  and  good  conscience  should  be  return 
ed.  Stout  V.  Carruthersville  Hardware  Ca 
110  S.  W.  619,  621, 131  Mo.  App.  520. 

'The  action  for  'money  had  and  receiv 
ed'  lies  to  recover  money  to  which  plaintiff  i 
entitled,  and  which  in  justice  and  equity  thi 
defendant  ought  to  refund  to  the  plaintiJl 
and  which  defendant  cannot  with  a  goo< 
conscience  retain."  Whittle  v.  Whittle,  9: 
Pac.  170,  172,  5  Cal.  App.  696  (citing  Bou? 
Law  Diet). 

"The  count  for  'money  had  and  recelT 
ed'  is  a  very  important  one,  and  in  some  re 
spects  differs  from  all  other  common-law  ac 
tions.  It  is  a  sort  of  connecting  link  betweei 
law  and  equity,  and  by  the  use  of  the  ver] 
convenient  fiction  of  an  implied  promise  thij 
count  will  lie  to  recover  any  money  wbicl 
defendant  has  received,  or  in  any  manner  ob 
tained  possession  of,  which  in  equity  anc 
good  faith  and  conscience  he  ought  to  paj 
over  to  plaintiff."  Montgomery  v.  Wise,  12( 
S.  W.  100,  103,  138  Mo.  App.  176  (quoting  anc 
adopting  Green  &  Myer,  Missouri  Prac  &  PI 
§  266). 

MONEY  IN  ANT  BANK 

All  money  in  any  bank,  see  AIL 

MONET  IN  THE  HANDS  OB  POSSES- 
SION OF  BAN^ 

Money  deposited  in  a  savings  bank  ii 
"money  or  other  property  in  the  hands  oi 
possession"  of  the  bank,  within  the  meaning 
of  Qen.  St.  1902,  §  1019,  providing  for  ae 
tions  in  the  nature  of  bills  of  interpleader 
Brown  v.  Clark,  68  Ati.  1001,  1006,  80  Oonn 
419. 


MONEY  JUDGMBKT 


429 


MONET  C^  THE  OITT 


KEY  JUDGMEHT 

"Money  judgment,"  as  used  in  Code  Civ. 
^  §  6S5,  providing  tliat,  in  all  cases  oth- 
han  for  the  recovery  of  a  money  Judg- 
t,  the  judgment  may  be  enforced  or  car- 

into  execution  after  the  lapse  of  five 
rs  from  the  date  of  its  entry,  etc,  Ic- 
es a  decree  allowing  a  certain  sum  to  a 
missioner  in  partition  for  services  and 
mses,  and  hence  it  cannot  be  enforced 
execution  after  five  years.  Cortes  v.  Su- 
or  Court,  24  Pac  1011,  86  CaL  274,  21 

St  Rep.  37. 

A  Judgment  foreclosing  a  laborer's  Hen 

directing  a  sale  is  not  a  ''money  judg- 
t  *  within  Rer.  St  1887,  i  4810,  proTiding 

on  appeal  from  a  judgment  directing  the 
Dent  of  money,  appellant,  to  stay  ihto- 
iings,  must  give  a  bond  In  doable  the 
unt  of  the  judgment  Naylor  &  Norlin  t. 
Iston  ft  S.  B.  Eflectric  Ry.  Co.,  95  Pac. 

828,  14  Idaho,  722. 

A  judgment  ordering  a  party  to  pay  a 
ific  sum  into  court,  and  authorizing  the 
erse  party  to  withdraw  it  as  soon  as 
i,  is  a  judgment  for  the  payment  of  mon- 
within  Civ.  Code  Prac.  t  764,  providing 
:,  on  the  affirmance  of  a  judgment  "for 

payment  of  money,"  the  collection  of 
nh  has  been  superseded,  10  per  cent  dam- 
\  on  the  amount  superseded  shall  be 
rded  against  appellant  Motion  for  as- 
ment  of  damages  on  supersedeas,  99  S. 
305,  sustained.  Robinson-Norton  ft  Co.  v. 
dcana   Cotton  Factory,  102   S.  W.  869, 

126  Ky.  75,  U  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  723,  15 
.  Oas.  770. 

A  judgment  for  alimony  Is  a  ''judgment 
a  sum  of  money  only,'*  within  Code  Civ. 
2.  I  1913,  providing  that  an  action  on  a 
^ment  for  a  sum  of  money  only  cannot 
maintained  between  the  original  parties 
!S8  10  years  have  elapsed  since  the  dock- 
g  of  the  judgment  Shepherd  v.  Shep- 
1,  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  401,  402,  51  Blisc.  Rep. 

An  application  for  foreclosure  of  a  ven- 
s  lien  on  realty  in  which  personal  judg- 
it  is  rendered  against  defendant,  with  a 
'ee  directing  the  sale  and  application  of 
proceeds,  is  not  a  judgment  directing  the 
ment  of  money  within  Rev.  Codes  1906,  t 
),  providing  that,  to  stay  execution  pend- 
appeal  from  such  a  judgment,  appellant 
t  furnish  a  bond  conditioned  to  pay  the 
»unt  of  the  judgment;  but  the  bond  re- 
red  is  defined  by  Rev.  Codes  1905,  |  721^, 
litioned  that  appellant  will  not  eonunit  or 
er  waste  and  if  the  judgment  is  affirmed 
pay  the  value  of  the  property  pending 
appeaL  Schafer  v.  Oleon*  (H  D.)  132  N. 
646,647. 

Civ.  Code  Prai!.  §  764,  provides  than  on 
affirmance  or  dismissal  of  an  appeal  from 
idgment  for  the  payment  of  money,  the 
ection  of  which' has  heen  superseded,  10 


per  oent.  damages  on  the  amount  superseded 
shall  be  awarded.  Held,  that  a  judgment  re- 
quiring appellant  to  execute  a  deed  to  cer- 
tain real  estate  on  payment  of  the  piloe  pur- 
suant to  a  contract  of  sale,  and  if  appellant 
failed  to  do  so  that  the  court  cemmissioner 
execute  the  deed,  and  that  a  writ  of  posses- 
sion be  issued  on  behalf  of  appellee,  was  not 
a  judgment  lor  the  payment  of  money;  and 
hence,  on  the  dismissal  of  an  appeal  on  which 
the  judgment  had  been  superseded,  appellee 
was  not  entitled  to  damages.  Bdaret  t.  San- 
ders, 182  S.  W.  552,  141  Ky.  806. 

MOHET  UBXT 

Money  deposited  in  a  bank  in  New  totk 
at  Interest  and  subject  to  check  constitutes 
"money  lent"  to  the  banker,  within  Civ.  Code 
La.  art  3638  (3503),  requiring  actions  for 
the  payment  of  money  lent  to  be  brought 
within  three  years.  Schinotti  t.  Whitney, 
130  Fed.  780,  781  (quoting  Morse^  Banks,  f 
298). 

KOHET  XiOAMBD  AHS  INVESTED 

A  note  and  mortgage  taken  in  exchange 
for  property  is  not  "money  loaned  and  in- 
vested,*' within  Cbbbey's  Ann.  St  1903,  i  10,- 
427,  but  is  a  credit  from  which  the  holder 
may  deduct  the  just  debts  by  him  owing  at 
the  time  of  making  his  tax  return.  Oleson  v. 
Cuming  CJounty,  115  N.  W.  783,  784,  81  Neb. 
209. 

**Money  loaned  or  invested,**  within  ttie 
ordinary  meaning  of  the  term,  Is  money  or 
capital  laid  out  with  a  view  of  obtaining  a 
profit  or  income  therefrom.  The  fact  that  a 
fund  in  question  has  assumed  the  form  of 
bonds,  mortgages,  or  other  securities  does  not 
of  itself  fix  its  nature  or  determine  its  use; 
it  is  the  use  to  which  it  is  put  that  deter- 
mines its  character.  Royal  Highlanders  v. 
State,  108  N.  W.  183,  186,  77  Neb.  18,  7  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  380. 

MONEY  HEOEMAHY  FOB  THE  JOUR- 
NET 

The  phrase  "money  necessary  for  the 
journey,"  within  the  law  as  to  the  liability  of 
carriers  for  the  loss  of  effects  of  the  passen- 
ger, includes  a  pro];)er,  reasonable,  and  nec- 
essary amount  for  the  plaintiff  to  carry  with 
him  for  his  journey,  taking  into  considera- 
tion his  position  and  circumstances,  the 
length  and  character  of  his  journey,  and  the 
contingencies  and  accidents  that  might  nat- 
urally arise,  and  the  fact  that  he  was  in  a 
foreign  country.  Knieriem  v.  New  York 
Cent  A  H.  R.  R.  CJo.,  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  602,  603. 
109  App.  Div.  709  (citing  Fairfax  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  Y.  167,  29  Am.  Rep. 
119). 

KOMET  OF  THE  OITT 

The  power  of  a  dty  to  grade  sireels  or 
lay  sewers  or  water  pipes  at  the  cost  of 
abutting  property^  is  not  strictly  a  govern- 
mental fuBction,  and  la  the  exercise  at  the 


MONET  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES      480 


UONWSC  VALUE 


power  it  acts  in  its  proprietary  character,  and 
the  money  collected  from  the  abutting  prop- 
erty' owners  is  not  "money  of  the  city"  with- 
in its  charter,  for  it  la  only  money  raised  by 
the  operation  of  a  general  law  that  becomes 
"money  of  the  city,"  or  public  funds,  and  sub- 
ject to  the  charter  provision  as  to  the  deposit 
thereof.  City  of  Seattle  ▼.  Stirrat,  104  Pac. 
834,  886,  65  Wash.  560,  24  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1275. 

mok:^t  of  the  united  states 

Current  money  of  the  United  States,  see 
Current  Money. 

It  is  held  that  the  term  "money  of  the 
United  States"  includes  gold,  silver,  and 
treasury  notes  of  the  government  which  are 
by  law  made  legal  tender  for  the  payment  of 
debts  but  not  national  bank  notes.  Johnson 
V.  State,  83  S.  W.  651,  652,  73  Ark.  101  (cit- 
ing Marshall  t.  State,  75  S.  W.  584,  71  Ark. 
416;  Murphy  y.  Smith,  8  S.  W.  891,  49  Ark. 
37;   Burton  t.  Brooks,  25  Ark.  215). 

The  phrase  "money  or  property  of  the 
United  States,"  In  the  federal  statutes,  relat- 
ing to  embezzlement,  does  not  Include  fees 
and  emoluments  received  by  the  clerk  of  a 
federal  district  court,  and  the  duty  of  a 
clerk  of  a  federal  district  court  to  pay  over 
to  the  United  States  the  surplus  fees  and 
emoluments  of  his  office  which  is  half-yearly 
returned,  or  the  audit  thereof  shown  to  ex- 
ist over  and  above  the  compensation  and  al- 
lowances authorized  by  law  to  be  retained 
by  him,  is  not  governed  by  the  statutes  re- 
lating to  the  embezzlement  of  money  or  prop- 
erty of  the  United  States.  United  States  v. 
Mason,  31  Sup.  Ct  28,  34,  218  U.  S.  517,  54 
L.  Ed.  1133. 

MONET  ORDER 

The  terms  "pay  check"  and  "money  or- 
der" mean  practically  the  same  thing.  Barnes 
V.  State,  35  South.  227,  228,  46  Fla.  96. 

MONEY  ORDER  FUNDS 

Rev.  St.  I  4045,  defines  "money  order 
funds"  to  consist  of  all  money  received  for 
the  sale  of  "money  orders,"  Including  all  fees 
thereon,  all  money  transferred  from  the  post- 
al revenues  to  the  money  order  funds  to 
the  service  of  the  Post  Office  Department. 
The  term  "sale  of  money  orders"  related  to 
the  executed  transactions,  when  the  money 
order  clerk  at  the  post  office  building  had  sold 
the  money  order  to  an  applicant  and  received 
the  price,  which  then  became  part  of  the 
money  order  funds.  United  States  y.  Mann, 
160  Fed.  552,  554. 

MONEY  OWING 

Code  Civ.  Proc.  t  710,  providing  that  a 
transcript  of  a  judgment  may  be  filed  with 
the  controller  of  the  state  or  auditor  of  any 
municipal  corporation  from  "which  money  Is 
owing  to"  the  judgment  debtor,  whereon  the 
controller  or  auditor  shall  draw  his  warrant 
In  favor  of  the  creditor,  or  pay  so  much 


money  into  court  as  will  cancel  the  Judgm 
and  which  belongs  to  or  is  owing  to  the  jt 
ment  debtor,"  applies  to  legislative  offic 
making  their  salaries  subject  to  the  payn 
of  their  debts ;  salaries  and  wages  of  pu 
officers  and  employ^  being  included  in 
phrases  "money  owing,"  "money  which 
longs  to,"  etc.  Ruperich  v.  Baehr,  75  1 
782,  784,  142  Cal.  190. 

MONEY  PAID 

Under  Const,  art  12,  |  6,  providing  t 
no  corporation  shall  issue  stock,  except 
"money  paid"  or  "property  actually  receive 
a  contract  for  the  sale  of  stock,  to  be  f 
for  in  part  In  cash  and  in  part  by  the  i 
chaser's  notes,  payable  on  a  future  date 
ultra  vires,  though  the  notes  are  to  be 
dorsed  by  a  solvent  Indorser  and  secured 
a  pledge  of  the  stock,  since  a  note  is 
the  equivalent  of  "money  paid,"  and  sli 
as  between  the  parties,  a  note  is  mere  ( 
dence  of  Indebtedness,  and  is  not  ''propc 
actually  rec^ved."  McCarthy  v.  Texas  li 
ft  Guaranty  Co.  (Tex.)  142  S.  W.  96,  97. 

MONEY  PAID  IN  FRAUD  OF  ORE] 
TOB8 

Rev.  Laws  1902,  c.  118,  |  73,  provid 
every  life  policy  for  benefit  of  a  married 
man,  or  after  its  issue  transferred  to  I 
shall  inure  to  her  separate  benefit,  provii 
that,  subject  to  the  statute  of  limitation, 
amount  of  premiums  paid  in  firaud  of  ci 
itors,  shall  inure  to  their  benefit  from 
proceeds,  etc.,  gives  to  her  Insurance  oi 
husband's  life,  originally  for  her  benefit 
subsequently  transferred  to  her,  whether 
not  he  was  Insolvent  at  time  of  transfer,  f 
gives  creditors  the  benefit  of  premiums  p 
by  him  when  insolvent,  subject  to  such  si 
ute,  and  money  paid  by  an  insolyent  as  i 
mlums  on  a  policy  inuring  to  a  third  % 
son's  benefit  as  a  gift  is  "money  paid 
fraud  of  creditors";  and  this  is  true  wheti 
or  not  such  person  Is  his  wife.  Bailey 
Wood,  89  N.  E.  149,  158,  202  Mass.  562. 

MONEY  PAID  INTO  COURT 

See  Paid  into  Court 

MONEY  RAISED 

A  note  or  bond  would  be  as  stric 
"money  raised"  as  would  a  subscription,  wi 
in  the  meaning  of  a  condition  in  a  subsa 
tion  to  a  church  that  the  church  raise  a  t 
ther  sum  within  a  certain  time.  St  Pai 
Episcopal  Church  t.  Fields,  72  Atl.  145,  1 
81  Conn.  670. 


MONEY  RECEIVED 

See  Money  Had  and  Received. 

MONEY  VAI-UE 

"The  so-called  'money  value'  of  real 
personal  property  ia  but  a  conveniently  sb 
method  of  expressing  the  present  potent 
'usefulness,'  and  'investment'  becomes  me 
Ingless  if  construed  to  mean  what  the  thJ 


MONXTSD  BUSINESS 


481 


ICOKSYBD  OORPORATIOII 


Bsted  In  cost  genenUons  ago-  Proptrt7« 
ither  real  or  personal,  la  only  valuable 
m  naefuL  Ita  nsefalneaa  commonly  de- 
ds  on  the  business  purposes  to  wbicb  it 
>T  may  be  complied  with.  Such  business 
I  living  thing  and  may  flourish  or  wither, 
reciate  or  depreciate,  but  whatever  hap- 
B  its  present  usefulness,  expressed  in  nat- 
1  terms,  must  be  its  value.**  Ck>nsolidated 
I  CkK  V.  aty  of  New  York,  157  Fed.  849, 


IHETED  BUSXHESS 

The  expressions  "moneyed  businesan  or 
>neyed  man"  are  often  used,  and  in  their 
imon  acceptation  and  generally  under- 
Ml  meaning  are  not  applied  solely  to  the 
iness  of  handling  and  loaning  money,  or 
1  man  whose  property  merely  consists  of 
ley.  A  person  is  commonly  referred  to  as 
Qoneyed  man  because  of  his  large  pos- 
dons,  yet  those  possessions  may  consist 
lusively  of  real  estate.  State  v.  Fidelity 
deposit  Co.  of  Maryland,  80  S.  W.  644, 
,  35  Tex.  Civ.  App.  214. 

^HETED  OAPITAI. 

Rev.  St  U.  S.  i  5219,  providing  that 
res  of  stock  in  national  banks  shall  not 
taxed  at  a  greater  rate  than  is  assessed 
"other  moneyed  capital'*  in  the  hands  of 
Ividual  citizens  of  the  state,  permits  the 
ation  of  national  bank  shares,  provided  no 
Timination  is  made  against  them  in  favor 
stock  of  other  banks  in  competition  with 
lonal  banks;  the  terms  '*other  moneyed 
ital*'  being  defined  as  capital  in  corpora- 
is  carrying  on  the  business  of  banking  as 
ned  by  law  and  custom,  and  which  is  em- 
red  in  competition  with  the  business  of 
lonal  banks.  Des  Moines  Nat  Bank  v. 
r  of  Des  Moines,  188  N.  W.  767,  788,  153 
ra,  836.  The  phrase  "other  moneyed  cap- 
**  applies  to  such  capital  as  in  its  use 
les  into  competition  with  the  business  of 
k&  Lippincott  V.  Llppincott,  66  AtL  113, 
»  74  N.  J.  Law,  439. 

Before  a  state  statute  denying  all  right 
taxation  to  deduct  debts  from  the  stock 
national  banks  assessed  with  taxes,  but 
wing  deduction  from  other  investments, 
be  held  a  violation  of  Rev.  St  U.  S. 
!19,  prohibiting  a  state  from  taxing  such 
^k  at  a  greater  rate  than  is  assessed  on 
ler  moneyed  capital,"  it  must  appear  that 
b  other  moneyed  capital  exists  in  such  an 
mnt  as  to  operate  as  a  discrimination 
inst  such  banks,  and  that  it  is  of  such 
racter  as  to  come  in  competition  with 
lonal  Banks.  West  Virginia  Nat  Bank 
)unkle,  64  S.  B.  531.  65  W.  Va.  210. 

"The  term  'moneyed  capital,'  as  used  in 
\  St  U.  S.  I  5219,  respecting  state  tax- 
in  of  shares  of  national  banks,  embraces 
Ital  employed  in  national  banks,  capital 
doyed  by  individuals  when  the  object  of 
ir  business  is  the  making  of  profit  by  the 


use  of  their  moneyed  capital,  as  in  banking." 
First  Nat  Bank  of  Albu<|uerQue  v.  Albright 
86  Paa  548,  560,  13  N.  M.  514  (quoting  Tal- 
bott  V.  SUver  Bow  County,  U  Sup.  Gt  594, 
139  U.  8.  488,  36  L.  Bd.  210). 

The  w<«d8  ^other  moneyed  capital^"  as 
used  in  Rev.  St  U.  S.  i  5219,  providing  that 
the  shaiw  in  national  banlLs  shall  not  be 
assessed  at  a  greater  rate  than  other  mon- 
eyed capital  in  the  hands  of  individual  clti- 
sens,  does  not  mean  all  capital,  the  value 
of  which  is  measured  in  terms  of  money,  nor 
all  forms  of  investment  in  which  the  inter- 
est of  the  owner  is  expressed  in  money,  nor 
shares  of  stock  represented  by  certificates 
showing  that  the  owner  is  entitled  to  an  in- 
terest expressed  in  money  value  in  the  entire 
property  of  the  corporation,  nor  real  or  per- 
sonal property,  such  as  ordinary  chattels  or 
commodities,  nor  investments  in  manufac- 
turing and  industrial  enterprises ;  but  does  in- 
clude shares  of  stock  or  other  interest  owned 
by  individuals  in  enterprises  in  which  the 
capital  employed  in  carrying  on  the  busi- 
ness is  money,  and  the  object  of  the  business 
is  the  making  of  a  profit  by  the  use  of  mon- 
ey. First  Nat  Bank  of  Nephi  v.  Christensen. 
118  Pac.  778,  780,  39  Utah,  568. 

In  a  statute  providing  for  the  taxation 
of  bank  stock  and  directing  that  the  assess- 
ment and  taxation  of  such  stock  shall  not 
be  at  •  greater  rate  than  is  made  or  assessed 
upon  "other  moneyed  capital"  in  the  hands 
of  individuals  within  the  states  the  expres- 
sion "other  moneyed  capital"  means  such 
capital  as  in  its  use  comes  into  competition 
with  the  business  of  banks.  Lippincott  v. 
Lippincott,  66  Aa.  113,  115.  74  N«  J.  Law, 
439. 

XOHETED  COBPORATIOir 

The  term  "moneyed  corporation"  is  de- 
fined in  1  Rev.  St  N.  Y.  p.  598,  t  51,  to  mean 
every  corporation  having  banking  powers,  or 
having  the  power  to  make  loans  upon  pledges 
or  deposits,  or  authorized  by  law  to  make 
insurances,  and  ia  defined  by  the  New  York 
act  of  1890  (LawB  1890,  c.  563)  to  be  one 
formed  under  or  subject  to  the  banking  or 
the  insurance  law.  A  Kansas  trust  com- 
pany, empowered  to  receive  deposits  and  to 
loan  money  on  real  estate  and  personal  se- 
curity, is  a  "moneyed  corporation,"  within 
this  definition  and  within  the  meaning  of 
Code  Civ.  Proc  N.  Y.  f  394,  prescribing  a 
three-year  limitation  for  actions  to  enforce 
stockholders'  liabilities.  Piatt  v.  Wilmot  24 
Sup.  Ct  542,  545,  198  U.  8.  602,  48  L.  Ed. 
809. 

The  expression  "moneyed  cor];>oration," 
in  Sayles'.  Ann.  St  1897,  art  5063,  providing 
for  the  taxation  of  all  personal  estate  of 
moneyed  corporations,  means  all  classes  of 
corporations  organised  and  created  for  busi- 
ness purposes,  as  distinguishable  from  public 
or  charitable  or  other  corporations  which 
are  exempted  by  law  from  taxation.    The 


MOKETED  CORFORATIOK 


432 


MONOMANIAC 


Legislature  evidently  did  not  Intend  to  use 
it  in  the  restrictlTe  sense,  as  applied  only 
to  corporations  that  dealt  exclusively  in  mon- 
ey. State  V.  Fidelity  ft  Deposit  CJo.  of  Md., 
80  S.  W.  644,  553,  85  Tex.  Oiv.  App.  214. 

A  company  incorporated  for  pecuniary 
profit,  though  having  no  power  to  engage  in 
banking  or  loaning  money  or  to  write  insur- 
ance, is  a  "moneyed  corporation,"  within  the 
meaning  of  that  phrase  as  used  in  the  crimes 
act  (Gen.  St  1900,  |  2621),  declaring  one 
guilty  of  forgery  who  fraudulently  makes 
false  entries  in  the  books  of  an  association  of 
that  character.  State  v.  Chance,  108  Pac 
701,  82  Kan.  392,  20  Ann.  Gas.  184. 

A  corporation  engaged  in  leasing  its  own 
property  and  collecting  rents  therefor,  with 
power  to  sue  and  be  sued,  to  contract  debts, 
and  to  dispose  of  its  property,  is  a  "moneyed, 
business,  or  commercial  corporation,**  against 
which  involuntary  proceedings  in  bankruptcy 
may  be  had  under  Bankruptcy  Act  July  1, 
1898,  c.  541,  §  4b,  30  Stat  547,  as  amended 
by  Act  June  25,  1910,  d.  412,  |  4,  36  Stat 
839.  In  re  B.  L.  Radke  Ck).,  193  Fed.  735, 
736. 

MONEYED  MAN 

See  Moneyed  Business. 

MONEYS  AND  CREDITS 

Corporate  bonds  are  not  taxable  as 
•inoneys  and  credita"  Murrow  v.  Heath,  125 
N.  W.  259,  261, 146  Iowa,  347. 

MONEYS  RECOVERED  ON  A  RECOO^ 
NIZANCE 

"Moneys"  deposited  in  lieu  of  ball  are  to 
be  treated  as  If  they  had  been  recovered  on 
a  recognizance.  The  fact  that  a  deposit  of 
currency  In  lieu  of  ball,  made  under  Code 
Cr.  Proc.  §  586,  was  made  with  money  be- 
longing to  the  estate  of  which  the  depositor 
was  executor,  and  did  not  belong  to  him,  did 
not  entitle  the  estate  to  recover  the  money 
back  after  the  failure  of  the  executor  to  ap- 
pear before  the  magistrate  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  the  deposit,  In  the  absence 
of  an  IdeDtiflcation  of  the  particular  money 
misappropriated  by  the  executor,  or  of  proof 
that  the  sheriff  or  treasurer  with  whom  the 
money  was  deposited  knew  or  had  notice 
that  the  executor  was  depositing  moneys 
which  did  not  actually  belong  to  him.  Suth- 
erland V.  St.  Lawrence  County,  91  N.  Y.  Supp. 
962,  966,  101  App.  Dlv.  299. 

MONEYS  REMAnmro 

Where  a  testator,  after  providing  for 
the  payment  of  his  debts  and  funeral  expens- 
es, and  devising  his  homestead  to  his  wife, 
and  bequeathing  her  the  sum  of  $50  per 
month,  dlrected'his  executors  to  sell  both  real 
and  personal  estate  and  to  invest  the  moneys 
remaining  in  their  hands,  the  expression 
"moneys  remaining'*  means  that  portion  of 
the  proceeds  remaining  after  payment  of  the 


debt!  and  funeral  erpenacwi  and  payment 
the  wife.  BoU  t.  Bo11«  69  Ati.  296,  298, 
N.  J.  Bq.  227. 

The  wUl  of  one  whose  personal  propei 
at  the  time  of  his  death  was  insufficient 
pay  his  debts  and  funeral  expenses,  a 
whose  real  estate,  other  than  his  homester 
had  a  rental  value  of  only  $300  a  year, 
rected  that  his  debts  and  funeral  expens 
be  paid,  gave  to  his  wife  in  lieu  of  debt 
the  homestead  and  $50  a  month  to  be  pf 
each  month  during  her  life,  authorized  1 
executors  to  sell  any  part  of  his  property,  a 
directed  that  the  "moneys  remaining**  in  1 
hands  should  be  Invested.  Held,  tl 
"moneys  remaining"  meant  remaining  fn 
the  proceeds  of  sale  after  deducting,  wfai 
can  only  be  of  payments  previously  direct 
which  were  three,  to  wit,  the  debts,  funei 
expenses,  and  payment  to  the  wife,  and  woe 
not  mean  remaining  if  only  debts  and  funei 
expenses  were  made.  Roll  v.  Roll,  59  A 
296,  297,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  227. 

MONEY'S  WORTH 

"Money  or  money's  worth"  means  ca 
or  its  equivalent  Gillett  v.  Chicago  Ti 
ft  Trust  Co.,  82  N.  BL  891,  904,  230  IlL  373. 

MONGOLIAN 

As  Indian,  see  Indian. 

MONOMANIA 

The  term  *'monomanla"  implies  ''part 
insanity,  and  excludes  the  idea  of  any  « 
of  ratiocination  as  to  the  particular  8UbJ< 
to  which  the  partial  insanity  relates.  Mc 
omanla  cannot  be  implied  because  a  pers 
takes  a  narrow,  or  prejudiced,  or  utterly 
logical  view  of  a  particular  subject.  It 
not  the  result  of  any  conclusion.  The  p< 
son  does  not  arrive  at  his  conviction  becav 
of  any  attempt  either  at  reasoning  or  i 
vestlgation.  The  partial  insanity  is  the  o 
spring  of  a  disordered  Intellect"  The  cc 
elusion  that  a  testator  was  a  monomani 
is  not  warranted  by  the  bare  circumstan 
that,  actuated  by  a  spirit  of  resentme 
against  his  wife,  he  disinherited  her  in  1 
will,  for  the  sole  reason  that  she  had  1 
terfered  with  him  Ip  carrying  out  his  del 
cirate  choice  to  lead  an  Immoral  and  diss 
lute  life.  Bohler  t.  Hicks,  48  S.  EL  306,  3( 
120  Ga.  800. 

MONOMANIAC 

''Monomaniac"  is  a  person  who  Is  derai 
ed  in  a  single  faculty  of  his  mind  or  with  i 
gard  to  a  particular  subject  only,  and  perso 
of  that  kind  may,  and  often  do,  on  all  so 
jects  foreign  to  the  subject  of  mania,  a 
rationally  and  with  ordinary  prudence  ai 
judgment,  even  to  the  making  of  a  valid  wi 
where  the  monomania  does  not  in  any  degr 
Influence  or  affect  the  provisions  of  the  wi 
Swygart  v.  Wlllard,  76  N.  E.  756,  767,  H 
Ind.  25.        . 


MONOPOLY 


433 


IfONOPOLr 


9N0P0LY 

Se?  Contract  in  Aid  of  Monopoly;  Un- 
lawful Monopoly. 

Ab  pobllc  nuiaance,  see  Public  or  Ck)ni- 
mon  Nuisance. 

See,  alao.  Combination  in  Restraint  of 
Trade;  Engrossing;  Trust  (Combina- 
tion). 

A  ^'monopoly"  is  the  exchisiTe  power, 
lilt,  or  prl¥ll€«e  of  selling  a  eommodity,  or 

dealing  in  the  same  article  or  trading  in 
s  same  market;  sole  command  in  traffic 
anything,  however  obtained.  State  v.  Cen- 
a  Lumber  Co.«  123  N.  W.  SOi,  509,  24  S. 

Ida,  42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  804. 

Under  the  (Ad  Bnglish  law,  a  tedmical 
lonopoly"  was  a  lleense  or  priviTege,  grant- 
by  the  sovereign  to  an  individual  for  the 
le  buying  and  ailing,  making,  working,  or 
[ng  of  anything,  whereby  ttie  people  in 
oeral  were  excluded  from  the  liberty  of 
inufacturing  and  trading,  which  they  had 
fbre  enjoyed.  It  differed  from  "engross^ 
f*  only  in  that,  in  the  case  of  a  monopoly,, 
patent  was  had  from  the  king,  while  en- 
osslng  was  a  transaction  between  Indivldu- 
I.    State  V.  Duloth  Board  of  Trade,  121 

W.  395,  408,  107  Minn.  506,  28  L.  B.  A. 
.  S.)  1280. 

A  ''monopoly,'*  as  defined  by  Coke,  was 
i  institution  or  allowance  by  the  Eling  by 
s  grant,  commission,  or  otherwise,  to  any 
rson  or  persons,  bodies  politic  or  corpo- 
te,  of  or  for  the  sole  buying,  selling,  mak- 
g,  working,  or  using  of  anything  whereby 
ly  person  or  persons,  bodies  politic  or  cor- 
rate,  are  sought  to  be  restrained  from  any 
eedom  or  liberty  that  they  had  before,  or 
Ddered  in  their  lawful  trade.  The  word 
IS  defined  by  Hawkins  as  an  allowance 
the  King  to  a  particular  peraon  or  persons 
the  sole  buying,  selling,  etc.,  of  anything 
hereby  any  person  is  sought  to  be  restrained 
om  any  freedom  which  he  had  before, 
andard  Oil  Co.  of  New  Jersey  v.  United 
ates,  31  Sup.  Ct  502,  512,  221  U.  S.  1,  55 
Ed.  619,  34  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  834,  Ann.  Cas. 
H2D.  734. 

"*A  monopoly'  is  an  institution  or  ai- 
wance  to  any  person  or  persons,  bodies  poll- 
z  or  incorporate,  of  or  for  the  sole  buying, 
Ulng,  making,  working,  or  using  anything, 
hereby  any  person  or  persons,  bodies  politic 
'  corporate,  are  sought  to  be  <x>nstrained  of 
ly  freedom  or  liberty  that  ihfey  had  before 
'  hindered  in  their  lawful  trade."  In  re 
barge  to  Grand  Jury,  151  Fed.  834,  835 
uoting  and  adopting  definition  by  Sir  Ed- 
ard  Coke);  Ware-Kramer  Tobacco  Co.  v. 
merican  Tobacco  Co.,  180  Fed.  160,  170 
uoting  and  adopting  the  definliion  by  Lord 
oke). 

It  is  a  '^monopoly*'  when  one  person  alone 
lys  up  the  whole  ai  one  kind  of  commodity, 

3  Wns.ft  P.2n  Sbb.— 28 


fixing  a  price  at  his  own  pleasure^  Sti^te  v. 
Eastern  Coal  Co.,  70  AU.  1,  4,  29  a  I.  254, 
132  Am.  St  Rep.  817,  17  Ann.  Cas.  96. 

A  ''monopoly"  exists  when  the  mahufac- 
ture  and  sale  of  any  commodity  is  restrained 
to  one  or  a  certain  number.  City  of  Seattle 
V.  Dencker,  108  Pac.  1086,  1090,  58  Wash. 
501,  28  L.  a  A.  (N.  S.)  446. 

The  purpose  of  the  Wisconsin  Public 
Utility  Law  was  to  give  the  holder  of  an 
indeterminate  permit,  as  regards  the  condi« 
tions  existing  at  the  time  of  its  origin,  a 
qualified  monopoly  within  the  scope  of  the 
privilege,  subject  to  the  conditions  and  llmita. 
tions  of  the  public  utility  law;  the  term 
"monopoly"  not  being  used  in  its  common- 
law  sense,  except  as  to  exclusiveness,  but  be-. 
Ing  characterized  by  purpose  to  promote  pub- 
lic welfare,  by  a  return  consideration  and 
by  not  being  of  common  right,  instead  of 
being  otherwise  but  for  the  grant  and  being 
for  private  gain.  Calumet  Service  Co.  v. 
City  of  Chilton,  135  N.  W.  131,  140,  148  Wis. 
334. 

"The  terms  'monopolies'  and  'trusts*  are, 
pe^aps,  too  often  employed  at  the  bar  to  all 
business  enterprises  requiring  and  employing 
great  aggregations  of  wealth,  and  in  the 
vague  sense  in  which,  at  the  bustlings,  they 
are  used  to  arouse  envy  and  jealousy,  forget- 
ting the  manifest  necessity  of  such  aggrega- 
tions of  wealth  to  produce  the  commodities, 
and  their  transportation,  which  our  civiliza- 
tion and  comfort  require.  Every  railroad 
corporation  is  In  one  sense  a  monopoly.  It 
has  franchises  giving  rights  and  powers  not 
common  to  all  citizens.  It  alone  can  operate 
its  own  railroad,  though  subject  to  reason- 
able regulation  by  the  state.  All  monopolies, 
in  a  strict  sense,  rest  upon  some  grant  by  the 
sovereign  power  of  an  exclusive  franchise 
or  prlvilega"  State  of  Minnesota  v.  North- 
ern Securities  Co.,  123  Fed.  692,  705. 

A  "monopoly,"  as  generally  defined  or 
understood,  is  the  exclusive  control  of  sup- 
ply asd  price  due  either  to  a  single  owner- 
ship of  a  large  part  of  the  sources  of  supply, 
or  unity  of  action  among  &  large  proportion 
of  the  owners  of  such  sources.  With  mo- 
nopoly in  this  sense  neither  the  pre-emption 
act  nor  the  land  act  has  anything  to  do,  since 
there  is  nothing  in  ^ther  to  prevent  any 
person,  having  sufficient  means,  acquiring 
acres  by  the  million  under  the  policy  of  free 
disposition  so  greatly  favored  by  the  United 
States  courts.  Pereles  v.  Weil,  157  Fed.  419, 
427  (dtlng  and  adopting  Myers  v.  Croft,  18 
WaU.  [80  U.  S.l  291,  20  L.  Ed.  562). 

A  "monopoly"  not  only  includes  an  ex- 
clusive right  granted  by  the  state  to  a  few, 
of  something  which  was  before  of  common 
right,  but  embraces  any  combination  or  con- 
tract, the  tendency  of  which  is  to  pcevent 
competition  in  its  broad  and  general  sense 
and  control  prices  to  the  detriment  of  the 
public,    regardless-  of    th^    form    assumed. 


liONOPOLT 


434 


MONOPOLY 


Where  owners  of  land  adjacent  to  a  city 
platted  the  same  and  executed  deeds  to  the 
dty  for  the  streets,  alleys,  and  public 
grounds,  reservations  therein  to  the  grantors 
of  the  ezclnsiYe  right  to  use  the  streets 
for  the  operation  of  street  railways  and  for 
the  maintenance  of  lighting  appliances,  sew- 
ers, gas,  waterworks,  and  telephone  lines, 
free  from  the  control  of  the  dty,  were  void 
as  tending  to  create  a  "monopoly."  Jones  v. 
Carter.  101  S.  W.  514,  516,  45  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
450. 

Same— Xdoenslns  of  pilots 

Pnb.  Laws  1907,  p.  903,  c.  625,  providing 
for  the  liceDsing  of  pilots  for  a  river,  and 
limiting  the  number  to  be  commissioned  to 
20,  does  not  create  a  •'monopoly"  in  violation 
of  Const,  art.  1,  {§  7,  31,  declaring  that  no 
man  or  set  of  men  is  entitled  to  exclusive  or 
separate  emoluments  or  privileges,  etc,  and 
that  '•monopolies"  are  contrary  to  the  genius 
of  a  free  state.  8t  George  v.  Hardie,  60  8. 
B.  920,  923,  147  N.  O.  88. 

Same— Patent 

"Monopoly"  restrains  trade  or  commerce 
in  articles,  which  were  before  the  subjects  of 
trade  or  commerce.  Patented  articles  can- 
not be  the  subject  of  monopoly,  since  a  patent 
is  that  which  brings  out  from  the  realm  of 
mind  something  which  never  existed  before 
and  gives  it  to  the  country.  Rubber  Tire 
Wheel  Co.  v.  Milwaukee  Works  Co.,  142  Fed. 
531,  537. 

A  patent  is  a  '^monopoly"  created  by  law, 
and  gives  the  right  to  exclude  all  others 
from  making,  using,  and  selling  the  inven- 
tion or  article  made  in  accordance  therewith. 
National  Hollow  Brake  Beam  Co.  v.  Bake- 
well,  123  S.  W.  561,  566,  224  Ma  203. 

The  "monopoly"  authorized  by  a  patent 
is  a  substantial  property  right  conferred  by 
law  as  an  inducement  or  stimulus  to  useful 
invention  and  discovery,  and  it  rests  with  the 
owner  what  part  of  this  property  he  will 
transfer  to  others,  and  upon  what  terms  he 
will  make  the  transfer.  National  Phono- 
graph Co.  V.  Schlegel,  128  Fed.  733,  735,  64 
0.  a  A.  594. 


-Water  f raaoMse 

A  contract  between  a  city  and  a  water 
company's  assignor,  by  which  the  city  agreed 
not  to  grant  to  any  other  person  the  right  to 
furnish  water  for  fire  hydrants  during  the 
life  of  the  Contract,  etc.,  was  Invalid  as  a 
"monopoly,"  in  violation  of  Const,  art.  1,  {  3, 
prohibiting  the  granting  of  a  perpetuity  or 
monopoly.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Houston,  116  S.  W.  36,  38,  102  Tex.  317. 

In  an  action  against  a  water  company  to 
recover  damages  for  cutting  oft  plaintiff's 
supply  of  water,  an  allegation  in  the  petition 
that  defendant  was  possessed  of  "a  monopoly 
of  such  business  in  said  dty"  would  not  be 


construed  as  used  in  an  oflenMve  sense  o 
with  the  purpose  of  insinuating  that  the  com 
pony  was  not  conducting  a  legitimate  bus! 
ness,  but  with  a  view  to  setting  forth  th( 
pertinent  fact  thlit  the  company  had  tiie  ei 
elusive  privilege  of  supplying  the  city  and  it 
Inhabitants  with  water,  and  for  this  reasoi 
the  plaintiff  was  wholly  dependent  upon  de 
f endant  for  his  supply  of  water.  Freonan  i 
Macon  Gas  light  &  Water  Co.,  56  S.  E.  61 
63,  126  Ga.  848,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  917. 

Defendant  city  entered  into  a  contrac 
with  a  water  company,  by  which  the  dt: 
agreed  not  to  grant  to  any  other  person  th( 
right  to  furnish  water  for  fire  hydrants  dur 
ing  the  life  of  the  contract,  which  was  for  2! 
years,  and  the  city  to  have  the  privilege  o: 
buying  the  waterworks,  but  if  the  dty  did  no 
exercise  the  option  to  purchase,  the  contrac 
to  continue  until  the  city  finally  pnrchasec 
the  works.  Held,  that  the  exclusive  privi 
lege  granted  by  the  contract  was  a  "perpetu 
ity"  and  "monopoly,"  in  contravention  oi 
Const  art  1,  i  26,  prohibiting  the  granting  ol 
a  perpetuity  or  monopoly,  which  rendered  Um 
contract  entirely  void ;  and  hence  the  dt] 
could  not  recover  for  damages  arising  out  oi 
the  water  company's  failure  to  furnish  snffi 
dent  water  pressure,  whereby  the  dty  mar 
ket  house  was  burned.  Hartford  Fire  Ins 
Co.  V.  City  of  Houston  (Tex.)  110  8.  W.  »73 
d77. 

As  a  eomblaLatlom 

A  '*monopoly"  is  the  concentration  ol 
business  in  the  hands  of  a  few.  Nations 
Fireproofing  Co.  v.  Mason  Builders*  Ass'n 
169  Fed.  259,  264,  94  C.  C.  A.  535,  26  Li  R 
A.  (N.  S.)  148. 

A  "monopoly,"  within  the  meaning  ol 
the  Aati-trust  Law,  is  more  than  the  men 
complete  occupation  of  a  certain  field  whlcl 
does  not  unfairly  exclude  other  competitors 
FonoUpia  Limited  v.  Bradley,  171  Fed.  951 
959. 

The  gravamen  of  the  offense  of  '*monop 
oly"  consists  in  combining  to  acquire  power 
the  exercise  of  which  depends  entirely  upon 
the  will  of  those  who  hold  the  power,  and 
efforts  to  acquire  the  power  of  monopoly 
should  be  prevented.  A  monopoly  embraces 
any  combination  the  tendency  of  which  is  tc 
prevent  competition  in  its  broad  and  general 
sense,  and  to  control  prices  to  the  detriment 
of  the  public.  SUte  v.  Eastern  Coal  Co.,  7C 
AtL  1,  5,  29  R.  L  254,  132  Am,  St  Rep.  817, 
17  Ann.  Cas.  96. 

A  "monopoly"  exists  where  all,  or  so 
nearly  all,  of  an  article  of  trade  or  commerce 
within  a  district,  is  brought  within  the  hands 
of  one  man,  or  set  of  men,  as  to  practically 
bring  the  handling  or  production  of  the  com- 
modity or  thing  within  such  control  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  competition  of  free  traffic 
therein.  Orogan  v:  Chaffee,  105  Pac.  745, 
746,  156  Cal.  611,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  395. 


MONOFOLT 


435 


MONOPOLY 


A  'Monopoly/*  In  its  orlgUial  sense,  was 
i  exclvslTe  ri^t  granted  by  tbe  state  to  one 
a  few  persons  to  do  something  which  was 
fore  of  common  right  As  now  used  and 
derstood,  it  embraces  any  combination,  the 
idency  of  which  is  to  prevent  competition 
its  broad  and  general  sense  and  to  control 
lees  to  the  detriment  of  the  public.  Poca- 
ntas  CJoke  Co.  t.  Powhatan  Coal  &  Coke 
L,  66  S.  B.  264,  269,  60  W.  Va.  508,  10  L. 

A.  (N.  S.)  268,  116  Am.  St  Rep.  901,  9 
in.  Cas.  667. 

"At  one  time  a  'monopoly'  meant  a 
ant  from  King  or  state  of  an  exclusive 
^t  to  manufacture  or  sell  certain  things, 
it  now  it  means  *any  combination,  the  tend- 
icy  of  which  is  to  prevent  competition,  in 
{  broad  and  general  sense,  and  to  control 
ices  to  the  detriment  of  the  public.*" 
larleston  Gas  Co.  v.  Kanawha  Gas  Co.,  00 
E.  876,  878,  58  W.  Va.  22,  112  Am.  St  Bep. 
6,  6  Ann.  Cas.  164  (citing  4  Black.  Com. 

'TThe  idea  of  'monopoly'  is  not  now  oon- 
led  to  a  grant  of  privil^es.  It  is  under- 
ood  to  Include  a  'condition  produced  by  the 
;ts  of  mere  individuals.'  Its  dominant 
lought  now  is,  to  quote  another,  'the  notion 
'  exclusiveness  or  unity' ;  in  other  words, 
le  suppression  of  competition  by  the  uniflca- 
on  of  interest  or  management,  or  it  may 
i  through  agreement  and  concert  of  action. 
D<i  the  purpose  is  so  definitely  the  control 
!  prices  that  monopoly  has  been  defined  to 
i  "unified  tactics  with  regard  to  prices.'  It 
the  power  to  control  prices  which  makes 
le  inducement  of  combinations  and  their 
refit  It  is  such  power  that  makes  it  the 
mcem  of  the  law  to  prohibit  or  limit  them." 
ational  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas,  25  Sup. 
t  379,  383,  197  U.  8.  115,  49  L.  Ed.  689. 

"A  ^monopoly,*  as  now  understood,  em- 
races  any  combination,  the  tendency  of 
hich  is  to  prevent  competition  in  its  broad 
Qd  general  sense  and  to  control  prices  to 
le  detriment  of  the  public  (quoting  and 
dopting  definition  in  20  Ency.  of  Law,  846). 
'trust'  has  been  defined  as  a  contract,  com- 
Ination,  confederation,  or  understanding,  ex- 
ress  or  implied,  between  two  or  more  per- 
>ii8,  to  control  the  price  of  a  commodity  or 
^rvice  for  the  benefit  of  the  parties  thereto 
Qd  to  the  injury  of  the  public,  and  which 
mds  to  create  a  monopoly.  More  accurate- 
r,  perhaps,  it  is  the  entity  resulting  from 
tie  contract,  etc,  just  described."  A  contract 
rhereby  plaintifF  agrees  to  sell  exclusively 
>  defendant  and  defendant  to  buy  exclu- 
Ively  of  the  plaintiff,  certain  farm  machin- 
ry  to  be  sold  in  a  certain  territory  is  not 
[ijurious  to  the  public  as  tending  to  create 
monopoly,  or  a  violation  of  Civ.  Code  1902, 
2845,  as  lessening  full  and  free  competition 
D  an  unreasonable  extent  Walter  A.  Wood 
lowing  &  Reaping  Co.  v.  Greenwood  Hard- 


ware Co.,  65  S.  E.  978,  974,  76  8.  C.  878,  9 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  501,  9  Ann.  Cas.  902. 

The  size  of  a  business  alone  does  not  con- 
stitute a  "monopoly'*  in  restraint  of  inter 
state  commerce,  in  violation  of  section  2  of 
tbe  anti-trust  act  (Act  July  2,  1800,  c.  647) ; 
but  to  render  a  combination  Illegal  there- 
under it  must  intentionally  and  necessarily 
prevent  other  persons  from  engaging  in  such 
business,  thereby  stifling  competition.  United 
States  V.  American  Naval  Stores  Co.,  172 
Fed.  455,  458. 

Personal  service  and  occupation  cannot 
be  the  subject  of  a  "monopoly,"  but,  unless 
there  is  propwty  to  be  affected  with  a  public 
interest  there  is  no  basis  for  the  fact  or  the 
charge  of  a  monopoly.  Labor  organisations 
oompoaed  of  carpenters,  joiners,  and  other 
persons  doing  carpenter  work  and  other  labor 
In  constructing  buildings,  organised  to  short- 
en the  hours  of  labor  and  to  increase  the  com- 
pensation therefor,  is  not  a  monopoly  or  un- 
lawful combination  In  restraint  of  trader 
Lohse  Patent  Door  Co.  v.  Fuelle,  114  8.  W. 
997,  1002,  215  Mo.  421,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.) 
007,  128  Am.  8t  Rep.  492. 

Combination  of  several  corporations,  each 
selling  or  leasing  machinery  intended  for  dif- 
ferent operations,  not  competing,  but  supple- 
menting each  other,  does  not  ordinarily  con- , 
stitute  a  "monopoly"  in  restraint  of  trade. 
United  States  v.  Winslow,  195  Fed.  578,  592. 

The  Texas  anti-trust  acts  of  May  25, 
1899,  and  March  31, 1903,  prohibiting  any  cor- 
poration becoming  a  party  to  any  under- 
standing with  any  other  corporation  to  regu- 
late the  price  in  the  state  of  any  article  of 
merchandise,  etc.,  defining  a  trust  as  a  com- 
bination to  restrict  commerce,  fix  the  price 
of  commodities,  lessen  competition,  etc.,  and 
defining  a  "monopoly"  as  a  combination  of 
two  or  more  corporations,  with  a  view  of 
stifiing  competition,  etc.,  are  not  indefinite 
and  uncertain,  and  are  valid.  Waters-Pierce 
Oil  Co.  V.  State,  106  S.  W.  918,  926,  48  Ter. 
Civ.  App.  162.   . 

Section  2  of  the  statute  (Laws  1903,  p. 
119,  c.  94)  defines  a  monopoly  as  "a  combina- 
tion or  consolidation  of  two  or  more  corpo- 
rations, when  effected  in  either  of  the  two 
following  methods:  (1)  When  the  direction 
of  the  affairs  of  two  or  more  corporatious  is 
in  any  manner  brought  under  the  same  con- 
trol for  tfie  purpose  of  producing  •  ♦  ♦  a 
trust  as  defined  in  the  first  section  of  this 
act  (2)  Where  any  corporation  acquires  the 
franchises  or  other  rights  or  the  physical 
properties  •  ♦  ♦  of  any  other  corpora- 
tion ♦  •  ♦  for  the  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing or  lessening  •  ♦  ♦  competition,''  etc. 
Held,  that  the  contract  did  not  constitute  a 
monopoly  within  the  terms  of  said  section 
2,  as  the  agreement  by  the  railroad  to  haul 
the  cars  of  the  sleeping  car  company  did  not 
transfer  to  the  latter  any  of  the  former's 


MONOPOLT 


436 


MONOPOLT 


franchise  anthorizing  It  to  operate '  trains 
over  its  road.  Ft  Worth  ft  D.  0.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
State,  87  &  W.  836,  840,  99  Tex.  84,  70  L.  B. 
A.  950. 

An  agreement  by  a  seller  of  whisky  not 
to  sell  any  other  whisky  of  the  same  brand 
in  the  places  where  the  buyer  was  engaged 
in  business  until  the  buyer  had  disposed  of 
the  quantity  purchased  was  not  in  violation 
of  Acts  1899,  p.  246,  c.  146,  prohibiting  agree- 
ments to  regulate  or  fix  the  price  of  any  ar- 
ticle, to  maintain  said  price  when  so  fixed,  or 
to  fix  or  limit  the  amount  or  quantity  of  any 
article,  and  defining  "monopoly"  as  a  "un- 
ion or  combination  whereby  any  of  the  pur- 
poses mentioned  in  the  act  is  accomplished  or 
sought  to  be  accomplished,"  and  making  it 
unlawful  for  persons  engaged  In  buying  or 
selling  any  articles  to  ^Qter  into  any  pool  or 
agreement  to  control  or  limit  the  trade  in 
su<di  article,  or  to  limit  competition  by  re- 
fusing to  buy  from  or  sell  to  any  other  per- 
son for  the  reason  that  such  other  person  or 
corporation  is  not  a  member  of  or  a  party  to 
such  pool  or  agreement  Norton  y.  W.  H. 
Thomas  ft  Sons  Co.,  91  8.  W.  780,  781«  99 
Tex.  57& 

A  grocery  company  and  a  photographic 
company  agreed  that  the  latter  should  far- 
nish  the  former  with  trading  tickets,  each 
entitling  its  holder  to  a  photo  art  calendar 
at  the  photographic  company's  studio  when 
countersigned  by  the  grocery  company,  and 
the  grocery  company  agreed  to  pay  a  certain 
amount  for  each  ticket  three  months  from 
date,  or  as  soon  as  the  tickets  should  be  dis- 
posed of,  if  before  that  time,  and  to  dispose  of 
the  tickets  as  soon  as  possible,  and  it  was  fur- 
ther agreed  that  from  the  date  of  the  contract 
the  photographic  company  should  not  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  grocery  company,  or 
until  the  disposal  of  the  tickets  furnished, 
sell  any  other  local  grocery  company  any  of 
such  tickets.  Such  a  contract  was  not  a 
^'monopoly"  within  the  meaning  of  the  act 
of  1903  (Gen.  Laws  1903,  p.  119,  c.  94),  pro- 
hibiting trusts,  monopolies,  and  conspiracies 
in  restraint  of  trade.  Forrest  Photographic 
Co.  V.  Hutchinson  Grocery  Co.  (Tex.)  108  8. 
W.  768,  769. 

A  contract  between  a  railroad  company 
and  an  express  company,  whereby  the  latter 
was  given  exclusive  privileges,  and  the  for- 
mer bound  itself  not  to  contract  with  others 
to  do  an  express  business  on  the  road,  and 
agreed  that  in  case  privileges  should  be 
accorded  others  by  legislation  or  judicial  pro- 
ceedings, the  express  company  in  question 
should  have  credit  for  the  sums  paid  by  oth- 
er companies,  was  violative  of  Acts  1903,  p. 
119,  c.  94,  defining  an  unlawful  trust  as  a 
combination  of  capital,  skill,  or  acts,  by  two 
or  more  persons,  to  create  or  carry  out  re- 
strictions in  the  free  pursuit  of  any  business 
authorized  by  the  laws  of  the  state  or  to 
prevent  or  lessen  competition  in  the  trans- 


portation of  merchandise.  State  y.  KIssour 
K.  ft  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas,  91  8.  W.  214,  211 
90  Tex.  516,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  783,  13  Am 
Caa.  1072. 

Where  two  corporations  supplying  tt 
same  community  with  natural  gas  made  a 
agreement  whereby  they  parceled  out  betwee 
them  the  territory,  giving  to  each  the  ei 
elusive  right  to  sell  gas  in  a  given  boundar] 
fixing  the  prices,  and  prohibiting  change  € 
prices  except  by  their  mutual  consent  bindin 
one  company  to  use  for  public  consumpdo 
only  gas  produced  by  the  other,  and  prohibli 
ing  one  from  producing  from  the  section  o 
the  country  in  which  the  other  produced  gaa 
the  agreement  tends  to  "monopoly**  and  i 
void  as  against  public  policy.  Charlesto 
Gas  Co.  V.  Kanawha  Gas  Co.,  60  S.  E.  87( 
879,  68  W.  Va.  22,  112  Am.  St  Rep.  936^ 
Ann.  Ca&  164. 

A  "monopoly**  in  trade  and  commerce  1 
created  within  the  anti-trust  law  (Gen.  Law 
1899,  p.  487,  c.  359;  Rev.  Laws  1905,  t  5168] 
when,  as  a  result  of  efforts  to  that  end,  prevj 
ously  competing  businesses  are  so  oonceutral 
ed  in  the  hands  of  a  single  person  or  corpora 
tion,  or  a  few  persons  or  corporations  actinj 
together,  that  they  have  power  to  practicall: 
control  the  prices  of  a  commodity,  and  t 
thus  suppress  competition.  State  v.  Duloti 
Board  of  Trade,  121  N.  W.  395,  398,  K^ 
Minn.  506,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  a)  126a 

A  "monopoly,"  within  the  anti-trust  la^ 
(Rev.  St  1899,  c.  143),  is  created  when,  as  i 
result  of  any  contract  or  combination,  previ 
ously  competing  businesses  are  so  concentrat 
ed  into  the  hands  of  a  single  corporation,  oi 
of  a  few  individuals  or  corporations  acting  li 
concert,  that  they  have  the  power  to  prac 
tically  control  the  prices  of  commodities  an< 
suppress  competition.  The  chief  question  ij 
detennlning  whether  a  monopoly  exists  la 
not  that  prices  are  raised,  and  competitio] 
destroyed,  but  whether  the  power  exists  iJ 
the  combine  to  raise  prices  and  destroy  com 
petition  at  pleasure.  State  ex  inf.  Hadley  v 
Standard  Oil  Co.,  116  S.  W.  902,  1045,  21J 
Mo.  1. 

Where  neither  party  to  a  contract  givlDi 
an  exclusive  selling  agency  in  specified  terri 
tory  was  a  corporation,  and  there  being  d< 
evidence  of  a  combination  or  consolidatloi] 
the  agreement  was  not  in  violation  of  Rev 
Civ.  St  1911,  art  7797,  defining  a  "monopo 
ly"  as  a  consolidation  or  combination  of  tw< 
or  more  corporations.  Nickels  v.  Prewit 
Auto  Co.  (Tex.)  149  S.  W.  1094,  1096. 

It  is  the  policy  of  the  common  law  anc 
the  purpose  of  the  anti-monopoly  act  (Consol 
Laws,  c.  20,  §§  340-346),  prohibiting  comblna 
tions  whereby  a  "monopoly"  may  be  created 
or  competition  restrained,  to  keep  free  tLut 
unfettered  the  prosecution  by  individuals  ol 
any  lawful  business,  and  to  protect  competl 
tion  in  trade  and  comnieToe  for  the  protectioi 


MONOPOLT 


487 


MONOPOLT 


he  public.  Hie  word  *^rningemenf*  in 
anti-monopoly  act  (ConsoL  Laws,  c.  20, 
40-346).  making  every  "contract;  agree- 
t,  arrangement  or  combination*'  whereby 
onopoly  may  be  created,  or  whereby  com- 
tion  may  be  restrained,  nnlawfol,  has  a 
ider  meaning  than  either  the  word  "Gon- 
t,"  "agreement,"  or  "combination,**  and  it 

include  each  and  all  of  these  things, 
more,  and  means  the  disposition  of  meas- 
I  for  the  accomplishment  of  a  purpose,  and 
tructure  or  combination  of  things  in  a 
Icular  way  for  any  purpose,  and  one  buy- 
the  business  of  his  competitors  under  an 
cement  binding  them  not  to  engage  there- 
or  a  specified  time  within  specified  ter- 
ry, for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  monopoly, 
6?hereby  competition  may  be  restrained, 
:es  an  "arrangement"  prohibited  by  the 

A^  purchase  of  a  going  business  accom- 
ied  by  an  agreement  by  the  seller  not  to 
age  in  the  same  business  for  a  limited 
B,  and  within  a  prescribed  territory,  made 
ti  no  ulterior  purpose  of  establishing  a 
lopoly  or  preventing  competition,  is  not 
?al  under  the  anti-monopoly  act  (Consol. 
^s,  c.  20,  H  340-^6),  prohibiting  comblna- 
IS  whereby  a  monopoly  may  be  created,  or 
ipetltion  restrained,  but  such  a  purchase 
the  purpose  of  creating  a  monopoly  so  as 
be  able  to  control  prices  is  illegal.  A 
tract  whereby  the  seller  of  an  ice  busi- 
3  binds  himself  not  to  engage  in  such  husi- 
B  for  a  specified  term  within  a  spedfled 
ritory  restricts  the  free  pursuit  in  the 
te  of  a  lawful  business,  and,  if  taken  by 
buyer  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  mo- 
>oly  within  the  state,  to  illegal  under  the 
i-monopoly  act  (Consol.  Laws,  c  20,  U 
^-346),  prohibiting  combinations  whereby 
Qonopoly  may  be  created,  or  competition 
trained.  The  Jury  in  determining  whether 
orporatlon  engaging  in  the  ice  business  in 
city  of  New  York,  which  procured  con- 
cts  from  competitors  whereby  the  latter 
1  their  business  and  bound  themselves  not 
engage  therein  within  a  specified  time 
hin  described  territory,  procured  the  con- 
cts  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  monopoly 
violation  of  the  anti-monopoly  act  (Consol. 
ws,  c  20,  H  340-346),  must  consider  all  the 
!ompanying  facts,  including  the  facts  that 
!  restrictive  agreements  included  greater 
ritory  than  that  in  which  the  selling  com- 
Itor  had  previously  done  business,  and 
Lt  the  corporation  procured  a  great  num- 
'  of  such  contracts.  A  corporation  beoom- 
;  the  owner  of  all  or  substantlaUy  all  of  the 
<:k  of  existing  corporations  is  not  crlminal- 
Uable  for  their  acts  in  procuring  before 
own  organization  contracts  for  the  pur- 
se of  creating  a  monopoly,  but  where,  after 
acquisition  of  such  stock,  it  makes  use  of 
2h  contracts  to  maintain  an  arrangement  to 
Ate  a  monopoly  and  prevent  competition,  it 
Liable  under  the  anti-monopoly  act  (Cohsol. 
iW8»   c,   20,   f I  340-^46),   prohibltiiig  such 


comblnatl<Ma&  A  corporation  owning  and  con- 
trolling subordinate  corporations,  which,  un- 
der its  direction  and  for  its  use,  bought  the 
business  of  competitors  and  procured  from 
them  agreements  not  to  engage  In  similar 
business  for  a  spedfled  time  within  d^escrlbed 
territory,  fbr  the  purpose  of  creating  a  mo- 
nopoly, is  guilty  €i  violating  the  anti-monopo- 
ly act  (ConsoL  Laws,  c.  20,  If  340-846).  A 
contract  whereby  the  •ello'  of  an  lee  businees 
binds  himself  not  to  engage  thef^^  for  a 
specified  time  within  described  territory  is 
permissible  only  when  innocently  made  with- 
out any  purpose  of  creating  or  maintaining 
a  monopoly,  and  a  contract  made  with  such 
an  illegal  purpose  is  illegal  because  it  may 
prevent  and  restrain  competition  in  violation 
of  the  anti-monopoly  act  (Consol.  Laws,  c  20, 
11840^^46).  Anti-monopoly  act  (ConsoL  Laws, 
c.  20,  H  84<V-846),  prohibiting  every  agreement 
or  combination  whereby  a  monopoly  may  be 
created,  or  whereby  competition  in  the  supply 
or  price  of  any  article  in  common  use  may  be 
restrained,  treats  a  monopoly  and  restraint 
of  competition  as  two  distinct  things,  as  a 
monopoly  usually  restrains  competition  and 
usually  is  the  result  of  a  restraint  of  compe- 
tition, but  a  restraint  in  competition  may  not 
extend  to  the  degree  of  creating  a  monopoly, 
and,  to  vitiate  contracts  procured  by  one 
from  his  competitors  on  purchasing  their 
business.  It  need  not  be  shown  that  the  ar- 
rangement results  or  may  result  in  a  total 
suppression  of  all  competition,  or  in  an  abso- 
lute monopoly,  and  all  that  is  essential  is 
that  they  restrain  competition  and  tend  to 
deprive  the  public  of  the  advantages  of  free 
competition.  A  corporation  engaging  in  the 
ice  business  in  the  dty  of  New  York«  whidi 
bought  the  business  of  competitorB  and  pro- 
cured from  them  agreements  not  to  engage  in 
such  business  for  a  spedfled  period  within 
described  territory,  for  the  purpose  of  creat- 
ing or  maintaining  a  monopoly,  violated  the 
anti-monopoly  act  (ConsoL  Laws,  c  20,  §§ 
340^346),  prohibiting  combinations  whereby  a 
monopoly  may  be  created  or  competition  re- 
strained, though  it  did  not  subsequently  raise 
prices.  A  monopoly  condemned  by  the  anti- 
monopoly  act  (ConsoL  Laws,  c.  20,  ||  340- 
346),  prohibiting  combinations  whereby  a 
monopoly  may  be  created,  or  competition  re- 
strained, need  not  be  an  absolute  one,  exdud- 
ing  all  competition,  but  a  monopoly  is  creat- 
ed where,  as  the  result  of  effort  to  that  end, 
previously  competing  businesses  are  so  con- 
centrated in  the  hands  of  a  single  person  or 
corporation,  or  in  a  few  persons  or  corpora- 
tions, that  they  have  power  to  practically  con- 
trol prices  of  a  commodity,  and  thus  sup- 
press competition.  A  corporation  engaging 
in  the  Ice  business  in  the  dty  of  New  York, 
which  establishes  a  monopoly  covering  a 
part  of  the  borough  of  Manhattan,  or  of  one 
district  in  the  borough,  so  that  the  oonsum- 
ers  in  tiiat  portion  of  the  dty  are  deprived 
of  the  benefit  ef  free  competition*  is  guilty 


MONOPOLY 


438 


MONOPOLY 


of  creatlBg  a  monopoly  in  ylolation  of  the 
anti-monopoly  act  (Consol.  Laws,  c.  20,  |i 
340-346).  The  anti-monopoly  act  (Consol. 
Laws,  c.  20,  SS  340-^46),  punishing  every  per- 
son ipaking  or  attempting  to  make  any  con- 
tract or  combination  whereby  a  monopoly 
may  be  created,  or  competition  restrained, 
makes  an  attempt  to  create  a  monopoly  un- 
lawful, and  one  who  attempts  to  create  a 
monopoly  by  buying  the  business  of  his  com- 
petitors and  procuring  from  them  agreements 
not  to  engage  in  such  business  for  a  specified 
period  within  described  territory,  and  by 
doing  any  act  for  the  consummation  thereof, 
as  by  keeping  such  contracts  in  force  and 
attempting  to  derive  benefit  therefrom,  is 
guilty  of  violating  the  anti-monopoly  act, 
though  it  failed  of  its  purpose,  and  the  crea- 
tion of  a  monopoly  became  practically  im- 
possible. People  V.  American  Ice  Co.,  120 
N.  Y.  Supp.  443,  447. 

Stock  Corporations  Law  N.  Y.  i  7,  as 
amended,  declares  that  no  domestic  stock  cor- 
poration shall  combine  with  any  oth^  cor- 
poration or  person  to  create  a  "monopoly"  or 
the  unlawful  restraint  of  trade,  or  to  prevent 
competition  in  any  necessary  of  Ufa  Held, 
that  the  word  "monopoly"  was  not  used  in  its 
strict  sense  as  requiring  a  control  of  all  ex- 
isting means  of  carrying  on  a  business,  or 
doing  a  particular  thing,  and  the  right  to  pos- 
sess, own,  or  control  all  means  of  doing  that 
thing  in  the  future,  but  was  satisfied  by  an 
exclusive  privilege  to  carry  on  a  traffic  or  the 
possession  or  assumption  of  anything  to  the 
exclusion  of  other  possessors,  and  embraces 
any  combination  or  contract  the  tendency  of 
which  is  to  prevent  competition  in  its  broad 
and  general  sense.  Continental  Securities  Co. 
V.  Interborough  Rapid  Transit  Oa,  165  Fed. 
945,  95a 

Stock  Corporation  Law  (Laws  1890,  p. 
1073,  c  564,  I  40),  as  amended,  permits  a 
stock  corporation  to  purchase  stock  of  anoth- 
er corporation,  if  authorized  in  its  certificate 
of  incorporation,  or  if  the  corporation  whose 
stock  is  purchased  is  engaged  in  a  business 
similar  to  that  of  the  purchasing  corporation. 
Stock  Corporation  Law  (Laws  1890,  p.  1069, 
c.  564,  i  7),  as  amended,  provides  that  no 
corporation  shall  combine  with  any  corpora- 
tion or  person  for  the  creation  of  a  monopoly 
or  the  unlawful  restraint  of  trade,  or  for  the 
prevention  of  competition  in  any  necessary 
of  life,  and  Laws  1897,  c.  810,  c  383,  and 
Laws  1899,  p.  1515,  c.  600,  were  enacted  to 
destroy  monopolies  and  prevent  combinations 
in  restraint  of  competition  or  the  free  pur- 
suit of  any  lawful  business.  Held,  that  the 
consolidation  under  Laws  1884,  p.  448»  c.  367. 
of  six  companies  engaged  in  the  manufacture 
and  sale  of  gas  and  electricity  into  a  corpora- 
tion to  continue  such  business,  and  the  sub- 
sequent purchase  by  such  consolidated  com- 
pany of  all,  or  a  controlling  interest  in,  the 
shares  of  other  similar  corporations,  purchas- 
ed to  prevent  competition,  did  not  create  a 


"monopoly"  in  contravention  of  said  acts,  i 
it  left  the  field  open  to  any  company  th 
might  be  organized  with  the  approval  of  t] 
commission,  provided  for  by  Public  Servl 
Commission  Law  (Laws  1907,  pu  889,  c  421 
Attorney  Cteneral  v.  Consolidated  Oas  Ca 
New  York,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  823,  824,  124  An 
Div.  401. 

In  statutes  prohibiting  contracts  or  coi 
blnations  creating  monopolies,  the  wo 
"monopoly"  is  not  used  in  a  strict,  leg 
sense  as  including  the  power  to  legally  e 
elude  all  others  from  the  field  monopolize 
since  such  a  "monopoly"  cannot  be  created  1 
a  contract  or  combination,  but  only  by  so 
ereign  power;  but  it  la  used  in  a  differei 
but  equally  well-understood,  sense  as  mea 
ing  the  obtaining  of  a  substantially  comple 
control  of  a  particular  business  or  artic 
of  trade.  The  acquisition  by  a  oori>orati( 
of  controlling  Interest  in  the  stock  of  the  cc 
porations  owning  or  controlling  and  operati] 
all  of  the  street  railway  lines  in  the  boroug! 
of  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx  in  New  Yo 
City,  including  the  underground,  elevate 
and  surface  lines,  la  unlawful,  as  creating 
practical  "monopoly"  of  the  means  for  trai 
portation  of  passengers  in  the  city,  in  viol 
tion  of  Stock  Corporations  Law,  |  7  (Lai 
1897,  p.  313,  c.  884).  Burrows  v.  Interborouj 
MetropoUtan  Co.,  156*S'ed.  389,  392. 

A  'Monopoly,"  in  the  sense  forbidden  I 
Const  art  1,  I  ^  consists  in  the  ownersb 
of  control  of  so  large  a  part  of  the  mark 
supply  of  a  given  oommodlty  as  to  stifle  ooi 
petition,  restrict  the  freedom  of  oommen 
and  give  the  monopolies  control  over  prio 
and  hence  Act  Jan.  26,  1905  (Acts  29th  U 
c  7),  which  granted  to  a  private  corporati< 
property  owned  by  the  state  diarged  with  i 
repair  and  maintenance  for  historical  a: 
patriotic  purposes,  subject  to  future  legisl 
tion,  did  not  violate  the  constitutional  pi 
vision,  since  it  was  but  the  assumption  of 
burden  which  deprived  no  citizen  of  a] 
privilege  or  right  and  brought  no  flnand 
gain  to  the  corporation.  Conley  v.  Daughtc 
of  the  Republic  of  Texas  (Tex.)  151  S.  W.  8i 
883. 

To  constitute  a  violation  of  Anti-Tn 
Act  July  2,  1890,  c  647,  H  1,  2,  there  mi 
be  a  contract,  combination,  or  conspira 
which  in  purpose  or  effect  tends  to  restrs 
trade  or  commerce  among  the  states  or 
monopolize  some  portion  thereof.  The 
must  be  a  meeting  of  the  minds  of  two 
more  to  accomplish  some  common  purpose  ( 
rectly  violative  of  the  act,  or  a  purpose  whi 
will,  whether  intentionally  or  not.  In  eff< 
constitute  a  restraint  of  trade  and  commei 
among  the  several  states.  The  mere  extent 
acquisition  of  business  or  property  achiev 
by  .fair  and  lawful  means  cannot  be  t 
criterion  of  monopoly  within  the  meaning 
Antt-Trust  Act  July  2,  1890,  c.  647,  i  2;  t 
in  addition  to  acquisition  and  acquireoM 


MONOPOLT 


489 


MONOPOLY 


re  most  be  an  intent  by  uDlawfsl  metns  to 
lode  others  from  the  same  traffic  or  boel- 
s»  or  from  aoqulring  by  the  same  means 
perty  and  material  things.  One  of  the 
poses  of  AntiL-Tmst  Act  July  2,  1890,  c. 
,  f  1,  in  making  illegal  every  contract, 
ibination»  or  conspiracy  in  restraint  of 
ie  or  commerce  among  the  aereral  states, 
to  maintain  Interstate  commerce  on  the 
is  of  free  competition,  and  any  contract, 
ibination,  or  conspiracy,  the  purpose  or  di- 
t  effect  of  which  is  to  restrict  snch  free 
ipetition  by  way  of  transportation  or  oth- 
rise,  is  in  restraint  of  interstate  commerce 
{  unlawfuL  The  fact  that  the  several  acts 
which  the  purpose  of  a  combination  in 
traint  of  trade  and  commerce  among  the 
eral  states  is  effected  are,  taken  in  isola- 
1,  lawfid  or  intrastate  in  diaracter,  and 

within  the  purview  of  Anti-Trust  Act 
y  2,  1890,  a  647,  does  not  relieve  the  com- 
ation  from  illegality;  but  such  acts  must 
viewed  as  elements  of  a  whole  and  in  the 
It  of  their  purpose  and  effect  in  combina- 
1.  United  States  t.  Reading  Co.,  183  Fed. 
,  456. 

The  generic  character  of  the  prohibitions 
Act  July  2,  1890,  c.  647,  U  1,  2,  against 
abinations  in  restraint  of  interstate  or  f  or- 
D  trade  or  commerce,  and  monopolization 
attempts  to  monopolise  any  part  thereof, 
ers  every  conceivable  act  which  can  pos- 
ly  come  within  the  si^rit  or  purpose  of  the 
tdenmatlon  of  the  law,  without  regard  to 
I  garb  in  which  such  acts  are  clothed.  The 
rds  **iestraint  of  trade"  in  Anti-Trust  Act 
iy  2,  1890,  c.  647,  condemning  combinations 
restraint  of  interstate  or  foreign  trade  or 
amerce,  or  the  monopolization  or  attempts 
monopolize  any  part  thereof,  should  be  glv- 
a  meaning  which  will  not  destroy  the  in- 
idual  right  to  contract,  and  render  dif- 
ilt,  if  not  impossible,  any  movement  of 
de  in  the  chiinnels  of  commerce,  the  free 
vement  of  wl^ich  it  was  the  purpose  of  the 
tute  to  protect  The  standard  of  reason 
ich  had  theretofore  been  applied  at  the 
omon  law  and  in  the  United  States  in  deal- 
;  with  subjects  of  the  character  embraced 
the  prohibitions  of  Act  July  2, 1690,  c.  647, 
1,  2,  against  combinations  in  restraint  of 
erstate  or  foreign  trade  or  commerce,  or 
>nopolization  or  attempts  to  monopolize  any 
rt  thereof,  was  intended  to  be  the  measure 
Ml  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether, 
a  given  case,  a  particular  act  had  or  bad 
t  brought  about  the  wrong  against  which 
>  statute  provided.  United  States  v.  Amer- 
n  Tobacco  Co.,  31  Sup.  Ct  632.  648,  221 
S.  106,  179-184,  55  L.  Ed.  663. 

The  control  by  one  mining  corporation 
poized  under  the  laws  of  Michigan  of 
other  similar  corporation  engaged  in  a 
upeting  business  in  interstate  and  foreign 
mmerce  by  acquiring  a  majority  of  iti 
Kik,  or  in  part  by  soliciting  and  obtaining 
oxles   from  other  stockholders   with   the 


purpose  and  intention  of  ellmlnwting  competi- 
tion and  obtaining  a  monopoly  of  trade  in 
their  products,  either  complete  or  partial,  is 
in  violation  of  the  fMeral  Anti-Trust  Law 
(Act  July  2,  1800,  c.  647),  which  makes  un- 
lawful every  ''combination  in  restraint  of  in- 
terstate or  foreign  trade  and  commerce,** 
and  also  of  Pub.  Acts  MidL  1899,  p.  409,  No. 
255,  as  supplemented  by  Pub.  Acts  Mich.  1905, 
p.  507,  No.  829,  prohibiting  all  combinations 
entered  into  for  the  purpose  and  with  the 
intent  of  establishing  and  maintaining  a  ''mo- 
nopoly"; nor  is  such  transaction  relieved 
from  its  invalidity  under  the  latter  statute 
by  Pub.  Acts  Mich.  1905,  pp.  153, 154,  No.  105, 
which  authorizes  mining  corporations  of  the 
state  to  purchase  and  own  stock  in  other 
similar  corporations.  Bigelow  v.  Calumet  ft 
Hecla  Mining  Co.,  155  Fed.  869,  874. 

A  secret  arrangemoit  between  two  cor- 
porations, which  together  produced  about 
85  per  cent  of  all  the  licorice  paste  consumed 
in  the  United  States  and  sold  to  consumers 
throughout  the  country,  by  which  they  ceased 
competition,  fixed  from  time  to  time  the  pric- 
es at  whiidi  each  should  sell«  and  apportioned 
the  customers  between  them,  and  also  by 
concerted  action  secured  contracts  with  their 
chief,  if  not  only  competitors,  which  enabled 
them  to  control  either  the  output  of  such 
competitors  or  the  prices  at  which  and  the 
persons  to  whom  they  should  sell,  constitutes 
a  virtual  ''monopoly**  in  the  interstate  dis- 
tribution of  the  substance  manufactured. 
United  States  t.  MacAndrews  k  Forbes  Co., 
149  Fed.  823,  834. 

The  combination  of  the  stocks  of  the  va- 
rious corporations  trading  in  petroleum  and 
its  products  in  the  hands  of  a  holding  com- 
pany, with  the  intent  to  exclude  others  from 
the  trade,  and  thus  centralize  in  the  com- 
bination the  perpetual  control  of  the  move- 
ment of  these  commodities  in  the  channels  of 
interstate  and  foreign  commerce,  constitutes 
a  violation  of  the  prohibitions  of  Act  July  2, 
1690,  c.  647,  fi  1,  2,  against  combinations  in 
restraint  of  interstate  or  foreign  commerce, 
or  the  monopolization  or  attempt  to  monop- 
olize any  part  of  such  trade  or  commerce. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  of  New  Jersey  v.  United 
States.  31  Sup.  Ct  502,  516,  221  U.  8.  1,  61, 
55  L.  Bd.  619,  84  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  884,  Ann. 
Cas.  1912D,  734. 

An  indictment  against  operators  of  a  cot- 
ton comer  for  alleged  violation  of  the  Sher- 
man anti-trust  law  charged  that  defendants 
had  conspired  to  monopolize  a  part  of  the 
trade  and  commerce  among  the  several  states 
by  becoming  members  of  and  engaging  in  an 
unlawful  combination  in  the  form  of  an  agree- 
ment by  which  they  were  severally  to  pur- 
chase cotton  to  such  an  extent  that,  together, 
they  would  have  enough  to  enable  them  to 
control  the  price  of  such  cotton,  and  several- 
ly to  demand  arbitrary,  excessive,  and  mo- 
nopolistic prices  for  tiie  same  on  the  sale 


MONOPOLY 


440 


MONTH 


[ 


hereof  by  them  respectively  to  spinners  and 
manufactiirers  other  than  such  consplratont 
Held  that,  since  no  monopoly  exists  when  in- 
dlyiduals,  each  acting  for  himself,  own  large 
quantities  of  a  commodity,  the  Indictment 
was  fatally  defective  as  alleging  only  a 
scheme  to  demand  monopolistic  prices  as  the 
result  of  indlTidual  as  distinguished  from 
coUectiye  power.  United  States  v.  Patten, 
187  Fed.  664,  672. 

A  business  device  by  which  a  considera- 
ble number  of  competing  corporations  are 
welded  into  a  single  corporate  entity  con- 
trolling from  90  to  95  per  cent,  of  the  com- 
merce of  the  country  in  a  particular  branch 
required  for  the  economical  production  of  a 
necessity  of  mankind,  as  shoe  machinery,  is 
a  monopoly,  within  the  federal  anti-trust  act 
United  Shoe  Machinery  Co.  v.  La  Chapelle, 
99  N.  E.  289,  290,  212  Mass.  467,  Ann.  Gas. 
1913D,  715. 

An  undue  and  unreasonable  restraint  of 
inteiBtate  commerce,  forbidden  by  the  act 
of  July  2,  1890,  results  from  the  concerted 
scheme  of  railway  carriers  possessing  a  sub- 
stantial monopoly  of  the  transportation  facil- 
ities between  the  anthracite  deposits  in  Penn- 
sylvania and  tide-water  distributing  points, 
and  also  controlling,  with  the  aid  of  their 
subsidiary  coal-mining  and  selling  companies, 
nearly  three-fourths  of  the  annual  supply  of 
anthracite,  whereby  a  large  number  of  the 
independent  coal  operators  were  induced  to 
enter  singly  into  uniform  perpetual  agree- 
ments for  the  sale  to  some  one  of  such  car- 
riers, or  its  subsidiary  coal  company,  of  the 
entire  output  of  their  several  mines  and  any 
others  they  might  thereafter  acquire,  at  a 
fixed  percentage  of  the  general  average  price 
prevailing  at  tide-water  points  at  or  near 
New  York,  whl<di  would  net  the  operator 
slightly  more  than  if  he  shipped  and  sold  on 
his  own  account,  the  necessary  result  being  to 
secure  to  the  carriers  the  control  at  tide-wa- 
ter markets  of  the  sale  of  a  large  part  of  the 
independent  output.  United  States  v.  Read- 
ing Co.,  33  Sup.  Ct  90,  94,  226  U.  S.  324,  57 
L.  Ed.  243. 

MONTE 

As  banking  game  see  Banking  Game. 

"Monte"  is  a  game  kept  by  a  dealer; 
that  .is,  the  dealer  against  all  the  bettors. 
Chancellor  v.  State,  107  S.  W.  823,  824,  52 
Tex.  Cr.  R.  464. 


MONTH 


See    Calendar    Month ; 
Month  to  Month. 


Tenant    from 


A  month  is  a  definite  period  of  time, 
commencing  on  the  1st  day  thereof,  and  end- 
ing on  the  28th,  29th,  30th,  or  31st  day.  Der- 
by v.  Dancey,  86  South.  795,  796,  112  La. 
891* 


The  term  "montiis,''  when' used  In  a  sta 
ute^  means  calendar  months,  not  liuu 
months,  unless  there  is  something  in  U 
statute  whidi  indicates  that  a  contrai 
meaning  was  Intended.  Simmons  t.  Hann 
39  South.  77,  79,  60  Fla.  267,  7  Ann.  Ca 
322  (citing  Guaranty  Trust  ft  Safe  Depoa 
Co.  T.  Buddington,  9  South.  246,  27  Fla.  21 
12  L.  R.  A.  770;  Bacon  v.  State,  22  Fla.  4€ 
Bertwell  y.  Haines,  68  Pac  702,  10  OkL  46 

The  word  '*month,"  whenever  it  occu 
in  the  statute  of  this  state,  means  a  "calei 
dar  month,"  unless  the  contrary  be  partlci 
larly  expressed.  Ellmball  y.  Lamson,  2  \ 
138,  141. 

Under  Rev.  St  1878,  |  2183,  providii 
that  a  tenancy  by  sufferance  may  be  termina 
ed  by  the  landlord  giving  "one  month's  n 
tlce"  in  writing  to  the  tenant,  requiring  hi 
to.  remove  from  the  demised  premises, 
notice  is  sufficient  where  giving  the  prop( 
number  of  days  before  the  action  is  brougl 
as  contained  in  the  calendar  month  in  whic 
it  is  given.  Mlnard  v.  Burtls,  53  N.  W.  50 
511,  83  Wis.  267. 

The  term  "month"  in  a  policy  of  life  ii 
surance  construed  to.  mean  a  calendar  montJ 
Bohles  V.  Prudential  In&  Co.  of  Amerlc 
83  Aa  904,  905,  83  N.  J.  Law,  246. 

The  word  "month"  in  a  contract  to  se 
4,000  tons  of  asphalt  to  be  delivered  on  o 
ders  not  exceeding  400  tcms  "in  any  on 
month*'  payments  to  be  made  on  the  lOt 
o(  each  month  for  asphalt  delivered  durin 
the  preceding  month  meant  calendar  moot! 
Fairchild-Gllmore-Wllton  Co.  v.  Southern  B( 
fining  Co.,  110  Pae  951,  963,  158  CaL  264. 

When  an  act  is  required  by  statute  to  I 
performed  within  a  certain  number  of  montt 
after  a  certain  date,  the  word  "months"  wi 
be  construed  to  mean  calendar  month 
whether  of  28,  .29,  30,  or  31  days,  and  pr 
ceedlngs  in  error  commenced  on  the  com 
spending  day  of  the  fourth  ^onth  after  it 
rendition  of  the  judgment  comply  with  tl 
statute  in  this  regard.  Oehler  y.  Walsh,  2 
Ohio  Clr.  Ct.  R.  446,  447. 

The  term  "months,**  in  a  constitntioni 
provision  providing  that  a  vacancy  in  a 
office  of  any  judge  holding  office  by  electlo 
shall  be  filled  by  appointment,  the  appoint! 
to  hold  his  office  until  the  next  general  ele 
tion  for  any  state  officer,  held  at  least  si 
months  after  the  vacancy  oecors,  means  ca 
endar  nlonth&  Foster  v.  State  ex  reL  Stai 
ford,  43  South.  179,  180,  1^  Ala.  632. 

Under  Laws  1892,  p.  1490,  c.  677,  |  3 
relating  to  the  computation  of  **months, 
and  negativing  any  right  to  Include  in  sue 
computation  a  day  beyond  the  day  in  tt 
last  month  so  counted,  having  the  san 
numerical  order  in  the  days  of  the  mont 
as  the  day  from  which  the  computation  J 
made,  and  section  27  providing  that  a  Soi 
day  or  public  holiday  must  be  excluded  froi 


MOyTHLT  PAYMENTS 


441 


MONUMBKT8 


reckoning^  If  it  la  the  last  day  Of  any 
h  period,  when  a  life  inenranoe  poUcy 
Tides  that  no  action  can  be  maintained 
reon  after  six  months  from  the  death  of 
Insured,  and  such  period  ezpirea  on  Son- 
,  an  action  commenced  on  the  following 
Dday  la  barred  by  the  express  terms  of 

policy.  Ryer  ▼.  Prudential  Ins.  Go.  of 
lerica,  77  N.  B.  727,  185  N.  T.  6. 

mTHIiY  PATMEHTS 

See  In  Monthly  Payments  as  Due. 

>lfTHIiY  8ETTIi£M£MT 

By  a  contract  for  services  of  plaintiff 
five  years  in  selling  defendant's  beer  to 
tain  customers,  defendant  agreed,  on  con- 
Ion  that  such  sales  should  not  be  less 
n  30,000  barrels  per  annum,  to  pay  plain- 
12  V^  cents  per  barrel  so  sold  yearly  dur- 
the  term  of  the  agreement,  monthly  set- 
nents  to  be  mada  Held,  that  the  words 
onthly  settlements"  could  not  be  construed 
mean  "monthly  payments,"  thereby  quail-, 
Dg  the  provisions  by  which  the  promise  to 
7  was  conditioned  on  sales  of  a  specified 
ount  per  annum,  and  payments  were  to  be 
de  yearly,  and  that  nothing  would  become 
i  until  the  expiration  of  a  year,  or  at 
St  until  30,000  barrels  should  have  been 
1  '  Gmlnder  v.  Zeltner  Brewing  Co.,  HI 
Y.  Supp.  215,  217,  126  App.  Div.  770. 

3NUMENT 

See  Suitable  Monument 
Dutiable  as  dressed  granite,  see  Dressed 
Granite. 

A  testator,  who  sets  apart  a  spedfled 
n  from  his  estate  for  funeral  expenses  and 
>per  Interment  of  his  remains  and  a  sult- 
le  monument  to  his  memory,  and  requests 
It  his  remains  be  burled  on  a  designated 
ich,  does  not  authorize  the  executors  to 
i  a  part  of  the  fund  for  the  erection  of 
free  library  as  a  memorial;  the  word 
iODument'*  being  used  in  Its  natural  sense 
meaning  a  shaft  or  any  structure  placed 
it  a  tomb  or  at  a  grave,  and  not  in  its 
plied  sense  as  meaning  a  reminder  taking 
y  form.  In  its  applied  sense,  a  monument, 
Ing  a  reminder,  may  take  any  form.  Na- 
leou's  battles  are  monuments  to  his  mem- 
f.  Horace  by  his  poetry  "built  himself  a 
mament  more  enduring  than  brass";  and 
p  Christopher  Wren  in  his  oft-quoted 
Itaph,  "Si  Monumentum  Bequiris  Circum- 
ice,"  declares  St.  Paul's  cathedral  his  mon- 
lenL  Fancher  v.  Fancher,  103  Pac,  206, 
7,  156  Cal.  13,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  044.  19 
in.  Cas.  1157. 

Act  April  3,  1003  (P.  lU  136),  amending 
t  May  22,  U895,  authorising  the  erection  of 
idlers'  monuments^  and  reciting  the  title 
such  amended  act  in  its  own  title.  Is  a 
fficlent  notice  of  a  provision  in  the  amend- 

act  allowing   county   commissioners   in 


counties  having  a  population  of  over  000,060 
and  less  than  1,000,000  to  erect  a  building  in 
memory  of  the  soldiers  and  sailors  In  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion  from  sndi  counties;  a 
memorial  hall  being  in  the  nature  of  a  "mon- 
ument" Yoho  V.  Allegheny  County,  67  AtL 
648,  640,  218  Pa.  401. 

MO]IUM£llT8  <Im  Bomadari— ) 

See  Natural  Monument;  Permanent 
Monument 

''Monuments"  are  permanent  landmarks 
established  for  the  purpose  of  indicating 
boundaries.  Tbompson  v.  HU1«  73  S.  E. 
640,  648,  187  Oa.  80a 

Permanent  objects,  such  as  streams,  or 
rivers,  and  the  shore  of  a  lake,  or  highways, 
or  other  lands,  or  buildings,  or  stakes,  when 
referred  to  in  the  description  of  property 
conveyed,  are  known  as  "monuments."  Tem- 
ple V.  Benson,  100  N.  E.  68,  218  Mass.  12a 

A  deed  describing  land  as  running  along 
an  unnavigable  stream,  or  referring  to  it  as 
the  boundary,  makes  it  a  "monument" 
Drake  v.  Russian  River  Land  Co.,  103  Pac. 
167,  170,  10  Oal.  App.  654. 

In  the  description  in  a  deed  of  land, 
commencing  26  feet  west  of  the  southeast 
comer  of  a  certain  lot,  "being  the  southwest 
comer  of  the  portion  of  said  lot,  formerly 
owned  by  B.,  where  she  now  resides,"  and 
running  thence  north  26  feet,  thence  west 
26  feet,  or  to  and  intersecting  "the  northeast 
comer  of  a  lot  formerly  owned  by  M.,"  and 
mnning  thence  south  to  Seventh  street  and 
thence  to  place  of  beginning,  said  southwest 
comer  of  land  owned  by  B.,  and  said  north- 
east corner  of  land  owned  by  M.,  are  not 
real  "monuments,"  which  are  fixed  and  vis- 
ible objects,  within  the  rule  that  real  monu- 
ments called  for  in  the  description  of  a  deed 
are  ordinarily  given  precedence  over  dis- 
tances called  for ;  It  not  appearing  that  such 
comers  are  any  more  established  than  are 
the  disputed  lines  of  description  in  the  deed. 
Koch  V.  Gk>rdon,  138  S.  W.  600,  610,  231  Mo. 
645. 

The  engineer  making  an  original  survey 
of  a  tract  into  lots,  blocks,  and  streets  set 
stakes  on  the  ground  to  Indicate  boundaries 
of  lots.  He  made  a  resurvey  from  his  orig- 
inal notes,  and  discovered  a  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  stakes  and  the  field  notes.  In 
placing  the  stakes  originally,  he  intended 
to  place  them  in  accordance  with  the  notes 
and  plat  One  of  the  earliest  purchasers 
found  the  stakes,  and  relied  thereon.  Oth* 
ers  accepted  the  stakes  as  marking  the  boun- 
daries. An  abutting  street  was  Improved 
with  paving,  gutters,  curb,  and  parking  in 
accordance  with  the  boundaries  of  the  lots 
established  by  the  stakes.  Held,  that  the 
stakes  constituted  monuments  on  the  ground 
controlling  the  field  notes,  and  established 
the  boundaries  between  property  owners  and 
were  controlling  on  the  dty.  TomUnaon  v. 
Golden  (Iowa)  138  N.  W.  448,  46a 


"H 


^ 


ll 


MOOB  442 

MOOR 

MOORAGB 

Wharfage  lynonyiDoiiB,  aee  Wharftige. 


MOBAIi  OERTAINTT 


MOOT  CASE 

A  "moot  dise"  la  one  which  seeks  to  get 
a  jadgment  on  a  pretended  controversy,  when 
In  reality  there  is  none,  or  a  decision  in  ad- 
vance about  a  right  before  it  lias  been  ac- 
tually asserted  and  contested,  or  a  Judgment 
upon  some  matter  which,  when  rendered,  for 
any  reason,  cannot  have  any,  practical  legal 
effect  upon  a  then  existing  controversy.  £z 
parte  Steele,  162  Fed.  694,  702. 

The  fact  that  a  suit  may  be  a  friendly 
one  would  not  of  necessity  render  it  a  '*moot 
case,"  which  is  defined  as  one  which  seeks  to 
determine  an  abstract  question .  which  does 
not  rest  upon  existing  facts  or  right&  State 
T.  First  Catholic  Church  of  Lincoln,  128  N. 
W.  657,  658,  88  Neb.  2. 

'*A  'moot  case'  is  one  which  seeks  to  de- 
termine an  abstract  question  which  does  not 
rest  upon  existing  facts  or  rights."  '*It  is 
universally  understood  by  the  bench  and  bar 
*  ^  *  that  a  moot  case  is  one  which  seeks 
to  get  a  judgment  on  a  pretended  contro- 
versy when  in  reality  there  is  none,  or  a  de- 
cision in  advance  about  a  right  before  it  has 
been  actually  asserted  and  contested,  or  a 
judgment  upon  some  matter  which,  when  ren- 
dered, for  any  reason  cannot  have  any  prac- 
tical legal  effect  upon  a  then  existing  con- 
troversy." Where  a  request  is  made  of  u 
public  officer  to  perform  an  act  under  a 
statute,  and  he,  although  believing  that  the 
law  requires  its  performance,  refuses  because 
of  a  doubt  on  the  subject  and  because  he 
wishes  the  question  to  be  quickly  and  finally 
settled  by  the  decision  of  a  court,  a  proceed- 
ing brought  by  the  state  to  compel  such  ac- 
tion on  his  part  is  not  fictitious.  State  v. 
Dolley,  108  Pac.  846,  847,  82  Kan.  533  (quot- 
ing Adams  V.  Union  Railroad  Co.,  42  Atl. 
517,  21  R.  I.  140,  44  L.  R.  A.  273;  Ex  parte 
Steele,  162  Fed.  694,  701). 

MORAL 

See  Contrary  to  Good  Morals. 

MORAI.  CERTAIHTT 

See  To  a  Moral  Certainty. 

"Moral  certainty"  is  that  degree  of  proof 
which  the  law  requires  of  moral  evidence. 
Moral  certainty  is  described  as  a  state  of 
impression  produced  by  facts  in  which  a 
reasonable  mind  feels  a  sort  of  coercion  or 
necessity  to  act  in  accordance  with  it.  It  is 
also  declared  to  be  a  certainty  that  con- 
vinces and  directs  the  understanding,  and 
satisfies  the  reason  and  judment  of  those 
who  are  bound  to  act  conscientiously  upon  it. 
People  V.  Lew  Fook,  75  Pac*  188,  141  Cal. 

54a 


"Moral  certainty"  is  a  probability  sui 
dently  certain  to  justify  action  upon 
"Reasonable  and  moral  certainty"  may 
said  to  be  that  degree  of  probability  whi 
exists  with  such  strength  as  to  justify  h 
man  action  upon  it  Austin  v.  State,  64  S. 
670,  6  Qa.  App.  211. 

Where  a  fact  established  by  evidence 
the  only  one  that  can  reasouably  exist  und 
the  circumstances,  the  truth  is  established 
a  "moral  certainty,"  which  is  the  highest  d 
gree  of  certainty  obtainable  in  human  i 
fairs.  ESvidenciary  circumstances  relied  i 
and  essential  to  establish  any  necessary  e] 
ment  in  a  criminal  prosecution  must,  in  c 
der  to  be  efficient,  be  shown  to  exist  to  ti 
satisfaction  of  the  jury  with  the  same  degr 
of  certainty  as  the  ultimate  object  of  inqul 
is  required  to  be  to  warrant  a  finding  in  ti 
affirmative.  Schwantes  t.  State,  106  N.  ) 
237,  244,  127  Wis.  160. 

A  "mathematical  demonstration"  is  wh< 
ly  different  from  a  "moral  certainty."  £ 
Idence  of  demonstration  relates  to  necessa 
truths,  truths  as  to  which  the  supposition 
the  contrary  involves,  not  merely  what  is  n 
and  cannot  be  true,  but  what  is  also  absui 
whereas  moral  evidence  Is  the  basis  of  co 
tingent  truth.  It  follows  obviously  tfai^t  ti 
convictions  which  these  distinct  and  dissij 
liar  classes  of  evidence  are  capable  of  pi 
dudng  are  necessarily  of  veiy  different  ii 
tures.  In  the  one  absolute  certitude  is  ti 
result,  to  which  moral  certainty,  the  highc 
degree  of  assurance  of  which  truths  of  ti 
latter  class  admit,  la  necessarily  inferic 
Wills,  Cir.  Bv.  5.  Moral  certainty  is  th 
full  and  complete  assurance  whi<di  admits 
no  degrees,  and  induces  a  sound  mind  to  a 
without  doubt  upon  the  conclusions  to  whi( 
it  naturally  and  reasonably  leads.  2  Ste^ 
art's  Elements,  c.  2,  i  4.  It  is  apparent,  th€ 
that  the  precision  attainable  in  the  one  ca 
is  of  a  nature  of  which  the  other  does  n 
admit  Bowman  v.  Little,  61  AtL  1084,  Itt 
101  Md.  273. 

The  term  '*moral  certainty,"  as  applii 
to  the  evidence  in  a  criminal  case,  has  tJ 
same  meaning  as  "reasonable  doubt"    Sta 
V.  Martin,  74  Pac.  725,  728,  29  Mont  27 
State  V.  Wappenstein,  121  Pac.  989,  998,  < 
Wash.  502;   Stewart  v.  State,  115  8.  W.  31 
375,  88  Ark.  602  (citing  Commonwealth 
Costley,  118  Mass.  1;    Jones  v.   State, 
South.  772,  100  Ala.  88;    Woodruff  v.  Stat 
12  South.  653,  31  Fla.  320;  Carlton  v.  Pc 
pie,  37  N.  B.  244,  150  111.  181,  41   Am.  J 
Rep.  346);  Norman  v.  State,  74  S.  ET.  ^28, 
Oa.  App.  802.    See,  also.  People  r.  Buettn< 
84  N.  B.  218,  220,  233  IlL  272,  18  Ann.  Ci 
235. 

"Reasonable  douhtf*  and  '*nioral  certai 
ty"  may  be  used  interchangeably.  The  wr 
ers  of  legal  dictionaries  define  '^oral  a 
tainty"  to  mean  that  degree  of  certain 
which  will  justify  a  jury  in  grounding  up 


MORAL  CERTAINTY 


44S 


MORAL  OBLiaATIOH 


beir  Terdlct  Bouvler  defines  the  term  to 
in:  '^Certainty  tliat  conyinces  and  directs 
understanding,  and  satisfies  the  reason 
I  Judgment  of  those  who  are  bound  to  act 
scientlously  upon  it  A  certainty  beyond 
easonable  doubt*'  Black's  Law  Dlctlona- 
ieflnes  the  term  as  follows:  "In  the  law  of 
nlnal  evidence  that  degree  of  assurance 
Ich  induces  a  man  of  sound  mind  to  act 
bout  doubt  upon  the  conclusion  to  which 
eads.  Hendriz  ▼.  United  States,  101  Pac. 
,  129,  2  OkL  Cr.  240. 

To  say  Chat  proof  of  the  fact  must  be 
de  reasonably  certain  is,  by  literal  Import 
liie  words,  tantamount  to  saying  that  the 
of  must  be  made  beyond  a  reasonable 
ibt    This  has  been  e3q>ressly  held  as  to 

phrase  "moral  certainty,"  which  Is  equlv- 
Qt  to  the  words  "reasonable  certainty." 
[diarge  that  if  a  passenger's  sickness  was 
;  the  result  of  her  being  put  off  the  train, 
1  that  It  was  "reasonably  certain"  to  have 
alted  from  other  causes,  the  carrier  is  not 
3le  is  erroneous  as  requiring  proof  beyond 
sonable  doubt  St  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 
Bums,  9  S.  W.  467,  468,  71  Tex.  479,  481. 

Refusal  to  give  an  instruction  in  a  mur- 
>  trial  that  the  presumption  of  innocence 
ust  be  overcome  by  competent  evidence 
Ich  convinces  you  of  his  guilt  to  a  moral 
tainty"  is  not  error  where  an  instruction 
given  that  "moral  certainty,  only,  is  re- 
ired,  or  that  degree  of  proof  which  produc- 

conviction  in  an  unprejudiced  mind.** 
ite  V.  Megorden,  88  Pac.  306,  810,  49  Or. 
).  14  Ann.  Cas.  130. 

An  instruction  to  the  Jury  that  they 
ist  be  satisfied  to  a  "moral  and  reasonable 
talnty"  is  the  same  in  effect  as  saying 
It  they  must  be  satisfied  "beyond  a  rea- 
lable  doubt"  Warr^  v.  Gay,  51  S.  B. 
I,  303,  123  Ga.  243  (quoting  and  adopting 
3nltion  in  Dwight  v.  Jones^  42  a  B.  48» 
5  Ga.  744). 

[>RAIi  CHARACTER  . 

See  Good  Moral  Character. 

[>RAI.  BUTT 

The  term  "performance  of  a  moral  duty,^ 
applied  to  a  meritorious  consideration  for 
contract,  Is  confined  to  three  duties,  of 
irity,  of  payment  of  creditors,  and  of 
iDtainlng  a  wife  and  children,  and  un- 
r  the  last  head  are  Included  provisions 
ide  for  persons,  not  being  children  of  the 
rty  promising,  but  in  relation  to  whom  he 
s  manifested  an  intention  to  stand  in  loco 
rentis  in  reference  to  the  parental  duty 
making  provision  for  a  child.  Where  the 
Ly  consideration  for  a  deed  by  a  father  to 
}  daughter  was  love  and  affection,  the 
ughter  could  not  enforce  a  provision  in 
i  deed  that  the  grantor  would  K>ay  an  ior 
mbrance  on  the  property  at  maturity. 
Hcher  V.  Union  Trust  Co.,  101  N.  W.  852, 
3,  138  Mich.  612,  68  L.  R.  A.  dti7,  110  Am* 


St  Rep.  329  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Adams,  Bq.  [8th  Ed.]  96). 

MORAL  HAZARD 

'''Moral  hazard,'  in  insurance,  is  but 
another  name  for  a  i>ecuniary  interest  in  the 
insured  to  permit  the  property  to  bum.** 
Glens  Falls  Ins.  Co.  v.  Michael,  74  N.  E.  964, 
972,  167  Ind.  659,  8  Li  R.  A  (N.  S.)  708  (quot- 
ing definition  in  Columbian  Ins.  Co.  of  Alex- 
andria V.  Lawrence,  2  Pet  [27  U.  S.]  25,  49, 
7  L.  Ed.  335);  Ck>nnectlcut  Fire  Ins.  O).  v. 
Manning,  160  Ffed.  382,  385,  87  C.  C.  A  334, 
15  Ann.  Caa  338;  Johnson  v.  Sun  Fire  Ins. 
Oa,  60  S.  E.  118,  119,  3  Ga.  App.  430  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  2  Cooley, 
Brtefs  on  Ins.  p.  1831  et  seq.). 

Tlie  term  "moral  hasaid,"  as  used  in  the 
law  of  fire  insurance,  means  the  possibility 
of  loss  by  fires  of  Incendiary  origin.  Hart- 
ford Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dorroh  fTex.)  188  &  W. 
466,  468. 

MORA!.  nrSAHITT 

"Moral  insanity"  or  "medical  insanity^  is 
a  pervenflon  of  the  sentiment  and  affections. 
Taylor  v.  McClintpck,  112  a  W.  405»  412. 
87  Ark.  248. 

MORAI.  MARRIAOB 

"Moral  marriage"  was  a  term  applied  to 
a  relation  between  slaves  who,  although  they 
had  no  power  to  make  the  marriage  contract, 
yet  came  together  and  agreed  to  live  as  man 
and  wife.  The  essence  of  such  an  agreement 
was  that  it  be  bona  fide,  and  that  the  parties 
act  in  accordance  with  it  Watson  v.  Ellerbe, 
67  a  B.  866,  866,  77  S.  C.  232. 

MORAL  OBUOATIOH 

'"Moral  obligations'  are  those  arising 
from  the  admonitions  of  conscience,  and  ac- 
countability to  the  Supreme  Being.  No  hu- 
man law-giver  can  impair  them.  They  are 
entirely  foreign  from  the  purposes  of  the 
Constltutloa."  Ogden  v.  Saunders,  12  Wheat 
213,  318,  6  L.  Ed.  606  (Trimble,  J.,  dissentp 
ing). 

*'Moral  obligation"  is  defined  to  be  an  ob- 
ligation '"which  cannot  be  enforced  by  action 
but  whUAi  is  binding  on  the  party  who  incur- 
red it  in  conscience  and  according  to  natural 
justice."  It  is  again  defined  as  ''a  duty 
which  would  be  enforceable  by  law  were  it 
not  for  some  positive  rule  which,  with  a  view 
to  general  benefit,  exempts  the  party  in  that 
particular  instance  from  legal  liability.  It 
is  held  that  such  'moral  obligation'  will  sus- 
tain an  express  promise  to  pay."  Rathfon  v. 
Locher,  64  AtL  790,  701,  215  Pa.  571  (quoting 
and  adopting  definitions  from  Bailey  v.  C!ity 
of  Philadelphia,  31  AtL  025,  167  Pa.  569,  46 
Am.  St  Rep.  691). 

A  debt  which  a  person  'inorally  owes" 
is  one  which  he  owes  in  equity  and  good  con- 
science, lawfully  owes,  but  iniilch  he  cannot 
be  personally  adjudged  to  pay.    MacDdnald 


MORAL  OBLiaATION 


444 


MORB 


?.  TefftWeUer  Co.,  128  Fed.  881,  885,  68  0. 
0.  A.  123,  es  L.  R.  A.  loa 

A  "moral  obligation"  on  the  part  of  the 
state  must  have  something  more  substantial 
than  legislation  obnoxious  to  the  fundamental 
law  to  rest  upon;  something  more  for  a  foun- 
dation or  starting  point  than  a  statute  which 
Is  itself  immoral.  A  moral  obligation  can  nev- 
er be  deemed  to  rest  upon  the  people  of  the 
state  to  discbarge  a  contract  made  by  the 
Legislature  in  direct  violation  of  the  Consti- 
tution. Minnesota  Sugar  Co.  v.  Iverson,  91 
Mhin.  30,  97  N.  W.  454,  457  (citing  Adsit  v. 
Osmun,  48  N.  W.  31,  84  Mich.  420,  U  L.  B.  A 
534). 

PoUtioal  ol^satloms  distiiiKiilslhed 

"*Moral  obligations'  are  universal  and 
immutable,  but  Apolitical  obligations'  must 
frequently  vary  according  to  political  circum- 
stances." Shanks  v.  Dupont,  8  Pet  242,  268, 
7  L.  Ed.  666  (Johnson,  J.,  dissenting). 

MORAIi  TUBPITUDE 

"Everything  done  contrary  to  Justice, 
honesty,  modesty,  or  good  morals  is  said  to  be 
done  with  'turpitude.*"  Thus  where  an  at- 
torney, acting  as  a  notary  public,  falsely  cer- 
tified, to  affidavits  to  be  used  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  pension  claims,  that  the  affiants  per- 
sonally appeared  before  him  and  were  sworn 
and  acknowledged  the  execution  thereof,  and 
he  was  convicted  in  a  federal  court,  under 
Rev.  St  U.  S.  I  4746,  imposing  a  fine  for  such 
an  offense  not  exceeding  (500  or  imprison- 
ment for  a  term  not  exceeding  five  years,  he 
was  convicted  of  an  offense  involving  "moral 
turpitude,"  Justifying  his  disbarment,  under 
BalUnger's  Ann.  Codes  &  St  |  4775.  In  re 
Hopkins,  103  Pac.  805,  806,  54  Wash.  669 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Bouv. 
Law  Diet). 

'•Turpitude,"  in  its  ordinary  sense  in- 
volves the  idea  of  inherent  baseness  or  vile- 
ness,  shameful  wickedness;  depravity.  In 
its  legal  sense,  it  includes  everything  done 
contrary  to  Justice,  honesty,  modesty,  or  good 
morals.  The  word  "moral,"  which  so  often 
precedes  the  word  "turpitude,"  does  not  seem 
to  add  anything  to  the  meaning  of  the  term, 
other  than  that  emphasis  which  often  results 
from  tautological  expression,  within  the  di- 
vorce statute.  Holloway  v.  Holloway,  55  S. 
E.  191,  126  Ga.  459,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  272, 
115  Am.  St  Rep.  102,  7  Ann.  Cas.  1164  (citing 
5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4580;  Webst  Diet; 
Black,  Law  Diet;   Bouv.  Law  Diet). 

Proof  of  a  prior  conviction  of  assault  and 
battery  was  inadmissible  to  affect  a  witness' 
credibility,  under  the  rule  permitting  evi- 
dence of  prior  convictions  of  offenses  involv- 
ing "moral  turpitude,"  as  such  term  signifies 
an  inherent  quality  of  baseness,  vileness,  and 
depravity  not  inherent  in  assault  and  battery. 
Gillman  v.  State,  51  South.  722,  723,  165  Ala. 
135. 


Oanytng  m  concealed  weapon  1b  not 
offense  inv<^vlng  "moral  turpitude,"  and 
offender's  conviction  is  not  ground  for  his 
portation.  Bx  parte  Saraceno,  182  Fed.  { 
957. 

The  keeper  of  a  disorderly  house  wit 
Pen.  Code  1911,  art  496,  defining  a  disordc 
house  as  any  assignation  house,  or  tbeatei 
house  where  liquors  are  kept  for  sale  i 
women  of  bad  reputation  are  permitted, 
guilty  of  an  offense  involving  "moral  to: 
tude,"  and  a  witness  for  accused  is  propc 
cross-examined  as  to  whether  he  Is  under 
indictment  for  keeping  a  disordwly  hoi 
Bird  V.  State  (Tex.)  148  S.  W.  738,  739  (dt 
5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4580). 

The  illegal  sale  of  intoxicating  liquon 
not  a  crime  involving  moral  turpitude  wit 
Kirby's  Dig.  |  5247,  authorizing  the  revc 
tion  of  a  physician's  license  on  his  convict 
of  crime  involving  moral  turpitude,  the  wo 
"moral   turpitude"   implying  something 
moral,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  it  is  p 
ishable  by  law,  and  offenses  against  the 
uor  laws,  such  as  illegal  sales  of  liquor, 
statutory  crimes,  and  merely  mala  prohib 
Fort  V.  aty  of  Brinkley,  112^.  W.  1084, 1( 
87  Ark.  400. 

Proof  of  a  conviction  of  an  illegal  sale 
intoxicating  liquors  is  not  admissible  to 
peach  a  witness*  credibility;  the  crime 
showing  "moral  turpitude,"  which  signifies 
inherent  quality  of  baseness,  vileness,  or 
pravity.  Swope  v.  State,  58  South.  809, 81 
Ala.  App.  83. 

"Moral  turpitude"  is  an  act  of  basen^ 
vileness,  or  depravity  in  the  private  and  8o< 
duties  which  a  man  owes  to  his  fellow  l 
or  to  society  in  general,  contrary  to  the 
cepted  and  customary  rule  of  right  and  d 
between  man  and  mAn.  Though  the  point 
which  an  act  begins  to  take  on  the  color 
turpitude  is  not  very  definitely  marked, 
the  commission  of  the  crime  of  larce 
whether  grand  or  petit  undoubtedly  invol 
"moral  turpitude,"  as  that  term  is  conmio 
used.  In  re  Henry,  99  Pac.  1054,  1055, 
Idaho,  755,  21  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  207. 

Fighting  not  being  an  offense  involv 
"moral  turpitude,"  the  state  may  not 
cross-examination  of  defendant  show  t 
he  had  paid  several  fines  for  fighting  bef 
the  charge  of  assault  for  which  he  was  be 
tried.  PoUok  v.  State  (Tex.)  101  &  W.  2 
232. 

MORE 


pmlblio  nam 

Under  a  Code  provision  allowing  proi 
ty  already  taken  for  public  use  to  be  tal 
for  a  "more  necessary  public  use"  than  t 
to  which  it  has  been  already  approprial 
the  land  of  a  private  person,  subject  to 
easement  for  a  public  highway,  may  be  tal 
by  a  water  company  for  a  dam  and  reservi 


MORE 


446 


MORE  OR  LE88 


MariB  County  Water 'Co.  ▼.  Marin  Oonntj,  79 
Pac.  282,  283,  14S  Cal.  586. 

More  partiovlarly 

"Particularly"  Is  defined  as  *in  a  particu- 
lar manner;  expressly  with  a  specific  refer- 
ence or  Interest;  in  particular;  distinctly.'* 
The  term  "more  particularly  described,"  as 
used  in  a  contract  to  convey  a  farm  "consist- 
ing of  two  hundred  (200)  acres,  more  or  less, 
•  •  *  more  particularly  described,"  in  a 
deed  specified,  means  exactly  described. 
Sweet  T.  Marsh,  117  N.  T.  8iiK>«  980,  084,  138 
App.  Dir.  315. 

More  tostimoBj 

An  inatmction  was  correct  whlcb,  con- 
strued as  a  whole,  told  tlie  Jury  that,  after 
rejecting  the  testimony  of  witnesses  discredit- 
ed by  them,  their  verdict  should  be  for  daim- 
tnt,  if  there  was  "more  testimony"  (that  is,  a 
preponderance  of  testimony)  tending  to  es- 
tablish the  validity  of  her  claim,  and  if  there 
was  not,  their  verdict  should  be  for  the  es- 
tate. Taylor  v.  Taylor's  Estate^  101  N.  W. 
832,  835, 188  Mich.  658. 

More  tluuft  one 

An  allegation,  in  a  pleading  contesting 
the  validity  of  an  election  in  a  school  dis- 
trict authorizing  the  Issuance  of  bonds,  that 
**more  than  one"  person  voted  in  favor  of  the 
bonds  who  was  not  a  taxpayer  of  the  district 
is  tantamount  to  an  allegation  that  two  votes 
were  cajst  by  persons  who  were  not  taxpayers 
of  the  district  Hicks  v.  Krigbaum,  106  Pac. 
482,  486»  13  Ariz.  237. 

More  tluuft  tea  years 

Where  defendant  pleaded  that  he  had 
been  in  peaceable  possession  of  all  the  prop- 
erty described  in  plaintiff's  petition,  using 
aod  exercising  ownership  over  same  for  "more 
than  ten  years  next  preceding  the  filing  of 
said  suit,"  the  phrase  quoted  indicates  that 
It  was  not  the  intention  of  the  pleader  to  limit 
the  time  of  possession  to  the  ten  years  im- 
mediately preceding  the  filing  of  the  suit 
Campbell  Real  Estate  Co.  v.  Wiley  (Tex.)  83 
S.  W.  251,  252  (dtlng  Hennessy  v.  Savings 
&  Loan  Co.,  55  S.  W.  124,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
691). 

MORE  OB  ZJB88 

The  phrase  "more  or  lessH  following  a 
numeral  conveys  the  meaning  of  an  estimate 
of  probable  distance  or  amount  The  idea 
of  nearness  is  suggested  but  that  of  fixedness 
is  excluded,  and,  where  the  question  at  is- 
sue in  the  controversy  is  one  of  distance,  it 
Is  a  question  of  fact  tor  the  jury  to  determine 
as  to  what  is  a  reasonable  limit  in  connec- 
fion  with  the  subject-matter  and  surrounding 
tacts  and  circumstances  of  the  particular 
case.  Geiger  v.  Kaestner,  148  111.  App.  529, 
632;  Santa  Paula  Commercial  Co.  v.  Park- 
hurst-Davis  Mercantile  Co.,  120  Pac.  347,  348, 
S6  Kan.  328.  j 


MOBS  OB  XJM8  (PerMkuaty) 

In  a  contract  for  sale  of  goods,  the  qual- 
ifying words  **more  or  less"  merely  provide 
against  slight  and  accidental  variati<ms  in 
number,  measure  or  weight  Hills  v.  Ed- 
mund Peycke  Oo^  110  Paa  1088,  1060,  14 
CaL  App.  32. 

The  i^rase  "more  or  lees,"  as  used  in  a 
contract  tor  the  manufacture  and  sale  of 
glass,  where  the  quantity  is  stated  at  200,000 
square  feet  '*more  or  less,"  means  only  such 
Immaterial  variations  in  quantity  as  would 
occur  naturally  in  connection  with  such  a 
contract  Hadley-Dean  Plate  Glass  Co.  v. 
Highland  Glass  Co.,  143  Fed.  242,  243,  74  C. 
C.  A.  462. 

The  words  '•more  or  less,"  in  a  contract 
for  the  sale  of  a  designated  number  of  staves 
"more  or  lees,"  all  b^ng  branded,  etc.,  are 
merely  precautionary  so  as  to  cover  slight 
and  unimportant  Inaccuracies  and  do  not  en- 
large the  descriptive  words  or  quantity.  Lit- 
tle Rock  Cooperage  Co.  v.  Gunnels,  101  S.  W. 
729,  730,  82  Ark.  286,  12  Ana  Cas.  293. 

The  terms  "about"  and  *'more  or  less," 
as  used  in  a  contract  of  sale  of  "about"  250 
tons  of  grapes  "more  or  less,"  do  not  create 
such  an  ambiguity  in  the  contract  as  to  let  in 
extrinsic  evidence  of  previous  or  contempo- 
raneous conversations  to  show  intent  Pe- 
terson V.  Chalx,  90  Pac.  948,  951,  5  CaL  App. 
525. 

Qujuitity  iileatMUd  hf  ladepeademt  elr. 
ewnstaaees,  ov  detendmed  liy  o»- 
tleii  of  Imyer 

Where  a  contract  Is  made  to  sell  or  fur- 
nish certain  goods  identified  by  reference  to 
independent  circumstances,  such  as  an  entire 
lot  deposited  in  a  certain  warehouse,  or  all 
that  may  be  manufactured  by  the  vendor  in 
a  certain  establishment,  or  that  may  be  ship- 
ped by  his  agent  or  correq;>ondent  in  certain 
vessels,  and  the  quantity  is  named  with  the 
qualification  of  "about,"  or  "more  or  less," 
or  words  of  like  import,  the  contract  applied 
to  the  specific  lot;  and  the  naming  of  the 
quantity  is  not  regarded  as  In  the  nature  of 
a  warranty,  but  only  as  an  estimate  of  the 
probable  amount,  in  referraoe  to  which  good 
faith  is  all  that  is  required  of  the  party  mak- 
ing it  In  such  cases  the  governing  rule  is 
somewhat  analogous  to  that  which  is  ap- ' 
piled  in  the  description  of  land,  where  natu- 
ral boundaries  and  monuments  control  cours- 
es and  distances*  and  estimates  of  quantity. 
A  contract  for  the  sale  of  cotton  linters  stip- 
ulated that  the  seller  confirmed  the  sale  to 
the  buyer  of  the  "season's  output  of  lin- 
ters ♦  ♦  ♦  estimated  at  200  to  250"  bales. 
Held,  that  the  contract  was  for  the  sale  of 
the  output,  regardless  of  the  number  of  bales, 
especially  in  view  of  the  eyidence  that  the 
buyer  was  buying  linters  generally,  and  want- 
ed all  he  could  get,  and  the  buyer  was  re- 
quired to  take  the  output  consisting  of  6(> 
bales  in  excess  of  the  maTini^TTi  f>^;»vin^, 


MORE  OR  LESS 


U6 


MORE  OR  LESS 


Loeb  V.  Wlnnsboro  C3otton  Oil  Oo.  (Tex.)  ©3 
S.  W.  515,  516  (quoting  and  adopting  Braw- 
ley,  to  Use  of  Myiick,  y.  United  States,  96  U. 
S.  171,  24  L.  Bd.  622). 

MORE  OR  1X88  (BMltj) 

The  words  *'more  or  less"  ordinarily 
mean  "abont,"  when  used  in  a  deed.  Oarling 
T.  Wilson  (Ala«)  58  South.  417,  418. 

Where  land  sold  was  described  by  metes 
and  bounds,  the  words  "containing  by  esti- 
mate" a  certain  number  of  acres  were  equiva- 
lent to  the  words  *'more  or  less.**  Mayer  & 
Schmidt  ▼.  Wooten,  102  S.  W.  423,  427,  46 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  327. 

"In  common-law  conveyances  the  words 
'more  or  less,'  while  sometimes  having  prac- 
tically no  effect,  are  frequently  added  to  pre- 
vent the  precise  quantity  named  from  being 
conclusive  on  the  parties,  and  may  operate 
to  make  a  sale  of  land  one  in  gross  instead  of 
by  the  acre."  Alnsa  v.  United  States,  161  U. 
S.  206,  228.  16  Sup.  Gt  544,  40  L.  Ed.  673. 

When  the  description  of  the  quantity  of 
land  conveyed  by  the  deed  concludes  with 
the  words  "more  or  less,*'  the  purchaser  is 
not  entitled  to  any  reduction  on  account  of 
a  deficiency  unless  it  is  very  gross.  Keenan 
V.  Bird,  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  467,  60  Hun,  175, 177; 
Cunningham  v.  Millner,  82  Va.  526,  527. 

Where  an  agreement  for  the  conveyance 
of  land  describes  it  as  32  acres  more  or  less, 
and  which  does  not  describe  the  land  by 
metes  and  bounds,  or  by  any  fixed  ascertain- 
able monuments,  the  words  "more  or  less"  do 
not  weaken  or  destroy  the  statement  of  the 
quantity.  Brooks  v.  Halane,  116  IlL  App. 
383,  388. 

The  qualification  '*more  or  less,"  specified 
in  a  conveyance  of  land,  will  cover  any  de- 
ficiency not  so  gross  as  to  Justify  a  suspicion 
of  willful  deception  or  mistake  amounting  to 
fraud.  In  the  latter  event  the  purchaser  may 
have  either  a  rescission  of  the  sale  or  an 
apportionment  of  the  price  according  to  the 
relative  value.  The  use  of  the  words  con- 
fers no  additional  right  upon  the  seller. 
Kendall  v.  Wells,  55  S.  B.  41,  42,  126  Ga. 
343  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Civ. 
Code  1895,  |  3542,  and  citing  4  Kent,  Comm. 
[14th  Ed.]  467;  1  Jones,  Real  Prop.  ||  398, 
399,  400;  Rawle,  Cov.  [5th  Ed.]  |  297;  3 
Washb.  Real  Prop.  [6th  Ed.]  |  2322;  1  Warv. 
Vendors,  |  381;  Collinsville  Granite  Oo.  v. 
Phillips,  51  S.  E.  666,  123*Ga.  842;  Jack- 
son ex  dem.  Suffem  v.  McConnell  [N.  Y.]  19 
Wend.  175,  32  Am.  Dec.  439;  Powell  v.  Clark, 
5  Mass.  355,  4  Am.  Dec.  67;  Wright  v. 
Wright,  34  Ala.  194;  Seegar  v.  Smith,  3  S. 
E.  613,  614,  78  Ga.  616,  618;  BeaU  v.  Berk- 
halter,  26  Ga.  567;  Estes  v.  Odom,  18  S.  E. 
355,  91  Ga.  600;  Perkins  Mfg.  Oo.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 25  S.  E.  556,  98  Ga.  388;  Seymore 
V.  Rice,  21  S.  E.  293,  94  Ga.  184 ;  Harrison 
V.  Talbot,  2  Dana  [32  Ky.]  258;  Noble  v. 
Googins,  99  Mass.  231 ;  Gauldin  v.  Shehee,  20 


Ga.  SSl  [4] ;  Soidth  v.  Dudley,  69  Oa.  768  [3 
2  Warv.  Vendors,  |  832;  Finney  v.  Morrj 
42  S.  E.  1020,  116  Ga.  758;  WyUy  v.  Gaza 
69  Ga.  506,  516;  Walton  v.  Ramsey,  50  G 
618 ;  Adams,  Eq.  [8th  Ed.]  177,  178 ;  Spen 
V.  Duren,  3  Ala.  251;  Leyden  v.  Hickma 
75  Ga.  684 ;  Seymore  v.  Rice,  21  S.  E.  28 
94  Ga.  183;  Yost  v.  MalUcote's  Adm'r,  ' 
Va.  610). 

The  words  "more  or  lees,"  as  used  in 
deed  stating  that  the  land  conveyed  oontai 
ed  a  speciiied  number  of  acres  more  or  les 
are  not  construed  to  mean  "as  estimated 
"as  supposed,"  but  are  construed  to  mei 
about  the  specified  number  of  acres,  and  a 
designed  to  cover  only  such  small  errors  < 
surveying  as  usually  occur  in  surveya  Wii 
ton  V.  McGraw,  54  S.  E.  506,  508,  60  W.  V 
96. 

The  term  "more  or  less,"  when  appendc 
to  the  expressed  area  of  land  stated  in 
deed,  constitutes  a  recognition  of  the  ft< 
that  measurements  of  land  ar^  apt  to  diffe 
and  that  m^i  of  intelligence  and  experienc 
who  are  familiar  with  the  premises,  may  m 
agree  in  their  estimates ;  and  one  who  pu 
chases  land  in  bulk  or  as  containing  an  e 
timated  number  of  acres  can  ordinarily  o 
tain  no  relief  on  account  of  any  shortai 
which  subsequent  accurate  measurement  mt 
disclose,  but  the  introduction  of  the  won 
"more  or  less"  does  not  afford  a  able] 
against  liability  for  false  representations,  ai 
the  mere  fact  that  the  deficiency  is  vei 
large  in  proportion  to  the  suiqposed  quantil 
is  often  treated  as  in  itself  evidence  of  frav 
or  of  mutual  mistake,  and  in  such  case  tl 
purchaser  is  entitled  to  relief  by  rescissioi 
or  by  an  abatement  of  the  price,  or,  whei 
he  has  paid  the  price,  an  action  at  law  f( 
damages.  Boddy  v.  Henry,  101  N.  W.  44 
452,  126  Iowa,  31  (citing  Paine  v.  Upton,  I 
N.  Y.  327,  41  Am.  Rep.  371 ;  Lewis  v.  Hoel( 
tke  [Tex.]  76  S.  W.  309;  Couse  v.  Boyles, 
N.  J.  Eq.  212,  88  Am.  Dec  514;  HarreU 
Hill,  19  Ark.  102,  68  Am.  Dec  202;  Triple 
V.  Alden,  26  Grat  [67  Va.]  721,  21  Am.  Re 
320;  Hoback  v.  Kilgores,  26  Grat  [67  Va 
442,  21  Am.  Rep.  317;  Camp  v.  Norfieet 
Adm'x,  5  S.  E.  374,  83  Va.  380;  Fiske 
Fleming's  Syndic,  15  La.  202 ;  Estes  v.  Odoi 
18  S.  E.  355,  91  Ga.  600;  Anthony  v.  Oldacr 
4  Call  [8  Va.]  489 ;  Cravens  v.  Kiser,  4  Im 
512;  Blessing's  Adm'rs  v.  Beatty,  1  pob.  [4 
Va,]  287;  Grislip  v.  Gain,  19  W.  Va.  43J 
Wilson  V.  Randall,  67  N.  Y.  338;  McCandlei 
V.  Young,  96  Pa.  289;  Baltimore  Permanei 
Building  &  Land  Soc  v.  Smith,  54  Md.  18 
39  Am.  Rep.  374;  Hosleton  v.  Dickinson, 
N.  W.  550.  51  Iowa,  244). 

Tlie  language  "more  or  less,**  used  1 
contracts  for  the  sale  of  land,  must  be  ui 
derstood  to  apply  only  to  small  excesses  ( 
deficiencies  attributable  to  variance  of  instn 
ments  of  surveyors,  etc,  and  tixese  terms  ai 
used  to  rather  replace  the  idea  of  a  contra< 
of  hazard,  and  implies  that  there  la  no  ccn 


MOBE  OR  US8S 


447 


HOUE  OR  LESS 


fliderable  diffeseiKKi  in  the  quantity.  Berry^s 
Ex'x  Y.  Flshbnme,  61  S.  B.  827,  104  Va.  459. 

The  retam  of  a]K>raiBer8  setting  aside  a 
year's  sapport  to  a  widow  described  the  proiH 
erty  set  aside  as  "460  acres  of  land,  more  or 
less,  including  homestead."  Held,  that  the 
words  ''more  or  less'*  indicate  that  no  pre- 
cise number  of  acres  was  intended,  but  that 
the  statement  of  the  quantity  was  given  as 
desdiptlTe  of  the  land  assigned.  Hancock 
▼.  Kin&  W  8.  E.  949,  960,  183  Qa.  734. 

The  words  "more  or  less,"  used  in  de- 
scribing land,  are  ordinarily  intended  and 
nnderstood  not  to  admit  of  infinite  variation, 
but  to  restrain  the  representation  to  a  rea- 
sonable or  usual  allowance  for  small  er- 
rors in  surveys;  and  a  description  of  land, 
in  a  bUl  to  quiet  title  thereto,  as  beginning 
at  a  point  on  the  south  line  of  S.  avenue,  60 
feet,  more  or  less,  eastwardly  from  the 
southeast  comer  of  S.  avenue  and  B.  avenue, 
said  point  being  at  the  intersection  of  said 
sonth  line  of  S.  avenue,  and  the  north  and 
south  fence  separating  the  lot  described  from 
the  lot  at  the  southeast  comer  of  said  two 
avenues  supposed  to  belong  to  B.,  00  feet 
more  or  less,  to  the  southeast  comer  of  said 

B.  lot,  thence  northwardly  along  the  fence 
separating  the  lot  described  from  the  B.  lot 
and  parallel,  or  nearly  so,  with  B.  avenue, 
202  feet,  more  or  lest,  to  the  place  of  be- 
ginning, being  suffldently  definite  that,  if  the 
action  had  been  ejectment,  a  surveyor  would 
have  been  able,  in  case  of  recovery,  to  locate 
the  exact  limits,  and  the  sheriff  to  execute  a 
writ  of  possession,  was  sufficient  Touart 
V.  Jett  Bros.  Ckmtractlng  Oo.,  68  South.  761, 
753,  109  Ala.  63a 

A  grantor,  whose  land  was  bounded  on 
the  east  by  lands  of  8.,  conveyed  a  part  to 

C,  and  then  conveyed  land  lying  between 
that  conveyed  to  <X  and  that  owned  by  S., 
describing  it  as  "beginning  at  a  point 
*  *  *  adjoining  the  land  of  G.,^ence  run- 
ning easterly  *  •  *  68  feet  to  the  land 
of  S.,  *  *  *  all  distances  above  men- 
tioned to  be  more  or  less."  Held,  that  the 
conveyance  covered  all  of  the  land  owned 
by  the  grantor  lying  between  the  lands  of  S. 
and  C,  whether  "more  or  less"  than  68  feet 
wide.  Holden  v.  CroUy,  138  N.  Y.  Supp.  23, 
25,  163  App.  Div.  264. 

Mistake  «v  framd 

Where  through  innocent  mistake  a  gran- 
tor represented  that  a  tract,  described  by 
metes  and  bounds,  containing  but  60.71  acres 
contained  82  acres  more  or  less,  the  grantee, 
purchasing  by  the  acre  and  paying  the  price 
In  ignorance  of  the  deficiency,  could  sue  in 
equity  for  the  deficiency  in  the  acreage ;  the 
words  "more'  or  leas'*  not  including  a  con- 
siderable variance,  and  the  mistake  being 
rafiOcient  to  induce  the  court  to  believe  that 
If  the  truth  had  been  known  the  purchase 
would  not  have  been  made.  Straus  v.  Nor- 
rt^  79  Aa  611,  012.  78  N.  J.  Bq.  488. 


ReasoAAble  ezoesa  or  defleiettey  oorered 

The  words  "more  or  less"  in  a  deed  re- 
lieve only  from  the  necessity  for  exactness, 
and  not  from  gross  deficiency.  Boggs  v. 
Bush,  122  &  W.  220,  222,  137  Ey.  96. 

The  words  ''more  or  less*'  in  a  convey- 
ance ordinarily  mean  that  the  grantor  does 
not  warrant  the  precise  quantity  of  land 
named  therein,  but  import  that  the  actual 
quantity  ia  a  near  approximate  to  that  men- 
ti<med,  so  that,  if  there  is  no  more  than  a 
reasonable  deficit  in  the  quantity,  such  as  a 
shortage  arising  from  a  part  thereof  taken 
for  street,  there  is  no  breach  of  the  covenant 
in  the  conveyance.  Eitzman  v.  Carl,  110  N. 
W.  687,  133  Iowa,  340,  12  Ann.  Cas.  290. 


Risk  M  to  «Mmtlty  Imdleated 

The  general  rule  ia  that,  where  it  ap- 
pears in  a  deed  conveying  land  by  the  quali- 
fying words  '*more  or  less"  that  the  state- 
ment of  the  number  of  acres  in  the  deed  is 
a  mere  matter  of  description  and  not  of  the 
essence  of  the  contract,  the  purchaser,  in  the 
absence  of  fraud,  takes  the  risk  as  to  the 
quantity  of  acres  conveyed  to  him.  Adams 
V.  Beta,  78  N.  B.  649,  661,  107  Ind.  101; 
Newman  v.  Eay,  49  S.  B.  926,  932,  67  W. 
Va.  98,  68  L.  B.  A.  908,  4  Ann.  Gas.  39  (cit- 
ing 4  Eent,  Conun.  467 ;  Noble  v.  Ooogins,  99 
Mass.  231;  Flagg  v.  Mason,  6  N.  E.  702,  141 
Mass.  64;  libby  v.  Didcey,  27  AU.  263,  86 
Me.  362;  Frenche  v.  Chancellor  of  State  of 
New  Jersey,  27  ML  140,  61  N.  J.  Bq.  624,  40 
Am.  St.  Rep.  648;  Borkenhagen  v.  Vian- 
den,  62  N.  W.  260,  82  Wis.  206;  Betes  v. 
Odom,  18  S.  B.  355,  91  Qa.  000);  Eendall  v. 
WeUs,  66  S.  B.  41,  44,  126  Ga.  343  (citing 
Jones,  Beal  Prop.  ||  398,  399,  400;  Rawle, 
Cov.  [6th  Ed.l  I  297;  3  Washb.  Real  Prop. 
[6th  Ed.]  I  2322;  CoUinsville  Granite  Co. 
V.  PhilUps,  61  S.  B.  666^  123  Ga.  842;  Jack- 
son V.  McConnell  [N.  Y.]  19  Wend.  176,  32 
Am.  Dea  439;  Powell  v.  Clarke,  6  Mass.  866, 
4  Am.  Dec.  67;  Wright  v.  Wright,  34  Ala. 
194) ;  Cohen  v.  Numsen,  66  AtL  432,  438, 104 
Md.  676;  Yates  v.  Buttrell  OCex.)  132  S.  W. 
831,  832. 

Sale  la  gross  or  hf  acre  Indicated 

The  description  of  land  conveyed  as  con- 
taining so  many  acres,  "more  or  less,"  con- 
stitutes a  sale  by  the  acre,  unless  it  plainly 
appears  from  the  whole  deed  that  a  sale  in 
gross  was  intended.  Pack  v.  Whitaker,  66 
S.  B.  496,  498,  110  Va.  122. 

A  description  in  a  deed  of  land  as  16 
acres,  "more  or  less,"  off  the  southwest  cor- 
ner of  a  quarter  section,  signified  a  sale  in 
gross  of  15  acres,  and  was  not  uncertain 
because  of  the  words  quoted.  W.  C.  Barly 
&  Co.  V.  Long,  42  South.  348,  89  Miss.  285. 

Where  defendant  rented  a  tract  of  land 
of  plaintiff,  and  executed  a  rent  note,  prom- 
ising to  pay  plaintiff  |160  for  rent  of  40 
acres  of  land  at  94  per  acre,  more  or  less, 
etc.,  it  waa  held  that  the  words  "more  or 


> '  ^). 


!'■'( 


t'i 


|,i|H| 

1  '^H  ., 

H 

IB 

/ . 


I 


MORE  OR  LESd 


448 


lEORTOlGB 


less"  iref erred  to  the  quantity  of  landj  and 
that  the  Instrument  should  be  construed  to 
evidence  a  contract  for  renting  by  the  acre, 
and  not  for  a  gross  sum  for  the  entire  tract 
Ayers  ▼.  Heustess,  127  S.  W.  957,  94  Ark. 
493. 

Immaterial  deiiatioB— 2  In  200  aerea 
On  an  exchange  of  land,  a  deficiency  of 
about  two  acres  in  a  farm  of  "200  acres, 
more  or  less/'  is  insafflcient  to  raise  a  pre- 
sumption that  it  would  have  prevented  the 
exchange,  if  known.  Webber  v.  Barter,  134 
N.  W.  947,  960,  154  Iowa,  317. 

Bfaterial  deTiation— 8  in  200  acres 

Where  a  contract  for  the  exchange  of  a 
stock  of  goods  for  a  farm  described  it  as 
containing  200  acres  "more  or  less  according 
to  the  government  survey,"  such  quoted 
words  contemplated  only  such  differences  as 
were  due  to  errors  incident  to  measurements 
by  different  surveyors  and  the  variance  in 
the  instruments  used,  and  did  not  cover  a 
discrepancy  of  8.58;  such  discrepancy  being 
sufficient  to  Justify  an  allowance  of  damages. 
Fisher  v.  Trumbauer  &  Smith  (Iowa)  138  N. 
W.  528,  530. 

Same— 30  in  80  aeres 

The  term  ''more  or  less,"  in  a  deed  de- 
scribing the  land  as  80  acres  more  or  less, 
does  not  cover  a  shortage  of  30  acres,  and 
the  grantee  going  into  possession  and  im- 
proving the  land  before  discovering  the  fraud 
of  the  grantor,  who  knew  that  the  land  de- 
scribed was  50  acres,  may  elect  to  retain  the 
land  the  grantor  conveyed  and  demand  an 
abatement  of  the  price  for  so  much  as  the 
Quantity  falls  short  of  the  amount  repre- 
sented. McGhee  v.  Bell,  70  S.  W.  493,  496, 
170  Mo.  121,  59  L.  R.  A.  761. 

MORGUE 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  1906,  |  3586a,  mak- 
ing it  unlawful  to  establish  a  morgue  on  any 
street  on  which  there  are  dwelling  houses, 
unless  the  owners  or  occupants  of  such 
dwelling  houses  within  200  yards  thereof 
give  their  written  consent,  the  word  "morgue" 
must  be  given  its  usual  meaning,  which  is  a 
place  or  deadhouse  where  the  bodies  of  per- 
sons fonnd  dead  are  exposed  for  identifica- 
tion, or  that  they  may  be  claimed  by  their 
friends.  Koebler  v.  Pennewell,  79  N.  R  471, 
473,  75  Ohio  St  278  (citing  Black,  Law 
Diet;  Rap.  &  L.  Law  Diet;  Cent  Diet; 
Stand.  Diet;  WebstDict;  Thesaurus,  Diet ; 
Bnc.  Diet). 

MORTAL  INJURY 

The  words  "mortal  injuries,**  as  used 
in  an  indictment  for  murder  alleging  that 
defendant  inflicted  certain  mortal  injuries, 
must  be  taken  as  the  equivalent  of  "serious 
bodily  injuries,"  as  used  in  Or.  Ck>de,  |  215, 
providing  that  an  aggravated  assault  is  com- 
mitted when  a  serious  bodily  injury  is  in- 


ISicted  upon  the  person  assaulted*  and  m 
indictment  Justifles  a  eonvMion  for  an 
gravated  assault    ICapoU  t.  Territory, 
Pac  889,  891,  9  Arts.  199. 

MORTAR 

"Mortar"  is  a  mixture  of  lime  in  ps 
with  sand.  It  may  be  divided  into  t 
principal  cdasses:  Hydraulic  mortar,  wh 
is  made  of  hydraulic  lime,  and  common  m 
tar,  made  of  common  lime.  Donaldson 
Roksament  Stone  Co^  170  Fed.  192,  193. 

MORTGAGE 

See  Chattel  Mortgage;  Construct 
Mortgage;  Dry  Mortgage;  E)quita 
Mortgage;  Indicia  of  a  Mtortga; 
Kansas  Cut-Throat  Mortgage;  F 
sonal  Mortgage;  Purchase-Money  M< 
gage;  Railroad  Mortgage;  Tight  M( 
gage. 

Deed,  mortgage,  or  otherwise,  see  Otti 
wise. 

Party  to  mortgage,  see  Party. 

Subject  to  mortgage,  see  Subject  to. 

"A  'mortgage'  is  literally  a  dead  pledi 
Stumpe  ▼.  Kopp,  99  S.  W.  1073,  1076^  ! 
Mo.  412. 

At  common  law  a  mortgage  was  a  o 
ditional  conveyance  to  secure  the  payment 
money  or  the  performance  of  some  act, 
be  void  upon  such  payment  or  performan 
By  more  modem  law  and  under  the  statu 
of  many  states  a  mortgage  is  a  mere  I 
upon  land.  Its  dominant  attribute  is  seci 
ty,  but  nevertheless  it  must  be  regarded 
"both  a  lien  in  equity  and  a  conveyance 
law.*'  United  States  t.  Commonwealth 
tie  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.,  24  Sup.  Ct  546,  5 
193  U.  S.  651,  48  Li  Ed.  830  (citing  Pom.  ] 
Jur.  I  1191). 

A  mortgage  is  a  conveyance  of  an  est 
or  property  by  way  of  pledge  for  the  secur 
of  a  debt,  to  become  void  on  payment  there 
and  is  not  a  mere  Ilea  Poarch  v.  Duno 
91  S.  W.  1110,  41  Tex.  Civ.  App.  275. 

A  ''mortgage"  is  a  pledge  of  land  < 
scribed  in  the  agreement  by  a  grantor 
the  grajltee  and  to  revert  to  the  grantor 
the  discharge  of  the  obligation  for  the  p 
formance  of  which  it  is  pledged.  Safe  I 
posit  Title  Guaranty  Co.  v.  Linton,  62  A 
566,  213  Pa.  105  (citing  Lance's  Appeal, 
Ati.  375,  112  Pa.  456;  Moran  v.  Munhall 
Ati.  1094,  204  Pa.  242). 

A  "mortgaged'  is  a  conveyance  or  tra: 
fer  of  property,  either  real  or  personal, 
security  to  pay  a  debt  or  in  discharge  of  soi 
other    obligation.    Williams    v.    Davis, 
South.  908,  909,  154  Ala.  422. 

An  instrument  will  be  deemed  a  mo 
gage,  whatever  its  form,  if,  taken  alone  or 
connection  with  the  surrounding  drcu 
stances,  it  appears  to  have  been  giv^  to  i 


MORTGAGE 


U» 


BCOB^XGAGB 


cure  payment  of  money;  and  the  meie  ab- 
eence  of  terms  of  defeasance  does  not  con- 
trol its  natore  as  a  mortgage.  Connor  ▼. 
Connor,  52  South.  727.  729,  60  Fla.  467;  Wyl- 
ly-Gabbett  Co.  v.  WllUams,  42  South.  910, 
929,  53  Fla.  872  (quoting  Cooper  t.  Brock, 
2  N.  W.  660,  41  Mich.  488). 

Act  Feb.  25,  1909  (26  St  at  Large,  p. 
161),  provides  that  In  every  action  to  recover 
personal  property  which  lias  been  pledged  in 
any  way  to  secure  credit  or  debt  the  defend- 
ant may  plead  a  counterclaim  arising  out  of 
the  same  transaction,  and  the  jury  may  find 
the  amount  due  the  plalntifl,  if  any,  in  which 
case  the  defoidant  may  pay  said  amount  and 
costs,  and  have  the  property  released  from 
the  incombranoe.  Held  that,  by  the  use  of 
the  words  'pledged  in  any  way,"  the  statute 
evidences  an  intention  not  to  limit  its  appli- 
cation to  cases  of  mere  technical  pledges, 
and,  as  a  'Mortgager'  is  a  "pledge,"  the  mort- 
gagor of  diattels  to  secure  the  purchase 
price  was  properly  permitted  to  Interpose  a 
counterclaim  that  the  property  in  question 
was  not  suitable  for  the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  purdiased  as  represented  by  the  sell^ 
in  an  action  to  foreclose  the  mortgage. 
Woodruff  Afachinery  &  Mfg.  Ck>.  v.  Timms, 
76  S.  B.  114,  115,  98  S.  C.  90. 

Any  instrument  creating  a  lien,  specify- 
ing the  debt  and  personal  property  on  which 
it  is  to  take  effect,  is  a  mortgage,  though 
there  may  be  some  language  indicating  an  in- 
tention to  convey  legal  title.  Powers  &  Co. 
V.  Georgia-Florida  Grocery  Co.,  67  S.  B.  685, 
686,  7  Ga.  App.  502. 

No  particular  formality  is  essential  to  th^ 
creation  of  a  mortgage.  A  writing  indicating 
an  intention  to  create  a  lien,  and  specifying 
a  debt  to  be  secured  and  the  property  on 
which  the  lien  is  to  take  effect,  is  a  mortgage. 
Howard  v.  Rumble,  61  S.  EL  297,  4  Ga.  App. 
327. 

A  'inortgage"  is  a  conveyance  by  a  debtor 
to  his  creditor,  or  to  some  one  in  trust  for 
him,  as  a  security  for  the  debt  Whatever  is 
substantially  this  is  held  to  be  a  mortgage  in 
a  court  of  equity.  Wilson  v.  Fisher,  62  S. 
B.  622,  624,  148  N.  C.  585. 

A  "mortgage^*  is  a  contract  pledging  prop- 
erty embraced  in  it  for  the  payment  of  the 
debt  it  is  given  to  secure.  McClung  v.  Culli- 
aon,  82  Pac.  499,  500, 15  Gkl.  402. 

A  common-law  "mortgage"  is  defined  to 
be  an  absolute  sale  of  the  property  by  the 
mortgagor  to  the  mortgagee,  subject  to  be 
redeemed  according  to  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract Mower  v.  McCarthy,  64  Aa  578,  579, 
79  y t  142,  7  Ia  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  418,  118  Am. 
St  Bep.  942. 

A  conveyance  of  property  in  writing  as 
security  is  a  "mortgage,"  regardless  of  the 
letter  of  the  instrument  The  purpose,  not 
the  form,  determines  its  character.  No  matp 
ter  what  the  nature  of  a  conveyance  may  be 

8  Wds  A  P.2n  Sn.— 29 


wtaldi  fB  given  as  secaxlty,  when  the  evldeacft, 
either  written  or  parol,  establishes  the  ftict 
that  the  relation  of  mortgagor  and  mort- 
gagee exists  between  the.  parties,  the  right 
of  the  party  is  limited  to  a  mere  mortgage 
interest  Smith  v.  Pfiuger,  106  N.  W.  476. 
477,  126  Wis.  253,  2  Lu  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  783,  110 
Am.  St  Bep.  911  (citing  Starks  v.  Bedfield, 
9  N.  W.  168,  52  Wis.  349 ;  Hoile  v.  BaUey,  17 
N.  W.  322,  58  Wis.  434;  Schriber  v.  Le 
Clair,  29  N.  W.  570,  889,  66  Wis.  579;  Mc- 
Cormick  v.  Hemdon,  56  N.  W.  1097,  86  Wis. 
449;  Schierl  v.  Newburg.  78  N.  W.  761,  102 
Wis.  552;  Chumps  v.  Kiyo,  80  N.  W.  937,  104 
Wis.  656). 

"A  transfer  of  property  as  eeeurity,  re- 
gardless of  the  form  therec^,  is  a  'mortgage,' 
and,  as  regards  rights  or  remedies,  must  be 
dealt  T^th  as  such.  If,  from  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  it  appears  dearly  that 
the  parties  intended  to  create  the  relation  of 
debtor  and  creditor  between  themselves  or 
to  recognize  that  rdation  as  existing  as  a 
basis  for  a  mortgage,  their  purpose  in  that 
regard  will  be  deemed  to  have  been  accom- 
plished so  f^r  as  necessary  to  carry  into  ef- 
fect the  incidental  purpose  to  create  the  re- 
lation of  mortgagor  and  mortgagee  to  secure 
payment  of  the  indebtedness,  though  It  does 
not  appear  that  there  was  the  express  prom- 
ise to  pay  which  generally  characterizes  the 
creation  of  such  principal  relation."  Beebe 
V.  Wisconsin  Mortgage  Loan  Co.,  98  N.  W. 
1103,  1105.  117  Wis.  828  (citing  Starks  v. 
Bedfield,  9  N.  W.  168,  52  Wis.  849;  Bray- 
ton  V.  Jones,  5  Wia  117;  Cumps  v.  Kiyo, 
80  N.  W.  937.  104  Wis.  666;  Schriber  v.  Le 
Clair,  29  N.  W.  570,  889,  66  Wis.  579;  Get- 
telman  v.  Ck>mmercial  U.  Assur.  Co.,  72  N. 
W.  627,  97  Wis.  237,  241;  Plato  v.  Boe,  14 
Wis.  403;  Sweet  v.  Mitchell,  15  Wis.  641; 
Jordan  v.  Warner's  Ditate^  88  N.  W.  946,  107 
Wis.  539,  560). 

An  instrument  in  the  form  of  a  common- 
law  deed  of  mortgage,  reciting  a  loan  of  mon- 
ey and  a  sale  of  real  estate  to  secure  the  re- 
payment of  the  sum  loaned,  with  interest,  ex- 
ecuted in  the  state  of  Louisiana  and  duly 
recorded  in  the  mortgage  office  of  the  parish 
wherein  the  property  is  situated,  has  the 
legal  effect  of  a  ''mortgage^*  or  hypothecation 
against  third  persons.  In  re  Immanuel  Pres- 
byterian Caiurch,  36  South.  408,  413,  112  La. 
348. 

Where  one  executed  an  assignment  and 
transfer  of  all  the  rents  from  a  farm  to 
secure  payment  of  his  note,  the  instrument 
amounted  to  a  "mortgage."  Thatcher  v.  Jef- 
fries (Tex.)  91  S.  W.  1091,  1092. 

A  building  and  loan  contract  providing 
that,  on  default  by  the  borrower,  the  lending 
company  may  re-enter  and  r^^oesess  the 
premises,  that  all  sums  advanced  by  it  shall 
become  due  and  payable,  and  that  it  shall 
have  power  to  sell  the  premises  according 
to  law,  and  be  entitled  to  the  rights  and 


MORTGAGE 


450 


MORTGAGE 


remedies  ot  the  "mortgagee,"  and  any  over- 
plus after  satisfying  the  Indebtedness  shall 
be  paid  to  the  borrower,  1b  In  the  nature  of 
a  "mortgage^'  and  subject  to  foreclosure  as 
such.  Preston  v.  JD'Ambroslo,  95  N.  Y.  Supp. 
70,  71,  46  Misc.  Rep.  523. 

Where  a  fire  policy  provided  that  the 
loss.  If  any,  was  payable  to  R.,  trustee,  as 
his  Interest  might  appear,  and  the  Interest 
of  R.  was  that  of  a  trustee  under  a  deed 
securing  bonds  Issued  by  Insured,  such  In- 
terest would  be  treated  as  a  mortgage,  and 
the  insurer  estopped  to  deny  liability  on  the 
ground  that  It  did  not  know  the  nature  and 
character  of  the  trust  Peerless  Mineral 
Springs  Ck>.  v.  German  American  Ins.  Go.  of 
New  York,  138  N.  W.  1023,  1024, 151  Wis.  352. 

Assignment  distinffnlslied 

An  "assignment  for  benefit  of  creditors" 
Is  more  than  a  security  for  the  payment  of 
debts;  It  Is  an  absolute  appropriation  of  prop- 
erty to  their  payment  It  does  not  create  a 
lien  In  favor  of  creditors  upon  property  which 
In  equity  Is  still  regarded  as  the  property  of 
the  assignor,  but  it  passes  both  the  legal  and 
equitable  title  beyond  the  control  of  the  as- 
signor, and  there  remains  in  him  no  equity 
of  redemption,  and  the  trust  which  results 
to  the  assignor  in  the  unemployed  balance 
does  not  indicate  such  an  equity.  The  assign- 
ment is  voluntary  on  the  part  of  the  debtor, 
and  no  authority  can  exact  it,  and  it  there- 
fore partakes  of  the  nature  of  a  private  con- 
tract Miller  V.  Swhier,  79  N.  B.  1092,  1093, 
40  Ind.  App.  465  (citing  Burrill,  Asslgnm. 
I  6,  and  distinguishing  O'Neil  v.  Beck,  69  Ind. 
239;  Robinson  v.  Hughes,  20  N.  E.  220,  117 
Ind.  293,  3  L.  R  A.  383,  10  Am.  St  Rep.  45; 
Graves  v.  Hinkle,  21  N.  B.  328,  120  Ind.  157). 

"If  the  intention  of  the  debtor  U  mere- 
ly to  secure  his  debt  to  one  or  more  of  his 
creditors,  and  the  conveyance  Is  not  Intended 
as  an  absolute  disposition  of  his  property, 
but  he  reserves  to  himself  a  right  therein, 
the  conveyance  will  be  treated  as  a  'mort- 
gage,' even  though  the  debtor  is  Insolvent  at 
the  time,  and  it  covers  all  his  property,  and 
but  a  portion  of  his  debts  are  secured  by  it" 
Civ.  Code,  §§  3449-n3473,  provide  that  an  as- 
signment for  the  benefit  of  creditors  is  void 
against  any  creditor  of  the  assignor  not  as- 
senting thereto,  in  case  it  gives  a  preference 
of  one  debt  or  class  of  debts  over  another, 
and  that  the  assignment  must  be  made  to  the 
sheriff  of  the  county  where  the  property  is 
situated.  A  debtor  executed  a  deed  of  a 
portion  of  her  property  to  a  trustee,  who 
Was  to  pay  certain  creditors  from  the  profits, 
but  it  was  provided  that  the  surplus  of  profits 
should  Inure  to  the  use  of  the  grantor  during 
her  life,  and  that,  after  payment  of  the  debts 
and  the  grantor's  death,  the  property  should 
be  transferred  to  her  children.  Any  surplus 
from  the  proceeds  of  any  sale  or  mortgage  by 
the  trustee  was  to  be  invested  by  him,  and 
he  was  empowered  to  exchange  the  property 


for  other  property  to  be  held  subject  to 
trust  Held,  that  the  deed  was  not  Inten 
as  an  absolute  dl^>ositlon  of  the  property 
as  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  credit 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  and  he 
was  not  invalid  for  failure  to  comply  th< 
with.  Heath  v.  Wilson,  78  Paa  182,  185, 
CaL  362  (quoting  and  adopting  definltioi 
Cadwell's  Bank  v.  Crittenden,  23  N.  W.  ( 
66  Iowa,  240). 

"A  'mortgage^  or  deed  of  trust  In  the 
ture  of  a  mortgage  1b  Intended  as  secuj 
for  the  payment  of  money,  or  for  the  ] 
formance  of  some  oollateivil  act,  and  becoi 
void  upon  such  payment  or  performan^ 
"A  'mortgage'  does  not  Invest  the  mortga 
with  an  abs(dute  and  indefeasible  title.  ^ 
equitable  title,  called  the  'equity  of  redei 
tlon,'  remains  in  the  mortgagor.  The  m 
gage  is  a  security  for  the  debt,  and  create 
Hen  upon  the  property  in  fftvor  of  the  en 
tor.  There  is  no  difference  in  legal  effect 
tween  a  mortgage  with  a  power  of  sale  i 
a  deed  of  trust  executed  to  secure  a  di 
where  the  power  of  sale  U  placed  li 
third  person.  Both  are  securities  for  a  d< 
Both  create  specific  liens  on  the  proper 
and  In  both  the  equitable  title  or  ri^^t 
redemption  remains  in  the  debtor,  and  Is 
estate  or  Interest  in  the  property  that 
debtor  may  sell,  or  that  may  be  seized  i 
sold  under  Judicial,  process  by  his  ot] 
creditors,  subject  to  the  lien  created  by 
mortgage  or  deed  of  trust  ♦  •  ♦  An 
signment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  is  v 
defined  to  be  'a  transfer  by  a  debtor  of  so 
or  all  of  his  property  to  an  assignee 
trust,  apply  the  same,  or  the  proceeds  the 
of,  to  the  payment  of  some  or  all  of 
debts,  and  to  return  the  surplus,  if  a 
to  the  debtor.'"  The  owner  of  a  sawr 
property,  including  the  mill,  machinery,  « 
logs  and  lumber,  the  personalty  being  s 
Ject  to  a  chattel  mortgage,  entered  intc 
contract  with  the  chattel  mortgagee  by  wh 
he  purported  to  convey  and  transfer  to  a 
mortgagee  all  of  the  property,  both  perso 
and  real,  with  authority  to  take  possess 
and  to  operate  the  mill  and  to  sell  any  i 
all  of  the  property,  the  owner  agreeing  to 
ecute  conveyances  of  the  same  as  required 
him.  In  consideration  of  such  contract  i 
grantee  agreed  to  pay  certain  Indebtedness 
the  owner,  including  his  own,  and  to  apply 
that  puri)ose  all  sums  received  from  i 
operation  of  the  mill  or  sales  of  the  proE 
ty,  after  deducting  expenses ;  the  surplus 
any,  to  be  paid  over  to  the  grantor.  He 
that  such  contract  was  not  a  mortgage,  bu 
trust  agreement  or  deed,  which  vested  the 
solute  title  to  the  property  in  the  grant 
and  that  it  avoided  a  policy  of  Insurai 
previously  issued  to  the  grantor  on  the  pr 
erty  containing  a  provision  that  it  should 
void  if  his  Interest  in  the  property  should 
or  become  other  than  unconditional  and  8 
ownership.    Brecht  t.  Law,  Union  A  Cro 


IIOBTGAGB 


451 


IIOBOTOAOB 


Ins.  Co.,  153  Fed.  452,  4B6  (qaoting  and  adofyt- 
Ing  definitions  In  Ladd  v.  Johnson,  49  Paa 
756,  32  Or.  105,  200;  BartleU  r.  Teah,  1  Fed. 
768;  Bnrrlll,  Assignm.  |  2;  and  citing 
Appolos  et  al.  T.  Brady  et  aL,  49  Fed.  401, 
1  G.  a  A.  299;  Richmond  t.  Mississippi 
Hills,  11  S.  W.  960,  52  Aik.  80,  4  L.  B.  A. 
413;  Bohson  r.  Tomlinson,  15  8.  W.  456^ 
54  Ark.  229;  Stote,  to  use  of  Holliday,  ▼. 
Benoist,  87  Mo.  501 ;  GadweU'a  Bank  v.  Gri^ 
tenden,  23  N.  W.  646,  648,  66  Iowa,  240^  241; 
Sabichi  t.  Chase,  41  Pac.  29,  108  GaL  81; 
Monteith  y.  Hogg,  20  Pac.  827, 17  Or.  270). 

Am    referrins  t«   mortsMTe   om   realty 
Aloae 

The  word  "mortgage,**  as  used  in  Const 
art  18^  I  4,  providing  that  a  mortgage  by 
which  a  debt  is  secured  shall,  tor  the  pur- 
poses of  assessment  and  taxation,  be  deemed 
and  treated  as  an  interest  in  property  af- 
fected thereby,  has  reference  to  mortgages  on 
realty  flone^  an  employment  of  the  word 
countenanced  even  in  legal  usage,  where 
"mortgage"  is  generally  employed  and  meant 
to  apply  to  the  creation  of  liens  upon  real 
estate,  while  like  liens  upon  personalty  are 
designated  as  ''chattel  mortgages."  Bank  of 
Woodland  r.  Pierce,  77  Pac  1012,  1018,  144 
GaL  434. 

CoDBt  art  18, 1 1,  permits  provision,  ex- 
eept  in  case  of  credits  secured,  for  a  deduc- 
tion from  credits  of  debts  due  to  bona  fide 
residaits.  Pol.  Code,  I  8617,  subd.  8,  pro- 
Tides  that  a  mortgage,  or  other  obligation  by 
which  a  debt  is  secured,  when  land  is  pledged, 
shall,  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  be  deemed 
an  Interest  in  the  land  so  pledged,  and  by 
Bubdiyision  6  the  term  "credits"  means  those 
solvent  debts  not  secured  owing  to  the  per- 
son assessed,  and  the  term  "debt"  means 
those  unsecured  liabilities  owing  by  the  per- 
son assessed  to  bona  fide  residents,  and  sec- 
tion 3628,  provides  that,  in  assessing  solvent 
credits  not  secured,  a  reduction  shall  be  made 
of  debts  due  bona  fide  residents,  and  section 
3650,  subd.  15,  provides  that  in  entering  as- 
sessments containing  solvent  credits,  subject 
to  deduction,  the  assessor  must  enter  in  the 
proper  column  the  value  of  debts  and  deduct 
tbem  therefrom.  Const  art.  13,  |  4,  provides 
that  a  mortgage,  or  other  obligation  by  which 
a  debt  is  secured,  shall,  for  the  purpose  of 
taxation,  be  deemed  an  interest  In  the  prop- 
erty affected.  Pol.  Code,  |  8627,  contains  the 
same  provision.  Held,  that  a  collateral  secu- 
rity of  credits  by  a  loan  on  personalty  was 
not  a  mortgage,  etc.,  or  "other  obligation  by 
wblcb  a  debt  is  secured,"  within  Const  art 
13,  §  4,  that  section  applying  only  to  liens  on 
land;  nor  was  it  a  "mortgage  or  trust  deed," 
within  section  1,  so  that  the  person  assessed 
on  such  credits  was  entitled  to  have  his  debts 
deducted  therefrom;  and  Pol.  Code,  I  3629, 
subd.  6,  directing  the  assessor  to  require  each 
person  assessed  to  show  separately  all  sol- 
vent credits  unsecured,  is  not  applicable,  not 


referring  to  the  assessor's  duty  Itt  making  the 
assessment  but  only  prescribing  the  form  of 
the  taxpayer's  zetum  for  the  assessor's  infor- 
mation. Bank  of  Willowa  v.  Glenn  County, 
101  Pac  18,  15,  16^  155  CaL  852. 

As  elhattel 

SeeChatteL 


See  Claim. 
Oondltioaal  sale  dlstiiignlslie4 

See  Conditional  Sale. 

Coatvaet  for  yaymeat  •£  moaey  dlstta^ 
svislied 

Defendant,  having  settled  on  unsnrvey- 
ed  public  land,  executed  a  written  contract 
for  the  purchase  of  fruit  trees,  which  recited 
that  defendant  was  the  owner  of  160  acres, 
and  that  for  the  payment  of  the  price  of  the 
trees  he  bound  himself,  his  heirs,  assigns*  and 
grantees  of  and  to  the  aforesaid  land.  De- 
fendant thereafter  acquired  title  to  a  quar- 
ter section  of  land  in  the  section  described  in 
the  contract  though  not  of  the  same  tech- 
nical deseripttcm  as  the  one  therein  describ- 
ed. Held,  that  the  contract  was  a  simple 
contract  for  the  paymoit  of  money,  and  not 
a  "mortgage^'  on  the  land.  Stark  Bros.  t. 
Boyce^  87  Pac  840*  843»  44  Wash.  287. 


See  Conveyance. 

Convey  as  including,  see  Convey. 

Gontrmet  for  sale  of  real  estate 

The  words  "foreclosure  of  a  mortgage" 
do  not  in  common  parlance  refer  to  the  fore- 
closure of  a  land  contract  and  the  words,  as 
used  in  Comp.  Laws,  |  435,  providing  that  the 
circuit  courts  in  chancery  shall  dismiss  suits 
concerning  property  where  the  matter  in  dis- 
pute shall  not  exceed  $100,  excepting  suits 
for  the  foreclosure  of  morti^ges,  etc.,  do  not 
include  a  foreclosure  of  a  land  contract  and 
a  suit  to  foreclose  a  land  contract  on  which 
there  remains  less  than  $100  unpaid  must 
be  dismissed.  Sands  &  Maxwell  Lumber  Co. 
T.  Gay,  101  N.  W.  53,  138  Mich.  82. 

OomTeyamee  absolmte  Im  f •*» 

An  instrument  though  in  form  an  abso- 
lute deed,  having  been  jbatended  merely  as  se- 
curity for  payment  of  a  debt  is  a  "mort^ 
gage."  Todd  v.  Todd,  128  Pac  413,  414,  164 
Gal.  255;  White  v.  Walsh,  114  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1015,  1017,  62  Misc.  Rep.  428  (citing  Mooney 
V.  Byrne,  57  N.  BL  163,  163  N.  Y.  86) ;  Mar- 
quam  t.  Boss,  83  Pac  852,  860, 47  Or.  874. 

An  absolute  conveyance  given  to  secure 
a  note  which  the  grantor  intends  to  repay 
will  in  equity  be  held  a  "mortgage,"  where 
the  form  of  the  conveyance  is  dictated  by 
the  lender.    Plato  v.  Roe,  14  Wis.  458,  457. 

In  determining  whether  an  instrument  in 
the  form  of  a  deed  is  or  is  not  a  ''mortgage," 
the  principal  test  to  be  applied  is  whether  the 
relation  of  the  parties  towards  each  other, 


M(»TGAGB 


462 


MOBTQAaB 


of  debtor  o?  creditor,  continued  after  the  ex- 
ecution of  the  deed.  The  test  is  the  eidst^ice 
or  nonexlBtence  of  a  debt,  and  equity  looks 
behind  the  form  to  the  fact.  If  the  transac- 
tion was  Intended  as  a  loan.  If  there  remains 
a  debt  for  which  the  conveyance  is  only  a 
security,  and  the  collection  of  which  may  be 
enforced  independent  of  the  security,  equity 
will  hold  it  a  mortgage,  no  matter  whether 
the  transaction  is  evidenced  by  one  or  two  in- 
struments. Plummer  ▼.  Ilse,  82  Pac.  1009, 
1010,  41  Wash.  5,  2  L.  a  A.  (N.  S.)  627,  111 
Am.  St  Rep.  907. 

The  conyeyance  must  be  judged  accord- 
ing to  the  real  intent  of  the  parties.  If  there 
is  a  debt  subsisting  between  the  parties,  and 
it  is  the  intention  to  continue  the  debt,  it  is 
a  "mortgage" ;  but  if  the  conveyance  extin- 
guishes the  debt,  and  the  parties  intend  that 
result,  a  contract  for  a  resale  at  the  same 
price-  does  not  destroy  the  character  of  the 
"deed'*  as  an  absolute  conveyance.  While  J. 
was  indebted  to  M.,  he  made  a  fraudulent 
conveyance  to  K.  Thereafter,  for  the  pur- 
pose, not  of  extinguishing  the  debt,  but  of 
securing  it,  he  conveyed  land  to  M.  by  deed, 
reciting  a  consideration,  the  amount  of  the 
debt,  and  at  the  same  time  M.  quitclaimed 
the  land  to  J.  for  the  same  recited  considera- 
tion, reserving  a  vendor's  U&i,  Held,  that 
M.  still  remained  a  creditor,  whose  debt  ex- 
isted at  the  date  of  the  fraudulent  convey- 
ance. James  v.  Mallory,  80  S.  W.  472,  473, 
76  Ark.  509  (citing  Hays  v.  Bmerson,  87  8. 
W.  1027,  75  Ark.  551). 

A  deed  absolute,  with  parol  agreement 
that  it  shall  be  a  mortgage  is  a  "mortgage" 
from  its  inception.  Where  a  cotenant*s  in- 
terest in  land  was  to  be  sold  on  execution, 
and  it  was  agreed  that  the  other  tenant 
should  purchase  the  laud  at  such  sale,  and 
take  title  under  the  sheriff's  deed,  as  secu- 
rity for  payment  to  him,  by  the  judgment 
debtor,  of  the  amount  of  the  debt,  the  trans- 
action created  a  "mortgage,"  although  the 
agreement  was  unknown  except  to  the  ten- 
ants. Stafford  v.  Stafford,  71  S.  W.  984,  986, 
29  Tex.  Civ.  App.  73  (citing  and  adopting 
Jones,  Mortg.  |  285). 

Where  a  deed  is  intended  to  secure  a 
debt,  and  the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor 
exists  between  the  parties,  the  legal  inference 
is  that  a  "mortgage"  was  intended.  Thus  a 
deed  was  a  mortgage,  and  not  a  conditional 
sale,  where  it  was  given  to  secure  payment 
for  a  horse,  recited  a  consideration  of  "$110 
cash  or  its  equivalent,"  a  horse,  describing  it, 
contained  the  ordinary  recitals  of  a  war- 
ranty deed,  and  recited  that  the  grantee 
should  hold  the  land  for  1^  years  and  I'econ- 
vey  on  payment  of  $118.60  "being  purchase 
price  hereof  and  necessary  recording  fee." 
Tucker  v.  Wltherbee,  113  S.  W.  123,  125,  130 
Ky.  269. 

"Where  the  proof  is  clear  that  the  trans- 
action was  a  borrowing  of  money,  and  that 


the  deed  was  made  to  secure  the  monej 
rowed,  the  deed  will  always  be  treated  s 
'mortgage,'  and  redemption  will  be  allo^ 
notwithstanding  the  form  in  which  the  ] 
ties  may  have  put  the  contract"  Garr 
Adm'x  V.  Vincent  (Ky.)  87  8.  W.  804, 

Where  a  contract  and  chattel  mortg 
executed  contemporaneously  with  a  deed 
solute  in  form  show  that  It  was  inten 
merely  as  security  for  a  debt  and  to  ind 
nify  the  mortgagee  on  a  contract  of  goan 
for  the  benefit  of  the  mortgagor,  such  d 
will  be  given  effect  as  a  "mortgage.**  Fei 
son  V.  Boyd  and.)  79  N.  B.  549,  556  (dl 
Davis  V.  Stonestreet  4  ihd.  101,  106 ;  W11 
V.  Carpenter,  62  Ind.  495,  600;  Orassei 
Swoveland,  22  Ind.  427,  429;  Yoss  ▼.  El 
10  N.  B.  74, 109  Ind.  260,  262,  263;  Heat! 
WlUlams,  80  Ind.  495,  513;  Watkins  v.  Oi 
ory  [Ind.]  6  Blackf.  113.  114;  Lents  v.  1^ 
tin,  75  Ind.  228,  235;  Miller  r.  Curry.  24 
E.  219,  374,  124  Ind.  48,  49,  61;  Housei 
Lament,  55  Pa.  316,  93  Am.  Dec  756; 
peal  of  Harper,  64  Pa.  819 ;  Taylor  v.  W 
5  Mass.  109;  Keithley  v.  Wood,  38  N. 
149,  151  lU.  566,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  266,  2 
Smith  V.  Brand,  64  Ind.  427,  429,  430;  L 
V.  McAllster,  41  N.  B.  1061,  44  N.  B.  378, 
Ind.  App.  643,  645 ;  Proctor  v.  Cole,  66  1 
576,  578;  Peugh  v.  Davis,  96  U.  &  832,  : 
24  L.  Ed.  776;  Cox  v.  Ratcliffe,  6  N.  E 
106  Ind.  374;  ComeU  v.  Hall,  22  Midi.  3 
Russell  V.  Southard,  12  How.  [58  U.  SJ  ) 
13  L.  Ed.  927;  Jones,  Mortg.  [6th  Bd.]  |j 
8,  242,  245,  247a,  258,  265,  340). 

"Under  (Georgia  law  the  word  "mortgt 
is  used  in  a  double  sense.  Sometimes  it 
fers  to  a  mortgage  which  creates  a  lien,  i 
at  othei'  times  as  passing  title  as  a  secui 
for  the  debt  An  instrument  containlni 
defeasance  clause  describing  the  debt,  i 
showing  on  its  face  that  it  is  intended 
security,  is  a  mortgage,  and  passes  no  tl 
A  writing  in  the  form  of  an  absolute  bill 
sale,  but  in  fact  intended  only  as  secui 
for  a  debt,  conveys  title,  but  is  treated  as 
equitable  mortgage."  Denton  v.  Shields, 
S.  B.  423,  120  Ga.  1076. 

Under  Rev.  Codes,  |  3391,  every  tra 
f er  of  an  interest  in  real  property  other  tl 
in  trust,  made  only  as  security  for  the  p 
formance  of  another  act,  is  a  "mortga« 
though  the  conveyance  is  a  deed  absolute 
form.  Hannah  v.  Vensel,  116  Pac  115,  1 
19  Idaho,  796. 

Notwithstanding  the  provision  of  C 
Code,  I  2922,  that  a  '^mortgage"  can  be  c 
ated  only  by  writing  executed  with  the  t 
malitles  required  in  case  of  a  grant  of  n 
property,  a  deed  absolute  on  its  face  may 
equity  be  shown  by  K>arol  evidence  to  bi 
been  intended  as  a  mere  mortgage,  and  1 
indebtedness  intended  to  be  secured  therel 
whether  present  or  future,  although  not  sp 
Ified  in  the  deed  or  in  any  contemporanec 
writing,  may  also  be  shown  by  parol  e 


IIORTOAOB 


453 


MOBTGAOV 


doice.  The  fttct  that  the  manager  of  plain- 
tiff corporation,  Instead  of  plaintiff  Itself, 
was  named  as  grantee  In  certain  deeds  ex- 
ecuted to  secure  an  indebtedness  dne  plain- 
tiff in  no  wise  impairs  the  validity  of  snch 
deeds  as  mortgages  in  plaintiff's  favor.  Ab- 
solute deeds,  given  solely  by  way  of  seen- 
rity,  and  constitutinff  in  fact  only  mortgages, 
carry  with  them  no  estate  in  the  land,  but 
create  only  a  lien  thereon  as  incident  to  the 
aecnred  d^t  Anslo^Salifomlan  Bank  y. 
Oerf  ,  81  Pac.  1077,  1079, 147  OaL  884. 

Where  a  conveyance  of  land  is  made  as 
security  for  a  loan,  although  there  is  no  per- 
sonal obligation  to  repay,  the  mortgagee  look- 
ing solely  to  the  instrument,  it  will  be  deem- 
ed a  **mortgage,'*  if  intended  as  security. 
Ck)nover  v.  Pahner,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  480,  4^ 
123  App.  Div.  817. 

Plaintiff  advaneed  money  to  the  purchas- 
ers of  land  under  a  bond  from  the  owner, 
under  an  arrangement  whereby  the  land  was 
deeded  to  plaintiff,  on  an  understanding  that 
he  would  convey  to  the  purchasers  under  the 
bond,  on  payment  to  him  of  the  amount  ad- 
vanced and  Interest  Plaintiff  gave  a  bond 
binding  himself  to  convey,  and  those  to  whom 
the  bond  was  given  gave  no  note,  but  prom« 
ised  to  pay  him  the  amount  advanced.  Held, 
that  the  transaction  constituted  a  "mort- 
gage,** within  a  statute  subjecting  to  taxation 
money  at  interest,  including  money  loaned  on 
any  mortgage,  etc.  Glidden  v.  Town  of  New- 
port, 06  AtL  U7, 118,  74  N.  H.  207. 

An  owner  of  property  executed  a  deed  to 
a  corporation  in  pursuance  of  an  agreement 
by  which  payment  therefor  was  to  be  made  in 
the  capital  stock  of  the  corporation  at  par; 
the  value  of  the  property  to  be  determined 
by  appraisers.  Subsequently  agreements  were 
made  between  the  corporation  and  a  syndi- 
cate composed  of  the  larger  sto^holden  of 
the  grantor  and  between  the  grantor  and 
grantee  for  the  ikirpose  of  aiding  the  grantor 
in  adjusting  its  liabilities,  by  whidi  the  syn- 
dicate and  grantee  were  to  pay  the  indebted- 
ness of  the  grantor  and  receive  reimburse- 
ment thtf efor  from  the  stock  c<mstitutlng  the 
purchase  price  (tf  the  property,  the  stock  to 
be  deposited  with  a  third  party  until  sudi 
Indebtedness  was  liquidated.  Thereafter  the 
grantor  caused  such  property  to  be  Insured, 
the  application  containing  a  warranty  that 
it  was  the  sole  owner,  and  the  policy  a  pro- 
vision that  it  should  be  void  if  the  property 
was  sold  without  the  assent  of  the  company, 
and  subsequently  the  deed  theretofore  exe- 
cated  was  delivered.  The  policy  was  not  as- 
signed, and  no  consent  to  the  sale  was  given. 
The  property  was  destroyed  by  fire.  Held, 
that  the  Insuranoe  company  was  not  liable, 
because  insured  had  no  insurable  Interest 
in  the  property  at  the  time  of  its  destruction, 
tbe  transfer  being  an  absolute  one  and  not 
a  "mortgage**  within  Rev.  St  c  92,  |  1,  de- 
fining mortgages  as  those  made  in  the  usual 


fMm,  In  whldi  the  condition  Is  set  fbrth  In 
the  deed,  and  those  made  by  a  conveyance 
appearing  on  its  face  to  be  absolute,  with  an 
instrument  of  defeasance  executed  at  the 
same  time  or  as  part  of  the  same  transaction, 
since  there  was  no  agreement  purporting  to 
be  a  defeasance  and  also  because  the  property 
was  "sold**  without  the  consent  of  the  Insurer 
within  the  meaning  of  that  term  as  used  In 
the  policy,  and  hence  the  policy  was  invali- 
dated previous  to  the  fire.  Buffalo  Fertiliser 
Oo.  V.  Aroostook  Mut  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  84  AtL 
1078^  1080,  100  lie.  488. 

gawe   Defeasaaee  elaase 

Notes  reciting  that  they  are  given  to  se- 
cure payment  for  certain  described  lands, 
and  deeds  reciting  that  the  land  is  secured 
by  the  notes  of  the  grantee  (describing  them), 
and  that  if  the  notes  are  not  paid  at  maturity 
the  deeds  are  to  be  null  and  void,  constitute 
mortgages,  and  not  conditional  sales.  Land 
V.  Uay,  84  S.  W.  488,  490,  78  Ark.  415  (citing 
Gibson  V.  liartin,  88  Ark.  207;  Stryker  v. 
Hereby,  88  Ark.  204;  mtchell  v.  Wade,  89 
Ark.  877;  Hershey  v.  Luce,  19  &  W.  963,  20 
8.  W.  0,  06  Ark.  820). 

iMstna&emi  of  def  ea- 


A  conveyance  of  land,  absolute  in  form, 
accompanied  by  a  contemporaneous  instru- 
ment executed  by  the  grantee  and  reciting 
that  on  the  payment  of  a  specified  sum  with- 
in a  specified  time  the  premises  shall  be  re- 
conveyed  to  the  grantor,  is  a  mortgage  to  se- 
cure the  payment  of  a  debt  Raskl  v.  Wise, 
107  Pac.  984,  988,  66  Or.  T2.  The  test  in  de- 
termining whether  such  conveyance,  con- 
stitutes a  '^mortgage**  is  whether  the  relation 
of  debtor  and  creditor  continues  to  exist 
Fabrlque  v.  Cherokee  &  P.  Coal  &  Mining  0>., 
77  Pac.  684,  586,  69  Kan.  788. 

Whether  a  conveyance  absolute  in  form, 
when  taken  with  a  contemporaneous  separate 
agreement  to  reconvey,  constituted  a  mort- 
gage, depends  upon  the  existence  of  a  debt; 
a  deed  made  to  secure  a  debt  being  a  mort- 
gage in  legal  effect,  and  the  fact  that  the 
mortgagor  subsequently  leased  the  property 
from  the  mortgagee  would  not  change  the  na- 
ture of  the  transaction.  Farmers*  &  Mer- 
chants* Bank  of  Scandia  v.  Kackley,  127  Paa 
589,  540,  88  Kan.  70. 

The  contemporaneous  agreement  for  a 
resale  and  purchase  does  not  of  itself  make 
the  deed  a  "mortgage."  The  conveyance 
must  be  Judged  according  to  the  real  intent 
of  the  parties.  If  there  is  a  debt  subsisting 
between  the  parties,  and  it  is  the  intention 
to  continue  the  debt,  it  is  a  ''mortgage*' ;  but 
if  the  conveyance  extinguishes  the  debt,  and 
the  parties  intend  that  result,  a  contract  for 
a  resale  at  the  same  price  does  not  destroy 
the  character  of  the  deed  as  an  ''absolute 
conveyance.**  Hays  v.  Eknerson,  87  8.  W. 
1027,  1028,  75  Ark.  561. 


MORTGAGE 


454 


MOBTGAGB 


A  deed  csecated  as  security  for  a  loan, 
the  lender  executing,  In  turn,  a  written  de- 
feasance agreeing  to  reconvey  to  the  borrow- 
er upon  payment  of  the  debt,  constituted  a 
"mortgage."  Wells  v.  Scanlan,  102  N.  W. 
571,  572, 124  Wis.  229. 

Where  the  relation  of  debtor  and  credi- 
tor exists  between  parties  executing  a  deed 
absolute  on  its  face,  and  a  collateral  agree- 
ment permitting  redemption,  the.  court  is 
always  inclined  to  treat  such  arrangement 
as  constituting  a  mortgage.  Where  plaintiffs 
executed  to  defendant  a  deed  absolute  on  its 
face,  but  on  the  same  day  a  writing  was 
executed  reciting  the  sale  and  providing  that 
plaintiff^  were  to  occupy  the  house  they  lived 
in  for  five  years  at  a  certain  rent,  and  at 
the  end  of  such  period  they  were  to  pay  back 
the  purchase  money  and  redeem,  defendant 
to  have  the  rent  of  a  log  house  and  all  the 
land  as  Interest,  plaintiffs  to  pay  the  taxes 
and  keep  the  house  insured,  such  deed  and 
other  writing  constituted  a  mortgage^  even 
though  the  collateral  writing  was  made  an 
hour  after  the  deed,  and  nothing  had  been 
said  about  it  before  that  time.  Sebree  v. 
Thompson  (Ky.)  104  S.  W.  781. 

Where,  at  the  time  a  deed  of  conveyance 
was  executed,  the  grantees  therein  executed 
a  deed  to  the  grantors  reciting  the  first  deed, 
and  stating  that  it  was  made  in  considera- 
tion of  an  agreement  by  the  grantees  to  pay 
the  grantors  a  sum  of  money,  and  purported 
to  reconvey  the  land  to  secure  the  same,  both 
deeds  were  to  be  construed  as  one,  the  form- 
er as  a  conveyance  of  title  to  the  grantees, 
and  the  latter  as  a  "mortgage,"  under  Prac- 
tice Act  1851,  p.  93,  I  260,  providing  that  a 
"mortgage"  shall  not  be  deemed  a  convey- 
ance, whatever  its  terms,  so  as  to  enable 
the  mortgagee  to  recover  possession  without 
foreclosure.  Adams  v.  Hopkins,  77  Pac.  712, 
713,  717,  144  Cal.  19. 

Although,  under  Real  Property  Law  (Con- 
sol.  Laws  1909,  c.  5O0  S  320,  one  who  records 
a  deed  without  recording  a  defeasance  agree- 
ment making  the  deed  a  mortgage,  receives 
no  benefit  from  the  recording,  the  failure  to 
record  the  defeasance  agreement,  and  pay 
the  mortgage  recording  tax,  does  not  bring 
the  grantee  within  the  provision  of  Tax  Law 
(Oonsol.  Laws  1909,  c.  00)  |  258,  forbidding 
the  enforcement  of  any  mortgage  on  which 
the  tax  has  not  been  paid  as  Tax  Law,  f 
250,  defining  a  mortgage  on  real  property  as 
being  every  mortgage  by  which  a  lien  is  im- 
posed on  or  which  affects  the  title  to  real 
property,  executory  contracts  for  sale  of  real 
property  and  contracts  Increasing  indebted- 
ness secured  by  mortgage,  does  not  include 
this  kind  of  a  mortgage,  and,  the  law  being  a 
tax  law,  it  must  be  strictly  construed.  Ger- 
ken  V.  Sonnabend,  130  N.  Y.  Supp.  605,  606. 

Where  plaintiff's  land,  worth  $790,  was 
sold  at  Judicial  sale  for  |455,  and  a  subse- 
quent agreement  between  him  and  defendant 


recited  that  defendant  had  paid  the  puzebM- 
er  at  judicial  sale  |455  and  received  a  con- 
veyance, and  that  defendant  agreed  to  con- 
vey to  plaintiff  in  case  he  should  repay  de- 
fendant before  a  specified  date,  but  that 
otherwise  defendant's  duty  to  convey  should 
terminate,,  the  transaction  amounted  to  a 
"mortgage."  Sheffield  v.  Day  (B^.)  90  S.  W. 
545,546. 

Where  plaintiff  deeded  land  to  defend- 
ant, her  husband's  creditor,  under  a  separate 
agreement  for  a  reconveyance  on  the  payment 
of  the  amount  of  the  debt,  interest,  etc.,  that 
plaintiff  was  not  bound  to  pay  the  amount 
for  which  the  reconveyance  was  to  be  had, 
does  not  show  conclusively  that  the  transact 
tion  was  a  conditional  sale.  If  an  instru- 
ment does  not  show  clearly  whether  a  "mort- 
gage" or  conditional  sale  was  intended,  equity 
will  oonstrue  it  as  a  ''mortgage,"  rather  than 
a  conditional  sale.  White  v.  Redenbaus^,  82 
N.  E.  110,  111,  41  Ind.  App.  580. 

Gonveymnoe  oonditioned  for  support 

A  conveyance  conditioned  for  the  support 
of  the  grantor  will  be  treated  as  a  "mort- 
gage." Abt)ott  V.  Sanders,  66  AtiL.  1032, 1033, 
80  Vt.  179,  13  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  725,  130  Abl 
St  Rep.  974, 12  Ann.  Gas.  898. 

Debt  or  obligation  neoossary 

One  sure  test  and  essential  requisite  of  a 
mortgage  is  the  existence  of  a  debt  from  the 
grantor  to  the  grantee  in  the  deed.  If  there 
is  no  debt,  the  instrument  cannot  be  a  "mort- 
gage," whatever  else  it  may  be.  Jones  v. 
Hubbard,  90  S.  W.  1137,  1141,  193  Mo.  147; 
Goodbar  &  Oo.  v.  Bloom,  96  S.  W.  657,  602, 
43  Tex.  Civ.  App.  434.  But  it  is  not  neoes- 
sary  that  the  debt  be  created  by  an  expreas 
promise.  Beebe  ▼.  Wisconsin  Mortgage  Loan 
Co.,  93  N.  W.  U03,  1105,  117  Wis.  328. 

One  of  the  essentials  of  a  mortgage  is 
the  existence  of  an  indebtedness,  payment  of 
which  the  mortgage  is  designed  to  secure. 
An  instrument,  in  form  a  conditional  bill  of 
sale.  Lb  not  made  a  mortgage  by  reason  of 
the  fact  that  it  contains  a  provision  that 
the  instrum^it  shall  be  void  if  the  grantora 
pay  a  certain  sum  of  money  by  a  certain 
day.  Smith  t.  Hope,  80  South.  865,  866,  47 
Bla.  295. 

A  "mortgage"  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere 
incident  or  security  of  the  debt  A  mortgage 
given  as  part  of  a  business  transaction  can 
be  foreclosed  only  when  it  secures  a  debt 
Perkins  v.  Trinity  Realty  Co.,  61  Ati.  167, 
168,  69  N.  J.  Eq.  723. 

A  debt  either  pre-existing,  or  created  at 
the  time,  or  contracted  to  be  created,  is  an 
essential  requisite  of  a  "mortgage."  Hence 
a  deed  absolute  on  its  face  is  not  a  mortgage, 
where  it  is  delivered  to  extinguish  a  debt,  and 
the  parties  so  intended,  though  the  grantee 
gave  a  contemporaneous  promise  to  reconvey 
on  being  r^mbursed  within  an  agreed  period 
an  amount  equal  to  the  debt  and  interest 


IIOBTQAOB 


466 


MOBTGACHD 


thereon.    Rotan  Groeery  0>.  t.  Turner,  102 
a  W.  082,  033,  46  Tex.  Oiy.  App.  684. 

A  "mortgage"  has  been  defined  as  a  con- 
reyance  of  lands  npon  a  condition,  in  the 
deed  or  a  defeasance  out  of  it,  that  on  the 
grantor's  paying  a  sum  of  money,  or  doing 
some  other  aet,  the  conveyance  shall  be  void, 
and  performance  of  the  condition,  without 
any  other  act,  puts  an  end  to  all  title  and 
interest  in  the  grantee.  A  deed  absolute  on 
its  face  will  not  be  h^d  a  mortgage  unless 
the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor  exists 
between  the  grantors  and  grantee,  and  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  parties  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  such  debt  Where  the  grantee,  in  an 
absolute  conveyance,  by  an  agreement  execut- 
ed at  the  same  time^  reciting  that  the  convey- 
ance was  made  to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  mon- 
ey, stipulates  that  he  will  not  convey  the 
premises  within  a  specified  time  without  the 
consent  of  the  grantor,  and  that,  if  the  gran- 
tor within  that  time  shall  find  a  purchaser, 
the  grantee  will  convey  on  receiving  the 
amount,  with  interest,  for  which  the  land  had 
been  conveyed  to  liim,  the  transaction  is  not 
a  ''mortgage,"  but  is  a  conditional  sale,  giv- 
ing the  grantee  the  right  to  recover  the  land 
after  the  expiration  of  the  specified  time. 
Duell  V.  Ticelie,  106  S.  W.  489,  405,  207  Mo. 
668. 

The  conveyance  must  be  Judged  accord- 
ing to  the  real  intent  of  the  parties.  If  there 
is  a  debt  subsisting  between  the  parties,  and 
it  is  the  intention  to  continue  the  debt, 
it  is  a  "mortgage^*;  but  if  the  conveyance 
extinguishes  the  debt,  and  the  parties  in- 
tend that  result,  a  contract  for  a  resale  at 
the  same  price  does  not  destroy  the  character 
of  the  deed  as  an  "absolute  conveyance." 
Hays  V.  Emerson,  87  S.  W.  1027, 1028,  75  Ark. 
551;  James  v.  Mallory,  89  S.  W.  472,  473,  76 
Ark.  509  (citing  Hays  v.  Emerson,  87  S.  W. 
1027,  75  Ark.  551). 

Where  plal^ntiiT,  having  an  option  on 
land  which  was  about  to  expire,  wished  to 
borrow  money  to  enable  him  to  take  it  up, 
but  defendant  refused  to  make  a  loan,  taking 
a  mortgage  on  the  land  as  security,  but  ad- 
vanced thS  money,  took  title  to  the  land  in 
his  own  name,  and  executed  to  plaintiff  a 
bond  for  title,  the  transaction  did  not  con- 
stitute a  "mortgage"  entitling  plaintiff  to 
the  rights  of  redemption.  Conner  v.  Clapp, 
79  Pac.  929,  931,  87  Wash.  299. 

Under  Civ.  Code,  |  2924,  providing  that 
every  transfer  of  land,  made  only  as  security 
for  another  act,  is  a  "mortgage,"  a  transfer 
to  enable  the  grantee  to  recover  a  judgment 
quieting  title  in  him  is  not  a  mortgage.  Ren- 
ton  V.  Gibson,  84  Pac.  186, 187, 148  CaL  650. 

As  deed  or  sMUit 

See  DeAd ;  Grant 

Beed  of  tvnst 

Certain  trust  deeds  In  real  estate  are 
recQi^ilsed  by  our  decisions,  by  whidh  trust 


deeds  the  legal  title  passes  to  the  trustee, 
witii  power  of  sale^  In  all  respects  these 
deeds  and  transfers  of  title  are  "security," 
but  they  are  not  "mortgages."  Renton  r. 
Gibson,  84  Pac.  186-188,  148  Cat.  66a 

As  oTldenoo  of  ladebtedness 

See  Evidence  of  Indebtedness. 

As  laoiisiliranoe 

See  Incumbrance. 

As  iaterest  Im  Irnrnd 

See  Interest  (In  Property). 

As  passliiK  lesal  title 

A  "mortgage**  Is  a  mere  lien  or  security 
for  the  payment  of  money,  and  does  not  con- 
vey any  title  to  the  mortgagee.  Jump  v. 
North  British  A  Mercantile  Ins.  Co.,  87  Pac. 
928,  929,  44  Wash.  696, 12  Ann.  Ca&  267  (cit- 
ing Dane  t.  Daniel,  68  Pac.  268,  28  Wash. 
879). 

Under  the  Idaho  statute  and  the  deci- 
sions of  the  court  construing  the  same,  a 
"mortgage,"  or  any  contract  or  Instrument 
made  only  as  security  for  the  payment  of  a 
debt,  merely  creates  a  lien  on  the  real  prop- 
erty therein  described,  and  leaves  the  legal 
title  in  the  mortgagor  or  grantor,  which  ti- 
tle can  only  be  divested  by  Judicial  sale  in  a 
suit  or  action  under  and  In  conformity  with 
the  statute.  Hannah  t.  Tensel,  116  Pac.  115, 
117,  19  Idaho,  796. 

Under  the  statute  of  South  Dakota  a 
"mortgage**  on  real  estate  Is  not  a  convey- 
ance of  title,  but  only  a  lien  on  the  land 
as  security  for  a  debt  Farr  v.  Semmler,  123 
N.  W.  885,  887,  24  S.  D.  290. 

Under  Civ.  Code,  |  2920,  defining  a  mort- 
gage as  a  contract  hypothecating  spedflc 
property  for  the  performance  of  an  act  with- 
out the  necessity  of  a  change  of  possession, 
and  section  2927,  providing  that  a  mortgage 
does  not  entitle  the  mortgagee  to  possession 
unless  authorized  by  the  express  terms  of 
the  mortgage,  a  mortgage  gives  the  mort- 
gagee neither  the  title,  possession,  nor  right 
to  possession  of  the  mortgaged  property  un- 
less authorized  by  the  express  terms  of  the 
instrument  Ely  v.  Williams,  92  Pac.  898, 
394,  6  Cal.  App.  455. 

A  "mortgage**  on  real  estate  creates  only 
a  lien  in  favor  of  the  mortgagee,  and  neither 
the  legal  nor  equitable  title  passes  to  the 
mortgagee  until  after  a  valid  foreclosure  and 
sale  thereunder.  The  rights  of  the  mortgagee 
in  possession  are  therefore  not  adverse  to 
the  rights  of  the  mortgagor  or  his  grantees, 
so  long  as  the  relation  of  mortgagor  and 
mortgagee  exista  Gillett  v.  Romig,  87  Pac. 
825,  329,  17  Okl.  824  (citing  Baldufl  v.  Grif- 
wold,  60  Paa  223,  9  Okl.  489;  3  Pom.  £q. 
Jur.  [3d  Ed.]  |  1188). 

At  common  law  a  "mortgagei"  vests  the 
legal  title  In  the  mortgagee,  and;  on  condl- 


MORTGAGE 


454 


MOBTGAGB 


A  deed  csecated  as  security  for  a  loan, 
the  lender  executing,  in  turn,  a  written  de- 
feasance agreeing  to  reconvey  to  the  borrow- 
er upon  payment  of  the  debt,  constituted  a 
"mortgage."  Wells  v.  Scanlan,  102  N.  W. 
571,  572, 124  Wis.  229. 

Where  the  relation  of  debtor  and  credi- 
tor exists  between  parties  executing  a  deed 
absolute  on  its  face,  and  a  collateral  agree- 
ment permitting  redemption,  the  court  is 
always  inclined  to  treat  sudi  arrangement 
as  constituting  a  mortgage.  Where  plaintiffs 
executed  to  defendant  a  deed  absolute  on  its 
face,  but  on  the  same  day  a  writing  was 
executed  reciting  the  sale  and  providing  that 
plaintiffs  were  to  occupy  the  house  they  lived 
in  for  five  years  at  a  certain  rent,  and  at 
the  end  of  such  period  they  were  to  pay  back 
the  purchase  money  and  redeem,  defendant 
to  have  the  rent  of  a  log  house  and  all  the 
land  as  interest,  plaintiffs  to  pay  the  taxes 
and  keep  the  house  insured,  such  deed  and 
other  writing  constituted  a  mortgage,  even 
though  the  collateral  writing  was  made  an 
hour  after  the  deed,  and  nothing  had  been 
said  about  it  before  that  time.  Sebree  v. 
Thompson  (Ky.)  104  S.  W.  781. 

Where,  at  the  time  a  deed  of  conveyance 
was  executed,  the  grantees  therein  executed 
a  deed  to  the  grantors  reciting  the  first  deed, 
and  stating  that  it  was  made  in  considera- 
tion of  an  agreement  by  the  grantees  to  pay 
the  grantors  a  sum  of  money,  and  purported 
to  reconvey  the  land  to  secure  the  same,  both 
deeds  were  to  be  construed  as  one,  the  form- 
er as  a  conveyance  of  title  to  the  grantees, 
and  the  latter  as  a  "mortgage,"  under  Prac- 
tice Act  1851,  p.  93,  I  260,  providing  that  a 
"mortgage"  shall  not  be  deemed  a  convey- 
ance, whatever  its  terms,  so  as  to  enable 
the  mortgagee  to  recover  possession  without 
foreclosure.  Adams  v.  Hopkins,  77  Pac.  712, 
713,  717,  144  Cal.  19. 

Although,  under  Real  Property  Law  (Con- 
sol.  Laws  1909,  c.  50)  S  320,  one  who  records 
a  deed  without  recording  a  defeasance  agree- 
ment making  the  deed  a  mortgage,  receives 
no  benefit  from  the  recording,  the  failure  to 
record  the  defeasance  agreement,  and  pay 
the  mortgage  recording  tax,  does  not  bring 
the  grantee  within  the  provision  of  Tax  Law 
(Oonsol.  Laws  1909,  c.  00)  |  258,  forbidding 
the  enforcement  of  any  mortgage  on  which 
the  tax  has  not  been  paid  as  Tax  Law,  § 
250,  defining  a  mortgage  on  real  property  as 
being  every  mortgage  by  which  a  lien  is  im- 
posed on  or  which  affects  the  title  to  real 
property,  executory  contracts  for  sale  of  real 
property  and  contracts  increasing  indebted- 
ness secured  by  mortgage,  does  not  include 
this  kind  of  a  mortgage,  and,  the  law  being  a 
tax  law,  it  must  be  strictly  construed.  Ger- 
ken  V.  Sonnabend,  130  N.  Y.  Supp.  605,  606. 

Where  plaintiff's  land,  worth  $790,  was 
sold  at  Judicial  sale  for  $455,  and  a  subse- 
quent agreement  between  him  and  defendant 


recited  that  defendant  had  paid  the  purelh 
er  at  Judicial  sale  $455  and  received  a  en 
veyance,  and  that  defendant  agreed  to  c< 
vey  to  plaintiff  in  case  he  should  repay  < 
fendant  before  a  specified  date,  but  tl 
otherwise  defendant's  duty  to  convey  shoi 
terminate,,  the  transaction  amounted  to 
"mortgaged"  Sheffield  v.  Day  (Ky.)  90  S. 
545,  546. 

Where  plaintiff  deeded  land  to  defei 
ant,  her  husband's  creditor,  under  a  sepan 
agreement  for  a  reconveyance  on  the  paymc 
of  the  amount  of  the  debt,  interest,  etc.,  tli 
plaintiff  was  not  bound  to  pay  the  amoi] 
for  which  the  reconveyance  was  to  be  hi 
does  not  show  conclusively  that  the  transi 
tion  was  a  conditional  sale.  If  an  insti 
ment  does  not  show  clearly  whether  a  ''mo 
gage"  or  conditional  sale  was  intended,  equl 
will  oonstrue  it  as  a  ''mortgage,**  rather  th 
a  conditional  sale.  White  v.  Redenbau^, 
N.  E.  110,  111,  41  Ind.  App.  580. 

Oonveyanoe  oomditloned  for  support 

A  conveyance  conditioned  for  the  suppc 
of  the  grantor  will  be  treated  as  a  "moi 
gage."  Abt)ott  v.  Sanders,  66  AtiL.  1082,  m 
80  Vt.  179,  13  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  726,  130  A 
St  Hep.  974, 12  Ann.  Gas.  898. 

Debt  or  obligation  neoesMUPsr 

One  sure  test  and  essential  requisite  of 
mortgage  is  the  existence  of  a  debt  from  t 
grantor  to  the  grantee  in  the  deed.  If  the 
is  no  debt,  the  instrument  cannot  be  a  "moi 
gage,"  whatever  else  it  may  be.  Jones 
Hubbard,  90  S.  W.  1187,  1141,  193  Mo.  14 
Goodbar  &  Co.  v.  Bloom,  96  S.  W.  657,  6( 
48  Tex.  Civ.  App.  434.  But  it  la  not  nea 
sary  that  the  debt  be  created  by  an  expre 
promise.  Beebe  ▼.  Wisconsin  Mortgage  Loi 
Co.,  93  N.  W.  U03,  1105,  U7  Wis.  82a 

One  of  the  essentials  of  a  mortgage 
the  existence  of  an  indebtedness,  paymoit 
which  the  mortgage  is  designed  to  seem 
An  instrument,  in  form  a  c6ndltional  bill 
sale,  is  not  made  a  mortgage  by  reason 
the  fact  that  it  contains  a  provision  tb 
the  instrument  shall  be  void  if  the  granto 
pay  a  certain  sum  of  money  by  a  certa 
day.  Smith  t.  Hope,  80  South.  865,  866,  ^ 
Bla.  295. 

A  "mortgage"  Is  to  be  regarded  as  a  me 
incident  or  security  of  the  debt  A  mortgai 
given  as  part  of  a  business  transaction  a 
be  foreclosed  only  when  it  secures  a  del 
Perkins  v.  Trinity  Realty  Co.,  61  Ati.  16 
168,  69  N.  J.  Eq.  723. 

A  debt  either  pre-existing,  or  created  i 
the  time,  or  contracted  to  be  created.  Is  t 
essential  requisite  of  a  "mortgage."  HeD( 
a  deed  absolute  on  its  face  is  not  a  mortgas 
where  it  is  delivered  to  extinguish  a  debt,  ai 
the  parties  so  intended*  though  the  grants 
gave  a  contemporaneous  promise  to  reconvi 
on  being  r^mbursed  within  an  agreed  peric 
an  amount  equal  to  the  debt  and  intere 


IfOBIOAOB 


466 


HOBTGACHD 


thereon.    Rotan  Oroeery  Oow  t.  Turner,  102 
a  W.  982,  833,  46  Tez.  Cttv.  App.  684. 

A  "mortgage"  has  been  defined  as  a  con- 
yeyance  of  lands  upon  a  condition,  In  the 
deed  or  a  defeasance  ont  of  it,  that  on  the 
grantor's  paying  a  sum  of  money,  or  doing 
some  other  aet,  the  conv^ance  shall  be  void, 
and  performance  of  the  condition,  without 
any  other  act,  puts  an  end  to  all  title  and 
interest  in  the  grantee.  A  deed  absolute  on 
Its  face  will  not  be  held  a  mortgage  unless 
the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor  exists 
between  the  grantors  and  grantee,  and  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  parties  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  such  debt  Where  the  grantee,  in  an 
absolute  conyeyance»  by  an  agreement  execut- 
ed at  the  same  time^  reciting  that  the  convey- 
ance was  made  to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  mon- 
ey, stipulates  that  he  will  not  convey  the 
premises  within  a  spedfled  time  without  the 
consent  of  the  grantor,  and  that,  if  the  gran- 
tor within  that  time  shall  find  a  purchaser, 
the  grantee  will  convey  on  receiving  the 
amount,  with  interest,  for  which  the  land  had 
been  conveyed  to  him,  the  transaction  is  not 
a  "mortgage,"  but  is  a  conditional  sale,  giv- 
ing the  grantee  the  right  to  recover  the  land 
after  the  expiration  of  the  specified  time. 
Dnell  V.  TiCSlie,  106  S.  W.  489,  495,  207  Mo. 
658. 

The  conveyance  must  be  Judged  accord- 
ing to  the  real  intent  of  the  parties.  If  there 
is  a  debt  subsisting  between  the  parties,  and 
it  is  the  intention  to  continue  the  debt, 
it  is  a  "mortgage^';  but  if  the  conveyance 
extlngui&ihes  the  debt,  and  the  parties  in- 
tend that  result,  a  contract  for  a  resale  at 
the  same  price  does  not  destroy  the  character 
of  the  deed  as  an  "absolute  conveyance." 
Hays  V.  Emerson,  87  S.  W.  1027, 1028,  75  Ark. 
551;  James  v.  Mallory,  89  S.  W.  472,  473,  76 
Ark.  509  (citing  Hays  v.  Emerson,  87  S.  W. 
1027,  75  Ark.  651). 

Where  plal!ntiiT,  having  an  option  on 
land  which  was  about  to  expire,  wished  to 
borrow  money  to  enable  him  to  take  it  up, 
bat  defendant  refused  to  make  a  loan,  taking 
a  mortgage  on  the  land  as  security,  but  ad- 
vanced thS  money,  took  title  to  the  land  in 
his  own  name,  and  executed  to  plaintiff  a 
bond  for  title,  the  transaction  did  not  con- 
stitute a  "mortgage"  entitling  plaintiff  to 
the  rights  of  redemption.  Conner  v.  Clapp, 
79  Pac  929,  931,  37  Wash.  299. 

Under  Civ.  Code,  |  2924,  providing  that 
every  transfer  of  land,  made  only  as  security 
tor  another  act,  is  a  "mortgage,"  a  transfer 
to  enable  the  grantee  to  recover  a  judgment 
quieting  title  in  him  is  not  a  mortgage.  Ren- 
ton  T.  Gibson,  84  Pac.  186, 187, 148  CaL  65a 

As  deed  or  sraai 

See  DeAd ;  Grant 

Deed  of  traet 

Certain  tmst  deeds  in  real  estate  are 
recognised  by  our  decisions,  by  whicb  trust 


deeds  the  legal  title  passes  to  the  trustee, 
witii  power  of  salow  In  all  respects  these 
deeds  and  transfers  of  title  are  ''security," 
but  they  are  not  ''mortgagee.'*  Ronton  t. 
Gibson,  84  Pac.  186-188,  148  CaL  66a 

Jkm  OTldenoe  of  ladebtedaess 
See  Evidence  of  Indebtedness. 

Jkm  laevabraace 

See  Incumbrance. 

As  Interest  Im  Umd 

See  Interest  (In  Property). 

As  passliiK  lesal  title 

A  "mortgage"  is  a  mere  Hen  or  security 
for  the  payment  of  money,  and  does  not  con- 
vey any  title  to  the  mortgagee.  Jump  v. 
North  British  k  Mercantile  Ins.  Co.,  87  Pac. 
928,  929,  44  Wash.  696»  12  Ann.  Ca&  267  (cit- 
ing Dane  t.  Daniel,  68  Pac.  268,  23  Wash. 
879). 

Under  the  Idaho  statute  and  the  deci- 
sions of  the  court  construing  the  same,  a 
"mortgage,"  or  any  contract  or  instrument 
made  only  as  security  for  the  pajrment  of  a 
debt,  merely  creates  a  lien  on  the  real  prop- 
erty therein  described,  and  leaves  the  legal 
title  in  the  mortgagor  or  grantor,  which  ti- 
tle can  only  be  divested  by  Judicial  sale  in  a 
suit  or  action  under  and  in  conformity  with 
the  statato.  Hannah  t.  Tensel,  116  Pae  116, 
117,  19  Idaho,  796. 

Under  the  statute  of  South  Dakota  a 
"mortgage"  on  real  estate  is  not  a  convey- 
ance of  title,  but  only  a  lien  on  the  land 
as  security  for  a  debt  Farr  v.  Semmler,  123 
N.  W.  835,  837,  24  S.  D.  290. 

Under  Civ.  Code,  |  2920,  defining  a  mort- 
gage as  a  contract  hypothecating  spedflc 
property  for  the  performance  of  an  act  with- 
out the  necessity  of  a  change  of  possession, 
and  section  2927,  providing  that  a  mortgage 
does  not  entitle  the  mortgagee  to  possession 
unless  authorized  by  the  express  terms  of 
the  mortgage,  a  mortgage  gives  the  mort- 
gagee neither  the  title,  possession,  nor  right 
to  possession  of  the  mortgaged  property  un- 
less authorized  by  the  express  terms  of  the 
instrument.  Ely  ▼.  Williams,  92  Pac.  393, 
394,  6  CaL  App.  460. 

A  "mortgage"  on  real  estate  creates  only 
a  lien  in  favor  of  the  mortgagee,  and  neither 
the  legal  nor  equitable  title  passes  to  the 
mortgagee  until  after  a  valid  foreclosure  and 
sale  thereunder.  The  righto  of  the  mortgagee 
in  possession  are  therefore  not  adverse  to 
the  righto  of  the  mortgagor  or  his  grantees, 
so  long  as  the  relation  of  mortgagor  and 
mortgagee  ezista  Gillett  v.  RonOg,  87  Pac. 
326,  329,  17  Okl.  324  (citing  Baldufl  v.  Grif- 
wold,  60  Pac.  223,  9  Okl*  439;  8  Pomu  £q. 
Jur.  [3d  Ed.]  |  1188). 

At  common  law  a  ''mortgage^'  vests  the 
legal  title  in  the  mortgagee,  and*  on  condl- 


HOBTGAGE 


456 


MOBTGAGB 


\vi\ 


Uon  broken,  the  mortgagee  may  re-enter  or 
bring  ejectment  The  Ck>lorado  statute,  how- 
ever, has  taken  from  the  instrument  the  com- 
mon-law character  and  deprived  the  mort- 
gagee of  all  possession  or  right  of  possession 
either  after  or  before  condition  broken,  and 
before  this  right  exists  the  mortgagee  must 
foreclose  his  mortgage  and  seU  the  mortgaged 
property.  Moncrleff  v.  Hare,  87  Pac  1082, 
1083,  38  CJolo.  221,  7  K  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1001 
(citing  Pueblo  &  A.  V.  B.  B.  Co.  v.  Beshoar, 
5  Pac.  639,  8  Colo.  82;  Fogarty  ▼.  Sawyer, 
17  Cal.  589). 

In  eqi^ty,  a  mortgage  is  not  a  convey- 
ance of  the  legal  title,  but  only  a  security  for 
debt,  Barron  v.  San  Angelo  Nat  Bank 
(Tex.)  138  S.  W.  142,  144. 

Und»  the  statute,  a  "mortgage"  does  not 
convey  title  to  the  property  mortgaged,  but 
only  creates  a  lien  thereon.  The  mortgagor 
has  the  right  to  pHy  the  indebtedness,  and 
thus  extinguish  the  lien,  at  any  time  before 
the  property  is  sold  by  the  mortgagee.  The 
contract  of  the  mortgagor  does  not  terminate 
with  his  death,  but  by  operation  of  law  it  is 
suspended  until  an  administrator  is  appoint- 
ed. Litz  V.  Exchange  Bank  of  Alva,  83  Paa 
790,  792, 15  Okl.  564. 

Iden  indioated 

As  lien,  see  lien. 

The  owner  of  property,  exempt  from  tax- 
ation under  its  charter  (Pub.  &  Loa  Laws 
1869,  c.  149),  executed  a  mortgage  to  secure 
a  loan,  and  executed  its  bonds  to  secure  the 
mortgage,  and  agreed  that  it  would  pay  all 
taxes  and  assessments  imposed  on  the  mort- 
gaged property,  all  taxes  assessed  or  imposed 
on  the  mortgage,  and  all  taxes  assessed 
against  the  lien  or  interest  created  by  the 
mortgage.  St  1898,  f  1042d,  added  by  Laws 
1903,  c.  378,  I  2,  provided  that,  whenever  tax- 
able real  estate  is  subject  to  mortgage,  the 
mortgage,  for  the  purposes  of  taxation, 
should  be  an  interest  in  the  real  estate  tax- 
able as  such  where  the  real  estate  was  lo- 
cated, or  might  be  separately  assessed  and 
taxed.  Held,  in  the  mortgagee's  action  to 
foreclose  because  of  the  mortgagor's  refusal 
to  pay  taxes  against  the  bonds  in  the  hands 
of  purchasers  from  the  mortgagee,  that  the 
first  obligation  referred  only  to  general  tax- 
es or  special  assessments  levied  on  the  prop- 
erty; that  the  third  obligation  referred  to 
an  assessment  against  some  interest  In  the 
mortgaged  real  estate,  not  including  an  as- 
sessment on  the  bonds;  that  the  words 
"mortgage"  and  "lien  or  interest  created 
thereby"  were  synonymous;  that  the  obliga- 
tion to  pay  taxes  on  the  "mortgage"  did  not 
comprehend  such  taxes  assessed  on  the 
'  bonds,  and  that  the  mortgagor  was  not  lia- 
ble therefor.  Citizens'  Savings  &  Trust  Co. 
V.  School  Sisters  of  Notre  Dame»  189  N.  W. 
439,  441,  151  Wla.  619. 


Aa  m  mere  laeldMit  of  tlM  deM 

"A  'mortgage'  ia  a  mere  incident  of  t 
debt  which  it  la  intended  to  secure."  Vo< 
hees  V.  Nixon,  66  AtL  192,  195,  72  N.  J.  E 
791  (quoting  Magie  t.  Beynolds,  26  AtL  li 
51  N.  J.  Eq.  118,  117). 

"The  debt  la  the  principal  thing,  and  t 
'mortgage'  only  an  incident,  a  mere  aecuri 
for  the  payment  of  the  debt,  and  the  relea 
of  the  debt  secured  by  the  mortgage  ne 
not  be  under  seal,  but  the  transfer  of  t 
debt  will  in  equity  carry  the  mortgage  wi 
it"  Bradley  ▼.  lightcap,  66  N.  Bl  540,  5^ 
201  111.  611  (citing  Vansant  ▼.  Allmon,  23  1 
30). 

"A  'mortga^  la  but  a  security  for 
debt.  Independent  of  the  debt,  the  lien  o 
have  no  existence  in  equity.  The  debt  is  t 
principal,  the  lien  is  the  accessory,  whi 
can  no  more  exist  without  the  debt  than  t 
shadow  without  the  substance."  Walsh 
Bobinson,  99  N.  W.  282,  135  Mich.  16. 

A  "mortgage"  la  only  an  incident  to  t 
debt  it  was  given  to  secure,  and  cannot 
separated  therefrom,  and  a  transfer  of  t 
mortgage  without  the  debt  is  a  nuliii 
Bichards  Trust  Co.  v.  Bhomberg,  104  N.  ^ 
268,  270,  19  S.  D.  595  (quoting  and  adopU 
definiUon  in  Merritt  t.  BarthoUck,  36  N. 
44). 
Aa  a  mero  seenHty  for  tlio  doM 

A  mortgage  itself  does  not  create 
alienate  an  estate  in  real  property,  but  is 
mere  security  for  the  payment  of  a  debt 
the  discharge  of  an  obligation.  Mueller 
Benkes,  77  Pac.  512,  518,  31  Mont  100.  Si 
also,  Alexander  t.  Cleland,  86  Pac.  425,  41 
18  N.  M.  624. 

A  mortgage  is  a  security  for  payment 
a  debt,  or  performance  of  some  condition;  t 
mortgagee  only  acquiring  a  chattel  intere 
Malsberger  y.  Parsons  (Del.)  75  Atl.  698,  7i 

"A  'mortgage*  is  a  contract  by  whl 
specific  property  is  hypothecated  for  the  p< 
formance  of  an  act,  without  the  necessity 
a  change  of  possession."  Civ.  Code,  {  3S] 
"The  lien  of  a  mortgage  is  special,  unk 
otherwise  agreed,  and  is  independent  of  [x 
session."  Qv.  Code,  i  3812.  A  mortga 
does  not  create  an  estate  in  real  properl 
"It  is  a  mere  security  for  the  payment  of 
debt  or  the  fulfillment  of  an  obligation,  ai 
is  only  a  chattel  interest  While  it  affe< 
lands  by  imposing  a  lien  of  charge  upon  the 
it  in  no  wise  conveys  title  thereto."  Swa 
y.  McMillan,  76  Pac.  943,  946,  80  Mont  42 

A  "mortgage"  is  but  a  security  tor  t 
payment  of  money  with  the  right  of  lien  up 
the  mortgage  premises  to  enforce  paymei 
It  is  not  stamped  with  the  character  of  re 
estate,  but  is  a  bare  incumbrance  or  chan 
In  re  Lukens,  188  Fed.  188,  191  (citing  Bic 
ert  v.  Madeira  [Pa.]  1  Bawle,  828;  Oorpoi 
tion  for  Belief  of  Poor  Miniafeers  y.  Walla 
[Pa.]  8  Bawle^  100;  Graft  v.  Webster  [Pi 


MORTGAGE 


46T 


MORTGAGSB 


4  Rawle,  242;  Asay  v.  Hoover,  5  Pa.  21,  45 
Am.  Dec  713 ;  Wilson  t.  Shoenberger's  IDx'n, 
31  Pa.  296;  In  re  Lenning's  Bistate,  62  Pa« 
135;  Mclatyre  ▼.  Velte»  25  AtL  739,  153  Fa. 
350). 

In  egoity  a  "mortgage"  is  a  mere  securi- 
ty for  the  debt  and  only  a  chattel  interest, 
and  until  a  decree  of  foreclosure  the  mort- 
gagor continues  the  real  owner  of  the  fee. 
Where  the  owner  of  land  conyeyed  the  timber 
thereon  on  condition  that  the  deed  should  be 
Toid  unless  the  grantee  paid  a  note  for  the 
purchase  price  at  maturity,  and  removed  the 
timber  within  a  spedfled  time,  the  deed  creat- 
ed a  relation  in  l^al  effect  the  same  as  in  the 
case  of  a  conveyance  of  absolute  title  with 
mortgage  back  to  secure  the  purchase  price. 
Ordway  v.  Farrow,  64  AtL  1116,  U19,  79  Vt 
192, 118  Am.  St  Rep.  961. 

A  "mortgage"  is  too  narrowly  defined 
when  it  is  said  to  be  a  security  f6r  a  debt 
It  may  be  a  security  for  the  payment  of  a 
debt  or  for  the  performance  of  some  duty, 
or  for  both.  Stitt  v.  Rat  Portage  Lumber  Oo., 
104  N.  W.  661,  664,  96  Minn.  27  (citing  Madi- 
gan  V.  Mead,  16  N.  W.  539,  81  Minn.  94). 

A  "mortgage,"  prior  to  its  foreclosure 
and  the  final  confirmation  of  the  sale  had 
thereunder,  is  but  a  security  for  the  debt, 
and  does  not  operate  as  a  lien  on  the  rents 
and  profits  of  the  mortgaged  premises,  un- 
less an  application  is  made  for  a  receiver  in 
the  manner  provided  by  law.  Westerfleld  v. 
South  Omaha  Loan  it  Bldg.  Ass'n,  105  N.  W. 
1087,  1088.  75  Neb.  63. 

"A  'mortgage'  is  a  mere  security  for 
a  debt  and  there  is  no  such  relation  of  trust 
or  confidence  between  the  maker  and  holder 
of  a  mortgage  as  prevents  the  latter  from 
acquiring  title  to  its  subjectrmatter,  either 
under  his  own  or  any  other  valid  lien." 
Jones  V.  Black,  90  Pac  422,  424,  18  Okl.  844, 
11  Ann.  Cas.  763  (quoting  from  opinion  in 
Williams  v.  Townsend,  81  N.  Y.  416)« 

A  mortgagee  ^holds  his  "mortgage"  as 
security  for  the  debt  only,  and,  where  there 
is  no  obligation  in  the  contract  on  the  part 
of  the  mortgagee  to  pay  taxes  on  the  prop- 
erty, he  may  acquire  title  through  tax  sale. 
The  mortgagee  has  a  mere  lien  on  the  proper- 
ty, but  no  title.  His  lien  gives  him  no  right 
of  possession,  and  his  only  remedy  is  by  fore^ 
closure.  Jones  v.  Black,  88  Pac.  1052,  1063, 
18  Okl.  344,  11  Ann.  Oas.  758. 

Note  or  oihmr  seeiixitjr  immeoeMAry 
Under  Bev.  Civ.  Code,  i  2044,  providing 
that  every  transfer  of  an  interest  in  property, 
other  than  a  trust  made  as  security  for  the 
performance  of  another  act,  shall  be  deemed 
a  mortgage,  a  transfer  of  real  property  by 
deed  made  to  secure  a  loan  is  a  "mortgage," 
and  may  be  shown  to  be  such  by  proof  of 
circumstances  attending  its  execution  and 
the  actual  intention  of  the  parties.  Where 
a  deed  was  executed  as  security  for  a  loan^  ^ 


the  tsLCt  that  there  was  no  collateral  under- 
taking evidencing  the  indebtedness,  and  no 
covenant  or  personal  obligation  by  the  gran- 
tor to  pay,  wap  not  fatal  to  the  grantor's 
right  to  have  the  deed  declared  a  mortgage. 
Krug  V.  Kauta,  118  N.  W.  623,  024,  21  S.  D. 
461. 


to  mortSACe  «Utiii«ois]Md 

An  instrument  reciting  that,  to  secure  in- 
tervener as  surety  on  a  certain  note  of  even 
date  with  the  instrument,  "I  doth  hereby 
agree,  and  doth  agree  to  give  unto"  said  inter- 
vener a  mortgage  on  certain  real  estate  de- 
scribed, "to  have  and  to  hold  the  said  prop- 
erty to  secure  said"  intervener  as  surety  on 
said  note,  to  be  void  on  condition  that  the 
maker  cause  the  note  to  be  paid  and  signed 
by  defendant  and  his  wife,  constituted  a 
"mortgage"  and  not  a  mere  promise  to  mort- 
gage.   Bray  v.  Ellison  (Ky.)  83  S.  W.  96. 

As  property 

See  Personal  Property ;  Property. 
As  pmtehmam  • 

See  Purchase. 
As  sale  or  transfer 

See  Sale;  Sell  and  Convey;  Transfer. 

KORTOAOS  ACTION 

Under  Rev.  St  1895.  I  1490,  providing 
that  all  claims  against  a  corporation  at  the 
time  of  receivership  shall  be  paid  out  of  the 
earnings  thereof  to  the  exclusion  of  mortgage 
action,  the  term  "mortgage  action"  does  not 
merely  mean  a  mortgage,  but  relates  to  the 
action  whereby  a  mortgagee  secures  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  receiver;  and  hence  a  mort- 
gagee, not  having  secured  the  appointment 
of  a  receiver,  is  entitled  to  share  in  the  earn- 
ings of  a  receivership.  First  Nat  Bank  of 
Houston  V.  J.  I.  CampbeU  Ck).,  140  S.  W«  430, 
481,  104  Tex.  467. 

MORTGAGE  OI.AIM 

See  Open  Mortgage  Clause. 

KORTOAC^B  DBBT 

See  Transfer  of  Mortgage  D^t 

KORTOAGB  SAUB 

Expenses  of  mortgage  sale,  see  Bkpenses. 

Though  a  chattel  mortgagor  and  mort- 
gagee brought  about  an  auction  sale  of  the 
property  by  agreement,  in  order  to  create  the 
Impression  that  the  sale  was  not  a  forced 
one,  in  order  thereby  to  sell  the  property  for 
a  better  price  than  on  a  forced  sale,  it  being 
understood  that  the  proceeds  should  be  turn- 
ed over  to  the  mortgagee  to  satisfy  his  debt 
the  sale  was  nevertheless  in  legal  effect  a 
"mortgage  sale."  Seiberling  ft  Co.  v.  Porter, 
74  N.  B.  516,  517,  165  Ind.  7. 

MORTOAOZfi 

As  assigns,  see  Assigns. 
As  creditor,  see  Creditor. 
As  owner,  see  Owner. 


MORTOAOEE 


468 


MOSS 


As  purdiaaer,  see  Purchaser. 

As  purchaser  tor  valuable  consideration, 
see  Purchaser  for  Valuable  Considera- 
tion. 

As  purchaser  for  yalue,'  see  Purchaser 
for  Value. 

KOaXOAOEE  m  GOOD  FAITH 

8ee  Bona  Fide  Mortgagee;  Good  Faith. 

MOBTOAOEE  IH  POSSESSION 

The  expression  "mortgagee  in  possession" 
has  been  adopted  by  the  courts  and  law  writ- 
ers as  a  conyenient  phrase  to  describe  the 
condition  of  a  mortgagee,  who  is  in  posses- 
sion of  mortgaged  premises  under  such  cir- 
cumstances as  to  make  the  satisfaction  of  his 
lien  a  prerequisite  to  his  being  dispossessed, 
even  in  Jurisdictions  where  the  mortgage  it- 
self can  confer  no  possessory  right,  either  be- 
fore or  after  default  Stouffer  v.  Harlan,  74 
Pac.  610,  611,  68  Kan.  135,  64  L.  B.  A  820,  104 
Am.  St  Rep.  396. 

A  "mortgagee  in  possession"  is  not  only 
one  who  holds  actual  possession  with  the 
consent  of  the  mortgagor,  but  one  who  has 
in  good  faith  taken  possession  as  the  result 
of  a  y(4d  foreclosure.  The  possession  must, 
however,  be  actual  and  not  merely  construc- 
tiye.  Fuhrman  v.  Power,  86  Pac  940,  942, 
43  Wash.  533. 

A  mortgagee  who,  while  the  mortgage  is 
subsisting,  obtains  in  a  lawful  manner  the 
possession  Is  a  "mortgagee  in  possession,"  and 
his  interest  enables  him  to  retain  such  pos- 
session and  to  defend  against  it  against  the 
mortgagor  or  those  succeeding  to  his  title.  A 
mortgagee  who  has  foreclosed  his  mortgage 
without  bringing  in  a  purchaser  from  the 
mortgagor,  and  who  has  entered  into  posses- 
sion under  such  proceedings,  though  without 
the  consent  of  the  purchaser,  may  retain  pos- 
session until  his  lien  is  released  by  payment 
though  the  debt  is  barred  by  limitations. 
Burns  y.  Hiatt  87  Pac.  196,  198,  149  CaL 
617,  117  Am.  St  Rep.  157. 

A  "mortgagee  in  possession"  is  one  who 
enters  either  by  the  consent  of  the  mortgagor, 
honest  mistake,  or  pursuant  to  lawful  pro- 
cess, and  he  is  not  allowed  for  permanent 
improyements,  but  only  for  necessary  repara- 
tions made  by  him  during  the  time.  Faulk- 
ner y.  Cody,  91  N.  Y.  Supp.  633,  638,  45  Misc. 
Rep.  64  (citing  Moore  v.  Cable  [N.  Y.]  1  Johns. 
Ch.  385;  Madison  Ave.  Baptist  Church  v. 
Baptist  Church  in  Oliver  St,  73  N.  Y.  82 ;  3 
Pom.  Eq.  Jur.  i  1217). 

It  is  not  necessary  to  the  status  of  a 
mortgagee  in  possession  that  possession  of  the 
land  shall  have  been  taken  under  the  mort- 
gage or  by  the  consent  of  the  mortgagor.  To 
constitute  a  mortgagee  in  possession,  it  is 
enough  if  the  possession  be  peaceably  and 
legally  taken;  and  one  who  takes  possession 
under  an  invalid  tax  deed,  and  purchases 
a  subsisting  mortgage,  is  not  precluded  from 
claiming  the  rights  of  a  mortgagee  in  posses- 


sion.   Jaggar  y.  Pluukett  106  Pac  280,  2 
81  Kan.  565,  25  L.  B.  A  (N.  S.)  935. 

KOBTOAOOB 

See  Creditors  of  the  Mortgagor. 
As  owner,  see  Owner. 

Rev.  Codes  1899,  i  5846,  antfaorlzln« 
suit  by  a  "mortgagor"  to  restrain  foreclosi 
by  advertisement  includes  any  person  daJ 
ing  title  to  the  mortgaged  premises  unc 
and  in  privity  with  the  original  mortgag 
Scott  y.  District  Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Di 
of  Barnes  County,  107  N.  W.  61,  62,  16  N. 
259. 

As  used  in  Rey.  Codes  1906,  |  7464,  p: 
viding  that  when  the  mortgagee  or  his  i 
signee  has  commenced  foreclosure  proce< 
ings  by  advertisement,  and  it  shall  be  made 
appear  by  the  affidavit  of  the  mortgagor  tb 
the  mortgagor  lias  a  legal  counterclaim 
any  other  valid  defense,  foreclosure  may 
enjoined,  the  word  "mortgagoif'  includes  p< 
sons  in  privity  to  and  claiming  under  t 
mortgagor;  and  a  subsequent  mortgagee  m; 
take  the  necessary  affidavit  and  enjoin  t 
sale.    State  v.  Buttz,  131  N.  W.  241,  21  N. 
540. 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  1899,  {  4342,  reguj 
ing  the  inclusion  of  the  mortgagor  and  acta 
tenant  or  occupier  of  the  land  among  the  d 
fendants  in  all  actions  to  foreclose  moi 
gages,  the  term  "mortgagor,"  so  far  as 
relates  to  the  foreclosure  of  the  equity  of  i 
demptlon,  refers  to  the  actual  owner  of  tJ 
equity,  who  is  an  indispensable  party  to  ai 
kind  of  a  foreclosure  proceeding,  but  the  a 
sence  of  the  grantor  in  a  deed  of  trust  Const 
tutes  no  defect  of  parties,  where,  prior  i 
such  action,  he  has  conveyed  his  equity  of  r 
demption.  McCauley  v.  Brady.  100  S.  ^ 
541,  543,  123  Mo.  App.  558  (citing  2  Pin 
Mortg.  I  1707). 

MORTIFICATION 

As  mental  amsulsk 

Allegations  in  a  petition,  In  an  actio 
against  a  sheriff  and  his  deputy,  that  the 
wrongfully  and  unlawfully  entered  into 
house  and  premises  occupied  by  plaintl 
under  a  lease  and  dispossessed  him,  and  pi 
his  household  goods  and  personal  propert 
in  the  public  highway,  and  so  put  plaint! 
to  great  trouble  and  distress,  properly  ai 
tborize  a  recovery  for  humiliation  and  mort 
fication,  or  any  phase  of  "mental  anguish, 
since  the  word  "distress,**  being  a  generl 
term,  includes  anguish  or  suffering,  both  o 
mind  and  body,  and  since  "humiliation**  an 
"mortification**  are  simply  phases  of  ments 
anguish.  '  Perkins  T.  Ogilvie,  146  S.  W.  73! 
737.  148  Ky.  309. 

MOSS 

See  Sea  Moss. 

liily  of  the  valley  roots  are  not  covere 
by  Tariff  Act  Aug.  28,  1894,  c.  349,  {  2,  Pre 


ICOfiS 


459 


HOTIOK 


fst,  par.  568,  rutins  to  "moMi,  seaweeds, 
Qd  Tegetable  substances,*'  not  bcdng  Tegeta- 
le  sabstances  in  the  class  of  moss  and  sea- 
eeds.  McAllister  t.  United  States,  147  Fed. 
73. 

Tariff  Act  July  24.  1897,  c.  11,  i  2,  Free 
1st,  pars.  566,  617,  relating  to  "fibrous  vege- 
ible  substances**  and  to  '^moss,  seaweeds, 
Qd  vegetable  substances,"  does  not  include 
Irch  bark.  Reed  &  Keller  ▼.  United  States, 
72  Fed.  453. 

iOST 

A  blU  for  diroroe  a  vinculo,  iUed  June 
S,  1906,  in  tbe  county  court  of  Cleburne 
}unty,  alleged  that  complainant,  a  resident 
f  Cleburne  county,  was  married  May  3, 1906, 
Dd  tliat  he  and  his  wife  lived  together  until 
nne  4,  1906,  most  of  the  time  residing  in 
lebome  county,  and  that  complainant  'lias 
Ben  a  bona  fide  resident  of  Cleburne  county 
>r  more  than  three  years,'*  and  that  re- 
[wndenfs  particular  place  of  residence  was 
nknown.  Held,  that  the  verb  *'has  been,*' 
eseriptive  oit  past  action,  referred  the  resi- 
enoe  to  a  period  before  the  bill  was  filed, 
at  did  not  make  a  part  of  the  period  so 
rerred  the  year  next  before  the  bill  was 
led,  and  that  "most**  signified,  not  all,  but 
early  all,  of  the  time  between  the  marriage 
nd  the  date  of  the  bill,  and  that  the  aver- 
lent  of  more  than  three  years'  bona  fide 
»idence  was  InsnfDcient  as  a  Jurisdictional 
verment  of  residence  for  "one  year  next 
receding  the  filing  of  the  bill,"  and  hence 
lat  a  decree  entered  on  the  bill  was  void 
a  collateral  attack.  Martin  t.  Martin,  65 
ooth.  682,  634,  173  Ala.  106. 

[08T  OOmnBHIEXT 

As  used  in  a  charter  party  providing 
lat  the  anchorage  directed  by  the  charterers 
last  be  the  "most  convenient,"  the  words 
most  convenimit**  mean  convenient  as  well 
»r  the  ship  as  for  the  consignees  of  the  car- 
).  Reld  V.  Jones,  23  Sup.  Ot  89,  187  U.  S. 
S3,  47  L.  Ed.  116. 

lOTES 

Waste,  to  which  a  small  quantity  of  cot- 
m  still  attaches  after  it  has  been  run 
trough  the  machine  at  a  cotton  mill,  is  call- 
l  "motes."  Washington  Mills  v.  Cox,  157 
ed.  634,  686,  86  C.  C.  A.  164. 

lOTHER 

See    From    and    Through   the    Mother; 

Through  the  Mother. 
Father  synonymous,  see  Father. 

A  statute  referring  to  a  father  or  mother 

)es  not.  In  the  absence  of  special  statement, 

idude  a  natural  father  or  mother.    Landry 

American  Creosote  Works,  43  Sonth.  1016, 

)18, 119  La.  231, 11  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  387. 


The  right  granted  by  Bar.  av.  Oode^ 
art  2315,  to  the  surviving  father  or  mother  to 
recover  damages  for  the  death  of  their  son, 
is  a  right  granted  to  the  actual  father  or 
mother,  and  not  to  an  adopting  parent. 
Mount  V.  Tremont  Lumber  Co.,  46  South.  103, 
121  La.  64,  126  Am.  St  Rep.  312,  15  Ann. 
Cas.  14a 

The  exemption  allowed  by  Ky.  St  1903, 
1 1403,  subsec.  6,  to  be  set  apart  to  "the  wid- 
ow or  infant  child"  from  the  estate  of  an  in- 
testate, to  the  Infant  child.  If  no  "mother" 
survives,  and  to  the  "widow**  if  there  be  no 
infant  children,  or  If  none  reside  in  the  fami- 
ly with  the  "widow,*'  does  not  apply  to  the 
husband  and  children  of  the  intestate  wife. 
Thaxton's  Guardian  v.  Walters*  Adm*r,  113 
S.  W.  118,  U9, 130  Ky.  235. 

Where  the  constitution  of  a  firemen's  re* 
lief  association  organised  pursuant  to  Laws 
1885,  c.  176  (St  1898,  ||  1987,  1988),  and  acts 
amendatory  thereof,  providing  for  the  organ- 
ization of  such  associations,  and  designating 
that  they  may  be  organized  for  the  purpose 
of  giving  relief  to  persons  dependent  upon 
the  deceased  members,  but  no  others,  stated 
the  object  of  such  association  to  be  to  give 
relief  to  families  of  deceased  members,  and 
provided  that  an  Insured  could  designate  his 
mother  or  certain  others  as  his  beneficiary, 
a  designation  by  an  insured  of  his  stepmoth- 
er as  beneficiary  was  valid,  where  he  was  a 
single  man  living  with  her  as  a  member  of 
the  same  family  at  the  time  of  his  death; 
tbe  term  '^mother'*  in  this  connection  not  be- 
ing limited  in  meaning  merely  to  a  mother 
by  blood,  though  used  with  such  meaning  in 
a  subsequent  provision  of  the  association's 
constitution  which  specified  the  beirs  to 
whom  relief  money  should  be  paid  in  case 
no  beneficiary  be  designated  by  the  insured. 
Jones  V.  Mangan,  138  N.  W.  618,  620,  151 
Wis.  215. 

MOTHER  or  FEABL 

Manufacture  of,  see  Manoflactares — 
Mannfactnred  Articles. 

MOTION 

See  Greyhound  Motion;  Inleriocutoxy 
Motion;  Special  Motion. 

In  practice 

See  Civil  Action— Case— Suit— Bta 

As  answer,  see  Answer. 

As  commencement  of  action,  see  Com- 
mencement of  Action. 

As  pleading,  see  Pleading. 

As  special  proceeding,  see  Special  Pro- 
ceeding. 

A  "motion"  is  a  request  to  the  court  to 
grant  the  mover  some  right  which  he  claima 
It  is  a  notification  that  he  considers  himself 
entitled  to  what  he  asks.  Arnold  v.  Regan, 
69  Atl.  292,  29  B.  I.  71.  See,  also,  Howard 
V.  Carter,  80  Pac.  61,  02,  71  Kan.  85  (citing 


h  i 


MOTION 


460 


BfOTIOK 


dark  T.  Board  of  CJom'rs  of  Mitchell  €k>imty, 
77  Pac.  284,  09  Kan.  542,  66  L.  B.  A.  965). 

A  '^motion*'  is  an  application  for  an  or- 
der and  la  nsnally  made  orally.  Williama  t. 
Hawley,  77  Pac.  762,  763.  144  Cal.  97. 

A  **niotion*'  is  an  application  for  an  or- 
der, and  was  sufficiently  made  within  a  re- 
quired time  by  formal  appearance  in  court 
and  application  for  relief,  stating  the  grounds 
and  filing  affidavits,  though  the  opposing 
parties  were  not  required  to  appear  until  a 
subsequent  day.  Brownell  v.  Superior  CJourt 
of  Yolo  County,  109  Pac.  91,  94,  167  Cal.  703. 

A  *'motion"  la  simply  an  application 
made  in  a  pending  or  proposed  action  or  spe- 
cial proceeding,  and  must  depend  for  its 
granting  upon  its  relevancy  to  the  main  liti- 
gation. It  is  not  an  independent  right  In 
re  Diets,  122  N.  Y.  Supp.  1063,  1065,  188 
App.  DiY.  283. 

A  "motion"  seeks  some  order  of  court 
falling  short  of  the  dignity  of  a  Judgment 
Ewing  V.  Vernon  County,  116  S.  W.  518,  519, 
216  Mo.  681  (citing  Bliss,  Code  PI.  [3d  Ed.] 
SI  418,  420,  et  seq.). 

"Motions"  are  not  original  and  independ- 
ent proceedings,  but  are  only  incidental  steps 
taken  in  all  classes  of  cases  pending;  and 
the  rulings  of  the  court  thereon  are  not 
"judgments."  State  ex  rel.  Shackelford  y. 
McElhinney,  145  S.  W.  1139,  1142,  241  Mo. 
592. 

A  motion  is  not  required  to  be  signed, 
but  it  is  a  proper  practice  of  the  counsel  for 
a  party  to  sign  it.  Nobach  y.  Scott,  119 
Pac.  295,  296,  20  Idaho,  558. 

Applications  for  orders  directing  issu- 
ance of  executions  against  the  wages  of 
defendant  debtors  are  not  "motions"  within 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  3236,  authorizing  the  award 
of  costs  on  motion.  Brodie  v.  O'Donnell,  130 
N.  Y.  Supp.  805,  806,  71  Misa  Rep.  580. 

The  district  court  at  chambers  has  ju- 
risdiction to  open  a  judgment  under  Code 
Civ.  Proc.  I  83 ;  the  application  being  a  mo- 
tion within  section  556  which  defines  "mo- 
tion" as  an  application  for  an  order  address- 
ed to  the  court  or  a  judge  in  vacation.  Tay- 
lor v.  Woodbury,  120  Paa  867,  368,  86  Kan. 
236. 

An  application  for  suit  money  in  a  di- 
vorce action  should  be  treated  as  a  motion 
within  Code,  |  3833,  authorizing  motions  to 
be  supported  by  affidavit  which  may  be  con- 
sidered as  testimony  on  the  hearing.  Mengel 
V.  Mengel  (Iowa)  138  N.  W.  495,  500. 

Under  Rev.  St.  1909,  |  2092,  defining  a 
motion  as  an  application  for  an  order,  and 
section  1841,  requiring  motions  to  contain  a 
written  specification  of  the  reasons  on  which 
they  are  founded,  a  motion  possessing  these 
requisites  may  be  embodied  as  well  in  a  brief 
ill  the  Supreme  Court  as  on  a  separate  piece 


of  paper.    Smith  y.  Moseley,  IST  S.  W.  07 
978,  284  Mo.  48a 

Under  Local  Improvement  Act,  I  I 
(Hurd*s  Rev.  St  1906,  c  24,  |  543),  provii 
ing  that  copies  of  the  ordinance,  the  recoi 
mendation  of  the  board,  and  the  estimate  < 
cost,  certified  under  seal,  must  be  attache 
to  the  petition,  but  that  failure  to  so  fi 
them  shall  not  affect  the  jurisdiction  of  tl 
court  to  act  on  the  petition,  but,  if  it  sha 
appear  that  such  copies  have  not  been  a 
tached,  then,  on  motion  of  any  objector  f( 
that  purpose,  on  or  before  appearance  da; 
the  entire  petition  shall  be  dismissed,  mer 
ly  filing  obje«.tions  to  the  confirmation  of  tt 
assessment,  one  of  which  objections  wi 
that  the  copies  were  not  attached  under  sea 
without  calling  the  attention  of  the  court  t 
them  in  some  way,  is  not  a  "motion"  withJ 
the  statute,  since  a  motion  is  an  appUcatio 
made  to  the  court,  and  the  filing  of  the  pi 
per  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  is  not  such 
motion.  City  of  Marengo  y.  Bidiler,  91  I 
B.  758,  759,  245  111.  47. 

The  words  "motion"  and  "application 
as  used  in  Code  Civ.  Proc.  {  686,  dedarii 
that,  notwithstanding  the  death  of  a  part 
after  judgment,  execution  may  issue  in  eta 
of  the  death  of  the  judgioent  creditor  o 
"application'*  of  his  executor,  administrato 
or  successor  in  interest,  and  section  685  di 
daring  that  judgments  may  be  enforced  af 
er  five  years  from  the  date  of  its  entry  t 
leave  of  court  on  "motion,"  have  the  saii 
signification,  and  on  the  death  of  a  judgmei 
creditor  his  administratrix  is  not  require 
to  institute  an  action  at  law  to  enforce  tt 
judgment  but  is  entitled  to  an  execution  c 
"motion."  Weldon  v.  Rogers,  90  Pac  106 
1063,  151  CaL  432. 

A  judge  may  be  disqualified  for  bias  an 
prejudice  to  sit  on  a  motion  for  new  tria 
when  such  disqualification  is  invoked  peD< 
ing  the  motion  and  before  the  day  of  hea 
ing;  such  moticm  being  a  "motion,"  withi 
the  statute  providing  for  such  dlsqualifla 
tion  on  the  filing  of  an  affidavit  by  any  pa 
ty  to  an  "action,  motion  or  proceeding"  t 
any  time  before  the  day  fixed  for  the  hearin 
of  such  "action,  motion,  or  proceeding. 
State  ex  rel.  Carleton  v.  District  Court  ( 
Lewis  and  Clarke  County,  82  Pac.  789,  79 
33  Mont  138,  8  Ann.  C^as.  752. 

Same— Notice  of  motioii 

An  application  to  change  the  place  ( 
trial  of  an  action  commenced  in  the  wroi 
county  is  not  a  motion  within  (3ode  01 
Proc.  §  1005,  providing  for  service  of  wri 
ten  notice  of  a  motion,  though  under  se 
tion  1010  the  action  of  the  court  on  a  d< 
mand  for  a  change  of  venue  is  an  order,  an 
though  the  application  made  on  the  deman 
is  designated  a  motion,  but  the  moUon  goc 
on  the  calendar  to  be  called  for  hearing  i 
the  regular  ord^  of  business.  Bohn  y 
Bohn,  116  Pac.  568,  569,  le  CaL  App.  17ft. 


MOTION  FOR  JUDOMSNT 


461 


MOTION  TO  DISMISS 


OTIOK  FOB  JUDGMEirr  ON  PUBA1»- 
IHG 

A  motion  to  dismiss  tbe  action  and 
ash  the  attachment  and  lery  therein,  has- 

on  affldavlts  and  files  and  records  in  the 
56,  is  not  within  Mills'  Ann.  Code  I  887, 
Glaring  that  decisions  on  "motions  hased 

the  pleadings/*  etc.,  shall  he  taken  as  a 
It  of  the  record  without  heing  made  snch 

bill  of  exceptions,  and  is  not  a  part  of 
e  record,  unless  embodied  in  a  bill  of  ez- 
ptlons.  Sfverett  y.  Wilson,  88  Pac.  211, 
2,  84  Gola  476. 

OTION  FOB  NEW  TBIAX. 

A  motion  for  a  new  trial  is,  in  this 
ite,  a  statutory  remedy,  and  can  only  be 
roked  in  the  manner,  within  the  time,  and 
>0D  the  grounds  provided  in  the  statute. 
le  losing  party  must  pursue  the  require- 
snts  of  the  statute,  or  else  he  cannot  avail 
mself  of  the  remedy.  State  ez  rel.  City  of 
alkerville  ▼.  District  Ck>urt  of  Second  Jn- 
dal  Dist,  74  Pac  414,  415,  29  Mont  176. 

A  ''motipn  for  a  new  trial"  is  not  fjn- 

dded  as  evidence  of  previous  action  by  the 

art     It  is  a  proceeding  taken  by  a  party 

a  cause  after  verdict;   its  purpose  being 

secure  a  new  trial  on  account  of  alleged 

rors  which  it  assumes  to  designate  that 

ay  have  occurred  on  the  trial  or  in  the 

oceedings  in  pais,  as  distinguished  from 

x>ceedings  evidenced  by  the  record  proper, 

le  errors  in  which  are  reached  by  motions 

arrest  of  judgment     Keigans  ▼•  State, 

South.  886,  894,  52  Fla.  57  (citing  S^dg- 

Lck  y.  Dawkins»  18  Fla.  886;    Murray  y. 

tate,  9  Fla.  246). 

The  "motion  for  a  new  trial**  \a  a  rem- 
ty  accorded  to  a  party  for  the  correction 
r  the  trial  court  of  injustice  done  by  the 
^rdlct  of  a  jury.  It  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
>rtant  rights  which  a  party  to  a  jury  trial 
IS.  It  is  a  right  to  invoke  the  discretion 
!  the  court  to  decide  whether  the  injustice 
'  the  verdict  is  such  that  he  ought  to  have 
1  opportunity  to  take  the  case  bedtore  an- 
her  jury.  It  is  the  only  method  by  which 
\e  weight  of  the  evidence  can  be  reviewed. 
assey  y.  Btate,  89^  South.  790,  791,  60  Fla. 
)9. 

[OnON  FOB  NONSUIT 

A  motion  for  nonsuit  is  a  general  one, 
Dd  only  challenges  the  general  sufficiency 
I  the  evidence ;  that  is,  says,  in  effect,  there 
'  a  total  failure  of  evidence.  Upon  a  mo- 
on of  this  kind  the  only  question  raised  is 
bether  there  is  any  evidence  tending  to 
rove  the  crime  charged,  not  whether  the 
rldence  fails  in  some  particular  matters, 
tate  V.  Eubank,  74  Pac.  378,  33  Wash.  293 
Itlng  State  v.  Hyde,  61  Pac.  719,  22  Wash; 
51).  '        . 

A  motion  for  nohstrit  at  title  close  of 
laintiffs  case  is  tantamount  to  a  demiirrto 
>  the  evidence  on  the  ground  that  it  is  in^ 


Sufficient  to  establish  one  or  mora  of  the 
material  issues  devolving  upon  the  plaintiff 
to  proves  and  that  the  cause  therefore  Aonld 
not  be  submitted  to  the  jury,  and  where  de- 
fendant offers  no  evidence  after  the  denial 
of  the  motion,  and  the  plaintiff  moves  for  a 
directed  verdict,  the  conrt  may  direct  the 
verdict;  there  being  some  evidence  to  sua- 
tain  plaintiff's  case^  as  both  parties  have 
waived  the  right  to  a  jury  trial  by  submit- 
ting the  case  to  the  court  Patty  v.  Salem 
Flooring  Mills  Oo.,  96  Pac.  621,  622,  68  Or. 
880. 

A  motion  to  dismiss  in  a  justice's  court 
on  the  ground  that  plaintiff  has  failed  to 
prove  his  case  is  in  effect  a  "motion  for  a 
nonsuit,"  and  the  question  presented  on  a 
motion  for  a  nonsuit  it  is  a  question  of  law. 
Smith  V.  Superior  €k>urt  of  Napa  Oounty, 
84  Pac.  64,  66,  2  OaL  App.  629  (citing  Don- 
ahue V.  Gallavan,  48  Oal.  670). 

MOTION  FOB  BESEABINO 

The  words  "motion  for  a  rehearing,"  as 
used  in  the  statute  relating  to  appeals,  are 
to  be  construed  broadly  as  including  any  mo- 
tion involving  a  setting  aside  or  modifica- 
tion of  the  judgment  actually  rendered  by 
the  court,  Inclusive  both  of  the  motion  for  a 
rehearing,  strictly  so  called,  and  those  mo- 
tions for  the  modification  of  a  judgment, 
but  not  for  a  reargument  of  the  case,  which 
have  come  to  be  termed  "motions  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  motion  for  a  rehearing."  Ott  v. 
Boring;  111  N.  W.  883,  884,  181  Wis.  472,  U 
Ann.  Cas.  867. 

MOTION  TO  AMBNB 

See  Amend. 

MOTION  TO  DIBEOT  VEBBIOT 

A  motion  for  verdict  is  considered  In 
law  as  in  the  nature  of  a  demurrer  to  the 
evidence,  and  on  a  motion  for  a  verdict  the 
province  of  the  court  is  not  to  weigh  the 
evidence  and  ascertain  where  the  preponder- 
ance is,  but  it  is  limited  to  a  determination 
as  to  the  existence  of  evidence  from  which, 
if  true,  it  may  be  reasonably  inferred  that 
the  fact  afllrmed  exists,  excluding  the  effect 
of  all  modifying  or  contrary  evidence.  Bass 
V.  Bublee,  67  AtL  906,  966,  T6  Vt  896^ 

A  motion  by  defendant  at  the  close  of 
plaintiff's  testimony,  reciting  that  plaintiff 
had  failed  to  allege  or  prove  certain  speci- 
fied things,  "wherefore  defendant  moves  the 
court  to  instruct  the  jury  to  return  a  ver- 
dict for  the  defendant,"  was  not  a  "demur- 
rer to  the  evidebce*'  but  a  "ihotlon  to  direct 
a  verdict,"  and  the  interposition  of  the  same 
did  not  preclude  defendant  from  introducing 
defensive  evidence  after  it  was  overruled. 
Woldert  Grocery .  Oo.  v.  Veltman  (Texi)  83 
S.  W.  224. 

MOTION  TO  DI8MI8S 

"A  ^notion  to  dismiss'  Is^  the  equlvmlent 
of  a  general  4emu«ser,  and  Baar  be  mads  at 


MOTION  TO  DISMISS 


462 


MOTOR  VEHICLB 


the  trial  term,  if  the  petition  is  fatally  de- 
fective; but  such  a  motion  cannot  reach 
mere  defects  in  pleading,  such  as  may  be 
cured  by  appropriate  amendment."  Minne- 
sota Lumber  Go.  v.  Hobbs  &  Livingston,  49 
S.  B.  783,  784,  122  Ga.  20. 

"A  'motion  to  dismiss'  and  a  demurrer 
are  not  interchangeable.  The  former  can 
be  used  to  abate  an  action  only  when  it  is 
apparent  from  the  record  that  the  court  has 
no  jurisdiction.  The  latter  admits  the  ju- 
risdiction but  attacks  the  pleadings.'*  lit- 
tlefleld  V.  Maine  Gent  R.  Go.,  71  AtL  657, 
660,  104  Me.  126. 

MOTIOH  TO  QUASH 

A  motion  to  quash  the  writ  in  habeas 
corpus  amounts  to  a  demurrer,  and,  if  de- 
nied and  excepted  to,  may  be  urged  on  ap- 
peal, though  issues  were  joined  and  trial 
had,  providing  the  proceeding  is  one  which 
is  appealable.  Bleakley  v.  Barclay,  89  Pac. 
906,  912,  75  Kan.  462,  10  L.  B.  A  (N.  S.)  290. 

A  "motion  to  quash"  an  indictment  may 
be  made  when  there  is  a  defect  apparent 
upon  the  face  of  the  record.  Ldndsey  v. 
State,  69  N.  E.  126,  128,  69  Ohio  St  215. 

MOTION  TO  SET  ASIDE  JUDOMEHT 

As  part  of  record,  see  Record. 

MOTIOH  TO  BTBJKB  OUT 

A  motion  to  strike  seeks  an  order  of 
court  Of  less  dignity  than  a  judgment,  while 
a  demurrer  raises  an  issue  at  law  and  seeks 
a  trial  and  judgment  on  that  issue.  A  mo- 
tion to  strike  a  petition  might  lie  against  a 
frivolous  pleading,  a  second  petition  depart- 
ing from  the  first,  or  a  sham  pleading,  or 
against  trifling,  nugatory,  redundant,  or  ir- 
relevant matter,  or  matter  of  duplicity,  but 
it  cannot  fill  the  office  of  a  demurrer  on  chal- 
lenging demurrable  defects  in  the  petition. 
Ewing  V.  Vernon  County,  116  S.  W.  518,  519, 
216  Mo.  681. 

A  "motion  to  strike"  is  applicable  where 
a  pleading,  either  as  a  whole  or  any  part 
of  it,  is  so  framed  as  to  prejudice,  or  em- 
barrass, or  delay  a  fair  trial,  and  is  thus 
distinguished  from  a  demurrer  which  goes 
to  a  pleading  as  a  whole  for  insufficiency. 
If  the  answer  to  an  alternative  writ  of  man- 
damus is  wholly  irrelevant  and  impedes  a 
fair  trial  of  the  cause,  it  may  be  stricken  on 
motion,  while,  if  it  is  wholly  insufficient  as 
a  pleading,  a  demurrer  will  He.  State  ex 
reL  Ellis  v.  Atlantic  Goast  Line  R.  Go.,  44 
South.  230,  236,  53  Fla.  711. 

MOTIVE 

See  Improper  Motive. 

As  consideration,  see  Gonslderation. 

*'In  the  sense  of  the  criminal  law,  'mo- 
tive^ has  been  well  enough  defined  as  that 
which  leads  or  tempts  the  mind  to  indulge 
in  a  criminal  act,,  and  it  is  something  that 


may  be  resorted  to  as  a  legitimate  help 
arriving  at  the  ultimate  act  in  questic 
Thompson  v.  United  States,  144  Fed.  14, 
75  G.  G.  A.  172,  7  Ann.  Gas.  62. 

In  murder,  "motive"  is  the  impulse 
purpose  that  induces  the  murderer  to  kill 
victim.  Where  it  is  demonstrated  that 
defendant  murdered  the  deceased,  no  qc 
tion  of  motive  need  arise.  State  v.  Hyde, : 
S.  W.  816,  322,  234  Mo.  200,  Ann.  Gas.  191! 
191. 

"Motive"  means  reason,  cause,  indc 
ment,  and  incentive  to  do  the  acts  and  thii 
charged  in  the  indictment  Ball  v.  Comm 
wealth,  101  S.  W.  956,  960,  125  Ky.  6 
Gambrell  v.  Gommonwealth,  113  S.  W.  4 
480,  130  Ky.  513. 

"  'Motive*  is  an  inferential  fact,  and  n 
be  inferred,  not  merely  from  the  attends 
and  surrounding  circumstances,  but,  in  c 
junction  with  these,  all  previous  occurren 
having  reference  to  and  connected  with  i 
commission  of  the  offense."  State  v.  Bo 
86  Pac.  43,  48,  12  Idaho,  424  (quoUng  Wall 
V.  State,  4  South.  686,  85  Ala.  7,  7  Am. 
Rep.  17). 

Intent  dlstinsnlsl&ed 

"Intent,"  in  its  legal  sense,  is  quite  i 
tinct  from  "motive."  It  is  defined  as  I 
purpose  to  use  a  particular  means  to  effec 
certain  result  "Motive"  is  the  reason  wh 
leads  the  mind  to  desire  that  result  Bal 
V.  State,  97  N.  W.  566.  570,  120  Wis.  135. 

^'Motive"  must  be  distinguished  from  ** 
tent"  "Motive"  is  the  moving  power  wh 
impels  an  action  for  a  definite  result  It 
that  which  incites  or  stimulates  a  person 
do  an  act  "Motive"  is  not  an  essoitial  c 
ment  of  a  crime,  and  a  good  motive  does  i 
prevent  an  act  from  being  a  crime.  Peoi 
ex  rel.  Hegeman  v.  Gorrigan,  87  N.  E.  7 
796,  195  N.  Y.  1  (quoting  People  v.  Molinei 
61  N.  B.  286,  296,  168  N.  Y.  264,  297,  62 
R.  A.  193;  Glark,  Gr.  Law,  1 14). 


MOTOR 

MOTOa  OTCLE 

As  motor  vehicle^  i 


Motor  Vehicle. 


MOTOB  VEHICLE 

As  wagon,  see  Wagon. 
Running,  registration,  and  license  of 
within  police  power,  see  Police  Pow 

The  Maryland  Statute  (Gode  Pub.  & 
Laws  1904,  art  56,  {  180)  provides  that  wb< 
ever  the  term  "motor  vehicle"  is  used  in  st 
ute  it  shall  be  construed  to  include  auton 
biles,  locomobiles,  and  all  other  vehicles  pi 
polled  otherwise  than  by  muscular  power,  i 
cept  those  running  on  rails.  Fletcher  v.  Di 
on,  68  AtL  875,  878,  107  Md.  420. 

A  motor  cycle  la  a  "motor  vdiide"  wil 
in  Pub.  Acts  1905,  p.  287,  Act  No.  196,  pi 
viding  for  the  registration  and  identificati 


MOTOB  VEHIOLB 


46a 


MOVED  BY  HAND 


!  sach  y^bUdea,  and  regnlatiiig  tliel^  ine, 
Id  defining  the  same  (section  1)  to  mean  ''all 
ihlcles  propelled  by  power,  other  than  mna^ 
liar  power,  except  traction  engines  and  such 
otor  vehicles  as  run  only  upon  rails  or 
acks.**  People  y.  Smith,  120  N.  W.  681, 582, 
>6  Micb.  173,  21  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  41,  16  Ann. 
as.  607. 

A  statute  requiring  the  licensing  ot  op- 
rators  of  automobiles  and  "motor  cycles," 
ad  defining  them  as  all  yehidles  propelled 
f  other  than  muscular  power,  except  rail- 
>ad  and  railway  cars,  and  motor  yehicles 
mning  only  upon  rails  or  tracks,  and  road 
>llers,  includes  a  road  locomotLye  or  trae- 
on  engine  used  to  draw  cars.  Emerson 
roy  Granite  Oou  t.  Pearson,  64  Aa  682,  74 
.  H.22. 

lOUNTED 

In  machine  construction,  the  expression 
mounted  on"  seems  to  haye  an  ordinary 
leaning.  The  thing  mounted  upon  another 
lost  be  borne  or  supported  by  it  Mere  rid- 
ig  in  or  oyer  another  in  a  slot  for  the  pur- 
ose,  although  operating  in  connection  there- 
rlth,  is  not  equiyalent  to  being  mounted 
tiereon.  In  re  Duncan,  28  App.  D.  C.  457, 
60. 

lOUTH  ORGAN 

As  musical  instrument»  see  Musical  In- 
strument. 

lOVABLE 

The  word  "moyable,"  as  applied  to  prop- 
rty,  is  defined  as  "that  which  may  be  lifted, 
arried,  drawn,  turned,  or  conyeyed,  or  in 
Jiy  way  made  to  change  place  or  position*" 
lonarch  Laundry  y.  Westbrook,  63  8.  B. 
070,  1072,  100  Va.  882. 

"Moyables"  are  conyerted  into  immoy- 
bles  by  destination,  when  placed  by  the  own- 
3*  of  a  tract  of  land  upon  it  "for  its  seryice 
iBd  improyement'*  Ciy.  Ck>de,  art  468.  Hence 
t  would  seem  that  when  from  any  cause  a 
moyable"  ceases  to  be  of  seryice  to  a  tract 
t  land,  or  is  detached  from  a  building  or 
enement  of  which  it  formed  a  part  as  an  ac- 
essory,  there  is  no  longer  ground  for  a  claim 
hat  such  "moyable"  appertains  to  realty. 
^o\ae  y.  Tridie,  37  South.  875,  113  La.  915. 

The  lease  required  the  lessee  of  rooms  in 
in  office  building  to  surrender  the  premises 
Q  as  good  condition  as  reasonable  use  per- 
Qitted,  and  proyided  that  all  alterations,  ad- 
litioDs,  or  improyements  made  by  either 
)arty,  except  moyable  office  furniture  put  In 
)y  the  lessee,  should  be  surrendered  to  the 
esBor  as  a  part  of  the  premises.  The  lessee  re- 
DOTed  some  of  the  permanent  partitions  with 
he  lessor's  consent,  agreeing  to  restore  them 
It  the  termination  of  the  lease,  and  con- 
structed temporary  partitions,  whidi  did  not 


extend  to  the  ceiling,  and  were  lightly  nailed 
to  the  floor  and  walls,  and  at  the  termina- 
tion of  (he  lease  the  permanent  partitions 
were  restored.  Held,  that  the  reasonable  in- 
tention of  the  parties  was  the  test  of  wheth- 
er fixtures  were  annexed  to  the  realty,  and 
the  word  "improyements"  alone,  though  of 
wider  meaning  than  "fixtures,"  did  not  in- 
clude the  temporary  partitions;  and,  con- 
struing the  word  in  connection  with  the  ex- 
ceptions in  the  lease,  and  in  yiew  of  the  in- 
tention shown  thereby  that  such  partitions 
should  not  be  permanently  annexed,  they 
were  not  "improyements,"  but  were  "moy- 
able oflice  furniture."  wthln  the  meaning  of 
the  lease,  and  remoyable  by  the  lessee.  Unit- 
ed Booking  Offices  y.  Pittsburgh  Life  ft  Trust 
Go.,  110  N.  Y.  Supp.  216^  217,  65  Mise. 
Bep.  31. 

Where,  in  a  press  for  making  screw 
insulators,  an  essential  element,  to  difTeren- 
tiate  the  prior  art  is  a  rotary  table  or  its 
equiyalent  to  support  the  molds  and  carry 
them  in  a  fixed  and  predetermined  path  to 
and  from  other  parts  of  the  machine,  by 
which  the  process  inyolyed  is  carried  out  the 
spedflcation  of  a  "moyable  mold  adapted  to 
traVel,"  although  under  some  circumstances 
competent  to  imply  a  structural  arrangement 
by  which  the  mold  is  moyed  back  and  forth 
mechanically,  in  a  predetermined  way,  be- 
tween designated  points,  the  spedflc  means 
employed  for  doing  so  in  the  patent  in  suit 
being  of  the  essence  of  the  inyention,  a  claim 
in  which  it  is  not  made  an  element  of  the 
combination  is  inyalid,  as  being  too  broad; 
or  if,  disregarding  this,  the  omitted  element 
is  read  into  the  claim  as  being  implied,  it  will 
also  be  bad  where,  as  here,  it  thereby  dupli- 
cates another  claim.  Noyelty  Glass  Mfg.  Co. 
y.  Brookfleld,  170  Fed.  946,  056,  05  0.  O.  A 
516. 

MOVE 

The  word  "moyed,**  aa  applied  to  a 
change  of  one's  residence,  may  or  may  not, 
according  to  circumstances,  warrant  an  'in- 
ference of  a  permanent  change.  Dixon  y. 
Dixon,  66  Aa  597,  598,  72  N.  J.  Bq.  588. 

MOVE  SLOW  8IGNAI. 

A  "moye  slow  signal"  is  one  calling  for  a 
slow  and  gradual  moyement  of  the  train. 
Texas  Mexican  It  Ce.  y.  Hlggins,  99  S.  W. 
200,  201,  44  Tex.  Ciy.  App.  523. 

MOVED  BY  HAND 

In  Code  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  Md.  art  83,  | 
11,  exempting  from  execution  all  tools  or 
other  mechanical  instruments  or  appliances 
moyed  or  worked  by  hand  or  foot  necessary 
to  the  practice  of  any  trade  or  profession  and 
used  in  the  practice  thereof,  the  expression 
"moyed  or  worked  by  hand  or  foot"  evidently 
applies  only  to  machinery,  and  the  goyeming 
idea  of  the  section  seems  to  be  that  the  ar- 
ticles exempted  are  those  necessary  to  the 


a 

ii 


MOVEMJSSCr 


404 


BCDIiATTO 


praetlQe  0f  the  tnde  or  professloii,  not  mored 
by  steam,  electricity,  or  other  motlTe  power 
than  hand  or  foot  Stelner  t.  Marahall*  140 
Fed.  710,  712»  72  a  a  A.  108. 

KOVEMEMT 

See  Forward  Movement 

MOVCfO  0AU8E 

See  Initial  and  Moving  Ganae. 

MOVniG  PIOTUBB  SHOW 

As  drcas,  see  Gircns. 

As  other  amusement,  see  Other. 

As  public  show,  see  Public  Show* 

As  theater,  Ste  Theater. 

See,  also.  Panorama. 

MOVnrG  TBAFFIO 

Used  in  moving  Interstate  traffic,   see 
Use— Used. 

A  freight  oar  which  was  being  taken  to 
a  repair  shop  to  be  repaired  was  not  within 
Rev.  Laws,  c.  Ill,  H  203,  209,  prohibiting  a 
railroad  company,  in  '•moving  traffic,**  from 
hauling  a  car  not  equipped  with  an  automatic 
coupler.  Taylor  v.  Boston  ft  M.  B.  B.,  74  N. 
E.  591,  188  Mass.  890. 

MRS. 

In  the  absence  of  «  statute,  parties  to  a 
litigation  must  be  designated  by  name,  and 
not  merely  by  description  of  the  person,  and 
the  designation  ''Mrs.**  is  not  a  name,  but 
usually  distinguishes  the  person  referred  to 
as  a  married  woman.  Feld  v.  Loftis,  88  N. 
B.  281,  283.  240  111.  105 ;  Uihl^n  v.  Gladleux, 
78  N.  E.  363,  365,  74  Ohio  St  232. 

The. prefix  "Mrs.,**  before  the  name  of  a 
party  in  a  pleading,  indicates  that  the  party 
is  a  female,  but  leaves  it  doubtful  whether 
she  is  married  or  single  (using  the  word 
"single**  in  a  sense  broad  enough  to  include  a 
divorced  person).  Wrightsville  &  T.  R.  CJo.  v. 
Vaughan,  71  8.  E.  691,  693,  9  Oa.  App.  871. 

Where  the  back  of  a  railread  mileage 
book  containeid  a  line  for  the  signature  of  the 
purchaser,  preceded  by  a  printed  M.,  which 
was  to  be  followed  either  by  the  designation 
Mr.  or  Mrs.,  such  designation  was  a  mere 
matter  of  courtesy",  although  intended  to 
show  the  sex  of  the  purchaser,  and  a  con- 
ductor should  not  refuse  to  accept  mileage 
where  he  knows  that  through  some  error,  a 
book  purchased  by  i^alntiff,  a  woman,  redd 
"Mr.**  Instead  of  "Mrs.**  Parish  v,  Ulster  ft 
D.  R.  Co.,  85  N.  E.  153,  154,  192  N.  Y.  353. 

MUCH 

See  As  much  as. 

The  word  "many,"  In  a  provision  of  a 
dty  charter  that  notice  of  the  introduction  of 
an  ordinance  shall  be  published  at  least  as 
many  as  ten  days  before  the  adoption  of  such 
ordinance*  meant  the  same  lis  though  the 


word  'Innclf*  had  been  used,  and  reqni 
merely  that  the  notice  be  published  ten  d 
before  the  action  was  taken,  but  did  not 
quire  that  it  be  published  every  day  for 
days.  Smith  T.  Atlanta*  51  &  B.  741«  'i 
128  Ga.  877. 

MUCK  BAR 

"  'Muck  bar*  is  more  advanced  than 
iron,  for  it  is  the  product  of  pig  iron  ai 
its  conversion  into  wrought  iron  \n  the  p 
dllng  furnace.  But  t/s>  make  muck  bar 
wrought  iron  is  rolled  through  a  set  of  ro 
This  rolled  iron  comes  from  the  rolls  in  I 
form.  *  *  *  Knight's  Mechanical  I 
tlonary  defines  'muck  bar*  as  'bar  iron  wb 
has  passed  once  through  the  rolls.*  *'  Moc 
head  Bros,  ft  Co<  ▼•  United  States,  127  f 
779,  780. 

MUCKER 

A  "mucker^  Is  one  who  r^noves 
ore,  rock,  and  debris  thrown  down  by  mln< 
His  work  must  be  done  in  part,  at  lei 
ahead  of  the  timbering,  which  is  to  aff< 
protection  against  the  falling  of  ore,  ro 
and  d^rls.  Smith  v.  Hecla  Mln.  Co., 
Pac.  779,  780,  88  Wash.  454 ;  Bird  v.  Ut 
Gold  Mln.  Ck».,  84  Paa  25^-260,  2  GaL  A 
674. 

MUD 

See  Water  and  Mud* 

MUFFLER 

"Muttier,'*  anything  used  to  mufBe 
wrap  up,  is  an  ordinary  English  word,  whj 
fitly  describes  a  neck  scarf.  The  name  "m 
fiet,"  used  as  a  trade-mark,  is  not,  under  t 
trade-mark  law,  preclusive  of  the  word  "m 
fier.**  Hygienic  Fleeced  Underwear  Co. 
Way,  137  Fed.  592,  595,  70  C.  C.  A.  STv*)  (( 
Ing  Cent  Diet). 

A  "muffler**  is  a  device  attached  to  t 
exhaust  pipe  of  a  gas  engine  and  throo 
which  the  exhaust  passes,  used  to  muffle 
deaden  the  sound  of  the  explosion.  Wolf 
Des  Moines  Elevator  Co.,  98  N.  W.  801,  9 
126  Iowa,  659. 


MUGUET 

As    enfleurage    grease,    see    Enfleura 
Grease. 


MULATTO 

A  person  too  dark  to  be  white  and  t 
bright  to  be  a  griff  is  a  "mulatta"  State 
Treadaway,  52  South.  500,  508,  126  La.  dC 
139  Anu  St  Rep.  514,  20  Ann.  Cas.  297. 


MUXiOT 


466 


MDZiTZFABJOPSKBBS 


MULCT 

Tlie  words  •"mulct,"  ''pmilaliment,'*  and 
**fine,"  as  used  In  the  decisions  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Alabama  in  referring  to  the 
statutory  action  for  death,  given  by  Oode 
Ala.  1896, 1 27,  are  not  used  In  the  sense  that 
Is  ordinaTlly  attached  to  such  words  In  the 
domain  of  criminal  law,  and  therefore  such 
statute  is  not  a  penal  <»e^  within  the  rule 
that  one  state  wUl  not  enfoioe  the  penal 
laws  of  another  state.  Whitlow  v.  NashyiUe, 
C.  &  St  L.  R.  Co.,  84  S.  W.  618,  620, 114  Tenn. 
344,  68  L.  B.  A.  503  (Citing  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
T.  Bush,  26  South.  168,  174,  122  AUl  470,  488, 
489). 

lEUI^nr  TAXES 

The  term  ''mulct  taxes,"  in  Code,  |  2433, 
etc,  imposing  *'mulct  taxes"  on  dealers  in 
Intoxicating  liquors,  and  providing  that  the 
tax  shall  be  a  lien  on  the  property  where  the 
Uquor  is  sold.  Is  not  a  license  for  the  privi- 
lege of  carrying  on  the  business  of  selUng 
intoxicating  liquors,  but  is  a  tax  without 
legalizing  the  business,  and  Its  imposition  is 
levied  pursuant  to  the  taxing  power  and  may 
be  collected  as  other  taxes.  Newton  v.  Mc- 
Kay, 102  N.  W.  827,  828, 180  Iowa,  506. 

MULE 

As  horse,  see  Horse. 

As  mare^  see  Mare. 

As  work  horse,  see  Work  Horse. 

MULTIFARIOUSNESS 

Duplicity  synonymous,  see  Duplicity. 

A  bill  Is  generally  understood  to  be  mul- 
tifarious when  distinct  and  independent  mat^ 
ters  are  impr<^;»^ly  joined  in  one  bill,  and 
thereby  confounded,  as  for  example,  where 
several  perfectly  distinct  and  unconnected 
matters  against  one  defendant  are  united  In 
one  MIL  Baumgartner  v.  Bradt,  60  N.  B. 
012,  913,  207  IlL  345;  Btate  Trust  C3o.  v.  Kan- 
sas City,  P.  &  O.  B.  Ck).,  128  Fed.  129  (dtlng 
Story,  £q.  PI.  [10th  Bd.]  par.  271). 

While  the  rule  as  to  multifariousness  may 
be  said  to  be  one  of  convenience,  and  there 
may  not  be  any  inflexible  rule  as  to  what 
constitutes  fatal  multifariousness,  yet,  broad- 
ly speaking,  "multifariousness'*  may  be  de- 
fined as  the  improper  Joining  In  one  bill  dis- 
tinct and  Independent  matters.  Murrell  v. 
Peterson,  49  So.  31,  34,  67  Fla.  480. 

A  bin  is  multifarious  when  it  states  dis- 
tinct, separate,  and  Independent  equities  that 
can  better  be  adjudicated  in  more  than  one 
suit  Arcadia  Mercantile  Go.  v.  Branning, 
S2  South.  588,  689,  69  Fla.  428. 

"Multifariousness*'  Is  the  Improper  joln- 
iag  In  one  bill  of  distinct  and  Independent 
unconnected  matters  against  one  defendant 
or  the  demand  of  several  matters  of  a  dis- 
tinct and  independent  nature  against  sever- 

8  Wn&&  P.2D  Sbb.— 30 


ml  defendants.    Martin  v.  Brown,  69  9.  B. 
302,  300,  129  Ga.  662. 

Btrlotly  speaking,  misjoinder  of  parties 
plaintiff  is  not  ''multifariousness.'*  Brelmey- 
er  V.  Star  BotUlng  Cki.,  117  &  W.  119,  122, 
136  Mo.  App.  84. 

A  bill  U  multifMoos  when  it  Improperly 
Joins  several  defendants  in  charging  matters 
of  a  distinct  nature.  Baker  v.  Berry  Hill 
Mineral  Springs  Co.,  66  S.  B.  660,  668,  109 
Vr.776. 

While  not  entirely  synonymous,  the  com- 
mon-law term  "misjoinder**  and  the  equity 
term  ''multifarious**  have  much  in  common. 
They  each  token  improper  Joinder,  and  both 
have  reference  to  the  confusing  result 
wrought  thereby.  Neither  goes  to  the  sub- 
stance of  complalnant*s  claim,  but  merely  as- 
serts improper  Joinder  of  causes  of  action. 
Since  these  terms  go  only  to  form,  and  not 
to  substance,  objections  for  either  or  both  are 
not  defenses  within  the  accepted  meaning  of 
that  term.  Skalns  v.  Barnes,  68  South.  268, 
270,  168  Ala.  426. 

"To  render  a  bill  'multifarious,*  it  must 
contain,  not  only  separate  and  distinct  mat- 
ters, but  such  that  each  entitles  the  com- 
plainant to  separate  equitable  reliet  It  is 
not  so  if  it  be  single  as  to  the  subject-matter 
and  object  thereof,  and  the  relief  sought.  If 
all  the  defendants  are  connected,  though  dif- 
ferently, with  the  whole  subject  of  dispute." 
Braun  &  Ferguson  Co.  v.  Paulson  (Tex.)  95  S. 
W.  617,  619  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Love  v.  Keowne,  68  Tex.  191,  and  citing 
Skipwith  V.  Hurt,  60  S.  W.  423,  94  Tex.  322; 
SSinger  Mfg.  Ck).  v.  Ponder.  18  S.  W.  152,  82 
Tex.  653). 

By  '^multlftirionsness'*  is  meant  the  im- 
properly Joining  in  one  bill  distinct  and  Inde- 
pendent matters,  and  thereby  confounding 
them,  as,  for  example,  the  uniting  in  one 
bill  of  several  matters,  perfectly  distinct  and 
unconnected,  against  one  defendant,  or  the 
demand  of  several  matters,  of  a  distinct  and 
Independent  nature,  against  several  defend- 
ants in  the  same  bill.  United  States  v.  Rea- 
Read  MiU  &  Blevator  Co.,  171  Fed.  601,  616 
(quoting  and  adopting  definitions  In  Walker 
V.  Powers,  104  U.  S.  245,  26  L.  Ed.  729). 

The  objection  of  "multifariousness,"  as 
containing  different  causes  of  action,  is  not 
supported  unless  •'two  things  occur:  First, 
the  grounds  of  suit  must  be  different;  second, 
each  ground  must  be  sufficient,  as  stated,  to 
sustain  a  bill.'*  Howe  &  Davidson  Oo.  v. 
Haugan,  140  Fed.  182,  184  (citing  Brown  v. 
Guarantee  Trust  ft  8.  D.  Co.,  9  Sup.  Ot  127, 
128  U.  S.  403,  411,  412,  82  K  Bd.  468). 

A  bill  may  contain  equity  and  not  be 
"multifarious,'*  which  is  generally  under- 
stood to  indicate  a  case  where  a  party  Is 
brought  in  as  a  defendant  on  a  record,  with 
a  large  portion  of  which,  and  in  the  case 


B4ULTIFAKI0USNBSS 


466 


MULTIFARIOUSNESS 


made  by  which,  he  had  no  connection  what- 
eyer.  Alabama  Great  Sonthern  R.  Co.  v. 
Prouty,  43  South.  352,  354,  149  Ala.  71  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  the  definition  in  Adamt  y. 
Jones,  68  Ala.  117,  and  dtlng  Mayfleld'a 
Dig.  290.  if  2104,  2105). 

A  joinder  of  two  cauaea  of  action  against 
the  same  party  for  the  same  relief,  one 
against  him  as  an  individual  and  one  against 
him  as  an  officer,  does  not  make  the  bill 
"multifarious."  No  biU  Is  multifarious  which 
presents  a  common  point  of  litigation,  the  de- 
cision of  which  will  affect  the  entire  subject- 
matter  and  settle  the  rights  of  the  parties  to 
the  suit  Rogers  v.  Penobscot  Mining  Co., 
154  Fed.  606,  614,  83  C.  C.  A.  380. 

The  Tice  of  ^'multifariousness"  la  the 
union  of  causes  of  action  which,  or  of  parties 
whose  claims,  it  is  either  impracticable  or 
inconyenlent  to  hear  and  adjudicate  in  a  sin- 
gle suit.  Where  it  is  practical  and  conyen- 
ient  for  the  court  and  the  parties  to  deal 
with  the  claims  or  causes  of  action  present- 
ed, and  the  parties  joined  by  a  petition,  in 
one  suit  as  in  many,  the  pleading  is  not  mul- 
tifarious and  should  be  sustained.  The  union 
of  several  causes  of  action  for  the  same  de- 
mand or  relief  in  a  bill  or  petition  does  not 
constitute  multifariousness.  The  joinder  of 
a  cause  of  action  to  enforce  a  mechanic's 
lien  and  a  cause  of  action  to  enforce  an 
equitable  lien  upon  the  same  property,  to  se- 
cure the  same  debt,  in  a  bill  or  petition  to 
enforce  the  preferential  payment  of  the  debt, 
does  not  render  the  pleading  multifarious;  it 
being  more  convenient  and  practicable  to  try 
and  adjudicate  these  causes  of  action  in  one 
suit  than  in  several.  Westinghouse  Air 
Brake  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  Southern  R.  Co., 
137  Fed.  26,  31-33,  71  C.  C.  A.  1  (citing 
Stephens  v.  McCargo,  9  Wheat  [22  U.  S.]  502, 
504,  6  L.  Ed.  145;  Gerriah  y.  Towne,  3  Gray 
[69  Mass.]  82;  Halsey  y.  Goddard,  86  Fed.  25, 
28;  Chaffin  v.  Hull,  39  Fed.  887,  889,  891; 
Davis  V.  Berry,  106  Fed-  761;  Barcus  y. 
Gates,  89  Fed.  783,  791,  32  C.  C.  A.  337,  345 ; 
1  Danlell,  Ch.  PL  &  Prac.  ♦343.  ♦344  [6th 
Am.  Ed.] ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  Si  531,  532,  p.  461 
[10th  Ed.];  Fletcher,  Eq.  PI.  &  Prac.  |  108,  p. 
145). 

"A  bill  in  equity  is  said  to  be  'multi- 
farious' when  distinct  and  independent  mat- 
ters are  joined  therein.  If  the  subject-mat- 
ter in  the  main  relates  to  one  transaction 
around  which  the  others  cluster,  and  each 
party  has  an  interest  in  some  matters  in  the 
suit,  and  they  are  connected,  evien  though  all 
tbe  parties  do  not  have  an  Interest  In  all  the 
matters  in  the  suit,  the  bill  is  not  multifari- 
ous." Where  complainants  were  all  inter- 
ested in  a  suit  to  compel  specific  performance 
of  a  contract  to  dispose  ot  real  and  personal 
property  by  will,  there  was  no  misjoinder  of 
parties  complainant,  because  they  were  not 
all  Interested  to  the  same  extent.  Stewart  v. 
Smith,  91  Pac.  667,  669,  6  CaL  App.  152  (quot- 


ing and  adopting  definition  in  WhitAead 
Sweety  58  Pac.  876,  120  OaL  7Q). 

The  essence  of  "multifariousneas'* 
pleading  is  the  improperly  blending  of  d 
tinct  demands  or  independent  matters  in  o 
bilL  A  bill  alleging  that  defendant  H.  w 
the  holder  of  notes  variously  indorsed 
plaintiffs,  representing  a  single  transaction 
series  of  transactions,  consisting  of  loans 
discounts  at  usurious  rates  and  usurious  i 
newals,  that  among  sncdi  notes  were  two  1 
dorsed  by  defendant  N.,  which  were  giv&i 
H.  as  collateral  without  further  considei 
don,  that  H.,  in  renewing  the  loans,  had  pv 
posely  so  mingled  his  usurious  transactioi 
as  to  make  it  difllcult,  without  a  full  accoui 
ing  with  him,  to  determine  the  amount  of  ti 
legal  indebtedness  to  him  either  of  plaintj 
or  defendant  N.  on  the  notes  bearing  the 
names,  and  prayed  f6r  such  an  acoonntiii 
was  not  objectionable  for  "multifSiriousnesfl 
in  so  far  as  defendant  N.  and  H.  were  co 
cemed.  Homer  y.  Nitach,  63  AtL  1052,  105 
103  Md.  498. 

"Multifariousness"  is  avoided  if  each  < 
the  parties  is  concerned  in  matters  materk 
provided  they  are  allied  to  or  connected  wit 
the  others.  So,  where  some  defendant  ma 
be  a  necessary  party  to  some  essential  po 
tion  of  the  relief  growing  out  of  the  entii 
controversy,  the  objection  will  not  obtain, 
bill  is  not  "multifarious"  which  seeks  to  ha^ 
an  accounting  on  contracts  with  one  of  it 
defendants,  where  another  defendant  is  job 
ed  under  allegations  that  the  two  have  wronj 
fully  taken  the  funds  equitably  belonging  t 
the  complainant,  and  fraudulently  sought  1 
cover  them  up  by  investing  them  in  land 
taking  the  legal  title  thereto  in  themselve 
and  the  bill  seeks  to  fasten  a  trust  thereo 
for  the  use  of  the  complainant  McMulle 
Lumber  Co.  ▼.  Strother,  136  Fed.  296,  306,  6 
C.  C.  A.  433  (citing  Barcus  v.  Gates,  89  Fe< 
783,  32  C.  C.  A.  387;  Brown  v.  Guarante 
Trust  &  Safe-Deposit  Co.,  9  Sup.  OL  127, 12 
U.  S.  403,  412,  32  Lw  Ed.  468;  K^ey  y 
Boettcher,  85  Fed.  64,  29  C.  C.  A.  14;  Curra 
V.  Campion,  85  Fed.  70,  29  a  a  A.  26;  Wei 
V.  Bay  State  Gas  Co.,  91  Fed.  940). 

"By  'multifariousness  in  a  bill/  as  defii 
ed  by  Story,  Bq.  PI.  {  271,  is  meant:  Th 
impitoperly  joining  In  one  bill  of  distinct  aD< 
Independent  matters,  and  thereby  confound 
ing  them ;  as,  for  example,  the  uniting  in  on 
bill  of  several  matters,  perfectly  distinct  an 
unconnected,  against  one  defendant,  or  tb 
demand  of  several  matters  of  distinct  and  li 
dependent  nature  against  several  defendant 
in  the  same  bill.'"  There  is  no  fatal  m& 
joinder  of  causes  pf  action  in  equity  in  an: 
bill  which  presents  a  common  point  of  lltlga 
tlon,  the  decision  of  which  will  affect  thi 
whole  subject-matter  and  will  settle  thi 
rights  of  all  the  parties  to  the  suit  It  is  no 
Indispensable  that  all  the  parties  should  havi 
an  interest  in  all  the  matters  contained  in  thi 


MULTIFARIOUSNESS 


m 


MULTIFARIOUSNESS 


Boit.  It  will  be  saffldent  if  each  party  baa 
ui  interest  in  some  material  matters  in  tbe 
suit,  and  that  they  are  connected  with  the 
others.  Where  an  inaurance  corporation  ia- 
sued  a  large  number  of  poIicLea  and  contract- 
ed to  pay  a  certain  sum  to  each  policy  holder, 
together  with  an  equitable  portion  of  a  profit 
fund,  to  be  made  up  from  gaioa  and  profits 
from  lapses  and  other  sources,  and,  when 
such  policies  were  outstanding,  the  company 
transferred  its  assets  to  another  company, 
disenabling  itself  from  performing  its  con- 
tracts, and  went  out  of  business,  and  its  suc- 
cessor, after  issuing  similar  policies,  trans- 
ferred its  assets  to  a  third,  and  the  third  to 
a  fourth,  company,  the  holders  of  policies  in 
the  transferring  companies  were  entitled  to 
join  in  a  bill  in  equity  for  some  form  of  relief 
with  respect  to  the  assets  transferred  as  a 
trust  fund,  and  where  the  bill  contained  alle- 
gations tending  to  negative  any  novation  to 
Join  all  the  companies  as  d^endants.  Wat- 
son V.  National  Life  ft  Trust  Oo^  102  Fed.  7, 
10,  88  C.  C  A.  380  (quoting  and  adopting  Kel- 
ley  v.,Boettcher,  85  Fed.  55,  64,  29  0.  O.  A. 
14;  Brown  v.  Guarantee  Trust  Co.,  9  Sup.  Ot 
127,  130.  128  U.  S.  403,  412,  32  U  Ed.  468). 

It  is  difficult  to  give  any  distinct  defini- 
tton  of  "multifajiousness,"  and  the  cases  so 
nearly  approach  each  other  that  it  is  not 
easy  to  distinguish  them.  A  learned  author 
states  that  ''multlfSariousiiess  means  the  join- 
ing together  improperly  in  one  bill  of  com- 
plaint of  distinct  and  independ^it  matters 
and  thereby  confounding  them";  also  that 
"a  claim  against  two  or  more  defendants 
cannot  be  properly  united  in  the  same  bill 
with  a  SQ;Mirate  daia  against  one  only.*' 
Our  own  court  has  said  that  it  "is  generally 
understood  to  include  those  cases  'where  a 
party  is  brought  as  a  defendant  on  the  rec- 
ord,' with  a  large  portion  of  which,  and  in 
the  case  made  by  which,  he  has  no  connection 
whatever."  A  bill  for  specific  performance 
of  a  contract  for  the  assignment  of  an  inter- 
est of  a  partner  in  the  firm  property,  and  for 
an  accounting  from  one  who  had  done  busi- 
ness with  the  assignor  in  violation  of  the 
provisions  of  the  assignment,  and  for  an  ac* 
counting  of  the  firm  business  by  the  other 
partners,  is  multifarious.  Bentley  v.  Barnes, 
47  South.  159,  161,  151  Ala.  659  (citing  1 
Beach,  Mod.  Eq.  Prac  li  115,  121;  Adams  v. 
Jcmes,  68  Ala.  117, 119). 

"Multifariousness"  is  Incapable  of  exact 
definition.  The  objection  is  frequently  a 
matter  of  discretion,  and  every  case  must,  in 
a  measure,  be  governed  by  what  is  convenient 
and  equitable  under  its  own  peculiar  facts, 
subject  to  the  recognized  principles  of  equi- 
ty jurisprudence.  It  is  always  proper  to  exer- 
cise this  discretion  in  suefa  manner  as  to  dis- 
courage future  litigation  about  the  same  sub- 
ject-matter, and  to  prevent  a  multiplicity  of 
suits,  but  never  to  do  plain  violence  to  the 
maxim  that  "courts  0((  equity  deUght  to  do 


justice  and  not  by  halves."  All  that  can  be 
done  in  each  particular  case,  as  it  arises,  is 
to  consider  whether  it  comes  nearer  to  the 
decisions  where  the  objection  has  been  held 
fatal  or  to  those  where  it  has  not  been  so 
held.  Complainant  purchased  a  portion  of 
a  plat  of  ground,  all  of  which  originally  be- 
longed to  his  vendor,  W.,  who  had  previously 
sold  another  portion  of  the  plat  to  Q.,  who 
had  taken  possession  only  of  the  portion  so 
purchased;  W.  retaining  the  balance.  As 
the  result  of  inaccuracies  and  misdescriptions 
in  each  of  the  deeds,  there  was  a  confusion 
of  boundaries  on  the  face  of  the  paper  titles, 
and  G.,  claiming  that  her  deed  conveyed  the 
land  claimed  by  complainant,  Instituted  eject- 
ment against  him  to  recover  the  lot  of  which 
he  was  in  possession,  whereupon  complainant 
filed  a  bin  against  G.  and  W.  and  wife,  seek- 
ing to  correct  the  errors  and  misdescriptions 
in  both  deeds,  to  enjoin  the  ejectment  suit, 
and  for  general  relief.  Held,  that  the  bin 
was  properly  maintainable  to  prevent  a  mul- 
tiplicity of  suits,  and  was  therefore  not  de- 
murrable for  multifariousness.  Sicard  v. 
Guyllou,  41  South.  474,  147  Ala.  289  (citing 
Adams  v.  Jones,  68  Ala.  117;  1  Danlell,  C3i. 
PI.  ft  Prac.  834,  note  2;  Boyd  v.  Hunter,  44 
Ala.  705). 

There  is  no  fixed  or  infiexible  rule  by 
which  to  determine  whether  or  not  a  bill  1b 
"multifarious."  The  test  must  be  applied  to 
the  facts  of  each  particular  case,  in  the  ll^t 
of  the  general  principles  regulating  single- 
ness in  pleading,  which  forbid  the  blending 
in  the  same  suit  entirely  distinct  and  sep- 
arate matters  relating  to  different  parties. 
A  bill  to  reach  property  fraudulently  convey- 
ed is  not  multifarious  because  it  Joins  as 
defendants  with  the  debtor  a  number  of  per- 
sons alleged  to  have  severaUy  assisted  him 
in  covering  up  separate  and  distinct  portions 
of  his  property  by  accepting  transfers  there- 
of. Regester  v.  Regester,  65  Aa  12,  13,  104 
Md.  859. 

As  to  whether  a  bUl  is  "multifarious" 
depends  on  the  particular  fact  of  each  case 
and  is  largely  within  the  sound  discretion  of 
the  court  It  Is  not  indispensable  that  an  tbe 
parties  to  a  suit  in  equity  should  have  an  in- 
terest in  all  the  matters  contained  in  the  suit, 
but  it  \b  sufficient  If  each  party  has  an  inter- 
est in  some  material  matters  in  the  suit  and 
they  are  cotmected  with  the  others.  In  a 
suit  for  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  of  a 
bankrupt  prior  to  adjudication  for  the  pur- 
pose of  taking  possession  of  property  alleged 
to  have  been  fraudulently  conveyed  to  vari- 
ous relatives  of  the  bankrupt,  the  biU  was 
not  'Multifarious"  because  many  claimants 
were  joined  who  were  the  various  aUeged 
fraudulent  transferees  of  the  property.  Hor^ 
ner-Gaylord  Ca  v.  MlUer  ft  Bennett,  147  Fed. 
295,  298  (citing  United  States  v.  American 
BeU  Telephone  Ck>.,  9  Sup.  Ot  90,  128  U.  S. 
315,  32  L.  Ed.  450;   Walker  t.  Powers.  104 


MULTIFARIOUSNESS 


468 


MUIiTlPIilCITT  OF  SUITS 


U.  S.  245,  26  L.  Bd.  729;  Brown  T.  Guarantee 
Tniflt  ft  S.  D.  Co.,  9  Sup.  Ct  127,  128  U.  a 
403,  82  L.  Bd.  468;  South  Penn  Oil  Co.  v. 
Calf  Creek  Oil  &  Gas  Co.,  140  Fed.  516 ;  Sha- 
fer  T.  O'Brien,  8  S.  E.  298,  31  W.  Va-  601). 

"  'Multifariousness,'  abstractly,  lias  been 
properly  said  to  be  Incapable  of  a  distinct 
definition,  but  Is  generally  understood  to  In- 
clude those  cases  'where  a  party  Is  brought 
as  a  defendant  on  the  record,  with  a  large 
portion  of  which,  and  In  the  case  made  by 
which,  he  has  no  connection  whatever.' "  A 
bill  against  a  cotton  compress  company  and 
a  carrier  for  discovery  and  the  value  of  cot- 
ton damaged  or  lost  Is  not  multifarious  be- 
cause, on  an  accounting,  It  may  result  that 
one  of  the  defendants  may  be  shown  to  be 
liable  to  complainant  on  one  or  more  Items 
for  which  the  other  Is  not,  and  with  which  It 
l8  In  no  wise  connected.  Qulf  Compress  Co. 
V.  Jones  Cotton  Co.,  47  South.  251,  254,  157 
Ala.  32  (dtlng  Adams  v.  Jones,  68  Ala.  117, 
119). 

A  stockholder's  bill  to  compel  the  cancel- 
lation of  an  alleged  Illegal  Issue  of  the  corpo- 
ration's conmion  stock  and  the  rescission  of 
a  transfer  thereof  and  for  a  receiver  to  con- 
duct the  corporation's  affairs  for  a  reasonable 
time  and  an  Injunction  restraining  the  trans- 
feree of  the  stock  from  voting  the  same  as 
stockholders'  meetings  was  not  demurrable 
for  multifariousness,  under  the  rule  that 
whether  a  bill  is  "multifarious"  is  a  question 
of  discretion,  and  that  the  bill  will  not  be  so 
held  where  there  are  only  s^arate  claims  to 
the  same  individual  subject-matter.  Howard 
V.  National  Telephone  Co.,  182  Fed.  215,  220. 

A  bill  filed  by  the  United  States  to  cancel 
for  fraud  a  large  number  of  separate  convey- 
ances made  by  individual  Indians  to  the  sev- 
eral defendants,  and  having  no  connection 
with  each  other,  the  suit  being  on  behalf  of 
the  various  grantors,  is  multifarious.  Unit- 
ed States  V.  Allen,  171  Fed.  907,  928  (citing  6 
Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4616). 

A  bin  by  a  Judgment  creditor  against 
the  debtor  and  others  to  set  aside  various 
conveyances  by  which  it  is  alleged  the  debtor 
fraudulently  transferred  his  property  to  dif- 
ferent corporations  organized  for  the  purpose, 
and  of  which  he  owned  the  stock,  the  purpose 
being  to  cover  it  up  and  place  it  beyond  the 
reach  of  execution,  through  which  transfers 
the  other  defendants  have  acquired  or  claim- 
ed some  Interest  in  different  portions  of  the 
property,  has  but  a  single  object,  which  is  to 
reach  and  subject  the  property,  is  based  on  a 
series  of  transactions  forming  one  course  of 
dealing,  and  is  not  demurrable  for  "multifa- 
riousness," although  the  interests  of  the  oth- 
er parties  defendant  are  separate  and  dis- 
tinct Where  the  object  of  the  suit  is  single, 
and  it  happens  that  different  persons  have 
separate  interests  in  distinct  questions  which 
arise  out  of  the  single  object,  it  necessarily 
foUowB  that  siich  different  persons  must  be 


bron^t  before  the  court  in  order  that  tl 
suit  may  conclude  the  whole  subject;  and  : 
order  to  determine  whether  a  suit  is  multif 
rlous,  or,  in  other  words,  contains  distloi 
matters,  the  inquiry  is,  not  wheth^  each  d 
fendant  is  connected  with  every  branch  < 
the  cause,  but  whether  the  plaintiff's  bl 
seeks  relief  in  respect  of  matters  which  u 
in  their  nature  separate  and  distinct.  Fo^ 
«r  V.  Palmer,  160  Fed.  1,  16,  17,  18,  19,  87  ( 
a  A.  157. 

A  bin  in  equity,  which  charges:  (1)  Tbi 
certain  real  estate  was  bought  for  the  plai 
tiff  corporation  by  its  president,  and  wt 
paid  for  in  whole  or  in  part  with  its  fund 
or  with  the  proceeds  of  its  stodc  unlawful 
Issued  and  sold,  and  not  properly  accounU 
for,  and  that  its  president  fraudulently  can 
ed  the  real  estate  to  be  conveyed  to  his  so 
one  of  the  defendants,  through  whom  seven 
other  defendants,  but  not  all  the  defendant 
have  legal  or  equitable  titles,  which  tin 
should  convey  to  the  plaintiff;  (2)  that  a  pa 
of  the  above  defendants,  and  two  other  d 
fendants,  have  unlawfully  received  stock  1 
the  plaintiff  corporation,  which  they  shonj 
account  for  to  it;  and  ^)  that  still  anotht 
defendant  has  unlawfully  received  and  sol 
the  stock  of  the  plaintiff,  in  part,  at  leaa 
other  than  that  mentioned  in  the  precedii 
class,  for  the  proceeds  of  which  he  shon] 
account  to  It— Is  bad  for  "multifariousnesB 
Camden  Land  Co.  v.  Lewis,  63  Aa  628,  52 
101  lia  7a 

MULTIPHASE  SYSTEM 

Technically  the  ''multiphase  87Btem«'*  i 
used  in  the  transmission  of  electric  powe 
consists  of  the  use  of  two  or  more  altemai 
currents  of  equal  period,  but  differing  1 
phase.  Harrison  y.  Detroit,  Y.,  A.  A.  &  . 
By.,  100  N.  W.  451,  452,  187  Mich.  7a 

MULTIPLICITY 

BfULTIPLIOITY  OF  PBOOEEDOf 08 

The  continuation  of  a  pending  suit  ft 
infringement  of  a  patent,  and  the  taking  < 
testimony  therein  by  complainant  after  It  hi 
filed  a  petition  for  a  reissue  on  the  ground  ( 
the  invalidity  of  the  patent  in  suit,  const 
tutes  a  '^multiplication  of  proceedings,*'  so  t 
to  unreasonably  and  vexatiously  increase  tl 
costs,  within  the  meaning  of  Rev.  St  I  98 
and  on  a  dismissal  of  the  suit  after  the  gran 
Ihg  of  a  reissue  defendant  is  entitled  ther 
under  to  a  special  allowance  commensurai 
with  the  expense  Occasioned  thereby.  M 
tlon  Picture  Patents  Co.  v.  Yankee  Film  C( 
192  Fed.  134, 135. 

MUXTIPIiICITT  OF  fHllTS 

A  "multiplicity  of  suits"  does  not  met 
a  multitude  of  ^its,  the  term  not  applylr 
merely  because  each  of  sev^al  parties  joint) 
and^^everaliy  liable  toa^  bi»  independent! 


MtTLTITUDB 


489 


MUKICIPAr.  AlV AIB8 


ned,  tmt  wbere  one  may  be  sued  sereral 
imee  reepectliiff  tbe  same  aubject-matter  in 
ts  enttrety,  or  some  element  or  elements 
liereot.  Illinois  Steel  Go.  v.  Schzoeder,  118 
S\  W.  51,  66, 133  Wis.  661,  14  U  B.  A.  (N.  &) 
S9,  126  Am.  St  BeiK  Wl. 

HULTITUDE 

The  law  of  trespass  or  forcible  entry 
■equires  a  demonstration  of  force  sufficient  to 
create  a  reasonable  apprehension  that  the 
)arty  In  possession  must  yield  to  avoid  a 
)reach  of  the  peace  being  committed,  either 
>y  a  "multitude"  or  by  weapons,  and  three 
)er8ons  have  been  held  sufficient  to  constitute 
I  multitude.  State  v.  Davis,  13  S.  E.  883, 
109  N.  G.  811,  14  U  B.  A.  206. 

MUNICIPAL 

The  term  'teimlcliMil,''  as  oommnoly 
ised,  is  appropiriately  applied  to  all  corpora- 
tions exerdfling  govemmental  functions,  ei- 
^er  genial  or  special.  Merchants'  Nat. 
Bank  of  San  Diego  v.  Bscondido  Irr.  Dlst, 
n  Paa  937,  938,  144  GaL  329. 

The  word  ''municipal"  is  defined  as 
meaning  or  pertaining  to  a  city  or  corpora- 
tioD  having  the  right  to  administer  local 
government  Miller  v.  People,  82  N.  B.  621, 
523,  230  IlL  65. 

The  word  ''municipal,**  as  originally  used 
In  its  strictness,  applied  to  cities  only,  but 
It  now  has  a  much  more  extended  meaning, 
&nd,  when  applied  to  corporations,  the  words 
"municipal,"  "poUtical,"  and  '-pubUC'  are 
ased  interchangeably.  Smith  v.  Board  of 
Trustees  of  Robersonville  Graded  School,  63 
S.  E.  524,  527,  141  N.  G.  143,  8  Ann.  Gas.  529 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Gurxler 
T.  District  Tp.  of  Sioux  Gity,  17  N.  W.  191, 
62  Iowa,  lOZi. 

The  term  "munldpar  relates  not  only  to 
a  town  or  dty  as  a  territorial  entity  but  also 
pertains  to  local  self-government  in  general, 
andin  a  broader  sense  to  the  internal  govern- 
ment of  a  state.  A  town  or  a  city  is  wholly 
a  creature  of  the  state  and  wholly  sub- 
servient  to  the  stat^,  and  for  that  reason  is 
not  strictly  a  corporation,  as  interpreted  by 
the  common  law.  It  is  rather  a  quasi  mu- 
nicipal corporation.  City  of  Augusta  v. 
Augusta  Water  Dist.,  63  Ati.  663,  664,  101 
Me.  148  (citing  Standard  Diet  "munldpaV). 

The  word  "municipal"  appears  to  have 
been  derived  from  "municipium,"  meaning 
4  town,  particularly  In  Italy,  which  possess- 
ed the  right  of  Roman  citizenship,  but  was 
governed  by  its  own  laws,  a  free  town;  and 
it  may  be  thus  defined :  (1)  Of  or  pertaining 
to  a  dty  or  corporation  having  the  right  of 
administering  local  government,  as  municipal 
rt^ts,  municipal  officers.  (1^  Of  or  pertain- 
ing to  a  state,  kingdom,  or  nation,  as  mu- 
nicipal law,  municipal  offense,  in  contradis- 
tinction to  international  law  or  international 


offense— and  stifcUy  the  word  applies  only 
to  what  belongs  to  a  dty-  Laws  1906,  p. 
276^  c  163,  creating  a  board,  to  be  known  as 
the  state  capltol  commission,  for  the  purpose 
of  procuring  the  erection  of  a  capltol  build- 
ing, and  authorising  the  commission  to  pro- 
cure the  erection  of  a  building,  adopt  plans 
and  spedflcations,  etc..  Is  not  in  conflict  with 
Gonst  art  3,  f  26k  declaring  that  the  Legis- 
lature shall  not  delegate  to  any  special  com- 
mission power  to  perform  any  "munidpar* 
function;  the  erection  of  a  capltol  building 
not  being  a  •'municipal"  function,  which  in 
sudi  case  is  restricted  to  the  affairs  of  cities 
and  towns.  Davenport  v.  Elrod,  107  N.  W. 
883,  834,  20  S.  D.  067  (citing  Webst  Int  Diet 
and  Bouv.). 

The  word  "municipal'*  applies  strictly 
only  to  a  dty  or  community  within  a  state 
possessing  rights  of  self-government  Prac- 
tice Act  (Kurd's  Rev.  St  1909,  c.  110)  t  118, 
which  provides  that  appeals  from  and  wilts 
of  error  to  drcuit  courts  and  the  superior 
court  of  Oook  county  shall  be  taken  direct  to 
the  Supreme  Gourt  in  cases  In  which  the  va- 
lidity of  a  "munidpal"  ordinance  is  involv- 
ed, upon  a  certificate  of  the  trial  court  that 
the  public  interest  so  requires,  applies  only 
to  ordinances  of  dties  and  villages  and  not 
to  ordinances  of  the  sanitary  district  of  Ghl- 
cago.  People  ex  rel.  Mortell  ▼.  Bergman,  97 
N.  B.  695,  696,  268  IlL  469. 

The  term  "munidpal  officer,"  as  used 
in  Gonst  art  16,  |  6»  limiting  the  terms  of  of- 
fice thereof  to  two  years,  means  "dty  offi- 
cers"; the  word  "munidpar*  having  its  ori- 
gin in  the  idea  of  a  free  town  or  dty,  and  in. 
its  popular  use  Is  applied  to  dties,  though  in 
Its  general  meaning  It  embodies  the  idea  of 
local  self-government  as  distinguished  ftom 
centralized  government  "Munidpar*  may 
either  refer  to* a  town  or  a  dty.  State  ex 
rel.  Quintin  t.  Edwards,  90  Pac.  040,  941,  946, 
38  Mont  290  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion In  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4619). 

mnaciPAX.  affairs 

The  phrase  "munidpal  affairs'*  has  a 
meaning  and  a  most  significant  one,  and,  as 
used  in  the  organic  law,  referred  to  the  in- 
ternal business  affairs  of  the  munidpality. 
Ck>nst  art  11,  §  6,  provides:  "Gities  and 
towns  heretofore  or  hereafter  organized,  and 
all  charters  thereof  framed  and  adopted  by 
authority  of  this  Gonstitution,  except  in  mu- 
nidpal affairs,  shall  be  subject  to  and  con- 
trolled by  general  laws."  The  wording  of 
this  provision  shows  that  aU  matters  of  leg^ 
islation  pertaining  to  and  bearing  upon  mu- 
nldpalities  do  not  come  within  the  significa- 
tion of  the  words  "munidpal  affairs'*  as  used 
in  the  Ck>nstitution.  Fragley  v.  Phelan,  68 
Paa  923,  925,  126  OL  383,  388.. 

The  power  to  Impose  a  license  tax  fbr 
revenue  purposes,  granted  by  the  state  to  a 
munidpality  for  munidpal  purposes,  became 
a  "mruiddpal  affair^'*  within  Const  art  11, 


I 


MUNICIPAL  AFFAIRS 


470 


MUinoiPAIi  AFFAIRS 


I  6,  providing  that  cities  and  their  charters 
shall  be  subject  to  and  controlled  by  general 
laws,  except  in  municipal  affairs,  and  the 
Legislature  was  without  authority  to  with- 
draw or  modify  such  power.  Ehc  parte 
Braun,  74  Pac  780,  783,  141  CaL  204. 

A  proylsion  in  a  charter  authorizing  a 
municipality  to  impose  and  collect  a  license 
tax  for  purposes  of  municipal  revenue  is  a 
"municipal  affair,"  and  within  the  proper 
scope  of  a  municipal  charter.  Ex  parte 
Jackson,  77  Pac.  457,  460.  143  Cal.  504. 

The  election  and  dismissal  of  teachers 
In  the  public  schools  are  not  "municipal  af- 
fairs," which  may,  by  a  freeholder's  charter, 
be  regulated  in  a  manner  in  conflict  with  that 
provided  by  the  general  law.  Barthel  v. 
Board  of  Education  of  City  of  San  Jose,  95 
Pac.  892.  893,  153  Cal.  376. 

The  amendment  of  Const,  art  11,  |  6,  by 
Insertion  of  the  words  '^except  in  munidpal 
affairs,"  so  as  to  protect  the  cities  and  coun- 
ties and  parties  thereof  except  in  municipal 
affairs,  shall  be  subject  to  and  controlled  by 
general  laws,  and  was  intended  to  give  mu- 
nicipalities the  sole  right  to  regulate,  control, 
and  govern  their  internal  conduct  independ- 
ent of  general  laws,  while  intended  to  give 
municipalitleB  the  sole  right  to  regulate,  con- 
trol, and  govern  their  internal  conduct,  in- 
dependent of  general  laws,  and  this  internal 
regulation  and  control  by  municipalities  com- 
prises the  municipal  affairs  spoken  of  in  the 
Constitution.  Dinan  v.  Superior  Court  of 
City  and  County  of  San  Francisco,  91  Pac. 
806,  808,  6  Cal.  App.  217  (citing  Fragley  v. 
Phelan,  58  Pac.  923,  126  Cal.  383). 

The  election  of  municipal  officers  is 
strictly  a  municipal  affair,  within  Const  art. 
11,  {  6,  providing  that  general  laws  shall  i»ot 
be  applicable  to  municipalities  as  to  matters 
which  are  strictly  ''municipal  affairs."  So- 
cialist Party  v.  Uhl,  103  Pac.  181,  186,  156 
Cal.  776. 

The  licensing  of  bawdy  houses,  and  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  "municipal 
affairs"  within.  Const  art  11,  i  6,  declaring 
that  "all  charters,  ♦  ♦  ♦  except  In  mu- 
nicipal affairs,  shall  be  subject  to  and  con- 
trolled by  general  laws."  Farmer  v.  Behmer, 
100  Pac.  901,  904,  9  Cal.  App.  773. 

The  regulation  and  fixing  of  charges  to 
be  made  by  telephone  companies  doing  busi- 
ness within  a  city  is  none  the  less  a  "mu- 
nicipal affair,"  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
city,  because  rates  so  fixed'  would  not  be  uni- 
form throughout  the  state;  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  charge  depending  on  the  value  of 
the  plant,  cost  of  maintenance  and  operation, 
which  vary  in  different  localities.  The  regu- 
lation of  the  charges  of  a  public  service  cor- 
poration within  the  limits  of  the  city  is  a 
"municipal  affair."  The  streets  of  the  city 
are  public  highways  in  which  the  people  of 
the  whole  state  are  interested;  and  yet  the 


opening  and  widening  of  streets  are  "i 
nicipal  affairs,"  and  the  regulation  of  t 
phone  rates  in  a  city  would  seem  to  be  m 
clearly  a  matter  of  local  concern  than 
control  of  streeta  Home  Telephone  &  T< 
graph  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles,  155  Fed.  554,  5C 

The  construction  and  maintenance 
telephone  wires  along  the  streets  of  a  d 
and  the  terms  and  conditions  under  wh 
they  shall  be  constructed  and  maintain 
is  a  municipal  affair  within  Const  art  U 
6,  as  amended  in  1896,  making  the  provisic 
of  a  freeholders*  charter,  adopted  by  a  ci 
paramount  to  general  laws  enacted  by  t 
state  Legislature  in  municipal  affairs.  Sli 
the  rights  of  a  telephone  company  to  ma 
tain  and  operate  a  telephone  line  on  t 
streets  of  a  city  is  a  municipal  affair  witl 
Const  art  11,  {  6,  making  the  provisions 
a  freeholders'  charter  paramount  to  genei 
statutes  in  municipal  affairs,  the  rights 
a  telephone  company,  using  the  streets  of 
,city  governed  by  a  freeholders'  charter,  wc 
not  extended  by  Civ.  Code,  §  536,  as  re-ena 
ed  by  St  1905,  p.  492,  authorizing:  telegra 
or  telephone  corporations  to  construct  lli 
along  and  on  any  public  road  or  hlghwi 
etc.  Sunset  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co. 
aty  of  Pasadena,  118  Pac.  796,  802,  803,  1 
Cal.  265. 

Where  the  power  to  Impose  a  license  t 
for  revenue  for  municipal  purposes  is  conf< 
red  upon  a  municipality,  that  power  becom 
a  "municipal  affair,"  within  the  meaning 
those  words,  as  used  in  Const  art  11,  § 
declaring  that  cities  and  towns  heretofo 
or  hereafter  organized,  and  all  charts 
thereof  framed  or  adopted  by  authority 
this  Constitution,  except  in  municipal  affaii 
shall  be  subject  to  and  controlled  by  genei 
laws.  Ex  parte  Helm,  77  Pac.  453,  454,  1 
Cal.  553. 

Under  Const  art  2,  |  6,  providing  th 
the  charters  of  cities  heretofore  or  hereaft 
organized  shall  be  subject  to  the  genei 
laws,  except  in  "municipal  affairs,"  Si 
Francisco  has  power  to  incur  a  bonded  \ 
debtedness  for  the  erection  of  new  scbo< 
houses  for  the  acquisition  of  land  for  the 
purposes,  and  for  additional  land  for  pla 
grounds  of  established  schools;  they  bel 
''municipal  affairs."  Law  v.  San  Francls< 
77  Pac.  1014,  1017,  144  CaL  384. 

San  Diego  City  Charter,  art  6,  c  2,  {  1 
provides  that  the  common  council  shall  deti 
mine  the  necessity  for  public  improvemcD 
and  that  where  the  ordinary  revenues  a 
insufficient,  bonds  may  be  issued,  the  pi 
ceedings  for  which  shall  be  In  accordas 
with  the  general  laws  relating  to  manldi] 
bonded  debts,  but  the  charter  Is  silent  as 
how  money  so  raised  shaU  be  spent  He 
that,  in  the  silence  of  the  charter,  the  c 
pendlture  of  the  money  was  not  a  "munidF 
affair"  within  Const  art  11,  |  6,  provldi 
that   city   charters   shall   be  controlled  1 


KDKIGIPAXi  AFFAIRS 


471 


MUNICIPAZi  CLAIM 


sneral  laws,  ^'ezoeiit  In  mimlcipal  aflftln,** 
o  that  the  general  law  followed  as  to  the 
node  of  teolng  the  bonds  for  the  Imiaove- 
Qent,  lisws  IDOl,  c.  80»  |  9,  was  controUlng, 
rhich  forbids  wending  sach  funds,  ezoept  on 
ompetitlTe  bidding.  Olonse  ▼.  City  of  Ban 
Mego,  114  Pae  673,  574,  IfiO  CaL  484. 

Proceedings  for  annexation  of  territory 
0  a  city  are  had  nnder  Act  March  19,  1889 
St  1889,  p.  858,  c.  247),  a  general  law  pro- 
iding  a  complete  scheme  for  annexation 
rhich,  nnder  the  Gonstitntion,  controls  and  is 
nperior  to  city  diarter  provisions,  except  in 
Inunicipal  afflairs,"  annexation  of  territory 
o  a  dty  being  in  no  s^iae  a  *'nranicipal  af- 
^dr"  within  the  Oonstitatlon;  and  hence  an 
mnexation  was  not  Told  because  the  ordi* 
lance  calling  the  spedal  election  on  that 
luestion  and  (Hrdering  notice  thereof  to  be 
riren,  pnblislied  as  provided  by  the  act  of 
L889,  was  not  published  for  10  days  as  pre- 
Krrlbed  by  the  city  charter  for  ordinances 
aiUing  elections.  People  ex  rel.  Peck  y.  City 
>f  Loe  Angeles,  97  Pac.  811,  314, 154  Cal  220. 

(General  Municipal  Incorporation  Act 
[Gen.  Laws  1906,  p.  898),  i  862,  empowering 
titles  of  the  sixth  class  to  acquire  and  main- 
tain waterworks  and  works  for  light,  relates 
to  a  "municipal  affair,**  and  is  not  special 
legislation  because  confined  to  cities  of  the 
sixth  class.  Gary  y.  Blodgett,  102  Pac.  668, 
369,  10  CaL  App.  463. 

The  supplying  of  water  by  a  city  to  out- 
side territory,  when  incidental  to  the  main 
purpose  of  supplying  water  to  its  own  in- 
habitants is  a  "municipal  affair^'  of  the  dty, 
within  Const  art  11,  i  6,  providing  that  the 
charters  of  cities  "except  in  municipal  af- 
fairs'* shall  be  controlled  by  general  laws, 
and  the  charter  of  the  dty  preyails  oyer  the 
general  legislation  embodied  in  Act  March 
27,  1897,  St  1897,  p.  182,  c.  121,  authorizing 
a  dty,  having  in  its  supply  more  water  than 
is  necessary  for  its  inhabitants,  to  sell  the 
surplus,  etc.  City  of  South  Pasadena  v. 
Pasadena  Land  A  Water  Co.,  93  Pac.  490, 
496,  152  CaL  679. 

Act  March  8,  1909  (St  1909,  c.  133),  pro- 
viding for  the  care  and  custody  of  children 
who  are  likely  to  develop  criminal  tendencies, 
and  giving  additional  powers  to  the  superior 
courts  in  respect  thereof,  provides  for  an  ex- 
ercise of  the  police  powers  of  the  state 
through  the  judicial  department,  and  its 
subject-matter  is  not  embraced  within  "mu- 
nicipal afr airs*'  as  used  in  Const  art  11,  §  6, 
providing  that  charters  of  cities  and  towns 
except  in  municipal  affairs  shall  be  subject 
to  and  controlled  by  general  laws,  though 
the  functions  of  the  particular  extension  of 
the  system  may  be  exercised  exclusively  with- 
in incorporated  cities  having  a  freeholders* 
charter.  NicboU  v.  Koeter»  108  Pac.  302, 
303, 157  Cal.  416. 

Act  April  10,  1906  (P.  L.  p.  206),  provid- 
ing for  a  special  election  in  any  election  dis- 


trict in  whidi  the  Secretary  of  State  has , 
placed  voting  machines  to  determine  upon  the ' 
retention  or  rejection  of  such  madiines^  is 
not  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  prohibi- 
tion against  private,  local,  or  special  acts  af- 
fecting the  tntemal  affairs  of  municipalities. 
Mara  v.  City  of  Bayonne,  71  AU.  1181,  77 
K  J.  Law,  288;  Id.,  75  AtL  UOl,  78  N.  J. 
Law,  74a 

KUHICTPAZ.  BOMD 

As  negotiable  instrument,  see  Negotiable 
Instrument 

The  term  ''mnnleipal  bond"  imports  a 
nmnieipal  debt  or  obligation.  The  common 
mind  understands,  from  the  fact  that  a  mu- 
nicipal bond  is  issued,  that  a  municipal  debt 
has  been  created,  and  that  the  faith  and  good 
credit  of  the  municipality  issuing  the  bond  is 
pledged  to  its  payment  As  used  in  Const 
art  16,  I  5,  as  amended  in  1894,  permitting 
the  investment  of  the  school  funds  in  nation- 
al, state,  county,  municipal,  or  school  dis- 
trict bonds,  the  term  does  not  include  bonds 
of  a  city  indebted  to  its  constitutional  limit, 
issued  under  the  express  provisions  of  Laws 
1901,  p.  177,  c  85,  for  the  payment  of  a  water- 
works plant,  payable  out  of  a  q;)eclal  fund 
composed  of  a  fixed  per  cent  of  the  gross 
receipts  of  the  plant,  and  such  further  sum 
as  the  dty  may  from  time  to  time  by  ordinance 
transfer  from  the  receipts  of  the  plant  or 
from  its  general  revenue,  without  pledging 
the  credit  of  the  dty.  State  ex  rel.  City  of 
Port  Townsend  v.  Clausen,  82  Pac.  187,  190, 
192,  40  Wash.  95. 

"By  the  term  'municipal  bonds'  is  meant 
evidences  of  indebtedness  issued  by  dties,  in- 
corporated towns,  townships,  school  districts, 
and  other  corporate  public  bodies  negotiable 
in  form  payable  at  a  designated  future  time, 
bearing  interest  payable  annually  or  semian- 
nually, and  usually  having  coupons  attached 
evldendng  the  several  installments  of  inter- 
est Municipal  bonds  issued  in  the  usual 
negotiable  form  and  authorised  by  law  have 
all  the  attributes  of  negotiable  commercial 
paper  of  individuals  and  private  corpora- 
tions; they  are  usually  made  payable  to 
bearer ;  they  pass  by  delivery  and,  like  other 
negotiable  papers,  are  not  subject  to  equities 
between  prior  holders  in  the  hands  of  a  bona 
fide  purchaser  for  value,  before  due,  without 
notice  of  such  equities."  But,  despite  the 
similarity  in  form,  county  commissioners, 
authorized  to  issue  new  bonds  to  take  up  old 
ones,  have  no  power  to  issue  bonds  to  take 
up  the  promissory  notes.  Muskingum  County 
Comers  V.  State,  85  N.  Ek  662,  566,  78  Ohio  St 
287  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  la  Har- 
ris, Mun.  Bonds,  8). 

MITNICIPAIi  CHARTER 

See  Charter. 

ICUiaOIPAI.  CLAIM 

Registered  taxes  are  "munidpal  daims," 
within  a  statute  providing  for  service  for 


MUNICIPAL  OONTHAOT 


473 


MUKICIPAI»  ODRPaRATTON 


posOng  and  advertlaement  In  proceedings  on 
a  "nraniclpal  claim."  Jones  y.  Beale,  06  Atl. 
254,  217  Pa.  182. 

MUNIOIPAI.  OONTRAOT 

As  privilege  of  citizen,  see  PrlYlleges 
and  Immunities. 

mnaoiPAi.  oobporatiok 

Charter  of,  see  Charter. 
See,  also,  Municipality;  Public  Corpora- 
tion. 

Municipal  corporations  are  mere  govern- 
ing bodies  having  charge  of  and  Jurisdiction 
over  particular  political  subdivisions  of  the 
state.  Uvalde  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  City 
of  New  York,  184  N.  7.  Supp.  60,  51, 149  App. 
Div.  40L 

A  municipal  corporation  proper  is  cre- 
ated mainly  for  the  interest,  advantage,  and 
convenience  of  the  locality  and  its  people. 
People  V.  Sours,  74  Paa  107,  172,  81  Colo. 
369,  102  Am.  St  Rep.  84  (citing  1  DUL  Mun. 
Corp.  i  23). 

The  term  "municipal  corporation"  im- 
plies the  organization  of  a  certain  geograph- 
ical district  under  authority  of  law  includ- 
ing within  its  Jurisdiction  and  control  a  cer- 
tain geographical  area.  Short  v.  Gouger 
(Tex.)  130  S.  W.  267,  269. 

A  ''municipal  corporation"  is  one  created 
by  a  government  for  political  purposes,  hav- 
ing subordinate  and  local  powers  of  legisla- 
tion; and  the  word  ''municipal"  applies  strict- 
ly only  to  a  city  or  community  within  a  state 
possessing  rights  of  self-government  People 
ex  rel.  Mortell  v.  Bergman,  97  N.  E.  695,  696, 
253  111.  469. 

A  "municipal  corporation"  is  a  body  cor- 
porate, established  by  law  to  share  in  the 
civil  government  of  the  country,  but  chiefly 
to  regulate  the  local  or  internal  affairs  of 
the  dty,  town,  or  district  incorporated. 
State  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  Knoxville, 
90  S.  W.  289,  293,  115  Tenn.  175  (citing  East 
Tennessee  University  v.  Mayor,  etc^  of  City 
of  Knoxville,  6  Baxt  [65  Tenn.]  166). 

The  term  "municipal  corporations"  In- 
volves the  idea  of  a  voluntary  association  by 
the  inhabitants  of  a  particular  territory, 
sanctioned  by  the  power  of  the  state  for  the 
purposes  of  local  government  But  the  sov- 
er^gn  power  may,  without  regard  to  any 
prior  agreement  or  action  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  territory  involved,  pro- 
vide for  the  exercise  of  powers,  such  as  the 
election  of  local  ofRcers  by  the  inhabitants, 
and  these  organizations,  though  public  in 
character  and  partaking  somewhat  of  the  na- 
ture of  a  corporation,  are  not,  strictly  speak- 
ing cori)oratlons,  but  "quasi  corporations." 
Hanson  v.  City  of  Cresco,  109  N.  W.  1109, 
1110,  1111,  132  Iowa,  533. 

A  municipal  corporation  in  its  historical 
and  proper  sense  is  the  incorporation  by  the 
authority  of  the  government  of  the  inhabit- 


ants of  a  parttcolar  place  or  district  and 
thorizing  them  in  their  oorporate  capac 
to  exercise  subordinate  spedfled  powers 
legislation  and  regulation  with  respect 
their  local  and  internal  concerns.  This  p( 
er  of  local  government  is  the  distinctive  p 
pose  and  the  distinguishing  feature  of  a  z 
nidpal  corporation  proper.  £x  parte  S 
mons,  112  Pac.  951,  956,  4  OkL  Cr.  662. 

A  complaint,  in  an  action  tor  damages 
a  change  in  the  grade  of  a  street,  which 
leges  that  the  defendant  is  a  municipal  c 
poration,  organized  and  existing  under 
laws  of  the  state,  and  that  in  a  specU 
year  the  defendant  committed  the  act  ca 
ing  the  injury  complained  of,  suffldently 
leges  that  the  city  which  committed  the  i 
was  at  that  time  a  municipal  corporation  a 
a  "body  politic  and  corporate,"  within  R 
CkMles,  S  3202.  Drew  ▼.  City  of  Butte,  ] 
Paa  279,  280,  44  Mont  124. 

Action  for  lands  may  not  be  brought 
the  name  of  the  state  for  the  use  of  1 
board  of  directors  of  a  levee  district,  sr 
board  being  under  Acts  1888,  p.  24,  a  "bo 
politic  and  corporate"  with  power  to  sue,  a 
so  having  the  right  to  sue  for  the  lands 
its  own  name.  State  ▼.  Southwestern  La 
&  Timber  Co.,  126  S.  W.  73,  76^  98  Ark.  6 

A  municipal  corporation  is  a  legal  ln< 
tution  formed  by  charter  from  sovereign  pc 
er,  erecting  a  populous  community  of  p 
scribed  area  into  a  body  politic  and  con 
rate,  with  corporate  name  and  continue 
succession,  and  for  the  purpose  and  with  t 
authority  of  subordinate  self-government  a 
improvement  and  local  administration  of  i 
fairs  of  state.  Ancrum  v.  Camden  Wat 
Light  &  Ice  Co.,  64  S.  B.  151,  154,  82  S. 
284,  21  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1029. 

"Municipal  corporations"  or  governmei 
are  creatures  of  the  law,  and  the  warrant  1 
their  creation  must  be  found  in  a  valid  sfe 
ute  or  they  have  no  legal  existence.  Hurl 
V.  Motz,  152  S.  W.  248,  250, 151  Ky.  451. 

A  "municipal  corporation"  is  a  creatu 
of  statute,  and  the  adjustment  of  its  powe 
and  duties  and  its  rights  relative  to  those 
citizens  is  the  province  of  the  Legislatui 
Scott  T.  Village  of  Saratoga  Springs,  115 
T.  Supp.  796,  797,  131  App.  Div.  847  (quotl] 
MacMullen  y.  City  of  Middletown,  79  N. 
863,  187  N.  T.  87,  11  L.  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  391). 

Municipal  corporations  are  bodies  polil 
vested  with  many  political  and  legislati 
powers  for  local  government  and  police  reg 
lations,  established  to  aid  the  government  1 
the  state,  and  a  municipal  government  hi 
power  to  make  more  definite  regulations  thf 
are  usually  provided  by  general  1egislati< 
and  to  enforce  them  by  appropriate  penaltic 
City  of  (^Icago  v.  Union  Ice  Cream  Mtg.  O 
96  N.  B.  872,  873,  252  IlL  311,  Ann.  Ob 
1912D,  675. 

"Municipal  corporations"  are  bodies  pc 
itic  and  corporations  vested  with  politic 


MlTNXOIPAIi  COBFORAnON 


47S 


MUNICIPAL  GORFORATIOH 


ind  leglalattre  powers  for  local  ctfll  sovem- 
Qent  and  police  regulatioiia  of  tlie  inhabit- 
ints  of  partUmlar  dlatiieta  Indiided  in  the 
lotmdarieB  of  tbe  eorporatlona.  They  are  in 
nany  xeqpects  local  goyemmenta  established 
o  aid  the  goyemment  of  the  state.  The  ne- 
■essity  of  their  organization  may  be  found  in 
he  density  of  the  population  of  localities  and 
he  conditions  incidental  thereto.  Town  of 
^'eola  V.  Reidiart,  109  N.  W.  6.  7,  131  Iowa, 
[92. 

"Manidpal  corporations"  are  bodies  pol- 
tic»  created  by  laws  of  the  state  for  the 
>urpose  of  administering  the  affairs  of  the 
ncorporated  territory.  They  exercise  pow- 
^  of  goyernment,  which  are  delegated  to 
hem  by  the  Legislature,  and  they  are  sub- 
jected to  certain  duties.  They  are  the  auz- 
liaries,  or  the  conyenient  instrumentalities, 
)f  the  general  goyernment  of  the  state  for 
;he  purpose  of  municipal  rule.  The  consid- 
eration of  the  grant  of  a  charter  is  the 
)eDefit  to  the  public,  and  their  relation  to 
the  state  Is  not  contractual,  in  the  constitu- 
tional sense,  for  there  is  no  element  of  rec- 
iprocity, and  the  corporate  duties  are  in- 
compatible with  the  notion  of  a  compact 
rhe  whole  interests  are  the  exclusiye  do- 
Dsaln  of  the  goyemment  itself,  and  the  pow- 
er of  the  Legislature  oyer  them  is  supreme 
ind  transcendent,  except  as  restricted  by  the 
Constltutton  of  the  state.  Their  charters  be- 
ing granted  for  the  better  goyemment  of 
the  particular  districts,  the  right  to  Insert 
Buoh  proyisions  as  seem  to  best  subserye  the 
public  Interest  would  seem,  from  the  very 
nature  of  such  institutions,  to  be  inherent 
MacMuUen  y.  City  of  Middletown,  79  N.  D. 
863,  864,  187  N.  X.  87,  11  I*  B.  A.  (N.  B.) 
391  (citing  People  ex  rel.  Wood  y.  Draper, 
15  N.  Y.  532,  544 ;  People  y.  Tweed,  63  N.  T. 
207;  Meriwether  y.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472, 
511,  26  Ia  Bd.  197;  Dartmouth  College  y. 
Woodward,  4  Wheat  [17  U.  S.]  518,  4  U  Bd. 
629;  Cooley.  CJonst  Um.  ♦pp.  191-193;  Dill. 
Man.  Corp.  ||  9,  30;   Ang.  &  A.  Corp.  i  31). 

"A  'municipal  corporation'  is,  for  the 
purposes  of  its  creation,  a  goyemment  pos- 
sessing, to  a  limited  extent  soyereign  pow- 
ers, which  in  their  nature  are  either  legls- 
latlve  or  judicial,  and  may  be  denominated 
'goyemmental*  or  'public'  The  extent  to 
which  it  may  be  proper  to  exercise  such  pow- 
ers, as  wen  as  the  mode  of  their  exercise  by 
the  corporation,  within  the  limits  prescribed 
by  the  law  creating  them,  are  of  necessity 
intrusted  to  the  judgment  discretion,  and 
will  of  the  properly  constituted  authorities 
to  whom  they  are  delegated;  and,  being  pub- 
lic and  soyereign  In  their  nature,  the  corpora- 
tion is  not  liable  to  be  sued  either  for  a 
failnre  to  exercise  them  or  for  errors  com- 
mitted in  their  exerdae."  Hall  y.  Town  of 
Hoxborob  55  8.  B.  861,  862,  142  N.  O.  4B8,  12 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  688  (Qiiotlng  and  adopting 
the  definition  Uk  Klstnar  t.  Indianapolis,  100 
lQd.210). 


*'A  'municipal  corporation'  la,  for  the 
purposes  of  its  creation,  a  goyemment  posaess- 
Ing,  to  a  limited  extent  soyer^gn  powers. 
*  *  *  The  extent  to  which  it  may  be  prop- 
er to  exercise  such  powers,  as  well  as  the 
mode  of  theij  exercise  by  the  corporation, 
within  the  limits  prescribed  by  the  law  cre- 
ating it  are  of  necessity  Intrusted  to  the 
judgment  and  discretion  and  will  of  the  prop- 
erly constituted  authorities  to  whom  they 
are  delegated."  Indiana  By.  Co.  y.  Calyert 
80  N.  B.  961,  964,  168  Ind.  321,  10  U  B.  A. 
(N.  8.)  780,  11  Ann.  Gas.  685  (quoting  and 
adopting  deflnitlon  in  Brinkmeyer  y.  City  of 
Byansyille,  29  Ind.  187). 

"The  framers  of  our  Constitution  intend- 
ed,  by  the  term  'municipal  corporations,'  to 
use  it  in  its  restricted  sense  as  applicable 
only  to  dtles,  towns,  or  yillages  inyested 
with  the  power  of  local  legislation."  Day«i- 
port  y.  Blrod,  107  N.  W.  833,  834,  20  S.  D. 
567  (quoting  and  adopting  the  definition  in 
Town  of  Dell  Rapids  y.  Irylng,  64  N.  W.  149, 
7  8.  D.  810,  29  L.  R.  A.  861). 

The  term  "municipal  corporations,'*  as 
used  in  Ck)nst  1898,  art  48,  prohibiting  the 
(General  Assembly  from  passing  any  local  or 
special  law  creating  corporations  or  renewing 
or  amending  the  charter  thereof,  proylded 
that  'this  shall  not  apply  to  municipal  cor- 
porations haying  a  population  of  not  less 
than  2,6(N>  Inhabitants,  or  to  the  organisa- 
tion of  leyee  districts  and  parishes,"  is  lim- 
ited by  the  context  to  dtles,  towns,  and  yil- 
lages. Board  of  8chool  Directors  of  Madison 
Parish  y.  Ooltharp,  64  8outh.  299,  800,  127 
La.  066. 

"Counties,  dtles,  and  towns  are  'munic- 
ipal corporations^  created  by  the  authority 
of  the  Legislature,  and  they  deriye  all  their 
powers  from  the  source  of  thdr  creation,  ex- 
cept where  the  Constitution  of  the  state  oth- 
erwise proyldes.  Beyond  doubt  they  are,  In 
general,  made  bodies  polltie  and  corporate^ 
and  are  usually  inyested  with  certain  sub- 
ordinate leglslatiye  powers,  to  fadlitate  the 
due  administration  of  their  own  internal  af- 
fairs, and  to'  promote  the  general  welfare  of 
the  munidpallty.  They  haye  no  Inherent 
jurisdiction  to  malce  laws,  or  to  adopt  goy- 
emmental regulations;  nor  can  they  exercise 
any  other  powers  in  that  regard  than  such  as 
are  expressly  or  impliedly  derlyed  from  their 
charters,  or  other  statutes  of  the  state." 
State  ex  rel.  Potter  y.  King  County,  88  Pac. 
935,  936,  45  Wash.  619  (quoting  Laramie 
County  y.  Albany  County,  92  U.  8.  307,  28 
L.  Bd.  652). 
As  an  aseat  or  Isatruaeatality  of  tlie 
state 

A  "munidpal  corporation"  la  an  agent 
of  the  state  for  local  purpoaea.  CSamdea 
Interstate  B.  Co.  y.  Catlettabnrg,  129  Fed- 
421,422. 

"  'Municipal  eorporatlona'  are  but  poblio 
agendes  with  llndtsd  riffhts  and  powotb.** 


•  H 


|l  1  ki 
i 


I  \ 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION 


474 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION 


Peterg  v.  aty  of  St  Louis,  125  8.  W.  1134, 
1135,  226  Mo.  62,  21  Ann.  Gas.  1069. 

A  "municipal  corporation"  Is,  so  far  as 
Its  purely  municipal  relations  are  concerned, 
simply  an  agency  of  the  state  for  conducting 
affairs  of  government,  and  as  such  it  is  sub- 
ject to  the  control  of  the  Legislature.  They 
owe  their  origin  to,  and  derive  their  powers 
and  rights  wholly  from,  the  Legislature.  Ry- 
an V.  City  of  New  York,  69  N.  B.  599,  601, 
177  N.  T.  271  (quoting  Williams  v.  BJggleston, 

18  Sup.  Ct.  617,  619,  170  U.  S.  304,  310,  42 
L.  Ed.  1047 ;  City  of  Clinton  v.  Cedar  Rapids 
&  M.  R.  R.  Ch.,  24  Iowa,  455). 

A  "municipal  corporation"  In  the  machin- 
ery of  the  state  Is  a  mere  agency.  It  pos- 
sesses no  inherent  and  independent  author- 
ity to  create  rights  in  others  which  affect 
the  public  interests.  Rhinehart  v.  Redfleld, 
87  N.  Y.  Supp.  789,  791,  93  App.  Div.  410. 

''Municipal  corporations"  are  instrumen- 
talities of  the  state  for  the  more  convenient 
administration  of  local  affairs,  and  for  that 
purpose  are  invested  with  certain  legislative 
powers.  Wolff  v.  City  of  Denver,  77  Pac. 
364,  365,  20  Colo.  App.  135  (citing  Lewis  v. 
Denver  City  Waterworks  Co.,  34  Paa  993, 

19  Colo.  236,  41  Am.  St  Rep.  248). 

"Municipal  corporations"  are  mere  in- 
strumentalities of  the  state  for  the  more  con- 
venient administration  of  local  government 
Their  powers  are  such  as  the  Legislature  may 
confer,  and  these  may  be  enlarged,  abridged, 
or  entirely  withdrawn  at  its  pleasure.  Attor- 
ney General  ex  rel.  Battishell  v.  Township 
Board  of  Springwells,  107  N.  W.  87,  90,  143 
Mich.  523  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  In 
Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472,  511,  26 
L.Bd.  197). 

"A  'municipal  corporation'  is  but  a  gov- 
ernmental agency  or  local  organization  for 
governmental  purposes.  Its  officers  are  none 
the  less  governmental  officers  because  elected 
or  chosen  by  the  people  of  a  particular  local- 
ity." Llvesley  v.  Litchfield,  83  Pac.  142, 143, 
47  Or.  248,  114  Am.  St  Rep.  920. 

•"Municipal  corporations'  are  political 
subdivisions  of  the  state,  created  as  conven- 
ient agencies  for  exercising  such  of  the  gov- 
ernmental powers  of  the  state  as  may  be  In- 
trusted to  them."  Hunter  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burgh, 28  Sup.  Ct  40,  46,  207  U.  S.  161,  52 
L.  Ed.  151. 

"Municipal  corporations"  are  political 
subdivisions  of  the  state,  created  as  conven- 
ient agencies  for  exercising  such  of  the  gov- 
ernmental powers  of  the  state  as  may  be  in- 
trusted to  them.  The  charter  of  a  municipal 
corporation  is  conferred  for  political  purpos- 
es, and  the  power  to  alter  municipal  charters 
or  to  repeal  them  exists  without  limitation ; 
and  Const  1901,  9  229,  providing  that  the 
charter  of  any  corporation  shall  be  subject 
to  amendment  or  repeal  under  general  laws, 
a];H>lie8  only  to  private  business  corporations. 


City  of  Eosley  ▼.  Simpson,  52  South.  61, 
166  Ala.  366  (citing  Hunter  v.  Pittsburgh, 
Sup.  Ct  207,  207  U.  S.  161,  52  L.  Ed.  15 

"'Municipal  corporations,'  such  as  coi 
ties  and  Incorporated  cities  and  towns,  i 
instrumentalities  of  the  state  govemme 
They  serve  Its  political  and  civil  purpos 
more  or  less  generous  In  their  nature  a 
extent  and  more  particularly  where  tl 
are  located.  They  are  public  in  their  natu 
and  the  Legislature  has  control  over  the 
It  may  determine  and  establish  their  pow< 
and  enlarge  or  modify  their  powers  and  i 
tbority  from  time  to  time ;  it  may  create  n 
ones  prescribing  their  powers  and  author 
as  public  necessity  and  convenience  requir 
Folsom  V.  Greenwood  County,  137  Fed.  4 
451,  69  C.  0.  A.  473  (quoting  definition  glT 
in  Wood  V.  Town  of  Oxford,  2  8.  B.  665, 
N.  C.  230). 

"  'Municipal  corporations,*  Including  cbi 
tered  municipalities,  are  agencies  in  the  wo 
of  government  They  are  created  by  the  L 
islature,  which  delegates  to  them  certi 
clearly  defined  portions  of  the  sovereign  po 
er.  Except  as  restrained  by  constltutioi 
provisions,  these  auxiliary  agencies  of  govei 
ment  are  under  the  absolute  control  of  t 
Legislature.  Powers  and  duties  may  be  i 
posed  and  taken  away  at  the  legislative  wil 
Schigley  v.  City  of  Waseca,  118  N.  W.  2; 
260,  106  Minn.  94,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  61 
16  Ann.  Cas.  169. 

''Municipal  corporations"  are  the  Inst 
mentalities  of  the  state  for  the  more  conv< 
lent  administration  of  local  affairs,  and  i 
that  purpose  are  invested  with  certain  leg 
lative  power.  In  the  exercise  of  the  po^ 
upon  the  subjects  submitted  to  their  Jurisd 
tion,  they  are  as  much  beyond  judicial  inti 
ference  as  the  Legislature  Itself.  Glide 
Superior  Court  of  County  of  Yolo,  81  Pj 
225,  226, 147  Cal.  21. 

"'Municipal  corporations*  are  the  i 
ministrative  agencies  established  for  the 
cal  government  of  towns,  cities,  and  coi 
ties,  or  other  particular  districts.  The  s] 
cial  powers  conferred  on  them  are  not  vest 
rights  as  against  the  state,  nor  are  they 
the  nature  of  contracts,  but,  being  wholly  i 
litical,  they  exist  only  during  the  will  of  t 
Legislature.  Such  powers  may  at  any  tii 
be  changed,  modified,  repealed,  or  destroy 
by  the  Legislature,  saving  only  the  vest 
rights  of  the  individuals."  Ex  parte  O 
liss,  114  N.  W.  962,  981,  16  N.  D.  470  (citi 
Black,  Const  Law,  {  132). 

"A  'municipal  corporation'  is  simply 
political  subdivision  of  the  state,  and  exii 
by  virtue  of  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  t 
state  thiough  its  legislative  department  T 
Legislature  could  at  any  time  terminate  t 
existence  of  the  corporation  itself,  and  pi 
vide  other  and  difTewnt  means  for  the  g< 
emment  of  the  district  comprised  within  t 


MT7KICIPAL  OOKPORATION 


«76 


MUNICIPAL  OOEPORiiTION 


limits  of  the  former  dty.  The  city  1b  tbe 
creature  of  the  state."  City  of  Worcester  ▼. 
Worcester  ConsoL  St.  Ry.  Oo^  25  Sap.  Ot 
327,  329,  196  U.  S.  539,  49  U  Ed.  591  (quot- 
ing East  Hartford  v.  Hartford  Bridge  CJo.,  10 
How.  511,  533,  534,  13  L«.  Ed.  518,  628). 

As  p<»ssessiifts  donUe  eliAraoter 

"Municipal  corporations,**  as  ordinarily 
constituted,  possess  a  doable  character— the 
one,  governmental,  legislative,  or  public; 
the  other.  In  a  sense  proprietary  or  private — 
and  over  Its  dvil,  political,  or  governmental 
powers  the  authority  of  the  Legislature  is,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  supreme  and  without 
limitation,  unless  the  limitation  1b  found  in 
the  Constitution  of  the  particular  state.  But, 
in  its  proprietary  or  private  character,  the 
theory  is  that  the  powers  are  supposed  not 
to  be  conferred  primarily  or  chiefly  from  con- 
siderations connected  with  the  government  of 
the  state  at  Irf^ge,  but  for  the  private  advan- 
tage of  the  compact  community  which  is  In- 
corporated as  a  distinct  personality  or  corpo- 
rate individual ;  and  as  to  such  powers,  and 
to  property  acquired  thereunder,  the  corpo- 
ration Is  to  be  regarded  quo  ad  hoc  as  a  pri- 
rate  corporation.  Town  of  Nahant  v.  United 
States,  136  Fed.  273,  281,  70  0.  0.  A.  641, 
69  Ia  R.  A.  723  (dtlng  Dill.  Man.  Corp.  [4th 
£d.]  H  66,  67,  and  notes). 

A  "municipal  corpbratlon"  is  the  delegate 
of  sovereign  power  to  legislate  as  to  the  pub- 
lic needs  of  the  locality,  and  in  a  sense- it 
possesses  a  dual  character.  It  acts  In  a 
governmental  capacity  to  the  extent  that  It 
exercises  its  powers  in  matters  of  public  con- 
cern, and  it  acts  in  a  private  capacity  in  so 
far  as  it  exercises  Its  powers  under  its  by- 
laws for  private  advanftage  in  matters  per- 
taining to  the  municipality,  as  the  propri- 
etor of  the  various  works  and  properties.  It 
cannot  be  held  liable  for  the  nonexercise  of 
governmental  powers  delegated  by  the  state, 
which  are  discretionary  powers,  and  which 
are  classed  as  a  public  or  legislative  charac- 
ter ;  neither  can  it  be  held  responsible  for 
tbe  manner  in  which  it  exercises  those  pow- 
ers. 0*DonneU  ▼.  City  of  Syracuse,  76  N.  B. 
738-740,  184  N.  Y.  1,  8  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1053, 
112  Am.  St  Bep.  558,  6  Ann.  Oas.  173  (citing 
liloyd  V.  Mayor,  etc,  of  City  of  New  York,  5 
N.  Y.  369,  55  Am.  Dec  347). 

Ai  eorporate  body  or  person 

See  Corporate  Body. 

Corporation  as  Inalvdias 

See  Corporation. 

Ai  em1»raeisic  UJiaUtants 

A  "municipal  corporation"  la  a  flctittous 
being  created  for  the  sole  and  exclusive  pur- 
pose of  administering  the  public  interest 
Bnch  corporation  and  the  inhabitants  of  its 
territory  are  in  law  distinct  separate  persons, 
^nd  a  corporation  is  not  the  mandatary  of 
the  inhabitants  iadividuaily  for  ^terlng  into 


contracts  for  them  individually.  It  does  not 
follow,  from  the  fiust  that  the  inhabitants  ore 
Interested,  that  the  obligations  of  contractors 
toward  the  "municipal  corporation**  shall  be 
faithfully  complied  with,  or,  from  the  fact 
that  they,  as  taxpayers,  contribute  the  money 
with  which  the  payments  have  to  be  made, 
that  they  are  principals  in  the  contracts  en- 
tered into  by  the  corporation.  Allen  A  Cur- 
rey  Mfg.  Co.  v.  ShrevQ;>ort  Waterworks  Co., 
37  Sooth.  980,  981,  113  La.  1091,  68  L.  R.  A. 
600,  104  Am.  St  Rep.  525,  2  Ann.  Cas.  471. 

As  yart  of  state 
As  political    snbdiviflion,   see   Political 
Subdivision. 

A  'Municipal  corporation*'  Is  a  subordi- 
nate subdivision  of  the  state  government  It 
derives  its  existence,  powers,  and  privileges 
from  the  state  State  v.  City  of  Aberdeen, 
74  Pac  1022,  1023,  34  Wash.  61. 

""Municipal  corporations'  constitute  a 
part  of  the  civil  government  of  the  state,  and 
their  streets  are  highways."  Southern  Bell 
Telephone  A  Telegraph  Co.  ▼.  Mobile,  162 
Fed.  523,  529. 

A  ''municipal  corporation"  is  a  subordi- 
nate branch  of  the  domestic  government  of 
the  state.  It  is  Instituted  for  public  purposes 
only,  and  has  none  of  the  peculiar  qualities 
and  characteristics  of  a  trading  corporation, 
instituted  for  the  purpose  of  private  gain, 
except  that  of  acting  in  a  corporate  capacity. 
Its  objects,  its  responsibilities,  and  its  pow- 
ers are  different  As  a  local  governmental 
institution  it  exists  for  the  benefit  of  the 
people  within  its  corporate  limits.  The  Leg- 
islature invests  it  with  such  powers  as  it 
deems  adequate  to  the  ends  to  be  accomplish- 
ed. State  V.  Butter,  77  S.  W.  560,  570,  178 
Mo.  272  (quoting  Nashville  v.  Ray,  19  Wall. 
[86  U.  S.1  468,  475,  22  L.  Ed.  164). 

A  ''municipal  corporation*'  is  a  part  of 
the  governmental  machinery  of  the  state,  or- 
ganized for  the  purpose  of  exercising  certain 
functions  of  government,  within  a  specified 
locality;  and  it  possesses  such  powers,  and 
such  only,  as  are  conferred  upon  it  by  the 
Legislature ;  and  they  are  to  be  exercised  in 
such  form,  mode,  and  manner,  and  by  such 
agencies,  as  the  Legislature  may  from  time  to 
time  prescribe,  within  the  limits  of  the  Con- 
stitution. Tommasl  v.  Bolger,  100  N.  Y. 
Supp.  367,  372,  114  App.  Dlv.  838;  People  ex 
rel.  Devery  v.  Color,  65  N.  B.  956,  958,  173 
N.  Y.  103  (quoting  People  ex  rel.  City  of 
Rochester  v.  Briggs,  50  N.  Y.  553-559). 

It  is  within  the  power  of  the  Legislature 
to  abolish  the  ofilce  of  chief  of  police  of  the 
dty  of  New  York,  and  as  chapter  33^  Laws 
1901,  to  that  effect,  does  not  purport  to 
abrogate  any  right  of  such  chief  of  police  to 
any  pension,  he  has  the  power  to  assert 
any  vested  rights  which  he  may  have  to  sudti 
pension  ot  in  the  pension  ford  by  a  proper 


MUmOIPAL  CORPORATION 


476 


MTfMOIPAL  OORPORAHON 


proceeding.    People  ex  rel.  Devery  y.  Ooler, 
66  N.  E.  956,  968,  173  N.  Y.  10$. 

As  political  or  pvblio  corporation 

"The  American  'municipal  corporation*  is 
simply  and  purely  a  strictiy  public  corpora- 
tion. It  is  a  corporation  of  citizens,  for  citi- 
zens, and  by  citizens.  Its  sole  object  is  local 
government"  Beale  v.  Pankey,  67  8.  B.  661, 
663,  107  Va.  215,  12  Ann.  Ca&  1134. 

For  the  purpose  of  general  designation, 
it  is  not  uncommon  to  use  the  term  "munici- 
pal corporation"  as  including  quasi  corpora- 
tions to  distinguish  public  or  political  corpo- 
rations from  those  which  are  termed  "pri- 
rate."  A  county  is  a  "municipal  corpora- 
tion," within  a  constitutional  provision  pro- 
viding that  no  right  of  way  shall  be  appro- 
priated for  the  use  of  any  corporation  other 
than  municipal  until  full  compensation  shall 
have  been  made,  Irrespective  of  benefits. 
Lincoln  County  ▼.  Brock,  79  Pac.  477,  478, 
37  Wash.  14. 

The  term  "municipal  corporations,**  as 
used  by  text-writers  in  discussing  the  del- 
egation of  the  power  of  taxation  to  munici- 
pal corporations,  is  not  used  in  the  restricted 
sense  of  cities  and  towns,  but  in  a  more  en- 
larged and  generally  received  acceptation, 
which  Includes  municipal  corporations  tech- 
nically so  termed,  and  also  public  corpora- 
tions created  by  the  state  for  the  purpose  of 
exercising  defined  and  limited  govenmiental 
functions  in  certain  designated  portions  of 
the  state's  territory.  These  are  termed  by 
authors  of  approved  excellence  and  decisions 
of  authority  to  be  "public  quasi  corpora- 
tions," and  are  said  to  include  counties,  town- 
ships, school  districts,  and  the  like.  Smith 
▼.  Board  of  Trustees  of  Robersonville  Graded 
School,  63  S.  B.  624,  627, 141  N.  a  143,  8  Ann. 
Gas.  629. 

"The  term  ^municipal,'  as  used  in  defining 
a  corporation,  indicates  by  its  historical  mean- 
ing a  corporation  proper,  as  distinguished 
from  a  quasi  corporation,  and  designates  only 
cities  and  incorporated  towns  which  have 
powers  of  local  self-government,  and,  in  strict- 
ness of  meaning,  would  not  include  counties 
and  school  districts,  although  they  are  ex- 
pressly declared  by  statute  to  be  bodies  corpo- 
rate. But,  in  common  speech,  the  term  'mu- 
nicipal corporation*  is  used  to  include  all  pub- 
lic or  political  corporations  having  corporate 
powers."  Hanson  v.  City  of  Cresco,  109  N.  W. 
1109, 1112, 132  Iowa,  638  (citing  6  Words  and 
Phrases,  p.  4620). 

Board  of  drainage  coaunissioncrfl 

Code  1906,  |  3486,  providing  that  money 
deposited  in  banks  by  an  ofl[lcer  having  the 
custody  of  public  funds,  "state,  county,  mu- 
nicipal, or  levee  board,"  is  prima  facie  public 
money,  and  a  trust  fund,  and  may  not  be 
taken  by  the  general  creditors  of  the  bank, 
is  in  derogation  of  the  common  law  and  must 
be  strictly  construed,  and  the  word  "munic- 


liNU"  embraces  only  municipal  corporations 
represented  by  cities,  towns,  and  villages, 
and  does  not  Indude  the  board  of  drainage 
commissionerB,  and  the  funds  of  such  board 
deposited  In  a  bank  are  not  within  the  pro- 
tection of  the  statute.  United  States  Fidel- 
ity &  Guaranty  Bank  v.  First  State  Bank  of 
Shaw  (Misa)  60  South.  47. 

Board  of  edacatioa 

Under  Detroit  City  Charter  (Comp.  1904» 
I  696),  providing  the  school  inspectors  shall 
be  a  body  corporate,  known  as  '^ard  of 
education  of  the  city  of  Detroit,"  and  in  that 
name  may  sue  and  be  sued,  and  hold  and 
convey  real  and  personal  property,  such 
board  is  a  "municipal  corporation,*'  and  not 
liable  for  the  negligence  of  its  employte  and 
agents.  Whitehead  v.  Board  of  Education  of 
City  of  Detroit,  102  N.  W.  1028,  1029,  18» 
Mich.  490.  . 

Oowatj 

A  county  is  a  "Municipal  corporation.'' 
Wadsworth  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Livingston 
County,  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  8,  16  (citing  County 
Law  [Laws  1892,  p.  1744,  e  686]  |  2;  Gen- 
eral Corporation  Law  [Laws  1890,  p.  1061,  a 
663]  I  3,  subd.  1). 

A  county,  properly  spealdng,  is  not  a 
"municipal  corporation."  Knowles  v.  Board 
of  Education  of  City  of  Topeka,  7  Pac.  661, 
664,  83  Kan.  692  (citing  Dill.  Mun.  Corp.  1 22). 

A  county  is  a  "municipal  corporation," 
within  the  rule  that  a  municipal  corporation 
cannot  be  estopped  by  the  unauthorized  or 
illegal  agreements  or  acts  of  their  agents. 
People  ex  rel.  Sweet  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  St. 
Lawrence  Ck)unty,  91  N.  Y.  Supp.  948,  949. 
101  App.  Div.  327. 

While  a  county  is  not  strictly  a  munic- 
ipal corporation,  yet,  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
a  body  corporate  with  only  such  powers  as 
are  expressly  conferred  by  statute,  it  is  with- 
in the  rules  applicable  to  such  corporations. 
Morse  v.  Qranlte  County,  119  Pac.  286,  289, 
44  Mont  7a 

A  county  is  a  municipal  or  <]uasi  munic- 
ipal corporation  Invested  with  lief^^islative 
powers  to  be  exercised  for  local  purposes, 
subject  to  the  control  of  the  state,  but  Is  not, 
in  a  strict  sense,  a  "municipal  corporation.'* 
Schubel  V.  Olcott,  120  Pac.  375,  378,  60  Or. 
608. 

"Municipal  corporations"  are  subordi- 
nate parts  of  the  state,  and  Invested  with 
limited  powers.  In  Montana  counties  are  at 
most  only  <iuasi  municipal  corporations,  with 
no  legislative  authority  vested  in  tiie  several 
boards  of  county  conunlssioners,  in  the  sense 
that  they  may  adopt  ordinances  and  pre- 
scribe penalties  for  a  violation  thereot  or 
define  nuisances  and  provide  for  their  abate- 
ment In  re  O'Brien,  75  Pac.  196,  199,  29 
Mont  680,  1  Ann.  Cas.  378  (citing  Wilcox  ▼. 
Deer  Lodge  County,  2  Mont  674). 


MUNIOIPAL  CORPORATION 


477 


MUNIOIPAL  CORPORATION 


A  ''municipal  corporation"  proper  la  ere* 
ated  mainly  for  the  interest,  advantage,  and 
convenience  of  the  locality  and  iti  people,  as 
distinguished  from  a  county  organization 
which  is  created  almost  exclusiyely  with  a 
Tiew  to  the  policy  of  the  state  at  large.  Peo- 
ple ex  reL  Attorney  General  y.  Johnson,  86 
Pac  233,  235,  84  Colo.  143  (citing  1  Dill. 
Mun.  Corp.  |  23). 

A  "county"  ifl  a  goTemmental  agency  of 
the  state,  and  in  a  sense  a  ''municipal  corpo- 
ration^'  Kumpe  ▼.  Bynum»  48  South.  66,  66, 
168  AU.  311. 

A  special  sdiool  district  is  not  within 
the  constitutional  provision  declaring  that 
no  county,  city,  town,  or  municipality  shall 
issue  any  interest  bearing  evidence  of  indebt- 
edness. All  corporations  intended  as  agencies 
in  the  administration  of  dvil  government  are 
public,  as  distinguished  from  private,  corpora- 
tiona  Cities  are  "municipal  corporations," 
while  school  districts  and  "counties,**  properly 
^peaking,  are  not  Schmutz  v.  Special  School 
Dlst  of  City  of  Uttte  Rock,  95  S.  W.  438, 
439,  78  Ark.  118  (citing  Memphis  Trust  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Directors  of  St  Francis  Levee  Dist, 
62  S.  W.  902,  69  Ark.  284;  1  Dill.  Mun.  Corp. 
122). 

The  "county"  is  a  political  subdivision 
of  the  state,  though  for  many  purposes  it  is 
deemed  a  municipality.  Its  power  of  con- 
tracting indebtedness  is  limited  to  the  mat- 
ters expressly  conferred  by  the  Legislature, 
or  which  are  conferred  by  necessary  impli- 
cation as  an  incident  of  powers  expressly 
conferred.  Not  only  is  it  limited  as  to  the 
things  for  which,  but  it  is  limited  as  to  the 
manner  in  which,  it  may  become  bound  by 
contract  McDonald's  Adm*x  ▼.  Franklin 
County,  100  S.  W.  861,  862, 125  Ky.  205. 

A  "county"  is  a  local  subdivision  of  the 
state,  created  by  the  state  of  its  own  will, 
and  is  not  a  "municipal  corporation"  proper, 
which  is  called  into  existence  either  at  the 
direct  solicitation  or  by  the  consent  of  the 
persons  composing  it  for  the  promotion  of 
theiT  private  advantage,  and  a  county  cannot 
be  sued  except  on  an  express  contract  Ma- 
rion County  V.  Rives  k  McChord,  118  8.  W. 
809,  311,  138  Ky.  477. 

Drainage  dlstrioi 

"Municipal  corporations"  cease  to  exist 
only  by  legislative  consent  and  a  failure  for 
a  term  of  years  to  exercise  the  functions  of  a 
municipality  doea  not  eitect  a  dissolution, 
neither  does  a  failure  to  elect  officers. 
Drainage  districts  are  classed  as  municipal 
corporations.  People  ex  rel.  Oauen  v.  Nie- 
bruegge,  91  N.  B.  115, 117,  244  IlL  82. 

A  drainage  district  although  a  quasi 
public  corporation,  is  not  a  '^municipal  cor- 
poration" within  the  purview  of  Const  art 
6,  f  5,  providing  that  property  belonging  to 
the  state  or  municipal  corporations  shall  be 
exempt    from    taxation,    and   hence    under 


Ck>nst  art  6,  |  8,  art  7,  |  9,  respectively, 
providing  that  all  moneys,  stocks,  and  per- 
sonal property  shall  be  taxed  by  uniform  law, 
and  that  all  taxes  levied  by  any  county,  city, 
or  town  shall  be  uniform,  the  Legislature 
was  without  power  to  exempt  from  taxation 
bonds  issued  by  a  drainage  district  as  was 
attempted  by  Pub.  Laws  1911,  c.  177.  Drain- 
age Com'rs  V.  C.  A.  Webb  &  0>.,  76  S.  E.  552, 
16(>  N.  C.  594. 

Znigatioa  distriot 

Irrigation  districts  organized  under  the 
laws  of  the  state  are  quasi  municipal  corpo- 
rations, and  are  governed  by  the  general  elec- 
tion laws  of  the  state;  and  the  qualifications 
prescribed  by  the  Constitution  for  voters  at 
elections  apply  to  an  election  held  in  an  ir- 
rigation district  Pioneer  Irr.  Dist  v.  Walk- 
er, 119  Pac  304,  307,  20  Idaho,  605. 

Xi«Te«  board  or  dlstHet 

Acts  1909,  p.  660,  creating  levee  district 
No.  2,  in  Jackson  county,  provides  by  section 
2  that  the  district  shall  have  power  to  make 
such  by-laws  and  regulations  as  they  may 
deem  proper,  not  inconsistent  with  their 
charter  and  state  law,  to  carry  into  effect  the 
object  of  their  incorporation,  and  to  do  all 
other  acts  not  inconsistent  with  state  law 
which  may  be  proper  to  effectuate  the  pur- 
pose of  the  act  uid  section  9  authorisEes  them 
to  hear  complaints  from  parties  aggrieved  by 
the  assessment  and  make  all  necessary  cor- 
rections therein.  Held,  that  the  district  is 
not  a  municipal  corporation  within  Const 
art  12,  i  4,  prohibiting  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion from  levying  a  tax  on  realty  to  a  greater 
extent  in  one  year  than  five  mills  on  the 
dollar  of  the  assessed  valuation.  St  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Ca  v.  Board  of  Directors  of 
Levee  Dist  No.  2,  Jackson  County,  145  S.  W. 
892,  895,  103  Ark.  127. 

Levee  boards,  under  the  Constitution,  are 
bodies  politic,  entirely  separate  and  distinct 
from  "municipal  corporations,"  fbr  the  pur* 
pose  of  taxation.  United  Railroad  &  Trad- 
ing Co.  V.  Movers,  86  South.  797,  799, 112  La. 
897. 

Paiisli  preoiaet 

A  parish  precinct  la  not  one  of  the  sub- 
divisions mentioned  in  Const  art  282,  au- 
thorizing special  election  to  be  held  In  any 
parish,  "municipal  corporation,*'  ward,  or 
school  district  Regard  v.  Police  Jury  of 
AvoyeUes,  42  South.  438, 117  La.  952. 

Portdlstvlot 

A  port  district  incoiporated  to  provide 
public  terminal  facilities  for  both  sea  and 
land  commerce  is  a  "municipal  corporation,*' 
within  a  constitutional  limitation  as  to  the 
amount  of  indebtedness  of  "counties,  cities, 
towns,  school  districts,  and  other  municipal 
corporations,"  and  when  properly  and  legally 
organised  it  will  possess  the  same  powers  aa 
the  municipal  corporations  specifically  men- 
tioned; and,  though  U  be  superimiKMed  over 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION 


478 


MI7NI0IPAL  CORPORATION 


territory  occupied  by  each  other  mimlcipal- 
Itles,  existing  for  an  entirely  different  pnr^ 
pose,  the  limit  of  its  power  to  incur  indebt- 
edness is  independent  of  and  not  measured 
by  the  portion  of  the  constitutional  limita- 
tion not  taken  up  by  the  indebtedness  of  the 
other  divisions.  Paine  v.  Port  of  Seattle, 
127  Pac.  580,  581,  70  Wash.  294. 

Reolan&ation  distriot 

A  reclamation  district  is  a  public,' as 
distinguished  from  a  private,  corporation, 
acting  as  a  state  agency  invested  with  limit- 
ed powers,  but  it  is  not  a  "municipal  cor- 
poration," possessing  in  any  degree  general 
powers  of  government,  though,  within  the 
limits  of  the  authority  granted  to  it,  it  ex- 
ercises public  functions.  Metcalfe  v.  Merritt, 
111  Paa  505,  506,  14  CaL  App.  244. 

Sehool  dlstHet 

A  school  district  is  not  a  "municipal 
corporation."  State  ex  reL  Oarrollton  School 
Dist  No.  1,  Tp.  53,  R.  23,  v.  Gordon,  133  S. 
W.  44,  51,  231  Mo.  547 ;  Knowles  v.  Board  of 
Education  of  City  of  Topeka,  7  Pac  561,  564, 
33  Kan.  692  (citing  DilL  Mun.  Corp.  |  22). 

A  sdiool  district  is  not  a  municipal  cor- 
poration within  Const  art  7,  |  6,  prohibit- 
ing the  Legislature,  from  imposing  taxes  for 
the  purpose  of  any  municipal  corporation. 
Fenton  t.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Ada  County, 
119  Pac.  41,  44,  20  Idaho,  392. 

A  school  district  is  a  "municipal  cor- 
poration," within  Const  art  8, 1 1,  excepting 
such  corporations  from  the  prohibition 
against  creating  corporations  by  special  act 
Board  of  Education  of  Union  Free  School 
Dist  No.  6  of  Town  of  Cortlandt  v.  Board  of 
Education  of  Union  Free  School  Dist  No.  7 
of  Town  of  Cortlandt  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  522, 
524,  76  App.  Dlv.  355. 

Graded  school  districts  are  public  quasi 
Corporations  within  the  term  "municipal  cor- 
poration," as  used  in  Const  art  7,  |  7,  pro- 
hibiting any  city,  town,  or  other  municipal 
corporation  from  contracting  debts  except 
for  necessary  expenses,  unless  by  vote  of  the 
qualified  voters ;  so  that  a  gr&ded  school  dis- 
trict could  not  issue  bonds  to  erect  a  school 
building  unless  their  issue  was  approved  by  a 
majority  of  the  qualified  voters;  the  erection 
of  a  school  building  not  being  a  "necessary 
expense"  within  section  7.  Ellis  v.  Trustees 
of  Graded  School  of  Oxford,  72  S.  B.  2,  3, 
156  N.  C.  10. 

School  districts  are  public  quasi  corpora- 
tions included  in  the  term  **munlcll)al  cor- 
porations" as  tiered  in  article  7,  f  7,  of  our 
Constitution,  and  so  come  withfh  the  ex- 
press provisions  of  section  7,  that  '*no  county, 
city,  town,  or  other  municipal  corporation, 
shall  contract  any  debt  pledge  its  faith,  or 
loan  its  credit  etc.,  nor  shall  any  tax  be 
levied  unless  by  a  vote  of  the  qualified  vot- 
ers." And  the  principle  of  uniformity  is 
efltabUahed  and  required  by  section  9  of  tUa 


artide.  Smith  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of  Rob- 
ersonville  Graded  School,  58  S.  B.  524,  827, 
141  N.  C.  143,  8  Ann.  Ca&  529. 

Const  art  5,  |  1,  directing  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  to  levy  a  poll  tax  equal  to  the 
tax  on  property  valued  at  $300,  but  provid- 
ing that  the  state  and  county  poll  tax  com- 
bined shall  not  exceed  ^  a  head,  does  not 
apply*  as  to  such  limitation,  to  a  special 
school  district  created  pursuant  to  Revisal 
1905,  I  4115,  but  such  district  is  a  public 
quasi  corporation  included  within  the  term 
"municipal  corporations,"  as  used  in  Const 
art  7,  and  subject  only  to  the  limitations 
contained  in  that  article,  forbidding  a  munici- 
pal corporation  to  contract  any  debt  or  to 
levy  any  tax,  except  for  the  necessary  ex- 
penses thereof,  unless  by  a  vote  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  qualified  voters,  and  requiring 
all  taxes  levied  to  be  uniform  and  ad  valor- 
em. Perry  v.  Commissioners  of  Franklin 
County,  62  S.  B.  608,  609,  148  N.  C.  521. 

State 

Laws  1905,  p.  870,  c.  176,  in  amendment 
of  Code  Civ.  Proc.  i  1391,  authorizing  an  ex- 
ecution against  the  wages  or  salary  of  the 
judgment  debtor,  and  making  it  the  duty  of 
any  person  or  corporation,  municipal  or  oth- 
erwise, to  whom  the  execution  shall  be  pre- 
sented, and  who  shall  be  Indebted  to  the 
judgment  debtor,  to  pay  over  to  the  oflicer 
the  amount  of  the  debt  does  not  authorize 
the  issuance  of  an  execution  against  the 
salary  of  a  state  officer;  the  state  being 
neither  a  person  nor  a  corporation  nor  a 
municipal  corporation.  Osterhoudt  v.  Keith, 
117  N.  T.  Supp.  809,  810,  183  App.  Dlv.  88. 

Toim  or  towasldp 

A  township  is  clearly  to  be  classed 
with  quasi  corporations,  and  not  with  "mu- 
nicipal corporations.'*  Hanson  ▼.  City  of 
Oresco,  109  N.  W.  1109,  1112,  132  Iowa,  588. 

''Townships"  are  the  lowest  grade  o7 
''municipal  corporations,"  being  created  for 
specific  purposes,  and  endowed  with  limited 
powers  and  liabilities,  acting  through  oflicers 
duly  authorized  by  the  law  for  that  purpose. 
Posey  Tp.,  Franklin  County,  v.  Senour,  86 
N.  B.  440,  441,  42  Ind.  App.  680. 

Under  General  Corporation  Laws,  || 
2,  8,  Town  Law,  |  2,  and  General  Municipal 
Law,  I  1,  a  "town"  is  a  "municipal  corpora- 
tion." Town  of  Hempstead  v.  Lawrence,  122 
N.  T.  Supp.  1037,  1039, 188  Al^.  Dlv.  478. 

New  Tork  Town  Law  defines  a  "town" 
as  a  "municipal  corporation"  comprising  the 
inhabitants  within  its  boundaries,  and  form- 
ed for  the  purpose  of  exercising  such  powers 
and  discharging  sudi  duties  of  local  govern- 
ment and  administration  of  public  affairs  bm 
may  be  conferred  or  imposed  upon  it  by  law; 
and  hence  a  town  is  a  municipal  corporation 
which  may  enter  into  a  lighting  contract 
Dunn  V.  Whlteatown*  185  Fed.  586^  688. 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION 


479 


aiUNIOIFAIi  CK>Y£RNMENT 


Gode  Civ.  Proc.  |  264,  provides  that  no 
award  Bhall  be  made  on  any  claim  against 
the  state,  except  upon  such  legal  evidence 
as  would  establish  liability  against  an  in- 
dividual or  corporation.  Canal  Law,  |  47, 
provides  that  no  judgment  shall  be  awarded 
by  the  Court  of  Claims  for  damages  from 
neglect  or  conduct  of  any  state  officer  having 
charge  of  canals,  or  from  any  accident  con- 
nected with  the  canals,  unless  the  facts  make 
out  a  case  which  would  create  a  legal  lia- 
bility against  the  state,  were  they  established 
in  court  against  an  individual  or  corpora- 
tion. Held,  that  the  phrase  "individual  or 
corporation*'  includes  a  town;  Town  Law,  § 
2,  defining  a  *'town**  as  a  "municipal  corpora- 
tion**  comprising  the  inhabitants  within  its 
boundaries.  O'Bryan  v.  State,  126  N.  T. 
Supp.  490,  491,  68  Misc;  Rep.  618. 

KUNIOIPAIi  COUXOXL 

See  Council. 

MUJWXOAPAIi  OOUBTS 

As  state  court,  see  State  Court 

There  is  no  substantial  or  material  dif- 
ference between  the  terms  "city  court"  and 
"municipal  court."  Miller  v.  People,  82  N. 
B.  621,  623,  230  IlL  66. 

MUmClPAIi  DEPARTMENT 

A  covenant  in  a  lease  that  the  tenant 
shall  comply  with  the  orders  of  "municipal 
departments"  of  the  city  of  New  York  in- 
cluded the  tenement  house  department  of 
such  city,  although  its  existence  began  at  a 
date  subsequent  to  the  execution  of  the 
lease.  Palmieri  v.  Antinozzl,  96  N.  T. 
Supp.  866,  866,  47  Misc.  Rep.  237. 

JfUNICIPAI-  EliECTION 

See  Next  General  Election. 
Included  In  any  election,  see  Any. 

Under  Rev.  Laws  1906,  |  886,  municipal 
Sections,  as  well  as  state  and  county  col- 
lections, may  be  contested,  and  a  village 
election  is  a  ''municipal  election."  State  ex 
rel.  Village  of  Rxcelsior  v.  District  Court  of 
Henn^ln  County,  120  ISL  W.  894,  896,  107 
Minn.  437. 

An  election  authorized  by  the  general 
council  of  a  city  of  the  fourth  class  to  sub- 
mit the  question  of  whether  the  city  should 
Issue  bonds  to  raise  money  for  the  erection 
of  common  school  buildings  was  not  held 
under  any  statutes  relating  to  common 
schools,  but  was  a  "municipal  election"  held 
under  Ky.  St.  |  3490,  subsec.  34,  authorizing 
cities  of  the  fourth  class  to  issue  municipal 
iMUds  for  municipal  purposes,  and  providing 
that  the  city  council,  if  they  deem  it  neces- 
sary to  incur  a  debt,  shall  give  notice  of  an 
election  to  determine  whether  the  debt  shall 
be  Incurred,  and,  if  two-thirds  of  the  quali- 
fied electors  vote  therefor,  shall  provide  by 
ordinance  for  creating  the  debt,  so  that  the 
olectioa  was  properly  held  by  secret  ballot,  as 


provided  by  the  Constitution,  even  if  elections 
relating  to  common  ^public  schools  must  be 
held  viva  voce.  Frost  v.  Central  City,  120 
S.  W.  367,  368,  134  Ky.  434. 

XUNICIPAIi  FtTNCTION 

Const  art  11,  |  13,  providing  that  the 
Legislature  shall  not  delegate  to  any  as- 
sociation or  individual  power  to  perform  any 
"municipal  function,"  has  no  application  to 
St  1899,  p.  868,  c.  247,  permitting  territory 
to  be  annexed  to  towns  at  the  discretion  of 
the  inhabitants,  nor  does  it  effect  the  valid- 
ity thereof,  for  "the  fixing  of  the  boundaries 
of  the  territory  to  be  annexed  is  In  no  sense 
of  the  words  a  'municipal  function.' "  There 
is  no  constitutional  provision  that  intimates 
that  this  power  can  be  conferred  only  on 
some  legislative  body,  and  not  upon  the  elec- 
tors pf .  the  locality  to  be  affected^  and,  in  the 
absence  of  such  a  provision,  the  question  as 
to  whether  it  shall  be  given  to  the  one  or 
the  other  is  purely  one  of  policy,  upon  which 
the  determination  of  the  Legislature  is  con- 
clusive. People  V.  Town  of  Ontario,  84  Pac. 
205-208, 148  Cal.  625. 

Laws  1905,  p.  276,  c  163,  creating  a 
board,  to  be  known  as  the  state  capitol  com- 
mission, for  the  purpose  of  procuring  the 
erection  of  a  capitol  building,  and  author- 
izing the  commission  to  procure  the  erection 
of  a  building,  adopt  plans  and  specifica- 
tions, etc.,  is  not  in  conflict  with  Const  art 
3,  I  26,  declaring  that  the  Legislature  shall 
not  delegate  to  any  special  commission  power 
to  perform  any  "municipal  function";  the 
erection  of  a  capitol  building  not  being  a 
"municipal  function,"  which  in  such  case  is 
restricted  to  the  affairs  of  cities  and  towns. 
Davenport  v.  Elrod,  107  N.  W.  833,  834,  20 
S.  D.  667. 

MUNICIPAIi  CK>VEItNMENT 

"'Municipal  governments*  are  entities 
distinct  from  the  state  government,  incur- 
ring liabilities  of  their  own,  In  no  way  bind- 
ing upon  the  state,  and  acquiring  rights  and 
property  in  which  the  state  has  no  property 
interest  Except  where  the  law  makes  the 
municipal  government  an  agent  for  the  state 
in  collecting  the  state's  taxes,  or  in  discharg- 
ing some  other  state  function,  there  is  no 
relation  between  the  one  and  the  other  of 
principal  and  agent,  as  that  relation  is  usual- 
ly understood  in  the  law.  The  state  may, 
through  its  legislative  branch,  confer  upon, 
and  withdraw  from,  the  counties  and  cities 
power  of  taxation.  But  when  the  power 
thus  conferred  is  for  the  benefit  of  the  local 
community  in  which  it  is  to  be  exercised,  its 
exercise  is  not  by  agent  for  a  principal.  It 
is  by  a  quasi  Independent  government  for  the 
benefit  of  the  people  within  its  lindta"  Bank 
of  Kentucky  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.)  94  S. 
W.  620,  621  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Northern  Bank  of  Kentudsy  v.  Stone»  88 
Fed.  413). 


MUNICIPAL*  n^DEBTEDNESS 


480 


MUNICIPAL  OFFICEB 


m 


H 


KUNIOIPAIi  XmiEBTllDlfEBS 

An  indebtedness  created  by  l>ondB  for  a 
street  improvement  as  authorized  by  stat- 
ute, allowing  a  city  to  order  the  original 
construction  of  a  dty  improvement  at  the 
cost  of  abutting  owners,  and  to  issue  10- 
year  bonds  against  the  property  not  paying 
in  cash,  is  not  a  "municipal  Indebtedness" 
within  the  Constitution,  limiting  municipal 
indebtedness.  Guilfoyle's  Ez'r  v.  City  of 
Maysville,  112  S.  W.  666,  667,  129  Ky.  532. 

MUmUIPAI.  XJLW 

"Municipal  law**  is  a  rule  of  civil  con- 
duct prescribed  by  the  supreme  power  of  a 
state  That  definition  is  a  part  of  Sir  Wil- 
liam Blackstone's,  which  adds,  commanding 
what  is  right,  and  prohibiting  what  is  wrong. 
Merchants*  Exchange  of  St  Louis  ▼.  Knott, 
111  S.  W.  065,  571,  212  Mo.  616  (dtlng  1 
Kent,  Comm.  447). 

MUHIOIPAI.  liEOISLATIOK 

The  only  acts  of  a  dty  council  subject 
to  the  referendum  by  Const  art  4,  §  la,  re- 
serving the  referendum  as  to  "municipal 
legislation,**  are  such  as  come  within  the  term 
"municipal  legislation**;  and  such  legislation 
must  be  considered  in  the  sense  of  laws  of 
general  application,  and  does  not  include 
transient  orders  to  a  particular  person,  and 
the  latter  may  be  adopted  without  reference 
to  the  referendum.  Long  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 98  Pac  1111,  1112,  53  Or.  92. 

To  understand  the  signification  of  the 
words  "municipal  legislation,'*  as  used  in 
Const,  art  11,  §  2,  prohibiting  the  Legisla- 
ture from  amending  the  charters  of  cities 
and  towns,  the  right  of  which  is  reserved  to 
the  voters  thereof,  and  article  4  providing 
that  the  referendum  may  be  demanded  by 
the  people,  which  power  is  reserved  to  the 
legal  voters  of  every  municipality  and  dis- 
trict, as  to  all  local,  special,  and  munldpal 
legislation  of  every  character  in  and  for 
their  respective  munidpalities  and  districts, 
requires  an  interpretation  of  the  term  'lo- 
cal and  spedal  legislation,**  the  right  to  for- 
mulate rules  in  relation  to  which  is  implied- 
ly denied  to  dties  and  towns,  on  the  prin- 
dple  that  the  expression  of  one  thing  is  the 
exclusion  of  another.  The  qualifying  words 
"local**  and  "special"  are  synonymous,  and, 
in  the  sense  in  which  they  are  used,  mean 
any  enactment  that  is  plainly  intended  to 
affect  a  particular  person  or  thing  or  to  be 
in  effect  in  some  spedfled  locality  only. 
The  words  "munidpallty**  and  "district**  are 
evidently  expressions  of  equivalent  import, 
for  a  district  legally  created  from  a  desig- 
nated part  of  the  state  and  organized  to 
promote  the  convenience  of  the  public  at 
large  is  a  "munldpal  corporation.'*  The  au- 
thority of  such  a  corporation  has  been  here- 
tofore derived  from  an  act  of  the  legislative 
assembly  creating  it,  and,  as  sudi  statute  is 
applicable  to  and  enforceable  in  a  part  of 


the  state  only,  it  is  a  local  or  special  1 
The  change  in  the  <)rganic  law  deprlyes 
legislative  assembly  of  all  authority  to 
act,  amend,  or  repeal  any  charter  of  a  to 
the  legal  voters  of  which  reserve  to  th 
selves  the  exercise  of  all  such  power, 
cept  the  right  of  repeal,  and  it  was  evid 
ly  the  intention  of  the  framers  of  such  < 
stitutional  provision,  and  also  the  people  \ 
ratified  it,  to  vest  an  incorporated  dty 
town  with  authority  to  provide  the  mai 
of  exercising  the  initiative  and  referent 
powers  as  to  amendments  of  a  diarter,  wl 
change  is  reasonably  within  the  term  of  ** 
nidpal  legislation."  Acme  Dairy  Co.  v.  ( 
of  Astoria,  90  Pac.  153,  154,  49  Or.  62a 

MUNIOIPAI.  OFFENSB 

As  crime,  see  Crime. 

MUMIOIPJJL  OFFIOB 

A  ^Milage,*'  as  defined  In  the.^tatate 
elections  (Rev.  Laws  1905,  |  154),  is  a  mn 
ipality,  and  an  office  therein  is  a  ''mnnicl 
office,**  witliin  section  386.  State  ex 
Village  of  Excelsior  v.  District  Court 
Hennepin  County,  120  N.  W.  894,  895, 
Minn.  437. 

MUHiClPAIi  OFFICER 

See,  also,  City  Officer. 

In  the  broad  sense  "municipal  office 
indnde  all  local  elective  or  appointive  < 
cers.  Uvalde  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  ▼.  Cits 
New  Tork,  134  N.  Y.  Supp.  60,  52,  149  A 
Div.  491. 

The  mayor  and  aldermen  constitate 
'Munldpal  officers  of  a  dty,"  under  Rev. 
1903,  c.  1,  I  0,  par.  25.    Huntington  v.  C 
of  Cahiis,  73  Aa  829,  830,  105  Me.  144. 

The  term  "municipal  officer,'*  as  naed 
Const  art  16,  |  6,  limiting  the  terms  of 
fice  to  two  years,  means  "dty  officers.**  St 
ex  reL  Quintin  v.  Edwards,  99  Pac.  910,  $ 
38  Mont  250  (dting  6  Words  and  Phrai 
p.  4618). 

Sersea&t  at  arms  of  ooiinoll 

"The  distinction  is  plainly  taken 
tween  a  person  acting  as  a  'servant*  or  '( 
ploy^'  who  does  not  discharge  independ 
duties  but  acts  by  the  direction  of  oth< 
and  an  'officer*  empowered  to  act  in  the  < 
charge  of  a  duty  or  legal  authority  in  < 
dal  life.**  Where  a  fireman,  wrongfully  < 
charged  from  the  fire  department  of  the  c 
of  New  York,  pending  reinstatement,  acoi 
ed  a  position  as  sergeant  at  arms  to 
council  of  the  mnnidpal  assembly,  he  wai 
mere  "employ^**  of  the  dty,  and  not  an  ' 
ficer,"  within  New  York  City  CSiarter  (U 
1897,  p.  543,  c.  878,  I  1549),  prohibiting  "i 
nidpal  officers^  from  holding  two  offl< 
Padden  v.  City  of  New  York,  92  N.  Y.  So 
926,  928,  45  Misc.  Rep.  017  (quoting  a 
adopting  definition  in  Olmstead  v.  City 
New  York,  42  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct  481,  and  ( 
ing  People  v.  Murray,  TB  N.  X«  639. 


MUNICIPAL  OFFICER 


461 


MUNICIPAL  PURPOSES 


Jmdse 

Judges  of  dty  courts*  organized  by  Rev. 
St  1899,  a  87,  i  240,  are  municipal  officers, 
within  Const  art  9,  |  U,  providing  that 
the  fees,  salary,  or  compensation  of  no  mu- 
nicipal officer  elected  or  appointed  for  a  def- 
inite term  shall  be  increased  or  diminished 
luring  the  term.  Wolf  ▼.  Hope,  70  N.  B. 
1082,  1087,  210  IlL  60. 

PoUeemmm 

A  policeman  is  not  strictly  a  state  officer, 
Qor  is  he  a  "municipal  officer"  or  servant  of 
i  dty  in  which  his  duties  are  to  be  perform- 
ed, and  is  therefore  not  within  Const  art 
16,  §  6,  limiting  the  terms  of  office  of  munic- 
ipal officers  to  two  years.  State  ex  rel. 
QalDtin  v.  Edwards,  99  Paa  940,  946,  38 
Mont  250. 

A  private  policeman  or  watchman  em- 
ployed by  a  private  corporation,  who  is  paid 
by  the  corporation  and  who  may  be  discharg- 
ed by  it,  is  not  a  munidpal  officer,  so  as 
to  make  his  wages  exempt  from  garnish- 
ment, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he  was 
empowered  to  make  arrests  and  subject  to 
the  supervision  and  control  of  the  dty  police 
department  Tabb  v.  Mallette,  47  S.  E.  687, 
S88,  120  Cki.  97,  102  Am.  St  Rep.  7a 

State  oAeer  dUtlnffnisHed 

The  distinction  between  "state  officers*' 
and  '*munidpal  officers"  Ib  that  the  duties  of 
the  former  concern  the  state  at  large  and 
the  general  public,  although  exercised  with- 
in definite  territorial  limits,  while  the  func- 
tions of  the  latter  relate  to  a  particular  com- 
munity. Ex  parte  Corliss,  114  N.  W.  962, 
M8,  16  N.  D.  470. 

■tmilClPAIi  ORDIHAHOB 

See  Ordinance. 
As  statute,  see  Statute. 
Violation    of   ordinance  as   crime,   see 
Crime. 

KUNICIPAIi  PBOPERTT 

As  private  property,  see  Private  Prop- 
erty. 

A  tax  legally  imposed  by  a  munidpali- 
ty  Is  *'munldpal  property"  of  which  the 
municipality  cannot  be  deprived  without  due 
process  of  law.  Harris  v.  Steams,  97  N.  W. 
361.  363,  17  S.  D.  439. 

MUKICIPAI.  PUBP08E8 

See  Corporation  for  Munidpal  Purposes. 

The  erection  of  a  school  building  was  a 
'*munidpal  purpose'*  for  which  the  dty  was 
authorized  to  issue  bonds.  Frost  v.  Central 
City,  120  S.  W.  367,  368,  184  Ky.  434. 

Acts  Ala.  1894r^,  p.  593,  entltied  "An 
act  to  amend  an  act  entitled  an  act  to  incor- 
porate the  dty  of  Columbia,"  etc.,  provides 
(section  29)  for  the  construction  of  a  bridge 
across  the  Chattahoochle  river,  and  author- 
izes the  issue  of  bonds  therefor.    Held  that, 

8  WD8.&  P.2D  SSB.— 81 


since  the  river  constitutes  the  south  and  east 
boundary  of  the  dty,  as  declared  in  its 
amended  charter,  the  construction  of  a 
bridge  across  the  river  was  a  "munidpal  pur- 
pose," and  hence  the  authority  for  the  bond 
issue  was  valid  and  within  the  title  to  the 
act  City  of  Columbia  v.  Chicago  Title  & 
Trust  Co.,  200  Fed.  569,  571,  119  a  C.  A.  49. 

Under  a  charter  authorizing  a  dty  to  in- 
cur indebtedness  for  "munidpal  purposes,'* 
the  furnishing  of  water  for  street  sprinkling, 
for  use  in  public  buildings,  etc.,  is  a  mu- 
nidpal purpose.  City  of  Winchester  v.  Win- 
chester Waterworks  Co.,  148  S.  W.  1,  6,  149 
K:y.  177. 

The  acquisition  of  parks  is,  without  any 
express  words  of  authorization.  Included 
whenever  a  grant  of  power  is  conferred  to 
acquire  property  for  ^'munidpal  purposes." 
Cil^  of  Oakland  v.  Thompson,  91  Pac  S87, 
888,  151  Cal.  572. 

An  ordinance  of  A  town  out  of  debt, 
levying  a  property  tax  for  "munidpal  pur- 
poses" and  a  poll  tax  "for  said  purposes,** 
suffidently  spedfles  the  purposes  for  which 
the  taxes  are  levied,  within  Const  |  180,  re- 
quiring an  ordinance  imposing  a  tax  to  sped- 
ty  distinctly  the  purpose  for  which  the  same 
is  levied.  The  expression  "for  munidpal 
purposes,"  in  the  ordinance,  is  the  same  in 
meaning  as  if  it  had  read  "for  ordinary  mu- 
nidpal purposes"  or  "for  carrying  on  the 
town  government  in  the  ordinary  routine.'* 
Town  of  Mt  Pleasant  v.  Eversole  (Ky.)  96  S. 
W.  478,  479. 

Laws  1905,  p.  2096,  c.  737,  I  11,  provid- 
ing that  no  munidpality  shall  build  and  op- 
erate for  other  than  "munidpal  purposes" 
any  systems  for  furnishing  gas  or  electridty 
fOr  lighting  purposes,  without  a  certificate  of 
authority  granted  by  the  state  gas  commhi- 
sion,  enacted  whoa  Laws  1897,  p.  488,  c.  414, 
authorising  a  village  to  maintain  a  lighting 
system  for  lighting  its  streets  and  the 
private  buildings  of  its  Inhabitants,  was  la 
force,  prohibits  a  village  from  erecting  a 
lighting  system  for  llflfhting  the  private 
buildings  of  its  inhabitants  unless  authority 
therefor  \b  granted  by  the  commission. 
Potsdam  Electric  Ldght  A  Power  Co.  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Potsdam,  97  N.  Y.  Supp.  190,  192,  49 
Misc.  Rep.  la 

Const  art  8^  |  8^  gives  the  Legislature 
power  to  establish  and  abolish  munidpalities, 
to  provide  for  thdr  government,  to  prescribe 
thdr  jurisdiction  and  powers,  and  to  alter 
the  same.  Article  9,  §  5,  provides  that  the 
Legislature  shall  authorize  counties  or  incor- 
porated dties  and  towns  to  impose  taxes  for 
county  and  mimldpal  purposes,  and  for  no 
other.  Article  12,  §  1,  provides  that  the  Leg- 
islature shall  Institute  a  uniform  system  of 
public  free  schools  and  provide  fOr  the  liber- 
al maintenance  thereol  Section  10  requires 
the  Legislature  to  provide  for  the  division  of 
the  counties  into  convenient  school  districts. 


MUNICIPAL  TREASURY 


482 


MUNICIPALITY 


and  for  the  levying  and  collecting  of  a  dis- 
trict school  tax  for  the  exclusive  use  of  pub- 
lic free  schools  within  the  district  Section 
U  provides  that  any  Incorporated  town  or 
city  may  constitute  a  school  district,  and  the 
fund  raised  by  section  10  may  be  extended  in 
the  district  where  levied  for  building  or  re- 
pairing schoolhouses,  purchase  of  school  li- 
braries and  text-books,  etc,  so  that  the  dis- 
tribution among  all  the  schools  of  the  dis- 
trict be  equitabla  Held,  that  the  power  giv- 
en the  Legislature  to  prescribe  the  "powers** 
of  municipalities  and  to  authorize  cities  and 
towns  to  assess  and  impose  taxes  for  *'munlc- 
ipal  purposes"  does  not  authorize  the  giving 
to  municipalities,  as  such,  authority  to  issue 
bonds  and  levy  a  municipal  tax  to  pay  them, 
when  the  proceeds  are  to  be  used  to  erect 
schoolhouses  and  maintain  a  system  of  pub- 
lic education  in  the  municipality,  as  provided 
by  Laws  1899,  c.  4869,  9  37,  as  amended 
by  Laws  1907,  c.  5817,  §  3.  Brown  v.  City 
of  Lakeland,  64  South.  716,  717,  61  Fla.  60a 

KUNIOIPAI.  TBEA8URY 

Expenses  of  municipal  treasury,  see  Ex- 
penses. 

MUHIGIPAIi  YEAB 

The  "mimicipal  year"  has  usually  been 
taken  to  be  the  political  year,  or  year  inter- 
vening between  the  taking  of  office  by  the  re- 
spective city  officers  elected  in  each  year.  So 
where  the  time  of  elections  was  fixed  as  the 
first  Tuesday  of  April  in  each  year,  and  as 
this  day  may  fall  on  the  first  or  any  day  up 
to  and  including  the  7th  day  of  the  month, 
the  municipal  year  may  vary  several  days 
in  length.  It  is  not  a  fixed  number  of  days 
or  weeks  or  months.  The  term  "municipal 
year,"  as  used  in  Comp.  St  1903,  a  60,  §  25, 
providing  that  a  liquor  license  shall  expire 
on  the  last  Monday  of  the  "municipal  year," 
means  the  political  year.  Reusch  v.  City  of 
Lincoln,  112  N.  W.  377,  878,  78  Neb.  828, 

]fUHIOIPAI.ITT 

See  Freeholder  of  the  Municipality. 

As  owner,  see  Owner. 

Improvement  of  municipality,  see  Im- 
provement 

Other  municipalities,  see  Other. 

Private  powers  of  municipality,  see  Pri- 
vate Powers. 

"Municipalities"  are  statutory  creaturea 
Burke  v.  State,  119  N.  T.  Supp.  1089,  1099, 
64  Misc.  Rep.  558. 

"Municipalities"  are  but  mere  depart- 
ments or  agencies  of  the  state,  charged  with 
the  performance  of  duties  for  and  on  its  be- 
half, and  subject  always  to  its  controL 
Straw  V.  Harris,  103  Pac  777,  782,  54  Or. 
424. 

"'Municipalities'  are  agencies  of  the 
commonwealth  created  by  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people."  Adams  v.  Oklahoma  City,  95 
Pac.  975,  979,  20  OkL  519. 


A  "municipality"  is  merely  an  agency  in- 
stituted by  the  sovereign  for  the  puri>ose  ol 
carrying  out  in  detail  the  objects  of  govern- 
ment essentially  a  revocable  agency,  subject 
to  legislative  control  "which  may  destroy  lt« 
very  existence  with  the  mere  breath  of  arbi- 
trary decision."  In  re  City  of  Pittsburg,  66 
Atl.  348,  352,  217  Pa.  227  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing  the  definition  in  City  of  Philadelphia  t. 
Fox,  64  Pa. 


"A  'municipality'  is  a  mere  political  sab- 
divislon  of  the  state."  "It  is  a  public  corpo 
ration  having  for  its  object  the  administra- 
tion of  a  portion  of  the  powers  of  the  govern- 
ment delegated  to  it  for  that  purpose."  Pen- 
ick  V.  Foster,  58  S.  B.  773,  775,  129  Ga.  217, 
12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1159,  12  Ann.  Cas.  346. 

A  "municipality"  is  an  arm  of  the  state, 
an  effluence  from  its  sovereignty,  and  is  an 
instrumentality  by  which  the  state  seeks  to 
give  its  citizens  the  best  government  possi- 
ble; hence  a  municipal  waterworks  system  is 
of  a  governmental  and  public  nature,  and  is 
exempt  from  taxation.  Commonwealth  t. 
City  of  Covington,  107  S.  W.  231.  232,  128  Ky. 
36,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1214. 


The  word  "municipality/'  as  used  before 
the  independence  of  Texas,  comprehended  not 
only  the  town  but  certain  adjacent  country, 
and  the  square  set  apart  for  municipal  build- 
ings was  granted  for  the  use  of  the  people 
of  the  whole  district  municipality,  or  pre- 
cinct and  was  not  granted  to  the  central  or 
capitol  town  alone.  City  of  Victoria  v.  Vic- 
toria County  (Tex.)  94  S.  W.  368,  371. 

The  term  "municipality"  has  sometimes 
been  limited  by  definition  to  include  munic- 
ipal corporation  in  the  proper  and  strict 
sense.  But  the  term  is  also  used  by  good 
authority  in  a  broader  sense  to  include  pub- 
lic and  political  corporations  which  are  not 
strictly  municipal.  Hanson  v.  City  of  Cres- 
co,  109  N.  W.  1109,  1112,  132  Iowa,  633  (cit- 
ing 5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4630). 

As  used  in  Const  art  4,  providing  that 
the  referendum  may  be  demanded  by  the 
people,  which  power  is  reserved  to  the  legal 
voters  of  every  "municipality"  and  district, 
as  to  all  local,  special,  and  municipal  legis- 
lation of  every  character  in  and  for  thfir 
respective  municipalities  and  districts,  the 
words  "municipality"  and  "district"  are  eri- 
dently  expressions  of  equivalent  import  for 
a  district  legally  created  from  a  designated 
part  of  the  state  and  organized  to  promote 
the  convenience  of  the  public  at  large  is  t 
municipal  corporation.  The  authority  ot 
such  a  corporation  has  been  heretofore  de- 
rived from  an  act  of  the  legislative  assembly 
creating  it  and,  as  such  statute  is  applicable 
to  and  enforceable  in  a  part  of  the  state  only, 
it  is  a  local  or  special  law.  Acme  Dairy  Oa 
V.  City  of  Astoria,  90  Pac.  153,  154,  49  Or. 
520. 


MUKICIPALITT 


488 


HURDBft 


A  conntr  18  within  Ck>n8t  art  4,  |  la,  re- 
srving  the  initiative  and  referendum  powers 
}  the  voters  of  every  municipality  and  dis- 
rict,  and  the  people  of  the  several  counties 
re  authorized,  by  article  9,  |  la,  to  regulate 
ization  and  exemptiona  within  their  several 
Dunties,  as  provided  by  article  4,  |  la,  In  a 
lanner  subservient  to  any  general  law  whldi 
lay  be  enacted,  though  the  word  "district,*' 
s  used  in  article  4»  |  la,  has  a  broader  sig- 
ification  than  ''county,**  and  may  designate 
territory  comprising  more  than  a  county, 
r  containing  less  area.  Schubel  ▼•  Olcott, 
20  Pac.  S75,  379,  60  Or.  608. 

The  original  meaning  of  a  ''municipality" 
ras  a  "free  town  under  the  Roman  S2mpire, 
rith  powers  of  local  self-government"  Its 
redBe  use  now  would  confine  it  to  subordi- 
late  subdivisions  of  the  state  having  powers 
f  local  self-government  Dillon,  however, 
K)ints  out  in  the  same  section,  after  stating 
he  proper  signification  of  the  word:  "But 
ometimes  it  is  used  in  a  broader  sense  that 
Qcludes  also  public  or  quasi  corporations,  the 
frinclpal  purpose  of  whose  creation  is  as 
in  instrumentality  of  the  state,  and  not  for 
he  regulation  of  the  local  and  special  aflCairs 
)t  a  compact  community."  Act  March  30, 
892  (P.  li.  p.  SeO;  Gen.  St  p.  207^,  provid- 
ng  for  liens  for  persons  doing  labor  or  fur- 
lishing  materials  under  any  contract  for  a 
mblic  improvement  made  with  any  city, 
»wn,  township,  or  other  municipality  author- 
zed  by  law  to  make  contracts  for  public 
mprovements,  applies  to  contracts  with  conn- 
Jes  for  public  improvements.  Union  Stone 
3o.  V.  Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders  of  Hud- 
wn  County,  66  Atl.  466,  469,  71  N.  J.  B^.  657 
citing  1  DHL  Bfun.  Corp.  [4th  Ed.]  p.  89, 
120). 

Act  Mardi  80,  1892  (P.  L.  p.  869;  2  Oen. 
3t  p.  2078),  provides  that  any  person  who, 
[>iur8uant  to  the  terms  of  a  contract  for  any 
?ablic  improvement  in  any  city,  town,  town- 
ship, or  other  "municipality,"  within  the 
»tate,  authorized  by  law  to  contract  for  such 
improvement,  shall  perform  labor  or  fur- 
bish materials  for  the  completion  of  such 
contract,  shall  have  a  Hen  on  the  moneys 
Sue  under  the  contract  Held  that,  where  a 
county  let  a  contract  for  the  construction  of 
I  county  courthouse,  the  county  was  a  "mu- 
nicipality," within  such  a^t  Herman  & 
Grace  ▼.  Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders  of 
Essex  County,  64  AtL  742,  71  N.  J.  Bq.  641. 

Seliool  distrioi 

A  special  school  district  is  not  within 
the  constitutional  provision  declaring  that  no 
county,  city,  town,  or  "municipality"  shall 
Issue  any  interest  bearing  evidence  of  in- 
debtedness. All  corporations  intended  as 
agencies  In  the  administration  of  dvil  gov- 
ernment are  public,  as  distinguished  from 
private,  corporations.  Cities  and  school  dis- 
tricts are  public  corporations.     Cities  are 


municipal  corporations,  while  school  dlBtriefcil 
and  counties,  properly  speaking,  are  not  A 
municipality  is  a  corporation  having  the 
right  to  administer  local  government  as  a 
dty  or  incorporated  town.  A  schof»l  dis- 
trict Is  merely  an  agency  of  state  wiUi  lim- 
ited corporate  powers  btionging  to  a  class  of 
corporate  bodies  known  as  quasi  corporation^. 
Schmuts  V.  Special  School  Dist  of  City  of 
Uttle  Bock,  90  8.  W.  438,  489,  78  Ark.  118 
(citing  Memphis  Trust  Co.  ▼.  Board  of  Di- 
rectoxto  of  St  FrancU  Levee  Dist,  62  S.  W. 
902,  69  Ark.  284;  1  DHL  Mun.  Corp.  |  22). 
TowBsMp 
Code  Supp.  1902,  i  2676,  provides  that 
when  a  controversy  arises  between  munic- 
ipalities or  boards  of  health  thereof  respect- 
ing the  location  of  pesthouses,  reference  shall 
be  made  to  the  president  of  the  state  board 
of  health,  who  shall  appoint  a  committae 
whose  order  in  the  premises  shall  be  flnaL 
Code,  I  394,  declares  each  county  to  be  a 
body  corporate  for  dvil  and  political  pur- 
poses, and  gives  it  power  to  sue  and  be  sued 
and  other  corporate  powers.  A  township  is 
not  expressly  declared  to  be  a  body  corporate, 
and  has  no  right  to  sue  or  to  be  sued  and 
none  of  the  characteristics  of  a  corporation. 
Held«  that,  in  view  of  the  evident  legislative 
intention,  a  township  is  a  "munidpallty^ 
within  the  statute.  Hanson  v.  City  of  Cres- 
00,  109  N.  W.  1109,  1112,  132  Iowa,  638. 

Villase 

A  village,  as  defined  in  the  statute  on 
elections  (Rev.  Laws  1906, 1 164),  is  a  "munic- 
ipality." State  ex  rel.  Village  of  Excelsior  v. 
District  Court  of  Hennepin  County,  120  N, 
W.  894,  896, 107  Minn.  437. 

MURDER 

See  Assault  with  Intent  to  Commit  Mur- 
der;   Ck>mmon-Law  Murder. 

Willful  murder,  see  Willful— Willfully. 

See,  also,  Express  Malice;  Intent  to  Kill ; 
KilL 

The  word  "murder^  defines  the  crime  l^ 
self,  and  is  not  a  constituent  element  there- 
of. Hocker  ▼.  Commonwealth  (Ky.)  Ill  S. 
W.  676.  679. 

"Murder"  is  an  unlawful  killing  with 
malice.  Cole  v.  State,  69  S.  B.  24,  26,  2  Ga. 
App.  734. 

"Murder"  is  the  unlawful  killing  of  a 
human  bdng  with  malice  aforethought  State 
V.  Tinkler,  83  Pac.  830,  831,  72  Kan.  262; 
State  V.  Ireland,  83  Pac.  1036,  1038,  72  Kan. 
265;  State  v.  Wetter,  83  Pac  341,  346,  11 
Idaho,  433;  State  v.  Abbott,  62  S.  BL  693,  64 
W.  Va.  411 ;  State  v.  Johnson  (Del.)  78  Atl. 
606,  2  Boyce,  49;  State  v.  Brown,  60  S.  B. 
946,  946,  79  8.  C.  390;  State  v.  Moore  (Del.) 
74  Ati.  1112,  1114,  1  Boyce,  142. 

Murder  is  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  hu- 
man creature  in  being  with  maUce  afore- 


JtfUBDEB 


484 


inTRDBB 


thoni^t,  either  express  or  Implied.  State  ▼. 
Pepe  (Del.)  76  AtL  867,  809,  1  Boyce,  232; 
State  T.  Jackson  (Del.)  82  AU.  824,  825;  State 
V.  Stockley  (Del.)  82  AtL  1078,  1079;  State 
y.  Moore  (Del.)  74  Atl.  1112,  1114,  1  Boyce, 
142. 

"Harder"  is  the  killing  of  a  human  be- 
ing by  a  person  of  sonnd  memory  and  dis- 
cretion with  malice  aforethought,  either  ex- 
press or  implied.  State  ▼.  Mills  (Del.)  69 
Atl.  841,  842,  6  Pennewill,  497;  State  y.  Wil- 
son (Del.)  62  Att.  227,  280,  6  PennewUl,  77; 
State  ▼.  Di  Ouglielmo  (Del)  56  Atl.  360,  851, 
4  PennewUl,  336;  Smith  y.  State,  56  S.  B. 
475,  126  Ga.  644  (quoting  and  adopting  the 
definition  in  Pen.  Code  1895,  §  60.) 

*'Murder"  is  the  unlawful  killing  of  a 
human  creature  with  malice  aforethought, 
either  express  or  implied,  and  is  of  the  first 
or  second  degree,  as  the  malice  is  express  or 
implied.  State  ▼.  De  Paolo  (DeL)  84  Atl.  213, 
214. 

**  'Murder,'  at  common  law,  was  commit- 
ted when  a  person  of  sound  mind  and  dis- 
cretion unlawfully  killed  any  reasonable  crea- 
ture in  being,  in  the  peace  of  the  sovereign, 
with  malice  aforethought,  either  expressed  or 
implied.  According  to  this  rule,  if  one  feloni- 
ously and  with  malice  aforethought  wounded 
another,  from  which  wound  death  ensued 
within  a  year  and  a  day,  it  was  murder,  un- 
less excuse  or  Justification  was  shown.  Un- 
der our  statute,  such  act  would  not  consti- 
tute an  element  of  murder,  unless  perpetrat- 
ed with  a  premeditated  design,  to  effect  the 
death  of  the  person  killed  or  of  some  other 
person,  but  would  be  embraced  within  some 
one  of  the  lower  degrees  of  homicide."  Mor- 
ris V.  Territory,  99  Pac.  760,  767,  1  Okl.  Or. 
617  (quoting  with  approval  from  Jewell  ▼. 
Territory,  4  Okl.  63,  43  Paa  1076). 

Under  a  statute  defining  "murder"  as  the 
unlawful  killing  of  a  human  being,  an  indict- 
ment charging  that  the  act  was  done  "felo- 
niously,** and  which  omits  the  word  "unlaw- 
fully," is  sufficient,  as  the  word  "feloniously" 
includes  that  which  would  be  charged  by  the 
use  of  the  word  "unlawfully.**  People  ▼.  St 
Caair,  91  N.  E.  573,  244  IlL  444. 

"Murder"  is  the  unlawful,  willful,  and 
felonious  killing  of  another  with  malice  afore- 
thought, not  in  the  necessary  or  apparently 
necessary  self-defense  of  the  slayer.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Mosser,  118  S.  W.  916,  133  Ky. 
609. 

If  the  killing  by  a  defendant  or  his  aid- 
ing or  abetting  of  the  killing  by  another  was 
done  with  malice  unlawfully  and  willfully 
in  sudden  affray,  it  was  murder.  Watklns 
V.  Commonwealth,  97  S.  W.  740,  742,  123  Ky. 
817. 

As  expressly  defined  by  Pen.  Code,  1 187, 
"murder**  is  the  "unlawful  killing  of  a  human 
being  with  malice  aforethought*'  People  v. 
Frank,  83  Pac  678,  579,  2  CaL  App.  283. 


By  Pen.  Gode,  |  860,  '^uidei^  to  the  on 
lawful  killing  of  a  hnman  being  with  maKo 
aforethought  State  v.  Hliboka,  78  Pac  965 
31  Mont  466^  8  Ann.  Gas.  934. 

Bev.  St  1887,  I  6660,  defines  "murder* 
as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  beini 
with  malice  aforethought  State  t.  Fhlnnej 
89  Pac  634,  18  Idaho,  307,  12  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.] 
935,  12  Ann.  Gas.  1079. 

An  information  charging  that  accused 
unlawfully,  feloniously,  willfully,  premedltat 
edly,  deliberately,  and  of  hto  malice  afore 
thought  shot  and  killed  decedent,  a  humai 
being,  sufiadently  charges  murder  as  defined 
by  Rev.  Oodes,  |  8290,  defining  murder  as  th( 
unlawful  killing  H>t  a  human  being  wltli 
malice  aforethought  State  ▼.  Grean,  114  Pac 
603,  606,  43  Mont  47,  Ann.  Gas.  1912G,  424. 

An  information  alleging  that  accused  oi 
a  specified  date  did  willfully,  unlawfully,  and 
feloniously  and  with  maUoe  aforethought 
assault  S.,  with  intent  tiien  and  there  to  kill 
and  murder  her,  was  not  fatally  defective  foi 
failure  to  allege  that  S.  was  a  human  b^g, 
the  term  "murder"  being  defined  as  the  xm 
lawful  killing  of  a  human  being  with  malice 
aforethought  under  Pen.  Gode,  |  950,  snbd 
2,  providing  that  an  information  shall  coi^ 
tain  a  statement  of  the  acts  constituting  thi 
offense  in  ordinary  and  concise  language,  and 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  enable  a  person  ol 
common  understanding  to  know  what  is  in 
tended.  People  v.  Vaughn,  111  Pac  620,  622, 
14  GaL  App.  201. 

"Murder"  in  this  state  is  the  unlawful 
killing  of  a  human  being  with  malice  afore 
thought  Allegations  sufficient  for  a  common 
law  indictment  are  sufficient  tor  an  informa 
tion  under  the  statute  defining  murder  as 
above.  State  v.  McGowan,  93  Pac  662,  655, 
36  Mont  422  (citing  Territory  ▼.  Stears,  2 
Mont  324;  State  v.  Lu  Sing,  86  Pac  621,  34 
Mont  31). 

Where  the  act  of  killing  another  to  doni 
willfully,  feloniously,  and  with  malice  otort 
thought,  accused  to  guilty  of  murder.  Comba 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.)  112  S.  W.  658,  G59. 

A  deliberate  killing  committed  in  re 
venge  for  an  injury  infiicted  in  the  past  ei 
ther  near  or  remote,  to  "murder."  fix  parte 
Fraley,  109  Pac  296,  297,  8  Oki  Gr.  719, 139 
Am.  St  Bep.  988. 

"The  word  'murder*  is  a  legal  and  tech- 
nical term  and  implies  something  more  tbas 
mere  killing,  though  it  includes  all  the  ele- 
ments of  the  latter  word,  but  there  to  nothing 
technical  about  the  word  *kilL*  It  means  to 
deprive  of  life;  to  put  to  death;  to  slay." 
An  allegation  that  defendant  did  "kUl  and 
murder"  the  deceased  to  a  sufficient  allega- 
Uon  that  the  latter  died.  State  ▼.  Sly,  SO 
Pac  1125,  11^,  11  Idaho,  110. 

Homicide  to  "murder"  when  perpetrated 
without  authority  of  law  and  with  a  pre- 
meditated design  to  effect  the  death  of  tbe 


MUBDEB 


186 


MURDER 


person  killed.  Baystnger  ▼.  Territory,  82 
?ac  728,  730,  15  OkL  888. 

"AU  voluntary  felonious  homicide,  with- 
>ut  a  proTocation,  is  undoubtedly  'murder.* " 
rhe  presumption  of  murder  arises  from  proof 
>t  voluntary  homicide,  and,  when  the  killing 
s  admitted  or  proved,  the  burden  of  proof 
s  thenceforth  on  the  defendant  to  excuse  or 
ustify  his  act  Rutherford  v.  Foster,  126 
red.  187.  190,  60  C.  C.  A.  129  (quoting  and 
idopting  definition  In  Fost  Grown  Law,  p. 

as). 

"Murder"  Is  distinguishable  from  every 
»ther  spedes  of  homicide  by  the  absence  of 
Ircumstances  which  reduce  the  ofl!ense  to 
negligent  homicide  or  manslaughter,  or  which 
ixcuse  or  justify  the  homidde.  Jones  v. 
Jtate,  96  S.  W.  930,  931,  60  Tex.  Or.  R.  329. 

The  crime  of  *'murder"  includes  the  les- 
er  crimes  of  second  degree  murder  and  man- 
laughter.  State  V.  Pepoon,  114  Pac.  449, 
^1,  62  Wash.  635. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  where 
in  involuntary  killing  happens  in  the  com- 
Qission  of  an  unlawful  attack,  whidii.  In  its 
onsequences,  nalurally  tends  to  destroy  the 
Ife  of  a  human  being,  or  Is  committed  in 
he  prosecution  of  a  riotous  intent,  or  of  a 
Time  punishable  by  death  or  confinement  in 
he  penitentiary,  the  offense  shall  be  deemed 
murder,**  one  indicted  for  murder  may  be 
onvicted  of  involuntary  manslaughter,  where 
he  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  state  would 
luthorize  a  verdict  of  murder.  Chatman  v. 
;tate,  66  S.  E.  360,  6  Ga.  App.  564. 

In  view  of  Pen.  Code  1901,  |  172,  defin- 
og  "murder**  as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a 
luman  being  with  malice  aforethought,  an 
Qdlctment  sufficiently  charges  murder  by  si- 
eging facts  showing  the  unlawful  killing  of 
.  human  being  with  malice  aforethought, 
without  alleging  facts  bringing  it  within  one 
f  the  statutory  degrees  of  murder;  it  bdng 
or  the  jury  to  determine  the  degree.  Wil- 
lams  V.  Territory,  114  Pac.  666,  13  ArlB.  806. 

"Murder,**  as  defined  in  Pen.  Code,  (  187, 
iedaring  that  "murder  is  the  unlawful  kill- 
Qg  of  a  human  beijig  with  malice  afore- 
bought,**  includes  murder  in  the  first  degree 
nd  murder  in  the  second  degree.  People  v. 
Jng  Ting  Bow,  75  Pac.  899,  142  CaL  341  (cit- 
Qg  People  V.  De  la  Cour  Soto,  63  Cal.  166). 

One  is  guilty  of  murder  who  by  felonious- 
f  severing  another's  blood  vessel  causes  him 

0  bleed  to  death,  where  through  want  of 
ssistance  decedent  is  unable  to  prevent  ex- 
essive  loss  of  blood.     Rlgsby  v.  State,  91 

1  E.  925,  927,  174  lud.  284. 

An  information  in  extradition  proceed- 
Dgs  charging  accused  with  ''assault  with  in- 
ent  to  kill  and  murder*'  sufficiently  brings 
he  offense  within  article  10  of  the  treaty 
rith  Great  Britain,  authorizing  extradition 
f  persons  charged  with  "assault  with  intent 
0  commit  murder.**    An  assault  with  intent 


to  kill  and  murder  is  practically  the  same  as 
an  assault  with  intent  to  commit  murder, 
though  the  words  "to  kill"  do  not  necessarily 
imply  more  than  the  destruction  of  life, 
whidi  may  have  been  caused  without  guilt, 
while  to  commit  murder  implies  killing  with 
malice  aforethought.  But  the  use  of  the  word 
"kiU**  in  the  conjunctive  with  "murder** 
shows  that  it  waer  intended  to  charge  the  com- 
mission of  the  crime  of  assault  with  Intent 
to  kill  with  malice  aforethought.  United 
States  V.  Plaza,  133  Fed.  998,  999. 

In  view  of  Pen.  Code  1901,  |  172,  defin- 
ing murder  as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a 
himaan  being  with  malice  aforethought,  an 
indictment  charging  that  accused  unlawfully, 
willfully,  feloniously,  and  of  his  deliberately 
premeditated  malice  aforethought  made  an 
assault  with  a  loaded  revolver  upon  R.,  "a 
human  being,  with  the  intent,  then  and  there^ 
willfully,  unlawfully,  feloniously,  and  of  his 
deliberately  premeditated  malice  aforethought 
to  kill  and  murder  him,  the  said  R.,*'  suffi- 
ciently alleged  the  crime  of  assault  with  in- 
tent to  murder.  Williams  v.  Territory,  114 
Pac.  566,  13  Ariz.  806. 

Under  Pen.  Code,  H  187,  189,  defining 
murder  as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human 
being  with  malice  aforethought,  and  defining 
murder  in  the  first  and  second  degrees,  and 
section  192,  defining  manslaughter  as  the  un- 
lawful killing  of  a  human  being  without  mal- 
ice, and  dividing  manslaughter  into  volun- 
tary and  involuntary  manslaughter,  and  sec- 
tion 274,  making  it  a  felony  to  perform  a 
criminal  abortion,  an  unlawful  killing  with 
malice  aforethought  is  "murder,**  and  is  also 
"manslaughter,**  because  it  is  the  unlawful 
killing  of  a  human  being,  though  it  cannot  be 
logically  classed  as  voluntary  or  involuntary 
manslaughter,  and  under  a  charge  of  murder 
by  attempting  a  criminal  abortion,  a  verdict 
of  manslaughter  may  be  returned.  People  v. 
Hunangtoo,  97  Pac.  760,  762,  8  Cal.  App.  612. 

Under  Pen.  Code,  §§  242,  246,  254,  declar- 
ing that  a  homicide  is  either  murder,  man- 
slaughter, excusable  homicide,  or  justifiable 
homicide,  that  homicide  is  "murder,**  when 
perpetrated  with  a  premeditated  design  to 
effect  the  death  of  the  person  killed,  and  that 
homicide  is  "manslaughter,"  when  perpetrat- 
ed without  a  design  to  effect  death,  and  in 
heat  of  passion,  etc.,  and  Oode  Cr.  Proc  i 
400,  authorizing  a  conviction  of  any  offense 
necessarily  included  in  the  offense  charged, 
the  jury  may  find  accused  guilty  of  man- 
slaughter in  the  first  degree  under  an  in- 
dictment charging  murder.  State  v.  Stum- 
baugh,  132  N.  W.  666,  668,  28  S.  D.  50. 

An  indictment  which  shows  that  the 
homicide  complained  of  is  the  result  of  a 
pemeditated  design  to  effect  the  death  of  the 
person  killed,  and  is  without  authority  of 
law,  sufficiently  alleges  "murder.**  Cavett  v. 
Territory,  98  Pac.  890,  893,  1  Okl.  Cr.  493. 


BiURDEB 


486 


MURDEB 


Under  2  Wilson's  Rev.  &  Ann.  St  1903,  i 
2167,  defining  "murder"  as  "homicide  when 
perpetrated  without  authority  of  law  and 
with  a  premeditated  design  to  effect  the  deatli 
of  the  person  killed,  or  of  any  other  human 
being,"  a  killing  of  a  human  being,  perpetrat- 
ed without  authority  of  law  and  with  a  pre- 
meditated design  to  effect  the  death  of  the 
person  killed,  is  •'murder."  Walcher  v.  Ter- 
ritory, 90  Pac  887,  888,  18  Okl.  528. 

"Murder"  must  be  conmiitted  by  an  act 
applied  to  or  affecting  the  person  either  di- 
rectly, as  by  inflicting  a  wound,  or  indirect- 
ly, as  by  exposing  the  person  to  a  deadly 
agency  or  influence,  from  which  death  ensues, 
and  the  working  upon  the  fancy  of  another, 
or  treating  him  harshly  or  unkindly,  by  whi<^ 
he  dies  of  fear,  or  grief,  would  not  constitute 
this  offense.  State  v.  McGowan,  93  Pac.  652, 
554,  36  Mont  422  (citing  Commonwealth  y. 
Webster,  5  Cush.  [59  Mass.]  295,  52  Am.  Dec. 
711 ;  State  v.  Turner  [Ohio]  Wright,  20). 

If  a  man  shoots  at  another  with  the  in- 
tention of  killing  him  (and  such  killing  if 
consummated  would  be  murder),  and  kills  a 
bystander  or  another,  he  is  guilty  of  the  mur- 
der of  the  person  killed,  whether  the  killing 
of  the  latter  was  due  to  a  mistake  as  to  his 
or  her  identity,  or  to  recklessness  in  the  aim 
of  the  one  doing  the  killing.  United  States 
V.  Hart,  162  Fed.  192, 197. 

Where  one  shoots  with  intent  to  kill  an 
intended  victim,  it  is  immaterial,  on  a  prose- 
cution for  killing  a  different  person,  whether 
he  saw  the  person  who  was  killed  by  the  shot 
when  be  fired.  Gater  v.  State,  37  South.  692, 
695,  141  Ala.  10. 

In  an  indictment  for  the  murder  of  one 
person,  committed  with  a  premeditated  de- 
sign to  effect  the  death  of  a  different  person. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  allege  an  actual  as- 
sault upon  the  person  designed  to  be  killed, 
under  a  statute  defining  murder  as  the  kill- 
ing of  one  human  being  by  another,  without 
authority  of  law,  and  with  a  premeditated 
design  to  effect  the  death  of  the  person  killed, 
or  of  any  other  human  being.  Fooshee  v. 
State,  108  Pac  554,  559,  560,  3  Okl.  Cr.  666. 

Under  Rev.  St  1908,  i  1624,  the  term 
"murder"  includes  all  killing  perpetrated  from 
a  deliberate  and  premeditated  design,  unlaw- 
fully and  maliciously,  to  effect  the  death  of 
any  human  being  other  than  him  who  is 
killed,  so  that  where  defendant  was  damaged 
in  an  altercation  with  two  others,  and  shorts 
ly  thereafter,  when  a  half  dozen  or  more  per- 
sons, including  these  two,  were  gathered,  de- 
fendant came  around  the  corner  with  a  re- 
volver in  each  hand,  and  fired  five  or  six 
shots  toward  the  crowd,  resulting  in  the 
death  of  deceased,  who  was  unknown  to  liim 
and  only  accidentally  there,  the  provision  of 
the  statute  is  expressly  applicable.  Ryan  v. 
People,  114  Pac.  306,  308,  50  Colo.  99,  Ann. 
Cas.  1912B,  1232. 


One  who,  as  heir,  would,  under  Or.  O 
i  1386,  share  in  the  estate  of  decedent 
not,  by  reason  of  his  conviction  of  manslai 
ter  for  killing  intestate,  within  section  1' 
declaring  that  no  one  convicted  of  "murd 
of  deceased  shall  succeed  to  any  of  his 
tate;  "murder"  not  only  being  a  techn: 
word  within  section  13,  requiring  such  wo 
to  be  construed  according  to  their  pecu 
or  technical  meaning,  but  being  precisely 
fined  by  Pen.  Ckxie,  i  187,  so  as  to  excl 
manslaughter,  and  PoL  Code,  i  4480,  reqi 
ing,  with  relation  to  each  other,  the  pn 
sions  of  the  four  Codes  to  be  construed 
though  they  were  all  parts  of  the  same  si 
ute.  In  re  Kirby's  Estate,  121  Paa  370, 
OaL  91,  39  L.  R.  A.  (N.  a)  1088.  Ann.  C 
19130,  928. 

The  word  "murder"  is  often  used  in 
dual  character  of  both  a  noun  and  a  vc 
When  it  is  said  that  A.  concealed  hinu 
with  intent  to  murder  B.,  it  is  undersb 
that  his  purpose  was  to  commit  "murd 
upon  B.,  without  the  use  of  the  verb,  "a 
mit"  Hence  a  verdict  finding  defendi 
guilty  of  an  assault  with  intent  to  "murd 
Is  not  objectionable  for  fiblure  to  use 
verb  "commit"  before  "murder."  Nickles 
State,  87  South.  812,  813,  48  Fla.  46. 

The  statute  dividing  murder  into  two 
grees  has  not  added  to  or  taken  away  any 
gredients  of  murd^  at  common  law,  i 
every  murder  at  common  law  is  murder  un< 
the  statutes  of  Alabama.  McMahan  t.  Sti 
53  South.  89,  90, 168  Ala.  70. 

Deliberation  and  premeditation 

Where,  in  a  prosecution  for  homid 
there  was  evidence  that  defendant  killed  • 
ceased  deliberately,  intending  so  to  do,  1 
length  of  time  that  such  intention  existed  v 
immaterial  to  make  the  offense  of  murd 
State  V.  PoweU  (Del.)  61  Atl.  966,  971,  6  P 
newill,24. 

Under  Rev.  Codes,  i  8290^  defining  "mi 
der"  as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  1 
ing  with  malice  aforethought,  an  informatl 
charging  accused  with  willfully,  unlawful 
and  feloniously,  and  of  his  "deliberately  p 
meditated"  malice  aforethought,  killing  ano 
er  sufficiently  charged  that  the  killing  ^ 
with  malice  aforethought,  and  that  the  woi 
quoted  characterized  the  malice,  and  not  t 
killing,  was  immaterial.  Deliberation  a 
premeditation  need  not  be  alleged.  State 
Nielson,  100  Pac  229,  230,  38  Mont  451. 

Under  White's  Ann.  Pen.  Code,  art  7( 
providing  that  though  a  homicide  occurs  i 
der  circumstances  showing  no  deliberati( 
if  the  guilty  person  provoked  a  contest  wl 
the  apparent  intent  of  killing  decedent, 
doing  him  serious  bodily  harm,  the  offense 
not  manslaughter,  if  accused  provoked  t 
contest  with  the  apparent  intention  of  kill! 
decedent,  or  doing  him  serious  bodily  injoi 
he  is  guilty  of  murder,  though  he  may  ha 
killed  him  suddenly  without  deliberation  ej 


MURDEB 


487 


MURDEB 


to  protect  his  own  life,  though,  if  he  proToked 
the  contest  without  intent  to  kill,  or  inflict 
serious  bodily  injury  and  suddenly  without 
iellberation  killed  decedent,  the  offense  might 
\>e  a  lower  grade  than  murder.  Keeton  t. 
State,  128  S.  W.  404,  413,  60  Tex.  Gr.  R.  316w 

To  constitute  "murder,**  the  homicide 
must  be  committed  with  the  premeditated 
lesign,  on  the  part  of  the  accused,  to  unlaw- 
rully  take  the  life  of  the  person  slain  or  som^ 
:>ther  person.  Kent  v.  State,  126  Pac  1040, 
1042,  8  OkL  Or.  188. 

In  its  last  analysis  murder  in  Oklahoma 
[Consists  in  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human 
being  with  a  premeditated  design  to  effect  his 
death,  or  the  death  of  some  other  person, 
rhis  premeditated  design  to  effect  death  must 
be  established  either  by  direct  evidence  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  or  it  arises  as  a  condusiye 
presumption  of  law  in  the  class  of  cases  men- 
tioned in  paragraphs  2  and  8  of  section  2268, 
Oomp.  Laws  1909.  These  paragraphs  do  not 
Btate  a  rule  of  pleading  to  be  followed  in  an 
Indictment,  but  they  establish  a  rule  of  evi- 
dence for  the  trial  Judge  in  the  admission 
of  testimony  and  in  his  instructions  to  the 
iury.  Turner  t.  State^  126  Pac  462,  467,  468, 
B  OkL  Or.  IL 

Am  felonious  l&omioide 
See  Felonious  Homiddew 

IfaUeo 

To  constitute  "murder,"  it  \a  sufDdent  if 
the  malice  existed  at  the  moment  of  the  kill- 
ing. State  v.  Heidelberg,  45  South.  266,  268, 
120  La.  800. 

At  common  law  the  reckless  killing  of 
another  with  a  deadly  weapon  was  murder; 
malice  being  impUed.  Bwing  v.  Common- 
wealth, lU  S.  W.  862,  366, 129  Ky.  237. 

Malice  is  the  essence  of  "murder."  In 
murder  of  the  first  degree  such  malice  must 
be  express,  and  may  be  indicated  by  all  such 
facts  and  circumstances  as  show  a  deliberate- 
ly formed  design  to  take  life.  In  murder  of 
the  second  degree,  malice  may  be  shown  by 
sach  cruel  acts  and  conduct  as  indicate  a 
reckless  disregard  of  human  life,  although 
unaccompanied  with  a  deliberate  design  to 
take  life.  In  manslaughter  there  is  no  mal- 
ice. Stote  V.  Collins  (Del.)  62  Ati.  224,  226, 
6  Pennewill,  263. 

^Ifurder"  is  the  unlawful  killing  of  a 
human  creature  in  being  with  malice  afore- 
thought, either  express  or  implied;  it  being 
sufficient  that  the  malice  is  implied  from  any 
unlawful  act  which  in  itself  denotes  a  wicked 
heart,  fatally  bent  on  mischief,  or  a  reckless 
disregard  for  human  Ufe.  State  t.  Lee 
(Del.)  74  AtL  4,  6, 1  Boyce^  1& 

**  'Murder*  does  not  consist  merely  in  the 
Ulling  of  a  human  being.  The  killing  must 
be  done  with  malice.'*  Where,  on  a  trial  for 
murder,  the  accused  admitted  the  killing,  but 
coupled   such  admission  with  declarations, 


which,  if  b^eved,  showed  Justification,  no 
presumption  that  the  homicide  was  m^urder 
arose  f^om  such  admission.  Perkins  y.  State, 
62  S.  B.  17, 124  Oa.  6. 

"Murder"  is  where  a  person  of  sound 
memory  and  discretion  unlawfully  kills  any 
human  being  with  malice  aforethought,  ei- 
ther express  or  implied.  The  chief  charac- 
teristic of  this  crime,  as  distinguished  from 
other  homicides,  is  malice  aforethought 
State  T.  Wilson  (DeL)  62  Aa  227,  230,  6 
Pennewill,  77. 

Hie  crime  of  murder  is  the  unlawful 
killing  of  a  human  creature  in  being  with 
malice  aforethought,  either  express  or  im- 
plied. If  Hie  killing  is  proTed,  it  must  be 
also  proved  that  it  was  done  with  malice, 
either  express  or  implied,  before  the  person 
charged  can  be  convicted  of  murder;  but 
sudi  malice  may  be  implied  from  any  unlaw- 
ful act,  such  as  in  itself  denotes  a  wicked 
heart  fktally  bent  on  mischief,  or  a  reckless 
disregard  of  human  life.  The  deliberate  se- 
lection of  a  deadly  weapon  has  been  held 
to  be  evidence  of  maUce,  and  where  malice 
exists,  together  with  the  killing,  the  crime 
of  murder  is  complete.  Btate  t.  Scott  (Del.) 
67  Atl.  684,  636,  4  Pennewill,  638. 

Under  Revisal  1906,  i  3631,  providing 
that  a  murder  which  shall  be  perpetrated  by 
means  of  poison,  etc.,  or  by  any  other  kind 
of  willful,  deliberate^  and  premeditated  kill- 
ing, shall  be  deemed  "murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree,*' and  that  all  other  kinds  of  murder 
shall  be  deemed  murder  in  the  second  degree, 
malice  is  always  an  essential  ingredient  of 
murder.  State  y.  Baldwin,  68  S.  B.  148, 161, 
162  N.  C.  822. 

To  constitute  •'murder,"  the  evidence 
must  show  that  accused  thought  of  it  before- 
hand, though  as  to  the  time  it  is  immaterial 
whether  it  was  thought  of  an  hour  before- 
hand, or  a  day  beforehand,  or  a  minute  be- 
forehand. If  the  thought  came  to  the  mind 
of  the  accused,  "I  will  kill,"  and  he  did  kill 
immediately  after  that,  the  killing  is  "mur- 
der*'; there  being  malice  aforethought  Green 
V.  United  States,  104  S.  W.  1159,  1160,  7  Ind. 
T.  733. 

Both  before  and  since  the  statute  divid- 
ing the  crime  of  "murder"  into  two  degrees 
(Revisal  1906,  i  3631),  "murder"  is  the  unlaw- 
ful killing  of  another  with  malice  afore- 
thought This  malice  may  arise  from  per- 
sonal ill  will  or  grudge,  but  it  may  also  be 
said  to  exist  whenever  there  has  been  a 
wrongful  and  intentional  killing  of  another 
without  lawful  excuse  or  mitigating  circum- 
stances. The  statute  does  not  undertake  to 
give  any  new  definition  of  murder,  but  dasBi- 
fies  the  different  kinds  of  murder  as  they  ex- 
isted at  common  law,  and  which  were  before 
the  statute  all  included  in  one  and  the  same 
degree.  Thus  all  murder  done  by  means  of 
poison,  lying  in  wait,  etc.,  or  by  any  other 
kind  of  willful,  deliberate^  or  premeditated 


IfXTRDBB 


488 


MURDEB 


r 


killing,  or  murder  done  In  the  effort  to  per- 
petrate a  felony,  shall  be  murder  in  the  first 
degree,  and  punished  with  death.  All  other 
kinds  of  murder  shall  be  deemed  murder  in 
the  second  degree,  and  punished  by  imprison- 
ment in  the  state's  prison.  But  the  constit- 
uent definition  of  murder  remains  as  it 
was,  and  in  neither  degree  is  it  necessarily 
required  that  the  unlawful  killing  should  be 
from  personal  ill  will  or  grudge.  State  t. 
Banks,  67  S.  E.  174.  176,  143  N.  O.  652  (citing 
Clark,  Or.  Law,  p.  187 ;  State  v.  Wilcox,  23 
S.  E.  928,  118  N.  O.  1131;  State  t.  Finley, 
24  S.  E.  495,  118  N.  C.  1161). 

▲n  instruction  that  when  a  homicide  oc- 
curs, and  the  circumstances  are  absent  which 
would  excuse  or  justify  the  act  or  reduce  it 
to  manslaughter,  the  law  implies  malice,  and 
the  killing  would  be  murder,  was  a  mere  ab- 
stract statement  applicable  to  all  degrees  of 
murder,  as  prescribed  by  St  1898,  8  4365,  and 
was  not  erroneous,  the  court  having  also 
charged  that  the  law  presumes  that  every 
person  Intends  all  the  natural  and  probable 
consequences  of  his  acts,  and  when  one  as- 
saults another  with  a  dangerous  weapon, 
likely  to  kill,  not  in  self-defense,  nor  in  sud- 
den heat  of  passion  caused  by  provocation 
apparently  sufficient  to  make  passion  irre- 
sistible or  involuntary,  and  the  life  of  the 
person  assaulted  is  taken  in  consequence  of 
such  assault,  then  the  legal  presumption  Is 
that  death  was  intended,  and  the  law  liiiplies 
malice  making  the  Idlling  murder,  etc.  Hedg- 
er  V.  State,  128  N.  W.  80,  90,  144  Wis.  279. 

KilHiig  in  eommlMloa  of  nalawf «1  aet 

If  an  involuntary  killing  happens  in  the 
commission  of  an  unlawful  act,  which,  in  its 
consequences,  naturally  tends  to  destroy  life 
of  a  human  being,  the  offense  is  murder,  un- 
der Pen.  Code  1895,  8  67.  Gadsden  v.  State, 
68  S.  E.  497,  134  Ga.  785. 

Killing  in  perpetration  of  a  felony 

Under  Code,  8  4727,  defining  "murder" 
as  the  killing  of  a  human  being  with  malice 
aforethought,  and  under  section  4728  provid- 
ing that  all  murder  committed  in  the  per- 
petration or  attempt  to  perpetrate  any  rob- 
bery is  murder  in  the  first  degree,  one  who, 
with  intent  to  rob,  displaced  the  rails  of  a 
railroad  for  the  purpose  of  wrecking  a  train 
is  guilty  of  murder,  where  the  train  was 
wrecked  in  consequence  of  his  act,  «nd  a 
person  named  was  fatally  injured.  State  v. 
Von  Kutzleben,  113  N.  W.  484,  487,  136  Iowa, 
89. 

An  indictment  for  murder  while  com- 
mitting robbery,  under  Code,  |  798  (31  Stat 
1321,  c.  854),  providing  that  one  who  kills  an- 
other in  perpetrating  any  offense  punishable 
by  imprisonment  in  the  penitentiary  is  guilty 
of  murder,  is  not  demurrable  on  the  ground 
that  robbery  is  not  punishable  by  such  im- 
prisonment; section  810  punishing  robbery 
by  imprisonment  for  not  lees  than  6  months 
or  more  than  15  years,  and  section  934  pro- 


viding for  Jail  imprisonment  where  the  i 
tence  is  for  more  than  6  months  and  not 
ceeding  a  year,  and  for  imprisonment  in 
penitentiary  where  it  exceeds  a  year.  U 
ed  States  ▼.  Evans,  28  App.  D.  0.  264,  ' 

XansUnsktOT  diatingnislied 

Voluntary    manslaughtier    diatinguist 
see  Voluntary  lianslaaghter. 

The  unlawful  killing  of  another  ^ 
malice  is  "murder,"  as  distinguished  fi 
"manslaughter,"  which  is  an  unlawful  kill 
without  such  malice.  State  v.  Lee,  60  S. 
524,  625,  79  S.  0.223. 

"Murder"  and  "manslaughter^*  are  dis 
guished,  in  that  malice  is  essential  to  the  i 
mer  offense,  and  by  absence  of  premeditat 
or  deliberation  in  the  latter.  Reed  v.  Sti 
145  S.  W.  206,  208,  102  Ark.  525. 

While,  in  <me  sense  "murder"  and  "m 
daughter"  are  separate  and  distinct  crin 
yet,  in  a  broader  sense,  they  both  involve  1 
one  offense  and  are  simply  different  degr 
of  felonious  homicide.  On  an  indictment 
murder,  defendant  may  be  convicted  of  m 
slaughter.  Rhea  v.  Territory,  105  Pac.  3 
816^  8  OkL  Cr.  230. 

"'Homicide*  is  'murder,*  unless  it 
attended  with  extenuating  circumstanc 
which  must  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  1 
Jury.  If  A.  assaults  B.,  giving  him  a  seY( 
blow,  or  otherwise  making  the  provocati 
great,  and  B.  strikes  him  with  a  deadly  wei 
on,  and  death  ensues,  the  law,  in  deferei 
to  human  passion,  says  this  is  'manslauj 
ter.*  ♦  ♦  ♦  If  the  provocation  be  slig 
and  it  can  be  collected  from  the  weapon  us 
or  any  other  circumstances  that  the  prisoi 
intended  to  kill  or  do  great  bodily  harm,  a 
death  follows,  it  is  'murder.* "  State 
White,  51  S.  E.  44,  48,  188  N.  O.  704  (quoti 
and  adopting  definition  in  State  ▼.  Smith, 
N.  O.  488). 

If  the  slayer  provoked  the  combat  or  pi 
duced  the  occasion  in  order  to  have  a  pi 
tense  for  killing  his  adversary  or  doing  bi 
great  bodily  harm,  the  killing^  will  be  "mi 
der,**  no  matter  to  what  extremity  he  m 
have  been  reduced  in  the  combat  But  if 
had  no  felonious  intent,  intending,  for  1 
stance,  an  ordinary  battery  merely,  the  fin 
killing  in  self-defense  would  be  "manslaug 
ter**  only;  the  distinction  being  between  t 
right  of  perfect  and  the  right  of  imperfe 
self-defense.  State  v.  Kelleher,  100  S.  } 
470,  475,  201  Mo.  614  (citing  State  v.  Partlo 
4  S.  W.  14,  90  Mo.  608,  59  Am.  Rep.  81). 

"Manslaughter**  is  distinguished  froi 
"murder**  by  the  absence  of  malice  as  a  eo 
tingent  element.  If,  under  the  infiuence  < 
some  violent  emotion,  a  sudden  intent  wi 
formed,  which  on  adequate  provocation  ove 
whelmed  the  reason  of  the  appellant,  tb( 
the  killing  was  not  murder,  but  manslaugbti 
only.  State  y.  Clark,  77  Pac  287,  288,  ( 
Kan.  576. 


IffUBDEB 


HUBDBB 


The  chief  dlstinctton  between  'border" 
d  '^manslaughter"  is  deliberation  and  mal* 
I  in  murder,  and  the  want  thereof  in  man- 
lUgbter,  and,  where  the  Issue  was  whether 
:used  or  a  third  person  inflicted  the  fatal 
lund,  the  error  in  an  instruction  that  if  ac- 
aed  killed  decedent  without  authority  of 
V,  and  not  in  necessary  self-defense,  he  was 
llty  of  manslaughter,  arising  from  the 
dssion  of  the  words  "without  malice,  and 
the  heat  of  passion,"  was  not  prejudicial, 
lest  y.  State,  52  South.  211,  212,  06  Miss. 
I. 

Generally  it  is  not  "murder"  but  "man- 
Lughter"  to  kill  an  officer,  or  other  person, 
prevent  an  illegal  arrest.  Consequently* 
ootlng  at  an  officer  without  killing  him,  if 
ne  to  prevent  an  illegal  arrest,  is  prima  fa- 
)  not  an  assault  with  intent  to  murder,  but 
B  statutory  crime  of  shooting  at  another, 
scribed  in  Code  1882,  8  4370.  Jenkins  v. 
ate,  50  S.  E.  435,  436,  3  Ga.  App.  146  (quot- 
l  with  approval  from  Thomas  v.  State,  18 
B.  305,  01  Ga.  20$. 

Under  Pen.  Code,  {{  187,  180,  defining 
irder  as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  be- 
?  with  malice  aforethought,  and  defining 
irder  in  the  first  and  second  degrees,  and 
:;tion  102  defining  manslaughter  as  the  un- 
^ful  killing  of  a  human  being  without  mal- 
U  and  dividing  manslaughter  into  volunta- 

and  involuntary  manslaughter,  and  section 
4  making  it  a  felony  to  perform  a  criminal 
ortion,  an  unlawful  killing  with  malice 
orethought  is  "murder,"  and  is  also  "man- 
mghter,"  because  it  is  the  unlawful  killing 

a  human  being,  though  it  cannot  be  log!- 
Ily  classed  as  voluntary  or  involuntary 
iDslaughter,  and,  under  a  charge  of  murder 

attempting  a  criminal  abortion,  a  verdict 

manslaughter  may  be  returned.  People  v. 
antington,  07  Pac.  760,  762,  8  Cal.  App.  612. 

"Manslaughter"  is  an  unlawful  killing, 
ilch  becomes  "murder  in  the  second  degree" 
len  it  has  the  added  element  of  malice, 
ate  V.  Fowler,  66  S.  E.  567,  151  N.  C.  731. 

"Manslaughter"  consists  of  the  unlaw- 
1  killing  of  a  human  being  without  malice, 
id  so,  in  a  prosecution  for  assault  with  in- 
Qt  to  commit  murder,  the  accused  cannot 

convicted  if,  had  his  victim  died,  his 
Lme  would  have  only  been  manslaughter, 
ate  V.  Stockley  (Del.)  82  Atl.  1078,  1070. 

"Manslaughter"  is  an  unlawful  killing  in 
iger  without  malice.  Proof  of  prior  provo- 
tion  may  exclude  the  idea  of  malice  in  the 
mieide,  but  does  not  exclude  the  idea  of 
^lawfulness.  It  merely  substitutes  the  ele- 
Bnt  of  anger  without  malice  for  the  element 
malice,  thus  distinguishing  manslaughter 
om  "murder."  Cole  v.  State,  50  S.  B.  24,  26, 
Ga.  App.  734. 

"Murder"  in  the  second  degree  consists 

the  killing  of  another  without  a  formed 

»ign  to  take  life,  and  without  provocation 


to  reduce  the  offense  to  "manslaughter,"  and 
under  the  influence  of  a  wicked  or  depraved 
heart,  or  with  cruel  and  wicked  indifference 
to  human  life.  "  'Manslaughter*  is  where  one 
in  a  sudden  afTray,  in  the  heat  of  blood,  or  in 
a  transport  of  passion,  without  malice,  inflicts 
a  mortal  wound,  without  time  for  reflection 
or  for  the  passions  to  cool.  It  is  where  one 
person  unlawfully  kills  another  without  mal- 
ice. In  order  to  reduce  the  crime  to  Man- 
slaughter,* the  provocation  must  be  very 
great,  so  great  as  to  produce  such  a  trans- 
port of  passion  as  to  render  the  person  for 
the  time  being  deaf  to  the  voice  of  reason. 
While  'murder*  proceeds  from  a  wicked  and 
depraved  heart  and  is  characterised  by  mal- 
ice, 'manslaughter'  results,  not  from  malice, 
but  from  unpremeditated  and  unreflecting 
passion.'*  State  v.  Cephus  (Del.)  67  AU.  150, 
151,  6  Pennewill,  160. 

When  a  killing  is  intentional  and  is  not 
lawful,  it  is  generally  'Murder*' ;  but  under 
circumstances  of  provocation,  or  of  mutual 
combat.  It  may  be  reduced  to  "manslaughter." 
State  V.  Goldsby,  114  S.  W.  500,  503,  215  Mo. 
48  (citing  2  Bish.  Cr.  Law  [6th  Bd.]  §  605). 

Murder  is  where  a  person  of  sound  mem- 
ory and  discretion  unlawfully  kills  any  hu- 
man being  under  the  peace  of  the  state,  with 
malice  aforethought,  either  express  or  im- ' 
plied.  The  chief  characteristic  of  this  crime, 
distingulBhing  it  from  manslaughter  and  ev- 
ery other  kind  of  homicide,  and  therefore  in- 
dispensably necessary  to  be  proved,  is  malice 
preconceived  or  aforethought  State  v.  Brinte 
(Del.)  58  Ati.  258,  262,  4  Pennewill,  551. 

A  charge  that,  where  an  officer  is  shot 
and  killed  by  one  whom  he  is  seeking  legally 
to  arrest,  the  ofTense  is  "murder"  and  not 
manslaughter  was  not  erroneous  when  taken 
in  connection  with  the  evidence,  which  waa 
sufficient  to  show  that  defendant  was  violat- 
ing the  law  in  the  presence  of  the  officer,  and 
that,  upon  an  effort  to  arrest  him,  he  drew  a 
pistol  and  shot  the  officer.  Johnson  v.  State, 
60  S.  B.  160,  161,  130  Ga.  27. 

In  an  instruction  correctly  deflning  mur- 
der and  manslaughter,  the  statement  that, 
"You  see  by  these  definitions  that  in  murder 
malice  must  exist,  but  that  manslaughter  is 
the  killing  of  a  human  being  without  malice," 
made  only  to  distinguish  the  two,  is  not  re- 
versible error.  Prince  v.  United  States,  100 
Pac.  241,  242,  3  OkL  Cr.  700. 

If  two  persons  deliberately  agree  to  flght 
with  deadly  weapons  on  a  subsequent  day  at 
a  deflnite  time  and  place,  and,  both  being 
armed,  meet  by  chance  near  the  appointed 
place  and  near  the  appointed  time,  and  with- 
out any  fresh  cause  of  a  quarrel  or  other  al- 
tercation one  slays  the  other  without  juntifl- 
cation,  the  crime  is  "murder,**  and  not  volun- 
tary manslaughter.  Bundrick  y.  State^  54 
S.  B.  683,  685,  120  Ga.  753. 


i 


;; 


iim 


I 


MI7BDEB  IN  FIRST  DEGBBB 


490 


HUBDEB  IN  FIRST  DEORBB 


XUBDEB  or  FIB8T  DEOBEB 

As   felonious   homicide,    aee    Felonious 
Homicid& 

"Murder  in  the  first  desrree*'  is  the  wiU- 
ful«  deliberate,  and  premeditated  killing  of  a 
human  being.  State  t.  Briggs,  02  S.  B.  218, 
219,  68  W.  Va.  291. 

**Murder  in  the  first  degree"  U  the  will- 
ful, felonious,  deliberate,  and  premeditated 
killing  of  a  human  being  with  malice  afore- 
thought State  ▼.  Hottman,  94  S.  W.  237, 
239,  196  Mo.  110. 

Willful,  deliberate,  and  premeditated 
killing,  without  any  motive  appearing  at  all, 
is  murder  in  the  first  degree.  State  y.  Jag- 
gers,  68  AtL  1014,  1016,  71  N.  J.  Law,  281, 
108  Am.  St  Rep.  746. 

"Murder  of  the  first  degree'*  is  where 
the  killing  was  done  with  malioe  afore- 
thought State  V.  Primrose  (Del.)  77  Atl.  717, 
2  Boyce,164;  State  y.  Roberts  (DeL)  78  Atl. 
806,  310,  2  Boyce,  140. 

To  constitute  murder  in  the  first  degree, 
the  offender  8  mind  must  be  cool  and  sedate; 
and  there  must  be  express  malice  afore- 
thought Dixon  y.  State,  103  S.  W.  39^-401, 
61  Tex.  Cr.  B.  666. 

"Murder  in  the  first  degree"  is  defined 
'in  Bey.  St  1899,  i  4960,  as  a  purposeful  and 
premeditated   malicious  killing.    Hollibaugh 
V.  Hehn,  79  Pac  1044, 1047, 13  Wyo.  269. 

To  constitute  **murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree," the  killing  must  be  done  with  malice 
aforethought,  express  or  implied,  and  with 
willful  premeditation  and  determination. 
State  y.  McKay,  63  S.  E.  1069,  1060,  160  N. 
0.813. 

A  homicide  committed  with  express  mal- 
ice aforethought  is  "murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree."   State  y.  Brooks  (Del.)  84  Ati.  226,  227. 

An  indictment  charging  that  accused  pur- 
posely, feloniously,  and  with  premeditated 
malice  killed  a  person  named  charges  murder 
in  the  first  degree.  Stout  y.  State,  92  N.  E. 
161,  162,  174  Ind.  395,  Ann.  Gas.  1912D,  37. 

"Murder  of  the  first  degree'*  is  a  killing 
done  with  express  malioe  aforethought  or  in 
perpetrating  or  attempting  to  perpetrate  a 
crime  punishable  with  death.  State  y.  Wig- 
gins (Del.)  76  Atl.  632,  634,  7  Pennewill,  127; 
State  7.  Brown  (Del.)  61  Ati.  1077,  1078,  5 
PennewUl,  339;  State  y.  PoweU  (Del.)  61 
Atl.  966,  971,  5  Pennewill,  24;  State  y.  Busso 
(Del.)  77  Ati.  743,  745,  1  Boyce,  538;  State 
V.  Mills  (Del.)  69  Ati.  841,  842,  6  Pennewill, 
497;  State  y.  Samuels  (Del.)  67  Ati.  164,  165, 
6  Pennewill,  36;  State  y.  Johns  (Del.)  65  Atl. 
763,  764,  6  Pennewill,  174;  State  y.  Tilghman 
(Del.)  63  Ati.  772,  773;  State  y.  Boberts  (Del.) 
78  Atl.  306,  310;  State  y.  Blackburn  (DeL) 
76  Ati.  536,  639,  7  PennewUl,  479;  State  y. 
BeU  (Del.)  62  Ati.  147, 148,  6  Pennewill,  192. 


"Murder   in    the    first   degree"    occurs 
where  the  killing  was  done  in  perpetrating  or 


attempting  to  perpetrate  a  cdnie  ponisha 
with  death*  State  y.  Beese  (DeL)  79  AtL  S 
221,  2  Boyce^  434. 

Murder  In  the  first  degree  oonsiste  in  k 
ing  a  human  being  with  malice  aforethong 
or  in  perpetrating  or  attempting  to  perpetr 
a  crime  punishable  with  death,  where 
murder  is  committed  with  sedate  deliber 
mind,  and  formed  design  to  take  Mte.  St 
y.  Adams  (DeL)  66  AtL  610,  611^  6  Pameif 
17a 

Murder  in  the  first  degree  is  the  tak 
of  human  life  with  express  malice  afo 
thought  or  in  perpetrating  or  attempting 
perpetrate  a  crime  punishable  with  dea 
when  the  act  is  done  deliberately  and  wit] 
formed  design  to  take  life  or  do  some  gr^ 
bodily  harm.  State  y.  Collins  (Del.)  62  I 
22A,  226,  6  Pennewill,  263;  Same  y.  £ 
(DeL)  62  Aa  147,  148,  6  Pennewill.  1\ 
Same  y.  Brown  (DeL)  61  AtL  1077,  1078 
Pennewill,  339. 

Under  Ck>de  Iowa,  |  4728,  killing  sho 
not  only  to  haye  be^  done  in  malice.  1 
with  deliberation,  premeditation,  and  w 
specific  Intent  to  kill,  is  "murder  in  the  fl 
degree."  State  y.  Baldes,  110  N.  W.  440,  4 
133  Iowa,  168. 

An  instruction  on  murder  in  the  secc 
degree  which  fails  to  state  that  there  mi 
be  no  circumstances  of  mitigation,  Justifl 
tion,  or  excuse  is  erroneous.  Campbell 
Territory  (Ariz.)  126  Pac  717,  721. 

Under  L.  O.  L.  |  1893,  defining  "mun 
in  the  first  degree"  as  a  homicide  with  < 
liberate  and  premeditated  malice,  or  in  1 
commission  or  attempt  to  commit  any  ra 
arson,  robbery,  or  burglary,  the  state,  cha 
ing  a  killing  while  in  the  commission  of  sc 
other  offenses,  need  not  proye  deliberate 
premeditated  malice;  but  fts  malice  is  i 
necessarily  excluded  by  su<di  other  offeni 
in  which  homicide  results,  defendante  a 
not  complain  if  the  state  electa  to  predict 
the  murder  upon  a  killing  with  deliben 
and  premeditated  malice.  State  y.  Hn 
phrey,  128  Pac  824,  827,  63  Or.  640. 

Under  the  statute  declaring  that  whoei 
purposely  and  with  premeditated  mali 
kills  another  is  guilty  of  "murder  in  the  fi] 
degree,"  the  intent  to  kill,  the  premeditatii 
or  deliberation,  and  malice  are  as  much  e 
menta  of  the  crime  as  the  act  of  killing,  a 
each  must  exist  and  be  established  b«yo 
a  reasonable  doubt  State  y.  Pressler, 
Pac  806,  808,  16  Wyo.  214,  16  Ann.  Cas.  I 

The  statutes  define  "murder  in  the  fi: 
degree"  as  follows:  "Every  person  who  sb 
purposely  and  in  his  deliberate  and  preme 
tated  malice  kill  another  shall  be  deem 
guilty  in  the  first  degree."  State  v.  Lii 
grind,  74  Pac  666,  666,  33  Wash.  440. 

The  crime  of  'Murder"  is  diyided  into  t 
degrees  in  North  Dakota,  according  to  t 
facta  and  circumstances  attending  the  U 


ftfUBDBB  IN  FIBST  DBGRBB         491         HUBDBB  ^^  FIRST  DBOBBS 


ig,  depending  upon  the  presence  6r  absence 
r  deliberation  and  premeditation.  Tbese  de- 
rees  are  not  distinct  crimes  but  are  simply 
egrees  of  murder  dependent  upon  the  facts 
ttending  the  killing.  There  are  no  degrees 
f  murder  in  the  first  degree;  the  elements 
r  murder  in  the  second  degree  are  necessa- 
11  y  included  in  the  charge  of  murder  in  the 
rst  degree.  State  ▼.  Noah,  124  N.  W.  1121, 
124,  20  N.  D.  281. 

Under  Rem.  &  BaL  Oode,  i  2892,  defining 
murder  in  the  first  degree"  as  the  killing  of 
human  being  with  the  premeditated  design 
>  effect  deaths  an  information  alleging  that 
ccused  did,  with  a  premeditated  design  to  ef - 
Bct  her  death,  kill  and  murder  a  spedfled 
erson,  is  sufficient,  without  alleging  that  the 
erson  died.  State  y.  Jahns^  112  Pac  747, 
1  Wash.  630. 

Where  death  naturally  ensues  f^om  the 
orce,  manner,  or  instrumentality  of  a  chas- 
Isement,  and  the  chastisement  is  made  re- 
ardless  of  its  probable  result  in  death,  the 
ury  may  oonyict  of  murder  in  the  first  de- 
ree.  Bosemond  y.  State,  110  S.  W.  229,  230, 
6  Ark.  100. 

Where  accused  entered  into  a  plot  with 
nother,  by  which  the  latter  was  to  do  the 
illing,  while  he  was  to  wait  at  some  little 
istance  from  the  house  to  allow  the  murder- 
r  to  escape,  and  then  to  set  fire  to  the  house, 
nd  the  plot  was  carried  out,  accused  could 
e  convicted  of  murder  in  the  first  degree. 
Commonwealth  y.  Johnson,  66  AtL  233,  235, 
17  Pa.  77. 

One  who  kills  another,  who  is  approach- 
Qg  in  a  friendly  manner,  with  no  weapon  in 
is  hand,  and  making  peaceable  overtures,  by 
booting  at  him,  both  at  dose  range  and  after 
e  has  fied  across  the  street  and  into  another's 
lOuse,  is  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree. 
;tate  y.  WUliams,  84  S.  W.  924,  927,  186  Mo. 
28  (citing  State  y.  Wieners,  66  Mo.  13 ;  State 
.  Ellis,  74  Mo.  loc.  dt  218,  219;  State  y. 
tobinson,  73  Mo.  306;  State  y.  McEenzie, 
6  S.  W.  1015,  177  Mo.  699). 

Where  defendant,  haying  manifested  ez- 
ress  antecedent  maUce  against  deceased,  fol- 
Dwed  him  down  a  creek,  in  which  he  and  his 
rife  were  fishing,  and  without  any  cause  shot 
Im  to  death,  and  threw  his  body  into  the 
reek,  and  there  were  no  mitigating  drcum- 
tances^  he  was  properly  eonyicted  of  murder 
Q  the  first  degree.  Young  y.  State,  84  S.  W. 
22,  47  Tex.  Or.  R.  530. 

The  killing  of  a  human  being  in  the 
Perpetration  of  or  attempt  to  perpetrate  the 
Time  of  arson  is  *'murder  in  the  first  degree.** 
^udwig  y.  State,  85  N.  B.  845,  847,  170  Ind. 

^48. 

An  instruction  that  all  murder  commit- 
ed  with  express  malice  is  "murder  in  the 
list  degree,"  and  that  all  murder  commit- 
«d  in  the  perpetration  of  robbery  is  "murder 


in  the  first  degree,**  is  correct    Ransom  r*. 
State  CTez.)  70  S.  W.  960,  963. 

An  indictment  charging  the  commission 
of  murder  by  accused  while  engaged  in  per- 
petrating a  burglary  charges  murder  In  the 
first  degree.  Stout  y.  State,  92  N.  B.  161, 
162,  174  Ind.  896,  Ann.  Cas.  1912D,  87. 

A  murder  which  is  perpetrated  by  poison, 
lying  in  wait,  or  any  other  kind  of  willful, 
deliberate,  and  premeditated  killing  is  mur- 
der in  the  first  degree.  State  y.  Abbott,  62 
S.  B.  693,  64  W.  Ya.  411. 

All  murder  which  is  perpetrated  by 
means  of  poison,  or  lying  in  wait,  torture,  or 
by^ny  kind  of  willful,  deliberate,  and  pre- 
meditated killing,  or  which  is  conmiitted  in 
the  perpetration  or  attempt  to  perpetrate  a 
felony,  is  "murder  of  the  first  degree.**  State 
y.  Hllboka,  78  Pac  965,  31  Mont  455,  8  Ann. 
Cas.  934. 

Rey.  St  I  6808,  provides  that  whoso- 
ever purposely  and  either  of  deliberate  and 
premeditated  malice  or  by  means  of  poison 
or  in  perpetrating  or  attempting  to  perpe- 
trate any  rape,  arson,  robbery  or  burglary 
kills  another  is  guilty  of  "murder  in  the 
first  degree.*'  State  v.  Schiller,  70  N.  B.  505, 
506,  70  Ohio  St  1. 

Pen.  Code  1901,  i  173,  providing  that  all 
"murder^  which  Is  perpetrated  by  means  of 
poison,  etc.,  shall  be  murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree, and  all  other  kinds  of  murder  are  in  the 
necond  degree,  does  not  prescribe  that  aU 
"killing**  perpetrated  by  means  of  poison  is 
murder  in  the  first  degree,  but  that  all  **mur- 
der"  80  perpetrated  is  so;  the  word  "murder" 
being  used  to  denote  all  that  is  covered  by 
section  172,  defining  murder  as  the  unlawful 
killing  of  a  human  being  with  malice  afore- 
thought, etc  Bytinge  v.  Territory,  100  Pac 
443,  445,  12  Ariz.  131. 

By  Rev.  St  1887,  i  6562,  "murder  of  the 
first  degree**  includes  all  murder  "which  is 
performed  by  means  of  poison,  or  lying  in 
wait,  torture,  or  by  any  other  kind  of  will- 
ful, deliberate,  and  premeditated  killing,  or 
which  is  conmiitted  in  the  perpetration  or 
attempt  to  perpetrate  arson,  robbery,  bur- 
glary, or  mayhem.*'  State  y.  Phinney,  89 
Pac  634,  13  Idaho,  307,  12  K  R.  A.  (N.  8.) 
985,  12  Ann.  Cas.  1097. 

Pen.  Code,  i  189,  provides  that  murder 
committed  in  the  perpetration  or  attempt  to 
perpetrate  arson,  robbery,  rape,  burglary,  or 
mayhem  Is  murder  in  the  first  degree.  Held, 
that  it  is  immaterial  on  a  trial  for  such  a 
murder  whether  the  killing  was  willful,  dc^- 
liberate,  and  premeditated,  or  absolutely  ac- 
ddentaL  People  y.  MUton,  78  Pac  549,  146 
CaL  169. 

Where  two  persons  acting  together  arm- 
ed themselves  and  broke  into  a  dwelling  to 
rob  it,  and  were,  when  discovered,  engaged, 
one  in  robbing  the  house  and  the  other  in 


MUBDBB  IN  FIRST  DBGRBB 


492 


MURDBB  IN  FIRST  DBQRBB 


watching,  and  one  of  them  killed  an  coca- 
pant  of  the  dwelling  in  their  attempt  to  es- 
cape, both  were  guilty  of  "murder  in  the 
first  degree,'*  under  Pen.  Code,  1 183,  defining 
murder  in  the  first  degree  as  murder  commit- 
ted by  a  person  "engaged  in  the  commis- 
sion of,  or  in  an  attempt  to  commit,  a  felony." 
People  V.  Giro,  90  N.  E.  432,  434,  197  N.  Y. 
162. 

"Murder  in  the  first  degree,"  as  defiijed 
by  Comp.  Laws  1897,  {  1063,  is  "all  murder 
which  shall  be  perpetrated  by  means  of  poi- 
son or  lying  in  wait,  torture,  or  by  any 
kind  of  willful,  deliberate,  and  premeditated 
killing,  and  which  is  committed  in  the  perpe- 
tration or  attempt  to  perpetrate  any  felony, 
or  perpetrated  from  any  dellber^e  design  un- 
lawfully and  maliciously  to  effect  the  death 
of  any  human  being,  or  perpetrated  by  any 
act  greatly  dangerous  to  the  lives  of  others, 
and  Indicating  a  depraved  mind  regardless 
of  human  life."  Territory  v.  Hendricks,  84 
Pac  523,  524,  13  N.  M.  300. 

Under  Rev.  St  1899,  {  1815  (Ann.  St 
1906,  p.  1258),  providing  that  every  homldde 
committed  in  perpetration  or  attempt  to  per- 
petrate robbery  shall  be  deemed  murder  In 
the  fii^st  degree,  where  poison  was  adminis- 
tered willfully  and  deliberately  in  the  perpe- 
tration of  a  robbery  and  death  ensued,  mal- 
ice aforethought  and  premeditation  were  not 
elements  of  the  offense,  and  it  was  unnec- 
essary for  the  court  to  define  such  terms  in 
the  instructions.  State  v.  Daly,  109  S.  W. 
53,  57,  210  Mo.  664. 

Crimes  and  Punishments  Act,  i  17  (Comp. 
Laws,  $  4672),  making  all  murder  by  poi- 
son, lying  in  wait,  or  torture,  or  any  other 
kind  of  willful,  deliberate,  and  premeditated 
killing,  or  committed  in  the  perpetration  or 
attempt  to  perpetrate  any  arson,  rape,  rob- 
bery, or  burglary,  murder  in  the  first  degree, 
does  not  create  separate  statutory  homicides, 
but  the  killing  of  a  human  being  in  either 
one  of  the  methods  described  is  "murder  in 
the  first  degree,"  and  a  felony  and  a  homi- 
cide committed  in  perpetrating  or  attempt- 
ing to  perpetrate  a  felony  constitute  together 
the  one  crime  of  murder  in  the  first  degree. 
State  V.  Mangana,  112  Pac  693,  696,  33  Nev. 
511. 

Under  Pen.  Code  1895,  art.  711,  provid- 
ing that  murder  committed  in  the  perpetra- 
tion or  in  the  attempt  at  the  perpetration  of 
arson,  rape,  robbery,  or  burglary  is  "murder 
in  the  first  degree,"  etc,  an  indictment  for 
murder  which  alleges  in  different  counts  that 
the  murder  was  committed  in  the  perpetra- 
tion of  arson  and  in  the  perpetration  of  bur- 
glary, and  which  alleges  malice  aforethought, 
sufHclently  advises  accused  of  the  character 
of  the  charge  against  him;  and  it  is  not  nec- 
essary to  define  with  particularity  the  con- 
stituent elements  of  the  offenses  of  arson  or 
burglary,  or  what  accused  was  doing  at  the 
time  he  committed  the  murder,  further  than 


that  the  same  was  conmiitted  in  the  perp 
tratlon  of  arson  and  burglary.  Jones  t.  Stat 
110  S.  W.  741,  742,  68  Tex.  Or.  R.  131,  11 
Am.  St  Rep.  776. 

Where  the  evidence  tends  to  prove  tin 
a  murder  was  committed  by  means  of  pc 
son,  lying  in  wait,  imprisonment,  or  tortui 
or  In  perpetration  or  attempt  to  perpetra 
any  arson,  rape,  robbery,  burglary,  or  oth( 
felony,  and  where  there  is  no  evidence  i 
prove  murder  in  the  second  degree  or  mai 
slaughter,  the  trial  judge  should  instruct  tl 
Jury  that  it  is  their  duty  to  render  a  verdl 
of  guilty  of  "murder  in  the  first  degree," 
they  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  dout 
or  of  not  guilty.  State  v.  Spivey,  66  S.  ] 
995,  998,  999,  161  N.  C.  676. 

P.  L.  1898,  p.  824,  {  107,  declares  thi 
"murder  which  shall  be  perpetrated  by  meai 
of  poison,  or  by  lying  in  wait,  or  by  any  oth< 
kind  of  willful,  deliberate  and  premeditate 
billing,  or  which  shall  be  committed  in  pe 
petrating,  or  attempting  to  perpetrate,  ai 
arson,  burglary,  rape,  robbery  or  sodom 
shall  be  'murder  in  the  first  degree';  and  a 
other  kinds  of  murder  shall  be  murder  in  tl 
second  degree."  In  this  istatute  the  two  coi 
Crete  cases  of  murder  in  the  first  degree,  an 
the  general  description  of  the  cognate  clai 
that  immediately  follows,  are  all  based  upc 
the  existence  of  a  certain  condition  of  mii 
in  the  perpetrator  of  the  murder,  which,  t 
to  the  concrete  instances,  is  described  by  re 
erence  to  the  means  employed  or  the  met) 
od  adopted,  viz.,  by  poison  or  by  lying  1 
wait,  and  as  to  the  general  class  that  fo 
lows,  by  the  use  of  descriptive  words  of  whlc 
the  two  concrete  cases  are  something  moi 
than  apt  illustrations,  being,  by  force  of  tl 
word  "other,"  criteria  controlling  the  seni 
in  which  the  more  general  terms  are  emplo: 
ed.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  murder,  whet) 
er  resulting  under  the  special  circumstance 
first  detailed  or  evincing  the  state  of  mil 
afterwards  described,  is  "murder  in  the  fir 
degree,"  without  regard  to  any  extraneoi 
consideration,  and  that  the  determining  el 
ment  in  either  case  is  the  existence  of  tl 
reprobated  state  of  mind  in  the  murdere 
and  not  the  measure  of  success  that  attende 
its  accomplishment.  The  court  correctly  Ij 
structed  that,  if  the  death  of  R.  results 
from  a  pistol  shot  intended  by  the  defendai 
for  another  person,  defendant's  guilt  and  tl 
degree  of  guilt  was  to  be  determined  preci.* 
ly  the  same  as  if  the  bullet  had  killed  tl 
person  for  whom  It  was  intended.  State 
Bectsa,  58  Atl.  933,  985,  71  N.  J.  Law,  322. 

BalUnger's  Ann.  Codes  &  St  §  68( 
(Pierce's  Code,  {  2091),  abolishes  all  forms  ( 
pleading  in  criminal  acts  theretofore  exls 
ing.  Section  6850,  subd.  6  (Pierce's  Code, 
2103),  provides  that  an  information  shall  1 
sufficient  if  it  cah  be  understood  therefroi 
that  the  act  or  omission  charged  is  clearl 
and  distinctly  set  out  in  ordinary,  languag 


MUBPBB  IN  FIRST  DEGREE  403         MURDER  IN  FIRST  DEORBB 


ithout  repetition,  and  so  as  to  enable  a  per- 
m  of  common  understanding  to  know  what 
intended.  Section  7035  (Pierce's  CJode,  | 
K/4)  defines  murder  in  tlie  first  degree  as 
le  killing  of  another  purposely  and  of  de- 
t>erate  and  premeditated  malice,  or  in  the 
jrpetration  or  attempt  to  perpetrate  rob- 
^ry,  burglary,  etc  Held  that  the  words, 
Ltte^pt,"  "robbery,"  "burglary,"  as  used  in 
le  &:tatute,  have  a  well-defined  legal  mean- 
.g,  and  in  drawing  an  information  charg- 
ig  murder  in  the  first  degree,  if  the  perpe- 
aUon  or  attempt  to  perpetrate  the  included 
Imes  is  pleaded  in  the  language  of  the  stat- 
:e  without  setting  forth  the  acts  constitut- 
ig  the  crimes,  it  is  a  sufiScient  compliance 
Ith  section  6850  (Pierce's  Ck>de,  8  21C»). 
tate  V.  Fillpot,  98  Pac.  659,  661,  51  Wash. 
13. 

An  information,  on  thd  oath  of  the  pros- 
siting  attorney,  alleging  that  on  January 
t,  1905,  in  P.  county,  lio.,  defendants  did 
ake  an  assault  on  deceased,  and  did  felo- 
oosly,  willfully,  deliberately,  premeditated- 
,  and  of  their  malice  aforethought  shoot  de- 
ased  with  a  pistol  loaded  with  bullets  and 
mpowder,  thereby  inflicting  on  deceased  a 
ortal  wound  described,  of  which  deceased 
lortly  thereafter  died,  was  sufficient  to 
Large  first-degree  murder.  State  v.  Barnett, 
t2  S.  W.  506-509,  203  Ma  640. 

"Murder  in  the  first  degree,"  as  defined 
f  Pen.  Ck)de,  {  1044,  subd«  1,  is  the  IdlUng  of 
human  being  when  committed  '*from  a  de- 
^rate  and  premeditated  design  to  effect  the 
Ath  of  the  person  killed,  or  of  another," 
broad  enough  to  embrace  murder  in  the 
<»nd  degree,  as  defined  in  the  same  statute, 
eople  T.  Schleiman,  90  N.  B.  950,  952,  197 
.  Y.  383. 

Under  Rev.  Codes,  U  8290,  8292,  8295, 
iflning  murder  as  the  unlawful  killing  of  a 
mian  being  with  malice  aforethought,  and 
nrder  in  the  first  degree  as  all  murder  per- 
itrated  by  any  kind  of  willful,  deliberate, 
id  premeditated  killing,  and  manslaughter 
I  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  being 
Ithout  malice,  murder  in  the  first  degree 
eludes  manslaughter,  and  an  information 
larging  murder  Justifies  a  conyiction  of 
andaughter  within  section  9826,  authoriz- 
g  the  Jury  to  convict  of  a  lesser  offense  in- 
aded  in  the  offense  charged.  State  v. 
rean,  114  Pac.  603,  605,  43  Mont  47,  Ann. 
is.  1912C,  424. 

Where,  on  a  trial  for  homicide,  the  evi- 
nce showed  that  decedent  had  assaulted 
xnised,  and  the  court  charged  that  willful, 
^liberate,  malicious,  and  premeditated  kill- 
ig  Is  "murder  in  the  first  degree,"  and  that 
the  assault  by  decedent  was  sufficient  to 
rouse  in  accused  passion,  and  that  while  un- 
*r  its  influence  he  killed  decedent,  he  was 
Jllty  of  voluntary  manslaughter  only,  an 
istructlon  that  if  sufficient  time  elapsed  for 
xiised's  passion  to  subside  before  the  kill- 


ing, and  if  accused  deliberately  drew  a  pis- 
tol and  shot  deoedent  with  malice  afore- 
thought, and  with  the  intent  to  take  his  life, 
accused  was  guilty  of  ''murder  in  the  flrst 
degree"  was  not  erroneous  for  falling  to 
state  the  elements  constituting  murder  in  the 
flrst  degree.  Duckworth  t.  State,  97  S.  W. 
280,  281,  80  Ark.  860. 

An  instruction  on  a  trial  for  homicide 
that  murder  in  the  flrst  degree  consists  in 
the  taking  of  a  human  life  with  intent  to 
kill  and  with  deliberation  and  premeditation; 
that  it  is  not  necessary  that  deliberation  and 
premeditation  should  continue  for  an  hour 
or  for  a  minute,  but  that  it  Is  enough  that 
the  design  to  kill  be  fully  formed  and  pur- 
posely executed;  and  that  the  elements  con- 
stituting the  crime  are  an  Intent  to  kill  and 
an  execution  of  that  Intent  with  deliberation 
and  premeditation — ^properly  deflnes  murder 
in  the  flrst  degree.  State  y.  Lang,  66  Atl. 
942,  945,  76  N.  J.  Law,  1. 

An  indictment  for  homicide  charging  that 
accused  feloniously,  willfully,  deliberately, 
premeditatedly  and  of  his  malice  afore- 
thought assaulted  deceased  with  a  pistol, 
which  he  feloniously,  willfully,  deliberately, 
premeditatedly  and  of  his  malice  afore- 
thought discharged  against  and  upon  him, 
thereby  feloniously,  willfully,  deliberately, 
and  premeditatedly  striking,  penetrating,  and 
mortally  wounding  deceased,  of  which  mor- 
tal wound  he  instantly  died,  sufficiently 
charges  the  offense  of  murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree. Stete  V.  Clay,  100  S.  W.  439,  441,  201 
Mo.  679. 

An  Instaruction  that  if  the  jury  believes 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  shot 
and  killed  Lw  as  charged,  and  that  at  the 
time,  or  before  the  shot  was  fired,  the  de- 
fendant had  formed  in  his  mind  the  willful, 
premeditated,  and  deliberate  design  or  pur- 
pose to  take  the  life  of  the  deceased,  and 
that  the  shot  was  fired  in  furtherance  of  that 
design  or  purpose,  and  without  any  Justifi- 
able cause  or  legal  excuse  therefor,  as  ex- 
plained in  these  instructions,  then  the  Jury 
should  find  the  defendant  guilty  of  "murder 
in  the  first  degree"  sufficiently  d^ines  that 
offense.  State  v.  McCarver,  92  S.  W.  684, 
691,  194  Mo.  717. 

(Domp.  Laws  1907,  {  4159,  defines  murder 
as  "the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  being 
with  malice  aforethought"  Section  4161 
maked  a  killing  committed  in  an  attempt  to 
perpetrate  robbery  murder  in  the  first  degree. 
An  information  for  murder  alleged  that  ac- 
cused "unlawfully,  willfully,  feloniously,  ^de- 
liberately, premeditatedly,  and  of  his  malice 
aforethought,  and  with  the  specific  Intent  to 
take  the  life"  of  a  person  named,  shot  and 
killed  him.  The  undisputed  evidence  at  the 
trial  showed  that  the  murder  was  committed 
during  an  attempt  to  perpetrate  a  robbery, 
and  the  evidence  of  accused  was  to  the  ef- 
fect that  the  kiUing  was  due  to  an  unlnleii- 


MUBDBB  IN  FIRST  D1DGBB&         iM         MUBDBB  IN  FIB6T  DEQ|BUSE 


tlonal  disdiarge  of  his  pistoL  Tbe  state  ad- 
duced eyldenoe  tbat  the  klUing  was  willfol 
and  intentioDal,  and  occorred  daring  tbe  at- 
tempt to  perpetrate  a  robbery.  Held,  that  It 
was  not  error  for  tbe  court  to  instruct  tbat 
though  tbe  killing  was  done  in  perpetrating 
or  in  an.  attempt  to  perpetrate  a  robbery,  and 
though  the  information  contained  no  allega- 
tions of  the  killing  under  such  circumstances, 
nevertheless  the  accused  could,  under  the  al- 
legations contained  in  the  information,  be 
convicted  of  first  degree  murder.  State  v. 
Thome,  U7  Pac.  58,  60,  89  Utah,  208. 

In  a  prosecution  for  statntory  murder  in 
the  first  degree^  the  state  claimed  that  accus- 
ed killed  deceased  with  premeditated  design. 
The  court  charged  tbat  premeditated  design 
was  simply  an  intent  to  kill,  that  ''design" 
meant  'intoit,'*  and  that  both  words  implied 
premeditation,  that  premeditation  did  not  ex- 
clude sudden  intent,  and  tbat  whether  it  be 
described  by  the  words  "actual  intent,"  "de- 
sign," or  "premeditated  design"  was  immate- 
rial; that  the  intent  was  understood  to  be 
premeditated  because  without  mental  action 
the  purpose  could  not  be  formed ;  that,  when 
there  were  no  circumstances  to  prevent  the 
presumption,  the  law  would  presume  that  the 
unlawful  act  was  intentional  and  malicious; 
that,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  con- 
trary, he  who  takes  the  life  of  another  by 
some  act  naturally  calculated  to  produce 
death  would  be  presumed  to  have  intended 
that  result  and  to  be  guilty  of  murder  in  the 
first  degree,  it  being  presumed  that  such  per- 
son intended  the  result  that  followed,  and 
must  be  guilty  of  murder  in  the  absence  of 
evidence  that  the  homicide  was  justifiable  or 
excusable  or  such  as  to  raise  a  reasonable 
doubt  on  the  question;  thus  that  where  ac- 
cused fired  a  shot,  the  weapon  being  aimed 
at  a  vital  part  of  the  body,  and  death  ^isued 
as  a  natural  result,  the  presumption  of  fact 
as  to  the  Intention  to  take  life,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  explanatory  circumstances, 
makes  a  prima  fade  case  for  the  prosecution, 
the  state  not  being  required  to  negative  any 
probability  that  there  were  circumstances  re- 
ducing the  homicide  below  that  of  murder 
in  the  first  degree,  or  excusing  or  justifying 
it  Held,  that  such  diarge  was  correct  in  so 
far  as  it  related  to  statutory  murder  in  the 
first  degree  under  the  facts  proved.  Hedger 
V.  State,  128  N.  W.  80,  90, 144  Wis.  279. 

Pen.  Code  1895,  art  710,  provides  that 
every  person  who  shall  unlawfully  kill  any 
person  with  malice  aforethought,  either  ex- 
press or  implied,  shall  be  guilty  of  murder, 
and  that  all  murder  committed  in  the  per- 
petration of  robbery  is  murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree, and  that  all  murder  not  of  the  first  de- 
gree is  murder  of  the  second  degree.  White's 
Ann.  Code  Cr.  Proc.  art  554,  provides  that,  if 
the  defendant  pleads  guilty,  he  shall  be  ad- 
monished of  the  consequences  of  such  plea, 
and  no  such  plea  shall  be  received  unless  it 
appears  that  he  is  sane  and  1b  oninfiuenced 


by  fear  or  hope  of  pardon.  Artide  555  i 
vldes  that  where  a  defendant  in  a  case 
felony  persists  in  pleading  guilty,  if  the  p 
Ishment  of  the  offense  is  not  absolutely  fi: 
by  law,  a  jury  shall  be  impaneled  to  ass 
the  punishment  on  evidence  submitted 
enable  them  to  decide  thereon.  Pen.  Gc 
1895,  art  712,  provides  that  if  a  per 
pleads  guilty  to  murder,  a  jury  shall  be  si 
moned  to  find  of  what  degree  of  murder  h< 
guilty.  Held,  that  when  an  accused  plea< 
guilty  of  murder,  and  his  plea  was  accep 
by  the  court  after  examination,  and  evlde 
was  introduced  before  a  jury  which  c 
cluslvely  showed  that  the  murder  was  c< 
mitted  in  the  perpetration  of  robbery, 
court  was  not  compelled  to  submit  the  is 
of  second  degree  murder,  under  article  1 
Neither  was  the  court  in  error  in  not  defin 
for  the  jury  murder  in  tbe  first  degree.  Mil 
V.  State,  126  S.  W.  864,  58  Tex.  Cr.  B.  600. 

Dellberatlom  aad  premeditation 

Deliberation,  as  an  element  of  first 
gree  murder,  is  established  if  accased  I 
time  for  thought  and,  thinking,  though  1 
for  a  moment  did  intend  to  kill,  and  in  t 
did  kilL  State  v.  Russo  (DeL)  77  Aa  7 
745,  1  Boyce,  588. 

To  constitute  "murder  in  the  first 
gree,"  there  must  be,  not  only  an  intait 
to  kill  on  the  part  of  the  slayer,  but  th( 
must  be  a  premeditated  design  to  kill 
efTect  death.    Keigans  ▼.  State,  41  South.  8 
887,  52  Fla.  57. 

'Murder  of  the  first  degree"  is  when 
homicide  is  committed  with  sedate,  deUben 
mind  and  formed  design  to  kill,  though  1 
deliberate  and  formed  design  exist  only  fbi 
moment  State  v.  Harmon  (DeL)  60  AtL  8( 
868,  4  PennewiU,  580;  State  ▼.  Blackbi 
(Del.)  75  AtL.  536,  539,  7  Pennewill,  479. 

A  homicide  committed  under  such  c 
cumstances  that  the  law  implies  malice  is  i 
always  murder  in  the  first  degree,  but 
such  only  where  there  exists  at  the  time 
the  part  of  accused  a  premeditated  design 
effect  the  death  of  the  person  killed  or  of  a 
human  b^ng.  Hedger  v.  State,  128  N.  W. : 
90, 144  Wla  279. 

"Murder  in  the  first  degree"  is  not  < 
termined  by  a  design  to  kill,  unless  that  < 
sign  originated  in,  or  resulted  from,  a  sede 
deliberate  mind,  or  in  other  words,  at  i 
time  the  design  is  formed,  the  noind  must 
calm,  sedate,  and  deliberate.  Wynne 
State,  127  S.  W.  197,  199,  59  Tex.  Cr.  R.  3 
(citing  Farrer  v.  State,  42  Tex.  271). 

To  constitute  "murder  in  the  first  degre 
there  must  be  both  an  intent  to  kill  and  a  < 
liberate  and  premeditated  design  to  kj 
which  design  must  precede  the  killing 
some  appreciable  space  of  time.  It  ne 
not  be  long,  but  it  must  be  sufficient  for  soi 
refiection  on  the  matter  and  a  choice  to  b 
or  not  to  kill.  People  y.  Boggiano,  72  N. 
101,  179  N-  y.  267. 


MURDBB  IN  FIRST  DEOREB 


496 


MURDBB  IN  FIRST  DBORBB 


To  constitute  '*morder  In  the  first  de- 
ee,**  tbe  killing  most  be  willful,  premedltat- 
i,  and  deUberate,  but  willful  intent,  pre- 
editatlon,  or  deliberation  need  not  exist  for 
\y  prescribed  length  of  time  before  the 
Ime  is  committed;  it  is  sufficient  that  there 
premeditation  and  design  to  kill  distinctly 
rmed  in  the  mind  at  any  time  before  or 
the  time  the  shot  is  fired.  State  v.  McMnl- 
1,  71  S.  W.  221,  224, 170  Mo.  60& 

The  law  defining  **marder  in  the  first  de- 
ee*'  does  not  fix  any  InTariable  role  as  to  the 
Dgth  of  the  time  that  must  elapse  between  a 
rmed  design  to  kill  and  its  execution,  but 
Lly  requires  that  the  killing  must  hare  been 
^liberate  and  that  a  formed  design  to  kill 
Isted.  Snowberger  t.  State,  126  S.  W.  878, 
12,  58  Tex.  Or.  R.  680. 

If  one  actually  forms  the  purpose  mal- 
lously  to  kill  another,  and  deliberates  and 
"emeditates  upon  it,  and  then  does  the  act, 
i  commits  "murder  in  the  first  degree,"  no 
atter  how  short  the  time  may  have  been, 

but  the  time  necessary  for  one  thought  to 
How  another  between  the  purpose  and  its 
[ecution.  Wickham  ▼.  People,  08  Pac.  478, 
tl,  41  Ck>lo.  845. 

To  constitute  "murder  in  the  first  degree** 

is  not  essential  that  there  should  be  any 
)preciable  space  of  time  between  the  intent 

>  kill  and  the  act  of  killing;  i.  e.,  any  in- 
rral  "capable  of  being  appreciated  or  duly 
timated."  The  intent  to  kill  must  be  form- 
1  deliberately  and  with  premeditaticm ;  but, 
hen  80  formed,  there  need  be  no  appreda- 
e  space  of  time  between  the  intent  and 
le  act  People  ▼.  Suesser,  75  Pac.  1003, 
m,  142  Gal.  354. 

To  constitute  "murder  in  the  first  de- 
ree,"  there  need  be  no  appreciable  space  of 
me  between  the  intention  to  kill  and  the 
:t  of  killing — ^they  may  be  as  instantaneous 
)  successive  thoughts  of  the  mind — and  it  is 
lly  necessary  that  the  act  of  killing  be  pre- 
Kled  by  a  concurrence  of  will,  deliberation, 
ad  premeditation;  and  where  such  is  the 
ise,  the  killing  is  murder  in  the  first  degree, 

>  matter  how  rapidly  the  acts  of  the  mind 
ay  succeed  each  other,  or  how  quickly  they 
i&j  be  followed  by  the  act  of  killing.    People 

Tee  Foo,  89  Pac.  450,  452,  4  Cal.  App.  730. 

A  killing  in  a  combat  which  engenders 

Dt  blood  is  not  "murder  in  the  first  degree," 

I  the  absence  of  premeditation.    Osburn  y. 

tate,  73  N.  E.  601,  604,  164  Ind.  262. 

"In  order  to  constitute  'murder  in  the 
ret  degree,'  where  only  the  question  of  mal- 
«  is  involTed,  and  not  robbery,  or  some  of 
lose  extraneous  matters  made  murder  in  the 
rst  degree  by  the  statute,  the  intent  to 
UI  must  be  formed  in  a  mind  that  is  cool, 
eliberate,  and  sedate.  The  intent  to  kill, 
)rmed  in  a  mind  that  is  not  cool,  deliberate, 
Dd  sedate,  is  not  murder  in  the  first  degree." 
ianning  T.  State,  86  8.  W.  1149,  48  Tex.  Cr. 
1.55. 


It  ii  not  necessary,  under  our  statute.  In 
order  to  constitute  murder  in  the  first  degree, 
that  the  murder  should  be  committed  by 
means  of  poison,  or  by  lying  in  wait,  or  that 
it  shall  be  committed  in  the  perpetration  or 
attempt  to  perpetrate  arson,  rape,  robbery, 
burglary,  or  mayhem ;  but  any  kind  of  willful, 
deliberate,  and  premeditated  killing.  Is  "mur- 
der in  the  first  degree.**  A  murderous  pur- 
pose to  draw  some  one  into  a  dispute,  and 
then  strike  him  down  with  a  deadly  weapon, 
is  sufficient  to  support  a  finding  that  the  hom- 
icide was  deliberate  and  premeditated.  State 
T.  Vinso,  71  S.  W.  1084,  1037,  171  Mo.  576 
(quoting  and  adopting  State  ▼.  Fairlamb,  25 
S.  W.  897,  121  Mo.  loc  dt  144). 

"To  constitute  'murder  in  the  first  degree* 
there  must  have  been  an  unlawful  killing 
done,  purposely  and  with  deliberate  and  pre- 
meditated malice.  If  the  person  has  actu- 
ally formed  the  purpose  maliciously  to  kill 
and  has  deliberated  and  premeditated  upon 
it  before  he  performs  the  act,  and  then  per- 
forms it,  he  Is  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first 
degree,  however  short  the  time  may  hare 
been  between  the  purpose  and  its  execution. 
It  Is  not  time  that  constitutes  the  distinctive 
difference  between  murdor  in  the  first  degree 
and  murder  in  the  second  degree.  An  un- 
lawful killing  with  malice,  deliberation,  and 
premeditation  constitutes  the  crime  of  mur- 
der in  the  first  degree.  It  matters  not  how 
short  the  time,  if  the  party  has  turned  it 
over  in  his  mind  and  weighed  and  deliberated 
upon  It"  Reed  v.  State,  106  N.  W.  649,  651, 
75  Neb.  509. 

"In  order  to  warrant  a  verdict  of  "mur- 
der in  the  first  degree,*  malice  must  be  shown 
by  the  evidence  to  have  existed  (that  is,  the 
jury  must  be  •satisfied  from  the  evidence, 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  killing 
was  a  consummation  of  a  previously  formed 
design  to  take  the  life  of  the  person  killed, 
and  that  the  design  to  kill  was  formed  de- 
liberately with  a  sedate  mind;  that  is,  at 
the  time  when  the  design  was  formed,  the 
mind  of  the  person  killing  was  self-possessed 
and  capable  of  contemplating  the  consequenc- 
es of  the  act  proi>osed  to  be  done) .  There  is, 
however,  no  definite  space  of  time  necessary 
to  intervene  between  the  formed  design  to 
Idll  and  the  actual  killing ;  a  single  moment 
of  time  may  be  sufficient ;  all  that  is  required 
is  that  the  mind  be  cool  and  deliberate  in 
forming  ita  purpose,  and  that  the  design  to 
kill  is  formed."  Gregg  v.  State  (Tex.)  100  S. 
W.  1161, 1163. 

Rev.  Laws,  c  207, 1 1,  declares  that  mur- 
der committed  with  deliberately  premeditat- 
ed malice  aforethought,  or  in  the  commission 
or  attempt  to  commit  any  crime  punishable 
with  imprisonment  for  Ufe,  or  committed 
with  extreme  atrocity  or  cruelty,  is  murder 
in  the  first  degree,  and  punishable  with  death. 
In  a  prosecution  for  such  offense,  the  court 
diarged  that  the  words   "deliberately  pre- 


I 


MURDBB  IN  FIRST  DBGREB 


496 


MURDER  IN  FIRST  DBGRBB 


I 


^'] 


meditated  malice  aforethought"  meant  Bimply 
"thought  upon,  resolved  upon  beforehand,  not 
a  thing  done  suddenly,  not  a  thing  that  cornea 
into  the  mind  of  a  sudden,  and  is  done  be- 
fore there  is  time  to  think  about  it,  but  a 
thing  thought  upon  or  planned  some  time  be- 
fore, or  thought  upon  long  enough  before  the 
act  is  done  so  that  it  can  reasonably  be  said 
to  have  become  a  purpose  of  the  mind,"  that 
''no  particular  length  of  time  is  necessary" 
and  illustrated  the  same  by  stating  that  if  a 
robber  with  a  dirk  or  pistol  turns  a  corner 
and  meets  a  bank  messenger  with  a  roll  of 
bills,  and  determines  in  one  moment  to  get  it, 
and  the  next  shoots  or  stabs  the  messenger 
dead,  takes  the  package,  and  flees,  hts  mal- 
ice was  deliberately  premeditated,  though  it 
occupied  only  a  few  seconds  to  accomplish. 
Held,  that  both  the  definition  and  illustration 
were  proper.  Commonwealth  v.  Tucker,  76 
N.  B.  127,  138,  140,  141,  180  Mass.  467,  7  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1056. 

An  instruction  that,  to  constitute  ''mur- 
der in  the  flrst  degree,''  there  must  be  proof 
of  malice  and  premeditation,  and  that  if  ei- 
ther of  these  elements  Is  absent  there  can  be 
no  conviction  for  that  grade  of  homicide,  that 
a  '^premeditated  design  or  purpose'*  is  one 
resulting  from  thought  and  reflection,  a  de- 
sign conceived  and  aftwwards  so  deliberat^y 
considered  as  to  become  resolved  and  fixed, 
that  when  the  design  to  take  human  life  is 
formed  after  deliberation,  and  there  Is  ade- 
quate time  and  opportunity  for  deliberate 
thought,  then,  no  matter  how  soon  the  felo- 
nious killing  follows  the  formation  of  the 
settled  purpose,  it  is  murder  in  the  flrst  de- 
gree, that  there  need  be  no  appreciable  space 
of  time  between  the  formation  of  the  inten- 
tion to  kill  and  the  killing,  but  that  it  Is  as 
much  "premeditation"  If  it  enters  Into  the 
mind  of  the  guilty  agent  a  moment  before 
the  act  as  if  it  entered  years  before,  and  that 
it  is  only  necessary  that  the  act  of  killing  be 
preceded  by  the  concurrence  of  will,  delibera- 
tion, and  premeditation,  but  that,  when  there 
is  no  time  and  opportunity  for  deliberate 
thought,  the  unlawful  killing  cannot  be  mur- 
dor  in  the  flrst  degree,  is  correct.  Welty  ▼. 
State  and.)  100  N.  B.  73,  81. 

Intent 

"Murder  in  the  flrst  degree"  cannot  be 
predicated  on  the  mere  existence  of  an  in- 
tent to  kill  at  the  time  of  committing  the 
crime,  State  v.  Mangano,  72  Atl.  366,  367,  77 
N.  J.  Law,  544. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  a  prior  Intention 
to  do  the  act  of  killing  be  conceived  for  any 
particular  period  of  time  in  order  to  consti- 
tute murder  in  the  flrst  degree.  Ferguson  v. 
State,  122  S.  W.  236,  237,  92  Ark.  120. 

If  there  was  a  fixed,  deliberate,  and  se- 
date purpose  to  kill,  usually  termed  "specific 
intent  to  take  life,"  willful,  deliberate,  and 
premeditated,  although  in  the  course  of  mu- 


tual combat»  the  offense  was  'inorder  of  tbe 
flrst  degree."  State  y.  Taylor,  50  &  E.  247. 
252,  57  W.  Va.  228. 

To  constitute  "murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree," the  killing  must  be  intentional,  must 
be  deliberate  and  premeditated,  and  no  kill- 
ing can  be  murder  in  the  flrst  degree  unless 
the  act  of  kilUng  is  preceded  by  a  willful,  de- 
liberate, premeditated,  and  specific  intent  to 
kilL    State  v.  Marx,  60  Atl)  690,  692,  78  Gonn. 

la 

Under  Biills'  Ann.  St  |  1176,  providing 
that  murder  in  the  perpetration  of  robbery 
shall  be  deemed  murder  in  the  flrst  degree, 
the  intent  is  immaterial,  so  that,  where  aer- 
eral  conspire  to  rob,  and  one  of  the  consphB- 
tors  commits  murder  in  the  perpetration  of 
robbery,  the  others  are  responsible  for  his  act, 
though  murder  was  not  originally  intended. 
Andrews  v.  People,  79  Pac.  1031,  1033,  33 
Colo.  193,  108  Am.  St  Rep.  76. 

"Under  Code,  I  4728,  all  murder  whlcb 
is  perpetrated  by  means  of  poiaon  is  'murder 
in  the  ftrst  degree.'  Hence  a  Iwmicide  com- 
mitted by  the  administration  of  poison,  with 
a  bad  motive  or  intent,  Is  murder  in  the  first 
degree,  no  matter  whether  there  was  spe- 
cific intent  to  kill."  State  v.  Bums,  99  N.  W. 
721,  722,  124  Iowa,  207  (citing  SUte  v.  Van 
Tassel,  72  N.  W.  497,  103  Iowa,  6;  State 
V.  WeUs,  17  N.  W.  90,  61  Iowa,  629,  47  Am. 
Bep.  822;  State  v.  Bertoch,  88  N.  W.  967, 
112  Iowa,  195). 

The  distinctive  feature  of  "murder  in  tbe 
flrst  degree"  is  a  willful,  deliberate,  malidoiis. 
and  premeditated  intent  to  take  life,  and,  al- 
though it  is  not  indispensable  that  the  pre- 
meditated design  should  have  existed  in  the 
mind  of  the  slayer  for  any  particular  length 
of  time  before  the  killing,  yet  to  constitute 
murder  in  the  flrst  degree  it  is  indispensable 
that  the  evidence  should  show  that  the  kill* 
lug  was  not  only  done  with  malice  but  that 
it  was  preceded  by  a  clearly  formed  design  to 
kill,  a  clear  intent  to  take  life.  Howard  r. 
State,  100  S.  W.  756,  757,  82  Ark.  97  (cith« 
Bivens  v.  State,  11  Ark.  460;  Fitpatrlck  v. 
State,  87  Ark.  239). 

Under  CJode,  i  4728,  providing  that  the 
killing  of  a  human  being  by  means  of  a  will- 
ful, unlawful,  and  felonious  administration  of 
poison  is  "murder  in  the  flrst  degree,"  an  In- 
dictment for  homldde  so  committed  is  not 
objectionable  for  falling  to  allege  a  spedfie 
intent  A  homicide  so  committed  cannot  con- 
stitute murder  in  the  second  degree  or  man- 
slaughter, and  hence  a  spedflc  intent  to  kill 
is  not  an  essential  allegation  In  the  indict- 
ment State  V.  Bobinson,  101  N.  W.  634,  635, 
126  Iowa,  69  (citing  State  v.  Van  Tassel,  T2 
N.  W.  497, 103  Iowa,  9 ;  State  v.  Wtfls,  17  N. 
W.  90,  61  Iowa,  629,  47  Am.  Bep.  822;  Bpps 
V.  State,  1  N.  Bl  491,  102  Ind.  639). 

If  a  person  takes  the  life  of  another  by 
an  act  naturally  calculated  to  produce  that 


HURDEB  IN  FIRST  DEGBEB 


497 


MUBDEB  IN  FIBST  DEQBEE 


isalt.  In  the  absence  of  any  explanatory  dr- 
imstanoe  or  drcumatancee  rendering  the 
>micide  excusable  or  justifiable,  or  criminal 
L  some  degree  less  than  the  highest,  or  cre- 
:ing  a  reasonable  doubt  in  regard  to  one  of 
icb  contingencies,  the  law  presumes  that  he 
itejided  the  result  effected,  and  he  is  guilty 
!  murder  in  the  first  degree.  Cupps  y.  State, 
r  N.  W.  210,  214,  120  Wis.  504,  102  Am.  St 
ep.  996. 

Pen.  C!ode  1901,  {  172,  declares  that  *'mur- 
;r^  is  the  unlawful  killiug  of  a  human  be- 
ig  with  malice  aforethought     Such  malice 

express  or  implied.  Section  173  declares 
lat  all  murder  perpetrated  by  poison  or  by 
3y  other  Und  of  willful,  deliberate,  and  pre- 
editated  killing,  or  which  is  committed  in 
le  perpetration  of  certain  crimes,  is  murder 
i  the  first  degree,  and  all  other  kinds  of 
urder  are  in  the  second  degree.  Held,  that 
le  word  "other"  in  section  173  was  used  to 
ipply  the  sense  of  addition  to  the  enumera- 
on;  and  hence  an  instruction  that  it  was 
[>t  essential  to  a  verdict  of  murder  in  the 
rst  degree  by  poison  that  there  should  be 
roof  that  defendant  administered  the  poison 
i  decedent  with  a  specific  intent  to  kill  him 
as  proper ;    malice  being  implied.    Eytin^ 

Territory,  100  Pac.  443,  445,  12  Ariz.  131. 

Penal  Law  (GonsoL  Laws,  c.  40)  §  1044, 
ibd.  1,  proYides  that  the  killing  of  a  human 
eing  is  '*marder  in  the  first  degree"  when 
)mmitted  from  a  deliberate  and  premeditat* 
1  design  to  effect  the  death  of  the  person 
Llled  or  of  another.    Subdivision  2  provides 

is  murder  in  the  first  degree  when  com- 
litted  without  a  design  to  effect  death  while 
i  the  commission  of  a  felony.  Section  610 
rovides  that,  upon  the  trial  of  an  indict- 
ment, the  prisoner  may  be  convicted  of  the 
rime  charged  therein  or  of  a  lesser  degree 
r  the  same  crime.  Held,  that  altiiough  mur- 
er  in  the  first  degree  as  defined  by  section 
Hi,  subd.  1,  is  broad  enough  to  embrace 
lurder  in  the  second  degree  or  manslaughter 
\  either  degree,  where  accused  was  tried  for 
lurder  under  section  1044,  subd.  2,  the  power 
f  the  jury  to*  convict  of  a  lesser  degree  could 
ot  be  exercised,  since  an  intent  to  kill  is  not 

necessary  ingredient  to  the  crime,  and  it 
Bs  enough  to  show  beyond  a  reasonable 
oubt  that  the  killing  vras  done  in  commit- 
ng  or  attempting  to  commit  a  felony.  Peo- 
le  V.  Schleiman,  90  N.  B.  950,  951,  197  N.  Y. 
33,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1075,  18  Ann.  Oas. 
3& 

In  a  prosecution  for  statutory  murder  in 
le  first  degree,  the  state  claimed  that  accus- 
i  killed  deceased  with  premeditated  design, 
he  court  (barged  that  premeditated  design 
fas  simply  an  intent  to  kill,  that  "design" 
leant  "intent,"  and  that  both  words  implied 
remeditation,  that  premeditation  did  not 
iclude  sudden  intent  and  that  whether  it 
e  described  by  the  words  "actual  intent" 
design,*'  or  '^premeditated  design"  was  im- 
8  WDB.&  P.2D  Skb.— 32 


material;  ^at  the  intent  was  understood  to 
be  premeditated  because  without  mental  ac- 
tion the  purpose  could  not  be  formed ;  that 
when  there  were  no  circumstances  to  prevent 
the  presumption,  the  law  would  presume  that 
the  unlawful  act  was  intentional  and  mali- 
cious; that  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to 
the  contrary,  he  who  takes  the  life  of  another 
by  some  act  naturally  calculated  to  produce 
death  would  be  presumed  to  have  intended 
that  result  and  to  be  guilty  of  murder  in  the 
first  degree,  it  being  presumed  that  such  per- 
son intended  the  result  that  followed,  and  \ 
must  be  guilty  of  murder  in  the  absence  of 
evidence  that  the  homicide  was  Justifiable  or 
excusable  or  such  as  to  raise  a  reasonable 
doubt  on  the  question;  thus  that  where  ac- 
cused fired  a  shot  the  weapon  being  aimed  at 
a  vital  part  of  the  body,  and  death  ensued 
as  a  natural  result  the  presumption  of  fact 
as  to  the  intention  to  take  life,  in  the  absence 
of  any  explanatory  circumstances,  makes  a 
prima  facie  case  for  the  prosecution,  the 
state  not  being  required  to  negative  any  prob- 
ability that  there  were  circumstances  reduc- 
ing the  homicide  below  that  of  murder  in  the 
first  degree,  or  excusing  or  Justifying  it 
Held,  that  such  charge  was  correct  in  so  far 
as  it  related  to  statutory  murder  in  the  first 
degree  under  the  facts  proved.  Hedger  v. 
State,  128  N.  W.  80,  90, 144  Wis.  279. 

Blalioe  dr  motlTe 

Malice  is  an  essential  element  of  "mur- 
der in  the  first  degree."  State  v.  Beese  (Del.) 
79  Atl.  217,  220,  2  Boyce,  434. 

To  establish  "murder  of  the  first  degree," 
it  must  be  shown  that  the  killing  was  com- 
mitted with  express  malice  aforethought 
State  V.  Borrelli  (Del.)  76  Ati.  605,  606,  1 
Boyce,  349. 

First  degree  murder  is  included  within 
the  term  "felonious  homicide"  and  malice  is 
an  essential  ingredient  thereof.  State  v. 
Busso  (Del.)  77  Ati.  748,  745,  1  Boyce,  538. 

"Murder  of  the  first  degree"  is  where  the 
killing  was  done  with  malice  aforethought. 
State  V.  Primrose  (Del.)  77  Ati.  717,  719,  2 
Boyce,  164. 

"Murder  in  the  first  degree"  occurs  where 
the  killing  was  done  with  express  malice 
aforethought  State  v.  Beese  (Del.)  79  Ati. 
217,  221,  2  Boyce,  434. 

"Murder  of  the  first  degree"  exists  where 
the  kUling  is  done  with  express  maUce  afore- 
thought, and  express  malice  aforethought  ex- 
ists where  the  killing  is  done  with  a  sedate, 
deliberate  mind  and  formed  design  to  kill. 
State  V.  Brelawski  (Del.)  84  Aa  950,  952. 

"Murder  of  the  first  degree"  is  committed 
when  the  killing  is  done  with  express  malice 
aforethought ;  that  is,  with  a  sedate,  deliber- 
ate mind,  and  formed  design  to  kill.  State  v. 
Miele  (Del.)  74  Ati.  8,  9,  1  Boyce,  33;  State 
V.  Uzzo  (Del.)  65  Aa  775,  777,  6  PennewiU, 


f 


MURDER  IN  FIRST  DEGREE 


498 


MURDER  IN  FIRST  DEQREB 


212;    State  y.  Short  (Del.)  82  Aa  239,  241, 
2  Boyce^  491. 

If  a  person  puts  poison  in  flour  with  in- 
tent tliat  it  shall  be  cooked  and  eaten  by  B., 
but  it  is  eaten  by  C,  who  dies  therefrom, 
such  person  will  be  guilty  of  murder,  though 
he  had  no  malicg  against  C.  Ohelsey  ▼.  State, 
49  a  E.  258,  259,  121  Ga.  840. 

An  instruction  that,  if  any  person  in  the 
perpetration,  or  in  the  attempt  to  perpetrate, 
a  robbery  shall  take  the  life  of  the  person  in- 
'  tended  to  be  robbed,  he  is  guilty  of  "murder 
in  the  first  degree"  is  erroneous  as  eliminat- 
ing malice.  Gates  ▼.  State,  103  S.  W.  869, 
860,  51  Tex.  Or.  B.  449. 

"Murder,"  within  Rev.  St  1908,  |  1024, 
cL  4,  providing  that  murder  perpetrated  by 
any  act  greatly  dangerous  to  the  lives  of  oth- 
ers, but  indicating  a  depraved  mind  regard- 
less of  human  life,  shall  be  "murder  in  the 
first  degree,"  Is  such  as  is  committed  by  an 
act  greatly  dangerous  to  the  lives  of  persons 
other  than  the  one  killed,  and  showing  a 
reckless  disregard  of  human  life;  and  it 
therefore  does  not  include  a  killing  resulting 
from  intentional  shooting  of  the  Individual 
slain,  and  where  there  is  no  element  of  what 
is  termed  ^'universal  malice"  shown.  Longi- 
notti  V.  People,  102  Pac.  165, 168,  46  CJolo.  173 
(citing  and  adopting  Darry  v.  People,  10  N.  Y. 
120 ;  Mitchell  v.  State,  60  Ala.  2q;  Jewell  v. 
Territory,  43  Pac.  1075,  4  Gkl.  53 ;  and  Gold- 
ing  V.  State,  8  South.  811,  26  Fla. 


Revisal  1905,  i  3631,  declaring  that  mur- 
der by  means  of  poison,  lying  in  wait,  etc., 
or  by  any  other  kind  of  willful,  deliberate,  or 
premeditated  killing,  shall  be  murder  in  the 
first  degree,  and  that  all  other  kinds  of  mur- 
der shall  be  murder  in  the  second  degree, 
classifies  the  different  kinds  of  murder  at 
common  law,  without  giving  any  new  defini- 
tion, and  the  malice  essential  to  constitute 
murder  in  the  first  degree  need  not  arise 
from  personal  ill  will,  but  may  exist  where 
there  has  been  a  wrongful  and  intentional 
killing  without  lawful  excuse  or  mitigating 
circumstances.  State  v.  Banks,  57  S.  E.  174, 
176,  143  N.  C.  652. 

Murder  may  be  committed  without  any 
motive.  It  is  the  intention,  deliberately 
formed  after  premeditation,  so  that  it  be- 
comes a  definite  purpose  to  kill,  and  a  conse- 
quent killing  without  legal  provocation  or  ex- 
cuse, that  constitutes  "murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree." The  existence  of  a  motive  may  be 
evidence  to  show  the  degree  of  the  offense,  or 
to  establish  the  identity  of  the  defendant  as 
the  slayer;  but  motive  is  not  an  essential 
element  of  the  crime,  nor  is  it  indispensable 
to  a  conviction  of  the  person  charged  with 
its  commission.  State  v.  Adams,  50  S.  B. 
765,  768,  138  N.  C.  688. 

Mvrder  in  second  des^ee  dlstingnlshed 

"Murder  in  the  first"  and  "murder  in  the 
second   degree"   are  distinguished,   in  that 


specific  intent  to  kill  is  essential  to  the 
fense  in  the  first  degree.    Reed  v.  State,  ] 
S.  W.  206,  206,  102  Ark.  525. 

The  distinction  between  murder  in  1 
first  and  second  degrees  is  that  in  *'murd» 
the  first  degree"  a  specific  intent  to  take  1 
must  be  shown,  while  in  murder  in  the  seco 
degree  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  such 
tent  Petty  v.  State,  89  S.  W.  465,  406, 
Ark.  515. 

Under  Kirby's  Dig.  i  1766,  declaring  tt 
all  murder  by  means  of  poison,  lying  in  wi 
or  other  malicious  or  premeditated  killing, 
which  shall  be  committed  in  the  perpetrati 
or  attempt  to  i)erpetrate  arson,  rape,  n 
bery,  burglary,  or  larceny,  shall  be  deem 
"murder  in  the  first  degree,"  when  the  fi 
of  killing  alone  is  proved,  it  will  be  presun 
that  the  crime  is  murder  in  the  second  < 
gree.  Ferguson  v.  State,  122  S.  W.  236,  2 
92  Ark.  120. 

Where  there  existe  a  design  deliberati 
formed  in  the  mind  of  accused  to  take  11 
and  death  ensues  from  his  act,  the  homid 
is  "murder  in  the  first  degree";  but  wh( 
there  exists  no  design  to  take  life,  but  dea 
resulto  from  an  unlawful  act  of  violence,  a 
there  is  no  adequate  provocation,  the  hoi 
cide  is  murder  in  the  second  degree.  Sti 
V.  Honey  (Del.)  66  AtL  764-766,  6  Pennew 
148. 

The  statute,  providhig  Uiat  all  mur^ 
in  robbery  or  in  the  perpetration  of  robb€ 
is  "murder  in  the  first  degree,*'  eliminal 
murder  in  the  second  degree  in  homid 
committed  in  robbery  or  in  the  perpetrati 
of  robbery,  and  the  killing  of  one  in  the  p 
petration  of  the  robbery  of  another  is  "mi 
der  in  the  first  degree."  Milo  v.  State,  1 
S.  W.  1025,  1029,  59  Tex.  Or.  R.  196. 

Revisal  1905,  i  3631,  declaring  that  mi 
der  by  means  of  poison,  lying  in  wait,  et 
or  by  any  other  kind  of  willful,  delibera 
or  premeditated  killing,  shall  be  "murder 
the  first  degree,"  and  that  all  other  kinds 
murder  shall  be  "murder  in  the  second  ( 
gree,"  classifies  the  different  kinds  of  mi 
der  at  common  law,  without  giving  any  n< 
definition.  State  v.  Banks,  57  S.  E.  174,  i: 
143  N.  C.  652. 

The  degree  of  murder  under  the  statu 
declaring  that  murder  perpetrated  by  a 
kind  of  willful,  deliberate,  and  premeditat 
killing  shall  be  "murder  in  the  first  degree 
and  all  other  kinds  of  murder  shall  be  mi 
der  in  the  second  degree,  depends  on  t 
question  whether  the  crime  was  willful,  c 
liberate,  and  premeditated,  and  on  that  qu< 
tion  it  becomes  material  whether  accus 
was  in  such  a  condition  of  mind  by  reas 
of  intoxication  as  to  be  incapable  of  deliber 
tion  and  premeditation.  Brennan  v.  Peop 
86  Pac.  79,  81,  87  Colo.  256. 

The  characteristic  quality  of  "murder 
the  first  degree,"  and  that  which  distingui^ 


MURDER  IN  FIRST  DFXShREB         499       MURDER  IN  SECOND  DEGREE 


I  It  from  murder  in  the  second  degree  or 
ly  other  homicide,  is  the  existence  of  a  set- 
ed  purpose  and  fixed  design  on  the  part  of 
le  assailant  that  the  act  of  assault  should 
suit  In  the  death  of  the  party  assaulted ; 
lat  death  being  the  end  aimed  at,  the  ob- 
ct  sought  for  and  wished.  The  distlnctiye 
laracteristlc  of  murder  in  the  first  degree 

premeditation.  When  the  act  of  killing  is 
>t  done  in  the  commission  or  attempt  to 
^mmit  some  felony  nor  by  poison,  or  lying 
I  wait,  the  killing  must  be  done  willfully, 
^liberately,  maliciously,  and  with  premedita- 
on.  Turner  v.  Stete,  108  S.  W.  1139,  1142, 
L9  T«m.  663,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  988,  123 
m.  St.  Rep.  758,  14  Ann.  Gas.  990  (quoting 
ale  ▼.  State,  10  Terg.  [18  Tenn.]  561 ;  Swan 

State,  4  Humph.  [23  Tenn.]  136 ;  Lewis  Y. 
tate,  3  Head  [40  Tenn.]  148). 

A  willful,  deliberate,  and  premeditated 
Llling,  or  a  killing  done  in  the  perpetration, 
r  attempted  perpetration,  of  robbery,  is 
murder  in  the  first  degree."  Otherwise  a 
Uling  is  "murder  in  the  second  degree,*' 
here  accused  unlawfully  and  with  malice 
forethought  killed  decedent,  and  in  deter- 
lining  the  degree  any  evidence  of  the  men- 
i\  status  of  accused  is  proper.  State  r. 
ohnny,  87  Pac  8,  8,  29  Nev.  203. 

An  unlawful  killing,  done  purposely  and 
1th  deliberate  and  premeditated  malice,  is 
murder  in  the  first  degree,"  and  it  matters 
ot  how  short  the  time  may  be  between  the 
me  of  the  formation  of  the  purpose  to  kill 
nd  its  execution,  if  the  person  committing 
le  crime  has  deliberated  upon  it  "Murder 
1  the  second  degree"  consists  in  an  unlaw- 
il  killing  done  purposely  and  maliciously, 
at  without  deliberation  and  premeditation, 
[amblin  y.  State,  115  N.  W.  860,  853,  81 
reb.  148,  16  Ann.  Can.  569. 

The  only  essential  difference  between 
murder  in  the  first  degree"  and  **murder  in 
be  second  degree"  is  that  the  former  is  com- 
litted  after  deliberation  and  premeditation, 
rhich  elements  do  not  inhere  in  the  lower 
rade  of  the  crime,  but  all  the  elements  of 
mrder  in  the  second  degree  are  included  in 
tie  statutory  definition  of  murder  in  the 
rst  degree.  To  render  one  who  is  not  pres- 
nt  and  does  not  aid  or  assist  in  a  murder 
uilty  thereof,  by  reason  of  a  former  con- 
piracy  with  the  slayer,  it  must  appear  that 
tie  murder  was  within  the  contemplation  of 
tie  conspiracy,  or  was  the  natural  and  prob- 
ble  outcome  thereof.  State  t.  Keleher,  87 
'ac  738,  739,  74  Kan.  631. 

In  a  prosecution  for  murder,  the  court 
barged  that  '"malice  is  also  necessary  to 
lurder  in  the  first  degree.  The  distinguish- 
Qg  feature,  so  far  as  malice  la  concerned,  is 
hat,  in  murder  of  the  first  degree,  malice 
iQst  be  proven  to  your  satisfaction  beyond  a 
easonable  doubt  as  an  existing  fact,  while 
Q  murder  of  the  second  degree  malice  will 
le  implied  from  the  fact  of  an  unlawful  kill- 


ing." Held  that,  if  the  instructions  stood 
alone,  the  latter  part  of  the  paragraph  might 
be  erroneous,  but  as  it  was  followed  by  an 
instructioB  defining  malice  as  being  that 
which  the  law  infers  from  certain  acts,  how- 
ever suddenly  done,  as  when  the  fact  of  an 
unlawful  killing  is  established  and  the  facts 
do  not  establish  malice  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  though  they  tend  to  excuse  or  justify 
the  act,  then  the  law  implies  malice,  and  the 
murder  is  murder  of  the  second  degree,  and 
also  that  if  the  killing  is  unlawful  and  done 
with  implied  malice  aforethought,  it  would 
be  murder  in  the  ^second  degree,  the  instruc- 
tions taken  together  were  correct.  Eggles- 
ton  y.  State  (Tex.)  128  S.  W.  1105,  1109. 

The  next  lower  grade  of  culpable  homi- 
cide than  **murder  in  the  first  degree'*  is 
**murder  in  the  second  degree."  Malice  is 
also  a  necessary  ingredient  of  the  offense 
of  murder  in  the  second  degree.  The  dis- 
tinguishing feature,  however,  so  far  as  the 
element  of  malice  is  concerned,  is  that  in 
murder  in  the  first  degree  malice  must  be 
proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt  as  an  existing  fact, 
while  in  murder  in  the  second  degree  malice 
will  be  implied  from  the  fact  of  an  unlaw- 
ful killing.  Implied  malice  is  that  which  the 
law  Infers  from  or  imputes  to  certain  acts, 
however  suddenly  done.  Thus,  when  the  fact 
of  an  unlawful  killing  is  established,  and  the 
facts  do  not  establish  express  malice  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt,  nor  tend  to  mitigate,  ex- 
cuse, or  justify  the  act,  then  the  law  implies 
malice,  and  the  murder  is  in  the  second  de- 
gree, and  the  law  does  not  further  define 
murder  in  the  second  degree  than  if  the  kill- 
ing is  shown  to  be  unlawful,  and  there  is 
nothing  in  evidence  on  the  one  hand  showing 
express  malice,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
is  nothing  that  will  reduce  the  killing  below 
the  grade  of  murder,  then  the  law  implies 
malice,  and  the  homicide  is  murder  in  the 
second  degree.  Dobbs  v.  State,  113  S.  W. 
923,  927,  54  Tex.  Or.  R.  550. 

MUBDEB  IN  SECOND  BEOBEE 

As    felonious    homicide,    see    Felonious 
Homicide. 

All  murder  not  of  the  first  degree  is 
"murder  of  the  second  degree."  Waters  v. 
State,  114  S.  W.  628,  632,  54  Tex.  Cr.  R.  322. 

Ry  Pen.  Ck>de,  §  352,  "murder  of  the  sec- 
ond degree"  is  all  murder  which  does  not 
amount  to  murder  of  the  first  degree.  State 
V.  HUboka,  78  Pac.  965,  966,  81  Mont  455,  3 
Ann.  Gas.  934. 

"Murder  of  the  second  degree"  is  all 
murder  not  murder  in  the  first  degree^  as 
defined  by  Rev.  St  1887,  {  6562.  State  v. 
Phinney,  89  Pac.  634,  13  Idaho,  307,  12  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  935,  12  Ann.  Cas.  1079. 

To  render  one  guilty  of  "murder  in  the 
second  degree,"  he  must  have  inflicted  an 
act  of  violence  on  decedent  which  produced 


'I  I 


MURDEB  IK  SECOND  DEGREE        600        MURDER  IN  SECOND  DEQREE 


•  i  i:  ■ 


t^ 


i 


Nil 


death,  with  the  intention  to  kin  decedent  or 
to  do  an  act  of  violence  from  which  ordina- 
rily, in  the  usual  course  of  events,  death  or 
great  bodily  harm  might  result  Fowler  V. 
State,  49  South.  788,  789,  790,  lei  Ala.  1. 

"The  law  requires  that,  before  a  homi- 
cide can  be  'murder  in  the  second  degree,'  it 
must  be  unlawfully  done,  and  upon  malice 
aforethought'*  Thomas  y.  State,  74  S.  W. 
36,  38,  45  Tex.  Cr.  B.  lU. 

Where  one  person  unlawfully  kills  an- 
other with  implied  malice,  the  crime  is  "mur- 
der in  the  second  degree."  State  ▼.  Short 
(DeL)  82  Aa  239,  241,  2  Boyce,  491. 

Killing  with  Implied  malice  constitutes 
"murder  in  the  second  degree";  that  is, 
where  the  malice  is  not  express,  as  in  murder 
in  the  first  degree,  but  is  an  inference  or  con- 
clusion of  law  from  facts  proved,  where  there 
is  no  deliberate  mind  and  formed  design  to 
take  life,  but  where  the  killing  is  done  with- 
out justification  or  excuse,  and  without  pro- 
vocation, or  without  sufficient  provocation  to 
reduce  the  offense  to  manslaughter.  State  v. 
Brooks  (Del.)  84  Atl.  225,  227;  Same  v.  Bre- 
lawski  (Del.)  84  Atl.  950,  952;  Same  v.  De 
Paolo  (Del.)  84  Atl.  213,  214. 

Where  the  killing  with  a  deadly  weapon 
was  established,  or  admitted,  and  the  plea 
was  self-defense,  the  two  presumptions  that 
the  killing  was  unlawful  and  that  It  was  done 
with  malice  arose,  and,  wh^e  accused  merely- 
rebutted  the  presumption  of  malice,  the  pre- 
sumption that  the  killing  was  unlawful  stood. 
Justifying  a  conviction  of  "manslaughter," 
which  is  an  unlawful  killing,  which  becomes 
"murder  in  the  second  degree"  when  it  has 
the  added  element  of  malice.  State  v.  Fowl- 
er, 66  S.  E.  567,  151  N.  C.  731. 

Murder  in  the  second  degree  is  the  un- 
lawful killing  of  a  human  being  with  malice, 
but  without  deliberation  or  premeditation. 
Miller  v.  State,  40  South.  47,  48,  145  Ala. 
677. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  the  un- 
lawful killing  of  a  human  being  with  malice 
aforethought,  but  without  deliberation,  pre- 
meditation, or  preconcerted  design  to  kill. 
State  V.  Bradley,  24  Ati.  1053,  1065,  64  Yt 
466. 

An  instruction  that  "murder  in  the  sec- 
ond degree"  is  the  killing  of  a  human  being, 
"willfully,  premedltatedly,  and  with  malice 
aforethought,"  la  correct  State  v.  Myers, 
121  S.  W.  181,  135,  221  Mo.  59a 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  the  kill- 
ing of  a  human  being  willfully,  premedltated- 
ly, and  with  malice  aforethought,  but  with- 
out deliberation.  State  v.  West,  100  S.  W. 
478,  481,  202  Mo.  12a 

A  killing  with  malice  aforethought,  but 
without  express  malice  is  "murder  in  the  sec- 
ond degree."  McMeans  v.  State,  114  S.  W. 
837,  839,  56  Tex.  Cr.  B.  69. 


"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  fs  consti- 
tuted by  the  absence  of  express  malice  upon 
one  side  and  extenuating  drcumstanoes  or 
self-defense  or  adequate  cause  upon  the  other. 
Wheeler  v.  State,  121  S.  W.  166,  167,  56  Tex. 
Cr.  B.  647. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  consists 
design  to  take  life,  and  without  provocation 
of  the  killing  of  another  without  a  foriued 
to  reduce  the  offense  to  manslaughter,  and 
under  the  influence  of  a  wicked  or  depraved 
heart,  or  with  cruel  and  wicked  indifference 
to  human  life.  State  v.  Cephus  (DeL)  67  Aa 
150,  151,  6  PennewiU,  160. 

Murder  in  the  second  degree  is  a  killing 
with  implied  malice ;  that  is,  without  design 
or  premeditation,  but  under  the  influence  of 
a  depraved  heart  and  with  a  cruel  and  wick- 
ed indifference  to  human  life.  State  v.  Uzzo 
(DeL)  65  Atl.  775-777,  6  Pennewill,  212. 

Murder  of  the  second  degree  is  where 
there  is  no  sedate,  deliberate  mind  and  form- 
ed design  to  take  life,  but  when  the  drcnm* 
stances  show  that  the  homicide  waa  commit- 
ted under  the  influence  of  a  wicked  and  de- 
praved heart,  and  with  a  cruel  and  reckless 
indifference  to  human  life.  State  v.  Harmon 
(Del.)  60  Atl.  86e-«68,  4  PennewiU,  580. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  the  kill- 
ing of  a  human  being  without  a  sedate,  delib- 
erate purpose  and  formed  design  to  take  life, 
but  one  which  is  committed  suddenly,  with- 
out Justification  or  excuse,  and  without  prov- 
ocation sufficient  to  reduce  the  crime  to 
manslaughter.  State  v.  Mills  (Del.)  69  AtL 
841,  842,  6  PennewiU,  497. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  where 
the  kiUing  is  done  with  impUed  maUce ;  that 
is,  without  Justification  or  excuse  or  with- 
out provocation  or  sufficient  provocation  to 
reduce  it  to  manslaughter.  State  v.  Tilgh- 
man  (DeL)  63  AtL  772,  773. 

"Murder  of  the  second  degree"  ia  where 
there  is  no  deliberate  mind  and  formed  design 
to  take  Ufe,  but  where  the  kUling  is  maUcious, 
and  without  Justification  or  excuse,  without 
provocation,  or  without  sufficient  provocation 
to  reduce  the  homicide  to  manslaughter. 
State  V.  Adams  (DeL)  65  Att.  510,  511,  6  Pen- 
newiU, 178. 

"Murder  of  the  second  degree"  Is  conmiit- 
ted  when  the  kUling  is  done  with  implied 
malice,  where  there  is  no  deUberate  mind  or 
formed  design  to  take  Ufe  or  to  perpetrate  a 
crime  punishable  with  death,  but  where  the 
kilUng  is  without  Justification  or  excuse,  and 
without  sufficient  provocation  to  reduce  the 
offense  to  manslaughter.  State  v.  Miele 
(DeL)  74  AU.  8,  9,  1  Boyce,  33;  Same  v. 
Brown  (DeL)  61  Ati.  1077,  10^8,  5  PennewiU, 
339;  Same  v.  Johns  (DeL)  65  Aa  763,  764, 
6  PennewiU,  174. 

"Murder  of  the  second  degree"  occurs 
where  the  killing  is  done  with  implied  mal- 
ice;   that  la,  where  thend  is  no  deUberate 


MURDER  IN  SECOND  DEGREE       SOI        MURDER  IN  SEOOm)  DEGREE 


1(1  or  formed  design,  to  take  life,  but  where 
killing  was  done  without  Jnstlflcation  or 
nse,  or  without  proTOcation  to  reduce  the 
nse  to  manslaughter.  State  v.  Reese 
1.)  79  Ati.  217,  220,  2  Boyce,  434 ;  Same  ▼. 
Fell  (Del.)  61  AU.  966,  971,  5*Pennewill,  24. 

"Murder  of  the  second  degree"  is  the  kiU- 
wlth  implied  malice,  inferred  from  the 

is  proved,  where  there  is  no  deliberate 

id  or  formed  design  to  take  life,  but  where 
killing  is  done  without  Justification  or  ex- 

e,  and  without  provocation  sufficient  to  re- 

e  the  offense  to  manslaughter.    State  t. 

jso  (Del.)  77  Atl.  743,  746,  1  Boyce,  588; 

ue  V.  Roberts  (Del.)  78  Atl.  305,  810,  2 

ce,  140. 

"Murder  of  the  second  degree'*  is  when 

killing  is  done  with  implied  malice,  not 
h  a  deliberate  or  formed  design,  but  with- 

Justification  or  excuse,  and  without  prov- 
tion,  or  sufficient  provocation  to  reduce 

offense  to  manslaughter.  State  v.  Prim- 
s  (Del.)  77  Ati.  717,  719,  2  Boyce,  164. 

''Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  where 
re  is  no  such  deliberate  mind  and  formed 
ign  to  take  life,  but  where,  nevertheless, 
killing  is  malicious  and  without  Justiflca- 

I  or  excuse,  without  any  provocation,  or 
bout  sufficient  provocation  to  reduce  the 
nicide  to  the  grade  of  manslaughter, 
te  V.  Emory  (DeL)  58  Aa  1036,  1038,  5 
inewill,  12a 

Where  there  is  no  deliberate  mind  or 
med  design  to  take  life,  or  to  perpetrate  a 
»ital  crime,  but  where  the  killing  is  done 
bout  Justification  or  excuse,  and  without 
vocation,  or  sufficient  provocation  to  re- 
»  the  offense  to  manslaughter,  it  is  "mur- 

of  the  second  degree."  State  v.  Borrelli 
L)  76  Aa  605,  606,  1  Boyce,  349. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  where 
killing  was  done  with  implied  malice; 
ere  there  was  no  deliberate  mind  or  form- 
lesign  to  take  life  or  to  perpetrate  a  crime 
lishable  with  death;  but  where  the  killing. 
B  done  without  Justification  or  excuse  and 
bout  provocation,  or  without  sufficient 
ivocation  to  reduce  the  offense  to  man- 
oghter.  State  v.  Brown  (Del.)  61  Ati. 
7, 1078,  5  Pennewill,  339. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  the  kiU- 
of  a  human  being  without  a  deliberately 
med  design  to  take  life,  or  to  perpetrate 
attempt  to  perpetrate  a  crime  punishable 
h  death,  but  without  Justification,  excuse, 
sufficient  provocation  to  reduce  the  homi- 
e  to  manslaughter.  State  v.  Collins  (Del.) 
Atl.  224.  226,  5  Pennewill,  263;    Same  v. 

II  (Del.)  62  AtL  147, 148,  5  Pennewill,  192. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  proved 
ere  it  is  satisfactorily  shown  that  the 
ling  was  done  with  a  sedate,  deliberate 
rpose  and  formed  design  to  take  life,  or  in 
•petratlng  or  attempting  to  perpetrate  any 
me  punishable  with  death,  but  is  usually 


shown  to  have  been  done  suddenly,  without 
Justification  or  excuse,  and  without  provoca- 
tion sufficient  to  reduce  the  homicide  to  man- 
slaughter or  in  the  committing  or  attempting 
to  commit  a  noncapital  felony  or  an  act 
of  violence  from  which  malloe  is  presumed. 
State  V.  Wilson  (DeL)  62  AtL  227,  230,  5 
Pennewill,  77. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree^'  Is  con- 
stituted by  the  absence  of  express  malice  on 
one  side  and  extenuating  circumstances  or 
self-defense  or  adequate  cause  on  the  other; 
and  where  the  one  who  killed  another  laid 
in  wait  for  him  and  shot  him,  adequate  cause 
and  self-defense  were  not  in  the  case,  and  the 
killing  could  not  be  lower  than  murder  in 
the  second  degree.  Wheeler  y.  State,  121  S. 
W.  166,  167,  56  Tex.  Cr.  R.  547. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  defined 
in  Comp.  Laws  1897,  {1064,  as  "every  mur- 
der which  shall  be  perpetrated  without  a  de- 
sign to  effect  the  death,  by  a  person  while 
engaged  in  the  oommission  of  a  misdemeanor, 
or  which  shall  be  perpetrated  in  the  heat  of 
passion  without  design  to  effect  death,  but 
in  a  cruel  and  unusual  manner  or  by  means 
of  a  dangerous  weapon,  unless  it  is  commit- 
ted under  such  circumstances  as  constitute 
excusable  homicide  or  which  shall  be  perpe- 
trated Unnecessarily  either  while  resisting 
an  attempt  by  the  person  killed  to  commit 
any  offense  against  person  or  property  or 
after  such  attempt  shall  have  failed."  Ter- 
ritory V.  Hendricks,  84  Pac.  528,  524,  13  N. 
M.  300. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is :  First, 
all  murder  which  shall  be  perpetrated  with- 
out a  design  to  effect  death  by  a  person  while 
engaged  in  the  commission  of  a  misdemean- 
or; or,  second,  all  murder  whidi  shall  be 
perpetrated  in  the  heat  of  passion  without 
design  to  effect  death,  but  In  a  cruel  and  un- 
usual manner,  or  by  means  of  a  dangerous 
weapon,  unless  it  is  committed  under  such 
circumstances  as  constitute  excusable  or  Jus- 
tifiable homicide;  or,  third,  all  murder 
which  shall  be  perpetrated  unnecessarily,  ei- 
ther while  resisting  an  attempt  by  the  person 
killed  to  commit  an  offense  against  the  per- 
son, or  property,  or  after  such  attempt  shall 
have  failed.  Ck)mp.  I^iws  1897,  i  1064.  An 
instruction  that  premeditation  and  malice 
aforethought  are  not  elements  of  the  crime 
of  murder  in  the  second  degree,  and  defining 
it  as  the  kiling  of  a  human  being  by  the  use 
of  a  dangerous  weapon  without  premedita- 
tion and  without  malice  aforethought,  is  er- 
roneous. Territory  v.  Gutierez,  79  Pac.  716, 
718,  13  N.  M.  138. 

A  killing  in  a  combat  which  engenders 
hot  blood  is  not  "murder  in  the  second  de- 
gree," unless  the  elements  of  purpose  and 
malice  concur  in  the  act  Osbum  v.  State, 
78  N.  E.  601,  604,  164  Ind.  262. 

To  constitute  "murder  in  the  second  de- 
gree" in  Texas,  the  statute  only  requires  that 


MUBDER  IN  SECOND  DEGREE        502       MURDER  IN  SECOND  DEGREB 


the  klllng  be  done  in  a  passion  aroused  with- 
out adequate  cause.  Redman  y.  State,  108 
S.  W.  365,  367,  52  Tex.  Or.  R.  591. 

If  a  design  to  kill  is  formed  in  a  mind 
excited  by  passion,  or  disturbed  by  any  in- 
adequate cause,  and  cooling  time  has  not 
elapsed  before  the  execution  of  the  design, 
the  homicide  is  not  greater  than  "murder  in 
the  second  degree."  Manning  y.  ^tate,  85 
S.  W.  1149,  48  Tex.  Or.  R.  56. 

**Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  the 
wrongful  killing  of  a  human  being  with  mal« 
ice  aforethought,  but  without  deliberation. 
It  is  where  the  intent  to  kill  is  In  a  heat  of 
passion,  executed  the  instant  it  is  conceiyed, 
or  before  there  has  been  time  for  the  passion 
to  subside.  State  y.  Robertson,  77  S.  W.  528, 
530,  178  Mo.  496. 

One  who  intentionally  and  premeditated- 
ly  kills  another  with  a  deadly  weapon,  but 
while  smarting  under  the  insult  and  passion 
aroused  by  yile  epithets  spoken  of  him  in  his 
presence  and  hearing  by  deceased,  is  guilty 
of  ••murder  in  the  second  degree."  State  y. 
WUliams.  84  S.  W.  924,  927,  186  Mo.  128  (cit^ 
ing  State  y.  Wieners,  66  Mo.  13;  State  y. 
EUis,  74  Mo.  loc.  cit  218,  219;  State  y.  Rob- 
inson, 73  Mo.  306;  State  y.  McKenzie,  76 
S.  W.  1015,  177  Mo.  699). 

.  To  reduce  a  murder  from  the  first  to 
the  second  degree,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  homicide  should  occur  in  a  sudden  trans- 
port of  passion.  A  passion  is  not  required 
to  be  sudden,  nor  is  it  necessary  that  there 
be  a  transport  of  passion,  and  if  the  mind  of 
the  slayer  is  not  cool  and  deliberate  when 
the  intent  is  formed,  but  is  laboring  under 
any  excitement  or  passion,  this  will  reduce 
the  homicide  to  the  second  degree.  It  is  an 
undue  limitation  and  restriction,  calculated 
to  cause  a  conyiction  of  "murder  in  the  first 
degree,"  for  a  charge  on  "murder  in  the  sec- 
ond degree"  to  require  the  jury  to  belieye 
that  accused  shot  decedent  in  a  sudden  trans- 
port of  passion.  Kannmacher  y.  State,  101 
S.  W.  238,  242,  51  Tex.  Or.  R.  lia 

Though  deceased  brought  on  the  difll- 
cnlty  by  calling  defendant  names,  and  struck 
the  first  blow,  yet,  it  having  been  With  his 
hands,  and  he  not  haying  offered  to  strike 
him  with  anything  else,  and  defendant  hay- 
ing from  the  first  cut  and  slashed  deceased 
with  his  knife,  and  continued  it  after  de- 
ceased had  fallen,  mortally  wounded,  a  con- 
viction of  "murder,  in  the  second  degree"  is 
justified.  Hatchell  v.  State,  84  S.  W.  234, 
237,  47  Tex.  Or.  R.  380. 

Mere  words  or  epithets,  however  oppro- 
brious or  insulting,  cannot  justify  the  killing 
of  the  person  who  uses  them,  but  his  killing 
by  one  while  in  a  violent  passion  aroused  by 
such  language,  though  not  deliberate,  is 
"murder  in  the  second  degree,"  if  done  will- 
fully, premeditatedly,  and  of  malice  afore- 
thought State  y.  Ballance,  106  &  W.  60, 
64,  207  Mo.  607. 


"If  a  person  to  whom  opprobrious  ei 
thets  or  insulting  gestures  are  applied 
thereby  aroused  to  a  sudden  heat  of  passio 
and,  before  such  passion  has  had  time  i 
cool,  with  a  deadly  weapon  kills  the  perse 
who  applies  such  opprobrious  epithets  < 
gestures  to  him,  then  such  killing  is  doi 
without  deliberation,  and  a  homicide  con 
mitted  under  such  circumstances  is  "murd^ 
in  the  second  degree.'"  State  y.  Brown,  1 
8.  W.  1111,  1112,  181  Mo.  192. 

Defendant,  with  another,  went  into 
saloon  of  decedent,  and  there  proposed  i 
throw  dice  for  the  drinks,  and  invited  dee 
dent  to  throw  and  also  to  drink,  both  ( 
which  decedent  refused  to  do,  using  at  tl 
time  insulting  language  toward  defendan 
Thereupon,  after  drinking,  defendant,  wit 
his  companion,  left  the  saloon.  While  wall 
ing  away  defendant  suggested  to  his  compai 
ion  that  decedent  had  it  in  for  him  (compai 
ion)  as  the  reason  why  he  had  insulted  d< 
fendant,  to  which  his  companion  replied  thu 
decedent  had  nothing  against  him,  but  tlu 
he  (defendant)  was  the  man  decedent  wa 
after.  Defendant's  oompanion  then  left  hln 
and  about  15  minutes  later  defendant  n 
turned  to  decedent's  place  with  a  pistol,  an 
In  a  renewal  of  the  difficulty  shot  decedeni 
Held  that,  if  defendant's  intent  to  kfU  wa 
formed  at  the  time  of  the  first  meeting,  o 
after  the  conversation  with  his  companioi 
and  he  then  went  for  a  pistol,  and  his  mini 
was  Infiamed  by  the  insulting  language  el 
ther  at  the  time  it  was  spoken  or  in  the  sut 
sequent  conversation  with  his  companion,  aix 
cooling  time  had  not  elapsed  before  he  n 
turned  and  shot  decedent,  he  was  guilty  o 
no  greater  offense  than  "murder  in  the  sec 
ond  degree."  Rice  v.  State,  103  S.  W.  115( 
1168,  51  Tex.  CJr.  R.  255. 

Our  statute  declares  murders  committe 
by  lying  in  wait,  by  poison,  and  in  attemp 
to  perpetrate  certain  felonies,  and  all  othe 
willful,  deliberate,  and  {Premeditated  mui 
ders,  to  be  of  the  first  degree,  and  all  othe 
kinds  of  murder  at  common  law,  not  here! 
declared  to  be  manslaughter  or  justifiable  o 
excusable  homicide,  to  be  "murder  in  the  sec 
ond  degree."  Those  murders  committed  in  i 
heat  of  passion  engendered,  not  by  what  wa 
legal  provocation  at  common  law  to  reduce  i 
homicide  from  murder  to  manslaughter,  bD 
by  opprobrious  epithets  or  other  insults,  snffl 
dent  to  arouse  the  same  heat  of  passion  whid 
would  be  caused  by  a  technical,  legal  pro? 
ocation,  are  of  second  degree.  An  instmc 
tion  that,  if  deceased  used  words  toward 
defendant  whidi  were  a  reasonable  provoca 
tion  for  an  assault  by  defendant  on  deceased 
defendant  is  only  guilty  of  manslaughter  h 
the  fourth  degree  was  properly  refused,  sine 
such  provocation  by  mere  words  would  onl; 
reduce  the  grade  of  the  offense  to  murder  iJ 
the  second  degree,  where  the  party  provoker 
used  a  deadly  weapon  with  which  he  killer 
his  opponent     State  y.  Gartrell,  71  S.  W 


i 


MURDER  m  SECOND  DEORBB       603        MUKDKt  IN  SECOND  DEGRBB 


15,  1053, 171  Mo.  489  (quoting  and  adoptliig 
ite  v.  Kotovsky,  74  Mo.  247). 

The  killing  of  a  human  being  with  mal- 
aforethought,  without  premeditation  or 
iberation,  is,  generally  i9>eaking,  "murder 
the  second  degree."  Hence  an  instruction 
it  the  intoxication  of  accused  should  be 
Lsidered  in  determining  the  degree  of 
murder  was  improperly  refused.  State  v. 
lliams,  07  N.  W..902,  006, 122  Iowa,  115. 

"Murder  In  the  second  degree**  la  the 
Dugful  killing  of  a  human  being  with  mal- 

aforethoui^t,  but  without  deliberation, 
lere  the  court,  on  a  trial  for  murder,  had 
ined  "premeditatedly"  as  "thought  of  be- 
ehand,"  and  "malice  aforethought"  as 
aning  that  the  killing  was  done  with  mal- 
and  premeditation,  an  instruction  that,  if 
e  defendant  did  unlawfully,  premeditated- 
and  of  his  malice  aforethought,  but  with- 
;  deliberation,  as  defined  in  these  instruct 
OS,  kill  the  deceased,"  etc.,  to  find  him 
Ity  of  "murder  in  the  second  degree,"  was 
;  objectionable  in  that  it  omitted  to  tell  the 
y  that,  to  constitute  that  degree  of  mur- 
',  the  homicide  must  be  committed  "will- 
ly-  or  "intentionally."  State  ▼.  Marsh,  71 
W.  1003,  1004,  171  Mo.  523. 

Any  error  in  defining  "murder  in  the  seo- 
1  di^ree**  as  the  felonious  killing  of  a 
[nan  being  could  not  have  misled  the  jury, 
ere  the  court  subsequently  defined  it  as  the 
Dnious  killing  of  a  human  being  by  one  of 
ind  memory  and  discretion  with  malice 
rethought,  whidi  might  be  either  express 
implied,  and  such  charge  was  afterwards 
leated.  State  v.  Tweed,  68  S.  B.  189,  152 
G.843. 

Where,  in  a  prosecution  for  murder,  the 
LTt  properly  presented  the  issue  of  self-de- 
ise,  and  correctly  defined  murder  in  the 
ond  degree,  and  then  charged  the  Jury  to 
1  defendant  guilty  if  he  shot  deceased  with 
run,  which  was  a  deadly  weapon,  and  that 
±.  shooting  was  not  under  the  immediate 
luence  of  sudden  passion,  produced  by  an 
equate  cause,  and  was  not  in  defense  of 
Qself  against  an  unlawful  attack,  etc.,  the 
iige  is  not  erroneous,  as  nojpirhere  charg- 
:  that  the  killing  must  be  unlawful  or  that 
±,  killing  was  done  on  malice,  nince,  to  Jus- 
7  a  conviction  of  murder  in  the  second 
^ee,  facts  must  be  found  which  would 
ke  the  killing  unlawful  under  drcumstanc- 
which  would  imply  malice.  Pratt  ▼.  State, 
r  S.  W.  827,  829,  59  Tex.  Cr.  R.  167. 

An  instruction,  on  a  trial  for  murder  al- 
ed  to  have  been  committed  in  the  perpetra- 
Q  of  burglary  by  setting  fire  to  the  house 
rglarized  and  occupied  by  decedent,  that  if 
cedent  occupied  the  house,  and  if  accused 
>ke  and  entered  the  same  with  the  intent  to 
ladulently  take  corporeal  personal  proper- 
of  value  then  and  there  in  the  house,  and 
thout  the  consent  of  decedent,  and  if  ac^ 


cused,  acting  with  implied  malice  af6re- 
thoui^t,  set  fire  to  the  house,  and  by  reason 
thereof  decedent  was  burned  and  died  there- 
from, etc.,  accused  was  guilty  of  "murder 
in  the  second  degree,"  etc,  sufficiently  defined 
arson  and  burglary.  Jones  v.  State,  110  S. 
W.  741,  742,  63  Tex.  Or.  R.  131,  126  Am.  St 
R^.  776. 

In  a  prosecution  for  homicide,  the  court 
charged  that,  if  a  person  by  his  own  wrong- 
ful act  brings  about  the  necessity  of  taking 
the  life  of  another  to  prevent  being  killed 
himself,  he  cannot  claim  that  the  killing  is 
in  self-defense,  but  the  killing  will  be  imputed 
to  malice;  that  a  person  provoking  a  difficul- 
ty with  another  with  the  willful  intention  of 
killing  the  latter  or  of  doing  him  serious  bod- 
ily harm  is  guilty  of  murder,  though  he  may 
have  done  the  killing  suddenly  and  without 
deliberation  to  save  his  own  life,  and  if  the 
Jury  believed  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
defendant  by  his  acts  or  language,  or  both, 
provoked  the  difficulty  with  deceased,  and 
cause  deceased  to  attadc  defendant  with  a 
gun,  and  defendant,  pursuant  to  his  original, 
unlawful  and  willful  Intention  to  kill  deceas- 
ed, shot  and  killed  him  to  save  his  own  life, 
the  homldde  would  be  "murder  in  the  second 
degree."  Held  a  correct  charge  on  the  issue 
of  provoking  a  difficulty.  Woodard  v.  State, 
Ul  S.  W.  941,  943,  54  Tex.  Cr.  R.  86. 

Where  accused  Intentionally  shot  deco- 
dent  with  a  pistol  and  killed  him,  and  the  state 
failed  to  show  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
the  killing  was  done  with  deliberation  and 
premeditation,  accused  was  guilty  of  "murder 
in  the  second  degree."  State  v.  Jones,  59  S. 
E.  353,  354,  145  N.  a  466. 

Where  accused  admitted  that  he  killed 
decedent  while  holding  the  pistol  so  close 
to  her  body  as  to  scorch  her  clothing,  and  he 
oflTered  no  excuse  therefor  except  decedent's 
refusal  to  surrender  a  child  of  the  parties, 
and  that  he  fired  to  make  her  release  the 
child,  he  was  at  least  guilty  of  "murder  in 
the  second  degree."  State  v.  Thompson,  69 
S.  B.  254,  255,  153  N.  C.  6ia 

Defendant  and  decedent,  brothers,  had  an 
altercation,  in  which  a  knife  was  used,  and 
defendant  was  ordered  from  their  mutual 
home,  and  he  returned  an  hour  later,  secured 
his  clothing  and  a  gun,  and  in  a  renewal  of 
the  difficulty  klUed  decedent.  Held,  that  if 
the  intention  to  kill  was  formed  through 
passion,  without  adequate  cause^  and  a  suffi- 
cient time  had  not  elapsed  for  his  mind  to 
cool  to  the  extent  of  contemplating  the  con- 
sequences of  his  act,  he  was  guilty  of  no 
greater  offense  than  "murder  in  the  second 
degree."  Dixon  v.  State,  103  S.  W.  399,  401, 
51  Tex.  Cr.  R.  555. 

Accused  admitted  the  shooting  of  dece- 
dent twice  with  a  rifle,  inflicting  wounds  ei- 
ther of  which  would  produce  death,  and  re- 
lied on  self-defense.    The  killing  took  place 


MURDBR  IN  BEOOSD  DEGREE       504        MXTRDER  IK  SECOND  DEGREE 


in  the  woods  while  the  parties  were  hunting. 
Both  had  whisky  with  them,  and  accused  ad- 
mitted that  he  was  a  little  drunk  at  the  time 
of  the  shooting.  There  was  no  motive  for 
the  killing.  The  evidence  showed  a  quarrel 
between  them  after  a  deer  had  been  killed. 
Held  to  justify  a  finding  of  "murder  in  the 
second  degree"  within  St  1808,  I  4339,  defin- 
ing murder  in  the  second  degree,  as  a  killing 
perpetrated  by  any  act  imminently  dangerous 
to  others  and  evincing  a  depraved  mind, 
though  without  any  premeditated  design  to 
effect  the  death,  instead  of  finding  him  guilty 
of  murder  in  the  first  degree.  Where  the 
case  was  one  where  the  jury  might  conclude 
from  the  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
that  murder  either  in  the  first  or  second 
degree  had  been  committed,  but,  not  being 
wholly  convinced  that  the  greater  offense 
had  been  perpetrated,  the  jury  properly  gave 
accused  the  benefit  of  the  doubt,  and  found 
him  guilty  of  murder  in  the  second  degree. 
LUlystrom  v.  State,  132  N.  W.  132,  133,  146 
Wis.  625. 

Pen«  Code  1886,  art  710,  provides  that 
every  person  who  shall  unlawfully  kill  any 
person  with  malice  aforethought,  either  ex- 
press or  implied,  shall  be  guilty  of  murder, 
and  that  all  murder  committed  in  the  per- 
petration of  robbery  Is  murder  in  the  first 
degree,  and  that  all  murder  not  of  the  first 
degree  is  murder  of  the  second  degree. 
White's  Ann.  Code  Or.  Proc  art  664,  pro- 
vides that  if  the  defendant  pleads  guilty, 
he  shall  be  admonished  of  the  consequences 
of  such  plea,  and  no  such  plea  shall  be  re- 
ceived unless  it  appears  that  he  is  sane  and 
is  uninfluenced  by  fear  or  hope  of  pardon. 
Article  655  provides  that  where  a  defendant 
in  a  case  of  felony  persists  in  pleading  guilty, 
if  the  punishment  of  the  offense  is  not  abso- 
lutely fixed  by  law,  a  jury  shall  be  impanel- 
ed to  assess  the  punishment  on  evidence  sub- 
mitted to  enable  them  to  decide  thereon. 
Pen.  Code  1895,  art  712,  provides  that  if  a 
person  pleads  guilty  to  murder,  a  jury  shall 
be  summoned  to  find  of  what  degree  of  mur- 
der he  is  guilty.  Held,  that  when  an  accus- 
ed pleaded  guilty  of  murder,  and  his  plea 
was  accepted  by  the  court  after  examination, 
and  evidence  was  introduced  before  a  jury 
which  conclusively  showed  that  the  murder 
was  committed  in  the  perpetration  of  rob- 
bery, the  court  was  not  compelled  to  submit 
the  issue  of  second  degree  murder,  under  ar- 
ticle 712.  Neither  was  the  court  in  error  in 
not  defining  for  the  jury  murder  in  the  first 
degree.  Miller  v.  State,  126  S.  W.  864,  865, 
58  Tex.  Cr.  R.  600. 

Intent 

Where  there  was  a  fixed  purpose  to  do 
bodily  harm,  without  killing,  and  death  re- 
sulted, it  was  "murder  of  the  second  degree." 
State  ▼•  Taylor,  60  S.  £.  247,  262,  67  W.  Va. 
228. 


Malice  is  an  essential  element  of  "murdei 
in  the  second  degree."  State  t.  Bcodo  (DeUJ 
79  AtL  217,  220,  2  Boyce,  434. 

"Murder  in  the  second  degree"  is  a  kill 
ing  done  with  Implied  malice.  State  v.  Wig 
gins  (Del.)  78  Atl.  632,  635,  7  PennewlU.  127 
Same  v.  BorrelU  (Del.)  76  Atl.  605,  606,  ] 
Boyce,  349;  Same  v.  Underhill  (DeL)  69  Atl 
880,  882,  6  Pennewlll,  491. 

If  the  killing  is  shown  to  be  unlawful 
without  any  other  proof,  malice  is  implied,  » 
as  to  make  the  slayer  guilty  of  second  de 
gree  murder.  Wilson  v.  State^  129  S.  W 
613,  614,  60  Tex.  Or.  R.  1. 

"Murder  of  the  second  degree"  Is  com 
mitted  where  the  killing  Is  with  malice  afore 
thought  implied  by  law,  arising  as  an  infer 
ence  or  conclusion  of  law  from  the  fact 
found.  State  v.  Blackburn  (Del.)  76  AtL  536 
639,  7  PennewlU,  479. 

Where  a  killing  is  committed  under  th< 
influence  of  a  depraved  heart  or  with  crue 
indifference  to  human  life,  the  law  implle 
malice,  and  makes  the  offense  "murder  of  th^ 
second  degree" ;  the  killing  neither  being  de 
liberate  nor  in  the  heat  of  passion.  State  v 
Primrose  (Del.)  77  Atl.  717.  719,  2  Boyce.  164 

A  charge  that  when  an  unlawful  killinj 
is  established,  and  the  facts  neither  show  ex 
press  malice  nor  tend  to  mitigate,  excuse,  oi 
justify  the  act,  the  law  implies  malice,  &m 
the  killing  constitutes  "murder  in  the  secoD< 
degree,"  is  a  correct  definition  of  murder  ii 
the  second  degree.  Burns  v.  State  (Tex.)  14^ 
S.  W.  356,  364. 

"The  crime  of  'murder  in  the  second  de 
gree'  necessarily  Involves  an  act  done  witi 
malice  aforethought  but  that  term,  used  ii 
defining  the  crime,  is  technical  rather  thai 
descriptive.  It  does  not  necessarily  requln 
an  intent  to  murder.  Malice  aforethough 
may  be  Implied  where  there  is  no  intent  t 
kill  but  an  intent  to  commit  a  felony,  froo 
which  death  results,  although  that  result  L 
unintended.  That  death  resulting  from  i 
criminal  attempt  to  commit  an  abortion  con 
stltutes  murder  in  the  second  degree  is  1] 
this  state  well  settled."  State  ▼.  Gibbons 
120  N.  W.  474,  475,  142  Iowa,  96. 

An  instruction  with  reference  to  "mui 
der  in  the  second  degree"  that  malice  was  no 
an  essential  ingredient  of  that  offense,  th< 
distinguishing  feature  being  that  in  murde 
in  the  first  degree  malice  must  be  proved  be 
yond  a  reasonable  doubt,  while  in  murder  ii 
the  "second"  degree  malice  will  be  impliei 
from  an  unlawful  killing,  where  the  facts  d( 
not  reduce  it  to  manslaughter,  that  implies 
malice  is  that  which  the  law  infers  from  cei 
tain  acts,  however  suddenly  done,  as  whei 
the  fact  of  an  unlawful  killing  is  established 
and  there  are  no  facts  which  establish  tbi 
existence  of  express  malice,  and  none  whicl 


MURDER  IN  SECOND  DEQREB       605 


MUSICAL  INSTRUMENT 


id  to  reduce  the  kllUng  to  manslaufrhter  or 
excuse  it,  tben  the  law  Implies  malice,  cor- 
^y  defined  second  degree  murder.  Ed- 
irds  y.  State,  135  S.  W.  540,  546,  61  Tex.  Cr. 
307. 

A  charge  that  implied  malice  is  what  the 
w  infers  from  or  imputes  to  certain  acts, 
wever  suddenly  done,  as  when  the  fact  of 

unlawful  killing  is  established,  and  the 
ns  do  not  establish  express  malice  beyond 
reasonable  doubt,  nor  tend  to  mitigate,  ex- 
se,  or  justify  the  act,  then  the  law  implies 
ilice  and  the  murder  is  in  the  second  de- 
ee,  was  not  upon  the  weight  of  the  evi- 
Dce,  but  was  a  general  definition  in  ef- 
!t  that  where  an  unlawful  killing  is  shown, 
which  accused  is  guilty,  and  the  evidence 
es  not  show  express  malice  or  facts  Justi- 
LDg  or  excusing  the  homicide,  or  reducing 
to  maDslaughter,  such  killing,  being  unlaw- 
I,  is  **murder  in  the  second  degree,"  stating 
B  distinguishing  features  between  murder 
the  first  degree,  murder  in  the  second  de- 
&e,  and  manslaughter.  Carson  v.  State,  123 
W.  590,  502,  57  Tex.  Cr.  R.  394, 136  Am.  St. 
!p.  98L 

Murdev  Im  flrst  deffrea  dlstia««isk«d 

See  Murder  in  First  Degree. 

ITBDEK  IN  THIRD  DEGREE 

'^Murder  in  the  third  degree,"  as  defined 
Comp.  Laws  1897,  |  1065,  is  "every  kUling 
a  human  being  by  the  act,  procurement,  or 
Ipable  negligence  of  another,  which  under 
e  provision  of  this  act  is  not  murder  in  the 
St  or  second  degrees  and  which  is  not  ex- 
sable  or  justifiable  homicide,  as  now  de- 
led  by  law."  Territory  v.  Hendricks,  84 
LC.  523.  524,  13  N.  M.  300. 

USEUM  OF  ART 

As  educational  corporation,  aae  Bdnca- 
tional  Corporation. 

USHROOMS 

TruflEles  in  tins  are  dutiable  as  "mush- 
oms  in  tins,"  by  similitude,  under  Tariff 
:t  July  24,  1897,  c.  11, 1 1,  Schedule  G,  par. 
1,  30  Stat  170.  Von  Bremen,  MacMonnies 
Co.  V.  United  States,  168  Fed.  889,  94  a 
A  801. 

The  provision  in  paragraph  241,  Sched- 
e  Q,  i  1,  c  11,  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  30 
at  170,  for  "mushrooms  prepared  or  pre- 
rved,"  does  not  include  mushrooms  dried 
erely  by  evaporation,  which  are  dutiable 
ider  paragraph  257  of  said  act,  30  Stat  171, 
\  '^vegetables  in  their  natural  state."  Kraut 
United  States,  139  Fed.  94. 

Mushrooms  dried  in  order  to  preserve 
tern  and  placed  In  hermetically  sealed  tins 
Dlding  from  30  to  46  pounds,  are  within  the 
roTision  in  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11, 
1,  Sdiednle  G,  par.  241,  30  SUt  170,  relat- 


ing to  'Mushrooms  prepared  or  preserved,  in 
tins,  jars,  bottlies  or  similar  packages,"  rather 
than  paragraph  257,  80  Stat  171,  relating  to 
'^vegetables  in  their  natural  state."  Choy 
Chong  Woh  ft  Co.  v.  United  States,  158  Fed. 
879,  82  a  C.  A.  608. 

MUSIC 

MUSIO  TEACHER 

As  wage-earner,  see  Wage-Earner. 

MU8I0AX. 

"A  well-recognlsEed  definition  of  •musicaV 
is  of  or  pertaining  to  music  or  the  perform- 
ance of  music."  ^olian  Co.  v.  Hallett  &  Da- 
vis Piano  Co.,  184  Fed.  872,  880. 

MU8I0AX.  OOMPOSmOH 

'*A  innsical  composition'  is  a  rational 
collocation  of  sounds  apart  from  concepts, 
reduced  to  a  tangible  expression  from  which 
the  collocation  can  be  reproduced  either  with 
or  without  continuous  human  intervention." 
White-Smith  Music  Pub.  Co.  v.  Apollo  Co., 
28  Sup.  Ct  319,  324,  209  U.  S.  1,  52  L.  Ed. 
655,  14  Ann.  Cas.  628. 

In  Rev.  St  |  4952,  the  author  or  propri 
etor  of  any  "musical  composition,"  on  com- 
pliance with  the  provisions  of  the  copyright 
act,  being  given  the  exclusive  liberty  of  copy- 
ing and  vending  the  same,  the  words  "musi- 
cal composition"  undoubtedly  relate  to  the 
intellectual  conception  of  the  composer.  The 
act  confers  protection  to  only  the  material 
sembhince  in  which  the  musical  composition 
finds  expression.  A  perforated  record  or 
sheet  designed  to  be  played  with  mechanism, 
is  not  to  be  protected.  White-Smith  Music 
Pub.  Co.  T.  Apollo  Co.,  139  Fed.  427,  480. 

MU8I0AX.  IN STRUMEHT 

Certain  metallophones  and  mouth  organs 
or  harmonicas,  having  at  least  one  full  oc- 
tave, and  capable  of  playing  a  musical  air, 
but  not  so  finished  as  to  musical  qualities 
that  they  would  be  used  by  musicians,  being 
fitted  rather  for  the  amusement  of  children, 
are  dutiable  as  ••toys,"  under  paragraph  418, 
Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11  (30  Stat  191), 
and  not  as  "musical  instruments,"  under 
paragraph  453  of  said  act  (30  Stat  193). 
Borgfeldt  v.  United  States,  124  Fed.  473,  474. 

Rev.  St  1899,  %  3018,  forbids  a  dramshop 
keeper  to  keep,  exhibt,  or  use,  or  suffer  to  be 
kept,  exhibited,  or  used  in  his  dramshop,  a 
piano,  organ,  or  other  musicdl  instrument 
whatever,  "for  the  purpose  of  performing  up- 
on or  having  the  same  performed  upon  in 
such  dramshop."  While  a  Reglna  Concerto, 
which  is  a  musical  machine  set  playing  by 
dropping  a  coin  in  a  slot,  and  thereby  releas- 
ing the  spring  setting  the  machinery  in  mo- 
tion, is  a  musical  instrument,  and  winding 
it  up  and  dropping  a  coin  in  the  slot  consti- 
tutes perfbrming  on  it,  it  is  not  such  a  "musi- 
cal instrument"  as  th«  Legislature  meant  to 


MUSIOAL  IKSTRUMEKT 


606 


MUST 


designate  in  the  statute,  which  meant  the 
keeping  of  an  instrument  with  the  intention 
of  the  dramshop  keeper  to  perform  on  it 
himself  or  engaging  some  one  else  to  do  so ; 
the  word  "having"  in  the  phrase  "having  the 
same  performed  on"  not  being  synonymous 
with  "permitting,"  but  importing  making  an 
arrangement  to  have  an  act  done.  Thiebes- 
Stlerlin  Music  Co.  v.  Weiss,  121  S.  W.  1099, 
1101,  142  Mo.  App.  598. 

A  mechanical  piano  player  is  a  "musical 
instrument."  ^olian  Co.  v.  Hallett  &  Davis 
Piano  Co.,  134  Fed.  872,  880. 

MXT8ICIAH 

As  servant,  see  Servant 

MUST 

Words  like  •'may,'*  '•must,*'  •^shall,"  etc., 
are  constantly  used  in  statutes  without  in- 
tending that  they  shall  be  taken  literally, 
and  in  their  construction  the  object  evidently 
designed  to  be  reached  limits  and  controls 
the  literal  import  of  the  terms  and  phrases 
employed.  Fields  v.  United  States,  27  App. 
D.  C.  433. 
As  mandatory 

May  construed  as  must,  see  May. 

The  word  "must"  is  not  always  to  be  con- 
strued as  mandatory.  It  has  been  construed 
as  directory  only.  People  ex  rel.  Jerome  v. 
Goff,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  66,  67,  49  Misc.  R^p.  72 
(citing  In  re  Hennessy,  68  N.  B.  446,  164  N. 
Y. 


"It  is  true  the  word  *mu8tr  is  sometimes 
construed  as  'may'— permissive — ^but  ttiis 
only  when  the  context  requires  it.  Where  the 
context  plainly  shows  the  provision  to  be 
mandatory,  the  word  'must*  is  a  command, 
and  cannot  be  construed  as  permissive,  but 
must  be  given  the  signification  which  it  im- 
parts." Glbbs  V.  Gibbs,  73  Pac  641,  653, 
26  Utah,  882. 

Const,  art  2,  |  20,  declaring  that  "the 
style  of  the  laws  of  this  state  shall  be,"  etc, 
is  mandatory  and  must  be  complied  with; 
the  word  "shall"  being  equivalent  to  "must." 
State  ex  rel.  Gouge  v.  Burrow,  104  S.  W.  526, 
529,  119  Tenn.  376,  14  Ann.  Cas.  809. 

The  word  "must,"  in  Code  Civ.  Proc.  i 
483,  providing  that,  where  the  complaint  sets 
forth  two  or  more  causes  of  action,  the  state- 
ment of  the  fticts  constituting  each  cause  of 
action  "must"  be  separate  and  numbered,  and 
section  607  providing  that  defendant  may  set 
forth  as  many  defenses  as  he  has,  and  that 
each  defense  "must"  be  separately  stated  and 
numbered,  is  a  mandatory  word,  and  the 
provisions  are  mandatory,  and  the  court  can- 
not disregard  them.  Stem  v.  Marcuse,  103 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1026,  1027,  119  App.  Div.  47a 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  1899,  i  2627,  pre- 
scribing the  order  of  trial  in  criminal  cases, 
and  providing  that  the  prosecuting  attorney 


must  first  state  the  case,  the  word  "must"  is 
used  in  a  mandatory  or  imperative  sense. 
Hence  it  is  not  permissible  for  hired  counsel 
to  open  and  close  to  the  Jury  on  behalf  of  the 
state.  State  v.  Price,  85  S.  W.  922,  928»  111 
Mo.  App.  423. 

In  a  statute  providing  for  a  hearing  and 
determination  of  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  an 
election  contest  the  provision  that  on  the 
presentation  of  the  petition,  the  court  "  'must' 
proceed  to  a  summary  canvass  of  the  vote" 
should  not  be  construed  as  depriving  the 
court  of  its  discretion  to  determine  whether 
the  petition  presented  facts  Justifying  such 
action.  Mets  v.  Maddox,  106  N.  Y.  Supp. 
702,  708,  121  App.  Div.  147  (concurring  opin- 
ion of  Judge  Rich). 

The  word  "must"  in  Municipal  Court 
Act  f  26,  subd.  6,  providing  that  actions  to. 
recover  a  penalty  or  a  fine  for  a  violation 
of  any  provision  of  the  Sanitary  Code  must 
be  brought  in  the  district  where  the  viola- 
tion happened  or  occurred,  when  that  sub- 
division is  read  in  connection  with  subdivi- 
sion 4,  providing  that,  if  an  action  is  brought 
in  a  different  district  it  may  nevertheless  be 
tried  therein  unless  transferred  to  the  proper 
dlstdct  before  trial*  on  demand  of  the  defend- 
ant made  on  or  before  Joinder  of  issue,  is 
not  mandatory  in  the  sense  of  taking  away 
Jurisdiction  from  a  court  other  than  the  one 
spedfled  as  the  place  of  trial,  but  simply 
gives  the  defendant  an  absolute  right  of  re- 
moval to  the  proper  district  if  demand  is 
made  at  the  proper  time  and  in  the  proper 
way.  Department  of  Health  of  City  of  New 
York  V.  Halpin,  81  N.  Y.  Supp.  679,  681,  40 
Misc.  Rep.  248. 

The  word  "must,"  as  used  in  Pol.  Code, 
i  4645,  providing  that  the  clerk  of  the  district 
court  must  give  each  Juror,  when  excused 
from  service,  a  certificate,  signed  by  himself 
under  seal,  stating  the  amount  due  him,  etc, 
and  on  its  presentation  to  the  county  treas- 
urer the  amount  must  be  paid,  etc,  indicates 
that  the  duty  of  the  clerk  becomes  imperative 
as  soon  as  a  Juror  is  entitled  to  his  pay,  and 
that  the  duty  of  the  treasurer  is  imperative 
as  soon  as  a  certificate  properly  issued  by 
the  district  court  is  presented  to  him.  Bx 
parte  Farrell,  92  Pac.  786,  786,  36  Mont  254. 

Code  Cr.  Proc  |  466,  provides  that: 
"The  application  for  a  new  trial  *must'  be 
made  before  Judgment,  except  an  application 
made  under  subdivision  7  of  section  465, 
which  may  be  made  at  any  time  within  one 
year,  and  except  in  case  of  a  sentence  of 
death,  when  the  application  may  be  made  at 
any  time  before  execution."  The  court  says: 
"The  learned  Judge  at  special  term  in  his 
opinion  herein  said:  Not  always  is  the  word 
'must^  to  be  construed  as  mandatory."  "That 
is  quite  true,  but  considering  the  history  of 
these  provisions,  the  prior  state  of  the  law, 
and  that  new  trials  in  criminal  cases  an  per- 


HUST 


607 


MUTUAL 


misslble  by  statute  only,  it  seems  to  me  tbat 
the  words  are  too  plain  and  Imperattre  to 
permit  of  sueh  construction.  It  is  like  a  stat- 
ute of  limitations.  If  the  motion  for  a  new 
trial  'may'  be  made  after  judgment,  'may' 
a  motion  upon  the  ground  of  newly  discov- 
ered evidence  other  than  capital  be  made  aft- 
er a  year?"  People  ex  rel.  Jerome  ▼.  Gourt 
of  (General  Sessions,  OS  N.  T.  Supp.  067,  560, 
112  App.  Div.  424. 

Code  Oiv.  Proc  |  1070,  provides  that, 
when  a  notice  of  pendency  of  action  is  filed 
with  the  complaint,  personal  service  of  the 
summons  "must"  be  made  upon  defendant 
within  00  days  after  the  filing,  or  else,  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  that  time,  publication 
of  the  summons  must  be  commenced,  or  serv- 
ice thereof  must  be  made  without  ttie  state. 
Section  1074  authorizes  the  court  in  its  dis- 
cretion to  cancel  a  lis  pendens  if  a  plaintUT 
filing  the  notice  unreasonably  neglects  to  pro- 
ceed in  the  action.  Held,  that  the  provision 
of  section  1070  is  peremptory,  and  a  failure 
to  comply  with  it  is  a  form  of  unreasonable 
neglect  which  requires  the  court  to  cancel  the 
notice;  and  hence  where  a  lis  poidens  was 
filed  November  14,  1907,  and  an  amended 
summons  and  complaint  was  filed  November 
18,  1907,  and  the  summons  and  complaint 
were  not  served  on  defendant  until'  January 
20,  1908,  no  attempt  being  made  to  serve  it 
until  January  0th,  and  no  attempt  made  to 
efl^ect  substituted  service,  the  Us  pendens 
should  be  canceled.  Brown  v.  Mando,  109 
N.  Y.  Supp.  720, 126  App.  Dlv.  880. 

Oode  Civ.  Proc.  §  134,  as  amended,  pro- 
vides that  no  court  other  than  the  Supreme 
Court  "must"  be  open  on  any  of  the  holidays 
mentioned  in  section  10,  except  to  give  in- 
structions to  Juries  on  their  request,  to  re- 
ceive a  verdict  or  discharge  a  Jury,  or  for  the 
exercise  of  the  powers  of  a  magistrate  in  a 
criminal  action,  and  tbat  injunctions  and 
writs  of  prohibition  may  be  Issued  on  any 
day.  Previous  to  the  amendment  of  1907  the 
section  read  no  court  "shall"  be  open  nor 
shall  any  Judicial  business  be  transacted, 
etc.,  provided  that  the  Supreme  Court  and 
the  superior  courts  shall  always  be  open  for 
the  transaction  of  business,  and  that  injunc- 
tions and  writs  of  prohibition  may  be  issued 
on  any  day.  Among  the  holidays  mentioned 
in  section  10  is  any  day  appointed  by  the 
Governor  for  a  holiday.  Section  133  provides 
that  courts  of  Justice  may  be  held  and  Judi- 
cial business  transacted  on  any  day  except  as 
provided  in  section  134.  Section  136  provides 
that,  if  any  day  mentioned  in  section  184 
happens  to  be  the  day  appointed  for  the  hold* 
ing  of  a  court  or  to  which  it  is  adjourned, 
it  shall  be  deemed  appointed  for  or  adjourned 
to  the  next  day.  Held,  that  section  134  as 
amended  March  19,  1907,  still  means  what  it 
has  always  meant,  that  the  superior  court 
shall  not  on  a  legal  holiday  transact  any 
judicial  business  outside  of  the  constitutional 
and    statutory   exceptions,    notwithstanding 


the  substitution  of  the  word  '^usf  for 
"shall" ;  and  hence  a  sentence  pronounced  on 
a  day  ai^inted  by  the  Governor  as  a  legal 
holiday  was  void.  S)x  parte  Smith,  93  Pac. 
191,  198,  194,  162  CaL  606. 

MUTATIS  MUTANDIS 

Where  profits  are  defined  by  a  certain  ar- 
ticle, all  the  provisions  of  which  are  to  apply 
to  the  relations  between  the  parties  springing 
into  existence  after  the  expiration  of  the  eon- 
tract  '^mutatis  mutandis,"  these  latter  words 
mean  necessary  changes  in  details  to  conform 
to  a  single  vital  alteration,  and  suggest  a  re- 
versal of  the  relative  positions  of  the  parties 
under  the  contract,  which  was  to  continue  the 
same  In  other  respects.  Copeland  v.  £>aton, 
95  N.  EL  291,  209  Mass.  139,  Ann.  Ca&  1912B, 
621. 

MUTE 

See  Stood  Mute. 

MUTILATE— MUTIUTION 

"Mutilate"  is  defined  by  the  Standard 
Dictionary  as  follows:  '*To  cut  off  or  deprive 
of  a  Umb  or  essential  part  of,  as  an  animal 
body ;  maim ;  cut  or  break  off,  or  otherwise 
remove  any  part  of,  as  a  statue;  disfigure; 
to  retrench,  remove,  expunge,  or  delete  an 
essential  or  material  part  of ,  so  as  to  render 
incomplete  or  imperfect,  as  a  literary  com- 
position; as  to  mutilate  a  speech."  The 
main  idea  of  such  a  definition  is  the  removal 
of  an  essential  part,  so  that  the  whole  is 
rendered  imperfect  A  railroad  ticket  is  not 
mutilated,  within  the  meaning  of  a  stipula- 
tion on  tiie  face  thereof  that  It  should  not 
be  good  for  passage  If  mutilated  in  any 
way,  where  both  pieces  are  presented  to  the 
conductor  at  the  same  time,  and  it  is  ap- 
parent that  they  are  parts  of  the  same  ticket, 
and  that  together  they  form  the  entire  ticket 
Young  V.  Central  of  Georgia  R.  Co.,  47  S.  B. 
666,  120  Oa.  26,  66  L.  R.  A  486,  102  Am.  St 
Rep.  68,  1  Ann.  Cas.  24. 

Code  Cr.  Proc.  1895,  art  470,  provides 
that,  when  an  indictment  or  information  has 
been  lost,  mutilated,  or  obliterated,  the  dis- 
trict or  county  attorney  may  suggest  the  fact 
to  the  court  and  another  Indictment  or  in- 
formation may  be  substituted.  Held,  that  the 
county  attorney  had  no  authority  to  change 
the  date  of  filing  on  an  information  and  com- 
plaint, and  that  such  change  constituted  a 
mutilation,  rendering  the  same  nugatory. 
KeUy  V.  State,  127  S.  W.  644,  69  Tex.  Cr.  R. 
14. 

MUTUAL 

The  words  'Mutual'*  and  ''mutually,"  as 
applied  to  an  exception  in  the  charter  of  a 
vessel,  providing  for  allowances  for  demur- 
rage and  dispatch  money,  that  delay  from 


i! 


MUTUAL  ACOOUNTS 


608 


MUTUAL  AOCX)UNTS 


\U' 


:J 


M 


ill 


causes  b^jond  control  of  the  parttos  shall  be 
"always  mntually  excepted,"  cannot  he  con- 
strued in  the  sense  of  reciprocal  In  respect 
to  the  same  broken  engagement,  but  should  be 
understood  as  meaning  that  the  exception 
was  intended  to  protect  the  parties  from  lia- 
bility to  each  other,  whoiev^  performance  of 
any  covenant  was  prevented  or  delayed  by 
any  exception.  Pool  Shipping  Co.  t.  Samuel, 
200  Fed.  86,  118  O.  0.  A  264. 

IfUTUAX.  AOOOUKTS 

An  account  of  a  miller  for  supplies  fur- 
nished on  the  credit  of  a  physician,  pursuant 
to  his  orders,  and  an  account  of  the  physician 
for  professional  services  rendered  the  miller 
and  his  family  during  the  period  of  the  fur- 
nishing of  the  supplies,  consist  of  reciprocal 
demands  constituting  a  mutual  current  ac- 
count, within  Code  Oiv.  Proc.  f  886,  declaring 
that  a  cause  of  action  on  a  mutual  current 
account  accrues  from  the  time  of  the  last 
item  proved  in  the  account  on  either  side. 
Miller  V.  Longshore,  131  N,  Y^  Supp.  1041, 
147  App.  r>iv.  214. 

An  account  of  loans  between  the  lender 
and  tile  borrowing  firm,  kept  on  the  firm's 
books  or  on  slips  of  paper,  did  not  constitute 
a  ''mutual,  open,  and  current  account,"  with- 
in Code  Civ.  Proc.  N.  Y.  i  886,  providing  that 
In  an  action  to  recover  a  balance  due  on  a 
mutual,  open,  and  current  account,  where 
there  have  been  reciprocal  demands  between 
the  parties,  the  cause  of  action  was  deemed 
to  have  accrued  from  the  time  of  the  last 
item  proved  in  the  account  on  either  8id&  In 
re  Oirvln,  160  Fed.  197. 

That  one  party  kept  one  side  of  the  ac- 
count and  the  other  party  the  other  side 
thereof  is  immaterial  in  determining  whether 
there  were  mutual  accounts.  Lapham  v. 
Kansas  &  Texas  Oil,  Gas  &  Pipe  Line  Co.,  123 
Pac.  863,  87  Kan.  65,  Ann.  Cas.  1913D,  813. 

A  current  account  kept  by  a  husband  of 
his  transactions  with  his  wife's  money  does 
not  constitute  a  "mutual  account,"  nor  is  an 
account  mutual  where  it  simply  contains 
items  of  money,  received  and  paid,  nor  one 
in  which  there  were  but  three  items  of  credit 
during  a  period  of  five  years ;  cash  items  be- 
ing also  held  to  form  no  part  of  a  mutual, 
open,  and  running  account  In  re  Girvin,  160 
Fed.  197. 

A  husband  transferred  his  business  and 
accounts  due  him  to  his  wifat  who  executed 
to  him  a  power  of  attorney  to  manage  the 
business  for  her.  At  the  time  of  the  transfer, 
a  debtor  was  indebted  to  the  husband  for 
goods  sold  at  various  timea  After  the  trans- 
fer, an  account  therefor  was  rendered  the 
debtor,  who  made  a  cash  payment,  and  at 
various  times  delivered  materials  to  the  hus- 
band. Subsequently  the  wife  reassigned  the 
account  to  the  husband.  Held,  that  the  ao> 
count  was  an  open  account  as  distinguished 
from  an  account  stated,  since  mutual  ac- 


counts are  made  up  of  matters  of  set-off,  an^ 
there  must  be  a  mutual  credit  founded  on  i 
subsisting  debt  on  the  other  side,  or  an  ex 
press  or  an  implied  agreement  for  a  set 
off  of  mutual  debts.  Culver  v.  Newhart,  12 
Pac.  975,  18  GaL  App.  614. 

A  bill  alleging  damages  to  property  grow 
ing  out  of  the  laying  of  a  pavement  ant 
change  of  grade  and  praying  for  an  account 
ing,  alleging  that  it  was  necessaiy  to  raia 
plalntilTs  residence,  surface  her  yard,  ao^ 
various  other  things,  does  not  state  a  cans< 
wherein  "the  accounts  to  be  investigated  an 
mutual,"  within  Const  1890,  |  161,  relatiiu 
to  causes  of  which  the  chancery  court  and  cLr 
cult  courts  have  concurrent  Jurladictloii 
Murphy  v.  City  of  Meridian  (Miss.)  00  South 
48.      . 

Where  an  officer  of  a  corporation,  actbi 
as  general  manager  with  the  knowledge  aiui 
consent  of  the  other  officers  and  others  inter 
ested,  kept  the  books  of  the  corporation  in  tlu 
usual  course  of  business,  and  during  tiM 
period  of  his  service  as  manager  credited 
himself  from  time  to  time  with  salary  aiMi 
charged  against  such  credits  items  of  cash  it 
ceived  from  time  to  time  during  such  period 
the  account  between  him  and  the  coiporatioG 
was  a  "mutual,  open  account,"  within  Bern.  A 
BaL  Code,  1 166,  declaring  that  in  an  actioi 
on  a  mutual,  open  account  the  cause  of  actioii 
accrues  from  the  time  of  the  last  item  pror 
ed  in  the  account  on  either  side ;  there  beins 
nothing  to  show  that  the  officer  had  not 
actually  received  the  amounts  charged  fron 
time  to  time.  Blom  v.  Blom  Codfish  Co.,  121 
Pac.  596,  71  Wash.  4L 

Items  on  both  sides  required 

Under  Rev.  St  |  4226,  providing  that  tlM 
cause  of  action  for  the  balance  due  on  i 
mutual  and  open  account  current  accmes  al 
the  time  of  the  last  item  proved  therein,  il 
is  proper  to  charge  that  such  an  account  'ii 
an  account  consisting  of  credits  as  well  as 
debits,  charges,  and  credits,  between  the  par 
ties.  An  account  in  which  A  charges  B 
with  a  number  of  items  extending  through  t 
considerable  time,  but  in  which  B.  has  nc 
credits,  is  not  a  'mutual  and  open  accoonl 
current' "  Dunn  v.  Howard,  41  N.  W.  707. 75 
Wis.  546  (citing  and  adopting  Hannon  r 
Engelmann,  6  N.  W.  791,  49  Wis.  282;  Fiti 
Patrick  V.  Estate  of  Phelan,  16  N.  W.  606,  K 
Wis.  254). 

Payments  alone  iasnillolent 

The  claim  for  services  and  the  47  itenu 
of  expenses  set  forth  in  the  petition,  witli 
proper  credits  of  payments  thereon,  constl^ 
tute  one  account  only.  The  answer  challais& 
the  correctness  of  the  charge  for  services  aiuJ 
of  the  it^ns  of  expenses  therein,  and  seta 
forth  S4  items  of  alleged  payments  which,  li 
correct,  should  have  been  included  in  the  ao 
count  Held,  that  no  "mutual  accounts"  were 
involved.  Lapham  v.  Blansas  &  Texas  Oil, 
Gas  ft  Pipe  Line  Co.,  123  Pac  863,  87  Kan 


MUTUAL  ACKX^UNTS 


609 


MUTUAL  COMBAT 


;,  Aim.  Cas.  1913D,  818  (citing  5  Words  and 
tirases,  p.  4647). 

Where  the  items  of  an  account  are  all 
i  one  side,  there  being  none  on  the  other 
ie,  exc^t  credits  of  payment,  or  where  the 
icoont  consists  mer^  of  matters  of  charge 
I  the  one  side  and  demands  of  set-off  on  the 
her,  it  is  not  a  ^'mutual  account"  Hoosier 
)U8t.  Ck>.  y.  National  Bank  of  Commerce  of 
iattle,  73  N.  E.  1006,  1008,  86  Ind.  App.  270. 

A  '*mntual  acoonnt"  implies  a  reciprocity 
dealing  between  the  parties  to  the  account, 
id  is  made  up  of  matters  of  set-off  wherein 
eh  party  has  a  right  of  action  against  the 
her;  and  a  set-off  can  be  pleaded  only 
lien  the  ri^t  of  action  is  against  the  plain- 
r  in  the  same  capacity  as  that  in  which  he 
prosecuting  his  claim;  and  an  individual 
ligation  is  not  a  matter  of  set-off  to  a  part- 
rshlp  claim  or  to  a  claim  by  the  plaintiff 

a  representative  capacity;  nor  can  a 
irtnership  debt  be  a  set-off  to  a  claim  by 
le  of  the  members  of  the  partnership ;  and, 
I  a  general  payment  on  an  open  account  be- 
reen  them,  the  account  would  not  for  that 
ason  have  been  rendered  mutual,  since  the 
ere  payment  of  money  upon  an  account 
»es  not  have  that  effect,  but  operates  simply 
I  a  reduction  pro  tanto  of  the  claim.  Flynn 
Seale^  84  Pac  268-266,  2  Cal.  App.  666. 

Where  the  items  of  an  account  are  all 
1  one  side  as  between  a  shopkeeper  and 
B  customer,  and  where  goods  are  charged 
id  payments  credited,  there  is  no  "mutual- 
f  which  will  prevent  the  statute  from 
rring  the  account  Under  Rev.  Code  Civ. 
'DC.  S  64,  providing  that  an  action  for  a 
lance  due  upon  an  open  account,  where 
ere  have  been  reciprocal  demands,  shall 
deemed  to  accrue  from  the  time  of  the 
St  item  proved  on  account  on  either  side, 
I  account  consisting  entirely  of  charges  on 
e  side  and  a  payment  on  account  on  the  oth- 
is  not  a  mutual  account  ,*  the  important  pre- 
quisite  being  a  condition  of  mutuality  and 
dprocity  of  dealing  sufficient  to  reasonably 
Btity  the  inference  of  an  understanding  be- 
een  the  parties  that  the  items  of  one  ao- 
unt  are  to  be  set  off  against  the  items  of 
e  other,  so  far  as  they  go.  McArthur  v. 
cCoy,  112  N.  W.  155, 167,  21  S.  D.  814  (quotr 
ir  Bouv.  Law  Diet.). 

UTUAIi  AOBEEMENT 

A  "mutual  agreement*'  implies  an  offer 
id  acceptance,  or  a  promise  for  a  promise, 
id  means  a  reciprocal  agreement,  or  one 
at  requires  something  to  be  done  or  for- 
me by  either  party  for  the  other.  Gross- 
in  V.  Schenker,  100  N.  B.  89,  206  N.  Y.  466. 

UTUAXi  AHD  DEPENDENT  COVE- 
NANTS 

Where  a  written  contract  for  the  sale 

land  recited  the  payment  of  a  sum  down 

the  purchaser,  and  required  him  to  pay 

e  remainder  of  the  purchase  money  on  a 


specified  date,  and  further  provided  that  on 
such  payment  being  made  the  vendor  should 
"on  demand  thereafter"  cause  to  be  executed 
to  the  purchaser  "a  good  and  sufficient  deed 
in  fee  simple  of  the  premises  above  described, 
free  and  clear  of  all  legal  liens  and  incum- 
brances," the  covenants  for  payment  of  the 
purchase  money  and  for  the  delivery  of  the 
deed  conveying  a  good  title  were  "mutual 
and  dependent,"  and  a  tender  of  performance 
by  the  vendor  in  accordance  with  the  contract 
was  a  condition  precedent  to  his  right  to 
maintain  an  action  to  recover  the  purchase 
money  from  the  purchaser.  Michigan  Home 
Colony  Co.  t.  Tabor,  141  Fed.  832,  386,  72 
C.  C.  A.  480. 

MUTUAX.  AND  OPEN  ACCOUNT 

See  Mutual  Accounts. 

MUTUAX.  AND  REOIPBOOAX. 

Where  a  husband  and  wife,  advanced  in 
years,  and  each  owning  separate  property, 
agreed  that  they  would  have  their  wills 
made,  and  he  made  a  will  giving  her  a  life 
estate  in  his  property,  and  she  conveyed  her 
property  to  him,  the  deed  to  take  effect  on 
her  death,  but  it  did  not  appear  that  any 
agreement  was  made  between  them  as  to 
the  terms  of  the  will,  or  that  one  was  to  be 
the  consideration  for  the  other,  a  contention 
that  the  deed  and  the  will  were  "mutual  and 
reciprocal,"  and  for  that  reason  irrevocable, 
was  without  merit  Sappingfleld  v.  King,  90 
Pac.  150,  49  Or.  102,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1066. 

MUTUAX.  ASSENT 

Element  of  sale,  see  Sale. 

"Mutual  assent"  is  assent  to  the  same 
thing  in  the  sahie  sense  and  under  a  common 
understanding  of  the  stipulations  agreed  to. 
Martin  t.  Thrower,  60  S.  B.  825,  8  Ga.  App. 
784. 

MUTUAX.  COMBAT 

"Mutual  combat"  can  exist  where  there 
is  "mutual  intent"  to  fight,  though  only  one 
of  the  parties  strikes  a  blow.  Lee  v.  State, 
58  S.  R  676-678,  2  Ga.  App.  481. 

"Mutual  combat,"  within  the  meaning  of 
Pen.  Code,  i  73,  providing  that,  if  a  person 
kill  another  in  his  defense,  it  must  appear 
that  the  danger  was  so  urgent  and  pressing 
that  to  save  his  own  nfe  the  killing  of  the 
other  was  absolutely  necessary,  and  that  it 
must  appear  also  that  the  person  killed  was 
the  assailant,  or  that  the  slayer  had  in  good 
faith  endeaivored  to  decline  any  further 
struggle,  is  a  mutual  fight  following  a  mutual 
intention  to  fight  with  felonious  purpose. 
Wamack  T.  State,  60  S.  B.  288,  290,  3  Ga. 
App.  590. 

A  charge  that  if  defendant  believed  a 
deceased  had  taken  possession  of  a  field 
claimed  by  him,  and  would  be  there  with  an 
armed  party  on  the  morning  of  the  killing, 
and  they  had  made  threats  against  the  life 


r  i '   ' 


MUTUAL  CONSENT 


610 


MUTUAL  0KBTS 


I    [ 

i  \ 
■J 


^#^ 


I 


of  defendant,  and  defendant,  knowing  all 
these  things,  voluntarily  organized  a  party, 
arming  them  with  deadly  weapons  for  the 
pnrpose  of  meeting  such  parties  in  deadly 
conflict,  and  a  conflict  ensued  and  the  de- 
ceased was  killed,  then  such  conflict  was  a 
"mutual  combat,'*  and  all  parties  intentionally 
engaged  in  it  are  guilty  of  murder,  was  not 
under  the  theory  of  the  prosecution  errone- 
ous. Driggers  v.  United  States,  95  Pac  612, 
21  Okl.  eO,  129  Am.  St  R^.  823,  17  Ann. 
Cas.  68. 

MUTUAX.  CONSENT 

To  constitute  a  contract,  the  agreement 
must  be  mutual  and  communicated  to  each 
other,  and  "consent  is  not  mutual"  unless 
the  parties  all  agree  upon  the  same  thing  in 
the  same  sense.  Humphrey  t.  Timken  Car- 
riage Co.,  75  Pac.  528.  533,  12  Okl.  413. 

MnrUAX.  OONTBAOTg 

See  Mutuality  of  Contract 

For  a  contract  to  be  "mutual,**  an  obliga- 
tion must  rest  on  each  party  to  do  or  permit 
to  be  done,  something  in  consideration  of  the 
act  or  promise  of  the  other;  that  is,  neither 
party  can  be  bound,  unless  both  are  bound. 
Cal  Hirseh  &  Sons  Iron  &  Rail  Co.  v.  Para- 
gould  ft  M.  B.  Co.,  127  S.  W.  623,  148  Mo. 
App.   173. 

MnrUAX.  OOVENANT8 

See  Mutual  and  Dependent  Coyenants. 

MUTUAX.  0BEDIT8 

"Mutual  debts  or  mutual  credits,"  with- 
in the  Bankruptcy  Act,  proYiding  that,  in 
all  cases  of  "mutual  debts"  or  "mutual  cred- 
its" between  the  estate  of  a  bankrupt  and  a 
creditor,  the  account  shall  be  stated  and  one 
debt  shall  be  set  off  against  the  other,  and 
the  balance  only  shall  be  allowed  or  paid, 
are  established  on  proof  that  an  insolvent 
has  money  on  deposit  in  a  bank  subject  to 
check,  and  also  owes  the  bank  on  a  promis- 
sory note,  the  money  deposited  being  the 
money  obtained  on  the  note,  and  the  bank 
may,  before  the  insolvent  is  declared  a  bank- 
rupt, credit  the  amount  of  the  deposit  on  the 
debt  due  on  the  note.  West  v.  Bank  of  La- 
homa,  86  Pac.  469,  471,  16  Okl.  328. 

The  Bankruptcy  Act  of  1898,  providing 
that,  in  all  cases  of  mutual  debts  or  mutual 
credits  between  the  estate  of  a  bankrupt  and 
a  creditor,  the  account  shall  be  stated  and  one 
debt  shall  be  set  off  against  the  other,  and 
only  the  balance  paid.  The  Bankruptcy  Act 
of  1867  had  a  substantially  similar  provision 
taken  from  the  earlier  English  acts,  under 
which  it  was  decided  that  "mutual  credits" 
must  in  their  nature  terminate  in  debts,  or  a 
debt  be  in  the  contemplation  of  the  parties. 
Some  of  the  latter  English  cases  arose  under 
the  more  recent  English  acts,  in  whidi  th^ 
term  "mutual  dealings"  was  used,  and  this 
the  court  said  is  a  much  more  comprehensive 
term  than   "mutual  credits."    It  was  held 


that  the  act  of  1898  does  not  authorise  ti 
setting  off  against  the  daim  of  a  landlord  f< 
rent  under  a  lease  to  the  bankrupt  of  an  ui 
liquidated  daim  for  damages  in  favor  of  tl 
bankrupt  sounding  in  tort  and  arlsliig  ind 
pendently  of  the  contract  of  lease.  In  i 
Becker  Bros.,  139  Fed.  d66»  367. 

A  bailment  contract  transferring  tt 
possession  of  a  mercantile  business  to  tl 
bankrupts  to  operate  the  same  for  a  yea 
provided  that  for  the  use  of  the  propert; 
the  bankrupts  should  pay  to  the  bailor  ce 
tain  percentages  on  sales,  and  rent  and  L 
suranoe;  that  the  bankrupts  should  keep  tl 
stock  up  to  within  $500  of  the  original  inv« 
tory  value;  that  on  tomination  of  tbe  cm 
tract  the  bailor  should  pay  any  inventory  « 
oess  up  to  $500;  and  that  the  bankrupt 
should  be  liable  for  any  defidenoy.  On  tii 
termination,  of  the  contract  the  Inventoi 
excess  amounted  to  $1323.42,  but  the  banl 
rupts  were  indebted  to  the  bailor  on  aceoui 
of  unpaid  insurance  and  percentages  on  sale 
etc.,  $679.73.  Held,  that  such  items  w^ 
"mutual  debits  and  credits,"  as  defined  I 
Bankr.  Act  July  1, 1896,  c  541,  |  68  (30  Sta 
566),  providing  that  sudi  daims  BbsU  be  m 
off  in  bankruptcy.  Walther  v.  Williams  Me] 
cantUe  Co.,  169  Fed.  270,  94  O.  G.  A.  646. 

A  daim  for  money  expended  as  quai 
surety  for  a  bankrupt  is  a  "mutual  credit, 
within  section  68  of  the  bankrupt  act  pn 
vlding  inter  alia  that  in  all  cases  of  mutui 
credits  between  the  estate  of  a  bankrupt  an 
a  creditor,  the  account  shall  be  stated,  au 
one  debt  shall  be  set  off  against  tlie  othei 
eta  Wagner  v.  Bumham,  73  AtL  990,  99: 
224  iPa.  586. 

Wh&e^equity  usually  follows  the  statute 
allowing  a  set-off  or  counterclaim  in  an  a< 
tlon  at  law,  and  while  ordinarily  a  mei 
claim  or  account  will  not  furnish  ground  fo 
equitable  relief,  and  while  equity  will  Intei 
vene  and  effect  a  set-off  only  when,  unde 
the  strict  rules  of  law.  Justice  cannot  be  ei 
fectuated,  equity.  Independent  of  statute,  an 
under  its  general  jurisdiction,  will  grant  n 
lief  where,  though  there  are  mutual  and  it 
dependent  debts,  there  is  a  mutual  credit  b< 
tween  the  parties  founded  on  the  existence  o 
some  debt  due  by  the  crediting  party  to  tb 
other ;  "mutual  credit"  meaning  mutual  trust 
Tuttle  V.  Blsbee,  120  N.  W.  699,  144  Iowa,  S 

MUTUAX.  nBAUHCW 

'Itfutual  dealings,"  within  the  statute  o 
Hmitations  applicable  to  an  account  ma 
consist  of  one  item  or  many  items  on  eac] 
side  of  the  account  It  Is  tbe  nature  and  no 
the  extending  of  the  dealings  that  give  tbei 
the  character  of  mutuaUty.  B^amln  i 
Webster,  65  Me.  170,  171. 

MUTUAXi  ]>£BTS 

"Mutual  debts  or  mutual  credits,"  witli 
in  the  Bankruptcy  Act  providing  that,  in  a] 
cases  of  "mutual  debts  or  mutual  creditaf 


MUTUAL  DEBTS 


611        MUTUAL  REIJEF  ABSOOIATION 


ween  the  estate  of  a  bankrupt  and  a  cred* 
r,  the  account  aball  be  stated,  and  one 
>t  shall  be  set  off  against  the  other,  and 
i  balance  only  shall  be  allowed  or  paid,  are 
abllshed  on  proof  that  an  insolvent  has 
ney  on  deposit  in  a  hfBLikk.  subject  to  check, 
1  also  owes  the  bank  on  a  promissory  note, 
i  money  deposited  being  the  money  ob- 
ned  on  the  note,  and  the  bank  may,  be- 
'e  the  insolvent  is  declared  a  bankrupt, 
Klit  the  amount  of  the  deposit  on  the  debt 
&  on  the  note.  West  v.  Bank  of  Lahoma, 
Pac.  469,  471,  16  Okl.  82a 

A  firm  note  to  a  bank,  assumed  by  an  in* 
vent  partner  on  dissolution,  became  his 
Uvidual  indebtedness,  and  such  debt  with 
k  amount  due  him  as  a  depositor,  independ- 
t  of  any  partnership  consideration,  became 
itual  debts  within  Bankruptcy  Act  (Act 
ly  1,  18d8,  c.  641,  30  Stat  666),  I  68,  allow- 
;  set-offs.  Hooks  v.  Gila  Valley  Bank  ft 
ust  Ck>.,  100  Pac  806^  12  Ariz.  816. 

A  bailment  contract  transferring  the  pos- 
Esion  of  a  mercantile  business  t6  the  bank- 
)ts  to  operate  the  same  for  a  year  provid- 

that,  for  the  use  of  the  property,  the 
ikrupts  should  pay  to  the  bailor  certain 
rcentages  on  sales,  and  rent  and  insurance. 
Lt  the  bankrupts  should  keep  the  stock  up 
within  $500  of  the  original  inventory  val- 

that  on  termination  of  the  contract  the 
llor  should  pay  any  inventory  excess  up 
$500,  and  that  the  bankrupts  should  be 
ble  for  any  deficiency.  On  the  termlna- 
n  of  the  contract,  the  inventory  excess 
lounted  to  $1,323.42,  but  the  bankrupts 
re  indebted  to  the  bailor  on  account  of  un- 
Id  insurance  and  percentages  on  sales,  etc., 
r9.73.  Held,  that  such  items  were  "mutu- 
debits  and  credits"  as  defined  by  Bankr. 
t  July  1,  1898,  c.  641,  |  68,  30  Stat  565, 
)vidlng  that  such  claims  shall  be  set  off 

bankruptcy.  Walther  v.  Williams  Mer- 
itile  CJo.,  169  Fed.  270,  94  C.  C.  A.  646. 

UTVAL     TZRE     IN8UBAKCE     OOl^ 
PANT 

A  mutual  fire  Insurance  company  organ- 
d  under  the  laws  of  the  state  is  an  assoda- 
n  to  provide  mutual  relief  for  loss  by  fire, 
d  all  policy  holders  are  members,  and  each 
B  the  same  proportionate  interest,  and  is 
ble  to  the  same  proportionate  extent  J. 
Lamb  &  Co.  v.  Merchants'  Nat  Mut  Fire 
8.  CJo.,  119  N.  W.  1048,  18  N.  D.  268. 

UnrAI.   TNHVMAMOB 

*'  'Mutual  insurance'  is  essentially  differ- 
t  from  'stock  insurance,'  and  much  of  the 
igation  that  has  grown  out  of  this  species 
insurance  has  been  owing  to  inattention  to 
Ls  difference.  Its  original  design  was  to 
ovide  cheap  insurance  by  means  of  local 
Bociationa,  the  manors  of  which  should 
sore  each  other.  Such  associations  are  in 
^  nature  adapted  only  to  local  business, 
ley  need  many  by-laws  and  conditions  that 


are  not  required  in  sto<^  companies;  and  it 
is  necessary  and  equitable  that  eadi  person 
who  gets  insured  in  them  should  become 
subject  to  the  same  obligations  towards  his 
associates  that  he  requires  toward  himself." 
J.  P.  Lamb  A  Co.  y.  Merchante'  Nat  Mut 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  119  N.  W.  1048,  1049,  18  N.  D. 
268  (quoting  with  approval  from  May,  Ins. 
1146). 

MUTUAX.  IRRI6ATIOH   OOKPANT 

An  irrigation  company  organized  under 
the  laws  of  the  state,  which  derives  no  reve- 
nue from  the  operation  of  its  canal  and  con- 
ducts its  business  solely  to  irrigate  the  lands 
of  its  stockholders,  is,  de  facto,  a  **mutual 
irrigation  company**  as  defined  by  Cobbey's 
Ann.  St  1909,  {  6845.  Swanger  v.  Porter,  128 
N.  W.  516,  87  Neb.  764. 

MUTUAX.  MISTAKX: 

To  constitute  a  "mutual  mistake**  so  as 
to  authorize  reformation  of  an  instrument 
the  minds  of  the  parties  must  meet  in  a  com- 
mon intent  Potter  v.  Frank,  76  AtL  489, 
106  Me.  166. 

In  an  action  on  a  contract  findings  held 
not  to  show  a  mutual  mistake,  entitling  de- 
fendant to  equitable  relief  from  the  contract 
for  a  breach  of  which  plaintiff  seeks  to  recov- 
er damages.  C.  H.  Toung  Co.  v.  Springer, 
129  N.  W.  773,  113  Minn.  882. 

A  "mutual  mistake,"  which  will  justify 
the  reformation  of  an  instrument  is  a  mis- 
take reciprocal  and  conunon  to  both  parties, 
where  each  alike  labored  under  the  same 
misconception  in  req;>ect  to  the  terms  of  the 
instrument  Equity  will  not  reform  a  writ- 
ten contract  unless  the  mistake  is  proved  to 
be  a  mistake  of  both  parties,  but  may  rescind 
and  cancel  a  contract  upon  the  ground  of 
mistake  of  fftcts  material  to  the  contract  by 
one  party  only.  Coleman  v.  Illinois  Life 
Ins.  Co.  (Ky.)  82  8.  W.  616,  617  (citing  Bots- 
ford  V.  McLean  [N.  Y.l  45  Barb.  478;  Prit- 
chett  V.  Frlsby  [Ky.]  68  S,  W.  10;  Bush  v. 
Starks  [Ky.]  65  S.  W.  589;  Reeder  v.  I^wis 
A  Mason  Turnpike  Road,  7  E^y.  Law  Rep. 
373;  Tandy's  Assignee  v.  Hatcher  A  Co.,  9 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  161;  Stockhoff  A  De  Witt  v. 
Brannin,  14  Ky.  Law  Rep.  717). 

A  mistake  in  a  conveyance  as  to  the  sub- 
Jee^matter  surveyed,  superinduced  by  Igno- 
rance of  the  true  description  of  the  land 
which  the  grantor  intended  to  sell  and  the 
grantee  intended  to  buy,  when  participated 
in  by  both  parties,  is  a  "mutual  mistake  of 
fact"  which  equity  will  correct  American 
Ass'n  T.  Williams,  166  Fed.  17,  93  a  C.  A.  1. 

MUTUAX.  BEXJEF  ASSOCIATION 

A  "live  stock  insurance  company"  incor- 
porated under  Rev.  St  1895,  art  642,  subd. 
46,  authorizing  the  incorporation  of  fire,  ma- 
rine, life,  and  live  stock  insurance  companies, 
to  conduct  a  live  stock  insurance  company 
,  on  a  mutual  or  co-operative  plan  without 


MUTUAL  STANDARD 


512 


MUTUALITY    OP   OONTBAOT 


capital  stock,  and  to  issue  policies  of  indem- 
nity on  live  stock  to  its  members,  Is  a  live 
stock  insurance  company  conducted  on  tbe 
mutual  or  co-operative  plan,  and  is  not  a 
"mutual  relief  association"  within  article 
3096,  providing  that  nothing  in  the  title- 
title  58,  entitled  "Incorporation  of  Insurance 
CJompanies" — shall  apply  to  mutual  relief 
associations.  State  v.  Burgess,  109  S.  W. 
922,  101  Tex.  524. 

MUTUAX.  STAHDABD 

The  term  "mutual  standard,'*  as  used 
with  reference  to  mutual  standards  in  the 
construction  of  ambiguous  words  or  clauses 
in  contracts,  means  the  meaning  in  which 
an  ambiguous  word  or  phrase  was  used  and 
accepted  by  both  parties  to  the  contract  or 
undertaking  to  expiess  in  writing  the  terms 
of  the  actual  agreement.  It  is  subject  to  the 
modification  that  a  clear  and  unambiguous 
meaning  will  not  be  overthrown  by  resort  to 
parol  to  determine  what  the  parties  actually 
meant  West  v.  Hermann,  104  S.  W.  428,  47 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  131. 

MUTUAXi  WILL 

See,  also.  Reciprocal  WilL 

A  Joint  will  is  a  single  instrument  con- 
taining the  wills  of  two  or  more  persons. 
A  "mutual  will,"  or,  more  strictly  speaking, 
a  reciprocal  will,  is  one  by  which  each  testa- 
tor makes  testamentary  disposition  in  favor 
of  the  other.  Bower  v.  Daniel,  95  S.  W. 
847,  357,  198  Mo.  289  (citing  Schumaker  v. 
Schmidt,  44  Ala.  454,  4  Am.  Rep.  135;  In  re 
Diez,  50  N.  Y.  88;  Cawley's  Estate,  20  Ati. 
567,  136  Pa.  628,  10  L.  R.  A.  93). 

A  "joint  will"  is  one  where  the  same  in- 
strument is  made  the  will  of  two  or  more 
persons  and  is  jointly  signed  by  them,  being 
not  necessarily  either  mutual  or  reciprocal, 
while  "mutual  wills"  are  the  separate  wills 
of  two  persons  reciprocal  in  their  provisions. 
A  will  that  is  both  joint  and  mutual  is  one 
executed  jointly  by  two  or  more  persons,  the 
provisions  of  wliich  are  reciprocal,  and  which 
shows  on  its  face  that  the  devises  are  made 
one  in  consideration  of  the  other.  A  joint 
will  which  is  not  reciprocal  is  simply  the  in- 
dividual personal  will  of  each  of  the  persons 
signing  it  and  is  subject  to  the  same  rules  as 
apply  to  several  wills.  Frailer  v.  Patterson, 
90  N.  E.  216,  243  111.  80,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
506, 17  Ann.  Gas.  1003. 

A  testamentary  disposition  contained  tn 
one  writing  disposing  of  property  held  joint- 
ly is  a  "joint  will" ;  whereas,  the  same  docu- 
ment, if  it  refers  to  and  deals  with  property 
held  separately,  would  be  a  "mutual  wilL" 
Deseumeur  v.  Rondel,  74  Atl.  703,  76  N.  J. 
Eq.  894. 

MUTUALITY  OF  OONTBACT 

See  Mutual  €k>ntracts. 

''Mutuality  of  contract"  means  that  an 
obligation  rests  upon  each  party  to  do  or 


permit  to  be  done  something  in  consideration 
of  the  act  or  promise  of  the  other;  that  is, 
neither  party  is  bound  unless  the  both  are 
bound.  Where  a  contract  under  which  plain- 
tiff was  to  cut  and  deliver,  at  defendant's 
factory,  timber  of  certain  dimensions  at  a 
certain  price,  did  not  bind  plalntilf  to  fur- 
nish any  specified  quantity  thereof,  but 
left  him  at  liberty  to  cease  cutting  and  deliv- 
ering at  any  time,  there  was  no  mutuality 
of  contract  Campbell  v.  American  Handle 
Co.,  94  S.  W.  815,  816,  117  Mo.  App.  19. 

"'Mutuality  of  contract'  means  that  an 
obligation  must  rest  on  each  party  to  do  or 
permit  to  be  done  something  in  consideration 
of  the  act  or  promise  of  the  other;  that  is, 
neither  party  is  bound  unless  both  are 
bound."  Where  it  was  alleged  that  plaintifiC 
promised  to  marry  defendant  on  his  request, 
and  that  defendant  promised  plaintHDT  to  so 
marry  her  on  his  request,  the  agreement  was 
unenforceable  for  lack  of  mutuality ;  defend- 
ant's engagement  being  a  mere  option  to 
marry  plaintiff.  Smythe  v.  Greacen,  91  N. 
Y.  Supp.  450,  457, 100  App.  Div.  275. 

"Mutuality  of  contract"  means  that  an 
obligation  must  rest  upon  each  party  to  do 
or  permit  to  be  done  something  in  considera- 
tion of  the  act  or  promise  of  the  other;  that 
is,  neither  party  is  bound  unless  both  are 
bound.  A  contract  by  which  a  city  gave  de- 
fendant the  privilege  of  sorting  and  appro- 
priating to  his  own  use  refuse  at  specified 
dumps  of  the  department  of  street  <deaning 
for  one  year,  in  consideration  of  a  certain 
weekly  payment,  the  dty  reserving  the 
right  to  at  any  time  change  the  locations  and 
Increase  the  number  of  dumps,  was  not  void 
for  want  of  mutuality;  there  being  an  im- 
plied obligation  on  the  part  of  the  city  to  pro- 
vide for  one  year  the  refuse  for  defendant's 
use  at  the  places  named  in  the  contract 
City  of  New  York  v.  Paoli,  116  N.  Y.  Supp. 
544,  546,  63  Misc.  R^.  411  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Laclede  Construction 
Co.  V.  Tudor  Iron  Works,  69  S.  W.  884,  169 
Mo.  137). 

"  'Mutuality  of  contract'  means  that  an 
obligation  must  rest  on  each  party  to  do  or 
permit  to  be  done  something  in  considera- 
tion of  the  act  or  promise  of  the  other ;  that 
is,  neither  party  is  bound  unless  both  are 
bound."  Where  plaintiff  contracted  with 
third  persons  to  make  excavations  for  them 
for  railroad  side  tracks,  on  the  agreement  of 
defendant  railroad  company,  held  out  by  It 
as  an  inducement  for  his  making  the  excava- 
tion contract,  that  it  would  furnish  the  can 
and  take  away  the  dirt,  tliere  is  no  lack  of 
mutuality  in  the  agreement  between  plaintiff 
and  defendant  St  Louis,  I.  M.  dt  S.  R.  Co. 
V.  Clark,  119  S.  W.  825,  827, 90  Ark.  504. 

An  engagement  lacks  ''mutuality*'  where 
one  party  is  bound  and  the  other  is  not ;  for 
example,  where  one  offers  to  supply  another 
with  such  goods  of  a  certain  kind  as  he  may 


MUTUALITY  OF  CONTRACT 


RLS 


MTT 


cho<Me  to  order  or  may  wish  during  a  cer- 
tain time,  and  the  other  accepts  the  offer. 
In  audi  caae,  there  la  no  consideration  for 
the  promise  or  offer;  tor  the  promisee  has 
not  bound  himself  to  anything  and  has  incur- 
red no  legal  liability  at  alL  Steinwender- 
Stoffreg«i  Ooffee  Co.  v.  F.  T.  Gu^ither  Gro- 
cery Co.  (Ky.)  80  S,  W.  U70,  1171  (citing  7 
Cyc.  p.  827). 

A  contract  is  void  for  lack  of  "mutual- 
ity^ where  there  is  no  consideration  for  the 
promise  of  one  party  to  furnish  or  sell  so 
much  of  the  commodity  as  the  other  may 
want,  except  the  promise  of  the  other  to 
take  and  pay  for  so  much  of  the  commodity 
as  he  may  want,  and  there  is  no  agreement 
that  he  shall  want  any  quantity  whatever, 
and  no  method  exists  by  which  it  can  be 
determined  whether  he  will  want  any  of  the 
commodity,  or  what  quantity  he  will  want 
Higble  V.  Rust,  71  N.  B.  1010,  1011,  211  111. 
883, 108  Am.  St  Rep.  204. 

"Where  there  is  an  agreement  founded 
on  a  consideration,  it  is  not  invalid  for  want 
of  'mutuality'  because  one  party  has  an  op- 
tion and  the  other  has  not;  or,  in  other 
words,  because  it  is  obligatory  on  one  and  op- 
tional on  the  other.  So  want  of  'mutuality' 
cannot  be  set  up  as  a  defense  by  the  party 
who  has  received  the  benefit  simply  because 
it  was  left  optional  with  the  other  as  to 
whether  he  would  enforce  his  right"  Pitts- 
burg Vitrified  Paving  &  Building  Brick  Co. 
V.  BaUey,  90  Paa  808,  805,  76  Kan.  42,  12 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  745  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  9  Cyc.  p.  334). 

A  contract  between  an  iron  company  and 
a  railroad  company,  evidenced  by  a  writing 
reciting  that  the  iron  company  obligated  Itr 
self  to  furnish  such  rails  of  a  certain  kind 
and  splice  bars  as  it  might  have,  without 
any  showing  of  any  contract  or  act  of  the 
railroad  company  recognizing  the  existence 
of  the  contract  between  the  parties,  is  void 
for  lack  of  mutuality.  Cal  Hirsch  ft  Sons 
Iron  &  Rail  Co.  v.  Paragould  &  M.  R.  Ck>., 
127  S.  W.  623,  148  Mo.  App.  173. 

A  contract  of  employment,  reciting  that 
the  employ^  *'is  to  begin  .service  for"  the  em- 
ployer on  a  specified  date  "and  as  manager 
of  local  agencies  for"  the  employer  at  a 
specified  salary,  "it  being  mutuaUy  under- 
stood that  the  said  position  here  given"  the 
employe  'Is  for  five  years,"  and  the  abiUty 
and  willingness  of  the  employ^  "to  perform 
the  duty  of  his  position  are  also  a  part  of 
the  essentials"  of  the  agreement,  Is  not  void 
for  want  of  "mutuality";  there  being  an  ob- 
ligation on  the  employ^  to  serve  for  five 
years  and  on  the  employer  to  cofitinue  him 
in  the  service  fbr  such  period.  The  word 
"mutually"  means  reciprocally  given  and  re- 
ceived. It  means  an  Interdwnge  of  promises 
betweai  the  parties  that  the  thing  stated  is 
agreed  to.  ButteridL  Pub.  Co.  v.  Whitoomb, 
8  WDS.&  P.2D  Skb.— 88 


80  N.  IB.  247,  248,  225  IIL  «(»,  8  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  8.)  1001 

MUTUAXiITY  OF  IJBaAL  RIGHT 

The  term  "mutuality  of  legal  right,"  as 
used  in  the  rule  that  specific  performance 
will  not  be  decreed  unless  there  is  mutuality 
of  legal  right  as  well  as  of  remedy,  means 
only  that  the  contract  must  be  binding  on 
both  parties,  i.  e.,  that  it  is  nudum  pactum. 
Naylor  v.  Parker  (Tex.)  139  S.  W.  93. 

See  HutuaL 

mrXUAIXT  A0KirOWI.BI>GED 

See  Acknowledge — Acknowledgment 

MUTtTALLT  BOUHB 

The  words  "mutually  bound,"  as  used  in 
Civ.  Code,  |  1301,  with  reference  to  the  obli- 
gations of  coterminous  owners  in  respect  to 
the  maintainence  of  boundaries  and  fences 
between  them,  necessarily  suggest  that  the 
burden  must  rest  equally  upon  each,  and 
as  applied  to  fences,  this  burden  includes 
one-half  of  the  ground  upon  which  the  fences 
shall  rest  Hoar  v.  Hennessy,  74  Paa  452, 
454,  29  Mont  253. 

BfUTtTAIXT  INBEBTED 

Rev.  St  1899,  §  4487,  provides  that,  if 
any  "two  or  more  persons  are  mutually  in- 
debted" in  any  manner  whatsoever,  and  one 
of  them  commences  an  action  against  the 
other,  one  debt  may  be  set  off  against  the 
other,  though  such  debts  are  of  a  different 
nature.  Held,  that  where  plaintiff  was  in- 
debted to  defendant  on  certain  judgments, 
and  plaintiff  claimed  that  defendant  was  li- 
able for  damages  for  conversion  of  personal 
property,  plaintiff  and  defendant  were  not 
"mutually  indebted,"  defendant's  daim  be- 
ing in  contract,  while  plaintiff's  was  in  tort ; 
and  hence  the  claims  could  not  be  set  off. 
Caldwell  v.  Ryan,  108  S.  W.  533,  210  Mo.  17, 
16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  494,  124  Am.  St  Rep.  717, 
14  Ann.  Cas.  814. 

MY 

All  my  estate,  see  AIL 
All  my  lands,  see  All. 
All  my  property,  see  All. 

A  mortgage,  though  using  the  pronouns 
*T»  and  "my,"  being  signed  by  both  husband 
and  wife,  included  the  wife  as  well  as  the 
husband,  though  she  was  not  named  in  the 
body  of  the  instrument,  and  wa»  therefore 
sufficient  to  cover  the  grantors'  homestead 
interest  in  the  land.  Bray  v.  Bllison  (Ky.) 
88  S.  W.  96,  97. 

While  the  words  "I**  and  "my"  In  a  mort- 
gage ordinarily  refer  to  the  actor  or  speaker, 
who  expresses  himself  through  the  drafts- 
man, the  connection  in  which  they  are  used 
may  sometimes  make  it  doubtful  to  whom 
they  refer,  and  th^y  will  not  be  considered 


MT: 


BU; 


MY 


••I 


tQ.  htive.  Ipeoi  .1M>  tiocKl,  wltere^  tiie  effect  Wtftald 
be  to  burden  the  mortgagee  with  b  condition 
which  the  mortgagor  conld  not  Impose. 
Jones  V.  N^orrlB^  60  S.  B.  714,  715,  147  N,  O. 
84. 

If7  Mtate 

An  agreement  to  sell  "my  estate,"  with- 
out any  provision  as  to  the  vendor's  title, 
did  not  clearly  show  that  the  land  was  free 
from  incumbrance  or  define  the  title  to  be 
conveyed,  so  that  parol  evidence  was  admis- 
sible to  show  that  it  was  understood  that  the 
deed  was  to  be  subject  to  a  lease  on  the  prop- 
erty. Jenndnga  v.  Pqffer,  88  N.  B.  1036,  208 
Mass.  634. 

Where  certain  real  estate  had  been  con- 
veyed for  the  use  of  testatrix  for  life,  with 
remainders  over,  by  a  deed  providing  that 
she  at  any  time,  by  any  writing  or  writings 
sealed  and  attested,  might  revoke,  annul, 
change,  and  alter  all  and  every  use  or  uses, 
estate  or  estates,  previously  and  expressly 
limited  and  declared  concerning  the  premises 
granted,  testatrix  properly  executed  such 
power  by  a  will  reciting  that  as  to  all  "my** 
estates,  real  and  personal,  and  "with  intent 
to  execute  all  powers  vested"  in  her,  she 
gave,  devised,  bequeathed,  and  appointed 
the  property  as  follows,  etc  Du  Bols  v. 
Walnut.  70  AtL  796,  221  Pa.  285. 

My  ezeentor 

A  will,  empowering  "my  executor"  to 
compromise  claims  and  to  sell  and  dispose 
of  property,  and  providing  that,  in  case  of 
the  executor's  death,  it  is  testator's  wish 
that  designated  other  persons  act  as  trus- 
tees and  executors,  with  all  the  powers  vest- 
ed in  the  original  executor,  vests  the  legal 
title  to  the  real  estate,  with  power  to  sell 
and  convey  the  same  in  the  executor,  as 
trustee  under  the  will,  and  not  by  virtue  of 
appointment  by  the  court  Haggart  v.  Ean- 
ney,  84  S.  W.  703,  704,  73  Ark,  344. 

My  farm 

A  devise  of  "my  farm"  includes,  not  only 
the  testator's  homestead,  but  also  other  outr 
lying  lots,  which  had  been  used  by  the  tes- 
tator in  carrying  on  the  business  of  farming 
for  years  before  he  wrote  his  vrlll,  and  which 
had  been  referred  to  in  business  transactions 
as  his  farm.  ScovlUe  v.  Mason,  57  AtL  114, 
115,  76  Conn.  459. 

My  luuid  and  seal 

The  clause  in  a  will,  "I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  and  seal,"  does  not  necessarily 
Import  that  testatrix  signed  her  name  with 
her  own  hand,  as  it  became  her  hand  11  her 
name  was  written  by  some  one  at  her  direc- 
tion to  the  same  extent  as  If  she  had  written 
it  with  her  own  hand.  Elston  v.  Montgom- 
ery, 90  N.  B.  8,  242  IlL  848,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
42a 


My  ]io«aa  and  lat 
"In  WarveUe  on  Vendors,  f  185,  it  h 
said  that  a  description  as  'my  house  an^ 
lot'  imports  a  particular  house  and  lot  ren 
dered  certain  by  the  description  that  it  U 
the  one  that  belongs  to  'me.'"  Moayon  v 
Moayon,  72  8.  W.  38,  88,  114  Ky.  855,  60  L 
R.  A.  415,  102  Am.  8t  Rep.  803. 

My  land 

The  words  "my  land,"  prefixed  to  an  un 
certain  description  of  a  tract  of  land  in  i 
certain  section  wherein  a  testator  devising 
the  land  had  but  one  tract,  would  remove  thi 
uncertainty.  In  re  Lynch's  Estate,  75  Pac 
1086,  1088,  142  CaL  878. 

My  lesal  lieirs 

A  clause  in  a  will  providing  for  the  divl 
sion  of  property  among  "my  legal  heirs"  re 
fers  to  the  next  of  kin  and  legal  heirs  of  thf 
testator,  and  does  not  include  the  next  ol 
kin  or  legal  heirs  of  his  wife.  Miller  ▼.  Met 
calf,  58  Atl.  743,  744,  77  Conn.  176. 

My  moaeys»  bonds,  ete. 

A  bequest  to  a  hospital  of  "my  moneys 
bonds,  notes,  and  money  in  savings  bank* 
Included  railroad  stock  and  scrip,  when  con 
sidered  in  the  light  of  the  other  provlsloiu 
and  the  general  constnictlon  of  testator'^ 
will,  which  provided  for  the  payment  of  all 
testator's  debts  and  two  small  legacies,  thei 
disposed  of  testator's  live  stod^,  household 
furniture,  and  land  to  the  hospital,  whlcli 
left  to  be  disposed  of  merely  notes,  bonda 
money  in  savings  bank,  and  the  railroad 
stock  and  scrip;  the  stock  and  scrip  beini 
avails  of  the  bonds,  and  the  testator's  evi 
dent  intention  being  to  dispose  of  the  bulk 
of  his  whole  estate  to  the  hospltaL  Scovillc 
V.  Mason,  57  Aa  114,  115,  76  Conn.  450. 

My  property 

Testator  gave  all  "my^  furniture  and 
stock  and  the  farm  on  which  "I  now  reside" 
to  his  wife  for  life,  with  remainder  over,  and 
directed  that  all  legacies  should  be  paid  oat 
of  "my"  estate.  The  residuary  clause  par- 
ported  to  pass  only  "my"  property.  Held,  that 
the  will  disposed  only  of  testator's  separate 
property,  and  dfd  not  purport  to  dispose  ot 
community  property,  so  as  to  require  the 
wife  to  elect  whether  to  take  under  the  will 
or  her  own  property.  Sauvage  v.  Wauhop 
(Tex.)  143  S.  W.  259. 

"My  property,"  and  the  "property  I  pos- 
sess," mean  one  and  the  same  thing.  Thom- 
as y.  Blair,  85  South.  811,  818,  111  La.  e7& 

My  wife 

A  bequest  in  a  will  to  ''my  odd  wif^.  C" 
is  to  0.  as  testator's  wife,  and,  if  she  failed 
to  answer  that  description,  the  gift  to  her 
would  fall.  The  words  "my  wife,"  as  used 
here,  are  not  words  of  description  to  desig* 


MT 


616 


MTIZJTIS 


te  the  legatee,  but  rather  to  indicate  the 
aracter  or  capacity  in  which  alone  she 
Hid  take.  CoUard  t.  Gollard  (N.  J.)  67  AU. 
0.  102. 

IfywiU 

Insured  assigned  all  Ma  right,  title,  and 
terest  In  certain  life  insorance  policies  to 
nistees  to  be  named  in  my  wlllt**  for  plain- 


tiff's use.  Held  to  mean  the  trustees  named 
in  the  document  finally  admitted  to  probate 
as  the  will  of  insured.  Frost  v.  Frost,  88  N. 
B.  446,  202  Mass.  100,  27  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  18^ 
132  Am.  St  Rep.  47& 

MYELITIS 

As  disease^  see  Disease. 


N«P« 


616 


MAMB 


N 


'Ml 


N.  P. 

The  Initials  "N.  P.**  will  be  xecognised 
by  the  court  as  the  usual  and  ordinary  abbre- 
viation for  the  official  title  of  a  notary  pubUc. 
Towler  t.  Carlthers,  61  S.  B.  1182,  1188,  4 
6a.  App.  617;  WiUiams  t.  Lobban,  104  S.  W. 
58,  69,  206  Mo.  399  (citing  Sumner  t.  Mitch- 
ell,  10  South.  662,  29  Fla.  179, 14  L.  B.  A.  816, 
80  Am.  St  Bep.  106;  Rowley  t.  Berrian,  12 
lU.  198) ;  Worl^  t.  Adams,  69  8.  B.  929,  981, 
lUVa.79Ql 

N.W. 

The  abbreTiation  '"N.  W.**  in  the  column 
headed  *Tart  of  Section,"  is  sufficient  to 
identify  the  land  as  the  northwest  quarter  of 
the  section  named  in  the  assessment  roll. 
Beggs  T.  Paine,  109  N.  W.  822,  16  N.  D.  436 
(distinguishing  Power  t.  Bowdle,  64  N.  W. 
404,  406,  8  N.  D.  107,  21  L.  R.  A.  828,  44  Am. 
St  Bep.  611;  Power  ▼•  Larabee^  49  N.  W. 
724,  2  N.  D.  141). 

NAKED 

NAKED  POWEJBl 

A  '^naked  power,**  or  a  power  simply  col- 
lateral and  without  interest,  'is  when,  to  a 
mere  stranger,  authority  is  given  of  disposing 
of  an  interest,  in  which  he  had  not  before, 
nor  hath,  by  the  instrument  creating  the 
power,  any  estate  whatever."  Weaver  v. 
Bichards,  108  N.  W.  882,  887, 144  Mich.  896,  6 
L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  866  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Chancellor  Kent  in  Bergen  v. 
Bennett  [N.  YJ  1  Gaines  Gas.  1,  16,  2  Am. 
Dea  281). 

NAME 

See  Ohrlstian  Name;   Fictitious  Name; 

Good  Name;  Legal  Name;  Nickname; 

Surname;  Trade-Name. 
As  property,  see  Property. 
As  trade-mark,  see  Trade-Mark. 
Identity  of  names,  see  Idem  Sonans. 
Ignorant  of  name,  see  Ignorant      * 
Suffix  Sr.  as  part  of,  see  Sr. 

By  the  common  law  since  the  Norman 
Conquest,  a  legal  name  has  consisted  of  one 
"Christian  name,"  or  that  which  is  given  one 
after  ,his  birth  or  at  baptism,  or  is  afterwards 
assumed  by  him  in  addition  to  his  family 
name,  and  of  one  "surname,"  or  family  name, 
which  Is  that  derived  from  the  common  name 
of  his  parents,  or  borne  by  him  in  common 
with  other  members  of  his  family.  Schaffer 
T.  Levenson  Wrecking  Ga,  81  Att.  434,  82  N. 
J.  Law,  61. 

In  law,  the  name  of  a  person  consists  of 
one  given  name  and  one  surname;  the  two, 
using  the  given  name  first  and  the  surname 


last,  oonstltottng  sndi  poroonls  legal 
and  to  be  ignorant  of  either  the  given  or  su 
name  is  to  be  ignorant  of  the  person's  nan 
within  Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  148,  providing  tha 
when  plaintifl  shall  be  ignorant  of  the  nan 
of  a  defendant,  such  defendant  may  be  de 
ignated  in  any  pleading  or  proceeding  by  ao 
name  and  description,  and  that,  when  hi 
true  name  Is  discovered,  the  pleadinsr  <v  P» 
ceeding  may  be  amended  according^,  an 
that  plaintilf  must  state  in  the  veriflcation  c 
his  petition  that  he  could  not  discover  tt 
true  name,  and  the  summons  must  contal 
the  words  ''zeal  name  unknown"  and  a  cop 
thereof  be  perscmally  served  upon  defaidan 
McNamara  v.  Ounderaon,  181  N.  W.  188, 18< 
89  Neb.  112. 

•*The  word  'Junior,'  'Jr.,*  or  words  c 
similar  import  are  ordinarily  mere  matters  o 
description,  and  form  no  part  of  a  person' 
legal  'name^'  and  to  omit  or  add  sndi  appeUi 
tion  or  cognomen  is  harmless  error,  both  1 
civil  and  in  criminal  proceeding.**  Wlndoi 
V.  State,  72  S.  W.  193, 194,  44  Tex.  Or.  B.  61^ 

FoUbmm 

,  In  giving  constructive  notice  to  a  defend 
ant  not  sued  on  a  written  instrum^it  signe 
by  himself,  his  legal  name  includes  his  fnl 
first  Christian  name  and  surname.  Bntler  i 
Smith,  120  N.  W.  1106,  1107,  84  Neb.  78,  2 
L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  436. 

On  service  by  publication  on  defendant  i 
a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  where  he  is  nc 
sued  on  a  written  instrument  signed  by  him 
self,  notice  to  "B.  B.  Ballard**  not  ahowla 
his  Christian  name  is  insufficient  McCab 
V.  Bquitable  Land  Co.,  129  N.  W.  HUB,  1011 
88  Neb.  468. 

As  indleatins  identity 

A  person's  name  is  the  designation  b, 
which  he  is  known  and  called  in  the  communi 
ty  in  which  he  lives  andis  best  known.  Lose 
V.  Plainfield  Savings  Bank,  128  N.  W.  UOl 
1108, 149  Iowa,  672,  81  L.  B.  A.  (N.  &)  1112. 

The  word  "name"  is  defined  as  "a  wort 
by  which  a  person  or  thing  Is  denoted ;  th 
word  or  words  by  which  an  Individual,  pei 
son,  or  thing,  or  class  of  persons  or  things 
is  designated  and  distinguished  from  others. 
Koth  V.  Pallachucola  Club,  61  8.  EL  77,  7S 
79  S.  C.  614;  Uihlein  v.  Gladieux,  78  N.  £ 
363,  366,  74  Ohio  St  282  (citing  Bouv.  Lai 
Diet  467). 

A  "name**  Is  a  word  or  words,  desigiu 
tion,  or  appellation  used  to  disttngnlflh  a  pei 
son  or  thing  or  class  from  others,  and  word 
indicated  by  single  letters  are  only  less  adapt 
ed  to  that  purpose  than  words  indicate 
by  several  letters.  Griffith  v.  Bonawits,  10 
N.  W.  327,  329,  73  Neb.  622. 

'*A  man's  'name*  \a  simply  the  sound  <» 
sounds  by  which  he  Is  commonly  desigiuito 


KAICE 


617 


NATKkK 


his  f  ellowB,  and  by  which  they  distinguish 
m.  It  l8  a  mere  means  of  description. 
»metimes  a  man  is  known  by  several  dlf- 
rent  names,  and  It  was  formerly  the  costom, 

drawing  Indictments,  to  charge  him  under 
i  the  names  by  which  he  was  known,  con- 
cting  them  with  the  words  'alias  dictus,' 

with  simply  'alias.*  These  words  mean 
herwlse  called*  or  'otherwise.*  *'  State  v. 
)ward,  77  Pac.  60,  61,  30  Mont  618. 

An  indictment  for  rape  on  an  illegitimate 
lid,  whose  mother  married  when  tlie  child 
\a  three  years  old,  which  glyes  as  the  sur- 
nie  of  the  child  the  surname  of  the  hus- 
Dd  of  th«  mother,  is  sttffldlently  supported 
proof  that  after  the  marriage  the  child 
Ls  generally  known  by  such  name;  a  has- 
rd  not  necessarily  bearing  its  mother's 
me ;  a  "name**  b^ng  one  or  more  words  to 
signate  a  person  or  thing.  People  v.  Gray, 
N.  E.  268,  278,  261  IlL  431. 

IClddle  name  or  faltlal 

It  is  necessary  in  court  proceedings  to 
rrectly  give  all  the  initials  in  a  person's 
me,  though  at  common  law  mistakes  in  a 
ddle  name  or  initial  were  not  materiaL 
may  t.  Bigham,  99  Pac.  21,  22,  61  Wash. 
2,  19  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  906. 

"The  common  law  recognizes  but  one 
ristian  'name,'  and  a  middle  initial  may 
dropped  or  changed  at  pleasure.  Its  pres- 
^  or  absence  or  difference  affects  nothing, 
tiile  a  letter  of  the  ali^abet  does  not  con- 
tute  a  name,  yet  the  initial  letter  of  the 
rlstian  name  is  so  commonly  used  that 
Is  to  be  regarded,  not  as  the  name  of  some 
ler  person,  but  as  an  abbreviation  of  the 
rlstian  name  of  the  person  intended."  II- 
ois  Cent  R.  Ck).  v.  Hasenwinkle,  83  N.  E>. 
),  816,  232  lU.  224, 16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  129. 

The  middle  name  \b  no  part  of  the  name, 
cl  under  Acts  33d  Gen.  Assem.  c  118,  relat- 
:  to  notice  to  owners  of  land  in  a  drainage 
trict,  a  notice  to  "EJmma  Forsythe  Jones,? 
ose  maiden  name  was  "FOrsythe,"  was  a 
Bdent  notice  to  "Bknma  Jones."  Collins 
Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Pottawattamie  County 
wa)  138  N.  W.  1095,  1097. 

LM£]> 

See  Herein  Named. 

A  trustee  who  Is  named  in  the  way  the 
tator  has  provided  to  perpetuate  the  trust 
"named  in  the  will,"  within  the  meaning 
Pub.  St  1901,  c.  185,  S  2,  cl.  12,  authorizing 
i  probate  court  to  appoint  the  trustees  nam- 
In  the  will.  Carr  v.  Coming,  62  Atl.  168, 
),  73  N.  H.  362. 

APHTHA 

A  commercial  comi)ound,  of  which  one  of 
i  substantial  parts  is  nai^ttia,  but  which, 
en  compounded  with  other  ingredients,  be- 
nes  a  distinct  product,  is  not  within  Bev. 
WB,  c  102,  §  106,  punishing  the  sale  or 


keeping  for  sale  of  "naphtha"  under  an  as- 
sumed name;  but  where  the  contributed 
parts  merely  supply  color  to  the  fluid,  with  a 
slight  thickening,  making  the  mixture  ad- 
hesive when  applied,  the  Jury  must  deter- 
mine whether  the  article  does  not  remain  es- 
sentially naphtha,  which  is  a  product  of  pe- 
troleum intermediate  between  the  associate 
products  of  gasoline  and  benzine,  all  of  which 
do  not  differ  in  their  essential  nature,  but 
vary  only  in  the  degree  of  Inflammability 
when  brought  into  contact  with  radiant  heat 
Gately  v.  Taylor,  97  N.  E.  619,  621,  2U  Mass. 
60,  39  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  472. 

NAPKIN 

As  printed  matter,  see  Printed  Matter. 

NARROW 

The  word  "narrow,**  as  used  in  the  def- 
inition of  "galloon"  as  a  "narrow,  tapelike 
fabric  used  for  binding  hats,  shoes,  etc.," 
is  a  relative  term  of  varying  meanings.  It 
Is  easy  to  ooneelve  of  a  tapelike  fabric  so 
narrow  as  to  come  within  the  definition,  and 
equally  easy  to  conceive  of  one  so  wide  that 
it  must  fall  without  it  There  is  nothing 
in  the  dictionary  which  indicates  just  where 
the  dividing  line  occurs.  Certain  woven  cot- 
ton articles,  from  1  to  2Mi  inches  wide,  chief- 
ly used  as  hat  bands  for  trimming  men's 
hats,  are  not  galloons,  under  Tariff  Act  Aug. 
28,  1894,  c.  349,  I  1,  Schedule  I,  par.  263, 
28  Stat  629.  United  States  v.  Walter  H. 
Oraef  ft  Co.,  127  Fed.  688,  689,  62  a  0.  A. 
414. 

NARROW  OHANHEI. 

"Narrow  channels,"  within  the  meaning 
of  article  25  of  the  inland  navigation  rules 
(Act  June  7,  1897,  30  Stat  96),  are  bodies 
of  water  navigated  up  and  down  in  opposite 
directions,  and  do  not  include  harbor  wa- 
ters, with  piers  on  each  side,  where  the  ne- 
cessities of  commerce  require  navigation  in 
every  conceivable  direction.  Tested  by  such 
rule,  the  Hudson  river  above  Tw^ity-Third 
street.  New  York,  and  within  the  city  limits 
is  not  a  narrow  channeL  The  Number  4, 
161  red.  847,  860,  88  C.  C.  A.  666;  The  Is- 
lander, 162  Fed.  386,  386,  81  C.  C.  A.  611. 

The   Hudson    river   in   the    vicinity    of 
Tonkers,  where  it  has   a   single  deep   and 
straight  channel  for  a  number  of  miles,   is 
a  "narrow  channel,"  within  the  meaning  of 
the  inland  navigation  rules.    The  Benjamin 
Franklin,  146  Fed.   18,  15,  76  a  a  A.   43. 

NATION 

See  Comity  of  Nations. 

**The  terms  'state'  and  ^nation*  are  ose^ 
in  the  law  of  nations,  as  well  as  In  comxx^OY^ 
parlance,  as  importing  tbe  same  thing;     a'kx^ 
imply  a   body   of  men,    united  together,       "to 
procure  their  mutual  safety   and  advai^*^«S^ 
by  means  of  their   union.      Sncb  a  Bcx^l^^t:^ 


KATIOK 


518 


NATIVE  WINK 


has  its  affairs  and  interests  to  manage;  it 
deliberates,  and  takes  resolutions  In  com- 
mon, and  thus  becomes  a  moral  person,  hav- 
ing an  understanding  and  a  will  peculiar  to 
itself,  and  is  susceptible  of  obligations  and 
laws."  Cherokee  Nation  t.  Georgia,  5  Pet 
1,  52,  8  L.  Bd.  25  (Thompson,  J.,  dissenting). 

The  term  "nation,"  as  applied  to  the  In- 
dian nations,  means  a  people  distinct  from 
others.  The  Indians  have  always  been  re- 
garded as  having  a  semi-independent  posi- 
tion when  they  preserved  their  tribal  rela- 
tions, not  as  states,  not  as  nations,  not  as 
possessed  of  the  full  attributes  of  sovereign- 
ty, but  as  a  separate  people,  with  the  pow- 
ers of  regulating  their  internal  and  social 
relations,  and  thus  far  not  brought  under 
the  laws  of  the  Union,  or  of  the  state  with- 
in whose  limits  they  reside.  Glenn-Tucker 
V.  Clayton,  70  S.  W.  8,  18,  4  Ind.  T.  511. 

NATIONAI.  BANK 

A  "National  bank"  is  a  corporation,  the 
powers  of  which  are  defined  and  limited  by 
the  acts  of  Congress  authorizing  the  creation 
of  such  institutions.  Hansford  v.  National 
Bank  of  Tif  ton,  78  S.  B.  405,  406, 10  Ga.  App. 
270. 

"National  banks"  are  federal  instrumen- 
talities, subject  to  the  paramount  authority 
of  the  United  States.  An  attempt  by  a  state 
to  define  their  duties,  or  control  the  con- 
duct of  their  affairs,  is  abisolutely  void  wher- 
ever such  attempted  exercise  of  the  author- 
ity conflicts  with  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  and  either  frustrates  the  purpose  of 
the  national  legislation,  or  impairs  the  effi- 
ciency of  those  agencies  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment to  discharge  the  duties  for  the  per- 
formance of  which  they  were  created.  Schles- 
inger  v.  Kelly,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  1083, 1087,  114 
App.  Div.  546  (citing  Easton  v.  Iowa,  23  Sup. 
Ct  288,  188  U.  S.  220,  47  L.  Ed.  452;  Davis 
V.  Elmira  Savings  Bank,  16  Sup.  Ct  502, 161 
U.  S.  275,  40  L.  Ed.  700). 

"'National  banks'  are  instrumentalities 
of  the  federal  government,  created  for  a 
public  purpose,  and  as  such  necessarily  sub- 
ject to  the  paramount  authority  of  the  Unit- 
ed States."  The  coverture  of  the  legatee  of 
shares  of  stock  in  a  national  bank,  when 
her  name  was  placed  upon  the  bank's  books 
as  a  stockholder,  and  when  she  received  the 
certificate  of  stodc,  does  not  protect  her 
against  a  personal  judgment  at  law  for  the 
amount  due  as  a  shareholder  under  an  as- 
sessment made  by  the  Ck>mptroller  of  the 
Currency  to  pay  the  debts  of  the  bank,  al- 
though a  married  woman  may  be  incapa- 
ble, under  the  local  law,  if  making  or  bind- 
ing herself  personally  by  contract,  if  such 
law  does  not  incapacitate  her  from  becom- 
ing an  owner  of  such  stock,  by  bequest  or 
otherwise.  Christopher  v.  Norvell,  26  Sup. 
Ct  502,  505,  201  U.  S.  216,  50  L.  Ed.  732,  6 
Ann.  Cas.  740  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion In  Davis  v.  Elmlni  Sav.  Bank,  16  Sup. 


Ct  502,  508,  161  U.  S.  275,  283,  40  L.  Ed. 

700,  701). 

"For  some  purposes  a  'national  bank'  Is 
a  public  institution,  notwithstanding  it  is 
the  subject  of  private  ownership.  It  may 
issue  bills,  which  circulate  as  part  of  the 
currency  of  the  country.  It  Is  subject  to  ex- 
amination, and,  in  a  large  measure,  to  the 
supervision,  of  the  (Comptroller  of  the  Cur- 
rency. It  is  examined  at  stated  periods,  and 
may  be  the  subject  of  special  examination 
by  order  of  the  Comptroller.  But  it  is  own- 
ed by  shareholders,  like  other  banking  in- 
stitutions." Any  legal  right  which  a  stock- 
holder of  a  "national  bank"  may  have  to 
obtain  an  inspection  of  its  books  may  be  en- 
forced in  the  state  courts  by  mandamus,  In 
view  of  the  provision  of  the  act  of  August 
13,  1888  (25  Stat  483,  c.  806),  that,  for  ac- 
tions against  national  banks  at  law  or  in 
equity,  they  shall  be  deemed  citizens  of  the 
state  in  which  thoy  are  located,  and  that  in 
such  cases  the  federal  circuit  and  district 
courts  shall  have  jurisdiction  only  as  in 
cases  between  individual  citizens  of  the  same 
state.  Guthrie  v.  Harkness,  !f&  Sup.  Ct  4, 
7,  199  U.  S.  148,  50  L.  Ed.  130,  4  Ann.  Cas. 
433. 

"A  'national  bank'  is  an  instrumentality 
of  the  United  States;  its  circulating  notes 
are  guaranteed  by  the  United  States;  and 
if  the  United  States  should  be  compelled  to 
pay  them,  the  United  States  has  a  para- 
mount lien  on  the  assets  of  the  bank  for  re- 
imbursement The  administration  of  the 
bank's  assets  is  therefore  vested  in  the 
Comptroller  of  the  Currency  as  an  officer  of 
the  United  States.  He  appoints  the  receiver, 
and  directs  his  acts.  The  individual  liabili- 
ty of  a  stockholder  can  only  be  enforced  by 
his  order.  The  provision  is  as  much  for  the 
benefit  of  the  stockholders  as  for  the  United 
States,  and  it  is  indiq;)ensable  to  the  bring- 
ing of  a  suit  against  the  stockholder.  In 
other  words,  the  liability  dates  from  the  or- 
der of  the  (Comptroller."  Bankin  v.  Barton, 
26  Sup.  Ct  29,  30,  199  U.  S.  228,  50  L.  £». 
168. 

NATIONAI.  BANK  NOTES 

As  legal  tender,  see  Legal  Tender. 

NATIONAL  BANK  OFFIOEB 

See  Officer  (of  corporation). 

NATIVE 

NAnVE  WINE 

The  words  "native  wine,"  as  used  In 
Rev.  Laws,  c.  100,  |  1,  prohibiting  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquor  without  a  license,  ex- 
cept "sales  by  the  makers  thereof  of  native 
wine  or  of  dder  manufactured  in  this  com- 
monwealth," mean  wine  made  in  the  ooounon- 
wealth,  and  not  wine  made  in  any  of  the 
states  in  the  Union.  Commonwealth  t»  Pe- 
tranlch,  66  N.  E.  807, 188  Mass.  217. 


MATUBAIi 


619 


NATURAIi  OONSEQGSNCJEB 


NATURAL 

An  Instractlon  that  no  form  of  words 
was  necessary  to  constitute  a  contract,  but 
that,  if  the  ^'natural"  inference  from  what 
appeared  to  have  passed  between  the  parties 
was  .that  their  minds  met  presently  in  an 
agreement,  a  valid  contract  was  made,  what- 
ever might  have  been  the  verbal  expression 
used,  is  not  prejudicial  because  of  the  use  of 
the  word  "natural"  Instead  of  the  better 
word  "reasonable."  An  inference  can  hard- 
ly be  reasonable  without  being  natural  Sic- 
ard  V.  Albenberg  Go^  118  N.  W.  179,  180,  186 
Wis.  622. 

HATlTBAIi  AFFBOTIOK 

"Natural  affection"  is  such  as  naturally 
exists  between  near  relatives,  as  a  father  and 
child,  brother  and  sister,  husband  and  wife, 
and  it  is  regarded  in  law  as  a  good  considera- 
tion. The  word  "father"  is  interchangeable 
with  "mother"  in  so  far  as  relationship  is 
concerned,  and  the  presumable  natural  af- 
fection of  a  child  for  the  mother  is  a  good 
consideration  to  support  a  contract  Worth 
V.  Daniel,  67  S.  B.  898,  900,  1  Oa.  App.  15 
(quoting  and  adopting  definitions  in  2  Bout, 
Law  Diet  p.  269;  Black's  Law  Diet  6). 

KATVBAI.  BOUKBABT 

Courses  and  distances  must,  as  a  gener- 
al rule,  give  way  to  a  call  for  a  natural 
boundary,  because  a  natural  boimdary,  if 
fixed,  is  unchangeable,  and  more  likely  to  be 
the  true  call  than  courses  and  distances.  A 
well-known  and  established  line  of  an  adja- 
cent tract  is  a  "natural  boundary"  within 
the  rule  that  courses  and  distances  give  way 
to  a  natural  boundary,  because  the  line  is 
more  certain  than  course  and  distance.  Wil- 
son Lumber  &  Milling  Co.  v.  Button  &  Bour- 
bonnais^  68  S.  E.  2,  4,  152  N.  C.  537. 

The  line  of  another  tract  of  land  is  a 
**natnral  boundary"  if,  at  the  time  a  deed 
calling  for  it  is  made;  the  line  Is  indicated  by 
visible  marks,  so  that  it  can  be  identified 
and  located,  or  if  it  can  be  otherwise  located 
with  reasonable  certainty.  Lance  v.  Rum- 
bough,  68  S.  O.  857,  360^  150  N.  0.  19. 

HATURAX.  0ATJ8B8 

Other  natural  causes,  see  Other. 

"It  is  not  essential  that  the  negligence 
should  be  the  direct  cause  of  the  injury.  It 
suffices  that  it  is  the  natural  and  probable 
cause.  It  is  the  'natural  cause'  when  either 
it  acts  directly  in  producing  the  injury,  or 
sets  in  motion  other  causes  so  producing  it 
and  forming  a  continuous  chain  in  natural 
sequence  down  to  the  injury,  thus  linking  the 
negligence  with  the  injury  by  a  chain  of 
natural  and  consequential  causation,  al- 
though the  former  may  be  neither  tlie  imme- 
diate nor  the  direct  cause  of  the  event  *  But 
such  causation  cannot  be  proximate  cause  in 
law  to  arouse  liability,  unless  an  ordinarily 
prudent  and  intelligent  person  ought,  in  the 


exercise  of  such  intelligenoe,  to  have  foreseen 
that  an  injury  might  probably  result  from 
the  negligence  under  like  circumstances." 
Meyer  v.  Milwaukee  Electric  By.  A  Light  Co., 
93  N.  W.  6,  8,  116  Wis.  336  (citing  Deisen- 
rieter  v.  Kraus-Merkel  Malting  Co.,  72  N^  W. 
735,  97  Wis.  279;  Dehsoy  v.  light  Co.,  85  N. 
W.  973,  110  Wis.  412;  Seaver  v.  Town  of 
Union,  89  N.  W.  163,  113  Wis.  322). 

NATUBAIi  OEMEKT 

"Natural  cement* *  is  the  quick-setting 
product  of  a  low  temperature  kiln  burning 
a  cement  rock  of  irregular  composition. 
Donaldson  v.  Roksament  Stone  Co.,  170  Fed. 
192,  193. 

KATUBAI.  OONBrnOK 

The  phrase  "natural  condition,"  in  an 
ordinance  requiring  any  person  who  opens  or 
excavates  a  highway  to  restore  the  same  to 
Its  "natural  condition,"  is  applicable  to  the 
erection  of  electric  light  poles,  as  the  phrase 
means  only  that  the  street  is  to  be  restored 
to  the  condition  which  is  natural  to  the 
street  with  the  contemplated  improvements 
for  which  the  excavation  is  required.  "No 
street  that  has  been  improved  at  all  is,  strict- 
ly speaking,  in  a  'natural  condition*;  it  can 
only  be  in  a  condition  natural  to  a  street" 
Cook  V.  North  Bergen  Tp.,  59  Aa  1035,  1036, 
72  N.  J.  Law,  119. 

KATURAI.   OOVUBQXnSNCEM 

A  "natural  consequence"  of  an  act  is  the 
consequence  which  ordinarily  follows  it ;  the 
result  which  may  reasonably  be  anticipated 
from  it  The  Santa  Rita,  173  Fed.  413,  417 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Cole  v. 
German  Savings  &  Loan  Soc.,  124  Fed.  115, 
59  C.  C.  A.  595,  63  L.  R.  A.  416). 

"A  'natural  consequence'  is  one  which 
has  followed  from  the  original  act  complain- 
ed of,  in  the  usual,  ordinary,  and  experienced 
course  of  events;  a  result,  therefore^  which 
might  reasonably  have  been  anticipated  or 
expected.  Natural  consequences^  however,  do 
not  necessarily  include  all  such  as,  upon  a 
calculation  of  chances,  would  be  found  pos- 
sible of  occurrence,  or  such  as  extreme  pru- 
dence might  anticipate,  but  only  those  which 
ensue  from  the  original  act  without  any 
such  extraordinary  coincidence  or  conjunc- 
tion of  circumstances  as  that  the  usual  course 
of  nature  should  seem  to  have  been  departed 
from."  Winfree  v.  Jones,  61  S.  O.  153,  154, 
104  Va.  39,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  201  (quoting 
and  adopting  definition  in  Watson,  Damages, 
§33). 

For  the  purpose  of  civil  liability,  those 
consequences,  and  those  only,  are  deemed 
"natural"  and  probable  which  a  person  of 
average  competence  and  knowledge,  being  in 
the  like  case  with  the  person  whose  conduct 
is  complained  of,  and  liaving  the  like  oppor- 
tunities of  observation,  might  be  expected  to 
foresee  as  likely  to  follow  such  conduct  The 
doctrine  of  "natural  and  probable"  conse- 


NATURAL  CONSEQUENCES 


520 


NATURAL  JUSTICE 


quences  is  illustrated  in  the  law  of  negli- 
gence, and  there  the  substance  of  the  wrong 
itself  is  failure  to  act  with  due  foresight 
The  negligent  delay  of  a  carrier  in  moying 
goods  intrusted  to  it  for  transportation,  not 
so  unreaaonable  as  to  amount  to  a  conyer- 
sion,  would  not  raider  it  liable  for  the  loss 
of  the  goods  after  they  hare  been  carried 
to  their  destination,  if  they  are  there  de- 
stroyed by  an  act  of  God  before  delivery. 
Rodgers  ▼.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Go.,  88  Pac.  886, 
76  Eiin.  222,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  668,  121  Am. 
St.  Rep.  416,  12  Ann.  Cas.  441  (quoting  with 
approval  from  Pollock,  Torts). 

For  damages  to  be  the  "natural  and  prox- 
ixpate  consequence"  of  a  breach  of  contract 
of  carriage  by  failure  to  deliver  the  goods 
within  a  reasonable  time,  the  loss  must  be 
immediately  connected  with  the  supposed 
cause  of  it,  and,  if  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
events  a  certain  result  usually  follows  from 
a  given  cause,  the  immediate  relation  of  the 
one  to  the  other  is  established.  Williams  v. 
Atlantic  Ck>ast  line  R.  Co.,  48  South.  209, 
212.  66  Fla.  735,  24  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  134,  181 
Am.  St  Rep.  169  (citing  Michigan  Gent  R. 
Go.  V.  Burrows,  33  Mich.  Q. 

KATUBAI.  BitAnr 

As  used  in  Laws  1910,  c.  183,  which  cre- 
ates a  special  drainage  district  to  provide  ef- 
fectual drainage  by  artificial  drains  or  other 
drainage  facilities,  and  provides  for  a  cohi* 
mission  to  develop  a  drainage  system  by 
artificial  canals  and  by  improving  all  natural 
drains,  the  words  "natural  drains"  mean  a 
natural  water  course,  including  creeks, 
streams,  brooks,  or  rivers,  and  the  act  is 
therefore  in  violation  of  (}onst  §  90,  par.  ''q," 
prohibiting  the  Legislatuie  from  passing  spe- 
cial laws  relating  to  water  courses.  Belzoni 
Drainage  Commission  v.  Winn,  68  South.  778, 
779,  98  Miss.  369. 

NATURAL  EFFECT 

The  rule  of  law  requires  that  the  dam- 
ages recoverable  from  a  wrongdoer  must  be 
the  natural  and  proximate  effects  of  his  de- 
linquency. The  term  "natural"  imports  that 
they  are  such  as  might  reasonably  have  been 
foreseen.  Smith  v.  Public  Service  Corpora- 
tion of  New  Jersey,  76  Ati.  937,  938,  78  N.  J. 
Law,  478,  20  Ann.  Cas.  161. 

NATURAL  FLOWERS 

Statice  wreaths,  which  have  all  the  ap- 
pearance of  "natural  flowers  •  •  ♦  pre- 
served," are  dutiable  under  the  enumeration 
of  such  articles  in  Tariff  Act  July  24, 1897,  a 
11,  I  1,  Schedule  G,  par.  261,  30  Stat  170. 
Bayersdorfer  A  Co.  v.  United  States,  171  Fed. 
286,287. 

NATURAL  FOOL 

A  "natural  fool"  is  one  that  hath  no 
understanding  of  his  nativity  and  therefore 
is  liy  law  presumed  never  likely  to  obtain 
any.    Hauber  ▼•  Leibold,   107  N.  W.  10i2, 


1044,  76  Neb.  706  (quoting  and  adopting  M 
nition  of  Blackstone,  dted  in  Clark  y.  Robij 
son,  88  HL  408,  60S9* 

NATURAL  OAS 

Aa  mineral,  see  MineraL 
As    property,    see    Personal    Propertj 
Property. 

"Natural  gas"  is  a  mineral,  and  is  a  pai 
of  the  land  until  severed.  Osbom  v.  Arkai 
sas  Territorial  Oil  ft  Gaa  Co^  146  &  W.  12 
124,  108  Ark.  176. 

NATURAL  GUARDIAN 

The  father  is  the  "natural  guardian**  c 
his  chUd.  In  re  Knott,  126  N.  W.  1040, 104! 
162  Mich,  la 

Under  Kirby's  Dig.  1 3767,  and  under  tti 
common  law,  the  father,  unless  ineompetei 
or  unfit,  is  the  "natural  guardian"  and  ei 
titied  to  the  care,  custody,  and  education  c 
his  minor  children,  and,  even  as  between  tl: 
fiither  and  the  mother,  the  custody  In  tli 
father  is  generally  allowed  unless  the  chlh 
on  account  of  tender  years,  or  being  a  f( 
male,  imperatively  requires  that  attentio 
which  a  mother  only  can  supply.  But  b< 
tween  the  parent  and  the  grandparent  or  an 
one  else,  the  law  prefers  the  former  as  cui 
todian  of  the  child,  unless  the  permit  ia  ii 
competent,  or  unfit  because  of  his  or  her  poi 
erty  or  depravity  to  provide  the  proper  phyt 
ical  comforts  and  moral  training.  Baker  y 
Durham,  120  S.  W.  789,  790,  96  Ark.  656. 

NATURAL  IN0RZIA8S 

Testator  devised  shares  of  stock  of 
corporation  in  trust  to  pay  to  his  daughtc 
the  income  during  life,  and  at  her  death  t 
divide  the  same  between  her  children  an 
grandchildren.  After  testator^s  death,  tli 
corporation  issued  additional  shares  under 
resolution  reciting  that  it  accumulated  a  sni 
plus,  and  that  it  was  desirable  to  increae 
the  capital  to  a  certaiii  sum,  and  that  addj 
tional  shares  to  the  amount  of  the  aurpla 
capitalized  be  issued  to  the  stodsholden 
Held,  that  under  Civ.  Code  1910,  f  3667,  pre 
viding  that  the  natural  increase  of  the  prof 
erty  belongs  to  the  tenant  for  life,  and  ai^ 
extraordinary  accumulation  goes  to  the  re 
mainderman,  the  additional  shares  attache 
to  the  corpus  can  go  to  the  remainderman 
the  words  "natural  increase  ct  the  property, 
as  applied  to  corporate  stock,  meaning  divl 
dends.  Jadcson  v.  Maddox,  70  S.  E7.  866,  86( 
136  Qa.  31,  Ann.  Cas.  1912B,  1216. 

NATURAL  JUSTICE 

By  "natural  Justice,"  in  the  role  tiial 
where  one  makes  a  will  contrary  to  natura 
justice,  that  fact  may  be  considered  witJ 
other  facts,  means  that  which  la  founded  ii 
equity,  honesty,  and  right,  and  "natural  Jaa 
tice"  requlrea  that  a  parent  shall  care  foi 
his  children.  The  fftct  that  testatrix,  7< 
yenrs  of  age^  gave  the  bulk  of  her  pvopertg 


KATOBAL  LIFE 


S2l 


NATURAL  PREMIUM 


%  public  library  to  the  exduckm  of  her 
i  sisters  and  her  brother  liiing  in  other 
es  did  not  show  lack  of  testamentary  ca- 
ity;  there  having  been  litigation  tending 
unbitter  them,  and  their  relations  not  be- 
intimate.  Spencer  v.  Terrjr'B  Bstate^  94 
W.  372,  374,  133  Mich.  30. 

TURAXi  UFB 

See  Daring  Natural  Life;  Imprisonment 
for  life  or  Less  Than  Natural  Life; 
Quarterly  During  His  Natural  Ufa 

TURJkli  MOHUMEHT 

The  limitation  on  the  rule  that  a  body 
water  appearing  on  the  original  govern- 
it  sorrey  and  plat  as  the  boundary  of  a 
;:t  of  land  is  a  ''natural  monument,"  and 
I  constitute  the  boundary,  however  dis- 
t  from  the  poaition  indicated  for  it  by  the 
mder  line,  and  that,  where  the  meander 
i  is  drawn  on  one  aide  of  one  of  the  reg- 
r  surrey  lines,  the  one-quarter  line,  or  the 
-sixteenth  line,  the  boundaries  cannot  be 
ended  across  such  line  to  reach  the  wa- 

front,  especially  if  soch  survey  line  ap- 
rs  on  the  government  plat  as  a  boundary 
%  lot  conveyed  to  another,  is  inapplicable, 
ere,  though  in  some  places  the  meander 
»  falls  south  of  the  east  and  west  one- 
teenth  line  and  west  of  the  north  and 
th  one-sixteenth  line^  yet  at  other  points 
located  north  of  the  one  and  east  of  the 
er,  thus  conclusively  refuting  the  infer- 
e  that  the  government  intended  that  the 

line  should  be  confined  within  either  pf 
h  one-sixteenth  linea     Brown  v.  Dunn, 

N.  W.  1007,  1008. 135  Wis.  374. 

The  mouth  of  the  second  right-hand  fork 
a  stream  called  for  in  a  survey  is  a  "nat- 
1,  indestructible  monument,"  which  will 
vail  over  courses  and  distances.  Morgan 
Renfro,  00  S.  W.  311,  313,  124  Ky.  314. 

lTitraXi  mother 

Mother  as  including,  see  Mother. 

lTURAL  ORJEOT  of  KI8  ROURTT 

If  a  person  has  sufficient  capacity  to 
uprehend  perfectly  the  condition  of  his 
perty,  his  relations  to  the  persons  who 
old  or  should  or  might  be  the  objects  of 

bounty,  and  the  scope  and  power  of  the 
tvisions  of  his  will,  he  has  testamentary 
»acity;  the  term  ''natural  objects  of  his 
mty*'  does  not  mean  that  he  should  know 
i  recognize  every  distant  relative  who  is 
it  led  to  inherit  from  him  under  the  exist- 
:  canons  of  descent,  and  does  not  include 
isins  to  the  second  and  remoter  degrees 
propinquity,  but  refers  to  his  near  rela- 
es.  In  re  Campbell's  Will,  138  N.  T.  Supp. 
W,  1007. 

LTURAI.   ORUOATIOir 

'*!  think  it  incontestably  true  that  the 
tural  obligation'  of  private  contracts  be- 
een  individuals  in  iociety  ceases  and  is 


converted  into  a  civil  obligation,  by  the  very 
act  of  surrendering  the  right  and  powtf  of 
enforcing  performance  into  the  hands  of  the 
government  The  right  and  power  of  enforc- 
ing perfiormance  exists,  as  I  think  all  must 
admit,  only  in  the  law  of  the  land,  and  the 
obligation  resulting  from  this  condition  is  a 
dvil  obligation."  Ogden  v.  Saunders,  12 
Wheat.  213,  320,  6  L.  Bd.  006  (per  Trimble, 
J.,  dissenting). 

NATURAL  OFPSPRmO 
As  kelr 

A  deed  of  land  to  a  woman  and  her  '^chil- 
dren, the  natural  offspring  of  her  body,"  cre- 
ates an  estate  tail,  the  quoted  words  being 
equivalent  to  the  expression  "heirs  of  her 
body,"  whidi  estate  by  statute  is  dianged  to 
a  life  estate  in  the  first  holder  with  a  re- 
mainder in  fee  to  the  first  taker  after  ter- 
mination of  the  life  estate  Dempaey  v.  Da- 
vis»  136  S.  W.  075,  076^  08  Ark.  570. 

NATURAL  PERSON 

Corporatloo  distinguished,  see  Corpora- 
tion. 

Under  the  bankruptcy  act  providing  that 
any  "natural  person*'  may  be  adjudged  an  in- 
voluntary bankrupt,  the  word  '*person"  does 
not  include  an  Infant  or  a  lunatic  In  re 
Kehler,  153  Fed.  235,  237. 

"  'Natural  persons'  are  such  as  the  God 
of  nature  formed  us."  A  "natural  person"  is 
a  man,  woman,  or  child.  John  C  Orr  Co.  v. 
Cushman,  104  N.  Y.  Supp.  510,  511,  54  Misc. 
Etep.  121  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Blackstone  and  2  Abb.  Law  Diet  p.  151). 

The  provision  of  the  bankrupt  act  ex- 
empting a  person  engaged  chiefly  in  farming 
from  liability  to  be  adjudged  a  bankrupt  does 
not  apply  to  a  corporation.  The  use  of  the 
phrase  "natural  person,"  when  construed  in 
connection  with,  the  i^vase  "except  wage- 
earners  and  those  chiefly  engaged  in  farm- 
ing," and  all  that  follows  it,  excludes  corpo- 
rations from  the  exception.  In  re  Lake 
Jackson  Sugar  Co.,  120  Fed.  640,  648. 

NATURAL  POaaSBSION 

"Natural  possession"  is  that  by  which  a 
man  detains  a  thing  corporeally,  as  by  occu- 
pying a  house,  cultivating  ground,  or  retain- 
ing a  movable  possession.  Oiv.  Code,  art. 
3428.  Such  a  possession  in  its  nature  must 
be  visible,  open,  and  public.  Albert  Hanson 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Baldwin  Lumber  Co.,  52  South. 
537,  530,  126  La.  347. 

NATURAL  PREmUM 

The  term  "natural  premium  plan,"  is 
used  in  the  law  of  insurance  to  represent 
what  is  commonly  known  as  the  "assessment 
plan,"  or  the  writing  of  insurance  by  com- 
panies limiting  th«ir  assessments  to  sucb 
sum  as  is  necessary  to  cover  the  actual  coet 
of  insurance  from  one  renewal  period  to  an- 
other.   Westerman  v.  Supreme  Lodge  Knights 


I; 


NATURAL  BIGHTS 


522 


NATURAL  WATBR  COURSE 


of  Pytbias,  94  8.  W.  470,  481,  196  Mo.  070,  6 
U  R.  A  (N.  S.)  1114. 

NATURAL  RIGHTS 

The  rigbt  to  demand  that  property  pass 
by  inheritance  or  will  is  a  ''natural"  and  in- 
herent right,  which  cannot  be  wholly  taken 
away  or  substantially  Impaired  by  the  Legis- 
lature, but  is  subject  only  to  reasonable  reg- 
ulation. Nunnemacher  v.  State^  108  N.  W. 
627,  628,  129  Wis.  190,  9  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  121, 
9  Ann.  €as.  711.  But  see  Magoun  t.  Illinois 
Trust  A  Sav.  Bank,  18  Sup.  Ot  694,  696,  170 
U.  a  283,  42  L.  Ed.  1037;  PuUen  v.  Wake 
County  Com'rs,  66  N.  0.  361,  363. 

NATURAL  STATE 

See  Arrowroot  in  Its  Natural  State. 
Pearls  in  their  natural  state^  see  Pearl. 

Hanks  and  balls  of  dried  and  salted  cab- 
bage, the  salting  and  manipulation  of  which 
were  done  as  a  preparation,  fitting  the  cab- 
bage for  cooking  purposes,  and  intended  to  be 
permanent,  are  dutiable  as  vegetables  "pre- 
pared or  preserved,"  under  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1897,  c.  11,  t  1,  Schedule  G,  par.  241,  30 
Stat  170,  and  not  as  vegetables  in  their  "nat- 
ural state,"  under  paragraph  267,  80  Stat 
171.  Sun  Kwong  On  ▼.  United  States,  177 
Fed.  696,  696. 

NATURAL  WANT 

A  finding  of  the  master  directed  to  find 
and  report  whether  an  upper  proprietor's  use 
of  a  stream  by  maintaining  a  dam  across  it 
was  reasonable,  that  the  stream  was  so  small 
that  the  amount  of  water  flowing  in  it  during 
certain  seasons  of  the  year  was  barely  suffi- 
cient under  the  best  conditions  to  supply  the 
"natural"  wants  of  the  users  thereof,  was  a 
finding  that  the  upper  proprietor's  use  was 
unreasonable  because  the  stream  was  so 
small  that  at  times  it  furnished  barely 
enough  water  for  the  domestic  uses  of  lower 
proprietors;  the  term  "natural  wants'*  design 
natlng  domestic  uses.  Lawrie  v.  Sillsby,  74 
Aa  94,  95,  82  Vt  505. 

NATURAL  WATER  COURSE 

See,  also.  Water  Course. 

A  "natural  water  course"  \s  a  stream 
having  defined  bounds  and  continuity  of  flow. 
Jennings  v.  Bohner,  134  N.  Y.  Supp.  943,  944. 

A  "natural  water  course"  is  a  natural 
stream  flowing  in  a  deflnlte  bed  or  channel 
with  banks  and  sides,  and  having  a  perma- 
nent source  of  supply.  McHenry  v.  City  of 
Parkersburg,  66  S.  B.  750,  753,  66  W.  Va.  533, 
29  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  860  (dtlng  2  Bouv.  Law 
Diet  468,  1219;  Neal  v.  Ohio  Blver  E.  Co., 
34  S.  B.  914,  47  W.  Va.  316). 

A  living  stream,  with  a  well-defined 
channel,  is  a  "natural  water  course."  Wilson 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  Supp.  UOl, 
1103,  129  App.  Div.  821. 


A  water  course  with  well-defined  ban] 
which  is  the  natural  outlet  of  lakes,  ai 
through  which  the  waters  will  reach  a  coi 
mon  place,  is  a  "natural  water  course 
though  it  is  called  a  swag  or  a  swamp  or 
creek,  and  whether  its  course  is  straight  ( 
crooked.  Hastie  v.  Jenkins,  101  Pac.  4S 
496,  63  Wash.  2L 

It  is  not  essential  to  the  existence  of 
"natural  water  course"  that  the  supply  shou 
be  living  water,  but  it  may  be  surface  wat 
collected  on  a  large  watershed  which  cuts  f( 
Itself  a  well-defined  channel ;  nor  is  it  nece 
sary  that  there  should  be  a  constant  and  co 
tinuous  flow  of  water.  Brown  v.  Schn^dc 
106  Pac.  41,  81  Kan.  486,  135  Am.  St  Be 
396;  Palmer  v.  WaddeU,  22  Kan.  352,  355. 

To  constitute  a  "natural  water  coursi 
it  \b  not  necessary  that  the  flow  of  water  1 
sufficient  to  wear  out  a  channel  having  we! 
marked  sides  and  banks;  but,  if  the  surfa< 
water  uniformly  or  habitually  fiowB  over 
given  course  having  reasonable  limits  as 
width,  the  line  of  its  flow  is  a  water  coun 
Hull  V.  Harker.  106  N.  W.  629,  630,  130  low 
190  (citing  lAmbert  v.  Alcorn,  33  N.  E.  S 
144  111.  313,  21  L.  B.  A  611). 

A  depression  or  slou£^  s^[)aratlng  an  1 
land  from  the  Mississippi  river,  so  that 
time  of  high  water  it  became  an  arm  of  tl 
river  with  water  flowing  into  it  at  the  nor 
end  and  emptying  at  the  south  end,  and  al 
forming  a  drain  for  surface  water,  was 
"natural  water  course."  St  Louis  Merchanl 
Bridge  Terminal  By.  Ass*n  ▼.  Schults,  80  : 
B.  879,  882,  226  IlL  409. 

Where  the  flow  of  water  through  an  a 
tlflclal  ditch  for  many  years  was  such  i 
would  constitute  a  "natural  water  course" 
the  flow  had  begun  without  artificial  aj 
a  finding  that  it  was  a  water  course  to  whii 
the  same  rules  of  law  apply  as  are  appllcab 
to  natural  water  courses  was  warrante 
Stimson  V.  Inhabitants  of  Brookllne,  83  N. 
893.  894,  895,  19Y  Mass.  568,  16  L.  R.  A  (1 
S.)  280,  125  Am.  St  Rep.  382,  14  Ann.  Ob 
907. 

After  high-water  channels  are  artificial 
opened,  and  the  cuts  connecting  them  wi 
the  main  stream  are  used  by  the  parti 
opening  them  and  such  use  Is  acquiesced 
as  branches  of  the  main  stream  for  the  perit 
of  limitations,  they  become  natural  channel 
and  owners  of  land  adjacent  thereto  are  e 
titled  to  the  same  rights  as  those  on  ti 
main  channel.  Hough  v.  Porter,  95  Pac  73 
98  Pac.  1083,  1101,  61  Or.  318. 

To  constitute  a  "natural  water  course 
it  is  not  necessary  that  there  should  be 
stream  with  well-defined  banks  and  bed,  ( 
that  the  water  fiow  at  all  seasons  of  the  yea 
but,  where  the  conformation  of  the  land 
such  as  to  give  surface  water  flowing  fro 
one  tract  to  another,  a  fixed  determlna 
course,  so  as  to  uniformly  discdiarge  it  on  tl 


NATUBAIi  WATEB  COURSE 


628 


NA  TURB 


Tlent  tract  at  a  fixed  and  definite  point, 
}  course  thus  Bniformly  followed  by  the 
ter  In  Iti  flow  Is  a  water  conrae.  Town  of 
l8  lyArc  T.  Convery,  90  N.  a  666^  668, 
»  lU.  51L 

Where  surface  water  In  a  hilly  region  of 
:h  bluffs  seeks  an  outlet  through  a  gorge  or 
rine  during  the  rainy  season  and  by  its 
BT  assumes  a  definite  and  natural  channel, 
1  such  has  always  been  the  case  so  far 
the  memory  of  man  runs,  such  accustomed 
innel  through  which  the  water  fiows  pos- 
ses the  attributes  of  a  "natural  water 
irse."  The  flow  of  the  water  need  not  be 
itinuous,  and  the  size  of  the  stream  is  im- 
teriaL  Jaquez  Ditch  Co.  t.  Garcia  (N.  M.) 
I  Pac.  891,  898. 

LTUBAL  WSA&  AHD  TEAR 

A  lease  by  which  the  lessee  not  only 
reed  to  exerdse  er&ry  precaution  in  the 
i  of  the  leased  ma<±inery,  but  agreed  to 
nune  all  coat  of  repairs,  and,  at  expiration 
the  t^m,  turn  oTer  the  machinery  and 
lipment  in  perfect  condition,  '^saving  nat- 
il  wear  and  tear,**  required  the  lessee  to 
iLe  whole  damage  to  machinery  resulting 
•m  accidents,  like  the  fracture  of  an  engine 
ift,  though  not  resulting  from  its  negli- 
ice;  "natural  wear  and  tear"  signifying 
ar  resulting  from  friction  and  the  gradual 
iring  apart  of  Joints,  rivets,  and  other  por- 
ns  in  the  operation  of  the  machinery.  Pe- 
r  V.  8t  Louis  Brass  Mfg.  Co.,  123  S.  W. 
L2,  1015,  146  Mo.  App.  187  (citing  ;faques  ▼. 
uld,  4  Gush.  [58  Mass.]  884 ;  Thompson  T. 
mmings,  39  Mo.  App.  537 ;  Green  y.  Kelly, 
N.  J.  Law,  544;  Waddell  y.  De  Jet,  23 
tith.  437,  76  Miss.  104;   Mcintosh  v.  Lown 

Y.]  49  Barb.  560;  Lockrow  ▼.  Horgan,  58 
Y.  635). 

iTURALIZATION 

See  Lawfully  Naturalized. 

As  dvil  action,  see  Oiyil  Action— Case — 

Suit— Etc. 
Order  as  judgment,  see  Judgment 

''Naturalization**  creates  a  political  sta- 
I  which  is  entirely  the  result  of  legislation 
Ck>ngress,  and,  in  the  case  of  a  person  not 
-u  a  citizen,  naturalization  can  be  obtained 
y  in  the  way  in  which  Congress  has  pro- 
led  that  it  shall  be  granted,  and  upon  such 
howing  of  facts  as  Congress  has  determin- 
must  be  set  forth.  In  re  Knight,  171  Fed. 
),  301. 

ITURE 

See  Crime  against  Nature;  Intensely  Al- 
kaline Nature;  Local  Nature;  Style 
and  Nature. 


The  contention  that  an  indictment  charg- 
(  sul)oniatlon  of  perjury  before  a  federal 


grand  jury  did  not  sufBdently  aet  fbrth  "the 
nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation,"  within 
the  meaning  of  Ckmst  U.  8.  Amend.  6,  be- 
cause it  did  not  '^aet  forth  Ip  some  definite 
way  the  matter  or  thing  which  was  under 
investigation  at  the  particular  time,  so  that 
the  defendant  may  know  as  to  what  particu- 
lar controversy  the  alleged  false  testimony 
is  claimed  to  be  material,  .and  how  to  meet 
the  allegation  of  materiality,*'  is  too  frivo- 
lous to  serve  as  the  basis  of  a  writ  of  error 
from  the  federal  Supreme  Court  to  a  circuit 
court,  to  review  a  conviction  under  such  in- 
dictment, where  the  description  therein  of 
the  proceeding  in  which  the  perjury  was  com- 
mitted is  as  foUows:  "•  *  •  SitUng  as  a 
grand  jury  •  ^  ^  and,  among  other  mat- 
ters, inquiring  into  certain  criminal  viola- 
tions of  the  laws  of  the  said  United  States 
relating  to  the  public  lands  and  the  disposal 
of  the  same,  and  the  unlawful  fencing  there- 
of, which  had  then  lately  before  been  commit- 
ted within  the  said  district"  Hendricks  ▼. 
United  States,  32  Sup.  Gt  818,  315,  228  U.  8. 
178,  56  L.  Ed.  394. 

Of  act 

An  instruction  on  insanity.  In  a  prosecu- 
tion for  homicide,  that,  if  accused  was  suffi- 
ciently sane  to  know  the  nature  and  quality 
of  his  act,  he  was  then  legally  responsible 
therefor,  was  not  objectionable  for  failure  to 
also  require  that  he  was  sufficiently  sane  to 
know  that  his  act  in  killing  deceased  was 
wrong;  the  term  "nature  of  act"  being  de- 
fined to  mean  the  attributes  which  constitute 
the  thing  and  distinguish  it  from  all  others, 
while  "quality  of  act**  is  the  power  to  clearly 
and  distinctly  apprehend  its  nature,  so  that, 
if  a  person  has  sufficient  mental  power  to 
fully  appreciate  and  know  what  he  is  doing, 
he  must  necessarily  know  that  the  killing  of 
a  human  b^ng  is  wrong.  Montgomery  v. 
State  (Tex.)  151  S.  W.  818,  817. 

Of  proposition  submitted  to  Toters 

A  requirement  that  the  voter  be  apprised 
of  the  "nature**  of  a  public  utility  means  that 
the  ballot  title  shall  in  specific  language  noti- 
fy him  only  of  the  kind,  sort,  or  character  of 
such  public  utility.    A  ballot  title  reading, 
"Shall  the  city  of  W.    ♦    •    •    incur  an  in- 
debtedness   •     •    •    for  an  electric  plant  in 
and  to  be  owned  exclusively  by  said  city? 
♦    ♦    ♦  **  was  sufficient  to  apprise  the  voter 
of  the  nature  of  such  utility,  within  the  con- 
templation of  Const,  art  10,  §  27,  as  constru- 
ed in  Coleman  v.  Frame,  109  Pac.  928,  26  Okl. 
193,  31  L.  E.  A.  (N.  S.)  656,  wher^n  it  is 
stated  that  the  proposition  submitted  "must 
be  stated  in  such  specific  language  as  to  ap- 
prise the  voter  of  the  'nature*  of  the  specific 
utility  the  city  wishes  to  purchase,  construct, 
or  repair.*'    City  of  Woodward  v.  Raynor, 
119  Pac.  964,  966,  29  OkL  ^3  (dUng  State  ▼- 
Murphy,  48  Pac  628,  128  Nev.  390;    State  ▼- 
Birchim,  9  Nev.  96;    also  citiD«   Webster's 
International  Diet). 


Ml 


NAVAL  STORES 


624 


NAVIGABLB 


II 


NAVAL  STORES 

'^he  term  'naval  stores'  Includes  rosin, 
turpentine,  products  of  crude  turpentine,  tar, 
and  rosin  oIL"  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission ▼.  LoulsYllle  &  N.  B.  Go^  118  Ted. 
613,  617. 

In  Florida,  where  the  production  of  spir- 
its of  turpentine  and  rosin,  otherwise  known 
as  '*nayal  stores/'  constitutes  one  of  the 
state's  leading  lndusti:le6,  the  courts  will 
take  judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  such 
naval  stores  are  the  manufactured  products 
of  the  gum  extracted  from  pine  trees.  Knight 
V.  Kmplre  lAud  Co.,  45  South.  1025,  1026,  55 
Bla.  301. 

NAVIGABLE 

See  Not  Navigable;  Point  of  Naviga- 
bility. 

Improvement  of,  as  taking  property,  see 
Taking  (In  Eminent  Domain). 

Improvement  of  navigable  water,  see 
Improvement 

Navigable  stream  as  highway,  see  High- 
way. 

See,  also.  Floatable  Stream. 

In  Bngland  the  term  ''navigable  waters" 
Is  synonymous  with  tidewaters.  Olds  v.  Com- 
missioner of  State  Land  Office,  112  N.  W. 
952,  958, 150  Mich.  134  (quoting  and  adopting 
IlUnols  Cent  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  18  Sup.  C5t 
110,  146  U.  S.  387,  36  L.  Ed.  1018). 

A  nontldal  stream,  which  was  not  me- 
andered In  the  survey  by  the  United  States 
In  1823,  Is  prima  fade  a  nonnavigable  stream. 
In  determining  the  navigability  of  a  fresh- 
water stream,  navigable  for  only  a  part  of 
the  year,  not  less  than  all  of  the  following 
considerations  should  be  considered:  Wheth- 
er the  stream  is  suitable  for  valuable  float- 
age for  a  sufficient  length  of  time  for  its 
beneficial  use  by  the  public;  whether  the  pub- 
lic or  only  a  few  individuals  are  Interested 
in  transportation  on  it,  or  any  great  public 
interests  are  promoted  in  its  use  for  trans- 
portation; whether  it  has  been  previously 
used  generally,  and  how  long  it  has  been  and 
will  be  used,  by  the  public;  and  whether  it 
was  meandered  by  government  surveys,  or 
included  therein.  Blackman  v.  Mauldln,  51 
South.  23,  25,  164  Ala.  337,  27  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
670. 

A  meandered  lake  is  "navigable,"  under 
St  1898, 1 1596,  making  navigable  all  streams 
meandered  by  the  government  Runyard  v. 
Oettlng  Bros.  Ice  Co.,  125  N.  W.  931,  932, 
142  Wia  471. 

The  part  of  a  river  above  falls  and  above 
the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  is  not  a  ''naviga- 
ble river"  at  common  law.  Charles  C  Wil- 
son ft  Son  V.  Harrisburg,  77  Ati.  787,  788,  107 
Me.  207. 

The  term  "navigable"  at  common  law 
and  in  a  legal  sense  means  a  streatn  in  which 


the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  and  the  fact  that  a  rii 
eriequitea  largeone  and  capableof  fnmisl] 
ing  considerable  water  power  does  not  chang 
the  rule,  nor  does  the  fact  that  the  river  ma; 
in  certain  portions  of  it  be  a  navigable  streai 
in  fact,  for  that  merely  affects  the  questio] 
of  the  pubUc  right  to  transportation  over  it 
Laws  1786,  p.  834,  c.  67,  permitting  th 
commissioners  of  the  land  office  to  grant  Itna 
under  "navigable  rivers"  as  they  might  deei 
necessary  to  promote  the  commerce  of  th 
state,  provided  the  grant  should  be  made  t 
the  adjacent  owner,  is  only  applicable  to 
tidal  stream  and  does  not  extend  to  a  not 
tidal  stream,  though  in  fact  navigable.  Fu 
ton  light.  Heat  ft  Power  Co.  v.  State,  11 
N.  Y.  S.  1000,  1006,  1013,  62  Mlsa  Rep.  181 

At  common  law  a  '^navigable  river^  ws 
confined  to  rivers  or  arms  of  the  sea  in  whic 
the  tide  ebbed  and  flowed,  all  fresh  water  rii 
ers  being  nonnavigable;  but  all  streams  a< 
tually  capable  of  navigation  were  commo 
highways  for  commerce.  Fulton  light,  Hefl 
ft  Power  Co.  v.  State,  94  N.  B.  198^  202,  20 
N.  Y.  400,  87  L.  R  A.  (N.  S.)  307. 

A  river  Is  "navigable"  if  tiie  tide  ebb 
and  flows  therein,  or  if  it  is  in  fact  navigabi 
during  some  season  of  the  year  for  the  floai 
age  of  boats,  lighters,  rafts,  logs,  etc  In  i 
Delaware  River  at  Stllesvllle,  115  N.  Y.  Supi 
745,  750,  131  App.  Dlv.  403. 

Aetval  maTlsaliiUty 

Though  by  the  English  common  la? 
"navigable  waters"  are  tidal  waters  only,  1 
the  United  States  those  waters  are  navigab] 
in  contemplation  of  law  which  are  navigabi 
in  fact  McGUvra  v.  Ross,  161  Fed.  39l 
399;  Smart  v.  Aroostook  Lumbw  Oo.,  68  At 
527,  531,  103  He.  37,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  lOS 
(citing  The  Daniel  BaU,  10  WalL  [77  U.  S 
557,  19  L.  Ed.  999 ;  Brown  v.  Chadboume.  2 
Me.  9,  50  Am.  Dec  641;  Treat  v.  liord,  4 
Me.  552,  66  Am.  Dec.  298 ;  Lancey  y.  Cllffon 
54  Me.  487,  92  Am.  Dec.  561;  The  Montell 
20  WaU.  [87  U.  S.1-430,  22  L.  Ed.  891;  Heal 
V.  Joliet  ft  C.  R.  Co.,  6  Sup.  Ct  852,  116  U.  i 
191,  29  L.  Ed.  607;  Rhodes  v.  Otis,  33  Ali 
578,  73  Am.  Dec.  439 ;  Moore  v.  Sanborne, 
Mich.  519.  59  Am.  Dec.  209;  Thunder  Ba 
River  Booming  Co.  v.  Speechly,  31  Mich.  33< 
18  Am.  Rep.  184);  Klnkead  v.  Turgeon,  10 
N.  W.  1061,  1062,  74  Neb.  573,  1  K  R  A.  0 
S.)  762,  121  Am.  St  Rep.  740,  13  Ann.  Ca 
43. 

The  term  "navigable,"  as  applied  to  wi 
ters,  Includes  streams  navigable  In  fbc 
though  not  subject  to  the  ebb  and  flow  of  tt 
tide,  though  the  term  does  not  necessarily  e^ 
tend  to  streams  that  are  only  capable  of  nt 
for  pleasure  boating,  fowling,  cutting  Ice,  c 
skating.    Hobart  v.  HaU,  174  Fed.  433,  46" 

While  the  common-law  rule  as  to  navigi 
ble  waters  Is  In  force  in  Illinois  In  so  far  a 
it  relates  to  the  questions  of  boundary  an 
ownership,  yet,  on  the  question  of  navigi^bi 
Ity,  the  common-law  rule  that  waters  ai 


NAVIGABLB 


526 


NAVIGABLB 


arigable^  only  where  ttie  tide  eblw  and 
IW8  is  not  the  law,  and  waters  nayigable  in 
ct  are  navigable  in  law;  the  test  b^ng 
tiether  they  are  of  sufficient  depth  to  af- 
rd  a  chann^  for  useful  commerce  or  prac- 
»ble  public  utility.  Schult«  t.  Warren,  75 
E.  783,  785,  218  HI.  106, 18  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.) 
5. 

A  stream,  in  order  to  be  "navigable,** 
Qst  be  of  common  or  public  use  for  the 
rriage  of  boats  and  lighters,  and  of  bearing 

>  and  floating  vessels  for  the  transportation 
property  conducted  by  the  agency  of  man. 
is  navigable  in  fact  only  when  it  affords  a 

lannel  for  useful  commerce,  and  Is  a  prao 
ml  utility  to  the  public  as  such,  and  in  its 
dinary  natural  condition  famishes  a  high- 
ay  over  which  commerce  Is  or  may  be  car- 
ed in  the  customary  modes  of  conducting 
tmmerce  by  water.    It  is  not  sufficient  that 
is  available  in  places  for  rowboats  or  i 
nail  launches,  or  that  hunters  and  fisher- ' 
en  pass  over  the  water  in  boats  used  for 
lat  purpose.    People  v.  Economy  Light  & ' 
ower  Co.,  89  N.  B.  760,  771,  241  111.  290; 
chulte  V.  Warren,  75  N.  B.  78»,  785,  218  IlL  | 
L9,  13  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  745. 

The  term  "navigable  waters,**  as  applied  , 

>  the  dominion  of  the  national  and  state  i 
>vemments  over  shore  lands  and  the  rights 
hich  they  have  or  can  convey,  means  waters  ' 
hldi  are  navigable  in  fact  and  not  simply  j 
dal  waters.  McOilvra  v.  Boss,  30  Sup.  Ct  i 
r.  31,  215  U.  a  70,  78,  54  L.  Ed.  95. 

The  term  "navigable  stream**  is  not  lim- 1 
ed  to  a  tidewater  stream,  but  the  question 
I  each  case  is  whether  it  is  in  fact  naviga- 
te;   that  is,,  used  or  susc^tible  of  being' 
Bed,  in  its  ordinary  condition,  as  a  highway  | 
)r  commerce,  over  which  trade  and  travel ' 
re  or  may  be  conducted  in  the  customary 
K)de8  of  trade  and  travel  on  water.    Willow 
Iver,  an  indirect  tributary  of  the  Mississippi, 
ftpable  of  floating  logs  at  certain  seasons  of 
tie  year   and  carrying   rowboats,   although 
ot  meandered,  and  so  shallow  that  in  places 
tie  boats  have  to  be  pushed,  is  a  public  "navi- 
able  stream.*'    Willow  River  Club  v.  Wade, 
6  N.  W.  273,  276,  100  Wis.  86,  42  L.  R.  A. 
05. 

In  general:  those  rivers  are  ''public  and 
avigable"  in  law  which  are  navigable  in 
act  State  ex  reL  atizens*  Blectric  Lighting 
:  Power  Co.  v.  Longfellow,  69  S.  W.  374,  377, 
69  Mo.  109  (quoting  and  adopting  definitions 
D  Gould,  Waters  [3d  Bd.]  t  40). 

A  stream  running  into  the  sea,  and  in 
rhich  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  is  "navigable 
rater,*'  and  subject  to  the  Jurisdiction  of  the 
Jnited  States  as  far  up  as  It  is  actually  nav- 
gable  for  the  purposes  of  interstate  and  for- 
lign  commerce.  United  States  v.  President 
(tc,  of  Jamaica  &  R.  Turnpike  Road,  183 
r^  098,  601. 

"If  a  stream  is  ^navigable  in  fact  it  is 
lavigable  in  law.*    Qould,  Waters  (9d  Bd.)  § 


67.  The  capability  of  being  used  for  pur- 
poses of  trade  and  travel  in  the  usual  and  or- 
dinary mode  is  the  test  and  not  the  extent 
and  manner  of  such  use.  •  •  •  NavigaUll- 
ty  cannot  be  affected  by  the  conditions  on 
the  adjacent  land,  such  as  there  being  a 
large  town  on  the  shore,  with  numerous 
streets  and  wharves,  or  whether  ^  •  ^ 
one  riparian  owner  has  a  monopoly  of  the 
land,  with  no  public  road  to  the  water,  thus 
cutting  off  access  to  the  land.  It  is  the  nav- 
igability of  the  water  that  is  the  test*'  State 
V.  TMf  opd,  48  S.  B.  586,  587,  136  N.  C.  603. 

A  stream  is  ''navigable"  legally  if  it  is 
navigable  in  fact  A  stream  which  is  only  nav- 
igable for  three  or  four  miles  from  its  mouth 
at  high  tide  by  small  boats  drawing  from 
three  to  four  feet  of  water,  and  is  floatable 
for  its  entire  length,  is  not  a  navigable 
stream  within  Act  Sept  19,  1890,  c.  907,  i 
10,  26  Stat.  454,  prohibiting  the  creation  of 
an  obstruction  not  authorized  by  law  to  the 
navigable  capacity  of  any  waters  over  which 
the  United  States  has  Jurisdiction.  State  ex 
rel.  Pealer  v.  Superior  of  Chahalls  County. 
109  Pac.  340,  841,  58  Wash.  565. 

A  "navigable  river*'  is  a  natural  high- 
way for  commerce.  The  Cumberland  river 
is  navigable  in  fact  from  its  mouth  to  a  point 
far  above  Nashville,  and  it  is  therefore  a  nat- 
ural highway  for  commerce  between  two  or 
more  states,  and,  as  such,  is  the  property  of 
the  public  constituting  the  country  at  large, 
and  Jurisdiction  over  it  for  purposes  of  inter- 
state commerce  is  in  Congress.  Ryman 
Steamboat  Line  v.  Commonwealth,  101  8.  W. 
408, 125  Ky.  253, 10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1187. 

A  river  in  fact  nonnavigable,  which  is 
declared  by  Laws  1844-45,  p.  299,  a  public 
highway,  is  not  thereby  made  a  navigable 
river,  within  Rev.  St  1899,  §  8278,  as  amend- 
ed by  Laws  !l903,  p.  234,  §  1,  and  re-enacted 
by  Laws  1905,  p.  180  (Ann.  St  1906,  p.  3917), 
authorizing  the  Improvement  of  a  nonnaviga- 
ble stream  for  the  drainage  of  lands,  for  a 
"public  highway"  is  a  way  open  to  all  per- 
sons, and  all  streams  which  are  actually  ca- 
pable of  floating  and  of  permitting  the  pas- 
sage of  ordinary  boats  are  "navigable.*' 
State  ex  rel.  Applegate  v.  Taylor,  123  S.  W. 
892,  919,  224  Mo.  393. 

Oapacity  for  navigation 

Any  water,  to  be  "navigable,**  must  be 
susceptible  of  use  for  purposes  of  commerce, 
or  possess  the  capacity  for  valuable  floatage 
in  transportation  to  market  of  the  products 
of  the  country  through  which  it  runs,  and 
must  be  of  practical  usefulness  to  the  public 
as  a  public  highway  in  its  own  state  and 
without  the  aid  of  artifldal  means;  a  theoret- 
ical or  potential  navigation  or  one  that  is 
temporary,  precarious,  and  unprofitable  not 
being  sufladent  Hurst  v.  Dana*  122  Pac. 
1041,  1042,  86  Kan.  947. 

A  "navigable  stream**  is  one  capable  of 
bearing  on  its  bosom,  either  for  tha  whole  or 


V 


I'  V 


f 

rl; 


NAVIOABLB 


526 


NAVIGABLB 


.  a  part  of  the  year,  boats  loaded  with  freight 
In  regular  course  of  trade.  The  mere  rafting 
of  timber  or  transporting  wood  in  small 
boats  at  certain  seasons  of  the  year  is  not 
sufficient  to  render  the  stream  navigable. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  B.  Go.  ▼.  Sikes,  eo  S.  B. 
09,  4  6a.  App.  7. 


A  "navigable  stream"  is  one  which  is 
large  enough  to  float  a  boat  of  some  size,  en- 
gaged in  carrying  trade,  and  implies  the  pos- 
sibility of  transporting  men  and  things. 
Burns  v;  Crescent  Gun  &  Bod  Club. '41  South. 
249,  251, 116  La.  1038.  /V^'^ 

The  words  ''navigable  streanr'  ordinarily 
mean  a  stream  navigable  in  ^w^  one  of  suffi- 
cient capacity  to  permit  of  saw  logs  being 
floated  down  the  same  at  high  water,  and  of 
small  row  boats. being  used  thereon  to  some 
extent,  and  such  meaning  must  be  attributed 
to  such  words  when  used  in  a  statute,  in  the 
absence  of  ambiguity  suggesting  that  a  differ- 
ent meaning  might  have  been  intended,  which 
is  discoverable  by  Judicial  construction.  Vil- 
lage of  Bloomer  v.  Town  of  Bloomer,  107  N. 
W.  W4,  979,  128  Wis.  297. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  waters  should 
be  "navigable"  in  all  their  parts,  or  that  the 
navigable  portion  is  open  for  use  all  the  year, 
in  order  that  the  public  may  have  a  right 
of  navigation  where  the  waters  are  deep 
enough  and  flt  for  such  use.  Schulte  v.  War- 
ren, 76  N.  B.  783,  785,  218  111.  108,  13  L.  B. 
A.  (N.  S.)  745;  People  v.  Bconomy  light  ft 
Power  Co.,  89  N.  B.  760,  767,  241  111.  290. 

A  slough  emptying  into  the  sea,  which 
during  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  is  naviga- 
ble for  scows  and  for  rafting  and  booming 
logs,  is  a  "navigable  stream."  Dawson  v. 
McMillan,  76  Pac.  807,  808,  34  Wash.  269. 

A  stream  has  '^navigable  capacity"  when 
it  is  capable  of  being  navigated  over  any 
part  of  the  waters  in  their  normal  condition. 
Hubbard  v.  Fort,  188  Fed.  987,  996. 

Streams  in  the  state  of  Idaho  are  "navi- 
gable" if  used  either  for  transporting  freight 
or  passengers  by  boats,  or  for  floating  lum- 
ber, logs,  wood,  or  any  other  product  to  mar- 
ket The  rule  applied  in  that  state  is  stat- 
ed in  Black's  Pomeroy  on  Water  Bights,  t 
218,  as  follows:  "In  those  states,  where  lum- 
bering is  a  principal  industrial  interest,  it  has 
been  found  necessary  to  establish  a  new  rule 
in  respect  to  the  use  of  the  streams,  which  is 
not  founded  upon  any  principle  or  precedent 
of  the  common  law,  but  solely  on  the  local 
exigencies  and  customs.  This  rule  is  that  a 
fresh  water  stream  which  is  capable  of  being 
used  for  the  purpose  of  floating  down  logs 
to  mills  or  to  market,  although  it  may  be 
too  small  to  admit  of  navigation,  is  *navi- 
gable'  (or,  more  properly,  'floatable*),  and  a 
public  highway  in  the  sense  that  the  general 
public  have  an  easement  of  passage  over  it 
for  that  purpose,  though  the  title  to  the  bed 
of  tlie  stream  may  remain  in  tlie  riparian 


owner  subject  to  such  public  easement."  T 
rule  generally  applied  \b  that  "to  be  'navii 
ble*  a  water  course  must  have  a  useful  < 
pacity  as  a  public  highway  of  transport 
tion";  but,  where  the  streams  of  a  state  a 
more  generally  used  for  floating  timber  th 
for  carrying  passengers  or  freight,  this  n 
does  not  apply.  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  05  Pi 
499,  607,  14  Idaho,  561,  24  L.  IL  A.  (N.  I 
1240  (quoting  Harrison  v.  Fite,  148  Fed.  V 
78  C.  C.  A.  447) ;  Moss  ft  Bros.  ▼.  Barney, 
Pac.  613, 14  Idaho,  69& 

*To  be  'navigable^  a  water  course  mi 
have  a  useful  Capacity  as  a  public  highw 
of  transportation.  Mere  depth  of  wat 
without  profitable  utility,  will  not  render 
water  course  navigable  in  the  legal  sense, 
as  to  subject  it  to  public  servitude,  nor  w 
the  fact  that  it  is  sufficient  for  pleasure  boi 
ing  or  to  enable  hunters  or  fishermen  to  flo 
their  skiffb  or  canoea"  Harrison  v.  Fite,  1 
Fed.  781,  784,  78  a  0.  A.  447. 

A  channel  in  a  tide  river  which  at  hi 
tide  Is  navigable  with  a  rowboat,  and  whi 
at  full  tide  is  navigable  for  boats,  is  a  '^na 
gable  channel,"  though  at  low  tide  there 
not  much  water  therein.  Judson  v.  Tide  ^^ 
ter  Lumber  Co.,  98  Pac.  877,  379,  51  Wai 
164. 

A  lake  on  wliidi  a  steamboat  carry! 
pleasure  parties  is  operated,  and  on  whi 
numerous  small  boats  are  used  for  rowi 
and  fishing,  the  average  depth  of  water  bei 
16  feet,  is  a  "navigable  water."  Kalez 
Spokane  Valley  Land  ft  Water  Co.,  84  Pi 
395,  396,  42  Wash.  43. 

A  lake  not  of  sufficient  siae  to  warn 
its  use  for  maritime  or  commercial  purpof 
is  not  ''navigable"  within  the  definition 
navigable  waters,  and  such  a  lake  is  propei 
subject  to  individual  ownership  by  the  lii 
rian  owners.  City  of  Geneva  v.  Henson,  1 
N.  T.  Supp.  688,  593,  140  App.  Div.  49. 

Where  a  lake  had  a  total  area  of  9 
acres,  499  of  which  were  covered  to  a  dep 
of  over  25  feet  with  a  maximum  depth  of 
feet,  and  boats  of  considerable  dimensio] 
as  well  as  smaller  craft  at  different  tim< 
had  plied  on  its  waters,  and  booms  of  loj 
piles,  shingle  bolts,  and  other  timber  pro 
ucts  had  been  transported  from  place 
place  thereon,  as  well  as  moored  in  booi 
while  awaiting  the  process  of  manufactuj 
the  lake  was  navigable,  though  little  us 
for  navigation.  Brace  ft  Hergert  Mill  Co. 
State,  95  Pac.  278,  281,  49  Wash.  326. 

The  extended  application  of  the  right 
the  public  to  use  "navigable  streams,**  whet 
er  tidal  or  nontidal,  even  those  of  inconsidc 
able  size,  as  highways  for  transporting  mc 
chandise,  rafting  and  driving  logs,  and  pi 
pelling  boats,  has  made  the  terms  "navigabl 
and  "fioatable"  practically  synonymoi: 
Smart  v.  Aroostook  Lumber  Co.,  68  Atl.  52 
631,  103  Me.  37,  14  L.  IL  A.  (N.  S.)  1083  (d 
Ing  Knox  v.  Chaloner,  42  Me.  150). 


NAVIOABLB 


NAVIOABLl 


A  '^miTlsable  stream*'  li  a  hii^way  open 
the  use  of  alL    State  «z  reL  Oaenther  t. 
larleston  light  A  Water  CkK,  47  8.  H  979, 
3,  68  S.  a  540. 

A  body  of  water  de^  enough  in  places 
r  hunters  and  fishermen  to  nse  It  for  small 
ats  is  not  legally  ''navigable*'  as  a  whole, 
t  there  may  be  a  public  right  of  navigation 
the  places  where  the  water  is  deep  oiough 
r  use.  Schulte  v.  Warren,  76  N.  B.  783, 
5,  218  IlL  106, 18  Lu  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  746. 

Baae-^Floatace  of  loss 

A  river  capable  of  floating  logs  Is  a  navi- 
ble  stream.  In  re  Southern  Wisconsin 
►wer  Oo.,  122  N.  W.  801.  806,  140  Wis.  246; 
ettherby  v.  Meiklejohn,  13  N.  W.  607,  608, 
Wis.  78 ;  Stevens  Point  Boom  Co,  v.  Reil- 
44  Wis.  295,  306;  Oohn  v.  Wausau  Boom 
L.  2  N.  W.  546,  648,  47  Wis.  314. 

That  a  stream  is  capable  of  floating  logs 
ereby  aititling  the  public  to  a  right  of  high- 
ly therein  for  that  purpose  is  wholly  insuffl- 
>nt  to  establish  that  it  is  ''navigable''  with- 

St  1806,  t  3874,  authorizing  the  erection 
id  maintenance  of  a  dam  across  any  stream 
»t  navigable.  Allaby  v.  Mauston  BUectric 
arice  Co.,  116  N.  W.  4,  6,  186  Wis.  846,  16 

&  A.  (N.  S.)  420. 

A  stream  which  in  its  natural  state  can 
t  practicably  used  for  the  floating  of  shin- 
e  bolts  to  market  is  a  "navigable  stream.'* 
onroe  Mill  Co.  v.  Menzel,  77  Pac.  813,  816, 
\  Wash.  487,  70  L.  B.  A.  272,  102  Am  St 
ep.  906. 

Where  streams  were  large  oiough  to  be 
led  for  floating  logs  and  for  oonmierce  the 
"eater  part  of  the  year,  one  being  about  a 
lie  long,  300  feet  wide,  and  from  6  to  8  feet 
«p,  and  the  other  2  or  3  miles  long,  50  feet 
Ide  at  its  mouth,  and  10  or  12  feet  deep  in 
gh  water,  they  were  navigable  streams, 
nder  Sayles'  Ann.  Ov.  St  1897,  art  4147, 
^fining  "navigable  stream,"  the  public  would 
ive  a  right  to  the  use  of  such  streams  as 
Lvigable  public  highways  whenever  they 
ive  sufficient  water  for  such  purpose, 
range  Lumber  Oo.  v.  Thompson  (Tex.)  126 
W.  604,  606. 

A  stream  capable  of  transporting  rafts 
!  railroad  ties  for  several  months  during 
Le  spring  of  the  year,  without  the  aid  of 
en  on  the  banks  thereof,  \b  "navigable," 
Ithin  the  meaning  of  the  law  for  that  pur- 
ose  and  subject  to  the  use  of  the  public 
lerefor,  and  the  rights  of  the  riparian  own- 
rs  to  the  soil  adjacent  to  and  underlying  the 
Bd  of  such  stream  are  subject  to  this  right 
r  easement  in  the  public,  which  rests  upon 
le  necessities  of  commerce;  and,  where  it 
ppears  that  there  was  no  other  practical 
rate  by  which  ties  could  be  transported  to 
uirket,  the  adjacent  owners  would  have  no 
Ight  to  interfere  with  one  using  the  stream 
NT  the  commercial  purposes  indicated.    Mo- 


Kinney  T.  IVorChciitt,  88  8.'W.  861*  869,  U4 
Mo.  App.  146L 

Aetval  «so 

A  stream  which  is  used  only  a  few  times 
in  many  years  by  a  boat  for  a  picnic  or  ex- 
cursion Is  not  "navigable,"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  Laws  1860,  p.  224,  c.  140,  §  28,  subd.  6, 
autliorising  railroads  to  cross  streams,  but 
providing  that  nothing  in  the  acts  shall  be 
oon^tmed  to  authorize  the  erection  of  any 
bridge  across  any  navigable  stream  or  lake. 
People  T.  New  York,  O.  A  W.  By.  Ca,  117  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1048, 1061, 133  App.  Div.  476. 

Oontlmiial  naTlcability 

Any  stream  sufficient  duripg  the  high- 
water  season  to  be  used  for  floating  logs  or 
timber  to  market  or  the  place  of  use  is  "navi- 
gable^" and  to  tliat  oxtent  find  for  that  pm> 
pose  is  a  public  highway;  and  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  sm^  stream  be  navigabie  the  whole 
year  for  such  purpose  or  any  purpose.  Idaho 
Northern  B.  Oo.  v.  Post  Fiills  Lumber  A  Mf^ 
Co.,  119  Paa  1006,  1101,  20  Idaho,  605,  88  U 
B.  A.  (N.  S.)  114.  But  it  is  sufficient  that  the 
stream  have  periods  of  navigable  capacity, 
ordinarily  recurring  from  year  to  year,  and 
continuing  long  enough  to  make  it  useful  as 
a  highway.  A  C  Conn  Co.  v.  Little  Suamico 
Lumber  Mfg.  Co.,  43  N.  W.  680,  74  Wis.  662. 

The  court's  instruction,  in  an  action  for 
the  obstruction  of  a  Jitream  so  as  to  interfere 
with  the  rafting  of  logs,  that  a  navigable 
stream  is  one  capable  of  being  used  at  all 
times  or  periodically  during  ttie  year  for 
times  long  enough  to  make  it  susceptible  of 
beneficial  use  to  the  public  as  a  means  of 
transportation,  sufficiently  defined  a  "naviga- 
ble stream"  for  the  purpose  of  the  case,  and 
defendants  requested  instruction  upon  the 
same  matter  was  properly  refused.  Burr's 
Ferry,  B.  A  a  By.  Co.  v.  Allen  (Tex.)  140  8. 
W.  368,  860. 

A  stream  is  a  ''navigable"  or  "floatable^* 
one  if,  by  the  increased  precipitation  at  sea- 
sons, recurring  periodically  with  reasonable 
certainty,  the  flow  of  water  will  be  sufficient 
to  be  substantially  useful  to  the  public  for 
transportation.  Hot  Springs  Lumber  A  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Bevercomb,  56  S.  B.  680,  682,  106  Va. 
176,  9  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  804. 

A  stream  which  had  been  successfully 
used  for  more  than  20  years  during  the  win- 
ter for  floating  logs  to  the  market  from  a 
distance  at  least  10  miles  above  plaintiff s* 
mill  was  a  "navigable  stream"  at  the  mill, 
notwithstanding  opinions  of  witnesses  ttiat 
the  stream  was  not  navigable.    TrulUnger  ir. 
Howe,  07  Pac  648,  68  Or.  210,  22  U  B.    A^ 
(N.  S.)  545. 

The  navigability  ot  a  stream  is  sho'^vrx 
where  It  appears  that,  a  great  many  ye«Lir» 
previously,  boats  navigated  it  at  certain  ae«L- 
sons  of  the  year,  and  there  is  no  eviaeno^ 
that  its  condition  baa  changed.    Miller  Sl  X^xlx. 


NAYIOABLB 


628. 


navigabcj:  watbbb 


▼.  EkiterpclM  Oanal  &  Land  Co.,  T5  Pa^  770, 
771,  142  GaL  208,  100  Am.  St  R^  116. 

In  an  action  for  damages  for  placing  ol>- 
Btmctions  in  a  bayou  and  river  alleged  by 
plaintiff  to  be  nayigable,  thus  preventing  him 
from  floating  logs  placed  therein  to  market, 
an  instruction  to  find  for  plaintiff,  if  the 
jury  believed  from  the  evidence  that  he  had 
placed  logs  in  the  bayou  and  rivor,  and  fut^ 
ther  believed  that  said  bayou  and  river  ''were 
navigable  for  the  purpose  of  floating  said  logs 
to  market,"  is  Inaccurate,  as  such  waters 
might  have  been  navigable  at  the  time  that 
plaintiff  wished  to  market  his  logs  and  not 
navigable  at  other  times,  and  the  stream  to 
be  navigable  must  be  capable  of  use  by  the 
public,  either  at  all  times  during  the  year, 
or  for  times  long  enough  to  make  them  use- 
ful to  the  public  as  a  means  of  transporta- 
tion. Orange  Lumber  Oo.  ▼.  Thompson  (Tez.) 
113  S.  W.  503,  504. 

NatuTAl  BATlcability 

According  to  the  general  deflnition,  wa- 
ter is  "navigable"  when  in  its  ordinary  state 
it  forms  by  itself  or  its  connection  with  other 
waters  a  continued  highway  over  which  com- 
merce is  or  may  be  carried  in  the  customary 
mode,  and  a  stream  not  naturally  navigable^ 
but  made  so  by  artificial  means,  \s  not  nav- 
igable water  in  a  legal  sense.  State  ex  rel. 
Lyon  V.  Columbia  Water  Power  Co.,  63  S.  B. 
884.  887,  82  S.  C.  181,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  435, 
129  Am.  St  Rep.  876,  17  Ann.  C^s.  343. 

A  stream  Incapable  of  carrying  logs  with- 
out the  construction  of  dams  to  increase  the 
volume  of  water  is  not  "navigable"  for  float- 
ing logs.  La  Velne  v.  Stack-Gibbs  Lumber 
Co.,.  104  Pac.  606,  667,  17  Idaho,  51,  134  Am. 
St  Rep.  253.       . 

E}very  stream,  which  in  its  natural  state 
is  capable  of  floating  logs  or  other  commer- 
cial and  floatable  commodities  for  any  prac- 
tical period  of  time,  is  to  such  extent  and 
for  sndi  time  a  "navigably  stream,"  and  the 
bed  thereof  is  for  such  purposes  subject  to 
the  regulation  of  the  state.  Mashburn  v.  St 
Joe.  Improvement  Co.,  113  Pac  92,  95,  19 
Idaho,  30,  35  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  824. 

Whether  a  stream  is  "navigable^'  must 
be  determine^  with  reference  to  its  natural 
condition.  Where  a  stream  is  in  fact  nav- 
igable in  its  natural  state,  it  may  be  improved 
to  enlarge  its  usefulness  for  the  public's 
benefit.  People  v.  Economy  Light  &  Power 
Co.,  89  N.  B.  700,  769,  241  IlL  290. 

A  river  which  in  its  natural  condition, 
unaided  by  artificial  means,  is  susceptible  to 
public  use  to  float  vessels,  rafts,  or  logs,  is 
a  navigable  or  floatable  stream  according  to 
the  law  of  Maine,  though  not  a  navigable  riv- 
er in  the  technical  sense  of  the  common  law. 
Charles  C.  Wilson  ft  Son  v.  Harrisburg,  77 
Ati.  787,  789,  107  Me.  207. 

A  stream,  to  be  "navigable"  or  floatable 
for  saw  logs,  must  be  capable,  in  its  natural 


condition,  at  ordinary  incurring  freshets,  of 
being  successfully  and  profitably  used  for 
that  purpose,  and  a  stream  not  navigable  or 
floatable  in  its  natural  condition  cannot  be 
made  so  by  artlflcial  means.  Where  a  stream 
is  such  that  in  its  natural  condition  sawlogs 
cannot  be  floated  therein,  except  at  extreme 
high  water,  continued  for  a  few  hours  at  a 
time,  and  then  only  small  logs,  it  is  not  a 
navigable  stream  for  the  purpose  of  floatr 
age.  Kamm  v.  Normand,  91  Pac  448,  451, 
50  Or.  9,  11  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  290,  126  Am. 
St.  Rep.  698. 

Pnblie  termiiki  neeesflavy 

A  "navigable  body  of  wateif*  Is  one 
which  the  public  has  a  right  to  use  tor  nav- 
igation. The  term  Includes  all  waters  hav- 
ing suflScient  capacity  to  float  water  Aaft 
for  a  period  long  enough  to  be  of  oommer 
cial  value,  or  to  float  to  market  the  products 
of  the  country  through  which  the  WAt&c  ex- 
tends 00  as  to  be  useful  to  the  population 
along  its  bank&  The  stream  must  be  of 
some  value  to  trade,  commerce^  or  agricol- 
ture,  and  the  term  therefor  excdudes  waten 
which  are  merely  capable  of  floattng  a  skiff 
for  pleasure.  To  be  useful  for  commercial 
purposes,  the  water  must  connect  with  other 
waters  or  lead  from  one  public  place  to  an- 
other, so  as  to  be  in  the  path  of  comm^ce. 
A  stream  which  leads  from  a  public  river  to 
a  private  house,  or  to  which  the  public  had 
no  access,  except  at  one  point  where  the 
highway  approaches  it,  is  not  navigable  so 
as  to  render  it  a  public  highway.  A  "nav- 
igable body  of  water**  must  have  a  terminus 
by  which  the  public  can  enter  it  and  auother 
from  which  it  can  leave  it,  but  it  need  not 
lead  from  one  county  to  another.  The  rights 
of  the  public  in  a  body  of  water  are  entirely 
dependent  on  its  capacity  for  navigatioD. 
King  V.  Muller,  07  Ati.  380,  884,  73  N.  J. 
Eq.  32  (citing  1  Famham,  p.  100;  S  Fftm- 
ham,  p.  2407). 

NAVIOABLE  WATERS  OF  THE  UHIT. 
ED  STATES 

The  term  "navigable  waters  of  the  Unit- 
ed States"  applies:  First,  to  all  waters  capa- 
ble of  sustaining  or  being  used  for  interstate 
or  foreign  commerce,  covering  every  part  of 
any  body  of  water,  tidal  or  otherwise^  any 
portion  of  which  is  capable  of  such  use ;  and, 
second,  to  all  waters  under  the  admiralty 
and  maritime  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States  and  over  which  the  District  Court  of 
the  United  States  can  exercise  its  peculiar 
admiralty  Jurisdiction.  United  States  t. 
Banister  Realty  Co.,  155  Fed.  583,  593. 

Where  a  river  within  a  state  was  nav- 
igable for  some  distance  from  its  mouth,  and 
was  actually  navigated  by  small  steamboats 
and  river  craft  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
up  groceries,  supplies,  clothing,  loggers'  to<^ 
etc.,  to  the  head  of  navigation,  and  returning 
with  farmers'  products,  a  bill  was  maintain- 
able in  the  federal  courts  to  restrain  a  boom 


KAVIOABLB  WATERS 


629 


NBBXSAT 


^mpuiy  from  maintaining  a  boom  in  the 
iver  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  an  obstruc- 
on  to  navigation,  though  tlie  river  waa 
^iefly  valuable  for  floating  logs,  and  there 
^8  no  inoof  of  actual  carriage  of  goods  on 
le  river  in  interstate  commerce.  To  render 
river  navigable  in  law,  it  muft  be  navigable 
I  f^ct  A  river  is  navigable  in  fact  when 
is  used,  or  is  susceptible  of  being  used, 
bile  in  its  ordinary  condition,  as  a  highway 
>r  commerce,  over  which  trade  and  trav^ 
re  or  may  be  conducted  in  customary  modea 
r  trade  and  travel  on  water.  "Navigable 
aters"  of  the  United  States,  within  the 
leaning  of  the  Acts  of  CongreBS,  in  contra- 
Istinction  with  the  navigable  waters  of  the 
:ate8,  are  those  waters  which  fbrm,  in  their 
rdiuary  condition,  by  themselves  or  by  unity 
ith  other  waters,  a  continued  highway,  over 
hich  commerce  is  or  may  be  carried  on  with 
ther  states  or  foreign  countries  in  the  cus- 
)mary  modes  in  which  such  commerce  is 
inducted  by  water.  The  term  "navigable 
aters  of  the  United  States*'  has  reference  to 
^mmerce  of  a  substantial  and  permanent 
tiaracter.    United  States  v.  Wishkah  Boom 

c.  136  Fed.  42,  45,  47,  68  0.  C.  A.  692 
riting  The  Daniel  Ball,  10  Wall.  [77  U.  S.] 
57,  563,  19  I*.  Ed.  999;  Leovy  v.  United 
tates,  20  Sup.  Ct  797,  177  U.  S.  621,  44  L. 

d.  914). 

State  waters  distiacalshed 

The  Erie  Canal,  which,  though  lying 
holly  within  the  state  of  New  Torlt,  forms 
part  of  a  continuous  highway  for  inter- 
i&te  and  foreign  commerce  by  connecting 
ake  EHe  with  the  Hudson  river,  is  a  "nav- 
^ble  water"  of  the  United  States,  as  con- 
radistingulshed  from  a  navigable  water  of 
\ie  state.  Perry  v.  Haines,  24  Sup.  Gt  8, 
1,  191  U.  S.  17,  48  L.  Ed.  73. 

"Navigable  waters"  lying  within  thelim- 
:s  of  a  state  are  both  state  and  national  in 
tieir  character,  with  a  paranM>unt  right  of 
Dotrol  or  regulation  in  the  general  govem- 
lent,  when  Congress  chooses  to  exercise  the 
athority  over  the  same.  But,  until  such  ao- 
tiority  is  exercised,  the  jurisdiction  and  pow- 
r  of  the  state  to  authorize  the  erection  or 
onstmction  of  bridges  over  the  same  is  clear- 
er establiabed.  Act  Ctong^  Blandi  8,  1899,  t 
0,  30  Stat  1151,  which  provides  that  "the 
reation  of  any  obetnictton,  not  affirmatively 
uthorised  by  Congress,  to  the  navigable 
apacity  of  any  of  the  waters  of  the  United 
itates,  is  hereby  prohibited,"  is  prospective 
urely,  and  not  intended  to  take  away  from 
railroad  company,  which,  under  a  duly 
uthorized  grant  from  a  state,  has  constnict- 
d  a  bridge  over  a  navigable  interstate  river, 
he  implied  power  to  make  all  necessary  re- 
pairs. Kansas  City,  M.  ft  B.  R.  Co.  v.  J.  T. 
Vlygul  ft  Son,  33  South.  965,  967,  968,  82 
iiss.  223,  61  L.  R.  A.  578  (quoting  and  adopt- 
Qg  Rhea  v.  Newport  News  ft  M.  V.  B.  Co., 
0  Fed.  16). 

8  Wnaft  P.2D  Seb.— 34 


NAVIGATE 

ITAVIGATXOir 

See  Dangers  of  Navigation;  Inland  Nav- 
igation;    Practical    Improvement    of 
Navigation;   Right  of  Navigation. 
As  commerce,  see  Commerce 
Obstruction  of  navigation,  aee  Obstruct- 
Obstruction. 

"Navigation"  is  defined  by  Bouvier  as 
whatever  relates  to  traversing  the  sea  in 
ships ;  the  art  of  ascertaining  the  geographi- 
cal position  of  a  ship  and  directing  its  course. 
The  construction  of  a  dock,  while  it  may  be 
useful  to  individuals  engaged  in  navigation, 
is  not  involved  in  the  public  right  of  naviga- 
tion as  understood  by  the  law.  Trustees  of 
the  Freeholders  ft  Commonalty  of  Town  of 
Brookhaven  v.  Smith,  90  N.  T.  Supp.  646, 
651,  98  An;>.  Div.  212. 


NAVY 


tbe  navy,   sea  Belonr— 


Belonging  to 
Belonging. 

NE  EXEAT 

Under  the  English  practics,  the  "Vrit  of 
ne  exeat"  regno  was  a  prerogative  writ  which 
Issued  to  prevent  a  person  from  leaving  the 
realm.  In  America  it  has  been  treated,  not 
as  a  prerogative  writ,  but  as  a  writ  of  right 
in  the  cases  in  which  it  is  properly  grantable. 
Lamar  v.  Lamar,  51  S.  B.  763,  123  Ga.  827, 
107  Am.  St  Rep.  169,  8  Ann.  Cas.  294. 

'^The  object  of  a  writ  of  *ne  exeat'  is  to 
secure  to  the  plaintiff  the  presence  of  the 
defendant  at  the  termination  of  the  suit,  ei- 
ther by  his  detention  or  by  his  giving  equitable 
bail."  Dunsmoor  v.  Bankers'  Surety  Co.,  91 
N.  E.  907,  908,  206  Mass.  23. 

A  writ  of  "ne  exeat,"  at  common  law, 
was  simply  a  writ  to  obtain  equitable  bail. 
It  was  issued  by  a  court  of  equity,  upon  ap- 
plication of  the  complainant  against  the  de- 
fendant when  it  appeared  that  there  was  a 
debt  positively  due,  certain  in  amount,  or 
capable  of  being  made  certain  on  an  equi- 
table demand  not  suable  at  law  (except  in 
cases  of  account  and  possibly  some  other 
cases  of  concurrent  Jurisdiction),  having  con- 
veyed away  his  property,  or  under  other  cir- 
cumstances which  would  render  any  decree 
ineffectual.  Davidor  v.  Rosenberg,  109  N. 
W.  925,  180  Wis.  22,  118  Am.  St.  Rep.  986. 

A  writ  of  •^e  exeat"  is  one  of  right,  and 
not  prohibited  by  the  constitutional  provision 
regarding  imprisonment  for  debt  It  is  little 
more  than  an  order  to  hold  to  equitable  bail, 
the  party  generally  getting  rid  of  it  by  giving 
security  to  abide  the  event  of  the  litigation. 
Gooding  v.  Reid,  Murdock  ft  Co.,  177  Fed.  684, 
686,  101  C.  C.  A.  310  (citing  Dean  v.  Smith, 
23  Wis.  483,  99  Am.  Dec  198;  2  Story,  Eq. 
Jur.  [10th  Ed.]  i  1469;  preface  to  Warner'a 
1st  Am.  Ed.  of  Beames'  Ne  Exeat  Regno; 


Si 

!»1 


NEAR 


530 


NBAR  BBBB 


Patterson  t.  McLaughlin,  18  Fed.  Gas.  1826, 1 
Cranch,  C.  C.  352 ;  Union  Mut  Life  Ins.  CJo.  v. 
Kellogg,  24  Fed.  Gas.  611 ;  In  re  Rosser,  101 
Fed.  662,  41  C.  C.  A.  497;  EInos  v.  Hnnter,  4 
Oilman  [9  IlL]  211;  Mltford  &  Tyler's  PI.  ft 
Pr.  In  Equity,  p.  144 ;  Gibson's  Suits  in  Ghan- 
eery  [1907],  note  to  section  866). 

NEAR 

See  As  Near  as  May  Be;  At  or  Near; 
In  or  Near;  Property  On  or  Near  Prem- 
ises. 

''Near"  means  "adjacent  to,  close  by,  not 
ter  from."  It  is  a  relative  term,  and  its 
precise  Import  can  only  be  determined  by 
surrounding  facts  and  circumstances.  Kll- 
gore  V.  Jackson,  118  S.  W.  819,  821,  66  Tex. 
GlT.  App.  99 ;  Karczenska  t.  Gity  of  Ghicago, 
88  N.  B.  188,  189,  239  IlL  483. 

As  an  indeflnite  term 

"Near"  is  a  relative  term,  the  precise 
Import  of  wMch  can  only  be  determined  by 
the  surrounding  facts  and  circumstances  in 
the  case  in  which  it  is  used,  and  so  an  aver- 
ment that  plaintiff  lived  near  a  telegraph 
station  is  not  equivalent  to  an  allegation  that 
he  lived  within  a  mile  thereof.  Western  Un- 
ion Telegraph  Go.  v.  Klitzke,  89  N.  B.  406, 
406.  46  Ind.  App.  660. 

Stating  that  plaintiff  was  in  front  of  and 
"near"  to  defendant's  car  alleged  to  have  in- 
jured her  when  It  started  was  not  sufficient- 
ly certain  to  warrant  a  conclusion  that  the 
starting  of  the  car  was  negligence  as  matter 
of  law ;  the  word  "near"  being  an  indefinite 
word  which  may  mean  a  foot,  a  chain,  or  any 
other  distance.  Gobe  v.  Malloy,  88  N.  B. 
620,  622,  44  Ind.  App.  a 

The  word  "near,"  in  the  Vrooman  act 
(St  1886,  p.  147),  as  amended  by  St.  1891,  p. 
196,  providing  for  the  posting  of  notices  in 
street  assessment  proceedings  **on  or  near  the 
chamber  -door  of  the  city  coundl,  etc.,  is  a 
relative  term,  and  its  meaning  must  be  de- 
termined by  reference  to  the  subject-matter, 
and  the  posting  of  the  notices  on  a  bulletin 
board  in  the  dty  hall  in  which  the  council 
chamber  was  located  was  sufficient  where  such 
bulletin  board  was  In  plain  view  from  the 
main  entrance  of  the  hall,  and  so  placed  as 
to  be  likely  to  bring  the  notices  to  the  atten- 
tion of  persons  visiting  the  council  cham- 
ber, though  the  bulletin  board  was  far  remov- 
ed from  the  council  chamber.  Haughawout 
V.  Perdval,  119  Pac.  649,  650,  161  GaL  491, 
Ann.  Gas.  1913D,  115. 

As  Allowins  diflcretioii  as  to  plaoe 

The  word  •'near,"  as  applied  to  space,  can 
have  no  positive  or  precise  meaning.  It  is 
a  relative  term  depending  for  Its  significa- 
tion on  the  subject-matter  in  relation  to 
whldi  it  is  used  and  the  circumstances  under 
which  it  becomes  necessary  to  apply  It  to  sur- 
rounding objects.  A  charter  granting  a  rail- 
road a  right  to  cross  a  river   "above"  or 


"near^  a  certain  town  conferred  a  rlc^t  1 
locate  its  bridge  "below"  such  town.  Pe 
rick  V.  Raleigh  &  P.  S.  R.  Go.,  66  8.  E.  87 
883,  143  N.  G.  486,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  &)  « 
(quoting  and  adopdng  the  deflnition  in  Fa 
River  Iron  Works  Co.  v.  Old  Golony  St  P.  I 
R.  Go.,  6  All^  [87  Mass.]  221;  Wood,  Nui 
§274). 

The  title  of  Acts  1909,  c.  1,  an  act  to  pn 
hlbit  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  as 
beverage  "near"  any  schoolhouse,  where 
school  is  kept,  whether  it  be  in  session  or  no 
cannot  be  said  not  to  warrant  the  provisio 
of  the  act  prohibiting  such  a  sale  within  ton 
miles  of  such  a  schoolhouse,  especially  whei 
such  provision  has  repeatedly  been  made  b< 
fore  under  a  like  title;  the  word  ••near"  b< 
Ing  a  relative  term,  the  proper  import  c 
which  is  dependent  on  the  sense  sjid  coi 
nectlon  in  whidi  it  is  used,  considered  U 
gether  with  the  purposes  to  be  accompllshe< 
J.  W.  Kelly  &  Go.  v.  State,  132  8.  W.  19: 
201,  123  Tenn.  616. 

Giv.  Gode  1902,  {  208,  provides  that  at  a 
general  elections  held  in  the  state  the  san 
shall  be  conducted  at  the  polling  prednd 
fixed  by  law  in  the  various  counties,  dtle 
and  towns,  the  location  of  which  shall  be  a 
designated,  and  then  declares  that,  at  tb 
Waverly  prednct,  in  IL  Gounty,  the  poUlD 
place  shall  be  "at  or  near  the  fork  of  tb 
Rice  Greek  spring  and  Gamden  road."  He]< 
that  it  could  not  be  said  as  a  matter  of  U^ 
that  a  polling  place  located  a  quarter  of 
mile  from  the  crossing  of  the  stream  an 
road  was  not  properly  located  **near"  sue 
point  Vemer  v.  Muller,  71  8.  E.  654,  ^ 
89  S.  G.  117. 

Om  synenyBftoss 

See  On — Upon. 

The  call  from  the  third  to  the  fourt 
comer  of  a  survey  of  land,  made  under  wu 
rant  of  the  state  of  Kentucky  and  afterward 
carried  into  a  patent  issued  by  the  state,  wa 
from  a  stake  on  the  top  of  Gumberland  Mooi 
tain,  ''thence  south,  60  degrees  west,  8^2 
poles,  to  a  stake  near  Gumberland  Gap."  I 
the  course  and  distance  be  followed,  it  woul< 
carry  the  fourth  comer  several  miles  withl 
the  state  of  Tennessee;  whereas,  if  the  Un 
be  ran  following  the  state  line  along  the  cree 
of  the  Gumberland  Mountains  in  a  genera 
southwesterly  course^  it  would  strike  the  cez 
ter  of  the  Gap  at  the  Tennessee  line.  Helc 
that  the  words  "near  Gumberland  Gap 
should  be  constraed  to  mean  at  or  in  Gun 
berland  Gap,  and  that,  as  so  construed,  sad 
natural  object  would  control  the  calls  fo 
course  and  distance,  and  fix  the  comer  a 
the  center  of  the  Gap.  Davis*  Heirs  i 
Hinckley,  141  Fed.  706,  710;  Davis  ▼.  Fann 
er,  141  Fed.  703,  707. 

HEAR  BEER 

"Near  beer"  is  an  imitation  of  beei 
Manus  v.  State,  66  &  B.  1037,  7  Oa.  App.  373 


NEAR  BEER 


631        NEAREST  BliOOD  RELATIONS 


One  who  has  paid  the  tax  Imposed  by 

Is  1908,  p.  1112,  known  as  the  '*near  beer 

t,**  and  has  obtained  a  license  thereunder, 

not  entitled  to  keep  on  hand  at  his  place 

business  any  alcoholic,  spirltnons,  malt, 

intoxicating  liquors,  but  only  such  liquors 

,  if  drunk  to  excess,  will  not  produce  intoxi- 

tion.     Cassidy  v.  State,  72  S.  E.  939,  941, 

Ga.  App.  123. 

The  court  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the 
inlntoxicating  qualities  of  "near  beer/'  a 
rm  currently  used  to  designate  all  that 
Eiss  of  malt  liquors  which  contain  so  little 
cohol  that  they  will  not  produce  intoxica- 
>n,  though  drunk  to  excess,  and  including 
1  malt  liquors  not  within  the  purriew  of  the 
neral  prohibition  law.  Loh  v.  City  of  Ma- 
tt, 70  S.  E.  149,  150,  8  Ga.  App.  744. 

Act  March  12,  1906  (Laws  1908,  p.  275,  c 
!9),  known  as  the  **Byrd  Liquor  Law,"  is 
Ltltled  *'An  act  to  define  and  regulate  the 
Lie,  distribution,  rectifying,  manufacture 
id  distilling  of  intoxicating  liquor  and  malt 
averages,  and  to  impose  a  license  thereon," 
id  defines  what  shall  be  deemed  intoxicat- 
ig  spirits,  including  beer,  etc.,  therein,  and 
K?tlon  23%  provides  that  "malt  bererage" 
lall  mean  the  by-products  of  a  brewery,  but 
ust  be  nonlntoxicating,  and  shall  not  con- 
in  more  than  2%  per  cent  of  alcohol,  and 
lall  only  be  sold  by  the  manufacturer  to  the 
istomer  and  in  quantities  of  not  less  than 
le-half  dozen  bottles  or  more  than  four  doz- 
1  bottles  at  a  time;  that  the  name  "malt 
average"  shall  be  blown  in  the  bottles  in 
le  manner  stated,  with  the  name  and  ad- 
ress  of  the  manufacturer,  and  that  no  per- 
>n  shall  place  in  such  bottles  liquid  odn- 
dning  more  than  2%  per  cent  volume  of  al- 
)hol,  and  prescribes  a  penalty  for  its  vlo- 
Ltion.  Held,  that  the  section  was  intended 
»  regulate  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  all 
asses  of  malt  liquors  not  containing  2% 
sr  cent,  alcohol,  "malt  beverage"  being  syn- 
nymous  with  "small  brew"  and  "near  beer," 
Qd  was  a  valid  exercise  of  the  state's  gener- 
l  police  power,  as  well  as  of  the  authority 
ranted  by  Ck>nst  |  62  (Ck>de  1904,  p.  ccxxiii), 
athorizing  the  General  Assembly  to  enact 
iws  regulating  or  prohibiting  the  manufac- 
ire  or  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors ;  that  see- 
on  of  the  Ck>nstitutlon  not  being  designed  to 
mit  but  to  enlarge  the  police  power  over 
itoxicants.  Commonwealth  v.  Henry,  65  S. 
.  570,  572,  110  Va,  879,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
33. 

"Near  beer"  ts  a  term  used  to  designate 
a  malt  liquors  which  contain  so  little  al- 
>hol  that  they  will  not  produce  intoxication, 
longh  drunk  to  excess,  and  includes  all  malt 
qnors  not  within  the  purview  of  the  general 
rohibition  law.  Campbell  ▼.  City  of  Hiom- 
srUle,  64  8.  E.  815,  818,  6  Ga.  App.  212. 

As  iatoxieatlns  liquor 

See  Intoxicating  Liquor. 


NEAR  COMPAOT  PART  OF  TOWN 

The  phrase  "near  the  compact  part  of  a 
town"  in  Rev.  St  c.  52,  |-86,  providing  that 
no  engine  or  train  shall  run  across  a  highway 
near  the  compact  part  of  a  town  at  a  speed 
greater  than  6  miles  an  hour,  unless  the  rail- 
road maintains  a  flagman,  a  gate,  or  certain 
signals  at  such  crossing,  is  not  limited  to  the 
largest  or  principal  compact  part  of  a  town, 
but  applies  to  any  compact  portion,  and  in- 
cludes a  village  with  church,  schoolhouse,  en- 
gine house,  store  and  dwelling  houses,  in  all 
at  least  25  buildings,  and  all  situated  within 
350  feet  of  the  central  point  Moore  v.  Maine 
Cent  R.  Co.,  76  AtL  871,  872,  106  Me.  297. 

NEAR  RELATIVES 

The  term  "near  relatives,"  in  a  petition 
for  leave  to  appeal  from  a  decision  admitting 
a  will  to  probate,  averring  that  the  petition- 
ers are  "near  relatives"  and  heirs  at  law  of 
the  deceased  and  entitled  to  a  distributive 
share  of  the  estate  if  the  will  should  be  set 
aside,  is  used  as  synonymous  with  the  term 
"heirs,"  and  is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  pe- 
titioners are  beneficially  interested  in  the  es- 
tate and  entitled  to  appeal.  Perry  y.  Scaife, 
106  N.  W.  920,  921,  126  Wis.  405. 


TO 

As  on,  see  On — Upon. 

NEAREST 

There  is  a  shade  of  difference  between 
the  words  "next"  and  "nearest"  The  word 
"next,"  in  a  certificate  of  membership  of  a 
mutual  benefit  society,  providing  for  payment 
of  a  benefit  on  the  death  of  a  member  to  the 
beneficiary  named,  who  under  the  by-laws 
must  be  either  the  wife,  children,  adopted 
children,  parents,  etc.,  and,  if  the  member 
outlived  the  beneficiary  named  and  died  with- 
out naming  another  beneficiary,  the  benefit 
was  to  go  to  the  member's  "next"  living  re- 
lation in  the  order  named,  is  used  as  a  syno- 
nym of  "nearest,"  and  refers  to  the  member 
and  not  to  the  beneficiary.  Therefore,  where 
a  member  named  his  wife  as  beneficiary,  and 
she  died,  and  he  married  again,  leaving  a 
second  wife,  without  having  changed  the 
beneficiary,  the  second  wife,  and  not  his 
children,  took  the  benefit  Speegle  v.  Sover- 
eign Camp  of  Woodmen  of  the  World,  58  S. 
B.  435.  436,  77  S.  C.  517. 

NEAREST  BLOOD  RELATIONS 

The  words  "my  nearest  blood  relatives," 
used  in  wills,  generally  mean  such  persons 
as  take  under  the  statute  regarding  the  dis- 
tribution of  estates  of  intestates,  but  any 
reasonably  different  meaning  may  be  given 
thereto  when  necessary  to  effectuate  the  in- 
tention of  the  testator.  In  re  Sander's  E2s- 
tate,  105  N.  W.  1064,  1065,  126  Wis.  660,  5 
Ann.  Cas.  508. 

No  one  is  "nearest"  in  degree  of  blood, 
if  aome  one  else  be  "nearer."    In  re  Weaver'a 


ITliCQSSARIES 


534    KECESSARILiT  AFFECT  JUDGM£N1 


ground  of  the  client's  minority.  Sattoo  ▼. 
Ueinzle,  U5  Pac.  560,  561,  84  Kan.  756,  84 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  238. 

Under  Bev.  Laws,  c  145,  i  26,  requiring 
guardians  to  Irae  tor  and  receive  debts  due 
their  wards,  and  to  represent  their  wards 
in  all  actions  unless  some  other  person  Is 
appointed  aA  guardian  ad  litem  or  next 
friend,  and  section  28  providing  for  guardians 
ad  litem  for  minors  in  suits  in  which  the 
latter  may  be  interested,  services  of  an  at- 
torney in  settling  the  estate  of  a  deceased 
person,  in  which  a  minor  is  interested,  are 
not  "necessaries"  for  which  the  minor  is 
liable,  in  the  absence  of  an  employment  of  the 
attorney  by  the  minor's  guardian.  Mclsaac 
V.  Adams,  76  N.  B.  654,  190  Mass.  117,  112 
Am.  St  Rep.  321,  6  Ann.  Ga&  729. 

A  buggy  is  not  a  "necessary"  to  an  infant 
not  engaged  in  any  business  requiring  the  use 
of  a  buggy,  nor  attending  school,  so  as  to 
make  it  necessary  for  htm  to  ride  to  and 
from  schooL  Hefflngton  v.  Jackson  ft  Norton, 
96  S.  W.  108, 109,  43  Tex.  Civ.  App.  560. 

Olothlas,  ed«eatiim»  food*  lodstnc*  and 


The  question  of  what  are  "necessaries*' 
for  an  infant  depends  largely  upon  his  rank, 
social  position,  and  like  circumstances.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  necessaries  for  an  intent  in- 
clude support  and  maintenance,  food,  lodging, 
clothing,  medical  attendance,  and  education 
suitable  to  his  station  in  life.  McLean  v. 
Jackson,  76  S.  B.  792,  12  Ga.  App.  51. 

"What  may  be  included  in  the  term 
^necessaries'  is  a  question  upon  which  the 
authorities  are  not  entirely  harmonious,  but 
certainly  the  term  is  not  so  limited  as  to  in- 
clude only  what  is  necessary  to  the  actual 
support  of  life,  and  it  is  usually  held  to  be 
sufficiently  extensive  to  include  articles  fit 
to  maintain  a  particular  person  in  the  state, 
station,  and  degree  in  life  in  which  he  is,  so 
that  things  may  be  necessary  for  one  person 
which  would  not  be  necessary  for  another  in 
a  different  station  in  life  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  Clark  on  Contracts  [2d  Ed.] 
156).  'Necessaries'  are  defined  by  Mr.  Green- 
leaf  to  be  such  things  as  are  useful  and  suit- 
able to  the  party's  state  and  condition  in  life, 
and  not  merely  such  as  are  requisite  for  bare 
existence."  In  order  to  determine  the  ques- 
tion whether  or  not  the  contract  of  an  in- 
fant for  a  course  in  stenography  was  a 
contract  for  necessaries,  in  the  sense  in 
which  the  term  '^necessaries"  is  used  to  ren- 
der the  contract  binding  upon  such  infant, 
the  evidence  in  the  case  should  show  the 
state,  degree,  and  condition  in  life  in  which 
the  infant  is  whose  contract  is  under  con- 
sideration; and  it  should  also  affirmatively 
appear  that  the  parents  or  guardian  of  such 
infant  failed  or  refused  to  furnish  the  al- 
leged necessary.    Mauldin  v.  Southern  Short- 


hand ft  Business  University,  55  S.  B.  922, 1 
Ga.  681,  8  Ann.  Gas.  130. 

QnMtioa  of  law  or  faet 

Articles  suitable  and   which  would 
beneficial  to  an  infant  are  not  ex  vl  term 
necessaries,  but  the  question  is  for  tlie  juj 
Nielsen  v.  International  Textbook  Co.,  75  A 
380,  831,  106  Me.  104,  20  Ann.  Caa.  591. 

ICEOESSARIES  (For  Vossola) 

The  "necessaries"  for  which  the  masl 
of  a  vessel  may,  in  a  proper  case,  bind  1 
vessel  means  whatever  is  fit  and  proper  1 
the  service  on  which  a  vessel  Is  engagi 
The  Pleroma,  175  Fed.  639,  64a 

NECESSARILY 

See  Unnecessarily. 

As  used  in  an  instruction  that,  if  pla 
tiff  was  employed  by  defendant,  plaintiff  i 
sumed  all  the  dangers  "necessarily"  inddc 
to  such  employment,  but  plaintiff  did  not  i 
sume  any  dangers  arising  from  or  caused 
defendant's  carelessness  and  negligence,  t 
word  "necessarily"  means  inevitably,  not 
be  avoided  even  by  the  exercise  of  the  hi| 
est  degree  of  care,  and  such  instruction  is  < 
roneous  as  Imposing  too  high  a  degree 
care.  Reickert  v.  Hammond  Packing  Co^  1 
S.  W.  525,  527, 136  Bio.  App.  565. 

NEOESSARXXiY     AOQUIBED     KHOW 
EDGE 

'*By  'necessarily  acquired  knowledge* 
meant  that  which  arises  from  the  obvio 
and  open  negligence  which  the  servant  mi 
have  seen  and  known  in  performing  his  wo 
by  the  use  of  ordinary  care."  Galveston, 
ft  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Stoy,  99  S.  W.  135,  15 
44  Tex.  Civ.. App.  448  (citing  Bonnet  v.  6i 
veston,  H.  ft  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  33  S.  W.  334, 
Tex.  72;  Missouri,  K.  ft  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hu 
nig,  43  S.  W.  508,  91  Tex.  347;  Peck  v.  Pe< 
87  S.  W.  248,  99  Tex.  10;  El  Paso  ft  S.  ^ 
R.  Co.  V.  Vizard,  88  S.  W.  457,  39  Tex.  O 
App.  534). 

KEGESSAKILY  AFFECT  JXTBGMEirr 

Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  1068,  provides  that 
writ  of  review  shall  issue  only  where  an  in! 
rior  tribunal  has  exceeded  its  jurisdictl< 
and  there  is  no  appeal  or  other  adequa 
remedy.  Section  956  provides  that,  upon  i 
appeal  from  a  Judgment,  the  court  may  i 
view  the  verdict  or  decision  and  any  inti 
mediate  order  or  decision  excepted  to  whi 
involves  the  merits  or  "necessarily  affects  ti 
Judgment,"  h^d  that,  though  no  appeal  U 
from  an  order  dismissing  or  refusing  to  di 
miss  an  action,  an  erroneous  order  denyl 
plaintiff's  motion  to  dismiss  the  action  affec 
the  Judgment  thereafter  rendered  on  tl 
merits  against  the  plaintiff,  so  that  such  c 
der  may  be  reviewed  on  appeal  from  tl 
Judgm^it,  and  hence  a  writ  of  review  w 
not  lie.    Huntington  Park  Impw  Go.  v.  Suf 


KBCESSAUXiT  ANP  BOhKLY 


686 


KBOBSSABT 


lor  Court  ot  Los  Angeles  County*  121  Pftc 
01,  703,  17  CaL  App.  t>92. 

nBCE8SABXI.Y  AKB  SOLEIiT 

The  requiremeiit  of  an  aoddent  policy 
tiat  deatb  must  have  resulted  "necessarily 
jQul  solely"  from  accidental  Injury  Is  satis- 
^ed,  where  the  Injury  was  the  predominating 
jui  efficient  cause  of  the  deatiit  and  that  oth- 
r  conditions  were  set  in  motion  by  the  in- 
ory  which  may  have  contributed  to  the  death 
i  immaterial  Continental  Casualty  Co.  y. 
k>lTln,  95  Pac.  666,  668,  77  Kan.  661. 

nBCESSABILY  COMTXirEII  TO  HOITSE 

A  policy  insuring  against  diseases  pro- 
ided  for  a  weekly  Indonnity  for  the  period 
in  assured  ''should  be  necessarily  confined  to 
he  house."  Held,  that  the  clause,  in  the 
ase  of  a  person  taking  treatment  for  tuber- 
ulosls,  meant  confined  to  any  part  of  the 
loose,  either  inside  or  upon  the  porches  at- 
ached  to  it  on  the  outside.  Dnlany  v.  Fi- 
lellty  &  Casualty  Co.  of  New  York,  66  AtL 
tl4,  617,  106  Md,  17. 

A  health  indemnity  policy  provided  for 
Miyment  for  the  number  of  consecutive  days 
ifter  the  first  week  ttiat  insured  was  neces- 
sarily and  continuously  confined  within  the 
louse  and  r^^arly  visited  by  a  physician  by 
reason  of  illness  contracted  after  the  policy 
lad  been  in  force  for  30  days.  Plaintiff  was 
:aken  ill  in  a  hotel  while  in  Florida,  where 
le  was  treated  by  a  physician,  and,  after  gat- 
ing somewhat  better,  was  transported  in  a 
Pullman  car  to  his  home,  where  it  was  de- 
termined that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to 
indergo  an  operation  by  surgeons  in  a  near- 
t>y  city.  He  was  operated  upon,  attended  by 
them  daily  by  being  taken  to  them  in  a  car- 
riage from  his  hotel  near  by  and  occasional- 
ly walking  to  them  when  able,  and  on  being 
returned  to  his  home  was  yet  under  the 
treatment  of  physicians  and  confined  to  his 
bouse,  exc^t  occasionally  when  he  sat  on 
the  porch,  and  was  once  driven  to  his  place 
ot  business  without  taking  any  part  in  busi- 
Qess  matters.  At  another  time  he  was  taken 
to  the  physicians*  office,  and  with  these  ex- 
ceptions he  was  in  the  house  and  much  of 
the  time  in  bed.  Held,  that  the  policy  did 
Dot  require  that  plaintiff  should  be  literally 
confined  within  the  walls  of  his  house  all 
the  time,  and  that  he  was  necessarily  and 
continQonsly  confined  within  the  house  with- 
in the  terms  of  the  policy.  Ramsey  v.  Gener- 
al Accident,  Fire  &  life  Ins.  Co.,  142  S.  W. 
763,  160  Mo.  App.  236. 

KECX»SABII.T  IHGI^UDEB 

To  be  "necessarily  included*'  in  the  of- 
fense charged,  the  lesser  offense  must  not 
only  be  part  of  the  greater  in  fact,  but  it 
mast  be  embraced  wittiin  the  legal  definition 
of  the  greater  as  a  part  thereof.  Peoi^e  v. 
Kerrick,  77  Pac.  7U,  712,  144  CaL  46. 


Code  Cr.  Proc  i  444,  provides  that  on 
an  indictment  for  crime  consisting  of  differ- 
ent degrees  the  Jury  may  find  defendant  not 
guilty  of  the  crime  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment, and  guilty  of  any  degree  inferior 
thereto,  or  of  an  attempt  to  commit  the 
crime.  Section  446  provides  that  in  all  other 
cases  defendant  may  be  found  guilty  of  any 
crime  the  commission  of  which  is  necessarily 
included  in  tliat  witk  wliich  he  li  charged 
in  the  indictment  Penal  Law  (Consol.  Laws, 
c.  40)  i  404,  provides  that  a  person  who  with 
intent  to  commit  a  crime  therein  breaks  and 
enters  a  building,  etc.,  is  guilty  of  burglary 
in  the  third  degree.  Section  405  provides 
that  a  person  who,  under  circumstances  or 
in  a  manner  not  amounting  to  a  burglary, 
enters  a  building  or  any  part  thereof,  with 
intent  to  commit  a  felony,  or  a  larceny  or 
any  malidons  mischief,  is  guilty  of  a  misde- 
meanor. Held,  that  the  words  ''necessarily 
included'*  in  said  section  445  should  not  be 
so  construed  as  to  require  that  the  lesser  of- 
fense for  which  a  conviction  may  be  had 
must  be  so  included  in  the  statutory  defini- 
tion of  the  crime  for  which  defendant  is  in- 
dicted, but  it  suffices  that  the  acts  constitut- 
ing the  lesser  crime  be  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment and  duly  proven,  and  hence  one  charg- 
ed with  burglary  in  the  third  degree  may  be 
convicted  of  an  unlawful  entry  with  intent  to 
commit  a  larceny,  where  the  Indictment 
charges  the  commission  of  all  the  acts  neces- 
sary to  establish  the  latter  crime.  People  v. 
Miller,  128  N.  T.  8.  549,  600,  143  App.  Div. 
251. 

HXOBSSAAXIiY  DTOUBBIBD 

Code  Civ.  Proc  1 1033,  allowing  recovery 
of  disbursements  "necessarily**  incurred  in 
the  acticm,  does  not  make  the  premium  paid 
a  surety  company  for  a  replevin  bond,  pro- 
cured pendente  lite  by  a  plaintiff  ultimately 
successful,  a  proper  item  of  costs;  it  not  be- 
ing a  necessity  to  plalntilTs  cause  of  action 
that  he  take  into  possession  the  property 
pending  the  action,  but  a  privilege  granted  on 
filing  the  bond,  and  the  filing  of  the  bond  by 
a  surety  company  likewise  being  a  privilege, 
and  not  a  necessity.  Williams  v.  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  By.  Co.,  103  Pac.  885, 156  Cal.  140, 
134  Am.  St  Rep.  U7, 10  Ann.  Cas.  1260. 

NECESSARY 

See  Proper  and  Necessary. 

The  word  "necessary**  must  be  consider- 
ed in  the  connection  in  wliich  it  is  used,  as  it 
is  a  word  susceptible  of  various  meanings. 
It  may  import  absolute  physical  necessity  or 
inevitability,  or  it  may  import  that  which 
is  only  convenient,  useful,  appropriate,  suit- 
able, proper,  or  conductive  to  the  end  sought. 
Bexroth  y.  HoUoway,  90  N.  B.  87,  45  Ind. 
App.  36. 

Though  plaintiff  in  an  employe's  person* 
al  injury  action  alleged  in  his  complaint  that 
it  was  "necessary**  for  him  to  do  his  work  in 


KECE8SART 


S8« 


NSaBSSABT 


a  particalar  way,  it  was  not  error  to  refuse 
to  Instruct  that  he  was  bound  to  prove  that 
allegation,  and  to  instruct,  in  lieu  thereof; 
that  it  was  not  essential  that  plaintiff  was 
absolutely  required  to  do  his  work  in  that 
way  if  the  method  he  adopted  was  custom- 
arily pursued  and  was  a  reasonably  safe 
method;  it  not  appearing  that  plaintiff  in- 
tended to  use  the  term  '"necessary"  in  its  re- 
stricted sense  as  meaning  indispensable.  EUl- 
leen  v.  Barnes-King  Development  Go.,  127 
Pac.  89,  d3,  46  Mont  212;  State  ▼.  liarron 
(N.  M.)  128  Pac.  485,  491. 

The  word  "necessary"  has  no  fixed  mean- 
ing or  character  peculiar  to  itself.  It  is  flex- 
ible and  relative.  It  is  an  adjective  express- 
ing degrees,  and  may  express  mere  conven- 
ience or  that  whidh  is  indispensable  or  an  ab- 
solute physical  necessity.  It  may  mean  some- 
thing which  in  the  accomplishment  of  a  given 
object  cannot  be  dispensed  with,  or  it  may 
mean  something  reasonably  useful  and  prop- 
er, and  of  greater  or  lesser  benefit  or  conven- 
ience, and  its  force  and  meaning  must  be  de- 
termined with  relation  to  the  particular  ob- 
ject sought,  and  is  a  relative  and  compara- 
tive term,  depending  upon  its  application  to 
the  object  sought,  the  character  of  and  rea- 
sons for  the  convenience  as  public  or  pri- 
vate, and  its  adaptation  to  the  public  needs 
or  public  convenience,  and  especially  is  this 
true  where  it  is  based  upon  a  condition  or 
state  of  affairs  in  which  the  public  are  di- 
rectly interested,  and  as  to  which  a  public 
duty  is  imposed  upon  a  public  instrumental- 
ity, as  a  railroad.  Chicago,  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Go. 
V.  Baugh,  94  N.  B.  671,  978, 175  Ind.  419. 

The  word  "necessary**  is  a  somewhat 
elastic  term,  and  according  to  Webster's  Dic- 
tionary may  mean  such  as  must  be;  impos- 
sible to  be  otherwise;  not  to  be  avoided;  in- 
evitable; or,  according  to  Bouvier's  Law 
Diet.,  it  may  mean  that  one  tiling  is  conven- 
ient, or  useful,  or  essential  to  another.  In 
an  action  against  a  railroad  company  to  re- 
cover for  the  death  of  employes  of  a  contrac- 
tor, the  court'  instructed  the  Jury  that  if  it 
was  contemplated  in  the  construction  con- 
tract tliat  the  workmen  should  use  the  tracks 
in  going  to  and  from  their  work,  or  that  such 
use  was  practically  necessary,  such  use  of 
the  trade  did  not  constitute  the  employes 
trespassers  or  mere  licensees,  but  they  were 
there  by  the  invitation  of  the  company.  It 
is  plain  from  the  context  that  in  the  instruc- 
tion under  consideration  the  word  "necessa- 
ry** was  used  in  Its  primary  sense  as  given 
in  Webster's  Dictionary,  especially  as  the 
court  in  another  Instruction  said:  "If,  on  the 
contrary,  the  Jury  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  such  use  was  neither  contemplated  nor 
necessary,  as  aforesaid,  then  the  mere  use  of 
said  tract,  by  said  employes,  even  with  the 
company's  knowledge,  whether  for  the  sake 
of  convenience  or  otherwise,  constitutes  them 
mere  licensees,  and  as  such  the  defendant 
owed  them  the  same  duty  as  to  trespassera" 


Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Denny's  Adm'r,  66 
BL  821,  328, 106  Ya.  86S. 

**To  have  been  'necoBsaxy,*  the  admix 
tration  of  chloroform  must  have  'such 
would  be;  that  cannot  be  otherwise;*  or 
'such  that  it  cannot  be  disregarded  or  on 
ted;  indispensable,  requisite,  essential,  nei 
ful,  required.' "  Mella  y.  Northern  S.  S.  C 
162  Fed.  499,  511  (quoting  and  adopting  Ce 
Diet). 

The  word  "necessary,"  as  used  in  B 
St  1898,  c.  48,  providing  for  the  taxation 
railroads  according  to  gross  profits,  and  s 
tion  1038,  subd.  14,  declaring  tbat  all  1 
track,  right  of  way,  depot  grounds,  a 
buildings,  macdiine  shops,  rolling  stock,  a 
all  other  property  neoeasarily  used  in  op 
ating  any  railroad,  shall  be  exempt  fr^ 
taxation  for  any  purpose,  except  spedal 
sessments  for  local  improvementa,  met 
neither  inevitable  nor  merely  conTenient 
profitable,  but  refers  to  a  stage  of  utility 
materialty  to  the  general  business  of  a  oo 
men  carrier  less  than  the  first  and  greai 
than  the  latter  of  such  expressions.  Chi< 
go,  St  P.,  M.  ft  O.  R.  Co.  V.  Douglas  Coun 
99  N.  W.  1030.  1031,  122  Wis.  273. 

The  word  ''necessary,"  in  St  1898, 
4075,  giving  the  privilege  of  secrecy  to 
information,  required  by  a  physician  fn 
patient  in  attending  the  latter  professional 
necessary  to  enable  prescription  for  sc 
patient,  will  not  receive  any  technical  or  i 
duly  restricted  meaning,  and  the  testimo 
and  opinion  of  a  decedent* s  attending  phj 
dan  as  to  her  mental  capacity,  based  enU 
ly  on  information  derived  from  her  sta 
ments  or  the  physician's  observation  wb 
treating  her  professionally,  and  for  the  pi 
pose  of  such  treatment,  are  properly  exdi 
ed  in  a  proceeding  contesting  the  proU 
of  decedent's  wilL  In  re  Hunt's  Will,  100 
W.  874,  876,  122  Wis.  460  (citing  In 
Bniendl's  WiU,  78  N.  W.  169,  102  Wis.  45). 

**When  it  comes  to  determining  what 
"necessary*  for  the  conduct  of  the  busing 
and  transaction  of  tlie  affairs  for  which. 
corporation  has  been  chartered,  it  must 
course,  be  understood  that  what  is  meant 
a  due  and  profitable  prosecution  of  its  la 
ful  purposes;    that  the  'necessity'  conte 
plated  is  a  relative  one  having  reference 
economy,  convenience,  efficiency,  and  succe 
and  that  some  latitude  is  to  be  allowed 
the  discretion  of  the  corporation   itself 
deciding  what,  from  time  to  time,  is  or 
not  in  that  sense,  necessary.**    Folk  v.  St^ 
Capital  Savings  ft  Loan  Ass'n,  63  Atl.  lOJ 
1016,  214  Pa.  529. 

The  term  "necessary  or  in  use  in  t 
proper  operation,"  in  Comp.  Laws  1897, 
6277,  providing  that  specified  railroad  tax 
shall  be  in  lieu  of  other  taxes,  except  so 
real  estate  as  is  owned  and  can  be  convey* 
by  such  corporations,  and  not  actually  occ 
pied  in  the  exerdse  of  its  franchises,  and  n 


KSCBS8ARY 


B37 


NB0BS8ABT 


necessary  or  in  use  in  the  proper  operation'* 
>t  ita  road,  indndes  land  owned  by  a  rail- 
oad  but  in  the  possession  of  private  indl- 
iduals  and  need  ezdnsiTely  by  them  in 
belr  indlTidnal  bnslness  for  wood  and  coal 
ranis  and  sheds  and  storage  of  grain,  and 
iuch  property  is  taxable  as  other  real  estate. 
}rand  Rapids  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  ▼.  City  of  Grand 
lapids,  100  N.  W.  1012,  1018,  187  liCLch. 
;S7,  4  Ann.  Cas.  1195. 


The  declaration  in  an  action  for  injn- 
ies  to  an  employ^  in  a  coal  mine  while 
)lacing  a  loaded  car  on  a  side  track  alleged 
liat  it  became  ^'necessary"  for  tibe  employd 
n  the  performanoe  of  his  dnty  to  place  the 
r&r  on  the  side  track.  The  evidenee  showed 
liat  it  was  convenient,  and  tended  to  great* 
J  facilitate  the  performance  of  the  work  to 
>lace  the  car  on  the  side  track,  which  was 
lot  more  than  200  feet  from  where  it  was 
loaded,  instead  of  taking  it  from  one-fourth 
:o  one-half  a  mile  distant  Held,  that  the 
;>roof  sQstained  the  allegation;  the  word 
*necesBary"  not  meaitfng  Indispensable,  nn- 
lYoidable,  or  that  whldi  mnst  be,  bnt  mean- 
ng  reasonably  convenient  Brooks  v.  Chl- 
»go,  W.  ft  V.  Goal  Ck>.,  84  N.  B.  1028,  1081, 
234  DL  872. 

The  word  "necessary,"  as  used  in  an 
igreement  permitting  the  cohstmctlon  of  a 
switch  necessary  for  the  accommodation  of 
1  railway  company,  does  not  mean  absolutely 
requisite,  bnt  is  equivalent  to  the  words 
'reasonably  convenient"  Reeser  v.  Phila- 
lelphia  ft  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Ati.  878,  8T7,  215  Pa. 
L36. 

The  word  "necessary,**  as  used  in  an 
iillegatlon,  in  a  railroad  company's  com- 
plaint to  restrain  the  enforcement  of  an  or- 
ler  requiring  the  construction  of  a  connec- 
tion with  another  road,  that  all  the  land  it 
wsiB  required  to  use  for  such  connection  was 
'necessary"  to  enable  it  to  handle  its  traffic, 
meant  nothing  more  than  that  the  lands 
nrould  be  reasonably  convenient  Pittsburgh, 
C,  C.  ft  St  L.  R.  Co.  V.  Railroad  Commission 
of  Indiana,  86  N.  E.  828,  834,  171  Ind.  189 
(citing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4705). 
As  ezpedieiit  or  appropriate 

In  determining  what  is  reasonably  nec- 
essary in  making  a  public  improvement,  and 
what  the  authorities  in  charge  are  therefore 
empowered  to  do,  the  word  "necessary"  does 
Qot  mean  indispensable,  but  includes  what- 
ever is  appropriate  to  render  the  improve- 
ment effective.  Meriwether  v.  Board  of  Di- 
rectors of  St  Francis  Levee  District,  166 
Fed.  817,  819,  91  O.  C.  A.  286. 

The  word  "necessary,'*  as  used  in  Rev. 
St  a  34,  I  26,  making  it  the  duty  of  the 
county  board  of  each  county  to  provide  a 
suitable  courthouse  when  "necessary^  and 
the  finances  of  the  county  will  Justify  it,  **\b 
not  to  be  interpreted  as  referring  to  such 
measures  as  afe  absolutely  and  indispensably 


bat  as  including  all  appropriate 
means  whidi  are  conducive  or  are  adapted 
to  the  end  to  be  accomplished,  and  which  in 
the  Judgment  of  the  board  will  most  advan- 
tageously effect  it**  Coles  County  v.  Qoeh- 
ring,  70  N.  B.  610,  617,  209  DL  142. 

As  imvelvljic  diseretiom 
The  words  '^rhen  nsosesary,"  as  used  in 
a  atatotSb  making  It  the  doty  of  the  court, 
whether  feqnested  or  not,  to  Instmet  the  jary 
on  all  qvesttons  of  law  necessary  for  their  in- 
formation, which  instruction  shall  include, 
whenever  necessary,  the  subject  of  good  d^r^ 
acter,  do  not  mean  that  it  is  discretionary 
with  the  court  as  to  including,  in  its  instruc- 
tions, good  character,  when  there  is  evidence 
upon  which  to  base  the  instruction.  The  prov- 
ince of  the  court  is  to  guide  the  Jury  by  prop- 
er instructions  upon  the  facts  in  proof  and 
not  to  consider  the  necessity  of  an  instruc- 
tion which  practically,  if  that  rule  should  be 
adopted,  would  permit  the  court  to  determine 
whether  the  fiicts  in  proof  would  have  any 
effect  upon  the  conclusion  to  be  reached,  and 
the  court  must  instruct  on  good  character 
whenever  there  Is  testimony  as  to  good  char- 
acter in  evidence.  State  v.  Anslinger,  71  8. 
W.  1041,  1048,  171  Ho.  600. 

As  material  er  relevant 
Code  Olv.  Proc.  |  885,  making  It  a  prereq- 
uisite to  the  granting  of  an  order  for  the 
appointment  of  a  referee  to  take  depositions 
of  the  officers  of  a  corporation  that  the  affi- 
davit show  that  it  Is  ''necessary*'  for  use  on 
a  motion,  etc.,  requires  thBt  it  diall  appear 
first  that  the  person  sought  to  be  examined 
can,  and  if  compelled  will,  swear  to  the  facts 
desired,  and  that  the  facts  to  which  he  can 
swear  are  relevant  to  the  proceeding.  Cal- 
vet-Rogniat  v.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.,  98  N. 
Y.  Supp.  241,  248,  46  Misc.  R«p^  20. 

In  Code  Civ.  Proc  |  870  et  seq.,  and  gen- 
eral rule  of  practice  82,  requiring,  for  the 
examination  of  an  adverse  party  before  trial, 
a  showing  by  affidavit  that  the  testimony  is 
material  and  necessary,  the  words  '^material'* 
and  'Necessary*'  are  not  used  synonymously, 
even  if  the  word  ''necessary**  does  not  mean 
indispensable  to  the  making  of  an  issue. 
Koplln  V.  Hoe,  108  N.  T.  Supp.  602,  603,  128 
App.  Div.  827. 

In  Code  Supp.  1907,  |  3060al4,  provid- 
ing that,  where  a  negotiable  instrument  is 
wanting  in  any  "material  particular,**  the 
person  in  possession  has  prima  fade  author- 
ity to  complete  it  by  filling  up  the  blank 
therein,  etc.,  the  word  "material**  was  not 
used  as  synonymous  with  "necessary,**  so  as 
to  restrict  the  right  to  filling  in  an  omission 
essential  to  the  completion  of  a  negotiable 
instrument,  but  included  all  omitted  matter 
usually  found  in  such  instruments,  and  where 
a  negotiable  note  was  delivered  to  the  payee 
complete,  except  fbr  the  filling  of  a  blank 
left  for  the  place  of  paym^t,  the  payee 
had  pilma  fiicle  authority^  befbre  indondng 


fjl  . 


!   ^• 


■'.    f<^?: 


I 


NECESSABT 


588 


NX9CESSART 


/•^ 


it  to  a  bona  fide  holder  for  yalne  before  ma- 
turity* to  fill  the  blank  so  as  to  make  the 
note  payable  at  a  place  other  than  that 
where  the  maker  resided.  Johnston  v.  Hooy- 
er,  117  N.  W.  277,  278,  139  Iowa,  14S. 

As  prolmble,  usual,  and  ordinary 

In  prosecutions  for  homicide,  tn  charg- 
ing as  to  the  presumption  that  persons  in- 
tend the  ordinary  results  of  th^r  acts,  the 
words  "necessary,"  **probable,"  "usual,"  and 
"ordinary"  are  substantially  synonymous. 
Beauregard  t.  State,  131  N.  W.  847,  351,  146 
Wis.  280. 

As  reasonably  necessary 

The  phrase  "necessary  ballast,"  as  used 
in  a  contract  for  necessary  ballast  for  a  trac- 
tion company's  tracks,  means  the  ballast  rea- 
sonably necessary  to  complete  the  road  for 
the  purposes  for  which  it  was  built,  and  the 
contract  is  not  void  for  want  of  mutuality 
of  obligation,  where  the  necessary  amount 
can  be  determined  from  the  testimony  of  ex- 
perts. Blue  Grass  Traction  Co.  v.  Hedges 
A  Adair,  104  S.  W.  870,  372,  139  Ky.  358. 

NEGESSART  <Ib  Eminent  Domain) 
As  eonTenient 

The  word  **necessary,*'  as  used  In  a  stat- 
ute authorizing  the  taking  of  land  necessary 
for  canals,  does  not  mean  absolute  and  indis- 
pensable, or  that,  without  the  use  of  the  land 
in  the  given  case,  the  work  could  not  possibly 
go  on.  That  would  be  the  same  as  extreme 
necessity.  The  Legislature  used  the  word  in 
a  more  reasonable  and  popular  sense.  It  is 
sufficient  that  the  land  used  and  the  materi- 
als taken  from  it  are  needful  and  condudve 
to  the  object  and  more  convenient  in  the  ap- 
plication and  less  valuable,  and  the  use  of 
them  less  injurious  to  the  owner  than  any 
that  might  readily  be  selected.  There  must, 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing  and  the  nature 
of  the  case,  be  great  latitude  of  discretion  in 
the  selection  of  land  and  the  materials.  Un- 
der Canal  Law  (Laws  1894,  p.  635,  c.  338)  | 
70,  providing  that  the  superintendent  of  pub- 
lic works  may  take  any  lands,  the  appropri- 
ation of  which,  for  the  use  of  canals  and  the 
works  connected  therewith,  shall  in  his  Judg- 
ment be  necessary,  section  71  (page  636)  au- 
thorizing a  permanent  appropriation,  and 
section  72  (page  636)  authorizing  a  temporary 
appropriation,  the  determination  as  to  neces- 
sity of  appropriation,  which  need  not  be  an 
absolute  necessity,  and  as  to  whether  a  per- 
manent appropriation  of  the  lands  be  neces- 
sary or  whether  a  permanent  easement  or  a 
temporary  use  of  the  lands  will  be  sufficient, 
is  for  such  superintendent  acting  in  good 
faith  and  with  sound  discretion.  People  v. 
Fisher,  83  N.  B.  482,  485,  190  N.  Y.  468  (quot- 
ing Jerome  v.  Ross  [N.  Y.]  7  Johns.  Gh.  315, 
339,  11  Am.  Dec.  484). 

As  indispensable 

The  word  '^necessary,"  as  used  in  the 
rule  that  a  party  having  the  right  of  con- 


demning private  property  for  public  pnrposi 
can  only  condemn  such  amount  thereof  as 
"necessary,"  is  not  meant  to  be  used  in  tl 
sense  of  indispensable.  Necessity  for  publ 
use  is  not  such  an  imperative  necessity  thi 
would  render  the  contract  of  a  railroad,  f( 
instance,  impossible  without  the  anoiount  < 
land  in  Question.  Piedmont  Cotton  Mills 
Georgia  Ry.  A  Electric  Co.,  62  S.  B.  52,  5 
131  Ga.  129  (citing  15  Oyc  p.  633). 

Evidence  that  the  tracks  proposed  to  I 
located  over  and  across  the  streets  sought  t 
be  appropriated  are  necessary  in  the  use  an 
operation  of  the  switching  yards  of  the  rai 
road  company  does  not  authorize  a  trii 
court  to  find  that  sudi  tracks  are  necessai 
within  Rev.  St  |  3283,  authorizing  the  rai 
road  company  to  appropriate  so  much  of  an 
street  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  purpose 
of  its  road.  Village  of  Rockport  v.  Clev* 
land,  C,  G.  A  St  L.  Ry.  Co.,  97  N.  S3. 133, 13i 
85  Ohio  St  78. 

As  reasonably  neoessavy 

The  word  "necessary,"  in  acts  involvin 
the  right  of  eminent  domain,  does  not  mea 
"absolutely  necessary  or  indispensable,''  b« 
"reasonably  necessary,"  to  secure  the  end  ] 
view.  Sayre  v.  City  of  Orange  (N.  J.)  67  At 
933. 

"Necessary  accommodations,"  to  maintai 
which  a  carrier  can  condemn  lands,  are  sue 
as  are  reasonably  suitable  and  us^al,  an 
are  not  limited  to  those  which  are  absolute! 
necessary.  Chicago,  I.  A  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baugl 
94  N.  B.  571,  573,  175  Xnd.  419. 

As  used  in  Rev.  Codes,  i  7334,  providin 
that,  before  property  can  be  taken  by  em 
nent  domain,  it  must  appear  that  the  use  1 
authorized  by  law,  and  that  the  taking  is  ne( 
essary  to  such  use,  the  term  "necessary^  doe 
not  import  absolute  necessity,  but  only  sud 
as  may  be  characterized  as  reasonable,  1 
view  of  the  purpose  to  which  the  propert; 
sought  to  be  condemned  is  to  be  devoted  an< 
the  benefits  to  accrue  therefrom  to  the  puli 
lie.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McAdow,  12 
Pac.  473,  474,  44  Mont  547. 

The  word  "necessary,"  as  used  in  Bal 
linger's  Ann.  Codes  A  St  |  4335,  providini 
that  a  corporation  formed  for  the  construe 
tion  of  a  railroad  shall  have  power  to  cros 
or  Join  its  railway  with  any  other  railwa: 
before  constructed,  and  that,  if  the  two  coi 
porations  cannot  agree  as  to  the  amount  o 
compensation,  it  may  be  ascertained  in  tb( 
manner  provided  by  law  for  the  taking  o 
lands  necessary  for  the  constructioii  of  it 
road,  does  not  mean  an  absolute  "necessity," 
or  that  there  shall  be  no  other  place  for  th< 
location  of  the  road,  but  means  a  reasonable 
i^ecessity,  depending  upon  the  drcumstancei 
of  the  particular  case.  State  ex  reL  Keni 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Superior  Court  of  King  Coon 
ty,  90  Pac.  663,  665, 46  Wash.  516. 


NBCESSABT 


S89 


iraOES84BT  GHABOBS 


The  word  "neceadty**  in  Code  1904»  | 
L038,  as  amended  by  Acts  1008,  c.  349,  au- 
ihorlzing  any  city  or  town  to  acquire  land 
lecessary  for  the  acquisition  and  operation 
>f  waterworks  and  other  public  utilities,  but 
x>  property  shall  be  condemned,  unless  the 
lecessity  therefor  shall  be  shown  to  exist* 
loes  not  mean  absolutely  necessary,  but  rea- 
lonably  necessary  for  the  greatest  benefit  to 
Lhe  public  with  the  least  inconvenience  and 
expense.  Miller  ▼.  Town  of  Pularid,  75  8.  B. 
r67,  768»  U4  Ya.  86. 

HBCS88ABY  ABB  FBOPEB 

The  words  "necessary  and  ivoper,**  as 
osed  in  the  provision  of  the  federal  Oonstita- 
Hon  declaring  that  Congress  shall  have  pow- 
&r  to  pass  all  laws  which  are  "necessary  and 
proper^  for  carrying  into  execution  the  pow- 
er to  regulate  ecmmieroe  between  the  states, 
etc.,  do  not  imply  the  employment  of  only 
Buch  means  as  are  absolutely  necessary  to 
effect  the  object  sought,  but  Include  as  well 
all  the  means  which  in  the  Judgment  of  Con- 
gress may  be  proper  to  carry  out  the  power 
80  granted.  United  States  y.  Hoke,  187  Fed. 
992,  994. 

The  allegation  in  an  information  that 
the  board  of  county  commissioners  did  not 
make  "necessary  and  proper**  rules  and  regu- 
lations to  prevent  the  outbreak  and  spread 
of  contagious  and  infectious  diseases  is  not  a 
sufficient  allegation  that  no  rules  or  regula- 
tions in  regard  thereto  had  been  made.  Cor- 
ker V.  Pence,  8S  Pac.  388,  891,  12  Idaho,  152. 

BBGESSABT  BBUMB 

Code  1907,  |  6766,  provides  that  the  court 
of  county  commissioners  shall  have  general 
supervision  of  tiie  public  roads  within  the 
county,  and  may  establish  new  roads  and 
duinge  or  discontinue  old  ones,  and  shall 
have  power  to  maintain  public  roads,  bridg- 
es, and  ferries,  so  as  to  render  travel  safe. 
Section  3024  confers  on  such  court  the  same 
powers  over  bridges  as  it  has  over  public 
roads.  Section  3025  provides  that  whenever 
a  bridge  on  the  line  between  two  counties  is 
necessary,  and  the  work  is  too  great  to  be 
done  by  the  overseers,  the  same  must  be  built 
at  the  Joint  expense  of  such  counties.  Held, 
that  the  court  of  county  commissioners  of 
one  county  cannot  without  the  concurrence  of 
the  court  of  another  county  make  the  latter 
county  liable  for  the  expense  of  erecting  a 
bridge  on  the  line  of  the  two  counties,  for  a 
bridge,  becomes  necessary  within  the  mean- 
ing of  this  act  only  when  it  has  been  declared 
80  by  the  concurring  judgment  of  th^  commis- 
Bloners*  courts  of  both  countieB.  Pickens 
County  V.  Greene  County,  64  South.  998,  999, 
in  Ala.  377. 

mOEBBABY  CHAHQBS 

The  word  ''necessary,**  as  used  in  a  eon- 
tract  allowing  the  state  to  make  necessary 
ebanges  in  the  plans  and  q)eclflcations  tor 


a  canal  improvement,  should  not  be  coi^ 
strued  as  meaning  indispensably  requisite, 
and  the  construetion  of  the  clause  in  which 
it  occurs  is  not  to  be  limited  to  the  particu- 
lar contract  in  whidi  the  clause  is  found,  as 
the  contract  is  for  only  a  portion  of  an  entire 
improvement  and  must  be  construed  in  the 
lii^t  of  the  whole  work,  and  it  may  be  con- 
strued as  meaning  reasonably  necessary,  and 
the  changes  provided  for  as  being  those  need- 
ful, requisite,  or  desirable,  but  not  extrava- 
gant or  wastefnl  of  public  funds,  or  made 
without  the  exercise  of  sound  discretion,  or 
arbitrary  or  such  as  substantially  changed 
the  nature  of  the  cost  of  the  work.  What 
changes  are  necessary  in  the  contract  is  a 
question  for  the  courts.  Ferguson  Con- 
tracting Co.  V.  State,  126  N.  Y.  Supp.  80S, 
8U,  70  Misc.  Rep.  472. 

A  ccHitnct  for  the  eoDStmction  of  a  sec- 
tion of  the  state  baife  canal,  including  a 
lock,  reserved  to  the  state  the  right  to  make 
deductions  from  the  work,  or  such  changes  in 
the  idans  as  might  be  necessary,  and  that  the 
contractor  should  make  no  claim  for  any 
loss  of  profits  resulting  from  any  change  so 
made,  and  stated  that  the  contractor  had  sat- 
isfied himself  by  investigation  as  to  the  con- 
ditions afCecting  the  work,  and  that  he  would 
make  no  claim  against  the  state  because  of 
estimates  and  repr.@sentations  by  any  agent  of 
the  state,  and  that  the  contract  should  not 
be  invalidated  by  any  changes  so  made. 
Held,  that  the  provision  for  changes  neces- 
sarily implied  reasonable  necessity  therefor, 
and  where,  by  reason  of  the  underlying  char- 
acter of  the  earth,  it  became  impossible  to 
construct  the  lock  on  the  section  covered  by 
the  contract,  and  the  state  for  that  reason 
eliminated  the  construction  thereof  within  the 
section,  such  change  did  not  constitute  a 
breach  of  the  contract  by  the  state  nor  en- 
title the  contractor  to  recover  profits  lost  by 
reason  thereof.  Kinser  Const  Co.  v.  State, 
97  N.  n.  871,  874,  204  N.  Y.  381. 

NBOEflSART  CHARGES 

All   Other   Necessary   charges,  see  All 
Other. 

A  vote  of  a  tovm  required  the  selectmen  to 
insert  in  any  franchise  granted  a  street  rail- 
way company  certain  conditions  enumerated 
as  to  the  rails  to  be  laid,  and  the  portion  of 
the  street  to  be  paved,  and  required  the  com- 
pany to  employ  resident  laborers  at  uniform 
wages,  and  that  there  should  be  but  one  fare 
of  five  cents  to  any  point  in  another  town. 
A  second  vote  provided  for  a  eomraittee  to 
confer  with  the  selectmen,  or  independently 
attend  and  represent  the  town  on  all  ques- 
tions of  franchises,  etc.,  to  be  granted  to  any 
street  railway  company,  which  committee 
was  authorised  to  employ  counsel,  and  a 
third  vote  instructed  the  treasurer  to  bor- 
row 9300  to  carry  the  second  vote  into  tf  ect 
Held,  that  the  three  votes,  must  be  construed 


KE0B8SABT  OONCLUSION 


MO 


NECE8SABT  EXPENSES 


•8  a  whola,  and  as  In  aereral  of  tbe  oondi- 
tlona,  the  town  had  no  corporate  interest,  the 
scheme  as  a  whole  did  not  constitute  a  *'nec- 
essary  charge,**  within  Rev.  Laws,  c.  25,  8 
16,  anthorizing  town  officers  to  appropriate 
money  for  necessary  charges  arising  in  the 
town.  Flood  y.  Leahy,  06  N.  B.  787,  188 
Mass.  232. 

ITEGESSARY  CONOLU8XOH 

The  word  ''necessary,"  as  used  in  an  in- 
struction that  negligence  must  he  hased  on 
and  be  a  reasonable,  logical,  and  necessary 
condosion  from  the  facts  and  circumstances 
shown  by  the  eyidence,  meant  beyond  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  doubt,  and  therefore  rendered 
the  instruction  erroneous.  Daluin  y.  O.  W. 
Chase  &  Son  Mercantile  Go.,  94  S.  W.  914, 951, 
197  Mo.  288. 

NEOESSABY   OOST   OF   PBESBBVIKO 
ESTATE  OF  BAKKBUFT 

The  claim  of  a  landlord  for  rent  of  prem- 
ises occupied  by  the  receiyer  and  trustee  of 
a  bankrupt  is  entitled  to  rank  as  a  preferred 
daim  under  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c  541, 
I  (14b  (1)>  80  Stat.  563,  as  a  necessary  cost 
of  preserying  the  estate.  The  trustee's  com- 
missions rank  under  subdiyision  8  as  a  cost 
of  administration.  An  allowance  made  to  the 
attorney  for  the  trustee  for  services  ordina- 
rily falls  within  the  same  subdiyision,  al- 
though, when  such  seryices  were  necessary 
to  preserye  the  estate,  such  claim  may  be 
classified  under  subdiyision  1.  In  re  Grignard 
Lithographing  Co.,  158  Fed.  567,  55& 

KEOEMABT  DILIGEECB 

"Necessary  diligence"  is  tliat  degree  of 
diligence  which  men,  ordinarily  engaged  in 
and  acquainted  with  a  particular  kind  of 
bustness,  would  use  in  their  own  affairs. 
Sanderson  y.  Brown,  57  Me.  308,  312. 

HEOESSABT  BISBUBSEMENTS 

Under  Code  Ciy.  Proc.  |  1866,  proyiding 
that  "a  party  to  whom  costs  are  awarded  in 
an  action  is  entitled  to  include  in  his  Mil 
of  costs  'necessary  disbursements*  as  follows: 
^  *  *  The  legal  fees  paid  stenographers 
for  per  diem  or  for  copies;  •  •  •  the 
reasonable  expense  in  making  transcript  for 
the  Supreme  Court" — ^the  fact  that  copies  of 
the  testimony  were  ordered  during  the  trial 
and  prior  to  a  final  decision,  being  paid  for 
by  the  parties  obtaining  them,  did  not  pre- 
yent  a  recoyery  of  the  amount  paid  for  them 
within  the  limitatioa  fixed  by  statute;  such 
copies  being  necessary  to  secure  a  reyiew  of 
the  casa  Montana  Ore  Purchasing  Co.  y. 
Boston  A  Montana  ConsoL  Copper  A  Silyer 
Min.  Co^  84  Pac  706,  707,  33  Mont  400. 

If  a  witness  can  recoyer  compensation 
from  the  litigant  wHo  procured  his  attend- 
ance, the  sum  so  paid  would  undoubtedly  be 
a  "necessary  cost  of  disbursement"  in  the 
action.     Anderson  y.  Ferguson-Bach  Sheep 


Co.,  86  Fae.  41«  42,  12  Idaho,  4]«,  10  Ann. 
Cas.895. 

HEOESSABT  EASEMEHT 

The  term  "necessary,"  used  to  describe 
the  easement  which  may  be  established  by 
an  implied  reseryation  where  there  has  been 
a  unity  of  possession  and  a  subsequent  sale 
of  a  portion  of  the  land  oyer  which  the  ease- 
ment is  claimed,  means  there  can  be  no  other 
reasonable  mode  of  enjoying  the  dominant 
tenement  without  the  easement ;  there  should 
be  an  element  of  absolute  necessity.  Qierry 
y.  BrizBolara,  116  8.  W.  668,  671«  89  Ark. 
809,  21Ii.  B.  A.  (N.  a)  508  (citing  Crosland 
y.  Rogers,  10  8«  B.  874,  82  &  U  180). 

HEOE88ABT  EZFE]r8E8 

Any  and  all  neoessary  expaDses^  see  Any* 
Other  necessary  expenses,  see  Other* 

Of  administrator 
Under  Code  Ciy.  Proc.  |  2730,  proyid- 
ing that  an  administrator  may  be  allowed 
such  necessary  expenses  actually  defrayed 
by  him  as  appears  Just  and  reasonable,  s 
litigation  can  be  treated  as  "neoessaiy"  only 
when  it  has  been  prosecuted,  not  only  in 
good  fbith,  but  also  in  the  exercise  of  a 
reasonable  judgment  In  re  Hufs  Estate, 
115  N.  Y.  Supp.  984,  989,  62  Miac  Rep.  600 
(citing  Matter  of  Huntley,  85  N.  T.  Supp. 
113,  18  Misc.  Rep.  375;  Matter  of  Stanton, 
84  N.  T.  Supp.  46,  41  Misc.  Rep.  278;  St 
John  y.  McKee  [N.  Y.]  2  Dem.  Sur.  286;  Es- 
tate of  Peyster,  6  N.  Y.  St  Rep.  884). 

Of  bvildlac  aaiA  Umm  aasoetotjgm 

The  acquisition  of  a  place  or  home  by  a 
building  and  loan  association  for  the  con- 
duct of  its  business  is  a  ''necessary  expense," 
within  Ky.  St  1903,  |  868.  making  proyislon 
for  the  allowance  of  necessary  and  proper 
expenses  from  moneys  accumulated.  Home 
Sayings  Funds  Co.  Bldg.  Ass'n  y.  Driyer,  112 
8.  W.  864,  866,  129  Ky.  754. 

Of  etty 

Furnishing  light  and  water  for  public 
purposes  is  a  ''necessary  purpose,"  and  the 
cost  thereof  is  a  "necessary  expense"  of  mu- 
nicipalities furnishing  the  same.  Wadsworth 
y.  aty  of  Concord,  45  S.  E.  94a  950, 138  N.  C 
587. 

The  construction  of  water  and  electric 
light  plants  is  a  necessary  expense,  within 
Const,  art  7,  i  7,  proyiding  that  no  municipal 
corporation  shall  contract  any  debt,  except 
for  the  "necessary  expenses'*  thereof;  unless 
by  yote  of  the  majority  of  the  yoters  therein, 
and  the  indebtedness  therefor  need  not  be 
approyed  by  popular  yote ;  but  under  Code, 
IS  8800,  3821,  authorizing  municipal  corpora- 
tions to  leyy  taxes,  and  proyiding  that  their 
debts  shall  be  paid  only  by  taxation,  they 
haye  power  to  contract  and  provide  for  pay- 
ment for  such  improyements,  in  the  absence 
of  a  charter  proyiaUm  forbidding  them  to  dc 


WBOBBaABY  XZPSNSE8 


(Ml 


KBCE8BABY  FOOD 


■o.  l^weett  T«  Town  ot  Mt  Alxy*  45  8*  B, 
1029,  1000,  184  N.  C.  126,  63  Lw  B.  A.  87a 
101  Am.  St  Rep.  825. 

The  protectton  of  a  town  from  fire  and 
disease  by  providing  water  and  sewerage  Is  a 
'Necessary  expense/*  within  the  meaning  of 
Const,  art.  7,  ^  1,  and  Rerlaal  1005,  |  2074, 
providing  that  no  municipal  corporation  shall 
contract  any  debt,  pledge  its  ftdth,  or  loan 
its  credit,  nor  shall  any  tax  be  levied  or  col- 
lected by  any  officers  of  the  same  except 
for  the  necessary  expenses  thereof,  nnless  by 
a  vote  of  the  majority  of  the  qnallfled  voters 
therein,  and,  therefore  a  vote  of  the  people 
is  not  reqnired  to  render  bonds  issned  to  pro- 
vide waterworks  and  a  sewerage  system  val- 
id, in  the  absence  of  statutory  restrictions  en- 
acted under  Const  art  8,  |  4,  making  it  the 
duty  of  the  Legislature  to  restrict  the  power 
of  cities  to  tax,  borrow  money,  contract  debts, 
or  loan  their  credit  Underwood  v.  Town  of 
Asheboro,  68  8.  E.  147,  152  N.  C.  641. 

The  expense  of  maintaining  the  streets 
of  a  town  in  a  proper  manner  is  a  ''neces- 
sary expense,"  within  Const  art  7,  i  7,  for- 
bidding a  municipality  to  contract  a  debt,  etc., 
except  for  a  necessary  expense^  without  a 
popular  vote.  Town  of  H^idersonville  v.  Jor- 
dan, 63  S.  B.  167,  168,  150  N.  C  85. 

In  the  absence  of  any  legislative  restric- 
tion on  taxation  and  the  contracting  of  debts, 
there  is  no  objection  to  the  issuance  of 
bonds  for  the  necessary  expenses  of  a  town, 
without  a  popular  vote  authorizing  the  same; 
and  bonds  issued  by  a  town,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  extending  and  enlarging  its  water 
and  sewerage  system  and  making  street  im- 
provements, fall  within  the  class  of  "neces- 
sary expenses."  Town  of  Murphy  v.  C.  A. 
Webb  ft  Co.,  72  S.  E.  460,  461, 156  N.  C.  402. 

Working  the  roads  is  a  "necessary  ex- 
pense," within  Const  art  7,  i  7,  forbidding 
the  levy  of  any  tax  by  municipal  corpora- 
tlODs  except  for  the  necessary  expenses  there- 
of unless  by  a  vote  of  the  majority  of  the 
qnallfled  voters.  Crocker  v.  Moore,  53  S.  B. 
229,  230,  140  N.  a  429. 

Of  eM&demaatioB  proeeedlngs 

The  use  of  automobiles  by  commissioners 
of  appraisal  in  condemnation  proceedings 
Is  not  a  ''necessary  expense"  or  "necessary 
traveling  expense,"  which  under  Laws  1905, 
€.  725,  I  5,  and  chapter  724,  {  32,  is  to  be  al- 
lowed them,  there  being  railroads,  on  which 
many  trains  run,  going  very  near  all  parts 
of  the  lands,  and  livery  teams  being  acces- 
sible; the  statute  contemplating  the  ordi- 
nary method  of  traveL  In  re  Bensel,  124 
N.  T.  Supp.  716,  723. 

Of  dlstviet  attorMy 

County  Law  (ConsoL  Laws  1900,  c  11)  I 
240,  subd«  1,  provides  that  the  expenses  neo- 
tssarlly  incurred  by  the  district  attorney  In 
criminal  actions  or  proceedings  arising  in 
his  own  county  are  a  county  charge.    HeLd 


to  Invest  a  district  attorney  with  much  dis- 
cretion in  determining  what  expenses  are 
necessary;  the  term-  ''necessary  expenses" 
being  a  flexible  one,  to  be  applied  in  the  dis- 
trict attorney's  discretion,  depending  on  the 
circumstances  of  each  particular  case.  Peo- 
ple ex  reL  Koetterltz  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of 
Herkimer  County,  132  N.  Y.  Supp.  808,  810, 
148  App.  Div.  392. 

Of  axeeution  of  will 

On  appeal  from  the  decree  of  a  probate 
court  proving  a  will,  the  executor  named  in 
the  will  may,  if  acting  In  good  faith,  prose- 
cute the  probate  in  the  appellate  court  at 
the  expense  of  the  estate,  and  the  reason- 
able expenses  incurred  by  him  in  so  doing, 
are  "necessary  expenses  incident  to  admin- 
istration.''   Hazard  v.  Bugs,  14  R.  I.  6,  9. 

Of  snardiaa 

A  Judgment  against  the  ward  tat  costs  is 
not  a  liability  of  the  guardian  ad  litem,  and 
payment  thereof  by  him  is  not,  under  ordi- 
nary drcumstanoes,  to  be  recognized  as  a 
necessary  expenditure.  In  re  McNaughton's 
Will,  118  N.  W.  997,  1006,  138  Wis.  179. 

Of  sekooU 

Graded  school  districts  are  public  quasi 
corporations  within  the  term  "municipal  cor- 
poration," as  used  in  Const  art  7,  |  7,  pro- 
hibiting any  city,  town,  or  other  municipal 
corporation  from  contracting  debts  except 
for  necessary  expenses,  unless  by  vote  of  the 
qnallfled  voters;  so  that  a  graded  school 
district  could  not  issue  Ixmds  to  erect  a 
school  buildiug  unless  their  issue  was  ap- 
proved by  a  majority  of  the  qualified  voters ; 
the  erection  of  a  school  building  not  being  a 
"necessary  expense"  within  section  7.  Ellis 
V.  Trustees  of  Graded  School  of  Oxford,  72 
S.  E.  2,  3,  156  N.  a  10 

Of  shraUr 

The  sum  allowed  a  sheriff  for  "neces- 
sary expenses,"  under  the  statute,  covers 
reasonable  help  and  expenses  in  transporting 
and  delivering  convicts  and  lunatics  to  the 
penitentiary  and  asylum.  Lenhart  v.  Cam- 
bria County,  64  Aa  876,  216  Pa.  25. 

Of  state 

Under  Const  art  6,  H  30,  81,  requiring 
the  general  appropriation  bill  to  embrace 
nothing  but  appropriations  for  the  "ordi- 
nary" expenses  of  government,  and  prohibit- 
ing the  appropriation  of  money  except  in 
specified  cases,  among  which  Is  included  de- 
fraying the  "necessary"  expenses  of  govern- 
ment unless  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the  Leg- 
islature, extraordinary  expenses  may  be  "nec- 
essary," and  may  be  authorized  by  a  ma- 
jority vote.  State  v.  Moore,  88  S.  W.  881, 
883,  76  Ark.  197,  70  K  R.  A.  67L 

KEGESSABY  FOOB 

Rev.  St  1909,  |  4492,  provides  that  if 
any  father  without  lawful  excuse  neglects  to 
provide  audi  Infant  with  "necessary"  food. 


NEOESSART  FOR  THE  JOURNEY      S42 


N£iOB^AAT  1NJI7RT 


1! 


I  '-. 


etc.,  he  shall  be  punished.  Defendant  and 
his  wife  separated,  the  wife  going  to  her 
father's  house,  taking  with  her  one  child  of 
the  marriage,  and  another  was  born  at  the 
house  of  the  wlfe^s  father,  and  both  the  chil- 
dren were  there  supplied  with  all  necessary 
food,  etc.  Defendant  after  the  separation 
contributed  nothing  to  their  support  Held, 
that  "necessary*'  food,  clothing,  and  lodging, 
as  used  In  the  statute,  Is  food,  etc.,  which  the 
Infant  actually  needed  at  the  time ;  and  that 
as  the  Infant  children  were  receiving  neces- 
sary food,  etc.,  defendant  was  not  guilty. 
State  v.  Thornton,  134  S.  W.  519,  620,  232 
Mo.  2d8,  82  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  841. 

HEOESSART  FOB  THE  JOURHET 

See  Money  Necessary  for  the  Journey- 

NEOESSABY  FUBHITUBB 

The  words  "necessaiy  furniture,"  as  used 
In  Illinois  Administration  Act,  |  74  (Starr  & 
C.  Ann.  St  1896,  c.  8,  par.  74),  allowing  the 
widow  certain  articles  of  property,  such  as 
bedsteads,  bedding,  and  household  and  kltdi- 
en  fumlture,  necessary  for  herself  and  fam- 
ily, must  be  construed  with  referenoe  to  the 
drcumstanoes  and  mode  of  life  of  the  par- 
ties, and  mean  the  ordinary  and  appropriate 
furniture  for  such  homesteads.  Olllett  ▼. 
Glllett,  69  N.  B.  942,  946,  207  IlL  136  (qnot^ 
Ing  Strawn  y.  Strawn,  63  IlL  263). 

NEOESSART  IMPUOATION 

Plain  Implication  synonymous,  see  Plain 
Implication. 

By  "necessary  Implication"  as  used  In 
the  rule  that  It  Is  possible  for  a  testator  to 
dispose  of  property  by  necessary  Implication 
from  his  will,  taken  as  a  whole,  Is  meant  so 
strong  a  probability  of  Intention  that  an  In- 
tention contrary  to  that  which  Is  Imputed  to 
the  testator  cannot  be  supposed.  Coberly  ▼. 
Earle,  54  S.  B.  336,  339,  60  W.  Va.  295  (cit- 
ing Bartiett  v.  Patton,  10  S.  E.  21,  33  W.  Va. 
71,  5  L.  R.  A.  523;  Graham  y.  Graham,  23 
W.  Va.  36,  48  Am.  Rep.  364;  Beard  y.  Beard, 
22  W.  Va.  130;  Irwin  v.  Zane,  15  W.  Va. 
646). 

"Necessary  Implication"  means,  not  nat- 
ural necessity,  but  so  strong  a  probability 
of  an  Intention  that  an  intention  contrary  to 
that  which  \b  Imputed  to  the  testator  cannot 
be  Imposed.  Galloway  y.  Durham,  81  S.  W. 
659,  660,  118  Ky.  544,  111  Am.  St  Rep.  300 
(quoting  1  Ves.  A  B.  468). 

"Necessary  Implication,"  In  cases  on  the 
construction  of  Instruments,  means,  not  nat- 
ural necessity,  but  so  strong  a  probability  of 
Intention  that  an  Intention  contrary  to  that 
which  Is  Imputed  cannot  be  supposed.  Tut- 
tie  y.  Wooiworth,  77  Ati.  684,  686,  74  N.  J. 
Eq.  810. 

The  phrases  **plaln  Implication"  and 
"necessary  Implication*'  haye  exactly  the 
same  meaning,  when  used  In  reference  to  the 


donstraetlon  df  deeds.  By  these  Is  not  mea 
a  physical  necessity,  but  a  logical  necessll 
Where  a  clause  Is  enlarged  In  Its  effect  t 
yond  the  Import  of  the  words  used  on  ti 
theory  of  an  Intent  established  by  an  imp 
cation,  it  must  be  necessary  to  so  enlarge 
In  order  to  glye  effect  to  the  plain  and  e 
press  proylslons  of  other  clauses,  or  the  pro 
ability  of  Intent  must  be  so  strong  that  ti 
contrary  thereof  cannot  be  supposed.  Gt\ 
fin  y.  Fairmont  Coal  Ck>.,  63  S.  E.  24^  66,  I 
W.  Va.  480,  2  L.  R  A.  (N.  &)  Ulfi. 

HEC3ESSABY  nrDEBTEDNESS 

The  word  '^necessary,"  as  used  in  ti 
Constitution  and  laws  of  Montana,  proyl 
Ing  for  the  extension  of  the  constitution 
limit  of  municipal  Indebtedness  when  su< 
Increase  Is  "necessary"  to  construct  a  sewe 
age  system  or  procure  a  supply  of  water,  < 
ratification  by  a  yote  of  the  taxpayers,  d 
fines  the  condition  of  affairs  which  requii^ 
the  additional  Indebtedness.  The  oonditic 
must  be  such  as  to  create  the  neoesatty. 
a  municipality  Is  dot  Indebted  in  .any  amom 
at  all,  or  If  it  has  the  necessary  funds  in  i 
treasury,  no  additional  indebtedness  can  I 
Incurred;  nor  can  It  be  said  that  any  n 
cesslty  has  arisen  demanding  it  A  city  coul 
only  ayall  Itself  of  the  prlyllege  of  extenslo 
when  the  financial  condition  of  the  dty  n 
quired  a  resort  to  it,  and  could  not  arUtr 
rlly  declare  a  debt  to  be  in  the  extended  Ub 
It  when  the  dty  was  not  Indebted  to  the  coi 
stituttonal  limit  Bntier  y.  Andrus»  90  Pa 
785,  786,  85  Mont  575. 

HEOESSABY  INJURT 

"The  'necessary  Injury'  resulting  to 
parent  from  the  negligent  killing  of  his  mine 
child,  within  the  meaning  of  the  damage  m 
(Rey.  St  1899,  S  2866),  consists  in  the  la 
of  serylces  of  the  deceased  during  mlnorlt; 
the  cost  of  nursing,  surgical  and  medical  a 
tendance,  and  appropriate  funeral  expenses 
Coleman  y.  Hlmmelberger-Harrlson  Land 
Lumber  Co.,  79  S.  W.  981,  987,  105  Mo.  Ap 
254  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  In  Rali 
y.  St  Louis,  I.  M.  ft  8.  By.  Co.,  71  Mo.  16 
86  AnL  Rep.  469). 

The  term  "necessary  Injury,"  as  used  1 
Rey.  St  1809,  f  2866,  relating  to  damages  1 
death  actions,  authorizing  damages  not  e^ 
ceedlng  |5,000,  as  may  be  deemed  fklr  an 
just  with  reference  to  the  'Necessary  injur; 
resulting  to  the  surylylng  parties,  etc.,  doc 
not  Include  more  than  pecuniary  injui: 
Brunke  y.  Missouri  A  K.  Telephone  Co.,  S 
8.  W.  84,  85,  112  Mo.  App.  623. 

Under  Rey.  St  1890,  |  286?,  anthorisln 
an  action  for  the  death  of  a  person  caused  b 
wrongful  act,  etc,  and  section  2800,  proyldin 
th^t  the  jury  may  glye  audi  damages  as  the 
may  deem  fair  and  just  with  ref^ence  **i 
the  necessary  Injuries  resulting  from"  sue 
death,  the  measure  of  daoaages  In  an  actio 
by  a  paroit  for  tbe  wrongfol  death  of  hJ 


NSf^asaSAMY  lilTiaATION 


543 


NBCKSSART  PARTIES 


minor  J50II  does  not  include*  loss  of  comfort 
and  society  of.  the  son ;  the  words  "neces- 
sary injury"  meaning  "pecuniary  injury," 
and  confining  dadiages  to  property  los& 
Marshall  v.  Consolidated  Jack  Mines  Co.,  95 

5.  W.  972,  973,  119  Mo.  App.  270. 

HEOESSARY  UTiaATIOH 

Iiitigation  to  determine  doubtful  ques- 
tions as  to  the  liability  of  transferees  for  the 
inheritance  tax,  and  delays  occasioned  there- 
by, is  "necessary  litigation  or  other  unavoid- 
able delay,"  within  Laws  1908,  p.  09,  c  44,  | 

6,  providing  that  in  such  case  the  penalty  of 
10  per  cent,  interest  for  nonpayment  of  the 
tax  shall  not  be  imposed.  State  v.  Pabst,  121 
N.  W.  351,  301,  139  Wis.  SOL 

NECESSARY  PARTIES 

See  Not  a  Necessary  Party. 

Persons  who  not  only  have  an  interest 
in  the  controversy,  but  an  interest  of  such  a 
nature  that  a  final  decree  cannot  be  made 
without  affecting  that  interest,  or  leaving  the 
controversy  in  such  a  condition  that  its  final 
determination  may  be  wholly  inconslstait 
with  equity  and  good  conscience,  are  "nec- 
essary parties."  Disbrow  v.  Creamery  Pack- 
age Mfg.  Co.,  115  N.  W.  751,  752,  104  Minn. 
17;   Perkins  v.  Hendryx,  149  Fed.  520,  528. 

The  words  "necessary"  and  *indispen0a* 
ble^  have  sometimes  been  considered  synony- 
mous, and  parties  in  equity  have  been  classi- 
fied as  "necessary  parties"  and  "proper  par- 
ties." Bailroad  Oomonission  of  Georgia  v. 
Palmer  Hardware  Co.,  53  S.  B.  193,  195,  124 
6a,  033. 

A  distinction  has  been  rec(^^nized  be- 
tween necessary  and  indispensable  parties,  to 
ascertain  whether  some  of  those,  who  under 
the  established  rules  of  equity  pleading  and 
practice  were  deemed  necessary,  may  not, 
under  su(^  rules,  be  dispensed  with  as  par- 
ties, that  equitable  relief  in  a  given  case  may 
not  wholly  faiL  Mathieson  y.  Craven,  104 
Fed.  471,  475. 

"'Necessary  parties,'  when  the  term  is 
accurately  used,  are  those  without  whom  no 
decree  at  all  can  be  effectively  made  deter- 
mining the  principal  issues  in  the  cause." 
Leonard  v.  Pierce,  75  N.  B.  813,  315,  182  N. 
Y.  431,  1  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  101  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  In  Pomeroy's  Remedies  ft 
Remedial  Rights,  S  329>. 

All  persons  who  are  interested  in  the 
subject-matter  of  a  suit,  and  who  will  be 
affected  by  the  results  thereof,  are  "necessa- 
Tf  parties."  Sweeney  v.  Foster,  71  S.  B. 
648,  550,  112  Va.  499.  Such  as  beneficiaries 
and  trustees.  Mitau  v.  Roddan,  84  Pac.  145, 
147, 149  CaL  1,  0  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  275;  Benton 
V.  Benton,  U6  Pac.  535,  530,  84  Kan.  091.  Or 
the  owners  in  proceedings  to  condemn  land. 
Kansas  City  Interurban  Ry.  Co.  v.  Davis,  95 
S.  W.  881,  884, 197  Mo.  009, 114  Am.  St  Rep. 
790.   Or  the p«rsoos,lji  whom  the  titl^  vested 


on  the  death  of  the  grantee  in  a  deed  sougnt 
to  be  set  aside  for  fraud.  Hagan  v.  Mcl>er- 
mott,  115  N.  W.  138,  140, 134  Wis.  490.  But 
not  an  agent  to  whom  a  deed  absolute  in 
form  was  executed  as  security  for  a  debt  to 
the  principal.  In  re  Russell's  Estate,  84 
Pac.  155,  150,  148  Cal.  708. 

"Necessary  parties"  are  all  those  who 
have  an  interest  in  the  subject  and  object  of 
the  action,  and  all  persons  against  whom 
relief  must  be  obtained  to  accomplish  the 
object  of  the  suit  McLean  v.  Farmers*  High- 
line  Canal  &  Reservoir  Co.,  98  Pac  10,  19, 
44  Colo.  184. 

"Parties  in  equity  are:  (1)  Formal  pai> 
ties.  (2)  Persons  hav&ng  an  interest  in  the 
controversy,  and  who  ought  to  be  made  par- 
ties in  order  that  the  court  may  act  on  that 
rule  which  requires  it  to  decide  on,  and  final- 
ly determine,  the  entire  controversy,  and  do 
complete  Justice,  by  adjusting  all  the  rights 
involved  in  It  These  persons  are  commonly 
termed  'necessary  parties';  but  if  their  Inter- 
ests are  separable  from  those  of  the  parties 
before  the  court,  so  that  the  court  can  pro- 
ceed to  a  decree,  and  do  complete  and  final 
justice,  without  affecting  other  persons  not 
before  the  court,  the  latter  are  not  indis- 
pensable parties.  (3)  Persons  who  not  only 
have  an  Interest  in  the  controversy  but 
an  interest  of  such  a  nature  that  a  final 
decree  cannot  be  made  without  either  affect- 
ing that  interest,  or  leaving  the  controversy 
in  such  a  condition  that  its  final  termination 
may  be  wholly  inconsistent  with  equity  and 
good  conscience."  "The  relation  of  an  in- 
dispensable party  to  the  suit  must  be  such 
that  no  decree  can  be  entered  in  the  case 
which  will  do  Justice  between  the  parties  ac- 
tually before  the  court,  without  injuriously 
affecting  the  rights  of  such  absent  party." 
United  States  v.  AUen,  179  Fed.  13,  21,  103 
C.  C.  A  1  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How.  [58  V.  S.]  130, 
139, 15  L.  Ed.  158 ;  Waterman  v.  Canal-Louisi- 
ana Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  30  Sup.  Ct  10,  215  U. 
S.  33,  49,  54  L.  Ed.  80). 

The  use  of  the  word  "indispensable,"  as 
distinguished  from  "proper"  or  "necessary," 
parties  is  stated  in  the  citation  of  a  case 
holding  that  an  indispensable  party  is  one 
whose  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the 
controversy  is  such  that  a  final  decree  cannot 
be  rendered  between  the  other  parties  to  the 
suit  without  radically  and  injuriously  affect- 
ing his  interest,  or  without  leaving  the  con- 
troversy in  such  a  situation  that  its  final 
determination  may  be  inconsistent  with  equi- 
ty and  good  conscience.  Defendants  who 
were  joined  in  a  suit  in  a  state  court  to 
recover  an  interest  in  lands  only  as  trustees 
holding  the  paramount  title  in  trust,  and 
whose  title  aa  such  was  not  disputed,  held 
not  indispensable  parties,  whose  dtizensMp 
and  residence  in  the  same  state  as  com- 
plainant would  prevent  a  removal  of  the 
cause  by  the  other  defendants,  who  were  the 


KECESSART  PARTIES 


644 


KECESSART  RBPAIB8 


real  parties  In  interest  Lawrence  ▼.  South- 
em  Pac.  Co.,  166  Fed.  241,  243  (citing  Rogers 
y.  Penobscot  Min.  Co.,  154  Fed.  606,  88  C. 
C.  A.  380). 

Proper  parties  distinsnisl&ecl 

Persons  legitimately  made  parties  to 
snits  in  equity  may  belong  to  three  classes: 
First,  proper  parties ;  second,  necessary  par- 
ties; and,  third,  indispensable  parties.  The 
phrases  •'proper  parties/*  "necessary  parties," 
and  "indispensable  parties,"  in  their  techni- 
cal sense,  are  distinguishable  from  one  an- 
other; each  denoting  a  separate  and  inde- 
pendent class.  But  in  a  broader  sense  the 
first  is  the  most,  and  the  last  the  least,  com- 
prehensive class,  for  "proper  parties**  may 
or  may  not  be  either  necessary  or  indispensa- 
ble, and  ••necessary  parties'*  may  or  may  not 
be  indispensable.  In  the  same  broad  sense 
an  indispensable  party  is  both  a  necessary 
and  a  proper  party,  and,  though  a  necessary 
party  may  or  may  not  be  indispensable,  he 
is  nevertheless  a  proper  party.  The  dis- 
tinction between  a  necessary  and  an  in- 
dispensable party,  while  doing  violence  to 
the  English  language  in  its  usual  accepta- 
tion, has  been  recognized  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  the  question  whether  some  of 
those  who,  under  the  well-established  roles 
of  equity  pleading  and  practice,  were  deem- 
ed necessary  parties  may  not,  under  existing 
rules  governing  pleading  and  practice  in 
equity,  be  dispensed  with  as  parties  in  order 
that  equitable  relief  in  a  given  case  may  not 
wholly  falL  Mathieson  ▼.  Craven,  164  Fed. 
471,  476. 

••Necessary  parties"  to  a  suit  are  parties 
who  are  so  vitally  interested  in  the  subject- 
matter  that  a  valid  decree  could  not  be  ren- 
dered without  their  presence,  whether  there 
was  an  objection  to  a  failure  to  make  them 
parties  or  not;  but  where  they  are  only 
"proper  parties,"  the  right  to  complain  that 
they  were  not  made  parties  may  be  waived 
by  delay.  Biggs  v.  Miller  (Tex.)  147  S.  W. 
682,  687. 

KE0ES8ABY  POUOB  OBDIHAN0E8 

City  and  VUlage  Act  (Hurd*s  Rev.  St 
1903,  p.  291)  art  5,  i  1,  subds.  4,  9,  15,  20, 
41,  66,  78,  96,  empowering  cities  to  regulate 
traffic  on  the  streets  and  sidewallis,  to  li- 
cense, tax,  regulate,  suppress,  and  prohibit 
peddlers,  to  make  all  regulations  which  may 
be  necessary  for  the  promotion  of  health,  and 
to  pass  all  ordinances  and  make  all  regula- 
tions necessary  to  carry  into  effect  the  pow- 
ers granted  to  such  cities,  etc.  Held,  that  by 
the  word  ••necessary"  Indispensable  was  not 
intended,  but  power  was  conferred  on  the 
dty  to  pass  all  ordinances  whidti  would  be 
conducive  to  the  promotion  of  the  health, 
safety,  and  welfare  of  its  inhabitants,  which 
power  may  reasonably  be  held  to  Include 
the  power  to  pass  an  ordinance  regulating 
in  a  reasonable  manner  the  handling  of  oils 
in  tank  wagons,  or  other  wagons  or  vehicles  > 


on  the  streets  of  the  dty.    Spiegler  t.  ( 
of  Chicago,  74  N.  B.  718-721,  216  IIL  U4. 

HE0E8SABT  POWSBfl 

Of  oorporatioa 

The  power  given  to  a  railway  compi 
to  do  all  acts  Inddental  to  the  malntens 
of  the  road  Indudes  the  right  to  lay  < 
duits  in  its  right  of  way  to  conduct  wt 
to  its  buildings,  whether  the  right  of  \ 
traverses  private  property  or  a  dty  str 
being  a  reasonably  ••necessary"  Inddent 
the  maintenance  of  the  road.  Mayor,  c 
of  City  of  Canton  v.  Canton  Cotton  Wi 
house  Co.,  36  South.  266,  272,  84  Bilss.  26^ 
L.  R.  A.  561, 106  Am.  St  Rep.  428. 

KEGE8SARY  PURPOSSS 

Furnishing  l^ght  and  water  for  pul 
purposes  is  a  "necessary  purpose,**  and 
cost  thereof  Is  a  ••necessary  expense"  of  i 
nlcipalities  furnishing  the  same.  Wadswo 
V.  City  of  Concord,  45  S.  B.  948,  960,  133 
a   587. 

HEOESSABY  KEPAZBS 

A  covenant  by  a  tenant  to  make  "nee 
sary  repairs"  means  only  such  repairs 
the  tenant  finds  necessary  for  his  nse  of 
premises,  and  does  not  require  him  to  ] 
the  premises  in  better  condition  than  tJ 
were  at  the  beginning  of  the  tenancy.  Ti 
ley  V.  Smith,  101  N.  Y.  Snpp.  382,  385. 
App.  Div.  708  (dting  and  constmiiig  Wli 
V.  Albany  Ry.  [N.  Y.)  17  Hun,  9^. 

The  words  "necessary  repairs,"  in  an 
der  enjoining  county  officers  from  doing  n 
work  or  spending  money  under  a  cert 
resolution,  and  from  expending  money  af 
an  annual  levy  was  exhausted,  excepting 
the  making  of  necessary  repairs  to  roa 
legally  designated  for  expenditure  of  moi 
in  their  repair,  means  emergency  repairs 
such  repairs  on  roads  as  were  necessary 
make  travel  safe,  so  that  the  duty  of  I 
county  to  travelers  upon  its  highways  mi{ 
still  be  discharged.  Webster  v.  £>ouglas  C 
77  N.  W.  885,  888,  102  Wis.  181,  72  Am. 
Rep.  87a 

A  party  wall  agreement,  providing  tl 
each  party  shall  contribute  equally  if  it  sh 
become  ••necessary'*  to  repair  and  reboi 
cannot  be  deftoted  by  either  party  sayi 
it  is  not  necessary  to  r^Mdr  or  rebuild.  Mi 
pal  V.  Jackson,  118  N.  Y.  Supp.  513,  617, 
Misc.  Rep.  407. 

To  Tvssel 

Although  the  master  of  a  ship  tn  a  fi 
eign  port  has  authority  to  procure  all  si 
plies  and  repairs  ••necessary"  for  the  saft 
of  the  ship  and  the  due  performance  <Ji  t 
voyage,  on  the  credit  of  the  owner,  he  mi 
be  restricted  to  such  repairs  and  supplies 
are  in  a  Just  s^ise  necessary  for  the  afa 
under  the  actual  circumstances  of  the  voyai 
and  a  soit  against  the  Qvma  for  thdr  vali 


im 


KE0E68ARY  RISK 


646      NSGBSSARY  TO  HOLD  MINING  OLAIH 


Lnnot  be  maintained  wlthoat  proof  Chat  such 
(pairs  and  aappUes  were  neceetaxy.  Wblt- 
m  v.  Tladale,  43  Me.  461,  462. 

EGES8ART  BISK 

Laws  1002,  p.  1750,  c  600,  |  8,  piOTldlng 
mt  an  employ^,  by  entering  on  or  contia- 
Lng  in  the  employer's  service,  shall  be  pre- 
imed  to  have  assented  to  the  necessary  risks 
r  the  employment,  such  risks  including  those 
iherent  in  the  nature  of  the  business,  after 
le  employer  has  exercised  due  care  for  the 
Lfety  of  employ^,  and  complied  with  laws 
^gulating  such  busineds,  distinguishes  be- 
veen  "necessary  risk'*  and  "obvious  risk," 
hich  latter  may  be  due  to  the  master's  fail- 
re  to  perform  his  duty.  Hurley  v.  Olcott, 
19  X.  Y.  Supp.  430,  435,  134  App.  Div.  631. 

The  New  York  statute  defining  "neces- 
ary  risks"  as  those  ''inherent  in  the  nature 
t  the  business,  which  remain  after  the  em- 
loyer  has  exercised  due  care  in  providing 
or  the  safety  of  his  employte,"  is  but  dec- 
iratory  of  the  common  law.  Logerto  v.  Cen- 
ral  Bldg.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  604,  607,  128 
lPp.  Div.  840  (citing  Benzing  ▼.  Bteinway, 
N.  E.  449,  101  N.  Y.  547).  See,  also,  O'Neii 
.  Karr,  97  N.  Y.  Supp.  148;  150, 110  App.  Div. 
71;  Wynkoop  y.  Ludlow  Valve  Mfg.  Co.,  98 
r.  Y.  Supp.  1076,  1077, 112  App.  Div.  729. 

The  risk  of  injury  to  a  servant  who,  at 
be  suggestion  of  his  foreman,  thrust  his 
isnd  into  a  wooden  box,  in  which  a  screw 
rith  sharp  blades  was  rapidly  revolving,  in 
rder  to  loosen  cement  in  a  chute  leading 
ato  the  box,  knowing  the  cement  was  liable 

0  fall  in  such  quantities  as  to  drive  his  arm 
gainst  the  screw,  was  not  a  "necessary  risk" 
t  the  business,  which  are  the  only  risks  that 
n  employ^  is  conclusively  presumed  not  to 
issume,  as  provided  by  Employers'  Liability 
Let  (Laws  1902,  p.  1750,  c.  600,  |  3).  Vaughn 
.  Glens  Palls  Portland  Cement  Co.,  93  N.  Y. 
Jupp.  979,  980,  105  App.  Div.  136. 

rSCESSABT  BOAB 

The  term  '^necessary  plantation  roads," 
IB  used  in  Code  1906,  |  4058,  requiring  their 
onstmction  and  maintenance  t^  railroads, 
neans  roads  necessary  to  the  plantation  to 
rhich  they  are  annexed,  and,  wliile  an  occa- 
lonal  and  isolated  use  of  the  crossing  by 
others  would  not  relieve  the  company  from 
iabUity  to  maintain  it,  the  company  is  not 
K)imd  to  maintain  the  crossing  in  good  con- 
lition  and  make  r^;>airs  necessitated  by  con- 
ttant  heavy  driving,  done  by  others  than  the 
^wner  with  his  consent  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co. 
r.  HcQowan,  46  South.  55,  66,  92  Miss.  603: 
toUey  V.  Cavallier,  46  South.  55,  56,  92 
)iia8.603. 

Where  a  proposed  railroad,  only  12  miles 
^  length,  to  be  built  as  an  independent  road, 
voQid  serve  only  a  small  locality,  would 
probably  not  earn  running  expenses,  and 
^onld  be  financially  disabled  from  the  start, 

1  finding  by  the  board  of  railroad  commission- 

8  WxmA  P.2n  Skb.-36 


#n  ffiat  it  was  ''necessary  and  eonveiUflntr' 
was  erroneoBs.  I^eople  ex  rti.  Potter  v. 
Board  of  Bailroad  Com'rs  of  State  of  New 
York,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  288,  289,  124  App.  D|y. 
47. 

mCSMABT  SEIiF-BEFEHSB 

See  Self-Def ense. 

XEOEMABT  SUFPU3B9 

Food  supplies  ordered  by  the  master  of 
a  fishing  schooner,  who  was  alao  managing 
owner,  for  the  use  of  the  crew  on  a  fishing 
Toyage,  under  the  usual  lay  contracts,  In  the 
absence  of  any  showing  of  bad  faith  on  his 
part  will  be*  presumed  to  be  supplies  "nece»- 
sary"  for  the  employment  of  the  vessel,  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  Maine  statute  giving 
a  lien  for  such  mipplles,  and  the  court  will 
not  undertake  to  determine  that  certain  of 
the  articles  were  "luxuries"  for  which  the 
vessel  is  not  liable.  The  term  luxuries'*  Is 
an  entirely  relative  term.  The  Mary  F.  Chis- 
holm;i33  Fed.  598,  600. 

Ky.  St  I  4426a,  sabd.  9,  provides  that 
the  board  of  education  shall  lay  before  the 
fiscal  coTurt  the  educational  needs  of  the 
county,  and  the  county  shall  levy  a  tax  for 
school  purposes,  not  exceeding  20  cents  on 
each  $100,  and  the  proceeds  of  the  tax  shall 
be  turned  over  to  the  county  superintendent, 
and  the  county  board  shall  expend  the  money 
for  certain  designated  purposes.  Including 
the  purchase  of  "necessary  supplies"  and  the 
"extension  of  the  school  term"  in  the  sub- 
districts  ;  and  that  upon  petition  of  10  voters 
of  a  subdistrlct  the  board  of  education  shall 
submit  to  a  vote  the  question  whether  an  ad- 
ditional tax  shall  be  levied,  and  when  levied 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  sheriff  to  collect 
It  and  hold  It  subject  to  the  order  of  the 
county  board,  for  the  benefit  of  the  subdis- 
trlct voting  such  tax.  Held,  that  such  ad- 
ditional tax  was  to  be  expended,  under  the 
order  of  the  board  of  education,  for  tiie  sole 
use  of  the  subdistrlct  levying  It,  and  for  the 
purposes  enumerated  In  the  statute,  and  the 
board  had  no  power  to  use  an  additional  tax 
levy  for  the  purpose  of  transporting  children 
to  and  from  school ;  such  purpose  not  being 
mentioned  in  the  statute  and  not  coming 
within  the  terms  ''necessary  supplies"  or  "ex- 
tension of  school  term."  Shanklin  v.  Boyd, 
142  S.  W.  1041,  1042,  1048,  146  Ky.  460,  38 
Ix  R.  A.  (N.  a)  710. 

NECE8SABT  TO  HOLD  MINIKa  CI.AIM 

Comp.  Laws,  |  231,  provides  that  certif- 
icates of  location  and  of  labor  and  Improve- 
ments necessary  to  hold  claims  need  not  be 
sworn  to,  but  must  truly  state  the  required 
facta  Held,  that  the  words  '^necessary  to 
hold  claims'*  did  not  refer  to  "certificates  of 
location,"  but  only  to  the  words  "labor  and 
Improvements,"  which  referred  to  the  provi- 
sions of  the  federal  statutes  requiring  the 
expenditure  of  $100  annually  in  labor  or  im- 
provements In  order  to  hold  a  mining  claim 


li.  ! 


\i. 


NECES8ABY  TRAVELIKa  EXPENSB       54$ 


KECBSSITT 


1.1 


prior  to  the  Issaanoe  of  patent.    F6nl  ▼. 
Campbell,  92  Pac  206,  209,  29  Nev.  578. 

NECESSARY  TBAVELIHa  EXPEITSE 

The  use  of  automobiles  by  commissioners 
of  appraisal  in  condemnation  proceedings  is 
not  a  "necessary  expense"  or  ''necessary  trav- 
eling expense,"  which  under  Laws  1905,  c. 
725,  i  5,  and  chapter  724,  |  32,  is  to  be  allow- 
ed them,  there  being  railroads,  on  which 
many  trains  run,  going  very  near  all  parts  of 
the  lands,  and  livery  teams  being  accessible; 
the  statute  contemplating  the  ordinary  meth- 
od of  traveL  In  re  Bensel,  124  N.  X.  Snpp. 
716,  723. 

NECESSARY  VEGETABXJB8 

The  term  ''necessary,'*  as  used  in  Code 
dv.  Proc.  I  1390,  providing  that  all  "neces- 
sary vegetables"  actually  provided  for  family 
use  should  be  exempt  from  levy,  is  a  word 
of  qualification,  and  qualifies  the  extent  of 
the  exemption.  McCarthy  v.  McCabe,  116 
N.  Y.  Supp.  829,  832,  181  App.  Div.  896. 

NECESSARY  WAY 

See  Way  of  Necessity.    ^ 

NECESSITIES 

See  Actual  Necessities:  As  Their  Neces- 
sities Might  Require. 

Plumbers*  supplies  are  "necessities"  of 
life  and  a  staple  commodity,  and  a  combina- 
tion controlling  such  supplies  to  the  extent 
that  it  either  does,  or  tends  to,  prevent  or 
restrain  competition  may  be  prohibited. 
Knight  A  Jillson  Co.  v.  MUler,  87  N.  E.  823, 
832,  172  Ind.  27, 18  Ann.  Cas.  1146. 

NECESSITY 

See  Inevitable  Necessity;  Law  of  Neces- 
sity ;  Paramount  Necessity ;  Public 
Necessity;   Way  of  Necessity. 

The  word  "necessity,"  in  common  use, 
connotes  different  degrees  of  necessity.  It 
sometimes  means  indispensable;  at  others, 
needful,  requisite,  incidental,  or  conducive. 
In  its  primary  sense,  it  signifies  a  thing 
or  act  without  which  some  other  thing  or  act 
cannot  be  done  or  exist  The  word  ''neces- 
sary,'* as  applied  to  the  determination  of  an 
agent's  power  to  do  an  incidental  act,  should 
be  held  to  mean  an  act  or  measure  requisite 
to  enable  him  to  discharge  his  main  duty — 
something  more  urgently  required  than  is 
signified  by  the  words,  "appropriate,"  "suit- 
able," or  "expedient."  St  Louis  Gunning  Ad- 
vertising Co.  V.  Wanamaker  A  Brown,  90 
S.  W.  737,  743,  115  Mo.  App.  270. 

For  class  legislatioii 

By  "necessity,"  which  permits  legisla- 
tion on  a  subject  to  be  divided  into  classes,  is 
meant  practical,  and  not  absolute,  necessity. 
Pepin  Tp.  v.  Sage,  129  Fed.  657,  665,  64  C. 
C.  A.  169  (citing  State  ex  reL  Board  of  Court- 


l  house  and  City  Hall  Com'rs  of  City  of  11 
neapolls  and  County  of  Hennepin  y.  Cooley, 
N.  W.  153,  66  Minn.  551). 

For  eonduot  o£  1rasln«ss  and  trmaai 
tlon  of  affairs  by  eorporation 

"When  it  comes  to  determining  what 
'necessary'  for  the  conduct  of  the  busln 
and  transaction  of  the  affairs  for  whi 
a  corporation  has  been  chartered,  it  mn 
of  course,  be  understood  that  what  is  mef 
is  a  due  and  profitable  prosecution  of 
lawful  purposes ;  that  the  'necessity'  conte 
plated  is  a  relative  one,  having  referei 
to  economy,  convenience,  efficiency,  and  si 
cess;  and  that  some  latitude  is  to  be  allow 
to  the  discretion  of  the  corporation  its 
in  deciding  what,  from  time  to  tlme^  is  or 
not,  In  that  sense,  •necessary."*  Folk 
State  Capital  Savings  A  Loan  Ass'n,  63  A 
1018,  1016,  214  Pa.  629. 

For  easement  to  enjoy  property 

Under  the  rule  that  all  continuous  ai 
apparent  quasi  easements  as  are  reaaonal 
necessary  to  the  Enjoyment  of  the  propez 
granted  pass  to  the  grantee,  mere  inconvc 
ience  will  not  constitute  such  necessity.  T 
test  of  such  necessity  is  held  to  be  the  qm 
tion  whether  the  grantee  might  at  a  leasc 
able  expense  procure  for  himself  an  enjo 
ment  of  a  similar  easement  Two  i>ersoi 
OMming  in  common  land  on  which  were  t\ 
houses,  partitioned  It  by  deed,  giving  ea 
one  of  the  houses,  the  boundary  line  being 
an  alley  between  the  houses  and  providii 
that  the  alley  should  be  kept  oi>en  for  ti 
use  and  benefit  of  the  owners  of  the  lots,  fc 
ever,  but  making  no  mention  of  the  drain  ai 
stairway  on  the  dividing  line.  Held  that, 
not  being  reasonably  necessary  that  eitb 
grantee  should  have  the  part  of  the  dra 
or  stairway  on  the  land  of  the  other  mai 
tained,  no  easement  was  to  be  implied.  6a 
nor  V.  Bauer,  39  South.  749-751,  144  AJ 
448,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1082  (citing  Tied.  Be 
Prop.  §  609;  Walker  v.  Clifford,  29  Sout 
588,  128  Ala.  74,  86  Am.  St  Rep.  74;  Wash 
Easem.  [4th  Ed.]  107). 

For  forwarding  sltipment  by  any  «« 
rier 

Plaintiff  shipped  two  cars  of  phospha 
rock  from  a  point  on  defendant's  railros 
to  a  point  in  another  state,  the  rate  state 
in  the  bills  of  lading  being  that  fixed  by 
joint  schedule  filed  by  defendant  and  otbi 
connecting  carriers.  The  bills  of  lading,  hoi 
ever,  contained  a  provision  that  the  carri< 
should  have  the  right  **ln  case  of  necessitj 
to  forward  by  any  carrier,  and  that  in  sue 
case  plaintiff  should  bear  the  additional  riE 
and  cost  Defendant  delivered  the  cars  i 
Cincinnati  to  a  railroad  which  was  not 
party  to  the  through  schedule,  and  plalnti 
was  required  to  pay  a  substantially  higlu 
rate.  Held,  that  the  fact  that  there  was 
congestion  of  traffic  at  Cincinnati  becaus 
of  which  the  connecting  carrier  xefused  ( 


KECESSITT 


647 


KECESSITT 


ceire  tbe  curs  and  fheir  retentloii  bj  Oe- 
ndant  would  bave  brought  about  a  oon- 
stlon  and  blockade  of  its  own  Une  did  not 
eate  a  '^necessity"  within  the  meaning  of 
e  bills  of  lading  which  anthorlEed  defend- 
it  to  subject  plalntifr  to  the  Increased  cost, 
^iDg  dne  to  insufficiency  of  equipment  on 
3  own  part  and  that  of  its  connecting  car- 
er. Dickerson  v.  Louisville  &  N.  B.  Ck>., 
17  Fed.  874.  879. 

For  vvivate  way 

Cases  of  necessity,  contemplated  in  that 
-oTision  of  the  Gonstitatlon  which  declares 
lat  in  cases  of  necessity'  private  ways  may 
)  granted  upon  jnst  compensation  first  be- 
ig  paid,  do  not  arise  «zo^  where  the  way 
»u^t  to  be  laid  oat  is  absolute  indis- 
snsable  to  the  applicant  as  a  means  of 
Aching  his  proper^.  If  there  is  in  ezls^ 
ice  a  way  suitable  for  all  the  purposes  for 
hich  the  property  is  to  be  used,  a  ''case  of 
H^essity"  does  not  arise,  even  though  such 
ay  may  be  leas  convenient  than  the  one  pro- 
)8ed.  Charleston  &  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Flem- 
ig,  45  8.  B.  664,  666,  118  Ga.  690  (quot^g 
Id  adopting  Chattanooga,  R.  ft  S.  R.  Co. 
Philpot,  87  S.  B.  181,  112  Ga.  1S3). 

Fov  svit  bjr  admiaifltrator 

Where  an  administrator,  being  an  at- 
»rney,  finds  it  necessary  to  institute  a  suit 
L  behalf  of  the  estate  and  associates  another 
ttomey  with  him,  and  he  and  the  other  at- 
^rney  jointly  render  professional  services  to 
le  estate,  the  administrator  is  entitled  to  a 
!«dlt  on  the  settlement  of  the  administration 
I  the  probate  court  to  the  extent  of  the  rea- 
)nable  value  of  such  services.  Tyson,  J., 
i  a  dissenting  opinion,  said:  'The  'neoes- 
ity'  spok^i  of  in  our  cases,  authorising  an 
[lowance  for  compensation  upon  proof  of  it 
>r  professional  services  rendered  by  an 
dministrator  in  a  case  like  this,  is  one  aris- 
ig  out  of  the  duty  of  the  administrator  to 
aforce  the  collection  of  the  claim  by  suit, 
Dd  not  out  of  any  contract  he  may  make 
1th  counsel  to  render  him  assistance  in  its 
)Uection.''  John  v.  Sharps,  41  South.  686, 
S8, 148  Ala.  665. 

fEGESSITT  (Saadajr  lAbor) 

The  term  ''necessity,"  as  «nployed  in  the 
unday  statutes,  is  not  an  absolute,  un- 
▼oidable,  physical  necessity,  but  rather  an 
conomic  and  moral  necessity,  and  the  ne- 
essity  may  grow  out  of  or  be  incident  to  a 
articular  trade  or  calling.  Lane  v.  State 
rex.)  150  S.  W.  637,  638  (quoting  6  Words 
nd  Phrases,  p.  4729). 

By  the  word  "necessity,''  as  it  rdates  to 
be  exemption  of  work  of  necessity  on  a  day 
rhen  work  is  forbidd^a,  we  are  not  to  un- 
^rstand  a  physical  and  absolute  necessity, 
»ut  a  moral  fitness  or  propriety  of  the  work 
ioDe,  under  the  circumstances  of  sach  par- 
icalar  case.  SUte  v.  Lewi^,  72  Pac.  121, 123, 
ilWash.  51S» 


The  word  "necessity^  in  Befv.  8t  1899, 1 
2240,  prohibiting  labor  on  Sunday,  excepting 
works  of  necessity,  should  be  construed  rea- 
sonably and  neither  too  literally  nor  too 
liberally.  State  v.  Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  R.  Co., 
143  S.  W.  785,  787,  239  Mo.  196. 

The  word  ''necessity,"  in  Kirby's  Dig.  | 
2030,  making  it  unlawful  to  work  on  Sun- 
day except  to  perform  "customary  household 
duties  of  daily  necessity,  comfort,  or  charity," 
does  not  mean  an  absolute  unavoidable  physi- 
cal necessity,  but  rather  an  economic  and 
moral  necessity.  Barefleld  v.  State,  107  S. 
W.  886,  85  ATk.  184. 

The  sending  of  a  telegram  by  a  husband 
to  his  wife,  notifying  h^  that  he  would  not 
return  as  expected,  is  a  "work  of  necessity,** 
within  Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  |  2864,  prohibit- 
ing any  work  on  Sunday,  save  that  of  char- 
ity and  necessity.  Western  Union  Telegraph 
Co.  V.  Fulling,  96  N.  B.  967,  49  Ind.  App.  172. 

The  fact  that  in  gath^lng  a  crop  it  is 
somewhat  less  expensive  and  more  conven- 
ient to  work  seven  days  in  the  week,  rather 
than  six,  does  not  make  such  gathering  a 
"work  of  necessity,"  within  St.  1904,  p.  477, 
c.  460,  I  2,  making  it  h  criminal  offense  to 
do  any  manner  of  labor,  business,  or  work, 
except  works  of  necessity  and  charity,  on 
Sunday.  Commonwealth  v.  White,  77  N.  SL 
636,  637,  190  Mass.  678,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
320. 

Gen.  St.  1902,  |  1369,  prohibits  any 
secular  business  or  labor  except  works  of  n^ 
cessity  or  mercy,  or  engaging  in  any  sport 
between  midnight  of  Saturday  and  mid- 
night of  Sunday.  Section  1870  makes  it  a 
penal  offense  to  be  present  at  any  concert  of 
music,  dancing,  or  other  public  diversion  on 
Sunday.  Held,  that  the  act  of  seUing  tickets 
on  Sunday  to  a  moving  picture  show  to  be 
held  in  an  opera  house  on  that  day,  and 
thereby  pnnnotlng  attendance  at  a  place  of 
public  diversion,  where  It  was  unlawful  for 
any  one  to  be  present,  was  not  a  "work  of 
necessity  or  mercy."  State  v.  Ryan,  69  Atl. 
586,  537,  80  Conn.  582. 

Pen.  Code  1895,  |  420,  has  made  it  legal 
to  operate  passenger  and  mail  trains  on  Sun- 
day. Therefore  any  work  necessary  to  the 
running  of  such  trains  is  a  "work  of  neces- 
sity," within  Pen.  Code  1895,  |  422,  prohibit- 
ing  the  pursuing  of  business  or  work  on  the 
Lord's  day.  Kellam  v.  State,  67  S.  Bl  683, 
7  Ga.  App.  575. 

Pen.  Code  1895,  |  420,  making  it  a  mis- 
demeanor to  run  freight  or  excursion  trains 
on  Sdnday,  but  allowing  regular  trains  car- 
rying mail  or  passengers  to  run  on  that 
day,  is  an  expression  of  public  policy  as  to 
the  legality  of  running  the  excepted  trains  on 
Sunday,  and  a  legislative  construction  that 
the  running  of  mail  and  passenger  trains  is 
within  the  exception  to  section  422,  making  it 
a  misdemeanor  to  pursue  one's  business  on 
Sunday,  if  not  a  "work  of  necessity  or  char> 


i:; 


KEOE6SITT 


548 


NEED 


Ity."  Southern  By.  Go.  v.  Wallls,  9S  S.  E. 
870,  872,  138  Ga.  568,  80  Ia.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  401, 
18  Ann.  Gas.  67. 

Courts,  in  construing  the  term  ''neces- 
sity" as  used  in  statutes  relating  to  the  stat- 
ute prohibiting  work  on  the  Sabbath  except- 
ing work  of  necessity,  is  given  a  liberal  rath- 
er than  a  literal  Interpretation,  and  It  la 
"not  an  absolute,  unavoidable,  physical  neces- 
sity that  is  meant,  but  rather  an  economic 
and  moral  necessity."  Where  a  belt  in  a 
mill  employing  200  persons  broke  on  a  Satur- 
day through  an  tlnexpected  defect,  and  could 
not  be  repaired  that  day  because  gasoline 
could  not  be  procured  in  a  town  of  8,000 
inhabitants,  the  repairing  of  it  Sunday  mern- 
ing,  without  which  the  mill  would  have  to 
be  shut  down  Monday,  as,  after  the  belt  was 
glued,  it  had  to  dry  18  hours  before  it  could 
be  used,  was  a  work  of  necessity,  within  the 
statute.  State  v.  CJollett,  79  S.  W.  701,  702, 
72  Ark.  167,  64  L.  R.  A.  204  (quoting  Shipley 
V.  State,  82  S.  W.  489,  83  S.  W.  107,  61  Ark. 
216,  219). 

St  1898, 1  4595,  provided  that  any  person 
who  shall  keep  open  his  shop,  warehouse,  or 
workhouse  on  Sunday,  or  shall  do  any  man- 
ner of  labor,  business,  or  work,  except  only 
works  of  necessity  and  charity,  should  be 
punished.  Held,  that  the  exception  of 
"works  of  necessity  and  charity"  related  to 
"labor,  business,  or  work"  only,  and  hence  it 
was  no  defense  to  a  prosecution  for  keeping 
open  a  shop,  warehouse,  or  workhouse  that 
it  was  done  for  necessity  or  charity.  Stark 
V.  Backus,  123  N.  W.  98,  101,  140  Wis.  557. 

BepAirins  belt  la  mUl 

Courts,  in  construing  the  term  "neces- 
sity" as  used  in  the  statutes  whldi  forbid 
work  and  labor  on  the  Sabbath,  have  general- 
ly given  It  a  liberal,  rather  than  a  literal, 
interpretation.  It  is  not  an  absolute,  un- 
avoidable, physical  necessity  that  is  meant, 
but  rather  an  economic  and  moral  necessity. 
Where  a  belt  in  a  mill  employing  200  persons 
broke  on  a  Saturday,  through  an  unexpected 
defect,  and  could  not  be  repaired  that  day, 
because  gasoline  could  not  be  procured  in  a 
town  of  3,000  inhabitants,  the  repairing  of  it 
Sunday  morning,  without  which  the  mill 
would  have  to  be  shut  down  Monday,  as, 
after  the  belt  was  glued,  it  had  to  dry  18 
hours  before  it  could  be  used,  was  a  "work 
of  necessity,"  within  the  exception  of  the 
law  against  Sabbath  breaking.  State  v.  Col- 
lett,  79  S.  W.  791,  792,  72  Ark.  169,  64  L.  R. 
A.  204  (citing  Shipley  v.  State,  82  S.  W.  489, 
88  S.  W.  107,  61  Ark,  219). 

Keeping  barber  sbop  open  and  shavins 

It  is  not  a  "work  of  necessity,"  within 
the  exception  to  the  Sunday  law,  for  a  bar- 
ber to  ply  his  usual  avocation  on  that  day 
by  cutting  the  hair  of  and  shaving  a  cus- 
tomer.   State  V.  Kuehuer  (Mo.)  110  S.  W.  605. 

The  shaving  of  a  customer  by  a  barber  is 
worldly  labor  in  the  course  of  his  ordinary 


calling,  and  is  not  A  *<work  of  neoesaitjr,"  p 
mitted  by  Pen.  Code  1895,  f  422,  to  be  dc 
on  the  Lord's  day.  McCain  v.  State,  58  S. 
550,  551,  2  Oa.  Ai^.  889  (citing  State  r.  Fn 
erick,  45  Ark.  847,  55  Am.  R^.  559- 
Sale  of  ioe  or  fresh  aieat 
"Necessity"  is  an  elastic  term.  It  d( 
not  mean  that  which  is  indispensable,  t 
it  means  something  more  than  that  which 
merely  needful  or  desirable.  No  doubt 
thing  which  is  merely  needful  or  deslral 
to  the  residents  of  a  town  might  be  a  "nee 
alty"  to  the  residents  of  a  great  city,  i 
also,  that  whidi  was  a  luxury  a  century  a 
may  have  become  now  a  '^eoessi^."  Th( 
is  always,  however,  a  tendency  to  dalm  i 
customed  luxuries  as  necessities  falling  wii 
in  the  exception  of  the  Sunday  law  as  to  wc 
of  necessity.  The  obvious  intention  of  a  sfe 
ute  making  It  an  offense  for  a  person  to 
work  on  Sunday,  unless  such  work  is  a  wo 
of  "necessity,"  is  to  set  apart  one  day  for  n 
from  ordinary  labor,  so  as  to  give  opportnnJ 
to  all  f6r  leisure  and  the  contemplation  of  t 
higher  things  of  life.  This  purpose  woi 
be  defeated  if  the  courts  should  hold  evE 
work  a  "necessity,"  the  interruption  of  whl 
would  break  into  the  ordinary  habits  of  t 
community,  or  produce  a  degree  of  public 
convenience  or  discomfort.  The  continual 
on  Sunday  of  ordinary  sales  or  deliveries 
ice  or  fresh  meat  is  not  a  work  of  ''nee 
sity"  in  a  town.  State  v.  James,  02  S. 
214,  81  S.  C.  107,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  617, 1 
Am.  St  Rep.  902,  16  Ann.  Cas.  277. 

NECKTIES 

The  word  ••neckties,"  in  Tariff  Act  2i 
24,  1897,  I  1,  Schedule  I,  par.  314  (80  St 
178,  c  11),  relating  to  artldes  of  wearing  t 
parol  of  every  description,  including  neckt 
not  specially  provided  for,  is  not  a  term 
commercial  designation.  Goldenberg  Broa 
Co.  V.  United  States,  124  Fed.  1003,  1004. 

NECKWEAR 

The  word  "neckwear,**  In  Tariff  Act  Ji 
24,  1897,  i  1,  Schedule  I,  par.  314  (30  St 
178,  c.  11),  relating  to  artldes  of  wearing  i 
pairel  of  every  description,  indndlng  nee 
wear  not  specially  provided  for,  is  not  a  tei 
of  commercial  designation.  Groldenberg  Bn 
ft  Ck).  T.  United  States,  124  Fed.  1008,  KX 

NEED 

See  If  Needed. 

The  word  "need***  as  used  in  a  clause 
a  will  providing  that,  •if  at  my  decease  ai 
of  said  heirs  are  not  21  yearn  of  age,  I  ir 
that  the  money  going  to  them  be  invested  1 
the  trustees  in  good  dty  bonds  or  in  bod 
good  savings  bank,  and  if  said  heirs  are  n 
in  need  of  the  money  it  shall  remain  invest 
until  they  become  of  age,"  imports  aomethii 


ii. 


iM^il 


N£ED 


549 


NEGATIVE  EASEimMT 


Ifferent  from  mere  dc«li«  f er  the  pajment  of 
specified  som  at  a  apedfled  time.  The  main 
arpose  is  to  preserve  the  legacies  until  tiie 
snefldaries  attain  majority,  and  advance- 
lent  may  be  made  from  time  to  time  as  a 
)und  judgment  and  wise  discretion  may  die- 
ite.  In  the  Ught  of  all  attendant  circum- 
^nces.  Smith  v.  Haynea,  89  N.  E.  168,  160, 
[K2  Mass.  631. 

Tlie  words,  "the  ties  yon  may  need"  dor- 
ig  1809,  or  '^es  as  needed,"  as  used  In  a 
)ntract  for  the  furnishing  of  ties  for  the  con- 
traction of  a  railroad,  though  plain  in  their 
rdinary  meaning,  are  susceptible  of  various 
leanings,  accordingly  as  the  context  in 
rhicfa  they  appear  may  throw  light  upon 
iiem  or  the  subject-matter  with  respect  to 
rhich  they  are  used.  Laclede  Const  Go.  v. 
'.  J.  Moss  Tie  Ck>.,  d4  S.  W.  76,  90, 186  Mo.  26. 

The  word  "needed,"  as  used  in  BalUn- 
er's  Ann.  Oodes  ft  St  I  4166,  dedarlng  that 
tie  right  given  to  eondemn  the  use  of  watw 
ball  not  extend  further  than  to  the  riparian 
ights  of  persons  to  the  natural  ilow  of  water 
brough  lands  on  or  abutting  on  streams  or 
ikes  as  the  same  exists  at  common  law,  and 
3  not  Intended  to  allow  the  taking  of  water 
torn  any  person  that  is  used  by  the  person 
iimaelf  for  irrigation  or  that  is  needed  for 
hat  purpose,  meant  water  necessary  to  irri- 
gate the  land  of  a  littoral  or  riparian  owner 
?bich  he  has  under  irrigation  at  the  time 
kis  rights  are  sought  to  be  oondemned,  or 
rhich  be  int^ds  to  and  will  place  under  irri- 
;ation  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  that, 
IS  to  such  water,  no  condemnation  could  be 
lad.  State  ex  rel.  Liberty  Lake  «Irr.  Go.  v. 
Superior  Court  for  Spokane  County,  91  Pac. 
168,  969,  47  WadL  810. 

A  request  for  bids  for  coal  for  a  dty 
isked  for  coal  to  be  delivered  ''as  needed" 
md  also  as  fast  as  "required."  The  bids  of* 
fered  to  deliver  at  such  times  and  in  traidi 
ruantities  as  the  dty  might  direct,  and  the 
>ody  of  the  contract  stated  in  one  place  that 
he  coal  should  be  delivered  promptty  *'as  or- 
lered,"  and  in  another,  that  on  failure  to 
make  delivery  '*as  ordered,"  the  city  might 
Either  forfeit  the  contract  or  buy  coal  at  the 
:^ontractor'8  expense  in  the  open  market 
Beld,  that  the  words  *'oxder"  and  "direct" 
ihould  be  construed  as  syncmymous  with  the 
vord  "require,"  and  that  the  word  "require" 
teas  used  as  the  substantial  equivalent  of 
■^need."  McLean  County  Coal  Co.  v.  City  of 
Bloomington,  84  N.  E.  624,  627,  234  111.  90. 

Defendants,  who  were  operatora  of  a 
brewery,  contracted  for  6,000  bushels  of  malt 
to  be  delivered  "as  needed,"  and  at  the  aid 
of  the  contract  plaintiff  granted  defendants 
an  option  to  receive  2,000  bushels  more  at  the 
same  rate  'in  case  same  Is  needed."  Held, 
that  the  word  "needed"  was  not  used  in  the 
sense  of  "desired"  or  "wanted,"  disconnecidd 
with  the  conduct  of  defendants'  business,  but 
meant  required  for  defendants'  brewery  busi- 


ness, and  hence,  the  market  having  advanced, 
defendants  could  not  exercise  the  option  that 
they  might  sell  the  malt  at  a  profit  Hettiger 
V.  Davenport  Malt  &  Grain  Oo^  189  B.  W. 
1072,  1073,  145  Ky.  89. 

NEEDED  BEPAXaS 

If  one  county  resolves  upon  sudi  a 
course,  and  proceeds  to  replace  three  wooden 
spans  with  steel  at  three  times  the  cost  nec- 
essary to  rebuild  them  as  originally  construct- 
ed, there  being  seven  or  eight  times  that 
many  spans  in  the  entire  bridge,  it  cannot  re- 
cover from  the  other  county  as  for  "needed 
repairs."  Platte  County  v.  Butler  County, 
186  N.  W.  489,  440,  91  Neb.  132. 

ITBEDFVXi  BUXItDIirGS 

Post  offices  are  among  the  other  "needful 
buildings,"  for  the  erection  of  which,  as  well 
as  of  "forts,  magazines,  arsenals,  dodEyards," 
it  is  assumed  that  land  will  be  bought,  -and 
fbr  which  land  has  been  bought,  hy  the  gov- 
ernment all  over  the  United  States,  pursu- 
ant to  Const  art  1,  f  8,  cL  17.  Battte  v. 
United  States,  28  Sup.  Ct  422»  423,  209  U.  S. 
86,  52  L.  Bd.  670. 


See  Buyer's  Needs. 

NEEDLE 

See  Hand  Sewing  Needle. 
ManuiCactures    of,    see    Manufactures— 
Manuftictured  Articles. 

lfEEDI.E  OASES 

Not  dutiable  as  articles  composed  in  part 
of  steel,  see  Articles  within  Tariff  Act 

NEGATIVE 

KBOATiVfi  BASmBnT 

A  "negative  easement^  is  a  right  in  the 
owner  of  the  dominant  tenement  to  restrict 
the  owner  of  the  servient  tenement  in  respect 
of  the  tenement  in  the  exercise  of  general  and 
natural  rights  of  property,  such  as  rights  of 
light  and  air.  Bemere  v.  HcFarland  Real 
Estate  Co.,  114  8.  W.  631,  084,  134  Mo.  App. 
290. 

The  right  of  an  owner  of  a  dominant 
tenement  to  restrict  the  owner  of  the  ser- 
vient tenemeot  in  the  exercise  of  general  and 
natural  rights  of  property,  is  sometimes  call- 
ed a  "negative  easement"  Such  an  ease- 
ment was  created  where  the  owner  of  a 
building  conveyed  three  inches  of  land  to 
an  adjoining  owner,  with  the  right  to  use 
his  party  wall,  in  consideration  of  a  cove- 
nant by  the  grantee,  stipulated  to  run  with 
the  land,  that  she  would  not  during  a  speci- 
fied time  use  the  building  to  be  erected  for 
a  saloon.  Uihlein  v.  Matthews,  04  N.  B.  792, 
793, 172  N.  T.  164. 


■lii 


Si 

I; 


NBaATIVE  KKOWLEDGB 


550 


NEGATIVE  TESTIMONY 


M 


XEGATXTE  KNOWXXDGS 

TestLmony  that  a  fact  did  not  occur, 
founded  on  a .  witness'  failure  to  hear  or 
see  a  fact  which  he  could  supposedly  have 
heard  or  seen  If  it  had  occurred,  is  based  on 
what  is  called  "negative  knowledge."  Cot- 
ton V.  Willmar  &  Sioux  Falls  Ry.  Co.,  109  N. 
W.  836,  887,  99  Minn.  366,  8  L.  R,  A.  (N.  S.) 
648,  116  Am.  St.  Rep.  422,  9  Ann.  Cas.  935 
(citing  1  Wigmore,  Et.  §  664;  2  ElUott,  Ev. 
§  969;  6  Thomp.  Neg.  |  7866;  6  Current 
Law,  1369). 

"Negative  knowledge"  is  the  testimony 
that  a  fact  did  not  occur,  founded  on  the 
witness'  failure  to  hear  and  see  a  fact  which 
he  would  supposedly  have  heard  or  seen  if 
it  had  occurred,  and  the  only  requirement  is 
that  the  witness  should  have  been  so  situat- 
ed that,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events,  he 
would  have  heard  or  seen  the  fact,  had  it 
occurred.  Hoffard  v.  Illinois  Cent  Ry.  Co., 
110  N.  W.  446,  449, 138  Iowa,  643, 16  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  797  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Wigmore,  Ev.  f  664). 

HEGATTirE  PREGNAH T 

A  "negative  pregnant"  is  such  form  of  a 
negative  expression  as  may  carry  with  it  an 
affirmative.  Lemke  v.  Lemke,  111  N.  W.  138, 
139,  78  Neb.  626. 

A  "negative  pregnant"  in  a  pleading  is  a 
negative  implying  also  an  affirmative,  and  is 
such  a  form  of  negative  expression  as  may 
carry  with  it  an  affirmative.  Nobadi  v. 
Scott,  119  Pac.  295,  29T,  20  Idaho,  668. 

A  "negative  pregnant"  is  a  denial  preg- 
nant with  an  admission  of  a  substantial  fact 
which  is  apparently  controverted,  or  one 
which,  though  in  form  of  a  traverse,^  really 
admits  the  important  fact  contained  in  the 
allegation.  Electrical  Accessories  Co.  v. 
Mittenthal,  87  N.  B.  684,  686,  194  N.  Y.  478. 

Under  the  system  of  code  pleading,  a 
general  denial  is  as  broad  as  the  allegations 
denied,  and  a  general  denial  of  an  allegation 
of  value  or  damages  cannot  be  treated  as  a 
"negative  pregnant,"  and  an  admission  of 
any  value  or  damages  lees  than  the  sum  al- 
leged. McGrath  v.  Valentine,  167  Fed.  478, 
476,  93  C.  O.  A-  109. 

A  denial  that  the  defendants  are  Indebt^ 
ed  to  plaintiff  in  the  precise  sum  charged  in 
the  petition,  and  that  the  use  and  occupation 
of  the  premises  is  worth  the  sum  mentioned 
in  the  petition,  is  a  "negative  pregnant,"  and 
is  no  denial  at  all ;  and  where  such  a  plead- 
ing is  filed  by  way  of  an  answer  the  allega- 
tions of  the  petition  are  treated  as  admitted. 
Jackson  v.  Green,  74  Pac.  602,  603,  13  OkL 
314. 

Where  a  plaintiff  alleges  that  he  is  and 
has  been  for  the  last  10  years  the  owner  and 
in  possession  of  land,  an  answer  denying  that 
plaintiff  is  and  has  been  for  the  last  10  years 
the  owner  and  in  possession  of  the  land,  is 


in  form  a  "negative  pregnant"    J.  I.  Poirl 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Hill,  77  S.  W.  906,  908, 
Ark.  62. 

A  finding  by  a  Jury  that  a  sheriff  hi 
not  neglected  and  failed  to  present  and  ha 
approved  his  official  bond  as  sheriff,  and  tal 
the  oath  of  office,  within  the  time  prescrib 
by  law,  amounts  to  a  "negative  pregnant 
and  should  be  treated  as  an  admisaion  of  t 
implied  fact  State  ex  leL  Russell  v.  Be 
78  S.  W.  982,  984,  84  Tex.  GiT.  App.  435. 

Under  Municipal  Court'  Act  (Laws  19C 
p.  1638)    f  160,  providing  that  the  answ 
must  contain  a  denial  of  each  material  i 
legation   of  the   complaint  controverted, 
complaint   alleging  that  in   the   month 
April,  1904,  plaintiff  did  work,  etc.,  for  d 
fendants,   is  not  sufficiently   denied  by  i 
answer  denying  that  in  the  month  of  Apr 
1904,  plaintiff  did  work,  etc,  for  defendant 
but  failing  to  deny  that  he  did  ao  at  ai 
other  time ;  it  oonstituting  a  "negative  pre 
nant"    Levin  ft  Meyer  Contracting  Ca 
Jackson,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  807,  306,  46  Mii 
Rep.  446. 

NEGATIVJB  TESTHCOKY 

Where  one  of  two  witnesses,  havii 
equal  facilities  for  seeing  or  hearing  a  thin 
swears  that  it  occurred,  and  the  other  th 
it  did  not,  the  testimony  of  neither  la  neg 
tive,  within  the  rule  that  the  existence  of 
fact  testified  to  by  a  positive  witness  is  rat 
er  to  be  believed  than  that  of  one  who  swea 
that  it  did  not  occur.  Civ.  Code  1895, 1  61€ 
Hunter  v.  State,  62  S.  E.  466,  4  Ga.  App.  7« 

Where  the  witnesses  of  tbe  state  testifi^ 
that  defendant  drew  his  pistol  and  had  it 
Ills  hand  during  the  difficulty,  and  defen 
ant's  witnesses  testified  that  they  did  not  s 
him  have  any  pistol,  it  was  error  to  <diar] 
that  if  some  witnesses  were  present  and  hi 
opportunity  to  know  the  facts,  and  tliere  wi 
anoULer  class  of  witnesses  who  testified  thi 
they  did  not  know,  the  law  requires  tiie  jiu 
to  believe  the  positive  testimony,  and  thj 
"positive  testimony"  is  that  of  witnesses  wl 
know  the  ftiets,  and  "negative  testimony" 
that  where  the  witness  "doesn't  know  tl 
facts,  or  didn't  see  it"  Daniel  v.  State,  ( 
S.  B.  639,  4  Oa.  App.  843. 

On  an  issue  whether  a  gong  of  defen 
ant's  street  car,  by  wliich  plaintiff  wj 
struck,  was  sounded  as  the  car  approadi< 
a  crossing,  a  police  officer  on  the  car,  wt 
saw  the  motorman  set  the  brake  when  tl 
accident  occurred,  testified  that  no  gong  wi 
sounded,  because  as  soon  as  the  accident  hai 
pened  he  remembered  the  fact,  and  knew  tiu 
the  question  of  warning  by  b^  or  gong  wi 
an  important  one;  that  he  supposed  the  i 
Jury  was  caused  by  car  going  in  the  opposii 
direction,  because  no  gong  was  sounded  c 
the  one  he  was  on;  that  his  hearing  wi 
good,  and  his  attention  was  not  diverte 
Plaintiff  testified  that  he  was  listening  for 


|M|.; 


I  If  ill" 


NZQATtV^E  TESTIMONY 


tei 


KEQLEdT 


!ar  coming  in  tbe  oppfoedte  direction  from  the 
>ne  from  wblch  he  had  alighted  Jnst  prior 
^0  his  Injnry,  hecause  he  knew  one  might  be 
x>ming  at  any  time,  and  that  he  heard  no 
^ng  or  bell.  Sel4,  that  SEUch  testimony  was 
not  negative  in  the  sense  that  It  was  over* 
t)ome,  as  a  matter  of  law,  by  testimony  of 
defendant's  employ^  that  the  gong  was 
sounded.  Testimony  is  negative  only  when 
It  tends  to  prove  the  nonexistence  of  a  f^ct 
by  reason  of  a  mere  fWure  of  a  witness  to 
observe  and  remember  its  existence,  but,  if 
the  evidence  asserts  such  an  observation  as 
to  the  existence  of  the  fttct  and  the  recollec- 
tion of  what  that  observation  was,  denial  of. 
Its  existence  based  thereon  is  affirmative  ev- 
idence that  the  fact  does  not  exist  Ck>el  v. 
Qreen  Bay  Traction  Co.,  138  N.  W.  28,  25, 147 
Wis.  229. 

In  a  prosecution  for  homicide,  the  conrt 
properly  defined  and  distinguished  positive 
and  n^atlve  testimony:  ''The  testimony  of 
those  vTitnessee  who  swore  positively  that 
they  saw  the  pistol  in  the  hand  of  the  pris- 
oner, and  that  he  fired  the  fatal  shot  while 
the  pistol  was  in  his  hand,  is  what  the  law 
terms  'positive  testimony.'  They  swear  posi- 
tively that  they  saw  the  existence  of  a  fact 
The  testimony  of  the  witnesses  who  said 
that  they  saw  the  prisoner  and  the  deceased 
in  a  struggle  at  the  time  when  the  last  shot 
was  fired,  but  they  did  not  see  the  pistol, 
and  did  not  Icnow  in  whose  hand  the  pistol 
was,  is  what  the  law  terms  'negative  testi- 
mony.' The  reason  the  law  gives  greater 
weight  to  positive  testimony  than  to  nega- 
tive testimony  Is  because  the  witnesses  who 
swore  to  positive  testimony  swore  to  what  is 
a  ftict,  an  existing  fact,  or  else  they  delib- 
erately swore  to  a  falsehood,  while  those  who 
swore  to  negative  testimony  may  be  telling 
the  truth,  and  yet  the  fact  may  exist  which 
they  did  not  see.  If  one  witness  swears  that 
he  saw  Sheriff  Markham  in  the  courthouse  in 
Durham  on  a  certain  date,  the  sheriff  was 
there,  or  else  the  witness  told  a  lie.  Anoth- 
er witness  might  say:  'I  was  in  the  court> 
house  on  that  occasion,  but  I  did  not  see 
Sheriff  Markham  in  there.'  That  witness 
may  be  telling  the  truth  and  may  be  con- 
scientious, and  yet  it  may  be  a  fact,  notwith- 
standing, that  Sheriff  Markham  was  in  the 
courthouse.  And  for  that  reason  the  law 
says  yon  must  attach  greater  weight  to  posi- 
tive testimony  than  to  negative  testimony." 
State  V.  Murray,  51  S.  B.  776,  189  N.  O.  640. 

NEGLECT 

See  Culpable  Neglect;  Excusable  Neg- 
lect; Failed  and  Neglected;  Inadver- 
tence, Surprise,  and  Excusable  Neg- 
lect; Omissions,  Neglects,  and  De- 
faults; Ordinary  Neglect;  Wanton 
Neglect;   Willful  Neglect 

Gross  neglect,  see  Gross  Negligence. 


"The  word  "neglect,'  as  sometimes  used, 
imports  an  absence  of  care  or  attention  in 
the  doing  or  omission  of  a  given  act,  or  it 
may  be  used  In  the  sense  9t  an  omission  or 
failure  to  perform  some  act  To  neglect  is 
not  always  synonymous  with  to  omit 
Whether  the  use  of  the  term  Is  intended  to 
express  carelessness  or  lack  of  attention  re- 
quired by  the  circumstances,  or  to  express 
merely  a  failure  to  do  a  given  thing,  depends 
upon  the  connection  In  which  the  term  is 
used  and  on  the  meaning  Intended  to  be  ex- 
pressed. *  *  *  In  Webster's  Dictionary  the 
verb  *neglect'  is  defined  as  meaning  'not  to 
attend  to  with  due  care  or  attention;  to  for- 
bear one's  duty  In  regard  to;  to  suffer  to 
pass  unimproved,  unheeded,  undone.'  In  the 
Standard  Dictionary  the  word  is  defined  as 
meaning  'to  fftil  to  perform  through  careless- 
ness'; and  in  the  Century  Dictionary:  '(1) 
To  treat  carelessly  or  heedlessly;  forbear  to 
attend  to  or  treat  with  respect;  be  remiss  In 
attention  or  duty  toward.  (2)  To  overlook  or 
omit ;  disregard.  (8)  To  omit  to  do  or  per- 
form; let  slip;  leave  undone;  tail  through 
heedlessness  to  do  or  in  doing  (something).' 
As  defined  in  the  penal  statutes  of  several 
of  the  states,  the  word  'neglect'  is  said  to 
Import  'a  want  of  sudi  attention  to  the  na- 
ture or  probable  consequences  of  the  act  or 
omission  as  a  prudent  man  ordinarily  be- 
stows in  action  in  his  own  concerns.' "  H. 
Hackfeld  ft  Co.  v.  United  States,  26  Sup.  Ot 
460^  468,  197  U.  8.  442,  49  K  Ed.  826  (quo^ 
ing  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  474^^. 

The  absence  of  "ordinary  diligence,"  de- 
fined by  Civ.  Co4e  1896,  §  2898,  as  that  care 
which  every  prudent  man  takes  of  his  own 
property  of  a  similar  nature,  Is.  termed  "neg- 
lect" Objection  has  sometimes  been  made 
to  the  qualifying  words  "sUght,"  "ordinary," 
and  "gross,"  as  applicable  to  negligence,  and 
the  courts  of  some  jurisdictions  have  pre- 
ferred to  use  the  term  "ordinary  neglect" 
or  "negligence,"  as  applicable  to  a  want  of 
due  care  under  the  circumstances,  maintain- 
ing that  at  last  "ordinary  diligence"  in  the 
light  of  the  circumstances  Is  all  that  is  re- 
quired. Southern  Railway  Co.  v.  Davis,  66 
S.  B.  181,  132,  182  Ga.  812. 

The  word  "neglect,"  as  used  in  Rev.  St 
Idaho,  I  4100,  providing  that  when  a  per-, 
son's  death  is  caused  by  the  wrongful  act 
or  neglect  of  another,  his  heirs  and  personal 
representatives  may  maintain  an  action  for 
damages  against  the  person  causing  the 
death,  stands  in  the  same  category  with 
wrongful  act,  and  implies  some  omission  of 
duty.  The  death  of  a  free  passenger  on  a 
railway  train,  not  due  to  the  omission  on  the 
part  of  the  railway  company  of  any  duty  ow- 
ing to  deceased,  cannot  be  considered  as  caus- 
ed by  the  neglect  of  the  railroad  company, 
and  hence  the  heirs  or  personal  representa- 
tives of  the  deceased  cannot  maintain  an  ac- 
tion under  the  section.    Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v. 


mSQUSOT 


W2 


NxaLEor 


Adams,  24  Sop.  Ot  406.  400.  192  U.  S.  440, 
48  L.  Ed.  513. 

•«Gare"  and  "carefalness**  are  antonyms 
for  "neg:leet"  and  **negligence.*'  Negligence 
is  a  conclusion  of  law,  and  so  also  are  state- 
ments In  the  findings  by  the  jury  that  work 
was  done  carefally.  Avery  v.  Noidyke  ft 
Marmon  G6.,  70  N.  D.  888,  808,  84  Ind.  App. 
541. 

The  "neglect"  mentioned  In  the  statute 
defining  the  liability  of  a  dty  for  Injuries  to 
pedestrians  on  defective  sidewalks  means  the 
want  of  ordinary  care,  and  the  dty  must, 
to  escape  liability,  use  ordinary  care  to  keep 
defects  out  of  Its  streets.  Berry  v.  City  of 
Greenville,  65  S.  B.  1030.  1031,  84  S.  0.  122, 
19  Ann.  Ga&  978. 

An  InstnictloQ  In  an  action  against  a 
town  for  Injuries  to  a  traveler,  caused  by 
a  defective  bridge,  that  It  was  the  duty  of 
the  town  to  keep  the  bridge  reasonably  safe 
for  the  amount  and  kind  of  travel  that  might 
be  expected  to  pass  over  it,  and  that,  if  the 
town  was  chargeable  with  any  fault  In  re- 
spect of  such  duty,  the  liability  attached,  and 
the  town  was  liable  for  accidents  caused  by 
reason  of  defects  existing  through  the  fault 
of  the  town,  "and  this  without  notice  to  It 
or  regardless  of  the  question  of  'neglect,'" 
etc.,  was  not  erroneous  because  of  the  use 
of  the  quoted  phrase;  the  word  "neglect" 
therein  being  used  In  its  ordinary  legal  sense, 
and  it  being  apparent  that  the  part  of  the 
charge  quoted  was  Intended  to  mean  that 
the  liability  of  the  town  was  not  to  be  made 
to  depend  on  the  question  whether  or  not  it 
had  exercised  ordinary  care  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  bridge.  Graves  v.  Town  of 
Waltsfleld.  09  Att.  187,  140,  81  Vt  84. 

Since  in  this  state  the  liability  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  for  Injuries  caused  by  de- 
fects in  street  and  sidewalks  is  absolute,  an 
instruction  that  this  was  a  latent  defect,  for 
which  the  defendant  was  responsible  by  rea- 
son of  its  neglect  in  not  repairing  the  side- 
walk, the  word  ''neglect"  could  not  have  been 
used  in  its  ordinary  legal  sense,  and  must  be 
deemed  to  have  been  used  to  signify  mere 
failure  to  repair,  although  it  did  not  appear 
that  the  corporation  had  had  any  knowledge 
of  the  defect  Campbell  v.  City  of  Elklns. 
52  S.  B.  220,  222,  58  W.  Va.  308,  2  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  159. 

R.  L.  1905,  §  3696,  in  limiting  the  time 
within  which  the  priorities  of  right  of  ad- 
ministration thereby  conferred  must  be  as^ 
serted,  uses  the  word  "neglect"  synonymously 
with  "fall."  In  re  Lis'  Estate  (Minn.)  139  N. 
W.  300.  307. 

The  words  "fail,"  "refuse,"  and  "neg- 
lect."  as  used  in  St  1903,  i§  795,  797,  pro- 
viding that  any  railroad  company  which 
"shall  fail,  refuse  and  neglect  to  comply  with 
the  provisions"  of  the  act  shall  be  guilty  of 
a  misdemeanor,  are  used   interchangeably, 


and  mean  sometbing  mora  than  in  xmBrt 
able  and  accidental  violation  of  the  stati 
Chesapeake  ft  O.  B.  Oo.  v.  Commoawealtb, 
S.  W.  5e6»  568,  119  Ky.  519. 

Hie  purpose  of  Rem.  ft  BaL  Code,  f  8( 
providing  that  if  any  railroad  company  at 
"refuse  or  neglect"  to  obey  any  order  of 
Railroad  Commission,  the  company  shall 
subject  to  a  penalty.  Is  to  impose  a  pens 
for  neglect  or  refusal,  and  where  a  compi 
falls  to  perform  an  act  reqidred  by  an  on 
within  the  time  spediled  tfaereiii.  It  is  1 
material  whether  the  failure  resulted  fr 
willful  refusal  or  neglect,  or  from  mere  n 
.management;  the  word  ''neglect"  mean 
omission,  or  forbearance  to  do  a  thing  ti 
can  be  done,  or  that  is  required  to  be  do 
and  it  does  not  generally  imply  carelessn 
or  imprudence,  but  simply  an  omission 
perform.  State  ex  reL  Railroad  Commissi 
of  Washington  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  ( 
123  Pac.  8, 12,  68  Wash.  257. 

As  used  in  Gen.  8t  1902,  f  2499,  authoi 
ing  an  action  by  a  wife  against  her  husba 
for  support  when  he  neglects  to  support  b 
"neglect"  means  more  than  a  mere  omlssj 
or  failure  without  fault  It  imports  ozc 
sion  accompanied  by  some  kind  of  culpabll 
in  the  conduct  of  the  husband;  the  design 
the  statute  being  to  oompd  the  unwilU) 
and  not  to  constrain  those  who  have  act 
fairly  and  reasonably  in  the  performance 
the  duty.  Lathrop  v.  Lathrop,  63  AtL  5 
515,  78  Conn.  650. 

"Neglect,"  within  Rev.  St  1889,  I  22 
declaring  that  every  able-bodied  married  m 
who  shall  "neglect"  or  "refuse"  to  supix 
his  family  shall  be  deemed  a  "vagrant,"  ai 
ea  from  an  inattentive  state  of  mind,  wi 
of  care  for,  and  utter  disregard  of  the  oblii 
tion  resting  on  tlie  husband  to  sui^wrt  i 
f^moily,  whereas  the  word  "refuse"  impoi 
a  willful  disavowal  or  disregard  of  so 
obligation;  and  hence  where  a  physician 
good  habits  aideavored  to  establish  a  pn 
tice,  maintained  an  office  where  he  wait 
for  patients,  and  attoided  to  such  caUs 
he  had,  contributing  hia  entire  income  fn 
his  practice  to  the  support  of  his  wife  a 
hims^,  he  was  not  a  "vagrant,"  so  as  to  € 
title  his  wife  to  a  divorce  under  section  291 
declaring  that  when  the  husband  shall 
guilty  of  such  conduct  as  to  constitute  him 
"vagrant,"  within  the  meaning  of  the  li 
respecting  "vagrants."  the  wife  may  be  < 
vorced,  though  he  did  not  succeed  in  eami 
enough  to  support  both  of  them,  and  a 
was  compelled  to  contribute  to  their  suppc 
from  her  separate  means.  Gallemore  v.  Gi 
lemore,  91  S.  W.  406,  410,  115  Mo.  App.  11 

Of  oAeial  d«ty 

Under  Rev.  St  1896,  art  790,  providb 
that  no  county  shall  be  sued  unless  the  dal 
on  which  sudi  suit  is  founded  shall  ha 
first  been  presented  to  the  county  oommi 
sioners'  court  fbr  aUowanoeb  and  such  con 


':■■•! 


majJBxrc 


BSa 


KEGIatiWiaX  CHILD 


than  taATe  neglected  or  refused  to  tndtt  tbe 
(aiiie»  "n^lect*^  la  snffleieiitljr  shown  by  etrl- 
tence  that  the  court  has.  been  glTOi  a  lea- 
lonable  time  within  which  to  act,  and  has 
Uled  to  allow  the  daioL  Williams  t.  Bowie 
^nnty  (Tex.)  128  S.  W.  199.  200. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that,  if  any 
XMnmissioner  or  other  county  officer  shall 
'neglect"  to  perform  any  act  which  it  is  his 
luty  to  perform,  he  shall  forfdt  his  offlee  and 
»e  removed,  the  dnty  mnst  be  personal,  and 
lie  act  must  be  one  which  the  officer  has  tbe 
egal  capacity  and  authority  to  perform,  or 
le  cannot  be  guilty  of  neglect  The  purpose 
>f  the  statute  is  to  prevent  persons  from 
continuing  to  hold  office  whose  inattention 
x>  duty  endangers  the  public  welfare,  and 
±e  'Neglect"  oontamiriated  must  disclose  d- 
^er  willfulness  or  indifference  to  duty  so 
persistent  or  in  affairs  of  such  importance 
^at  the  safely  of  public  interests  is  threat- 
sned.  Irregularities  in  the  publication  of 
statements  of  sums  of  money  allowed  and 
in  advertisements  for  bids  for  bridge  repair 
v7ork,  failure  to  publish  estimates  of  ezpen- 
litures  upon  which  tax  levies  were  made, 
and  failure  to  advertise  for  bids  for  the  re- 
pair of  a  bridge  do  not  constitute  legal  causes 
For  the  removal  of  a  county  commissioner 
From  office  on  the  ground  of  neglect  of  duty. 
State  ▼.  Kennedy,  106  Pac  8S7,  841,  82  Kaa 
373. 

A  sheriff,  who,  notwithstanding  public 
feeUng  against  a  negro  charged  with  murder, 
failed  to  order  the  Jail  doors  closed,  or  to  take 
any  precaution  to  prevent  a  lynching,  being 
under  Ck>de  1907,  H  132,  7191,  the  legal  cus- 
todian of  the  Jail  chargeable  with  the  duty 
of  excluding  intruders,  was  subject  to  im- 
peachment under  Const  1901,  f  138,  provid- 
ing that,  when  any  prisoner  is  taken  from 
Jail  and  killed  owing  to  the  neglect  of  the 
sheriff,  the  sheriff  may  be  impeached,  for 
••neglect**  as  applied  to  a  public  officer,  means 
a  failure  on  his  part  to  perform  some  of  the 
duties  of  his  office;  State!  eX  rel.  Oarber  v. 
Cazalas,  60  South.  296,  102  Ala.  210,  19  Ann. 
Gas.  886  (quoting  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p. 
4740). 
Omlssioa  distliiciilshed 

Code  Civ.  Proc.  §  1511,  provides  that, 
**if  an  executor  •  ♦  ♦  neglects  for  two 
months  after  his  appointment  to  give  notice 
to  creditors  as  prescribed,  *  •  ^  the  court 
must  revoke  his  letters"  and  appoint  anoth- 
er executor.  Pen.  Code,  f  7,  subd.  2,  pro- 
vides that  the  term  "neglect"  imports  a  want 
of  such  attention  to  the  nature  or  probable 
consequences  of  the  act  or  omission  as  a  pru- 
dent man  ordinarily  uses  In  acting  in  his 
own  concerns.  Held  that  construing  section 
1511  in  view  of  the  policy  of  the  law  to  ef- 
fectuate testator's  expressed  will  as  tatr  as 
possible,  it  gave  the  court  a  wide  diacsetlon 
In  removing  executors  thereunder,  and  an  ex- 
ecutor should  not  be  removed  if  the  failure 
to  publish  the  notice  within  the  required 


time  is  kitlsfactorlly  ecneused;  the  terms  ''to 
neglect"  and  "to  omitf  not  behig  synonymouSr 
since'  to  neglect  lb  to  omit  by  carelessness  «r 
design;  While  an  omission  may  be  ivroluntary 
and  inevitable.  In  fe  ChadiMttnie's  Sstate, 
114  Pac.  1012,  1018,  15  Oal.  Appi  863. 

As  surprise 

See  Surprise. 

NBGXiEOT  AHB  BiaPITSAXi 

See,  also,  Befuse — RefusaL 

Plaintiff  contracted  to  procure  consign- 
ment to  defendant  of  some  of  the  product  of 
silk  mills,  and  defendant  argeed  to  pay  com- 
missions on  the  sale  of  the  product  consign- 
ed. The  contract  was  to  continue  for  a  year, 
and  thereafter  from  year  to  year  until  ter- 
minated by  notice,  and  It  provided  that  on 
"neglect  and  refusal"  of  plaintiff  to  perform 
his  agreement,  and  at  the  expiration  of  the 
agreement,  defendant  might  sell  the  goods  on 
hand.  The  company  owning  the  mills  refus- 
ed to  consign  any  product  to  defendant  so 
long  as  plaintiff  was  retained  as  sales  agent, 
and  defendant  was  so  notified.  Held,  that 
plaintiff,  on  being  unable  to  continue  to  con- 
sign goods,  was  guilty  of  a  breach  of  con- 
tract, the  inability  to  continue  not  being 
"neglect  and  refusal,"  and  defendant  was 
Justified  in  canceling  the  contract  for  the 
future,  and  might  enter  Into  a  contract  with 
the  company  fdr  the  consignment  of  future 
goods.  Napier  ▼.  Splelmann,  111  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1009,  1016,  127  App.  DlT.  711. 

HEGXiEGT  TO  TAKE  OATH 

Under  Const  art  1, 1  7,  which  provides 
that  an  officer  who  refuses  or  neglects  to 
take  the  oath  or  affirmation  of  office  shall  be 
deemed  to  have  refused  the  offiice,  and  a  new 
selection  shall  be  made,  and  under  Code 
1912,  art  20,  |  1,  which  requires  constables 
to  so  qualify  within  30  days  after  their  ap- 
polntmentf  neglect  of  a  constable  to  take  the 
oath,  etc.,  within  that  time,  deprives  him  of 
the  office;  the  term  "neglect  to  take  the 
oath,"  as  used  In  the  Constitution,  meaning 
neglect  of  an  appointee  to  take  the  oath 
within  tbe  time  required  by  law.  Little  v. 
Schul,  84  Atl.  649,  653,  118  Md.  454. 

HEOXtEOTIiD  CHILD 

The  words  "neglected  children,**  as  used 
in  Act  No.  82,  p.  134,  of  1906,  entitled  "An 
act  defining  the  power  of  the  district  courts 
of  this  state  and  the  dty  courts,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  care,  treatment  and  control  of 
dependent  neglected,  incorrigible,  and  de- 
linquent children,  under  the  age  of  16  years," 
mean  any  children  who  are  destitute,  home- 
less, abandoned,  or  depending  on  the  public 
for  sm^port  or  who  have  not  proper  care  or 
guardianship.  In  re  Parker,  43  South.  54, 
55,  118  La.  471. 

Laws  1907,  c.  41,  f  1  (Bums'  Ann.  St 
1908,  I  1642),  defines  a  "dependent  <±lld"  as 
one  under  the  age  stated  who  is  dependent 


NBGUGBNCB 


554 


NBQUQBNCB 


upon  tbe  public  for  sopport,  or  who  is  deiti* 
tute,  homeless,  or  abandoned,  and  section  2, 
Boms'  Ann.  St  1906,  f  1643,  defines  a  "neg- 
lected child"  as  one  who  has  not  proper 
parental  caie  or  gnardianship.  Held,  that 
children  were  neither  "dependent"  nor  ''neg- 
lected," so  as  to  charge  their  father  for  con- 
tributing to  their  neglect  under  the  statute^ 
where  their  mother,  after  unsuccessfnlly  at- 
tempting to  procure  a  divorce,  had  taken 
them  to  her  sister's  and  refused  to  bring 
them  to  the  home  which  the  father  offered  to 
furnish  on  condition  that  she  return  to  it 
Wheeler  v.  State  (Ind.)  100  N.  B.  25,  20. 

NEGLIGENCE 

See  Actionable  Negligence ;  Oomparatiye 
Negligence;  Concurrent  Negligence; 
Confession  of  Negligence ;  Constructiye 
Neg^gence;  Contributory  Negligence; 
Criminal  Negligence;  Culpable  Negli- 
gence; Discovered  Negligence;  Gross 
Negligence;  Hazardous  Negligence; 
Imputed  Negligence;  Intentional  Neg- 
ligence; Legal  Negligence;  Notice  of 
Negligence;  Ordinary  Negligence; 
Proximate  Contributory  Negligence; 
Slight  Negligence;  Wanton  Negligence; 
Willful  Negligence. 

Negligence  or  otherwise,  see  Otherwise 

"Negligence"  has  been  variously  defined 
by  the  courts  of  this  state ;  but,  after  all,  the 
different  definitions  mean  substantially  one 
and  the  same  thing.  It  has  been  termed  the 
want  of  ordinary  care ;  that  is,  the  want  of 
such  care  as  a  reasonably  prudent  and  care- 
ful man  would  exercise  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances. It  has  been  termed  the  failure 
to  observe,  for  the  protection  of  the  interests 
of  another,  that  degree  of  care,  prudence, 
and  vigilance  which  the  circumstances  justly 
demand,  whereby  such  other  person  suffers 
injury.  Lenkewicz  v.  Wilmington  City  E. 
Co.  (Del.)  74  Aa  11,  13,  7  Pennewill,  64. 

"Negligence"  is  a  failure  to  observe,  for 
the  protection  of  another,  that  degree  of  care 
which  the  circumstances  justly  demand. 
Warren  v.  Harlan  &  HolUngsworth  Corp. 
(Del.)  84  Ati.  215,  219;  Gatta  v.  Philadel- 
phia, B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (Del.)  88  AtL  788,  2 
Boyce,  551;  Temple  v.  Gilbert,  85  Atl.  880, 
882,  86  Conn.  335 ;  Florida  R.  Co.  v.  Sturkey, 
48  South.  34,  85,  56  Fla.  106. 

"  'Negligence*  is  thus  defined  by  the  text- 
writers:  'Negligence,'  in  its  civil  relations,  is 
such  an  inadvertent  imperfection  by  a  re- 
sponsible human  agent  in  the  discharge  of  a 
legal  duty  as  immediately  produces,  in  an  or- 
dinary and  natural  sequence,  a  damage  to 
another.  The  inadvertency  or  want  of  due 
consideration  of  duty  fe  the  injuria,  on 
which,  when  naturally  followed  by  the  dam- 
num, the  suit  is  based.  'Negligence,'  consti- 
tuting a  cause  of  civil  action,  is  such  an 
omissiop  by  a  responsible  person  to  use  that 


degree  of  care,  diligence,  and  skin  which 
was  his  legal  duty  to  use  for  the  protectic 
of  another  person  from  injury,  as  in  a  na 
ural  and  continuous  sequence,  causes  unii 
tended  damage  to  the  latter.  1  Thompson  o 
Negligence  (1st  Ed.)  p.  185,  approved  tt 
following  definition  of  'negligence'  by  WlUe 
J.,  in  Vaughan  v.  Railroad,  5  HurL  ft  I 
Exch.  678,  hi  which  it  is  said:  'Now,  the  de 
inition  of  negligence  is  the  absence  of  cai 
according  to  drcumstanoes.'  In  McMaho 
V.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  84  S.  W.  478,  182  M( 
641,  our  Supreme  Court  said:  'Negligenc 
consists  in  doing  something  which  a  reasoi 
ably  prudent  man  would  not  have  done  ui 
der  the  circumstances,  or  in  fftiling  to  d 
something  which  a  reasonably  i»n4ent  mai 
under  the  circumstances,  would  have  done.' 
Holden  v.  Missouri  R.  Ck>.,  84  S.  W.  183,  13< 
108  Mo.  App.  665  (citing  Wharton,  Neg.  §  3 
1  Shearman  ft  Redfield,  N6g.  I  8). 

The  component  parts  of  "negligence**  ar 
(1)  a  legal  duty  to  exercise  due  care ;  (2) 
breach  of  that  duty ;  (8)  the  absence  of  di^ 
tinct  intention  to  produce  the  precise  dan 
age,  if  any,  whidi  actually  follows.  Rid 
mond  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  113  S.  ^ 
708.  710,  188  Mo.  App.  463  (citing  Bindbeuta 
V.  Street  Ry.  Co.,  48  Mo.  App.  468). 

The  law  of  "negligence,"  which  mean 
the  law  of  actionable  negligence,  as  applie 
in  most  jurisdictions,  embraces  the  doctrin 
of  the  assumption  of  risks  on  the  part  of  ai 
employ^  and  the  doctrine  of  contrihutor; 
negligence;  also  the  doctrine  announced  ii 
Billings  V.  Breinig,  7  N.  W.  722,  46  Mich.  6B 
71,  that  although  disobedience  of  a  statut 
may  be  conclusive  evidence  of  negligence,  i 
condition  of  recovery  by  one  urging  dlsobedi 
ence  is  that  such  disobedience  must  be  th< 
proximate  cause  of  the  injury  complained  oi 
or  that  it  contributed  to  the  Injury.  Synefl 
zewski  V.  Schmidt,  116  N.  W.  1107,  1108,  15 
Mich.  488. 

''Negligence"  in  its  essence  is  alwayi 
concrete.  Hence  its  proof  must  always  res 
upon  testimony  that  tends  to  the  establisb 
ment  of  concrete  acts  either  of  omission  oi 
of  commission.  There  is  no  such  thing  ai 
negligence  at  large.  Wydsoff  v.  Birch,  T 
Ati.  248,  246,  76  N.  J.  Law,  646  (citing  Bi« 
V.  Unger,  46  AU.  503,  64  N.  J.  Law,  596). 

"If  a  property*  owner  exercises  his  righ 
to  connect  his  premises  by  a  private  draii 
with  a  public  sewer,  he  not  knowing  of  i 
defect  therein  which,  by  reason  of  such  cod 
nection,  will  produce  injury  to  such  property 
and  such  injury  is  caused  before  he  knowi 
of  the  danger,  or,  knowing  thereof,  has  rea 
sonable  time  to  guard  against  the^  same,  hi 
instrumentality  in  the  matter  will  not  pre 
dude  him  from  recovering  compensation  foi 
the  injury,  if  it  is  referable  to  'negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  city.  'Negligence'  in  sud 
an  action  may  consist  of  a  failure  to  adopt  i 
plan  for  the  sewer,  failure  to  ezerdse  ordi 


NXGUGBNOS 


665 


NEOLIOEKOB 


mrj  eaie  in  coastractliiff  the  sunet  or  fall- 
ire  to  act  with  reasonable  promptneas  to 
"emedy  defects  in  the  plan,  causing  direct  in* 
Inries  to  abutting  property  after  notice  of 
nch  defects."  Hart  ▼.  City  of  NeUIsriUe, 
L04  N.  W.  era,  706,  126  Wis.  640,  1  K  R.  A. 
[N.  S.)  952,  4  Ann.  Cas.  1066. 

In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  passenger 
illeged  to  have  been  occasioned  by  a  lurch 
>f  the  train  as  he  alighted,  an  instruction  to 
9nd  for  plaintiff,  if,  inter  alia,  defendant 
"negligently  or  carelessly  gave  the  [train]  a 
mdden  or  violent  Jerk,"  defines  •'negligence" 
in  language  not  susceptible  of  criticism  by 
defendant,  not  requesting  a  d^lnition  of  such 
term.  Louisville  St  N.  B.  Oo.  ▼.  Deason  (Ky.) 
96  S.  W.  1116,  1118. 

"Negligence^  of  a  railroad  company, 
whereby  fire  is  communicated  to  adjacent 
premises,  may  consist  in  not  being  provided 
with  the  best  appliances  to  prevent  the  un- 
necessary escape  of  fire  frojn  its  locomotives. 
In  not  keeping  such  api^ances  in  repair,  in 
not  keeping  Its  right  of  way  free  from  com- 
bustible material,  in  operating  its  looomo- 
tives  BO  as  to  unnecessarily  scatter  fire,  and 
in  not  arresting  the  spread  of  fire  after  it 
has  been  set  by  its  engines  from  its  negli- 
gence on  its  light  of  way.  liouisville  ft  N. 
R.  Go.  y.  Fort,  80  8.  W.  429,  434,  112  T^nn. 
432  (citing  Thomp.  Neg.). 

As  aet  of  ocMnuBlssloB  or  onlssim 

"Negligence"  may  consist  in  the  omission 
to  act  as  well  as  in  acting.  Lewy  Art  Co.  v. 
Agricola,  63  South.  146,  160,  169  Ala.  60. 

"Negligence"  impliss  some  act  of  omis- 
sion or  commission  wrongful  In  itself.  Whit* 
worth  V.  Shreveport  Belt  R.  Co.,  36  South. 
414,  420,  112  La.  863,  66  U  R.  A.  129  (citing 
Bckert  v.  Long  Island  R.  Ck).,  48  N.  Y.  603, 
3  Am.  Rep.  721). 

"Negligence"  is  doing  what  the  ordinary 
man  is  not  accustomed  to  do,  not  what  he  is 
in  the  habit  of  doing.  Goodale  v.  York,  69 
Aa  526,  626,  74  N.  H.  464. 

"Negligence"  may  be  active  or  passive, 
consisting  in  heedlessly  doing  an  improper 
thing  or  in  heedlessly  refraining  from  doing 
ttie  proper  thing.  Easier  v.  Sacramento  Qas. 
&  Electric  Co.,  Ill  Pac.  630,  632, 168  Oal.  614, 
Ann.  C^s.  1912A,  642. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  do  some- 
thing which  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care 
ought  to  have  been  done,  or  the  doing  of 
something  which  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
care  ought  not  to  have  been  done.  Lewis  v. 
Holier  &  Smith,  Ina,  186  Fed.  403,  406. 

"Negligence^  consists  in  the  doing  or 
omitting  to  do  some  act  which  a  person  in 
the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence 
wonld  not  do  or  omit  to  do,  and  which  act, 
if  done  or  omitted  by  him,  contributed  and 
helped  to  produce  the  Injuxy  complained  of. 


EyansviUe  lb  T.  H.  R.  Co.  ▼.  Mills,  77  N.  B. 
606--612,  87  Ind.  App.  698. 

''Negligence^  is  the  ftOlure  to  do  what 
a  prudent  person  would  ordinarily  have  done 
under  the  circumstances  of  the  situation,  or 
doing  what  such  person  under  the  circum- 
stances would  not  have  done.  The  duty  la 
indicated  and  measured  by  the  exigencies  of 
the  occasion.  International  ft  G.  N.  R.  Oa 
V.  Trump,  94  S.  W.  908,  906,  42  Tex.  Oir. 
App.  686  (quoting  and  adopting  the  definition 
in  Houston  &  T.  a  R.  Oo.  v.  Milam  [Tex.] 
68  e.  W.  736). 

Even  an  expert  may  be  gpHty  of  ••negli- 
gence" in  doing  what,  at  the  time,  his  Judg- 
ment approves.  Oceanic  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v. 
Aitken,  26  Sup.  Ot  817,  818,  196  U.  S.  689, 
49  L.  Ed.  610. 

••Negligence"  by  a  physician  consists  In 
doing  something  which  he  should  not  have 
done  in  the  treatment  of  a  case,  or  in  omit- 
ting to  do  something  he  should  have  done. 
McGraw  v.  Kerr,  128  Paa  870,  873,  23  Colo. 
App.  163. 

Brnmm   Oawtiaws  m^  prmdemi  persom 

••Negligence^"  in  actions  for  pefsonal  in- 
jury, means  the  doing  of  some  act  which  a 
cautious  and  prudent  man  would  not  do,  or 
neglecting  to  do  some  act  whidi  a  cautious 
and  prudent  man  would  not  neglect  Pro- 
dent  men  often  depart  from  common  usage  In 
the  performance  of  duty  without  overstep- 
ping the  boundaries  of  reasonable  care.  If 
they  did  not,  there  would  be  little,  if  any, 
progress  made  in  any  craft  The  law  does 
not  call  a  man  careless  because  he  refuses  to 
place  himself  in  bondage  to  custom.  The  ad- 
vancement of  art  science,  trade,  or  handi- 
craft requires  that  human  effort  be  given  a 
wider  field  of  operation  than  that  already 
occupied.  Therefore  a  given  act  is  denomi- 
nated as  negligent  not  that  it  is  violative  of 
custom,  but  because  it  Is  a  thing  no  prudent 
man  would  do.  Brunke  v.  Missouri  ft  K.  Tel- 
ephone Co.,  90  S.  W.  768,  764,  116  Mo.  App. 
36. 

Same— Ordinarily  earefnl  person 

"Negligence"  is  a  failure  to  do  that 
which  a  man  of  ordinary  care  would  do  un- 
der the  same  or  similar  circumstances,  or  do- 
ing that  which  such  a  man  would  not  do  un- 
der such  circumstances.  Missouri,  K.  ft  T. 
Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  ▼.  Parrott  92  S.  W.  796, 
100  Tex.  9;  Houston  ft  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Beard, 
93  S.  W.  632,  42  Tex.  CIt.  App.  427. 


•—Person  of  Itishost  decree  9>i  eavo 
and  pmdonoo 

Where,  In  an  action  for  injuxles  to  a  paa- 
senger,  the  court  in  one  paragraph  of  its 
charge,  defined  nei^gence  as  foUowa:  •*Tha 
word  or  term  'negligence/  as  applied  to  a  per- 
son or  corporation  engaged  in  the  transpor- 
tation of  passengers  for  hire,  is  the  failure 
to  do  anything  which  a  person  of  the  high- 
est^degrea  of  care  aud  pmdence  engaged  in 


KSGLIOEKOn 


656 


NEGUQDNOS 


the  same  kind  of  employment  woald  bave 
done  or  performed  under  similar  drcum- 
stanoes,  or  tlie  doing  of  anything  which  a 
person  possessed  with  the  highest  degree  of 
care  and  prudence  engaged  in  the  same  kind 
of  business  would  ha?e  refrained  from  doing 
under  like  or  similar  circumstances" — and 
a  paragraph  immediately  preceding  stated 
that  *the  term  'a  very  high  degree  of  care* 
means  that  degree  of  care  which  a  person 
possessed  of  the  highest  degree  of  care  and 
prudence  engaged  in  the  same  kind  of  em- 
ployment, would  exercise  under  like  circum- 
stances," it  was  held  that,  when  the  defini- 
tion of  the  term  "yery  high  degree  of  care" 
was  read  into  the  paragraph  defining  negli- 
gence, it  was  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
principle  announced  by  the  Supreme  Court 
in  International  ft  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Welch, 
24  S.  W.  390,  86  Tex.  204,  40  Am.  St  Rep. 
829.  Central  Texas  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  t.  Smith 
(Tex.)  73  S.  W.  637.  638. 


-Person   of    ordinary   care,   pru- 
denbe»  and  oantion 

In  an  instruction  that  "negligence^'  is  a 
failure  to  do  thai  wnich  a  person  of  ordinary 
care,  prudence,  and  caution  would  do  under 
like  or  similar  circumstances,  or  the  doing 
of  that  which  a  person  of  like  prudence  and 
caution  would  not  do  under  the  same  circum- 
stances, tile  words  "like  prudence"  meant  ''or- 
dinary prudence."  St  Louis  Southwestern  R. 
Co.  V.  Dixon  (Tex.)  91  S.  W.  626,  627. 

Same— Person    of    ordinary    pmdenoe 
and  care 

An  instruction  that  "negligence"  con- 
sists in  doing  something  which  a  person  of 
ordinary  prudence  and  care  would  not  have 
done  or  would  not  have  omitted  to  do  under 
the  same  or  similar  circumstances  is  not  as 
clear  as  it  might  be,  but  is  not  reversible  er- 
ror. Dubois  V.  Luthmer,  126  N.  W.  147,  149, 
147  Iowa,  315. 

Same— Person    of    ordinary    pmdenoe 
and  intellieence 

While  the  ordinary  test  of  "negligence" 
is  whether  a  man  of  ordinary  intelligence 
and  prudence  would  have  done  or  omitted 
the  act  in  question  under  the  circumstances, 
yet  there  are  circumstances  under  which  the 
law  does  not  permit  an  act  or  its  omission  to 
be  excused  because  some  persons  would  have 
been  willing  to  undertake  it,  for  the  hazard 
may  be  apparent  and  serious.  Stone  v.  Un- 
ion Paa  R,  Co.,  100  Pac.  362,  35  Utah,  305. 

It  is  not  strictly  accurate,  but  not  revers- 
ible ertor,  to  instruct  that  "negligence''  is 
the  failure  to  do  that  which  a  person  of  ordi- 
nary prudence  and  intelligence  would  do  un- 
der the  same  or  similar  circomstances,  or  the 
doing  of  that  which  a  person  of  ordinary 
prudence  and  intelligence  would  not  do  un- 
der the'  same  or  similar  drcnmstances. 
Houston  S^  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Qray,  86  S.  W.  838, 
839,  38  Tex.  (Div.  App.  2^  (citing  Houston  & 
T.  a  Ry»  Co.  T.  BrowB,  65  &  W.  44,  37  Tex. 


Civ.  App.  095;  Houston  ft  T.  C  Ry.  Go. 
Kothnuum,  84  S.  W.  1089,  87  Tex.  Qiv.  M 
546). 

Same    Ordinarily  pmdent  pereom 

"NegUgenpe"  is  the  failure  to  exerci 
such  care  as  ordinarily  prudent  persons  e 
ercise  under  lilie  or  similar  circumstance 
Kentuclcy  &  I.  Bridge  ft  R.  Co.  v.  Shrad< 
(Ky.)  80  S.  W.  1094,  1095. 

"Nes^ence"  is  the  failure  to  do  whi 
an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would  do  und« 
the  circumstances.  Brown  v.  Oregon-WaaJ 
ington  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  128  Pac  38,  41,  63  0 
396. 

"Negligence^  Is  the  doing  of  aomethii 
which  one  of  ordinary  prudence  would  m 
have  done,  or  the  omissiMi  ot  aomethii 
which  such  person  would  have  done,  und( 
like  circumstances.  Houston  ft  T.  C  R.  C 
v.  Alexander,  132  S.  W.  U9. 120, 103  Tex.  59 

One  is  not  gi^llty  of  "negligence^*  by  rei 
son  of  an  act  or  omission  which  would  d< 
lead  an  ordinarily  prudent  man,  giving  tJt 
matter  thought,  to  apprehend  danger  from  i 
Cowett  V.  American  Woolen  Oo^  60  AtL  7a 
704, 100  Me.  65. 

What  a  person  of  ordinary  prudeiK 
would  or  would  not  do  under  the  particuhi 
circumstances  is  the  true  test  of  "negligence 
Houston  ft  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Everett  (Tex.)  S 
S.W.  17,18. 

The  test  of  "negligence"  is  what  a  perso 
of  ordinary  prudence  would  or  would  not  d( 
and  not  what  ordinarily  intelligent  and  pn 
dent  men  would  or  would  not  do.  Houston  < 
T.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Brown,  85  &  W.  44,  45,  37  Te:! 
Civ.  App.  505. 

An  instruction  that  "negligence"  is  tb 
doing  of  an  act  which  an  ordinarily  pruden 
person  would  not  do  in  like  circumstances  1 
erroneous,  as  ignoring  the  fact  that  negli 
genoe  may  consist  in  careless  omission  to  ad 
Stolces  V.  Sac  City,  130  N.  W.  786,  788,  15 
Iowa,  10. 

Assuming  the  existence  of  a  duty,  an< 
where  only  ordinary  care  is  required,  '*nei; 
ligence"  is  properly  defined  as  the  failure  u 
do  what  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  wouh 
have  done  under'  the  circumstances,  or  tin 
doing  of  that  which  an  ordinarily  prodeni 
person  would  not  bave  done.  Alabama  City 
G.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Bullard,  47  South.  57S 
580,  157  Ala.  618  (citing  5  Words  and  Phras 
es,  p.  4744). 

"Negligence"  is  not  a  mere  technioai 
term,  but  means  "a  lack  of  due  diligence  o\ 
care;  omission  of  duty;  heedlessness,"  an(] 
in  a  legal  sense  is  no  more  nor  less  than  ttw 
failure  to  observe,  for  the  protection  of  the 
interest  of  another  person,  that  degree  ol 
oare,  precaution,  and  vigilance  which  the  cir- 
cumstances justly  demand,  whereby  such  oth- 
er person  suffers  injury ;  and  as  applied  to 
an  act  done  iA  4ischarge  of  a  duty  imposed^ 


MEOLIGENOB 


5ST 


NEOIilGBNOB 


is  a  ftdlure  to  do  what  aa  ordlaailly  pro- 
snt  person  would  hare  done  nnder  the  dr- 
imstances  of  the  sitaation,  of  a  doing  of 
mt  which  snch  a  person,  nnder  the  existing 
>Ddition8  would  not  have  done.  St  Louis  ft 
.  F.  R.  Co.  T.  Franklin  (Tex.)  128  S.  W. 
L50.  1165. 

An  Instruction  that  '^egHgsnce,'*  as  used 
i  the  charge,  meant  the  faihirs  to  do  that 
hich  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  would 
are  done  under  the  same  or  similar  drcum- 
Ances,  or  the  doUig  of  that  whidi  such  a 
erson  would  not  have  done  nnder  such  elr^ 
amstancee,  that  ''ordinary  care,"  as  used  in 
le  charge,  meant  that  degree  of  oaie  which 
person  of  ordinary  prudence  would  ex«r« 
ise  under  the  same  or  similar  drcumstanees, 
roperly  stated  the  ju^'s  duty  to  look  to  the 
Bicts  and  circumstances  as  they  existed  at 
lie  time  the  act  was  done  as  the  standard  by 
rhich  the  act  was  to  be  Judged.  Houston  & 
\  G.  R.  Co.  ▼.  Johnson,  127  &  W.  &38,  Ml, 
03  Tex.  320. 

The  question  of  "negligienee''  is  deter- 
[ilnable  by  what  an  ordinarily  prudent  per- 
on  would  have  done  under  the  same  or  siml- 
iT  drcumstancea  If  a  person  of  ordinary 
rudence,  standing  in  the  place  of  an  engineer, 
rould  have  k^pt  a  lookout  and  discovered  the 
kuming  bridge  in  time  to  have  stopped  the 
ngine  or  slackened  its  speed,  so  that  plain- 
er, the  fireman,  could  have  alighted  with 
easonable  safety  before  reaching  the  bridge, 
he  failure  of  the  engineer  to  do  what  such 
person  of  ordinary  prudence  would  have  done 
vould  constitute  negligence.  Missouri,  K.  ft 
r.  R.  Co.  V.  Keaveney  (Tex.)  80  S.  W.  387, 


8Kst»— KaasomaUe  and  prmdeAt 

"Negligence**  is  the  failure  to  do  what  a 
reasonable  and  prudent  person  would  ordi- 
larily  have  done  under  the  circumstances  of 
\he  situation,  or  doing  what  such  a  person, 
mder  the  existing  circumstances  would  not 
tiave  done.  Gelselman  v.  Schmidt,  68  AtL 
202,  204,  106  Md.  680;  Blrsch  v.  Citizens' 
EHectric  Co.,  83  Pac.  940,  942,  36  Mont  574. 
[quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Baltimore 
fe  P.  R.  a>.  V.  Jones,  95  U.  S.  439,  24  L.  Ed. 
506) ;  Flaherty  v.  Butte  Electric  By.  Co.,  107 
Pac.  416,  418,  40  Mont.  454,  135  Am.  St  Rep. 
B30;  Thompson  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St  P.  By. 
Co.,  180  Fed;  728,  725,  111  C.  C.  A.  261 ;  In- 
ternational ft  G.  N.  B.  Co.  V.  Trump,  94  8.  W. 
903,  906,  42  Tex.  Oiv.  Ai^.  536  (quoting  and 
adopting  the  definition  in  McDonald  v.  inter- 
national &  G.  N.  B.  Co.,  22  S.  W.  389,  86  Tex. 
1, 40  Am.  St  Rep.  803) ;  Western  Unk>n  Tele- 
graph Co.  y.  Catlett,  177  Fed.  71,  76,  100  O. 
G.  A.489. 

"Negligence"  is  a  failure  to  do^  what  rea- 
sonable and  prudent  persons  would  ordinarily 
have  done  under  the  circumstainces  and  situa- 
tions. L.  W.  Pomerene  Co.  v.  White,  97  N. 
W.  232,  283,  70  Neb.  iTl  (citing  Omaha  St 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Craig,  58  X  W.  209,-  39  Neb.  691); 


'Negligence'*  Is  the  failure  to  do  what  a 
reasonable  and  prudent  penon  would  ortt* 
narily  have  done  under  the  cfieumstanoss  of 
the  situation,  or  doing  what  such  a  person, 
under  the  existing  circumstances,  would  not 
have  done.  The  duty  is  dictated  and  meas- 
ured by  the  exigencies  of  the  occasion. 
Klenk  v.  Oregon  Short  line  R.  Co.,  76  Pac. 
214,  215,  27  Utah,  428 ;  Mason  ft  Perkins  v. 
Post,  54  &  B.  311,  818»  105  Va«  494,  U  I«»  R. 
A.  (N.  &>  1088  (quoting  and  adopting  the  defi- 
nition in  Baltimore  ft  P.  &.  Ca  v.  Jones,  95 
U.  S.  489,  24  L.  Ed.  606). 

"  'Negligence*  has  been  defined  to  be  the 
omission  to  do  something  which  a  reasonable 
man,  guided  by  those  considerations  whi<^ 
ordinarily  regulate  the  conduct  of  human  af- 
fairs, would  do,  or  doing  something  which  a 
prudent  and  reasonable  man  would  not  do. 
It  must  be  determined  in  all  cases  by  refer- 
ence to  the  situation  and  knowledge  of  the 
parties  and  all  the  attendant  circumstances. 
What  would  be  extreme  care  under  one  con- 
dition of  knowledge  and  one  state  of  drcnm- 
stances  would  be  groos  negligence  with  differ* 
ent  knowledge  and  in  changed  circumstances. 
Hie  law  is  reasonable  in  its  Judgments  in 
this  respect  It  does  not  charge  culpable  neg- 
ligence upon  any  one.  who  takes  the  usual 
precautioBS  against  aoddeBt  which  careful 
and  prudent  men  are  aecustomed  to  take  un- 
der similar  drcumstanoes."  Globe  Naviga- 
tion Co.  ▼.  Maryland  Casualty  Go.,  81  Pac 
826,  829,  39  Wash.  299  (quoting  the  Nitro- 
glycerine Case,  15  WalL  524,  21  L.  Bd.  206). 

"NegUgence**  is  the  failure  to  do  what  a 
reasonable  and  prudent  person  would  ordi- 
narily have  done  under  the  circumstances  of 
the  situation,  or  doing  what  sudi  a  person 
under  the  existing  circumstances  would  not 
have  done.  The  essence  of  the  fault  may  lie 
in  omission  or  commission.  Washington 
Mills  V.  Cox,  157  Fed.  634,  640,  85  a  0.  A. 
154  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Balti- 
more ft  P.  B.  Co.  V.  Jones,  95  U,  8*  489,  24 
L.  &d«  506). 

''Negligence^'  is  the  omission  to  do  some- 
thing which  a  reasonable  man,  guided  upon 
those  considerations  which  ordinarily  regu- 
late the  conduct  of  human  affairs,  would  do, 
or  doing  something  which  a  prudent  and  rea- 
sonable man  would  not  do.  Bodgers  v.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  Ry.  C^.,  88  Pac.  885,  75  Kan.  222, 
10  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  658,  121  Am.  St  Rep.  416, 
12  Ann.  Caa..  441. 

**  'Negligence'  is  the  omission  to  do  some- 
thing which  a  reasonable  man,  guided  by 
those  considerations  which  ordinarily  regu- 
late the  cdudnct  of  human  affairs,  would  do, 
or  doing  something  which  a  priident  and  rea- 
sonable man  would  net  do»  It  must  be  de- 
termined in  all  cases  by  reference  to  the 
situation  and  knowledge  of  the  pavtfes  ahd 
all  the  atlendsht  drcumstaaces."  Southern 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Ohatman,  53  S^  B.  683,  607, 124  Gai 
1026, 6  L.  R.  A.  <N.  8i>^2»)4^ABn.  Oas.  6«k  - 


NBOUGBNOB 


068 


NEOUGBNOB 


"NegUgenofr"  is  'tlie  omission  to  do  some- 
tbing  which  a  reasooahle  man,  guided  by 
those  oonsideratlons  which  ordinarily  regu- 
late the  conduct  of  human  affairs,  would  do, 
or  the  doing  of  something  which  a  prudent 
and  reasonable  man  would  not  do."  ▲  rea- 
sonable man  can  be  guided  only  by  a  reason- 
able estimate  of  probabilities.  Southern  R. 
Co.  V.  Carter,  51  South.  147-148.  164  Ala.  103. 

'"  'Negligence'  is  the  "omission  to  do  some- 
thing which  a  reasonable  man,  guided  upon 
those  considerations  which  ordinarily  regu- 
late the  conduct  of  human  affairs,  would  do, 
or  doing  something  which  a  prudent  and  rea- 
sonable man  would  not  do,  proTided,  (tf 
course,  that  the  party  whose  conduct  is  in 
question  is  already  in  a  situation  that  brings 
him  under  the  duty  of  taking  care."  North- 
em  P.  R.  Co.  7.  Adams,  24  Sup.  Ct  408,  409, 
102  U.  S.  440,  48  L.  S3d.  613  (quoting  PoUock, 
Torts»  p.  855). 

Bout.  Law  Diet  defines  ''negligence"  to 
be  the  omission  to  do  something  which  a 
reasonable  man,  guided  by  the  considerations 
which  ordinarily  regulate  the  conduct  of  hu- 
man affairs,  would  do,  or  the  doing  of  some- 
thing which  a  prudent  and  reasonable  man 
would  not  do.  Proof  that  a  telegraph  com- 
pany failed  to  transmit  a  message  correctiy 
is  prima  fade  evidence  of  its  negligence. 
Strong  ▼.  Weston  Union  TeL  Co.,  100  Pac. 
910,  916,  18  Idaho,  889,  80  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.) 
409,  Ann.  Ca&  1912A,  55  (citing  4  Words  and 
Phrases,  p.  8168). 

An  instruction  defining  "negligence"  as 
the  omission  to  do  something  which  a  rea- 
sonable man,  guided  by  those  ordinary  con- 
siderations which  ordinarily  regulate  human 
affairs,  would  do,  or  the  doing  of  something 
which  a  prudent  and  reasonable  man  would 
not  do,  is  substantially  correct.  Perryman  v. 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.,  89  N.  E.  980,  988,  242  lU. 


e— BeaaoiiAliley    earefnly    mnd   pru- 
dent maa 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  ordinary 
care,  tIz.,  such  care  as  a  reasonably  prudent 
and  careful  person  would  exercise  under  sim- 
ilar circumstances.  It  is  never  presumed 
but  must  be  proved ;  and  the  burden  of  prov- 
ing it  rests  on  the  party  alleging  it  It  may 
arise  from  overt  acts,  or  from  the  failure  to 
perform  a  duty.  Bowen  v.  Baltimore  &  P. 
Steamboat  Co.  (Del.)  84  Ati.  1022,  1025. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  do  what  a 
reasonable  and  prudent  person  would  ordi- 
narily have  done  under  the  circumstances, 
or  doing  what  such  a  person  would  not  have 
done.  CJhicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Watson, 
127  Pac.  693,  094,  36  Okl.  1. 

"Negligence"  may  be  defined  tn  a  general 
way  as  the  doing  of  a  thing  which  the  dic- 
tates of  common  prudence  or  foresight  would 
indicate  ought  not  to  be  done,  or  which  a 
reasonably  careful  and  prudent  man  would 
not  luive  done^  having  in  mind  the  att^iding 


conditions  and  drcumstanoes  of  the  oecaslo 
or  the  omission  to  do  a  thing  which  the  san 
prudence  and  foresight  would  say  ought 
be  done,  considering  again  the  attending  co 
ditions  and  drcumstancea  San  Franciaco 
P.  S.  S.  Co.  V.  Carlson,  161  Fed.  851,  852, 1 
C.  0.  A.  46. 


"Negligence"  is  the  doing  of  somethii 
which  under  the  drcumstancea  a  ressoo&t] 
person  would  not  do,  or  the  omission  to  ( 
something,  in  the  discharge  of  a  legal  dat 
which  under  the  circumstances  a  reasosab 
person  would  do,  and  which  act  of  commi 
sion  or  omiasion,  as  a  natural  conseqaeo 
directly  following,  produces  damages  to  t 
other.  Williams  v.  Belmont  Coal  &  Ck>ke  O 
46  S.  £.  802,  804,  55  W.  Va.  84  (quotii 
Washington  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  B.  Co.,  17  ^ 
Va.  190). 

lame    Beaseaialily  pmdMit  persom 

"Negligence"  lis  the  omitting  to  do  aom 
thing  that  a  reasonably  prudent  person  wool 
do,  or  the  doing  of  something  tiiat  such  pe 
son  would  not  do.    Illinois  Cent.  R.  O). 
O'Neill,  177  Fed.  828,  388,  100  C.  a  A.  65& 

"  'Negligence'  is  the  omission  to  do  wbi 
a  reasonably  prudent  person  would  ordiiuir 
ly  have  done  under  the  drcnmstances  of  U 
situation,  or  doing  what  such  a  person  node 
the  existing  circumstances  would  not  ha^ 
done.  The  duty  thus  imposed  is  dictated  u 
measured  by  the  particular  exigencies  of  tt 
occasion,  and  the  essence  of  the  fault  is  e 
ther  in  omission  or  commission;  negUgew 
being  either  active  or  passive.  Negligence  i 
also  defined  as  the  juridical  cause  of  the  1j 
Jury,  and  therefore  actionable  or  followed  b 
liability  to  another  when  it  consists  of  sue 
an  act  or  omission  on  the  part  of  a  respoi 
sible  person  as  In  ordinary  sequence  immed 
ately  results  in  such  injury ;  but  it  should  t 
added  that  the  party  complained  of  most  b 
the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  have  been  abl 
to  foresee  that  harm  or  injury  would  resalt 
Fuller  V.  Atlantic  Ck>ast  Line  R.  Co.,  53  S 
E.  297,  298,  140  N.  C.  480  (citing  Baltimore  i 
P.  R.  Co.  V.  Jones,  95  U.  S.  439,  24  L.  B 
506 ;  Carter  v.  Cape  Fear  Lumber  Co^  3 
S.  E.  828,  129  N.  C.  203 ;  Basnlght  v.  AUanti 
&  N.  C.  R.  Co..  16  S.  B.  323,  111  N.  C  592 
Wharton's  Neg.  §  73). 

eaaonably  pnd«»t  mad  «aref> 


"NegUgence"  is  the  failure  to  obeem 
for  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  anotbei 
that  degree  of  care,  prudence,  and  vigiltoc 
which  the  drcumstanoes  justly  demaix 
whereby  such  other  person  suffers  injury.  I 
is  the  want  of  such  care  as  a  reasonably  pn 
dent  and  careful  person  would  exercise  m 
der  similar  circumstances.  Gatta  v.  Pbil' 
delphla.  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (Del.)  83  Aa  788,  W 
2  Boyce,  551. 

"Negligence"  is  the  omission  to  do  «>m< 
thing  which  a  reasonably  prudent  and  can 


raDQUOBNOB 


669 


NEGLIOBMOS 


a  person  wonld^  or  tbm  doing  something 
hich  such  a  person  would  not,  do  under  like 
fcumBtances.  Arlunsas  &  Louisiana  By. 
o.  y.  Sanders,  99  8.  W.  1109,  UIO,  81  Ark. 
M  (adopting  definition  in  1  ThonoMon,  Neg. 
I  1,  2;  citing  Hot  Springs  B.  Ga  ▼.  New- 
lan,  36  Ark.  007). 

Aa  the  teeaeh  ev  mmUaimt  ef  •  legal 
dmty 

"Negligence"  eonsists  in  doing  or  permit- 
Ing  an  act  by  which  a  legal  duty  or  oblige- 
ion  has  been  violated.  Glaser  ▼.  Rothschild, 
D  S.  W.  332,  884,  106  Mo.  App.  418  (citing 
iweeny  v.  Old  (}olony  &  N.  B.  Co.,  92  Mass. 
LO  Allen]  872,  87  Am.  Dec.  644). 

**  'Negligence,'  to  be  actiMmble,  must  oc- 
ur  in  breach  of  a  legal  duty  arising  out  of 
ontract  or  otherwise,  owing  to  the  person 
ustaining  the  loss.''  Blinneapolis  General 
Slectric  (}o.  ▼.  Gronon,  166  Fed.  651,  662,  92 
X  G.  A.  846,  20  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  816  (quoting 
ind  adopting  definition  in  CHeTeland,  C.,  G.  ft 
)t  L.  R.  Co.  ▼.  Ballratine,  84  Fed.  935,  28  a 
1  A.  572;  citing  National  Sav.  Bank  t. 
nrard,  100  U.  S.  195,  25  U  Ed.  621;  Kahl 
T.  Lore,  37  N.  J.  Iaw,  5). 

A  necessary  element  of  actionable  negli- 
gence is  the  existence  of  a  duty  on  the  part 
)f  defendant  to  protect  plaintiff  from  the  in- 
|ary  complained  ot  "Negligence'*  is  the 
breach  or  omission  of  a  legal  duty;  it  in- 
[^ludes  two  subordinate  ideaa— duty  and  the 
performance  of  that  duty.  Todd  t.  Padflc 
Ry.  &  Nay.  Go.,  117  Pac  300,  59  Or.  249  (cit- 
ing 5  Words  and  Plirases,  pp.  4748-4746). 

'"Negligence*  is  a  breach  of  legal  duty. 
It  must  be  shown.  It  will  not  be  presumed. 
The  burden  of  proof  rests  with  the  party  as- 
serting or  charging  'negligence.' "  Meyers  ▼. 
Ruddock  Orleans  Gypress  (}o.,  43  South.  44a 
450,  118  La.  805  (quoting  and  adopting  state- 
ment tn  Black,  Law  ft  Prac.  Ace.  Gas.). 

An  essential  ingredient  to  any  concep- 
tion of  "negligence"  is  that  it  involTes  the 
violation  of  some  legal  duty  which  one  per- 
son owes  another— a  duty  to  take  care  for 
the  safety  of  the  person  or  property  of  the 
other.  This  duty  may  be  assumed  by  con- 
tract, or  it  may  be  imposed  by  Implication  of 
law.  Phcentx  Light  ft  Fuel  Co.  v.  Bennett, 
74  Pac  48,  50,  8  Aria.  314,  63  L.  R.  A.  219. 

An  essential  ingredient  of  any  concep- 
tion of  the  law  of  "negligence"  is  that  it  in- 
volTes the  violation  of  a  legal  duty  which 
one  person  owes  another,  the  duty  to  take 
care  for  the  safety  or  property  of  the  other; 
and  the  converse  proposition  is  that,  where 
there  is  no  legal  duty  to  exercise  care,  there 
can  be  no  actionable  negligence.  Saylor  v. 
Parsons,  98  N.  W.  500,  602,  122  Iowa,  679,  64 
U  R.  A.  542,  101  Am.  St  Rep.  283  (quoting 
Tbomp.  Neg.  §  3). 

''Negligence^'  is  a  shortage  of  legal  duty 
that  causes  injury.  The  fact  that  an  act  is 
in  violation  of  law  doen  not  dispense  with  an 
^ttiry  aa  to  tiie  ration  which  that  act  sua- 


tains  to  tlie  injury  complained  of,  and  if  It 
is  not  an  efficient  cause  of  injury  there  is  no 
liability.  Where  a  train  was  obstructing  a 
highway  czossing  in  violation  of  law,  and 
plaintiff,  mistaking  a  signal  for  an  invitation 
to  cross,  attempted  to  cross  between  two  cars 
and  was  injured,  the  proximate  cause  of  the 
accident  was  not  the  obstruction,  and  the 
railroad  company  was  not  liable,  (^rbin  v. 
Grand  Trunk  R.  Gd.,  63  Aa  138,  139,  78  Vt 
458. 

^'Negligence^'  whidi  ia  actionable  is  the 
infringement  of  the  legal  right  of  another, 
or  in  other  words  the  violation  of  a  duty  im- 
posed by  law  in  respect  to  another.  The 
mere  neglect  of  a  railroad  company  to  cut 
down  trees  on  its  right  of  way  in  the  vicinity 
of  a  grade  creasing  ia  not  in  itself  such  "neg- 
ligence," in  the  absence  of  any  statute  re- 
quiring it  to  keep  its  right  of  way  free  from 
unnecessary  obstruction  to  a  view  of  the 
tracks  by  persons  using  an  adjacent  highway, 
although  it  ^  may  be  considered'  with  other 
circumstances  in  determining  whether  the 
company  exercised  care  in  the  operation  of 
its  cars  at  a  particular  time.  Gowles  v.  New 
York,  N.  BL  ft  H.  R.  Go.,  66  Att.  1020,  1021, 
80  Gonn.  48,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  1067,  10  Ann. 
Gaa.48L 

''Negligence*'  is  the  breach  or  omission  of 
a  legal  duty.  Defendant,  an  electric  light 
company,  furnished  its  linemen  with  several 
pike  poles  Gong  poles  having  an  iron  ferule 
and  an  iron  pike  in  the  end)  of  the  character 
and  construction  customarily  used  in  bracing 
electric  light  poles  while  removing  the  same. 
One  of  these  pike  polee  had  become  dull  at 
the  point  and  unfit  to  be  used  with  safety. 
While  plaintiff  was  on  an  electric  light  pole, 
stripping  the  wires,  one  of  his  fellow  serv- 
ants picked  up  and  used  the  blunt  pike  pole, 
which  did  not  fix  the  electric  light  pole  so  as 
to  properly  hold  the  same,  and  it  In  conse- 
quence fell,  whereby  plaintiff  was  injured. 
Held,  that  defendant  had  properly  fulfilled 
its  dutt  of  furnishing  suitable  tools  and  ap- 
pliances, and  the  injury  was  in  no  way  the 
result  of  its  negligence.  Xowne  v.  United 
Electric  Gas  ft  Power  Ck).,  81  Pac.  124,  125, 
146  Gal.  766,  70  L.  R.  A.  214,  2  Ann.  Gas.  906. 

''Negligence"  is  the  breach  of  legal  duty. 
It  is  immaterial  whether  the  duty  is  one  im- 
posed by  the  rule  of  common  law  requiring 
exercise  of  ordinary  Care  not  to  injure  an- 
other, or  is  imposed  by  statute  designed  for 
the  protection  of  others.  The  only  differ- 
ence is  that  in  the  one  case  the  measure  of 
legal  duty  Is  to  be  determined  upon  common- 
law  principles,  while  in  the  other  the  stat-  . 
ute  fixes  it,  so  that  the  violation  of  the  stat- 
ute constitutes  conclusive  evidence  of  negli- 
gence, or,  in  other  words,  negligence  per  se. 
The  sale  of  kerosene  in  violation  of  Laws 
1908,  p.  108,  i  2,  requiring  the  names  and 
grades  of  distillates  of  petroleum  to  be  mark- 
ed on  the  receptacles  in  which  they  are  sold, 
and.making  it  a  misdemeanor  not  to  do  so,  ia 


It  ^^H 

I  ^B| 


^saXJOBNGS 


B60 


NBOUOBNOB 


**iiegUgeiK^'  per  aa  P^t^rson  r*  Standard 
OU  Co.,  106  Pac  937»  340,  65  Or.  611,  Ann. 
Oaa.  1912At  626  (quoting  and  adopting  defi- 
nition in  Osborne  t.  McMasters,  41  N.  W. 
643,  40  Minn.  103,  12  Am.  St  Rep.  096). 

Oarele«n&ess  dlsttnguiiilied 

"Negligence"  implies  an  omifision  to  do  a 
thing  which  a  person  ought  to  do,  while 
"carelessness"  implies  heedlessness  or  inatr 
tention.    Larkin  t.  Taylor,  6  Kan.  433,  446w 

Oegreea  of  aedlseaoe.    - 

There  are  three  degrees  of  "negligence^': 
First,  slight  negligence  iuTolvlng  an  absence 
of  that  degree  of  care  and  yigilanoe  which 
persons  of  extraordinary  prudence  and  fore- 
sight are  accustomed  to  use;  second,  ordi- 
nary negligence,  involTing  failure  to  exercise 
in  any  given  situation  such  care  as  the  great 
mass  of  mankind  ordinaiily  exerdBe  under 
the  same  or  similar  circumstances;  and, 
third,  gross  negligence  involying  a  failure  to 
exercise  any  care  to  avoid  inflicting  injury  to 
the  person  or  property  of  others,  recklessly 
or  wantonly  acting  or  failing  to  act  to  avoid 
such  injury,  evincing  such  utter  disregard  of 
consequences  as  to  suggest  a  willingness,  sub* 
stantially  equivalent  to  intent,,  to  injure  and 
denominated  such  constructively,  and  dassa- 
ble  with  actual  intent  as  regards  duty  to 
compensate  for  the  injury.  Astrin  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St  P.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  W.  265,  268,  143 
Wis.  477,  31  L.  E.  A-  (N.  S.)  158. 

A  classification  of  "n^llgence"  as 
"slight,"  "ordinary,"  and  "gross"  has  been 
quite  gttierally  abandoned,  and  the  more  ra- 
tional view  adopted  that  any  want  of  or- 
dinary care  constituted  actlcmable  negligence. 
Sherwood  v.  Home  Savings  Bank,  109  N.  W. 
9,  12»  131  Iowa,  528. 

In  Iowa  actionable  '^negligence"  does  not 
depend  on  its  degree,  and  the  differentiation 
into  gross,  ordinary,  and  slight  negligence 
means  little  more  than  a  matter  of  compara- 
tive emphasis  in  the  discussion  of  testimony. 
Denny  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  ft  P.  Ry.  Co.,  130  N. 
W.  368,  364,  150  Iowa,  460. 

Under  Ky.  St  1903,  {  6,  giving  a  cause 
of  action  for  a  death  caused  by  another's 
"negligence,*^  gross  negligence  need  not  be 
sho#n.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.'^Oo.  v. 
Evans*  Adm'r,  110  S.  W.  844,  848, 129'Ky.  152. 

An  instruction  as  to  the  division  of  "neg- 
ligence" Into  slight,  ordinary,  or  gross  can- 
not be  usefully  applied  In  trials  bjC  cases; 
their  signification  varying  according;  to, the 
circumstances,  until  there  are  so  many  real 
exceptions  that  the  words  can  scarcely  be 
said  to  have  any  real  application.  Oregon 
Co.  V.  Roe.  176  Fed.  715,  718,  100  0,  a  A. 
269. 

Degrees  of  negligence  are  not  recognized ; 
for,  though  the  terms  "wanton,  willful,  and 
reckless"  are  sometimes  used  in  characteriz- 
!Bg  conduct,  yet  ^the  law  applies  only  the 
word  "negligence,*'  whi<di  is  a  failure  to  per- 


form a  daty,  and,  though  the  law  reoognfa 
degrees  in  oare,  very  high  care,  and  ordtau 
care,  the  failure  to  exerdae  the  highest  < 
gree  of  care  required  is  only  negligen 
though  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care 
also  negligenoa  Young  v.  St  Louis,  L  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  127  8.  W.  19,  26,  227  Ma  907. 

As  «»ttt  ef  dlllKeaaee 

Negligence  is  not  a  tiling,  but  a  relatfa 
"The  word  "Bi^ligehce'  impliea  a  duty  to  i 
due  diligence,  and  such  a  duty  may  be  ow 
to  one  person,  and  not  to  another."  Best 
&  M.  R.  &  V.  Sargent,  67  AH.  688»  691,  72 
H.  465  (quoting  Mowbray  v.  Merryweathi 
[1895]  2  Q.  B.  DiV.  640,  647). 

"Negligence,"  relatively  to  the  safety 
any  particular  person,  is  the  breach  of  soi 
diligence  due  to  that  person.  Where  no  dn 
of  diligence  appeare  relatively  to  the  pen 
injured,  there  can  be  no  presumption  of  \ 
breadi.  "Negligence**  causing  an  injury  dc 
not  give  a  right  of  action  to  the  person  i 
jured,  unless  there  is  some  diligence  due 
such  pereon  at  the  time  with  reference  to  t 
particular  conduct  in  question.  Southern 
Ca  T.  Cash,  62  S.  E.  823,  826, 181  Oa.  637. 

Am  doimg  "wkmt  a  pmdeat  luut  w»i 

BO^  do 

If  one  does  what  the  great  body  of  oQi 
prudent  men  do,  under  a  like  situation,  be 
not  "negligent"  Tallman  v.  Nelson,  125 
W.  1181,  1183,  141  Mo.  App.  478. 

As  a  f  aot 

"Negligence*!  in  one  sense  la  a  quail 
attaching  to  acts  dependent  on  and  arisi 
out  of  the  duties  and  relations  of  the  part 
concerned,  and  is  as  much  a  fact  to  be  fou 
by  the  Jury  as  the  alleged  acts  to-  which 
attaches  by  virtue  of  such  duties  and  re 
tions.  Patton-Woraham  Drug  Co.  v.  Dreim 
(Tex.)  123  S.  W.  705,  708. 

"  'Negligence,'  in  one  sense,  la  a  qotialJ 
'attaching  to  acts  dependent  upon  and  arisi 
out  of  the  duties  and  relations  of  the  parti 
concerned,  and  is  as  much  a  fact  to  be  fou 
by  the  Jury  as  the  alleged  acts  to  which 
attaches  by  virtue  of  such  duties  and  re 
tions.  *  *  *  It  is  not  a  conclusion  tp 
testified  to  by  witnesses,  but  an  inference 
be  deduced  f rem  the  facts  and  circumstam 
disclosed  by  the  evidence.**  Tiborsky  v.  C 
cago,  M.  &  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  102  N.  W.  549,  51 
124  Wis.  243  (citing  Townley  v.  Chicago, 
&  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  11  N.  W.  55,  63  Wis.  63 
Kaples  V.  Orth,  21  N.  W.  633,  61  Wis.  53 
Hart  V.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  57  N.  W.  91, 
Wis.  489,  490,  21  L.  R.  A.  743,  .^  Am.  St  Bi 
877). 
As  an  Imf  ereaoe  of  f aat 

"'Negligence'  is  something  Invisible,  1 
tangible,  and,  for  the  most  part,  incapable 
direct  proof,  like  sensible  facta  or  physii 
events.  It.  U,  in  general,  a  matter  of  inft 
ence  from  other  facts  and  drcumstaiK 
which  admit  of  direct  proof,  and  wUcb  m 


;:  V 


NnouaENOs 


661 


NfiGLIOSa^OB 


lalae  a  jjnresiunpUoii  of  the  truth  of  the  naln 
fact  to  he  proTed«  Theoe  facts  and  circnm- 
stances  must  be  mch  as  would  warrant  a 
Jury  in  Inferring  from  them  the  fact  of  neg- 
ligence by  reasoning  in  the  ordinary  way, 
according  to  the  natural  and  proper  relation 
•f  things  and  consistently  with  the  common 
sense  and  experience  of  mankind."  Beebe  v. 
St.  Louis  Transit  Co^  lOa  S.  W.  1019,  1026, 
206  Mo.  419,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  760  (qupting 
and  adopting  the  definition  in  Callahan  t. 
Wame,  40  Mo.  136). 

As  tmXtmrm  of  dmtj 

"Negligence"  is  a  failure  of  duty.  Shaw- 
nee Light  &  Power  Ck>.  t.  Sears,  95  Pac.  449, 
466,  21  Okl.  IB  (citing  Haynes  v.  Gas  Ck>.,  19 
S.  E.  344,  114  N.  O.  206,  26  L.  B.  A.  810,  41 
Am.  St  Bep.  786). 

Failure  to  do  a  duty  is  "negligence." 
Beyer  y.  Hamburg-American  S.  S.  Ck>.,  171 
Fed.  582,  583. 

"Negligence"  must  depend  on  a  duty  owed 
by  one  person  to  another  which  is  negli- 
gently performed.  Southern  By.  Co.  ▼.  Smith, 
50  South.  390,  392, 163  Ala.  174 ;  Coin  v.  John 
H.  Talge  Lounge  Co.,  121  S.  W.  1,  6,  222  Mo. 
488.  25  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1179, 17  Ann.  Cas.  888; 
Hufft  V.  St  Louis  A  S.  P.  B.  Co.,  121  a  W. 
120.  222  Mo.  286;  Cohen  v.  Koster,  118  N. 
Y.  Supp.  142,  144,  133  App.  Div.  570;  Kenne- 
dy v.  Hawkins,  102  Pac.  733,  734,  54  Or.  164, 
25  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  606. 

EJvery  action  of  "negligence"  depends 
upon  a  duty  owing  by  defendant  to  protect 
plaintiff,  failure  to  perform  such  duty,  and  a 
resulting  injury  to  plaintiff.  City  of  Laporte 
T.  Osbom,  86  N.  BL  995,  996,  48  Ind.  App.  100. 

In  the  absence  of  a  duty  yiolated,  there 
can  be  no  "negligence."  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 
Ry.  Ca  of  Texas  y.  Byrd  (Tex.)  124  S.  W.  788, 

739. 

"Negligence"  may  result  from  omission 
respecting  duty.  Bandle  ▼.  Birmingham  By., 
Light  &  Power  Co.,  53  South.  918,  921,  160 
Ala.  314. 

''Negligence"  is  the  anttthesis  of  duty. 
Where  there  is  no  duty,  there  cannot  be  neg- 
ligence. Thomas  v,  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  ft  T.  P. 
R.  Co.,  105  S.  W.  879,  380,  127  Ky,  159. 

There  can  l)e  no  **negligence"  Mliere 
there  is  no  breach  of  duty.  It  must  appear 
that  defendant  owed  a  duty  and  also  that 
be  did  not  perform  it.  Boanoke  By.  &  lUec- 
tric  Co.  T.  Sterret,  62  S.  H  385,  387,  106  Ya. 
533,  19  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  316,  128  Am.  St  Bep. 
9T1. 

Broadly  speaking,  "negligence"  is  a 
breach  of  duty.  Harrington  v.  Bqtte,  A.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  95  Pac.  8,  10,  37  Mont  169;  16  L. 
R.  A  (N.  S.)  395. 

**Negligence"  implies  a  failure  to  do 
something  which  duty  or  prudence  requires 
should  hav^  beep  done.  GiU  v.  Fugate,  78  a 
W.  188, 191,117  5:y.?57.. 

3  WDS.&  P.2n  SEB.-86 


'*The  word  'negligence*  implies  a  duty 
as  well  as  its  breach,  and  the  fact  of  negli- 
gence can  never  be  found  in  the  absence  of  a 
duty."  Bobbins  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  B.  Co.,  59 
S.  E.  512,  513^  62  W.  Va.  535 ;  Huchlngson 
T.  Texas  Cent  B,  Co.,  118  S.  W.  1123,  1126, 
55  Tex.  Civ.  App^  229  (quoting  Little  Bock  & 
Ft  S.  By.  Co.  V.  Lawton,  18  S.  W.  543,  55 
Ark.  428,  15  L.  B.  A.  434,  29  Am.  St  Bep, 
48). 

"Negligence"  presupposes  the  existence  of 
a  duty  to  protect  from  injury,  and  failure  to 
perform  that  duty,  from  which  an  injury  te- 
suits.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  ft  S.  By.  Co.  v.  Bhoden; 
128  S.  W.  798,  800,  93  Ark.  29,  187  Am.  St. 
Bep.  73,  20  Ann.  Cas.  915. 

The  first  element  of  ''negligence"  is  a 
duty.  If  there  is  no  duty,  there  can  be  no 
negligence.  If  the  defendant  owed  a  duty, 
but  did  not  owe  it  to  the  plaintiff,  the  action 
will  not  lie.  Texas  Cent  B.  Co.  v.  Harbison, 
85  S.  W.  1188,  U39,  96  Tex.  499. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  discharge 
a  duty,  and  may  consist  of  the  omission  of  a 
duty,  or  the  doing  of  that  which  \s  contrary 
to  a  duty.  Where  there  is  not  a  duty,  there  is 
no  negligence.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  By. 
Co.  V.  Harrod's  Adm'r,  116  S.  W.  699,  701,  132 
Ey.  445. 

"Negligence"  is  a  breach  of  that  duty 
which  one  person  owes  to  another  by  reason 
of  the  relation  existing  between  them,  the 
duty  in  each  particular  case  being  tested  by 
What  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  wotild  do 
in  a  like  situation.  C^ilberg  v.  Standard 
Furniture  Co.,  115  Pac.  837,  838,  63  Wash. 
414,  84  L.  B.  A.  (N,  S.)  1079. 

"Negligence"  is  negative  in  its  character. 
It  is  the  omission  to  perform  some  duty.  It 
implies  nonfeasance,  and  is  contradistin- 
guished from  misfeasance;  Davenport  v. 
Southern  B.  Co.,  124  Fed.  983,  984. 

"Negligence"  is  the  violation  of  duty  by 
omission  or  commission,  which  creates  a  men- 
ace, and  whoi  it  becomes  effective  by  caus- 
ing injury  to  a  blameless  person  liability  fol- 
lows. Birch  V.  City  of  New  York,  106  N.  Y. 
Supp.  104,  105,  121  App.  Div.  395. 

"Negligence"  consists  in  the  violation  of 
a  duty  owed  by  one  person  to  another, 
whether  the  duty  arises  from  relations  of  the 
parties,  or  is  created  by  statute  under  the 
police  power  of  the  state.  Wells  v.  Joslin 
Mfg.  Co.,  82  Atl.  258,  260,  33  B.  I.  498. 

The  burden  is  on  plaintiff,  in  an  action 
for  negligent  injuries,  to  show  that  defendant 
owed  him  a  duty  and  failed  to  perform  it 
Mehler  v.  Flsch,  120  N.  Y.  Supp.  807,  809,  65 
Misc.  Rep.  549. 

Where  there  is  a  breach  of  a  duty  due 
to  all  persons,  the  liability  of  the  wrong- 
doer does  not  depend  on  privity  between  him- 
self and  the  person  injured.  Hasbrouck  v. 
Ar^iour  ft  Co.,  121  N.  W.  157,  160,  139  Wis. 
^367,  23  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  87a 


I  Jf- 


NEQLI6EN0B 


662 


NEOIilOBNCS 


"Negligence"  is  the  breach  of  some  duty 
whldi  a  person  owes  to  another,  and  where, 
by  such  breach  of  duty,  Injury  is  caused  as  a 
proximate  result  thereof,  then  such  negli- 
^nce  is  actionable,  and  the  injured  person 
may  recover  damages  therefor,  provided  he 
himself  did  not  contribute  thereto  materially 
by  negligence  on  his  part  Indianapolis  &  M. 
Rapid  Transit  Co.  v.  Edwards,  74  N.  B.  533, 
634,  86  Ind.'App.  202. 

To  constitute  a  good  cause  of  action  for 
injuries  through  "negligence,"  there  should 
be  stated  a  right  on  plaintifTs  part,  a  duty 
on  defendant's  part,  respecting  such  right, 
and  a  breach  of  such  duty  resulting  in  plain- 
tiff's injury.  City  of  Havre  De  Grace  v. 
Fletcher,  77  Aa  114,  116,  112  Md.  662. 

''Negligence"  is  a  breach  of  duty.  Wl|ere 
there  is  no  duty,  or  no  breach,  there  is  no 
negligence.  An  injury  that  is  a  natural  and 
probable  consequence  of  an  act  of  negligence 
is  actionable.  But  an  injury  which  could  not 
have  been  foreseen  nor  reasonably  anticipat- 
ed as  the  probable  result  of  an  act  or  omis- 
sion is  not  actionable,  and  such  an  act  or 
omission  is  either  the  remote  cause,  or  no 
cause  whatever,  of  the  injury.  Kreigh  v. 
Westinghouse,  Church,  Kerr  &  Co.,  152  Fed. 
120,  122.  81  C.  C.  A.  338,  11  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
684  (citing  Cole  v.  German  Savings  &  Loan 
Soa,  124  Fed.  113,  115,  59  C.  C.  A.  593.  505, 
63  L.  R.  A.  416). 

"'Negligence,'  among  workmen,  is  a 
breach  of  the  duty  which  each  owes  to  the 
others,  and  not  a  breach  of  the  master's  duty, 
if  he  has  exercised  the  care  that  is  required 
of  him."  Atchison  &  Eastern.  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Miller,  80  Pac.  18,  29,  71  Kan.  13,  1  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  682. 

"'Negligence'  has  been  defined  to  be  a 
failure  of  duty."  On  proof  that  a  live  wire, 
carrying  a  deadly  current,  fell  into  a  public 
street,  it  might  well  be  said  that  some  one 
has  failed  in  his  public  duty.  Booker  v. 
Southwest  Missouri  R.  Co.,  128  S.  W.  1012, 
1016,  144  Mo.  App.  273.  ^ 

The  elements  involved  In  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion for  "negligence"  are  the  exist^ice  of  a 
duty  to  protect  plaintiff  from  injury,  failure 
to  perform  such  duty,  and  resulting  injury. 
J.  M.  Pace  Mule  Co.  v.  Seaboard  Air  line  Ry. 
Co.  (N.  C.)  76  S.  E.  513,  515. 

"Negligence"  is  a  breach  of  duty.  In 
order  for  it  to  exist,  there  must  be  both  a 
duty  and  a  breach  of  it  It  is  the  duty  of 
tho  court  in  its  instructions  to  advise  the 
Jury  of  the  duties  which  the  law  Imposes  up- 
on the  parties,  and,  where  there  is  conflict  in 
the  evidence,  it  is  the  function  of  the  Jury  to 
determine  whether  these  duties  imposed  by 
law  have  been  violated.  The  Jury  is  the 
Judge  of  the  fact,  and  not  of  the  law.  Mid- 
land Valley  R.  Co.  ▼.  Bailey,  124  Pac.  987. 
988,  84  Okl.  193. 


"Negligence*  is  a  failure  to  perform 
duty  which  one  owes  to  another,  as  whe 
a  railway  company  tnila  to  make  due  inspe 
tion  of  a  public  sidewalk  maintained  by 
across  its  right  of  way  and  to  make  it  re 
sonably  safe  for  pedestrians,  as  the  n» 
thereof  might  be  discoverable  by  means  ( 
such  inspection."  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  De  Hai 
65  N.  E.  192,  194,  32  Ind.  App.  62. 

"  'Negligence'  constitutes  no  cause  of  t 
tion,  unless  it  expresses  or  establishes  son 
breach  of  duty."  There  can  be  no  recovei 
from  a  railroad  company  for  personal  inji 
ries  from  the  negligent  collision  of  its  car 
which  overturned,  crashing  into  plaindf! 
house,  causing  her  great  fright,  on  the  allegi 
tlons  of  mere  fright  alone,  as  the  compaii 
owed  plaintiff  no  duty  to  protect  her  froi 
fright  Ewing  v.  Pittsburgh,  C.  ft  St.  Ll  R 
Co.,  23  Atl.  340,  147  Pa.  40,  14  U  R  A.  86 
30  Am.  St  Rep.  709. 

"The  law  of  'negligence'  is  based  on  tl 
relative  duties  of  one  person  to  another.  1 
establish  negligence,  a  breadi  of  some  dni 
of  this  kind  must  be  shown."  Where  a  tel 
graph  agent  delivered  a  telegram  to  a  perse 
other  than  the  addressee,  but  having  a  siii 
liar  name,  and  the  discrepancy  was  notice 
by  the  person  to  whom  it  was  delivered,  tl 
telegraph  company  was  not  chargeable  wit 
negligence.  Bowyer  v.  Western  Union  Tc 
Co.,  106  N.  W.  748,  130  Iowa,  324,  5  L.  B.  J 
(N.  S.)  984. 


"Negligence"  consists  In  doing,  or  omi 
ting  to  do,  an  act  by  which  a  legal  duty  < 
obligation  is  violated.  Monroe  v.  Atlant 
Coast  line  R.  Co.,  66  S.  E.  315,  316»  151  ! 
C.  374,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  193. 

"Negligence"  in  its  technical  sense  ei 
braces  failure  to  discharge  a  legal  duty  to  a 
injured  person.  Goodwin  v.  Columbia  Tti< 
phone  Co.,  138  S.  W.  940,  943,  157  Mo.  Ap] 
59a 

There  can  be  no  "negligence"  whei 
there  is  no  legal  duty.  Cumberland  Tel< 
graph  ft  Telephone  Co.  v.  Martin's  Adm'r.  1 
S.  W.  718,  116  BCy.  554,  63  L.  R.  A.  469,  IC 
Am.  St  Rep.  229. 

"Negligence,"  as  used  in  the  law,  ma 
be  defined  as  the  failure  to  discharge  a  legi 
duty,  whereby  injury  occurs.  There  can  I 
no  negligence  where  there  is  no  duty  impo( 
ed.  FrankUn  v.  Tracy,  77  S.  W.  1113,  llli 
117  Ky.  267,  63  L.  R.  A.  649. 

Failure  to  perform  a  duty  imposed  b 
statute  or  ordinance  la  "negligence."  Fen 
V.  CUrk,  103  Pac.  944,  945,  11  C&L  AiH>.  T. 

"Negligence,"  as  distinguished  from  tli 
common-law  definition,  may  arise  from  tb 
failure  to  discharge  a  duty  Imposed  by 
statute  or  municipal  ordinance.  Strottma 
V.  St  Louis,  I.  M.  ft  S.  Ry.  Co.,  109  &  li 
769,  788,  2U  Mo.  227  (ittssenting  opinion). 


niBOUQENGff 


668 


NEOUGflNOS 


The  measure  of  legal  duty  Is  usually  ex- 
ressed  po6itlyely»  by  statltig  what  codsU- 
utes  due  care,  rather  than  negatiyely,  by 
tatiug  what  constitutes  ''negligence,*'  which 
s  the  unintentional  failure  to  pertprm  the 
iuty  imposed  by  law.  Baymond  v.  Portland 
L  Co.,  62  Aa  602,  605,  100  Me.  629,  3  L.  R. 
L  (N.  S.)  9i. 

''Negligence''  is  defined  as  "the  unloten- 
lonal  failure  to  perform  a  duty  implied  by 
aw,  whereby  damage  naturally  and  proxi- 
oately  results  to  another."  Southern  Ry. 
:o.  V.  Chatman,  53  S.  B.  692,  697,  124  Oa. 
LQ26,  6  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  283,  4  Ann.  Gas.  675. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  perform  a 
Inty  imposed  by  law,  or  to  exercise  that  care 
yhich  a  man  of  ordinary  pmd^ice  would 
laye  exercised  under  existing  circumstances, 
ind,  where  conditions  change,  the  degree  of 
»re  required  changes  with  them.  Pritchett 
J.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  72  S.  B.  828,  884,  157 
^.  C.  88. 

"'Negligence^  in  its  gItII  relations  is 
mch  an  inadvertent  imperfection,  by  a  re- 
sponsible human  agent,  in  the  discharge  of 
I  legal  duty,  as  immediately  produces,  in  an 
irdinary  and  natural  sequence,  a  damage  to 
mother.  OThe  inadyertency,  or  want  of  due 
»>n8ideratlon  of  duty,  is  the  injuria,  on 
vphich,  when  naturally  followed  by  the  dam- 
Dom,  the  suit  is  based."  Wharton,  Neg.  I  3. 
In  Hoepper  y.  Southern  Hotel  Co.,  44  S.  W. 
257,  142  Mo.  loc  dt  380,  the  f oUowing  lan- 
guage of  Cnannell,  B.,  in  Smith  v.  Railroad, 
U  R.  6  C.  P.  20,  Is  approvingly  quoted,  to  wit: 
"I  quite  agree  that  where  there  Is  no  direct 
evidence  of  negligence  the  question  what  a 
reasonable  man  might  foresee  is  of  im- 
portance in  considexlng  the  question  whether 
there  is  evidence  of  negligence  for  the  jury  or 
not;  but  when  it  has  been  determined  that 
there  is  evidence  of  negligence^  the  person 
guilty  of  it  is  equally  liable  for  its  conse- 
quences, whether  he  could  have  foreseen  them 
or  not"  Foley  v.  McMahon,  90  S.  W.  113, 
Hi  114  Mo.  App.  442. 

In  an  action  for  Injuries  to  a  servant,  the 
burden  Is  on  plaintiff  to  establish  defendant's 
"negligence,"  vla-t  failure  to  discharge  its 
legal  duties  toward  him.  Smith  v.  Philadel- 
phia, B.  <&  W.  R.  Co.,  73  Atl.  818,  819,  111 
Md.274. 

A  railroad  company  must  give  the  statu- 
tory signals  when  approaching  |i  highway 
crossing,  and  a  failure  to  do  so  is  "negli- 
gence," within  Klrby's  Dig.  |  6595,  providing 
that  railroad  companies  are  liable  for  dam- 
ages caused  by  the  omission  to  give  statutory 
signals.  Kansas  City  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Drew,  147  8.  W.  50,  53, 103  Ark.  374. 


;•  of  duty 

"Negligence"  is  ordinarily  predicated  in 
terms  of  Imowledge,  and  liability  attaches 
only  in  case  the  def aidant  knows,  or  by  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  cax^  could  know.    In  an 


action  for  injuries  received  in  a  street  by  oe 
ing  struck  by  a  bottle  that  was  thrown  by 
W.  from  the  roof  garden  of  a  hotel,  there  was 
no  evidence  to  show  that  W.  was  boisterous, 
or  that  he  threatened  any  one,  and  no  evi- 
dence from  which  it  could  be  inferred  that 
he  would  throw  the  bottle  in  question.  An 
instruction  as  to  the  liability  of  the  hotel 
company  that  if  the  jury  believed  that  W. 
threw  the  bottle  from  the  roof  garden,  and 
plaintiff  was  injured  thereby,  and  if  at  the 
time  he  was  intoxicated,  and  his  behavior 
was  such  as  would  indicate  to  a  man  of  aver- 
age prudence  that  he  might  throw  a  bottle  to 
the  street  below,  and  that  these  facts  were 
known,  or  by  ordinary  care  could  have  been 
known,  to  the  defendant  or  its  agents,  then  It 
became  the  duty  of  the  defendant  and  Its 
agents  to  remove  W.  from  the  roof  garden  or 
otherwise  control  him,  and  that  the  law  In 
that  event  is  for  the  plaintiff,  Is  not  errone- 
ous, as  basing  the  liability  of  defendant  on 
knowledge  rather  than  on  belief,  or  reason- 
able grounds  for  belief.  Bruner  v.  Seelbach 
Hotel  Co.,  117  S.  W.  873,  376,  133  Ky.  41,  19 
Ann.  Cas.  217. 

As  failure  to  azerelse  eare  Jvatly  de- 
maaded  In  eireiuiastaiiees 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  observe  for 
the  protection  of  another  that  degree  of  care 
which  the  circumstances  justly  demand, 
whereby  such  other  person  suffers  injury. 
Fisher  v.  City  of  New  Bern,  53  S.  EL  842,  345, 
140  N.  C.  506,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  542,  111  Am. 
St  Rep.  857;  McCartney  v.  People's  R.  Co. 
(Del.)  78  AU.  771,  772,  2  Boyce,  191 ;  Walls  v. 
People's  R.  Co.  (Del.)  80  Atl.  355,  358;  Mor- 
gan T.  Oronogo  Ciixle  Min.  Co.,  141  S.  W.  735, 
740,  160  Mo.  App.  99;  Valente  v.  American 
Bridge  Co.,  73  AU.  395,  400,  6  PennewUl, 
556;  Florida  R.  Co.  v.  Sturkey,  48  South.  34, 
35,  56  Fla.  196  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  Jacksonville  St  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chappell, 
21  Fla.  175) ;  Smith  v.  Detroit  United  By., 
U9  N.  W.  640,  644, 155  Mich.  466 ;  Linthicum 
V.  Truitt  (Del.)  80  AU.  245,  248,  2  Boyce,  338 ; 
Columbia  Box  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  Drown,  156 
Fed.  459,  462,  84  C.  C.  A.  269  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Cooley,  Torts,  p.  630) ; 
Buchanan  v.  Philadelphia,  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  75 
AtL  872,  876, 1  Boyce,  83;  Weldon  v.  People*s 
R.  Co.  (Del.)  65  Atl.  589,  590;  Black's  Adm'r 
V.  Ta.  Portland  Cement  Co.,  51  S.  E.  831,  104 
Va.  450  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
Cooley,  Torts,  p.  630) ;  Queen  Anne's  R.  Co. 
V.  Reed  (Del.)  59  Atl.  860,  862,  5  Pennewlll, 
226»  119  Am.  St  Rep.  301  (quoting  Cooley 
Torts.) 

"Negligence"  in  a  legal  sense  is  a  fail- 
ure to  observe,  for  the  protection  of  the  in- 
terests of  another  person,  that  degree  of  care, 
precaution,  and  vigilance  which  the  circum- 
stances justly  demand,  whereby  such  other 
person  suffers  injury.  While  the  obligation 
to  ez^xise  care  in  the  conduct  of  one's  busi- 
ness varies  under  different  circumstances, 
there  always  remaina  the  duty  to  exercise 


\i 


n 


:U: 


.'■;  ^: 


ii 


5i 


•!:! 


NEGLIOEKCB 


664 


NBGLIGENOB 


such  reasonable  care  aa  elhoidd  be  exercised 
by  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  under  like 
circumstances.  Szymanski  t.  Blumenthal,  56 
Atl.  674,  675,  4  Pennewlll,  511,  103  Am.  St 
Rep.  182  (citing  TuUy  t.  Philadelphia,  W.  ft 
B.  B.  Co.,  47  Atl.  1019,  2  PennewiU,  037,  62 
Am.  St  Rep.  420). 

"Negligence,"  in  a  legal  sense,  has  been 
defined  to  be  the  failure  to  obserye,  for  the 
protection  of  the  interests  of  another  person, 
that  degree  of  care,  precaution,  and  vigilance 
which  the  circumstances  justly  demand, 
whereby  such  other  person  suffers  Injury. 
In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  servant  while 
riding  on  a  private  railroad  by  derailment  of 
the  cars  and  the  fall  of  a  car  frame,  caused 
by  a  defective  bolt  used  to  fasten  the  same, 
defendant  was  not  guilty  of  negligence,  In 
failing  to  promulgate  rules  for  the  govern- 
ment of  its  servants  in  the  operation  of  cars 
on  the  railroad  in  question.  Jemnlenski  v. 
LobdeU  Car  Wheel  Co.,  63  AtL  835,  037,  0 
Pennewill,  885. 

"  'Negligence,'  in  a  legal  sense,  is  failure 
to  observe  for  the  protection  of  the  interests 
of  another  person  that  degree  of  care,  pre- 
caution, and  vigilance  which  the  circumstanc- 
es justly  demand,  whereby  such  other  person 
suffers  injury.'  Any  failure  upon  the  part 
of  the  master  to  observe  for  the  protection  of 
his  servant  that  reasonable  degree  of  care 
which  the  circumstances  of  the  particular 
case  justly  demand  Is  actionable  'negiigenee,' 
and  is  not  within  the  influence  of  the  doctrine 
of  assumed  risks."  Black  v.  Virginia  Port- 
land Cement  Co.,  51  a  E.  881,  832,  104  Ta. 
450  (quoting  and  adopting  Cooley,  Torts,  p. 


Under  Code  1906,  |  1085,  providing  that 
in  all  actions  against  railroad  companies  for 
injury  to  persons  or  property,  proof  of  in- 
jury inflicted  by  the  running  of  locomotives 
or  cars  shall  be  prima  fade  evidence  of  a 
lack  of  reasonable  skill  and  care  on  the  part 
of  the  servants  of  the  company,  proof  of  an 
Injury  raises  a  presumption  of  negligence, 
casting  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  railroad 
company;  and  as  "negligence"  is  a  failure 
to  observe,  for  the  protection  of  another  per- 
son, that  degree  of  care  which  the  circum- 
stances justly  demand,  proof  that  the  equip- 
ment of  a  train  was  proper  and  that  the  serv- 
ants of  the  company  kept  a  vigilant  lookout 
is,  in  the  absence  of  any  proof  as  to  the  con- 
dition of  the  person  injured,  insufficient  to 
rebut  the  statutory  presumption.  New  Or- 
leans, M.  &  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Cole,  57  South.  556, 
568,  101  Miss.  178. 


As  fftilwe  to  use  greatest  esve 

In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  passenger, 
alleged  to  be  due  to  the  negligence  of  defend- 
ant's employes,  the  court  properly  instructed 
that  "negligence"  meant  the  fWure  to  use 
the  utmost  care  that  would  be  used  by  a  very 
prudent   person   under   like   circumstances^ 


Contreras  t.  San  Antonio  Traction  Co.  (Te^ 
83  S.  W.  870. 

Fault  mjnonjTxovm 

See  Fault 

FoveseelMC  «if eet 

Failure  to  guard  against  that  whl<^  h 
never  occurred  and  which  is  very  unlikely 
occur,  and  which  does  not  naturally  snggc 
itself  to  prudent  men  as  something  whi 
should  be  guarded  against,  is  not  "nes 
gence.'*  Ryan  v.  Cortland  Carriage  Goo 
Co.,  U8  N.  Y.  Supp.  56,  57,  133  App.  Div.  4( 

"Negligence"  in  law  is  careless  condu 
under  such  circumstances  that  an  ordlnari 
prudent  person  would  anticipate  some  Inja 
to  another  as  a  rea»mably  probable  resi 
thereof.  JoluUison  v.  Webster  MUg.  Co^  1 
N.  W.  832,  833,  139  Wis.  181. 

"Negligence"  cannot  exist  unless  the 
is  a  duty  to  the  person  Injured,  and  It  oug! 
not  be  deemed  negligence  to  do  or  to  ft 
to  do  an  act  when  It  was  not  anticipate 
and  should  not  have  been  anticipated,  that 
would  result  In  Injury  to  any  one  Mnrpl 
V.  Galveston,  H.  &  N.  Ry.  Ca  (Tex.)  06 
W.  040,  945  (citing  St  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
Texas  V.  Pope,  86  S.  W.  5,  98 Tex.  535;  Texi 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Bigham,  38  S.  W.  162,  90  Te 
226,  227 ;  Brush  Electric  Light  &  Power  C 
V.  Le  Fevre,  57  S.  W.  640,  93  Tex.  607,  49  : 
R.  A.  771,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  898). 

"'Negligence*  involves  not  only  knov 
edge  of  a  defect,  but  an  appreciation  of  tl 
danger  to  be  apprehended  therefrom.  HeD< 
it  is  that,  if  the  danger  attending  the  use  < 
a  sidewalk  is  not  so  open  and  obvious  as  i 
suggest  itself  in  an  appreciative  way  to  tl 
mind  of  an  ordinarily  prudent  person,  i 
entry  upon  such*  walk  cannot  be  said  l 
amount  to  'negligence'  as  matter  of  law 
Arnold  v.  City  of  Waterloo,  104  N.  W.  44 
443,  128  Iowa,  410. 

An  act  cannot  be  held  to  be  negllgei 
when  there  was  no  reasonable  ground  fc 
supposing  that  it  would  cause  injury  to  ac 
one.  "Negligence"  -cannot  be  Imputed  becaus 
of  the  failure  to  perform  a  duty  so  suddeni 
and  unexpectedly  arising  that  there  is  no  o] 
portunity  to  comprehend  the  situation  an 
act  according  to  the  exigency.  McKee  ^ 
Harrlsburg  Traction  Co.,  60  AtL  498,  49 
211  Pa.  47. 

"Negligence"  consists  of  conduct  whic 
common  experience  or  the  special  knowledg 
of  the  actor  shows  to  be  so  likely  to  prodac 
the  result  complained  of,  under  the  dreun 
stances  known  to  the  actor,  that  he  is  hel 
answerable  for  that  result,  although  it  wa 
not  certain,  intended,  or  foreseen.  Schl^n 
mer  v.  Buffalo,  R.  &  P.  &.  Co.,  27  Sop.  C 
407,  409,  206  U.  S.  1«  12>  51  U  Ed.  68L 

"Negligence"  Is  the  proximate  cause  c 
an  injury  when  one  of  ordinary  sense  ougt 
to  have  foreseen  that  l«lie  act  would  probabl 


NBGLIGENOB 


666 


NEGLIGBNCB 


salt  in  such  injury  or  some  like  injurious 
QseQuence,  and  whether  one  of  ordinary 
gadty  onght  to  have  foreseen  the  probable 
nsequences  of  the  act  is  to  be  inferred  from 
consideration  of  all  the  facts  and  cinsum- 
inces  surroonding  the  case,  and  is  a  ques- 
m  for  the  court,  and  not  a.proper  subject 
an  interrogatory  addressed  to  a  Jury; 
id  hence^  in  an  action  against  a  street  rail- 
sty  company  for  injury  to  a  passenger  while 
Ighting,  a  question  whether  it  was  reason- 
>ly  probable  in  the  circumstances  that  she 
Duld,  after  the  conductor  gave  the  signal  to 
op  the  car  leave  her  seat  and  take  a  posl- 
}n  that  would  be  rendered  perilous  by  the 
opping  of  the  car  in  the  manner  in  which 
was  stopped,  could  not  properly  be  decided 
r  an  answer  to  an.interrogatory.  Richmond 
treet  &  Intemrban  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beverley,  84 
.  B.  568,  SS»,  80  N.  B.  721,  43  Ind.  App. 

"Negligence"  consistB  in  conduct  which 
»mmon  experience  or  the  special  knowledge 
I  the  action  shows  to  be  so  likely  to  produce 
le  result  complained  of,  under  the  drcum- 
:ances  known  to  the  actor,  that  he  is  held 
Qswerable  for  that  result,  although  it  was 
Dt  certain,  intended  or  foreseen.  "Railroad 
>mpanles,  like  natural  persons,  must  so  use 
lelr  property  and  privileges  as  not  to  injure 
le  rights  of  others,  and  in  running  and  op- 
rating  their  cars  must  ezerdse  care  pro- 
Drtionate  to  the  danger  of  injury  to  others. 
7hen,  in  the  exercise  of  such  care,  ordinary 
intlon  and  prudence  requiring  the  giving  of 
ignals  or  warning,  the  failure  to  do  so  is 
legligence.' "  Where  trainmen,  in  charge 
t  a  train  obstructed  a  crossing,  in  the  exer- 
ise  of  ordinary  care  ought  to  have  antid- 
ated  that  persons  in  the  act  of  crossing 
light  be  on  or  between  or  about  the  cars, 
nd  that  not  to  give  warning  before  moving 
lie  train  would  result  in  injury,  their  failure 
» give  such  warning  was  "negligence."  Ge- 
as  r.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  Co.,  08  Pac.  274, 
78,  33  Utah,  156,  13  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1074 
inotlng  and  adopting  definition  in  Schlem- 
aer  v.  Buffalo,  R.  ft  P.  R.,  27  Sup.  Ct  407, 
05  U.  S.  1,  51  li.  Bd.  681). 

Frand  dlstinffiilslied 

"'Negligence'  is  to  be  carefully  distin- 
;nished  from  'fraud! ;  the  distinction  arising 
Q  the  element  of  inadvertence.  'Fraud*  Is  in- 
ariably  intentional,  either  actually  or  con- 
tnictiyely ;  'negligence*  is  never  so."  Stand- 
ird  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  Limited,  of  Liverpool, 
^Qg.  V.  Nome  Beach  Lighterage  ft  Transp. 
0.,  133  Fed.  636,  648,  67  C.  C.  A.  602.  1  L. 
••  A.  (N.  S.)   1095.    . 

latent  distfwgnisfced 

"NegUgence"  is  not  a  matter  of  intention, 
uid  it  Is  proper  to  reftise  to  permit  a  witness 
:o  state  why  a  particular  act  was  not  done ; 
be  not  doing  of  su<^  act  being  the  baids  of 
^e  charge  of  negligence.  Walk^  v.  Chicago 
k  A.  a  Co.,  14»  m.  App;  408»  411. 


Purpose  or  design  Is  foreign  to  "negll- 
gence.**  Pittsburgh,  C,  C.  ft  St  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Ferrdl,  78  N.  B.  988,  989,  89  Ind.  App.  516 
(citing  Parker  v.  Pennsylvania  Company,  34 
N.  B.  604,  184  Ind.  678,  28  L.  R.  A. 


"Negligence"  excludes  the  idea  of  inten- 
tion. A  count  in  a  complaint  alleging  that 
defendant  was  a  common  carrier,  and  that 
it  so  negligently  conducted  its  business  that 
by  reason  of  such  negligence  plaintiff's  intes- 
tate, who  was  a  passenger  on  one  of  its 
trains,  received  personal  injuries  which  caus- 
ed his  death,  states  a  cause  of  action  for 
simple  negligence.  Louisville  ft  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Perkins,  44  South.  602,  604,  152  Ala.  183. 

laieatlonal  wroBV  dUtiacnislied 

The  distinction  between  '"negligence"  and 
intentional  wrong,  as  relating  to  the  llaUlity 
for  the  sale  of  dangerous  or  harmful  articles, 
is  important  as  bearing  on  the  civil  liabil- 
ity for  consequences  for  injuries.  If  a  ven- 
dor sell  a  machine,  knowing  it  defective  and 
dangerous,  he  is  liable ;  but,  if  he  sell  with- 
out knowledge  of  the  defect  or  danger,  he  is 
not  liable,  though  he  be  careless  or  negligent. 
Knelling  v.  Roderick  Lean  Mfg.  Co.,  75  N.  E. 
1098,  1101, 183  N.  Y.  78,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  303, 
111  Am.  St  Rep.  691,  5  Ann.  Cas.  124. 

"Negligence,"  generally  speaking,  wheth- 
er it  be  ordinary  or  gross,  is  merely  an  omis- 
sion to  perform  a  duty,  and  is  not  an  affirma- 
tive wrongful  act,  though  there  may  be  in- 
stances where  gross  negligence  is  of  an  af- 
firmative character,  and  amounts  to  an  in- 
tentional wrong,  or  a  reckless  disregard  of 
the  rights  of  others.  Schulte  v.  Louisville  ft 
N.  R  Co.,  108  8.  W.  941,  943,  128  Ky.  627. 

MaUee  dlstlacvished 

The  doing  of  an  act  without  tliat  ordi- 
nary prudence  and  discretion  which  persons 
of  mature  mind  and  sound  Judgment  are  pre- 
sumed to  have  constitutes  "negligence,"  but 
will  not  alone  warrant  an  inference  of  "mal- 
ice." Malice  Is  distinguishable  from  mere 
negligence,  in  that  it  arises  from  some  pur- 
pose, while  negligence  arises  from  absence  of 
purpose.  The  characteristic  of  negligence  Is 
inadvertence,  or  an  absence  of  an  intent  to 
injure.  This  does  not  imply  that  the  act  was 
done  Involuntarily  or  unconsciously,  but 
merely  that  the  person  doing  it  was  not  con- 
scious that  the  act  constituted  a  want  of 
reasonable  care.  Jenkins  v.  Oilligan,  108  N. 
W.  237,  238,  131  Iowa,  176,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.) 
1087  (citing  Pickens  v.  South  Carolina  ft  G. 
R.  Co.,  32  S.  B.  567,  64  8.  C.  49^. 

Misf  easaaoe  distingnished 

"Negligence"  is  negative  in  its  <diaracter. 
It  is  the  omission  to  perform  some  duty.  It 
implies  nonfeasance,  and  is  contradistinguiflb- 
ed  from  misfeasance.  Bavenport  v.  South- 
ern R.  Co.,  135  Fed.  960,  967,  68  C.  a  A.  444. 


lememt  dlsttasnislied 

Gen.  St.  1901,  §  5858^  providing  that  nii- 
road  companies  shall  be  liable  for 


NEGLIGENCE 


966 


NEGIilGBNOE 


to  any  employ^  of  said  companies  in  conse- 
quence of  any  negligence  of  their  agents,  or 
of  any  mismanagement  of  ttieir  engineers  or 
other  employes  to  any  person  sustaining  such 
,  damage*  does  not  make  a  distinction  between 
agents  on  the  one  hand,  and  engineers  and 
other  employes  on  the  other,  nor  between 
"negligence"  and  mismanagement,  but  by  the 
act  a  company  is  made  responsible  for  any 
mismanagement  of  its  engineers  or  other  em- 
ployes to  any  person  sustaining  damage  there- 
by. Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  CJo.  v.  Kellerman, 
8T  S.  W.  401,  404,  39  Tex.  OIt.  App.  274. 

Nuisanoe  distlnsvisl^ed 

See  Nuisance. 
As  ovdlaairjr  mesUsoaA* 

"The  term  'negligence,'  without  any  qual- 
ification, means  ordinary  negligence."  Chica- 
go, B,  I,  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Lacy,  97  Pac  1025, 
1027,  78  Kan.  622  (citing  Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
y.  Pointer,  14  Kan.  37). 

As  question  of  faot  or  law 

"Negligence,"  as  well  as  contributory 
negligence,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  is 
a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact  Ewing  ▼. 
Lanark  Fuel  Co.,  65  S.  B.  200,  205,  65  W.  Va. 
726,  29  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  487. 

The  burden  Is  on  plaintiff  of  proving  ac- 
tionable negligence,  notwithstanding  the  rule 
making  "negligence"  for  the  jury  where  rea- 
sonable men  might  differ  on  the  question. 
Baugher  v.  Harman,  66  S.  B.  86,  87,  110  Va. 
316. 

The  rule  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  not  being 
invoked,  it  is  error  to  authorize  a  jury  in  an 
action  for  personal  injuries  to  render  a  ver- 
dict for  the  plaintiff  without  proof  of  "negU- 
gence."  White  v.  Illinois  Collieries  Co.,  145 
III.  App.  417,  419. 

In  absence  of  proof  of  negligence  by  de- 
fendant in  permitting  the  stairway  in  its 
store  to  be  in  a  faulty  or  dangerous  condi- 
tion, "negligence"  cannot  be  imputed  as  a 
matter  of  law  from  the  happening  of  an  acci- 
dent on  the  stairway.  Belsky  v.  Fourteenth 
Street  Store,  121  N.  Y.  Supp.  321,  322. 

"Negligence"  is  in  the  main  a  question 
of  f^ct,  or  rather  whether  it  exists  or  not  in 
a  special  case  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the 
jury.  All  that  the  law  has  ever  determined 
on  the  subject  is  that  it  consists  in  failing 
to  bestow  due  care  to  the  matter  in  hand — 
failing  to  do  that  which  due  care  requires  to 
be  done,  or  doing  that  which  such  care  for- 
bids. Whether  a  trolley  car  conductor  was 
negligent  in  failing  to  assist  a  passenger  onto 
the  car  is  a  question  of  fact,  depending  upon 
all  the  circumstances  as  they  appeared  to  the 
conductor  at  the  time,  or  as  they  should  have 
appeared  to  a  person  in  the  exercise  of  that 
degree  of  care  which  the  law  requires  him  to 
exercise.  Richardson  v.  Augusta  ft  A.  R. 
Co.,  61  S.  B.  83,  84,  79  a  C.  635  (citing  Simms 
V.  South  Carolina  Ry.  Co.,  8  S.  B.  301,  27 
a  C.  268). 


As  Mlative  tc 

**Negligenoe"  is  a  relative  term,  to  be 
determined  on  the  facte  of  each  case.  Quinn 
V.  West  Jersey  ft  S.  R.  Co.,  74  Aa  466,  78  N. 
J.  Law«  539. 

"Negligence"  is  a  r^ative  term,  and 
what  would  be  negligence  in  one  situation 
might  not  be  in  another.  Gallagher  v.  City 
of  Tipton,  113  8.  W.  674,  675,  676,  133  Mo. 
App.  557. 

"Negligence"  is  a  relative  term,  and 
where  there  is  no  duty  there  can  be  no  ac- 
tionable negligence.  Coin  v.  J.  H.  Talge 
Lounge  Co.,  121  8.  W.  1,  6,  222  Mo.  488,  25 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1179,  17  Ann.  Cas.  888. 

"Negligence"  is  a  relative  term,  and  Im- 
plies the  neglect  of  some  djity.  Cole  v.  Jonea^ 
141  S.  W.  #89,  690,  159  Mo.  App.  472. 

"Negligence"  is  not  absolute  or  Intrinsic, 
but  is  always  relevant  to  some  circumstance 
of  time,  place,  or  person.  Connell  v.  New 
York  Cent  ft  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  129  N.  T.  Supp. 
666,  669,  144  App.  IMv.  664. 

There  can  be  no  "negligence^'  where 
there  is  no  duty  to  use  care,  for  negligence  is 
the  breach  of  some  duty  that  one  person 
owes  to  another,  and  consequently  it  is  a 
relative  term,  and  varies  with  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case.  West  Vir- 
ginia Cent  ft  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State,  54  AtL  669, 
671,  96  Md.  662,  61  L.  R.  A.  574. 

"Negligence"  can  neither  be  affirmed 
nor  denied  until  the  conditions  under  which 
the  act  was  performed  are  known.  Negli- 
gence primary  and  contributory  is  essential- 
ly relative  and  comparative  and  not  abso- 
lute. State,  to  Use  of  Hall,  v.  Trimble,  64 
AtL  1026,  1028,  104  Md.  317  (citing  United 
Railways  ft  Blectric  Co.  of  Baltimore  v. 
Watkins,  62  Ati.  234,  102  Md.  267). 

"Negligence"  is  a  relative  term,  and  de- 
pends upon  the  circumstances  of  each  par- 
ticular case.  What  might  be  negligence  un- 
der some  circumstances,  at  some  time  or 
place,  may  not  be  negligence  under  other 
circumstances,  at  another  time  and  place. 
Johnson  v.  Tazoo  ft  M.  V.  R.  Co.,  47  South. 
785,  786,  94  Miss.  447,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  312 
(citing  29  Cyc.  p.  417). 

"Negligence"  is  a  relative  term,  and  its 
existence  must  be  determined  in  view  of  the 
surrounding  circumstances;  the  test  being 
whether  the  person  charged  acted  as  an  ordi- 
narily prudent  man  would  have  done  in  the 
same  or  similar  circumstances.  Lyman  v. 
Dale,  136  S.  W.  760,  761,  156  Mo.  App.  427. 

" 'NegUgence^  is  a  comparative  and  not 
a  positive  term,  and  its  use  is  relative, 
whether  applied  to  the  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant or  that  of  the  plaintiff.  For  this 
reason  in  most  cases  it  becomes  a  qQeettom 
of  fact  for  the  Jury  to  detennine  who  was. 
ncglifcpt  under  the  drcomatanoes  of  the 
case.  The  degree  of  care  which  in  one  case 
is  insufficient  to  relieve  from  a  chaxie  ot 


NBGLIQBNGB 


667 


NBGX^OJfiNGB 


negiigence  In  anotber  might  constltiite  more 
than  ordinary  prudence  and  caution."  King 
T.  Green,  94  Pac.  777,  778,  7  CaL  ApiK  473. 

"Negligence"  ia  essentially  relatiye  and 
comparative,  not  absolute.  It  is  not  eren 
an  object  of  simple  apprehension,  apart  from 
the  circumstances  out  of  which  it  grows.  Aa 
these  circumstances  necessarily  vary  in  their 
relations  to  each  other,  under  different  sur- 
roundings, they  inevitably  change  their  orig- 
inal signification  and  import  Hence  it  is 
intrinsically  true  that  those  things  which 
would  not,  under  one  condition,  constitute 
negligence  would,  on  the  other  hand,  under  a 
different,  though  not  necessarily  an  opposite, 
condition,  most  unequivocally  indicate  its 
existence.  Mattingly  v.  Montgomery,  68AtL 
206,  206,  106  Md.  461  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Cocke  v.  Baltimore  Traction 
Co.,  81  Aa  828,  80  Md.  554). 

"Negligence"  cannot  be  defined  ^and 
measured  by  any  precise  standard.  It  is  al- 
ways relative  to  particular  facts  and  circum- 
stances upon  which  it  is  sought  to  be  predi- 
cated. Aa  a  general  rule,  it  ia  a  question 
for  the  Jury  to  determine,  from  the  facts 
and  the  logical  inferences  therefrom.  It  is 
only  in  cases  where  the  facts  are  without 
dispute,  or  the  deduction  inevitably  that  of 
no  negligence,  that  the  court  can  say,  as  a 
matter  of  law,  that  no  negligence  was  prov- 
en. Wikberg  v.  Olson  Co.,  71  Pac  611,  512, 
188  CaL  479. 

"  'Negligence'  is  a  relative  term.  What 
would  be  negligence  under  one  set  of  circum- 
stances might  be  due  care  under  another. 
The  degree  of  care  varies  with  the  circum- 
stances. The  greater  the  danger,  or  the 
greater  the  importance  of  the  matter  in  hand, 
the  greater  the  degree  of  care  required  to 
constitute  due  care;  that  is,  such  as  a  per- 
son of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  would 
ezerdae."  Bolton  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 
65  S.  B.  987,  938,  84  S.  C.  67. 

"  'Negligence'  is  essentially  relative  In 
the  abstract  it  is  nullity.  It  does  not,  and  it 
cannot  in  the  nature  of  things,  exist  It  ia 
metaphysically  impossible  to  evolve  a  con- 
cept of  negligence  apart  from  the  facta  which 
give  rise  to  it,  and  independently  of  some 
imposed  or  implied  correlative  duty.  The 
duty  must  be  essentially  related  to  the  par* 
ticular  circumstances,  and  a  variance  in  the 
circumstances  necessarily  begets  either  a 
modification  of  the  duty  or  else  extinguishes 
it  altogether.  Thus  the  duty  which  a  rail- 
road company  owes  to  a  passenger  whom  it 
la  carrying  on  its  train  Is  widely  different 
from  the  duty  it  owes  to  a  trespasser  on  its 
tracks;  not  only  because  the  rights  of  the 
two  are  different,  but  because  the  attendant 
circumstances  and  facts  creating  the  recipro- 
cal ilghta  in  each  instance  are  dissimilar. 
This  difference  in  rights  and  in  duties  springs 
from  a  divergence  in  the  circumstances  out 
of  which  they  respectively  grow.  Conse- 
quently a  condition  which  would  in  one  case 


give  rise  to  an  infeience  of  negligence  woold 
be  wholly  insufficient  to  justify  its  deduc- 
tion in  the  other.  United  States  fixp.  Co.  v. 
Everest,  83  Pac.  817,  820,  72  Kan.  517  (quot^ 
ing  and  adopting  definition  in  City  Pass.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Nugent,  38  Ati.  779,  781,  86  Md.  349, 
35©. 

"  'Negligence'  ia  essentially  relative  and 
comparative,  not  absolute.  It  is  not  even  an 
object  of  simple  apprehension,  apart  from 
the  circumstances  out  of  which  it  grows. 
As  these  drcumstancea  necessarily  vary  in 
their  relations  to  each  other,  under  different 
surroundings,  they  inevitably  change  their 
original  signification  and  import  ♦  ♦  • 
The  existence  of  'negligence*  is  therefore  to 
be  sought  in  the  facts  and  surroundings  of 
each  particular  case.  •  •  ♦  Where  the 
nature  and  attributes  of  the  act  relied  on  to 
show  negligence  contributing  to  the  injury 
can  only  be  correctly  determined  by  consider- 
ing all  the  attending  and  surrounding  dr- 
cumstancea of  the  transaction,  it  falls  with- 
in the  province  of  the  Jury  to  pass  upon  and 
characterize  it,  and  it  is  not  for  the  court  to 
determine  its  quality  as  matter  of  law." 
Sheridan  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  B.  Co.,  60  Atl. 
280,  282,  101  Md.  50  (quoting  and  adopting 
definUion  In  Cooke  v.  Traction  Co.,  31  Atl. 
327,  80  M)d.  551;  citing  Fltzpatrlck  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.,  35  Md.  32;  Baltimore  & 
O.  R.  Co.  V.  State,  to  Use  of  Dougherty,  36 
Md.  366;  Same  v.  State,  to  Use  of  Miller, 
29  Md.  252,  96  Am.  Dec  528). 

The  degree  of  caution,  both  by  a  carrier 
and  a  passenger,  is  to  be  estimated  in  a 
measure  by  the  hazard  to  life  and  limb. 
•*Care"  and  "negligence"  are  relative  terms, 
and  mean  such  care  and  vigilance  as  a 
prudent,  rational  person  would  exercise  un- 
der like  circumstances.  Dougherty  v.  Mis- 
souri R.  Co.,  81  Mo.  325,  331,  51  Am.  Rep. 
239  (citing  Flynn  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C. 
B.  R.  Co.,  78  Mo.  195,  47  Am.  Rep.  99). 

ReokleMsesB  distlngnlglied 

See  Reckless — Recklessly — Recklessness. 

Aa  waat  of  eare 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  care  under 
the  circumstances.  But  there  can  be  no  re- 
covery of  damages,  unless  there  has  been  a 
breach  of  legal  duty.  Welch  v.  Carlucd 
Stone  Ck).,  64  Aa  392,  393,  215  Pa.  34,  7  Ann. 
Cas.  299. 

"Want  of  care  Is  'negligence,'  not  assump- 
tion of  risk."  Lee  v.  St  Louis,  M.  &  S.  E.  R. 
Co.,  87  S,  W.  12,  21,  112  Mo.  App.  372. 

''Carefulness"  is  an  antonym  for  "neg- 
ligence." Negligence  is  a  conclusion  of  law, 
and  so  also  are  statements  in  the  findings 
l^y  the  Jury  that  work  was  done  carefully. 
Avery  v.  Nordyke  &  Marmon  Co.,  70  N.  E. 
888,  893,  34  Ind.  App.  541. 

Where  a  child  employed  in  a  factory  was 
injured,  "negligence"  on  his  part  meant  his 
failure  to  exercise  such  care  as  a  boy  of  his 


MBOLraSNCB 


668 


NBOLIOBKCIO 


lutelUgenoe,  capacity,  and  expetlence,  as 
shown  by  the  evidence,  wonld  have  usually 
exercised  in  the  same  situation  and  dxcnm- 
stances.  Morgan  v.  G.  Hager  A  &k)ns  Hinge 
Mfg.  Ck>.,  91  S.  W.  688,  042,  120  Mo.  App.  G90. 

Same— Careful  aad  pradent  person 

"'Negligence'  is  the  failure  to  ezei*cise 
such  care  as  is  ordinarily  exercised  by  care- 
ful and  prudent  persons  under  the  same  or 
similar  circumstances  in  the  same  or  similar 
business/'  Louisville  ft  N.  R.  Go.  v.  Garter 
(Ky.)  112  S.  W.  904,  906. 

"Negligence"  in  respect  to  the  duties  of  a 
youthful  employ^  in  the  operation  of  a  ma- 
chine means  a  want  of  that  degree  of  care 
which  the  majority  of  careful  and  prudent 
persons  of  his  age,  intelligence,  and  discre- 
tion are  accustomed  to  exercise  for  their 
own  protection  under  like  or  similar  cir- 
cumstancc&  Cohanlcus  Mfg.  Go.  v.  Bogers' 
Guardian  (Ky.)  96  S.  W.  437,  439. 

game   Person    of    cmmaamL    seas#  watd 
prndeaoe 

"Negligence"  Is  defined  as  a  want  of  that 
care  which  a  man  of  common  prudence  and 
of  common  sense  ordinarily  exercises  in  like 
employment.  To  constitute  it,  there  must  be 
a  disregard  of  some  duty  or  rule  of  conduct 
prescribed  beforehand,  or  arising  so  mani- 
festly from  the  facts  as  to  leave  no  doubt 
of  its  existence,  and  it  is  of  the  essence  of 
actionable  negligence  that  the  party  charged 
should  have  knowledge  that  the  act  com- 
plained of  was  such  an  act  of  omission  or 
commission  as  might,  within  the  domain  of 
probability,  cause  some  such  an  Injury  as 
that  complained  of.  JAnooln  Gas  ft  Electric 
Light  Go.  V.  Thomas,  104  N.  W.  153,  154,  74 
Neb.  257  (citing  Whart  Neg.  I  8;  Deering, 
Neg.  I  2). 

Same— Mian  of  ordinary  oare  and  pra- 
donoe 

"Negligence,"  in  reference  to  the  main- 
tenance of  a  track  in  a  mMe,  means  the  ab- 
sence of  that  care  to  keep  and  maintain  it  in 
a  reasonably  safe  condition  for  service  that 
a  man  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence,  under 
the  circumstances  of  the  business,  consider- 
ing its  perils,  dangers,  and  necessities,  would 
have  used.  Western  Goal  ft  Mining  Go.  r. 
Honaker,  96  S.  W.  861,  864,  70  Ark.  629. 

Same— iCan  of  ordinary  pradenoo 

By  "negligence"  is  meant  a  failure  to  use 
such  care  and  precaution  as  a  person  of  or- 
dinary prudence  would  use  under  like  dr- 
eumstances.  Bifissouri,  K.  ft  T.  Ry.  Go.  of 
Texas  V.  Wood  (Tex.)  81  S.  W.  1187,  1188. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  exercise 
that  degree  of  care  under  given  circumstances 
which  one  of  ordinary  prudence  would  exer- 
cise under  similar  circumstances,  and  the 
circumstances  considered  are  those  which 
are  known  to  the  actor,  but  he  will  be  charg- 
ed with  knowledge  of  what  he  could  have 
known  by  exercising  ordinary  care.     Sted- 


man  v.  O'Nell,  72  Aa  928,  926»  82  Cowl  100, 
22  U  B.  A.  (N.  SO  1229. 

"Negligence;"  such  as  to  preclude  a  re- 
covery for  injuries,  is  merely  the  absence  of 
such  care  as  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence 
would  exercise  under  similar  circumstances. 
Meyers  v.  Ghlcago,  R.  I.  ft  P.  B.  Go.,  77  S. 
W.  149,  151,  103  Mo.  App.  268. 

An  instruction  that  "by  'negligence'  is 
meai^t  the  failure  to  exercise  that  degree  of 
care  which  a  l>erson  of  ordinary  prudence 
usually  exercises  under  like  or  similar  cir- 
cumstances," given  in  an  action  for  death 
by  coming  in  contact  with  a  live  wire,  was 
erroneous;  the  duty  of  those  manufacturing 
and  using  electricity  being  to  use  the  utmost 
care  to  protect  others  from  danger.  Man- 
gan's  Adm'r  v.  Louisville  Electric  Light  Go.» 
91  8.  W.  703,  704,  122  Ky.  476,  6  L.  B.  A.  (N. 
S.)  459  (citing  and  adopting  Schweitzer's 
Adn^'r  v.  Gitizens'  Cfeneral  Electric  Go.  [Ky.] 
52  S.  W.  880;  Thomas  v.  Maysville  Oas  Go., 
56  S.  W.  153,  108  Ky.  244,  58  L.  B.  A.  147; 
Macon  r.  Paducah  St  By.  Go.,  62  S.  W.  496, 
110  Ky.  680). 

Same— Person  of  ordinary  reason  and 
pradenoo 

.  When,  in  order  to  determine  whether  one 
has  been  guilty  of  "negligence,"  his  conduct 
is  compared  with  that  of  reasonable  persons 
under  similar  circumstanoes,  the  comparison 
must  be  directed  to  a  person  of  ordinary  rea- 
son and  prudence.  The  standard  of  duty  is 
not  the  foresight  and  caution  which  some 
particular  man  is  capable  of  exercising,  but 
the  foresight  and  caution  of  the  average  pru- 
dent man,  or  of  a  reasonable  man  standing 
in  the  shoes  of  the  person  charged  with  neg- 
ligence. Hoard  v.  State,  95  S.  W.  1002,  1003, 
80  Ark.  87  (citing  Webb's  PoUock,  Torts  [Am. 
Ed.]  540). 

Same'  Ordinarily  oarefvl  and  j^ndent 
person 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  use  such 
care  as  ordinarily  careful  and  prudent  per- 
sons ordinarily  exercise  under  the  same  or 
similar  eircumstancea  Gomelius  v.  S^Qth 
Govington  ft  G.  St  By.  Go.  (Ky.)  93  8.  W. 
643,  644;  Felver  r.  Gentral  Electric  By.  Co., 
116  S.  W.  980,  988,  216  Mo.  196;  aty  of  Gov* 
ington  T.  Whitney  (Ky.)  99  S.  W.  887,  338. 

Samo— Ordinarily  pradont  man  In  Ida 
own  affairs 

"The  terms  'neglect,'  'negligence,'  'neg- 
ligent,' and  'negligently,'  when  so  employed, 
import  a  want  of  such  attention  to  the  na- 
ture or  probable  consequences  of  the  act  or 
omission  as  a  prudent  person  ordinarily  die* 
plays  in  acUng  in  his  own  concerns."  Ladow 
V.  Okla)ioma  Qaa  ft  Slectiio  Go.,  119  Pac. 
250,  257,  28  Okl«  15  (quoting  and  applying 
Gomp.  Laws  OkL  1909, 1  2880). 

"Negllgenee^"  for  which  a  tag  Is  UaMe^ 
"consists  in  the  want  of  ordinary  skill  in 
navigation  and  of  the  exercise  of  such  care* 


NBGUGENOE 


668 


NB6UQSN0B 


and  diligence  in  handling  tbe  tow  as  a  man 
of  ordinary  prudence  would  exercise  in  the 
preservation  of  his  own  property."  The  duty 
imposed  upon  a  tug  is  to  use  the  caution  and 
sidll  which  belong  to  prudent  navigators. 
The  Samuel  B.  Bonker,  141  Fed.  480  (dting 
The  Niagara,  20  Fed.  162;  The  Florence,  88 
Fed.  302). 

An  instruction  defining  "negligence"  as 
the  failure  to  exercise  that  degree  of  care 
and  diligence  that  an  ordinarily  prudent  per- 
son would  exercise  in  his  own  affairs  under 
like  or  similar  circumstances,  was  not  objec- 
tionable as  eliminating  acts  of  commission. 
German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
104  N.  W.  361,  363,  128  Iowa,  386. 

An  instruction  that  the  terms  "negli- 
gence," "negligent,"  and  "negligently"  import 
a  want  of  such  attention  to  the  natural  or 
probable  consequence  of  the  act  or  omission 
as  a  prudent  man  ordinarily  best9ws  in  act- 
ing in  his  own  concerns,  being  in  the  exact 
language  of  Rev.  Codes  1905,  |  9622,  is  suffi- 
cient, especially  where  no  more  specific  in- 
struction was  asked.  Zllke  v.  Johnson,  132 
N.  W.  640,  644,  22  N.  D.  76.  Ann.  Gas.  1913E, 
1006. 

Same— Ordinarily  pmdent  person 

"Negligence"  is  the  omission  of  the  care 
that  ordinarily  prudent  men  will  exercise  un- 
der similar  circumstances.  Heinz  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.,  77  Ati.  980,  983,  113  Md. 
682;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Schu- 
bert (Tex.)  130  S.  W.  708,  709. 

"Negligence"  in  a  particular  case  is  the 
failure  to  exercise  such  care  as  an  ordinarily 
prudent  person  would  exercise  under  the 
same  or  similar  drcumstanoes.  Boyles  v. 
Ttf  as  &  P.  R.  Co.  (Tex.)  86  8.  W.  986,  937. 

"Negligence,"  as  applied  to  a  passenger 
suing  for  injuries,  means  the  failure  to  use 
that  degree  of  care  that  would  be  exercised 
by  an  ordinarily  p^ident  person  under  the 
same  circumstances.  Williams  v.  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  78  S.  W.  45,  47,  34  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  145. 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  that  care 
which  ordinarily  prudent  men  use  in  the 
same  circumstances,  and  as  even  ordinarily 
prudent  men,  when  caught  in  a  trap  where 
they  must  act  instantly,  miscalculate  and 
misjudge,  that  one  caught  in  a  passage  near 
a  railroad  with  a  frightened  team  mistaken- 
ly concluded  that  the  safest  course  would  be 
to  try  to  cross  the  track,  and  so  came  near- 
er to  the  track  than  he  otherwise  would, 
would  not  necessarily  be  negUegnce.  Moore  v. 
Maine  Cent  R.  Co.,  76  AU.  871,  876,  106  Me. 
297. 

"'Negligence'  is  the  omission  to  exer- 
cise such  care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  man 
would  exercise  in  the  same  or  like  circum- 
stancea  To  choose,  under  all  drcumstances, 
the  safer  of  two  courses  of  action,  is  not  ex- 
pected or  reQUired  of  any  one.    It  two  alter- 


native oounies  reauixing  prompt  choice  and 
action  are  put  before  a  man,  and  cdther  ap- 
pears to  be  reasonably  safe,  if  he  chooses  the 
one  that  turns  out  to  be  less  safe  than  the 
other,  he  is  not  to  be  convicted  of  negligence 
for  choosing  the  course  which  proved,  by 
subsequent  events,  to  be  less  safe  than  the 
other."  Bhroeder  v.  St  Louis  Transit  Co., 
86  S.  W.  968,  971,  111  Mo.  App.  67. 

A  railroad  track  in  active  use  is  per  se 
a  warning  of  danger,  admonishing  every  one 
that  a  train  is  liable  to  pass  over  it  at  any 
time,  and  no  one,  whether  passenger,  li- 
censee, or  trespasser,  can  approach  such  a 
track  so  near  as  to  be  hit  by  a  passing  train 
without  first  both  looking  and  listening  to 
ascertain  whether  a  train  is  approaching 
which  might  injure  him,  nor  can  he  fre- 
quent or  walk  over  a  private  railroad  yard 
covered  by  many  tracks,  employed  constantly 
for  through  travel,  switching)  etc.,  without 
looking  and-  listening  and  exercising  the  ut- 
most degree  of  vigilance;  the  term  "negli- 
gence" under  such  circumstances  meaning 
the  want  of  such  care  as  ordinarily  prudent 
persons  usually  exercise  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances. Hart  V.  Northern  Pac  R.  Co.. 
196  Fed.  180,  185,  116  C.  C.  A.  12. 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  such  care 
and  caution  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  man 
would  exercise  under  the  same  circumstanc- 
es. An  instruction  defining  negligence  to  be 
the  want  of  such  care  and  caution  as  an 
"ordinary"  prudent  man  would  exercise  un- 
der the  circumstances  was  not  erroneous  be- 
cause of  the  use  of  the  word  "ordinary,"  in- 
stead of  the  "ordinarily."  Ft  Worth  ft  D. 
O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Partin,  76  S.  W.  236,  237,  33 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  178. 

The  test  of  "negligence"  is:  Did  the  hu- 
man agent  in  charge  af  the  instrumentality 
causing  the  injury  complained  of  act  with 
the  care  that  an  ordinarily  prudent  person 
under  the  same  circumstances  would  have 
exercised,  and,  if  he  did,  there  is  no  action- 
able negligence.  Wilkerson  v.  St.  Louis  & 
S.  F.  R.  Co.,  124  S.  W.  543,  546.  140  Mo.  App. 
306. 

An  instruction  that  by  the  term  "negli- 
gence" is  meant  the  want  of  that  degree  of 
care  that  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would 
have  exercised  under  the  same  or  similar 
circumstances  ii  correct  Meng  v.  St  Louis 
ft  S.  Ry.  Co.,  84  S.  W.  218,  215,  108  Mo.  App. 
553. 

Where  an  instruction  defining  "negli- 
gence" as  the  want  of  such  care  "as  a  pru- 
dent person  would  exercise,"  instead  of  "an 
ordinarily"  prudent  person  was  the  only  in- 
struction in  the  case  defining  negligence,  and 
was  referred  to  by  defendant  in  its  instruc- 
tions as  giving  the  definition  of  negligence, 
defendant  thereby  adopted  it,  and  could  not 
complain  on  appeal  that  it  was  erroneous. 
Spaulding  v.  Metropolitan  St  Ry.  Co.,  107 
S.  W.  1049^  1051,  129  Mo.  App.  007. 


NEGLIGENCE 


670 


NEGLIGBNGK 


SamtH-Persoa  of  ordinary  lAtoUisenoe 
and  pmdeaoa 

"Negligence"  is  failure  to  use  that  de- 
gree of  care  which  one  of  ordinary  intelli- 
gence and  prudence  might  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected to  use  in  the  particular  circumstances. 
Lundy  v.  Southern  Bell  Telephone  ft  Tele- 
graph Ck>.,  72  S.  E.  558,  664,  00  S.  C.  25. 

Santo— Pn&dent  and  jiist  man 

"  'Negligence'  is  the  absence  of  such 
care  and  regard  for  the  rights  of  others  as 
a  prudent  and  just  man  would  and  should 
have  in  the  same  situation."  Long  y.  Louis- 
ville ft  N.  R.  Co.,  107  S.  W.  203.  205,  128 
Ky.  26,  13  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  1063, 16  Ann.  Cas. 
673. 

8amo— BeasonaUj  pmdont  porson 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  use  such 
care  as  a  reasonably  prudent  man  would  or 
should  use  under  similar  circumstances. 
Heidelbaugh  v.  People's  R.  Co.  (Del.)  65 
Atl.  587,  6  Pennewill,  209. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  use  such 
care  as  a  reasonably  prudent  person  would 
exercise  under  similar  circumstances.  Ric- 
cio  V.  People's  R.  Co.  (Del.)  82  Ati.  604,  606. 

"Negligence"  is  a  failure  or  the  neglect 
by  one  to  exercise  that  same  care  and  cau- 
tion that  a  reasonably  prudent  person  would 
exercise  at  the  same  place  and  under  the 
same  circumstances.  Jennett  v.  Louisville 
ft  N.  R.  Co.,  162  Fed.  392,  393. 

8amo— RoasonaUj  prmdont  and  oarof nl 
porson 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  use  such 
cai:e  as  a  reasonably  prudent  and  careful 
person  would  exercise  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances. Baldwin  y.  People's  R.  Ck>.,  76 
AtL  1088,  1093,  7  PennewiU,  81;  Welch  y. 
Baltimore  ft  O.  R.  Co.,  76  Atl.  50,  7  Penne- 
will, 140;  Louft  y.  C.  ft  J.  Pyle  CJo..  75  AtL 
619,  622,  1  Boyce,  192;  Benson  v.  Wilming- 
ton City  R.  CJo.,  75  Atl.  793,  794,  1  Boyce, 
202;  Louisville  ft  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Lynch,  126 
S.  W.  362,  365,  137  Ky.  696;  Dungan  v.  Wil- 
mington City  R.  Co.  (Del.)  58  Atl.  868,  869, 
4  Pennewill,  458 ;  Eaton  v.  Wilmington  City 
R.  Co.  (Del.)  75  Atl.  369,  870,  1  Boyce,  435 ; 
Garrett  v.  People's  R.  Co.  (Del.)  64  Atl.  254, 
256,  6  Pennewill,  29. 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  such  care  as 
a  reasonably  prudent  and  careful  person 
would  use  under  similar  circumstances. 
Freeman  v.  Wilmington  ft  P.  Traction  (3o. 
(Del.)  80  Atl.  1001,  1002;  Braunstein  v.  Peo- 
ple's R,  Co.  (Del.)  78  Aa  609,  611,  2  Boyce, 
55. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  use  such 
care  as  a  reasonably  prudent  and  careful 
person  should  exercise  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances. Robinson  y.  Huber  (Del.)  63 
AtL  873,  874,  6  Pennewill,  21. 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  such  care  as 
a    reasonably   prudent   and   careful   person 


would  exercise  under  similar  circumstance 
Certain  things  are  negligence  in  law,  whet 
er  active  or  positiye  negligence  is  proved  < 
not  A  violation  of  a  statute  providing  tbi 
no  person  shall  operate  a  motor  vehicle  c 
the  public  highways  unless  he  has  obtaliif 
a  license  is  negligence  per  se,  and  rendei 
the  wrongdoer  liable  for  an  injury  resultii 
from  such  misconduct  C!eochi  y.  Lindsa 
(Del.)  75  Aa  376,  377,  1  Boyce,  185. 

Samo— Vory     eantlonSy     prndent,     aa 
oompetont  porson 

"Negligence,"  as  applied  to  a  defendai 
railroad  company,  sued  for  injuries  to  a  pa 
senger,  only  means  a  failure  to  use  that  big 
degree  of  care  that  would  be  exercised  b 
a  very  cautious,  competent  and  prudent  pe: 
son  under  similar  circumstances.  Willian 
V.  Galveston,  H.  ft  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  78  S.  W.  41 
47,  34  Tex.  Civ.  App.  145. 

"Negligence,"  when  applied  to  a  railroa 
company  and  its  employes  and  servant 
while  receiving  and  transporting  passenger 
means  the  failure  to  use  that  degree  of  cai 
which  very  cautious,  prudent  and  compete! 
persons  usually  exercise.  St.  John  v.  GuL 
C.  ft  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.)  80  S.  W.  235,  23( 

8amo— Very  pmdent  porson 

"Negligence"  of  a  motorman  toward  a 
alighting  passenger  is  a  failure  to  use  tbs 
high  degree  of  care  that  a  very  prudent  pei 
son  would  have  used  under  like  circnn 
stances.  San  Antonio  Traction  Co.  v.  Waj 
ren  (Tex.)  85  S.  W.  26,  27. 

Samo    Roqnirod  by  oiroumotanoos 

"Negligence"  is  the  absence  of  care,  tn 
cording  to  the  drcumstanoes.  Martin  i 
City  of  WiUiamsport  57  Aa  1063,  206  Pi 
590;  Drink  water  v.  Quaker  City  Cooperag 
Co.,  57  Ati.  1107,  208  Pa.  649;  AndersoD  ^ 
Hays  Mfg.  Co.,  56  Atl.  345,  348,  207  Pa.  lO 
63  L.  R.  A.  540;  James  McNeil  ft  Bro.  0>.  y 
Crucible  Steel  Co.  of  America,  56  Ati.  106( 
1069,  207  Pa.  493  (citing  Anderson  v.  Haj 
Mfg.  Co.,  56  Ati.  345,  207  Pa.  106,  63  L.  R  i 
540). 

"Negligence"  is  absence  of  care  ac 
cording  to  the  circumstances.  There  was  n 
negligence  on  the  part  of  a  contractor  1 
placing  a  mortar  bed  on  the  side  of  a  street 
near  which  he  was  erecting  a  building 
where  the  city,  under  its  powers,  had  grant 
ed  him  such  privilege.  White  v.  Roydhoust 
60  Ati.  316,  211  Pa.  13. 

"Negligence^*  is  a  failure  to  observe,  fo 
the  protection  of  another,  that  care  wbid 
the  circumstances  demand.  Culbert  v.  Wil 
mington  ft  P.  Traction  CJo.  (Del.)  82  Aa  108] 

losa. 

**Negllgence"  is  failure  to  exercise  the  dc 
gree  of  care  which  prudence  requires  unde 
the  circumstances  of  each  particular  <ft8c 
Campbell  v.  United  Rys.  Co.  of  St  LouU 
147  8.  W.  788,  701,  243  Ma  141. 


KBGUGENCn 


671 


KBOUOBNCHD 


*'Negllgei^'*  is  ttie  failure  to  exerdse 
the  care  appropriate  to  the  circmiMtanoes  of 
the  particnlar  case.  George  N.  Pleroe  Go.  t. 
Wells  Fargo  ft  Oa,  189  Fed.  061,  M2»  110 
C.  C.  A.  646. 

"  ^Negligence'  Is  a  tellnrs  to  use  in  the 
perf oimance  of  a  duty  owing  to  the  Individ- 
ual that  degree  of  care»  skill,  and  diligence 
which  the  drcomstanoes  of  the  case  reason- 
ably d^nand."  State,  to  Use  of  Oardin  ▼. 
Mcaellan,  86  S.  W.  267,  268,  U8  Tenn.  616, 
8  Ann.  Gas.  902. 

The  test  of  "negligoic^'  is  not  what  an 
ordinarily  pmdent  person  would  do  or  omit 
to  do  generally,  but  what  an  ordinarily 
prudent  person  would  do  or  omit  to  do  under 
circumstances  like  and  similar  to  those  sur- 
rounding the  person  whose  conduct  is  under 
test  In  other  words,  "negligence*'  is  the 
want  of  care  required  by  the  circumstances. 
Olmstead  y.  Oity  of  Olympla,  100  Pae  602, 
601,  59  Wash.  147. 

**  'Negligence*  is  merely  a  f  aUuie  to  be- 
stow the  care  and  skill  the  situation  de- 
mands, and  hence  it  is  more  accurate  to  call 
it  simply  negligence.  The  ^Lassillcation  of 
negligence  into  three  degrees  is  no  longer 
recognized  in  this  9tate."  Missouri  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Walters,  96  Pac.  346,  347,  78  Kan.  39 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  21  A.  ft 
E  Enc  of  Law  t2d  Ed.]  469). 

"In  each  case  the  'negligence,'  whatever 
epithet  we  give  it,  is  failure  to  bestow  the 
care  and  skill  which  the  situation  demands, 
and  hence  it  is  more  strictly  accurate,  per- 
haps, to  call  it  simply  "negUgenoe.'  And  this 
seems  to  be  the  tendency  of  nK>dem  author- 
ities.  *  *  *  In  the  case  before  us,  the 
law,  in  the  absence  of  special  contract,  fixes 
the  degree  of  care  and  diligence  due  from  the 
railroad  company  to  the  persons  carried  on 
Its  trains.  A  failure  to  exercise  such  care 
and  dLUgence  is  'negligence.'  It  needs  no 
epithet  properly  and  legally  to  describe  it." 
Chicago,  R.  I.  ft  P.  R.  Go.  y.  Hamler,  74  N.  B. 
705,  710,  215  in.  025,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N..  S.)  674, 
106  Am.  St  Rep.  187,  8  Ann.  Cas.  42  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  New  York  C. 
R.  Co.  V.  Lockwood,  17  Waa  857,  21  L.  Ed. 
«27). 

Hnw 6    B  cqnired  by  duty 

Many  definitions  have  been  given  of 
'^negligence,"  among  others,  that  it  is  a 
violation  of  the  duty  to  exercise  care.  "Neg- 
ligence" implies  a  voluntary  act  or  omission. 
Weeks  V.  Auburn  ft  Syracuse  Electric  Ry. 
Co.,  113  N.  Y.  Supp.  636,  638,  60  Misc.  Rep. 
400  (citing  Dowd  v.  New  York,  O.  ft  W.  R. 
Co.,  63  N.  B.  641,  170  ;N.  Y.  160). 

''Negligence"  is  a  breach  of  duty  to  ex- 
ercise reasonable  care  under  the  circum- 
Btances.  Vaughn  v.  Wm.  J.  Lemp  Brewing 
Co.,  132  S.  W.  293,  296, 152  Mo.  App.  48. 

"Negligence"  involves  the  violation  of  a  le- 
gal duty  which  one  owes  to  another  in  respect 


to  cate  for  the  safety  of  the  person  or  prop- 
erty of  that  other.  Sharkey  v.  Skllton,  77 
Aa  960,  952,  83  Conn.  603. 

*^egllgence"  is  the  violation  of  an  obli- 
gation to  exercise  care.  That  obligation 
may  inhere  in  the  relations  into  which  par- 
ties have  been  brought  by  contract,  but  it 
is  not  an  incident  to  the  making  of  the  con- 
tract Shinkle,  Wilson  ft  Kreis  Go.  v.  Bimey 
ft  Seymour,  67  N.  B.  716,  717,  68  Ohio  St  828. 

•^Negligence"  consists"  in  a  legal  duty  to 
use  care,  and  its  breach,  without  intention  to 
produce  the  precise  damage  which  follows, 
and,  in  order  to  be  "actionable  negligence," 
must  be  followed  by  damage  to  plaintiff,  re- 
sulting in  a  natural  and  continuous  sequence. 
Interstate  R.  Co.  v.  Tyree,  65  8.  B.  500,  501, 
110  Va.  38. 

"Negligence"  is  the  violation  of  the  duty 
enjoining  care  and  caution  in  what  one  does, 
but  the  duty  is  a  relative  one,  and  whez«  it 
has  no  existence  toward  a  particular  party, 
there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  negligence  in 
the  legal  sense  of  the  term.  Hlckey  v.  Chi- 
cago City  Ry.  Co.,  14S  III  App.  197,  207^ 

An  instruction  In  a  personal  injury  ac- 
tion that  "negligence"  means  the  failure  to 
use  "that  degree  of  care  which  the  law  re- 
quires^ that  is,  ordinary  care^  or  the  doing 
of  that  which  ordinary  care  •  •  ^  would 
dictate  should  not  be  done,"  is  not  open  to  the 
objection  that  matters  of  omission  are  ex- 
cluded from  consideration.  Struble  v.  Bur- 
lington, C.  B.  ft  N.  Ry.  Co.,  108  N.  W.  142, 
144,  128  Iowa,  15& 

••Negligence,"  constituting  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion, is  such  an  omission  by  a  H*spon8ible  per- 
soiwto  use  that  degree  of  care,  diligence,  and 
skill,  which  it  was  his  legal  duty  to  use  for 
the  protection  of  another  person  from  Injury, 
as  in  a  natural  and  continuous  sequence  caus- 
es unintended  damages  to  the  latter.  Pull- 
man Co.  V.  Cavlness,  Ue  S.  W.  410,  411,  53 
Tex.  Civ»  App.  540;  Chesapeake  ft  O.  Ry.  Ca 
▼.  Farrow's  Adm'x,  55  8.  fi.  569,  570, 106  Va. 
137, 10  Ann.  Ca&  12. 

The  words  "negligence"  and  •'wrongful 
act"  are  sufficiently  broad  to  embrace  every 
degree  of  tort  that  can  be  committed  against 
the  person.  Negligence,  constituting  a  cause 
of  dvll  action,  has  been  defined  as  such  an 
omission  by  a  responsible  person  to  use  that 
degree  of  care,  diligence,  and  skill,  which  it 
was  his  legal  duty  to  use  for  the  protection 
of  another  person  from  injury,  as  in  a  natu- 
ral and  continuous  sequence  causes  unintend- 
ed damage  to  the  latter.  The  word  Implies 
a  breach  of  duty,  and  a  person  cannot  be 
legally  negligent,  so  as  to  subject  him  to 
damages,  except  in  respect  to  others  to  whom 
he  owes  a  duty.  Howard's  Adm'r  v.  Hunter, 
104  8.  W.  723,  724,  126  Ky.  685, 

••  •NegUgence,'  constituting  a  cause  of 
dvU  action,  is  such  an  omission  by  a  respon- 
sible peEson  to.  ese  that  degree  o<  care^  diU- 


'.[V 


M 


NBGUGENGE 


672 


KBOUGENCB 


gence,  and  skill,  whidi  it  was  his  legal  duty 
to  use  for  the  protection  of  another  person 
from  Injury,  as  in  a  natural  and  continuous 
sequence,  causes  unintended  damage  to  the 
latter.  An  essential  element  of  negligence, 
as  is  shown  from  this  definition,  is,  as  in  all 
other  species  of  tort,  a  legal  duty.  Without 
such  legal  duty,  and  a  breach  of  it,  there 
can  be  no  negligence  or  any  other  species  of 
tort"  Where  an  employer  fails  to  furnish  an 
employ^  medical  attendance,  as  he  has  agreed 
to  do,  the  employe's  cause  of  action  is  not  in 
tort  for  negligence,  but  is  for  breach  of  con- 
tract Galveston,  H.  ft  S.  A.  By.  Oo.  ▼.  Hen- 
negan,  76  S.  W.  452,  454,  83  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
314. 

'*There  can  be  no  'negligence'  in  i^  legal 
sense  unless  there  is  a  violation  of  a  legal 
duty  to  exercise  care."  Therefore  a  railroad 
comimny,  owning  real  property  abutting  on  a 
street  is  not  required  to  construct  a  fence 
sufficiently  strong  to  provide  against  the  con- 
tingency of  a  crowd  of  trespassers  going  on 
the  inclosed  property  and  pushing  the  fence 
over  on  a  person  walking  in  the  street;  such 
injury  not  being  the  reasonable  and  proxi- 
mate result  of  the  defective  fence.  Grogan 
V.  Pennsylvania  B^  82  AtL  024,  925,  213  Pa. 
340. 

" 'Neglig^ice'  can  in  law  only  be  predi- 
cated upon  a  failure  to  use  the  degree  of  care 
required  by  law  in  the  discharge  of  a  duty 
imposed  thereby."  Where  a  car  cleaner,  at- 
tempting to  dimb  over  a  string  of  cars  likely 
to  be  moved  at  any  minute,  was  knocked  off 
and  killed  through  the  cars  being  pushed  in 
the  ordinary  way  In  switching  operations 
under  the  charge  of  other  employ^  who  had 
no  reason  to  expect  that  he  was  on  the  cars 
or  intended  to  try  to  cross  over  between 
them,  and  could  not  see  him,  they  were  not 
negligent  Hall  v.  Houston  ft  T.  O.  B.  Ca 
(Tex.)  125  8.  W.  946,  949. 

''Negligence"  on  the  part  of  a  railroad 
company  is  the  omission  on  its  part  to  do 
something  which  persons  conducting  a  rail- 
road with  reasonable  care  and  caution  should 
do.  McCk>rmlck  v.  Detroit,  Grand  Haven  ft 
M.  B.  €k>.,  104  N.  W.  390,  391,  141  Mich.  17 
(citing  Flagg  v.  Chicago,  D.  ft  0.  G.  T.  J.  By. 
Co.,  55  N.  W.  444,  96  Mich.  30,  24  L.  B. 
A.  835). 

It  is  the  duty  of  a  carrier  of  passengers 
to  exercise  the  highest  degree  of  care  that 
would  be  used  by  every  prudent  person  un- 
der the  same  or  similar  circumstances  to 
avoid  and  prevent  injury  to  passengers  upon 
its  cars,  and  a  failure  to  exercise  such  high 
degree  of  care  constitutes  "negligence.''  Gal- 
veston, H.  ft  S.  A.  By.  Oo.  v.  Norton,  119  S. 
W.  702,  706.  55  Tex.  Civ.  App.  478. 

"Negligence,"  when  applied  to  carriers 
of  passengers,  means  the  failure  of  a  per- 
formance of  duty,  imposed  by  law  for  the 
protection  of  others,  to  exercise  thiit  high 
degree  of  care  in  acting  and  refraining  from 


acting  which  very  competent  and  pmd 
persons  would  usually  exerdke  under 
same  or  other   similar   dreomstances. 
Louis  Southwestern  By.  Co.  ▼.  Harrison, 
S.  W.  38,  32  Tex.  av.  App.  368. 

onie  degree  of  care  required  by  a  can 
of  passengers  and  the  precise  duty  whid 
owes  to  them  is  clearly  defined  in  the  h 
The  carrier  owes  to  the  passenger  the  ei 
dse  of  the  utmost  care  and  dUigence  wb 
human  foresight  can  use,  though  not  an 
surer  of  the  safety  of  the  passenger, 
breach  of  that  duty  is  "negligence,"  and 
any  injury  results  therefrom,  and  is  the  c 
sequence  thereof,  an  action  will  lie  at 
suit  of  the  person  thus  injured.     It  is 
breach  of  the  duty  which  is  owed  that  con 
tutes  the  cause  of  action.    Philadelphia, 
ft  W.  B.  Co.  ▼.  Allen,  62  Atl.  245,  246,  ] 
Md.  110  (citing  Baltimore  City  Pass.  By. 
V.  Nugent,  88  AtL  779,  86  Md.  849,  39  L.  B 
161). 
As  WM&t  of  due,  proper*  and  ordlni 


Due  care  defined,  see  Due  Care. 
Ordinary  care  defined,  see  Ordinary  Q 

''Negligence"  is  the  want  ct  due  a 
Wofford  V.  Clinton  Cotton  Mills,  51  S.  B,  J 
919,  72  S.  C.  346  (quoting  and  adopting  d 
nition  in  Carter  v.  Columbia  ft  G.  B.  Co., 
8.  C.  24,  45  Am.  Bep.  754). 

"  'Negligence'  is  but  the  abs^ice  of  < 
care."  Comovski  v.  St  Louis  Transit  ( 
106  S.  W.  51,  56,  207  Mo.  263. 

The  simplest  definition  of  '^egUgen 
is  absence  of  due  care  under  the  drcumsta 
es.  Nord  v.  Boston  ft  M.  CoosoL  Coppei 
SUver  Min.  Co.,  75  Paa  681,  684^  80  Mont 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  due  cai 
that  is,  of  such  care  as  an  ordinarily  pnid< 
man  would  exercise  under  the  same  or  si 
lar  drcumstancea  Seininski  ▼.  Wllmingi 
Leather  Co.  (Del.)  83  Ati.  20,  24. 

"  'Negligence*  is  the  opposite  of  due  caj 
where  due  care  is  found  there  is  no  nei 
genoe.  If  there  is  a  want  of  due  care,  U 
there  is  negligence.*'  Baymond  v.  Portland 
Co.,  62  Atl.  602,  605,  100  Me.  629,  3  L.  B. 
(N.  S.)  94. 

"Negligence**  rests  in  tort  It  is  the  i 
sence  of  due  care  which  is  a  duty  lying 
the  root  of  the  social  compact  Charlton 
St  Louis  ft  S.  F.  B.  Co.,  98  S.  W.  629.  6 
200  Mo.  413. 

"Negligence**  is  the  failure  to  exercise  ( 
proper  degree  of  care  in  the  performance 
some  legal  duty  which  one  owes  another  a 
causing  unintended  damages.  Foot  v.  Si 
board  Air  line  By.,  64  S.  B.  843,  84i  142 
C.  52. 

There  are  no  degrees  of  "negligenc 
There  are  degrees  of  care,  and  a  failure 
exercise  that  proper  degree  of  care  as  t 
law  requires  is  "negUgenoai''    Battan  v.  O 


'] 


NSQLIQB2N0B 


673 


NEOLIGENGB 


tral  mectric  Ry.  Co^  96  8.  W.  786,  787,  120 
Mo.  App.  270  tauottng  aad  adopting  deftDitton 
in  Magrane  t.  St  Loois  ft  S.  B.  CkK,  81  S.  W. 
1158»  183  Mo.  U^. 

Where  an  aoddent  proceeds  from  an  act 
of  sncb  a  character  that  when  due  aire  is 
tak«:i  in  its  performance  no  injnry  ordinarily 
oisiies  from  it  in  similar  cases,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  ''negligent"  Pratt  y.  Missouri 
Pac  Ry.  Oo.,  122  S.  W.  1126,  1127,  139  Ma 
App.  502. 

While  the  term  ''negligence'*  is  popularly 
used  to  mean  an  act  or  omission  which  is 
wrongful  under  the  circumstances,  as  result- 
ing from  the  failure  to  exercise  the  proper 
care  for  the  protection  of  others,  without  re- 
gard to  resulting  injury  to  any  particular 
person,  the  legal  conception  of  "actionable 
negligence,"  for  which  recovery  may  be  had. 
Is  such  an  omission  to  use  the  degree  of  care 
for  the  protection  of  another  from  injury  as 
should  have  been  used  under  the  circumstanc- 
es and  which  in  a  natural  and  continuous  se- 
quence causes  damage  to  the  latter.  Cress- 
well  y.  Wainwright  134  N.  W.  094,  699.  154 
Iowa,  167. 

One  lawfully  using  electricity  to  operate 
a  street  railroad  system  in  a  ctty  must  ex* 
erdse  such  constant  care  as  a  man  of  reason- 
able prudence  would  exercise,  considering 
the  obligation  to  protect  persons  from  danger, 
and  the  care  must  be  commensnrate  with  the 
danger;  '^negligence"  consisting  in  the  want 
of  proper  care,  in  ylew  of  the  drcumstances. 
Birmingham  By.,  light  &  Power  C?o.  y.  Mur- 
phy, 56  South.  817,  819,  2  Ala.  App.  58a 

"Negligfflice"  has  been  defined  to  be  the 
"absence  of  care^  aceording  to  the  drcum- 
stances." Also  in  "its  ciyil  relations  is  such 
an  inadyertent  imperfection  by  a  responsible 
human  agent  in  the  discharge  of  a  legal  du- 
ty, as  immediately  produces,  in  an  ordinary 
and  natural  sequence,  a  damage  to  another. 
The  inadyertency,  or  want  of  due  considera- 
tion of  duty,  is  the  injuia  on  whidi,  when 
naturally  followed  by  the  damnum,  the  suit 
is  based."  According  to  another  work,  "neg- 
ligence" consists  of  "an  omission  by  a  respon- 
sible party  to  use  that  degree  of  care,  dili- 
gence, and  skill  which  it  was  his  legal  duty  to 
use  for  the  protection  of  another  person  from 
Injury,  as,  in  a  natural  and  continuous  se- 
quence, causes  unintended  damage  to  the  lat- 
ter." Again,  "negligence  consists  in  doing 
something  which  a  reasonably  prudent  man 
would  not  haye  done  under  the  circumstances, 
or  in  failing  to  do  something  which  a  reason- 
ably prudent  man,  under  the  circumstances, 
would  haye  done."  All  these  definitions  mean 
the  same  thing,  yiz.,  that  "negligence"  is  the 
absence  of  due  care,  and  due  care  is  a  care 
adjusting  itself  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
case.  Dean  y.  Kansas  City,  St.  L.  &  0.  B.  Co., 
97  S.  W.  910,  917,  199  Mo.  386  (quoting  in 
order  Wharton,  Neg.  |  3;  Shearman  &  Bed; 


field,  Neg.  I  8 ;  and  McMahon  y.  Padflc  Bip. 
Co.,  84  S.  W.  478,  132  Mo.  641). 

As  WM&t  of  ordinary  eare 

Ordinary  care  defined,  see  Ordinary  Care. 

"Negligence"  is  the  lack  or  want  of  ordi- 
nary care.  Tobias  y.  People's  R.  Co.  (Del.)  80 
AtL  868,  860;  Murray  y.  St  Louis  Transit 
Co.,  75  &  W.  611,  612,  176  Mo.  183. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  use  or  ex- 
ercise ordinary  care.  Adkisson's  Adm*r  y. 
Louisyille,  H.  ft  St  L.  R.  Co.  (Ky.)  110  S.  W. 
284,  286;  LouisyiUe  ft  N.  R.  Cb.  y.  Joshlin 
(Ky.)  110  S.  W.  382,  386;  LouisyiUe  &  N. 
R.  Co.  y.  Logsdon,  71  S.  W.  906,  906,  114  Ky. 
746;  Cross  y.  Illinois  Cent  R.  Ck).  (Ky.)  110 
8.  W.  290,  292;  LouisyiUe  Ry.  Co.  y.  Boutel- 
Uer  (Ky.)  110  S.  W.  867,  860;  Cincinnati,  N. 
O.  ft  T.  P.  Ry.  (}o.  y.  Byans*  Adm'r,  110  8. 
V{.  844,  848,  129  Ky.  162;  LouisyUle  ft  N. 
R.  Co.  V.  Roth,  114  S.  W.  264,  268,  130  Ky. 
759 ;  Nashyille,  C.  ft  St  L.  R.  Co.  y.  Russell, 
110  S.  W.  317,  319,  129  Ky.  14;  Galveston, 
H.  ft  S.  A  Ry.  CJo.  y.  Hubbard,  76  S.  W.  764, 
33  Tex.  Ciy.  App.  343;  Reybum  y.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  86  S.  W.  174,  176,  187  Mo.  565. 

"Negligence"  consists  of  the  failure  to 
use  ordinary  care  under  the  circumstances. 
Smith's  Adm'r  y.  Norfolk  ft  P.  Traction  Co., 
68  S.  E.  1006,  1006,  109  Va.  453. 

"Negligence"  is  the  ftdlure  to  do  some- 
tiiing  that  the  doer  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
care  should  haye  done.  Shemw^  y.  Owens- 
boro  ft  N.  R.  Co^  78  &  W.  448,  449,  117  Ky. 
666. 

*^e^gence"  is  the  absence  of  ordinary 
care,  and  ordinary  care  is  that  degree  of 
care  which  an  ordinarily  prudent  person 
would  exercise  under  circumstances  Uke  or 
simUar  to  those  shown.  LouisyiUe,  H.  ft  St 
U  Ry.  Co.  y.  StUlweU,  184  8.  W.  202,  204, 
142  Ky.  330. 

"NegUgence"  is  a  want  of  the  care  ordi- 
narily exercised  by  the  great  mass  of  persons 
under  Uke  circumstances.  Bandekow  y.  Chi- 
cago, B.  ft  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  117  N.  W.  812,  813,  136 
Wis.  841. 

"NegUgence^  is  the  want  of  the  ordinary 
care  which  a  reasonably  prudent  man  would 
exercise  under  like  circumstances.  Butler  y 
Wilmington  City  R.  Co.  (Del.)  78  Atl.  871,  872, 
2  Boyce,  262. 

"NegUgence"  is  a  want  of  "ordinary 
care" ;  that  is,  such  care  as  persons  of  ordi- 
nary prudence  usuaUy  exercise  under  similar 
circumstances.  Dorrls  y.  Warford,  100  S.  W. 
812,  813,  124  Ky.  768,  9  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  1090, 
14  Ann.  Cas.  602. 

"NegUgence"  is  the  want  of  ordinary 
care ;  want  of  such  care  as  a  reasonably  pru- 
dent and  careful  man  would  exercise  under 
Uie  circumstances.  Short  y.  Philadelphia,  B. 
ft  W.  R.  Co.,  76  AtL  863,  864»  7  Pennewill, 

loa 


:   : 


NBOLIGBNOB 


574 


NEOLIOBKOIB 


"N^ligence"  has  been  defined  to  be  the 
^t^ant  of  ordinary  care ;  that  Is,  the  want  of 
such  care  as  a  reasonably  prudent  and  care- 
ful man  would  exercise  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances. Boudwin  v.  Wilmington  City  R. 
Co.  (Del.)  60  AU.  865,  4  PennewUl,  881;  Mac- 
Feat  V.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  B.  Co.  (Del.)  62 
AtL  898,  905,  5  Pennewill,  52;  Campbell  y. 
Walker  (DeL)  78  Atl.  601,  603,  2  Boyce,  41. 

''Negligence"  is  the  want  of  ordinary 
care,  or  such  care  as  persons  of  average  pru- 
dence would  exercise  under  the  same  circum- 
stances. A  mere  error  in  judgment  is  not 
necessarily  negligence.  Carney  y.  Concord 
St  Ry.,  57  AtL  218,  222,  72  N.  H.  864. 

"  'Negligence'  is  defined  to  be  Injury  oc- 
casioned to  another  by  want  of  ordinary  care,' 
etc"  Bacon  v.  Kearney  Vineyard  Syndi- 
cate, 82  Pac.  84,  85,  1  Cal.  App.  275. 

"Negligence"  was  properly  defined  as  a 
want  of  ordinary  care  and  failure  to  exercise 
that  care  which  a  man  of  ordinary  prudence 
would  haye  exercised  under  the  circumstanc- 
es, or  a  failure  to  perform  some  duty  im- 
posed by  law.  Jones  y.  American  War^ouse 
Ck).,  51  S.  E.  106,  108,  138  N.  a  546. 

Want  of  ordinary  care  is  "negligence," 
but  want  of  extraordinary  care,  or  that  care 
which  is  customarily  exercised  by  extraor- 
dinarily careful  people,  is  "slight  negligence," 
and  the  latter  does  not  affect  the  rights  of 
parties  injured.  Hackett  y.  Wisconsin  Ceat 
Ry.  Co.,  124  N.  W.  1018,  1022,  141  Wis.  464. 

"By  the  term  'negligence'  is  meant  the 
failure  to  obsenre  ordinary  care."  Postal 
Telegraph  Cable  Co.  y.  Terrell,  100  S.  W. 
292,  293,  124  Ky.  822,  14  L.  R  A.  (N.  S.)  927. 

Statement  in  a  charge  that  "  'negligence,' 
as  that  term  is  used  in  this  charge,  means  the 
failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care,"  is  sufil- 
cient.  In  connection  with  the  preceding  para- 
graph, defining  "ordinary  care"  to  be  "the  ex- 
ercise of  that  degree  of  care  which  a  person 
of  ordinary  prudence  would  exercise  under 
like  or  similar  circumstanoes."  Rapid  Trans- 
it Ry.  Co.  y.  MiUer  (T^)  85  8.  W.  439. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  exercise 
the  ordinary  care  of  prudent  men  under  all 
the  attending  circumstances.  Stephenson  y. 
Corder,  80  Pac.  938,  939,  71  Kan.  475,  69  L.  R. 
A.  246,  114  Am.  St  Rep.  500  (quoting  Thomp. 
Neg.  I  50). 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  exerdse  or- 
dinary care,  such  care  as  a  reasonable  man 
under  like  circumstances  would  exercise.  In- 
ternational Mercantile  Marine  Ck>.  y.  Smith, 
145  Fed.  891,  893,  76  C.  C.  A.  423. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  use  ordi- 
nary care,  which  is  such  care  as  an  ordina- 
rily prudent  person  would  usually  exercise 
under  circumstances  similar  to  those  proyen 
In  the  case  under  inyestigatlon.  Henderson 
aty  Ry.  Co.  y.  Lockett  (Ky.)  98  S.  W.  303. 

"Negligence"  is  the  failure  to  exercise 
ordinary  care.    And  "ordinary  care"  is  that 


degree  of  care  which  an  ordinary,  prude 
and  careful  person  would  exerdse  under  t 
same  or  sbnilar  circumstances.    Gulf,  C 
S.  F.  Ry.  (Do.  y.  Hays,  89  8.  W.  29,  32, 
Tex.  Qy.  App.  162. 

"Negligence"  is  properly  d^lned  In  ani 
struction  as  a  failure  to  use  ordinary  ca 
and  ordinary  care  which  ordinarily  prude 
persons  are  accustomed  to  exercise  under  11 
or  similar  circumstance&  LouisylUe  &  N. 
Co.  y.  I^nch,  126  8.  W.  362,  863,  866, 137  E 


"Negligence"  Is  a  failure  to  exercise  ort 
nary  care,  or  a  degree  of  care  that  would 
used  by  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  uod 
the  same  or  similar  circumstance&  Moo 
y.  linden  Ry.  CJo.,  76  S.  W.  672,  674^  176  3i 
528. 

"Negligence"  has  been  termed  the  wa 
of  ordinary  care;  that  is,  the  want  of  so 
care  as  a  reasonably  prudent  and  carel 
man  would  exercise  under  similar  drcoi 
stances  It  has  been  termed  the  failure 
obsenre,  for  protection  of  the  interest  of  a 
other,  that  degree  of  care,  precaution,  aj 
yigilance  which  the  circumstances  justly  c 
mand,  whereby  such  other  person  suffers  i 
Jury.  Goldstein  y.  People's  R.  Co.  (DeL) 
AtL  975,  976^  5  PennewUl,  306. 

"Ordinary  care"  means  sndEi  care  m 
prudence  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  pers 
would  exercise  under  the  drcumstances  c 
tailed  in  eyidence,  and  "negligaice"  mee 
the  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care.  Heb< 
ling  y.  City  of  Wartensburg,  108  a  W.  86^  { 
204  Mo.  604  (quoting  and  adopting  the  deft 
Uon  in  Cohn  y.  Kansas  City,  18  &  W.  91 
108  Mo.  892). 

The  word  "negligraice,"  as  used  in  i 
instruction  for  the  wrongful  death  of  an  e 
ploy6,  means  the  failure  to  use  ordinary  caj 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  y.  Cane's  Adm'x  (E: 
90  S.  W.  1061,  1064. 

Defining  "n^ligence"  as  a  ftdlure  to  € 
erdse  ordinary  care  was  held  to  state  tl 
proper  test  of  "negligence,"  though  the  ca 
inyolyed  the  life  of  an  infant  four  years  ol 
Hanley  y.  Ft  Dodge  Light  &  Power  Co.,  1< 
N.  W.  598,  594,  133  Iowa,  326. 

"Negligence"  has  been  termed  the  wa 
of  ordinary  care;  that  is,  the  want  of  8U( 
care  as  a  reasonably  prudent  and  carefnl  m 
would  exercise  under  similar  drcumstana 
It  has  been  termed  the  failure  to  obseire,  f 
the  protection  of  the  interests  of  anoth< 
that  degree  of  care,  precaution,  and  yigllan 
which  the  circumstances  Justly  demao 
whereby  such  other  person  suffers  injur 
Di  Prisco  y.  Wilmington  City  R.  Co.  (De 
57  AU.  906,  909,  4  Pennewill,  627;  Bowrii 
y.  Wilmington  Malleable  Iron  Co.  (DeL)  i 
Ati.  369,  371,  5  Pennewill,  694. 

Where  the  charge  of  negligence  is  a  ge 
eral  one,  and  plaintiff  shows  that  the  inju] 
complained  of  occurred  under  such  drcai 
stances  that  it  may  be  reasonably  inf ern 


NBQLIGENCB 


675 


NEGLIGENOD 


that.  If  ordtnaxT  tare  had  been  used  by  de- 
fendant, the  injury  would  not  hare  resulted, 
he  thereby  makes  a  pxlma  fade  case,  and 
easts  on  defendant  the  burden  of  proving  due 
care.  Freeman  y.  Freeman,  125  S,  W.  624, 
526,  141  Mo.  App.  359. 

"Negligence**  is  the  want  of  ordinary 
care;  that  is,  the  want  of  such  care  as  a 
reasonably  prudent  and  careful  man  would 
exercise  under  like  circumstances.  What 
constltates  ^'negligence"  is  a  question  of  law 
for  the  court,  but  whether  "negligence'  ex- 
isted in  the  particular  case  is  a  question  of 
fact  for  the  Jury.  Neal  ▼.  Wilmington  &  N. 
G.  Electric  R.  Go.  (Del.)  58  Att.  838,  889,  8 
Pennewill,  487. 

"'Negligence'  is  the  want  of  ordinary 
care  according  to  the  circumstances,  and  the 
circumstances  are  everything  in  considering 
this  question.  The  ordinary  care  of  a  busi- 
ness man  in  his  own  affairs  is  one  thing, 
and  the  ordinary  care  of  a  gratuitous  man- 
datory is  quite  another  matter.  The  one 
implies  an  oversight  and  knowledge  of  every 
detail  of  his  business;  ^e  other  suggests 
such  care  only  as  a  man  can  give  in  a  short 
space  of  time  to  the  business  of  other  persons 
from  whom  he  receives  any  compensation." 
Mason  v.  Moore,  76  N.  E.  932,  937,  73  Ohio 
St  275,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  597,  4  Ann.  Gas. 
240  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Swent- 
Eel  V.  Penn  Bank,  23  Ati.  405,  414,  147  Pa. 
140, 15  L.  R.  A.  305,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  71^. 

Where  strict  accuracy  of  expression  re- 
qnired  an  instruction  that  an  employer  must 
exerdse  ordinary  care  to  furnish. his  em- 
ployes with  reasonably  safe  places  in  which 
to  work,  the  omission  of  the  words  "exercise 
ordinary  care"  is  not  ground  for  reversal, 
where  the  Jury  were  told  that  the  employer 
is  liable  only  for  his  negligence,  and  that 
negligence  is  the  failure  to  use  ordinary  care. 
Kamera  v.  Missouri  Boiler  Works,  106  Paa 
806,  807,  82  Kan.  432. 

An  instruction  that  "ordinary  care,'*  as 
oesd  in  instructions  given  in  an  action 
against  a  railroad  for  the  death  of  a  traveler 
in  a  collision  with  a  train  at  a  crossing, 
meant  such  care  as  ordinarily  prudent  per- 
sons would  exercise  under  circumstances  sim- 
ilar to  those  proven  in  the  case,  and  that 
''negligence'*  was  the  failure  to  exercise  or- 
dhiary  care,  was  correct  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
CkK  V.  Lucas'  Adm'r  (Ky.>  08  S.  W.  808, 813. 

"Negligence^*  on  the  part  of  a  railroad 
company  is  the  failure  on  its  part  to  use 
ordinary  care;  '*that  is,  such  degree  of  care 
as  an  ordinarily  careful  and  prudent  person 
wonld  have  used  under  the  circumstances." 
Where  the  court  defined  "negligence"  of  a 
railroad  company  to  be  the  failure  to  use 
Bnch  care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  person 
wonld  use  under  similar  circumstances,  the 
refusal  of  a  charge  containing  substantially 
tlie  same  definition,  and  the  qualification 
tbat,  in  determlnlDg  whether  an  act  is  neg- 


ligence, the  jury  will  take  into  consideration 
all  the  circumstances  and  will  not  view  the 
situation  from  a  retrospective  point  of  view, 
was  not  erroneous.  Galveston  H.  ft  N.  By. 
Ck).  V.  Olds  (Tex.)  112  S.  W.  789.  702. 

Since  the  term  "negligence"  has  been 
construed  to  mean  "want  of  ordinary  care," 
it  would  have  been  the  better  practice  had 
the  trial  court  used  the  latter  term  instead 
of  the  former  word  in  his  submission  of 
questions  to  the  Jury,  under  Laws  1907,  c. ' 
254,  providing  that  in  an  action  for  injuries 
against  a  railroad  company  the  Judge  should 
submit  to  the  Jury  the  questions,  first,  as  to 
whether  the  company,  or  any  officer,  other 
than  the  person  injured,  was  guilty  of  negli- 
gence, and,  second,  if  that  question  is  an- 
swered in  the  afllrmative,  whether  the  person 
injured  was  guilty  of  negligence,  etc.  Jensen 
V.  Wisconsin  Cent  Ry.  Co.,  128  N.  W.  982, 
985,  986,  145  Wis.  826. 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  "ordinary 
care."  As  applied  to  a  street  car  motorman 
in  the  case  of  a  collision  with  a  vehicle,  it 
means  the  neglect  to  use  "ordinary  care" 
in  observing  it  or  to  check  the  car  so  as  to 
avoid  hitting  it  Petersen  v.  St  Louis  Trans- 
it Co.,  97  S.  W.  860,  863,  199  Mo.  331. 

A  charge  that  "nei^lgencQ"  as  applied  to 
a  passenger  is  a  fWure  to  exercise  ordinary 
care  for  his  own  safety—that  is,  such  care  as 
an  "ordinarily  prudent  person"  would  exer- 
cise under  the  same  or  similar  circumstances 
— was  not  erroneous  in  fiilling  to  require  the 
passenger  to  use  such  care  as  a  "person  of 
ordinary  prudence"  would  exercise.  St  Louis 
Southwestern  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Parks,  90 
8.  W.  343.  345,  40  Tex.  Civ.  App.  480. 

Defining  "negligence'*  as  the  want  or 
failure  to  use  ordinary  care — that  is,  that 
degree  of  care  which  an  ordinarily  prudent 
person  would  use  under  like  circumstances  to 
avoid  injury  or  accident—- does  not  define  the 
degree  of  care  required  of  a  carrier  in  re- 
spect to  a  passenger  getting  on  a  car,  which 
is,  in  substance,  "such  a  high  degree  of  fore- 
sight as  to  possible  dangers,  and  such  a  high 
degree  of  prudence  in  guarding  against  them, 
as  would  be  used  by  very  cautious,  prudent 
and  competent  persons  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances." Green  v.  Houston  Electric  Co., 
89  S.  W.  442,  443,  40  Tex.  av.  App.  260  (cit- 
ing International  ft  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hallo- 
ren,  53  Tex.  53,  37  Am.  Rep.  744;  Interna- 
tional ft  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Welch.  24  S.  W.  300, 
86  Tex.  203.  40  Am.  St  Rep.  829). 

"Negligence**  has  often  been  defined  by 
the  court  to  be  the  want  of  ordinary  care; 
that  is,  the  want  of  such  care  as  a  reasona- 
bly prudent  and  careful  man  would  use  un- 
der similar  circumstances.  Recovery  on  the 
ground  of  negligence  may  be  had  for  sudden- 
ly starting  a  street  car  while  a  passenger  is 
in  the  act  of  aUghting  therefrom,  if  it  is 
shown  to  be  the  fault  of  the  company,  and 
that  injuries  to  the  passenger  were  caused 


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thereby.    Benson  v.  Wilmington  City  B.  Co. 
(Del.)  76  Atl.  793,  794,  1  Boyoe,  202. 

In  an  action  against  a  railroad  for  in- 
juries to  an  employ^  through  a  defective  car 
step,  an  instruction  that  if  defendant,  through 
its  inspectors  and  repairers,  exercised  ordi- 
nary care  to  see  that  the  equipnient  of  the 
car  was  In  reasonably  safe  condition,  "and 
were  not  guilty  of  negligence,"  the  verdict 
must  be  for  defendant,  was  not  misleading 
as  adding,  by  the  use  of  the  words  "and  were 
not  guilty  of  negligence,"  something  to  de- 
fendant's duty  beyond  the  exercise  of  ordi- 
nary care;  the  court  having  clearly  defined 
"negligence"  as  the  failure  to  use  ordinary 
care,  m  Paeo  &  S.  W.  R.  Ck).  v.  0*Keefe,  110 
S.  W.  1002,  1003.  60  Tex.  av.  App.  579. 

In  an  action  for  delay  In  delivering  a  tel- 
egram, an  instruction  defining  "negligence" 
as  the  failure  to  use  ordinary  care  to  deliver 
the  message,  and  instructing  that  if,  because 
of  such  failure,  plaintiff  was  unable  to  be 
with  his  father  before  his  death,  he  could 
recover  such  damages,  if  any,  as  he  suffered 
on  account  of  defendant's  negligence,  was 
not  objectionable  as  asserting  as  a  fact  that 
plaintiff  was  unable  to  be  with  his  father 
before  his  death  In  consequence  of  defend- 
ant's failure  to  deliver  the  telegram  prompt- 
ly. Western  Union  Telegraph  Go.  v.  Hack 
(Tex.)  128  S.  W.  921,  923. 

In  conducting  the  affairs  of  a  hospital, 
its  officers  and  agents  are  as  liable  to  com- 
mit acts  of  negligence  as  are  the  officers  and 
agents  of  a  railroad  or  other  business  cor- 
poration. Men  in  general  are  not  uniformly 
careful.  Experience  shows  that  "negligence" 
— the  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care — ^is 
to  be  expected  when  men  engage  in  industrial 
pursuits.  It  may,  not  inappropriately,  be  said 
to  be  necessarily  incidental  in  the  accom- 
plishment  of  most  practical  results  through 
the  agency  of  man.  Hewett  v.  Woman's  Hos- 
pital Aid  Ass'n,  64  Atl.  190, 193,  73  N.  H.  666, 
7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  496. 

Am  want  of  reaMmable  eare 

"Negligence"  is  a  failure  to  exercise  rea- 
sonable care.  Jarrell  v.  Blackbird  Block 
Coal  Co.,  186  S.  W.  754,  766,  154  Mo.  App. 
652. 

"Negligence"  is  the  want  of  reasonable 
care,  or  a  failure  to  use  such  care  as  an  ordi- 
narily careful  man  would  use  in  like  circum- 
stances. Klair  V.  Philadelphia,  B.  ft  W.  B. 
CJo.  (Del.)  78  AtL  1085,  1086,  1098,  2  Boyce, 
274. 

"Negligence"  is  the  absence  of  reasonable 
care.  What  is  reasonable  care  depends  on 
the  conditions  of  danger  or  lack  of  danger. 
In  some  cases  very  little  care  suffices  to  ful- 
fill the  rule  of  reasonable  care,  while  In  oth- 
ers the  highest  degree  of  care  is  required 
to  do  so.  Warth  t.  ECastriner,  100  N.  Y.  Supp. 
278,  279,  114  App.  Dlv.  766. 


An  instmction  defining  '^egUgenoeT' 
"the  want  or  omission  of  reasonable  caie  i 
diligence,  the  failure  to  do  something  wl 
a  reasonable  person  guided  by  those  c 
siderations  which  ordinarily  regulate 
conduct  of  human  affairs,  under  the  drci 
stances  would  do,  or  the  doing  of  sometb 
whi<^  such  person  under  such  circnmstan* 
would  not  do,"  was  proper.  Martin  r.  1 
Moines  Edison  Light  Oo.,  106  N.  W.  359,  i 
131  Iowa,  724. 

As  waat  of  oave  aad  pmdeaoe 

The  degree  of  negligence  necessary 
fasten  liability  upon  a  person  is  that  deg 
which  is  quivalent  to  lack  of  such  care  i 
prudence  as  ordinary  men  habitually  exen 
for  their  own  personal  safety.  The  Gene 
De  Sonis,  179  Fed.  123, 126. 

Sam*— Msn  of  ordinary  tetelllsenec 

An  instruction  that  the  term  "negUgen 
means  the  want  of  that  care  and  prude 
which  a  man  of  ordinary  intelligence  wo 
exercise  under  all  the  circumstances  of 
situation  is  erroneous,  where  the  case  is  1 
tomed  on  negligence,  and  defended  on 
ground  of  contributory  negligence,  since 
does  not  correctly  define  the  term,  and  si 
the  word  "Intelligence"  is  not  a  synonym 
either  "caution,"  "prudence,"  or  "care," 
a  very  intelligent  man  may  be  a  very  imp 
dent  one,  or  an  unusually  or  unneoessai 
cautious  one,  and  he  is  not  the  man  who  ex 
dses  ordinary  care'  about  his  own  concei 
and  therefore  the  use  of  the  word  'inu 
gence"  instead  of  the  term  "prudence"  1 
nished  the  jury  no  definition  of  negUgei 
Van  Cleve  v.  St  Louis,  M.  ft  S.  B.  B.  Co., 
S.  W.  632,  684,  124  Mo.  App.  224. 

As  want  of  ordinary  oaro  and  prada 

"NegUgence**  consists  of  the  fiiilure 
use  ordinary  care  and  pmd^noe  under 
circumstances.  One  who  has  a  reasons 
basis  for  belief  that  afiother  is  aware  o\ 
source  of  danger  may  act  on  the  assoi 
tion  that  the  latter  is  aware  of  it,  and  ^ 
make  reasonable  eftorts  to  save  hlms^;  1 
a  motorman  having  a  reasonable  basis 
the  belief  that  an  adult  person  on  the  tn 
is  aware  of  the  approach  of  the  car  may  v 
sume  that  he  will  get  out  of  danger  as  i 
car  approaches;  but  a  motorman  sound 
his  bell  cannot  assume  that  all  within  he 
ing  will  take  notice  that  a  car  is  an>roa 
ing,  and  he  can  make  no  such  assumptioD 
justification  of  his  failore  to  take  reasons 
precautions  untO  at  least  he  has  reasons 
grounds  for  believing  that  his  warning 
heeded  or  the  presence  of  the  car  reoognis 
and  that  the  p»soh  threatened  is  compete 
to  protect  himself  by  the  exercise  of  ordini 
care.  Blley  v.  CoiiSQlidated  B.  Go.»  72  i 
662«  663.^82  Conn.  105,  21  L.  &.  A.  (N.  8.)  8 


MEGLIGBNOB 


677 


KEGLIGBMCB 


As  waat  of  f oMilskt  miA 

A  charge  that  "negUgence,"  as  api^ed 
o  railroads  oigaged  in  the  tranqiortatloii 
If  paonoDgere,  is  a  talliire  to  exercise  sndi  a 
ilgh  degree  of  foresight  as  to  possible  dan- 
gers and  sacli  a  high  degree  of  pmdence  in 
niardlng  against  them  as  would  be  used  by 
rery  cautions,  prudent,  and  competent  per- 
lons  under  the  same  or  similar  dicumstane- 
s,  correctly  defines  ''negligence"  as  applied 
x>  the  duty  owed  by  a  carrier  to  its  paasen- 
sers,  and  Is  sufiicient  when  taken  in  connec- 
tion with  a  further  charge  that  the  railroad 
loes  not,  by  accepting  a  passenger,  become 
in  insnm  of  his  safety,  but  is  only  bound  to 
use  a  high  degree  of  care,  eta  St  Louis 
Southwestern  Ry.  Ck>.  of  Texas  t.  Parks,  90 
B.  W.  343,  845,  40  Tex.  Civ.  App.  480. 

As  want  of  reasonable  diUsemoe,  eav- 
tiont  aad  forestsbt 

Failure  of  a  master  to  exercise  such  rea- 
sonable diligence,  caution,  and  foresight  as 
t  prudent  man  would  exercise  under  similar 
circumstances  to  guard  employte  against  in- 
luries  is  "negligence."  Sandldge  v.  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  By.  C50..  183  Fed.  867,  872,  113  C. 
0.A668. 

WillfmlaeflB  dlsttncvlsliodl 

Mere  ''negligence*'  and  "willfulness"  are 
not  synonymous  terms.  Southern  By.  Go.  t. 
Davis,  65  S.  E.  181,  132,  132  Ga.  812. 

An  act  done  willingly  and  on  full  infor- 
mation is  not  done  negligently.  Negligence 
is  the  result  of  inattention  or  oversight 
Dean  v.  St  Louis  Woodenware  Works,  80 
8.  W.  292,  296,  106  Mo.  App.  167. 

Negligence  cannot  be  of  such  degree  as 
to  become  willfulness.  Cleveland,  C,  G.  & 
St.  L.  By.  Go.  V.  Starks,  02  N.  E.  54,  66,  174 
Ind.  346. 

There  are  no  degrees  of  negligence,  and 
n^igence,  no  matter  how  reprehensible,  can 
never  approximate  willfulness.  Vandalia  B. 
Go.  V.  Clem,  96  N.  B.  789,  790,  49  Ind.  App.  94. 

The  term  "negligence"  suggests  only  inad- 
vertence or  want  of  ordinary  care,  and,  how- 
ever great  may  l>e  the  degree  of  such  want  of 
care,  so  long  as  Inadvertence  remains,  will- 
Ailness  is  excluded.  Bideout  t.  \nnnebago 
Traction  Co..  101  N.  W.  672,  674,  123  Wis. 
297,  69  L.  B.  A  601. 

The  term  "willful  negligence"  is  a  mis- 
leading and  contradictory  expression.  Con- 
duct cannot  be  both  "wiUful"  and  *'negU- 
sent,**  as  "negligence"  involves  inattention, 
And  "willfulness,"  intention.  Anderson  v. 
Minneapolis,  St  P.  A  8.  8.  M.  B.  Co.,  114 
^-  W.  1128,  1126,  108  Minn.  224,  dissenting 
opinion  (citing  8  Words  and  Phrases,  pp. 
7468,  7835;  Bolin  ▼.  Chicago,  St  P.,  M.  ft  O. 
Hy.  Go^  84  N.  W.  446,  106  Wis.  833,  81  Am. 
St  Bep.  9U;  Louisville  ft  N.  B.  Cb.  v.  Per- 
^08,44  South.  602, 152  Ala.  183;  Lake  Shore 

8  Wds  ft  P  2n  SxB.— 4^7 


A  M.  8.  By.  Co.  V.  Bodemer,  29  N.  B.  682^ 
ld9  ni.  696,  32  Am.  St  Bep.  218). 

"Willfulness"  implies  design.  It  involves 
conduct  wMch  is  quasi  criminal.  "Willful- 
ness" and  "negligence"  are  held  Inconsist- 
oit  Purpose  or  design  is  foreign  to  negli- 
gence. WlUfulnesB  cannot  be  inferred  from 
a  mere  knowledge  on  the  part  of  operatives 
of  the  presence  of  the  injured  party.  Be- 
fore it  will  be  inferred,  such  optatives  must 
have  knowledge  also  of  the  inability  of  the 
injured  party  to  avoid  the  Injury.  Pitts- 
burgh, C,  C.  ft  St  L.  By.  Co.  v.  Ferrell,  78 
N.  E.  968,  989,  39  Ind.  App.  616. 

"An  inadvertent  ftillure  to  observe  due 
care  indicates  mere  'negligence,'  but  an  ad- 
vertent or  conscious  failure  to  observe  due 
care  passes  beyond  mere  negUgence  into  'wan- 
tonness' or  'willfulness.'"  Tinsley  v.  West- 
em  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  61  S.  B.  913,  914, 
72  8.  G.  360. 

In  order  to  constitute  willfulness  or  vnui- 
tonness  or  reckless  indifference  to  probable 
consequences,  the  act  done  or  omitted  must 
be  done  or  omitted  with  a  knowledge  or  a 
present  consciousness  that  injury  will  prob- 
ably result ;  and  this  consciousness  is  not  to 
be  implied  from  mere  knowledge  of  the  ele- 
ments of  the  dangerous  situation  a  person 
may  be  in  and  negligent  and  Inadvertent  acts 
in  respect  of  the  peril.  Duncan  v.  St  Louis 
ft  S.  r.  B.  Co.,  44  South.  418,  422,  162  Ala. 
118. 

Where  defendant's  conduct  resulting  in 
an  injury  is  willful,  it  is  no  longer  negli- 
gence, and  hence  the  defoise  of  contributory 
negligence  cannot  arise ;  such  defense  being 
only  applicable  where  negligence  is  charged 
against  defendant  Hawks  v.  Slusher,  104 
Pac.  888,  884,  66  Or.  1,  Ann.  Gas.  1912A,  491. 

"Negligence"  may  result  from  omission 
respecting  duty.  An  "act"  or  "wrongful  act" 
denotes  affirmative  action  or  performance, 
and  an  expression  of  will  or  purpose  as  dis- 
tinguished from  "omission"  or  "wrongful 
omission,"  which  denotes  a  negative  and  in- 
action. Bandle  v.  Birmingham  By.,  light  A 
Power  Co.,  63  South.  918,  921, 169  Ala.  314. 

Negligence  and  carelessness  are  general- 
ly esteemed  as  not  only  not  willfulness,  but 
rather  the  opposite.  Schooler  v.  Harrington, 
81  8.  W.  468,  469,  106  Mo.  App.  607  (follow- 
ing Gibeline  v.  Smith,  80  S.  W.  961,  106  Mo. 
App.  646). 

"Willfulness"  snd  "negligence"  are  dia- 
metrically opposed ;  negligence  importing  in* 
attention,  inadvertence,  and  indifference, 
while  willfulness  imports  intention,  purpose, 
and  design;  and  there  being  no  negligence 
with,  and  no  willfulness  without,  Intent 
Barrett  ▼.  Cleveland,  C,  C.  ft  St  L.  By.  Co., 
96  N.  E.  490,  492,  48  Ind.  App.  668. 

A  conscious  act  or  neglect  is  willful, 
though  there  is  no  evil  intent  but  willfulness 
implies  something  more  than  mere  failure  to 


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use  ordinary  care;  there  being  a  dear  4Uh 
tlDctlon  between  a  "negligent  omission**  and 
a  "wilUnl  faUnre*'  to  act  Cook  y.  Big  Mud- 
dy-Carterville  Mining  Co.,  04  N.  E.  90,  94, 
249  111.  41. 

"Willfulness"  means  something  more 
than  mere  oversight,  carelessness,  neglect, 
or  eyen  shiftlessness.  True,  in  the  legal 
sense  of  the  word,  an  intentional  act  is  or- 
dinarily willful;  but  the  Intentional  act  in 
opening  a  gate  or  leaving  it  open  does  not 
necessarily  imply  an  intention  that  cattle 
shall  pass  through  such  gate  on  a  railroad 
track.  Glaus  v.  Chicago  Great  Western  Ry. 
Co.,  HI  N.  W.  15, 16, 136  Iowa,  7. 

"Willfulness^  or  "wantonness,**  as  ap- 
plied in  cases  of  injury  to  a  person  by  a 
breach  of  duty,  where  the  peril  of  the  person 
injured  is  known,  means  a  direct  intent  to 
inflict  injury,  or  an  act  done  or  omitted,  with 
the  consciousness  that  the  act  or  omission 
will  probably  eventuate  in  injury.  Anniston 
Electric  &  Gas  Co.  v.  Rosen,  48  South.  798, 
799,  802,  159  Ala.  195,  183  Am.  St  Rep.  32. 

.  "Willfulness"  is  the  intentional  doing  of 
some  act  or  the  failure  to  do  some  act,  ac- 
cording to  one's  own. will,  regardless  of  the 
right  of  others,  when  the  party  knows,  "or 
is  under  legal  obligation  to  know,"  that  the 
doing  or  the  failing  to  do  such  act  might 
cause  injury  to  other  persons.  Geddings  v. 
Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.,  75  S.  E.  284,  91 
S.  C.  477. 

"'Negligence'  and  'willfulness*  are  the 
opposites  of  each  other.  They  indicate  radi- 
cally different  mental  states.  •  •  •  Neg- 
ligence is  also  to  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  fraud;  the  distinction  arising  in  this 
case,  as  before,  upon  the  element  of  inadver- 
tence. Fraud  is  invariably  intentional,  ei- 
ther actually  or  constructively ;  negligence  is 
never  so."  Standard  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  Lim- 
ited, of  Liverpool,  Eng.,  v.  Nome  Beach  Light- 
erage &  Transp.  Co.,  133  Fed.  636,  647,  648, 
67  C.  C.  A.  602,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1095. 

"'Willfulness*  and  ^negligence*  are  the 
opposites  of  each  other;  the  former  signify- 
ing the  presence  of  intuition,  and  the  latter 
its  absence."  Rldeout  v.  Winnebago  Traction 
Co.,  101  N.  W.  672,  676,  123  Wis.  297.  69 
L.  R.  A.  601  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
49  N.  E.  445,  449,  149  Ind.  490-501), 

"'Willfulness'  and  'negligence*  are  the 
opposites  of  each  other;  the  one  signifying 
the  presence  of  intention  or  purpose,  the  oth- 
er its  absence.  This  distinction  has  not  al« 
ways  been  observed.  Consequently  there  are 
cases  that  use  the  terms  'gross*  or  'willful' 
negligence  to  designate  willful  injuries.  Late 
cases  have  made  the  distinction  clear.  And 
the  principle  of  the  responsibility  of  the  will- 
ful wrongdoer  for  all  the  consequences  of  his 
misconduct  is  really  an  old  one."    Morrison 


y.  Lee^  118  N.  W.  1025, 1029, 16  N.  D.  377. 
U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  560. 

"'Willfulness'  and  'negligence'  are 
opposite  of  each  other;  the  former  signify 
the  presence  of  intention,  and  the  latter 
absence.  Negligence  arises  from  inattenti 
thoughtlessness,  while  wiUfulnesB  cannot 
ist  without  purpose  or  design,  *  ^  ^  a 
when  willfulness  is  the  essential  in  the 
or  conduct  charged  to  the  party  witli 
wrong,  the  case  ceases  to  be  one  of  ne 
gence."  Memphis  St  Ry.  Co.  y.  Roe,  IDS 
W.  343,  346,  118  Tenn.  601  (quoting  i 
adopting  the  definition  in  Cleveland,  C,  C 
St.  L.  R.  Co.  V.  MiUer,  49  N.  E.  445,  149  I 
490). 

The  conflict  in  instructions  sobmltt 
the  issue  of  negligence  of  defendant  and 
issue  of  a  willful  wrongful  act  cannot 
harmonized  on  the  theory  that  the  term  "i 
ligence,"  as  used  in  the  flrst  instruction,  c 
ers  willful  acts,  since  "negligence"  sign! 
the  absence  of  care  and  implies  a  failure 
duty  and  excludes  an  idea  of  intentio 
wrong,  while  "willful  negligence"  implies 
intentional  failure  to  perform  a  manii 
duty.  Tognazzlnl  v.  Freeman,  123  Pac.  8 
543,  18  Cal.  App.  468. 

An  instruction  that  "wiUful"  is  what 
word  implies,  it  means  an  act  proceed 
from  a  will,  done  of  a  purpose,  an  intent 
to  do  it,  and  that  "willfulneBs"  is  an 
which  proceeds  from  the  will  so  as  to  mi 
the  act  a  purpose  act,  was  not  error,  wh 
the  court  in  connection  therewith  illustra 
the  difference  between  "negligence"  and  "^ 
fulness."  Talbert  v.  CJharleston  &  Westi 
C.  Ry.,  51  S.  B.  564,  72  S.  C.  137. 

A  complaint  for  willful  injury  m 
show  that  the  injurious  act  was  purpos 
done,  with  an  intent  to  inflict  willfully  a 
purposely  the  particular  injury  complaii 
of;  "willfulness"  being  a  desire  or  intent 
produce  a  certain  result,  and  inconsist< 
With  negligence.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  1 
Neeley,  88  N.  B.  714,  715,  44  Ind.  App.  126 

NEOUOENOE  PEB  8E 

The  words  "per  se,"  when  used  as 
scriptive  of  negligence,  merely  refer  to  i 
method  by  which  Its  existence  is  to  be  asc 
tained  from  the  facts.  Piatt  y.  Soutb< 
Photo  Material  Co.,  60  S.  B.  1068,  1071^  4  ( 
App.  159. 

It  is  well  settled  that,  in  order  that 
act  shall  be  "negligence  per  se,"  it  mi 
have  been  done  contrary  to  a  statutory  du 
or  it  must  appear  so  opposed  to  the  dictai 
of  common  prudence  that  it  can  be  a 
without  hesitation  or  doubt  that  no  care 
person  would  have  committed  it  St  Loi 
Southwestern  R.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Hawti 
108  S.  W.  736,  740,  49  Tex.  Qy.  App.  f 
(quoting  Gulf,  C.  ft  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Gaascaii 
7  S.  W.  227,  69  Tex.  545). 


KEGUaiSKCS  PER  SB 


579 


NXGLIGENT  HOMJdDS 


It  Is  not  negUgence  per  se  to  rlae  from 
seat  and  step  to  the  side  of  a  slowly  moT- 
ig  open  car  which  is  coming  to  a  stop,  for 
cte  purpose  of  getting  upon  the  mnboard  to 
Light  when  the  car  does  stop.  Davis  t.  Cam- 
en,  G.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  63  AtL  848,  844,  73  N. 
.  Law,  415  (citing  Scott  y.  Bergoi  Ckinnt:^ 
Faction  Co.,  43  Atl.  1060,  63  N.  J.  Law, 
08 ;  Ck)n8olidated  Traction  Co.  y.  Thalheim- 
r,  37  Ath  132,  59  N.  J.  Law,  474). 
Aa  oadMiom  of  mmim  required  bj  statwto 


It  has  been  declared  that  "the  omission 
i  specified  acts  of  diligence  prescribed  by 
tatute  or  by  a  valid  municipal  ordinance  Is 
negligence  per  ae.'  **  G^ierally  a  court  can- 
lot  instruct  a  jury  that  certain  acts  consti- 
nte  ''negligence  per  se,"  bat  there  is  an  ex- 
eption  where  a  statute  or  municipal  ordi- 
lance  requires  the  performance  of  the  act 
Southern  R.  Co.  y.  Davis,  65  S.  B.  131,  182, 
32  Ga.  812  (citing  Central  Railroad  ft  Bank- 
ng  0>.  T.  Smith,  8  S.  BL  897,  78  Ga.  699;  6 
Swords  and  Phrases,  p.  4764). 

'There  are  certain  things  whldi  amount 
x>  'negligence  In  law,'  whether  any  positive 
>r  active  negligence  be  proved  or  not  The 
rlolation  of  an  ordinance  of  this  dty  Is  of 
itself  (per  se,  as  we  may  say)  an  act  of  neg- 
ligence, which  only  requires  to  be  proved  to 
render  a  wrongdoer  liable  for  any  injury  re- 
sulting from  such  misconduct  In  such  case, 
tiowever,  the  defendant  would  not  be  liable 
unless  the  violation  of  the  ordinance— that  is, 
the  excessive  speed  of  the  train— caused  the 
accident  complained  of;  nor  would  the  de- 
fendant be  liable  If  the  Injury  was  caused  l^ 
the  negligence  of  the  deceased.  l%e  law 
does  not  permit  any  one  to  recover  damages 
from  another  for  an  injury  if  his  own  neg- 
ligence has  contributed  thereto,  or  where  by 
the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  he  could  have 
avoided  If  MacFeat  v.  Philadelphia,  W. 
&  B.  R.  Co.  (DeL)  62  Atl.  898.  905,  906,  6 
Pennewlll,  62. 

A  violation  of  Acts  1906,  c.  169,  making 
It  an  offense  for  an  engineer  to  run  his  lo- 
comotive across  the  tracks  of  any  other  rail- 
road without  first  coming  to  a  stop  and  as- 
certaining that  there  is  no  train  approaching, 
is  negligence  per  se.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  & 
LighUng  Ck>.  v.  Hynes,  91  N.  Bl  962,  964,  47 
Ind.  App.  607. 

NEGLIGENT 

See,  also,  Negligencei 

"A  'negligent  act'  is  an  Inadvertent  act." 
Brown  v.  Boston  ft  M.  R.  B.,  64  Atl.  194, 
201,  73  N.  H.  668. 

The  phrase  ''act  of  negligence,"  as  ap- 
plied to  the  conduct  of  servants,  Includes  any 
condnct  whether  evinced  by  movement  of  the 
organs  of  speech  or  some  oUier  physical  move- 
tnent,  and  hence  where  a  conductor  told  a 
Maenger  to  Jump  from  a  train  as  It  was  In 


motion,  when  In  fuet  It  wmA.hot  in  motiox:, 
and  the  passenger  became  excited  and  jumped 
and  was  injured,  the  statement  of  the  con- 
ductor amounted  to  an  "act  of  negligence." 
Staines  v.  Central  R.  Ck>.  of  New  Jersey,  61 
Aa  386,  72  N.  J.  Law,  268. 

The  terms  "negligent  delay"  and  "un- 
reasonable delay"  are  used  interchangeably 
and  are  of  the  same  meaning.  Chicago,  R. 
I.  ft  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  GlUett  (Tex.)  99  S.  W.  712, 
713. 

If  acts  are  such  as  an  ordinarily  prudent 
person  would  have  committed  under  the  same 
circumstances,  they  are  not  "negligent." 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Massie's  Adm*r,  128 
S.  W.  330,  332,  188  Ky.  449. 

An  Instruction  that  the  terms  'Negli- 
gence," "negligent,"  and  "negligently"  Import 
a  want  of  such  attention  to  the  natural  or 
probable  consequence  of  the  act  or  omission 
as  a  prudent  man  ordinarily  bestows  in  act- 
ing in  his  own  concerns,  being  In  the  exact 
language  of  Rev.  Codes,  1906,  |  9622,  is  suffi- 
cient, especially  where  no  more  specific  in- 
struction was  asked.  Zilke  v.  Johnson,  132 
N.  W.  640,  644,  22  N.  D.  76,  Ann.  Gas.  1913E, 
1006. 

mOUeEHT  HOMIOIDB 

In  a  prosecution  for  "negligent  homi- 
cide," the  court  should  instruct  that,  in  the 
act  of  defendant  of  handling  the  pistol  with 
which  he  shot  deceased,  there  must  be  an  ap- 
parent danger  of  causing  the  latter's  death. 
Saye  v.  State,  99  S.  W.  661.  662,  664,  60  Tex. 
Cr.  R.  669. 

Broadly  speaking,  In  the  case  of  homicide 
by  shooting,  In  order  to  entitle  the  state  to 
a  conviction  for  "negligent  homicide"  the 
jury  should  be  required  to  find  first  that  the 
shooting  was  accidental  or  unintentional  and 
that  it  was  under  circumstances  from  which 
the  law  would  raise  the  imputation  of  neg- 
ligence. Joy  V.  State,  128  &  W.  684,  689,  67 
Tex.  Cr.  R.  03. 

Under  the  express  provisions  of  Pen. 
Ck>de  1S96,  art.  686,  there  must  be  an  appar- 
ent danger  of  causing  the  death  of  a  person 
ictlled  or  another,  in  order  to  constitute  the 
offense  of  "negligent  homicide"  denounced  t>y 
article  684,  providing  that,  if  a  person  in 
the  performance  of  a  lawful  act  shall  i>y  neg- 
ligence and  <;areleesne8s  cause  the  death  of 
another,  he  shall  be  guilty  of  "negligent  hom- 
icide in  the  first  degree."  Ctorden  v.  State 
(Tex.)  90  a  W.  636,  637. 

In  view  of  Pen.  Code  1895,  arts.  683-689, 
693,  604,  to  constitute  '^negligent  homicide," 
the  act  must  be  unlawful  and  a  misdemean- 
or, and  must  be  accompanied  by  want  of 
proper  care  and  caution,  and  there  must  be 
apparoit  danger  of  causing  the  death  of  the 
person  killed,  and  no  apparent  Intention  to 
kill.  Talbot  V.  State^  126  &  W.  906^  907,  68 
Tex.  Gr.  R.  324. 


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NBGLIOENT  HOMICIDE 


*  580      KSGOTIABIiE  BIIiL  OF  SXCHAKt 


Defendant,  keeper  of  a  bagnio,  had  trouble 
with  a  man  therein,  and  he  went  out,  being 
immediately  followed  by  deceased  and  his 
party.  The  testimony  for  the  state  was  that 
the  defendant  then  called  for  a  pistol,  aimed 
it  towards  the  party,  and  fired,  saying,  *'Run 
you,  •  •  •  run,"  and  that  on  her  going 
inside,  being  asked  if  they  ran,  she  said, 
"Yes."  She  and  her  witnesses  testified  that 
no  shot  was  fired  from  the  house.  Held,  that 
"negligent  homicide"  was  not  in  the  case,  but 
manslaughter,  of  which  she  was  convicted, 
was  the  lowest  grade  of  homicide  of  which 
she  could  be  found  guilty.  Clifton  v.  State, 
84  S.  W.  237,  239,  47  Tex.  Or.  E.  472. 

NEOLIOEirr  OPERATIOH 

''Negligent"  operation  is  the  failure  to 
use  the  proper  means  at  hand  in  a  proper 
and  careful  way  aa  persons  of  ordinary  pru- 
dence do  under  like  conditions  for  th^  own 
safety.  Central  Coal  ft  Iron  Co.  y.  Pearce 
(Ky.)  80  S.  W.  449,  450. 

mSOUOEXT  OB  UHU^WFUI.  XTBE 

Where  a  fire  insurance  policy  contained 
an  exertion  that  the  company  would  not  be 
liable  for  loss  caused  by  explosion  of  any 
kind  u^ess  fire  ensued,  and  in  that  eyent  for 
the  damages  by  fire  only,  a  loss  occurring 
solely  from  an  explosion,  not  by  a  preceding 
fire,  or  an  explosion  which  occurred  from  the 
contact  of  escaping  natural  gas  with  a  lighted 
match,  are  within  the  exceptions  of  the  pol- 
icy; the  rule  being  that  the  ignition  of  the 
explosive  substance  must  be  caused  by  an  ac- 
tual combustion  involuntarily  or  illegally 
started,  which  is  called  a  negliisent  or  unlaw- 
ful fire,  and  not  a  harmless  combustion  such 
as  a  lighted  match,  burning  gas  Jets,  or  a 
lighted  dgar,  which  are  called  innocent  fires. 
Stephens  v.  Fire  Ass'n  of  Philadelphia,  123 
S.  W.  63,  66,  139  Mo.  App.  369. 

NEOLIGENTLT 

The  words  "carelessly"  and  •'negligently^ 
are  synonymous.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Horine, 
49  S.  B.  2S5^  121  6a.  386;  Mascot  Coal  Co. 
V.  Garrett,  47  South.  149,  151,  156  Ala.  290 
(citing  1  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  974). 

An  interrogatory  as  to  whether  defend- 
ant's locomotive  was  operated  properly,  the 
complaint  alleging  that  it  was  carelessly  oper- 
ated, is  improper  as  calling  for  a  conclusion ; 
the  word  *^properly,"  as  used,  being  the  an- 
tonym of  '^negligently.*'  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
De  Pauw  (Ind.)  90  N.  E.  27,  29. 

The  word  "negligently''  means  the  fail- 
ure to  exercise  ordinary  care.  Toebbe  v.  City 
of  Covington,  141  S.  W.  421,  423,  145  Ky.  763. 

The  term  "negligently,"  when  applied  to 
the  failure  of  a  carrier  of  passengers  to  per- 
form its  duty  to  safely  carry  its  passengers, 
means  the  failure  to  use  the  highest  degree  of 
care;  and  the  "highest  degree  of  care"  means 
the  utmost  care  exercised  by  prudent  and 
skillful  persons  in  the  management  and  oper- 


ation of  trains.  Loulaville  &  N.  R.  O 
Kemp's  Adm'r,  149  S.  W.  836,  836,  149 
344. 

Under  an  allegatloii  In  a  petition  agi 
a  railroad  company  for  negligent  tread 
of  plaintiff  employe  at  the  company's  hosi 
stating  that  the  surgeon  furnished  "care 
ly  and  negligently  and  unnecessarily" 
formed  a  specified  operation,  the  words  "( 
lessly  and  negligently"  are  not  synonyi 
with  "unnecessarily" ;  the  latter  term  negi 
ing  necessity  for  the  operation,  while 
other  terms  refer  to  the  manner  of  peif< 
ing  the  operation.  Williams  v.  Union  Pa 
Co.  (Wyo.)  124  Pac  506,  608. 

An  instmctlMi  that  the  terms  '*n 
gence,"  ^'negligent,"  and  'Negligently"  im 
a  want  of  such  attention  to  the  natura 
probable  consequence  of  the  act  or  omi£ 
as  a  prudent  man  ordinarily  bestows  In 
ing  in  his  own  concerns,  being  in  the  e 
language  of  Rev.  Codes  1906,  S  9622,  is  i 
cient,  especially  where  no  more  specific 
struction  was  asked.  Zilke  r.  Johnson, 
N.  W.  640,  644,  22  N.  D.  76,  Ann.  Gas.  19 
1006. 

The  clause  of  an  instruction  deds 
plaintiff  entitled  to  recover  if  defendant " 
ligently  failed  to  stop  said  automobile  i 
enough  to  prevent  frightening  said  hoi 
does  not  charge  defendant  with  Uabiliti 
the  mere  finding  that  the  horses  were  fr] 
ened  by  the  automobUe,  the  word  "neelig 
ly"  referring  to  the  duty  to  stop  as  define 
the  instructions,  requiring  defendant  to  n 
tain  a  vigilant  watch  and  to  stop  at  the 
pearance  of  danger,  and  the  instmctioiu 
quiring,  as  a  conditioo  to  recovery,  that 
fondant's  failure  should  have  been  the  pi 
mate  cause  of  the  Injury.  &&V9  ▼•  Hui 
116  S.  W.  468,  466,  184  Mo.  Appt  66& 

NEGOTIABLE 

See  Not  Negotiable; 

The  term  "negotiable  meaxis  that  ai 
dorsee  for  value  without  notice  becomes 
owner  of  the  paper  unaffected  by  equities 
defenses  existing  between  the  original 
ties.  Bank  of  Sampson  v.  Hatcher,  66  S 
808,  810,  161  N.  G.  359,  134  Am.  St.  Rep. 

NEGOTIABLE  BUX  OF  EXCKANGl 

An  instrument  directing  the  drawo 
pay  to  the  order  of  the  payee  named  a  s] 
fled  sum  to  be  deducted  from  money  due 
drawer  on  loans,  and  accepted  by  the  dra 
is  not  a  negotiable  bill  of  exchange  wi 
Negotiable  Instruments  Law  (ConaoL  I 
1909,  c.  38)  i  210,  defining  a  biU  of  exchi 
as  an  unconditional  order  in  writing  addi 
ed  by  one  person  to  anothw,  signed  by 
person  giving  it,  requiring  the  person 
whom  it  is  addressed  to  pay  on  demanc 
at  a  fixed  or  determinable  fotore  time  a  i 
certain  in  money  to  order  or  to  bearer, 
is  only  an  equitable  assignment  of  moi 


NBaOTIABLE  IN  FORM 


581 


NEOOTZABLB  IN8TJEIUMXNT 


due  or  to  become  due  from  tbe  drawee  to 
tbe  drawer,  and  liability  arises  either  if  the 
proceeds  of  the  moneys  to  be  advanced  on 
tbe  loans  come  into  the  drawee's  hands,  or 
if  through  some  act  on  his  part  performance 
of  the  contract  out  of  which  such  funds  might 
have  otherwise  arisen  was  preyented,  and  the 
payee  may  not  recover  on  the  instrument  in 
the  absence  of  evidence  establishing  either 
of  such  facts  or  an  estoppeL  Tisdale  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Piquet,  137  N.  Y.  Supp.  1021,  1022,  153 
App.  Dlv.  266. 

KEOOTIABIiS  nr  FORM 

The  term  "negotiable  in  form,"  as  applied 
to  a  participation  receipt  issued  by  the  agent 
of  a  corporation  to  holders  of  its  bonds, 
would  not  imply  that  the  receipts  would 
be  negotiable  in  the  sense  of  the  law  mer- 
chant so  as  to  pass  to  an  innocent  holder  for 
value.  It  would  Imply  that  such  receipt 
would  be  transferable  by  the  holder  to  a 
third  party,  who  would  acquire  the  rights 
of  the  origliial  holder,  no  more  and  no  less. 
Cells  V.  Brown,  144  Fed.  742,  767.  76  0.  C 
A.  606.     . 

HEOOTIABZ.E  nrSTBUMEMT 

Bona  fide  holder  of,  see  Bona  Fide  Hold- 
er. 

Fictitious  name  in,  see  Flctttioua  Name. 

Issue  of  negotiable  instruments,  see  Is- 
suance— Issue. 

A  ''negotiable  instrument"  is  a  written 
promise  or  request  for  the  payment  of  a 
sum  certain  in  money  to  order  or  bearer. 
Cornish  v.  Woolverton,  81  Pac  4,  7,  82  Mont. 
456,  108  Am.  St  Rep.  698  (citing  Qv.  Code, 
13991). 

A  provisio9  for  payment  to  order  or 
bearer  is  in  general  necessary  to  create  "ne- 
gotiable paper."  Wettlaufer  v.  Baxter,  126 
S.  W.  741,  743,  187  Ky.  362,  26  L.  B.  A.  (N. 

8.)  804. 

A  "negotiable  instrument"  is  one  that  is 
simple,  certain,  and  unconditional,  and  is  so 
defined  by  the  law  merchant  It  has  always 
been  held,  both  at  the  common  law  and  by 
the  decisions  of  most  states,  that  any  Instru- 
ment which  does  not  come  within  this  defini- 
tion should  not  be  construed  to  be  a  negotia- 
ble Instrument  Randolph  v.  Hudson,  74  Pac. 
946,  948,  12  Okl.  6ia 

An  instrument  in  writing,  signed  by  the 
drawer  and  containing  an  unconditional  or- 
^r  to  pay  a  sum  certain  in  money  at  a  fixed 
future  date  to  the  order  of  a  specified  person, 
&nd  addressed  to  a  drawee  named  therein, 
was  a  "negotiable  instrument"  Bothwell  v. 
Conun,  123  S.  W.  291,  292,  135  Ky.  766. 

As  defined  by  ssctions  4626  and  4627, 
^mp.  Laws  1909,  a  '*negotlaUe  instrument" 
^  a  written  promise  or  request  for  the  pay- 
loent  of  a  certain  sum  of  money  to  order  or 
bearer,  and  must  be  made  payable  in  money 
^^7,  and  without  any  condition  not  certain 


of  fulfillment  Farmers^  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
McCoy  ft  Spivey  Bro&,  122  Pac  126,  126,  82 
OkL  277,  40  L.  R.  A.  (N.  &)  177. 

A  writing  providing  that  for  value  re- 
ceived the  signers  jointly  and  severally  prom- 
ise to  pay  another  or  order  a  certain  sum  at 
a  certain  bank  with  interest  and  without  any 
relief  from  valuation  of  appraisement  law, 
being  duly  signed  and  dated,  was  a  negotia- 
ble instrument  within  Revlsal  1905,  |  2161, 
and  the  following  sections.  Myers  y.  Petty, 
60  a  B.  417,  168  N.  C.  462. 

To  constitute  a  "negotiable  Instrument," 
the  fact  of  the  maturity  of  the  instrument 
at  some  time  must  be  morally  certain,  and  a 
written  agreement  to  pay  money  upon  the 
confirmation  by  Congress  of  a  land  grant  was 
not  negotiable.  Joseph  v.  Catron,  81  Pac. 
439,  442, 13  N.  M.  202,  1  Lw  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1120. 

A  mere  contract  of  employment  specify- 
ing compensation  for  services  is  not  a  nego- 
tiable instrument  within  Act  June  80,  1841 
(Laws  1841,  p.  627,  c.  601,  as  extended  by 
Gen.  St  1867,  c.  230,  |  21 ;  Pub.  St  1901,  e 
246,  H  21,  22),  specifying  the  negotiable  paper 
subject  to  trustee  process.  Steer  v.  Dow,  71 
Ati.  217,  218,  76  N.  H.  95,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
263. 

Checks  issued  to  employ^  payable  only 
in  merchandise  at  the  employer's  store  are 
not  negotiable  instruments  payable  to  bearer, 
and  possession  of  them  by  a  third  person 
raises  no  presumption  that  he  is  entitled  to 
the  rights  of  the  employ^s^  and,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  evidence  that  the  third  person  has 
acquired  such  right,  he  cannot  recover.  At- 
toyac  River  (Lumber  Co.  v.  Payne,  122  S.  W. 
278,  280,  57  Tex.  Civ.  App.  327. 

An  instrument  acluiowledging  receipt  of 
an  automobile  chassis  to  be  delivered  only  on 
return  of  the  receipt  properly  indorsed  was 
not  negotiable,  a  ''negotiable  Instrument"  be- 
ing a  written  promise  or  request  for  the  pay- 
ment of  money  to  order  or  to  bearer,  the 
word  'Indorsed"  as  there  used  not  being  as  If 
used  with  reference  to  commercial  paper. 
Manny  v.  Wilson,  122  N.  T.  Supp.  16,  18,  137 
App.  Dlv.  140. 

Under  Negotiable  Instruments  Law  (Con- 
soL  Laws  1909,  c.  38)  H  20,  27,  providing 
that  an  instrument  to  be  negotiable  must  be 
in  writing,  and  signed  by  the  maker  and  pay- 
able to  order  or  to  bearer,  and  providing  that 
an  instrument  is  payable  to  order  when  It  is 
drawn  to  the  order  of  a  specified  person,  or 
to  him  or  his  order,  an  instrument  whereby  a 
person  agrees  to  pay  a  specified  sum  at  a 
designated  place  without  mentioning  any  per- 
son to  whom  the  payment  shall  be  made,  or 
without  making  the  payment  to  bearer,  is  not 
a  negotiable  Instrument  Hilborn  v.  Penn- 
sylvania Cement  Co.,  129  N.  T.  Supp.  957, 
960,  145  App.  Dlv.  442. 

av.  Code  1895,  I  3991,  provides  that  a 
"negotiable  instrument"  is  a  written  prom- 
ise or  request  for  the  payment  of  a  certain 


NSaOTIABLE  INSTRUMENT 


582 


NXGOTIABI/E  INSTRUMENT 


u 


It 


4> 


«rum  of  money  to  order  or  bearer.  Section 
3d92  provides  that  a  negotiable  Instrument 
must  be  made  payable  in  money  only,  iand 
without  any  condition  not  certain  of  fulfill- 
ment Section  3996,  as  amended  by  Laws 
1899,  p.  124,  provides  that  a  negotiable  in- 
strument may  contain  a  pledge  of  collateral 
security,  with  the  authority  to  dispose  there- 
of, also  a  provision  for  reasonable  attorney 
fee,  or  both.  Section  3997  provides  that  a  ne- 
gotiable instrument  must  not  contain  any 
other  contract  than  such  as  is  specified  in 
this  article.  Laws  1903,  p.  238,  |  3,  subd.  2, 
provides  that  an  unqualified  order  or  promise 
to  pay  is  "unconditionar*  within  the  meaning 
of  this  act,  though  coupled  with  a  statement 
of  the  transaction  which  gives  rise  to  the  In- 
strument Held,  that  a  paper  containing  an 
order  or  contract  for  goods,  and  a  note  prom- 
ising to  pay  for  them,  is  not  a  negotiable  in- 
strument, where,  if  the  note  be  detached,  the 
order  for  goods  would  be  destroyed.  State 
V.  Mitton,  96  Pac.  926,  927,  928,  87  Mont  366, 
127  Am.  St  Rep.  732. 

An  instrument  in  the  form  of  a  letter, 
addressed  to  the  general  agent  of  an  insur- 
ance company,  acknowledging  receipt  of  a 
life  Insurance  policy,  and  requesting  him  *'to 
place  the  said  policy  in  force  from  this  date, 
and  I  promise  to  pay  to  you  or  to  your  or- 
der the  first  annual  premium  amounting  to 
$256.55,  as  follows:  Check  inclosed,  $125.00. 
On  Dec.  1,  1904,  $131.55.  Thomas  R.  Were" 
— is  a  "negotiable  instrument."  Equitable 
Trust  Co.  V.  Were,  132  N.  Y.  Supp.  351,  352, 
74  Misc.  Rep.  469. 

Under  Negotiable  Instruments  Law 
(Laws  1897,  c  612,  |  20),  which  provides  that 
an  instrument,  to  be  negotiable,  must  be  in 
writing  and  signed  by  the  maker  or  drawer, 
must  contain  an  unconditional  promise  or 
order  to  pay  a  sum  certain  in  money,  must  be 
payable  on  demand  at  a  fixed  or  determin- 
able future  time,  and  must  be  payable  to  or- 
der or  to  bearer,  and  section  22,  which  de- 
clares that  "an  unqualified  order  or  promise 
to  pay  Is  unconditional  within  the  meaning 
of  this  act,  though  coupled  with  ♦  •  •  a 
statement  of  the  transaction  which  gives 
rise  to  the  Instruments,"  an  Instrument  in 
the  form  of  a  letter,  addressed  to  the  gen- 
eral agent  of  an  Insurance  company,  dated 
April  19,  1905,  which,  after  acknowledging 
receipt  of  a  life  insurance  policy  requested 
him  "to  place  the  said  policy  in  force  from 
this  date,  and  I  promise  to  pay  you  or  your 
order  the  first  aniyial  premium,  amounting  to 
$53.10,  as  follows: 

Cash  paid  W.  B.  Watts $21.24 

On  July  10th,  1905 10.00 

On  Sept  10th,  1905 10.00 

On  Nov.  10th,  1905 11.86 


$53.10 
"Arthur  N.  Taylor," 
«— is   a  "negotiable   instrument";    the   mere 
fact  that  its  language  shows  that  the  con- 


sideration for  the  promise  was  an  Indebt 
ness  for  an  unpaid  balance  of  a  premii 
upon  a  policy  of  insurance  upon  defendai 
life  which  had  been  delivered  to  him  i 
operating  to  make  it  nonnegotiable,  ud< 
the  statute  or  the  customs  and  usages  of  m 
chants.  Equitable  Trust  Co.  of  New  York 
Taylor,  131  N.  Y.  Supp.  475,  476,  146  A] 
Div.  424 ;  Same  ▼.  Newman,  181  N.  Y.  Su] 
1118,  146  App.  Dlv.  953. 

A  claim  against  a  county  for  services 
not  a  '*negotiable  instrument,"  and  a  purch 
er  thereof  takes  it  subject  to  the  del&ase 
payment  or  any  other  defense  the  coi 
ty  might  have  had  against  the  assignor.  P 
Ty  County  v.  Eversole  (Ky.)  98  S.  W.  10 
1020. 

BiU  of  ladiac 

See  BiU  of  Lading. 

Certiiloate  of  deposit 

See  Certificate  of  Deposit 

Certifleate  of  stock 

See  Certificate  of  Stock. 

CHieolui 

Checks  are  "negotiable  instruments^  tx 
at  common  law  and  under  the  express  pro 
sions  of  Ey.  St  1903,  |  478.  Boswell  v.  Q 
zens'  Sav.  Bank,  96  &  W.  797,  799,  12S  I 
485. 

A  postdated  check  is  a  *^egotiable 
strument,"  subject  to  the  laws  relative  to  i 
gotiable  paper.    Symonds  y.  BU^»  74  N. 
926,  188  Ma8&  47a 

As  ol&ose  In  aotion 

See  Chose  in  Action. 

Oomity  bonds 

A  statute  creating  a  county  sanita 
commission  for  Jefferson  county,  authorii 
the  Issuing  of  "negotiable  bonds  of  Jeffers 
county,"  due  at  the  time  designated  then 
and  requiring  the  levy  of  a  special  anni 
tax,  the  proceeds  to  be  held  exclusively  a( 
sanitary  fund  and  applied  exclusively  to  t 
payment  of  interest  on  the  bonds  and  1 
keeping  In  repair  this  county  sanitary  a: 
tem ;  any  surplus  to  be  used  for  payment 
the  principal  of  the  bond.  Held,  that  a  i 
gotiable  bond  of  Jefferson  county  was  m« 
ly  the  general  obligation  of  the  county  to  p 
at  all  events  and  out  of  any  funds.  Blrmii 
ham  Trust  &  Savings  Co.  v.  Jefferson  Coun 
34  South.  398,  400,  137  Ala.  375. 

Mionieipal  bonds 

Municipal  bonds  payable  to  bearer  a 
negotiable  Instruments,  and  the  rights  a 
liabilities  of  the  makers  and  holders  of  su 
of  them  as  have  come  Into  existence  sic 
the  passage  of  the  Negotiable  Instnunei 
Act  (8  Comp.  St  1910,  p.  8732)  are  detemi 
able  by  the  provisions  of  that  act  Linbarg 
V.  Board  of  Education  of  West  New  York, 
Aa  235,  237,  83  N.  J.  Law,  446. 


NEGOTIABIiB  IHSTBUIONT 


58a 


]gKK>TL£BLB  NOTV 


PMtml  moteey  oitUr 

In  the  eetablishment  and  operation  of 
Lbe  postal  money  order  aystem,  the  goyem- 
nent  is  not  engaging  in  commercial  transac- 
tions, bat  exercises  a  goyemmental  power 
For  the  pnbllc  benefit;  and  it  follows  that 
noney  orders  are  not  negotiable  Instmments, 
mbject  to  the  defenses  permitted  to  bona 
ide  holders  for  yalif^  by  the  law  merchant, 
rhe  statute  also  imposes  limitations  and  re- 
»trictions  inconsistent  with  negotiability. 
Bolognesl  T.  United  States,  188  Fed.  S8S,  887, 
111  G.  G.  A.  er,  86  L.  R.  A.  (N.  &)  148. 

Promissory  note 

See  Promissory  Note. 

Wairamtfl 

Village  warrants  are  not  "negotiable  In- 
Btmments*'  in  such  a  sense  that  defenses 
available  against  the  original  payee  are  cut 
off  by  transfer  to  a  bona  fide  holder.  Field 
V.  Village  of  Highland  Park.  104  N.  W.  893, 
394,  141  Mich.  69  (citing  Wall  v.  Monroe  Co., 
103  U.  S.  77,  26  L.  Bd.  480). 

Under  the  Negotiable  Instrument  Act  of 
Iowa  (Acts  1902,  c.  130,  I  2;  Code  Supp. 
Iowa  1907, 1  3060a2),  which  provides  that  the 
sam  payable  by  an  instrument  shall  be  a 
sum  certain  within  the  meaning  of  the  act, 
"although  it  is  to  he  paid  •  •  •  with  ex- 
change, whether  at  a  fixed  rate  or  at  the  cur- 
rent rate,"  an  obligation  of  a  county,  nego- 
tiable in  form  and  issued  under  a  statute 
permitting  It  to  be  made  negotiable,  is  not 
nonnegotiable  bemuse  It  Is  made  payable  *^ 
New  York  or  Chicago  exchange.**  Security 
Trust  Co.  of  Rochester,  N.  Y.,  y.  Des  Moines 
County,  Iowa,  198  Fed.  831,  884. 

HEGOTIABI.E  HOTB 

A  "negotiable  promissory  note"  is  an 
tmeonditlonal  promise  in  writing  to  pay  a 
sum  certain  in  money  to  order  or  to  bearer. 
Wettlaufer  y.  Baxter.  125  S.  W.  741,  743, 
137  Ky.  362,  26  L.  K.  A.  (N.  S.)  804  (citing 
NegoUable  Instrument  Law  [Ky.  St  I  3720b; 
Russell  St  i  1897]  U  1,  184). 

Reyisal  N.  C.  1905,  |  2334,  proyldes  that 
a  '^negotiable  promissory  note,"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  chapter.  Is  an  unconditional 
promise  in  writing,  made  by  one  person  to 
another  signed  by  the  maker  engaging  to 
pay  on  demand  or  at  a  fixed  or  determinable 
^me  a  certain  sum  in  money  to  order  or  to 
bearer,  j.  W.  Perry  Co.  y.  Taylor  Bros.,  62 
S.  E.  423,  148  N.  C.  362. 

Any  uncertainty  in  any  of  the  essential 
elements  of  a  note  to  make  it  negotiable  de- 
a^TB  its  negotiability  as  an  Inland  bill  of 
exchange.  A  note  is  not  negotiable  as  an 
inland  Mil  of  exchange,  unless  on  its  face 
Its  dats  is  certain,  and  contains  an  uncondi- 
tional promise  to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money 
^  a  fixed  time  in  a  hank  of  the  stata  A 
note  dated  "Mount  Ayr,  Indiana,"  payable 
^Q  t  designated  future  date  to  a  person 


named  "at  the  Bank  of  Blount  Ayr,"  is  a  ne- 
gotiable note  within  Boms'  Ann.  St  1908,  | 
9076,  declaring  a  note  payable  to  order  of 
bearer  in  a  bank  in  the  state  is  negotiable, 
since  it  will  he  presumed  that  the  bank  nam- 
ed in  the  note  is  a  bank  in  the  town  named. 
Halstead  y.  Woods,  95  N.  B.  429,  481,  48 
Ind.  App.  127. 

A  note  payable  to  a  corporation  is  a 
'*negotlable  instrument,**  capable,  when  in- 
dorsed in  blank,  of  being  transferred  from 
hand  to  hand,  and  against  which  the  maker's 
trustee  in  bankruptcy  can  ayall  himself  of 
only  sach  defenses  as  were  ayallable  to  the 
maker,  not  including  collateral  issues  between 
the  indorsers  subsequent  to  deliyery.  In  re 
Schwarz,  200  Fed.  309,  310. 

A  "negotiable  promissory  note"  generally 
is  made  payable  to  a  person  or  order  and  is 
for  a  comparatlyely  short  period  of  time, 
while  a  bond  generally  is  made  payable  to 
bearer,  and  baa  a  long  time  to  nin.  Owing 
to  the  distinction  between  bonds  and  notes, 
county  commiMJonera  authorised  to  issue 
new  bonds  and  exchange  them  for  outstand- 
ing ones  are  not  authorized  to  exchange 
them  for  promissory  notes.  Commissioners 
of  Muskingum  County  y.  Stote,  86  N.  B.  562. 
567,  78  Ohio  St  287. 

By  the  law  merchant  in  order  to  be  "^ego- 
tlable"  a  note  must  be  payable  to  the  order 
of  some  person  or  to  bearer.  Under  Comp. 
St  Neb.  1901, 1  3880,  which  proyldes  that  "all 
bonds,  promissory  notes,  bills  of  exchange, 
foreign  and  inland,  drawn  for  any  sum  or 
sums  of  money  certain,  and  made  payable 
to  any  person  or  ord^r,  or  to  any  person  or 
assigns,  shall  be  negotiable  by  Indorsement 
thereon  so  as  absolutely  to  transfer  and  yest 
the  property  thereof  In  each  and  eyery  in- 
dorsee successlyely,"  as  construed  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  state,  a  written  guar- 
anty, signed  by  the  payee  on  the  back  of  a 
note  payable  to  his  order,  constitutes  an  in- 
dorsement with  an  enlarged  liability,  and 
transfers  the  legal  title  free  from  equities 
between  the  maker  and  payee.  Leahy  y. 
Haworth,  141  Fed.  850,  866,  73  O.  C.  A.  84, 
4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  657. 

The  essential  requisites  of  a  "negotiable 
note"  by  the  law  merchant  *'are  a  date  and 
an  unconditional  promise  to  pay  money  in  a 
certain  sum,  at  a  certain  time,  and  at  a 
certain  place.*'  The  negotiability  of  a  note 
is  not  destroyed  by  a  recital  of  the  consider- 
ation and  that  the  title  of  the  property  for 
which  it  is  glyen  shall  remain  in  the  payee 
until  It  is  paid,  and,  if  not  paid  at  maturity, 
then  the  property  shall  be  sold  and  the  pro- 
ceeds applied  to  the  debt  hut  a  further  stipu- 
lation that  partial  payments  to  any  amount 
less  than  the  principal  shall  be  considered  as 
rental  for  the  property  renders  the  amount 
payable  uncertain  and  destroys  its  negotia- 
bility. Gilpin  y.  People's  Bank,  90  N.  B.  91, 
92,  45  Ind.  App.  52. 


MXG^OTIABIiB  NOTB 


5S4 


KEaOTIABLB  KOTB 


Under  Negotiable  Instrament  Law,  Laws 
IS97,  p.  765,  c  612,  |  820,  proyldlng  that  a 
'Negotiable  note"  Is  an  unconditional  written 
promise  by  one  to  another,  signed  by  the 
maker,  to  pay  to  order  or  bearer,  and  that 
where  a  note  Is  drawn  to  the  maker's  order 
It  Is  not  complete  till  Indorsed  by  him,  the 
complaint  in  an  action  on  a  note  payable  to 
the  maker  must  allege  its  indorsement  by 
him.  Edelman  y.  Rams,  109  N.  Y.  Supp.  816, 
817,  58  Misc.  Rep.  561. 

A  writing  signed  by  a  party,  and  stating 
that  a  certain  amount  is  due  a  person  men- 
tioned therein  without  reciting  that  it  was 
executed  "for  value  received,"  is  not  a  "ne- 
gotiable note,"  for  under  Rev.  St.  18d0,  I 
457,  an  Instrument  to  be  a  negotiable  instru- 
ment must  contain  the  quoted  words.  Loch- 
er  v.  Euechenmlester,  98  S.  W.  92, 97, 120  Mo. 
App.  701. 

Under  Negotiable  Instrument  Law,  St. 

1898,  I  1675,  subd.  2,  as  amended  by  Laws 

1899,  p.  684,  a  856,  making  a  note  negotiable 
If  "the  sum  payable  is  a  sum  certain, 
•  •  •  although  it  Is  to  be  paid  •  •  • 
with  costs  of  collection  or  an  attorney's  fee 
in  case  payment  shall  not  be  made  at  ma- 
turity," a  note  is  negotiable  which  provides 
for  an  attorney's  fee  only  on  collection  by 
attorney  after  dishonor.  First  Nat  Bank 
of  Shawano  v.  Miller,  120  N.  W.  820,  821, 
139  Wis.  126,  131  Am.  St  Rep.  1040. 

A  note,  properly  signed  by  the  maker, 
containing  an  unconditional  promise  to  pay 
a  sum  certain  in  money  at  a  specified  future 
time,  to  the  order  of  a  specified  person,  is  a 
"negotiable  instrument"  Mechanics'  & 
Farmers'  Sav.  Bank  v.  Katterjohn,  125  S. 
W.  1071,  1072.  137  Ky.  427,  Ann.  Cas.  1912A, 
439. 

A  provision  in  an  interest-bearing  note 
that  if  the  Interest  be  not  paid  semiannual- 
ly it  shall  become  as  principal  and  bear  the 
same  rate  of  interest  does  not  make  the 
amount  of  the  note  uncertain,  so  as  to  render 
it  nonnegotiable,  and  such  note  is  a  "negoti- 
able instrument"  Brown  v.  Vossen,  87  S.  W. 
577,  578,  112  Mo.  App.  676. 

Under  a  statute  defining  a  "negotiable 
instrument"  and  providing  that  it  must  be 
made  payable  in  money  only,  without  condi- 
tions not  certain  of  fulfillment,  and  must  not 
contain  any  other  contract  than  that  speci- 
fied, a  note  providing  that,  if  not  paid  when 
due,  both  principal  and  interest  shall  bear  an 
increased  rate  of  interest,  is  not  negotiable. 
Cornish  v.  Woolverton,  81  Pac.  4,  6,  8,  32 
Mont  456,  108  Am.  St  Rep.  59a 

Under  Acts  1899,  c.  94,  relating  to  "nego- 
tiable Instruments"  and  providing  that  an 
instrument  to  be  negotiable  must  be  in  writ- 
ing, and  must  be  payable  to  order  or  bearer, 
etc.,  a  note  not  payable  to  either  order  or 
bearer  Is  not  a  "negotiable  instrument" 
Gilley  V.  HarreU,  101  S.  W.  424,  425,  118 
Tenn.  115. 


A  note  given  December  16, 1908,  payab 
In  lastallmeBts  three  months  apart,  f^< 
contains  a  stipulation  that;  If  it  is  pa 
within  15  days  from  date,  a  discount  Qf  5  p 
cent  will  be  allowed,  being  uncertain  as 
the  amount  necessary  to  satisfy  it  at  ti 
time  of  its  execution,  is  nonn^otiabl 
Farmers'  Loan  ft  Trust  Ck>.  v.  McCk>7  &  Spi 
ey  Bros.,  122  Pac  125,  426,  32  OkL  277,  : 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  177. 

A  note  containing  a  stipulation  wheret 
the  sureties,  guarantors^  indorsers,  and  mal 
ers  waive  notice  of  the  granting  of  any  e 
tension  of  time  for  payment  and  waive  tl 
right  of  defense  on  the  ground  that  extei 
slon  has  been  made  without  notice  to  them  ( 
either  of  them,  is  not  a  "negotiable  proml 
sory  note,"  within  the  meaning  and  intei 
of  the  negotiable  instrument  law  of  tb 
state.  Union  Stockyards  Nat  Bank  of  Soul 
Omaha  v.  Bolan,  93  Pac  508,  510,  14  Idab 
87,  125  Am.  St  Rep.  146  (citing  Sees.  Lav 
1903,  p.  380). 

Rem.  &  Bal.  CJode,  S  3392,  declares  tbi 
an  instrument  to  be  negotiable,  must  contai 
an  unconditional  promise  to  pay  a  sum  ce 
tain  in  money,  must  be  payable  on  demand  ( 
at  a  fixed  or  determinable  future  time,  ax 
must  be  payable  to  order  or  to  bearer.  Se 
tlon  3394  declares  that  an  unqualified  ord< 
to  pay  is  unconditional,  though  coupled  wit 
an  indication  of  a  particular  fund  out  < 
which  reimbursement  is  to  be  made  or  a  pa 
ticular  account  to  be  debited  with  the  amouj 
or  a  statement  of  a  particular  transactio 
which  gives  rise  to  the  instrument  but  tbi 
an  order  or  promise  to  pay  only  out  of 
particular  fund  is  not  unconditional.  Hel 
that,  where  a  note  was  payable  on  demam 
it  was  not  rendered  nonnegotiable  becais 
It  contained  a  statement  that  It  was  give 
to  take  up  the  freight  and  rehandling  of 
certain  car,  the  proceeds  from  resale  of  sue 
car  to  apply  on  the  note,  there  being  notbii 
therein  making  payment  dependent  on  Vi 
sufficiency  of  the  proceeds  of  the  resale  < 
the  material  on  the  car  or  preventing  a  d' 
mand  for  full  payment  Independent  of  sue 
proceeds  at  any  time;  the  test  being  wbetb< 
the  general  credit  of  the  maker  accompanii 
the  Instrument  First  Nat  Bank  of  Snoh^ 
mlsh  V.  SulUvan,  119  Pac  820,  821,  66  Was! 
375,  Ann.  Gaa  19130,  930. 

Under  the  statute  providing  that  a  "b( 
gotiable  instrument"  must  be  made  payabl 
in  money  only,  and  without  any  condition  nt 
certain  of  fulfillment  one  of  the  essentli 
qualities  of  a  ''negotiable  promissory  note 
is  absolute  certainty  as  to  the  sum  of  mone 
to  be  paid,  a  certainty  which  must  appea 
on  the  face  of  the  note.  Therefore,  if  an 
part  of  the  amount  is  dependent  on  any  coi 
tingency,  or  where  it  is  necessary  to  offe 
proof  other  than  the  instrument  itself,  tb 
negotiable  character  of  the  Instrument  1 
destroyed.  Cotton  v.  John  Deere  Plow  Co 
78  Pac  321,  14  OkL  60S. 


NEGOTIABLE  NOTE 


NEGOTIATE 


Under  Negotiable  Instrnments  Aot  18^ 
(Acts  1887,  p.  783,  c  74,  |  1;  Gen.  St  c.  234, 
M  4171,  417Q,  an  lAstnunent,  signed  by  tbe 
maker,  and  dated,  promising  to  pay  a  stated 
ELmount  at  a  certain  bank  one  year  after 
late,  was  a  "negotiable  promissory  note." 
St  Paul's  ESpiscopal  Ghardi  t.  Fields,  72  Atl. 
L43,  140,  81  Conn.  67a 

A  '^negotiable  promissory  note**  is  an  un- 
ronditional  promise  In  writing  made  by  one 
person  to  another,  signed  by  the  maker,  and 
engaging  to  pay,  on  demand  or  at  a  fixed  or 
ieterminable  future  time,  a  sum  certain  in 
money  to  order  or  to  bearer.  Baumeister  ▼. 
Kuntz,  42  South.  886,  887,  53  Fla.  340. 

B.  &  G.  Oomp.  II  299-302,  provide  in  ef- 
fect that  all  property  not  exempt  from  execu- 
tion shall  be  subject  to  attachment,  and  that 
personal  property  capable  of  manual  deliv- 
ery, and  not  in  possession  of  a  third  person, 
shall  be  attached  by  the  sheriff  taking  it  into 
tils  possession,  and  garnishment  proceedings 
&re  provided  to  reach  personal  property  not 
[sapable  of  manual  delivery  and  in  possession 
of  a  third  person.  Section  4586  defines  a  ne- 
gotiable promissory  note  as  an  unconditional 
promise  in  writing  engaging  to  pay  on  demand, 
or  at  a  fixed  or  determinable  time,  a  certain 
sum  in  money.  Held,  that  a  negotiable 
promissory  note  belons^g  to  defendant,  in 
tils  possession,  and  bearing  no  indorsements, 
wha  subject  to  attachment  and  sale  under  ex- 
ecution. Fishbum  v.  Londershausen,  92  Pac 
1060.  1061,  50  Or.  363, 14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  1284, 
15  Ann.  Gas.  975. 

Gourt  and  Practice  Act  1905,  |  601,  subd. 
11,  provides  that  debts  secured  by  bills  of 
exchange  or  negotiable  promissoiy  notes  Shall 
be  exempt  from  attachment  on  any  warrant 
of  distress  or  any  other  writ,  original,  mesne, 
or  judidaL  Held,  that  an  overdue  promis- 
sory note  iB  still  negotiable  within  the  stat- 
ute, and  hence  the  amount  due  thereon  is 
exempt  from  process  of  foreign  attachment 
Oakdale  Mfg.  Go.  v.  Glarke,  69  Atl.  681,  29 
R.I.  192. 

A  note  reciting  that  the  principal  and 
interest  are  payable  at  a  designated  place, 
but  if  any  part  of  the  principal  or  interest 
Is  not  paid  at  maturity  it  shall  bear  Interest, 
and  if  the  note  is  placed  in  the  hands  of  an 
attorney  for  collection  or  suit  is  brought 
thereon  an  attorney's  fee  of  10  per  cent.,  in- 
cluding interest,  shall  be  taxed  as  costs  or 
included  in  the  judgm^it,  is  a  "nonnegotia* 
ble  instrument"  Dickerson  v.  Hlggins,  82 
Pac.  649,  650,  16  Okl.  588. 

HEOOTIABIiE  PAPEK 

See  Gurrent  Negotiable  Paper. 

HEGOTIABILITT 

The  first  requisite  to  the  "negotiabiltty" 
of  a  paper  is  that  it  should  be  a  **note,'* 
and,  as  a  **note''  must  be  an  obligation  for 
the  payment  of  a  certain  sum  of  money,  a 


provision  thiat  if  eollectioa  Is  made  throiigh 
an  attorney,  or  by  legal  proeeos,.  the  maker 
will  pay  all  costs  and  expehses  Including  10 
per  cent  of  the  amount  collected  as  attorney's 
fees,  renders  the  note  nonnegotlable.  Green 
V.  Spires,  50  S.  B.  5M,  596,  71  8.  a  107,  4 
Ann.  Gas.  2ttL 

NEGOTIATE 

To  '^negotiate"  means  to  treat  with  an- 
other or  others;  to  arrange  for  or  procure 
by  negotiation;  to  put  into  circulation  by 
transference  and  assignment;  to  conclude 
by  bargain,  treaty,  or  agreement;  to  transfer, 
to  pass,  to  sell;  or  to  procure  by  mutual  iur 
tercourse  and  agreement  with  another.  Au- 
rora State  Bank  v.  Hayee-Eamea  ESlevator 
Go.,  129  N.  W.  279,  280,  88  Neb.  187  (quoting 
5  Words  and  Phrases,  pp.  4771,  4772). 

The  word  "negotiate,"  as  used  in  a  peti- 
tion, which  alleges  that  defendant  authorized 
plaintiif  to  negotiate  a  sale  of  a  lease  for 
defendant,  should  be  construed  to  mean  con- 
versation in  arranging  the  terms  of  a  con- 
tract Northrup  v.  Diggs,  106  S.  W.  1123, 
1126,   128  Mo.  App.  217. 

"An  instrument  is  'negotiated*  when  it  is 
transferred  from  one  person  to  another. in 
such  manner  as  to  constitute  the  transferee 
the  holder  thereof.*'  Wettlaufer  v.  Baxter, 
125  S.  W.  741,  748,  137  Ky.  362,  26  I*  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  804. 

"Negotiated,"  in  the  usual  technical  and 
legal  sense  used  by  law-writers  In  speaking 
of  commercial  paper,  means  to  transfer  for 
a  valuable  consideration  under  rules  of  com- 
mercial law.  The  term  is  sometimes  used  as 
meaning  to  discuss  or  arrange  for  a  sale  or 
bargain,  or  the  preliminaries  of  a  business 
transaction;  also,  to  sell  or  discount  nego- 
tiable paper,  or  assign  or  transfer  it  by  in- 
dorsement or  delivery.  The  term  as  used  in 
Rev.  St  1909,  i  1275,  which  provides  that  be- 
fore a  school  bond  shall  be  negotiated  it  shali 
first  be  presented  to  the  State  Auditor  for 
registry,  means  the  selling  and  putting  in 
circulation  by  delivery  in  consummation  of 
the  sale.  State  ex  reL  GarroUton  School 
Dist  V.  Gordon,  133  S.  W.  44,  47,  231  Mo.  547 
(quoting  and  adopting  definitions  in  Web- 
ster's New  Unabridged  Diet  and  Black's  Law 
Diet). 

Where  an  order  authorized  a  dty  finance 
oonunittee  to  "negotiate"  notes  for  the  city's 
benefit,  the  term  *iiegotiate"  was  sufficient 
to  Include  the  entire  transaction  of  asking 
for  bids,  or  ascertaining  the  discount  by 
private  Inquiry,  and  deciding  upon  the 
amounts,  the  rate,  and  the  time  on  which 
the  notes  should  be  given.  Brown  v.  Gity  of 
Newburyport,  95  N.  E.  504,  606,  209  Mass. 
259,  Ann.  Ga&  1912B,  495. 

Under  the  provisions  of  thi^  negotiable 
instruments  law  (Gomp.  St  1909,  c.  41)  that 
every  person  negotiating  an  instrum^t  by 


HJSaOTIATB 


688 


KEaOTIATIOK 


deUyeiy  Wlirraiiti  that  it  is  genuine,  and  that 
he  has  good  title,  and  article  8,  i  SO,  of  such 
law,  providing  that  an  instroment  ia  nego- 
tiated when  it  is  transferred  to  another  so 
as  to  make  the  transferee  the  holder,  the 
word  "negotiating"  means  putting  into  cir- 
culation by  assignment  of  a  claim,  by  indorse- 
ment, to  dispose  of  by  sale,  and  in  5  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  4771,  it  Is  said :  "To  'nego- 
tiate' means  to  conclude  by  a  bargain,  treaty, 
or  agreement,  to  transfer,  to  sell;  and  the 
power  to  negotiate  a  bill  or  note  is  said  to 
be  the  power  to  indorse  and  deUver  it  to 
another,  so  that  the  right  of  action  shall  also 
pass,  and  negotiation  means  the  act  by 
whi<^  a  bill  of  exchange  or  note  is  put  into 
circulation  by  being  passed  by  one  of  the  orig- 
inal parties  to  another  person."  National 
Bank  of  Commerce  of  Lincoln  t.  I^rmers'  & 
Merchants'  Bank,  128  N.  W.  522,  628,  87  Neb. 
841. 

Where  a  broker's  contract  of  authority 
authorized  him*  to  negotiate  for  the  sale  of 
the  lands  in  question  at  $5  an  acre  for  80 
days,  and  the  owners  bound  themselyes  to 
execute  good  conveyances  to  such  purchaser 
as  the  brokers  might  produce  on  payment  of 
the  price,  the  term  "negotiate"  imported  au- 
thority on  the  part  of  the  brokers  to  make 
a  binding  sale  agreement,  and  the  contract 
did  not  therefore  limit  their  authority  to  find- 
ing a  purchaser  ready  and  able  to  pay  the 
price.  Combes  t.  Adams,  63  8.  EL  186,  188, 
160  N.  C.  64. 

Rev.  St  1900,  i  1276,  provides  that  be- 
fore any  school  bond  "shall  obtain  validity 
or  be  negotiated,  such  bond  shall  first  be 
presented  to  the  State  Auditor,  who  shall 
register  the  same,"  etc  Held,  that  the  term 
"obtain  validity"  meant  to  become  clothed 
with  validity  as  a  present  and  subsisting 
obligation,  and  the  term  "negotiated"  meant 
that  the  bonds  should  have  been  sold  and 
put  in  circulation  by  delivery  in  consumma- 
tion of  the  sale ;  and  officers  of  a  school  dis- 
trict, after  bonds  have  been  voted,  may  ad- 
vertise for  bids  and  accept  a  bid  for  bonds 
before  they  have  been  registered  by  the 
State  Auditor;  and  hence  such  acts  of  the 
officers  furnish  no  reason  for  refusing  regis- 
tration. State  ex  rel.  Carrollton  School  Dist 
No.  1,  Tp.  63,  R.  23,  v.  Gordon,  183  S.  W. 
44,  47,  231  Mo.  547. 

According  to  the  express  terms  of  Ne- 
gotiable Instruments  Law,  |  60  (Laws  1897, 
p.  728,  c.  612),  "an  instrument  is  'negotiat- 
ed' when  it  is  transferred  from  one  person 
to  another  in  such  manner  as  to  constitute 
the  transferee  the  holder  thereof.  If  pay- 
able to  bearer,  it  is  negotiated  by  delivery; 
if  payable  to  order,  it  is  negotiated  by  the 
Indorsement  of  the  holder  completed  by  de« 
livery."  'The  popular  meaning  of  'negoti- 
ate* is  the  same."  Rogers  v.  Morton,  95  N. 
Y.  Supp.  4»,  60,  46  Misa  Rep.  494. 

Voting  trust  certificates  of  a  corporation 
were  turned  over  to  a  committee,  which  was 


authorized  '^  negotiate  in  behalf  of 
owners  for  the  sale  of  the  pooled  stoc 
Further  authority  was  given  to  s^  not  1 
than  two-thirds  of  such  stock  at  such  prl 
as  might  be  approved  in  writing  by  the  oi 
ers.  The  committee  made  an  agreement 
sale,  the  terms  c«f  which  were  net  onen 
and  the  price  was  adequate.  The  asreem 
for  sale  may  have  been  optional;  but,  if 
the  purchasers  proposed  to  execute  it  fi 
when  the  agreement  was  questioned  by 
stockholder.  It  was  made  by  the  commit 
in  good  faith.  The  sale  was  within  the 
press  authority  of  the  committee.  Weit» 
Burrage,  76  N.  E.  608,  190  Mass.  267. 

*  Acts  Mo.  1906,  pp.  247,  248,  |  30,  I 
vides  that  an  instrument  is  negotiated  wl 
it  is  transferred  from  one  person  to  anot 
in  such  manner  as  to  constitute  the  tn 
feree  holder  thereof:  if  payable  to  bearei 
is  negotiated  by  delivery;  if  payable  to 
der,  it  is  negotiated  by  the  Indorsement 
the  holder  completed  by  delivery.  Sect 
31:  "The  indorsement  must  be  writt»i 
the  instrument  itself  or  upon  a  paper 
tached  thereto."  Under  this  statute  a  nc 
tiable  note  payable  to  order  will  not  pass 
mere  delivery.  Sublette  v.  Brewington, 
S.  W.  1160,  139  Mo.  App.  410. 

NEGOTIATIOV 

"Negotiation'*  means  traffic  or  conclus 
by  bargain  or  agreement  Bverson  v.  G 
eral  Accident  Fire  ft  Life  Assur.  Ck>rp.,  L 
ited,  of  Perth,  Scotland,  88  N.  E.  668,  ( 
202  Mass.  169. 

"Negotiations"  is  a  very  broad  term, 
emblraces  everything  from  the  first  appro 
of  the  one  who  desires  to  purchase  to 
one  from  whom  the  purdiase  is  to  be  m 
to  the  final  consummation  of  the  contracl 
purchase.  No  interest  either  legal  or  equ 
ble,  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  negotiati< 
is  acquired  by  merely  beginning  them,  i 
no  right  is  vested  in  the  negotiator  until 
negotiations  reach  a  stage  where  the  pei 
desiring  to  purchase  could  compel  a  com 
ance  of  the  property  from  the  owner,  i 
until  such  state  is  reached  the  purchaser 
no  right  which  can  be  the  subject  of  bai^ 
Allen  &  Holmes  y.  Powell,  64  S.  E.  : 
138,  125  Ga.  438. 

"Negotiation"  means  the  act  by  wl 
a  bill  or  note  Is  put  into  circulation  by 
ing  passed  by  one  of  the  original  parties 
another;  and  presentation  of  the  check 
payment  is  not  a  negotiation  of  the  ch( 
within  the  meaning  of  the  negotiable  iusi 
ments  law.  Aurora  State  Bank  v.  Ha; 
Eames  Elevator  Co.,  129  N.  W.  279,  280, 
Neb.  187. 

"  'Negotiation'  means  the  act  by  whic 
bill  of  exchange  or  promissory  note  is 
Into  circulation  by  being  passed  by  one 
the  original  parties  to  another  person."    I 
ment  by  a  bank  of  a  check  drawn  upoi 


N.EQQTIATI02^ 


58T 


N£iaHBOBB00II 


cs  not  constltote  the  tMmk  a  liold«r  with- 
the  meaniiig  of  Negotiable  Ixustrnmenta 
LW,  proYlding  that  an  instnuiient  la  nego- 
tted  when  It  Is  tranaferred,  so  as  to  oon- 
tute  the  transferee  a  turfder  thereot  Na- 
>iial  Bank  of  Commerce  of  Lincoln  y. 
Limers'  ft  Merchants'  Bank,  128  N.  W.  622, 
3,  87  Neb.  841  (quoting  and  adopting  the 
flnltlon  In  5  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4771). 

To  make  one  a  holder  In  due  course  of 
negotiable  note  payable  to  order,  it  must 
L  ve  been  indorsed  to  him ;  Revisal,  1906,  f 
T8,  defining  negotiation  of  such  a  note  as 
dug  by  the  indorsement  of  the  holder  and 
»mpleted  by  delivery,  and,  without  proof 
indorsement,  the  note  is  held  subject  to 
^y  valid  defense  which  the  maker  has,  In- 
udlng  that  of  fraud.  Woods  t.  Finley,  60 
.    E.  502,  603,  163  N.  0.  401. 

In  an  admission  that  a  note  sued  on  was 
idorsed  by  the  several  defendants  "on  or  be- 
>re  negotiation,"  the  words  ''on  or  before*' 
ccluded  "after,"  and  the  word  "negotiation*' 
Ignifled  deliyery;  that  term  being  generally 
escriptiye  of  all  those  acts  by  which  a  note 
T  bill  is  put  into  circulation  or  passed  in 
ts  drcnlation,  including  delivery  in  Issue, 
raiMBfer  by  delivery,  or  transfer  by  indorse- 
nent.  Edward  Knapp  ft  Ck>.  v.  Tidewater 
>>al  Co^  81  Aa  1068,  1006,  86  Oonn.  147. 

In  an  affidavit  for  continuance  because 
>f  inability  to  obtain  counsel  to  prepare  the 
c^ase  and  to  represent  him  on  the  trial,  re- 
citing that  the  negotiations  for  the  employ- 
ment of  counsel  had  been  commenced  but 
never  consummated,  the  word  "negotiations" 
has  a  well-defined  professional  meaning. 
Carpenter  t.  Commonwealth  (Ky.)  02  S.  W. 
552. 

NEGRO 

As  citizen,  see  Citizen. 
See,  also,  Colored  Person. 

A  "^egro"  is  defined  as  a  "black  man, 
especially  one  of  the  race  who  inhabit  trop- 
ical Africa,  and  who  are  distinguished  by 
crisped  or  curly  hair,  flat  noses  and  protrud- 
ing lips,"  and  the  word  also  includes  their 
Ascendants  In  America  and  elsewhere,  but 
the  word  Is  also  loosely  applied  to  other 
dark  and  black-skinned  races  and  to  mixed 
breeds.   The  word  '*negro"  of  itself,  unqual- 
ified, does  not  necessarily  include  within  its 
meaning  persons  possessed  of  only  an  admix- 
ture of  negro  blood,  notably  those  whose  ad- 
mixture Is  80  slight  that  even  an  expert 
cannot  be  positive.     An  octoroon  Is  not  a 
'^person  of  the  negro  pr  black  race"  within 
^ct  No.  87  of  1908,  I  1,  making  concubinage 
between  a  person  of  the  Caucasian  or  wliite 
face  and  t  rierson  of  the  negro  or  black  race 
a  felony.     State  v.  Treadaway,  52   South. 
^.  5U,  126  La.  800,  130  Am.  8t  Rep.  514, 
^'  Ann,  Cas.  12W. 


HEGBO  cmui 

Child  as  induding,  gee  OMld--Chlldreii 
(In  Statute^). 

NEIGHBORHOOD 

See  Same  General  Neighborhood. 

The  phrase  "general  locality"  and  the 
word  •*ndghborhood*'  imply  a  considerable 
territory,  and  cannot  be  used  in  a  legal  senae 
as  describing  a  circle  on  a  street  of  a  diniu- 
eter  of  about  six  feet.  Morlarty  v.  City  of 
New  York,  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  523,  S24,  132  App. 
Div.  10. 

Etymologically  and  by  common  under- 
standing In  the  vicinity'  mearijj  La  the  neigh- 
borhood, and  'neighborhood,'  as  appUed  ta 
place,  signifies  nearness.  *Ifi  the  vieiulty' 
does  not  even  mean  adjoinliig  to  or  abutting 
on,  but  merely  dose  by,  or  neighboring  coun- 
try.'* Jones  V.  Rogers,  Sa  South.  742,  745, 
85  Miss.  802. 

Where  the  value  of  land  is  of  necessity 
to  be  deduced  from  a  consideration  of  the 
price  of  properties  in  the  neifrhborbood^  with 
reference  to  comparative  locations,  Improve- 
ments, and  other  incidents,  the  court  cannot 
say  that  a  '^neighborhood"  has  reference  oih 
ly  to  adjacent  property,  or  attempt  to  fix  a 
standard  of  measurement,  and  say  as  a  matp 
ter  of  law  that  the  similar  property  concern- 
ing which  inquiry  may  be  made  is  such  only 
as  may  be  found  within  a  given  number  of 
feet,  yards,  or  blocks  of  the  property  con- 
demned; that  being  a  matter  as  to  which  the 
trial  court  is  vested  vrith  discretion  to  draw 
the  line  in  each  case  as  shell  seem  Juat  un- 
der all  the  circumstances  developed  by  the 
testimony,  and  that,  unless  ubuiie  of  mwh 
discretion  is  shown,  its  ruling  will  uot  b# 
held  reversible  error.  Youtzy  v.  City  of 
Cedar  Rapids,  129  N.  W.  351,  150  lowa^  53. 

The  market  value  of  a  particular  piece 
of  realty  sought  to  be  condemned  is  to  be 
measured  by  the  price  usually  ^^Iven  for  »uch 
property  in  that  nelghborbood.  making  due 
allowance  for  differences  of  position  a,  aoU, 
and  improvements,  and  In  large  cities  the 
word  "neighborhood"  is  a  relative  one,  so 
that  the  field  which  a  witness  may  take  Into 
consideration  in  forming  an  opinion  of  tbe 
selling  price  of  land  in  the  vldnlty  of  certain 
property  sought  to  be  taken  should  be  rea- 
sonably adjacent  thereto  and  of  the  same 
general  character  as  the  immediate  locality 
in  which  the  property  sought  to  be  taken  la 
situated.  Rea  v.  Pittsburg  &  C.  B,  Co,.  18 
Ati.  73,  79,  229  Pa.  106,  140  Am.  St  Rep.  721. 

Act  approved  February  23,  1907  (St- 
1907,  p.  16,  c.  26),  provider  that  whenever  50 
or  a  majority  of  the  owners,  who  are  aldo  the 
owners  of  a  majority  of  the  lands  of  any 
farming  or  other  comimiinity  or  neighborhood 
within  this  state,  which  lands  lie  in  one 
body,  and  are  liable  to  overflow  or  damage 
from  the  waters  of  any  umiavlgable  stream. 


i'l 


'li 


NISIOHBORHOOD 


S88 


NEITHSB  PARTY*  VIC 


i 


tnd  may  be  protected  by  the  same  system  of 
works,  desire  to  provide  for  the  protection 
of  such  lands,  they  may  petition  the  board 
of  supervisors  in  the  county  in  which  the 
lands  of  the  conmiunity  or  neighborhood  and 
within  the  proposed  district  or  the  greater 
portion  thereof  are  situated  for  the  organisa- 
tion of  such  protection  district  Held,  that 
these  provisions  do  not  limit  the  area  of  any 
district  to  a  territory  which  might  after- 
wards be  determined  by  a  court  to  be  a  sin- 
gle community  or  neighborhood,  or  give  the 
court  power 'to  declare  the  district  organi- 
zation invalid  if  it  should  find  that  the 
boundaries  included  two  or  more  such  com- 
munities or  neighborhoods,  as  the  term  ^'com- 
munity" refers  rather  to  the  people  who  re- 
side in  a  given  locality,  in  more  or  less  prox- 
imity, than  to  the  territory  which  includes 
them,  and  the  term  "neighborhood"  describes 
a  territory  of  indefinite  size  and  without 
fixed  limits,  and  therefere  a  district  may  be 
organized  which  embraces  two  or  more  com- 
munities or  neighborhoods,  provided  the  lands 
lie  in  one  body,  and  are  liable  to  damage 
from  the  same  stream  and  may  be  protected 
therefrom  by  the  same  system  of  works. 
Keech  v.  Joplin,  106  Pac.  222,  227,  157  Cal.  1. 

As  Vance  of  aeqnaiatanoesliip  or  Imsi- 


The  term  •'neighborhood,"  in  the  rule 
that  a  person  called  to  impeach  the  reputa- 
tion of  a  witness  must  reside  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  the  residence  of  the  witness,  com- 
prises the  natural  radius  of  repute,  and  in- 
cludes thie  territory  wherein  one  resides, 
moves,  circulates,  does  business,  and  has  in- 
tercourse with  his  fellows;  and  it  is  not 
confined  to  the  same  village,  town,  or  city, 
and  a  person  residing  in  a  town  less  than 
14  miles  distant  from  a.  town  in  the  same 
county  in  which  a  witness  resides  may  testi- 
fy as  to  the  reputation  of  the  witness,  es- 
pecially where  he  does  business  in  the  latter 
town.  People  v.  Loris,  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  236, 
237,  238,  131  App.  Div.  127  (citing  Greenl.  on 
Ev.  [15th  Ed.]  451;  State  v.  Henderson,  1 
S.  E.  225,  29  W.  Va.  147;  Peters  v.  Bourneau, 
22  111.  App.  177;  Chess  v.  Chess  [Pa.]  1  Pen. 
&  W.  32,  21  Am.  Dec.  450 ;  Hadjo  v.  Gooden, 
13  Ala.  718 ;  Dupree  v.  State,  33  Ala.  380,  73 
Am.  Dec.  422;  State  v.  Mk:Laughlin,  50  S. 
W.  315,  149  Mo.  19;  WalUs  v.  White,  15  N. 
W.  767,  58  Wis.  26;  Burr- Jones,  Ev.  [2d  Ed.] 
1097;    Best,  Ev.  [International  Ed.]  p.  255). 

The  general  rule  is  that,  to  impeach  a 
witness  by  proof  of  bad  character,  the  predi- 
cate is  a  knowledge  of  his  character  in  the 
community  or  neighborhood  in  which  he  re- 
sides, the  terms  "community"  and  "neigh- 
borhood" meaning  in  a  general  way  where 
the  witness  is  well  known  and  has  estab- 
lished a  reputation,  and  the  inquiry  is  not 
necessarily  confined  to  his  domicile;  and 
hence,  where  it  appeared  that,  though  a  wit- 
ness, resided  in  Baltimore,  he  had  an  estab- 


lished toosiness  in  Mobile,  and  spent  much 
Us  time  there,  evidence  as  to  a  knowled^ 
of  his  ofaaracter  in  Mobile  was  admissible  i 
a  predicate  for  impea<Ailng  testimony.  Ric 
aid  P.  Baer  ft  Oo.  r.  Mobile  Cooperage 
Box  Mf^.  Ck>.,  49  South.  92,  98,  96,  150  Al 
49L 


KEIOHBORHOOD  BOAB 

As  highway,  see  Highway. 

KElOMBOnaOr 

The  word  "neighboring,**  in  Act  Mlin 
14,  1879  (P.  L.  p.  316),  is  sufficiently  exte 
sive  in  its  meaning  to  make  the  act  app] 
cable  to  municipalities  in  the  sanoe  county  i 
which  gas  may  conveniently  be  conveyc 
from  a  central  plant  The  word  '^neighbo 
ing"  is  of  indefinite  meaning,  and  it  has  be< 
construed  in  some  cases  as  possessing  a  na 
row  signification,  while  in  others  it  is  giv( 
a  broad  construction.  Its  meaning  must  d 
pend  upon  the  circumstances  and  the  subjec 
matter  with  which  we  have  to  deal.  Wii 
the  improvement  in  means  of  commnnicatio 
municipalities  which  were  remote  became 
a  fair  sense  "neighboring"  mnnidpalitic 
When  used  in  respect  to  a  commodity  whii 
may  be  distributed  as  readily  and  as  a 
vantageously  as  gas,  the  term  cannot  I 
limited  to  adjoining  municipalities.  It  nu 
at  least  be  held  to  be  broad  enough  to  1 
elude  municipalities  within  the  same  conn 
to  which  gas  may  conveniently  be  conveys 
from  a  central  plant  Millville  Imp.  Co. 
Pitman,  Glassboro  &  Clayton  Gas  Co.,  67  A 
1006,  1006,  75  N.  J.  Law,  410  (dlstinguis 
ing  Madison  v.  Morristown  Gaslight  Co.,  I 
AU.  439,  65  N.  J.  Eq.  356). 

NEIGHBORS 

Louisiana  Rev.  Civ.  Ck)de,  art  070,  pi 
vides  that  every  one  is  Inmnd  to  keep  fa 
buildings  in  repair  so  that  neither  all  D( 
any  part  of  the  material  composing  the 
may  injure  the  "neighbors  or  passengers'*  n 
der  penalty  of  all  losses  and  damages  th 
may  result  from  the  owner's  negligence 
such  respect  Held  applicable  only  to  pc 
sons  "outside"  the  building,  such  as  neig 
bors  or  passers-by  injured  by  the  fall  of  tl 
building  or  some  part  thereof,  and  does  d 
apply  to  persons  lawfully  in  the  building  i 
guests,  tenants,  etc.  Frank  y.  Suthon,  li 
Fed.  174,  17a  ,^ 

NEITHER  PARTY,  ETC. 

The  entry  of  ''Neither  party,  no  furth^ 
action,  same  cause,"  means  that  by  agre 
ment  neither  party  further  appears  in  coa 
in  that  suit,  and  it  also  Involves  a  stipul 
tion  that  the  plaintiff  shall  maintain  no  fn 
ther  action  for  the  same  cause.  The  plai 
tiff's  cause  of  action  is  extinguished.  6e 
dron  V.  Hovey,  56  AU.  583,  98  Me.  139l 


N£PHfiW 


589 


KBT 


iEPHEW 

The  word  "n^pbew"  Is  deflaed  m  *^e 
on  of  a  brother,  or  sister;  or  of  the  brother- 
Q-law  or  a  sister-ln-law" ;  **the  son  of  a 
irother  or  sister.  But  in  a  beqnest  would 
lot  include,  without  special  mention,  nephews 
md  nieces  by  marriage";  "in  Bnglish  law 
be  son  and  niece,  the  daughter,  of  a  brother 
r  sister;  and  great-nephews  or  great-nieces 
xe  not  embraced  by  the  terms,  and,  as  a 
ift  is  naturally  to  blood  relatlTee,  a  nephew 
r  niece  by  marriage — that  is,  the  nephew 
r  niece  of  the  testator's  husband  or  wife — 
3  prima  facie  excluded,  as  also  would  be  the 
rives  or  widows  of  a  blood  nephew.*'  Boyd 
.  Perkins,  113  S.  W.  95,  06,  130  Ky.  77  (dt- 
ng  Webstier's  Diet;  Bouv.  Caw  Diet;  Schou- 
^r.  Wills  [2d  Ed.]  I  689. 

As  brotker 

See  Brother. 

Ormadnepliew 

Testator  gave  a  legacy  to  his  nleoe  Kate, 
^ughter  of  Dr.  H.  W.,  and  to  Dr.  H.  W.  a 
pecified  sum  for  himself  and  his  other  chil- 
ren,  and  he  gave  legacies  to  any  niece  or 
epbew  whom  he  had  omitted,  excepting  the 
hildren  of  Dr.  H.  W.,  for  whom  he  had 
lade  provision.  Testator  was  a  widower, 
fho  had  never  had  any  children,  and  left 
unriving  him  a  number  of  nieces  and  nep- 
ews,  and  grandnieces  and  grandnephews, 
lescendants  of  sisters  who  died  before  the 
xecotion  of  the  will.  Tbere  were  two  Drs. 
1.  W.,  father  and  son;  the  father  being  the 
ather  of  the  niece  Kate.  Testator  had  a 
iece  Mrs.  P.,  Who  was  ondtted  from  the 
nil,  and  the  legacy  to  her  was  on  her  death 
aid  to  her  children.  Held,  that  the  words 
niece  or  nephew"  did  not  embrace  grand- 
ieoes  and  grandnephews.  White  v.  Old,  75 
L  E.  182.  184,  113  Va.  709. 

The  testator  was  a  widower,  and  left 
0  children  or  descendants.  He  left  surviv- 
Dg  1  brother,  and  16  nephews  and  nieces, 
nd  several  grandnephews  and  grandnlece& 
lany  of  the  nephews  and  nieces  had  married 
nd  had  children,  and  some  had  died  leaving 
hildren.  The  will  contained  bequests  m 
avor  of  all  his  nephews  and  nieces  with  one 
xception.  It  also  contained  legacies  to  a 
umber  of  grandnephews  and  grandnieces, 
hildren  of  deceased  nephews  and  nieces, 
ind,  after  making  provisions  for  the  surviv- 
Dg  brother  and  various  other  persons,  pro- 
ided  that  all  the  rest  ef  the  property  not 
hereinbefore  disposed  of  should  be  given  to 
lis  '^nephews  and  nieces,"  to  be  divided 
mong  them  in  the  proportion  whic^  the  prt- 
ious  gifts  made  to  them  bore  to  each  other, 
leld.  that  the  words  "nephews  and  nieces" 
ontained  In  the  residuary  clause  Included 
Tandnephews  and  grandnieces.  Leasic  v. 
Wchards,  101  N.  Y.  Supp.  652,  116  App. 
Mv.  274 ;  Leask  v.  Hoagland,  80  N.  B.  919, 
"20,  188  N.  Y.  291. 


NERVE  FOOD 

On  motion  for  a  pteUminary  injunction 
in  a  suit  by  the  mannf aotnrsr  of  a  secret 
preparation  alleged  in  the  bill  to  be  a  bever- 
age and  "nerve  food,"  or  compound  for  the 
nervous  system,  and  a  restorative  agent  of 
value  in  restoring  lost  nervous  energy,  and 
also  of  value  as  a  stomachic,  to  restrain  in- 
fringement and  unfair  competition,  on  which 
affidavits  were  presented  by  defendants  to 
the  effect  that  the  expression  "nerve  food" 
as  applied  to  a  compound  of  such  oharacter 
was  a  misrepresentation,  not  only  being  sd- 
entlflcally  a  meaningless  phrase,  but  as  im- 
porting the  possession  of  nerve  nourishing  or 
stimulating  properties  which  it  could  not 
possess,  and  complainants  in  reply  produced 
affidavits  that  its  actual  formula  had  been 
submitted  to  physicians  who  testified  that  it 
was  properly  described  as  a  nerve  food,  the 
weight  of  the  evidence  showed  that  complain- 
ants had  a  reasonable  basis  for  believing 
their  representations  made  to  the  public  that 
it  was  a  "nerve  food."  Moxie  Nerve  Food 
Go.  of  New  England  v.  Modox  Go.,  158  Fed. 
487,  48a 

NERVOUS 

The  word  "nervoos"  is  a  generic  term 
having  many  different  meanings,  and  evi- 
dence that  ever  since  the  accident  plaintiff 
had  been  ''nervous,"  without  any  particular 
indication  as  to  what  was  meant  by  that 
term,  where  counsel  disclaimed  an  intention 
to  show  injury  to  the  nervous  system  as  an 
item  of  damage,  simply  means  that  the  plain- 
tiff was  excitable  and  easily  agitated  or  an- 
noyed as  the  result  of  her  physical  injury, 
not  that  she  was  suffering  from  a  nervous 
disease  caused  by  the  accident  Adcock  v.  Or- 
egon R.,  etc,  Co.,  77  Pac.  78,  79,  45  Or.  173. 

NET 

See  GUI  Net ;  Trammel  Net;  Wing  Nets. 

Use  of  the  word  "net"  indicates  that 
something  is  being  deducted.  Georgia  R.  & 
Banking  Co.  v.  Wright,  132  Fed.  912,  914. 

Where  furs  were  sold  "net,"  that  expres- 
sion means  that  the  seller  was  required  to 
defray  the  cost  of  delivery.  Fleet  v.  Hirtz, 
66  N.  E.  858,  861,  201  111.  594,  94  Am.  St. 
Rep.  192. 

"Net"  means  free  from  charges  or  deduc- 
tions obtained  after  deducting  all  expenses; 
the  words  **net  to  us,"  in  a  telegram  sent 
by  plaintiff  offering  to  sell  butter  to.  defend- 
ant for  17  cents  per  pound  "net  to  us,"  means 
that  the  price  is  to  be  17  cents,  free  from  all 
charges  and  deductions.  Floral  Creamery 
Co.  V.  Dillon,  75  AtL  82,  85,  83  Conn.  65. 

Where  one  states  to  a  broker  that  he 
will  sell  land  for  a  certain  sum  "net^  to  him, 
the  broker  on  proouring  a  purchaser  is  enti- 
tled to  no  commissleo  unless  the  sum  reoeftv- 


'J 


1^1 


ii 


NOT. 


590 


N£T  IfiAKNIKOS 


11 


ed  exceeds  the  spedfled  net  price;  the  word 
"net"  meaning  that  which  remains  after  de- 
ducting all  charges  and  outllLy.  Wolverton 
V.  TutUe,  d4  Pac.  961,  063,  51  Or.  601. 

Testator  gave  personal  property  in  trust, 
the  income  of  which  was  to  be  paid  to  certain 
legatees  during  their  liyes,  and  devised  the 
remaining  f our-flfths  of  the  estate  in  trust  to 
pay  a  certain  part  of  the  "net  rents,  inter- 
est, or  income"  to  each  of  his  three  nieces, 
and  upon  their  death  payment  of  the  "rents, 
interests,  or  income"  of  their  respectiTe 
shares  w&s  to  be  paid  over  to  their  respective 
children  during  their  lives.  Two  of  the  three 
nieces,  to  whom  the  bulk  of  the  estate  was 
given,  were  made  executrices  and  trustees, 
with  a  provision  for  their  successors,  but 
without  any  express  provision  for  their  com- 
pensation. Held,  that  the  word  "net,"  used 
to  qualify  the  "rents,  interest,  or  income" 
payable  to  the  residuary  legatees,  if  not  in- 
advertent, did  notHshow  any  intention  of  the 
testator  to  impose  upon  their  interests  the 
burden  of  bearing  all  the  expenses  of  the 
trust  Leach  V.  Cowan,  140  S.  W.  1070,  1075, 
126  Tenn.  182,  Ann.  Cas.  1913C,  188. 

Where  a  contract  employing  plaintiffs  to 
sell  defendants'  property  provided  that  it 
must  be  sold  at  a  price  to  net  the  owners 
not  less  than  $125  per  acre,  and  that  the 
commission  must  be  added  to  that  amount, 
the  contract  did  not  authorize  the  brokers  to 
retain  as  their  commission  all  of  the  price 
above  $125  per  acre  obtained,  but  only  en- 
titled them  to  a  reasonable  compensation. 
AUen  V.  J.  A.  Glopton  Realty  Go.  (Tex.)  136 
S.  W.  242,  243. 

NET  ASSETS 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  "net  as- 
sets" means  the  funds  of  an  Insurance  com- 
pany available  for  the  payment  of  its  obliga- 
tiond  in  the  commonwealth  after  deducting 
therefrom  losses  and  "claims  for  losses,"  an 
insurance  company  whose  assets  exceed  by 
about  $30,000  its  liabiUaes,  not  including 
claims  against  it  aggregating  $300,000,  based 
on  policy  holders  disputing  the  validity  of 
settlements  for  losses,  is  insolvent,  and  the 
insurance  commissioner  may  apply  for  a  re- 
ceiver and  enjoin  the  company  from  carry- 
ing on  further  business  as  authorized  by  the 
statute;  the  phrase  "claims  for  losses"  in- 
cluding all  pending  claims,  whether  finally 
adjudged  valid  or  invalid.  Cutting  v.  Amer- 
ican Ins.  Co.,  83  N.  E.  396,  397,  197  Mass.  131. 

NET  CASH 

"Net  cash"  as  between  buyer  and  seller 
means  that  the  buyer  shall  pay  the  "net 
price"  to  seller.  Plaintiff  procured  a  con- 
tract authorizing  him  to  sell  defendant's  tim- 
ber land  on  a  5  per  cent,  commission;  and, 
having  found  a  purchaser,  presented  to  de- 
fendant for  his  signature  an  option  giving  the 
grantee  the  right  to  purchase  within  60  days. 
Defendant, .  before  signiag  the  option,   but 


without  any  conversation  with  plaini 
changed  the  same  so  as  to  read  that 
price  was  "net  cash"  to  him.  Held,  that  si 
alteration  meant  that  the  price  was  net  c 
to  defendant  as  between  himself  and  the  i 
chaser  and  had  not  reference  to  def endaj 
contract  with  plaintiff  for  commissions.  L 
V.  Scatcherd,  146  Fed.  1,  8,  77  O.  C.  A.  1. 

NET  CREDITS 

As  credits,  see  Credits. 

NET  EARNINGS 

The  "net  earnings  rule"  is  a  method 
determining  the  value  of  a  special  francti 
by .  ascertaining  its  earning  capacity; 
franchises  being  assumed  to  be  worth  tJ 
sum  which,  if  placed  at  interest  at  a  del 
mined  rate,  will  produce  the  amount  wh 
the  franchise  earns.  In  determining  the  t 
able  value  of  a  waterworks  franchise,  los 
due  to  functional  as  well  as  physical  de{ 
dation  should  be  charged  as  an  expense 
operation.  Earnings  in  an  adjoining  boroi 
from  the  sale  of  about  one-half  of  the  a 
pany's  output  are  properly  included.  A  gr 
sum,  covering  uncollectible  accounts,  1 
than  1  per  cent  of  the  gross  earnings,  ^ 
properly  deducted.  An  item  for  fanning 
penses  should  not  be  deducted  as  a  cost 
operation^  The  amount  of  land  neceasi 
for  proper  operation  and  for  preservation 
the  water  supply  is  largely  a  question 
determination  by  the  directors;  but  landp 
chased  to  prevent  its  acquisitioa  by  some  < 
else  should  not  be  included.  One  of  the  i 
tors  of  the  net  earnings  rule  governing  i 
taxable  value  of  a  waterworks  franchise 
the  amount  of  capital  invested  in  land.  1 
net  earnings  rule  for  determining  the  v& 
of  a  special  franchise  requires  an  ascertj 
ment  of  the  gross  earnings,  the  gross  opei 
ing  expenses  deductible  therefrom,  as  well 
a  fair  and  reasonable  return  on  the  port 
of  the  capital  invested  in  tangible  propei 
and  the  balance,  if  any,  capitalized  at  a  f 
rate,  represents  the  value  of  the  special  fn 
chise.  People  ex  rel.  Queens  County  Wa 
Co.  V.  Woodbury,  128  N.  Y.  Supp.  522,  5 
143  App.  Div.  618. 

Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  H  849^-8499.  85 
8638,  8555,  requiring  railroads  to  make  sta 
ments  giving  the  amount  of  the  cap! 
stock,  annual  gross  and  net  earnings,  e 
when  considered  in  the  light  of  the  hlsU 
of  legislation  on  the  subject  of  railroad  t 
aticm  and  the  construction  placed  on  si 
legislation,  require  the  ascertainment  of  1 
value  of  railroad  property  for  taxation,  whi 
valuation  includes  all  the  property  of  i 
railroad,  except  that  specifically  exempt,  a 
the  state  board  of  tax  commissioners  in 
sessing  the  property  of  a  railroad  must  in 
into  consideration  its  money  on  hand  or 
deposit  and  the  money  on  hand  cannot 
retaxed  as  money;  the  word  "earnings**  s 
nifying  proney,  and  "net  earnings**  the  si 
received   in   excess   of  opMerating   expens 


KET  BARKIKOS 


691 


IVET  PBOCEED8 


nark  T.  VandaUa  R.  Oo^  86  N.  B.  881.  854, 
72  Ind.  409. 

Dividends  can  lawfully  be  declared  and 
ilstrlbnted  only  out  of  the  actual,  legitimate 
let  earnings  of  the  corporation;  and  the  dif- 
erence  between  the  present  value  of  all  the 
orporate  assets  and  the  amount  of  all  loss- 
s,  expenses,  and  liabilities,  including  the 
apital  stocky  constitutes  "net  earnings**  for 
he  purpose  of  dividends.  It  follows  that  an 
nsolvent  corporation  cannot  have  net  earn- 
ngs  out  of  which  dividends  can  be  lawfully 
ledared  and  paid.  Mangham  v.  State,  75  8. 
C.  508,  610,  11  Oa.  Aw-  440. 

• 
fET  mCOMB 

Of  estate 

An  executrix,  under  the  authority  of  a 
vni  and  the  contract  constituting  a  partner- 
;hip,  carried  on  the  business  of  the  decedent 
uid  earned  a  profit.  The  will  directed  the 
executors  to  sell  the  residuum  of  the  estate 
uid  receive  the  profits,  and  also  the  profits 
>f  the  partnership  business  when  wound  up, 
md  the  ''net  income"  thereof,  and  also  pro- 
dded for  its  distribution'  anoong  certain 
:nists.  Held,  that  the  profits  of  the  partner- 
ship made  by  the  executrix  were  a  part  of 
the  fund  to  be  distributed.  In  re  Marx's  Es- 
:ate,  90  N.  Y.  Supp.  834,  336,  49  Misc.  Rep. 
280. 

Testator  devised  to  his  executors  in  trust 
For  the  benefit  of  his  widow  for  life  $200,000, 
the  "dividends,  rents  and  profits"  thereof  to 
^  to  and  belong  to  the  widow,  to  her  sole  and 
separate  use  during  her  natural  life,  with  re- 
version after  her  death  to  the  uses  and  ap- 
pointments recited  in  the  will.  Held,  that  the 
words  "dividends,  rents,  and  profits,"  as  so 
ased,  were  synonymous  with  "net  income," 
and  hence  the  accretions  to  the  fund  during 
the  widow's  life,  detemdned  on  the  basis  of 
the  market  value  of  the  securitiee  in  which 
the  fund  was  invested,  passed  to  the  remain- 
dermen on  the  termination  of  the  life  estate, 
and  not  to  the  estate  of  the  widow.  Board- 
man  V.  Mansfi^d,  66  Atl.  169,  170,  79  Conn. 
634,  12  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  793.  118  Am.  St  Rep. 
178. 

Where  a  will  created  a  trust,  giving  the 
trustee  authority  "to  manage,  invest,  alter 
the  investments,  and  reinvest  the  assets 
^  *  *  in  trust  as  he  may  deem  best,  and 
the  *net  income'  of  said  estate"  to  be  applied 
to  the  use  and  benefit  of  the  trustee  for  life, 
with  remainder  over,  and  the  trustee  invested 
^iDds  of  the  estate  in  real  estate  which  was 
nonproductive,  the .  trustee  was  entitled  to 
any  increase  in  the  value  of  the  real  estate 
after  the  investment  Billings  v.  Warren,  74 
N.  B.  1050-1053,  216  111.  281. 

Where  a  testator  gave  his  wife  and  un- 
married daughters  the  use  of  his  residence, 
together  with  the  total  income  of  his  estate 
&<ter  deducting  taxes,  the  total  income  in 
▼lew  of  the  deduction  of  taxes  meant  the 


''gross  Income,"  which  is  the  entire  amount 
that  the  use  of  the  principal  yields,  as  con- 
tradistlngulshed  from  "net  income^"  which 
means  what  is  left  of  gross  income  after  all 
expenses  on  behalf  of  up-keep  are  deducted. 
Schmidt  y.  Schmidt,  84  AU.  620,  631,  80  N.  J. 
Bq.864. 

Of  railroad 

The  net  income  of  a  railroad  for  purpos- 
es of  taxation  is  the  difference  between  the 
gross  receipts  and  expenses  as  they  would 
have  been  under  reasonably  economical  and 
prudent  management  State  v.  Nevada  Cent 
R.  Co.,  81  Pac  99,  102,  28  Nev.  186,  113  Am. 
St  Bep.  884. 

Laws  1867,  p.  1275,  c.  489,  authorized 
a  corporation  to  construct  an  elevated  rail- 
road in  New  York  City,  and  section  9  provid- 
ed the  corporation  should  pay  6  per  cent  of 
its  '^et  income"  from  passenger  traffic  upon 
Manhattan  Island  to  the  city  in  such  manner 
as  the  Legislature  might  thereafter  direct  as 
compensation  for  use  of  the  streeta  Laws 
1868,  p.  2034,  c.  855,  I  2,  provided  that  the 
company  pay  <iuarterly  to  the  city  comptrol- 
ler 6  per  cent  of  its  net  income  for  the  im- 
provement of  the  streets  through  which  the 
road  was  constructed.  Sections  2  and  3  also 
provided  that  such  payments  should  be  the 
legal  compensation  in  full  for  the  use  and 
occupancy  of  the  streets,  and  the  claims  of 
the  city  should  constitute  a  prior  lien  on  the 
railway.  Held,  that  it  was  the  legislative 
intention  that  the  compensatioQ  to  the  city  be 
actual  and  substantial,  and  by  "net  income*' 
was  meant  the  gross  passenger  traffic  receipts, 
less  the  general  expenses  of  operating  the 
road,  and  the  amounts  paid  for  general  taxes, 
the  rental  damages  to  abutting  owners  for 
trespass  upon  their  interests  in  the  streets, 
and  interest  on  the  corporation's  mortgage 
bonds  are  not  to  be  deducted  in  determining 
the  "net  income" ;  they  being  general  charges 
against  the  corporation,  and  not  against  the 
passenger  traffic.  City  of  New  Tork  v.  Man- 
hattan Ry.  Co.,  104  N.  T.  Supp.  609,  119  App. 
Div.  240;  Id.,  84  N.  Bi  745,  746,  192  N.  Y.  90. 

NET  PERSOKAIi  ESTATE 

Under  Sanb.  &  B.  Ann.  St  I  2172,  de- 
claring that  the  widow,  on  filing  her  election 
to  take  the  provisions  made  for  her  by  law, 
instead  of  the  provisions  made  by  her  hus- 
band's will,  is  entitled  to  the  same  share  of 
his  personal  estate  as  if  he  had  died  intestate, 
provided  that  such  share  shall  not  exceed  a 
third  of  his  "net  personal  estate,"  there  is 
deducted  from  the  personal  estate,  before  her 
share  is  taken  out,  not  only  the  expenses  of 
administering  an  intestate  estate,  but  the  ad- 
ditional ones  of  probating  and  carrying  out 
the  provisions  of  the  will.  Ford  v.  Ford,  59 
N.  W.  464,  466,  88  Wis.  122, 

MET  PROOEEBS 

As  proceeds,  see  Proceeds. 
Earnings  as,  see  Bamlngs. . 


VET  PBOCEEDS 


Nirr  P&OFTCB 


Where  title  owner  of  a  mbiiiis  property 
ga^e  an  option  to  porcbase,  with  prlTilege 
of  proepeotlng  and  mining  ore,  and  it  was 
agreed  that  all  ore  found  which  might  be 
anaoeptible  of  milling  shoold  be  sold  by  ench 
owner,  and  the  net  proceeds  applied  on  the 
purchase  price,  the  ^'net  proceeds"  in  such 
case  is  synonymous  with  **net  profits.**  Hall 
▼.  Abraham,  75  Pac.  882,  884,  44  Or.  477. 

Where  defendant  gaye  D.  a  permit  to 
cut  logs  upon  his  land  for  an  agreed  price 
per  thousand  to  be  holden  to  pay  stumpage, 
and  all  supplies  furnished  by  the  former,  and 
D.  employed  plaintiff  to  cut  under  the  permit, 
and,  after  the  latter  had  labored  two  months, 
the  defendant  gave  him  a  memorandum  in 
writing,  agre^ng  to  pay  him  his  wages  out 
of  the  net  proceeds  of  the  lumber  when  sold, 
and,  where  the  logs  sold  for  more  than 
enough  to  pay  the  stumpage  and  not  enough 
to  pay  for  both  stumpage  and  supplies,  the 
term  "net  proceeds"  in  the  memorandum 
meant  the  proceeds  of  the  lumber  after  de- 
ducting pay  for  the  stumpage,  but  without 
any  deduction  baying  been  made  for  the  sup- 
plies.   Warren  y.  Thatcher,  12  Me.  351,  352. 

Where  a  will  providing  that,  "after  the 
payment  of  debts  and  legacies  above  named, 
I  direct  that  a  diyislon  of  the  'net  proceeds' 
into  parts,  one  for  eadi  of  my  childr^i,  as 
follows,"  etc.,  and  the  question  was  whether 
the  will  manifested  an  intention  to  have  the 
real  estate  sold  and  the  proceeds  divided,  it 
was  held  that  the  term  '"net  proceeds,"  as 
used  therein,  referred  to  the  money  which 
would  come  ff om  a  sale  of  the  property.  May 
v.  Brewster,  73  N.  B.  546,  547,  187  Mass.  524. 

A  contract  between  an  inventor  and  a 
manufacturer,  which  recites  that  the  inventor 
has  invented  an  improvement  in  kilns  for 
drying  lumber,  for  which  an  application  for 
a  patent  has  been  filed,  that  the  manufacturer 
is  desirous  of  acquiring  an  undivided  half 
interest  in  the  invention  and  patent  to  be  ob- 
tained therefor,  to  be  issued  to  the  parties 
as  owners,  and  which  declares  that  the  in- 
ventor sells  to  the  manufacturer  an  undivided 
half  interest  in  the  inventloni  and  gives  to 
the  manufaoturer  the  right,  free  of  royalty, 
to  manufacture  and  use  kilns  at  plants  control- 
led by  him,  that  the  manufacturer  may  li- 
cense others  to  build  for  their  own  use  kilns, 
or  may  himself  build  and  sell  to  others,  in 
either  case  charging  "such  royalty,  license 
fee,  or  other  consideration"  as  to  him  may 
seem  best,  and  shall,  inunediately  on  the  re- 
ceipt thereof,  pay  to  the  inventor  one-half  of 
the  net  proceeds,  and  that  the  manufacturer 
shall  use  his  best  endeavors  to  introduce  the 
kilns  into  the  market  and  sell  licenses  to  oth- 
ers to.  use  the  same,  and  to  keep  accounts  of 
licenses  granted  and  the  proceeds  thereof, 
creates  a  joint  adventure,  and  the  inventor 
is  entitled  to  an  accounting  with  the  manu- 
facturer to  determine  the  amount  of  net 
profits,  after  deducting  losses  on  sales  and 


azpenaea  Incurred,  taieluding  attorney's 
and  costs  in  making  coUectioos;  fbe  t 
"net  proceeds'*  being  equivalent  to  "net  i 
its.**  Williams  V.  Walsh  Mfg.  Co.,  135  N 
954,  957,  109  Mich.  676.  (Per  Moore.  C 
and  McAlvay,  Steere,  and  Brooke,  JJ.; 
tra,  Ostrander,  Blair,  Stone^  and  Bird,  JJ 

NET  PROFITS 

See  First  Net  Profits. 

"Net  profits"  have  been  defined  aa 
gain  that  accrues  on  the  investmoit,  aftei 
ducting  the  losses  and  expenses  of  the  1 
ness.  City  of  Erie  v.  Erie  Gaa  ft  Mineral 
97  Pac  468,  469,  78  Kan.  348. 

"Net  profits"  are  the  dear  gain  of  a 
ture,  after  deducting  from  the  net  yalu 
all  assets  on  hand  the  capital  invested  ani 
outstanding  liabilities.    Thurston  y.  Hami 

85  N.  E.  82,  83,  199  Mass.  151. 

The  "net  profits*'  of  a  busineBa,  a 
centage  of  which  an  employ^  shaU  reoeiyc 
his  services,  is  what  remains  after  all  le 
mate  exi)enses  thereof  have  been  paid, 
thur  Jordan  Co.  v.  Gaylor,  76  N.  E.  419, 

86  Ind.  App.  640. 

Net  profits  may  be  construed  to  n 
what  is  left  after  deducting  from  the  sel 
price  the  actual  cost  price,  together  witl 
expenses  incidental  to  the  procurement  oi 
property.  Ck>oke  v.  Cain,  77  Pac.  682-68^ 
Wash.  358. 

Under  exceptional  circumstances  aho^ 
an  intended  distinction  there  may  be  a  dl 
ence  in  the  meaning  of  the  term  "net  pro 
and  "profits,"  but  usually  they  mean  the  s 
thing.  Thomas  v.  Columbia  Phonograph 
129  N.  W.  522,  523,  144  Wis.  470. 

"Net  profits*'  is  defined  as  what  rem 
as  the  clear  gain  in  a  business  after  ded 
ing  the  capital  invested,  the  expenses  in 
red,  and  the  losses  sustained.  Grawfor 
Calkins,  186  N.  W.  369,  870,  170  Mich.  ; 
Di  Palma  v.  Weinman,  121  Pac.  88,  40,  1< 
M.  302. 

"Net  profits**  of  a  corporation  are  the 
gains  which  have  been  actually  realized 
which  could  be  quickly  distributed  witl 
loss  by  sale  of  assess.  Stevens  v.  Uni 
States  Steel  Corp.,  69  Atl.  905,  906,  912, 
N.  J.  Eq.  378  (citing  and  adopting  definil 
in  Park  v.  Grant  Locomotive  Works,  3 
162,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  114). 

In  determini^ig,  whether  the  books  o 
malting  company  showed  a  "net  profit,"  sc 
to  Justify  the  declaring,  of  a  dividend,  an 
crease  of  15  per  cent  in  the  bulk  of  bai 
which  takes  place  when  it  is  manufiictu 
into  malt  was  properly  inventoried  as  hsT 
the  value  of  barley,  it  ai^)earing  that  t 
was  the  trade  custom.  Estimated  iwofits 
be  made  by  a  manufacturing  company  on 
ders  for  the  future  delivery  of  goods  to 
made  from  raw  material  not  yet  purdia 
are  not  '*net  profits"  within  Stock  Corpc 


NBT  PROFITS 


593 


NET  PROFITS 


tion  Law,  |  28  (Laws  1892,  p.  1820,  e.  688), 
and  New  Jersey  General  Corporation  Law,  S 
80  (P.  L.  p.  286),  t>oth  dedaring  tbat  dlTtdeiidfl 
shall  be  made  only  from  net  profits.  Hutch- 
inson ▼.  Gnrtlss,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  70,  72,  45 
Misc.  Rep.  484. 

In  ascertaining  the  ''net  profit"  derived 
from  carrying  on  any  ordinary  manufactur- 
ing business,  the  gross  profit  to  be  derived 
therefrom  is  to  be  divided,  first,  into  a  fair 
rental  for  the  factory,  based  on  the  cost  of  its 
reproduction ;  second,  interest  on  the  working 
capital ;  third,  cost  of  operating  and  adminis- 
tration ;  and  the  balance,  if  any,  is  "net  prof- 
it" See  V.  Hepponheimer,  61  AU.  843,  847,  69 
N.  J.  Eq.  36. 

The  term  ''net  profits,"  aa  used  in  P.  L. 
1904,  p.  275,  providing  that  a  corporation 
shall  not  pay  dividends  except  from  its  sur- 
plus or  from  the  net  profits  arising  from  its 
business,  is  not  synonymous  with  "surplus," 
nor  used  in  the  sense  of  an  excess  of  the 
value  of  its  present  assets  over  the  par  value 
of  its  outstanding  capital  stock,  and  "it  does 
fiot  necessarily  follow  that  net  profits  mean 
the  difference  between  net  earnings  and  what 
may  be  called  operating  expenses.  Sudi  prof- 
its may  be  called  annual  profits,  and  it  may 
be  that  by  net  profits  the  Legislature  meant 
the  net  profits  upon  the  whole  of  the  com- 
pany's business  from  its  organization.  If 
either  of  these  meanings  is  adopted,  the  dec- 
laration of  the  present  dividend  is  Justified. 
There  was  an  excess  of  gross  earnings  over 
the  operating  expenses  of  the  current  year, 
and  the  value  of  the  present  assets  exceeded 
the  value  of  the  actual  assets  with  which  the 
company  began  business."  Goodnow  v.  Amer- 
ican Writing  Paper  Co.,  69  Aa  1014r-1016,  73 
N.  J.  Bq.  692. 

A  contract  between  a  corporation  en- 
gaged in  the  manufacture  of  wire  cloth,  and 
another  for  the  establishment  of  the  new 
business  of  manufacturing  and  selling  wire 
rope,  provided  that  the  corporation  should 
furnish  caplUl  to  the  extent  of  $50,000,  if 
the  sales  did  not  exceed  $100,000  a  year,  rep- 
resented by  proper  buildings  with  power  and 
machiuery,  and  by  the  amount  of  capital 
necessary  to  purchase  or  provide  the  wire 
necessary  for  the  production  of  rope  to  the 
amount  named  per  annum.  The  contract  fur- 
ther provided  that  the  parties  were  each  to 
receive  one-half  of  the  net  profits,  and,  in 
ascertaining  net  profits,  taxes  on  the  capital 
employed  and  other  charges  as  usual  were 
to  be  made.  Held,  that  charges  for  the  de- 
predation of  buildings  and  machinery,  for 
power  furnished  by  the  corporation  to  the 
wire  department,  for  repairs,  for  insurance, 
and  for  loss  of  finished  product  destroyed 
while  in  a  warehouse  hired,  maintained,  and 
managed  by  the  wire  rope  department,  were 
proper  charges  against  the  gross  earnings 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  net  profits. 

3  WDS.&  P.2d  Seb.— 38 


Stone  V.  WHght  Wire  Co.,  86  N.  ¥L  471,  472, 
473,  199  lilass.  306. 

Where  the  owner  of  a  mining  lease  sold 
two-thirds  interest  therein  to  be  paid  for  out 
of  the  first  "net  profits"  out  of  the  mine, 
sueh  profits  comprised  the  first  excess  of 
current  receipts  for  ore  taken  out  of  the 
ground  over  aild  above  the  current  expenses 
for  producing  the  ore  and  the  necessary, 
charges  for  repairs  and  betterments,  and 
the  purchasers  were  not  to  be  reimbursed 
for  moneys  expended  in  the  development  of 
the  mine,  sinking  of  shaft,  erection  of  mill, 
purchase  of  machinery,  etc,  which  constitut- 
ed capital  before  an  account  of  the  first  ''net 
profits"  was  estimated.  Crocker  v.  Barteau, 
110  S.  W.  1062,  1066,  212  Mo.  859. 

"Net  profits,"  participation  in  which  con- 
stitutes a  person  a  partner,  contemplates  a 
sharing  of  the  loss  as  well  as  the  profits, 
while  gross  profits  mean  the  aggregate  sales 
made  after  deducting  cost,  import  duties, 
and  carriage,  and  participation  therein  would 
not  raise  a  presumption  of  partnership. 
Fechteler  v.  Palm  Bros,  ft  Co.,  138  Fed.  462, 
469,  470,  66  C.  C.  A.  336. 

The  term  "net  profits,"  in  a  contract  em- 
ploying one  to  take  charge  of  departments  in 
a  mercantile  establishment  for  an  annual  sal- 
ary and  a  per  cent  of  the  net  profits  of  the 
departments  in  his  charge,  means  the  prof- 
its realized  in  the  departments,  without  de- 
duction for  interest  on  the  capital  invested 
therein.  Daintrey  v.  Evans,  132  N.  T.  Supp. 
126,  128,  148  App.  Div.  275. 

The  term  "net  profits"  in  a  contract,  ap- 
plied to  a  course  of  dealing  involving  succes- 
sive transactions,  implies  an  element  of  time, 
and,  unqualified  by  custom,  usage,  or  other 
words,  refers  to  termination  of  the  particu- 
lar venture,  or  it  may  refer  to  expiration  of 
a  fiscal  period  at  the  end  of  which  profits 
are  to  be  computed,  less  than  the  period  of 
adventure,  but  if  the  business  covers  several 
fiscal  periods  provided  for  computing  com- 
pensation, losses,  and  gains  arising  from  mat- 
ters covered  by  an  earlier  fiscal  period,  but 
occurring  after  ascertainment  of  the  profits 
for  that  period,  are  carried  into  and  increase 
or  diminish  the  net  profits  for  the  next  or 
some  succeeding  fiscal  period,  though  the  par- 
ties may  at  the  end  of  any  fiscal  period  draw 
profits  thus  computed.  Thomas  v.  Columbia 
Phonograph  Co.,.  129  N.  W.  522,  523,  144  Wis. 
470. 

In  an  action  for  failure  to  deliver  a  pur- 
chased machine,  where  it  appeared  that  the 
purchase  price  was  to  be  paid  partly  on  ship- 
ment, partly  on  installment,  and  the  remain- 
der in  12  months  from  shipment,  with  inter- 
est, in  arriving  at  the  "net  profits"  which 
plaintiff  was  prevented  from  making  by  fail- 
ure of  defendant  to  deliver  the  machine,  the 
interest  on  the  investment,  at  least  on  the 
deferred  payment,  together  with  all  neces- 


NET  PROFITS 


694 


mST  VALUK 


P 


8ary  expenses  (Including  insaran<^  provided 
for  in  the  contract),  should  be  taken  into  ac- 
count. Fred  W.  Wolf  Co.  t.  Galbraith,  87 
S.  W.  390,  391.  39  Tex.  av.  App.  351. 

An  accident  insurance  contract  provided 
for  commissions  to  the  agent  consisting  of 
all  policy  fees  collected  and  33%  per  cent,  of 
the  "net  profits"  on  the  monthly  premium 
business  of  the  agency  to  be  ascertained  by 
crediting  the  gross  premiums  received  from 
the  collectors  in  the  territory  on  monthly 
premium  business,  to  the  account,  and  charg- 
ing the  same  with  the  sums  paid  in  losses 
and  claims  on  monthly  premium  business  in 
such  territory  and  taxes  and,  after  deduct- 
ing the  total  debits  from  credits,  the  bal- 
ance remainiiig  shall  constitute  the  "net  prof- 
its." Held,  that  losses  for  disability  begin- 
ning before  the  date  the  contract  was  ter- 
minated and  continuing  to  a  later  date  were 
properly  chargeable  against  the  business  of 
the  agency  in  ascertaining  the  "net  profits.*' 
C.  B.  Perry  ft  Sons  v.  United  States  Health 
ft  Accident  Ins.  Co.,  63  AtL  489,  490,  73  N. 
H.  608. 

A  hotel  lessee's  measure  of  damage  for 
wrongful  dispossession  is  such  amount  as 
will  compensate  him  for  the  injury,  not  ex- 
ceeding the  net  profits  of  the  business  for 
the  unexpired  portion  of  the  term,  and  in 
arriving  at  such  profits  it  la  proper  to  deduct 
the  gross  expenses  from  the  gross  receipts 
for  the  period  in  which  the  business  was 
run,  and  from  the  average  profits  thus  ascer- 
tained estimate  the  lessee's  loss  for  the  re- 
mainder of  the  term,  but  it  is  improper  to 
credit  uncollectible  accounts  as  profits. 
Orange  Hotel  Co.  v.  Townsend  (Tex.)  130  8. 
W.  701,  702. 

As  inoome 

See  Income. 

KET  RECEIPTS 

The  phrase  "net  receipts,**  as  used  in 
Laws  1869,  p.  228,  as  amended  by  Laws  1879, 
p.  179,  providing  that  agents  of  foreign  in- 
surance companies  shall  return  to  the  county, 
town,  etc.,  where  the  agency  is  situated,  the 
amount  of  the  "net  receipts"  of  such  agency 
for  the  preceding  year,  which  amount  shall 
be  subject  to  taxation  as  is  other  personal 
property,  means  the  amount  remaining  after 
the  operating  expenses  of  the  company  have 
been  deducted  from  the  gross  receipts;  and 
the  company  is  not  entitled  to  have  fire  losses 
paid  in  the  county,  etc.,  deducted  from  gross 
receipts.  National  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hanberg, 
74  N.  B.  877,  878,  215  111.  37a 

NET  SUCCES8IOK 

While  the  inheritance  tax  prescribed  by 
St  1905,  c.  314,  is  not  a  tax  on  property  as 
such,  but  upon  the  privilege  of  succession, 
the  amount  of  the  tax  as  to  any  beneficiary 
is  to  be  determined  according  to  the  value  of 
the  "net  succession";    that  is,  the  value  of 


such  property  as  remains  to  him  after  sal 
fying  lawful  diarges.  In  re  HIte's  Ssts 
118  Pac.  1072,  1078,  159  CaL  392,  32  !«,  B. 
(N.  8.)  1167,  Ann.  Cas.  1912C,  1014. 

NET  TO  US 

The  words  "net  to  us,"  in  a  telegram  « 
by  plaintiffs  offering  to  sell  butter  to  defei 
ants  for  17  cents  per  pound  "net  to  u 
meant  that  the  price  was  to  be  17  cents  fi 
from  all  charges  and  deductions.  Floi 
Creamery  Co.  v.  Dillon  ft  Douglaai^  75  A 
82,  84,  88  Conn.  66. 

NET  VALUE 

There  is  a  distinction  between  "^et  v 
ue"  and  the  "cash  surrender  value"  of  a  li 
insurance  policy.  Penn's  Mut.  Life  Ins.  ( 
V.  Bamett's  Adm'r,  90  S.  W.  228,  232,  1 
Ky.  26a 

In  construing  Rev.  St.  1899, 1  7897  (Ai 
St  1906,  p.  3752),  which  provides  that  po 
des  shall  not  be  forfeited  by  reason  of  nc 
payment  of  premiums  where  three-fourths 
the  net  value  of  the  policy  is  sufficient  to  i 
cure  temporary  insurance,  etc,  "net  value'* 
a  technical  term,  and  is  to  be  taken  in  i 
technical  sense.  The  "net  value"  of  an  J 
surance  policy,  as  computed  under  Rev.  i 
1899,  t  7897  (Ann.  St  1906,  p.  3752),  is  t 
excess  of  the  total  premiums  paid,  plus 
per  cent  compound  interest,  over  tbe  i 
tuarial  cost  of  insurance.  Rose  v.  Frank! 
liife  Ins.  Co.,  132  S.  W.  613,  614,  153  h 
App.  90. 

"Net  value**  of  a  policy  within  the  mea 
ing  of  the  statute  is  a  sum  which,  with  coi 
pound  interest  at  the  rate  of  4  per  cent,  p 
annum  and  with  the  addition  of  future  n 
premiums,  will  provide  for  the  payment 
the  policy  when  it  matures  according  to  t 
combined  experience  of  actuaries'  table 
mortality.  Westerman  v.  Supreme  Lod 
Knights  of  Pythias,  94  S.  W.  470,  480,  1 
Mo.  670,  5  li.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1114. 

The  term  "net  value,"  as  used  in  Re 
St  1899,  tt  7897,  7898,  7899,  7900,  relating 
insured's  rights  in  life  policies  after  defai 
in  payment  of  premium,  is  to  be  determln* 
by  construing  such  sections  together.  T^ 
term  does  not  mean  the  provision  for  tJ 
amount  of  paid-up  insurance  that  insun 
would  be  entitled  to  if  demanded,  but  is  t 
arbitrary  apportionment  arrived  at  in  tJ 
method  prescribed  by  section  7897,  whh 
"net  value"  is  the  same  referred  to  in  8ecti< 
7900,  so  that  where  insured,  after  havii 
paid  more  than  three  annual  premiums  on  i 
endowment  policy,  payable  on  a  specific 
date  or  at  death,  made  default  in  the  pa 
ment  of  premiums,  and  at  the  date  of  d 
fault  three-fourths  of  the  net  value,  coi 
puted  as  directed  by  section  7897,  amounU 
to  $47.86,  while  the  net  value  of  the  pald-i 
insurance  provided  in  the  policy  was  on 
$42.79,  and  the  sum  of  $47.86  would  porchaj 


Hjpr  WEIGHT 


S95 


NEW  ACQUISITION 


extmded  insurance  under  section  7807  for  a 
term  extending  beyond  the  date  of  insured's 
deatb,  the  amount  of  paid-up  insurance  so 
stipulated  in  tbe  policy  was  not  sufficient 
under  section  7900  to  make  section  7897  in- 
applicable, and  hence  insured's  beneficiary 
was  entitled  to  recover  the  full  amount  of  the 
policy.  Fahle  v.  Connecticut  Met  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  184  8.  W.  ao^  63,  106 
Mo.  App.  15. 

NET  'WdOHT 

The  "net  weight"  of  a  cargo  of  lumber 
means  the  weight  of  the  lumber  only,  exclu- 
sive of  standards,  supports,  etc,  used  in  pil- 
ing the  lumber  on  the  car.  State  ex  reL 
Washington  Mill  Co.  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 
Co.,  86  Paa  1056,  1057,  43  Wash.  658,  6  L. 
R.  A,  (N.  S.)  908, 117  Am.  St  Rep.  1084. 


KETTIHO 

See  Cotton  Netting. 

NEURALGIA 

See  Coccyx  Neuralgia. 

NEURASTHENIA 

See  Traumatic  Neurasthenia. 

**  'Neurasthenia*  is  a  somewhat  inde^lte 
term,  applied  to  certain  nervous  conditions, 
while  'myelitis'  is  a  diseased  condition,  or 
degeneration  of  the  spinal  cord,  and  Is  re- 
garded as  a  much  more  serious  ailment  than 
that  of  •neurasthenia.*"  In  a  i>ersonal  in- 
jury action,  the  weight  of  the  evidence  show- 
ing that  the  injuriel  had  produced  a  condi- 
tion of  neurasthenia  rather  than  myelitis, 
as  claimed  by  plaintilf,  a  verdict  for  |8,000 
was  excessive  by  at  least  $3,000;  plaintifT 
being  28  years  old  and  earning  $70  to  $85  per 
month.  Robinson  v.  Spokane  Traction  Co., 
91  Pac.  972,  978,  47  Wash.  803. 

NEURITIS 

As  disease,  see  Diseasew 

NEUROSIS. 

See  Traumatic  Neurosia. 

NEUTRAL  SPIRITS 

"Neutral  spirits,"  as  the  term  suggests, 
is  a  colorless  liquid  which  has  neither  flavor 
nor  character,  and  is  not  a  beverage  at  all. 
It  may  be  produced  from  any  fermented  sub- 
stance, such  as  com,  potatoes,  and  sugar 
beets.  It  was  formerly  used  exclusively  in 
tbe  arts,  but  with  the  advent  of  cheaper 
methods  of  production  it  has  been  palmed 
otf  on  the  public  as  a  beverage  with  some- 
thing to  give  it  flavor  and  character.  Levy 
V.  Uri,  31  App.  D.  C.  441,  445. 

"Neutral  spirits*'  are  made  at  very  high 
temperature  for  the  j^urpose  of  carrying  off 


so  far  as  possible  every  property  exo^  al- 
cohol and  water,  and,  while  whisky  is  aged 
and  matured  for  not  less  than  four  years  in 
charred  oak  barrels,  neutral  spirits  require 
no  aging,  but  may  be  Immediately  consumed, 
and,  as  the  name  signifies,  they  contain  nei- 
ther t^ste,  smell,  nor  color,  and  no  amount 
of  aging  such  spirits  will  change  it  without 
the  aid  of  foreign  matter.  "Whisky,"  with- 
in the  Food  &  Drugs  Act  June  30,  1906,  34 
Stat.  768,  c.  3915,  is  the  product  of  sound 
grain,  distilled  at  a  low  temperature  so  as 
to  retain  in  the  distillate  the  congeneric 
properties  of  the  grain,  which  give  to  the 
liquor,  when  matured  by  aging  In  charred 
casks,  its  desirable  potable  character.  "Neu- 
tral spirits,"  which  are  distilled  at  a  high 
temperature,  may  be  made  from  different  ma- 
terials and  do  not  contain  such  properties, 
and  which  are  not  rendered  potable  by  aging, 
although  reduced  by  water  to  potable  strength 
and  from  which  most  of  the  fusel  oil  has 
been  removed,  are  not  whisky  nor  a  like  sub- 
stance with  whisky.  Woolner  k  Co.  r.  Ren- 
nick,  170  Fed.  662-664.    . 

NEW 

NEW  B/L 

The  words  "New  B/L**  mean  a  certain 
form  of  a  bill  of  lading  known  as  the  "new 
bill  of  lading,"  containing  a  special  clause  as 
to  the  time  to  be  given  for  unloading  a  ves- 
sel after  arrival  in  port,  and  as  to  the  amount 
of  demurrage  for  its  detention  beyond  the 
day  specified  in  the  bill  of  lading.  Kenyon  v. 
Tucker,  23  Aa  61,  17  R.  I.  529. 

NEW  ACQUISITION 

Land  is  to  be  considered  an  ancestral  es- 
tate where  it  has  come  from  or  by  or  on  the 
part  of  the  father  or  mother  of  the  owner  by 
gift,  devise,  or  descent  either  mediately  or 
immediately  from  them  or  from  any  person 
in  their  respective  lines,  and  will  be  a  "new 
acquisition"  if  derived  from  any  source  other 
than  by  descent,  devise,  or  gift  from  any 
relative  in  the  paternal  or  maternal  line, 
as  by  a  son  from  father  or  mother  for  a  val- 
uable consideration.  Martin  v.  Martin,  135 
S.  W.  348,  349,  08  Ark.  03. 

An  allotment  acquired  by  a  Creek  citizen 
by  selection  and  certificate  of  allotment  or 
by  patent  is  a  new  acquisition  within  Mansf. 
Dig.  Ark.  S  2531  (Ind.  T.  Ann.  St  1899,  f 
1839),  providing  that  where  intestate  shall 
die  without  descendants,  if  the  estate  be  a 
new  acquisition,  it  shall  descend  to  the  father 
for  his  lifetime,  with  remainder  to  the  col- 
lateral kindred  of  intestate  in  the  manner 
provided  by  that  act.  Shulthia  v.  MacDou- 
gal,  162  Fed.  881,  837. 

The  heirs  who  take  under  such  provi- 
sion and  their  estate  are  determined  by 
Mansf*  Dig.  Ark.  c  49,  which  provides  that, 
on  the  death  of  a  person  intestate,  unmar- 
ried, and  leaving  no  children,  the  estate,  if  it 


NEW  ACTION 


596 


NEW  ASSETS 


came  from  the  father,  shall  go  to  the  father, 
and  If  from  the  mother  shall  go  to  the  moth- 
er, *'bnt  if  the  estate  be  a  new  acquisition  it 
shall  ascend  to  the  father  for  his  lifetime 
and  then  descend  in  remainder  to  the  collat- 
eral kindred  of  the  intestate."  A  child 
whose  father  was  a  member  of  the  Greek 
Tribe,  but  whose  mother  was  not,  was  born 
May  6,  1901,  and  died  in  November  of  the 
same  year.  He  thus  became  entitled  to  en- 
rollment in  the  tribe,  but  had  not  received  his 
allotment  at  the  time  of  his  death.  Held 
that,  technically,  the  Arkansas  statute  did 
not  apply  to  the  situation,  since  the  land  to 
which  the  decedent  was  entitled  and  which 
was  the  common  property  of  the  tribe  did 
not,  strictly  speaking,  come  to  him  by  grant, 
inheritance,  or  purchase,  but  by  a  division  of 
lands  held  in  effect  by  a  tenancy  in  common, 
to  an  interest  in  which  he  was  bom  as  a 
member  of  the  tribe  entitled  to  enrollment 
therein;  but  that,  applying  the  statute  by  an- 
alogy, such  land  was  not  a  "new  acquisition," 
but  came  to  him  by  the  blood  of  his  tribal 
parent,  or,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute, 
"from  his  father,"  and  that  therefore,  on  his 
death  and  the  subsequent  allotment  his  fa- 
ther took  the  full  title,  and  not  merely  a 
life  estate.  Shulthis  ▼.  MacDougal,  170  Fed. 
529,  533,  95  C.  O.  A.  616. 

NEW  ACTION 

See  Commencement  of  New  Action. 

The  words  **new  action,"  in  Wilson's  Rev. 
ft  Ann.  St  1903,  §  4221,  providing  that  where 
any  action  is  commenced  within  due  time  and 
a  Judgment  for  plaintiff  is  reversed,  etc., 
plaintiff  may  commence  a  "new  action"  with- 
in one  year  after  the  reversal,  means  an  ac- 
tion for  the  same  cause  as  that  of  the  former 
action;  the  statute  only  intending  to  save  to 
plaintiff  the  right  to  commence  a  new  ac- 
tion for  the  same  causes  as  in  his  original 
action.  Hatchell  v.  Hebeisen,  82  Pac.  826, 
827,  16  Okl.  223. 

NEW  AND  ADDFTIONAI.  80UBCB8 

Laws  1905,  p.  2023,  c.  723,  |  2,  requires 
the  submission  of  maps  and  profiles  and  ap- 
proval of  the  State  Water  Commission  before 
taking  or  condemning  lands  for  new  or  ad- 
ditional sources  of  water  supply.  Held,  that 
the  word  "source"  may  refer  to  a  lake,  etc., 
as  a  source  of  supply,  or  to  any  well-defined 
watershed  from  which  percolating  water 
might  be  taken,  and  the  statute  did  not  ex- 
clude a  whole  territory  in  which  a  city  has 
Incidentally  procured  some  part  of  Its  supply, 
the  limitation  on  "new  and  additional  sourc- 
es" meaning  sources  which  had  not  been  ap- 
propriated at  the  time  of  the  statute.  Queens 
County  Water  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  115  N.  Y.  Supp. 
495,  498,  131  App.  Div.  91. 

NEW  ANB  USEFUL  ART 

A  system  of  transacting  business  discon- 
nected from  the  means  for  carrying  out  the 
system  is  not  within  the  most  liberal  inter- 


pretation of  the  term  ''art,"  and,  unless  tl 
means  used  are  novel  and  disclose  invei 
tion,  the  system  is  not  patentable  as  a  "ne* 
and  useful  art,"  within  the  provisions  < 
Rev.  St.  f  4886.  Hotel  Security  Checkixi 
Co.  V.  Lorraine  Co.,  160  Fed.  467,  469,  87  ( 
O.  A.  451,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  665. 

NEW  ASSESSMENT 

The  term  "new  assessment^  and  it 
term  "reassessment,"  in  St  Paul  City  Cha: 
ter,  I  57,  refers  to  a  new  apportionment  c 
the  benefits,  and  in  making  a  "new  asses 
ment"  or  "reassessment*'  the  board  of  pnblJ 
works  has  authority  to  establish  an  entire! 
new  district  and  to  include  therein  all  pro] 
erty  benefited  by  the  improvement,  whethc 
embraced  within  the  original  district  or  no 
State  ex  rel.  Eaton  t.  District  Court  of  Ran 
sey  County,  104  N.  W.  553,  556,  95  Mlon.  5a 

NEW  ASSETS 

Where  land  conveyed  by  testatrix  undi 
a  deed  absolute  on  its  face,  but  held  under 
court  decree  for  the  executrix  to  be  a  mor 
gage,  was  redeemed  by  her,  it  was  •'new  aj 
sets,"  within  Rev.  Laws,  c.  141,  i  11,  prorlc 
ing  that,  if  new  assets  come  to  an  execute 
after  two  years  from  the  time  of  his  giviu 
bond,  he  shall  be  held  to  account  therefor  i 
an  action  of  a  creditor,  the  same  as  if  tli 
assets  had  been  received  within  two  year 
if  the  creditor's  action  is  commenced  with! 
one  year  after  notice  of  the  receipt  of  tl 
assets  and  within  two  years  after  they  ai 
actually  received ;  and  a  creditors'  suit,  con 
menced  within  one  yea?  after  reconveyanc 
of  the  redeemed  property  to  the  executrix 
was  not  barred.  Horton  y.  Robinson,  98  ? 
B.  681,  682,  212  Mass.  24& 

Where  a  debtor  conveyed  property  t 
trustees,  reserving  the  right  to  any  surpln 
remaining  after  pasrment  of  creditors  namec 
and  at  his  death  this  possible  right  was  sui 
posed  to  be  of  no  value,  and  was  not  ti 
ventoried,  but  12  years  thereafter  the  bene 
ficiaries  accepted  certain  stock  in  a  real  es 
tate  trust  then  formed,  in  satisfaction  o 
their  claims,  and  it  was  then  found  tha 
there  was  a  surplus,  it  was  held  that  thi 
surplus  was  "new  assets"  within  Pub.  St  < 
136,  I  11,  making  an  administrator  liable  t 
suit  by  a  creditor  on  account  of  assets  re 
ceived  after  two  years  from  the  time  of  git 
ing  bond,  provided  the  suit  be  commence^ 
within  two  years  after  the  assets  are  actn 
ally  received  and  within  one  year  afte 
plaintiff  has  notice  of  their  receipt  Qulncj 
V.  Quincy,  46  N.  B.  108,  109,  167  Mass.  53C 

Rev.  Laws,  c.  142,  |  10,  relating  to  insol 
vent  estates,  provides  that  a  creditor  wh< 
does  not  present  his  claim  for  allowance  tn 
the  commissioners,  or  to  the  court  where  d< 
commissioners  are  appointed,  within  the  tim< 
prescribed  by  that  court,  shall  be  barred,  bn 
that,  if  "further  assets"  come  into  the  hand! 
of  executor  or  administrator  after  the  decree 


NEW  BILL 


597 


NEW  CAUSE  OF  ACTION 


f  distribution,  tbe  claim  may  be  proved  and 
aid.  Held,  that  the  term  "farther  assets'* 
i  substantially  the  same  as  "new  assets," 
rhicb  belated  creditors  are  permitted  to 
each  under  chapter  141,  |  11,  relating  to 
olvent  estates,  and  in  general  does  not  in- 
lnde  property  for  which  the  administrator 
AS  been  charged,  or  the  property  into  which 
Dch  property,  or  any  part  theceof,  has  been 
hanged,  or  the  natural  increment  of  such 
roperty;  ahd  where  an  administrator  did 
lot  include  in  the  inventory,  nor  in  his  first 
ior  second  and  final  account,  certain  land, 
T  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  thereof,  if  he 
mew  that  the  land  belonged  to  his  intestate 
Dng  before  the  decree  of  distribution,  and 
lad  it  in  his  control  well  within  the  two- 
ear  period  from  his  appointment,  neither 
be  land  nor  the  proceeds  of  its  sale  would 
«  "further  assets,"  but,  if  his  knowledge  of 
Dtestate*s  interest  in  such  tract  did  not  come 
o  him  until  after  two  years  from  his  ap- 
)ointment,  the  proceeds  of  their  sale  would 
)€  "further  assets."  Fay  v.  Haskell,  93  N. 
S.  641,  643,  207  Mass.  207. 

VEW  BILL 

If  the  amendment  or  substituted  bill 
presents  a  measure  that  has  no  relation  to 
he  bill  as  originally  introduced,  it  cannot 
(tand,  for  it  is  in  substance  a  new  measure 
>r  bill.  .  If  the  substitute  has  a  clear  rela- 
ion  to  the  subject  of  the  original  bill,  it  can 
)e  said  to  be  germane,  and  will  not  be  treat- 
^  as  a  new  bill.  A  bill  to  provide  for  a 
^rd  of  county  auditors  for  a  designated 
»)iinty  was  introduced  and  referred  to  a 
committee.  The  committee  reported  the  bill, 
cirith  a  substitute  identically  like  the  original 
bill,  except  that  another  county  was  substi- 
tuted for  that  of  the  county  mentioned  in  the 
original  bill.  Under  the  definition  this  change 
made  tbe  substitute  a  new  bill.  People  ex 
rel.  Board  of  Supers  of  Kent  County  v.  Loom- 
Is,  98  N.  W.  262,  265.  135  Mich.  556,  8  Ann. 
Cas.  751. 

HEW  BOOK 

Under  tbe  copyright  statutes  as  they 
stood  prior  to  Act  March  4,  1909,  c.  320,  35 
Stat  1075,  as  well  as  by  the  express  provi- 
sion of  section  6  of  such  act,  the  addition  of 
Dew  matter  to  a  copyrighted  book  in  a  second 
or  subsequent  edition  makes  it  a  "new  book" 
subject  to  copyright  as  an  original  work. 
West  Pub.  Ck>.  V.  Edward  Thompson  Ck>., 
176  Fed.  883, 837, 100  O.  G.  A.  808. 

VEW  BUHiDIllO 

Building  a  one-story  kitchen  in  the  rear 
of  another  building  is  the  erection  of  a  "new 
building"  within  the  meaning  of  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  erection  of  wooden  build- 
ings. If  a  building  be  so  changed  in  plan, 
stmctDre,  dimensions  and  general  appear- 
ance that  it  might  in  common  parlance  be 
called  a  "new  building,"  it  is  a  violation  of 


the  ordinance.    State  v.  Long  Branch  Ooiii't% 

25  AtL  274,  276,  55  N.  J.  Law,  108. 

Within  a  city  ordinance  making  it  un- 
lawful to  construct  any  wooden  building 
within  the  fire  limits,  no  fixed  rule  can  be 
laid  down  stating  what  is  to  be  deemed  a 
"new  building"  and  what  a  "repairing." 
Where  a  building,  42  feet  long,  24  feet  8 
inches  in  width,  and  about  10  feet  in  height 
at  the  highest  part  outside  of  a  raised  part 
at  one  end  with  a  skylight  which  was  about 
17  feet  high  at  its  highest  point,  had  the 
roof  with  the  skylight  removed  and  the 
building  raised  in  height  except  in  the  front, 
and  on  the  rear  16  feet  of  the  upper  part 
was  an  addition  with  a  peaked  roof  16  feet 
long  and  about  17  feet  to  the  peak  and 
about  12  feet  to  the  base  of  the  roof,  thus 
making  the  building  all  of  the  same  height 
without  any  change  in  its  height  or  appear- 
ance in  front  and  with  no  change  in  appear- 
ance at  the  sides,  except  by  reason  of  the  in- 
creased height,  it  was  not  a  "new  building** 
and  was  not  within  the  ordinance.  Mayville 
V.  Rosing,  128  N.  W.  398,  894,  19  N.  D.  98, 

26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  120. 

HEW  BUnilESS 

Kirby*s  Dig.  S  6969,  makes  it  the  coun- 
ty assessor's  duty  whenever  any  person  shall 
commence  any  new  business  after  the  reg- 
ular assessment  to  assess  the  value  of  such 
business  and  make  an  extra  assessment  and 
file  it  with  the  clerk  who  shall  extend  the 
taxes  thereon.  On  May  1,  1909,  plaintiffs 
owned  a  stock  of  merchandise  at  a  building 
on  M.  street  consisting  of  dry  goods,  etc., 
purchased  for  $18,000.  In  June,  1909,  they 
were  assessed  for  personalty  in  the  sum  of 
$10,000,  and  in  October  they  leased  the  F. 
building  and  carried  into  it  some  shopworn 
goods  from  their  store  on  M.  street  which 
were  sold  at  a  sacrifice  by  the  plaintiffs*  reg- 
ular employte,  and  no  separate  books  were 
kept,  the  money  received  each  day  being 
taken  over  to  the  M.  street  store,  and  no 
new  goods  were  purchased  for  the  F.  build- 
ing. Held,  that  the  business  at  the  F.  build- 
ing was  not  a  "new  business*'  within  the 
statute.  Froug-Smullion  &  Co^  v.  Pulaski 
County,  147  S.  W.  72,  73,  108  Ark.  397. 

MEW  CAUSE  OF  ACTIOIT 

The  expression  "new  cause  of  action*' 
can  be  taken,  when  used  on  the  subject  of 
amendment,  as  intending  nothing  more  than 
a  new  right  or  claim  arising  out  of  the  same 
transaction.  If  it  were  not  so — that  is,  if  the 
new  cause  of  action  was  one  arising  out  of  a 
wholly  different  transaction  from  that  laid 
in  the  complaint — then  it  would  constitute 
what  we  have  sometimes  designated  as  an 
entirely  new  cause  of  action,  and  one  which 
could  not  be  introduced  into  the  complaint 
hy  amendment,  if  objected  to.  Identity  of 
transaction  is  therefore  the  basis  for  the  in- 
troduction by  way  of  amendment  of  counts 
on  new  claims  or  rights  -arising  out  of  the 


1J3BW,  CAUSE  OP  ACTION, 


598 


NEW  MATTER 


same.    Nelson  ▼.  First  Nat  Bank,  36  South. 
707,  709,  139  Ala.  678,  101  Am.  St.  Rep.  52. 

Within  the  statute  of  Umltations*  an 
amended  complaint  sets  up  a  "new  cause  of 
action*'  composed  of  the  right  of  plaintiff 
and  the  obligation,  duty,  or  wrong  of  defend- 
ant, where  the  new  allegation  deprives  de- 
fendant of  any  defense  he  had  to  the  origi- 
nal action,  where  the  evidence  that  would 
have  proved  the  original  complaint  will  not 
prove  the  new,  where  the  new  allegations,  if 
in  reply,  would  have  amounted  to  a  depar- 
ture, where  the  amended  complaint  sets  up 
a  title  not  before  asserted,  or  where  a  judg- 
ment on  the  first  complaint  would  be  no  bar 
to  a  judgment  on  the  amended  complaint 
Where  the  original  complaint  in  an  action 
for  injuries  to  a  lineman  of  an  electric  light 
and  power  company  alleged  a  negligent  fail- 
ure to  properly  insulate  live  wires,  an  amend- 
ed complaint,  alleging  the  negligent  failure 
to  turn  off  the  electric  current  passing 
through  the  wires^  sets  forth  an  additional 
charge  of  negligence,  but  did  not  set  up  a 
new  cause  of  action  so  as  to  make  the  stat- 
ute of  limitations  applicable^  since  the  facts 
alleged  in  either  the  original  or  amended 
complaint  would  bar  another  action  for  the 
same  cause  Raley  v.  Evansville  Gas  & 
Electric  Light  Co.,  90  N.  B.  783»  784,  45  Ind. 
App.  649. 

NEW  CONSTBUCTIOK 

Under  Rev.  Codes,  §  2419,  authoriidng 
directors  of  irrigation  districts  to  fix  rates 
of  tolls  and  charges  for  water  against  per- 
sons using  its  canals,  or  to  levy  assessments 
to  defray  expenses  of  the  operation,  repair 
and  improvement  of  such  portion  of  its 
works  as  are  In  use,  the  laying  of  a  pipe  line 
caused  by  the  lawful  removal  of  a  ditch  by 
municipal  authorities  is  a  repair  or  improve- 
ment the  funds  for  defraying  which  may 
be  included  in  a  maintenance  assessment  or 
in  increased  toll  rates,  and  is  not  a  new  con- 
struction which  must  be  defrayed  by  a  spe- 
cial assessment  under  section  2391,  or  a  bond 
issued  under  section  2396.  City  of  Nampa  v. 
Nampa  &  Meridian  Irr.  Dist,  115  Pac.  979, 
982,  19  Idaho,  779. 

NEW  COUNTY 

When  a  county  is  changed  in  its  terri- 
tory by  the  addition  of  territory,  it  becomes  a 
'*new  county,*'  although  the  name  be  un- 
changed, and  although  it  be  accomplished  by 
a  law  which  in  terms  attaches  the  territory 
to  the  old  county.  Taking  territory  from 
one  county  and  adding  to  another  is  with- 
in the  provision  of  Const  art  10,  |  2,  that 
no  organized  county  shall  ever  be  reduced  by 
the  organization  of  "new  counties"  to  less 
than  16  townships,  except  on  the  decision  of 
a  majority  of  electors  residing  in  each  coun- 
ty to  be  affected  thereby.  Board  of  Sup'rs 
of  Bay  County  v.  Edmunds,  102  N.  W.  998, 
999,  139  Mich.  466. 


Authority  granted  by  the  Oonatltat 
to  grant  new  counties  does  not  mean  to  re 
ganize  an  old  county  under  a  new  name, 
must  mean  a  new  county,  an  additional  co 
ty,  and  not  a  reorganization,  rebounding, 
renaming  of  an  old  county.  McDonald 
Doust  81  Pac.  60-63,  U  Idaho,  14,  69 
R.  A.  220. 

NEW  DEBT 

See  Creation  of  New  Debt 

NEW  FUNCTION 

A  claim  under  the  patent  laws  for 
''new  function*'  cannot  be  sustained  in  1 
absence  of  an  element  of  novelty  or  un^ 
pectedness.  General  Electric  Co.  t.  Y( 
Electric  Mfg.  Co.,  139  Fed.  568,  570,  71 
C.  A.  552. 

NEW  INN 

P.  L.  1891,  p.  311,  providing  that  af 
a  license  has  once  been  granted  to  keep 
inn  or  tavern,  or  to  sell  spirituous  liquo 
the  filing  of  a  petition  for  a  renewal  sigi 
by  applicant  shall  confer  power  upon  the 
censing  board  to  renew  the  license  for  one  y< 
in  cities  of  the  fourth  class,  and  that  the  fr 
holders  who  may  have  recommended  t 
former  application  shall  not  be  eligible 
signers  for  a  new  application  for  one  yc 
ttom  the  granting  of  such  renewal,  a 
that  the  act  shall  not  affect  applications  1 
new  inns  and  taverns,  saloons  or  vlctualU 
houses  in  such  cities,  applies  only  to  t 
licensing  of  places  which  had  been  alrea 
licensed  when  the  act  was  approved.  Lee 
y.  AtlanUc  City,  79  Aa  812,  813,  80  N. 
Law,  557. 

NEW  MATTER 
In  pleading 

A  defense  can  consist  only  of  *^ew  m; 
ter,"  that  is,  matter  which,  taking  all  of  t 
allegations  in  the  complaint  to  be  true» 
nevertheless  a  defense  to  the  action,  so 
as  payment  a  general  release,  fraud,  t 
truth  of  a  libelous  publication,  eta  Ia 
norowitz  v.  Ott,  82  N.  T.  Supp.  880,  40  Mi 
Rep.  551. 

"New  matter*'  in  a  pleading  is  matt 
for  defense  not  provable  under  a  general  c 
niaL     Schultz   v.   Greenwood  Cemetery, 
N.  Y.  Supp.  180,  182,  46  Misc.  Rep.  299. 

The  term  "new  matter,"  in  Rev.  Cod( 
N.  D.  1899,  §  5273,  subd.  2,  requiring  the  a 
swer  of  defendant  to  contain  a  statement 
any  "new  matter"  constituting  a  defense 
counterclaim,  means  matter  extrinsic  to  t 
matters  set  up  in  the  complaint  as  a  Imu 
of  the  cause  of  action;  a  def^ise  which  co 
cedes  that  a  cause  of  action  once  exlste 
but  has  been  determined  by  some  subseque 
transaction.  The  distinction  between  defer 
es  admissible  under  a  denial  and  those  whi< 
are  new  matter  depends  primarily  upon  tl 
structure  of  the  complaint  and  th^  materl 


NEW  MATTER 


599 


KEW  PROMIBB 


LYerments  of  fact  which  it  contains.  All 
^cts  whidi  directly  tend  to  disprove  any 
me  or  more  of  these  averments  may  be  offer- 
idi  nnder  the  general  deniaL  All  facts  which 
lo  not  thus  directly  tend  to  disprove  some 
>ne  or  more  of  these  averments,  but  tend 
to  establish  a  defense  independently  of  them, 
»nnot  be  offered  under  the  deniaL  They 
ire  new  matter,  and  must  be  specially  plead- 
sd.  Hogen  v.  Klabo,  100  N.  W.  847,  849,  18 
^^.  D.  319  (citing  Manning  v.  Winter  [N.  Y.] 
r  Hun,  482;  Qreenway  v.  James,  84  Mo. 
528;  Plercy  v.  Sabin,  10  OaL  22,  70  Am.  Dec 
382;  Ghurdiill  v.  Baumann,  80  Pac.  770,^90 
CaL  541;   Pom.  B^n.  ft  Rem.  Rights,  |  073). 

"New  matter  constituting  a  defense," 
i^thin  the  rule  requiring  such  matter  to  be 
pleaded,  is  matter  not  embraced  within  the 
statement  of  fftcts  made  by  the  plaintiff, 
but  existing  outside  of  the  narrative  which 
tie  has  given  and  such  that  proving  it  to  be 
true  does  not  disprove  a  single  averment  of 
fact  in  the  complaint  or  petition,  but  mere- 
ly prevents  or  destroys  the  legal  conclu- 
sion as  to  the  plaintiff's  right  and  the  de- 
fendant's duties  which  would  otherwise  have 
resulted  from  all  those  averments  admitted 
or  proved  to  be  true.  Montgomery  v.  Sea- 
board Air  Line  Ry.,  03  S.  E.  987,  989,  73  8. 
C.  608. 

Where  the  complaint  was  so  drawn  that 
it  could  be  claimed  that  the  action  was 
brought  for  damages  under  a  common-law 
liability  as  well  as  under  the  Employer's  Lia- 
biUty  Act  (Ck>nsol.  Laws  1909,  c.  31,  ff  200- 
204),  the  defendant,  under  a  general  denial, 
could  prove  failure  to  serve  the  120-day  no- 
tice, under  the  Employer's  Liability  Act,  and 
failure  to  bring  the  action  within  one  year 
after  date  of  accident;  and  hence  these 
were  not  "new  matters"  proper  to  be  set  up 
as  a  defense  under  authority  of  Code  Civ. 
Proc  S  500.  Kelliher  v.  New  York  Cent  & 
H.  R.  R.  Co.,  136  N.  Y.  Supp.  266,  269,  77 
Misc.  Rep.  330. 

HEW  OB  ADDITIONAI. 

If  a  change  simply  adds  to  a  mall  con- 
tractor's service  it  is  "new  or  additional  serv- 
ice," being  of  the  same  kind  within  a  provi- 
sion in  his  contract  providing  for  perform- 
ance of  such  service  without  additional  com- 
pensation. Proffit  V.  United  States,  42  Ct. 
a  248,  259. 

The  phrase  **new  or  additional  service," 
in  a  contract  for  the  carrying  of  mails  re- 
quiring the  contractor  to  perform  new  or 
additional  services  that  the  Postmaster  Gen- 
eral may  order,  etc.,  is  not  one  of  exact 
meaning,  and  the  court  must  give  to  it  a 
reasonable  construction  with  a  view  of  doln^ 
Justice  between  the  parties.  An  increase  in 
the  service  required  on  a  mail  route,  as  the 
resalt  of  the  establishment  of  a  new  distribut- 
ing station  in  the  city  of  New  York,  amount- 
ing to  more  tlian  300,000  miles  of  additional 


tnasteat  service,  and  involving  an  additional 
expenditure  of  nearly  $10,000  for  ferry  tolls, 
cannot  be  required  by  the  Postmaster  Gen- 
eral without  extra  compensation,  onder  the 
authority  reserved  to  him  in  the  contract  to 
call  for  new,  additional,  mail  messenger,  or 
transfer  service  without  additional  compen- 
sation. United  States  v.  Utah«  N.  &  C.  Stage 
Co.,  26  Sup.  Ct  69,  72,  199  U.  &  414,  50  L. 
Ed.  251. 

A  statute  providing  that  no  municipal 
corporation  shall  have  power  to  condemn 
lands  "for  any  new  or  additionai  sources  of 
water  supply,  until  it  has  first  submitted  the 
maps  and  profiles  therefor"  to  the  state  water 
supply  commission,  does  not  apply  to  a  pro- 
ceeding by  a  manidpal  corporation  to  con- 
demn an  established  and  fully  equipped  plant 
of  a  water  company ;  such  plant  not  being  a 
"new  and  additional"  source  of  supply.  Vil- 
lage of  Waverly  v.  Waverly  Water  Co.,  lOJ 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1070,  1071,  117  App.  Dlv.  336. 

KEW  PLAGE 

The  words  any  "new  place,"  as  used  in 
an  act  regulating  the  sale  of  liquors  (P.  L. 
1005,  p.  42),  means  a  place  for  which  a  license 
has  not  previously  been  granted  upon  a 
direct  application.  The  mere  transfer  of  a 
license  to  a  place  leaves  it  stiU  a  "new  place" 
for  the  purposes  of  this  act.  Wright  v. 
Board  of  Excise  of  City  of  BUaabeth,  66  AU. 
1061,  75  N.  J.  Law,  2a 

In  order  to  constitute  a  place  for  which 
a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  ap- 
plied for  a  "new  place,**  within  the  meaning 
of  the  act  of  1906  (C.  S.  2908,  pi.  84),  it  must 
appear,  in  cases  where  the  premises  had  for 
some  years  previously  been  used  continuously 
for  such  purpose,  that  there  has  been  a 
substantial  abandonment  of  the  business. 
Pames  v.  Board  of  Exdse  Com*rs  of  City  of 
Elizabeth,  82  Atl.  313,  314,  82  N.  J.  Law,  285 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Eckersly 
V.  Abbott,  74  Atl.  813,  79  N.  J.  Law,  157). 

An  inn  or  tavern  in  which  the  occupants 
have  for  many  years  retailed  liquor  under  a 
license  granted  annually  did  not  become  a 
"new  place**  within  P.  L.  1906,  p.  199.  forbid- 
ding the  granting  of  a  license  to  a  "new 
place*'  within  200  feet  of  a  church  merely  be- 
cause an  occupant  was  refused  a  license, 
where  he  again  applied,  at  the  first  opportu- 
nity, for  a  license,  and  it  was  granted.  Eck- 
ersly V.  Abbott,  74  AU.  313,  314,  79  N.  J. 
Law,  157. 

MEW  PROMISE 

See,     also.     Acknowledge — ^Acknowledg- 
ment 

A  direct  admission  by  a  debtor  within  six 
years  prior  to  the  commencemmt  of  the  ac- 
tion of  a  subsisting  debt  which  he  is  liable 
and  willing  to  pay  is  sufficient  evidence  of 
a  "new  promise*'  to  bar  limitations.  Barker 
V.  Heath,  67  AU.  222,  224,  74  N.  H.  270. 


t 


NEW  TlilAL- 


602 


NEW  TRJAIi. 


or  verdict  by  a  court  or  jnry.  Where  a 
Judgment  of  conTietlon  is  reversed  on  the 
ground  of  error,  overruling  a  demurrer  to 
the  indictment,  a  new  trial  will  be  ordered, 
subject  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  as 
to  resubmitting  the  cause  to  the  grand  jury. 
State  V.  Eddy.  82  Pac  707.  46  Or.  625. 

The  term  "issue  of  fact"  in  Rev.  Ck)des. 
I  6793.  defining  a  new  trial  as  a  re-examina- 
tion of  an  issue  of  fact  after  a  trial,  when 
considered  in  connection  with  section  6723, 
refers  only  to  ap  issue  arising  on  formal 
pleadings,  and  though,  under  section  7712, 
the  provisions  as  to  new  trials  apply  to  pro- 
bate proceedings,  a  motion  for  new  trial  In 
such  proceedings  does  not  lie  in  the  absence 
of  formal  pleadings  raising  an  issue  of  fact 
Where  two  ex  parte  applications  for  letters 
of  administration  are  heard  together  as  au- 
thorized by  Rev.  Ck>des,  f  7441,  and  no  issue 
is  joined  as  to  the  competency  of  either  of 
the  persons  seeking  to  act  as  administrator, 
a  motion  for  new  trial,  after  granting  one  of 
the  petitions  and  denying  the  other,  does  not 
lie.  In  re  AntonioU's  Estate,  111  Pac  1083, 
1084.  42  Mont  219. 

Under  Code  Civ.  Proa  i  656.  defining  a 
"new  trial"  as  a  re-examination  of  an  issue 
of  fact,  and  section  657,  providing  that  a 
verdict  or  other  decision  of  fact  may  be  re- 
view;ed  on  an  appeal  from  an  order  denying 
a  new  trial,  the  question  whether  the  judg- 
ment is  authorized  by  the  pleadings  cannot 
be  raised  or  reviewed  on  an  appeal  from  an 
order  denying  a  new  trial,  irrespective  of  the 
issues  presented  by  the  pleadings,  and  not- 
withstanding the  findings  may  be  at  variance 
with  such  issues.  Schroeder  v.  Mauzy,  118 
Pac.  459,  461. 16  Cal.  App.  443. 

Under  a  statutory  definition  that  a  "new 
trial"  is  the  re-examination  in  the  same  court 
of  an  issue  of  fact,  after  a  verdict,  report 
of  a  referee,  or  decision  by  the  court,  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial  is  not  proper  unless  an 
issue  of  fact  has  been  fully  determined  by  a 
jury  verdict  or  its  equivalent,  and  there  can 
be  no  "new  trial"  on  issues  of  law,  as  such 
issues  can  be  Investigated  on  appeal  without 
previous  re-examination  by  the  trial  court 
On  motion  for  a  new  trial,  only  those  errors 
of  law  which  vitiate  the  conclusions  of  fact 
need  be  called  to  the  trial  court's  attention, 
and.  if  the  facts  have  been  agreed  to  or  have 
been  eliminated  so  that  the  controversy  de- 
pends upon  a  question  of  law,  a  motion  for 
a  "new  trial"  is  not  necessary.  Wagner  v. 
Atchison.  T.  k  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Pac.  299,  73 
Kan.  283, 

Rev.  St  1892.  f  6436,  provides  that  a 
new  trial  shall  be  granted  for  cause  only,  and 
when  it  is  granted  it  shall  take  place  in  same 
court  as  the  first  trial  was  had  and  shall 
be  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  this  chapter  for  the  firdt  trial,  so 
far  as  the  same  are  applicable.  Held,  that 
.the  words  "new  trial"  mean  the  rehearing 


of  the  case  from  the  beginning.  Day  ten 
U.  R,  Co.  V.  Dayton  ft  M.  Traction  Co., 
N.  E.  195,  196,  72  Ohio  St.  429,  follofi 
State  V.  Judges  of  Court  of  Conmion  PI 
of  Hamilton  County,  69  N.  E.  659,  09  0 
St  372. 

Under  B.  &  C  Comp.  |  159,  provid 
that  the  findings  of  the  court  shall  be  de 
ed  a  verdict,  and  may  be  set  aside  in 
same  manner  and  for  the  same  reasons,  i 
section  173,  defining  a  new  trial  as  a 
examination  of  an  issue  of  fact  after  a  t 
and  decision,  and  section  174,  specifying 
manner  in  which  a  verdict  or  other  dedc 
may  be  set  aside  and  a  new  trial  grant 
and  providing  that  a  new  trial  may  be  gn 
ed  "on  the  motion  of  the  party  aggrieve 
the  court  cannot  on  its  own  motion  set  a^ 
its  filed  findings  after  the  filing  by  a  parts 
a  motion  for  judgment;  the  court  not  li 
ing  been  imposed  on  by  fraud  or  collusioi] 
the  parties  or  otherwise.  Scott  ▼.  Ford, 
Pac.  99,  101,  62  Or.  288. 

A  judgment  for  one  of  the  defendant: 
corporation,  was  reversed  on  appeal  on 
ground  that  the  findings  were  not  justi 
by  the  evidence,  without  any  specific  dii 
tions  as  to  the  further  proceedings  in 
case.    After  remand  plaintiff,  having  rec 
ered   against  the  other  defendants,    mo 
for  judgment  against  the  corporation  defe 
ant,  which  the  court  granted,  the  order  re 
ing  that  the  cause  came  on  to  be  heard 
plaintiff's  motion  for  judgment  against 
fendant  corporation  on  remittitur  from 
Court  of  Appeals,  and  it  appearing  to 
court  that  all  questions  of  fact  were  fins 
adjudicated  by  the  judgment  against  the  c 
er  defendants,  and,  good  cause  being  sho 
therefor  without  objection,  it  was  orde 
that  judgment  be  rendered  against  the  c 
poratipn.    Held,  that  such  proceedings 
not  constitute  a  new  trial,  to  which  the  c 
poration  defendant  was  entitled,  as  defii 
by  Code  Civ.  Proc.  S  666,  and  that  the  ju 
ment  was  therefore  erroneous.    Riley  v.  : 
ma  Vista   Ranch  Co.,  89  Pac.  849,   850, 
CaL  App.  26. 

Under  Code  Civ.  Proc  |  656,  definini 
new  trial  as  a  re-examination  of  an  issue 
fact  in  the  same  court,  where  the  case  v 
tried  on  an  agreed  statement  of  facts  wh 
the  parties  stipulated  was  to  be  conside: 
as  the  court's  findings  in  the  case,  a  mot 
for  new  trial  would  not  lie  on  the  groi 
that  the  decision  was  contrary  to  law, 
that  point  could  only  be  raised  on  appc 
Quist  V.  HiU.  99  Paa  204.  207.  164  CaL  7 

Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  1012,  provides  that 
a  case  specified  in  the  section  where  1 
parties  consent  to  a  reference,  and  a  n 
trial  of  the  action  tried  by  the  referee  d 
ignated  is  granted,  the  court  must  upon  i 
plication  of  either  party  appoint  anotl 
referee;  Held,  that  where  the  conrt  refni 
to  confirm  the  referee's  report,  and  ref« 


NSW  TBIAIi 


NBW  WATEB' 


the  matter  tD  be  again  heard  and  detemdned, 
it  In  effect  grants  a  new  trial  within  the 
meaning  of  the  section,  and  the  re-reference 
should  be  to  a  new  referee.  White  y.  White, 
122  N.  Y.  Snpp.  885,  886,  138  App.  Diy.  272. 

As   defined  by   Code  Civ.  Proc   {  265 
(Gen.  St.  Id05,  |  5160),  a  '*trlal*'  is  a  judicial 
examination  of  the  issues,  whether  of  law 
or  fact,  in  an  action;    and  a  '*new  .trial" 
(Code  GlT.  Proc.  S  806  [Gen.  St  1905,  |  5202]) 
is  a  re-examination  in  the  same  court  of  an 
issue  of  fact  aftar  a  verdict  by  a  jury,  re- 
port of  a  referee,  or  a  decision  of  a  court 
The  same  section  prorides  that  the  former 
verdict  report  or  dedaion  shall  be  Tacated, 
and  a  new  trial  granled  on  the  applleatioii 
of  the  party  aggrieved  (which  section  809 
[section  5205]  provides  must  be  by  motion 
on  written  grounds)  for  certain  causes  apec- 
ified    affecting    materially    the    substantial 
rights  of  such  party.    Some  of  the  causes 
specified   are  any  order  of  the  court   by 
which  the  party  is  prevented  from  having  a 
fair  trial;  that  the  decision  is  not  sustained 
by  sufficient  evidence^  or  is  contrary  to  law ; 
error  of  law  occurring  at  the  trial  and  ex- 
cepted to  at  the  time.    Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  306 
(Gen.  St  1905,  |  5202).     Strictly  construed, 
then,  as  defined  by  the  Code,  a  "trial**  in- 
Tolyes  the  judicial  examination  of  all  the 
issues  of  law  and  f^ct  in  an  action,  whUe 
a  ''new  trial**  involves  only  the  reexamina- 
tion of  an  issue  of  fact    That  this  strict 
construction  is  not  applicable  to  new  trials 
of  ordinary  actions  in  which  the  law  ap- 
plicable varies  to  the  varying  facts  pleaded 
or  proven  is  apparent,  when  we  consider  the 
grounds  for  which  new  trial  "shall  be  grant- 
ed" as  prescribed,   some  of  which   involve 
only  a  question  of  law.    These  must  be  re- 
examined both  on  the  hearing  of  the  motion 
for  the  new  trial  and  upon  the  new  trial, 
if  granted.    Issues  of  law  are  not  ordinarily 
framed  In  an  action  by  the  petition  and  an- 
swer or  by  the  answer  and   reply  in  the 
sense  that  a  proposition  of  law  is  asserted 
in  one  pleading  and  denied  in  another;   but 
such  Issues  may   arise  in   many  ways   at 
almost  every  stage  of  the  action,  and  are 
sometimes  determinative  of  the  action  and 
sometimes  not    Sometimes  they  arise  in  the 
course  of  the  trial,  and  sometimes  before 
tile  trial  is  commenced.     It  goes   without 
saying  that  there  can  be  no  new  trial  until 
there  has  been  a  trial;  and,  by  a  fair  con- 
struction of  the  Code,  It  must  be  such  a 
trial  as  results  or  should  result  In  a  verdict, 
a  report  of  a  referee,  or  a  decision  by  the 
court  which    Involves    and   determines    the 
facts  in  issue.    Otherwise  there  could  be  no 
new  trial  "of  the  Issue  of  fact"    It  follows 
therefore  that  whenever  a  trial  has  been  had 
upon  issues  of  fact,  which  trial  results  in  a 
verdict,  report  of  a  referee,  or  a  decision 
which  determines ,  such   facts,  elUier  party 
who  feels  himself  aggrieved   may   file  his 


motion  for  a>inew  trial  on  the  grounda  and 
within  the  time  prcacribed,.  and,  until  such 
motion  is  disposed  ot  the  action  is  still 
pending,  and  the  statutory  time  for  pre- 
paring a  case-made  for  an  appeal  does  not 
begin  to  run.  Darling  v.  Atchison,  T.  4  8. 
F.  By.  Co.,  93  Pac  612,  GUT,  76  Kan:  S93. 

Default  JudgnteAt 

An  order  vacating  a  default  decree  of 
divorce  and  allowing  defoidant  to  answer 
in  accordance  with  L.  O.  L.  |  69,  is  not  an 
appealable  order  within  section  648,  provid- 
ing that  appeals  will  lie  from  final  judg- 
ment and  decrees^  in  effect  determining  the 
action  and  orders  setting  aside  the  judgment 
and  granting  a  new  trial,  for  the  order  is  not 
a  final  one  determining  the  suit,  and  neither 
Is  it  an  order  granting  a  new  trial  whldi 
is  defined  by  section  178  as  a  re-examination 
of  an  issue  of  fact  in  the  same  court  after 
judgment,  for  this  order  only  vacates  a  de- 
fault, and  there  has  been  no  trial  which  is 
defined  by  section  lie  as  the  judicial  exam- 
ination of  the  issues  between  the  parties. 
Taylor  ▼.  Taylor,  121  Pac.  481,  432,  61  Or. 
257. 

Degree  of  offense 

A  '-new  trial'*  Is  defined  by  St  1893,  art. 
14,  c  68,  as  a  re-examinatlon  of  the  issue 
in  the  same  court  before  another  jury  after 
verdict  has  been  given,  and  the  granting 
of  a  new  trial  placea  the  parties  in  the 
same  position  as  if  no  trial  had  been  had, 
and  therefore  one  who  has  been  convicted 
of  manslaughter  under  an  indictment  charg- 
ing murder  may,,  on  being  granted  a  new 
trial,  be  tried  for  murder.  Turner  v.  Ter- 
ritory, 82  Pac.  600,  661,  16  Okl.  567. 

Under  Const,  art.  1,  f  1,  par.  8  (Civ. 
Code  1896,  f  5705),  providing  that  no  person 
shall  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy  for  the  same 
offense,  save  on  his  own  motion  for  a  new 
trial,  a  person  indicted  for  murder  and 
convicted  of  manslaughter  obtaining  a  new 
trial  may  be  again  tried  for  murder,  and 
cannot  successfully  interpose  a  plea  of 
former  acquittal  of  murder.  Brantley  v. 
State,  64  S.  E.  676,  678,  132  Oa.  573,  22  U  B. 
A.  (N.  S.)  959,  131  Am.  St  Bep.  218,  16  Ann« 
Cas.  1203. 

Direoted  verdioi 

Under  Code,  |  3755,  defining  a  "new 
trial**  as  a  re-exanoinatlon  in  the  same  court 
of  an  issue  after  a  "verdict  of  a  jury,**  or 
a  decision  of  the  court  the  court  may  grant 
a  new  trial  after  a  directed  verdict  for 
error  in  directing  the  verdict  Bottineau 
Land  4  Loan  Co.  v.  Hint2se,  126  N.  W.  842, 
843,  150  Iowa,  646. 

HirW  WATEB 

Benefits  of  an  irrigation  syston  were 
classified  under  two  heads;  one  of  "old  wa- 
ter,** and  the  other  of  '*new  water.*'  The 
term  "old  water**  referred  to  existing  water 


I 


NEWLY  DISCOYERED  EVIDENCE      604 


NEWSPAPER 


1 

ri 

M 

rights  at  the  time  of  the  purchase  of  the  ca- 
nalf  and  "new  water**  referred  to  rights  yet 
to  be  acquired  by  the  enlargement  of  the  ca- 
nal. No  benefits  under  the  head  of  "old 
water*'  were  apportioned  to  plalntilTs  land, 
and  the  canal  had  not  been  enlarged  so  as 
to  acquire  any  "new  water.*'  Held,  that  un- 
til such  enlargement  occurred,  or  it  was 
made  to  appear  that  the  canal  company  had 
sufficient  water  to  supply  plaintifTs  demand 
without  interfering  with  prior  users,  he  could 
not  acquire  a  perpetual  water  right  by  the 
temporary  use  of  water  from  the  canal  when 
prior  users  were  not  demanding  their  full 
rights.  Gerber  t.  Nampa  &  Meridian  Irr. 
Dist,  100  Pac.  80.  87,  16  Idaho,  1. 

NEWLY  DISCOVERED  EVIDENCE 

"Newly  discovered  evidence*'  is  evidence 
in  existence  at  the  time  of  the  trial  but 
which  could  not  by  reasonable  diligence  have 
been  procured.  Gassidy  v.  Johnson,  84  N. 
S.  835,  837,  41  Ind.  App.  696. 

Evidence  Is  not  newly  discovered  which 
at  the  time  of  the  trial  is  known  to  the  plain- 
tiff in  interest,  who  had  taken  upon  herself 
the  prosecution  of  the  case,  and  which  any 
inquiry  of  her  would  have  made  known  to 
the  nominal  plaintiff.  Emmet  v.  Perry,  60 
AU.  872,  873,  100  Me.  139. 

Where,  on  the  issue  of  payment,  plain- 
tiff testified  that  receipts  offered  in  evidence 
were  forgeries,  he  was  not  entitled  to  a 
new  trial  on  the  affidavit  of  a  handwriting 
expert  that  the  signatures  to  the  receipts 
were  forgeries,  since  the  proffered  testimony 
was  not  "newly  discovered  evidence"  but 
was  merely  newly  made  evidence  which  could 
easily  have  been  produced  on  the  original 
trial.  Heintze  v.  Graham,  116  N.  Y.  Supp. 
548,  550. 

Under  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  |  568,  subd. 
7,  providing  that  a  new  trial  may  be  granted 
for  newly  discovered  material  evidence  which 
could  not  with  reasonable  diligence  have 
bpen  produced  at  the  trial,  where  evidence 
was  discovered  by  a  party  some  time  before 
the  court  made  its  finding,  but  no  attempt 
was  made  to  have  the  court  consider  the 
evidence  before  the  finding  was  announced, 
it  was  not  "newly  discovered  evidence"  so  as 
to  constitute  a  ground  for  a  new  trial.  Burk 
V.  Matthews  Glass  Co.,  81  N.  E.  88,  89,  40 
Ind.  App.  81. 

By  "newly  discovered  evidence'*  warrant- 
ing a  new  trial  is  meant  testimony  that 
comes  to  a  party*8  knowledge  after  trial,  and 
hence,  where  during  the  trial  defendant  ob- 
tained knowledge  of  the  importance  of  an 
absent  witness  and  did  not  ask  leave  to 
withdraw  its  announcement  of  ready  for 
trial,  and  aak  a  oontinuanee  to  secure  his  at- 
tendance, but  proceeded  with  the  trial,  it 
could  not  claim  a  new  trial  on  the  ground 
of    newly    discovered   evidence.     Bl    Paso 


Soathwestem  R.  Go.  y.  Barrett,  101  a. 
1026,  1029,  46  Tex.  GIt.  App.  14 

NEWS 

NEWS  AGENT 

As  passenger,  see  Passenger. 

HEW8BOT 

As  passenger,  see  Passenger. 

NEWSPAPER 

See  Daily  Newspaper;  Some  Newi 
per;  Weekly  Newspaper. 

Publication  of  newspaper,  see  Pnbl 
tton. 

See,  also.  General  Girculatlon. 

A  "newspaper,**  In  the  popular  senBe^ 
publication  issued  at  regular  stated  inters 
containing,  among  other  things,  the  cun 
news,  or  the  news  of  the  day.  Times  Pi 
ing  Co.  V*  Star  Pub.  Go.,  99  Pac.  1040,  1 
51  Wash.  667,  16  Ann.  Gas.  414. 

A  "newspaper**  is  defined  as  a  publ 
tion  issued  at  regular  stated  intervals,  < 
taining,  among  other  things,  the  cun 
news  or  news  of  the  day.  A  publica 
printed  daily,  except  Sundays,  and  legal 
idays,  and  devoted  to  the  disseminatioi 
news  on  a  great  variety  of  topics  of  inte 
to  the  general  reader,  but  giving  spe 
prominence  to  legal  news,  including  the  ; 
ceedings  in  the  Supreme  Gourt  of  the  s 
and  of  the  local  courts  sitting  in  the  etati 
a  newspaper.  Puget  Sound  Pub.  Go.  ▼.  Ti 
Printing  Go.,  74  Pac.  802,  804,  33  Wash- 
(citing  21  Am.  ft  Eng.  Enc.  Law  [2d  Ed. 
533). 

A  weekly  publication,  printed  and  d 
lated  in  a  city,  containing  the  current  n 
and  matters  of  general  interest,  as  weU 
the  local  happenings,  is  a  "newspaper,*^  w 
in  the  meaning  of  the  statute  requiring 
publication  of  city  ordinances,  although 
circulation  may  be  very  limited.  Kai 
Gity  V.  Overton,  75  Pac.  549,  550,  68  E 
560. 

A  paper  regularly  published  in  a  cen 
dty  for  20  years,  and  in  general  circnlat 
having  among  its  subscribers,  bankers,  i 
estate  agents,  rental  agents,  architects,  be 
ing  companies,  public  and  private  cont 
tors,  public  service  corporations,  and  at 
neys,  and  containing  a  large  and  varied 
vertising  list  covering  many  lines  of  b 
ness,  and  publishing  news  concerning  < 
ordinances,  resolutions  of  the  dty  coui] 
building  improvements,  transfers  of  real  t 
personal  property,  building  permits,  oo 
proceedings,  and  probate  matters,  pul 
sales,  together  with  brief  items  of  local  i 
foreign  news  of  general  interest  and  misi 
laneous  items  of  interest  to  the.  gene 
reading  public  on  political,  sodal,  moral, 
ligious  and  other  subjects,  is  a  newspai 
MerriU  t.  Gonroy,  109  N.  W.  175,  77  K 
228. 


NBWaPAPXB 


605 


NSW8PAPJCB 


A  "newspaper/*  In  the  popular  aco^ta- 
Hon  of  the  word,  la  a  publication  Issued  at 
stated  intervals,  containing,  amonc  other 
things,  the  current  news  (citing  21  Am.  & 
£ng.  Encyc.  of  Law,  p.  583).  A  4-page,  6- 
colunm,  publication  containing  local  and 
general  news  and  correspondence,  and  also 
legal,  professional,  and  business  adYertising, 
and  apparently  intended  for  general  circu- 
lation, and  altered  in  the  United  States  mails 
as  second-class  matter,  was  a  ^'newspaper," 
where  the  eyidence  showed  that  it  had  been 
published  for  ten  years,  and  had  a  circula- 
tion in  four  counties  of  the  state  and  in  a 
majority  of  the  states  of  the  Union.  The 
genenll  circulation  of  a  newspaper  is  neces- 
saiily  comparative.  No  fixed  number  of  sub- 
scribers is  required  to  constitute  general  cir- 
culation. A  newspaper's  circulation  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  it  is  read  by  all  of  the 
people  of  the  county  or  township.  Ruth  y. 
Ruth,  79  N.  B.  623,  624,  39  Ind.  App.  290 
(citing  Lynn  v.  Allen,  44  N.  £.  ^,  145  Ind. 
584,  33  L.  R.  A.  779,  67  Am.  St  Bep.  228). 

''Finance  and  Commerce^**  a  daily  paper 
published  in  Minneapolis,  is  a  newspaper 
qualified  as  a  medium  of  ofBdal  and  legal 
publications,  under  B.  It,  1906,  S  6616.  Olson 
V.  Bibb  Co.,  136  N.  W.  886,  117  Minn.  214, 
Ann.  Gas.  1913D,  877. 

Under  Code,  i  3636,  providing  that  pub- 
lication of  an  original  notice  required  for 
commencing  an  action  must  be  in  some 
**newBpaper^  printed  in  the  county  where 
the  petition  is  filed,  publication  In  a  dally 
paper  published  regularly  In  the  city  where 
suit  is  brought  for  four  years,  with  an  actual 
paid  subscription  of  more  than  200  copies 
per  day,  not  made  up  of  subscribers  of  one 
class,  containing  advertising  covering  many 
lines  of  business,  publishing  the  latest  news, 
and  reporting  items  of  local  and  foreign 
news  and  others  of  interest,  including  trans- 
fers of  property,  and  all  news  relating  to 
court  proceedings,  and  that  has  for  more 
than  three  years  been  admitted  to  the  mails 
under  rules  governing  admission  of  all  other 
newspapers,  and  is  the  official  paper  of  the 
district  court  of  the  county,  is  sufficient,  as 
such  paper  is  a  "newspaper."  Brlce  v. 
Graves,  121  N.  W.  604,  606,  142  Iowa,  722. 

Under  St  1888,  c.  390,  {  86,  requiring 
tax  sale  advertisements  to  be  published  In 
''a"  newspaper,  and  under  section  43,  requir- 
ing tax  deeds  to  state  "the  newspaper**  in 
which  the  advertisement  was  published,  a 
tax  sale  based  on  cost  of  advertising  in  two 
newspapers  is  void,  the  word  "newspapers" 
ia  St.  1889,  c.  334,  |  3,  authorizing  a  charge 
tor  advertising  in  "newspapers,*'  meaning 
copies  of  the  newspaper  in  whldi  the  adver- 
tisement was  published.  Shurtlefl  v.  Pot- 
ter, 92  N.  B.  331,  206  Mass.  28a 

Printers'  affidavits  as  to  the  publication 
of  notices  of  tax  sales  declaring  that  the  pa- 


per had  been  published  in  the  county  for  the 
legal  period,  one  stating  U»  pohlication  for  a 
period  of  more  than  three  years,  and  the  oth- 
er for  more  than  two  years,  sufficiently 
showed  that  the  newspaper  was  a  legal  news- 
paper within  the  description  specified  by  St 
1818,  I  1130.  Bouchler  v.  Hanmier,  123  N. 
W.  182,  134,  186,  140  Wis.  648. 

As  vapev  la  fhigHsli 

Where  a  notice  is  required  to  be  publish- 
ed by  pilnting  in  a  newspaper,  the  notice 
must  be  published  in  BngHsh  in  a  newspaper 
printed  in  Kngllsh.  A  publication  in  Bug- 
lish  of  a  notice  in  a  French  newspaper  is 
insufficient.  Gonners  v.  Citj  of  liowell,  95 
N.  B.  412,  416,  209  Mass.  Ill,  Ann.  Gas. 
1912B,  627. 

(Considering  the  object  designed  and  the 
practical  means  of  accomplishing  the  object, 
the  manifest  legislative  Intent  in  the  re- 
quirement of  section  788  of  the  General  Stat- 
utes of  1906  that  the  notice  "shall  be  pub- 
lished in  the  several  newspapers  printed  in 
the  county*'  was  to  ihclude  only  such  "news 
papers**  as  are  devoted  to  the  publication  of 
current  news  in  general  and  are  circulated 
among  all  classes  of  the  people,  and  not  to 
include  publications  designed  chlefiy  or  whol- 
ly for  the  purposes  of  only  a  portion  of  the 
entire  public  The  English  language  is  the 
means  recognised  by  our  law  for  communi- 
cation and  information;  and,  while  a  paper 
printed  in  a  foreign  language  may  be  a 
"newspaper,"  it  may  not  be  within  the  pur- 
view of  a  statute  requiring  the  publication  of 
legal  notices  designed  for  the  information  of 
all  the  people,  where  the  statute  contains 
nothing  to  indicate  an  intention  to  include 
such  publication.  Tylee  ▼.  Hyde,  62  South. 
968,  969,  60  Fla.  889. 

NSWSPAPEm  OF  OSHERAL  OIBOUIJU 
TIOV 

PoL  Gode^  I  4469,  defines  "newspaper  of 
general  circulation"  as  a  newspaper  publish- 
ed for  the  dissemination  of  local  or  telegraph- 
ic news  and  intelligence  of  a  general  charac- 
ter, having  a  bona  fide  subscription  list  of 
paying  subscribers,  and  which  shall  have 
been  established,  printed,  and  published,  in 
the  state,  county,  dty,  dty  and  county,  or 
town,  where  such  publication,  notice  of  pub- 
lication, or  official  advertising  is  given  or 
made^  for  at  least  one  year.  A  newspaper  de- 
voted to  the  interests,  or  published  for  the 
entertainment,  of  a  particular  class,  profes- 
sion, trade,  calling,  race,  or  denomination,  or 
any  number  thereof.  Is  not  a  newspaper  of 
general  circulation.  In  re  Malone,  74  Pac. 
991,  992, 141  Gal.  331. 

Bvldence  held  to  show  that  a  certain 
newspaper  was  a  ^'newspaper  of  the  county 
having  general  drculatton  therein"  within 
Wilson's  Rev.  A  Ann.  St  1906,  |  4006,  so  that 
a  certificate  of  partnership  required  to  be 
published  by  Wilson's  Rev.  A  Ann.  St  1908, 


if 


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KBWSPAPfiR 


606 


NEXT  laOECTlOK 


§8001,  Was  properly  published  therein.    Hea- 
ler y.  ColdPOtt,  116  Pac.  787»  29  Okl.  216. 

A  daily  noon  publication  was  an  8-page 
paper,  18  by  23  Inches  in  size,  with  8  columns 
to  the  page,  and  contained  telegraphic,  sport- 
ing, political,  and  theatrical  news  and  adver- 
tisements with  an  editorial  column.  The  ^m- 
pany  also  published  an  evening  paper  by 
another  name,  and  the  noon  publication  in 
question  had  formerly  been  known  as  the 
noon  edition  of  the  evening  paper,  and  was 
principally  devoted  to  sporting  news.  The 
publishers  of  the  noon  paper  bid  for  the  city 
printing  to  be  published  therein.  The  paper 
at  that  time  had  no  regular  subscription  list, 
but  about  IjOOO  copies  were  sold  dally  by 
newsboys.  Subsequently  the  paper  had  a 
subscription  list  of  360  and  an  average  daily 
circulation  of  1,083.  Held,  that  the  paper, 
at  the  time  the  bid  was  submitted,  was  a 
'^newspaper"  within  Seattle  City  Charter, 
art  4,  §  31,  requiring  that  the  dty  official 
newspaper  be  a  daily  newspaper  of  general 
circulation,  etc.,  though  it  sometimes  contaia- 
ed  news  published  the  day  before  in  the  eve- 
ning paper.  Times  Printing  Co.  v.  Star  Pub. 
Co.,  d9  Pac.  1040, 1041,  61  Wash.  667, 16  Ann. 
Cas.  414. 

Under  PoL  Code,  |  4400,  defining  a 
"newspaper  of  genial  circulation*'  as  one 
which  shall  have  been  established,  printed,, 
and  published  at  regular  intervals  for  at 
least  one  year  preceding  the  date  of  publica- 
tion, where  a  newspaper  had  been  published 
weekly  for  part  of  a  year,  and  daily  for 
the  balance  of  the  year  preceding  the  filing 
of  a  petition  to  have  it  declared  a  newiq;)aper 
of  general  circulation,  it  was  published  at 
"regular  intervals"  for  one  year  within  the 
statute,  which  does  not  require  the  interval 
between  the  dates  of  publication  to  be  equal 
from  beginning  to  end,  but  only  to  be  regular 
and  not  spasmodic  or  occasional.  In  re 
Tribune  Pub.  Co.,  108  Paa  667,  12  CaL  App. 
754. 

NEWSPAPER   OF   OPPOSITE  POLZTL- 
OAIi  FAITH 

Under  Laws  1003,  p.  435,  c  182,  |  1, 
subsec.  29,  amending  Laws  1898,  p.  371,  c.  182 
(Second-Class  Cities  Law),  providing  for  the 
designation  by  the  common  council  of  two 
dally  newspapers  having  the  largest  circula- 
tion and  of  opposite  political  faith  as  official 
newspapers  of  the  city,  a  newspaper  which 
supports  no  party,  and  advocates  the  princi- 
ples or  candidates  of  no  party,  but  which  is 
the  personal  organ  of  its  publishers  and  pro- 
prietors, at  times  supporting  the  candidates 
and  principles  of  either  the  Republican  or 
Democratic  parties,  as  its  officials  may  de- 
termine, is  not  a  "paper  of  opposite  political 
faith''  to  any  regular  party  paper.  People 
ex  rel.  Troy  Press  Co.  v.  Common  Council 
of  City  of  Troy,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  1046,  1047, 
114  App.  DlT.  354. 


NEXT 

As  mMuresi 

There  is  a  idiade  of  dilferenoe  bet^ 
the  words  "next"  and  ^'nearest"  The  n 
"next"  in  a  certificate  of  membership  c 
mutual  benefit  society,  providing  for  i 
ment  of  a  benefit  on  the  death  of  a  meo 
to  the  beneficiary  named,  who  under  the 
laws  must  be  either  the  wife,  children,  ad 
ed  children,  parents,  etc,  and,  if  the  men 
outlived  the  beneficiary  named  and  died  ^ 
out  naming  another  beneficiary,  the  bei 
was  to  go  to  the  member's  "next"  11^ 
relation  in  the  order  named,  is  used  as  a 
onym  of  "nearest"  and  refers  to  the  men 
and  not  to  the  beneficiary.  Therefore  w] 
a  member  named  his  wife  as  beneficiary 
she  died  and  he  married  again,  leavin 
second  wife  without  having  changed  the  b 
fidary,  the  second  wife  and  not  his  chiU 
took  the  benefit  Speegle  v.  Sovereign  O 
of  Woodman  of  the  World,  68  &  S.  435, 
77  S.  O.  617.  ^ 

Oen.  St  1902,  §  788,  provides  that,  ^ 
a  final  judgment  is  roidered  in  any  cans 
which  a  party  may  be  entitled  to  a  wri 
error  to  the  Supreme  Court,  he  may  ap] 
from  such  judgment  to  the  next  term  of  o 
which  would  have  cognizance  of  the  wri 
error.  Accused  was  convicted  on  Noveo 
11,  1911,  and  the  next  term  of  the  Supr 
Court  was  January  16th.  Section  563 
vides  that  the  writ  of  error,  which  is  an 
dependent  action  begun  by  the  filing  o 
complaint  in  the  Supreme  Court,  and  the 
ing  out  of  the  writ  as  dvil  process  musi 
returned  at  least  30  days  before  the  sit 
of  the  court  Held  that,  as  the  word  *^( 
means  nearest  in  order  and  immediately 
lowing,  the  writ  of  order  in  this  case 
returnable  to  a  term  beginning  January  1 
and  an  appeal  cannot  be  filed  to  a  later  U 
State  V.  Caplan,  84  AtL  280,  283,  86  0 
61& 

As  vef arrtnc  to  sftwe  BMnatb 

The  word  "next,"  in  a  writ  of  ▼enin 
sued  June  12,  1906,  commanding  the  slv 
to  serve  the  writ  upon  the  jury  commiss 
ers,  and  requiring  them  tio  summon  the 
rors  to  appear  before  the  oonmion  pleas  o 
held  on  the  22d  of  June  next,  at  10  o'd 
etc.,  meant  the  next  22d  day  of  June  in 
year,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
next  term  of  the  court  after  June  12th 
June  22d.  State  v.  Washington,  64  &  EL 
887,  82  S.  C.  341.  (citing  6  Words 
Phrases,  p.  4796). 

K£aLT  0AU8E 

As    proximate    causey 
Cause. 


see    Prozii 


NEXT  ZXECTIOK 

Const  art  10,  |  6,  providing  that  in 
of  vacancy  in  the  Supreme  Court  the  c 
may  be  filled  by  the  i^and  committee  i 


NEXT  ELECTION 


607 


NEXT  MUNICIPAL  ELECTION. 


le  next  aimiial  election,  refers  to  tbe  next 
onual  election  of  public  offioerpb  In  le  Opin- 
^n  of  Judges,  51  AtL  221,  222,  28  R.  I.  685. 

The  words  "next  election,"  as  used  in 
.  L.  1901,  p.  338,  S  18,  providing  that  ac- 
sptance  or  rejection  of  the  act  should  be 
abmitted  to  a  popular  vote  at  the  '*next 
lection**  whether  general,  municipal,  or  spe- 
lal,  etc^  did  not  refer  to  the  '*next  election'* 
eld  after  the  passage  of  the  act  Had  such 
een  the  intention  of  the  Legislature,  it  was 
omparatively  easy  to  specify  a  date  for  a 
pedal  election,  or  to  designate  a  general 
lection.  Therefore,  in  support  of  the  consti- 
utionality  of  the  act,  it  is  fair  to  take  the 
rords  "next  election"  as  applying  to  the 
rst  general  election  that  shall  be  held  in  any 
ounty,  not  at  the  time  possessing  the  dis- 
Lnctive  featifres,  after  it  shall  thereafter 
cqolre  those  features.  Albright  t.  Sussex 
k)unty  Lake  &  Park  Commission,  58  AtL  612, 
116,  68  N.  J.  Law,  523. 

lEXT  EVENTUAL  K8TATB 

See  Eventual  Estate. 

IBXT  FBIEND 

As  party,  see  Party. 
Guardian   ad   litem    distinguished,    wee 
Guardian  Ad  Litem. 

''A  *next  friend'  is  one  who,  though  not 
regularly  appointed^  represents  in  a  suit  a 
?arty  thereto  who  is  not  sui  juris."  Jack- 
ion  V.  Counts,  54  S.  B.  870.  871,  106  Va.  7. 

The  office  of  next  friend  is  to  represent  a 
person  under  disability  in  the  litigation,  be- 
ing authorized  to  appear  only  when  there  is 
Qo  legal  and  statutory  representative  dis- 
charging that  duty.  Upton's  Committee  v. 
Bush,  121  S.  W.  1005, 1008,  135  Ky.  102. 

The  guardian  and  next  friend,  in  con- 
ductiiig  a  dvil  action,  are  a  "species  of  at- 
torney, whose  duty  it  is  to  bring  the  rights 
of  the  infant  to  the  notice  of  the  court,"  and 
the  authority  of  each  is  limited  to  the  pro- 
ceeding in  which  he  is  appointed.  Williams 
T.  Cleaveland,  56  Ati.  850,  853,  76  Conn.  426. 

Rev.  St.  1895,  art  3408u,  provides  that 
any  minor  having  a  sufficient  cause  of  action 
and  who  has  no  legal  guardian  can  bring  suit 
in  any  of  the  courts  by  "next  friend,"  and 
such  next  friend  shall  have  the  same  rights 
concerning  such  suit  as  if  he  were  guardian, 
etc  The  **next  friend"  is  merely  a  trustee 
who  voluntarily  assumes  the  task  of  repre- 
senting the  minor  fn  the  litigation  and  in  the 
suit  stands  as  the  representative  of  the  mi- 
nor. Biggins  V.  Gulf,  O.  &  S.  F.  B.  Co.  (Tex.) 
110  S.  W.  561,  563. 

The  relation  of  "proche  in  ami**  to  the 
action  is  that  of  ah  officer  of  the  court  spe- 
^lly  appointed  to  enforce  and  preserve  the 
fights  of  the  infant  In  whose  behalf  he  itcts. 
He  may  employ  an  attorney,  carry  the  suit 
on  to  judgment,  >and  may,  if  there  is  no  regu- 
larly constituted  guarcUan  of  the  infant,  re- 


ceive the  money  recovered  of  the  defttadant, 
and  thereupon  may  enter  m  valid  satisfiio- 
Uon  of  the  judgment.  State  ex  rel.  Lane  v. 
Ballinger,  82  Pac  1018,  1020,  41  Wash.  28, 
8  L.  B.  A.  (N.  &)  72. 

NEXT  OEHEBAIi  ASSEMBLY 

Act  Oct  14,  1879  (Laws  1878-79,  p.  125), 
authorizing  the  Governor  to  suspend  a  rail- 
road commissioner,  and  providing  that  the 
Governor  shall  report  the  fact  of  8ns*^t*n- 
sion  and  the  reason  therefor  to  the  "next" 
General  Assembly,  means  the  General  As- 
sembly nearest  in  point  of  time,  and,  if  the 
General  Assembly  is  in  session  when  the  sus- 
pension is  made  by  the  Governor,  it  is  his 
duty  to  make  his  report  to  that  General  As- 
sembly. Gray  v.  McLendon,  67  S.  B.  859, 
878,  184  Ga.  224. 

NEXT  OEHEBAIi  ELECTIOK 

The  phrase  "next  general  election,**  as 
used  in  Wilson's  Bev.  ft  Ann.  St  1903,  | 
8750,  which  provides  that  a  person  appointed 
to  fill  a  vacancy  shall  serve  until  the  next 
general  election,  means  the  next  regular  elec- 
tion at  which  that  particular  class  of  officers 
is  to  be  chosen.  Wainwright  v.  Fore,  97 
Paa  881,  833,  22  Okl.  887. 

The  term  "next  general  election,**  as  used 
in  Laws  1905,  p.  18,  |  10,  providing  that  all 
officers  appointed  by  the  act  should  hold 
their  respective  offices  until  after  the  "next 
general  election,"  so  far  as  the  office  of  clerk 
of  the  district  court  is  concerned,  means 
the  "next  general  election"  held  to  fill  that 
office  in  the  judicial  district,  and  a  per- 
son holding  such  office  is  not  ousted  by  the 
election  of  a  successor  at  a  general  election 
called  by  the  Governor  for  the  election  of 
other  officers  than  clerk  of  the  district  court 
State  ex  rel.  Livesay  v.  Smith,  90  Pac  750, 
751,  35  Mont  523,  10  Ann.  Cas.  1138. 

KEXT  HIGHEST  BI]>DER 

The  phrase  "next  highest  bidder,**  as 
used  in  Act  CaL  March  11,  1901,  relating  to 
the  granting  of  a  street  railway  franchise  by 
a  municipality  to  the  next  highest  bidder 
on  the  failure  of  a  successful  bidder  to  make 
the  requisite  deposit  within  a  specified  time, 
refers  to  bids  already  made,  and  not  to  a 
bid  or  bids  to  be  made.  It  expresses  the  re- 
lation between  bids  in  existence — those  al- 
ready made  and  pending  before  the  council. 
It  is  only  in  comparison  with  the  next  high- 
est of  those  that  the  words  have  significa- 
tion. Pacific  Electric  B.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles, 
24  Sup.  Ct  586,  589,  194  U.  S.  112,  48  L.  Ed. 
806. 

NEXT  MTTNIGIPAI.  ELECTION 

The  words  "next  municipal  election,**  as 
used  in  an  act  concerning  the  government  of 
cities,  and  requiring  that  the  act  be  submit- 
ted to  the  voters  at  the  municipal  election 
after  its  approval,  means  the  next  election 
after  the  municipality  comes  into  the  dasSi 


NEXT  MUNICIPAL  ELECTION 


608 


NEXT  OF  KIN 


affected  by  the  legislation.  Seymour  y.  City 
of  Orange,  65  Ati.  1038,  1034,  74  N.  J.  Law, 
549  (citing  Ross  y.  Board  of  Chosen  Free- 
holders of  Essex  County,  55  Atl.  310,  69  N.  J. 
Law,  291 ;  Fagan  v.  Payen,  50  Ati.  568,  75  N. 
X  Law,  851). 

The  phrase  "next  municipal  or  charter 
election,"  in  P.  L.  1894,  relative  to  cities  of 
the  first  class  and  providing  that  members  of 
certain  municipal  bodies  shall  be  elected  at 
the  "next  municipal  or  charter  election," 
would  as  to  existing  cities  be  the  first  elec- 
aon  after  the  passage  of  the  act  and  as  to 
any  future  cities  the  first  election  held  in 
the  same.  Fagan  t.  Payen,  59  AtL  568,  569, 
75  N.  J.  Law,  851. 

NEXT  OF  KIN 

''The  term  'next  of  kin'  is  used  to  signify 
the  relatives  of  a  person,  sometimes  in  the 
sense  of  nearest  blood  relatives  and  at  other 
times  in  the  sense  of  relatives  entitled  to 
take  under  the  statute  of  distribution."  Gra- 
ham V.  Whitridge,  57  Atl.  609,  617,  58  Atl.  36, 
99  Md.  248,  66  L.  R.  A.  40a 

The  words  "next  of  kin,"  as  used  in 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  2643,  relating  to  letters  of 
administration  with  will  annexed,  where 
there  is  no  executor  qualified  to  act,  and  pro- 
viding in  subdivision  3  that  where  the  re- 
siduary, principal,  or  specified  legatee,  or  the 
guardian  of  a  minor,  entitled  to  letters,  ei- 
ther do  not  exist  or  will  not  accept  adminis- 
tration, letters  shall  issue  to  one  or  more  of 
the  next  of  kin,  must  be  limited  to  such  of 
the  next  of  kin  as  are  entitled  to  share  in  the 
unbequeathed  assets  of  the  estate,  and  who 
are  therefore  persons  interested  therein ;  and 
a  person  having  no  such  right  is  to  be  ex- 
cluded. In  re  Goggin's  Estate,  88  N.  Y.  Supp. 
557,  559,  43  Misc.  Rep.  233. 

In  Rev.  St  c.  70,  |  2,  giving  a  right  of 
recovery  for  wrongful  death  to  the  wife  and 
"next  of  kin,"  the  quoted  words  mean  those 
standing  in  that  relation  in  a  technical  sense. 
Dukeman  v.  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St  L.  R.  Co., 
86  N.  E.  712,  714,  237  111.  104  (quoting  and 
adopting  definiUon  in  Chicago,  P.  ft  St  L.  R. 
Co.  V.  Woolridge,  51  N.  B.  701,  702,  174  IlL 
830,  334). 

The  words  "next  of  kin"  as  used  in  the 
statute  relating  to  wrongful  death  mean 
those  who  inherit  from  the  deceased  under 
the  statutes  of  descent  and  distribution.  Bo- 
linger  V.  Beacham,  106  Pac.  1094,  1096,  81 
Kan.  746. 

Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  i  285,  giving  a 
right  of  action  to  the  personal  representative 
for  death  by  wrongful  act,  provided  that  the 
damages  must  inure  to  the  exclusive  benefit 
of  the  widow  and  children,  if  any,  or  next  of 
kin,  recognizes  two  classes  of  beneficiaries, 
the  widow  and  children  and  next  of  kin; 
and,  if  there  are  persons  of  the  first  class  en- 
titled to  damages,  they  will  take  exclusively, 


and  granddkildren  are  not  "children*'  wttii 
the  statute,  but  come  within  the  second  dai 
and  may  take  as  beneficiaries  if  there  a 
none  of  the  first  daas,  nor  are  minor  childr 
"next  of  kin"  within  the  statute,  thongh  th 
are  in  fact  decedent's  next  of  kin.  Pittsbai 
C,  C.  &  St  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Reed,  88  N.  B.  Id 
1082,  44  Ind.  App.  635. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  ''wh 
the  title  to  any  real  estate  of  inheritance 
to  which  the  person  having  such  title  shi 
die  intestate,  came  by  descent,  gift  or  devi 
from  the  parent  or  other  kindred  of  the  J 
testate  and  such  intestate  die  without  ct 
dren,  such  estate  shall  go  to  the  kin  next 
the  intestate  of  the  blood  of  the  person  frc 
whom  such  estate  came  or  descended  if  a 
there  be,"  property  devised  by  testatrix 
her  grandchildren  who  are  children  of  t 
daughter,  with  the  provision  that  at  t 
death  of  one  of  the  grandchildren,  a  grai 
daughter,  the  property  should  vest  in  I 
heirs,  the  property  vested  in  equal  parts 
her  death  in  her  mother,  and  her  brother 
the  "next  of  kin"  to  the  exclusion  of  her  i 
ther.    Pierce  v.  Pierce,  14  R.  I.  514,  517. 

In  the  absence  of  a  contrary  intent,  a  g 
to  "next  of  kin"  is  a  gift  to  the  nearest  of  fe 
in  the  strictest  sense,  excluding  persons  w 
might  take  by  representation  under  the  st 
ute  of  distribution ;  e.  g.,  a  brother  or  sisi 
takes  to  the  exclusion  of  children  of  a  decei 
ed  brother  or  sister.  Claris  ▼.  Mack,  126 
W.  632,  634,  161  Mich.  545. 

Aa  kin  UtIhc  at  time 

A  devise  to  "heirs"  or  "next  of  kin" 
construed  as  referring  to  those  who  answ 
that  description  at  the  time  of  the  testato 
death  or  who  would  have  taken,  by  descei 
had  he  died  intestate,  unless  a  different  ! 
tention  is  plainly  manifested  by  the  wi 
Suman  v.  Harvey,  79  AtL  197,  201,  114  ¥ 
241. 

"Next  of  Wn,"  in  the  statute  fixing  t 
order  of  preference  in  which  letters  of  admi 
istration  shall  be  granted,  means  perso 
who  are  next  of  kin  at  the  death  of  the  inti 
tate,  and  who  inherit  the  estate  left  by  t 
decedent,  and  the  addition  of  the  words  '1u 
ing  an  inheritable  interest  in  the  estate*'  ad 
nothing.  In  re  Bills'  Estate,  88  N.  E.  3^ 
342,  43  Ind.  App.  620. 

Under  a  will  giving  the  residuary  esta 
to  the  executors,  in  trust  to  pay  the  incoi 
to  B.  for  life,  and  providing,  "From  and  aft 
the  death  of  B.,  I  direct  my  executors  aj 
trustees  to  convey  my  entire  residuary  estai 
with  all  accumulations  of  interest  then  ( 
hand,  to  my  heirs  at  law  and  next  of  kj 
whomsoever  they  may  be,"  the  gift  over  aft 
the  death  of  the  life  tenant  is  to  testatoi 
next  of  kin  living  at  the  death  of  the  life  te 
ant  In  re  Cooper's  Will,  96  N.  X.  Suj^u.  « 
564,  109  App.  Div.  566. 


KE3CT  OF  KIN 


N£XT  OF  KIN 


Ab  Bcarest  1il«od  relatloas 

Primarily  a  decedent's  "next  of  Mn**  are 
be  persons  nearest  In  degree  of  bipod  sur- 
"iving  hlnL  If  a  decedent  leares  neither  par- 
ent nor  lineal  descendant  surylying,  brothers 
LBd  sisters  are  "next  of  kin."  In  practical 
ise  in  public  statutes,  "next  of  Un**  ordina- 
lly  means  those  who  take  personal  estate  un- 
ler  the  statute  of  distributions.  In  re  Weav- 
T's  Estate,  119  N.  W.  69,  70,  140  Iowa,  eifi, 
!2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1161,  17  Axin.  Gas.  947. 

Adopted  ciaid 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  an  action 
!or  death  shall  be  for  the  exduslye  benefit 
>f  the  widow  and  "next  of  kin**  of  the  de- 
:eased  person,  the  "next  of  kin"  of  a  child 
idopted  under  the  statute  concerning  infants 
(2  Gen.  St  p.  1714)  are  the  "next  of  kin" 
^7  blood.  Heidecamp  t.  Jersey  City  H.  &  P. 
St  R.  Co.,  65  AU.  239,  69  N.  J.  Law,  284,  101 
A.m.  St.  Rep.  707. 

It  is  only  as  to  the  adopting  parent  that 
the  adopted  child  is  made  heir  or  next  of 
Un  by  the  statute  Gomp.  Laws  1897,  S  6780, 
proYidtng  that  an  adopted  child  shall  beeome 
the  heir  at  law  of  the  person  adopting  it; 
and  the  adopted  child,  therefor,  is  not  heir 
by  right  of  representation  of  the  kindred  of 
the  person  who  adopted  It  Van  Derlyn  t. 
Mack,  100  N.  W.  278,  280,  137  Mich.  146,  66  U 
R.  A.  437,  109  Am.  St  Bep.  669,  4  Ann.  Oas. 
879  (quoting  Helms  v.  ElUott,  14  B.  W.  930, 
89  Tenn.  446,  10  L.  R.  A.  535). 

As  de«e0mdamt 
See  Descendant 

Fatl&er 

Where  decedent  leaves  no  widow  or 
child,  but  is  survived  by  a  father,  mother, 
and  younger  sister,  the  father  is  the  sole 
"next  of  kin."  Swift  &  CJo.  v.  Johnson,  138 
Fed.  867,  870,  71  C.  C.  A.  619,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  1161  (citing  Gen.  St  1894,  |  4477  [d.  6] 
1.4471  [cL  3]). 

As  Keirs    • 

See  Heirs. 

Heirs  at  Iaw 

The  conmion-law  distinction  between 
"next  of  kin"  and  "heirs  at  law"  does  not  ex- 
ist In  our  statutes  of  descent,  but  heirs  at 
law  are  also  the  next  of  kin.  L.  T.  Dlckason 
Goal  Co.  T.  Dlddll,  94  N.  B.  411,  413,  49  Ind. 
App.  40. 

**Those  who  take  personalty  by  inherit- 
ance are  technically  'next  of  kin*  and  not 
heirs,"  Kalbach  v.  Clark  (Iowa)  110  N.  W. 
599,  602,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  801  (dtlng  and 
adopting  Tillman  v.  Davis,  95  N.  T.  17,  47 
Am.  Rep.  1). 

The  term  "next  of  kin"  at  least  in<diide8 

those  entitled  to  take  the  personal  estate  in 

case  of  intestacy.    While  it  is  doubtless  used 

iometlmeB  as  «yn<»nymoo8  with  the  broad 

8  WDS.&  PJ2d  Sol— 89 


tfgxdflcatlon  of  "hotrs  at  law,**  the  term 
"heirs  at  law**  is  often  used  in  ita  popular 
sense  of  including  heirs  in  the  legal  sense, 
those  on  whom  the  law  casts  title  to  realty 
possessed  by  the  intestate  at  the  time  of 
his  death,  and  next  of  kin  as  well.  Treating 
the  latter  term  and  the  former  only  In  their 
legal  sense,  the  one  refers  to  those  who  take 
the  personalty  of  an  intestate  and  the  other 
to  those  in  whom  the  title  to  the  realty 
possessed  by  the  intestate  vests  Immediately 
on  his  death.  In  re  Scaife's  Will,  105  N. 
W.  920,  921,  126  Wis.  406. 

Where  a  will  directed  that  on  the  death 
of  testator's  widow,  all  his  estate  then  re- 
maining should  be  divided  into  three  equal 
parts,  one  to  go  to  his  son  W.  or  to  his 
heirs  should  he  have  died,  the  word  "heArs" 
should  be  oonstmed  to  mean  '*next  of  kin,"  or 
those  related  by  blood,  entitled  to  take  the 
personal  estate  of  one  dying  Intestate,  and 
did  not  include  W.'s  widow.  Hess  v.  Zahn, 
107  N.  Y.  Snw.  951,  858,  954,  57  Miac.  Rep. 
516. 

Since  the  courts  of  Kansas  have  con- 
strued the  words  "next  of  kin**  In  Qen.  St 
Kan.  1897,  c.  96,  M  418,  419,  authoiiglng  an 
action  for  negligent  death  for  tbe  benefit  of 
decedent's  next  of  kin,  to  mean  those  ^^lo 
inherit  from  decedent  under  chapter  109,  f 
19,  providing  that  where  an  intestate  leaves 
no  issue  nor  wife,  his  estate  shall  go  to  his 
parents,  a  father  and  mottier  may  sue  for 
the  death  of  their  son,  dying  intestate,  with- 
out wife  or  issue,  in  consequence  of  an  injury 
received  in  Kansas.  Charlton  v.  St  Louis 
A  &  F.  R.  Co.,  98  8.  W.  629, 685,  200  Mo.  418. 

Testatrix,  by  the  fifth  clause  of  her  will, 
bequeathed  money  to  be  invested  and  the  in- 
terest paid  to  testatrix's  sister  for  life,  and 
on  her  death,  to  testatrix's  daughter,  and,  on 
the  death  of  the  daughter,  the  principal  to  be 
divided  between  the  issue  of  the  dau^ter, 
and,  if  no  issu^  then  to  testatrix's  next  of 
kin.  The  sixth  clause  devised  the  homestead 
to  the  executors,  the  rent  thereof  to  be  paid 
to  the  daughter  during  her  life,  and  at  her 
death  the  homestead  to  be  conveyed  to  the 
child  of  such  daughter,  or  the  issue  of  such 
child,  and.  In  the  event  of  the  failure  of 
issue,  then  to  testatrix's  heirs  at  law.  The 
seventh  clause  bequeathed  the  residue  of  the 
estate  In  trust,  to  be  divided  into  two  parts, 
and  the  income  of  one  part  paid  to  the  daugh- 
ter  during  her  life,  and,  on  the  death  of  such 
daughter,  the  principal  to  be  paid  to  her 
issue,  and,  if  she  leave  no  issue,  to  testatrix's 
next  of  kin.  Held,  that  testatrix  did  not 
Intend  that  her  daughter  should,  in  any 
event,  take  a  vested  remainder  in  the  corpus 
of  the  trusts,  subject  only  to  her  own  life 
estate;  the  words  "heirs  at  law"  and  "next 
of  kin"  not  being  used  in  their  strict  and 
primary  meaning,  viz.,  the  persons  who,  in 
case  of  intestacy,  would  at  the  moment  of 
testatrix's  death  succeed  to  her  property. 


NKXT  OF  KIN 


610 


NEXT  OF  KIN 


Salter  y.  Drowne»  98  N.  B.  401,  402,  205  N. 
Y.  204. 

Code  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904,  art  46,  pro- 
viding by  sections  6,  14,  and  21  for  the 
descent  of  real  estate,  declares  by  section  27 
that  if,  in  the  descending  or  collateral  line, 
any  parent  shall  be  dead,  a  child  or  children 
shall,  by  representation,  be  considered  in  the 
same  degree  as  the  parent  would  have  been 
if  living,  and  shall  have  the  same  share  of 
the  estate  as  the  parent  would  have  been 
entitled  to  if  living,  "provided  that  there  Is 
no  representation  admitted  among  collaterals 
after  brother's  and  sister's  children";  and 
article  93,  §  129,  provides:  "After  children, 
descendants,  father,  mother,  brothers  and 
sisters  of  the  deceased,  and  their  descend- 
ants, aU  collateral  relations  in  equal  degree 
shall  take,  and  no  representation  among 
such  collaterals  shall  be  allowed."  Testatrix 
directed  her  estate  to  be  converted  into  cash 
and  distributed  among  her  "heirs  at  law 
and  next  of  kin,  who'  should  be  entitled 
thereto  under  the  laws  of  Maryland."  Held, 
in  a  contest  between  the  first  cousins  of  the 
deceased  and  the  children  of  a  deceased  first 
cousin,  that  the  children  of  the  deceased  first 
cousin  were  not  within  the  class  described 
by  the  will  and  took  nothing  thereunder. 
Suman  v.  Harvey,  79  AU.  197,  201,  114  Md. 
241. 

Ulesitia&ate  oUldrea 

The  term  "blood  relatives"  or  **heirs"  or 
"next  of  kin"  may  include  illegitimate  off- 
spring, and  where  testator  left  his  property 
to  his  nearest  blood  relatives,  and  it  appears 
with  reasonable  certainty  that  when  he  made 
the  will  he  knew  or  ought  to  have  known 
that  he  had  no  blood  relatives  other  than 
Illegitimates,  he  used  the  terms  to  refer  to 
such  persons.  In  re  Sander's  Estate,  105  N. 
W.  1064,  1066,  126  Wis.  660,  5  Ann.  Gas.  508. 

The  administrator  of  an  illegitimate 
child  brought  action  for  his  wrongful  death 
under  Bums'  Ann.  St.  1908,  |  285,  for  the 
benefit  of  his  "next  of  kin,"  consisting  of 
his  mother,  his  half-brothers,  and  his  half- 
sister  by  his  mother's  subsequent  marriage. 
Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  {  2998,  provides  that 
illegitimate  children  may  inherit  from  the 
mother  as  if  legitimate,  and  through  the 
mother,  if  dead,  any  property  or  estate  which 
she  would,  if  living,  have  taken  by  gift,  de- 
vise, or  descent,  and  by  section  8002  the 
mother  of  an  illegitimate  child  dying  intes- 
tate wthout  issue  or  other  descendants  in- 
herits his  estate;  and,  if  such  mother  be 
dead,  her  descendants  or  kindred  shall  in- 
herit. Held,  that  the  "next  of  kin'*  included 
such  persons  as  were  entitled  to  inherit  the 
personal  property  of  the  decedent,  and  that, 
under  sections  2998  and  3002,  the  mother  and 
the  half-brothers  and  the  half-sister  were 
the  next  of  kin,  and  that  the  administrator's 
action  could  be  maintained  for  their  benefit 


li.  T.  Dickason  Goal  Co.  v.  Uddll,  94  li 
411-413,  49  Ind.  App.  40. 

Manrlas*  eoaneotioiM 

The  phrase  "next  of  kin,"  whether 
In  a  statute,  will,  or  contract,  includes 
relations   by   blood,  and    not   connectec 
marriage,  not  even  a  husband  and  wife. 
Graffenreld  v.   Iowa  Land  &  Trust  Co 
Pac.  624,  635,  20  Okl.  687   (dtlng    Supi 
Goundl  of  Order  of  Chosen  Friends  v. 
nett,  19  Atl.  785,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  39). 

The  phrase  "next  of  kin,"  whether 
in  a  statute,  will,  or  contract,  has  by  a 
fectly  uniform  course  of  decisions  been 
to  include  only  relations  by  blood,  and 
connections  by  marriage,  not  even  a  basl 
and  wife.  Boyd  v.  Perkins,  113  S.  W. 
96,  130  Ky.  77  (citing  Huting  v.  FeniK 
R.  I.  411;  2  Jarm.,  Wills,  661;  Scfao 
Wills,  I  537). 

The  term  "next  of  kin"  does  not  inc 
the  widow  of  testator,  In  the  absence  of 
evidence  of  an  intent  to  include  h^  in 
class  which  the  term  Is  employed  to  d« 
nate.  United  States  Trust  Co.  t.  Miller, 
N.  Y.  Supp.  938,  940,  57  Misc.  Rep.  500. 

The  surviving  husband  is,  within 
Gode^  i  422,  next  of  kin  to  his  wife,  and  < 
tied  to  recover  damages  for  her  wron 
death.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Go.  t.  Tc 
send,  81  Pac.  205,  206,  71  Kan.  524.  6  i 
Gais.  191. 

The  words  "next  of  kin"  do  not  inc 
a  widow  or  husband.  Hess  v.  Zahn,  10 
Y.  Supp.  951,  953,  57  Misc.  Rep.  515. 

Neither  husband  nor  wife  of  a  nep 
or  niece  of  a  testator  were  his  "next  of  1 
or  of  blood  relationship,  and  hence  mus 
excluded  in  seeking  those  indicated 
"heirs  and  representatives"  of  nephevt 
niece  surviving  him.  In  re  Nelson's  Esi 
74  Atl.  851,  857,  862,  9  Del.  Gh.  1. 

A  husband  is  his  wife's  ''next  of  1 
where  she  dies  intestate  and  without 
dren  or  direct  descendants,  wi£hln  Code 
Proc.  Kan.  §  422a,  providing  that  cez 
actions  for  wrongful  death  may  be  broi 
by  deceased's  "next  of  kin."  Joplin  J 
Ry.  Go.  V.  Payne,  194  Fed,  387,  889,  11 
C.  A.  305. 

Rev.  St  Ohio  1892,  |  4176,  provides  1 
when  a  person  dies  intestate  and  leave: 
children  or  their  legal  repres^itatlves, 
widow  or  widower  shall  be  entitled  as  *i 
of  kin"  to  all  the  personal  property,  < 
but,  if  the  intestate  leaves  any  children, 
widow  or  widower  shall  be  entitled  to 
first  $400  and  one-third  of  the  remalnde 
the  personal  property  subject  to  distrlbui 
A  policy  of  insurance  payable  to  the  insur 
heirs  was  by  its  terms  to  be  governed 
construed  according  to  the  laws  of  O 
Held  that,  though  in  New  York  •'heirs"  w 
applied    to    successors    to    personal    es 


i  V 


NEXT  OF  KIN 


6U 


NEXT  PBECEDINQ 


means  "next  of  kin/'  and  "next  of  kin**  does 
not  include  a  widow,  under  the  policy  and 
laws  of  Ohio,  the  widow  is  entitled  to  per- 
sonal property  as  "next  of  kin,*'  and  should 
share  in  the  insurance  with  the  insured's 
children.  Burns  v.  Bums,  82  N.  £.  1107, 
1108, 190  N.  Y.  211. 

Code  GiT.  Proc.  i  1908,  proyides  that 
damages  recovered  in  an  action  for  wrongful 
death  are  excluslyely  for  the  benefit  of  the 
decedent's  husband  or  wife  and  next  of  kin, 
to  be  distributed  as  unbequeathed  assets; 
section  1904  declares  that  the  damages  may 
be  such  as  the  jury  deems  Just  compehsatlon 
for  the  pecuniary  injuries  resulting  from  the 
decedent's  death  to  the  person  for  whose 
benefit  the  action  was  brought ;  and  sections 
1905  and  1870  define  ''next  of  kin"  to  include 
all  persons  entitled  under  the  statutes  of 
distribution  of  personal  property  to  share  in 
unbequeathed  assets  of  the  decedent  other 
than  a  surviylng  husband  or  wife.  Held, 
that  in  an  action  for  wrongful  death  of  a 
married  woman  living  apart  from  her  hus< 
band,  leaving  no  descendants,  the  damages 
recoverable  were  only  such  as  resulted  from 
the  pecuniary  injury  caused  by  her  death  to 
her  husband.  Austin  v.  Metropolitan  St  By. 
Co.,  95  N.  Y.  Supp.  740,  741,  108  App.  Div. 
249. 

Honreaident  alien 

A  statute  giving  the  ''next  of  kin"  of  one 
wrongfully  killed  a  cause  of  action  does  not 
apply  to  nonresident  aliens.  Zelger  v.  Penn- 
sylvania B.  Co.,  151  Fed.  848,  852. 

Under  Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  1902,  providing 
that  an  executor  or  administrator  of  de- 
cedent, who  has  left  surviving  a  husband, 
wife,  or  "next  of  kin,"  may  maintain  an 
action  to  recover  damages  for  wrongful 
death,  section  1905,  providing  that  the  term 
"next  of  kin,"  as  used  in  the  foregoing  sec- 
tions has  the  meaning  specified  in  section 
1870,  and  section  1870,  providing  that  the 
term  "next  of  kin"  includes  all  those  enti- 
tled, under  the  provisions  of  law  relating  to 
the  distribution  of  personal  property,  to 
share  in  the  unbequeathed  assets  of  a  de- 
cedent, after  payment  of  debts  and  expenses, 
other  than  a  surviving  husband  or  wife, 
the  administrator  of  a  decedent  whose  "next 
of  kin"  are  aliens  may  bring  such  an  action. 
AlflBon  V.  Bush  Co.,  75  N.  E.  230,  281,  182 
N.  Y.  893, 108  Am.  St  Rep.  815. 

As  relatlTe 

See  Relation— Relative. 

As  repreaentatiTe 

See  Legal  Representative;    Representa* 
tive. 

NxacT  OF  Knr  nr  equal  degbee 

Testatrix  devised  half  of  the  residue  of 
her  estate  to  the  heirs  of  her  late  husband. 
There  were  living  11  nieces  and  nephews  and 
8  i^randnieces  and  grandnephews  of  the  said 


husband  at  the  d^th  of  testatrix.  Held,  that 
his  "next  of  kin  in  equal  degree"  within  Rev. 
St  1903,  c.  77,  I  1,  rule  6,  are  his  11  nieces 
and  nephews  living  at  the  death  of  testatrix, 
taking  the  residue  so  devised  per  capita  and 
not  per  stirpes.  In  re  Ruggles'  Estate,  71 
Aa  933,  935,  104  Me.  383. 

The  statute  of  distributions  having  been 
amended  by  the  repeal  of  the  proviso  limit- 
ing representation  among  collaterals  to  the 
children  of  deceased  brothers  and  sisters, 
held,  that  the  words,  "and  in  case  there  be 
no  diild,  then  to  the  next  kindred  of  equal 
degree  of  or  unto  the  intestate  and  their  legal 
representatives,"  are  to  be. read  in  connec- 
tion with  a  prior  clause  directing  distribu- 
tion to  the  next  of  kindred  "in  equal  degrees 
or  l^ally  representing  their  stocks,"  and  in 
the  distribution  of  personal  property  among 
collaterals  representation  is  limited  to  the 
descendants  of  the  stock  represented  by  the 
surviving  "next  of  kin,"  as  the  words  "next 
of  kin"  must  mean  living  persons.  Smith  v. 
McDonald.  61  Atl.  453,  455,  69  N.  J.  EJq.  765. 

HSXT  OT  KIHDRED 

The  words  "next  of  kindred,**  as  used  In 
a  wiU  limiting  a  remainder  on  a  trust  es- 
tate after  the  beneficiary's  death  to  her  next 
of  kindred,  include  the  beneficiary's  nephew 
and  niece  in  preference  to  her  grandnephews 
and  grandnieces.  Graham  v.  Whitrldge,  57 
Ati.  609,  617,  58  Att.  86,  99  Md.  248,  66  L. 
R.A.40& 

The  words  "next  of  kindred,"  in  Or- 
phans* Court  Act  1898,  I  168  (P.  L.  p.  715), 
directing  disposition  to  the  next  of  kindred 
of  equal  degrees  or  legally  representing  their 
stocks,  mean  representatives  of  those  dead, 
who  if  living  would  answer  the  same  descrip- 
tion as  the  actually  living  next  of  kindred. 
Smith  V.  McDonald,  65  Atl.  840,  842,  71  N. 
J.  Eq.  261. 

NEXT  PREGEDINa 

The  words  "during  the  year  next  preced- 
ing," as  used  in  Qen.  St  1905,  a  54,  |  8, 
providing  that  in  making  a  selection  of  per- 
sons to  serve  as  jurors  "each  person  who 
shall  have  served  as  a  juror  in  any  capacity 
at  any  term  of  court  during  the  year  next 
preceding  such  selection  shall  be  excluded 
from  the  list  of  jurors  for  the  then  ensuing 
year,"  clearly  means  the  preceding  year, 
counting  back  from  the  time  of  the  naaking 
of  the  list  State  v.  Hamilton,  87  Pac.  363, 
365,  74  Kan.  461. 

Code  1906,  |  838,  requiring  notice  of  a 
proposal  to  issue  county  bonds  for  three 
weeks  "next  preceding,"  does  not  mean  that 
if  the  board  falls  to  issue  the  bonds  at  the 
meeting  next  after  the  publication  of  the 
notice,  it  may  not  do  so  at  a  future  time^ 
but  jurisdiction  is  acquired,  and  may  be  ex- 
ercised in  the  discretion  of  the  board.  West- 
on V.  Hancock  Countyt  54  South.  807,  809,  98 
Miss.  800. 


KmCT  SEaUIiAR  TERM 


ei2 


HEXT  TBBIC 


jfBXT  BSaULAK  T9BM 

See,  also,  N«ct  Tana. 

Defendant  was  given  until  the  last  day 
of  the  next  term  of  court  to  file  a  bill  of  ex- 
ceptions. The  next  term  should  have  been 
held  in  February,  and  the  following  term  in 
May.  Owing  to  the  absence  of  the  judge^  the 
February  term  was  not  held.  Held,  that  she 
had  until  the  last  day  of  the  May  term  with- 
in which  to  file  her  bill  of  exceptions,  since 
the  order  extending  her  time  did  not  give 
her  to  any  particular  day  of  the  year,  but 
to  a  certain  day  in  the  •'next  regular  term," 
which  meant  a  term  at  which  the  court  was 
legally  open  for- the  transaction  of  business, 
and  not  the  time  at  which  it  could  and  should 
have  been  open,  but  was  not  because  of  the 
absence  of  the  Judge.  Grant  City  v.  Sim- 
mons, IQl  S.  W.  187,  188,  167  Mo.  App.  183. 

HSXT  8E88I0H 

The  worda  "at  its  next  session,"  in  Const 
art  C^  §  14,;  authorizing  the  Legislature  to 
pass  bills  over  the  Governor's  veto,  and  pro- 
viding that,  when  the  Governor  witliin  five 
days  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Legisla- 
ture vetoes  a  bill  and  files  it  in  the  office  of 
the  Secretary  of  State,  the  latter  shall  lay 
the  same  before  the  Lc^slature  "at  its  next 
session"  as  if  it  had  been  returned  by  the 
Governor,  mean  the  first  session  following, 
whether  regular  or  special,  and  a  bill  vetoed 
by  the  Governor  after  the  adjournment  of 
th;^  Legislature  must  be  acted  on  at  the  fol- 
lowing special  session,  and  the  action  of  the 
Legislature  in  acting  on  it  at  the  regular  ses- 
sion following  the  special  session  and  passing 
it  over  the  Governor's  veto  Is  ineffectual. 
Woessner  v.  Bullock,  93  N.  E.  1057,  1058,  176 
Ind.  166. 

HEXT  StTOCEEDIirO 

Where  a  demand  for  trial  was  made  in 
the  superior  court  at  the  term  at  which  the 
indictment  was  found,  and  subsequently  dur- 
ing the  term  the  indictment  was  transferred 
to  a  city  court  fbr  trial,  the  demand  being  maue 
and  the  indictment  transferred  during  a  con- 
current term  of  the  city  court,  the  next  term 
of  the  city  court  and  not  the  concurrent 
term,  was  the  "next  succeeding  term"  after 
the  demand,  within  the  meaning  of  section 
988  of  the  Penal  Code.  Castleberry  ▼.  State, 
76  S.  B.  74,  75,  11  Ga.  App.  757. 

In  Act  May  23,  1889  (P.  L.  277,  art.  1). 
I  3,  as  amended  by  Act  June  21,  1911  (P.  L. 
1102),  providing  that  officers  of  a  borough 
shall  hold  their  respective  offices  until  the 
first  Monday  in  December  of  the  first  odd- 
numbered  year  next  succeeding  the  issuing  of 
letters  patent  to  the  borough  as  a  city  of  the 
third  class,  the  words  ^'next  succeeding" 
qualify  tlie  words  "the  first  odd-numbered 
year,"  and  not  the  word  "December."  Com- 
monwealth T.  Langley,  82  Aa  66,  58,  283  Pa. 
222.  i 


!15 


See^  also,  Next  Regular  Term. 

An  order  that  the  action  abate  if 
heirs  are  not  made  parties  by  the  '*next  tc 
refers  to  the  next  civil  term,  and  not  u 
intervening  criminal  term;  and  where  pre 
is  served  on  them  within  that  time,  and  v 
in  two  years  from  defendant's  death,  tlu 
fnsal  to  abate  the  action  la  not  an  abos 
discretion.  Moore  ▼•  Moore,  66  8.  EL  SOS, 
151  N.  O.  665. 

Const  art  1,  |  10,  declares  that  ixu 
shall  b^  administered  without  delay;  B.  i 
Comp.  I  1559,  provides  that  if  a  defenc 
whose  trial  has  not  been  postponed  on 
application,  or  by  his  consent,  be  not  broi 
to  trial  at  the  next  term  of  the  conzi 
which  the  indictment  is  triable,  after  1 
found,  the  court  must  order  the  indlctn 
dismissed,  except  for  cause;  and  B.  A 
Comp.  I  1379,  gives  the  court  authority 
postpone  a  criminal  case  to  another  tern 
the  statement  of  the  district  attorney.  B 
that  the  words  "next  term,"  as  uaed  in 
tion  1559,  excluded  the  current  term  at  wl 
the  indictment  was  found,  and  hence 
fendant  was  not  entitled  either  to  a  tria 
dismissal  at  that  term.  State  t.  Breaw 
Pac;  896»  45  Or.  586. 

Va.  Code  1904,  p.  1633,  |  3060,  prori 
in  section  3062,  that  there  may  be  trie^ 
special  term  any  dvil  case  not  tried  at 
last  preceding  term,  any  motion  cognixi 
by  the  court,  any  criminal  case  which  c( 
be  tried  at  a  regular  term,  and  any  oon 
versy  ready  for  hearing  at  law  or  in  chanc 
though  it  could  not  have  been  heard  at 
preceding  term;    and  section  3024,  p.  !< 
provides  that,  where  the  reasons  stated  i 
petition  for  quo  warranto  are  legally 
fident,  the  writ  shall  be  returnable  to 
next  term  of  the  court    Held,  that  a  wri 
quo  warranto  may  not  be  returned  to  a  i 
dal  term,  the  phrase  "next  term"  in  seel 
3024  referring  to  a  regular  term,  and 
matter  not  being  within  section  3062.     Sti 
V.  Pratt,  49  S.  E.  654, 103  Va.  536. 

Under  section  27  of  the  act  creating 
city  court  of  Camilla  (Acts  1905,  p.  1 
providing  that  if  a  defendant  stands  rai 
etc.,  then  the  judge  shall  commit  tUm 
trial  at  the  next  regular  term,  or  ape 
term,  a  contention  that  the  word  "ne 
means  nearest,  and  that  the  nearest  tern 
the  one  already  in  session,  is  too  straine<j 
be  tenable.  Heywood  ▼.  State,  54  S.  B.  1 
125  Ga.  262. 

The  phrase  "next  term,"  In  a  bail  N 
cdntainlng  incorrect  recitals  as  to  the  d 
month,  or  year  in  which  the  court  will  c 
vene  or  accused  appear,  coupled  with  a  c 
dition  for  accused  to  appear  at  the  **n( 
term,"  operates  to  render  the  bond  val 
Territory  ex  rel.  Thacker  ▼.  Conner,  87  P 
501,  592,  17  Okl.  135  (dting  State  ex  i 
Qibson  T.  Lay»  29i  S.  W.  999,  128  Mo.  0 


[-.Jl 


NBXT  TERM 


618 


KIEOB 


fState  ▼.  HcEUmney,  20  Mo.  App.  584;  Gay  r* 
State,  7  Kan.  S94;  5  Oye.  p.  96;  Moonej  t. 
People,  ai  IlL  ld4;  Hunter  ▼.  State,  21  Ind. 
351 ;  Garry  t.  State*  39  Miss.  611;  Feople  t. 
Welsh  [N.  Y.]  47  How.  Prac  420;  People  ▼. 
O'Brien,  41  111.  303;  Proseck  y.  State,  88 
Ohio  St  606). 

The  word  ''subsequent,"  in  the  act  re- 
quiring commissioners  appointed  by  the  Or- 
phans' Ck>urt  to  set  off  dower  to  make  their 
report  at  the  next  or  subsequent  term  after 
their  appointment,  has  the  same  meaning  as 
"next,"  and,  if  either  word  had  been  used 
alone,  it  would  have  expressed  the  same  idea. 
Osbom  T.  Rogers,  19  N.  J.  £q.  429,  431. 

Accused  was  indicted  at  the  October, 
1909,  term  of  the  district  court,  which  ended 
February  4, 1910.  On  February  8th  a  special 
term  of  the  court  was  convened  at  the  re- 
quest of  accused  to  hear  his  motion  to  quash 
the  indictmoit  Another  special  term  was 
convened  on  February  28th,  and  on  March 
7th  the  next  regular  term  convened  which 
was  to  continue  until  May  31st,  but  the  Leg- 
islature by  Act  March  26,  1910,  provided  that 
the  regular  term  of  such  district  court  should 
commence  on  the  first  Monday  in  January, 
May,  and  October  each  year.  Held,  that  ac- 
cused was  not  entitled  to  a  dismissal  because 
he  had  not  been  brought  to  trial  at  either  of 
such  terms,  since  the  "next  term  of  court" 
within  CJomp.  Laws  1909,  f  7047,  pityvldliiff 
that,  if  an  accused  prosecuted  for  a  public 
offense  whose  trial  has  not  been  postponed 
apon  his  application  is  not  brought  to  trial  ttt 
the  next  term  of  court  in  which  the  indict- 
ment is  triable,  the  court  must  order  the  pros- 
ecution dismissed,  etc.,  refers  to  the  next 
regular  term  of  the  court  as  distinguished 
from  a  special  term  held  for  a  special  pur- 
pose, and  the  law  becoming  effective  while 
the  March  term  was  being  held,  operating  to 
terminate  such  term  on  April  30th,  was  sufD- 
dent  cause  for  not  trying  him  during  such 
term,  so  that  accused's  right  to  a  speedy  trial 
guaranteed  by  Bill  of  Rights,  t  20,  was  not 
violated,  as  his  constitutional  right  to  a 
speedy  trial  was  not  contravened  by  delay  ne- 
cessitated by  the  .law  itself.  State  ex  rel. 
Eubanks  v.  Cde,  109  Pac.  736,  744,  4  Okl.  Cr. 
25. 

NEXT  THXKO  TO  AIT  XKPOflfllBIUTT 

"Next  thing  to  an  impossibility,"  as  used 
In  the  testimony  of  an  engineer  with  refer- 
ence to  the  construction  of  a  bridge  so  as  to 
pre?ent  debris  from  being  swept  therefrom 
either  by  the  city's  employes  or  by  air  cur- 
rents onto  the  houses  below,  meant  that  any 
further  or  additional  construction  to  remedy 
^e  alleged  defect  was  almost  Impossible  or 
impracticable.  Sadller  v.  New  York,  93  N. 
Y.  Supp.  579,  683,  1Q4  App.  Div.  82. 

NFY. 

Where  a  bill  of  lading  read  ''consignee 
J*  B.  8.  Nty.  W.  H.  J.  &  Co.*'  the  legend 


'*N«r."  is  tquivateat  to  '"nottCy"  and  imposes 
on  the  railroad  company  tiie  duty  to  notify 
W.  H.  J.  &  Co.,  and  evidence  to  show  such 
meaning  is  admissible.  Stoner  v.  Zacharay, 
97  N.  W.  1098,  1100,  122  Iowa,  287. 

NICE 

The  word  ''nice"  is  defined  as  "character- 
ized  by  discrimination  and  Judgment,  acute^ 
discerning,  exactly  fitted  or  adjusted,  accur- 
ate, apt,  delicately  constructed,  hence  easily 
disarranged  or  injured;  fragile,  tender, 
agreeable  or  pleasant  in  any  way,  pleasing  to 
the  senses."  Brophy  v.  Idaho  Produce  ft 
Provision  Co.,  78  Pac.  498,  495,  31  Mont  270 
(quoting  Standard  Diet). 

NICKEL 

Manufactures   o4    see  .  Manufactures- 
Manufactured  Articles. 
▲  "nicker*  means  5  cents.    Sims  v.  State, 
57  8.  B.  1029,  1  Ga.  App.  776. 

NICKNAME 

**Mik9^'  is  not  a  universally  recognized 
abbreviation  of  "Michael,"  but  is,  strictly 
speaking,  a  mere  diminutive  or  nickname. 
Ohlmann  v.  Clarkson  Sawmill  Co.,  120  S.  W. 
1155,  222  Mo.  62,  28  L^  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  432,  133 
Am.  St  Rep.  606. 

NIECE 

To  constitute  Incest  under  Bums'  Anil 
St  1908,  t  2352,  punishing  sexual  Intercourse 
between  uncle  and  niece  when  construed  in 
connection  with  section  8357,  making  males 
and  females  not  nearer  of  kin  than  second 
cousins  competent  to  jnarry,  the  uncle  and 
niece  must  be  related  by  blood;  the  word 
"niece"  in  its  primary  sense  including  rela- 
tionship by  consanguinity.  State  v.  Tucker, 
93  N.  E.  8,  4,  174  Ind.  715,  31  Ik  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  772,  Ann.  Cas.  19iaA,  100. 

As  brotlMr 

See  Brother 
Gvamdaieees 

The  words  "nephews  and  nieces,**  as  con- 
tained in  the  residuary  clause  of  a  will  giving 
to  testator's  "neiA^ews  and  nieces'' the  resi- 
due of  his  estate,  included  grandnephews  and 
grandnieces,  and  this,  whether  the  previous 
bequests  in  the  will  to  them  had  been  abso- 
lute or  in  trust.  Leask  v.  Richards,  101  N. 
Y.  Supp.  652,  666,  116  App.  Div.  274. 

Testator  gave  a  legacy  to  his  niece  Kate, 
daughter  of  Dr.  H.  W.,  and  to  Dr.  H.  W.  a 
specified  sum  for  himself  and  his  other  chil- 
dren, and  he  gave  legacies  to  any  niece  or 
nephew  whom  be  bad  omitted,  excepting  the 
children  of  Dr.  H.  W.,  for  whom  he  had  made 
provision.  Testator  was  a  widower,  who  had 
never  had  any  children,  and  left  surviving 
him  a  number  of  nieces  and  nephews,  and 


NIGGER 


614 


NITROGEN  PEROXIDE 


ill 


4 


grandnleces  and  grandnepbews,  descendants 
of  sisters  who  died  before  the  execution  of 
the  will.  There  were  two  Drs.  H.  W.,  father 
and  son;  the  father  being  the  father  of  the 
niece  Kate.  Testator  had  a  niece  Mrs.  P., 
who  was  omitted  from  the  will,  and  the  leg- 
acy to  her  was  on  her  death  paid  to  her  chil- 
dren. Held,  that  the  words  "niece  or  neph- 
ew" did  not  embrace  grandnleces  and  grand- 
nephews.  White  y.  Old,  75  S.  B.  182,  184, 
113  Va.  709. 

NIGGER 

A  '*nlgger"  is  a  part  of  the  machinery 
of  a  sawmill,  and  consists  of  a  piece  of  tim- 
ber with  Iron  spikes  along  the  upper  side, 
and  Is  used  In  striking  and  pushing  heavy 
logs  onto  the  carriage  and  for  turning  them 
thereon  when  desired.  O'Brien  v.  Page  Lum- 
ber Ck).,  82  Pac  114,  39  Wash.  037. 

NIGGERHEAD 

The  falling  of  a  "nlggerhead,"  which 
Is  a  large,  hard  substance  found  In  coal,  or 
partly  In  the  coal,  and  partly  In  the  walls,  Is 
such  a  caving  in  as  the  statute  requires  mine- 
owners  or  operators  to  furnish  timbers  to 
guard  against  Pachko  v.  Wllkeson  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.,  90  Pac.  436,  437,  46  Wash.  422. 

NIGHT— NIGHTTIME 

As  after  sundown 

An  instruction  defining  '^nighttime  bur- 
glary*' should  give  a  definition  of  "nighttime" 
as  80  minutes  after  sundown,  and  not  before, 
as  provided  by  statute.  Moray  v.  State,  135 
S.  W.  669.  570,  61  Tex.  Cr.  R.  547. 

As  between  dnrkness  and  dawn 

"Nighttime"  is  that  period  of  time  be- 
tween the  termination  of  daylight  on  the 
evening  of  .one  day  and  the  earliest  dawn  of 
the  next  morning.  United  States  v.  South- 
em  Paa  Co.,  157  Fed.  459,  461. 

As  between  sunset  and  snnrlse 

Pen.  Code,  S  824,  In  relation  to  burglary, 
defines  "nighttime"  as  meaning  the  period  be- 
tween sunset  and  sunrise.  State  v.  Copen- 
haver,  89  Pac.  61,  62,  35  Mont  342. 

Under  Rev.  St  1898, 1 4334,  defining  "bur- 
glary" as  entering  'In  the  nighttime,"  etc, 
and  section  4338,  defining  "nighttime"  as  the 
period  between  sunset  and  sunrise,  a  larceny, 
to  constitute  burglary,  must  be  committed  In 
the  nighttime,  and  afllrmatlve  proof  that  It 
was  so  committed  must  be  adduced;  but 
such  proof  need  not  be  direct,  but  may  be 
circumstantial,  in  character.  State  v.  Rich- 
ards, 81  Pac.  142,  29  Utah,  310. 

On  a  prosecution  for  burglary,  an  In- 
struction that  If  defendant  made  the  entry 
charged  'in  the  nighttime,  between  sunset 
and  sunrise,"  he  should  be  convicted,  was 
not  erroneous  on  the  ground  that  it  took  from 


the  Jury  the  question  whether  the  burg^ 
was  effected  In  the  nighttime,  but  the  Instr 
tlon  was  proper  aa  declaring  as  a  matter 
law  the  meaning  of  "nighttime"  as  defined 
Pen.  Code,  |  463.  People  v.  Hlgglns,  96  P 
683,  684,  9  CaL  App.  267. 

Evidence  that  a  building  was  entered 
accused  "In  the  evening  some  time  af 
dark"  was  sufficient  to  establish  bnrglary 
the  "nighttime**  within  Pen.  Code,  |  463,  m 
Ing  burglary  In  the  "nighttime"  burglary 
the  first  degree  and  defining  ^'nighttime" 
the  period  between  sunset  and  sunrise.  P 
pie  V.  Mendoza,  118  Pac.  964,  965,  17  C 
App.  157. 

Disoemment  of  features  as  teat 
Under  Rev.  Code  1893,  p.  737,  c  97 
29,  providing  that  search  warrants  shall  i 
authorize  the  searching  of  any  dwell 
house  In  the  nighttime,  the  term  "nlghttiii 
means  that  space  of  time  during  which  i 
sun  Is  below  the  horizon,  exc^t  that  spi 
which  precedes  Its  rising  and  follows  Its  t 
ting,  during  which,  by  Its  light,  the  coiu 
nance  of  a  man  may  be  discerned.  Petit 
Colmary  (DeL)  55  AU.  344,  346.  4  Pennen 
266. 

NIGHT  WAI.KEB 

See  Common  Night  Walker. 

NIGHT  WATCHICAN 

As  laborer,  see  Laborer. 

NISI  JUDGMENT 

As  judgment,  see  Judgment  (In  Law). 

NITROCELLULOSE 

"Nitrocellulose,'*  as  referred  to  tn  i 
Von  Freeden  patent.  No.  429,516,  for  a  p 
cess  for  making  smokeless  gunpowder  fr 
''nitrocellulose,'*  is  an  explosive  nitrate 
cellulose,  commonly  known  as  gun  cotton, 
is  made  by  digesting  clean  cotton  In  a  m 
ture  of  nitric  and  sulphuric  add.  There  i 
other  nitrates  of  cellulose  made  with  wc 
acids  and  a  short  period  of  digestion,  wh 
are  not  gun  cotton.  Nltrocelluloee.  or  c 
cotton,  is  soluble  In  certain  liquids,  such 
ethyl-ether,  methyl-ether,  a  solution  of  ca 
phor  In  ether,  etc.  Wolff  v.  B.  I.  Du  P< 
De  Nemours  &  Co..  122  Fed.  944,  945. 

NITROGEN  PEROXIDE 

"Nitrogen  peroxide'*  is  a  dark  brown  g 
deepening  in  color  as  the  temperature  is 
creased.  It  has  a  peculiarly  repulsive  od 
and  iB  poisonous  when  Inhaled.  While 
sometimes  bleaches.  It  more  frequently  i 
parts  color,  especially  as  to  protelds,  whi 
are  an  Important  constituent  of  flour.  It  v 
turn  commeal  and  other  com  products  a 
rice  products  yellow,  while  tobacco  is  m« 
darker  by  It  Naylor  v.  Alsop  Process  C 
168  Fed.  911,  917,  94  C.  C.  A.  315. 


MIXBOOIiTCEBIN 


615 


NO  OIHER 


NITROGLYCERIN 

An  inf onnatloii  for  the  malicloiu  placing 
of  an  ezploslYe  near  a  dwelling  house,  de- 
icriblng  the  ezploslTe  aa  ''nitroglycerin/'  com- 
monly known  as  "dynamite"  or  "giant  pow- 
der/' was  not  objectionable  for  indeflnite- 
ness  as  to  the  explosion  charged^  the  sub* 
stances  all  being  nitroglycerin  explosives. 
People  T.  Swaile»  107  Pac  184,  180^  12  CaL 
App.  192. 

NO 

The  single  answer,  "No,"  to  the  issoe, 
was  it  a  sale  of  goods  for  the  purpose  of 
defrauding  creditors?  or  was  it  to  secure 
the  payment  of  a  yalid  debt?  leaves  it  un- 
certain as  to  the  answer  intended.  Riske 
V.  Rotan  Grocery  Co.,  84  8.  W.  243,  244,  87 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  494. 

In  an  application  for  anployeri^  liabil- 
ity insurance,  the  question  and  answer :  "Q. 
No  explosives  or  chemicals  used  except  as 
herein  stated?  A  No*'— do  not  constitute  a 
double  negative,  amounting  to  an  affirmative. 
Columbian  Exposition  Salvage  Co.  v.  Union 
Casualty  ft  Surety  Co.,  77  N.  E.  12S»  220  IlL 
172. 

NO  CAUSE  OF  ACTION 

The  direction  of  a  verdict  of  "no  cause 
of  action**  at  the  close  of  plaintilTs  proof,  on 
motion  for  nonsuit  on  the  ground  .of  failure 
to  prove  absence  of  contributory  negligence, 
is  equivalent  to  a  nonsuit  because  of  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  evidence,  and  not  because  of 
the  insufficiency  of  the  complaint  Romaine 
V.  New  York,  N.  H.  ft  H.  R.  Co^  88  N.  Y. 
Supp.  248,  249,  91  App.  Div.  1. 

NO  CHANGE 

See  There  is  No  ChangSb 

NO  EFFECT 

See  Of  No  Effect 

NO  FURTHER  ACTION 

See  Neither  Party,  Etc. 

NO  INTEREflT  TO  MISREPRESENT 

The  term  "no  interest  to  mtBrepresent,** 
as  used  with  reference  to  conditions  requisite 
to  the  admission  of  declarations  of  a  deceas- 
ed person  respecting  a  boundary,  means  free- 
dom from  selfish  motive  or  self-interest  or 
personal  advantage;  disinterested,  not  mere- 
ly in  the  sense  of  having  no  pecuniary  inter- 
est, but  in  the  broader  sense  of  being  abso- 
lutely impartial  and  indifferent  to  the  contro- 
versy on  trial.  Turgeon  v.  Woodward,  78 
Aa  577,  579,  83  Conn.  537. 

NO  lABORER  NOT  A  CITIZEN  OF  THE 
UNITEO  STATES 

The  phrase  "no  mechanic  or  unskilled 
laborer  not  a  dtisen  of  the  United  States," 
as  used  in  a  dty  charter,  providing  that  no 


such  labors  who  has  not  declared  his  in- 
tention to  become  such,  and  who  has  not 
resided  within  the  dty  for  one  year  next  be- 
fore entering  thereon,  shall  be  employed  by 
the  dty,  applies  only  to  laborers  not  dtizens 
of  the  United  8tate&  Landswick  t.  Lane,  90 
Paa  490,  491,  49  Or.  408w 

NO-UCENSE  TERRITORY 

The  term  "no-license  territory"  Is  de- 
fined by  statute  as  all  parts  of  the  state  ex- 
cept the  premises  actually  occupied  by  li- 
censees. This  definition  makes  dear  the  leg- 
islative understanding  that  the  prohibitory 
law  is  in  force  generally  in  license  towns,  ex- 
cept in  so  far  as  it  is  rendered  inapplicable 
by  the  special  license  legislation.  State  v. 
Langdon,  84  Aa  1099, 1101,  74  N.  H.  50. 

Under  Acts  1910,  c.  190,  |  80,  requiring 
shipments  of  ardent  spirits  into  local  option 
or  no-license  territory  to  be  plainly  marked, 
showing  the  kind  and  quantity  of  spirits  and 
the  consignee  of  the  package,  and  section  19c, 
defining  "local  option  territory^  as  territory 
which,  by  vote  under  the  local  option  law, 
has  declared  against  the  issuance  of  licenses 
for  the  sale  of  ardent  spirits,  and  "no-license 
territory"  as  territory  in  which,  under  the 
provisions  of  that  or  some  other  act,  no  li- 
cense for  the  sale  of  such  spirits  can  be 
granted,  a  conviction  cannot  be  sustained  for 
failure  to  mark  as  spedfied  a  shipment  into  a 
magisterial  district,  where  licenses  may  be 
issued  under  certain  conditions,  and  which 
voted  against  local  option  at  the  last  local 
option  election,  al^ough  no  licenses  are  actu- 
ally in  effect.  Armstead  v.  Commonwealth, 
74  8.  E.  399,  400,  U3  Va.  765. 

NO  OTHER 

A  provision  in  an  election  statute  that 
"no  other  names  shall  be  placed  upon  the 
ballot"  than  the  names  of  those  who  have 
filed  a  statement  of  their  candidacy  was  not 
intended  to  forbid  voting  for  persons  other 
than  those  named  on  the  ballot  by  inserting 
thdr  names  in  writing.  Eckerson  v.  City  of 
Des  Moines*  U5  N.  W.  177,  190,  137  Iowa, 
452. 

Code  Civ.  Froc.  i  2476,  provides  that  the 
Surrogate's  Court  of  eadi  county  has  exdu- 
sive  Jurisdiction  to  grant  letters  testamentary 
where  a  nonresident  decedent  dies  without 
the  state  leaving  personal  property  in  that 
county  and  "no  other."  Subdivision  4  gives 
such  exdusive  Jurisdiction  where  decedent 
was  not  a  resident  of  the  state,  and  a  petition 
for  probate  of  his  will  or  for  a  grant  of  let- 
ters of  administration  has  not  been  filed  in 
any  Surrogate's  Court,  but  real  property  of 
the  decedent,  to  which  the  will  relates,  or 
which  is  subject  to  sale  for  his  debts,  is  situ- 
ated within  that  county  and  "no  other." 
Section  2477  provides  that,  where  personal 
property  of  a  decedent  is  within  two  or 
more  counties,  under  the  drcnmstances  sped- 
fied in  section  2476,  subd.  8»  or  real  estate  of 


NO  PBRSOK 


^16 


NOLLE  PBOSEQUI 


the  decedent  is  situated  in  two  or  more  coun- 
ties under  the  drcumstanoes  specified  in  sub- 
diylsion  4,  §  2476,  the  Surrogates'  Ck>urt8 
of  such  counties  have  concurrent  Jurisdiction 
to  issue  letters  testamentary.  Held  that, 
where  a  nonresident  decedent  left  personal 
property  in  several  counties  and  left  real 
estate  in  another  county,  and  no  letters  of 
administration  had  been  issued  in  the  state, 
the  Surrogates'  Courts  of  the  counties  in 
which  there  was  personal  property  had  con- 
current jurisdiction  to  issue  letters.  The 
words  ''no  other,"  as  used  in  section  2476, 
relate  to  exclusive  Jurisdiction,  and  do  not 
affect  the  concurrent  Jurisdiction  which  sec- 
tion 2477  confers  upon  Surrogate  CSourts, 
where  personal  property  is  in  two  or  more 
counties.  In  re  Arnold's  Estate,  90  N.  Y. 
Supp.  740,  742,  U4  App.  Div.  244. 

NO  PERSON 

The  words  "no  person"  in  a  criminal 
statute  are  to  be  given  their  literal  meaning, 
and,  when  a  statute  provided  that  no  person 
should  practice  dentistry  without  having  com- 
plied with  its  provisions,  there  was  no  im- 
plied exception  of  persons  holding  certificates 
entitling  them  to  practice  as  a  physician  or 
surgeon.  State  v.  Taylor,  118  N.  W.  1012, 
1013,  106  Minn.  218,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  877, 
16  Ann.  Cas.  487. 

NO  PERSON  BID 

The  words,  "No  person  bid,"  in  a  tax 
deed,  imply  that  the  land  "could  not  be  sold" 
to  a  private  bidder.  They  express  the  pre- 
cise idea  to  be  conveyed  by  the  statutory  re- 
cital, and  are  therefore  'equally  good.' "  The 
deed  is  not  void  on  its  face  because  it  sub- 
stitutes the  words  "no  person  bid"  for  the 
words  "said  property  could  not  be  sold"  In 
stating  the  necessity  of  a  sale  to  the  county. 
Baughman  v.  Harvey,  93  Pac.  146,  160,  76 
Kan.  767  (citing  and  adopting  Bowman  r. 
Coclcrill,  6  Kan.  311). 

NO  PROPERTY 

The  words  "no  property,"  In  Balllnger's 
Ann.  Codes  &  St  |  6248,  providing  that  "no 
property"  shall  be  exempt  from  execution  is- 
sued on  a  Judgment  against  an  attorney  or 
agent  on  account  of  any  liability  incurred  for 
failure  to  account  for  money  or  other  prop- 
erty coming  into  his  hands  belonging  to  his 
principal,  are  applicable  only  to  personal 
property,  and  the  section  does  not  apply  to 
homestead  exemptions.  Ervay  r.  Hill,  90 
Pac.  690,  592,  46  Wash.  457. 

NO  PROPERTY  FOUND 

A  return  of  "no  property  found"  means 
that  defendant  has  no  goods  or  chattels 
whereof  to  levy  the  execution  within  Rev.  St 
1899,  8  4019,  declaring  that  the  circuit  clerk 
may  not  issue  execution  on  a  transcript  Judg- 
ment until  after  the  Justice  has  issued  an  ex- 
ecution and  the  constable  has  made  return 
that  the  defendant  had  no  goods  or  chattels 


whereof  to  levy  the  sama    Hick  t.  Paris,  ] 
S.  W.  716,  717,  124  Mo.  App.  341. 

NO  UNDUE  INFIiUENOB  WAS  HAD 

Where  the  validity  of  assignments  fr 
testatrix  to  defendant  is  questioned,  a  ifa 
ing  that  "no  undue  influence  waa  had  or  ( 
erdsed"  is  equivalent  to  a  finding  that  1 
transaction  was  not  the  result  of  undue 
fluence,  and  does  not  negative  merely  the 
rect  employment  of  undue  influence,  with< 
taking  into  consideration  the  effect  of  the 
fluence  naturally  arising  from  testatrix's 
liance  on  defendant's  protection  and  her  i 
predation  of  his  kindness.  Hobarf  ■  Adi 
T.  Vail,  66  AtL  820,  823,  80  Yt  162. 

NOBILITY 

See  Confer  Title  of  Nobility. 

NOBLESSE  OBLHSE 

"The  French  have  a  maxim,  "Noble 
oblige,'  which  means  that  those  in  comfor 
ble  circumstances  and  possessed  of  met 
should  set  the  example  of  obedience  to  1 
laws."  State  r.  Ckdonial  Club,  69  S.  E.  7 
777,  154  N.  C.  177,  31  L.  R.  A.  (N.  a)  3 
Ann.  Cas.  1912A,  1079. 

NOLLE  PROSEQUI 

A  "nolle  prosequi*'  amounts  to  neither 
acquittal  nor  a  pardozL  It  is  simply  a  c 
charge  of  the  particular  Indictment  as 
which  it  is  entered,  and  is  no  bar  to  a 
ture  indictment  for  the  same  offense.  St 
V.  Brackin,  37  South.  863, 113  La.  879. 

A  "nolle  prosequi"  Is  not  a  demun 
general  or  special,  nor  is  it  an  amendmi 
in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  term.  It  e 
braces  only  the  withdrawal  or  abandonmi 
of  a  count.  Hudson  t.  McNear,  59  AtL  5 
547,  99  Me.  406. 

A  nolle  prosequi  in  criminal  proceedii 
is  merely  a  declaration  on  the  part  of  the 
licitor  that  he  will  not  then  prosecute  l 
suit  farther,  and  is  not  an  acquittal, 
though  its  effect  is  to  discharge  the  defei 
ant  without  day.  Wilkinson  v.  Wilkinson, 
S.  B.  740,  741,  159  N.  C.  265,  39  L^  R.  A. 
S.)  1215. 

A  "nolle  prosequi"  in  criminal  proee 
lugs  does  not  amount  to  an  acquittal  of  1 
defendant,  but  he  may  again  be  in-osecol 
for  the  same  offense,  or  fresh  process  may 
issued  to  try  him  on  the  same  indictment 
the  discretion  of  the  prosecuting  oflicer.  I 
der  a  statute  providing  that  a  "nolle  pro 
qui"  with  leave  shall  be  entered  in  all  cri 
inal  actions  in  which  the  action  has  be 
pending  for  two  terms  of  court,  and  the  ( 
fendant  has  not  been  apprehended,  the  pr 
ecution  of  an  Indictment  for  maintaining 
nuisance  at  April  term,  1906,  was  not  end 
hj  the  entering  of  a  nolle  prosequi  with  lee 


NOLO  CONTENDERE 


617 


NOMINAL  DAMAOSB 


»  issue  a  capias»  entered  at  November  tenn, 
L906,  for  whlcb  defendant  was  arrested  in 
ranuary»  1009,  so  that  the  prosecotion  was 
ipon  the  original  indictment,  and  was  bar- 
red by  the  statute.  State  v,  Williams,  66  S. 
£.  908,  968,  161  N.  G.  600  Quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  State  y.  Tliomton,  85  N.  O. 
267). 

NOLO  CONTENDERE 

*The  'plea  of  nolo  conleBdere^  is  an  im- 
plied confession  of  the  offense  charged.  The 
judgment  of  conviction  follows  that  plea  as 
vreU  as  the  plea  of  guilty.*  State  r.  Herlihy, 
B6  Atl.  648,  646,*  102  Me.  310. 

Under  the  common-law  rule,  which  gov- 
erns in  the  federal  courts,  to  authorize  the 
court  to  entertain  a  plea  of  nolo  contendere 
the  case  must  be  within  the  class  of  misde- 
meanors for  which  punishment  may  be  im- 
posed by  fine  alone,  although  the  offense  may 
as  weU  be  punishable  by  Imprisonment,  at 
tbe  discretion  of  the  court,  either  as  an  al- 
ternative of  fine  or  in  addition  thereto,  or  to 
enforce  payment  of  the  dne;   and  sucb  plea 
cannot  be  accepted  either  in  cases  of  felony 
requiring  infamous  punishment  to  be  impos- 
ed on  conviction,  or  in  cases  of  misdemeanor 
for  which  the  punishment  must  be  imprison- 
ment for  any  time,  with  or  witiiout  fine.   The 
so-called  plea  of  "nolo  contendere^  Is  not  a 
plea  in  the  strict  sense  of  that  term  in  the 
criminal  law.    It  is  not  one  of  the  pleas  gen- 
eral or  spedal,  open  to  the  accused  in  all 
criminal  prosecutions  and  is  allowable  only 
ander  leave  and  acceptance  by  the  court 
When  accepted  by  the  court,  it  becoittes  an 
Implied  confession  of  guilt,  and  for  the  pur* 
poses  of  the  case  only  equivalent  to  a  plea  of 
guilty,  but  distinguishable  from  such  plea  in 
that  it  cannot  be  used  against  the  defendant 
as  an  admission  in  any  dvil  suit  for  the  same 
act.    Where  a  plea  of  nolo  contendere  was 
tendered  to  an  indictment  containing  counts 
some  of  which  charged  offenses  which  requir- 
ed i>unlsbment  by  both  fine  and  imprisonment, 
while  on  others  a  fine  alone  might  be  Impos- 
ed, the  action  of  the  court  in  hearing  evi- 
dence, making  a  finding  of  guilty  as  charged 
and  sentencing  defendant  to  both  fine  and 
imprisonment,  was  Inconsistent  with  the  ac- 
ceptance of  such  plea,  and  the  judgment  of 
conviction  without  a  Jury  trial  was  without 
jurisdiction  and  void.    When  an  indictment 
contains  counts  charging  offenses  for  which 
the  statute  requires  the  Imposition  of  punish- 
ment by  both  fine  and  Imprisonment  and  oth- 
ers for  offenses  which  may  be  punished  by 
fine  alone,  the  court  has  authority  to  allow 
a  tendered  plea  of  nolo  contendere;    but  in 
such  case  the  further  proceedings  and  pun- 
ishment must  be  confined  to  the  latter  class 
of  counts  to  which  alone  the  plea  is  applica- 
ble.   Tucker  v.  LniCed  States,  196  Fed.  260, 
262,  266,  267,  116  a  C.  A.  62,  4  U  B.  A.  (N. 
S.)  70. 


As  eoAvletlom 

The  plea  of  ''nolo  contendere**  is  an  im- 
plied confession  of  the  offense  charged,  and 
the  Judgment  of  conviction  follows  that  plea 
as  well  as  the  plea  of  guilty,  and  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  court  should  adjudge  that 
the  party  was  guilty,  for  that  follows  by  nec- 
essary legal  inference  from  the  Implied  con- 
fession. State  T.  Herlihy,  66  AtL  64S,  646, 
102  Me.  810. 

"Plea  of  *nolo  contendere,*  when  accept- 
ed by  the  court,  is,  in  its  effect  on  the  case, 
equivalent  to  the  plea  of  guilty.  •  •  • 
The  Judgment  of  conviction  follows  upon 
such  a  plea,  as  well  as  upon  a  plea  of  guilty, 
and  such  a  plea,  if  accepted,  cannot  be  with- 
drawn and  a  plea  of  not  guilty  entered,  except 
by  leave  of  court"  State  v.  Siddall,  68  Atl. 
684,  686,  108  Me.  144  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Oommonwealth  ▼.  IngersoU,  14 
N.  E.  449,  145  Mass.  381). 

NOMINAL 

KOMIHAL  DAMAGES 

"Nominal  damages"  is  defined  as  some 
small  amount,  sufficient  to  cover  and  carry 
tlfts  costs.  Batson  v.  Hlggtebotfaem,  68  S.  E. 
466,  467,  7  Qa.  App.  886. 

"Nominal  damages''  is  some  very  small 
sum,  as  a  farthing,  a  penny,  or  a  sixpence. 
Hasselbusch  v.  Mohmklng,  73  Atl.  961,  962, 
76  N.  J.  Law,  691  (citing  Sedg.  Dam.  p.  44). 

A  new  trial  will  not,  as  a  general  rule, 
be  granted  to  enable  the  defeated  party  to 
recover  "nominal  damages,*'  which  are  such 
as  are  to  be  awarded  in  a  case  where  there 
has  been  a  breach  of  contract,  and  no  actual 
damages  can  be  shown.  Seattle  v.  New 
York,  N.  H.  ft  H.  R.  B.  Co..  80  Atl.  709,  710, 
84  Conn.  556. 

The  term  ''nominal  damages,"  lik«  ''ex- 
emplary damages,"  is  purely  relative,  and 
carries  with  it  no  suggestion  of  certainty  as 
to  amount,  though  it  generally  refers  to  a 
trivial  sum  awarded.  Where  a  mere  breach 
of  duty  or  infraction  of  right  is  shown  with 
no  serious  loss  sustained,  the  amount  may, 
according  to  the  drcumstances  of  each  par- 
ticular case,  vary  almost  indefinitely,  depend- 
ing largely  on  the  amount  involved,  a  recov- 
ery being  properly  classified  as  nominal  dam- 
ages where  the  violation  of  a  right  issue  is 
shown,  substantial  damages  claimed,  and 
some  actual  loss  proved,  and  yet  the  damages 
are  not  susceptible  of  reasonable  certainty  of 
proof  as  to  their  extent  Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Glenn,  68  8.  E.  881,  8  Ga. 
App.  168. 

"Nominal  damages  are  a  small  and  triv- 
ial sum,  awarded  for  a  technical  injury,  due 
to  a  violation  or  invasion  of  some  legal  right, 
and  as  a  consequence  of  which  some  dam- 
ages must  be  awarded  to  •  delemine  the 
right  They  are  not  given  as  an  equivalent 
for  the  wnmg,  but  in  reeognitioii  oC  a  teoli> 


NOMINAL  DAMAGES 


618 


NOMINEE 


nical  Injnry-  There  need  be  no  actual  dam- 
age, however  small.  They  are  called  nom- 
inal damages,  in  contradistinction  to  actual, 
substantial,  or  compensatory  damages.  They 
are  damages  in  name  only,  not  In  fact  They 
have  been  described  as  a  peg  on  which  to 
hang  costs ;  but  they  are  still  recognized  as 
the  subject  of  a  substantial  legal  claim,  and 
the  party  is  entitled  to  them  if  he  can  show 
any  injury  to  his  right  If  he  establishes  a 
cause  of  action — that  is,  an  injury  in  its 
technical  sense — and  falls  to  show  any  dam- 
num, or  damage,  he  can  recover  nominal 
damages."  Chaffln  v.  Fries  Mfg.  ft  Power 
Co.,  47  S.  B.  226,  228,  135  N.  C.  95. 

Where  a  legal  right  has  been  invaded 
and  real  injury  done,  the  damages,  though 
small,  are  actual,  and  not  nominal,  nominal 
damages  being  those  so  small  in  amount  as  to 
show  that  they  were  not  Intended  as  any 
equivalent  or  satisfaction  to  the  party  recov- 
ering them;  the  term  being  a  relative  one, 
and  carries  no  suggestion  of  certainty  as  to 
amount  Moore  v.  Duke,  80  AtL  104,  197,  84 
Vt  401. 

NOMINAL  PARTNER 

The  term  ''nominal  partner,"  as  com- 
monly understood,  means  "a  person  who  is 
not  a  partner  at  all^  but  allows  the  use  of  his 
name  in  the  firm,  generally  to  give  it  addi- 
tional credit  or  to  attract  custom,  thus  in- 
curring all  the  liabilities  while  deriving  none 
of  the  benefits  of  the  association."  Lasher  v. 
Colton,  80  N.  E.  122,  123,  225  ni.  234,  8  Ann. 
Gas.  367  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  In 
2  Bates,  Partn.  1 11. 

NOMINATE 

See,  also,  Ai^wlnt— Appointment;  Pri- 
mary Election. 

The  term  "nominate"  means  to  designate 
by  name,  and  not  merely  to  refer  to  some 
place  where  the  name  can  be  found.  In  re 
Hopper,  132  N.  Y.  Supp.  730,  731,  73  Misc. 
Rep.  369. 

The  terms  "nominate"  and  "appoint"  are 
not  synonymous,  though  there  are  some  in- 
stances where  the  terms  may  be  used  to 
mean  the  same  thing,  and  under  St  Gal. 
1887,  p.  67,  c.  57,  providing  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  certain  trust^s  by  the  Governor  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  an  ap- 
pointment is  not  completed  by  the  transmis- 
sion of  the  nomination  by  the  Governor  to 
the  Senate  and  the  confirmation  of  the  nom- 
ination by  the  Senate.  The  appointment  is 
not  made  until  the  commission  is  Issued,  and 
issuing  the  same  is  the  last  act,  and  in  is- 
suing the  commission  the  Governor  is  per- 
forming an  executive  and  not  a  ministerial 
act,  and  is  therefore  acting  under  his  discre- 
tionary powers,  and  may  or  may  not  issue 
the  commission,  although  the  Senate  may 
have  advised  it  and  consented  that  he  should 
make  the  appointment    Harrington  v.  Par- 


dee, 82  Pac.  88,  84,  1  Gal.  App.  278  itit 
Marbury  v.  Madison,  1  Granch  [5  U.  S.]  1 
2  L.  Ed.  60). 

NOMINATION 

See   Gertlflcate   of   Nomination;     Pa 
Nomination. 

The  provision  in  Laws  1911,  c  € 
amending  Election  Law,  1 831,  that  the  nai 
of  candidates  chosen  by  more  than  one 
litical  party  or  independent  body  shall  : 
appear  more  than  once  on  the  printed  ofD< 
ballot,  discriminates  against  the  political  p 
ties  nominating  a  candidate  also  nomiiia 
by  another  party  in  whose  column  alone 
name  appears,  and  violates  the  Gonstltnti 
notwithstanding  the  definition  in  such  ame 
ing  law  o'f  the  term  "nomination,''  which  U 
Its  the  right  of  all  parties  to  nominate  c 
dldates  to  a  selection  in  accordance  with 
act,  and  so  does  not  Include  the  right 
have  the  candidates'  names  appear  on  the 
ficial  ballot  in  the  column  of  a  particu 
party.  In  re  Hopper,  132  N.  T.  Supp.  7 
731,  73  Misc.  Rep.  369. 

The  act  incorporating  the  dty  of  Gra 
ton,  providing  for  caucuses  for  the  select 
of  candidates  to  be  voted  for  at  the  first  e] 
tion,  and  ttiat  all  "certificates  of  nomlnati( 
of  candidates  shall  be  filed  at  least  nine  di 
before  the  first  election,  merely  provides 
the  filing  of  certificates  of  nomination  at  c 
cuses;  and  Gen.  Laws  1909,  c  11,  f  18,  p 
viding  for  the  filing  of  "certificates  of  ii< 
ination  "  and  "nomination  papers,"  gOTernE 
to  the  filing  of  nomination  papers,  since 
statutes  by  long  usage  make  certificates 
nomination  refer  to  nominations  by  caucui 
while  nomination  papers  relate  to  nomi 
tions  by  individual  voters.  Greenough  ▼.  'I 
terman,  75  AU.  865,  866,  30  B.  L  447. 

NOMINEE 

As  officer,  see  Officer. 

A  candidate  becomes  a  •Nominee" 
public  office  only  upon  filing  the  certificate 
nomination  with  the  proper  officers,  wit 
the  meaning  of  Election  Law  (GonsoL  La 
c  17)  I  136.  In  re  O'Brien,  125  N.  Y.  Sn 
269,  140  App.  Div.  467. 

In  St  1898,  §  34,  pertaining  to  gen< 
elections,  and  providing  that  if  the  nomi 
die  after  the  ballots  are  printed  and  no  n< 
ination  shall  be  made  as  herein  provii 
the  votes  cast  for  him  shall  be  counted  i 
returned,  the  "nominee"  is  the  person  d 
has  received  the  party  nomination  for  an 
flee.  State  ex  rel.  Bancroft  t.  Frear,  128 
W.  1068,  1075,  144  Wis.  79,  140  Aul  St.  B 
992. 

Gomp.  St.  1903,  c.  26,  §  32,  provides  tJ 
in  no  case  shall  the  candidate  of  any  pol 
cal  party  be  entitled  to  be  designated  on  i 
official  election  ballot  as  the  candidate 
more  than  one  political  party,  and  shall 
designated  on  the  "official  ballot"  as  the  no 


NOK 


619 


NON  OBSTANTE  VEREDICTO 


ioee  of  tbe  party  in  whose  nomljiatlon  his 
name  appears  as  tbe  political  party  with 
which  he  affiliatee.  Held,  that  the  words  "can- 
didate of  any  political  party*'  and  the  "nomi- 
nee of  the  party"  mean  a  person  who  has 
been  selected  by  a  party  as  its  candidate  for 
public  office,  and  do  not  refer  to  one  who  is 
desirous  of  becoming  a  candidate  and  whose 
name  is  submitted  to  the  choice  of  the  vo- 
ters at  a  primary  election.  A  party's  candi- 
date and  its  nominee  cannot  be  determined 
until  after  a  choice  has  been  made  at  a  pri- 
mary. State  ex  rel.  Adair  T.  Drezel,  106  N. 
W.  174,  177,  74  Neb.  776^ 

NON 

NOK  COMPOS  XBHTIS 

See  Blind  of  a  Non  Compos. 

The  words  "non  compos  mentis^  mean  a 
total  deprivation  of  reason.  Slaughter  y. 
Heath,  57  &  E.  69,  71,  73,  127  Ga.  747,  27 
L.  R.  A-  (N.  S.)  1. 

One  is  "non  compos  mentis'*  as  to  his  con- 
tracts when  he  does  not  possess  understand- 
ing sufficient  to  comprehend  the  nature,  ex- 
t^it,  and  consequences  of  them.  Nichols  r. 
Nichols,  66  Att.  161,  166,  79  Ck>nn.  644. 

"The  term  iion  compos  mentis,'  used  by 
the  Code,  embraces  not  only  lunatics  and  idi- 
ots, but  also  all  persons  of  unsound  mind." 
Under  the  rule  that,  for  the  assumption  of 
continued  maintenance  of  control,  by  a  court 
of  chancery  over  the  peiBon  and  estate  of 
one  alleged  to  be  of  unsound  mind,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  prove  the  entire  absence  of  rea- 
son, understanding,  or  memory,  but  only  to 
show  incapacity  to  contract,  evidence  held 
sufficient  to  sustain  an  order  dismissing  a  pe- 
tition for  the  discharge  of  the  committee  of 
the  person  and  estate  of  a  person  of  unsound 
mind."  Johnson  v.  Safe  Deposit  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Baltimore,  65  Atl.  330.  334,  104  Md.  460 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Green- 
wade  V.  Greenwade,  43  Md.  316). 

NON  I>ETIN£T 

A  plea  of  the  "general  issue"  in  detinue 
is  tbe  equivalent  of  a  plea  of  "non  detinet" 
at  common  law,  and  puts  in  Issue  the  plain- 
tilTs  right  of  recover.  Byall  v.  Pearson 
Bros.,  41  South.  673,  148  Ala.  668  (citing  Car- 
lisle's Case,  26  South.  115,  122  Ala.  446). 

NON  EST  FACTUK 

"A  plea  of  *non  est  factum'  properly  ten- 
ders tbe  issue  whether  the  specialty  was  law- 
fully sealed  by  the  commissioners  and,  if  so, 
whether  it  is  the  deed  of  the  defendants." 
English  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  Jersey 
aty,  42  N.  J.  Law,  275,  278. 

In  an  action  on  a  policy  of  life  insuranee, 
a  plea  that  "the  defendant  did  not  enter  in- 
to the  alleged  contract  sued  on"  was  not  a 
plea  of  "non  est  factum,"  within  Code  1896» 


i  3353,  form  S3.  Manhattan  life  Ins.  Co.  ▼• 
Vemeuille,  47  South.  72,  73,  156  Ala.  592. 

NON  OBSTANTE  V£BEDXCTO 

A  motion  for  Judgment  notwithstanding 
the  verdict  is  not  proper,  where  no  motion 
for  a  directed  verdict  was  made  at  tbe  elom 
of  plaintiff's  case.  I^ndis  Mach.  Ca  v.  Kon- 
antz  Saddlwy  Co.,  116  N.  W.  333,  334,  17  N. 

D.  310. 

A  "judgment  non  obstante^'  is  usually  a 
judgment  entered  by  order  of  the  court  for 
the  plaintiff  in  an  action  at  law  notwith- 
standing a  verdict  for  the  defendant.  At 
common  law  a  judgment  non  obstante  vere- 
dicto could  be  entered  only  when  the  plea 
confessed  the  cause  of  action  and  set  up  mat- 
ters in  avoidance  which  were  insufficient,  al- 
thought  found  true,  to  constitute  either  a 
defense  or  a  bar  to  the  action.  In  such  case 
the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  a  judgment  in 
his  favor  notwithstanding  a  verdict  for  the 
defendant  The  practice  was  adopted,  says 
Judge  Pearson,  to  discourage  sham  pleas  by 
the  defendant  Hence  it  follows  that  at  com- 
mon law  a  judgment  non  obstante  could  only 
be  granted  upon  motion  of  the  plaintiff,  nev- 
er for  a  defendant,  and  that  its  use  was  con- 
sequently very  restricted.  This  rule,  howev- 
er, has  been  relaxed  in  many  jurisdictions, 
especially  where  counterclaims  are  pleaded, 
and  where  the  code  system  prevails,  and  it  is 
held  that  such  judgment  may  be  rendered  on 
the  pleadings  for  either  party  entitled  to  It 
Irrespective  of  the  verdict.  In  no  case,  how- 
ever, can  such  a  judgment  be  rendered  for 
any  party,  except  when  the  pleadings  entitle 
the  party  against  whom  the  verdict  was  ren- 
dered to  a  judgment  Where  the  court  in  an 
action  for  personal  injuries  refused  a  motion 
of  nonsuit,  and  a  motion  to  render  judgment 
on  the  issues,  whether  plaintiff  contributed  to 
his  injury  by  negligence,  and  the  amount  of 
damages,  judgment  could  not  be  appropriate- 
ly rendered  for  defendant  notwithstanding 
the  jury's  negative  answer  to  the  first  issue 
and  its  finding  of  |3,000  damage  on  the  sec^ 
ond  issue.    Shives  v.  Eno  Cotton  Mills,  66  8. 

E.  141, 142, 151  N.  C.  290  (citing  and  adopting 
2  Tldd,  Pr.  922 ;  Rap.  ft  U  Law  Diet ;  Black 
Law  Diet ;  Cotton  Mills  v.  Abemathy,  20  8. 
E.  522,  115  N.  C.  403 ;  Walker  v.  Scott,  11  8. 
E.  364,  106  N.  C.  57 ;  Riddle  v.  Town  of  Ger- 
manton,  23  S.  B.  332,  117  N.  C.  387;  Moye 
V.  Petway,  76  N.  C.  329). 

"A  motion  for  a  judgment  'non  obstante 
veredicto'— that  is,  that  judgment  be  given 
in.  the  mover's  favor,  without  regard  to  the 
verdict  obtained  by  his  adversary— is  made 
in  cases  where,  after  a  pleading  by  the  adver- 
sary in  confession  and  avoidance,  and  issue 
joined  thereon,  and  verdict  for  the  adversary, 
the  unsuccessful  party,  in  retrospective  exam- 
ination of  the  record,  conceives  that  such 
pleading  was  bad  in  substance,  and  might 
have  been  made  the  subject  of  demurrer  on 
that  ground.    *    *    *    In  such  a  case^  thexflh- 


•:  i 


NON  SUI  JURIS 


620 


NONFEASANOB 


fore,  the  court  will  give  Judgment  for  suc^ 
opposite  party  without  regard  to  the  verdict" 
N.  Frank  &  Sons  v.  Gump,  51  S.  E.  358,  104 
Ya.  306  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
4  Min.  Inst  [3d  Ed.]  pt  1,  p.  946). 

KOK  BVl  JURIS 

The  words  "non  sul  Juris,**  as  applied  to 
a  child,  means  that  the  child  has  not  yet 
arrived  at  what  is  called  the  age  of  adult  dis^ 
cretion,  so  that  the  burden  of  proof  Is  on  the 
party  claiming  that  the  child  was,  as  a  matr 
ter  of  fact,  sui  Juris.  Grealish  v.  Brooklyn* 
Q.  C.  ft  S.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  Y.  Supp.  682,  583, 
130  App.  Div.  238  (citing  Gerbar  v.  Boorstein, 
99  N.  Y.  Supp.  1091,  113  App.  Div.  808). 

The  phrase  "non  sui  Juris,"  as  used  in 
an  Instruction  in  a  personal  injury  suit  sub- 
mitting it  to  the  Jury  to  determine  whether 
or  not  the  person  injured,  who  was  under  six 
years  of  age,  was  non  sui  Juris,  means  that 
the  child  was  not  of  sufficient  age  and  dis- 
cretion to  care  for  his  own  safety,  so  that  it 
would  be  imprudent  to  go  about  alone.  Kost- 
enbaum  v.  New  York  City  R.  Co.,  105  N.  Y. 
Supp.  65.  67,  120  App.  Div.  160. 

N0NG0NTIKU01I8   EA8EME1IT 

A  right  of  way  is  ''noncontinuoufl^  be- 
cause to  its  use  the  act  of  man  is  essential 
at  each  time  of  enjoyment  Dee  v.  King,  69 
Atl.  889,  841,  77  Vt  230,  68  L.  R.  A  860. 

N0NEXPI.08I01I 

A  "constant  pressure  engine"  is  one  in 
which  the  cylinder  pressure  remains  the  same 
during  the  outward  travel  of  the  piston  while 
the  volume  of  flame  increases.  The  pres- 
sure is  applied  continuously.  This  mode  of 
operation  is  also  called  *'8low  combustion" 
and  "nonexplosion."  Columbia  Motor  Car 
Ck).  V.  a  A  Duerr  &  Co.,  184  Fed.  893,  898, 
107  O.  C.  A.  215. 

NONFEASANCE 

*"Non  feasance^  is  the  omission  of  an 
act  which  a  person  ought  to  do."  It  is  the 
neglect  or  refusal  without  suflldent  excuse 
to  perform  an  act  which  it  is  an  officer's 
legal  duty  to  the  individual  to  perform. 
State,  to  Use  of  Cardin,  v.  McClellan,  85  S. 
W.  267,  268,  113  Tenn.  616,  3  Ann.  Cas.  992. 

"  *Nonfeasance'  is  the  nonperformance  of 
some  act  which  ought  to  be  performed."  The 
directors  of  a  county  fair  association  are  not 
liable  for  the  admission  fee,  for  mere  non- 
feasance in  failing  to  more  securely  protect 
patrons  in  the  grand  stand  from  injuries 
from  a  wild  ball  pitched  or  batted  in  the 
game,  which  resulted  in  injury  to  one  admit- 
ted to  the  grand  stand.  Williams  v.  Dean, 
111  N.  W.  931,  933,  134  Iowa,  216,  11  L.  R.  A 
(N.  S.)  410  (dttng  and  adopting  111.  Cent  Ry. 
v..  $^oulkes,  60  N.  £.  890,  191  lU.  57). 

Under  Otr,  Code  Oal.  |  2629,  providing 
that  ''an  insurer  is  nbt  liable  for  a  loss  caus- 
^  by  the  willful  act  of  the  insured,  but  he 


is  not  exonerated  by  the  negligence  of  U 
insured,  or  of  his  agents  or  others,"  e 
pressly  made  a  part  of  a  marine  policy  c 
cargo,  there  can  be  no  recovery  f6r  los"  < 
damage  resulting  directly  from  the  act  < 
the  master  in  designedly  undertaking  i 
force  the  vessel  through  floating  ice  on 
voyage  to  Alaska,  with  knowledge  of  tl 
dangers  to  be  encountered  and  witb  amp 
time  to  have  avoided  them,  in  order  to  a 
rive  more  quickly  at  his  destination  and  9 
cure  a  better  market  for  his  cargo.  Sue 
conduct  is  not  mere  negligence,  but  is 
willful  omission  to  perfbrm  his  legal  dul 
and  an  intentional  conunission  of  a  wrongfi 
act  The  court,  speaking  through  Chief  Ja 
tice  Shaw,  in  Chandler  v.  Worcester  Mutui 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  3  Cush.  (57  Mass.)  828  (an  a 
tion  on  a  flre  policy)  said:  "By  an  Intei 
to  burn  the  building  we  understand  a  pu 
pose  manifested  and  followed  by  some  ai 
done  tending  to  carry  that  purpose  into  e 
feet,  but  not  including  a  mere  *nonfeasanc( 
Suppose  the  assured,  in  his  own  house,  sec 
the  DurBbig  coals  in  the  fireplace  it^  dow 
onto  the  wooden  floor,  and  does  not  brae 
them  away.  This  would  be  mere  'nonfea 
anoe.'  It  would  not  prove  an  intent  1 
bum  the  buildiiig;  but  it  would  ahow 
'culpable  recklessness'  and  indifference  l 
the  rights  of  others.  •  •  ♦  To  what  « 
tent  such  negligence  must  go,  in  order  t 
amount  to  'gross  misconduct,'  it  is  difficu 
by  any  definitive  or  abstract  rule  of  law,  ii 
dependently  of  circumstances,  to  designat 
The  doctrine  of  the  civil  law,  that  'crass 
negligentia'  was  of  itself  proof  of  fraud,  c 
equivalent  to  fraudulent  purpose  or  desigi 
was  no  doubt  founded  in  the  consideratio 
that,  although  such  negligence  consists  i 
doing  nothing,  and  is  therefore  a  nonf&ii 
a  nee,  yet  the  doing  of  nothing,  when  th 
slightest  care  or  attention  would  prever 
a  great  injury,  manifests  a  willingness,  dh 
ferlng  little  in  character  from  a  fraudulei: 
and  criminal  purpose^  to  commit  surh  ir 
jury."  Standard  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  Uraita 
of  Liverpool,  Eng.,  v.  Nome  Beach  Liigtite] 
age  &  Transp.  Co.,  133  Fed.  636,  648,  67  ( 
C.  A.  602,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1095. 

Misf  easAMoe  distlACitia^ed 

"Nonfeasance**  is  doing  nothing,  whll 
"misfeasance"  is  doing  improperly.  Stlewe 
V.  Borman,  37  S.  W.  404,  105,  63  Ark.  30 

"Nonfeasance"  is  the  omission  of  a 
act  which  a  person  ought  to  do,  as  distil 
guished  from  "misfeasance,"  whl<di  Is  th 
Improper  doing  of  an  act  which  a  perso 
might  lawfully  do.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  ^ 
Rowe,  59  S.  E.  462,  466,  2  Qa.  App.  557. 

"'Nonfeasance'  Is  the  total  omission  o 
failure  of  the  agent  to  enter  upon  the  pei 
formance  of  a  distinct  duty  or  undertakin 
which  he  has  agreed  with  his  principal  t 
do.  'Misfeasance*  means  the  improper  d( 
ing  of  an  act  which  the  agent  might  ISLwtuL 


K0NFEA8ANCB 


621 


KOK7EASAK0K 


ly  do."  Southern  Ry.  Co.  V.  Miller,  57  S.  D. 
1090,  1092,  1  Ga.  App.  616  (quoting  Und 
adopting  the  definitions  In  Southern  Ry.  Go. 
r.  Grizzle,  03  S.  B.  244,  124  Qa.  736,  110  Am. 
St  Rep.  191). 

"Misfeasance"  is  the  performance  of  an 
act,  which  might  lawfully  be  done,  in  an  Im- 
proper manner,  resulting  in  injury  to  anoth- 
er, while  '^nonfeasance"  is  the  nonperform- 
ance of  an  act  which  should  be  performed- 
Haynes'  Adm'rs  y.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P. 
R.  Co.,  140  S.  W.  176,  179,  146  Ky.  209,  Ann. 
Gas.  1913B,  719. 

"Misfeasance**  and  "nonfeasance,'*  as 
used  in  connection  with  the  acts  of  agents, 
is  often  difficult  of  determination.  ''Mis- 
feasance" means  a  positive  wrong.  It  may 
involve  also,  to  some  extent,  the  idea  of  not 
doing,  as  where  the  agent  while  engaged  in 
the  performance  of  his  undertaking  does  not 
do  something  which  it  was  his  duty  to  do 
under  the  circumstance&  The  distinction 
to  be  observed  between  mere  nonfeasance 
and  misfeasance  was  considered  in  Osborne 
Y.  Morgan,  130  Mass.  103  (39  Am.  Rep.  437), 
where  the  court  said:  ''It  is  often  said  in 
the  books  that  an  agent  Is  responsible  to 
third  persons  for  misfeasance  only,  and  not 
for  nonfeasance.  And  it  is  doubtless  true 
that  if  an  agent  never  does  anything  to- 
wards carrying  out  his  contract  with  his 
principal,  but  wholly  omits  and  neglects  to 
do  so,  the  principal  is  the  only  person  who 
can  maintain  any  abtion  against  him  for  the 
nonfeasance.  But  if  the  agent  once  actual- 
ly undertakes  and  enters  upon  the  ezecntion 
of  a  particular  work,  it  Is  his  duty  to  use 
reasonable  care  In  the  manner  of  executing 
it,  so  as  not  to  cause  any  injury  to  third 
persons  which  may  be  the  natural  conse- 
quence of  his  acts ;  and  he  cannot,  by  aban- 
doning its  execution  midway  and  leaving 
things  in  a  dangerous  condition,  exempt 
himself  from  liability  to  any  person  who 
suffers  injury  by  reason  of  his  having  so  left 
them  without  proper  safeguards.  This  is 
not  nonfeasance,  or  doing  nothing,  but  it  is 
misfeasance,  doliig  Improperly."  Where  an 
agent  has  complete  control  of  a  tenement 
house,  and  constructs  a  new  walk  in  the 
court,  leaving  a  large  hole  in  the  walk,  and 
plaintiff,  a  new  tenant,  without  previous 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the  hole,  step- 
ped into  it  after  dark  and  was  severely  in- 
jured, it  is  misfeasance  of  the  agent  render- 
ing him  liable,  and  not  a  mere  nonfeasance. 
Carson  v.  Qulnn,  105  S.  W.  1088,  1091,  127 
Mo.  App.  525. 

"A  distinction  ordinarily  is  taken  be- 
tween acts  of  'misfeasance,'  or  positive 
wrongs,  and  *nonfeasance/  or  mere  omissions 
of  duty.  The  mflster  is  always  liable  to 
third  persons  for  the  misfeasances  of  his 
servants  in  all  cases  within  Uie  scot)e  of  his 
employment.  The  principal  is  also  liable  to 
third  ])ersonB  for  like  misfeasances  of*  his 


agent  The  agent  Is  also  liable  tx)  third  per- 
sons for  his  own  mfsfeasances  and  positive 
^ongs,  but  he  is  not  liable  to  tiiird  persons 
for  his  own  nonfeasances  or  omissions  of 
duty  in  the  coorse  of  his  employment  His 
liability  in  such  cases  is  to  his  prlndpaL 
The  distinction  between  misfeasance  and 
nonfeasance,  between  acts  of  direct  positive 
wrongs  and  mere  neglects  of  agents  as  to 
their  personal  liability,  seems  to  be  fovnded 
on  this  ground.  No  authority  whatever 
from  a  superior  to  an  inferior  can  furnish 
the  latter  a  jnst  defense  for  his  own  posi- 
tire  wrongs  or  trespasses,  for  no  man  can 
authorize  another  to  do  a  poditlTe  wrong. 
But  in  respect  to  nonfeasanoe,  or  mere  neg- 
lects in  the  performanoe  of  duty,  the  re- 
sponsibility therefor  most  arise  from  some 
express  or  implied  obligation  between  par- 
ticular parties  standing  in  privity  of  law 
or  contract  with  each  other,  and  no  man  is 
bound  to  answer  for  any  such  violations  of 
duty  or  obligation  exoept  to  those  to  whom 
he  has  become  directly  boimd  nr  amenable 
for  his  conduct."  Bryce  v.  Southern  R.  Co., 
125  Fed.  958,  962  (quoting  and  adopting  def- 
initions in  Story,  Ag.  [9th  Ed.]  |{  308, 


"Xhere  Is  a  distinction  between  'non- 
feasance' and  'misfeasance'  or  'malfeasance* ; 
and  tbia  distinction  Is  often  of  great  im- 
portanee  in  determining  an  agent* s  liability 
to  third  persons.  In  this  connection,  'non- 
feasance' means  the  total  omission  or  failure 
of  an  agent  to  enter  upon  tlie  performance 
of  some  distinct  duty  or  undertaking,  which 
he  has  agreed  with  his  principal  to  do.  'Mis- 
feasance' means  the  improper  doing  of  an 
act  which  the  agent  mi^t  lawfully  do,  or, 
in  other  words,  it  is  the  performing  of  his 
duty  to  his  principal  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
infringe  Upon  the  rights  and  privileges  of 
third  persons;  and  'malfeasance'  is  the  do- 
ing of  an  act  which  he  ought  not  to  do  at 
iall.  It  Is  not  every  omission  or  failure  to 
perform  a  duty  that  will  constitute  a  non- 
feasance, but  only  an  omission  to  perform 
such  distinct  duties  as  he  owes  to  his  prin- 
cipal, as  distinguished  from  those  which  he 
owes  to  third  persons,  or  the  public  In  gen- 
eral as  a  member  of  society.  Nonfeasance 
does  not  extend  to  the  omission  or  failure  to 
do  some  act,  whereby  a  third  person  Is  in- 
jured after  he  has  once  entered  upon  the 
performance  of  Ms  contractual  obligations, 
^'or  example,  if  an  ag^nt  undertakes  to  per- 
form certain  acts  f^r  another,  and  he  re- 
fus€fb  or  falls  to  enter  upon  such  perform- 
^ince,  it  is-  nonfeasance ;  but  if  he  once  be- 
gins the  performance  of  such  aets,  and,  in 
doing  so,  falls  or  omits  to  do  certain  acts 
which  he  eihould  have  done,  whereby  a  third 
person  Is  injured,  it  Is  not  a  nonfeasance, 
but  a  misfeasanoe.  Misfeasance  may  In- 
volve the  omission  to  do  something  which 
ought  to  be  Hone;  as  where  an  agent  en- 
gaged ill  the  performance  of  his  undertaking, 
-omita  ta  do  something  which  itiia.lila  dnty 


KONFEASANCB 


NONJOINDER  OF  PARTIES 


!    '  iJ3 


to  00  under  the  circamstances,  as  when  he 
dn^s  not  exercise  that  degree  of  care  which 
doe  regard  for  the  rights  of  others  requires.*' 
Where  the  owner  of  a  building  executed  a 
deed  of  trust  thereon  to  secure  bonds  Issued 
by  the  owner,  and  the  trustee  was  made  an 
attorney  in  fact,  irrevocable,  to  rent  the 
building,  collect  rents,  pay  taxes,  and  all 
expenses  connected  with  the  management  of 
the  building,  and  the  trustee  was  to  retain  a 
certain  per  cent  of  the  moneys  collected  in 
payment  of  such  services,  and  the  trustee 
also  assumed  management  of  the  building, 
employed  all  servants  connected  with  the 
building,  and  paid  them  their  wages,  it  was 
held  that  the  trustee  was  liable,  as  for  a 
"misfeasance,"  for  injuries  to  one  riding  on 
an  elevator  in  the  building  owing  to  negli- 
gence in  the  maintenance  and  repair  of  the 
elevntor,  or  the  negligence  of  the  operator. 
Orcutt  V.  Century  Bldg.  Co.,  90  S.  W.  1062, 
1063,  1068,  201  Mo.  424,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
929  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Clark 
&  S.  Law  of  Agency,  |  696). 

The  failure  of  a  gas  company  operating 
as  an  agent  of  a  city  under  contract  for  the 
illumination  of  the  dty  streets  to  perform  its 
duty  to  keep  service  pipes  from  its  mains  to 
the  dty  lamps  in  repair  involves  an  affirm- 
ative element  of  negligence  amounting  to 
misfeasance,  and  it  is  liable  to  any  one  In- 
jured in  consequence  thereof,  for  an  agent 
who  undertakes  and  enters  on  the  execution 
of  a  particular  work,  must  use  reasonable 
care  in  the  manner  of  executing  it,  and  he 
cannot  by  abandoning  its  execution,  exempt 
himself  from  liability  to  any  person  suffering 
injury  by  reason  of  his  act,  because  that  act 
is  not  "nonfeasance,"  but  1b  "misfeasance." 
Consolidated  Gas  Co.  of  Baltimore  City  v. 
Connor,  78  Atl.  725,  729,  114  Md.  140,  32  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  809. 

The  term  "nonfeasance"  refers  to  an 
agent's  omission  to  perform  a  duty  which  he 
owes  to  his  principal  by  virtue  of  the  agen- 
cy and  for  which  he  is  responsible  to  his 
principal  only;  but,  whenever  the  agent's 
omission  consists  of  failure  to  perform  a 
duty  which  he  owes  to  third  persons,  then, 
as  to  such  persons,  his  omission  is  "mis- 
feasance" for  which  he  is  responsible.  Ha- 
gerty  v.  Montana  Ore  Purchasing  Co.,  98  Pac. 
643,  645,  38  Mont.  69,  25  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  356. 

The  distinction  between  "nonfeasance" 
and  "misfeasance"  has  been  expressed  by 
the  courts  of  this  state  as  follows:  "If  the 
duty  omitted  by  the  agent  or  servant  de- 
volved upon  him  purely  from  his  agency  or 
employment,  his  omission  is  only  of  a  duty 
he  owes  his  principal  or  master,  and  the  mas- 
ter alone  is  liable.  While,  if  the  duty  rests 
upon  him  la  his  individual  character,  and 
was  one  that  the  law  imposed  upon  him  in- 
dependently of  his  agency  or  employment, 
then  he  is  liable."  Delay  of  the  sole  trans- 
fer agent  in  issuing  new  stock  at  the  in- 


stance of  an  executor  to  certain  desi^fnat 
persons  In  lieu  of  stock  held  by  decedent 
account  of  failure  of  the  comptroller  to  gi 
consent  pen^g  determination  whether  t 
stock  was  subject  to  the  transfer  tax  la 
was  not  a  "misfeasance,"  though  it  was  i 
in  fact  taxable  and  the  comptroller's  « 
sent  was  unnecessary.  Dunham  v.  City  Tn 
Co.  of  New  York,  101  N.  Y.  Supp.  87,  89,  J 
115  App.  Div.  584  (quoting  and  adopting  T 
Antwerp  v.  linton,  85  N.  Y.  Supp.  318, 
Hun,  417,  419). 

NOmETNAKGIAI. 

The  temi  "nonflnandal,"  as  used  in 
fraternal  insurance  policy,  means  that  t 
policy  holder  Is  not  In  good  financial  stai 
ing  with  the  order.  Morgan  v.  Independc 
Order  of  Sons  &  Daughters  of  Jacob  of  Am^ 
lea,  44  South.  791,  792,  90  Miss.  864. 

NONFORFEITABLE 

Where  a  policy  of  insurance  provl^ 
that  if  insured,  after  paying  two  foil  anni 
premiums,  should  fail  to  pay  any  semlannt 
premiums  when  due,  its  entire  net  reserve 
the  American  Experience  Mortality,  and 
terest  at  4  per  cent,  yearly,  less  any  indebtc 
ness  to  the  company  on  the  policy,  shall 
applied  by  the  company  as  a  single  premlu 
at  the  company's  rates  to  the  purchase 
nonpartidpating  insurance  for  the  t 
amount  insured  by  the  policy,  is  called 
"nonforfeitable"  policy.  Mutual  Ben.  Li 
Ins.  Co.  of  Newark,  N.  J.,  v.  First  Nat-  Ba 
(Ky.)  69  S.  W.  1. 

NONINTERVENTION  WlUt 

Under  what  is  known  in  Washington 
a  "nonintervention  will,"  by  which  fall  po 
ers  were  conferred  on  the  executors  to  ta 
possession  of  and  wind  up  the  estate  of  t 
testator  without  any  judicial  prooeedin 
whatever,  except  those  necessary  to  establi 
the  will,  and  which  devised  and  bequeath 
all  of  testator's  property  absolutely  to  I 
executors  as  trustees,  with  instructions  to  s 
the  same  and  use  the  proceeds  as  th^ein  < 
rected,  the  legal  title  to  the  testator's  re 
estate  was  vested  in  such  trustees  resaidlc 
of  the  validity  of  the  disposition  made  of  ti 
proceeds.  Korsstrom  v.  Barnes,  156  Fed.  2^ 
283. 

NONINTOXICATINO  UQITORS 

The  words  "nonintoxlcatlng  liquors  ai 
beverages,'*  as  used  in  Acts  31st  Leg.  c.  20, 
2,  considered  in  connection  with  the  evil  i 
tended  to  be  corrected  and  with  the  hlsto 
of  the  legislation  upon  the  same  subject,  ha 
reference  to  alcoholic  or  spirituous  flak 
either  distilled  or  fermented,  and  do  not  i 
dude  liquids  such  as  water,  milk,  etc  i 
parte  Flake  (Tex.)  149  S.  W.  146, 151. 

NONJOINDER  OF  PARTIES 

''A  nonjoinder,  or,  as  expressed  in  tl 
Code,  'a  defect,  of  parties  plaintiff  or  defeo 


KONMAIIiABLB  HATTER 


628     KONRESID£NGfi— NONBIBSIDJEBIT 


nV  means  sniBcleiit  iMutle«»  and  baa  no 
Plication  to  a  case  of  too  many  partiea,  or 
be  Joining  of  a  person  liaying  no  interest  in 
he  Utigatlon."  Mader  ▼.  Piano  Mfg.  Go^  97 
7.  W.  84S,  840,  17  S.  T>.  553. 


A  newspaper  without  a  wrapper,  the 
iddiess  being  written  on  the  paper  itself, 
hongh  containing  scnrrilous  and  defamatory 
natter,  marked  with  blue  pendl  and  so  fold- 
id  as  to  expose  the  same  to  view,  is  not  '*non- 
Daiiable  matter,"  within  Cr.  Code  (Act  BCarch 
^  1909,  c  821)  I  212,  which  provides  that 
ai  matter  otherwise  mailable^  on  the  "enye- 
ope  or  outside  cover  or  wrapper"  of  which 
anguage  of  a  libelous  or  scurrilous  character 
nay  be  written,  is  nonmailable,  and  which 
)rohibit8  the  sending  thereof  through  the 
nails.  United  States  v.  Higglns,  194  Fed. 
^,541. 

EfOmCAViaABLB 

To  oonstitate  a  nonnavigabls  lake^  no 
particular  dQ>th  Is  essential,  nor  is  it  neces- 
sary that  the  water  cover  the  entire  bed  at  all 
seasons,  and  it  is  enough  if  the  body  of  the 
water  has  well-defined  banks,  filled  during 
portions  of  the  year.  State  r.  Jones,  122  N. 
W.  241,  242, 143  Iowa,  398. 

In  Kentucky,  all  rivers  are  nonnavigable 
within  the  meaning  of  that  term  as  used  in 
connection  with  riparian  ownership.  Robin- 
son  V.  Wells,  135  S.  W.  817,  818»  142  Ky.  800. 

NONHEOOTIABIA 

See  Negotiable. 

Under  Rev.  St  1909,  S  8392,  "providing 
that  for  every  loan  made  by  a  building  and 
loan  association  a  "nonnegotiable  note"  se- 
cnred  by  a  first  mortgage  on  real  estate  shall 
be  given,  accompanied  by  a  transfer  of  the 
stock  of  the  member,  notes  executed  by  stodc- 
holders  of  a  building  and  loan  association  are 
not,  while  the  association  is  a  going  concern, 
assignable;  the  word  "nonnegotlable"  mean- 
ing "nonassignable."  Layton  v.  Hough,  152 
S.  W.  410,  415,  169  Mo.  App.  218. 

HOHOGGUPAHOT 
Vaoaaay  syMosiyiKOVs 

In  an  action  on  an  insurance  policy  pro- 
viding that  it  was  to  become  void  if  the  build- 
ings became  vacant  or  unoccupied,  the  answer 
alleged  that  the  possession  and  occupancy  of 
the  buildings  described  and  of  the  insured 
premises  was  changed,  and  said  premises 
ceased  to  be  occupied  as  provided  in  the 
policy.  Held,  that  the  answer  was  sufllcient 
to  raise  the  question  of  a  vacancy,  for  the 
terms  **vacancy"  and  •'nonoccupancy*'  are 
used  interchangeably  and  are  equivalent  In 
meaning.  Cone  v.  Century  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  117 
N.  W.  807,  308,  189  Iowa,  205. 

HOKPEGinCIABT  DAMAGES 

Nonpecuniary  damages  are  those  the 
amount  of  wliich  cannot  be  determined  by 


any  known  rule,  but  depend  upon  the  en« 
lightened  Judgment  of  an  impartial  court  or 
Jury.  In  this  dass  are  Induded  damages 
for  pain,  suffering,  loss  of  reputation,  impair- 
ment of  faculties,  etc  L.  W.  Pomerene  Co. 
V.  White,  97  N.  W.  232,  234,  70  Neb.  171. 

XOmUMIBEirOB— HOX&ESIDBVT 

As  person,  see  Person. 

To  be  a  Nonresident**  within  the  meaning 
of  the  statute  authorizing  removal  of  causes, 
defendant  must  be  a  citizen  of  another  state. 
Parker  v.  VanderbUt,  136  Fed.  246,  249  (cit- 
ing Martin  v.  Baltimore  A  O.  B.  Co.,  14  Sup. 
Ct  534,  151  U.  S.  676,  38  L.  Ed.  311). 

A  nonresident,  within  Code  Pub.  Gen. 
Laws  1904,  art  16,  I  123,  providing  that 
where  it  is  unknown  whether  a  nonresident  is 
living  a  bill  may  be  filed  against  him  as  if 
living,  etc.,  is  one  who  does  not  reside  In  the 
state  as  defined  in  the  law  relating  to  attach- 
ment Hollander  v.  Central  Metal  ft  Supply 
Co.  of  Baltimore  City,  71  AtL  442,  448,  109 
Md.  131,  23  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1135. 

A  'Nonresident**  is  one  who  is  not  a  reBi< 
dent  of  a  particular  idace,  and  the  term  may 
boused  indiscriminately  to  describe  one  who 
does  not  reside  in  a  particular  country,  or 
state,  or  county,  or  any  of  the  smaller  subdi- 
visions of  territory  made  for  governmental 
purposes,  and  the  word  may  as  well  refer  to 
one  not  residing  in  a  county  as  to  one  resid- 
ing outside  of  the  state.  Watson  v.  Coon,  93 
N.  B.  289,  290,  247  IH  414. 

The  term  'Nonresident,"  as  used  in  Civ. 
Code  Prac.  S  616,  requiring  a  nonresident, 
before  commencing  an  action,  to  give  a  bond 
for  costs,  and  section  617,  providing  that  if 
the  bond  is  not  given  the  action  shall  be  dis- 
missed, means  a  person  whose  legal  resi- 
denoe  is  not  in  this  state  but  another  state; 
and  does  not  Include  a  person  whose  legal 
residence  is  in  this  state,  though  he  is  tem- 
porarily an  actual  resident  of  another  state. 
Brwln  V.  Allen,  99  &  W.  822,  828,  124  Ky. 
458. 

A  citizen  of  another  state  is  not  neces- 
sarily a  "nonresident,*'  as  a  person  may  re- 
side in  one  state  and  be  a  citizen  in  another. 
An  allegation  in  a  petitioa  for  removal  that 
defendant  Is  a  citizen  of  a  state  other  than 
that  in  which  the  suit  is  pending  is  not  equiv- 
alent to  an  allegation  that  he  is  a  'Nonresi- 
dent of  that  state"  and  does  not  show  h^i 
right  to  a  removal.  Irving  v.  Smith,  132  Fed. 
207. 

The  words  "nonresidentB  of  that  state," 
as  used  In  Act  March  8,  1887,  c.  873,  24  Stat 
552,  and  Act  Aug.  18,  1888,  c;  866,  25  Stat 
433,  providing  that  any  suit  of  a  dvll  nature 
at  law  or  in  equity,  of  which  the  Circuit 
Courts  of  the  United  States  are  given  Juris- 
diction, may  be  rwnoved  into  the  Circuit 
Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  proper 
district,  by  the  defendant  or  defendants 
therein,  being  nonresidents  of  that  state,  are 


II 


MdKBfESI>£>ENCS>-NONK£SII>EKT      624      NONBESIDEKCS-^OKilESIDE^NT 


4i 


I       'I 


eqtilvaitot  to  the  wordls  '*iiot  being  citlBens  of 
that  state.**  MadifloiiTUle  Traction  Co.  y.  St 
Bernard  Mln.  Co.,  ISO  Fed.  789,  791  (dtlng 
Martin  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  14  Sup.  Ct 
583, 151  U.  S.  676,  677,  88  L.  Ed.  811). 

Tbe  words  "nonresident  defendant,**  as 
used  In  Ami.  St  Mo.  1906,  |  384,  providing 
that  no  property  or  wages  declared  by  statute 
to  be  exempt  shall  be  attached  except  In  the 
case  of  a  "nonresident  defendant**  or  a  de- 
fendant who  Is  about  to  move  out  of  the  state 
with  intent  to  change  his  domicile,  has  refer- 
ence to  one  whose  domicile  Is  out  of  the  state, 
and  classed  nonresident  defendants  with  de- 
fendants about  to  move  out  of  the  state  with 
Intent  to  change  their  domiciles.  McDowell 
r.  Friedman  Bros.  Shoe  Co.,  115  S.  W.  1028, 
1082,  185  Mo.  App.  276. 

In  an  action  to  quiet  title,  certain  defend- 
ants, by  their  cross-complaints,  sought  to  re- 
cover possession  of  the  property,  and  to  re- 
deem from  a  mortgage.  These  defendants 
neter  resided  In  thl^  state.  Held,  that  these 
causes  of  action  were  not  saved  from  the  bar 
of  the  statute  of  limitations  by  Bums*  Ann. 
St  1906, 1  299,  providing  that  the  time  during 
which  a  defendant  Is  a  nonresident  shall  not 
be  oompilted  in  any  period  of  limitation,  since 
this  does  not  apply  to  persons  who  at  all 
times  have  been  nonresidents,  and  only  ap- 
plies where  the  person  against  whom,  and 
not  in  favor  of  whom,  the  cause  of  action  ex- 
ists, is  a  nonresident.  Sinclair  r.  Ounzen- 
hauser  (Ind.)  98  N.  E.  37,  54. 

Uhder  Rev.  St.  1899,  Sf  575,  577,  provid- 
ing that  if  the  plaintilT  shall  allege  in  his  peti- 
tion, or  at  any  time  thereafter  shall  file  an 
affidavit  stating,  that  part  or  lail  of  the  de- 
fendants ere  nonresidents,  or  have  absconded 
or  absented  themselves  from  their  usual  place 
of  abode  in  this  state,  and  that  where  the  re- 
turn on  any  summons  Issued  Is  that  defend- 
ant cannot  be  found,  service  may  be  had  by 
publication,  an  affidavit  in  a  tax  action, 
where  the  petition  was  silent  as  to  that  mat- 
ter, and  where  summons  Issued  as  against  a 
resident  defendant,  whicdi  only  alleged  that 
defendant  had  absconded  and  absented  himr 
self  from  his  usual  place  of  abode  in  this 
etate,  did  not  authorize  service  by  publication 
on  the  ground  that  defendant  was  a  ''nonresi- 
dent," since  it  appeared,  both  affirmatively 
and  negatively^  that  defendant  was  a  res- 
ident and  not  a  nonresident  Parker  v.  Bur- 
ton, 72  S.  W.  668,  664, 172  Mo.  85. 

Ky.  St  §  3014,  provides  that  the  agent  or 
agents  of  nonresident  proprietors  shall  be 
Civilly  responsible  for  the  license  tax  and 
criminally  responsible  for  carrying  on  busi- 
ness in  like  manner  as  if  they  were  proprie- 
tors. HeOd,  that  th^  word  '^nonresident"  as 
used  In  a  city  ordinance  reproducing  such 
section  and  requiring  every  person,  etc.,  en- 
gaged In  posting  bills  as  a  business  to  pay  a 
license  fee,  means  one  living  without  the  cor- 
porate limits  of  the  dty,  thougtr^  within  the 


state.    liOgee  v.  City  of  Louisville,  I8S^  S. 
565,  667,  141  Ky.  867. 

A  person  traveling  about  the  count 
wandering  from  place  to  place  and  from  sti 
to  state,  who  took  employment  with  a  n 
road  company  in  Texas  as  a  member  of 
gang  taking  up  old  and  laying  down  n* 
steel,  which  employment  he  intended  to  kc 
only  until  he  had  raised  $50,  when  he  Intei 
ed  to  leave  the  state,  who  slept  in  a  boai 
Ing  car  and  had  his  washing  done  there,  a 
who  was  li^ured  while  in  the  railroad 
employ,  was  not  a  resident  of  the  county 
which  he  received  his  Injury  or  <^  the  eU 
of  Texas,  but  was  a  nonresident  within  t 
meaning  of  the  venue  law  (Acts  27th  D 
[Laws  1901,  p.  81,  c  27]),  providing  that 
case  plaintiff  in  a  personal  Injury  salt  agah 
a  railroad  Is  a  nonresident  of  the  state,  1 
suit  may  be  brought  in  any  county  in  whi 
the  railroad  may  operate  its  road  or  have 
agent  Ft  Worth  &  D.  O.  Ry.  Ca  v.  Mow 
110  S.  W.  504,  607,  50  Tez.  OLr.  App.  287. 

Evidence  that  a  husband  left  his  wife 
another  state,  went  to  Nebraska,  and  conce 
ed  his  residence  from  her  for  nine  years,  n 
resented  himself  to  be  an  unmarried  nu 
and  conveyed  land  as  such,  that  he  suh 
quently  moved  to  another  state,  where 
died,  his  wife  never  living  in  Nebraska  t 
after  his  death,  is  sufficient  to  sustain  a  fli 
ing  that  she  was  a  nonresident,  within  Con 
St  1903,  c.  28,  I  20,  limiting  dower  right 
a  nonresident  to  lands  of  which  her  husbsj 
dies  seised.  Miner  t.  Morgan*  119  N.  W.  li 
782,  83  Neb.  400. 

Municipal  Court  Act  (Laws  1902, 
580)  1 25,  si|bd.  3,  provides  that  no  person  ha 
ing  a  place  in  the  dty  for  the  regular  trai 
action  of.  business  is  deemed  a  *'nonresldeD 
under  the  provisions  of  the  act  and  sectl( 
32  permits  the  order  for  service  of  summo 
upo^  a  defendant  residing  within  the  ci 
after  an  alias  summons  has  heea  issued,  u 
on  satisfactory  proof  that  diligent  effort  h 
been  made  to  serve  the  summons  and  tbAt  tl 
place,  of  his  sojourn  cannot  be  found,  or, 
he  is  within  the  city,  that  he  evades  eerrit 
so  that  personal  service  cannot  be  made.  D 
fendant.had  an  office  in  the  dty  at  a  certa 
address,  and  plaintiff's  attorney  made  a 
fldavit  that  defendai^  called  upon  him  at  b 
office  before  the  action  was  begun.  f1^ 
alias  summonses  were  secured,  and  numeroi 
efforts  were  made  to  serve  defendant  &i 
plaintiff  wrote  him  several  letters  at  his  Ne 
Jersey  residence,  stating  that  suit  would  1 
brought  and  plaintiff  was  Informed  by  « 
tomeys,  who  appeared  spedaUy,  but  did  D( 
ace^t  service,  that  they  were  attorneys  f< 
defendant  though  plaintiff  had  requested  d 
fendant*s  attorney  to  enter  an  appeartno 
and  defendant's  son  stated  to  the  pn 
cess  server  tiiat  his  father  came  to  the  offi( 
sometimes  once  a  week,  and  sometimes  ix 
so  often.    Held,  that  a&^jrd^  for  aubstitiite 


NONRESIDEarOB— NONRESIDENT      826      NONIUSaiI>KNC]&-^NONR]BSU»ENT 


•errloe  was  properly  itsaed  under  tbe  cir- 
comatances;  tke  facts  jDstlflying  the  belief 
tbat  defendant  ima  aeekix^  to  evade  personal 
aervlce.  TricoU  ▼.  McKenzle,  128  N.  Y.  Supp. 
211,  212. 


A  mere  casual  or  temporary  absence  of  a 
debtor  from  the  state  on  business  or  pleasure 
will  not  render  him  a  "nonresident/*  within 
the  meaning^  of  the  statute  relating  to  attach- 
ments. Flemlster  Grocery  Co,  v.  Wright  Mer- 
cantile &  Lumber  Co.,  73  S.  B.  1077,  10  Ga. 
App.  702  (citing  Stickney  y.  Chapman,  42  S. 
E.  68,  115  Oa.  761). 


In  the  absraice  of  a  statute  making  a  for- 
eign corporation,  for  purposes  of  litigation,  a 
resident  of  every  county  in  which  it  does 
business,  a  foreign  corporation  is  a  "nonresi- 
dent," within  Comp.  Laws,  |  719,  requirtng 
the  service  of  a  short  summons.  In  an  action 
in  Justice's  court  against  a  nonresident,  and 
the  service  of  a  long  summons  does  not  give 
the  court  Jurisdiction.  Wells  v.  United 
States  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co.  of  Baltimore^ 
Md.,  125  N.  W.  57,  59,  160  Mich.  213. 

A  corporation  is  "resident,**  irrespective 
of  its  domicile,  when  it  does  business  in  a 
state  and  its  officers  reside  there,  upon  whom 
process  may  be  served  at  their  homes.  Con- 
versely, a  corporation,  no  matter  where  in- 
corporated, which  does  not  do  business  in  the 
state  and  does  not  have  officers  residing  there 
upon  whom  process  may  be  served,  is  ''non- 
resident" Brand  v.  Auto  Service  Co.»  67  AtiL 
19,  20,  75  N.  J.  Law,  280. 

A  corporation  organized  under  the  laws 
of  any  one  of  the  United  States  is  in  con- 
templation of  law  a  "citizen"  and  ^resident'* 
of  the  state  in  which  it  is  incorporated.  Act 
March  a,  1887,  c.  373,  24  Stat.  552,  as  cor- 
rected and  amended  by  Act  Aug.  13,  1888, 
c.  866,  25  Stat  438,  provides  for  the  removal 
of  causes  In  which  there  shall  be  controver- 
sy between  citizens  of  the  state  and  foreign 
states,  citizens,  or  subjects,  and  section  2 
declares  that  all  such  suits  may  be  removed 
to  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for 
the  proper  district  by  the  defendant  or  de- 
fendants therein  being  "nonresidents"  of  that 
state.  Held  that  where  defendant  was  an 
alien  insurance  corporation,  it  was  a  non- 
resident of  California  within  such  act,  though 
it  bad  a  branch  office  within  the  state  for  the 
transaction  of  business.  Baumgarten  v.  Al- 
liance Assur  Co.,  153  Fed.  301,  302,  303,  304 
(citing  Shaw  v.  Quincy  Mining  Company,  12 
Sup.  Ct  935,  145  U.  S.  444,  36  L.  Ed.  768 ; 
Miller  v.  Eastern  Oregon  Gold  Mln.  Co.,  45 
Fed.  348 ;  Gilbert  v.  New  Zealand  Ins.  Co., 
49  Fed.  884,  15  L.  R.  A  125;  Barrow  S.  S. 
Co.  T.  Kane,  18  Sup.  Ct  626,  170  U.  S.  100,  42 
L.  Dd.  064 ;  In  re  Keasbey  &  M.  Co.,  16  Sup. 
Ct273,160U.  S.221,40Ij.Ed.402;  Howard 
V.  Gold  Beefii  of  Georgia,  102  Fed.  657;  Shat* 

3  WDS.&  P.  2d  Seb.-— 40 


tuck  V.  North  British  k  Mercantile  Ins*  Co^ 
58  Fed.  600,  7  C.  a  A«  386). 

rugitlTs  from  Justiee 

One  may  be  a  "nonresident  of  the  state" 
and  also  a  fugitive  from  Justice  or  a  fugitive 
from  Justice  and  still  a  resident  of  the  state. 
State  V.  Miller,  87  S.  W.  484,  486,  188  Mo. 
870. 

Imtemttom 

A  person  domiciled  within  the  state,  who 
temporarily  leaves  it  for  medical  treatment 
for  injuries,  intending  to  return,  is  not  a 
"nonresident"  Taylor  v.  Norrls,  93  N.  Y. 
Supp.  856,  357,  104  App.  Div.  21. 

If  petitioner  has  been  out  of  the  state 
for  a  year  and  a  half  with  no  intention  of  re- 
turning or  with  the  intention  of  returning  at 
some  indefinite  future  time,  he  is  a  "non- 
resident" within  Code  Pub.  Qen.  Laws  1904, 
art.  16, 1 128,  providing  that  where  it  is  un- 
known whether  a  nonresident  is  living  or 
dead,  a  bill  may  be  filed  against  him  as  if 
living,  etc.,  and  he  may  be  proceeded  against 
as  smA,  though  he  may  not  intend  to  abandon 
Ua.doB9icUe  in  the  state.  Hollander  t.  Cen- 
tral Metal  ft  Supply  Co.  ot  Baltimore  City, 
71  AU.  442,  448,  109  Md.  181,  23  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  1185. 

A  person  who  has  acquired  under  the 
provisions  of  Code  1899,  c.  41,  the  right  to 
have  personal  property  exempted  from  forced 
sale,  does  not  forfeit  It  on  the  ground  of 
nonresidence  until  he  begins  to  remove  his 
personalty  from  his  place  of  abode  in  the 
state  to  another  state  or  country  with  Intent 
to  fix  his  residence  in  such  other  state  or 
country,  although  he  may  Intend  to  leave  the 
state  permanently  and  has  made  complete 
preparation  so  to  do,  and  delivered  his  per- 
sonal property  and  effects  for  shipment  to 
a  point  outside  the  state.  Brown  v.  Beck- 
with,  51  S.  K.  977,  978,  68  W.  Va.  140,  1  L.  R. 
A  (N.  S.)  778, 112  Am.  St  Rep.  955. 

Defendant,  after  the  Judgment  sued  on, 
went  to  Idaho,  where  she  lived  with  her 
daughter  in  a  rented  house,  and  taught  school 
continuously,  except  durligg;  vacations,  when 
she  generally  returned  to  Washington,  al- 
ways intending  to  return  to  Idaho  before  the 
next  school  year.  Her  vlsts  to  Washington 
were  not  to  the  place  of  her  previous  resi- 
dence ;  the  house  there  having  been  deserted, 
wrecked  by  the  wind,  and  finally  burned. 
Held,  that  defendant  became  a  nonresident 
within  Balllnger*s  Ann.  Codes  4k  St.  §  4S08 
(Pierce's  Code,  t  292),  providing  that  the  time 
that  a  person  shall  reside  out  of  the  state 
shall  not  be  a  part  of  the  time  limited  for  the 
commencement  of  ttie  action.  Dlgnam  v. 
Shaff,  98  Pac.  1113,  1114,  51  Wash.  412,  22 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  996. 

Nonresident  domestio  eorporatton 

Code  W.  Va.  1006,  c.  32,  {  124,  defines  a 
nonresident    domestic    corporation    as    one 


KONRESIDENT  ALIKK 


626 


K0K8UIT 


!  t^ 


whose  principal  place  of  busiiiesa  or  cbief 
works  is  located  without  the  state,  and  chap- 
ter 124, 1  8a,  declares  that  the  State  Auditor 
shall  be,  and  is  constituted,  the  attorney  in 
fact  for  and  on  behalf  of  every  nonresident 
domestic  corporation  which  by  power  of  at- 
torney shall  appoint  such  Auditor  and  his 
successors  in  oflSce  attorney  in  fact  to  accept 
service  of  process.  Held,  that  the  State  Au- 
ditor by  virtue  of  the  statute  alone  without  act 
on  the  part  of  the  corporation  is  authorized 
to  accept  service  of  process  for  it,  and  hence 
where  the  corporation  was  chartered  in  West 
Virginia,  but  none  of  its  officers  resided 
there,  jurisdiction  was  properly  obtained  by 
service  of  process  on  the  State  Auditor.  Wy- 
lie  Permanent  Camping  Oo.  t.  Ljmch,  105  Fed. 
886,  896,  115  C.  G.  A.  288. 

NONRESIDENT  AI<I£N 

A  "nonresident  alien,"  within  Code,  | 
8368^  providing  that,  as  against  a  purchaser 
from  a  nonresident  alien,  the  survivor  shall 
not  be  entitled  to  a  distributive  share  in  the 
estate  of  deceased,  if  at  the  time  of  the  pur- 
chase the  survivor  was  also  a  nonresident 
alien,  is  a  nonresident  of  the  state,  though  a 
resident  of  a  sister  state.  In  re  Kennedy's 
Estate,  135  N.  W.  53,  55,  154  Iowa*  460. 

NONSUIT 

See  Involuntary  Nonsuit;  Motion  for 
Nonsuit;     Voluntary  Nonsuit 

Suffer  nonsuit,  see  Suffer. 

The  term  "nonsuit,"  as  used  in  a  court 
rule  providing  that  if  service  of  a  bill  of 
particulars  is  not  effected  on  defendant  by 
the  succeeding  term  a  nonsuit  shall  be  award- 
ed, is  to  be  taken  in  the  sense  of  the  non 
pros,  of  the  English  practice  or  the  dismis- 
sal of  the  practice  in  this  state.  Souders  v. 
Carolina  Portland  Cement  Co.,  59  S.  E.  467, 
468,  8  Ga.  App.  99. 

A  "nonsuit"  is  a  Judgment  given  against 
the  plaintiff  when  he  is  unable  to  prove  his 
case  or  when  he  refuses  to  proceed  to  the 
trial  of  the  cause  after  it  has  been  put  at  is- 
sue, without  determining  the  issue.  A  vol- 
untary nonsuit  is  an  abandonment  of  his 
cause  by  the  plaintiff,  who  suffers  judgment 
for  costs  to  be  entered  against  him  by  absent- 
ing himself  or  failing  to  answer  when  called 
upon  to  hear  the  verdict  An  involuntary 
nonsuit  takes  place  when  the  plaintiff  on  be- 
ing called  when  his  case  is  before  the  court 
for  trial  neglects  to  appear,  or  when  he  has 
given  no  evidence  on  which  a  Jury  could  find 
a  verdict.  Wise  v.  Cohen,  99  N.  Y.  Supp. 
663,  665,  113  App.  Div.  859  (citing  Deeley  v. 
Heintz,  62  N.  E.  158,  169  N.  Y.  129). 

A  Judgment  for  want  of  prosecution  is  a 
nonsuit  within  the  meaning  of  that  term  as 
understood  in  the  Virginiaa  Henry  Marcus 
ft  Son  V.  McClure,  59  S.  E.  1055,  63  W.  Va. 
215. 

The  rule  that  a  "Judgment  of  nonsuit"  is 
not  a  Judgment  on  the  merits  is  so  well  set- 


tled that  discaasion  la  unnecessary-  Badi 
Judgment  is  no  bar  to  another  suit.  Gutiu 
V.  Gilmer,  76  Pac  628,  631.  27  Utah,  496L 

A  "Judgment  of  nonsuit"  la  a  decision  1 
the  court  that  the  plaintiff  has  produced  ] 
evidence  upon  which  facts  may  be  foos 
Hence  the  dismissal  of  an  action  against  i 
insurance  company  on  motion  of  defenda 
after  plaintiff  had  established  his  applic 
tion  for  a  paid-up  policy  within  six  montJ 
after  default  in  payment  of  the  premitu 
that  he  had  complied  with  all  the  other  i 
quirements  of  the  policy  authorizing  such  j 
sue  except  the  surrender  of  the  policy  J 
self,  which  he  had  failed  to  find  after  a  di 
gent  search,  that  he  had  tendered  to  ti 
company  a  release  of  all  liability  under  8u< 
policy,  and  that  it  refused  to  acc^t  the  i 
lease  and  issue  a  paid-up  policy,  la  a  ''no 
suitSi"  Lindenthal  v.  Germania  JAta  In 
Co.,  66  N.  E.  629,  630,  174  N.  Y.  76. 

A  "Judgment  of  nonsuit,"  within  Belli 
ger^s  Ann.  Codes  ft  St  {  5065,  authorising  tl 
court  to  enter  a  nonsuit  on  motion  of  defai< 
ant  when  on  the  trial  plaintiff  falls  to  pro^ 
a  sufficient  cause  for  the  Jury,  is  the  Jud 
ment  rendered  against  plaintiff  in  a  leg 
proceeding  on  his  inability  to  maintain  h 
cause  in  court  or  when  he  refuses  or  neglec 
to  proceed  to  trial  after  issue  Joined,  ai 
without  determination*  of  the  issues.  M 
Guire  v.  Bryant  Lumber  &  Shingle  Mill  O 
102  Paa  237,  238,  53  Wash.  425. 

A  nonsuit  is  a  Judgment  based  on  the  pr 
cess  or  pleading,  but,  when  rendered,  tt 
person  nonsuited  remains  a  party  to  the  pr 
cess  or  pleading  as  before,  and  it  Is  m 
available  to  cure  a  misjoinder  of  parti< 
plaintiff.  Gowan  v.  Stevens,  76  AtL  147,  U 
83  Vt  85a 

Where  defendant  rested  at  the  close  < 
plaintiff's  case  and  moved  for  a  diemlssi 
of  the  complaint,  and  plaintiff  moved  fc 
Judgment,  a  Judgment  for  defendant  was  nc 
one  of  **nonsuit,*'  but  one  involving  a  detei 
mination  that  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  t 
recover  on  the  facts  as  submitted  to  the  conr 
M.  Zimmerman  Co.  v.  New  York  Oily  R.  Co 
95  N.  Y.  Sui^.  698,  599. 

Where  both  parties  introduced  their  ev^ 
dence,  and  plaintiff's  evidence  supported 
Judgment  for  him,  and  defendant  made  d 
motion  for  a  Judgment  of  dismissal,  a  Juds 
ment,  though  termed  a  dismissal,  was  a  "final 
decision,  and  deemed  excepted  to,  withl] 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  647,  and  not  a  Ju<fgmeo 
of  "nonsuit,**  within  section  581,  authorizin 
a  nonsuit,  on  motion  of  defendant,  on  plaintil 
failing  to  prove  a  case.  Saul  v.  Moscow 
118  Pac  452,  454,  16  Cal.  App.  506. 

Where  the  county  court  disallowed  i 
claim  against  the  estate  of  a  decedent,  indors 
ing  the  disallowance  on  the  back  of  the  dain 
and  entering  an  order  disallowing  the  dalo 
and  taxing  costs  against  the  claimant,  tiu 


NONSUIT 


627 


NON£» 


jQdsment  was  not  one  of  nonsuit,  obrlonsly 
beins  intended  as  a  final  judgment,  and  not 
falling  within  Code  Civ.  Proc.  {  188,  defin- 
ing nonsntt,  and  Is  appealable.  Tucker  t. 
Tncker,  121  Pac.  125, 126,  21  Colo.  App.  94. 

''It  has  been  said  tbat  'a  nonsuit  is  but 
like  tbe  blowing  out  of  a  candle,  which  a 
man  at  his  own  pleasure  may  li^t  again.' 
This  is  an  apt  Illustration,  but  it  does  not 
mean  that  the  plaintiff  may  re-enter  the 
court  when  he  has  once  abandoned  the  fur- 
ther prosecution' of  Ms  case,  and  avail  him- 
self of  what  had  already  been  done  at  a 
former  trlaL  That  he  will  be  entitled  to  the 
fall  benefit  of  the  legal  principle  settled  by 
the  appellate  tribunal,  if  he  has  been  driven 
to  a  nonsuit  and  appeals,  and  that  his  ad- 
versary will  be  concliided  by  it,  so  far  as  it 
is  applicable  to  the  facts  as  established  at 
the  next  trial,  is  undeniable,  but  this  is  all 
he  has  accomplished.  He  cannot  enjoy  any 
greater  advantage  otherwise  than  if  he  had 
taken  a  voluntary  nonsuit  and  brought  a 
new  salt  for  the  same  cause  of  action."  City 
of  Hickory  v.  Southern  By.  Co.,  50  S.  B.  683, 
685,  138  N.  C.  811. 

**  'Nonsuif  is  a  process  of  legal  mechan- 
ics. The  case  is  chopped  oflT.  Only  in  a  clear, 
gross  case  is  this  me^dianlcal  treatment  prop- 
er.  Where  there  is  any  doubt,  another  meth- 
od is  to  be  used— a  method  involving  a  sort 
of  mental  chemistry;  and  the  chemistB  of 
the  law  are  the  Jury.  They  are  supposed  to 
be  able  to  examine  every  molecule  of  the 
evidence,  and  to  feel  every  shock  and  tremor 
of  its  probative  force.**  Corcoran  v.  Mer- 
chants' &  Miners*  Transportation  Co.,  57  8. 
E.  902,  964,  1  Oa.  App.  741  (quoting  from 
Vickers  v.  Atlanta  &  W.  P.  R.  Co.,  64  Ga. 
307). 

Retraidi  distlngnlslied 

See  Retraxit 

NOHTENAHT 

The  plea  of  ''nontenant"  and  an  avowry 
for  rent  in  replevin  puts  in  issue  the  demise 
and  tenancy  as  stated  in  the  avowry  or  cog- 
nizance and  requires  the  defendant  to  prove 
them,  while  the  plea  of  "nothing  in  arrear*' 
admits  the  tenancy  as  stated  in  the  avowry 
or  cognizance  and  puts  in  issue  the  fact  of 
the  rent  being  in  arrear.  Middleton  v.  Quig- 
ley,  12  N.  J.  Law,  352,  356. 

A  denial  in  the  answer  in  partition  of 
the  allegations  of  the  petition  that  petitioner 
is  a  tenant  in  common  with  defendant,  and 
is  seised  in  fee,  raised  an  issue  of  fact,  being 
equiyalent  to  a  plea  of  non  tenent  insimul  by 
which  defendant  denies  that  he  and  plaintiff 
are  tenants  in  common.  Gregory  v.  Pinnix, 
73  S.  B.  814,  815,  158  N.  C.  147. 

NOHTBADIHO  PAKTHERSHIP 

"In  partnerships  not  commercial  in  their 
nature,  such  as  those  of  lawyers,  doctors, 
and  others,  called  'nontrading,*  one  partner 


cannot  bind  the  other  by  the  ezecntloa  of 
promissory  notes,  unless  authority  is  express- 
ly given  or  recognized  by  all  the  parties,  or 
implied  from  their  general  business  habits. 
The  issue  of  negotiable  paper  by  such  part- 
nerships is  genially  neither  customary  nor 
necessary,  and  there  is  no  Implied  authority 
from  the  existence  of  the  partnership.  The 
partners  can  only  be  bound  upon  proof  of 
authority,  and  the  burden  of  proof  to  estab> 
lish  such  authority  is  upon  the  plaintiff.*' 
Teed  v.  Parsons,  66  N.  E.  1044r-1046,  202  lU. 
455  (citing  Ulery  v.  Ginrich,  57  IlL  531; 
Pars.  Partn.  199,  note). 

Partnerships,  when  considered  with  ref- 
erence to  the  business  In  which  they  are  en- 
gaged, may  generally  be  divided  into  two 
classes,  one  of  which  is  known  as  "trading" 
or  commercial  partnerships,  and  the  other  as 
"nontrading"  or  noncommercial  partnerships. 
Any  member  of  an  ordinary  trading  partner- 
ship can  bind  the  firm  by  the  signing  of  the 
firm  name  in  the  usual  course  of  business  as 
a  part  of  the  usual  routine  of  their  affairs, 
irrespective  of  restrictions  in  the  articles  of 
partnership  not  brought  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  payee.  In  a  "nontrading  partnership,** 
howe^r — ^that  is,  a  partnership  engaged  in 
some  occupation  which  is  not  of  a  commercial 
character — a  partner  does  not  generally  pos- 
sess the  power  to  bind  the  firm,  and  the  ex- 
tent of  his  powers  is  not  fixed  by  the  rules  of 
law.  The  general  rule  is  that  the  partners  in 
such  a  firm  have  no  implied  power  to  bind 
the  partnership,  but  each  case  is  left  to  be 
decided  upon  its  particular  facts,  and  one 
who  seeks  to  hold  the  firm  bound  upon  a  con- 
tract made  by  a  single  member  must  be  able 
to  show  such  acts  as  will  warrant  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  partner  had  been  invested  by 
his  copartner  with  the  requisite  authority  to 
make  the  contract.  Smallhouse  v.  Morris 
(Ky.)  107  S.  W.  708,  709  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing definition  in  Alsop  v.  Central  Trust  Ca, 
38  S.  W.  510, 100  Ky.  375). 

NOMlTSZiB 

Abandonment  of  an  easement  necessarily 
implies  nonuser,  but  nonuser  does  not  create 
abandonment,  however  long  continued.  Ad- 
ams V.  Hodgkins,  84  AU.  530,  532,  109  Me. 
361,  42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  741. 

NONE 

See  If  None. 

NONES 

What  is  now  known  as  noon,  or  12  o'clock 
in  the  daytime,  originally  represented  the 
ninth  hour  of  the  day  after  sunrise,  or  about 
3  o*clock  p.  m.,  and  was  the  canonical  hour 
of  "nones,*'  at  which  was  celebrated  a  reli- 
gious rite.  Rochester  German  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Peaslee-Gaulbert  Co.,  87  S.  W.  U15, 1118, 120 
Ky.  752,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  364,  9  Ann.  Cas. 
334  (ad<^ting  deflniUon  in  Webst  Diet). 


NOOK 


628 


NORTH  RIYKB 


It. 


ill 


:Mi 


NOON 

In  exact  tiae  'iioon"  meaos  12  o'clock, 
midday.  Andrecsik  t.  New  Jersey  Tube  Go^ 
63  Atl.  719,  720,  73  N.  J.  Law,  664,  4  Ix  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  913,  9  Ann.  Gas.  1006  (quoting  Cent 
Diet). 

In  the  state  of  New  York  "noon"  is  12 
o'clock  m.  standard  time,  as  fixed  by  Laws 
N.  Y.  1892,  p.  1491,  c.  677,  |  28.  Globe  & 
Uutgers  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York  r.  David 
Moffat  Go.,  154  Fed.  13,  21,  83  G.  G.  A.  91. 

The  word  "noon"  in  an  insurance  ppUcy 
means  noon  by  sun  time.  Meier  v.  Phoenix 
Ins.  Co.,  decision  of  lower  court  oi  Ohio,  af- 
firmed in  the  Supreme  Court  on  an  equal  di- 
vision, 65  N.  E.  1129,  66  Ohio  St  659.  See 
32  In&  Law  J.  192. 

In  construing  a  policy  of  insurance  on  a 
vessel,  ending  at  *'noon"  of  a  certain  date,  it 
is  held  that  the.  parties  must  be  considered  as 
regarding  the  meridian  of  the  place  where 
the  contract  is  made,  unless  some  other  one 
is  mentioned  in  it  Walker  v.  Protection  Ins. 
Co.,  29  Me.  317,  321. 

"Noon"  is  midday,  and  is  merely  a  short- 
er expression  than  "12  o'clock  in  the  day 
time."  Where  a  policy  expired  on  a  certain 
day  at  "noon,"  parol  evidence  was  admissible 
to  establish  that  by  a  well-known  custom  of 
the  place  where  the  contract  was  made  the 
word  '*noon"  was  used  to  mean  12  o'clock 
midday  standard  time,  and  was  so  intended 
by  the  parties  to  the  contract  instead  of  12 
o'clock  sun  time;  and  so  an  instruction  that  if, 
at  the  time  the  policy  was  issued,  there  exist- 
ed at  the  place  where  the  contract  was  made  a 
custom  or  usage  with  ref^ence  to  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  "noon"  so  well  settled  and 
uniformly  acted  on,  and  of  such  continuance, 
as  to  raise  a  presumption  that  the  parties 
knew  thereof  and  entered  into  the  contract 
with  reference  to  It  such  usage  would  govern 
in  determining  whether  the  policy  had  ex- 
pired, was  proper.  The  insurer  is  not  liable 
for  a  loss  which  was  inevitable  at  the  time 
the  policy  expired,  provided  the  fire  had  not 
then  attacked  the  building.  Rochester  Ger- 
man Ins.  Co.  V.  Peaslee-Gaulbert  Co.,  87  S. 
W.  U15,  1118,  120  Ky.  752,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
364,  9  Ann.  Gas.  324. 

KOON  HOUR 

As  used  in  a  promise  to  repair  machin- 
ery during  the  "noon  hour,"  it  meant  the 
time  from  12  o'clock  noon  to  1  o'clock  p.  m. 
Andrecsik  v.  New  Jersey  Tube  Co.,  63  Atl. 
719,  720,  73  N.  J.  Law,  664,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
913,  9  Ann.  Gas.  1006. 

NOR 

The  word  "nor,"  in  a  will  whereby  testa- 
tor empowered  the  trustee  to  sell  real  estate, 
with  a  proviso  that  no  sale  should  be  made 
during  the  lifetime  of  either  of  the  daugh* 
ters  Of  testator  without  their  consent  "nor" 


unless  it  is  necessary  to  pay  debts.  Is  use^ 
in  the  sense  of  ''or.**  Reed  r*  Lonffstieet  (N 
J.)  63  Ati.  500,  601. 

Or  ooastmed  a«  jmmt 

See  Or. 

NORI 

AS  seaweeQ,  see  seaweeci* 

NORMAL  OUTAGE  OR  WANTAGE 

See  Outage. 

NORMALLY 

The  word  •^normally'*  Is  defined  "nM  i 
rule;  regularly ;  according  to  a  rule,  genera 
custom,"  etc.  Palmer  t.  Jordan  ICaeh.  Ca 
186  Fed.  496,  504. 

NORTH 

The  tenn  '^orth"  has  two  meanings;  on 
common,  and  the  other  technical.  Unprofet 
sional  men  generally  mean,  in  statii^  conraei 
the  lines  indicated  by  the  compass,  witboa 
making  any  allowance  for  variation  In  tbi 
needle;  and  even  professional  sorveyors,  a 
appears  from  the  evidence,  would  not  consid 
er  the  true  meridian  as  intended,  unless  spe 
dally  so  informed.  Jenny  Lind  Go.  t.  Bowei 
11  GaL  194,  197. 

NORTH  HALT 

The  words  "the  north  half,"  used  In  tin 
conveyance  of  a  part  of  a  platted  block  o 
land,  mean  the  half  of  the  block  lying  norti 
of  an  east  and  west  line  drawn  through  tlu 
block,  unless  the  surrounding  facts  requir 
that  these  words  be  given  a  different  mean 
ing.  Lavis  v.  Wilcox,  133  N.  W.  563,  11( 
Minn.  187. 

Under  a  conveyance  of  the  "north  half 
of  a  tract  of  land,  the  east  line  of  which  l 
of  such  a  shape  tiiat  the  north  line  is  les 
than  one-half  the  leugUi  of  the  south  hoe 
the  grantee  is  entitled  to  one-half  of  the  arei 
of  the  tract,  and  not  merely  to  one-half  oi 
the  north  and  south  length  of  the  tract 
Robinson  v.  Taylor,  123  Pac.  444,  445,  6{ 
Wash.  351,  Ann.  Gas.  1913E,  1011. 

NORTH  BIVER 

The  words  "North  river,'*  as  used  in  i 
marine  policy  on  a  scow,  containing  the  fol 
lowing  provision:  ''Warranted  by  tbe  fi» 
sured  to  be  employed  exclusively  in  the 
freighting  business,  and  to  navigate  only  Um 
waters  of  the  bay  and  harbor  of  New  York 
the  North  and  Bast  rivers,  and  inland  waten 
of  New  Jersey" — cannot  be  extended  by  con 
structlon  to  include  tributaries  of  the  Hud 
son  in  the  state  of  New  York,  and  therft  tai 
be  no  recovery  under  the  policy  f6r  an  injun 
to  the  scow  received  while  she  was  lying  hi 
a  dock  in  Rondout  Cre^  2^  mUes  firom  the 


NORTHERLY 


NOT  BEING 


andson.    Hastorf  r.  Greenwich  Ins.  Ck>.,  132 
red.  122,  124- 

ffORTHEBIiT 

Wbere  a  notloe  of  the  opening  of  a  new 
road  described  it  as  mnnlng  with  a  ''norther- 
ly" course  across  the  property  of  another, 
iie  fact  that  it  ran  5  degrees  50  minutes  west 
}f  north  was  immaterial.  Riggs  t.  Winter- 
>de,  50  Atl.  762,  765,  100  Md.  439. 

BrORTHERHIiT 

**Tbe  term  *northernly'  In  a  grant,  where 
there  is  no  object  menticmsd  to  direet  the  in- 
i!lination  of  the  course  toward  the  east  or 
nrest,  means  due  north.**  State  ex  rel.  CAiand* 
ler  T.  Huff,  79  S.  W.  1010, 1012,  105  Mo.  App. 
^54  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  tn 
Brandt  ex  dem.  Walton  t.  Ogden  [N.  Y.]  1 
Johns.  150). 

HOBTHWBST 

See  N.  W* 

NOSCITUR  A  SOCIIS 

"Xoscitur  a  sociis"— it  is  known  by  its 
associates.  Thus,  in  92  Ohio  Laws,  p.  44 
(Act  Feb.  27,  1806),  forbidding  the  prescrib- 
ing of  any  drug,  medidne,  or  other  agency 
for  the  treatment  of  disease  by  a  person  who 
has  not  obtained  from  the  board  of  medical 
registration  and  examination  a  certificate  of 
qtialiflcation,  the  word  "ageney"  rtiould  be 
limited  by  the  associated  words  ''drug'*  and 
"medicine,'*  and  therefore  dtd  not  Include  the 
system  of  healing  known  as  ''osteopathy," 
which  consists  of  rubbing  or  kneading  the 
body.  State  v.  Liffring,  65  N.  B.  166,  169,. 61 
Ohio  St.  39,  50,  46  L.  R.  A.  884,  76  Am.  St 
Rep.  858. 

Under  Rev.  St  Wis.  |  1564,  providing 
that  any  tavern  keeper  or  other  person  sell- 
ing liquor  on  Sunday  or  election  day  shall 
be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  the  general 
words  '*otber  person"  must,  under  the  famil- 
iar rule  "noscitur  a  sodis,"  be  taken  to  mean 
a  similar  class  of  persons  and  not  be  extend- 
ed so  as  to  include  all  persons,  and  hence  in- 
cludes only  persons  whose  business,  at  least 
in  part,  is  to  sell  Intoxicating  liquors.  Jen- 
sen V.  State,  19  N.  W.  374,  375,  60  Wis.  577. 

The  words  "estate"  and  "aUmony,*'  in 
Rev.  St  Wis.  I  2364,  authorizing  the  couvt 
in  divorce  actions  to  adjudge  to  the  wlCe  ali- 
mony out  of  the  hu8band*s  estate,  are  not 
only  associated  within  the  rule  "noscitur  a 
sodis"  and  to  be  understood  in  a  kindred 
sense,  but  are  correlatives  dependent  one  on 
the  other  for  eflTect  and  should  be  understood 
in  a  corresponding  sense.  Blake  v.  Blake,  43 
N.  W.  144,  145,  75  Wis.  3^9  (citing  Campbell 
V.  Campbell,  37  Wis.  219). 

The  doctrine  of  '*noscitur  a  sociis"  ap- 
plied to  a  mercantile  instrument  content 
plates  the  ascertaining  of  the  meaning  of  gear 
eral  words  by  reference  to  preceding  special 


words  therein.  A  fire  policy  covering  a 
steamboat  provided  that  "if  gunpowder,  cam- 
phene,  spirit  gas,  naphtha,  benzine,  or  ben* 
sole,  chttnical,  crude  or  refined  coal  or  earth 
oUs,  should  be  kept  or  need  on  the  premises 
without  written  consent,"  the  policy  should 
be  void.  In  an  action  on  the  policy  it  ap- 
peared that  kerosene  oil  was  used  to  light 
the  cabin  and  saloon  of  the  boat  after  such 
policy  was  issued.  Held,  that  this  win  hot 
prevent  a  recovery.  Applying  the  maxim 
"noscitur  a  sociis,"  and  other  rules  of  con- 
struction, the  provision  above  recited  is  held 
to  refer  to  "crude  or  refined  coal  or  earth 
oils,"  similar  to  the  coal  or  earth  oils  and 
other  substances  spedflcally  named,  in  re- 
spect to  their  dangerous  and  inflammable 
character.  Morse  v.  Buffalo  Fire  &  Marine 
Ins.  Co.,  80  Wis.  534,  537,  11  Am.  Rep.  587 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  In  Broom, 
Leg.  Max.  p.  451). 

NOT 

See  Whether  or  Not 

NOT  A  NBCEMABT  PAKTT 

The  term  "not  a  necessary  party**  means 
that  the  suit  can  proceed  just  as  well  with- 
out him,  and  in  that  event  if  his  presence 
has  the  effect  to  hinder  or  burden  the  case, 
he  may  be  dropped.  Jones  v.  Kansas  City, 
Ft  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  77  S.  W.  890,  893,  178  Mo. 
528,  101  Am.  St  Rep.  434. 

NOT  A  BS8FBOTABLB  "S^OMAN 

An  indictment  alleging  that  accused  im- 
puted to  a  married  woman  that  she  "was  not 
a  respectable  woman,"  without  containing  in- 
nuendo averments  alleging  what  the  language 
meant,  and  that  as  spoken  and  intended  it 
meant  that  she  was  unchaste,  does  not  state 
an  offense  under  Pen.  Code  1895,  art.  750, 
making  a  person  falsely  imputing  to  a  female 
a  want  of  chastity  guilty  of  slander.  Woods 
V.  State,  124  S.  W.  918,  58  Tex.  Cr.  R.  103. 

NOT  BE  FATABUB 

Where  testator  directs  his  executor  to 
pay  all  the  collateral  inheritance  taxes  on  the 
devises  and  legacies  in  the  will  as  soon  as 
the  same  can  be  conveniently  done,  and  the 
executor  pays  the  tax  on  the  entire  estate  at 
the  time  of  its  valuation,  the  commonwealth 
cannot,  on  the  death  of  the  life  tenant  im- 
pose any  tax  upon  the  remainderman  under 
Act  May  6,  1887  (P.  L.  79),  providing  that 
the  tax  on  estates  in  remainder  shall  not  be 
payable  until  the  person  liable  for  the  same 
shall  come  into  actual  possession ;  the  words 
"not  be  payable"  meaning  only  "shall  not  be 
demandable.'*  In  re  De  Borbon's  Bstatd,  61 
AU.  244,  246,  211  Pa.  623. 

NOT  BEZNO 

The  term  "without  as  used  In  an  aver- 
ment that  building  material  was  suffered  to 
remain  in  a  street  after  night  "without"  be- 


NOT  COMPLETED 


630 


NOT  OUIIiTY 


ing  yarded,  is  a  direct  ayerment  that  no 
guards  or  lights  were  placed  around  the  ob- 
struction, and  the  pleading  did  not  merely  re- 
cite such  facts;  the  word  "without**  being 
synonymous  with  "not  being."  City  of  La- 
porte  y.  Osbom,  86  N.  B.  dd5,  097,  48  Ind. 
App.  100. 

NOT  OOlffPIiETED 

A  contract  which  has  neyer  been  begun 
is  a  contract  '"not  completed'  within  the 
time  spedfled,"  within  CJobbey's  Ann.  St 
1903,  §  5519,  proyldlng  for  re-estimating  and 
reletting  drainage  contracts.  Gutschow  y. 
Washington  County,  104  N.  W.  602,  603,  74 
Neb.  37a 

KOT  DOUBTiHO 

The  words  "desire,"  "request,"  "recom- 
mend," "hope,"  "not  doubting"  used  by  tes- 
tator in  a  will  to  express  his  desire  that 
the  executor  will  conduct  a  fund  in  a  speci- 
fied manner,  testator  haying  power  to  com- 
mand, will  not  be  construed  as  precatory 
only,  but  as  commands  clothed  In  the  lan- 
guage of  dyility,  and  to  impose  on  the  ex- 
ecutor an  enforceable  duty,  sufficient  to  cre- 
ate a  trust  Trustees  of  Pembroke  Academy 
V.  Epsom  School  Dist,  75  Atl.  100,  101,  75 
N.  H.  408,  37  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  646. 

NOT  ENOUGH 

Under  a  statute  proyldlng  that  no  ap- 
peal shall  be  dismissed  for  insufficiency  of 
the  undertaking,  if  a  good  and  sufficient 
undertaking  be  filed  before  the  hearing  on 
motion  to  dismiss,  the  term  'Insufficient" 
as  applied  to  an  undertaking  on  appeal, 
must  be  construed  as  meaning  such  a  one 
as  has  some  efficiency,  but  "not  enough"  to 
meet  the  necessary  requirements,  and  bears 
the  ordinary  meaning  of  "not  enough" ;  that 
is,  importing  degree  in  quantity  or  quality, 
and  not  total  absence.  Pirrle  y.  Monle,  81 
Pac.  390,  392,  33  Mont  1. 

NOT  EXEMPT 

The  words  "not  exempt  from  attach- 
ment by  law,"  in  the  poor  debtor's  act,  re- 
quiring an  assignment  of  all  the  debtor's 
estate,  both  real  and  personal,  not  exempt 
from  attachment  by  law,  except  only  from 
the  assignment  only  such  property  as  is 
expressly  exempted  from  attachment  by  stat- 
ute relating  to  that  subject  and  an  assign- 
ment by  debtor  In  the  language  of  the  stat- 
ute is  sufficient  to  include  eyery  equitable 
as  well  as  legal  interest  in  the  real  or  per- 
sonal property  of  the  assigning  debtor.  Til- 
linghast  y.  Bradford,  5  R.  I.  205,  212. 

The  phrase  "not  exempt  from  execu- 
tion," used  In  Rey.  St  1898,  §  3035,  author- 
izing application  to  the  judgment  of  any 
property  of  the  judgment  debtor  not  exempt 
from  execution,  is  equiyalent  to  the  ex- 
pression "not  exempted  by  express  statute 
from  execution,"  and  so  the  Income  from 
personal   property   held    in   trust   may   be 


reached;  there  being  no  statute  exemptl] 
it  WiUiams  y.  Smith,  03  N.  W.  404,  4fi 
117  Wis.  142. 

NOT  OUILTT 

A  plea  of   "not  guilty**  puts  In   Issi 
every  fact  which  the  commonwealth    mu 
establish  to  secure  a  conyictlon.    Frazier 
Commonwealth   (Ky.)   114   S.   W.    268,   2fi 

By  a  plea  of  "not  guilty"  defendant  d 
nled  eyery  fact  essential  to  his  guUt  Inclu 
Ing  his  identity  with  the  person  who  coi 
mltted  the  homicide.  People  y.  Wong  Sai 
Lung,  84  Pac.  844,  845,  3  GaL  App.  2: 
(adopting  definition  in  Commonwealth 
Briggs,  5  Pldc.  [22  Mass.]  429). 

Rey.  St  1898,  |  4891,  providing  th 
a  verdict  on  a  plea  of  not  guilty  shall  1 
either  "guilty"  or  "not  guUty."  which  ii 
ports  a  conviction  or  acquittal  on  the  offen 
charged,  and  that  on  a  plea  of  former  co 
viction  or  acquittal  it  shall  be  either  *f  or  t] 
state"  or  "for  defendant"  requires  a  verdi 
on  the  latter  plea,  and,  where  defendaj 
pleaded  not  guilty  and  autrefois  acquit 
was  error  to  enter  judgment  on  a  verdict  < 
guilty.  State  v.  Creechley,  75  Pac.  384.  ' 
Utah,  142. 

The  plea  of  "not  guilty,*'  in  a  crlmln 
action,  puts  in  issue  evefy  material  alleg 
tion  of  the  Indictm^it  or  information,  an 
like  a  general  denial  in  a  dvll  action,  cas 
the  burden  of  establishing  the  facts  necc 
sary  to  convict  upon  the  prosecution.  ] 
civil  actions,  under  a  general  denial,  tl 
plaintiff  will  recover  unless  his  evidence 
met  and  overcome  by  evidence  of  equal  < 
greater  weight;  and  if  the  jury  beUev^ 
from  a  consideration  of  all  of  the  eviden 
in  the  case  that  the  preponderance,  howev! 
slight,  is  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  he  wj 
be  entitled  to  a  verdict  But  in  crlmln 
cases.  Id  order  to  convict,  the  prosecution 
required  to  prove  every  material  allegatlc 
of  the  indictment  or  information,  every  e 
sentlal  element  of  the  crime  charged,  d< 
only  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidenc 
but  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  beyond 
reasonable  doubt  And  if,  upon  consider 
tion  of  all  of  the  evidence  in  the  case,  thei 
exists  in  the  mind  of  the  jury  a  reasonab 
doubt  as  to  the  existence  of  any  one  < 
more  of  these  essential  elements  which  mm 
be  proven  to  render  the  act  criminal,  tl 
defendant  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  thi 
doubt,  and  should  be  acquitted.  State 
Pressler,  92  Pac.  806,  809,  16  Wyo.  214,  ) 
Ann.  Ca&  93. 

A  plea  of  "not  guilty^  by  one  accuK 
of  crime  is  an  express  contention  on  h 
part  antagonistic  to  every  ffect  necessary  i 
be  proved  by  the  state  in  order  to  establis 
his  guilt;  and,  unless  the  accused  admii 
one  or  more  of  the  facts  whidi  It  devolT< 
upon  the  state  to  prove,  such  fact  must  I 
established  by  evidence.  To  assume  thi 
an  Important  fact  in  the  case  on  trial  hi 


NOT  aUILTY 


681 


KOT  LESS  THAN 


t»ecn  admitted,  and  to  so  instnict  the  jnrr, 
nrhen  no  Buch  admiSBlon  has  been  made,  ia 
reversible  error.  Cooper  v.  State,  69  8.  B. 
W,  2  Ga.  Ai^  730. 

Under  B.  ft  G.  Oomp.  §{  1836,  1356»  a 
defendant  accused  of  a  misdemeanor  can  ap- 
pear for  arraignment  and  enter  a  plea  of 
not  g:uilt7  by  counsel.  Held,  that  a  stipula- 
tion entered  into  by  the  district  attorney 
and  counsel  for  defendant  that  all  the  mat- 
ters alleged  in  the  indictment  are  true  and 
admitted,  and  that  judgment  should  be  en- 
tered according  to  the  facts  and  the  law, 
was  In  effect  a  plea  of  **not  guilty"  as  it  in 
effect  admitted  the  facts  charged,  but  denied 
that  they  constituted  a  crime.  State  t.  Sul- 
livan, 98  Pac.  493,  52  Or.  614. 

iSFOBB  DISP08SD  OF 


HOT 

Under  a  will  bequeathing  an  equal  sum 
to  each  of  six  diaritable  institutions,  but 
providing  that,  if  such  bequests  should  ex- 
ceefi  one-half  of  the  personal  estate  of 
which  be  died  possessed,  such  a  proportion- 
ate amount  should  be  taken  from  each  as 
would  reduce  the  sum  thereof  to  one-half 
of  his  personal  estate,  but  that,  if  the  sum 
of  the  bequests  should  not  equal  one-half 
of  tlie  personal  estate  of  which  he  died  pos- 
sessed, such  an  equal  amount  should  be 
added  to  each  bequest  as  would  make  the 
sum  of  the  bequests  equal  to  one-half  of  his 
personal  estate,  and  directing  the  executors 
to  divide  the  remainder  of  the  estate  "not 
hereinbefore  disposed  of  as  therein  pro- 
vided, the  words  "not  hereinbefore  disposed 
of  mean  the  half  of  the  estate  in  value  at 
the  time  of  the  testator's  death,  which  he 
had  set  aside  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
the  provisions  of  his  will,  and  do  not  mean 
that  the  residuary  legatees  should  share 
equally  the  interest  and  dividends  and  any 
other  property  which  might  come  to  the 
estate  with  the  specific  and  general  legatees. 
In  re  Barton's  Estate,  118  N.  Y.  Supp.  1087, 
1090,  04  Misc.  Bep.  242. 

HOT  HIS  own 

Tbe  words  **not  his  own,"  which  are 
essential  to  an  allegation  in  a  complaint  for 
trespass  on  inclosed  lands  or  premises,  not 
the  property  of  the  person  against  whom  the 
complaint  is  made,  is  an  exclusive  negative, 
denying  any  right,  however  small,  and  is 
intended  to  include  any  right  of  the  usu- 
fruct, control,  occupation,  or  of  entry.  A 
complaint  fiiillng  to  charge  that  the  lands 
on  which  defendant  was  alleged  to  have 
trespassed  were  "not  his  own"  is  fatally  de- 
fective. Binhoff  V.  State,  90  Pac.  586,  587, 
49  Or.  419. 

HOT   HITCHED 

In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  person  on 
a  street  from  collision  with  a  runaway  team, 
where  the  petition  averred  that  the  team 
was  not  hitched,  a  charge  authorizing  a  re- 
covery for  plaintiff   against  the   owner  of 


the  team,  if  the  Jury  should  find  tliat  the 
team  was  left  without  any  person  in  charge 
and  without  exercising  ordinary  care  to 
securely,  hitch  it  while  the  driver  was  ab- 
sent, was  not  objectionable  as  authorizing  a 
recovery  for  negligence  not  alleged  in  the 
pleading,  as  the  law  devolves  upon  the  own- 
er the  obligation  to  exercise  ordinary  care 
in  hitching  the  team  in  some  reasonably  se- 
cure manner,  and  the  allegation  that  the 
team  was  not  hitched  should  be  viewed  in 
the  sense  of  the  law  under  which,  if  the 
team  was  insecurely  hitched,  when  consid- 
ered with  respect  to  the  obligation  to  exer- 
cise ordinary  care  in  that  behalf,  they 
would  be  "not  hitched"  in  the  eye  of  the 
law.  Miller  v.  United  Rys.  Ck>.  of  St  Louis^ 
134  S.  W.  1045.  1047,  155  Ma  Appi  52a 

KOT  XHOW 

See  Do  Not  Know. 

WOT  XHowmo 

The  words  "not  knowing,"  or  'Hiavlng 
no  reasonable  grounds  to  suspect,"  or 
••knew,"  or  ••know,"  or  ••had  reasonable 
grounds  to  suspect,"  wh^i  used  in  an  In- 
struction in  an  action  for  Injuries  to  a 
passenger  while  attempting  to  board  a  train 
in  consequence  of  the  starting  of  the  train, 
relating  to  the  knowledge  or  want  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  conductor  In  starting  the  train 
before  the  passenger  had  boarded  it,  are 
legal  eqnivalenta  Choctaw,  O.  4k  O.  R.  Co. 
V.  Hlckey,  99  S.  W.  839,  842,  81  Ark.  579. 

NOT  uses  THAH 

••When  so  many  'dear  days^*  or  so 
many  days  •at  least,'  are  given  to  do  an  act, 
or  •not  less  than'  so  many  days  must  Inter- 
vene, both  the  terminal  days  are  excluded." 
In  re  Gregg's  Estate,  62  AtL  856,  857,  213 
Pa.  200  (Quoting  and  adopting  the  language 
of  Bnd.  Interp.  St  |  391). 

Act  April  4,  1870,  provides  that  county 
commissioners,  before  contracting  for  the 
erection  of  any  buildings,  shall  by  advertise- 
ment invite  sealed  proposals  according  to 
specifications  kept  open  for  the  inspection 
of  all  persons  for  at  least  four  weeks  before 
the  time  appointed  for  (^)ening  the  pro- 
posals. Held,  that  the  phrase  "not  less  than 
four  weeks"  means  at  least  four  weeks  and 
the  four  weeks  during  which  the  advertise- 
ment must  be  published  or  the  same  four 
weeks  during  which  the  specifications  must 
be  of  record.  The  commissioners  of  a  cer- 
tain county  fixed  the  time  for  opening  the 
bids  for  a  new  courthouse  at  July  19,  1903. 
The  specifications  were  deposited  in  the 
office  of  the  county  commissioners  for  a 
period  longer  than  four  weeks  to  such  date, 
and  the  advertisements  were  published  in 
two  weekly  newspapers  in  the  county  on 
June  16th,  June  23d,  June  80th,  and  July 
7th.  Held,  that  the  advertisements  com- 
plied with  the  requirements  of  the  act  that 
the  advertisement  shall  be  published  for  not 


{ 

.t 
,  J: 


NOT  LB8S  THAN 


6S2     NOT  OTHERWIBB  PROVIDED  FOB 


111 


m 


leos  tten  tour  we^8  before  tlie  contract  la 
awarded.  Oommonwealth  ez  leL  Miller  ft 
Sona  V.  Brown,  59  AtL  479,  460,  210  Pa.  29. 

An  ordinance  of  the  town  of  Central  pro- 
hibits the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  except 
as  is  now  provided  by  the  dispensary  law, 
and  for  a  ylolation  of  snch  ordinance  fixes 
the  penalty  at  *'not  less  than  one  hnndred 
dollars,  or  not  less  than  thirty  days'  impris- 
onment, or  thirty  days'  labor  on  the  chain 
gang,  or  thirty  days'  labor  on  the  streets  of 
the  town,  at  the  discretion  of  the  mayor's 
court"  Const,  art.  5,  §  21,  provides  tiiat 
magistrates  shall  have  exclusive  jurisdiction 
in  criminal  cases  where  the  punishment  does 
not  exceed  a  fine  of  $100  or  imprisonment 
for  30  days.  Cr.  Code  1902,  §  12,  provides 
that  magistrates  shall  have  jurisdiction  of 
all  offenses  where  the  punishment  does  not 
exceed  a  fine  of  $100  or  imprisonment  for 
30  days,  and  may  impose  any  sentence,  with- 
in those  limits,  singly  or  within  the  altema- 
tlva  The  charter  of  the  town  of  Central 
(Laws  1885,  p.  405,  |  4)  provides  that  the  isr 
tendant  and  wardens  shaU  have  the  same 
jurisdiction  in  criminal  matters  as  trial  jus- 
tices, so  far  as  the  same  relates  to  the  ordi- 
nances of  the  town.  Held,  that  the  words 
''not  less  than  one  hundred  dollars,"  as  used 
in  the  ordinance,  mean  "one  hundred  dol- 
lars," and  therefore  a  prosecution  for  viola- 
tion of  the  ordinance  was  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  intendant  Town  of  Central  v. 
Madden,  61  S.  E.  1028. 1029,  81  S.  O.  7. 

NOT  NAVIGABLE 

The  phrase  "streams  not  navigable," 
within  a  statute  providing  that  the  right  of 
eminent  domain  may  be  exercised  for  stor- 
ing and  floating  logs  and  lumber  on  streams 
"not  navigable,"  means  streams  not  navigable 
In  fact.  Potlatch  Lumber  Co.  v. 'Peterson, 
88  Pac.  426,  430,  12  Idaho,  769,  118  Am.  St. 
Rep.  233. 

NOT  NEGOTIABLB 

The  words  "not  negotiable,"  stamped  on 
the  face  of  a  bill  of  lading,  do  not  prohibit 
transfer  of  the  bill  and  of  the  contract  rep- 
resented thereby  by  Indorsement  and  deliv- 
ery, as,  under  Code  Civ.  Proc.  §  449,  any  con- 
tract is  transferable  and  enforceable  by  suit 
in  the  name  of  the  assignee,  but  the  transfer- 
ror of  such  a  bill  has  only  his  common-law 
rights,  and  cannot  avail  himself  of  Factors' 
Act  (Laws  1830,  p.  203,  c.  179)  §  3,  providing 
that  au  agent  intrusted  with  the  possession 
of  a  bill  of  lading  shall  be  deemed  the  true 
owner  thereof  so  far  as  to  give  validity  to 
any  contract  for  the  sale  of  goods  thereunder. 
Gass  V.  Astoria  Veneer  Mills,  118  N.  Y.  Supp. 
982,  966,  134  App.  Div.  184. 

The  words  "not  negotiable,"  stamped 
on  the  face  of  the  bill  of  lading,  did  not  de- 
stroy its  assignability,  but  the  sole  effect  was 
to  exempt  the  bill  from  the  statutory  pro- 
visions relative  thereto,  and  a  bill,  though  not 


negotlAble,  may  be  transferred  bj  assif 
ment;  the  asatgnee  taldng  subject  to  t 
equities  between  the  original  parttea.  ^ 
tional  Bank  of  Bristol  v.  Baltimore  A  O. 
Co.,  69  AU.  1B4^  188,  99  Md.  661«  106  Am.  i 
Bep.  321« 

NOT  OPEN  FOB  BV8INB8S 

See  Open  for  Business. 

NOT  OTHERWISE 

The  words  "not  otherwise,**  in  Pol.  Ok 
i  3366,  providing  that  county  boards  of  supi 
visors  shall,  in  the  exercise  of  their  pol] 
powers,  and  for  the  purpose  of  regulati( 
and  "not  otherwise,"  have  power  to  Ucer 
all  and  every  kind  of  business  not  prohibit 
by  law,  transacted,  and  carried  on  wltl 
the  limits  of  their  respective  Jurisdictioi 
operate  to  curtail  all  power  boards  of  supi 
visors  previously  had  to  issue  licenses  a 
charge  therefor  aa  a  revenue  measure.  PI 
mas  County  v.  Wheeler,  87  Pac.  900,  910, 1 
Cal.  758. 

NOT  OTHERWISE  EXCEPTED 

Under  Const.  1875,  art.  5,  §  6,  conferri 
on  the  circuit  courts  jurisdiction  in  all  mi 
ters,  civil  and  criminal,  not  otherwise  exce] 
ed,  the  words  "not  otherwise  excepted"  i 
not  words  of  prohibition  on  the  Legislatu 
but  simply  words  of  description  as  to  wl 
jurisdiction  is  conferred  absolutely  on  t 
circuit  courts,  and  hence,  when  constm 
with  section  7,  declaring  that  the  Genei 
Assembly  should  have  power  to  establi 
courts  of  chancery,  and  directed  the  state 
be  divided  Into  chancery  divisions  and  d 
tricts,  and  Const  1901,  |  148,  declaring  tl 
the  Legislature  may  confer  upon  the  c 
cult  court  or  the  chancery  court  the  jur 
diction  of  both  of  such  courts.  Acts  1894  1 
p.  881,  conferring  chancery  jurisdiction 
the  circuit  court  of  Jefferson  county,  is  e 
unconstitutional.  Bnsley  Development  Co. 
Powell,  40  South.  137,  139.  147  Ala.  300. 

NOT  OTHERWISE   ORNAMENTED  € 
DECORATED 

In  the  tariff  aet  in  a  paragraph  in  relati 
to  articles  of  glass,  the  use  of  the  phra 
"not  otherwise  ornamented  or  decorate(] 
after  an  enumeration  of  several  process 
by  which  an  article  may  be  ornamented 
decorated,  not  only  im^ies,  but  indicates^  i 
understanding  that  this  result  of  the  enumi 
ated  processes  is  to  be  an  ornament  or  dec 
ration,  in  order  to  bring  the  article  with 
the  terms  of  such  paragraph.  Utard  v.  Un: 
ed  States,  128  Fed.  422,  63  O.  a  A.  164  (c 
Ing  Koscherak  v.  United  States,  98  Fed.  5fi 
39  C.  C.  A.  166). 

NOT  OTHERWISE  PROVIDED  FOR 

Code  12^06,  §  4561,  provides  for  a  soUcJ 
or's  fee  of  $50  for  securing  the  conviction 
any  corporation  for  violating  any  law,  ai 
another  section  authorizes  a  fee  of  $7.50  f 


^OT  OTHERWISE  PROVIDED  FOR      633 


NOT  WHOLIiY  WITHIN 


each  convictiaii  of  a  misdemeanor  not  other- 
wise provided  for.  Held  that,  slnee  section 
6388  makes  the  willful  obstruction  of  a  pub- 
lic load  a  misdemeanor,  but  affixes  no  pen- 
alty, the  offense  Is  one  "not  otherwise  pro- 
vided for,"  for  which  the  solicitor's  fee  is 
but  $7.50.  Birmingham  Waterworks  Co.  v. 
State,  48  South.  658,  660,  150  Ala.  118. 

The  expression  "not  otherwise  provided 
for,**  or  "not  specially  provided  for,'*  in  a 
tariff  provision,  does  not  deprive  the  general 
rule  as  to  classification  by  spedflc  designation 
of  Its  ordinary  application,  so  that  a  provi- 
sion which  specifically  derdgnates  goods,  but 
which  is  so  qualified,  shall  not  prevail  over 
words  of  a  general  description  in  another 
provision  containing  no  such  qualification. 
United  States  v.  Schwarz,  140  FM.  802,  804. 

HOT  B£STBAIN£D  BY  LAW 

The  term  "agreement,"  in  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  I  66,  providing  that  the  comp^isation 
of  an  attorney  for  his  services  is  governed 
by  agreemoit,  express  or  Implied,  which  is 
'^ot  restrained  by  law,"  means  an  agreement 
which  is  recognized  by  the  law  as  a  valid 
agreement  An  agreement  obtained  for  a  con- 
sideration which  is  valid,  or  upon  induce- 
ment which  is  expressly  prohibited^  would 
not  be  an  agreement  which  was  not  restrained 
by  law.  O'Neill  v.  Campbell,  103  N.  T.  Supp. 
150.  152,  118  App.  Div.  64. 

HOT  SAFE 

The  phrase  '*not  saf^'  is  a  negation  of 
every  degree  of  safety,  and  hence  an  instmc- 
tlon,  in  an  action  against  a  railroad  company 
for  injury  resulting  from  a  defective  track, 
merely  relating  to  the  condition  of  the  track, 
and  not  to  an  imposed  duty,  which  was  oth- 
erwise covered,  stating,  "If  you  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  track  of  the  defendant 
at  the  place  of  the  accident  was  not  in  a 
safe  condltton,"  etc.,  if  erroneous  in  omitting 
to  qualify  the  phrase  "not  in  safe  condition,'' 
was  to  the  advantage  of  defendant,  and  it 
had  no  right  to  complain.  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  By.  Oo.  V.  Roberts  (Tex.)  »1  8.  W.  876, 
884. 

HOT  80  DTINO 

By  the  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  paragraphs 
of  his  will,  testator  devised  in  fee  simple 
lands  in  severalty  to  his  three  sons.  The 
seventh  paragraph  of  the  will  provided  that, 
if  any  or  either  of  such  children  should  die 
leaving  no  issue  living  at  the  time  of  his  or 
her  decease,  the  estate  devised  to  the  child 
60  dying  was  to  go  to  the  other  and  remain- 
ing "children  or  child  not  so  dying  in  equal 
proportions  in  fee  simple  In  remainder  for- 
ever." Held,  that  the  words  "not  so  dying" 
meant  that  the  executory  devisees  should 
be  children  of  the  testator  not  dying  in  like 
manner  or  under  the  same  circumstances  as 
the  deceased  dilld—  that  is^  leaving  no  child 
or  children,  or  descendant  or  descendants  liv- 
ing at  the  time  of  th^r  decea8e-*«nd  audi 


words  could  not  be  changed  so  a^  to  read  "not 
having  so  died,"  and  since  by  this  construc- 
tion there  will  be  no  person  who  can  take 
under  the  seventh  paragraph,  as  no  living 
person  can  fulfill  the  description,  the  seventh 
paragraph  must  be  regarded  as  ineffective 
and  insuflScient  to  restrain  of  limit  the  previ- 
ous paragraphs  of  the  will,  and  hence  the 
devisees  in  such  paragraphs  take  a  fee^mple 
estate.  Mills  v.  Teel,  92  N.  B.  810,  812,  245 
111.483. 

NOT  8PE0IAIXT  PBOVIDED  FOB 

See  Not  Otherwise  Provided  For. 

HOT  SUBJECT  TO  OOUBTEBMANL 

A  writing  in  the  form  of  an  order  to  ship 
trees,  ^though  stated  to  be  a  contract  and 
not  "subject  to  countermand,"  is  not  a  con- 
tract, and  may  be  countermanded,  where 
there  is  nothing  in  the  writing  its^  to  show 
an  agreement  to  deliver,  and  the  order  was 
not  accepted  by  the  person  to  whom  it  was 
directed  or  by  his  agent  Mayo  v.  Roller,  28 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  91,  96. 

NOT  TO  BE  PSBFOBMEB 

The  provlflloD  in  a  contract  of  sale  of  a 
machine  that  the  seUar  would  ke^  at  a  ob- 
tain place  a  stock  of  all  parts  of  the  ma- 
chine, so  that,  if  any  part  of  it  broke,  the 
buyer  could  get  the  part  needed  for  repairs 
within  24  hours  of  giving  an  order,  is  not 
within  the  statute  of  frauds,  as  an  undetrtak- 
ing  "not  to  be  performed  within  a  year." 
Janney  Mf^.  Oa  v.  Banta  (Ky.)  88  S.  W.  130, 
131. 

NOT  TO  BE  PBETENTED 

Testatrix  bequeathed  to  certain  named 
persons  both  real  and  personal  property  to 
be  divided  among  them  equally,  and  then  pro- 
vided that  such  shares  should  not  be  paid 
until  the  respective  donees  should  become  of 
age,  but  in  the  meantime  should  be  deposited 
in  some  bank  or  institution  on  interest,  and 
that  her  executor  should  not  be  prevented 
from  aiiplylng  any  share  during  minority  of 
the  donee  to*  his  maintenance.  Held,  that 
the  term  "not  to  be  prevented"  included  an 
implied  authorization  to  the  executor  to  so 
apply  any  of  such  shares.  Weber  v.  Waldeck 
(N.  J.)  63  Atl.  495,  496. 


NOT  TO  THE  I.BTTEB 

Where,  in  response  to  an  issue,  the  jury 
found  that  plaintiff  substantially  complied 
with  his  contract,  and  the  question  was  sub- 
mitted twice  tliereafter,  to  which  the  jury 
replied,  "No,  not  to  the  letter,"  such  phrase 
indicated  an  Intent  to  find  a  substantial  per- 
formance. Carnegie  Public  library  Ass'n  of 
Brownwood  v.  Harris,  97  S.  W.  520,  43  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  165. 


NOT  WHOXXT  WITHAN 

Ordinarily  the  words  "not  wholly  within" 
refer  to  a  situation  where  a  part  Is  within. 


I 


^  :?l 


■:  h 


NOTARY 


634 


NOTB 


"Not  wholly"  iB  synonymotiB  with  "partly." 
People  ex  rel.  Donegan  y.  Dooling,  125  N.  Y. 
Supp.  783,  786,  141  App.  Dir.  31. 

NOTARY 

See  De  Facto  Notary- 

A  **iiotary"  Is  a  public  ofBcer  whose  duty 
it  is  to  attest  the  genuineness  of  any  deeds 
or  writings  in  order  to  render  them  available 
as  evidence  of  the  facts  therein  contained. 
He  is  a  public  functionary,  authorized  to  re- 
ceive all  acts  and  contracts  to  which  parties 
wish  to  give  the  character  of  authenticity,  at- 
tached to  the  act  of  public  authority,  to  se- 
cure their  date,  their  preservation,  and  the 
delivery  of  copies.  The  functions  and  au- 
thority of  a  notary  are  defined  by  law,  and 
he  cannot  act  as  the  mandatory  of  a  vendor 
for  whom  he  draws  up  and  passes  a  deed  of 
sale,  since  that  is  not  one  of  the  functions 
conferred  upon  him  by  law,  and  hence  the 
purchaser  cannot  make  a  valid  payment  of 
the  price  to  him.  Nolan  v.  Labatut,  41  South. 
713,  718.  117  La.  431  (citing  2  Abbott's  Dig. 
p.  182;  6  Diet  Droit  Civil,  p.  27 ;  Breen  v. 
Schmidt,  6  La.  Ann.  13;  Brown  v.  Schmidt, 
7  La.  Ann.  349;  Succession  of  O'Keefe,  12 
La.  Ann.  246;  Lescouzeve  &  Abty  v.  Duca- 
tel,  18  La.  Ann.  470). 

NOTAKT  PUBUO 

See  N.  P. 

As  holding  an  ofBce,  see  Officer. 

As  magistrate,  see  Magistrata 

Notary's  paraph,  see  Paraph. 

Section  1750,  Rev.  St  U.  S.,  confers  on 
consular  officers  the  power  "to  perform  any 
notarial  act  which  any  notary  public  is  re- 
quired or  authorized  by  law  to  do  within  the 
United  States."  Held,  that  such  consular  of- 
ficer is  a  "notary  public,"  within  the  meaning 
of  our  statute,  and  authorized  to  take  and 
certify  affidavits  of  depositions  for  use  in  the 
courts  of  the  state.  Browne  ▼.  Palmer,  92 
N.  W.  315,  317,  66  Neb.  287. 

The  office  of  a  notary  is  of  great  antiq- 
uity, deriving  its  origin  from  ihe  early  Ro- 
man Jurisprudence,  and  has  for  many  cen- 
turies been  recognized  by  most,  if  not  all,  of 
the  Christian  nations.  The  office  is  known 
to  international  law,  to  the  common  law,  be- 
ing concerned  more  especially  with  the  law 
merchant  branch,  and  to  the  civil  law. 
"Black's  Law  Dictionary  defines  a  'notary 
public*  as  'a  public  officer  whose  function  it 
is  to  attest  and  certify,  by  his  hand  and 
official  seal,  certain  classes  of  documents  in 
order  to  give  them  credit  and  authenticity 
in  foreign  jurisdictions.'  "  Gharst  v.  St  Lou- 
is Transit  Co.,  91  S.  W.  453,  465,  115  Mo. 
App.  403  (quoting  and  adopting  Black,  Law 
Diet). 

NOTE 

See  Blue  Notes;  Field  Notea 


KOTE  da  OoaunerelAl  Xaw) 

See  Action  on  a  Note ;  ApproTed  Noti 
Bankable  Note;  Demand  Note;  Go<] 
Note;  Less  Note;  Negotiable  Not 
Peddler's  Notes;  Promissory  Not< 
Secure  a  Note;  Secured  Bankabi 
Note;  Sold  Notes;  Take  up  Note. 
Bought    and    sold    notes,    see    Bong] 

and  Sold. 
Issue  of  notes,  see  Issuance — ^Issue. 
Maker  of  note,  see  Maker. 
Note  secured  by  trust  deed  as  estate,  m 

Estate. 
Other  notes,  see  Other. 
The  first  requisite  to  the  "negotiaUlit] 
of  a  paper  is  that  it  should  be  a  '^note."  an< 
as  a  "note"  must  be  an  obligation  for  tl 
payment  of  a  certain  sum  of  money,  a  pr 
vision  that  if  collection  is  made  through  s 
attorney,  or  by  legal  process,  the  maker  wi 
pay  all  costs  and  expenses,  including  10  p< 
cent  of  the  amount  collected  as  attome; 
fees,  renders  the  note  nonnegotiable  Gm 
V.  Spires,  50  S.  B.  664,  656,  71  S.  a  107, 
Ann.  Ca&  261. 

"Bangor,  Sept  8,  1882.  I,  James  Nei 
comb,  of  Carmel,  Maine,  bought  of  Lemu 
Nicholsy  Bangor,  Maine,  one  black  hon 
name  Nig,  7  years  old,  for  ($80.00)  eighty  d( 
lars  and  interest  on  same  until  paid  fc 
which  I  agree  to  pay  out  of  my  next  qua 
ter's  mail  pay,  which  becomes  due  Jan. 
1883,  on  route  184  from  Carmel  to  Kendn 
keag,  which  he  is  now  carrying.  The  abo 
horse  is  to  remain  said  Nichols*  until  fnl 
paid  for.  James  Newcomb.'*  Held,  that  ti 
instrument  contains  a  "note"  given  for  pc 
sonal  property  bargained  and  delivered,  pa 
able  absolutely  for  a  fixed  sum  in  monc 
within  Bev.  St  a  111,  |  5,  providing  that  '^i 
agreement  that  personal  property  bargains 
and  delivered  to  another,  for  which  a  note 
given,  shall  remain  the  property  of  the  pay 
tin  the  note  is  paid  is  valid  unless  it  Is  nia< 
and  signed  as  a  part  of  the  note,  nor  whi 
so  made  and  signed  in  a  note  for  more  thi 
$30,  unless  it  is  recorded  like  mortgages 
personal  property."  Nichols  v.  Buggies,  ' 
Me.  25-27. 

Since  the  enactment  of  Acts  1908,  ^ 
228,  providing  that  makers  of  tokens,  che<d 
or  other  devices  redeemable  in  merchandi 
shall  be  liable  on  demand  in  current  monc 
a  trade  check  in  the  form  of  a  note  payat 
to  bearer  in  merchandise  is  a  note,  with 
the  purview  of  the  statute  against  the  fc 
gery  of  notes,  orders,  etc.  State  v.  Whl 
52  South.  238,  126  La.  119. 

An  instrument  signed  by  E.,  reciting  tli 
on  or  b^ore  a  certain  day  "I  promise  to  p 
to  the  order  of  H.  $300  rent  for  90  acres 
land  at  $4  per  acre  of  L.  plantation,  for  t 
year  1901,  value  received,"  is  not  only 
**note,"  but  a  contract  embradn^r  all  t 
terms  of  the  contract  between  the  parties 
as  to  exclude  evidence  of  an  agreement  Iqr 


KOTB 


636 


KOTICE 


to  imt  a  fence  aroiind  the  place  to  keep  ca^ 
tie  out  Hightowor  y.  Henry,  87  South,  74B, 
476. 


A  conditional  sale  contract  required  pay- 
ment in  10  days  either  In  cash  or  notes,  de- 
claring that  all  notes  and  open  accounts  shall 
be  drawn  payable  at  Oklahoma  City,  with 
10  per  cent  attorney's  fees  added,  and  that, 
on  default  in  the  payment  of  any  install- 
ment, the  seller  might  consider  the  entire  in- 
debtedness due;  that  the  title  to  and  the 
ownership  of  all  the  goods  should  be  in  the 
seiller  untU  the  buyer's  indebtedness  had 
been  paid  in  money.  Held,  that  the  word 
'^money**  was  used  In  contradistinction  to 
**notes,"  and  did  not  include  notes,  so  that 
the  acceptance  of  notes  did  not  constitute  a 
payment  sufScient  to  rest  title  to  the  goods 
in  the  buyer.  The  term  ''notes'*  has  refer- 
ence to  an  evidence  of  indebtedness.  In  re 
Gray,  170  Fed.  688|  643. 

iLi  credits 

See  Credits. 
As  debt 

See  Debt 
As  fond 

See  Fund. 
As  soodfl 

See  Goods. 


See  Money. 
As  property 

See  Personal  Property;  Proper^. 
As  property  aetvally  reoelTed 

See  Property  Actually  Beceived. 
As  soenrity 

See  Security. 
As  specialty 

See  Specialty. 

NOTE  OB   MEMOBAKDUM  IIT  WBIT- 
IHO 

See  Memorandum. 

NOTHING  IN  ARREAR 

Plea  of  nontenant  distinguished,  see  Non- 
tenant 

The  plea  of  "nothing  in  arrear"  admits 
the  tenancy  as  stated  in  the  aTowry  or  cog- 
nizance, and  puts  in  issue  the  fact  of  the 
rent  being  in  arrear.  Middleton  v.  Quigley, 
12  N.  J.  Law,  352,  856. 

NOTICE 

See  Actual  Notice;  Blanket  Notice;  Cron- 
structive  Notice;  Day*8  Notice;  Due 
Notice ;  Explicit  Notice;  Further  No- 
tiLce;  Immediate  Notice;  Implied  No- 
tice; Judicial  Notice;  Legal  Notice; 
Personal  Notice;    Purchaser  without 


Notice;  Reasonable  Notice;  Requisite 
Notice;  Trespass  Notice;  With  Notice; 
Without  Notice. 

Date  of  notice,  see  Date. 

Fifteen  days'  published  notice,  see  Fif- 


Four  weeks'  notice,  see  Four. 

Issue  of,  see  Issuance — Issue. 

Of  appearance  as  written  instrument,  see 
Written  Instrument 

Of  materialman's  daim  as  pleading,  see 
Pleadii^. 

Service  of  notice,  see  Service  (In  Prac- 
tice). 

See,  also.  Knowledge. 

The  term  ''notice^"  as  used  in  Rev.  St 
1899,  I  8028,  requiring  weekly  publication  of 
notice  of  local  option  elections  for  four  con- 
secutive weeks  in  one  paper,  and  such  other 
**notice"  as  the  county  court  may  think  prop- 
er, is  not  restricted  to  a  publication  in  a 
newspaper,  but  may  include  other  legal  forms 
of  notice,  such  as  posting  hand  bills,  etc. 
State  V.  Morgan,  128  S.  W.  839,  841,  144  Mo. 
App.  35. 

One  who  knew  of  deceased's  death,  was 
present  in  the  state  during  the  first  two 
publications  of  the  notice  to  present  claims, 
returned  to  the  state,  and  had  actual  notice 
of  the  publication  for  more  than  one  month 
prior  to  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  filing 
claims,  but  yet  failed  to  do  so  until  long  aft- 
er that  time  had  expired,  was  not  one  who, 
"by  reason  of  being  out  of  the  state,"  had  no 
''notice,"  "as  provided  in  this  chapter,"  to 
present  his  claim,  within  the  meaning  of 
Code  Civ.  Proc  {  1493,  and  his  claim  was 
therefore  barred.  MacGowan  v.  Jones,  76 
Pac.  503,  142  CaL  593. 

Though  the  statute  provides  that  all  no- 
tices shall  be  served  upon  the  attorney,  and 
not  upon  the  party,  such  provision  has  ref- 
erence more  particularly  to  notices  of  mo- 
tions and  other  proceedings  served  during 
the  pendency  of  the  action,  and  does  not 
exclude  the  right  of  plaintilT  personally  to 
serve  a  notice  of  the  dismissal  of  his  action 
upon  defendant,  instead  of  on  defendant's 
attorney.  Nelson  v.  Nelson,  126  N.  W.  731, 
735,  lU  Minn.  183,  31  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  523, 
137  Am.  St  Rep.  549. 

A  request  to  the  chairman  of  the  board 
of  trustees  of  a  graded  common  school,  sign- 
ed by  three  members  of  the  board,  request- 
ing him  to  call  a  meeting  at  a  specified  time 
and  place,  was  not  a  *'notice"  to  him  of  a 
meeting  of  the  board  at  such  time  and  place. 
Saunders  v.  O'Bannon  (Ky.)  87  S.  W.  1105. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  a  mate- 
rialman shall  not  be  entitled  to  a  lien  unless, 
within  60  days,  he  shall  give  notice  in  writ- 
ing to  the  owner  or  agent  of  his  intention  to 
daim  such  lien,  a  'Notice"  given  that  claim- 
ants claimed  and  should  forthwith  file  their 
claim  of  a  mechanic's  lien  in  the  office  of  the 


NOTICE 


KOTIOB 


< 


derk  of  the  circuit  court  was  not  fatally  de- 
fective for  failure  to  recite  that  they  "in- 
tended" to  claim  such  lien,  as  any  phrase- 
ology which  clearly  and  distinctly  apprised 
the  owner  of  the  intention  of  the  material- 
man to  claim  the  lien  will  satisfy  the  terms 
of  the  section  and  efPeetuate  Its  design, 
though  the  word  "intention"  be  not  used  at 
aU.  The  intention  to  claim  a  lien  could  not 
be  more  definitely  expressed  than  by  the 
statement  that  the  lien  is  claimed  and  will 
be  forthwith  filed.  The  owner  was  just  as 
fully  informed  by  the  notice  given  that  the 
claimants  intended  to  file  a  lien  claim  as 
she  would  have  been  had  the  notice  specific- 
ally stated  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the 
lienors  to  claim  such  a  lien.  Pulton  v.  Pap- 
leU  &  Parlett,  64  Atl.  68,  59,  104  Md.  62. 

A  notice  by  a  landlord  served  on  the 
tenant  which  demands  possession  within 
three  days,  without  stating  the  ground  there- 
for, and  a  notice  served  at  the  same  time 
which  recites  that  the  tenant  has  forfeited 
the  lease  by  underletting  without  the  land- 
lord's consent,  must  be  construed  as  one  no- 
tice within  Rev.  St.  1908,  §{  2603,  2605,  de- 
fining unlawfi^  detainer,  and  requiring  no- 
tice in  writing  specifying  the  grounds  of  de- 
mandant's right  to  possession.  Hepp  Wall 
Paper  &  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Deahl,  125  Pac. 
491,  492,  53  Colo.  274. 

Only  such  substantial  compliance  with 
Laws  1899,  p.  74,  requiring  notice  to  be  giv- 
en to  municipal  corporations  of  claims  for 
damages  against  them,  stating  the  time, 
place,  and  extent  of  such  injury  as  near  as 
practicable,  and  the  negligence  which  caused 
It,  as  will  enable  the  municipality  to  fully  in- 
vestigate the  claim,  and  determine  whether 
it  prefers  to  adjust  it  without  suit,  or  to 
contest  its  validity,  is  necessary.  The  form 
of  notice  required  to  be  given  to  a  municipal- 
ity of  a  claim  for  damages  against  it  under 
Laws  1899,  p.  74,  requiring  such  notice  to 
state  the  time,  place,  and  extent  of  the  injury 
as  near  as  practicable,  and  the  negligence 
which  caused  it,  is  not  amenable  to  the  strict 
rules  of  pleading;  and  a  claimant  is  not  re- 
quired to  do  more  than  state  definitely  and 
specifically  all  the  facts  upon  which  he  bases 
his  claim,  so  as  to  enable  the  municipality  to 
promptly  investigate  the  merits  thereof. 
Kennedy  v.  City  of  Savannah,  68  S.  £).  662, 
8  Oa.  App.  98. 

Tke  phrase  "without  notice,"  used  in  re- 
lation to  the  taking  of  a  note,  usually  refers 
to  some  defense  of  the  maker  or  to  some 
claim  of  title  to  it  other  than  that  of  the 
seller,  with  or  without  notice  of  which  a 
purchaser  has  taken  it.  Vansickle  v.  Wat- 
son, 123  S.  W.  112,  116,  103  Tex.  37. 

"Notice"  to  the  purchaser  of  a  note  may 
be  of  two  kinds:  "Bhcplldt  notice"  of  the 
fraud  or  illegality,  and  "implicit"  or  ''gener- 
al notice."  *If  the  purchaser  of  notes  at  the 
time  of  buying  them  had  notice  or  knowledge 


of  some  lUegsUty  or  knowledge  of  some  f] 
gallty  or  fraud  which  vitiated  them,  Uio>ii 
he  was  not  apprised  of  its  nature,  this  woi 
be  such  "general  notice"  as  would  aifect  1 
title.  Mere  negligence,  however  gross,  i 
amounting  to  this  willful  and  frauduli 
blindness,  will  not  of  Itself  amount  to  notii 
but  the  Jury  may  and  should  consider  1 
fact  of  such  negligence  as  it  may  tend 
prove  such  "general  notice."  Mack  v.  Sta 
61  Atl.  472,  473,  78  Conn.  184. 

A  letter,  sent  by  defendant  to  plalntll 
attorney  giving  notice  of  appeal  from  1 
judgment  of  a  Justice,  but  not  shown  to  lu 
been  received,  nor  served  bs  required  by  st 
ute,  did  not  constittste  a  'Notice  of  trii 
within  Bev.  St.  1899,  |  4074  (Ann.  St  19 
p.  2217),  providing  that,  in  order  that  m 
an  appeal  be  triable  at  the  first  term.  If  i 
appealed  on  the  day  the  judgment  was  n 
dered,  appellant,  10  days  before  such  tei 
must  give  the  opposite  party  notice  of  1 
appeal.  Knowledge  by  appellee's  attorney 
the  taking  of  an  appeal  from  a  Justice's  Jni 
ment  is  not  the  equivalent  of  notice  um 
Rev.  St  1899,  |  4074  (Ann.  St  1906^  p.  221 
requiring  the  appealing  party  to  give  not 
thereof,  unless  the  appeal  was  taken  on  I 
day  Judgment  was  rendered.  Lombard  v.  1 
ban,  126  S.  W.  221,  222,  142  Mo.  Appu  ^S2 

Actual  or  oonstraotiTS 

"Notice"  is  defined  by  Wilson's  Rev. 
Ann.  St  1903,  |  10,  as  either  actual  or  o 
structive  notice;  sections  11  and  12  defini 
actual  notice  as  express  Information  of 
fact  and  constructive  notice  as  that  impul 
by  law  to  a  person  not  having  actual  noti 
Cooper  V.  Flesner,  103  Pac.  1016^  1020, 
OkL  47,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1189^  20  Ann.  0 
29. 

The  word  "notice"  means  actual  notl 
in  Pub.  St  1882,  c.  144,  |  9,  providing  th 
when  an  account  of  a  trustee  is  settled  in  1 
absence  of  a  person  adversely  Interested  s 
without  notice  to  him,  such  account  may 
opened  on  the  application  of  such  pers 
Parker  v.  Boston  Safe  Deposit  A  Trust  C 
71  N.  E.  806,  807, 186  Mass.  393. 

Under  Real  Property  Law  (ConsoL  La 
1909,  c  60)  §  266,  which  provides  that  t 
title  of  a  purchaser  for  a  valuable  oonside] 
tion  shall  not  be  affected,  unless  he  had  i 
tice  of  the  fraudulent  intent  of  his  imme 
ate  grantor,  the  words  "notice  of  the  frau^ 
lent  intent"  refer  to  actual,  and  not  to  cc 
structive,  notice.  CJain  v.  Snyder,  135  N. 
Supp.  443,  446,  76  Misc.  Rep.  e3a 

Negotiable  Instruments  Law  Tenn.  I  ( 
provides  that,  to  constitute  "notice"  of 
infirmity  In  the  Instrument  or  defect  in  t 
title  of  the  person  negotiating  the  same,  t 
person  to  whom  It  is  negotiated  must  ha 
had  actual  knowledge  of  the  infirmity  or  t 
feet,  or  knowledge  of  such  facts  that  his  i 
tion  in  taking  the  instrument  amounted 


-i! 


NOTICE 


637 


NOTICn 


Ad  faith.    Slgfai  Glty  Baiddag  Oou  t,  BaJlf 

lOS  S.  W.  1068,  1071,  U9  TeniL  MS. 

ReT.  St  a  73,  i  12,  wlijkch  d^dares  that 
lie  title  of  one  who  purchaaes  property  for  a 
raluable  consideration  cannot  be  defeated  by 
L  tmst  affecting  the  property,  nnless  the  pur- 
chaser has  "notice"  of  the  trust,  while  it 
nay  in  peculiar  instancea  mean  constructive 
lotlce,  in  cases  generally,  including  a  case 
¥here  the  trust  reduces  an  absolute  deed  to 
i  mortgage,  means  actual  notloe;  and  actual 
Aotice  as  applicable  to  conveyances,  does  not 
lecessarlly  mean  actual  knowledge;  It  may 
ye  express  or  implied;  it  may  be  proved  by 
lirecC  evidence,  or  implied  from  indirect  or 
drcumstantial  evidence.  The  statutory  ao> 
taal  notice  is  a  conduaion  of  fAet  capable  of 
toeing  established  by  all  grades  of  legitimate 
evidence.  Knapp  v.  Bailey,  0  Atl.  122-124, 
79  Me.  105,  1  Am.  St  Bep.  295. 

Under  the  statute  imposing  a  liability 
m  a  coimty  for  damages  sustained  by  reason 
sf  a  defective  bridge  constructed  by  the  coun- 
ty, where  the  chairman  of  the  board  of  coun- 
ty commissionerB  has  five  days'  '^notice"  of 
the  defect,  an  actual  notice  is  meant  Parr 
r.  Board  of  Cbm'rs  of  Shawnee  County,  78 
Pac.  449,  450,  70  Kan.  111. 

To  constitute  notice  of  an  infirmity  in  a 
negotiable  bill  indorsed  before  maturity,  the 
Indorsee  must  have  actual  knowledge  of  the 
infirmity  or  defect,  or  knowledge  of  such 
facts  that  his  action  in  taking  the  instrument 
amounts  to  bad  faith,  as  provided  by  Ky. 
St  I  3720b^  subsec.  66  (Russell's  St  f  1925). 
BothweU  V.  Corum,  128  &  W.  291,  292,  135 
Ky.  766. 

Notice  under  Laws  1905,  c.  142,  |  80,  ex- 
empting a  city  from  liability  for  injury  caus- 
ed by  defective  ways,  unless  notice  of  the 
ansafe  condition  has  been  given  to  the  mayor 
or  the  dty  clerk  a  reasonable  time  previous- 
ly, must  be  actual  as  dlstingulahed  from  con- 
stmctlve  noUce.  Gregorius  v.  Glty  of  Com- 
Ins,  125  N.  Y.  Suppi  684,  686,  140  App.  Div. 
701. 

A  notice  within  a  lire  policy  stipulating 
for  its  cancellation  on  notice  and  repayment 
of  unearned  premiums  is  a  personal  notice, 
and  a  notice  by  publication  requiring  the 
filing  of  claims  against  insurer,  a  foreign  cor- 
poration, in  the  state  of  its  origin  in  pro- 
ceedings for  its  dissolution,  is  insufficient, 
and  the  policy  holder  in  the  state  may  sue 
the  corporation  in  the  courts  of  the  state, 
and  obtain  a  judgment  to  be  satisfied  out  of 
the  securities  deposited  by  insurer,  as  requir- 
ed by  CIly,  Code  1902,  |  1796.  Frink  v.  Na- 
tional \fut  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  74  S.  E.  33,  35,  90 
8.  C.  644,  Ann.  Cas.  1913D,  221. 

Rev.  (Laws  1905,  |  3850,  providing  that  a 
certified  copy  of  a  judgment  of  a  court  of 
record  aifecting  title  to  realty  or  any  Interest 
therein  may  be  recorded  in  any  county  where 
any  of  the  lands  lie^  with  the  same  effect  as 


a  conv^anoe,  to  a  recording  act,  and  does 
not  make  the  record  of  such  judgment  notice 
of  the  entry  thereof,  within  the  meaning  of 
section  4160,  limiting  the  time  within  which 
applications  for  relief  from  a  judgment  may 
be  made  to  one  year  from  notice  thereof. 
Foster  v.  Coughran,  129  N.  W.  853.  854,  118 
&(lnn.  438. 

"Bedtals  In  an  unrecorded  deed  in  one's 
chain  of  title,  or  with  which  one  is  in  privi- 
ty, are  'notice'  to  him  of  the  facts  therein  set 
out  •  •  •  Constructive  notice  of  recitals 
in  a  prior  unrecorded  deed  is  as  effective  as 
knowledge  of  such  recitals."  Bunge  v.  Gil- 
bough  (Tex.)  87  S.  W.  832,  836. 

Rev.  Codes  1906,  |  7205,  provides  that  an 
appeal  must  be  taken  by  serving  a  notice  on 
the  adverse  party  and  by  flUng  it  witii  the 
derk  of  the  conrt  Sectten  7882  provides 
that  servioe  of  any  notice  may  be  made  by 
moil,  where  the  person  making  the  service 
and  the  penon  upon  whom  it  is  to  be  made 
reside  in  different  places.  H^d,  that  a  notice 
at  appeal  is  a  notloe  within  section  7882, 
service  of  which  may  be  made  by  mail,  where 
the  parties  reside  in  different  places.  Oooler 
V.  Bidness»  121  N.  W.  88,  86,  18  N.  D.  338. 

A  purchaser  of  real  estate  is  chargeable 
with  notice  derived  from  the  recitals  of  his 
deed,  for  anything  which  will  put  a  prudent 
man  on  Inquiry  is  notice.  Adams  v.  Gossom, 
129  S.  W.  16,  20,  228  Mo.  566. 

Bevisal  1906,  |  2205,  provides  that  to 
constitute  "notice"  of  an  infirmity  in  a  note 
or  defect  in  the  title  of  the  person  negotiat- 
ing It,  the  person  to  whom  it  is  negotiated 
must  have  had  actual  knowledge,  or  knowl- 
edge of  such  facts  that  his  action  in  taking 
the  instrument  amounted  to  bad  faith.  Held, 
that  when  a  note  was  triansferred  before  ma- 
turity without  recourse,  it  was  no  defense  as 
against  the  Indorsee  that  it  was  given  under 
a  contract  for  territory  for  the  sale  of  a  cer- 
tain sash  lock,  and  that  the  locks  subsequent- 
ly furnished  pursuant  to  the  contract  were 
not  in  accordance  with  the  representations  of 
the  payee,  and  that  the  note  had  been  there- 
fore obtakied  by  fraud;  there  being  nothing 
to  show  that  the  indorsee  had  any  notice  of 
the  fraud  at  the  time  of  the  transfer.  Bank 
of  Sampson  v.  Hatcher,  66  S.  E.  308,  309,  151 
N.  a  859,  184  Am.  St  Bep.  989. 

Cobbey's  Ann.  St  1907,  |  9255,  providing 
that,  to  constitute  notice  of  an  infirmity  in  an 
instrument,  the  perscm  to  whom  negotiated 
must  have  actual  knowledge  thereof,  or 
knowledge  of  such  facts  that  his  taking  the 
instrument  amounts  to  bad  faith  does  not 
change  the  rule  that  to  constitute  bad  faith 
by  the  purchaser  of  a  negotiable  instrument, 
for  value,  before  maturity,  he  must  have  ac- 
quired it  with  knowledge  of  an  infirmity,  or 
with  a  belief  based  on  the  dreumstances 
known  to  him  that  there  was  a  defense,  or  he 
must  have  acted  dishonestly.    Benton  v.  Si- 


NOTICB 


638  KOTIOB 


I 


.\4^ 


kyta,  122  N.  W.  ei,  62,  84  Neb.  808,  24  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  1057. 

Gen.  St.  Kan.  1909,  |  6999,  gives  an  ac- 
tion for  death  of  or  injury  to  a  railroad  em- 
ploy^  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant, 
provided  notice  in  writing  shall  have  been 
given  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  person  injured 
to  the  railroad  company  within  eight  months 
after  the  injury,  and  section  7000  provides 
that  such  notice  may  be  served  by  a  written 
copy  thereof  by  the  person  Injured  or  any  one 
on  his  behalf,  or,  if  he  dies,  by  the  person  or 
persons  entitled  to  recover  for  the  injury,  on 
any  person  designated  by  the  railroad  in  the 
county  in  which  the  action  la  brought,  or,  if 
no  such  person  has  been  designated  or  ap- 
pointed, then  upon  any  local  superintendent 
of  affairs,  freight  agents,  agent  to  sell  tick- 
ets, or  station  keeper.  Held  that,  while  sec- 
tion 6999  makes  the  giving  of  notice  a  condi- 
tion  to  a  right  of  action  for  injuriea  to  or 
death  of  a  railroad  employ^  occurring  in 
Kansas,  the  mode  of  service  prescribed  by 
section  7000  is  not  a  condition  to  such  right, 
and  has  no  extraterritorial  force,  so  that, 
where  an  action  is  brought  in  Missouri  for 
the  wrongful  death  of  a  railroad  ^nploy^  in 
Kansas,  the  service  of  notice  in  any  proper 
way,  though  not  in  compliance  with  section 
7000,  is  sufficient  Plaintiffs  decedent,  a  rail- 
road employ^,  was  killed  in  Kansas  as  the 
result  of  a  railroad's  alleged  negligence,  and 
within  eight  months  the  plaintiff  filed  a  peti- 
tion for  decedent's  wrongful  death  in  the 
courts  of  Missouri,  setting  forth  in  full  the 
negligent  occurrence  in  Kansas  resulting  in 
decedent's  death,  with  the  time  and  place, 
etc.  Summons  was  duly  served  within  the 
eight-month  period,  and  defendant  appeared 
thereto.  Thereafter  the  suit  was  dismissed, 
and  another  one  begun.  Held,  Uiat  the  first 
suit  constituted  a  sufficient  '^notice"  in  writ- 
ing to  the  railroad  company  to  comply  with 
the  requirements  of  Gen.  St  Kan.  1909,  | 
6999.  Gen.  St  Kan.  1909,  §  6999,  requiring 
notice  of  Injuries  to  a  railroad  employ^  to  be 
given  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  person  injured 
as  a  condition  to  his  right  to  sue,  does  not 
require  service  of  such  notice  by  plaintiff 
personally.  Husted  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  C5o., 
128  S.  W.  282,  284,  143  Mo.  App.  623. 

A  suit  for  specific  performance  of  a  con- 
tract for  the  sale  of  land  is  notice  of  the 
claim  that  plaintiff  sets  up  from  the  time  it 
is  commenced  and  docketed,  and,  if  duly 
prosecuted  and  not  collusive,  one  purchasing 
the  land  pending  the  suit  is  affected  by  the 
decree  therein,  though  the  suit  is  in  a  county 
other  than  the  county  in  which  the  land  is 
located,  under  Civ.  Code  1910,  |  4533.  Mar- 
shall V.  Whatley,  72  S.  E.  244,  245,  136  Ga. 
805,  36  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  552. 

Citation  distinsvished 

See  Citation. 


tt  of  aotim 

See  Commencement  of  Actton. 

Olaim  of  rii^t  diatiacvialied 

The  term  "claim  of  right,"  as  appll( 
to  adverse  possession,  is  not  synonymcr 
with  the  word  "notice."  Swope  v.  Ward,  i 
S.  W.  895,  897,  185  Mo.  316  (citing  Whitak 
v.  Whltaker,  58  S.  W.  5,  157  Mo.  342). 

Faots  pnttias  on  inquiiy 

In  law,  that  is  "notice"  of  a  fiict  whii 
would  provc^e  a  reasonably  prudent  man 
such  inquiries  as,  pursued  with  reaaonafa 
diligence,  would  lead  to  full  knowledj 
Hingtgen  v.  Thackery,  121  N.  W.  839,  840, : 
S.  D.  329. 

If  a  party  has  knowledge  of  such  tnc 
as  would  lead  a  fair  and  prudent  man,  usii 
ordinary  caution,  to  make  further  inquirk 
and  he  avoids  inquiry,  he  is  chargeable  wii 
"notice"  of  the  facts  which  by  ordinary  dl 
gence  he  would  have  ascertained.  Knapp 
Bailey,  9  AU.  122-124,  79  Me.  19S,  1  Am.  S 
Rep.  295. 

Whatever  Is  sufficient  to  put  a  sutw 
qneaat  purchaser  on  inquiry  must  be  consl 
ered  "legal  notice"  to  him  of  the  fftcts  inqnt 
would  have  disclosed  by  the  exercise  of  re 
sonable  diligence.  Jennings  v.  Lents,  93  Pa 
327,  329,  50  Or.  483,  29  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  M 

"Notice"  may  be  the  existence  of  th 
which,  if  looked  at  or  listened  to,  and  tin 
followed  up  by  such  inquiry  as  ordinary  pr 
dence  would  suggest,  would  result  in  obtai 
ing  the  knowledge  sought  to  be  charge 
Warden  v.  Addington,  115  S.  W.  241,  245,  I 
Ky.  296. 

The  word  "trustee,"  fdllowing  the  nan 
of  the  grantee  in  a  deed,  constitutes  ''notio 
and  puts  one  on  inquiry.  Flitcraft  v.  Ccm 
monwealth  Title  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.,  60  Al 
557,  559,  211  Pa,  114. 

"Notice"  to  a  purchaser  of  adverse  inte 
ests  need  not  be  actual  nor  amount  to  fn 
knowledge,  but  it  should  be  information  e: 
citing  apprehension  in  an  ordinary  mind,  ai 
prompt  one  of  average  prudence  to  make  i 
qulry.  Implied  notice  to  a  purchaser  of  a< 
verse  interests  arises  from  knowledge  of  pa 
ticular  facts  unless  the  law  charges  notice  t 
registry  or  other  token.  Daly  v.  Rixzutt 
109  Paa  276,  278,  59  Wash.  62,  29  L.  B.  J 
(N.  S.)   467. 

"Whatever  puts  a  party  upon  inquin 
"amounts  in  judgment  of  law  to  *notice,'  pr 
vided  the  inquiry  becomes  a  duty,  as  in  ti 
case  of  purchasers  and  creditors,  and  coal 
lead  to  the  knowledge  of  the  requisite  fact  t 
the  exercise  of  ordinary  diligence  and  unde: 
standing."  Kellogg  v.  Randolph  (N.  J.)  C 
Atl.  753,  754  (quoting  and  adopting  d^hi 
tion  in  Smallwood  v.  Lewin,  15  N.  J.  Bq.  60 

"Actual  possession  of  land  is  ^otio 
equal  to  the  record  of  a  deed  under  whic 


NOTICB 


839 


NOTICK 


the  party  In  possession  claims.  A  purchaser 
is  botmd  to  Inqtilre  by  what  right  or  title  the 
party  in  possession  holds,  and  he  will  take 
subject  to  that  title,  whatever  it  may  be.'* 
Merchants*  ft  Farmers'  State  Bank  y.  Dawdy, 
82  N.  B.  e06,  e07,  280  III.  199  (dtlng  Joiner 
Y.  Dancan,  51  N.  B.  828. 174  111.  252 ;  Coarl  t. 
Olsen,  91  lU.  273). 

"  'Notice'  does  not  mean  positive  infor- 
mation brought  directly  home  to  the  parties 
sought  to  be  charged.  Anything  that  will 
put  a  prudent  man  upon  Inquiry  is  notice; 
and  gross  negligence  in  failing  to  make  in- 
quiry when  the  surrounding  facts  suggest 
the  existence  of  others,  and  that  inquiry  is 
to  be  made,  is  tantamount  in  the  courts  of 
equity  to  notice."  Scoggin  v.  Mason,  108  S. 
W.  831,  834,  46  Tex.  Olv.  App.  480  (quoting 
and  adopting  definition  in  Connecticut  Mut 
liife  Ins.  Ck>.  v.  Smith,  22  S.  W.  629,  117 
Mo.  261,  38  Am.  St  Rep.  656). 

Good  faitli  dlstiasnlshed 

The  terms  "good  faith"  and  "notice"  are 
Intimately  related  In  Jurisprudence,  but  are 
not  of  uniform  meaning ;  the  former  retain- 
ing in  some  measure  the  popular  sense  of 
honest  belief,  but  its  technical  significance 
depends  largely  on  the  doctrine  of  notice,  as 
developed  in  the  progress  of  the  equity  sys- 
tem. Considered  with  reference  to  and  as 
influenced  by  '^notice,"  the  term  "good  faith" 
bears  several  legal  meanings  according  to  the 
subject-matter  of  the  litigation  in  which  it  is 
used.  As  applied  to  the  purchase  of  a  parcel 
of  land,  the  title  to  which  passed  from  the 
grantor  by  a  prior  recorded  deed  or  incum- 
brance, the  constructive  notice  of  the  prior 
conveyance  which  the  record  imparts  pre- 
vents one  taking  title  subsequently  from  be- 
ing a  purchaser  in  good  faith.  Rev.  St  1899, 
I  8080  (Ann.  St  1906,  p.  1768),  permitting 
one  who  claims  land  in  another's  possession 
to  bar  the  occupant  from  compensation  for 
betterments  by  notifying  him  in  writing  of 
the  claim  and  its  nature,  does  not  make  an 
exception  in  favor  of  an  occupant  who  be- 
lieves the  hostile  title  to  be  bad  and  makes 
betterments  regardless  of  such  notli^e,  since 
'Notice"  and  "good  faith"  cannot  so  exist, 
for  it  is  an  equity  doctrine  of  universal  rec- 
ognition that  he  who  takes  with  notice  takes 
subject  to  the  claim,  and  the  notice  which 
will  suffice  for  this  purpose  does  not  mean 
direct  and  positive  information,  but  anything 
calculated  to  put  a  prudent  man  on  the  alert. 
Richmond  v.  Ashcraft,  117  S.  W.  689,  692, 
137  Mo.  App.  191. 

As  Information  or  knowledge 

"Knowledge"  is  not  the  same  as  "notice," 
but  to  constitute  "notice,"  the  "knowledge" 
must  be  communicated  in  the  prescribed  way. 
Wade  V.  Wade's  Adm'r,  69  AtL  826,  827,  81 
Vt  275. 

''Knowledge"  and  "notice"  are  not  al- 
ways synonymous.    Field  v.  Campbell  (Ind.) 


67  N.  B.  1010, 1041  (citing  Kirkham  t.  Moore, 
65  N.  E.  1042,  80  Ind.  App.  549).  ' 

"'Notice'  is  equivalent  to  Information,' 
'intelligence,'  or  'knowledge.' "  Bova  v.  Norl- 
gian,  67  Ati.  326,  327,  28  R.  I.  319,  125  Am. 
St  Rep.  741. 

"Notice"  means  information  by  whatever 
means  communicated;  knowledge  given  or 
received.  Metcalf  v.  Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co., 
112  N.  W.  22,  24,  132  Wis.  67. 

One's  knowledge  that  he  has  been  ap- 
pointed to  an  oflice  constitutes  "notice"  to 
him,  within  Code  1912,  art  70,  |  11,  which 
provides  that  an  office  is  forfeited  by  failure 
to  qualify  within  30  days  after  receiving  com- 
mission or  notice  of  appointment  Little  v. 
Schul,  84  AtL  649,  655,  118  Md.  454. 

"Knowledge"  and  "notice"  are  not  synon- 
ymous, for  that  which  does  not  amount  to 
actual  "knowledge"  may  constitute  "notice." 
The  notice  may  be  of  such  a  character  that 
its  effects  amount  to  knowledge.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  party  may  be  charged  with 
notice  when  in  utter  ignorance  of  that  of 
which  he  is  presumed  to  be  advised.  Rosen- 
berger  v.  Hawker,  103  N.  W.  781,  782,  127 
Iowa,  521. 

The  word  "notice,'*  as  used  in  Bev.  St 
1899,  §  3017,  imposing  a  penalty  for  selling 
liquors  to  a  drunkard  after  notice  from  his 
wife  not  to  do  so,  is  synonymous  with  infor- 
mation, intelligence,  or  knowledge,  and  oral 
notice  to  the  managing  agent  of  the  dram- 
shop keeper  is  sufficient  Jackson  County 
ex  rel.  Farley  v.  Schmld,  124  S.  W,  1074, 
141  Mo.  App.  229. 

B.  &  a  Oomp.  I  10$,  provides  that  the 
court  may  at  any  time  within  one  year  after 
notice  thereof  relieve  a  party  from  a  judg- 
ment or  order  taken  against  him  through  his 
mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable 
neglect  Held,  that  "notice,"  as  used  in  the 
statute,  means  "knowledge"  Fildew  v.  Mil- 
ner,  109  Pac.  1092,  1094,  57  Or.  16. 

"A  'notice'  to  a  purchaser  of  a  note  of 
fraud,  defect  in  titie,  illegality  of  considera- 
tion, or  other  fact  which  impeaches  its  validi- 
ty in  the  transferror's  hands  signifies  the 
same  as  knowledge"  Merchants*  &  Manu- 
facturers' Nat  Bank  v.  Ohio  Valley  Furni- 
ture Co.,  50  S.  E.  880,  882,  57  W.  Va.  625,  70 
L.  R.  A.  312  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Daniel,  Neg.  Instr.  §  789). 

The  word  "notice,"  used  in  negotiable  in- 
strument law,  must  be  understood  as  mean- 
ing actual  knowledge  as  distinguished  from 
implied  or  constructive  notice  which  arises 
when  a  person  is  put  on  inquiry,  and  knowl- 
edge is  presumed.  link  v.  Jackson,  139  S. 
W.  588,  593,  158  Mo.  App.  63. 

A  complaint  alleging  that  an  act  by 
which  plaintiff,  a  passenger,  was  injured  was 
done  with  "knowledge"  or  "notice"  of  defend- 
ant's agent  does  not  state  a  cause  of  action 


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tot^  Wantoimein ;  *tiotice**  not  beltiig  tbe 
eqcdYalent  of  **lmowledge,"  and  the  averment 
In  the  disjtmctiye  not  affirming  either.  Birm- 
ingham By.  &  Electric  Ck).  y.  Butler»  33 
South.  33,  35,  135  Ala.  388. 

Where,  In  an  action  against  a  county  to 
set  aside  a  conveyance,  a  decree  was  taken 
by  default,  the  court,  under  L.  O.  L.  I  103, 
may,  In  Its  discretion,  within  one  year  after 
notice  thereof,  relieve  a  party  from  a  Judg- 
ment taken  against  him  through  his  mistake, 
Inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect, 
and  has  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  motion 
to  set  aside  such  decree  when  filed  within 
one  year  after  knowledge  of  the  decree  was 
acquired  by  the  agents  or  officers  of  the  coun- 
ty, though  not  until  more  than  one  year  after 
the  decree  was  entered ;  "notice,"  as  used  In 
such  statute,  being  a  synonym  of  "knowl- 
edge." Chapman  v.  Multnomah  Oounty,  126 
Pac.  096,  998,  63  Or.  180. 

••Notice,"  In  connection  with  the  rule 
that  purchasers  of  corporate  stock  In  good 
faith  without  ••notice"  that  It  Is  unpaid  are 
not  liable  for  the  balance  due  on  it,  must  be 
given  the  ordinary  signification  of  that  term, 
and  means  knowledge  that  the  stock  was  un- 
paid, or  knowledge  of  such  facts  as  would 
have  put  an  ordinarily  prudent  man  on  in- 
quiry, when  the  inquiry  might  reasonably  be 
expected  to  lead  him  to  knowledge  that  the 
stock  was  unpaid.  OlUett  v.  Chicago  Title  A 
Trust  Co.,  82  N.  B.  891,  906,  230  lU.  378. 

A  distinction  Is  to  be  observed  between 
knowledge  of  the  pendency  of  a  suit  and  ''no- 
tlce"  thereof.  Jurisdiction  can  be  acquired. 
If  one  does  not  submit  himself  to  It,  In  no 
other  way  than  by,  actual  notice  or  by  con- 
structive notice.  Actual  notice  Is  given  only 
by  personal  service  of  process;  constroctlve 
notice  by  some  form  of  substituted  service. 
Where  there  Is  no  service  there  Is  no  notice, 
Irrespective  of  any  knowledge  which  the  de- 
fendant may  acquire  Informally.  Notice  Is 
given  only  by  a  service  of  process.  Informal 
knowledge  will  not  supply  It,  and  cannot  be 
relied  upon  to  put  the  one  acquiring  the 
knowledge  on  notice  or  to  force  him  into 
court  to  defend  himself.  National  Metal  Co. 
V.  Greene  Consol.  Copper  Co.,  89  Pac.  535, 
537,  11  Ariz.  108,  9  L.  E.  A.  (N.  S,)  1062. 

The  word  "notice,"  as  used  In  L.  O.  L.  { 
108,  permitting  a  court  in  its  discretion,  at 
any  time  within  a  year  after  notice  thereof, 
to  relieve  a  party  from  a  Judgment  taken 
against  him  by  mistake,  etc,  means  ••knowl- 
edge" by  the  moving  party  of  the  entry  of  a 
Judgment.  Evans  v.  Evans,  118  Pac.  177, 
179,  60  Or.  195. 

Rev.  Codes  1905,  |  6702,  providing  that 
constructive  notice  Is  notice  Imputed  by  law 
to  a  person  not  having  actual  notice,  and 
section  6703  providing  that  every  person  who 
has  actual  notice  of  sufficient  circumstances 
to  put  a  prudent  man  upon  inquiry,  and  wfto 


omits  to  make  sacii  Inquiry  wlOi 
diligence  is  deemed  to  have  eoDstracCive : 
tioe  of  the  fact  itself,  since  the  enactsient 
the  negotiable  instruments  law,  bare  no  i 
plication  to  actions  upon  negotiable  Inst 
ments  in  the  hands  of  indorsees  before  i 
tnrity,  if  they  ever  had  such  application, 
lug  superseded  by  section  6358,  defining  i 
tice  in  such  case  as  actual  knowledge  of 
firmity  or  defects  or  knowledge  of  such  fa 
as  to  amount  to  bad  faith.  American  K 
Bank  v.  Lundy,  129  N.  W.  99,  101,  21  N. 
167. 

Am  order 
The  word  •'notloe,'*  as  used  In  Laws  IS 
c.  380,  p.  583,  providing  that,  if  the  party 
sires  more  than  the  10  days  given  by  stat 
within  which  to  make  and  serve  his  cs 
made,  the  court  or  judge  before  whom  i 
case  was  tried  may  on  motion  order  an 
tension  of  that  time,  which  notice  of  ext 
slon  shall  be  filed  with  the  derk  of  the  cm 
may  well  be  held  that  the  word  •*notl 
should  be  read  ••order."  Howard  t.  Carl 
80  Pac.  61,  62,  71  Kan.  85  (citing  Clark 
Board  of  Com*rs  of  Mitchell  County*  77  I 
284,  69  Kan.  542,  66  U  B.  A.  9619. 


See  Prooesa 
As  proof 

See  Proof. 
BeasoBAble  aotioe 
There  is  no  difference  In  ttk^  meaning 
••notice^'  and  ••reasonable  notice,"  and  whi 
in  an  action  against  the  town  f6r  damages 
suiting  from  a  defect  in  a  highway,  couo 
for  defendant  admitted  ••notioe,"  tbe  ado 
«Aon  will  have  the  same  effect  as  though 
had  admitted  ••reasonable  notice."  Larrai 
V.  Inhabitants  of  Searsport,  42  Me.  202,  2 

To  offioer»  aseaty  or  attorney 

*•  'Notice'  communicated  to,  or  knowlec 
acquired  by,  the  officers  or  agents  of  corpo 
tlons,  when  acting  in  their  official  capacity 
within  the  scope  of  their  agency,  becon 
notice  to  or  knowledge  of  the  corporation  3 
all  Judicial  purposes."  Maryland  Trust  ( 
V.  National  Mechanics'  Bank,  68  AtL  70, 
102  Md.  608  (citing  13  Cya  pp.  899,  400). 

"Notice"  to  a  township  trustee  of  the 
solvency  of  his  brother,  a  defaulting  tov 
ship  treasurer,  was  notice  to  Oie  town^ 
within  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  S  6 
30  Stat  562,  relating  to  preferencea  Paini 
V.  Napoleon  Tp.,  190  Fed.  637,  639. 

In  an  action  by  the  receiver  of  a  d^w 
tor  to  recover  a  deposit  which  the  hank  b 
paid  out  on  forged  checks,  the  court  refas 
to  admit  in  evidence  the  deposition  of  a  < 
ceased  officer  of  the  depositor  to  the  eff< 
that  he  had  several  interviews  with  one 
the  counsel  for  the  bank,  who  was  aleo  a  < 
rector  and  a  memlier  of  its  esieootlve  co 
mittee,  within  one  year  aftar  tbm  retnia 


1  "|:^  :i^' 


NOTIOE 


641 


NOTICE  OF  DISHQNOB 


tlie  depositor  of  tbe  forged  ehbdkM,  in  which 
he  told  sach  oonnsel  that  the  checks  were 
forged.  Held  reyerslble  error,  since  the  dep- 
osition tended  to  show  that  the  connsel  was 
acting  for  the  hank,  that  he  had  knowledge 
of  facts  which  it  was  his  duty  to  communi- 
cate to  the  bank,  and  which  It  mnst  be  pre- 
sumed he  did  communicate,  and  hence  that 
the  bank  had  notice  within  the  meaning  of 
Negotiable  Instruments  Law  (ConsoL  Laws 
1909,  c.  88)  I  326,  requiring  notice  to  a  bank 
within  one  year  after  the  return  to  the  de- 
positor of  any  forged  Toucher,  In  order  to 
hold  the  bank  liable.  Shattuck  ▼.  Guardiao 
Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  97  N.  E.  517,  518,  204 
N.  Y.  200. 

Where  an  attorney  was  charged  with  the 
duty  of  haying  a  deed  to  his  client  executed 
and  acknowledged,  "notice"  to  him,  while  en- 
gaged in  the  transaction,  that  there  was  in 
fact  a  mortgage  on  the  premises,  though  It 
did  not  appear  of  record,  owing  to  a  mistake 
in  the  description,  was  "notice"  to  the  client 
Allison  T.  Falconer,  87  S.  W.  639,  76  Ark.  343. 

Verlial  or  writtea 

Rev.  St  Ohio,  I  3186,  provides  that, 
within  30  days  after  a  principal  contractor 
flies  an  affidavit  for  a  lien,  he  shall  notify 
the  owner,  his  agent  or  attorney,  that  he 
claims  a  lien,  and,  if  he  fails,  the  lien  shall 
be  null  and  void.  Held,  that  "notice"  as  so 
used  meant  information  by  whatever  means 
communicated,  knowledge  given  or  received; 
and,  written  notice  not  being  expressly  re- 
quired, oral  notice  was  sufficient  In  re 
Farmers'  Supply  Ck>.,  170  Fed.  602,  606. 

HOnOE     AFFEOmrO     OOUHTY     AF- 
FAIRS 

The  list  of  allowances  made  by  the  Judg- 
es of  the  several  courts,  required  by  Acts 
1890,  p.  415,  c.  186,  to  be  published  in  one 
newspaper  at  a  cost  not  exceeding  a  fixed 
sum  for  each  allowance,  are  required  to  be 
published  in  two  newspapers  in  Acts  1903,  p. 
860,  I  1,  providing  that,  where  the  law  re- 
quires the  publication  of  '^notices  affecting 
county  affaj^"  the  same  shall  be  published 
in  two  newspapers.  Cheney  v.  State  ex  reL 
Risk,  74  N.  B.  892,  893,  166  Ind.  121. 

VOTICE  OF  APPEAI. 

As  process,  see  Process. 

As  writ,  see  Writ 

If  to  appeal  is  not  to  institute  a  new  pro- 
eeeding,  a  ''notice  of  appeal"  cannot  be  an 
original  process  by  which  parties  are  brought 
into  court,  but  is  a  notice  merely  by  which 
the  parties  who  are  already  in  court  are  no- 
tified of  subsequent  and  further  proceedings 
in  the  cause  therein  pending,  and  hence, 
where  such  notice  was  served  on  defendant's 
attorney  and  purported  to  be  a  notice  of  ap- 
peal as  against  all  of  the  defendants  origi- 
nally sued,  it  was  not  objectionable  by  reason 
of  the  fiict  that  all  of  the  defendants  exoeift 
one  were  referred  to  hy  the  abbreviation  *%t 
8  Wn&ft  P.2D  Skb.— 41 


aL"  Instead  of  settiiig  out  their  names  in 
folL  Philadeli^bla  Mortgage  ft  Trust  Go.  v. 
Palmer,  73  Pac.  601,  602,  32  Wash.  466. 

The  words  "notice  of  the  appeal,"  as 
used  in  Rev.  Codes  N.  D.  {  7221,  refers  to  no- 
tice or  knowledge  of  a  perfected  appeal  as 
furuished  by  service  of  a  copy  of  the  under- 
taking and  not  merely  to  the  notice  in  writ- 
ing provided  for  by  section  7205.  Beddow  v. 
Flage,  126  N.  W.  97,  98,  20  N.  D.  66. 

NOTIOE  OF  APPROPRIATION 

A  notice  of  appropriation  of  water  with- 
in a  United  States  forest  reservation,  which 
states  all  the  matters  required  by  Civ.  Oode, 
S  1416,  relating  to  the  notioe  of  appropriation 
of  water,  and  which  states  ttie  points  of  di- 
version as  located  on  a  designated  section 
and  township  which  the  court  Judicially 
knows  is  within  a  reservation,  is  sufficient 
within  section  1422,  providing  that  where  the 
place  of  intended  diversion  is  within  a  reser- 
vation, and  is  so  shown  in  the  notice  of  ap- 
propriation, the  claimant  shall  have  a  speci- 
fied time  after  the  grant  of  authority  to  occu- 
py and  use  the  reservation  for  such  Intended 
purpose  within  whi<^  to  commence  the  con- 
struction of  the  works,  eta  The  form  of 
notice  of  appropriation  of  water  of  a  stream 
is  fixed  by  Civ.  Code,  1 1416,  requiring  a  per- 
son desiring  to  appropriate  water  to  post  a 
notice  stating  enumerated  facts,  and  section 
1422,  relating  to  diversion  of  water  vrithin 
any  reservation,  does  not  affect  the  form  of 
notice.  Wishon  v.  Globe  lilglht  ft  Power  Go., 
110  Pac.  290,  292, 158  Cal.  187. 

NOTIOE  OF  DISHONOR 

Oral  notice  of  dishonor  of  a  chedk,  given 
to  a  clerk  of  an  indorsing  ^mmerdal  corpo- 
ration, is  not  notice  to  the  corporation,  with- 
in Negotiable  Instrument  Law  (Acts  1899,  a 
94)  I  97,  authorizing  the  giving  of  "notice*'  to 
a  party  or  to  his  agent  American  Nat 
Bank  v.  National  Fertiliser  Co.,  143  S.  W. 
597,  699,  126  Tenn.  328. 

If  the  holder  of  negotiable  paper  desires 
to  charge  antecedent  parties  with  Its  pay- 
ment,'it  is  Incumbent  on  him  to  give  them 
"notice  of  dishonor."  The  notice  may  be 
either  written  or  verbal,  or  it  may  be  writ- 
ten and  supplemented  by  verbal  testimony. 
All  that  is  necessary,  says  Byles,  is  to  apprise 
the  party  liable  of  the  dishonor  of  the  bill 
in  question  and  to  intimate  that  he  is  ex- 
pected to  pay  it  It  is  sufficient  if,  under  all 
the  circumstances,  the  language  of  the  notice 
imports  that  the  indorser  is  looked  to  for  pay- 
ment, and  it  would  seem  not  unfair  to  imply 
such  intention  from  the  very  fkct  of  sending 
"notice  of  dishonor."  The  weight  of  author- 
ity is  that  a  notice  of  dl^onor  is  sufficient 
to  charge  an  indorser,  if  it  comes  from  the 
holder  or  his  agent  snd  notifies  the  indorser 
that  the  note  was  presented  and  payment 
was  refused.  Notioe  of  nonpayment,  how- 
ever, is  not  sufiki^it;  nor  is  mere  knowledge 


NOTICE  OP  INFIRMTTT 


6^ 


NOTIFICATION 


5  V^ 

Mil 

If 


at  protest  all  that  is  required  to  charge'  the 
Indorser.  "Notice  does  not  mean  mere 
knowledge,  but  an  actual  notification.  For  a 
man  who  can  be  dearly  shown  to  have 
known  beforehand  that  the  bill  would  be  dis- 
honored is,  nevertheless,  entitled  to  notice/* 
''Notice  means  something  more  than  knowl- 
edge, because  it  is  competent  to  the  holder 
to  give  credit  to  the  maker.  It  is  not  enough 
to  say  that  the  maker  does  not  Intend  to  pay, 
but  that  the  holder  does  not  intend  to  give 
credit  to  such  maker."  Marshall  v.  Sonne- 
man,  64  Atl.  874,  875,  216  Pa.  66  (citing  Byles, 
BiU,  •27Q;  7  Cyc.  p.  1109). 

VOnCOE  OF  UNFUtMITT 

Under  Negotiable  Instruments  Law  (Sess. 
Laws  1899,  p.  350,  c.  149)  |  56,  providing  that, 
in  order  to  constitute  "notice  of  an  infirmity" 
in  an  instrument  or  defect  in  the  title  of  the 
person  negotiating  the  same,  the  person  to 
whom  it  is  negotiated  must  have  actual 
knowledge  of  the  infirmity,  or  knowledge  of 
such  f&cta  that  his  action  in  taking  the  in- 
strument amounts  to  bad  faith,  one  who  has 
knowledge  of  a  defect  in  his  transferror's 
title,  or  knowledge  of  such  facts  that  his  ac- 
tion in  t&klng  the  instrument  amounts  to  bad 
faithj  is  not  a  holder  in  due  course.  Keene 
V.  Behan,  82  Pac.  884,  886,  40  Wash.  505. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that,  to  consti- 
tute "notice  of  infirmity"  in  a  negotiable  in- 
strument or  defect  in  the  title  of  the  person 
negotiating  it,  the  person  to  whom  it  is  nego- 
tiated must  have  had  actual  knowledge  of  the 
infirmity  or  defect,  or  knowledge  of  such 
facts  that  his  action  in  taking  the  instrument 
amounted  to  bad  faith,  evidence  that  the 
transfer  of  a  check  for  $400  by  S.,  the  payee 
thereof,  to  plaintiff,  his  brother-in-law,  took 
place  near  the  bank  on  which  the  check  was 
drawn,  and  of  which  plaintiff  was  vice  presi- 
dent, that  no  inquiry  was  made  at  the  bank 
before  purchase,  and  that  plaintiff,  went  to  a 
hotel,  got  a  blank  check,  and  filled  it  out  to 
the  order  of  S.  for  $400,  and  gave  it  to  an- 
other party  for  delivery  to  S.,  did  not  show 
actual  knowledge  on  plaintiff's  part  of  .an  in- 
firmity in  the  check.  Matlock  v.  Scheuer- 
man,  93  Pac.  823,  824,  826,  51  Or.  49,  17  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  747  (citing  and  adopting  Belmont 
Branch  of  State  Bank  of  Ohio  v.  Hoge,  35 
N.  Y.  65-^;  Bowman  v.  Metzger,  39  Pac  8, 
44  Pac  1090,  27  Or.  23). 

HOTIOE  OF  NEGUGEIIOE 

There  is  a  clear  distinction  between  a 
''notice  of  negligence"  and  a  claim  for  damag- 
es. A  mere  notice  to  a  telegraph  company 
that  its  employes  have  been  negligent  in  the 
transmission  of  a  message,  together  with  the 
circumstances  of  the  negligence,  is  not  a 
presentment  of  a  claim  for  damages,  based 
on  such  negligence,  within  the  contract  for 
the  transmission  of  the  message  providing 
that  the  company  shall  not  be  liable  for 


diimages  i^iere  the  ctaini  is  not  presen 
within  a  sgedAed  time,  etc.  Western  Un 
Telegrairti  Co.  v.  Mozley,  96  S.  W.  112, 113, 
Ark.  554. 

NOTIOE  OF  TRANSFER 

Before  notice  of  transfer,  i 


i  Before. 


NOTIOE  TO  THE  WORUO 

The  "notice  to  the  world,"  required 
Civ.  Ck)de  1895,  |  2684,  which  dedares  t 
the  dissolution  of  a  partnership  by  the 
tiring  of  an  ostensible  partner  must  be  m 
known  to  creditors  and  to  the  world,  may 
given  by  publication  in  a  public  gazette  di 
lated  in  the  locality  in  which  the  busines! 
the  partnership  has  been  conducted,  if  si 
publication  is  fair  and  reasonable  as  to 
terms  and  the  number  of  times  it  is  ma 
Such  publication  is  not,  however,  necesa 
as  any  means  of  fairly  publishing  the  f 
of  dissolution  as  widely  as  possible  in  or 
to  put  the  public  on  its  guard,  as  by  adi 
tisement,  public  notice  in  the  maimer  us 
In  the  community,  the  withdrawal  of  the 
terior  indications  of  partnership,  eta, 
proper  to  be  considered  on  the  qaestion 
notice.  Bush  &  Hattaway  v.  W.  A.  McCa 
Co.,  56  S.  E.  430,  431,  127  Oa.  308,  9  1 
Gas.  240  (quoting  and  adopting  definitioiis 
Askew  V.  Silman,  22  S.  E.  573,  05  6a.  t 
Lovejoy  V.  Spafford,  93  U.  8.  430,  23  L. 
851). 

NOTIFY 

See  Duly  Notified. 

To  "notify"  one  of  a  fact  is  to  "mak< 
known  to  him,"  to  "inform  him  by  notit 
Huntington  v.  aty  of  Calais,  73  Aa  829,  i 
105  Me.  144. 

Under  Rev.  St  Ohio,  |  3185,  provid 
that  a  person  filing  an  affidavit  or  a  medi 
ic's  lien  d^all  within  30  days  thereafter  di 
fy  the  owner  of  the  property,  his  agent, 
attorney  that  he  claimed  such  lien,  verbal 
tioe  is  sufiicient  The  word  '"notify"  as  g 
erally  used  does  not  imply  the  use  of  writ! 
it  meaning  simply  to  convey  informatJ 
knowledge,  or  notice  in  whatever  way.  In 
Boner,  189  Fed.  93,  94. 

NOTIFIOATIOH 

In  Pub.  St  c.  172,  S  29,  relating  to  s 
of  land  on  execution,  requiring  "notificatit 
thereof  to  be  posted  up  in  some  public  pi) 
in  the  city  or  town  where  tiie  land  lies,  i 
also  in  two  adjoining  cities  or  towns,  if  th 
are  so  many  in  the  county,"  the  plural  *tM 
fications"  would  be  construed,  apart  fr 
history,  with  reference  to  the  several  dt 
or  towns  in  which  the  notifications  are 
quired,  notwithstanding  the  words  ''and 
so,"  and  not  as  requiring  two  or  more  m 
fications  in  the  dty  or  town  where  the  Ui 
lies.  In  fact,  however,  the  plural  Is  a  s 
vtval  from  St  1798,  a  77,  |  4^  wlii<di  requii 


NOTIFISD 


643      NOTORIOUS  FUPLIG  INDECENOT 


the  posting  tip  of  notUficationfiriB  two  or  more 
public  places  in  the  town  where  the  land  lies. 
Rev.  St  c.  73,  |  39,  substituted  "some  public 
place"  for  "two  or  more  public  places,"  and 
thereby  made  one  notiflcation  sufficient 
Holmes  t.  Jordan,  39  N.  B.  lOOB,  1006,  163 
Mass.  147. 


VOTDTBD 

The  word  '"notified,*'  as  used  in  a  certifi- 
cate and  protest  by  a  notary  public  that  he 
duly  notified  the  indorser  of  the  note  of  non- 
payment, there  b^ng  no  qualification  of  the 
word  as  to  the  mode  of  notice,  must  be  re- 
garded as  meaning  verbal  notice.  Ticonic 
Bank  v.  Stackpole,  41  Me.  321,  824,  66  Am. 
Dec.  246. 

Where  one  desiring  to  ship  goods  inform- 
ed the  agent  of  the  carrier  that  lie  would 
want  two  cars  In  which  to  transport  the 
goods,  an  allegation  in  a  complaint  founded 
on  a  failure  to  furnish  the  cars,  that  the  agent 
"notified"  the  dilpper  that  he  "would  en- 
deavor" to  secure  the  cars  was  insufficient  to 
show  an  acceptance  of  the  proposal  according 
to  the  terms  in  whldi  it  was  made,  or  an 
unconditional  promise  to  comply  with  it  It 
was  no  more  than  a  luromlse  that  the  agent 
"would  endeavor"  to  comply  with  the  order 
which  it  was  his  duty  to  do  without  a  con- 
tract Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son, 79  N.  E.  881,  383,  39  Ind.  App.  112. 

Bums*  Ann.  St  1901,  |  3626a,  providing 
that  in  an  action  to  foreclose  a  lien  for  a 
municipal  Improvement  it  must  be  shown 
that  10  days  before  suit  the  owner,  if  found 
or  known,  was  "notified**  of  the  assessment 
Including  the  amount  thereof,  with  interest 
and  where  payable,  means  a  notice  either 
verbal  or  written,  and  it  may  be  given  by 
any  one  Interested  in  the  claim,  or  by  any 
municipal  officer  charged  with  a  duty  in  con- 
nection with  the  making  or  collection  of  the 
assessment  Ross  v.  Van  Natta,  74  N.  E.  10, 
U,  164  Ind.  557. 

The  word  "notified,"  in  the  warrant  of  a 
county  clerk  to  the  treasurer  directing  the 
collection  of  taxes,  reciting,  'Ton  are  hereby 
notified  to  collect  the  taxes**  enumerated  in 
the  lists  attached.  Is  suffidentiy  defined  to 
warrant  the  treasurer  to  proceed  to  collect 
tile  taxes,  pursuant  to  the  statute  providing 
tliat  the  county  clerk  shall  attach  to  the  lists 
his  warrant  in  general  terms  requiring  the 
treasurer  to  collect  the  taxes,  and  no  infor- 
mality shall  render  any  proceedings  for  the 
collection  of  taxes  Illegal.  Cadman  v.  Smith, 
85  Pac  346,  348,  15  OkL  633. 

NOTORIETY 

"  'Notoriety*  la  the  state  or  character  of 
being  well  known,  usually,  and,  always  when 
appUed  to  crime,  in  an  unfavorable  sense. 
It  is  often  found  with  words  of  similar  im- 
port such  as  'open'  and  'flagrant' "    People 


V.  Salmon,  83  Paa  42,  43,  148  CaL  303,  2 
L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1186»  113  Am.  St  Bep.  268. 

NOTORIET7  OF  POSSESSION 

See  Openness,  Kotorlety,  and  Exdusive- 
ness  of  Possession 

NOTORIOUS 

See  Open,  Notorious,  and  Continuous 
Change  of  Possession. 

The  word  "notorious"  is  used  in  the  stat- 
ute relating  to  the  recognition  of  a  child, 
with  the  design  of  emphasizing  the  thought 
that  the  understanding  of  the  father's  recog- 
nition should  be  as  extensive  as  the  Immedi- 
ate community  of  his  residence  and  within 
the  common  Imowledge  of  the  public.  Mor- 
gan ▼.  Strand,  110  N.  W.  696,  6d7,  133  Iowa, 
299. 

NOTORIOUS  ADXJjyrEKY 

See  Open  and  Notorious  Adultery. 

NOTORIOUS  POSSESSION 

See  Open  and  Notorious  Possession. 

''Notorious'*  possession  as  an  element 
of  titie  by  limitation  is  possession  which  is 
generally  known  and  talked  of,  and  univer- 
sally recognized,  conspicuous,  widely,  or  com- 
monly known.  Long  v.  Lackawanna  *Coal  & 
Iron  Co.,  136  S.  W.  673,  680,  681,  233  Mo.  713. 

Within  the  rule  that  to  constitute  ad- 
verse possession  it  is  necessary  that  the  pps^ 
session  be  "actual,**  "continuous,**  "notori- 
ous,*' and  "hostile,"  "actual*'  means  real, 
visible;  "continuous**  means  without  inter- 
ruption; "notorious**  means  open,  undisguis- 
ed, generally  known;  and  "hostile'*  means 
opposed  and  antagonistic  to  the  claims  of 
all  others.  Bradbury  Marble  Co.  r.  Laclede 
Gas  Light  Co.,  106  S.  W.  594,  699,  128  Mo. 
App.  96. 

The  elements  of  titie  by  limitation  are 
uninterrupted  possession,  actual,  visible,  no- 
torious, adverse,  and  hostile  under  color  and 
claim  of  right  for  the  statutory  period ;  the 
words  "adverse  and  hostile'*  meaning  practi- 
cally the  same  thing.  Long  v.  Lackawanna 
Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  136  S.  W.  673,  680,  681,  233 
Mo.  713. 

NOTORIOUS  FUBUO  INBECENOY 

What  is  decent  and  indecent  is  determin- 
ed by  the  sensibilities  and  moral  standards  of 
the  people  as  evolved  from  generation  to  gen- 
eration along  with  their  civilization.  Whether 
an  act  is  decent  or  indecent  depends  on  the 
time,  place,  and  the  circumstances,  including 
the  intention  of  the  actor.  When  by  general 
consensus  of  public  opinion  an  act  tending  to 
debauch  the  morals  Is  understood  to  be  of- 
fensive to  the  common  instincts  of  decency 
if  done  under  particular  circumstances,  the 
act,  when  so  done,  is  in  contemplation  of 
law  a  "i^torious  act  of  indecency."  A  public 
and  intentional  or  wanton  intruding  upon  the 


NOVATION 


644 


NOVATION 


attention  of  the  opportte  sex  of  the  sexual 
act  or  other  things  directly  soggestiye  of  it 
is  an  act  of  public  indecency,  within  Pen. 
Code  1895,  |  390,  making  notorious  acts  of 
public  indecency  a  misdemeanor;  the  barrier 
erected  by  social  decorum  between  the  sexes 
being  a  fundamental  of  decency.  For  a  man 
intenti<mally  and  wantonly  to  cause  a  bull 
and  cow  to  copulate  upon  a  public  highway, 
knowing  that  a  woman  and  children  are  so 
situated  that  they  can  hardly  fail  to  see  the 
act,  and  that  they  are  likely  to  be  offended 
by  it,  constitutes  criminal  notorious  public 
indecency,  within  Pen.  Code  1895,  |  390. 
Redd  y.  State,  07  8.  Bl  709,  TU*  T  Ga.  App. 
675. 

NOVATION 

A  "novation'*  is  the  substitution  of  one 
obligation  for  another.  Tilden  v.  Qordon  A 
Co.,  74  Pac  1016,  1017,  34  Wash.  92. 

A  "novation"  presupposes  a  previous  ob- 
ligation for  which  the  new  one  is  substituted. 
Idnder  Hardware  Go.  v.  Pacific  Sugar  Ck>rp., 
118  Pac.  785,  17  CaL  App.  81. 

The  doctrine  of  "novation**  is  derived 
from  the  civil  law,  and  a  novation  can  neither 
be  founded  on  an  original  claim,  which  was 
illegal,  nor,  under  the  civil  law,  be  made  by 
one  incapable  of  contracting.  Wadsworth  v. 
Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Livingston  County,  115  N. 
y.*  Supp.  8,  18  (citing  Green's  Brice^s  Ultra 
Vires,  p.  eoi).  , 

A  "novation"  is  in  the  nature  of  a  re- 
lease or  discharge  and  is  new  matter  which 
must  be  specially  pleaded.  There  can  be  no 
"novation"  and  substitution  in  law  unless 
the  original  creditor  and  the  new  debtor  all 
enter  into  such  an  agreement  Temple  v. 
Teller  Lumber  Co.,  106  Pac.  8,  9,  46  Colo. 
497. 

A  "novation"  is  the  making  of  a  new  con- 
tract, its  elements  being  essentially  the  same 
as  in  the  first  contract,  which  are,  parties,  a 
meeting  of  the  minds,  and  a  consideration. 
Daviess  County  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Wright, 
110  S.  W.  361,  363,  129  Ky.  21,  17  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  1122. 

The  necessary  legal  elements  to  establish 
"novation"  are:  Parties  capable  of  contract- 
ing, a  valid  prior  obligation  to  be  displaced, 
the  consent  of  all  parties  to  the  substitution, 
based  on  sufficient  consideration,  and  the  ex- 
tinction of  the  old  obligation  and  the  cre- 
ation of  a  new  one.  Harrington- Wiard  COb 
V.  Blomstrom  Mfg.  Co.*  131  N.  W.  659,  668, 
166  Mich.  276. 

The  essential  elements  of  a  "novation" 
are  parties  capable  of  contracting,  a  valid 
prior  obligation  to  be  displaced,  the  consent 
of  all  of  the  parties  to  the  substitution,  and 
the  extinction  of  the  old  obligation  and  the 
creati<Hi  of  a  new  one.  QiUett  t.  Ivory 
(Mich.)  139  N.  W.  58,  56. 


''Novation"  is  defined  to  be  the  snbatlta- 
ti<m  by  mutual  agreement  of  one  debtor  or  of 
one  creditor  for  another,  whereby  the  old 
debt  is  extinguished,  or  the  substitution  of  a 
new  debt  or  obligation  for  an  existing  one, 
which  lis  thereby  extinguished.  In  re  Rans- 
f  ord,  194  Fed.  658,  662,  115  a  a  A.  560. 

"Novatioa"  ocmsists  of  a  bilateral  agree- 
ment for  the  substitution  of  one  obligaticNi 
for  another,  and  may  take  place  ^ther  by 
the  substitution  of  a  new  for  an  old  party,  or 
by  the  substitution  of  a  new  agreement  be- 
tween the  parties,  or  by  a  change  of  parties 
and  agreement  at  the  same  time.  Parsons 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  Hamilton  Ice  Mfg.  Oo.,  78  AtL 
254,  255,  78  N.  J.  Law,  809. 

To  constitute  a  "novation"  by  substitution 
of  creditors  or  debtors,  there  must  be  a  mutual 
agreement  between  three  or  more  persona, 
whereby  a  debtor,  in  consideration  of  beinf 
discharged  from  his  liability  to  the  original 
creditor,  contracts  a  new  obligation  in  fiivor 
of  the  new  creditor,  and  the  new  creditor 
must  have  consented  to  the  discharge  of  his 
original  debtor,  and  have  accepted  the  new 
debtor.  McAllister  v.  McDonald,  106  Pac. 
882,  886,  40  Mont.  375. 

The  doctrine  of  "novation"  cannot  apply 
to  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  of  land  to 
which  plaintiff  had  no  legal  titie,  where  nei- 
ther defendant  nor  the  lessee  of  the  land  was 
indebted  to  plaintiff,  she  being  a  stranger  to 
the  transaction,  since  novatloii  imiAies  a 
substitution  of  a  debt<H:  of  a  creditor  and  of 
a  new  contract  Pennington  v.  Qartiey,  88 
Ati.  701,  708,  109  MSb  27a 

That  defendant  verbally  agreed  with  the 
payee  to  pay  others'  notes,  and  the  payee  ac- 
cepted the  promise,  and  thereafter  looked  to 
defendant  for  payment,  and  the  payee's  cash- 
ier told  a  surety  on  the  notes  that  defendant 
had  agreed  to  pay  them,  and  that  the  surety 
was  released,  is  insufficient  to  show  a  "nova- 
tion" binding  defendant,  for  want  of  eonsAdet- 
ation,  where  it  does  not  appear  that  defend- 
ant was  indebted  to  the  mak»s,  or  that  they 
paid,  or  agreed  to  pay,  him  anything  for  as- 
suming the  debt,  or  that  the  payee  formally 
released  the  makers  or  sureties  or  surr^ider^ 
ed  any  security  held  under  the  old  notea. 
Bank  of  St  James  v.  Walker,  111  S.  W.  829, 
830, 132  Mo.  App.  117. 

A  broker,  acting  for  several  customers^ 
whose  orders  for  goods  it  had  taken  and 
agreed  to  fill,  contracted  with  a  seller  for  tfa« 
purchase  of  the  goods  in  lump.  The  seller 
knew  that  the  merchandise  was  for  different 
customers,  and  for  convenience  agreed  to  ship 
car  load  lots  to  customers  and  draw  direct 
on  them  therefor.  It  shipped  goods  to  a 
customer  and  drew  against  him  th^efbr. 
The  customer  sued  the  seller  for  failure  to 
deliver  goods  of  a  merchantable  quality. 
Held,  that  he  could  not  maintain  the  action 
on  the  theory  that  the  seller  severed  the  con- 


NOVATIOK 


645 


NOVATION 


tract,  and  bb  to  the  castomer  released  the 
broker  and  looked  to  him  instead.  H.  Mid- 
wood's  Sons  Oo.  V,  Alaska-Portland  Packers' 
Assn,  67  AtL  61,  62,  28  B.  I.  S03»  IB  Ann. 
Gas.  954. 

A  ••novation"  Is  the  substltntton  of  a 
new  obligation  for  an  old  one.  The  reqnl- 
sites  of  a  novation  are  a  valid  prior  obliga- 
tion to  be  displaced,  consent  of  all  parties  to 
the  snbstitntlon,  a  sufficient  consideration, 
the  extinction  of  the  old  obligation,  and  the 
creation  of  a  valid  new  one.  The  snbstltn- 
tion  may  be  in  the  debt  or  contract,  in  the 
debtor,  or  in  the  creditor.  Where  one,  to 
whom  wage  claims  of  employte  of  bankrapts 
are  assigned,  ezdianges  them  with  the  baak- 
mpts  for  their  note  and  dneblll,  there  Is  a 
"novation"  of  the  wage  claims,  extlngnlshlng 
the  preference  given  by  Bankr.  Act  July  1, 
18d8,  c.  5CU  I  64b4,  80  Stat.  568,  to  claims 
for  wages.  In  re  Fnller  ft  Bennett,  162  Fed. 
538,  54L 

A  real  estate  agent  procured  the  sale  of 
certain  premises  to  defendant,  and  defend- 
ant,  In  consideration  of  the  agent's  release 
of  his  daim  against  the  vendors  for  commis- 
sions, paid  him  91>000,  and  agreed  to  pay  him 
$8,600  more  on  sale  of  the  premises.  Later 
the  agent  placed  his  daim  In  the  hands  of  an 
attorney  for  settlement,  and  negotiations 
were  carried  on  between  the  attorney  and  the 
defendant  Defendant  offered  to  pay  $2,500 
and  $250  counsel  fees,  for  the  snrrender  of 
the  contract,  and  the  delivery  of  a  general 
release  by  the  agent  The  offer  was  reported 
to  the  agent,  who  said  he  would  acc^t  it; 
and  a  day  was  fixed  as  the  time,  and  the 
attorney's  office  as  the  place,  for  closing  the 
transaction,  but  the  transaction  was  never 
completed  by  the  payment  of  the  money  or 
surrender  of  the  contract  and  delivery  of  the 
release.  At  the  time  of  the  offw  by  defend- 
ant for  surrender  of  the  contract,  negotia- 
tions had  been  completed  for  pur<diase  of  the 
premises  by  a  third  person,  but  the  agent  had 
no  knowledge  thereof.  Held,  that  the  trans- 
action did  not  amount  to  a  ''novation"  by  the 
substitution  of  a  new  contract  between  the 
parties.  Bandman  v.  Finn,  02  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1096,  1006,  103  App.  Dlv.  822. 

"Novation"  is  effected  by  the  substitution 
of  a  new  obligation  between  the  same  parties 
with  the  intention  to  extinguish  the  old  one, 
or  by  the  substitution  of  a  new  debtor  with 
the  Intention  to  release  the  old  one,  or  by  the 
substitution  Of  a  new  creditor  with  the  in- 
tent to  transfer  the  rights  of  the  old  one  to 
him.  There  must  be  a  mutual  agreement 
among  the  parties  for  the  substitution  of  the 
new  debt  In  place  of  the  old.  There  must  be 
an  extinguishment  of  the  old  debt  and  an 
agreement  tg  look  to  the  new  debtor  alone, 
and  the  mere  taking  of  a  new  debtor  will  not, 
standing  alone,  amount  to  a  ••novation."  The 
taking  by  a  creditor  of  a  note  from  one  who 
has  assumed  the  debt  is  not  a  "novation," 


releasing  the  old  debtor;  there  being  no 
agreement  to  this  effect  M.  Glmbell  &  Sons 
V.  King,  85  S.  W.  7,  8,  43  Tex.  av.  App.  188 
(citliig  Beach,  Mod.  Con.  |  786;  Add.  Cont  pw 
530;  Pimental  v.  Marquee,  42  Pac.  159,  108 
Cal.  406;  Jackson  Iron  Go.  v.  Negaunee  Con- 
centrating Ck).,  65  Fed.  298,  12  O.  C.  A  636; 
Stowell  V.  Gram,  69  N.  E.  342,  184  Mass.  562; 
Western  White  Bronze  Co.  v.  Portrey,  70  N. 
W.  383,  50  Neb.  801 ;  Piehl  v.  Plehl,  101  N. 
W.  628,  138  Mich.  515). 

Where  by  a  wrltt^i  contract  plaintiff 
sold  land  to  defendant,  with  the  agreement 
that  plaintiff  should  receive  one-third  of 
profit^  a^bove  that  amount  when  the  property 
could  be  sold  for  as  much  as  $19,000,  and  sub- 
sequently defendant  asserted  that  she  would 
not  take  lees  than  $21,000  for  her  share,  and 
that  plaintiff  might  take  any  amount  received 
above  that  sum,  and  plaintiff  attempted  to 
make  a  sale  on  such  terms  but  failed  to  get 
$21,000,  there  was  a  rescission  of  the  written 
agreement,  and  a  substitution  of  the  parol 
contract,  constituting  a  novation,  defined  by 
Civ.  Code,  I  1530,  as  the  substitution  of  a 
new  obligation  for  an  existing  one.  Simmons 
V.  Sweeney,  109  Paa  265,  267,  18  CaL  App. 
288. 

The  owner  of  real  estate  contracted  for 
Its  sale  for  a  specified  amount;  a  certain 
portion  of  the  paiehase  price  to  be  paid  on 
the  execution  and  delivery  of  the  agreement, 
another  on  the  delivery  of  the  deed,  the  bal- 
ance payable  In  three  years,  with  interest 
at  6  per  cent  for.  the  first  year  and  6  per 
cent  for  the  balance  of  the  term,  to  be  se- 
cured by  a  purchase-money  mortgage.  The 
purchaser  paid  the  agreed  sum  at  the  execu- 
tion of  the  contract,  and  on  the  passing  of 
the  deed  paid  the  vendor  an  amount  much 
greater  than  the  contract  required  to  be 
paid  at  that  time,  and  gave  the  mortgage 
for  the  balance.  Held,  that  the  receipt  by 
the  vendor  at  the  delivery  of  the  deed  of  an 
amount  in  excess  of  the  amount  agreed  upon, 
and  the  acceptance  of  a  mortgage  for  the  bal- 
ance, constituted  a  "novation,"  and  that  the 
vendor  was  not  entitled  to  interest  under 
the  terms  of  the  first  contract  on  the  excess 
of  the  amount  received  at  the  delivery  of  the 
deed  over  the  amount  agreed  upon.  Crim- 
mins  V.  Carlyle  Realty  Co.,  117  N.  Y.  Supp. 
434,  435,  132  App.  Div.  665. 

Substitntioa  of  new  delator 

"Novation"  is  the  substitution  of  one 
debtor  by  mutual  agreement  for  another, 
whereby  the  old  debt  is  extinguished.  Cheno- 
weth  V.  National  Bldg.  Ass'n,  53  S.  El  659, 
561,  59  W.  Va.  653. 

Where  parties  to  an  executory  contract 
for  work,  acting  with  a  third  person,  agree 
to  substitute  the  third  person,  by  consent  of 
all,  in  place  of  the  original  contractor,  there 
is  a  species  of  "novation."  Security  Nat 
Bank  v.  St  Croix  Power  Co.,  04  N.  W.  74, 
77,  117  Wis.  211. 


I  i. 


i 


i  \ 
I  III 


: 


^  "!;■ 


y  I 


;;i 


;  i  ii' 


NOVATION 


646 


NOVATION 


Tlie  essence  of  '"novation"  is  tliat  all  the 
three  parties  assent  to  or  concur  in  the 
agreement  whereby  the  new  debtor  is  sub- 
stituted for  the  old  and  the  old  debt  ex- 
tinguished. Elliott  y.  Quails,  130  S.  W.  474, 
470,  149  Mo.  App.  482. 

Where  a  corporation,  as  creditor,  accepts 
in  payment  of  a  debt  the  note  of  a  third  per- 
son, together  with  valuable  security,  a  "nova- 
tion" is  effected,  and  it  can  thereafter  look 
only  to  the  substituted  debtor  for  reimburse- 
ment. Security  Warehousing  Co.  v.  Ameri- 
can Bzch.  Nat.  Bank,  103  N.  Y.  Supp.  390, 
402,  118  App.  Div.  350. 

A  "novation  by  the  substitution  of  a  new 
debtor"  consists  of  a  mutual  agreement 
among  three  parties,  the  creditor,  his  im- 
mediate debtor,  and  the  intended  new  debtor, 
whereby  the  liability  of  the  last  named  is 
accepted  in  place  of  that  of  the  original 
debtor  in  discharge  of  the  original  debt 
Babbitt  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co..  130  S.  W. 
364,  367,  149  Mo.  App.  439. 

A  "novation"  occurs  when  a  debtor 
makes  an  arrangement  with  his  debtor,  for 
a  valuable  consideration,  whereby  the  second 
debtor  assumes  and  is  to  pay  the  first  debt- 
or's debt,  and  if,  before  passing  of  the  con- 
sideration, or  completion  of  the  transaction, 
either  of  the  debtors  explains  the  proposed 
transaction  to  the  first  debtor's  creditor,  and 
the  creditor  consents  to  the  substitution  and 
agrees  to  accept  the  new  debtor  and  release 
the  old  one,  the  novation  is  complete.  Bank 
of  St  James  v.  Walker,  111  S.  W.  829,  830, 
132  Mo.  App.  117. 

Where  a  divorced  husband  and  wife  en- 
tered into  an  agreement  that  the  wife  would 
pay  the  husband's  attorneys  in  consideration 
of  his  transferring  certain  property  to  her, 
and  the  husband's  attorneys  agreed  to  look 
to  the  wife  for  compensation,  and  the  proper- 
ty was  transferred,  and  the  wife  drew  a 
check  in  favor  of  the  attorneys,  there  was  a 
complete  "novation."  Dougherty  v.  Van  Rip- 
er, 120  Pac.  333,  334,  16  N.  M.  600. 

Where,  after  the  sale  of  goods  to  an 
individual,  the  business  was  Incorporated, 
and  the  corporation  requested  the  delivery 
of  the  goods  under  the  contract  to  it,  and 
made  payment  on  account  of  such  goods,  a 
"novation"  was  efTected,  and  the  corporation 
was  substituted  for  the  original  purchaser, 
as  debtor  of  the  seller.  An  express  agree- 
ment is  not  requisite  for  a  "novation"  or 
substitution  of  parties  to  a  contract,  as  it 
may  be  implied.  J.  H.  Lane  &  Co.  v.  United 
Oilcloth  Co.,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  1061,  1062,  103 
App.  Div.  378. 

EztiiiCiiial&meat  of  old  debt 

A  "novation"  requires  the  creation  of 
new  contractual  relations,  as  well  as  the  ex- 
tinguishment of  old.  There  must  be  the  con- 
jsent  of  all  the  parties  to  the  substitution,  re- 
sulting tn  the  extinction  of  the  old  obliga- 


tion and  the  creation  of  a  valid  new  one 
Held  V.  CaldweU*Baston  Co.,  89  N.  Y.  Sopp 
964,  955,  97  App.  Div.  801« 

To  constitute  a  contract  of  ''novation,' 
the  original  indebtedness  or  obligation  mos 
be  extinguished,  and  a  mutual  agreezneni 
made  among  the  parties  to  the  old  and  nev 
obligations,  whereby  the  new  is  sabstitatM 
for  the  old.  Inman  v.  F.  N.  Burt  Co.,  108  N 
Y.  Supp.  210,  211,  212,  124  App.  Div.  73  (dt 
ing  Ryan  v.  Pistone,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  81,  ^ 
Hun,  78). 

The  eesentiaUi  of  a  "noyatfon"  are  a  nro 
tual  agreement  to  which  the  creditor,  tbe  old 
debtor,  and  the  new  debtor  assent,  by  wMcl 
the.  old  obligation  is  extinguished  and  t  nei 
and  valid  obligation  is  created  and  takes  iti 
place.  Hemenway  v.  Beecher,  121  N.  W 
160, 161,  139  Wis.  399. 

"  'Novation'  is  the  substitution  of  m 
obligation  for  another,  and  takes  place  ei 
ther  by  the  substitution  of  a  new  for  an  oU 
part7,  or  by  the  substitution  of  a  new  a^ree 
ment  between  the  old  parties,  or  it  may  be  b; 
a  change  both  of  parties  and  of  agreemeni 
at  the  same  timew"  To  support  the  claim 
of  a  "novation,"  the  assent  of  tbe  partle! 
that  the  new  obligation  shall  be  accepted  la 
extinguishment  of  an  old  one  is  an  essentitl 
element,  but  the  substitution  may  be  accom- 
plished by  either  an  express  or  an  implied 
agreement  Illinois  Life  Ins.  Oo.  v.  Benoer. 
97  Pac.  438,  439,  78  Kan.  611. 

"Novation"  takes  place  by  agreemeDt  of 
all  the  parties  concerned,  and,  where  A  tis- 
dertakes  to  pay  B.'s  debt,  the  obligation  u^ 
sumed  may  be  collateral  to  B.'s  obiigatloD 
rather  than  substituted  therefor,  and,  if  in- 
tended as  collateral,  B.'s  debt  conthineB  to 
exist,  and  this  distinguishes  such  a  ca.« 
from  one  of  novation  in  which  B.'8  debt 
would  be  extinguished.  Hargadine-McKit 
trick  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Goodman,  45  Soutt 
995,  997,  55  Fla.  361. 

"  'Novation*  is  the  substitution  of  a  new 
obligation  for  an  old  one,  which  is  thereby 
extinguished."  Where  a  mortgagee,  who 
had  given  a  loan  on  security,  falsely  repre; 
sented  to  be  a  first  mortgage,  and  bac 
brought  an  action  for  the  deceit  discontiiso 
ed  on  the  oral  promise  of  the  mortgagor's  fa- 
ther to  pay  the  debt,  but  did  not  release  tlu 
mortgage  or  the  debt  of  the  mortgagee  bot 
only  the  claim  for  the  deceit,  th^e  was  so 
such  "novation"  as  to  render  the  promise  o^ 
the  mortgagor's  father  binding  under  ^ 
statute  of  frauds.  BicknaU  v.  Blcknall,  6^' 
AtL  976,  977,  27  B.  I.  429  (citing  Bout.  U' 
Diet). 

"Novation"  is  defined  as  the  sobstitutioB 
of  one  obligation  for  another,  and  taktf 
place  either  by  substitution  of  ft  new  for  an 
old  party  or  by  the  substitution  ott^ 
agreement  between  tiie  old  parties,  or  it  otfT 
be  by  a  change  both  of  parties  and  ^P^^ 
ment  at  the  same  time.    One  of  the  ( 


NOVATION 


647 


NOW 


emeDts  to  a  *^oyatlon'*  is  that  there  should 
lYe  been  an  extfngnlshment  of  the  old  debt, 
id  another  is  that  there  should  have  been 
mutual  agreement  between  all  of  the  par* 
es  that  the  old  debt  should  become  the  obli- 
itlon  of  a  new  debtor.  Miles  ▼.  Bowers,  90 
ac.  905,  906,  49  Or.  429. 

Where  A.  imrchases  a  tract  of  Uind  from 
.  and  gives  a  purchase-money  note  there- 
»r,  payable  to  B.  '*or  order,"  and  B.  trans- 
^rs  said  note  by  indorsement,  together  with 
le  reserved  title  to  the  land  to  0.,  O.  be- 
>me8  thereby  a  party  both  to  the  note  and 
>  the  contract  of  purchase,  and  if  said  note 
Bcomes  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations, 
Dd  A.  enters  into  a  new  agreement  with 
.,  whereby  A.  promises  to  pay  to  C.  the  bal- 
Dce  due  on  said  note  by  installments  run- 
Ing  through  several  years,  the  consideration 
smalning  the  same,  and  no  new  security 
elng  added,  the  fact  that  the  holder  of  said 
ote  has  been  substituted  as  payee,  and  the 
ime  of  payment  definitely  extended,  does  not 
oQstltute  such  a  "novation**  between  said 
laker  and  holder  as  would  extinguish  the 
riginal  debt  and  create  a  new  one.  Ameri- 
an  Mortgage  Co.  of  Scotland  v.  Rawlings, 
6  S.  E.  110,  127  Ga.  82  (citing  Wofford  v. 
Jalnes,  53  Ga.  485;  Lott  v.  Dysart,  45  Ga. 
58;  McDonnell  v.  Alabama  Gold  Life  Ins. 
k).,  5  South.  120,  86  Ala.  401). 

A  bankrupt,  having  purchased  certain 
and  and  executed  a  deed  of  trust  thereon 

0  secure  a  debt,  conveyed  the  land  to  his 
atber.  who  did  not  assume  the  debt,  and 
ater  devised  the  land  to  his  two  children, 
'ODslsting  of  the  bankrupt  and  his  sister. 
^eld,  that  such  transaction  did  not  consti- 
iite  a  novation  of  the  debt  secured  by  the 
leed  of  trust,  which  can  occur  only  when 
here  is  a  substitution  of  a  valid  new  obliga- 
JOD  for  an  old  one,  necessitating  the  ex- 
Inction  of  the  old  debt  In  re  Straub,  158 
^ed.  375,  376. 

Directors  of  a  corporation,  by  vote  re- 
'iting  the  inability  of  subscribers  to  stock 
»  take  and  pay  for  all  the  shares  subscrib- 
^  for,  agreed  with  such  subscribers  that  in 
^nslderatton  of  payment  of  certain  sums  in 
^sh  they  would  be  released  as  to  one-half 
>f  the  amount  subscribed  for.  The  payments 
^ere  made,  the  contract  fully  executed,  the 
released  subscribers  thereafter  treated  as 
stockholders,  the  surrendered  stock  resold  to 
»ther  subscribers,  and  the  whole  transaction 
^aa  in  good  faith,  and  was  not  repudiated  by 
»ny  stockholder.  Held,  that  the  agreement 
^as  in  effect  a  ••novation,'*  which,  under  Civ. 
Me,  S  1531,  is  made  by  the  substitution  of 

1  new  obligation,  between  the  same  parties, 
^Ith  Intent  to  extinguish  the  old  obligation; 
*nd  the  fact  that  payment  of  a  part  of  the 
nwney  required  to  be  paid  by  the  released 
wbscribers  was  deferred  did  not  have  the 
effect  of  continuing  them  in  their  relation 
*8  stockholders,  for  the  full  amount  of  their 
■Qbscription,   until   the   final   payment   had 


been   made.    Thomas  v.    Wentworth    Hotel 
Co..  117  Pac.  1041,  1045,  16  CaL  App.  40a 

NOVEL 

A  complaint,  in  jan  action  for  libel,  which 
alleges  that  defendfint  published  and  circu- 
lated a  *'boQk  or  novel"  in  which  he  referred 
to  plaintiff  in  terms  set  out,  does  not  nega- 
tive by  reason  of  the  use  of  the  word  "nover* 
the  allegation  that  the  article  complained  of 
referred  to  plaintiff,  though  strictly  speak- 
ing the  characters  in  a  novel  are  fictitious. 
Dailey  v.  Bobbs-Merrill  Co^  186  N.  Y.  Supp. 
570,  571. 

NOVELTY 

"Novelty,"  as  used  in  Its  popular  sense, 
means  something  altogether  new  and  different 
from  any  other  method  and  an  improvement 
on  any  other  method.  Imperial  Bottie  Cap  & 
Machine  Co.  v.  Crown  OcNrk  &  Seal  Co.,  139 
Fed.  S12,  321,  71  a  O.  A.  442. 

The  novelty  of  an  article,  which  will  sup- 
port the  issuance  of  a  patent  thereon,  must 
be  a  "novelty"  in  the  means  or  mechanical 
device,  and  not  in  the  use  to  which  the  com- 
bination Is  put.  O'Rourke  Engineering  Const. 
Co.  V.  McMuUen,  150  Fed.  338,  349  (quoting 
and  adopting  the  definition  in  Woolensak  v. 
Sargent,  14  Sup.  Ct  293,  151  U.  S.  227,  88  L. 
Ed.  137). 

"A  'patentable  novelty*  may  be  found  in 
an  improvement  which  simplifies  a  compli- 
cated train  of  mechanism  by  eliminating 
some  of  its  elements,  with  the  result  that  de- 
fects due  to  presence  of  those  elements  are 
done  away  with."  Brown  v.  Huntington 
Piano  Co.,  134  Fed.  735,  739,  67  O.  C.  A.  639. 

NOW 

The  word  "now,"  as  used  in  a  will  pro- 
viding that  executors  should  carry  on  the 
testator*s  business  as  "now  conducted  by  me," 
must  refer  to, the  time  of  his  death.  Luers 
V.  Luers,  124  N.  W.  603,  604,  143  Iowa,  600 
(citing  Appeal  of  Allen,  17  Atl.  453,  125  Pa. 
544). 

A  devise  of  all  that  part  of  land  which 
"I  now  own"  should  be  construed  as  if  made 
at  testator's  death.  Garrison  v.  Garrison,  29 
N.  J.  Law,  158,  159. 

A  reference  in  a  will  to  the  "farm  on 
whidi  I  *now'  live"  refers  to  the  existing  state 
of  thiugs  at* the  date  of  the  will.  Mueller  v. 
Buenger,  83  S.  W.  458,  465,  184  Mo.  458,  67 
L.  R.  A.  648,  105  Am.  St  Rep.  541  (quoting 
and  adopting  definition  in  Liggat  v.  Hart,  23 
Mo.  127 ;    Gold  v.  Judson,  21  Conn.  616). 

The  word  "now,"  in  the  phrase  "now  be- 
ing on  the  various  tracts,"  implied  present 
time,  and  the  deed  conveyed  only  the  timber 
of  the  specified  size  at  the  time  it  was  execut- 
ed. Crawford  v.  Atiantic  Coast  Lumber  Co., 
60  S.  B.  445,  447,  79  S.  C.  16a 


*JOW 


648 


NOW 


Under  General  Con8ti:iict|on  Law  (ConsoL 
Laws  1909,  c.  22),  |  34»  providing  t|iat  tbe 
term  **now,*'  in  a  provision  referring  to  laws 
in  force  or  to  t&cta  as  existing,  relate^  to  the 
laws  in  force  or  to  the  facts  existing  immedi- 
ately before  the  taking  Wect  of  the  provision, 
the  word  "now,"  In  th^' institutional  provi- 
sion referring  to  the  Jurisdiction  of  courts 
"now"  exercised,  relates  to  laws  in  force  at 
the  adoption  of  the  Oonstitotlon,  and  to  the 
Jurisdiction  existing  immediately  b^ore  the 
taking  effect  of  the  Constitution.  Leach  r. 
Auwell,  138  N.  Y.  Supp.  976,  979,  164  App. 
EHv.  170. 

The  use  of  the  word  "now,"  in  a  statute, 
often  precludes  the  statute  from  being  deem- 
ed general,  as,  for  example,  certain  things 
confined  to  cities  where  a  board  of  assessment 
and  revision  "now"  exists,  or  confined  to 
honorably  discharged  soldiers  "now"  in  of- 
fice, or  confined  to  cities  in  which  there  are 
"now"  by  law  three  members  of  common 
council.  P.  L.  1906,  p.  192,  providing  that 
in  all  instances  where  excise  conunlssioners 
are  "now"  by  law  appointed  by  the  mayor  or 
other  governing  body  or  any  municipality 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  court  of  common 
pleas  in  the  county,  is  unconstitutional,  be- 
cause special.  Bumsted  v.  Henry,  64  Atl.  476, 
477,  74  N.  J.  Law,  162  (citing  Richards  v. 
Hammer,  42  N.  J.  Law,  436;  Pierson  v. 
O'Connor,  22  Ati.  1091,  64  N.  J.  Law,  36; 
Bennett  v.  Common  Council  of  City  of  Tren- 
ton, 25  Atl.  113,  55  N.  J.  Law,  72). 

A  mortgage  on  a  woolen  mill,  running 
gear,  tools.  Implements,  and  working  stock 
"  'now  upon  said  premises'  or  in  any  way  be- 
longing to  the  said  mills,  and  the  business 
of  the  same,"  did  not  embrace  after-acquired 
material.  Cunningham  v.  Alryan  Woolen 
Mills,  61  Atl.  372,  873,  69  N.  J.  Eq.  710. 

Priv.  Laws  1867,  p.  219,  c.  11,  divides 
the  city  of  Joliet  into  school  districts,  pro- 
vides for  the  election  of  school  inspectors, 
and  gives  the  city  council  power  to  levy  tax- 
es for  school  purposes.  Hurd*s  Rev.  St.  1903, 
p.  1714,  c.  122,  increases  the  power  of  the 
school  inspectors,  giving  them  authority  to 
employ  teachers,  and  to  fix  the  amount  of 
their  compensation,  and  to  build  or  purchase 
buildings,  etc.,  but  provides  that  all  moneys 
necessary  for  school  purposes  shall  be  raised 
as  "now  provided  by  law,"  and  that  they 
shall  be  held  by  the  treasurer  subject  to  the 
order  of  the  school  inspectors  on  warrants  to 
be  countersigned  by  the  mayor  and  city  clerk. 
Held,  that  the  latter  statute  did  not  give  the 
board  of  school  inspectors  authority  to  levy 
taxes  by  repealing  the  former  statute  by 
implication.  People  ex  rel.  Board  of  School 
Inspectors  of  Joliet  v.  Mottinger,  74  N.  E. 
160,  152,  215  111.  256. 

Under  Code,  |  8271,  providing  that  "prop- 
erty to  be  subsequently  acquired  may  be  de- 
vised when  the  intention  is  clear  and  ex- 
plicit," a  will  giving  to  certain  persona,  "all 


my  real  estote  which  is"  (deseribiiig  It)  "i 
so  including  all  other  real  estate  now  own* 
by  me,"  devises  real  estate  acquired  by  test 
tor  after  execution  of  the  will ;  "now*'  beii 
referable  to  the  time  of  testator's  deat 
Luers  v.  Luers,  124  N.  W.  608,  604,  145  low 
600,  139  Am.  St.  Repb  453. 

Rev.  St  S  2166^  providing  for  the  m 
uralUation  of  aliens  honorably  dischargi 
from  military  service  on  proof  of  one  yeai 
residence  in  the  United  States,  requires  th 
the  court  shall,  ia  addition  to  sucdi  proof 
residence  and  good  moral  diaracter  as  "^no^ 
provided  for  by  law,  be  satisfied  by  compete] 
proof  of  the  applicant  having  been  honorab 
discharged  from  service  of  the  United  State 
Held,  that  the  word  "now"  is  linated  to  tl 
laws  existing  at  tbe  enactment  ol  the  sti 
ute,  and  did  not  inelude  subsequent  enac 
ments.    In  re  McNabb,  176  Fed.  611,  513. 

An  owner  of  stock  contracted  with  ce 
tain  partfes  to  turn  over  to  them  all  the  8to< 
in  the  corporation  **now  owned"  by  hii 
This  stock,  at  the  time,  had  been  assigned 
one  of  the  proposed  purchasers  as  secori 
for  a  note  given  to  him.  Held,  that  the  seU< 
need  not  deliver  the  stock  to  the  purchase 
unincumbered.  BHiehrman  v.  McCord,  95  ] 
T.  Supp.  489,  490,  107  App.  Dlv.  12. 

2  Rev.  St  (1st  Ed.)  pt  2.  a  6.  tit  1, 
6,  provides  that  every  will  devising  in  expre 
terms,  or  by  intent,  all  of  testator's  real  e 
tate,  shall  be  construed  to  pass  all  he  own< 
at  his  death.    Testator's  will  read:    **!  gi^ 

•  ♦    ♦    to  my  husband  all  my  real  esta 

♦  •  ♦  of  which  I  am  now  possessed."  SI 
subsequently  sold  a  farm  which  she  then  ow 
ed  and  purchased  property  of  which  she  dii 
seised.  Held,  that  the  word  "now"  in  tl 
will  did  not  extend  its  meaning,  and  und< 
the  statute  the  property  subsequently  a( 
quired  by  the  testator  went  to  her  husbai 
under  the  wilL  Hodgkins  v.  Hodgkins,  1( 
N.  Y.  Supp.  178,  174,  123  App.  Dlv.  110  (d 
Ing  Lent  v.  Lent  [N.  Y.]  24  Hun,  436;  Schoc 
V.  Shook,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  935;  Heck  v.  Yo 
et  al.,  14  N.  Y.  St  Rep.  409,  affirmed  24  N.  1 
U04,  120  N.  Y.  668). 

Tillamook  City  CSiarter,  art  4,  |  2,  snl 
sec.  2  (Sess.  Laws  1893,  pp.  551,  552),  autho 
izes  the  city  to  collect  road  taxes  from  t 
property  of  the  corporation  equal  to  tbi 
"now"  levied  by  law  for  road  purposes,  to  I 
expended  on  highways,  streets,  and  alle} 
within  the  corporation,  under  the  supervisio 
of  the  common  council,  and  exempts  dtizei 
and  property  from  the  same  tax  for  count 
road  purposes.  Held,  that  the  word  '*now 
meant  "at  the  present  time,"  and  limited  tb 
city's  right  to  levy  taxes  for  street  purpose 
to  the  amount  the  county  was  authorised  t 
levy  for  road  taxes  when  the  charter  took  el 
feet,  and  this  amount  was  not  changed  o 
increased  by  subsequent  statutes*  raising  tb 
county  rate,  either  by  the  same  or  subsequen 
Legislature.    Tillamook  City  t.  County  Oooi 


NOW  ARS 


64» 


KUISANOk 


Tillamook  Ooooty,  107  Pac  482,  468,  66 
r.112. 

OW  ABE 

A  lease  provided  that  the  premises  be 
irrendered  at  the  end  of  the  term  of  two 
^ars  "in  the  same  condition  as  they  now 
•e."  It  covenanted  that  the  '^premises  are 
)w  in  good  repair."  When  the  lease  was  ex- 
ited the  premises  were  In  very  bad  con- 
tion,  and  It  was  agreed  that  the  pit)perty 
lould  be  put  In  good  condition  before  the 
ssee  would  take  possession.  The  necessary 
aprovements  cost  a  considerable  sum,  of 
blch  the  lessee  paid  a  small  part  Held,  In 
1  action  against  the  lessee  for  not  surrender- 
ig  the  premises  In  the  same  condition  they 
ere  at  the  time  of  the  rental,  that  the  parties 
(tended  the  premises  to  be  surrendered 
t  the  end  of  the  term  in  the  same  condition 
!  they  were  at  the  beginning  thereof,  the 
ords  *'now  are"  not  referring  to  the  condi- 
on  of  the  premises  at  the  time  of  making 
le  lease.  Chesapeake  Brewing  Co.  v.  Gold- 
srg,  60  AtL  37,  89,  107  Md.  486,  16  Ann. 
as.  879. 

OW  COKSTTTUTED 

See  As  Now  Constituted. 

row  DUE 

The  phrase  "debts  now  due,"  In  the  act 
f  1848,  dividing  the  town  of  Windsor  Into 
i^indsor  and  West  Windsor,  Is  synonymous 
rith  the  word  "UabUmeS,**  whether  arising 
I  contractu  or  ex  delicto.  Hunter  t.  Wind- 
or,  24  Vt  827,  338. 

row  DUE  AND  PATABUB 

The  allegation  of  a  counterclaim,  that 
laintlff's  Indebtedness  is  '*now  due  and  pay^ 
ble,"  even  treated  as  a  statement  of  fact, 
oes  not  show  that  the  counterclaim  existed 
t  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  ac- 
ioD,  as  required  by  Code  Civ.  Proc  |  438. 
*ro?ident  Mut.  Building  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Da- 
is, 76  Pac.  1034,  1035,  143  Cal.  253. 

row  FIXED  &T  I.AW 

The  effect  of  the  act  adopting  the  Code 
t  1910  was  to  re-enact  into  one  statute  all 
f  the  provisions  of  that  Code ;  and  hence  the 
►brase  •*iiow  fixed  by  law,"  as  used  in  sec- 
ion  2788  of  that  Code,  comprehends  all  the 
aw  in  the  Code  applicable  to  the  provisions 
•'  that  section.  The  Employer's  Liability 
^ct.  found  in  section  2782  et  seq.,  is  applica- 
>le  to  a  suit  brought  under  authority  of  sec- 
ion  2788,  by  an  employ^  against  a  federal  re* 
»lver  of  a  railroad  operated  partially  wlth- 
n  this  state.  Atkinson  v.  Swords,  74  S.  B. 
003,  1096,  11  Ga.  App.  167. 

VOW  OR  HEBEAFTEB 

The  bond  of  a  bank  to  p.  county  treas- 
urer, though  given  with  express  reference  to 
I  i%8olutlon  of  the  county  board  authorizing 
^e  deposit  In  the  bank  by  such  treasurer  of 


pobUo  funds  in  his  hands,  being,  In  tertns,  to 
secure  repayment  of  all  said  depestts  ''now  or 
hereafter  placed  in  said  bank  or  under  Its 
care  or  control  by  said  treasurer,'*  covers  de- 
poaiti  in  said  bank  of  such  funds  by  said 
treasorer  before  he  was  so  authorised,  the 
sureties  knowing  at  the  time  of  such  deposits. 
Sawyer  v.  Stilson,  125  N.  W.  822,  824,  146 
Iowa,  707. 

HOW  PROVIDED  BT  LAW 

See  As  Now  Provided. 

NOXIOUS 

"Noxious"  means  hurtful,  harmful,  in- 
jurious, destructive.  Johnson  v.  Northport 
Smelting  A  Refining  Co.,  97  Paa  746,  747,  60 
Wash,  567. 

irOZIOUS  BSTABUSHMEirr 

Any  other  noxious  establishment,  see 
Any  Other. 

HOXIOUS  PORTIQH  OR  SUBSTANCE 

"Noxious"  means  "hurtful,  harmful 
baneful,  pernicious,  destructive.*'  "Potion" 
means  "draught  used  as  a  liquid,  medlcinev 
or  dose."  (Webster,  Diet).  "Poison"  has  been 
defined  as  "a«y  substanee  which,  when  ap- 
plied to  the  body  externally,  or  ih  any  way 
introduced  into  the  system^  without  acting 
mechanically,  but  by  its  own  Inherent  quali- 
ties, is  capable  of  destroying  life"  (Beck, 
Med.  Jur.),  and  "as  a  substance  having  an 
inherent  deleterious  property,  which  renders 
It,  when  taken  into  the  system,  capable  of 
destroying  life"  (Wharton  A  Still^).  The 
term  **noxiou8  potion  or  substance"  is  a 
broader  term  than  "poison."  "Poison" 
would  not  Include  powdered  glass  or  boiling 
water,  while  "noxious  potion  or  substance" 
would  not  only  embrace  poisons,  but  the  lat- 
ter. As  used  in  a  statute  inflicting  a  punish- 
ment on  any  one  mingling  "any  other  noxious 
potion  or  substance  with  any  drug,  food,  or 
medicine,  with  Intent  to  kill  or  Injure  any 
person,"  the  word  "potion"  applies  to  some 
hurtful  or  baneful  liquid;  and  the  words 
"noxious  substance"  means  some  solid  of 
hurtful  or  baneful  character.  The  phrase 
"noxious  potion  or  substance"  means  some 
character  of  poison.  Runnels  v.  State,  77  S. 
W.  458,  460,  45  Tex.  Cr.  R.  446. 

NUISANCE 

See  Abatable  Nuisance;  Attractive  Nui- 
sance; Continuing  Nuisance;  Indict- 
able Nuisance;  Mixed  Nuisance;  Per- 
manent Nuisance;  Private  Nuisance; 
Public  or  Common  Nuisance. 

Abatement  of  nuisance,  see  Abatement 

Abatement  of  as  within  police  power,  see 
Police  Power. 

Other  nuisance,  see  Other. 

See,  also.  Annoy— Annoyanoa 


NUISANCE 


650 


NUISANOJD 


''Anything  that  worketh  hnrt,  InconTen- 
ience,  or  damage  to  another,  or  his  property, 
may  constltnte  a  nuisance."  Missouri,  K.  & 
Tl  By.  Co.  of  Texas  y.  Anderson,  81  S.  W. 
781,  787,  86  Tex.  av.  App.  121  (quoting  Bur- 
dltt  ▼.  Swenson,  17  Tex.  489,  001,  67  Am.  Dea 
660). 

A  "nuisance"  is  an  annoyance,  and,  ac- 
cording to  Blackstone,  it  signifies  anything 
that  woiiceth  hurt,  inconvenience,  or  damage. 
Hamm  t.  Briant,  124  S.  W.  112,  U3,  57  Tex. 
CftT.  App.  614. 

A  "nuisance"  is  anything  which  inter- 
feres with  the  rights  of  a  citizen,  either  in 
person,  property,  the  enjoyment  of  his  prop- 
erty, or  his  comfort  Thornton  ▼.  Dow,  111 
Pac.  899,  903,  60  Wash.  622,  82  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  968. 

A  *'nuisance"  is  anything  which  incom- 
modes, annoys,  or  produces  inconvenienoe  or 
damage.  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Lenfant, 
52  South.  575,  577,  126  La.  456,  29  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  S.)  642. 

"At  common  law  a  'nuisance^  was  any- 
thing that  worked  hurt  or  inconreni^iice  or 
damage."  City  of  Chicago  t.  Gunning  Sys- 
tem, 73  N.  B.  1035,  1038,  214  lU.  628,  70  h. 
R.  A.  230,  2  Ann.  Gas.  892  (<iuotlng  and  adop^ 
ing  definition  in  Harmon  ▼.  City  of  Chicago, 
110  111.  400,  413,  51  Am.  Rep.  698);  Jones  ▼. 
F.  8.  Royster  Guano  Co.,  65  S.  B.  861,  366,  6 
Oa.  App.  506w 

A  "nuisance"  is  defined  as  an  unreason- 
able, unwarrantable,  or  unlawful  use  of  one's 
own  property  to  the  annoyance^  inconven- 
ience, discomfort,  or  damage  of  another. 
Pritchard  v.  Bdison  Electric  Illuminating 
Co.,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  225,  226,  92  App.  Div.  178. 

A  'Nuisance"  is  anything  which  works 
hurt,  inconvenience,  or  damage;  anything 
which  essentially  interferes  with  the  enjoy- 
ment of  life  or  property.  State  ex  reL  Lyon 
V.  Columbia  Water  Power  Co.,  63  S.  B.  884, 
889,  82  S.  C.  181,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  435,  129 
Am.  St  Rep.  876,  17  Ann.  Cas.  343  (citing  29 
Cyc.  p.  1152;    Addison,  Torts,  370). 

The  word  "nuisance"  designates  a  dass 
of  wrongs  arising  from  an  unreasonable  or 
unlawful  use  of  property,  so  as  to  produce 
such  material  discomfort  or  injury  to  an- 
other that  the  law  presumes  damage;  every 
use  of  property,  so  as  to  materially  violate 
the  rights  of  another  being,  as  a  rule,  an 
actionable  nuisance.  McNulty  v.  Ludwig  & 
Co.,  138  N.  y.  Supp.  84,  87,  153  App.  Div. 
206. 

"The  term  'nuisance'  has  a  well-defined 
legal  meaning.  A  thing  cannot  be  declared 
a  nuisance  which  is  in  fact  not  a  nuisance." 
Boyd  V.  Board  of  Coundlmen,  77  S.  W.  669, 
673,  117  Ky.  199,  111  Am.  St  Rep.  240. 

A  "nuisance"  consists  in  unlawfully  do- 
ing an  act,  or  omitting  to  perform  a  duty, 
which  act  or  omission  either  annoys,  injures. 


or  endangors  the  comfort*  repose^  health,  c 
safety  of  others.  Town  of  Colton  ▼.  Scut 
Dakota  Cent  Land  Co.,  126  N.  W.  507,  50 
25  S.  D.  309,  28  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  122. 

"A  'nuisance'  is  anything  that  worket 
hurt,  inconvenience,  or  damage  to  anothei 
and  the  fact  that  the  act  done  may  otherwb 
be  lawful  does  not  keep  it  from  being  a  na 
sanoe.  The  inconvenience  complained  of  ma 
not  be  fanciful  or  such  as  would  aifect  on] 
one  fastidious  taste,  but  it  must  be  sndi  t 
would  affect  an  ordinary,  reasonable  maa 
Gabbett  v.  aty  of  Atlanta,  73  S.  B,  372,  3T 
137  Ga.  180  (quoting  and  applying  CIt.  Cod 
I  4457). 

Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  {  290,  defines  "^u 
sauce"  as  whatever  Is  injurious  to  health  c 
indecent  or  offensive  to  the  senses  or  an  ol 
struction  to  the  free  use  of  property,  so  as  t 
essentially  interfere  with  the  comfortabl 
enjoyment  of  life  or  property.  Russell  ^ 
State,  69  N.  B.  482,  483,  32  Ind.  App.  243. 

"Nuisance"  is  anything  done  to  the  bai 
or  annoyance  of  the  land  or  hereditameni 
of  another.  The  theory  is  the  doing  of  soin 
thing  intrinsically  lawful  in  a  manner  danut] 
ing  to  others;  it  being  the  resulting  damag 
that  creates  the  wrong.  Henry  v.  Cherry 
Webb,  73  Aa  97,  108,  30  R.  L  13»  24  L.  I 
A.  (N.  S.)  991,  136  Am.  St  Rep.  928,  18  Am 
Cas.  1006. 

When  the  cause  of  annoyance  and  disoon 
fort  arising  from  a  nuisance  is  oontinaoo} 
equity  will  restrain  it  Boyd  v.  Schrdsc 
(Tex.)  116  S.  W.  100,  104. 

The  question  of  nuisance  vel  non  cannc 
be  determined  by  reference  to  the  rules  of  tt 
common  law,  but  each  case  must  be  consic 
ered  on  its  own  fiicts.  A  thing  may  or  ma 
not  be  a  nuisance  according  to  the  msDoe 
in  which  it  is  used,  the  situation  in  whidi  i 
is  placed,  or  the  time  it  has  been  carried  o 
without  complaint,  when  measured  by  tb 
mind  and  taste  of  the  average  citizen.  Den^ 
more  v.  Evergreen  Camp  No.  147,  "Woodnie 
of  the  World,  112  Pac.  255,  61  Wash.  230, 3 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  608,  Ann.  Cas.  1912B.  1206. 

To  constitute  a  nuisance,  there  most  b 
more  than  a  tendency  to  injure,  and  tbtf 
must  be  something  appreciable,  tangible,  ac 
tual,  or  subsisting,  and,  in  determiniu 
whether  an  injury  charged  comes  witbt 
these  general  terms,  regard  must  be  had  t 
the  notions  of  comfort  and  convenience  entei 
tained  by  persons  generally  of  ordinar 
tastes  and  susceptibilities,  and  the  nuisaDC 
and  discomfort  must  affect  the  ordinary  con 
fort  of  existence  as  understood  by  the  peopfa 
Everett  v.  Paschall,  111  Pac.  879,  881,  6 
Wash.  47,  31  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  827,  Ann.  Csi 
1912B,  1128. 

A  ''nuisance"  is  confined  to  80<^  matter 
of  annoyance  as  the  law  recognizes,  and  fo 
which  it  gives  a  remedy  by  way  of  redress  o 
abatement  or  in  a  proper  case,  by  restraioi^ 


KT7I8ANOB 


651 


NUISANOD 


rocess.    Berger  v.  Smith,  75  &  Bl  1008,  UOO, 
K)  N.  C.  206. 

''What  is  a  nniaanci^  Is  a  relative  qiies- 
on  oftener  than  it  la  an  abstract  fact 
lackstone  was  wise  in  not  attempting  an 
cplidt  and  invariable  definition,  and  in  con- 
ning himself  to  general  terms.  He  said  a 
loisance*  is  'anything  that  worketh  hurt, 
(Convenience,  or  damage.* "  C3lty  of  St 
ouis  V.  (lalt,  77  8.  W.  876,  879,  179  Mo.  8, 
J  li.  R.  A.  778. 

The  test  of  nuisance  is  not  injury  and 
amage  simply,  but  injury  and  damage  re- 
citing from  the  violation  of  the  legal  right 
r  another.  There  is  no  nuisance,  however 
luch  of  injury  and  damage  may  ensue ;  but, 
I  a  right  is  violated,  there  is  an  actionable 
nisance,  even  though  no  actual  damage  re- 
alts  therefrom.  Powell  v.  Brookfleld  Press- 
a  Brick  &  Tile  Mfg.  Co.,  78  S.  W.  646,  647, 
04  Mo.  App.  713  (quoting  Wood,  Nuls.  1015). 

The  word  "nuisance"  means  that  which 
nnoys  or  gives  trouble;  annoys  or  disturbs 
ne  in  the  possession  of  his  property,  making 
\s  ordinary  use  or  occupation  physically  un- 
omfortable  to  him.  Iverson  v.  Dilno,  119 
^ac  719,  721,  44  Mont  270. 

Under  Snyder's  Comp.  Laws,  |  4751,  and 
J  the  common  law,  anything  which  annoys 
r  endangers  the  comfort  repose,  or  safety 
f  others  is  a  nuisance.  Ex  parte  Jones,  109 
'ac.  670,  573,  4  OkL  Cr.  74,  31  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
48, 140  Am.  St  Rep.  665. 

A  thing  is  not  a  *'nuisance"  merely  be> 
aase  a  municipal  ordinance  declares  it  to  be 
nch,  but  the  state  may  declare  what  shall 
»e  deemed  a  "nuisance."  Inhabitants  of 
loulton  V.  Titcomb,  66  Atl.  733,  738,  102 
ie.  272,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  580,  120  Am.  St 
lep.  492. 

Under  Giy.  Code  1896,  |  3861,  a  nuisance 
s  not  as  at  common  law  essentially  an  injury 
0  real  property,  hat  any  nnlawfiil  use  of 
•roperty  whereby  another  is  injured,  whether 
D  property,  business,  person,  or  otherwise,  is 
in  actionable  nuisanoe.  Towaliga  Falls  Pow- 
r  Co.  V.  Sims,  66  S.  B.  844,  846^  6  Ga.  App. 
49. 

Irrespective  of  Its  public  or  private  na- 
ore,  a  ^^nulsance"  is  'literally  an  annoyance, 
iDd  signifies  in  law  such  a  use  of  property 
>r  such  a  course  of  conduct  as,  irrespective  of 
ictual  trespass  against  others  or  of  malicious 
>r  actual  criminal  intent  transgresses  the 
Qst  restricttons  vpon  use  or  conduct  whidi 
he  proximity  of  other  persons  or  property 
n  civilized  communities  imposes  upon  what 
^ould  otherwise  be  rightful  freedom."  John- 
son V.  City  of  New  York,  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  754, 
r56.  109  App.  Div.  821 ;  Acme  FertUizer  Co. 
^  State,  72  N.  K.  1037,  34  Ind.  App.  346,  107 
^  St  Rep.  190. 

Code  Civ.  Proe.  |  781,  defines  a  '*nui- 
Buioe"  as  anything  which   is  injurious  to 


health,  or  Indecent,  or  offensive  to  the  senses^ 
or  an  obstruction  to  the  free  use  of  property, 
so  as  to  interfere  with  the  comfortable  enjoy- 
ment of  life  or  property,  and  mere  deprecia- 
tion in  value  of  surrounding  property  has  no 
tendency  to  prove  the  cause  of  the  depreci- 
ation a  nuisance.  Meek  v.  De  Latour,  83  Pac 
300,  302,  2  Cal.  App.  261. 

"A  'nuisance'  is  literally  an  annoyance, 
and  signifies  In  law  such  a  use  of  property  or 
such  a  course  of  conduct  as  •  ♦  •  trans- 
gresses the  Just  restrictions  upon  use  or  con- 
duct which  the  proximity  of  other  persons  or 
property  in  civilized  communities  imposes  up- 
on what  would  otherwise  be  rightful  free- 
dom." The  right  to  have  a  nuisance  on  an- 
other's property  restrained  or  abated  is  not 
based  upon  an  assertion  of  title  to  such  prop- 
erty, or  of  any  proprietary  interest  therein, 
or  right  or  claim  to  the  property  itself,  but  is, 
on  the  contrary,  based  solely  upon  the  breach 
of  a  personal  duty  which  the  owner  of  the 
property  owes  to  his  neighbor  In  its  manage- 
ment and  use;  a  breach  of  duty  which  may 
be  punished  by  indictment,  where  the  nui- 
sance is  of  a  public  character,  and  which  ren- 
ders the  offender  personally  liable  In  dam- 
ages to  the  Injured  neighbor.  And  therefore- 
the  assertion  by  the  neighbor  of  his  right  to- 
have  the  nuisanoe  restrained  or  abated,  beinr 
based  on  the  personal  wrong  and  breach  tl 
duty  on  the  part  of  the  owner,  and  seeking 
merely  to  enforce  the  Just  restrictions  which 
the  law  imposes  upon  him,  in  the  use  of 
his  property,  and  prevent  misuse,  cannot  be 
regarded  in  any  Just  sense  as  the  assertion 
on  the  part  of  the  neighbor  of  a  claim  to 
property  within  the  meaning  of  the  Judiciary 
act  Ladew  v.  Tennessee  Copper  Co^  179 
Fed.  246,  262. 

To  determine  a  nuisance,  the  criterion  Is 
whether  the  condition  is  so  serious  as  to  in- 
terfere with  the  comfort  of  Ufe  and  enjoy- 
ment of  property,  or  so  threatening  as  to  con- 
stitute an  imp^iding  danger  to  persons  In  the 
enjoyment  of  their  legitimate  rights.  Kilts 
V.  Board  of  Sup*rs  of  Kent  County,  127  N. 
W.  821,  823, 162  Mich.  646. 

Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  i  291,  defining  a 
nuisance  as  whatever  is  injurious  to  health, 
or  indecent,  or  offensive  to  the  senses,  or  an 
obstruction  to  the  free  use  of  property  so  as 
to  interfere  with  the  comfortable  enjoyment 
of  life  or  property,  defines  in  general  lan- 
guage a  nuisance,  and  the  court  must  de- 
termine whether  facts  charged  bring  a  partic- 
ular case  within  the  statute.  Lake  Shore 
A  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  L.  S.  A  8.  B.  Ry. 
Co.,  92  N.  B.  989,  990,  48  Ind.  App.  684. 

**  'Nuisance,'  in  its  largest  sense,  sigiiilles 
anything  that  worketh  hurt,  inconvenienos^ 
or  damage.  It  Is  ^ther  public,  annoying  aR 
the  parties  In  the  community,  or  It  is  private^ 
Injuriously  affecting  the  lands,  tenements,  or 
hereditaments  of  an  individual"  (Blackstone). 
"A  'nuisance,*  In  the  ordinary  sense  In  which 


NUISANOB 


662 


KUISANGB 


the  word  Is  used,  is  anytUng  that  produces 
an  annoyance,  anything  that  disturbs  one 
or  is  offensive;  but  in  legal  phraseology  it 
is  applied  to  that  class  of  wrongs  that  arise 
from  the  unreasonable,  unwarrantable,  or  un- 
lawful use  by  a  person  of  his  own  property, 
real  or  personal,  or  from  his  own  improper, 
indecent,  or  unlawful  personal  conduct,  work- 
ing an  obstruction  of  or  injury  to  a  right 
of  another  or  of  the  public,  and  producing 
such  material  annoyance,  inconvenience,  dis- 
comfort, or  hurt  that  the  law  will  presume  a 
consequent  damage.  Indeed,  it  may  be  stated 
as  a  general  proposition  that  every  enjoy-, 
ment  by  one  of  his  own  property,  which  vio- 
lates the  right  of  another  in  an  essential  de- 
gree, is  a  nuisance,  and  actionable  as  such  at 
the  suit  of  the  party  injured  thereby.  While 
it  is  true  that  every  person  has  and  may  exer- 
cise exclusive  dominion  over  his  own  prop- 
erty of  every  description,  and  has  a  right  to 
enjoy  it  in  all  the  ways  and  for  all  the  pur- 
poses in  which  such  property  is  usually  en- 
Jpyed,  yet  this  is  subject  to  the  qualification 
that  his  use  and  enjoyment  of  it  must  be  rea- 
sonable, and  such  as  will  not  prejudicially  af- 
fect the  rights  of  others."  Baker  v.  Mc- 
Daniel,  77  S.  W.  531,  637,  178  Mo.  447  (quot- 
ing Wood,  NuisO. 

An  actional  "nuisance"  is  anything 
wrongfully  done  or  permitted  which  injures 
or  annoys  another  in  the  enjoyment  of  his 
legal  rights.  To  constitute  a  nuisance,  it  is 
not  necessary  that  the  annoyance  should  be 
of  a  character  to  endanger  health.  It  is  suifl^ 
dent  if  it  occasions  what  is  offensive  to  the 
senses  and  which  renders  the  enjoyment  of 
life  and  property  uncomfortable.  Even  that 
which  does  but  cause  a  wellrfounded  appre- 
hension of  danger  may  be  a  nuisance.  The 
unauthorized  or  unreasonable  use  of,  or  the 
neglect  of  properly  and  reasonably  using, 
one's  own  property,  to  the  detriment,  hurt,  an- 
noyance, discomfort,  injury,  or  damage  of 
another  in  his  property  or  legal  rights,  or  of 
the  public,  is  a  nuisance.  A  use  made  by  one 
of  his  own  property,  which  works  an  irrep- 
arable injury  to  another's  property,  or  which 
deprives  his  neighbor  of  the  reasonable  and 
comfortable  enjoyment  and  use  of  his  prop- 
erty, or  which  violates  the  unwritten  but  ac- 
cepted law  of  decency,  or  which  endangers 
or  renders  insecure  the  life  and  health  of 
his  neighbor,  is  a  nuisance.  It  is  difficult 
to  define  Just  what  degree  of  injurious  an- 
noyance must  be  reached  in  order  to  war- 
rant the  court  in  determining  what  circum- 
stances constitute  a  nuisance.  A  mere  tend^ 
ency  to  injury  is  not  sufficient.  There  must 
be  something  actually  appreciable  which  of 
itself  arrests  the  attention,  that  rests  not 
merely  in  theory,  but  strikes  the  common 
sense  of  the  ordinary  eiti^n.  The  determina- 
tion, however,  of  the  question  rests  in  sound 
Judgment,  and  depends  upon  common  sense 
ift  each  case.  Sandet»  v.  Miller,  113  S.  W. 
996,  998,  62  Tex.  Ov.  App.  372  (dtlng  Black. 


Com.;   Btirdltt  y.  Swenaon^  17  T^z.  489, 
Am.  Dec.  666 ;  Joyce,  Nuisances,  H  11,  19). 

Crime  dUtl^gnislied 

"Crime"  and  "nuisance"  are  not  ct 
vertible  terms.  Hefferon  v.  New  York  Ta: 
cab  Co.,  130  N.  T.  Supp.  710,  712,  146  Aj 
Div.  311. 

If eBliKonoe  dlatingiilalied 

A  "nuisance"  involves  the  dement 
positive  wrongdoing,  as  distinguished  fire 
mere  negligence;  and  the  mere  "permlttini 
of  a  dog  to  lie  in  a  hallway  of  an  apartme 
house  does  not  amount  to  a  private  nulsaiK 
McCluskey  v.  Wile,  129  N.  Y.  Supp.  455,  45 
144  App.  Dlv.  470. 

Injnvy  to  healtli 

The  "nuisance"  contemplated  by  Heali 
Act  (2  Gen.  St  1895,  p.  1637)  |  28,  permittii 
any  local  board  of  iiealth  to  file  a  bill  in  t] 
name  of  the  state  for  an  injunction  to  pr 
hlbit  the  continuance  of  a  nuisance  hazari 
ous  to  public  health,  is  a  nuisance  which 
hazardous  to  public  health,  and  hence  tl 
subject  of  indictment  Board  of  Health  < 
Pompton  Lakes  v.  E.  I.  Du  Pont  de  Nemou: 
Powder  Co.,  80  AtL  998,  1000,  79  N.  J.  Eq.  3 

The.  allegations  of  the  petition  on  a  d 
murrer  to  Which  the  defendants  elected  i 
stand,  taken  as  true,  showed  that  a  Urj 
number  of  hogs  were  kept  adjacent  to  ti 
city  in  such  a  manner  that  odors  from  tX 
place  and  from  garbage  hauled  thereto  wei 
offensive  to  the  people  living  in  the  neighbo 
hood  and  to  those  who  passed  along  tl 
streets,  and  offensive  to  such  an  extent  as  i 
impair  the  health  of  citizens  and  diminis 
the  value  of  their  property.  Held  to  const 
tute  a  nuisance,  the  continuance  of  whic 
should  be  perpetually  enjoined.  Kansas  Qt 
V.  Sihler  Hog  Cholera  Serum  Co.,  125  Pai 
70,  71,  87  Kan.  786  (citing  5  Words  an 
Phrases,  pp.  4855-4866). 

Pkysieal  Imjmry  to  property 

Anything  which  causes  hurt  or  damag 
to  the  lands  or  tenements  of  another,  or  li 
terferee  with  the  reasonable  employment  c 
the  same,  is  a  "nuisance;"  In  an  actio 
against  a  railroad  company,  where  the  con 
plaiot  alleges  that  plaintiffa  land  was  injui 
ed  by  the  negligent  flow  of  adds  from  tb 
tower  house,  and  the  testimony  shows  thi 
defendant's  employes  constantly  poared  tb 
contents  of  vessels  oontaining  adds  on  plain 
tiff's  land,  and  that  such  acta  had  been  don 
within  six  years  before  bringli^  suit,  it  i 
error  to  enter  a  nonsuit  Stokes  v.  Pennsjl 
vania  R.  Co.,  63  Atl.  1028,  1030,  214  Pa.  412 

The  t)laclng,  by  a  mining  company,  o 
slack,  copperas,  and  other  deleterious  sub 
stances  in  and  near  a  water  course  on  iti 
land,  which  the  ordinary  rains  washed  orei 
the  lands  of  a  lower  proprietor,  ttins  injur 
ing  and  rendering  them  unfit  for  agrlcoltnn 
constitutes  a  nuisance;    a   nuisaaee  beim 


NUISANOB 


iroiSANOB 


anytidng  done  to  ttae  hurt  or  annoyance  of 
the  lands  of  another.  N^  GonsoL  Goal  & 
Coking  Co.  ▼.  Lynch,  133  8.  W.  763,  79^  141 
Ky.  711. 

The  use  of  water  by  an  upper  riparian 
proprietor  in  such  a  way  as  to  carry  sand, 
gravel,  and  mining  debris  over  the  land  of  a 
lower  proprietor,  rendering  it  valueless,  con- 
stitutes a  "nuisance,"  both  at  common  law 
and  under  Giv.  Gode,  |  4550,  defining  a  nui- 
sance as  anytliing  injurious  to  health  or  in- 
terfering with  the  comfortable  enjoyment  of 
life  or  property  or  unlawfully  obstructing 
the  customary  use  of  a  river.  Chessman  v. 
Hale,  79  Pa&  254,  257,  81  Mont  577,  68  L.  R. 
A.  410,  3  Ann.  Gas.  1088. 

A  "nuisance"  is  "anything  that  worketh 
hurt,  inconvenience,  or  damage  to  another" 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  by  Black- 
stone).  The  discharge  of  adds  and  waste 
from  an  oil  mill,  and  other  ofl^ulve  matter 
from  onttKrases  used  In  connection  there- 
with, into  a  ditch  originally  oonatmcted  for 
dratoage  of  the  land,  and  extending  through 
the  land  of  an  adjoining  owner,  by  which 
the  latter  suffers  injury  to  his  ecope  and 
from  the  offensive  and  unwholesome  odors, 
constitutes  a  private  nuisance  Bxley  v. 
Southern  Gotten  OU  Go.,  151  Fed.  101,  103. 

Bvery  person  is  bound  to  make  a  reason- 
able use  of  his  property,  so  aa  to  occasion 
no  unnecessary  damage  or  auAoyanoe  to  his 
neighbor.  If  he  make  an  unreasonablei  un- 
warrantable, or  unlawful  use  of  it,  so  as  to 
produce  material  annoyance,  inconvenience, 
discomfort,  or  hurt  to  his  neighbor,  he  will 
be  guilty  of  a  "nuisance"  to  his  neighbor. 
And  the  law  wUl  hold  him  responsible  for 
the  consequ^it  damage.  "What  is  a  reason- 
able use  of  one's  own  property  cannot  be  de- 
fined by  any  certain  general  rules,  but  must 
depend  upon  the  drcumstances  of  each  case. 
A  use  of  property  in  one  locality  and  under 
some  circumstances  may  be  lawful  and  rea- 
sonable, which  under  other  circumstances 
would  be  unlawful,  unreasonable,  and  a  nui- 
sance. To  constitute  a  'nuisance,'  the  use 
must  be  sadh  as  to  produce  a  tangible  and 
appreciable  injury  to  neighboring  property, 
or  such  as  to  render  its  enjoyment  specially 
uncomfortable  or  inconvenient."  The  opera- 
tion of  the  works  of  a  cement  company,  dur^ 
ing  the  season  for  harvesting  ice,  in  such 
manner  as  to  ttirow  on  the  ice  cinders,  ashes, 
coal  dust,  and  other  substances  which  nfight 
sink  into  the  ice  and  render  it  unmerchant- 
able, was  a  nuisance.  Aiberican  Ice  Go.  v. 
Catskill  Gement  Co.,  88  N.  T.  Supp.  455,  450, 
43  Misc.  Bep.  221  (quoting  and  adopting  def- 
inition in  Gampbell  v.  Seaman,  63  N.  Y.  568, 
577,  20  Am.  Bep.  567). 

TrespAM  diatlasvialied 

See  Trespass. 
▲eta  ov  ¥iurimesa  anthoriaed  fey  Hmm 

That  cannot  be  a  "nuisance,"  so  as  to 
give  a  common-law  right  of.  action,  whicdi 


the  law  authorised.  Gasey  v.  Wrought  Iron 
Bridge  Go.,  89  S.  W.  380,  384,  114  Mo.  App. 
47  (citing  Payne  v.  BCansas  Gity,  St  J.  ft  G.  B. 
By.  Go.,  20  8.  W.  322,  112  Mo.  6,  17  L.  B.  A. 
628;  5  Words  and  PhraBes,  p.  4861;  Trana- 
portation  Go.  ▼.  Ghicago,  99  U.  S.  640,  25  Ij. 
Ed.  336;  Whitfi^d  v.  Town  of  GarroUton,  50 
Mb.  App.  98). 

"Nuisances"  always  arise  from  unlawful 
acts.  That  which  Is  lawful  can  never  be  a 
nuisance.  Therefore,  where  the  Legislature, 
by  a  ph>per  act,  authorizes  that  to  be  done 
which  would  otherwise  be  a  nuisance,  the 
act  is  made  lawful  and  is  not  a  nuisance  so 
far  as  the  public  is  concerned,  unless  the 
power  given  by  the  Legislature  Is  exceeded. 
"There  are  two  classes  of  nuisances,  public 
and  private.  •  •  •  There  is  no  differ- 
ence between  these  two  kinds  of  nuisances 
except  as  they  affect  the  public  or  any  cer- 
tain individual&"  A  legislative  charter  to  a 
boom  corporation  to  do  work  which,  without 
the  charter,  would  be  a  nuisance  absolves  it 
from  liability  by  indictment  or  otherwise, 
but  does  not  exempt  it  from  action  by  an  in- 
dividual injured  by  its  existence  as  a  private 
nuisance.  Pickois  v»  Goal  Biver  Boom  & 
Timber  Go.,  65  B.  B.  865,  866,  66  W.  Va.  10, 
24  L.  B.  A.  (K  S.)  364  <anoting  and  adopting 
1  Wood,  Nuisances,  pi  2,  note). 

If  legislative  sanction  is  given  to  such 
acts  that  otherwise  would  be  deemed  a  "nui- 
sance" (as,  for  instance,  by  St  1894,  p.  446, 
c.  399,  licensing  the  storage  of  petroleum  or 
any  of  its  products),  tliey  cease  to  be  such 
when  properly  exercised  within  the  terms  of 
the  license  which  authorizes  and  permits 
them.  '  Gommonwealth  v.  Packard,  69  N.  E. 
1067,  185  Mass.  64  (citing  Gommonwealth  v. 
Gity  of  Boston,  97  Mass.  555 ;  Badger  v.  Gity 
of  Boston,  130  Mass.  170;  Aldworth  v,  Gity 
of  Lynn,  26  N.  E.  229,  153  Mass.  53,  10  L. 
B.  A.  210,  25  Am.  St.  Bep.  608;  Ba.con  v. 
aty  of  Boston.  28  N.  El  9,  154  Mass.  100; 
White  V.  Kenney,  31  N.  E.  664,  1^7  Mass.  12, 
13;  Taft  v.  Commonwealth,  33  N.  E.  1046, 
158  Mass.  526^48). 

An  offensive  trade  or  manufacture  may 
require  interfer^ce  In  equity  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  a  nuisance  for,  though  necessary 
and  lawful,  it  shouM  be  exeidsed  in  &  re- 
mote place.  •  McQIll  v.  Pintsch  Gompressing 
Go.,  U8  N.  W.  786,  788,  140  Iowa,  429,  20  L. 
B.  A.  (N,  S.)  466. 

A  business  .  may  belranie  a  nuJsanoe^ 
where  it  is  not  conducted  with,  dne  regard  to 
the  rights  of  surrounding  property  owners, 
and  renders  the  enjoyment  of  th^  property 
Impossible.  Nowak  v.  Baler,  77  Atl.  1062, 
1063,.78N.  J.  Bq.  112. 

That  crowds  of  people,  with  their  teams, 
will  congregate  at  or  near  a  cotton  gin  when 
erected,  does. not  render  the  gin  a. nuisance, 
where  it  Is  not  claimed  that  the  crowds  will 
conduct  themselves  in:iproperiy.  Bobinson 
V.  Dale  (Tex.)  031  a  W.  806^  8ia 


mrtsANGB 


654 


NUISANCE 


The  erection  by  a  railroad  company  of 
switch  tracks  and  a  freight  depot  In  a  resi- 
dence neighborhood  directly  across  the  street 
from  complainant's  residence  and  flat  build- 
ing, and  the  constmctlon  of  an  elevated 
drlTeway  from  the  street  to  the  tracks  and 
depot,  but  In  such  a  manner  as  not  to  cause 
the  traffic  to  Interfere  with  the  use  of  com- 
plainant's property  any  more  than  any  other 
constant  use  of  the  street  would  do,  cannot 
be  enjoined  as  a  "nuisance" ;  there  being  no 
showing  that  the  depot  was  not  neoessary, 
or  that  It  could  hare  been  as  conveniently 
built  elsewhere.  Walther  ▼.  Chicago  &  W. 
I.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  B.  461-463,  216  111.  456. 

One  may  not  create  a  '^nuisance"  and 
Justlf;^  himself  in  a  continuation  thereof  up- 
on the  ground  that  his  establishment  is  a 
source  of  benefit  and  profit  to  the  community, 
and,  as  applied  to  a  water  course,  a  nuisance 
Is  created  when  the  use  of  stream  by  the 
first  user  Is  unreasonable  In  character,  and 
such  as  to  produce  a  condition  actually  de- 
structive of  physical  comfort  or  health,  or  a 
tangible,  visible  injury  to  property.  ▲  ripa- 
rian proprietor  operating  a  creamery,  who 
deposits  refuse  therefrom  in  a  stream  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  produce  a  condition  de- 
structive of  physical  comfort  or  health,  or  to 
create  a  tangible,  visible  Injury  to  property 
rights  of  the  lower  riparian  proprietor,  is 
guilty  of  an  act  constituting  a  nuisance. 
Bowman  v.  Humphrey,  100  N.  W.  854,  855, 
124  Iowa,  744  (citing  Ferguson  v.  Flrmenlch 
Mfg.  Co.,  42  N.  W.  448,  77  Iowa,  576,  14  Am. 
St  Rep.  319;  Weston  Paper  Co.  v.  Pope,  57 
N.  E.  719,  155  Ind.  394,  56  L.  R.  A.  899; 
Gould,  Waters,  |  206;  Wood,  Nuls.  |  640); 
Id.,  109  N.  W.  714,  715,  132  Iowa,  234,  6  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1111,  U  Ann.  Cas.  131. 

Residents  of  cities,  towns,  or  villages 
must  of  necessity  submit  to  consequences  re- 
sulting from  occupations  and  pursuits  car- 
ried on  in  the  immediate  neighborhood  which 
are  lawful  and  necessary  for  trade  and  com- 
merce; and  matters  which,  though  in  them- 
selves annoying,  are  in  the  nature  of  ordi- 
nary incidents  of  city  or  town  life,  cannot  be 
abated  as  nuisances.  Locality  is  to  be  con- 
sidered in  determining  whether  a  certain  use 
of  property  is  a  nuisance.  Gose  v.  Coryell 
(Tex.)  126  S.  W.  1164.  1168. 

The  mere  imposition  of  more  railway 
tracks,  or  the  Increased  use  of  the  tracks 
beyond  what  may  originally  have  been 
thought  probable,  resulting  from  the  loca- 
tion of  defendant's  depot  on  land  acquired 
by  it  adjoining  the  avenue,  did  not  constitute 
a  "nuisance."  Oklahoma  City  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dunham,  88  S.  W.  849,  850,  39  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  575. 

The  presumption  that  a  telephone  pole 
in  a  street,  claimed  by  plaintiff  to  be  a  nui- 
sance, was  erected  with  the  consent  of  the 
city  council,  arising  from  the  absence  of  an 
averment  to  the  contrary  in  the  complaint 


to  compel  the  removal  of  the  pole,  would  i 
render  the  complaint  bad.  Merchants'  M 
Tel.  C6.  V.  Hlrschman,  87  N.  B.  238,  241, 
Ind.  App.  283. 

AdTertisiiic  stsns 

A  corporation  operating  public  sta; 
through  principal  streets  of  a  dty,  pern 
ting  its  vehicles  to  carry  advertising  si| 
bearing  colors,  constituting  a  dlsfigarenM 
rather  than  ornament,  but  not  Injuring  p 
lie  comfort,  health,  or  safety,  cannot  be 
strained  by  Injunction  from  exhibiting  si 
signs  on  the  ground  that  they  constitute 
nuisance.  Fifth  Avenue  Coach  Co.  v.  C 
of  New  York,  111  N.  T.  Supp.  759,  761, 
Misc.  Rep.  401. 

BlMtiiiK 

Blasting,  without  reference  to  Uie  p 
tlcular  locality  in  which  it  is  carried  on, 
not  so  intrinsically  dangerous  as  to  be  1] 
facto  a  "nuisance,"  so  that  a  blaster  woi 
be  liable  for  the  injury  caused  by  it,  whe 
er  or  not  he  was  guilty  of  any  ne^rllgence 
the  manner  in  which  the  blasting  was  do 
Houghton  V.  Loma  Prieta  Lumber  Ca, 
Pac.  82,  84,  152  CaL  500,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
913,  14  Ann.  Cas.  1159. 

Where  defendant  by  blasting  caused  n 
to  fall  into  a  stream  where  plaintiffs  w 
to  erect  a  pier  for  defendant,  the  injury  v 
not  a  nuisance,  since  the  term  *^iiiaance" 
volves  the  idea  of  continuity  or  recurra 
of  the  acts  causing  the  injury,  while  a  *^i 
constituting  an  invasion  of  personal  or  o 
tract  right,  expends  its  force  in  one  a 
though  the  injurious  consequences  may  be 
long  duration.  McCalla  v.  Louisville  &  N. 
Co.,  50  South.  971,  972, 163  Ala.  107. 

BowUbls  alley 

A  person  keeidng  bowling  alleys  undei 
license  granted  under  Rev.  Laws,  c  102, 
168,  is  not  liable  for  maintaining  a  *^ 
sance,"  where  the  alleys  are  built  in  the  mi 
ner  such  alleys  are  usually  built,  with  pi 
and  cushions  to  deaden  the  noise  caused 
the  rolling  of  the  balls,  and  where  the  alle: 
as  run,  make  no  more  noise  than  wonld  be  i 
pected  under  similar  circumstances.  Levin 
Goodwin,  77  N.  B.  718,  191  Mass.  341,  1 
Am.  St  R^.  616. 


.In  an  action  to  enjoin  a  public  **iii 
sance"  resulting  from  a  dam,  an  instruct] 
that  before  plaintiff  could  recover  the  ju 
must  find  that  the  dam  caused  sewage,  et 
to  accumulate  above  the  dam  so  as  to  actoi 
ly  pollute  the  water  and  render  the  Ht 
"materially"  unwholesome  or  offensive 
those  residing  near  by,  or  In  some  "materia 
respect  added  to  such  offensive  condition,  w. 
not  erroneous  as  tending  to  mislead  the  jui 
and  as  imposing  a  greater  degree  of  pro 
than  required.  Royd  T.  Schreiner  (Tex.)  1 
S.  W.  100,  104. 


NUISANCB 


965 


miisAi^cs 


Where  defendant  maintained  a  stairway 
leading  to  a  basement,  the  top  of  the  stairs 
betng  over  4%  feet  from  the  sidewalk  and 
in  a  private  alley,  the  stairway  was  not  a 
'^noisaBce,"  and  defendant  was  not  liable  to 
a  person  who,  while  walking  on  the  sidewalk 
and  in  attempting  to  avoid  a  runaway  horse, 
fell  down  the  stairs.  Sheehan  v.  Bailey  Bldg. 
Co.,  85  Pac.  44,  45,  42  Wash.  535. 

Pen.  Gode,  |  420,  requiring  one  cutting 
ice  to  sorronnd  the  openings  with  guards  to 
obstrnct  the  free  passage  of  persons  into  the 
hole,  and  making  failure  to  do  so  a  misde- 
meanor, is  a  condition  to  the  right  to  cut  ice, 
and  the  failure  to  do  so  at  a  place  much 
used  for  skating  would  constitute  a  nuisance 
within  section  385,  making  it  a  public  nui- 
sance to  unlawfully  omit  to  perform  a  duty 
which  endangers  the  safety  of  a  considerable 
number  of  persons.  Llnzey  v.  American  Ice 
Co.,  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  767.  768,  131  App,  Div, 
333. 

A  lease  limiting  the  liability  of  the  ten- 
ant respecting  orders  of  a  city  department 
to  those  issued  for  the  correction,  prevention, 
and  abatement  of  "nuisances"  or  **other 
grieyances"  does  not  render  the  tenant  liable 
for  the  cost  of  a  fire  escape,  as  the  words 
are  to  be  taken  in  their  natural  and  usual 
sense.  The  absence  of  a  fire  escape  is  not  a 
^'nuisance,"  as  that  word  is  commonly  used, 
and  the  more  generic  words  "other  grievanc- 
es'* do  not  extend  the  plaintifT's  liability  so 
far  as  to  render  him  liable  for  the  cost  of  the 
fire  escape.  Kalman  v.  Ck>z,  92  N.  T.  Supp. 
816,  46  Misc.  Rep.  589. 

DeMi  body 

A  guest  of  a  hotel,  who  knowingly  per- 
mits the  body  of  a  dead  infant  to  be  con* 
cealed  in  the  rooms  occupied  by  him,  or  caus- 
es it  to  be  concealed  in  any  other  part  of  the 
building,  and  in  either  case  to  remain  un- 
til it  becomes  ofTenslve  to  other  guests,  com- 
mits a  nuisance,  and  may  be  chargeable  with 
liability  for  damages  resulting  to  the  land- 
lord's business ;  but,  unless  he  actively  caus- 
es or  participates  in  the  concealment  in  a 
place  not  under  his  control,  he  is  not  charge- 
able with  liability  unless  the  act  was  done 
by  one  for  whom  he  is  responsible.  Parkes 
V.  Seasongood,  152  Fed.  583,  585. 

Dxmiiia 

Where  a  drain  laid  by  property  owners  in 
a  public  street,  under  permission  from  the 
dty,  empties  into  a  natural  stream,  and 
thereafter,  without  express  license  from  the 
dty,  is  used  as  a  sewer  to  discharge  sewage 
into  the  stream  to  the  injury  of  a  lower  ri- 
parian owner,  the  drain  is  a  "nuisance,*'  and 
the  dty  is  liable  for  negligence  in  not  abating 
it  Schlesiqger  v.  Gilhooly,  81  N.  E.  619,  631, 
189  N.  Y.  1,  12  Ann.  Cas.  1138. 


I^runkenness  In  a  public  place  Is  a  nui- 
sance 9^d  disorderly  conduct,  within  Klrby's 


Dig.  11  5438,  5461,  authorising  munidpal  cor- 
porations by  ordinance  to  prevent  nuisances 
and  disorderly  conduct  Dewitt  v.  Lacotts, 
88  S.  W.  877,  878,  76  Ark.  250. 

EzploslTes 

Whether  the  maintenance  of  a  powder 
magazine  within  1,000  feet  of  a  dwelling 
house  was  a  "nuisance"  was  a  question  for 
the  Jury,  In  an  action  for  injuries  caused  by 
an  explosion  of  the  magazine.  H.  S.  Ker- 
baugh  V.  Caldwell,  151  Fed.  194, 196,  80  C.  G. 
A.  470,  10  Ann.  Cas.  453. 

To  constitute  the  keeping  of  gunpowder 
a  nuisance,  there  must  be  negligence  in  the 
fact  or  the  manner  of  keeping  and  storing 
the  gunpowder;  and  whether  the  storing  of 
gunpowder  is  a  nulsimce  depends  on  the  lo- 
cality, quantity,  and  surrounding  drcum- 
stances.  Where  a  powder  magazine  was  im- 
perfectly constructed  and  improvldently 
maintained,  and  its  location,  manner  of  con- 
struction, and  maintenance  was  dangerous  to 
life  and  property,  the  magazine  was  a  nui- 
sance, and  the  owner  thereof  was  liable  for 
an  explosion  thereof.  Fisher  v.  Western 
Fuse  &  Explosives  Co.,  108  Pac  659,  662,  12 
CaL  App.  739. 

"A  'nuisance,'  at  common  law,  may  con- 
sist in  the  keeping  or  manufacture  of  gun- 
powder, naphtha,  or  other  explosive  or  in- 
flammable substances  in  such  quantities  and 
places  or  in  such  manner  as  to  be  dangerous 
to  the  persons  and  property  of  the  inhabit- 
ants of  the  neighborhood."  In  a  community 
sparsely  settled,  a  magazine  of  the  capadty 
of  that  belonging  to  defendants,  when  filled 
with  the  quantity  of  gunpowder  shown  by  the 
evidence,  may  not  imperil  life  or  property  in 
the  vicinity  by  reason  of  a  possible  explosion ; 
but,  if  located  In  a  more  populous  neighbor- 
hood, it  might  be  found  to  endanger  both.  In 
such  an  inquiry,  the  proximity  of  dwellings 
or  of  highways,  or  of  the  usual  fftdlities  for 
public  travel,  or  the  density  of  population, 
may  be  shown.  Flynn  v.  Butler,  75  N.  E.  730, 
731,  189  Mass.  377  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Commonwealth  v.  Kidder,  107 
Mass.  188,  192). 

Femoes 

To  constitute  a  fence  a  private  nuisance, 
within  Rev.  St  1902,  c  22,  |  6,  making  a 
fence  unnecessarily  exceeding  six  feet,  in 
height,  malidooely  kept  to  annoy  another,  a 
private  nuisance,  it  is  not  required  that  an- 
noyance shall  be  the  sole  purpose^  but  it  is 
suffldent  if  it  is  the  dominant  one.  An  ad- 
joining owner  may  erect  a  fence  as  much 
higher  than  six  feet  as  may  be  necessary  to 
protect  himself,  his  family,  and  his  property 
from  annoyances  inflicted  or  threatened  by 
tils  neighbor;  but,  li;  the  fence  is  built  higher 
than  six  feet  for  the  malicious  purpose  of,  in 
turn,  annoying  his  neighbor,  it  is  a  nuisance 
within  the  statute.  Healey  y,  Spauldlng,  71 
AtL  472,.  47?,  104  Me,  122. 


KUISANOB 


666 


NUISAMCB 


The  primary  meaning  of  *^iilaanoe^  Is 
that  which  Injures.  If  the  natoral  tendency 
of  the  act  complained  of  la  to  create  danger 
and  Inflict  injury  upon  person  or  property, 
it  may  properly  be  found  a  nuisance  as  a 
matter  of  fact ;  but,  if  the  act  in  its  Inherent 
nature  is  so  hazardous  as  to  make  the  danger 
extreme  and  serious  injury  so  probable  as  to 
be  almost  a  certainty*  it  should  be  held  a 
"nuisance"  as  a  matter  of  law.  The  ezhibi- 
tion  of  fireworks,  allowed  to  be  given  in  a 
pubUc  street^  where  a  large  number  of  people 
are  assembling,  is  not  a  ''nuisance''  as  a  mat- 
ter of  law,  and  whether  It  is  a  nuisance  in 
fact  Is  a  question  for  the  Jury.  Melker  ▼.  Oity 
of  New  York,  83  N.  B.  666,  667.  190  N.  Y.  481, 
16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  621, 18  Ann.  Cas.  644. 

Grade  evoaalac 

A  grade  crossing  or  the  condition  exist- 
ing by  reason  of  such  an  intersection  of  two 
hi^ways  is  in  the  nature  of  a  "nuisance," 
and  can  only  lawfnUy^exist  under  state  au- 
thority. Cowles  ▼.  MaW'Xork,  N.  H,  &  H.  R. 
Co.,  66  AtL  1020,  1022,:  80  Conn.  48«  12  L.  B. 
A.  (N.  S.)  1067«  10  Ann.  Cas.  481. 

Hospital 

Hospitals  for  the  treatment  et  patients 
suffering  from  infectious  and  contagioua  dl»- 
easeis  are  nuisances  when  located  in  the  resi- 
dential parts  of  cities  and  towns,  and  the 
danger  differs  in  kind  rather  than  degree. 
Shepard  v.  City  of  Seattle,  109  Pac.  1067, 
1070,  69  Wash.  863,  40  L.  R.  A,  (N.  S.)  647. 

A  building  used  as  a  hospital  for  the 
treatment  of  contagious  diseases  is  not  a 
"nuisance"  per  se.  Where  buildings  used  as 
a  hospital  for  contagious  diseases  were  locat- 
ed in  a  sparsely  settled  neighborhood  on  land 
entirely  surrounded  by  highways,  and  on 
which  there  were  no  other  buildings,  and 
with  ordinary  caution  there  was  no  proba- 
bility of  communication  of  contagious  diseas- 
es from  the  hospital  unless  by  transmission 
through  the  air,  and  the  buildings  were  at 
a  greater  distance  from  the  highways  than 
smallpox  Is  transmissible  In  the  open  air, 
there  was  no  showing  of  a  "nuisance."  State 
ex  rel.  Board  of  Health  of  Hamilton  3^»  y. 
Inhabitants  of  City  of  Trenton  (N.  J.)  68 
AtL  897,  898. 

JaU 

Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  |  290,  provides  that 
whatever  Is  injurious  to  health,  or  indecent, 
or  offensive  to  the  senses,  or  an  obstruction 
to  the  free  use  of  pr(^>erty,  so  as  essential- 
ly to  interfere  with  the  comfortable  enjoy- 
ment of  life  or  property,  Is  a  nuisance,  and 
the  subject  of  an  action,  thus  following  the 
common  law,  which  defines  a  "nuisance"  as 
anything  which  causes  an  injury  to  lands  or 
houses  and  renders  them  useless  or  even  un- 
comfortable for  habitation,  but  the  erection  of 
a  Jail  next  to  a  residence  is  not  the  creation 
of  a  nuisance.    Pritchett  ▼.  Board  of  Com'ra 


of  Knox  County,  86  N.  B.  82,  85,  42  Hid.  A 
3  (dtlng  Ha  Torta  [4th  Ed.]  p.  584). 

Keepiac  disorderly  l&oiiaa 

The  keeping  of  a  disorderly  house  h 
nuisance,  both  at  common  law  and  under  t 
statute,  and  the  offense  is  a  misdemeanor, : 
which  the  ordinary  remedy  is  by  crimi] 
proceedings.  Weidner  v.  Friedman,  151  S. 
66,  67, 126  Tenn.  677,  42  U  R.  A.  (N.  &)  10 


Holsea,  odors»  sasM»  and  i 
Noxious  gases  arising  from  the  carry! 
on  of  lawful  occupations  are  not  ''nuisano 
in  all  situations,  but  may  become  such 
reason  of  the  trade  being  carried  on  in  1 
proper  localltiea,  or  by  reason  of  tbe  ga 
being  negligently  suffered  to  escape.  Lc 
V.  Louisville  &  N.  B.  Co.,  107  S.  W.  203,  2 
128  Ky.  26,  18  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1063,  16  A 
Cas.  673. 

Any  act,  omission,  or  use  of  prope 
which  pollutes  the  atmosphere  with  offensd 
gases,  stenches,  or  vapor,  so  as  to  cause  o 
terlal  discomfort,  or  annoyance,  or  Injury 
health  or  property,  is  a  ''nuisance."  Wo< 
stock  Hardwood  &  Spool  Bltg.  Co.  r.  Gharl 
ton  light  &  Water  Co.  (S.  a)  63  S.  E.  5 
666. 

Noise  alone,  if  it  be  of  such  a  charao 
as  to  be  productive  of  actual  physical  d 
comfort  and  annoyance  to  a  person  of  or 
nary  sensibility,  may  create  a  "nuisance,**  t 
subject  of  a  remedy  at  law  or  in  equi 
Longley  v.  McGeoch,  80  Att.  843,  846, 115  \ 
182. 

"Under  the  statutes  anything  whi<A  p 
duces  noxious  exhalations,  offensive  smel 
or  other  annoyances,  injurious  to  the  heali 
comfort,  or  property  of  individuals.  Is  a  'n 
sance.'  It  is  not  necessary  that  these  ode 
be  deleterious  to  health.  It  is  suffident 
they  offend  the  senses  in  such  a  manner 
to  produce  actual  disoomfioct"  Bhoades 
Cook,  98  K  W.  122,  123,  122  Iowa,  336. 

The  malicious  annoyance  of  another 
loud    noises,    consisting   of   screaming   ai 
pounding  on  tin  pans,  fences,  and  iron, 
consequence  of  which  another  is  injured 
health  and  business,  is  a  "nuisance,"  whi 
equity  will  abate.    Shellabarger  y.  Morris,  \ 
S.  W.  1005,  1007,  116  Mo.  App.  566. 

An  authorized  business  properly  condi» 
ed  at  an  authorized  place  is  not  a  "nuisance 
for  whatever  Is  lawful  cannot  be  wrongfi 
and  the  owner  of  a  railroad  thus  authorte 
and  operated  is  not  liable  in  damages  to  oi 
whose  residence  is  permeated  by  smoke,  d 
ders,  and  gas  emitted  from  the  engines  ^ 
such  an  extent  as  to  be  injurious  to  tl 
health  and  comfort  of  the  inhabitants.  A 
chlson,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  i 
Pac  978,  979,  71  Kan.  366,  1  L.  B.  A.  (K.  S 
113,  114  Am.  St.  Rep.  474. 

The  operation  of  a  crematory  and  f» 
tlllzer  plant,  in  whldi  ordinary  garbage  an 
other  waste  matter  are  subjected  to  a  ban 


VUIAANCa 


6S7 


JfUIBAim 


ig  pxooeoi*  mad  tht  xealdiie,  In  <2ie  tfiape  of 
shes»  uaed  In  connection  with  otlier  elements 
>  make  a  feztiUser,  In  eacti  a  manner  tbat, 
nder  certain  conditiona  of  the  atmoephere 
nd  direction  of  the  wind,  the  smoke  arising 
rom  the  cremation  and  the  odor  dne  to  the 
lethod  of  handling  the  elements  of  the  fer- 
IMzer  compels  those  residing  within  a  dls- 
ance  of  from  2,000  to  2,500  feet  to  keep  their 
rindows  closed,  and  renders  their  houses  nn- 
omfortahle  for  habitation,  and  preyents 
bem  from  sitting  out  of  doors,  constitntes  a 
nuisance."  Laird  t.  Atlantic  Ooast  Sani- 
ary  Co.,  67  AtL  887,  388,  73  N.  J.  Bq.  49. 

"While  It  is  tme  that  dancing  is  fre- 
nently  an  innocent  amusement,  and  drink- 
Dg  may  be  engaged  in  without  becoming  a 
auisance,'  yet  if  the  dancing  and  drinking 
ire  accompanied  by  swearing  and  being 
Irunk,  making  lond  noises  and  otherwise 
Qlsbehaying,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  such 
icts  win  constitute  a  'nuisance.' "  Gommon- 
realth  y.  andnnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  B.  €k>., 
12  S.  W.  618,  614,  189  Ky.  429,  18  U  R.  A. 
N.  S.)  690,  Ana  Gas.  1912B,  427  (citing  and 
idopting  Jung  Biewing  Go.  v.  Gommonwealth, 
^  S.  W.  096,  123  Ky.  507,  124  Am.  St  Bep. 
;76). 

Noises  resulting  from  the  operation  of  a 
nanufacturing  plant,  to  constitute  a  **nui- 
unce,**  must  be  unreasonable  and  of  such  a 
^haracter  as  to  be  of  actual  physical  dls- 
»mfoTt  to  persons  of  ordinary  sensibilities. 
HcGUl  V.  Plntsch  Compressing  Co.,  118  N.  W. 
r86,  788,  140  Iowa,  429,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
166. 

A  creamery  discharged  Its  waste  on  the 
and  of  another,  and  ther^y  Increased  the 
Sow  of  water  on  the  land,  and  Interfered  with 
the  proper  cultivatlan  thereof.  Noisome  odors 
irose  from  the  waste,  but  these  were  not  no- 
Iceahle  until  one  got  near  the  point  of  dis- 
charge, and  there  was  no  evidence  that  any 
me  suffered  therefrom.  Held,  that  the  waste 
nras  not  a  nuisance  within  Code,  i  6078,  de- 
ling '^nuisances."  Ruthven  t.  Farmers'  Go* 
;>p.  Creamery  Co.,  118  N.  W.  915,  916,  140 
Iowa,  570. 

Noises  which  are  not  "nuisances^  on  a 
nreek  day  may  be  when  made  on  a  Sunday,  If 
Aisturbing  the  quiet  and  rest  which  a  dllzen 
Is  entitled  to  have  for  his  recuperation;  and 
the  fact  that  such  noises  are  forbidden  by 
the  Sunday  laws  takes  away  any  defense  for 
making  them,  though  they  be  but  slight.  Mc- 
MlUan  V.  Kuehnle,  78  Atl.  1054,  1056,  76  N.  J. 
Eq.  266. 

A  private  park  in  the  residence  part  of 
a  dty.  Inclosed  by  a  fence  and  rented  to 
lodges  and  other  bodies  for  holding  enter- 
tainments by  day  and  night,  is,  when  permit- 
ted to  be  so  conducted  that  it  is  a  rendezvous 
for  boisterous,  dissolute,  drunken  people,  who 
indulge  in  music,  dancing,  and  obscenity  un- 
til very  late  boors  of  the  night,  so  as  to  dis- 
turb the  sleep  of  neighboring  residents,  a 
8WDsAPJnSxB.— 12 


"nnlsanee.''    Palestine  Bhlg.  Ass^  ▼.  Minor 
(Ky.)  86  &  W.  696,  696. 

"At  conmion  law  a  'nuisance*  was  any- 
thing that  worked  hurt  or  damage.  A  public 
or  common  nuisance  was  that  which  affected 
the  public  or  was  an  annoyance  to  the  king's 
subjects  at  large."  An  Illinois  statute,  pro- 
viding that  a  city  council  in  cities  shall  have 
the  power  to  declare  what  riiall  be  a  nui- 
sance, to  abate  the  same,  and  to  Impose  fines 
on  parties  who  may  create,  continue,  or  suf- 
fer a  nuisance  to  exist,  authorised  the  Chi- 
cago city  council  to  pass  Ordinance  March 
23, 1903,  i  10,  declaring  the  emission  of  dense 
smoke  from  the  stack  of  any  boat,  locomo- 
tive, or  chimney  anywhere  within  the  dty, 
with  certain  exceptions,  to  be  a  public  nui- 
sance. Glucose  Beflning  Co.  v.  City  of  Chica- 
go, 188  Fed.  209,  214  (adopting  the  quotation 
from  Harmon  v.  Chicago,  110  JUL  400,  51  Am. 
Bep.  698). 

'at  may  be  laid  dovm  broadly  as  a  gen- 
eral rule  that  any  act,  omission,  or  use  of 
property  which  results  in  polluting  the  at- 
mofliphere  with  noxious  or  offensive  effluvia, 
gases,  stenches,  or  vapors,  thereby  produdug 
material  physical  discomfort  and  annoyance 
to  those  residing  in  the  vicinity  or  injury  to 
their  health  or  property,  is  a  nuisance*"  The 
occupant  of  a  dwelling  is  entitled  to  an  in- 
junction to  restrain  the  operation  of  a  slaugh- 
ter house  adjacent  thereto,  where  such  oper- 
ation causes  the  dwelling  to  be  filled  with 
noxious  smells.  Wright  v.  Ulrich,  91  Pac.  43, 
44,  40  Colo.  437. 

A  "nuisance"  Is  defined  as  an  'Unreason- 
able, unwarrantable,  or  unlawful  use  of  one's 
own  property,  to  the  annoyance,  inconven- 
ience, discomfort,  or  damage  of  another/' 
Under  this  definition,  the  jury  was  justified  in 
finding  that  an  electric  light  plant,  erected  in 
a  residential  neighborhood,  was  a  nuisance, 
where  the  evidence  showed  that  the  machin- 
ery produced  a  vibration  of  an  adjoining  ho- 
tel, that  dirt  and  cinders  came  into  the 
rooms  of  the  hotel,  that  noise  and  bad  odors 
invaded  the  premises,  and  that  the  income 
derived  from  rental  of  rooms  had  decreased 
since  the  plant  was  established.  Pritchard 
V.  Bdison  Electric  lUuminating  Co.,  87  N.  Y. 
Supp.  225,  229,  92  App.  l>iv.  178  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Bly  v.  Edison  Co.,  64 
N.  K  745,  172  N.  Y.  1,  98  In  R.  A.  500). 

Where  It  was  proven  that  the  owner  of 
a  steam  mill,  to  obtain  water,  made  an  ex- 
cavation in  a  hollow  leading  down  from  a 
suburb  of  a  nearby  town,  with  the  assent  of 
most  of  the  inhabitants  pf  the  nel^boriiood, 
that  the  filth  from  the  nearby  premises  cor- 
rupted the  water,  so  that  it  inconvenienced 
the  neighborhood,  and  that  the  pond  was  of 
too  recent  origin  to  have,  as  yet,  injuriously 
affected  the  health  of  the  community,  in- 
structions that  whatever  la  openly  injurious 
to  public  health  and  comfort,  is  a  ^'Buisaace,'* 
though  not  all  the  members  of  the  commu- 


ki. 


JIUiaANOB 


<58 


xm^ANom 


nity  are  affected  thereby,  tbat  a  "nnisance" 
must  either  be  in  a  populous  neighborhood, 
or  80  contiguous  to  a  highway  as  to  affect 
those  passing  thereon,  that  a  "nuisance"  was 
not  necessarily  detrimental  to  the  public 
health,  it  being  sufficient  If  its  bad  odors  af- 
fected the  public  at  large,  and  that,  if  the  de- 
fendant maintained  a  * 'nuisance"  by  main- 
taining a  pond  wherein  was  drained  a  part 
of  the  filth  of  a  nearby  town,  endangering 
the  public  health,  and  likely,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  to  generate  disease,  they  should  con- 
vict, were  applicable  to  the  evidence.  West 
V.  State,  71  S.  W.  483,  484,  71  Ark.  144. 

In  determining  whether  the  maintenance 
of  a  planing  mill,  coalyard,  and  bins  in  a  res- 
idence district  in  a  city  are  a  *'nuisMice,"  the 
effect  on  persons  of  ordinary  sensibilities 
only,  and  not  on  persons  of  very  delicate  and 
fastidious  tastes  or  sensibilities,  should  be 
considered.  First  Avenue  Coal  &  Lumber 
Go.  v.  Johnston,  54  South.  508,  600,  171  Ala. 
470,  82  U  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  522. 

It  is  not  essential  to  the  existence  of  a 
"nuisance"  from  offensive  odors  that  they 
should  be  calculated  to  break  down  or  injure 
health,  or  that  health  should  be  impaired  or 
even  threatened  by  them.  It  is  sufficient  that 
they  may  be  nauseating  or  physically  discom- 
forting or  annoying  to  persons  of  ordinary 
sensibilities,  "interfering  with  the  ordinary 
comfort  physically  of  human  existence,  not 
merely  according  to  elegant  and  dainty  modes 
and  habits  of  living,  but  according  to  plain 
and  sober  and  simple  notions  among  the  Eng- 
lish people.'*  The  sound  condition  of  those 
employed  in  fish  factories^  and  habituated  to 
the  smells  necessarily  generated  In  their  op- 
eration is  not  determinative  of  the  question 
whether  such  a  factory  is  a  nuisance.  It  is 
well  known  that  persons  can  become*  accus- 
tomed to  foul  and  noisome  odors  and  retain 
their  health.  United  States  v.  Luce,  141  Fed. 
385,408. 

Under  Code,  |  4302,  defining  a  ••nui- 
sance" to  be  whatever  is  injurious  to  health, 
indecent,  or  offensive  to  the  senses,  or  an  ob- 
struction to  the  free  use  of  property,  so  as 
to  interfere  with  the  comfortable  enjoyment 
of  life  or  property,  one  using  hia  property  so 
as  to  unwarrantably  impregnate  the  atmos- 
phere with  smoke,  odors,  etc.,  which  would 
not  exist  but  for  his  instrumentality,  creates 
a  nuisance;  but  only  where  an  unreasonable 
amount  of  smoke  or  noisome  fumes  are  emit- 
ted, or  they  are  emitted  in  an  unreasonable 
manner,  resulting  in  tangible  injury,  will  the 
courts  interfere.  ffcGill  v.  PIntsch  Com- 
pressing Co.,  118  N.  W.  786,  787,  140  Iowa, 
429,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  466. 

Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  S  291,  makes  whatr 
ever  obstructs  the  use  of  property  so  as  to 
essentially  interfere  with  its  comfortable  en- 
joyment a  "nuisance,"  and  the  subject  of  an 
action.  The  complaint  alleged  that  plaintiffs 
did  a  retail  clothing  and  furnishing  business  I 


on  the  first  floor  of  a  building,  under  a  leaf 
from  one  of  the  defendants,  and  that  sue 
defendant  caused  and  permitted  the  uppc 
story  to  be  used  by  the  other  defendant  as 
roller  skating  rink,  the  noise  from  which  pr^ 
vented  conversation  in  plaintiffs*  store,  an 
annoyed  and  drove  away  their  caatomer, 
thereby  causing  loss  of  profits  and  injury  t 
the  business  which  could  not  be  oompensai 
ed  for  by  damages,  and  that  if  smch  ose  1 
permitted  to  continue  plaintiffs'  buaiiieaBwi 
be  destroyed,  and  also  alleged  facts  showln 
the  character  and  ext^it  of  plaintiffs*  bus 
ness,  th^r  inability  to  procure  another  rooo 
and  prayed  an  Injunction.  Held,  tliat  tb 
complaint  showed  that  the  business  would  t 
destroyed  if  the  rink  was  continued,  so  tha 
plaintiffs  were  entitied  to  the  injunction;  th 
injury  not  being  susceptible  of  comp^isatio 
in  damages.  Foor  v.  BSdwards,  00  N.  EL  7S 
45  Ind.  App.  259. 

The  use  of  soft  coal  in  a  factory  a 
situated  in  a  country  district  soitable  fo 
country  homes  that  black  smoke  tberefros 
great  in  volume  and  dense  in  qoallty,  env^ 
ops  and  discolors  a  n^ghboring  dweUioi 
causing  discomfort  and  financial  loss  to  tb 
occupants,  is  a  •'nuisance,"  where  the  use  o 
soft  coal  is  not  necessary  for  the  running  o 
the  factory,  and  is  not  a  reasonable  use  o 
the  manufacturer's  property.  McCarty  ^ 
Natural  Carbonic  Gas  Co.,  81  N.  E.  549,  53C 
189  N.  Y.  40,  13  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  465,  12  Ano 
Cas.  840. 

By  Civ.  Code  1895,  |  8861,  a  '^nlsance' 
is  anything  that  worketh  hurt,  inconveo 
leiice,  or  damage,  to  another;  and  tive  fac 
that  the  act  done  may  otherwise  be  lawfo 
dees  not  keep  it  from  being  a  '•nuisance.' 
The  inconvenience  complained  of  must  not  bi 
feudful,  or  such  as  would  affect  only  one  ol 
f ii&tidious  taste,  but  it  must  be  sach  as  would 
affect  an  ordinarily  reasonable  man.  mic 
employment,  by  the  owner  of  a  ginnim 
plant,  of  machinery  which  separates  dust  and 
sand  from  cotton  and  expels  the  particles  oi 
dust  and  sand  Into  the  air  in  large  volumes, 
causing  the  same  to  be  blown  into  the  dwell- 
ing house  of  an  adjac^it  proprietor,  to  bis 
great  discomfort  and  injury,  is  an  in^*asioo 
of  his  property  rights,  for  which  an  action 
for  damages  will  lie.  Ponder  v.  Quitm&Q 
Ginnery,  49  S.  E.  746,  747,  122  6a.  29  (dtiag 
Swift  V.  Broyles,  42  S.  E.  277,  115  Ga.  8S5, 
58  L.  R.  A.  390;  Farley  v.  Gate  City  GasUght 
Co.,  31  S.  E.  193,  105  Ga.  331 ;  Austin  v.  Au- 
gusta T.  Ry.  Co.,  34  S.  E.  852. 108  Ga.  671,  47 
L.  R.  A.  755). 

ObstrmotioBL  of  Usl&waj 

An  obstruction  in  a  public  highway  cod- 
stitutes  a  "nuisance."  State  v.  Southern  Id 
di^na  Gas  Co.,  81  N.  B.  1149,  1150,  169  lod. 
124,  18  Ann.  Cas.  908  (citing  Zimmerman  v. 
State,  31  N.  E.  550,  4  Ind.  App.  583). 

"A  permanent  encroachment  upon  a  pub- 
lic street  for  a  private  purpose  Is  a  'purpres- 


NUISANCB 


659 


NUISANOB 


Qre.*  and  is  In  law  a  'nalsanoe/  **  Lacey  t. 
Ity  of  Oskaloosa,  121  N.  W.  542,  546,  143 
owa,  704,  31  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  863. 

The  general  rule  is  that  any  unauthoriz- 
d  obstruction  or  excavation  in  a  qublic 
treet,  impairing  its  safety,  constitutes  a 
ublie  "nuisance."  Blixer  v.  Herrlck,  02  Atl. 
019.  78  Vt  349. 

An  obstruction  placed  within  the  limits 
f  a  public  way  is  a  "nuisance"  at  common 
aw,  as  well  as  under  Rev.  St  1903,  c  22,  | 
.  Smith  V.  Preston,  71  Aa  063,  666,  104 
ie.  156. 

A  temporary  obstruction  of  a  street  or 
iighway  with  the  consent  of  the  proper  pub- 
ic authorities,  in  the  course  of  construction 
if  a  building,  sidewalk,  or  other  work,  is  not 
I  "nuisance."  Malkan  ▼.  Carlin,  93  N.  Y. 
>upp.  378. 

A  fence  obstmetliig  a  street,  which  is  a 
rablic  highway,  and  thereby  rendering  its 
ise  lees  conveolent,  would  be  an  indictable 
liuisance."  State  ▼.  Godwin,  69  S.  B.  132, 
33,  145  N.  G.  461,  122  Am.  St  Rep.  467. 

A  spike  two  inches  high  in  a  sidewalk  is 
L  ''nuisance."  Wile  ▼.  Los  Angeles  Ice  ft 
3old  Storage  Go.,  83  Pac.  271,  272,  2  GaL 

kpp.  19a 

Civ.  Gode,  f  3479,  defines  a  "nuisance" 
18  anything  which  obstructs  the  free  use  of 
property  or  free  passage  or  use  of  any 
;treet  Section  3493  provides  that  a  private 
)erson  may  maintain  an  action  for  a  public 
inisance,  if  it  is  specially  injurious  to  him. 
ield,  that  the  owner  of  a  lot  abutting  on  a 
^reet  his  such  an  easement  over  it  that  he 
nay  maintain  an  action  to  abate  structures 
erected  in  the  street  opposite  his  lot  Mc« 
[^ean  v.  Llewellyn  Iron  Works,  83  Pac  1082, 
L084,  2  GaL  App.  346. 

"At  common  law  any  act  or  obstruction 
^hlch  unnecessarily  Incommodes  or  impedes 
:he  lawful  use  of  a  highway  by  the  public 
s  a  •nuisance."'  Where  the  owner  of  a 
)uilding  negligently  maintained  a  leader 
!rom  the  roof  of  a  building  so  as  to  discharge 
nrater  on  the  sidewalk,  by  which  ice  accumu- 
ated  thereon  and  the  walk  became  danger- 
)ii8,  be  was  liable  to  any  person  injured 
Jiereby,  Tremblay  v.  Harmony  Blills,  64  N. 
S.  501,  171  N.  Y.  696  (quoting  and  adopting 
leflnition  in  Ang.  Highw.  |  223). 

An  obstruction  is  merely  matter  out  of 
[>lace  and  that  which  may  be  a  stepping  stone 
in  a  position  where  it  is  needed  and  may  be 
iised  as  such  becomes  an  obstruction  when 
Micupying  a  place  intended  for  other  use, 
eind  where  it  is  not  needed  and  cannot  be  so 
Q8e<l.  Where  a  iMivement  has  been  laid,  the 
Etsphalt  surface  of  which  lays  smoothly  down 
to  the  curb,  a  block  of  stone  placed  within 
the  curb  is  ah  obstmction  and  becomes  a 
"nuisance."  McGormack  v.  Robin,  62  Soutii. 
m,  781,  126  La.  594^  139  Am.  8t  Bep.  649. 


The  acciimulation  of  water  and  ice  in  a 
depression  in  a  sidewalk,  so  as  to  obstruct 
the  free  and  safe  use  of  the  sidewalk,  by  wa- 
ter being  collected  on  a  roof  and  cast  on  the 
sidewalk  by  a  projecting  conductor,  consti- 
tutes a  "nuisance,"  which  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
city  to  prevent  or  abate,  negligent  failure  to 
perform  which  will  make  it  liable  to  one  in- 
jured thereby.  Gity  of  Muncie  v.  Hey,  74 
N.  E.  260,  251,  164  Ind.  570. 

Under  Ky.  St  |  2886,  providing  that  it 
shall  be  the  duty  of  police  officers  in  cities  to 
remove  all  nuisances  in  the  public  streets, 
parks,  and  highways,  it  was  the  duty  of  a 
policeman,  on  obtaining  knowledge  of  a  dan- 
gerous cave-in  in  a  street,  to  guard  the  same 
in  order  to  prevent  injury  thereby,  and  hence 
the  policeman's  knowledge  thereof  was  no- 
tice to  the  city;  the  word  **nuisance,"  as 
there  used,  not  being  limited  to  a  physical 
obstruction  placed  in  a  street,  but  including 
ahything  that  "worketh  hurt,  inconvenience, 
or  damage."  Gity  of  Louisville  v.  Lenehan» 
149  S.  W.  932,  934,  149  Ky.  637. 

An  owner,  collecting  surface  water  inta 
a  definite  channrt  and  pouring  the  same  on 
a  pnblic  highway  where  the  water  freeies. 
creates  a  "nuisance,"  and  he  is  liable  for  the 
damages  ensuing  as  a  probable  consequence. 
Field  T.  Gowdy,  86  N.  E.  884,  886,  199  Mass. 
668,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  286. 

Where  a  trench,  dug  in  a  city  street  for 
the  purpose  of  supplying  heat  to  the  city 
library  building,  had  been  partly  filled,  but 
the  remainder  was  left  open  awaiting  ma- 
terial for  making  pipe  connections,  such  ex- 
cavation, having  been  made  for  a  proper 
purpose,  was  not  a  "nuisance"  per  se,  and 
did  not  become  such  unless  it  was  allowed  to 
remain  open  for  an  unreasonable  length  of 
time.  Oametz  v.  Gity  of  GarroU,  114  N.  W. 
67,  136  Iowa,  669. 

The  trees,  grass^  and  fiowers  growing  on 
park  strips  maintained  by  a  municipality  be- 
tween the  curbing jiud  the  sidewalk  and  prop- 
er barriers  placed  around  them  to  protect 
them  are  not  obstructions  or  "nuisances," 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  requiring 
the  city  council  to  keep  the  streets  of  a  mu- 
nicipality open,  in  r^jwir,  and  free  from  nui- 
sance. Village  of  BarnesviUe  v.  Ward,  96 
N.  E.  937,  938,  86  Ohio  St  1,  40  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  94,  Ann.  Gas.  1912D,  1234. 

Giv.  Gode,  I  8479,  declares  anything 
which  unlavrfully  obstructs  the  free  passage 
or  use  of  a  public  street  a  "nuisance."  Sec- 
tion 3480  defines  a  **public  nuisance"  as  one 
affecting  an  entire  community  or  any  consider- 
able number  of  persons.  Section  3493  pro- 
vides that  a  private  person  may  maintain  an 
action  for  a  "public  nuisance"  only  if  it  is 
specially  injurious  to  himself.  In  an  action 
to  enjoin  the  construction  or  operation  of  a 
railroad  in  the  street  in  front  of  plaintUTs 
premises^    the   complaint   alleged   that   the 


NtnSANGB 


660 


NUISANOB 


constitictloii  and  operation  of  the  railroad 
would  greatly  obstruct  the  use  of  plaintiff's 
premises  and  impair  the  easement  of  access 
thereto  and  egress  therefrom,  and  would 
greatly  hamper  plaintiff  in  carrying  on  his 
business  on  the  premises  and  lessen  the  yalne 
thereof.  Held,  that  the  allegations  were 
merely  statements  of  the  plaintiff's  opinion 
or  conclusions  as  to  the  effect  of  defendant's 
proposed  acts,  and  hence  the  complaint  was 
demurrable  as  not  showing  a  nuisance  result- 
ing in  some  special  injury,  within  the  mean- 
ing of  CiY.  Code,  f  S  3479,  3480,  3493.  Brown 
V.  Rea,  88  Pac.  713,  714,  150  CaL  171  (citing 
Aram  v.  Schallenberger,  41  Gal.  449;  Bigley 
▼.  Nunan,  63  Oal.  403;  Hogan  v.  Central 
Pac.  R.  CJo.,  11  Pac.  876,  71  Cal.  87). 

Obstmotioa  of  wmters 

A  obstruction  in  a  stream,  caused  by  fill- 
ing it,  and  resulting  in  damages  to  property 
through  water  being  set  back,  is  a  "nui- 
sance." Hedrick  v.  City  of  St  Joseph,  122 
S.  W.  375,  376,  138  Mo.  App.  396. 

Laws  1905,  a  57,  f  4,  gives  corporations 
organized  for  clearing  and  improving  streams 
for  logging  purposes,  power  to  build  wing 
dams  and  sheer  booms,  etc.,  for  the  purpose 
of  holding  logs,  providing  that  no  such  dam, 
etc.,  shall  be  so  maintained  as  to  obstruet 
the  outlet  of  the  stream,  and  that  if  such 
dam,  etc.,  is  constructed  so  as  to  interfere 
with  the  use  of  the  stream  for  any  other 
purpose  or  injure  adjacent  land,  compensa- 
tion shall  be  first  determined,  and  the  appro- 
priation of  the  use  made  by  eminent  domain. 
Held,  that  the  statute  contemplated  the  ob- 
struction of  navigation  at  times  by  the  con- 
struction of  dams,  etc,  for  driving  timber,  the 
only  limitation  being  that  the  outlet  of  the 
stream  be  not  obstructed,  so  that  the  fact  that 
a  boom  built  in  a  river  navigable  to  some  ex- 
tent for  three  or  four  miles  from  its  mouth 
at  high  tide  for  floating  logs  necessarily  ob- 
structed navigation  above  the  boom  would 
not  be  a  "nuisance^*'  as  defined  by  Rem.  A 
Bal.  Code,  |  943  (1  Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes  & 
St  fl  8085,  3093  [Pierce's  Code,  f|  1870, 
1867]),  so  that  the  boom  company  could  con- 
demn the  privilege  of  using  the  river  in  that 
manner.  State  ex  rel.  Pealer  v.  Superior 
Court  of  Chehalls  County,  109^  Pac  340,  341, 
58  Wash.  565. 

Comp.  liiws  1909,  f  4751,  defines  a 
''nuisance"  to  consist  in  unlawfully  doing  an 
act  or  omitting  to  perform  a  duty,  which  act 
or  omission,  among  other  things,  ''unlawful- 
ly Interferes  with,  obstructs  or  tends  to  ob- 
struct, or  renders  dangerous  for  passage,  any 
lake,  or  navigable  river,  bay,  stream,  canal, 
or  basin,  or  any  public  park»  square,  street, 
or  highway."  McKay  v.  City  of  Enid,  109 
Pac  520,  522,  26  Okl.  275,  30  L.  B.  A.  (^. 
S.)  1021. 

Pool  Toom 

The  maintenance  of  a  place  for  selling 
for  gain  pools  upon  horses  at  an  exhibition 


trial  of  their  q(ieed  on  a  race  track  and  ft 
selling  of  the  pools  is  punishable  as  a  'iin 
sance"  at  common  law  and  under  B.  &  ( 
Comp.  I  1930,  providing  for  the  punishmei 
of  any  person  who  willfully  or  wrongful) 
commits  any  act  which  grossly  disturl 
the  public  peace  or  health,  or  which  open) 
outrages  the  pubHc  decency  and  is  injurioi 
to  the  public  morals.  State  v.  Ayers,  J 
Pac  653,  49  Or.  61.  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  99 
124  Am.  St  Rep.  1036. 

A  pool  room  on  one  of  the  prindp; 
thoroughfares  in  the  dty,  in  which  persoi 
daily  congregate  to  bet  upon  horse  raa 
reported  to  the  proprietor  by  telegraph,  is 
gaming  house,  punishable  as  a  "nuisance 
at  common  law  and  under  the  statute  proTii 
ing  for  the  punishment  of  any  person  wl 
willfully  and  wrongfully  commits  any  a< 
which  grossly  disturbs  the  public  peace  ( 
health,  or  which  openly  outrages  Uie  publ 
decency,  and  is  injurious  to  the  public  mo 
als.  State  v.  Nease,  80  Pac  897,  898,  46  0 
433. 

Roller  skatlns  rink 

"Any  business,  however  lawtol,  whic 
causes  annoyances  that  materially  interfei 
with  the  ordinary  comfort,  physical,  of  lii 
man  existence,  is  a  'nuisance'  that  shou 
be  restrained."  The  operation  of  a  rolli 
skating  rink,  so  conducted  as  to  render  tl 
appropriate  enjoyment  of  adjacent  chun 
property  impossible  will  be  enjoined.  Fir 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church  of  City  of  Cai 
May  V.  Cape  May  Grain  &  Coal  Co.,  67  A1 
613»  614,  73  N.  J.  E^.  257  (quoting  and  adop 
ing  definition  in  Cleveland  v.  Citizens'  Ga 
light  Co.,  20  N.  J.  £q.  201,  205). 

Saloons  amd  otl^or  pl*ees  of  sale  of  U^ 


A  saloon  or  tippling  house  was  not 
'^nuisance"  at  common  law  if  properly  ooi 
ducted,  and  therefore  a  conviction  for  mal] 
taining  a  nuisance  cannot  be  sustained  t 
proof  of  the  maintenance  of  i^n  unlicensc 
tippling  house,  in  the  absence  of  proof  Uu 
it  was  so  conducted  as  to  annoy,  disturb,  < 
scandalize  the  people  li^  a  community,  t 
iriiowing  that  drunkard^  thieves,  prostitute 
or  .other  disorderly  persons  were  permits 
to  resort  there.  State  v.  Ingram  &  Adam 
94  S.  W.  790,  791,  118  Ma  App.  323. 

Under  Rev.  St  1903,  c  22»  |  1,  a  pla( 
of  resort  is  a  "nuisance"  if  used  by  a  dn 
either  to  sell  intoxicating  liquor  to  its  mei 
bers,  or  to  distribute  among  them  liquor  owi 
ed  in  common,  or  to  procure  and  dispense  i 
its  members  liquor  bought  for  and  belongii 
to  them  individually.  State  v.  KaplcslK 
73  Att.  830,  832,  105  Me.  127,  23  Ii.  B.  A  C 
S.)  737. 

SaaitarivoB. 

Under  the  statute  (Rem.  ft  Bal.  Code, 
8809)  defining  a  nuisance  as  an  act  or  omi 
sibn  which  either  aimo}tB»  injures^  or  endai 


NUISANCE 


681 


NUISANGB  PBB  88 


the  oomforl;  health,  or  sBtety  of  otbeni, 
naintenanoe  in  a  residential  district  of 
y  of  a  sanitarinm  for  tiie  treatment  of 
rcoloeis  patients  is  a  "nnisanoe,"  where 
fear  indnced  by  the  proximity  of  the 
arinm  distorbe  the  ''comfortable  enjoy- 
:'*  of  adjacent  property,  whether  the 
is  founded  on  scientific  facts  or  not,  for 
ifortable  enjoyment"  means  mental  qniet 
rell  as  physical  comfort,  and  the  word 
ifort"  implies  whateyer  is  requisite  to 
secnrity  from  want  and  famish  reason- 
physical,  mental,  and  spiritual  enjoys 
u  Everett  v.  Paschall,  111  Pac.  879, 
61  Wash.  47,  ai  U  B.  A,  (N.  S.)  827,  Ann. 
1912B,  1128. 

trfaee  water 

The  action  of  a  railroad  in  permitting 
ice  water  from  one  side  of  its  track  to 
pe  to  the  other  aide  alongside  of  a  high- 
does  not  create  an  actlonaMe  "nuisance." 
nsend  v.  New  York  Cent  &  H.  R.  R.  CJo., 
^^.  Y.  Supp.  381,  387,  06  Biisc  Rep.  258. 

SANCE  PEB  ra 

A  "nnisance  per  se"  is  a  nnisanoe  in  it- 
and  which  cannot  be  so  conducted  as  to 
awfully  carried  on  or  permitted  to  exist 
)er  ▼.  Whissen,  180  &  W.  903,  704,  05 
545. 

"A  'nuisance  per  se'  is  an  act,  thing,  or 
fsion  or  use  of  the  property  which  in  and 
self  is  a  nuisance,  and  hence  not  permis- 
s  or  excusable  under  any  circumstances." 
I  V.  Columbia  Theater  Co.^  94  ^  W.  847, 
197  Mo.  328. 

"A  'nuisance  at  law'  or  a  'nuisan^per 
s  an  act,  occupation,  or  structure  whipb 

nuisance  at  all  times,  under  any  cir- 
Btances,  regardless  of  looatloi^  or  sur- 
idlngs."  Swaim  v.  Morris,  125  S.  W.  432^ 
93  Ark.  362,  20  Ann.  Cas.  930  (quoting 

adopting  the  definition  tn  ^  Cyc.  P. 
). 

A  "nuisance  per  se"  is  an  act,  thing,  or 
sion,  or  use  of  the  property,  which  lA 
of  itself  is  a  nuisance,  and  hence'  Is  not 
lisslble  or  excusable  under  any  clrcum- 
:?es.  A  lawful  business  is  not  generally 
iuisance  per  se,"  but  may  become. so  by 
S  located  in  an  inappropriate  plaice^  or 
g  kept  in  an  improper  manner.    Bems- 

V.  Tola  Portland  Cement  Co.,  84  Pac. 

549,  73  Kan.  66. 

A  "nuisance"  is.  anything  wmch  incom- 
es, annoys,  or  produces  inconvenience 
amage.  A  "nuisance  per  se"  is  one  which 
iways  a  nuisance  in  certain  localities, 
nuisance  in  fact"  is  one  which  becomes 
lisance  by  reason  of  circumstances  and 
oundlngs.  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Len- 
,  52  South.  575,  677,  126  La.  455,  29  L. 
i.  (N.  S.)  642. 

A  "nuisance  per  se,"  as  the  tenn  im- 
s>  is  a  nuisance  in  itself,  and  one  ^hich 


oannot  therefore  be  so  conducted'  or  main- 
tained as  to  be  lawfully  carried  on  or  permit- 
ted to  ezlat  Sullivan  Realty  &  Improve- 
ment Co.  V.  Crockett,  188  8.  W.  024,  926,  158 
Mo.  App.  573. 

"  'Nuisances'  are  of  tliree  kinds,  viz.: 
Per  se^  malum  la  w  (that  ia,  naturally  evil); 
malum  prohibitum,  because  forbidden  by  law ; 
and  those  which  do  not  fall  within  the  two 
definitions  mentioned,  but  may  be  found  in 
fact  to  be  nuisances."  Awnings  constructed  of 
wood,  with  roofB  covered  with  metal,  extend- 
ing over  and  about  15  feet  above  a  street,  and 
attached  to  substantial  brick  buildings,  the 
outer  edge  resting  on  posts  in  the  sidewalk 
or  curb,  did  not  constitute  a  public  "nuis- 
ance per  se."  Brown  v.  Town  of  CarroUton, 
99  S.  W.  37,  39,  122  Mo.  App.  276. 

OemeteiT 

A  public  cemetery  Is  not  a  "nuisance  per 
se."  Sherman  r.  Crawford  (Tex.)  127  S.  W. 
1075,  1076. 

Dead  awliwals 

JDead  domestio  animals  «z«  not  ''nul- 
sanoes  per  se,"  and  cannot  be  made  such  by 
legialatlTe  declaration.  Oity  of  Richmond  v. 
Oamthers,  50  8.  B.  265,  1Q6  Va;  774,  70  U 
R.  A.  1006,  2  Ann.  Cas.  406. 

£leotrioit7 

The  transmission  of  electricity  at  a  high 
voltage  over  a  right  of  way,  being  authorized 
by  law,  is  not  a  "nuisance  pfer  se,"  as  It  is 
well  settled  that  a  lawful  business  or  erec- 
tion ib  never  a  "nuisance  per  se."  Mu!l  v. 
Indianapolis  ft  O.  Traction  Co.,  81  N.  B.  667, 
659,  660, 169  Ind.  214. 

lUFlosiTes 

The  arbitrary  rule  that  the  keeping  of 
gunpowder,  nitroglyceiine,  or  other  explosive 
substances  in  large  quantities  in  the  vicinity 
of  a  dwelling  house  or  place  of  business  is  a 
"nuisance  per  ae"  has  been  modified,  and  the 
present  rule  is  that  the  question  whether 
they  are  a  nuisance  depends  on  the  locality, 
the  quantity,  iind.  tto  surrounding  circum- 
stances, and  the  method  and  manner  of  ke^^ 
ing  and  i^sing^    The  owner  of  an  airtomobilie 
garage,  licensed  to  store  one  barrel  of  gaso- 
line in  the  building,  which  is  a  frame  building 
and  adjacent  to  other  frame  buildings,  will 
be  enjoined  from  introducing  gasoline  ipto 
the  tanks  of  the  automobile  inside   of  the 
building,  and  from  storing  automobiles,  with 
gasbllne  in  the  tanks,  inside   the   building. 
O'Hara   v.  Nelgon   (N.   J.)   63    Atl.   836.  840 
(citing,  in  support  of  a  general  rule,  Heeg  v. 
licht,  80  N.  Y.  579,  36  Am.  Rep.  654;  Rudder 
V.  Koopman,  22  South.  601,  116  Ala.  882,  37 
L.  R.  A.  489 ;  Kinney  ▼•  KooiNnaa,  22  Soutb. 
593,  116  Ala.  310,  37  U  R.  A.  497,  67  Am. 
St  Rep.  119;   Kleebauer  ▼.  ^Wesitem  Fuse  & 
Explosives  Co.,  71  Pac.  ei7,  138  Oal.  497,  GO 
JU  R.  A.  377,  04  Am.  Bt.  Ue^  62/,  Collins  ▼• 


NUISANCE  PER  BE 


662 


NULL  AND  VOID 


AJalMtnui  a.  8.  R.  Go,  16  South.  140,  104  AUu 
390;  High,  InJ.  [8d  Ed.]  p.  503,  f  776,  et  seq.; 
1  Pom.  Bquit.  Remedies,  S  516  et  seq ;  Barnes 
V.  Zettlemojer,  02  S.  W.  Ill,  26  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  468 ;  Flymi  v.  Butter.  75  N.  B.  780,  189 
Mass.  377). 

A  gambling  house,  under  the  statute  and 
as  recognized  by  the  oaurts,  is  a  '"nuisance," 
and  even  at  comm<m  law  such  a  nuisance 
could  be  enjoined  «t  the  instance  of  any  per* 
son  who  was  injured  thereby.  Ex  parte  Al- 
lison, 90  S.  W.  492,  494,  48  Tex.  Cr.  R.  634, 
8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  622,  13  Ann.  Gas.  684. 

"A  "nuisance  per  se'  is  any  act  or  omis^ 
Bion,  or  use  of  property  or  thing,  which  is  of 
itself  hurtful  to  the  health,  tranquility,  or 
morals,  or  outrages  the  decency,  of  the  com- 
munity." Keeping  a  common  gaming  house, 
which  is  held  to  include  pool  rooms  where 
betting  on  horse  races  is  indulged  (Bollinger 
V.  Commonwealth,  36  S.  W.  553,  98  Ky.  674 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Simmonds,  79  Ky.  618; 
Brown  v.  State,  13  S.  W.  236,  88  Tenn.  666; 
Swigart  V.  People,  40  N.  B.  432,  164  lU,  284), 
to  which  there  is  common  resort  for  the  pur- 
pose of  betting,  and  at  whidi  money  or  other 
property  is  bet,  won,  or  lost,  is  per  se  a 
nuisance  at  common  law  (1  Hank.  P.  G.  p. 
733;  Kneffler  v.  Commonwealth,  22  S.  W. 
446,  94  Ky.  369).  Ehrlick  v.  Commonwealth, 
102  S.  W.  289,  290,  11«5  Ky.  742,  10  L.  R.  A, 
(N.  S.)  996,  128  Am.  St  Rep.  269. 

Slansl^terlioiise 

Under  Wilson's  Rev.  &  Ann.  8t  1903, 
c  66  (enttttcid  "Nuisance")  ft  1,  3,  8,  10,  de- 
claring that  a  nuisance  consists  in  unlawfully 
doing  any  act  or  omitting  to  perform  a  duty, 
which  act  or  omission  annoys,  injures,  or 
endangers  the  comfort,  health,  or  safety  of 
others,  and  declaring  that  a  public  nuisance 
is  one  which  afTects  at  the  same  ttme  an  en- 
tire community  or  neighborhood,  or  any  con- 
siderable number  of  persons,  though  the  ex- 
tent of  the  annoyance  or  damage  inflicted  on 
the  individual  may  be  unequal,  etc.,  a 
slaughterhouse  is  not  a  "nuisance  per  se,"  un- 
less it  appears  from  thfe  evidence,  independ- 
ent of  the  manner  in  which  it  Is  being  used 
and  conducted,  that  its  location,  proximity, 
and  relationship  to  the  public  make  it  so. 
Weaver  v.  Kuchler,  87  Pac.  600,  602,  17  OW. 
189. 
Steam  traotloBL  ensiae 

The  use  of  a  steam  traction  engine  and 
trailers  in  the  streets  of  a  city  is  not  a  public 
"nuisance  per  se." — ^McCarter  v.  Ludlum  Steel 
&  Spring  Co.  (N.  J.)  63  AtL  761,  767. 

TrmiMM 

The  noises  of  locomotives,  shifting  of 
cars,  smoke,  offensive  odors,  loading  and  un- 
loading of  freijsht,  and  the  like,  occasioned  by 
and  incident  to  the  use  and  conduct  of  a  rail- 
road freight  and  passenger  terminal,  and  re- 
sulting in  damages  to  the  premises  as  a  place 


of  religious  worship  does  not  constitnte  i 
actimiable  nuisance,  where  the  railroad  con 
pany  conducts  its  operations  with  reasoDabl 
care.  Neither  does  the  nmning  of  tnios  aa 
shifting  of  cars  on  Sunday  at  the  thne  of  w 
ular  church  services  constitute  a  '^nuisuc 
per  se,"  since  under  the  express  provisioDsc 
Revisal  1906,  i  2613,  a  railroad  company  mi 
operate  Its  trains  on  Sunday.  But,  while  till 
is  true,  It  also  remains  true  that  a  nilm 
BO  operated  as  to  needlessly  cause  im 
would  be  such  a  nuisance.  Taylor  t.  §« 
board  Air  Line  Ry.,  59  8.  E.  129, 132, 145 ! 
O.  400,  122  Am.  St- Rep.  456. 

ITmdertakiiic  estabUskaiemt 

An  undertaking  establishment  is  not 
"nuisance  per  se."  The  malntenaoce  of  i 
undertaking  estabUdunent  In  a  buildiog  3  ( 
4  feet  from  the  residence  of  one  of  the  pUi 
tiffs  and  35  feet  from  the  residence  of  ti 
other  in  a  resldaice  district  of  a  city,  thooi 
the  mortician  operating  the  same  InteiMk 
to  occupy  the  upper  stories  of  the  biilldlDg< 
a  residence,  constituted  a  nuisance  where 
was  shown  that  noxious  odors,  gases,  et( 
were  likely  to  permeate  the  hooses  of  t) 
plaintiffs  therefrom,  and  that  there  wi 
danger  of  infection  and  contagion  from  ti 
proximity  of  the  morgue,  wltii  the  possibDi 
of  flies  passing  from  one  place  to  the  otiu 
etc.  Densmore  v.  Evergreen  Gamp  No.  H 
Woodmen  of  the  World,  112  Pac.  255,  < 
Wash.  230,  31  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  608,  Ann.  Ci 
1912B,  1206. 

NUXSAHOE  TAlsVB 

A  "nuisance  value"  is  the  value  of 
fftinchlse  "because  it  may  be  used  to  hind 
or  defraud  another  enterprise,  althoogb  I 
self  conferring  or  securing  nothing  of  ral* 
Consolidated  Gas  Go.  v.  New  YoA,  157  Fe 
849,874. 

NUL  TIEL  RECORD 

"The  plea  of  *nul  tl^  record'  ralsei  b* 
one  question,  and  that  Is  whether  there 
such  a  record  as  that  set  out  in  the  wilt 
Bank  of  Eau  Claire  v.  Reed,  83  N.  8.  £ 
821,  232  IlL  238,  122  Am.  St  R^.  66. 

NULL  AND  VOID 

The  terms  "nuU"  and  •Void'*  are  iw 
Interchangeably.  "Void"  is  defined  as  bi 
Ing  no  legal  force,  entirely  null,  incapable  < 
confirmation  or  ratification;  and  ''naU" 
defined  as  of  no  legal  or  binding  force  ( 
validity,  of  no  eflicacy,  Invalid,  void,  m 
tory,  useless,  or  of  no  account  or  signiflcsiK 
Forrester  &  MacGlnniss  v.  Boston  &  M.  Co 
soL  Copper  &  Silver  Min.  Co.,  74  Pac.  lOS 
1091,  29  Mont  397  (citing  Standard  Did)* 

Though  a  conveyance  was,  as  betv« 
the  parties,  within  the  statute  providing  tin 
all  fraudulent  conveyances  shaU  be  '^nnU  u 
void,"  the  fimudulait  grantee  hating  ooot« 


r- 


!■' 


luV 


KULL  AND  VOID 


663 


NUNC  PEO  TUNO 


le  prcperty  to  a  tlilrd  person,  who  was 
[oade  a  party  to  a  suit  bj  creditors  of 
vendor  to  subject  the  land  to  their  claims, 
ras  not  bound  by  a  decree  in  favor  of 
>lainant  The  words  **null  and  void,"  as 
in  this  statute,  are  to  be  given  the  sense 
roidable,"  since  the  conveyances  are  good 
etween  the  parties  and  also  as  against 
grantor.  As  stated  by  Bacon  in  his 
dgment,  tlL  "Void  and  Voidable":  "A 
;  is  void  which  was  done  against  law  at 
rery  time  of  the  doing  it,  and  no  person 
ound  by  such  act;  but  a  thing  is  only 
ible  which  is  done  by  a  person  who  ought 
to  have  done  it,  but  who  nevertheless 
lot  avoid  it  himself  after  it  is  done. 
•  Of  a  void  act  or  deed  every  stran- 
nay  take  advantage,  but  not  of  a  voidable 
'  Tudor  V.  Tudor,  67  Atl.  539,  80  Vt  220, 
Am.  St  Rep.  977  (citing  Carpenter  v. 
lure,  39  Vt  9,  91  Am.  Dec.  370;  Merrill 
nglesby,  28  Vt  150). 

In  a  statute  providing  that  all  capital 
t  or  securities  of  a  company  purchased 
\ie  company  by  a  director  thereof  for  less 
i  the  par  value  thereof  diall  be  ''null 
void,"  the  term  ''null  and  void"  should 
onstrued  as  meaning  "voidable."  Toledo 
L.  ft  K«  G.  R.  Ck>.,  V.  Continental  Trust 
96  Fed.  487, 520,  36  O.  C.  A  165. 

The  words  "void,"  "void  and  of  no  ef- 
"  and  "null  and  void,"  are  used  in  stat- 
and  legal  documents  in  the  sense  of  void- 
merely — that  is,  capable  of  being  avoid- 
-and  not  as  meaning  that  the  act  or  trans- 
on  is  absolutely  a  nullity,  as  if  it  never 
existed,  incapable  of  giving  rise  to  any 
ts  or  obligations  under  any  circum- 
ices.  Code  1896,  f  1286,  provides  that  no 
iflcate  of  incorporation  shall  issue  when 
corporate  name  assumed  is  that  of  a 
ion  or  firm,  unless  there  be  Joined  thereto 
e  name  designating  the  business  he  car- 
on,  followed  by  the  word  "company"  or 
poratlon,"  and  if  any  corporation  shall 
to  comply  with  this  qualification  its 
inlzation  is  void.  Section  1282  provides 
;  when  any  corporation  falls  to  comply 
1  the  requirements  of  the  statute  in  its 
inlzation,  the  failure  may  be  remedied  by 
g  with  the  probate  judge  who  Issued  the 
iflcate  of  Incorporation  a  statement  set- 
forth  the  omission  end  supplying  the 
e.  Failure  of  a  corporation  to  comply 
1  the  qualifications  of  section  1286,  by  in- 
iDg  the  word  designating  the  business 
e  carried  on,  did  not  render  its  incorpora- 
"void,"  but  "voidable"  only;  such  be- 
the  evident  import  of  the  two  sections 
'ode  1896,  which  are  pari  materia.  State 
reL  Thompson  v.  Colias,  43  South.  190, 
192,  150  Ala.  515  (citing  BweU  v.  Daggs, 
ap.  Ct  408,  108  U.  S.  148,  27  L.  Ed.  682; 
ieep  V.  Lecony,  1  N.  J.  Law,  112;  New 
k  &  Long  Island  Bridge  Co.,  42  N.  B.  1088, 
N.  Y.  540;  Columbia  ft  P.  S.  B.  Co.  v. 


Bralllard,  40  Pac  382,  12  Wash.  22;  Van 
Shaack  v.  Roboins,  36  Iowa,  201 ;  Rhelner  v. 
Union  Depot,  etc,  Co.,  17  N.  W.  623,  31  Minn. 
289 ;  Brown  v.  Brown,  50  N.  H.  538,  552). 

NULLA  BONA 

A  return  on  an  execution  "nulla  bona"  Is 
a  return  that  the  execution  is  uncollectible. 
Card  V.  Groesbeck,  124  N.  Y.  Supp.  372,  373, 
140  App.  Div.   SO. 

A  return  on  an  execution  issued  on  a 
Justice's  Judgment,  reciting:  "Executed  the 
within  writ  in  the  county  of  Stoddard,  state 
of  Missouri,  on  the  2d  day  of  May,  1893.  No 
property  found  to  levy  this  execution" — con- 
stituted a  sufficient  return  of  "nulla  bona." 
ScharfT  v.  McGaugh,  103  S.  W.  650,  552,  206 
Mo.  844. 

NULLUM  TEMPUS  OCCURRIT  REGI 

'The  maxim  ^nullum  tempus  occurrit 
regi'  only  applies  In  favor  of  the  sovereign 
power,  and  has  no  application  to  municipal 
corporations  deriving  their  powers  from  the 
sovereign,  although  their  powers,  in  a  limited 
sense,  are  governmental.  Thus  the  statute 
runs  for  or  against  towns  and  dtles,  and  al- 
so for  or  against  counties."  In  an  action 
between  a  county  and  an  individual,  the  stat- 
ute of  limitations  is  applicable  to  the  same 
extent  as  though  both  parties  were  natural 
persons.  State  ex  rel.  Board  of  Com*rs  of 
Fountain  County  v.  Stuart,  91  N.  E.  613,  615, 
46  Ind.  App.  6U  (quoting  Wood,  Lim.  f  53). 

NUMBER 

See  Reasonable  Number;  Street  and 
House  Number ;  Street  Number. 

Where  the  evidence  showed  that  the 
state's  witness  on  "one"  occasion  stated  that 
he  bought  the  liquor  from  another,  and  not 
from  defendant,  the  court  properly  refused  to 
instruct  the  Jury  to  acquit,  if  they  believed 
from  the  evidence  that  such  witness  made  a 
"number"  of  statements  that  he  did  not  pur- 
chase the  liquor  from  defendant,  but  from 
another.  Faulk  v.  State,  59  South.  225,  226, 
4  Ala.  App.  177. 

HirMBER  OF  VOTES 

See  Greatest  Number  of  VotesL 

NUNC  PRO  TUNC 

An  entry  *'nunc  pro  tunc^  is  something 
different  from  an  entry  correcting  an  over- 
sight or  mistake.  Such  entry  assumes  that 
an  act  was  done  at  a  particular  time,  which 
never  got  of  record  in  the  proper  books ;  and 
the  entry  is  finally  made  now  for  then.  Ho- 
facre  v.  City  of  Montlcello,  103  N.  W.  488, 
489,  128  Iowa,  239. 

*'The  court  may  order  'nunc  pro  tunc' 
entries,  as  they  are  called,  made  to  supply 


• 


1 


ir 


' 


■iHf 


NUNC  PRO  TUNC 


664 


NUT  Olli  OE  OIL  OF  inJTS 


some  diBisslon  in  the  entry  of  what  was  done 
at  the  preceding  term;  yet  this  is  a  power 
the  extent  of  which  is  limited  and  not  easily 
defined.  In  general,  mere  clerical  errors  may 
be  amended  in  this  way."  Evans  v.  Freeman, 
140  Fed.  419,  424, 

The  office  of  a  "nunc  pro  tone*'  entry  is, 
not  to  make  an  order  now  for  then,  but  to 
enter  now  for  then  an  order  previously  made; 
and  the  fact  that  a  Judge  in  chambers  ex- 
pressed a  willingness  to  make  a  desired  or- 
der extending  the  time  for  filing  a  motion  for 
new  trial,  where  no  such  order  was  actually 
made  or  directed  in  court,  does  not  warrant 
the  entry  of  such  an  order  nunc  pro  tunc  at 
a  succeeding  term.  Klein  v.  Southern  Pac. 
Co.,  140  Fed.  213,  216. 

A  "nunc  pro  tunC  entry  can  only  be  em- 
ployed to  correct  a  clerical  mistake  or  mis- 
prision of  the  derk.  It  can  never  correct  a 
mistake  or  oversight  of  the  judge,  nor  be 
used  to  correct  Judicial  errors,  nor  to  render 
a  Judgment  different  from  that  actually  ren- 
dered, even  though  the  Judgment  actually 
rendered,  was  not  the  Judgment  the  Judge 
intended  to  render.  Bumside  v.  Wand,  71  S. 
W.  337,  389,  170  Mo.  581,  62  L.  B.  A.  427. 

A  •'nunc  pro  tunc"  entry  can  only  be 
made  upon  evidence  furnished  by  the  papers 
and  files  in  the  cause,  or  something  of  rec- 
ord, or  in  the  minute  book  or  Judge's  docket, 
as  a  basis  to  amend  by.  The  stenographer's 
notes  of  proceedings  in  an  action  do  not  con- 
stitute a  paper  or  file  in  the  cause,  which  can 
be  made  the  basis  of  an  amendment  of  a 
Judgment  "nunc  pro  tunc"  A  memorandum 
for  a  Judgment  drawn  by  an  attorney  to  be 
copied  by  the  clerk  does  not  constitute  a  rec^ 
ord,  paper,  or  file  in  the  action,  which  can 
be  made  the  basis  of  an  amendment  of  a 
Judgment  "nunc  pro  tunc.''  Becher  v.  Denser, 
69  S.  W.  363,  364,  169  Mk).  159  (citing  Mis- 
souri, K.  &  B.  By.  Go.  v.  Holschlag,  45  S.  W. 
1101, 144  Mo.  256,  66  Am.  St.  Bep.  417 ;  Young 
V.  Young,  65  S.  W.  1016^  165  Mo.  ^4,  88  Am. 
St  Bep.  440). 

The  purpose  of  an  order  "nunc  pro  tunc" 
is  to  make  a  present  record  of  an  order 
which  the  court  made  at  a  previous  term,  but 
which  was  not  then  recorded;  it  being  im- 
proper to  make  the  record  show  an  order  not 
previously  actually  made,  and  hence  accused, 
who  was  sentenced  on  a  plea  of  guilty,  is  not 
entitled  to  an  order  nunc  pro  tunc  setting 
aside  the  sentence.  People  v.  Wllmot,  96  N. 
E.  973,  975,  254  IlL  554. 

NURSE 

As  servant,  see  Servant 

The  mere  giving  of  massage  treatments 
professionally  falls  within  the  profession  of 
a  trained  "nurse,"  and  one  who  gives  such 
treatments  is  not  required  to  be  licensed. 
People,  to  Use  of  State  Board  of  Health,  v. 
Hettiger,  150  lU.  App.  448,  45L 


Merely  giving  manage  treatment 
bathing  a  patient  falls  properly  within  I 
profession  of  a  trained  "nurse,"  while  i 
ministering  osteopathic  treatment  does  i 
Witty  V.  State,  90  N.  EL  627,  630,  173  I 
404,  26  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1297  (dting  Peo] 
V.  Gordon,  62  N.  BL  858,  194  lU.  560,  88  A 
St  Bep.  166). 

An  agreement  to  "nurse"  an  adult  i 
plies  that  the  object  of  the  care  is  sick,  a 
means  much  more  than  mere  watchfulBc 
and  contemplates  such  care  and  attenti 
of  the  person  as  will  conduce  to  the  co 
fort  and  hasten  the  recovery  of  the  patie: 
but  the  practice  of  medicine,  within  the  st 
ute  regulating  its  practice,  implies  not  oi 
the  knowledge  of  the  professional  nurse,  t 
implies  much  more,  and  includes  the  appli< 
tion  of  medical  knowledge  of  disease,  and  t 
loss  of  health,  and  henoe  an  agreement 
nurse  a  person  during  his  lifetime  in  a 
sideration  of  the  devise  of  the  patient's  pn 
erty  is  not  an  agreement  to  practice  medLd 
without  a  Ucoiae  prohibited  by  the  statu 
so  as  to  prevent  spedflc  pexformanoe  of  t 
contract  Oswald  t.  Nehla,  84  N.  £.  6 
622,  283  IlL  488. 

HUBSZlfO 

The  word  ''caring,"  in  an  Instruction 
an  action  by  a  parent  for  injuries  to  1 
minor  child  authorizing  a  recovery  for  t 
services  of  his  wife  in  nursing,  and  medi( 
attendance  made  necessary  by  the  injury, 
synonymous  with  "nursing,"  and  means  t 
usual  attendance  on  eldk  persons,  and  t 
use  thereof  does  not  render  the  instructi 
misleading.  Johnson  v.  St  Paul  ft  W.  C< 
Co.,  Ill  N.  W.  722,  728,  131  Wis.  627. 

NUTS 

Marrons  (chestnuts)  preserved  in  syr 
are  not  dutiable  as  "nuts"  under  paragrs] 
272,  Tariff  Act  July  24, 1897,  c.  11, 1 1,  Sdic 
ule  G,  30  Stat  172.  Schall  ft  Go.  v.  Unit< 
States,  154  Fed.  1005,  83  C.  a  A.  329. 

Apricot  stones  oome  within  the  comnn 
definition  of  "nuts,"  and  aprioot  kernels  a 
dutiable  as  "nuts  *  *  *  not  special 
provided  for,"  under  paragraph  272,  Taii 
Act  July  24^  1897,  o.  11,  |  1,  Schedule  G,  : 
Stat  172.  United  States  v.  Spenoer  ft  O 
151  Fed.  1022,  81  a  a  A.  683. 

NUT  OIL  OR  OIL  OF  NUTS 

"Nut  oil"  derived  from  the  fmlt  < 
aleurltes  vemica  of  China,  which  is  simih 
to  the  so-called  Jatropha  nuts,  is  proper 
subject  to  classification  of  "nut  oil  or  o 
of  nuts,"  not  otherwise  specially  provide 
for  under  the  provisions  of  l&e  Free  List  1 
TaHff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  11,  S  2,  par.  62 
30  Stat  199.  Edward  mils,  Sims  ft  Go. 
United  States,  127  FM.  970i 


HUTOALLS 


C66 


KXTTRINB 


TGALLS 

"Extract  of  natgalla,"  an  artide  wblch 
mde  by  grinding  natgalls,  digesting  the 
der  In  water,  and  filtering  to  remove  im- 
ties,  a  chemical  being  added  as  a  pre- 
atlve  wldiout  working  any  chemical 
ige,  Is  not  dutiable  as  tannin  or  tanle 
i,  under  paragraph  1,  Schedule  A,  {  1, 
L,  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  80  Stat  151, 
as  a  chemical  compound  under  para- 
)h  3,  Schedule  A,  f  1,  c.  11,  80  Stat  101, 
either  directly  or  by  similitude  as  "drugs, 
I       as    •    •    •    nutgalla,    •    •    •    ad- 


ranced  in  Talne  or  condition,**  under  para- 
graph 20,  Schedule  A,  |  1,  c.  11,  80  Stat  152. 
W.  N.  Proctor  &  Co.  t.  United  States,  189 
Fed.  586^  088. 

NUTRINE 

"Nntrine,**  which  is  made  out  of  crushed 
grain,  com,  and  wheat  sifted,  mixed  with 
cotton  seed  meal  and  molasses,  is  not  flour, 
within  article  280  of  the  ConsUtution  of  1898, 
in  reference  to  exemption  from  taxation.  At- 
las Feed  Products  Co.  v.  City  of  New  Or- 
leans, 87  South.  081,  088, 118  La.  eil. 


O.  F.  B.  A. 


eee 


OATH 


o 


0.  F.  B.  A. 

Where  a  writ  was  indorsed  •'Dr.  Peter 
Brudgeman,  O.  F.  B.  A.,"  It  was  held  clear 
from  the  remainder  of  the  writ  that  "Odd 
Fellows'  Building  Association"  was  meant 
Odd  Fellows'  Bldg.  Ass'n  ▼.  Hogan,  28  Ark. 
261,  264. 

0.  K. 

"O.  E."  may  have  no  title  to  be  classed 
as  elegant  English,  but  in  the  business  life 
of  this  country  it  has  for  many  years  been 
in  common  use,  and  has  acquired  a  meaning 
which  is  not  all  obscure  or  uncertain.  Web- 
ster's International  Dictionary  defines  It  as 
"all  correct."  The  Century  Dictionary  gives 
its  meaning  as  "all  Hccht;  correct;  now  com- 
monly used  as  an  indorsement,  as  on  a  bill." 
It  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  brief,  but 
expressive,  certificate  of  the  correctness  of 
the  bill  or  clain^  on  which  it  is  indorsed. 
Hence  mere  "O.  K."  indorsements  on  bills  by 
architects  are  a  suflacient  compliance  with  a 
contract  for  the  erection  of  a  building  requir- 
ing an  estimate  to  be  given  by  the  architect 
for  85  per  cent,  of  work  and  materials,  and 
providing  that  payments  shall  be  made  on 
written  certificates  of  the  architects,  without 
designating  any  particular  form  of  certifi- 
cate. Getchell  &  Martin  Lumber  &  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Petterson  &  Sampson,  100  N.  W.  660, 
554,  124  Iowa,  509. 

Under  Rev.  St.  1908,  f  3437,  requiring 
each  water  commissioner  to  keep  an  account 
of  the  time  of  each  assistant  employed  by 
him,  and  to  certify  it  to  the  board  of  county 
commissioners,  accounts  of  deputies  contain- 
ing "O.  K.  George  Hider,  Water  Commission- 
er, District  No.  40,"  are  sufiiciently  certified 
by  the  commissioner;  the*  abbreviation  "O. 
K."  meaning  "all  right,"  "correct."  Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Gunnison  County  v.  Hider,  107 
Pac.  1068,  1069,  47  Colo.  443. 

A«  indloatliis  consent 

The  court,  on  plaintiff's  motion  for  the 
direction  of  a  verdict,  discharged  the  Jury, 
and  directed  plaintiff's  counsel  to  prepare 
the  findings  and  judgment  Thereupon  de- 
fendant's attorney,  in  open  court,  stated, 
"And  we  can  have  an  exception  to  each  and 
every  finding."  Findings  and  conclusions, 
with  form  of  Judgment,  were  prepared  and 
served  on  defendant's  counsel.  In  the 
transcript,  below  the  findings,  conclusions, 
and  Judgment  entry,  was  the  abbreviation 
"O.  K.,"  followed  with  the  signature  of  de- 
fendant's counsel.  Held,  that  the  abbrevia- 
tion "O.  K."  did  not  show  that  defendant's 
counsel  assented  to  the  findings,  conclusions, 
and  Judgment  Humphries  v.  Sorenson,  74 
Pac.  690,  692,  33  Wash.  563. 


0  N 

A  bill  of  lading  declared  that.  If  the 
word  "Order,"  was  written  thereon  immedi- 
ately before  or  after  the  name  of  tlie  part; 
to  whose  order  the  property  was  eonsigDed 
the  surrender  of  the  bill  of  lading,  properly 
Indorsed,  should  be  required  before  d^very 
of  the  property.  An  organ  blower  was  ship- 
ped by  plaintiff  under  a  bill  of  lading,  recit- 
ing: "Consigned  to  Organ  Power  Company. 
P.  R.  M.  Co.  Notify  Patton-Rnbush  Mu^lc 
Company.  Via  Merchants  Dispatch.**  The 
freight  bill  contained  the  following:  "Con- 
signee Organ  Power  Company,  O  N  Pat- 
ton-Rubush  M.  House."  Held  that,  as  the 
court  would  take  Judicial  notice  that  the  tet- 
ters "O  N"  signified  "order  notify,"  the  car- 
rier was  chargeable  as  for  a  misdellTery  lo 
delivering  the  blower  to  the  person  to  be 
notified  without  surrender  of  the  biil  of  lad- 
ing and  payment  of  the  draft  thereto  attach- 
ed. Alabama  Great  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Or- 
gan Power  Co.,  46  South.  254,  92  Miss.  781. 

0.  R. 

"O.  R.,"  as  used  in  a  contract  of  ship- 
ment, indicates  that  the  shipment  Is  made 
on  the  owner's  risk.  Nairn  v.  Biissonri,  K. 
&  T.  R.  Co.,  106  S.  W.  102,  126  Ma  App.  707. 

OAK 

See  White  Oak. 

OAR 

In  mechanics  an  oar  is  but  a  lever.  The 
oarlock  is  the  fulcrum;  so  that,  given  a  loose 
oar,  the  distance  from  the  fulcnun  to  the 
power  or  weight  is  liable  to  shift  or  varr 
between  the  oars,  and  result  in  an  uneven  or 
unsteady  stroke,  and  prevent,  in  sudi  contin- 
gency, true  and  safe  rowing.  Where  an  em- 
ployer furnished  a  safe  boat  with  which  to 
row  its  employes  to  their  place  of  work,  the 
fact  that  the  boat  was  provided  with  tight 
oars  did  not  render  the  employer  liable  for 
the  death  of  a  servant,  who  was  drowned  bj 
the  overturning  of  the  boat  Chrismer  v. 
Bell  Telephone  Co.,  92  S.  W.  378,  384,  194 
Mo.  189,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  492. 

OATH 

See  Corporal  Oath;  General  Oath;  Sup- 
pletory  Oath. 

See,  also.  Swear — Sworn. 

An  *'oath"  is  an  outward  pledge,  given 
by  the  person  taking  It,  that  his  attestation 
or  promise  is  made  under  an  immediate  sense 
of  his  responsibility  to  God.  Pumphr^  ▼. 
State,  122  N.  W.  19,  20,  84  Neb.  636,  23  L 
R.  A  (N.  S.)  1023,  18  Ann.  Ca&  979. 


OATH 


667 


OBJECT 


^n  *oath**  l8  a  solemn  adjtintioii  to  God 
anlsh  the  affiant  If  he  swears  falsely, 
its  sanction  is  a  belief  that  the  Supreme 
g  ^wiU  panlsh  falsehood.  Birmingham 
rdsht  &  Power  Ck>.  y.  Jung,  49  South. 
4^0,  161  Ala.  461,  18  Ann.  Cas.  657. 

Pile  word  "oath"  does  not  necessarily 
y  perjury,  for  an  oath  may  be  taken  out- 
of  judicial  proceedings,  or  by  other 
ol  authority,  and,  although  false,  would 
be  perjury,  but  only  false  swearing. 
ed  States  y.  Howard,  132  Fed.  325,  338. 

Comp.  Laws  1909,  f  2177,  defines  '*oath" 
Including  every  mode  of  attesting  the 
1  of  that  which  is  stated  which  is  author- 
by  law.  Town  of  Checotah  y.  Town  of 
lula,  119  Pae.  1014,  1017,  31  Okl.  85. 

Tbe  requirement  of  Gly.  Code  1910,  f 
;  tbat  exceptions  to  tiie  award  of  arbi- 
0T8  be  made  "on  oath,"  is  not  met  by  af- 
rit of  the  party  filing  such  exception  that 
are  true  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge 
beUef.  Winn  y.  BiiUer,  71  &  B.  658»  669, 
Ga.  38a 

rs  OF  OFFIOB 

See  Neglect  to  Take  Oatii. 

rS-BOUND  FRATEBNITT 

"Oath-bound"  and  ^'secret,"  as  used  in 
1909,  p.  332,  prohibiting  '^secret,  oath- 
ad*'  fraternities  in  the  public  schools,  are 
onymous.  Bradford  ▼.  Board  of  fiduca- 
t  of  City  and  County  of  San  Francisco, 
Pae.  929,  932,  18  OaL  App.  19. 

TS 

See  Country  Run  Oats;  Texas  Bed  Rust^ 
Proof  Oats. 

As  proTisions,  see  Proyisiona 

The  word  "oats"  is  defined  as  ••prori- 
18  laid  in  large  for  man  and  beast"    Kan- 

Clty,  rt  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  V.  Graham,  74 
r.  232,  233,  67  Kan.  791  (citing  Dr.  John- 
's Diet,  and  Cent  Diet). 

,T  FEED 

Since  the  term  *<oat  f^ed"  in  its  ordi- 
7  acceptation  does  not  mean  the  whole  oat 
in,  either  crushed  or  ground,  but  instead 
ans  that  part  of  the  grain  which  remains 
er  the  miller  subtracts  the  portions  useful 

human  food,  consisting  of  nubbins,  mid- 
ngs,  hulls,  and  oat  dust,  a  compound 
^stance  sold  in  packages  under  the  name 
omo  Horse  and  Mule  Feed,"  and  describ- 
OD  the  package  as  a  "mixture  of  ground 
'alfa,  oats,  com,  alfalfa,  oat  and  hominy 
^ds,"  with  the  name  of  the  manufacturer 
d  place  of  manufacture,  followed  by  an 
alysis  of  its  contents,  was  not  mlsbrand- 
m  violation  of  the  food  and  drugs  act  (Act 
ng.  June  ,30,  1906,  c.  8915,  34  Stat  768), 
cau8e  it  contained  an  excess  of  oat  hulls 
compound  and  not  the  whole  ground  oats. 


United  States  r.  One  Car  Load  of   Como 
Horse  and  Mule  Feed,  188  Fed.  4S3,  457. 

OAT  HUIX8 

A  by-product  in  the  manufacture  of  oat- 
meal, which  consists  merely  of  the  broken 
hulls  of  the  oats,  and  is  known  as  "oatmeal 
feed,"  is  dutiable  as  "oat  hulls,*'  under  the 
Tariff  Act  of  July  24,  1897.  United  States 
T.  McGettrick,  139  Fed.  304. 

OBITER  DICTUM 

See  Dictum. 

OBJECT 

See  Natural  Object  of  His  Bounty. 

*'ObJect"  is  the  end  to  be  attained  by  a 
given  action  or  efFort  Sawter  r.  Shoenthal, 
80  Ati.  101,  81  N.  J.  Law,  197. 

Of  aotloBL 

"The  'object'  of  an  action  is  the  reUef 
demanded;  the  recovery  of  damages  or  the 
land  or  personalty  sued  for;  the  restraint  or 
other  relief  demanded."  Lassiter  v.  Norfolk 
&  C.  R.  Co.,  48  S.  E.  642,  643,  136  N.  C.  89, 
1  Ann.  Cas.  456. 

Of  eonspiimejr 

Under  Rev.  St  |  5440,  making  criminal 
a  conspiracy  to  commit  an  offense  against 
the  United  States  or  to  defraud  it,  where 
one  or  more  of  the  conspirators  do  some  act 
to  effect  the  "object"  of  the  conspiracy,  it  is 
not  enough  that  the  conspiracy  be  directed  to 
the  attainment  of  some  unlawful  object  but 
it  must  be  directed  to  the  attainment  of  such 
an  object  as  brings  the  conspiracy  within 
the  class  made  criminal,  and,  when  that  ob- 
ject is  attained,  "the  object  of  the  conspira- 
cy" is  effected,  and  there  can  be  no  further 
overt  act  Lonabaugh  y.  United  States,  179 
Fed.  476,  481,  108  C.  a  A.  56. 

Of  statnte  or  ordinance 

The  "object"  of  a  law  is  the  aim  or 
purpose  of  the  enactment  State  v.  De  Hart 
33  South.  605,  606,  109  La.  570. 

"The  object  of  an  act"  as  used  in  Const 
art  4,  f  7,  par.  4,  requiring  that  every  law 
shall   embrace  but  one   "object"   and   that 
shall  be  expressed  in  its  title,   means  the 
end  or  aim  of  the  subject     There  must  not 
be  mixed  in  one  and  the  same  act  such  things 
as  have  no  proper  relation  to  each  other.    To 
except  from  an  act  one  of  the  class  which 
the  act  would  otherwise  interdict  is  not  to 
intermingle  subjects  having   no    relation   to 
each  other,  but  to  legislate  on  a  subject  cov- 
ered by  the  statute  and  germane  to  its  pro- 
visions, and  to  give  expression  in  the  one  act 
to  the  legislative  purpose  covering   all  the 
subjects  embraced  within  the  object  of  the 
statute.     The  act  entitled  "An   act  for  the 
protection   of   pigeons   and   other   fowl   and 
constituting  the  violation  of  its  provisions  a 
misdemeanor,"  approved  April  12, .  1904   (P. 


OBJBcrr 


OBULaATlOK 


L.  p.  510)  Ifl  not  in  conflict  with  sndi  con- 
stitutional provisions.  State  t.  Davis,  61 
Atl.  2;  3,  72  N.  J.  Law,  346. 

Under  the  requirement  of  the  Constitu- 
tion that  the  "object"  of  an  act  must  be  ex- 
pressed in  its  title,  the  true  rule  is  that  the 
object  expressed  must  give  notice  of  the  ef- 
fect of  the  legislation  to  one  conversant  with 
the  existing  state  of  the  law.  The  validity 
of  the  title  is  not  to  be  determined  by  nice 
distinctions  o(  etymology  or  definition  of 
words,  but  by  the  facts  of  the  case  and  the 
history  of  the  legislation.  Sawter  v.  Shoen- 
thai,  83  Ati.  1004,  83  N.  J.  Law,  499;  Har- 
ris V.  American  Casualty  Co.  of  Reading, 
Pa.,  86  Atl.  194,  83  N.  J.  641,  44  L.  B.  A. 
(N.   S.)  70. 

OBJECTIOK 

As  proceeding,  see  Proceeding. 

Exception  synonymous,  see  Exception. 

Subject  to  objection,  see  Subject  To. 

Cases  on  appeal  are  tried  from  a  bill  of 
"exceptions,"  not  a  bill  of  "objections."  It 
is  true  that  the  word  "object"  in  certain 
connections  may  have  the  same  meaning  as 
"except"  In  the  course  of  a-  trial  an  objec- 
tion is  made  to  the  end  that  a  ruling  of  the 
court  may  be  had.  This  mMng  is  not  upon 
what  the  court  itself  has  done,  but  upon 
what  the  parties  are  doing  or  offering  to  do. 
The  objection  goes  to  the  act  of  persons  oth- 
er than  the  court  and  is  made  to  get  action 
from  the  court  When  the  court  acts,  the 
error  is  preserved  by  an  exception  to  the 
ruling.  Thus  the  origin  of  the  term  "bill  of 
exceptions.'*  Harding  v.  Missouri  Pac  Ry. 
Co.,  134  S.  W.  641,  643,  282  Mo.  444,  Ann. 
Cas.   1912B,   1221. 

OBJEOXIONABI.E  JVBOB 

An  "Objectionable  Juror"  Is  one  against 
whom  exists  some  ground  or  cause,  such  as 
the  formation  of  opinion  or  some  prejudice, 
which  might  be  ground,  of  challenge,  and 
would  tend  to  show  that  the  Jury  was  not 
absolutely  fair  and  impartiaL  Carter  y. 
State,  76  S.  W.  487,  439,  46  Tex.  Or.  R.  430. 

OBJEGTXVB  SYMPTOM 

"Objective  symptoms"  are  those  which 
the  surgeon  discovers  from  a  physical  exam- 
ination of  his  patient,  while  subjective  symp- 
toms are  those  he  learns  from  what  his 
patient  tells  him.  Dean  v.  Wabash  B,  Co., 
129  S.  W.  963,  967,  229  Mo.  426^^ 

OBLIGATE 

OBUOATIOH 

See  CivU  Obligation;  Existing  ObUga- 
tions;  General  Obligation;  Imperfect 
Obligation;  Joint  Obligation;  Moral 
Obligation;  Natural  Obligation;  Orig- 
inal  Obligation;  Pecuniary  Obliga- 
tion; Personal  Obligation;  Right Aris- 
Ing  Out  of  an   Obligation;    Several 


Obligvtion;    Single  Obligatkm;   SUt- 
ntory  Obligation* 
Other  obligation  by  whidi  debt  is  8eea^ 

ed,  see  Other. 
"The  word 'obligation'    •    •    •     imports 
an   existing  moral   or  physical   neeessity* 
Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6  Czanch  (XO  U.    S.)  ST. 
144,  3  L.  Bd.  162  (Johnson,  J.,  diaeeating). 

The  term  "obligation,'*  as  used  In  Loniri- 
ana,  is  in  its  general  and  most  extensile 
sense  synonymous  with  "duty;"  Obligations 
are  of  three  kinds,  imperfect,  natoral,  and 
dvil,  or  petltect,  obligations.  Morgan's  Loo- 
islana  &  T.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Stewart.  44 
South.  138,  148,  119  La.  892. 

The  term  "obligation,''  as  used  In  Rer. 
St  1896,  art  1194,  subd.  6,  providing  that 
when  one  has  contracted  In  wilting  to  per- 
form an  obligation  in  a  particular  conntr^ 
suit  may  be  brought  therein  or  in  tbe  oous^ 
of  defendant's  domicile,  means  such  an  ob- 
ligation that  its  breach  would  deprive  tbe 
other  party  of  some  ai^redable  right  or 
cause  him  some  actionable  damage;  and 
where  a  written  contract  for  the  sale  of 
lumber  did  not  provide  that  the  price  was 
to  be  paid  in  H.  county,  or  provide  where 
the  lumber  was  to  be  delivered,  merely  pro- 
viding that  the  seller  should  pay  ttie  frei^t 
to  a  point  in  that  county,  there  was  no  obli- 
gation to  be  performed  in  H.  county  which 
was  breached  by  the  buyer's  refusal  to  or- 
der and  receive  the  remainder  of  the  lum- 
ber, whether  the  contract  of  sale  be  consid- 
ered as  executed  or  executory;  the  refiBal 
to  pay  the  full  contract  price  being  tbe  onl; 
material  obligation  breached  in  the  first  is- 
stance,  and  the  seller's  measure  of  damages 
not  being  affected  by  such  refusal,  if  the 
contract  '  was  executory.  Ogbum-Dalchaa 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Taylor  (Tex.)  126  S.  W.  4a, 
62. 

Under  Bums'  Ana.  St  1901,  f  373,  pro- 
viding that  in  pleading  the  performance  of  a 
condition  precedent  in  a  contract  it  shall  be 
sufficient  to  allege  generally  that  the  party 
performed  all  the  conditions  on  his  part  an 
allegation  that  plaintiff  fully  perfiomied  all 
the  obligations  required  of  hw  was  a  suf- 
ficient compliance;  for,  while  "obligatiiHi'' 
and  ''condition"  are  not  synonymoua  tenns, 
the  effect  of  a  valid  condition  is  to  impose 
upon  the  party  to  whom  it  applies  the  obliga- 
tion of  perf ormanoeu  Security  Accident  & 
Si^  B&L  Ass'n  V.  Lee,  66  N.  B.  745, 160  Ind. 
249. 

In  an  action  on  notefl»  defendant  inter 
posed  a  counterclaim  for  damages  thronsh 
violation  of  instructions  by  plaintUTs  f onner 
firms  as  factors,  alleging  that  plaintiff  as- 
sumed and  agreed  to  pay  the  "obligatioos'' 
of  sudi  firms.  Held,  that  while  the  word 
"obligations"  has  been  limited  on  the  one 
hand  to  sealed  instruments  of  ascertain  kind 
only  and  extended  on  the  other  to  include  all 
legal  duties*  though  as  commonly  used  it  im- 


OBUQATIOK 


<69 


OBLIGATIOK 


fiUeB  no  mose  than  a  cause  of  action  «fi* 
denced  by  a  writing,  and  would  not  extend 
to  an  unliquidated  liability  aounding  in 
tort»  it  would  on  demurrer  be  assumed  that 
the  pleader  used  the  word  in  its  larger  senses 
and  the  remedy  for  indeflniteness  btfng  by 
motion  under  Code  CLr,  Proc  |  640,  the  coun- 
terclaim would  be  held  to  state  a  cause  of 
action  on  contract  Carroll  ▼.  GOiarp,  122 
N.  Y.  Supp.  694,  097,  67  Misc.  Rep.  264. 

Rev.  Codes,  |  4966,  defines  a  "contract 
as  an  agreement  to  do  or  not  to  do  a  certain 
thing.  Section  4966  provides  that  to  a  con- 
tract there  should  be  parties  capable  of  con- 
tracting, their  consult,  a  lawful  object,  and  a 
sufficient  cause  of  consideration.  Section 
4892  defines  an  "obligation"  as  a  legal  duty 
by  which  a  person  is  bound  to  do  or  not  to 
do  a  certain  thing.  Section  4898  provides 
that  an  obligation  arises  either  from  the  con- 
tract of  the  parties  or  by  operation  of  law. 
Section  6446  provides  that  an  action  upon  a 
contract,  account,  or  promise  not  founded 
upon  an  Instrument  In  writing  must  be  com- 
menced within  five  years.  Section  6447  pro- 
vides that  an  action  upon  an  obligation  or 
liability  not  founded  upon  an  instrument  in 
writing  other  than  a  contract,  account,  or 
promise  must  be  commenced  within  three 
years.  Defendant,  acting  as  agent  to  sell  real 
property  to  plalntifF,  received  $6,000  on  the 
purdmse  price.  Hie  sale  was  not  completed, 
and  but  $4,000  was  returned  to  plaintiff. 
Held,  in  an  action  for  the  balance  ttiat  the 
terms  ^contract"  and  "obligation,**  as  used 
in  sections  6446  and  6447,  were  defined  by 
sections  4966,  4966,  4892,  and  4893,  and  as 
tbexe  was  no  contract  between  the  parties  for 
the  return  of  the  money  an  action  to  enforce 
its  return  was  not  an  action  upon  a  contract 
as  defined  by  the  Code%  or  as  used  in  the 
statute  of  limitations,  but  the  duty  to  return 
the  money  was  an  "obligation"  or  legal  duty, 
and  the  action  being  upon  an  obligation,  not 
founded  upon  an  instrument  in  writing  with- 
in the  statute  of  UmitatioDs,  and  not  being 
brought  within  three  years,  was  barred. 
Schaeffer  r.  MlUer,  109  Paa  970,  973»  41 
Mont.  417,  137  Am.  St  B»  746. 


The  words  "obligation  executed,**  as  used 
in  P.  U  1902,  p.  459,  prohibiting  any  eoipora- 
tion  from  pleading  usury  on  any  obligation 
executed  by  it  refers  to  corporate  obligations 
such  as  bonds,  mortgages,  and  the  like^  and 
does  not  apply  to  an  agreement  to  pay  a  usn- 
rloua  eommission  to  an  agent  Mazarin  v. 
Hudson  County  Real  Estate  &  Building  Co., 
76  Aa  822,  823,  SON.  J.  Law,  35. 

Okeek 

A  bank  dieck  Is  not  an  "obligation  for 
tiw  payment  of  money,"  wttiUn  the  legal 
meaning  of  audi  term  as  used  In  B«r.  8t  S 
5461,  providing  for  the  punishment  of  bHb- 
Cfy  of  United  States  eBkcetn,  Tbe  dcflni- 
tlons  of  tlie  woKd  "cbe^"  as  given  In  1  Boor. 


Law  Diet  226^1  Abb.  Law  met  214,  2  Daniel, 
Neg.  Inst  (4th  Bd.)  |  1666,  Bish.  St  Crimes 
(2d  Ed.)  p.  299,  f  328,  and  People  v.  Howell 
<N.  X.)  4  Johns.  301,  do  not  support  the 
proposition  that  a  "check"  is  an  ''obligation 
for  the  payment  of  money,"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  statute.  The  definitions  of  the 
word  "obligation"  as  found  In  2  Bouv.  Law 
Diet  254,  Whart  Law  Diet,  2  Abb.  Law 
Diet  198»  Strong  t.  Wheaton  (N.  Y.)  38 
Barb.  616,  Crandall  v.  Bryan  (N.  T.)  16  How. 
Prac.  48,  Hippon's  Bx'rs  v.  Townsend's  Bx'rs 
(S.  C.)  1  Bay,  446,  and  Basehore  v.  Rhodes, 
86  Pa.  44,  are  not  sufficiently  broad  to  cover 
the  case  of  a  "check."  A  "check"  is  a  rep- 
resentation by  the  drawer  that  he  has  money 
on  deposit  with  the  drawee  subject  to  his 
order.  The  law  implies  a  consideration  for 
the  check,  and  a  promise  on  the  part  of  the 
drawer  to  pay  the  amount  of  the  check  in 
case  it  is  not  paid  or  accepted  by  the  bank 
or  banker  on  which  it  is  drawn.  The  giving 
of  a  check  is  not  the  creation  of  an  obliga- 
tion, but  is  merely  the  admission  by  the  draw- 
er of  the  existence  of  an  obligation  to  pay  a 
certain  sum  of  money.  If  payable  to  bearer, 
or  to  the  order  of  the  payee,  it  is  negotiable 
and  passes  by  delivery  or  Indorsement;  but 
the  check  imposes  no  obligation  on  the  drawee 
to  pay  the  same,  at  least  as  between  the 
drawee  and  payee;  but  if  the  bank  refuses  to 
pay  the  che<^,  having  funds  with  which  to 
pay  the  same,  the  payee  cannot  maintain  an 
action  in  law  or  in  equity  against  the  bank 
unless  the  bank  has  accepted  the  check.  A 
check  is  neither  a  draft  or  bill  of  exchange, 
although  it  has  many  of  the  features  of  a  bill 
of  exchange  and  some  of  the  features  of  a 
draft  It  is  not  a  bond  or  a  promissory  note. ' 
It  is  not  a  contract,  for  it  contains  no  prom- 
ise by  the  drawer  to  any  person.  United 
States  V.  Green,  136  Fed.  618,  646.  660  (cit- 
ing Bull  V.  First  Mat  Bank,  8  Sup.  Ct  62, 
123  U.  S.  110,  111,  SI  L.  Bd.  97;  Merchants' 
Nat  Bank  v.  State  Nat  Bank,  10  Wall.  [T7 
n.  8.1  604,  19  L.  Ed.  1008;  CJhapman  v. 
People,  89  Mich.  867,  869;  In  re  Ricfater,  100 
Fed.  296,  297;  U.  S.  v.  Boyall,  3  (branch,  C. 
C.  618,  27  Fed.  Cas.  906;  Elsasser  v.  Haines, 
18  Ati.  1006,  62  N.  J.  Law,  10;  Slnton  v.  Car- 
ter County,  23  Fed.  636,  637,  638;  Regina  v. 
Beed,  8  Carrlngton  &  Payne,  623;  MerchantB' 
Nat  Bank  v.  SUte  Bank,  10  Wall.  [77  U.  8.] 
604,  19  Ll  Bd.  1008;  Bull  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
8  Sup.  Ct  62,  123  U.  8.  110,  111,  31  Ll 
Ed.  97;  People  v.  Howell  [N.  T.]  4  Johns. 
296,  301). 

DoM  OT  UftUUty 

Obligation  aa  debt  see  Debt 

Bev.  St  Ohio  1892, 18300,  authorlaeaany 
railroad  company  to  purchase  a  railroad  con- 
structed by  another  company,  and  de<Hares 
that  after  such  purchase  the  purchasing 
company  shall  be  vested  of  all  the  rights  and 
powers  in  respeet  to  the  location,  eonstruc- 
tlon,  completion,  and  operation  of  sodi  rail- 
road, and  tfiall  be  snltfect  to  an  the  duties. 


OBUGATIOK 


670 


OBLiaATIOH 


''obllgatioiiB*''  and  restrictioiiB  of  the  former 
oompany.  Held,  tbat  a  claim  for.bteach  of 
a  contract  to  transport  plalntifTs  stone  for 
a  specified  rate,  existing  against  a  railroad 
company  whose  line  was  pnrchased  by  de- 
fendant»  was  not  an  ^'obligation"  which  de- 
fendant was  bound  to  perform  under  such 
section;  defendant  never  having  agreed  to 
assume  such  liability.  Rice  v.  Norfolk  ft  W. 
Ry.  Go.,  153  Fed.  497,  498,  82  G.  C.  A.  447. 

Where  testator  paid  the  secured  debt  of 
his  insane  nephew  In  order  to  preserve  the 
security  for  the  nephew  In  case  he  regained 
his  reason,  the  nephew's  liability  to  reim- 
burse testator  was  an  "obligation"  within 
Rev.  St  1909,  f  1889,  declaring  that  actions 
on  contracts,  obligations,  or  liabilities,  ex- 
press or  implied,  shall  be  barred  in  five  years, 
and  hence  an  action  to  enforce  testator's 
right  to  subrogation  must  be  brought  within 
that  time.  Petty  v.  Tucker,  148  S.  W.  142, 
144,  166  Mo.  App.  98. 

Rev.  Godes  1899,  f  5047,  relating  to  at- 
tachment, defines  "debtor"  as  one  who  by  rea- 
son of  an  existing  obligation  has  or  may  be- 
come liable  to  pay  money  to  another,*whether 
such  liability  is  certain  or  contingent,  and, 
so  defined,  the  term  "debtor"  has  its  usual 
signification;  that  is,  one  from  whom  a  debt 
is  due,  using  the  word  according  to  its  com- 
mon meaning.  Section  3762  defines  an  "ob- 
ligation" as  a  legal  duty  by  which  a  person 
is  bound  to  do  or  not  to  do  a  certain  thing. 
The  several  sections  quoted  make  it  plain 
that  the  Legislature  has  broadened  the  com- 
mon meaning  of  the  words  "debtor"  and 
"creditor,"  so  as  to  include  all  persons  from 
-whom  or  to  whom  obligations  are  due^  wheth- 
er arising  from  contract  or  imposed  by  law; 
but  none  of  these  provisions  define  the  term 
"debt,"  or  furnish  ground  for  the  contention 
that  "debt"  and  "obligation"  are  synonymous. 
It  will  be  conceded  that  the  common  and 
ordinary  meaning  of  the  term  "debt,"  in 
legal  acceptation  of  the  term,  is  an  obligation 
resting  upon  contract,  either  express  or  im- 
plied. Under  the  statutory  definitions  of  a 
debtor,  it  is  not  necessary  to  owe  a  debt  It 
is  sufficient  if  one  owes  an  oUlgatlon  imposed 
by  law.  Every  debt,  however,  is  an  obliga- 
tion; but  every  obligation  Is  not  a  debt 
"Obligation"  is  the  broader  term;  "debt" 
the  narrower.  The  term  "obligation"  in- 
cludes all  debts.  The  term  "debt"  does  not 
include  all  obligations,  but  only  that  particu- 
lar kind  of  obligations  known  as  debts.  The 
statement,  therefore,  that  the  Legislature  has 
specifically  defined  the  term  "debt,"  and  that 
the  term  "debt"  is  synonymous  with  the 
word  "obligation,"  is  not  sustained  by  the 
statute.  Sonnesyn  v.  Akin,  97  N.  W.  657, 
560-663,  12  N.  D.  227. 

Deed  or  sealed  instnunent 

Under  Rev.  Gode  1852,  amended  to  1893, 
p.  745,  c.  99,  §  12,  providing  that  to  an  ob- 
ligation for  the.  payment  of  any  sum   not 


exceeding  $200  there  may  be  an  extzt  lu- 
rant,  duly  executed,  authorizing  any  Josttoe 
of  the  peace  to  alter  Judgment  tbeie<m  by 
confession,  the  word  "obligation"  Imports  ai 
instrument  under  seal,  as  does  the  wamot; 
and  hence  a  note  and  warrant  attacbel 
neither  of  which  were  under  seal,  do  not 
give  a  Justice  authority  to  enter  Judgmeot 
by  confession.  Slaughter  v.  Provident  Sar. 
Bank  of  Preston,  Md.  (DeL)  80  AtL  243, 24i 
2  Boyce,  333. 

IHity  as  oblisAtioB 

See  Duty. 
Enforceable  oliUsatioa 

A  promise  founded  upon  a  good  ooDsid- 
eratlon  rendered  at  the  time  is  obligatory  and 
enforceable.  A  loan  of  money  and  simple  con- 
tract debts  are  familiar  instances  of  the 
kind.  The  promise  to  repay  the  money  or  to 
discharge  the  debt  becomes  binding  and  ob- 
ligatory by  reason  of  the  promisor  baving  re- 
ceived a  consideration  for  making  it  WLen, 
however,  a  promise,  by  whatsoever  reason. 
has  become  binding,  it  ia  more  aptly  termed 
an  "obligation."  But  a  promise  of  material 
import  will  support  a  counter  promise,  and 
vice  versa.  When  mutually  entered  into, 
they  operate  one  as  a  consideration  for  tlw 
other;  thus  constituting  an  agreement  bind- 
ing and  obligatory  upon  both  parties.  Wbeie 
the  agreement  is  wholly  executory,  it  is  es- 
sential that  the  obligation  be  mutual;  else 
there  is  no  consideration  for  its  support,  and 
it  is  but  a  mere  nudum  pactum.  Llvesley  ▼• 
Johnston,  76  Pac.  946,  948,  45  Or.  30,  65  L 
R,  A.  783,  106  Am.  St  Rep.  647. 
IdaMUtT  enforoeaUa  agalast  hoB<- 
stead 

The  meaning  of  the  word  "obligations.'' 
as  used  in  Const.  1885,  art.  10,  f  1,  provldin? 
that  an  exemption  of  a  homestead  shall  not 
apply  to  obligations  contracted  for  the  pur- 
chase of  the  property  or  for  improvemeots 
thereon,  means  a  debt  contracted  to  be  V^ 
or  a  duty  to  be  performed  by  the  purdiaser 
as  a  consideration  of  the  purchase.  Piatt  t. 
Piatt,  39  South.  536,  537,  50  Ma.  594  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  Whitaktf  ^ 
ElUott,  73  N.  G.  186k  and  dtlag  Fox  r.  Bnoks. 
88  N.  C.  234). 

A  loan  to  the  owner  of  a  homestead,  to 
pay  a  note  due  for  the  purchase  mosey  of  tbe 
homestead,  the  lender  taking  the  owner's 
note,  with  an  Indorsement  of  a  third  peisoo 
thereon  to  whom  he  looks  for  payment  is 
not  an  "obligation,"  within  a  constltntionil 
exception  rendering  a  homestead  liable  for  ^ 
obligation  contracted  for  the  purchase  there- 
of. Wilhelm  T.  Locklar,  35  South.  6,  46  Fit 
575,  110  Am.  St.  R^.  111. 

Should  implying 

Should  implying,  see  Should. 

Tax 

In  reference  to  the  payment  of  t*^* 
the  terms  "obligation"  and  "duty"  are  osed 


n 


OBLIGATION 


671 


OBLIGATION  OP  CONTRACT 


^o  senses ;  the  first  being  in  reference  to 
vidnals,  and  the  second  being  in  reference 
be  sovereign  imposing  the  tax.  The  mat- 
of  obligation  to  indiyidnals  arises  from 
legal  or  equitable  relation  of  the  [>artie8; 
matter  of  duty  to  the  sovereign  is  fixed 
the  legislative  enactments  imposing  the 
In  neither  case  is  the  measure  of  obli- 
on  fixed  by  the  mere  fact  of  an  interest 
in  estate  in  the  land.  It  is  settled  by  the 
tiorities  that  the  party  under  obligation 
)ay  taxes  cannot  acquire  a  title  at  a  tax 
K  Shrigley  v.  Black,  71  Pac.  301,  303, 
Kan.  213  (dissenting  opinion,  quoting 
att  V.  Price.  18  Fla.  289). 

ort 

An  order  of  the  federal  court  directing 
receiver  of  a  railroad  ^o  restore  to  the 
road  its  property  in  his  hands  on  the 
eement  of  the  railroad  to  assume  "all  law- 
liabilities  and  obligations  of  the  receiver 
itlng  on  a  designated  date  and  save  the 
dver  harmless  against  the  payment  of 
'  liabilities  incurred  by  him,  Imposes  on 
railroad  the  payment  of  liabilities  ind- 
tal  to  the  receiver's  operation  of  the  road, 
luding  the  liability  for  injuries  to  a  pas- 
ger  through  tire  negligence  of  the  receiv- 
i  servants;  the  word  "obligations'*  mean- 
duties  arising  out  of  a  contract  or  from 
acUonable  tort,  and  the  word  "liabilities" 
luding  any  form  of  legal  obligation  meas- 
d  by  money  valuation,  whether  arising 
m  contract,  express  or  implied,  from  duty 
Josod  by  law  or  judgment  of  court,  or  in 
sequence  of  a  tort  Vandalia  R.  Co.  v. 
^8,  91  N.  E.  173,  175,  46  Ind.  App.  363 
f)tlng  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4878). 

LIGATIOH  BT  WKIOH  DBBT  IS  SE- 
GUBED 

Const  art  13,  f  1,  permits  provision,  ex- 
t  in  case  of  credits  secured,  for  a  deduc- 
1  from  credits  of  debts  due  to  bona  fide 
Idents.  Pol.  Code,  §  3617,  subd.  8,  pro- 
es  that  a  mortgage,  or  other  ''obligation" 
which  a  debt  is  secured,  when  land  is 
dged,  shall,  for  the  purposes  of  taxation, 
deemed  as  interest  In  the  land  so  pledged, 
1  by  subdivision  6  the  term  "credits" 
ans  those  solvent  debts  not  secured  owing 
the  person  assessed,  and  the  term  "debt" 
ans  those  unsecured  liabilities  owing  by 
'  person  assessed  to  bona  fide  residents 
1  section  3628,  provides  that,  in  assessing 
rent  credits  not  secured,  a  reduction  shall 
made  of  debts  due  bona  fide  residents,  and 
tioD  3650,  snbd.  15,  provides  that  in  enter- 
assessments  containing  solvent  credits, 
>ject  to  deduction,  the  assessor  must  enter 
the  proper  column  the  value  of  debts  and 
luct  them  therefrom.  Const  art.  13,  | 
provides  that  a  mortgage,  or  other  obllga- 
Q  by  which  a  debt  is  sechired,  shall,  for 
purpose  of  taxation,  be  deemed  an  In- 
est  in  the  property  affected.  Pol.  Code,  S 
^,  contains  the  same  provision.     Held« 


that  a  collateral  security  of  credits  by  a  loan 
on  personalty  was  not  a  mortgage,  etc.,  or 
"other  obligation  by  which  a  debt  is  secured," 
within  Const  art  13,  f  4,  that  section  apply- 
ing only  to  liens  on  land;  nor  was  it  a  "mort- 
gage or  trust  deed,"  within  section  1,  so  that 
the  person  assessed  on  such  credits  was  en- 
titled to  have  his  debts  deducted  therefrom; 
and  Pol.  Code,  f  8629,  subd.  6,  directing  the 
asaessor  to  require  each  person  assessed  to 
show  separately  all  solvent  credits  unsecured, 
is  not  applicable,  not  referring  to  the  asses- 
sor's du^  in  making  the  assessment,  but  only 
prescribing  the  ft>rm  of  the  taxpayer's  return 
for  the  assessor's  Information.  Bank  of  Wil- 
lows T.  Glenn  County,  101  Pac.  18,  155  Cal. 
352. 

OBUOATIOH     FBAUBUUSlfTIiT      ZX- 
CUBMED 

A  debtor,  who  by  fraudulent  representa- 
tions procures  an  extension  of  time  within 
which  to  pay  a  debt,  fraudulently  incurs  an 
"oUigation,"  within  Rev.  St  f  2781,  subd. 
4,  and  renders  his  property  subject  to  at- 
tachment First  Nat.  Bank  of  Stevens  Point 
V.  Rosenfeld,  28  N.  W.  370,  371,  66  Wis.  292. 

OBUOATIOH  OF   OOHTRACT 

See  Impairing  Obligation  of  Contract. 

"The  'obligation  of  a  contract,'  within 
the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  ia  a  valid 
subsisting  obligation,  not  a  contingent  or 
speculative  one."  Ochiltree  v.  Iowa  Railroad 
Contracting  Co.,  21  WaU.  (88  U.  S.)  249,  252, 
22  L.  Ed.  546. 

The  "obligation  of  a  contract"  is  Its  en- 
gaging quality,  the  attribute  of  binding  force 
upon  the  parties  to  it  State  ex  rel.  Coleman 
V.  PuUman  Co.,  90  Pac  319,  321,  75  Kan.  664. 

The  "obligation  of  a  contract"  consists 
of  the  binding  force  of  its  stipulations  upon 
those  who  make  them,  and  depends  upon  the 
continued  existence  of  the  means  of  enforc- 
ing its  stipulations;  otherwise  a  contract 
would  be  without  obligation,  and  would  have 
only  such  effect  as  the  parties  should  choose 
to  give  it,  and  a  state  law  which  unreason- 
ably restricts  the  time  to  sue  in  its  own 
courts  to  enforce  the  judgment  of  a  sistier 
state  on  an  existing  contract  impairs  the  ob- 
ligation of  the  contract  and  is  invalid.  Lamb 
V.  Powder  River  Live  Stock  Co.,  132  Fed. 
434,  439,  65  C.  O.  A.  570,  67  L.  R.  A.  558. 

"The  'obligation  of  a  contract'  consists 
in  its  binding  force  on  the  party  who  makes 
it  This  depends  on  tht  laws  in  existence 
when  it  is  made.  These  are  necessarily  re- 
ferred to  in  all  contracts,  and  form  a  part  of 
them  as  the  measure  of  the  obligation  to  per- 
form them  by  the  one  party  and  the  right 
acquired  by  the  other.  There  can  be  no  other 
standard  by  which  to  ascertain  the  exteut  of 
either  than  that  which  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract indicate,  according  to  their  settled  legal 
meaning.     When  it  becomes  consummated,  the 


I 


#'4i<:t| 


II 


*PI 


OBLIOATION  OP  CONTRACT 


672 


OBSOENS— OBSOENITT 


law  defines  the  duty  and  the  right,  compete 
one  party  to  perform  the  thing  oontracted 
for,  and  gives  the  other  a  right  to  enforce 
the  performance  by  the  remedies  then  in  force. 
If  any  subsequent  law  affect  to  diminish  the 
duty  or  to  impair  the  right,  it  necessarily 
bears  on  the  obligation  of  the  contract  in 
inYOT  of  one  party,  to  the  injury  of  the  other; 
hence  any  law  which  in  its  operation  amounts 
to  a  denial  or  obstruction  of  the  rights  ac- 
cruing by  a  contract,  though  professing  to 
act  only  on  the  remedy,  is  directly  obnoxious 
to  the  prohibition  of  the  Constitution."  **The 
obligation  of  a  contract  in  the  constitutional 
sense  is  the  means  provided  by  law  by  which 
it  can  be  enforced — by  which  the  parties  can 
be  obliged  to  perform  it  Whatever  legisla- 
tion lessens  the  efficacy  of  these  means  im- 
pairs the  obligation.  If  it  tend  to  postpone 
or  retard  the  enforcement  of  the  contract, 
the  obligation  of  the  latter  is  to  that  extent 
weakened."  Harrison  v.  Remington  Paper 
Co.,  140  Fed.  385,  391,  392,  72  C.  O.  A.  405, 
3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  954,  5  Ann.  Cas.  314  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  the  definitions  in  McCrack« 
en  V.  Hayward,  2  How.  [43  U.  S.]  008,  611, 
612,  11  L.  Ed.  397,  and  Louisiana  ex  rei 
Ranger  v.  New  Orleans,  102  U.  S.  203,  206, 
26  L.  Ed.  132);  Myers  ▼.  Knickerbocker 
Trust  Co.,  139  Fed.  Ill,  115,  71  C.  C.  A.  199,  1 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1171  (adopting  definition  in 
McCracken  v.  Hayward,  2  How.  [43  U.  S.] 
608,  611, 11  L.  Ed.  897). 

Remedy  as  part  of 

The  remedy,  where  it  affects  substantial 
rights,  is  included  in  the  terms  "obligation  of 
a  contract,"  and  the  remedy  cannot  be  alter- 
ed so  as  to  materially  impair  such  obligation. 
Welsh  V.  Cross,  81  Pac.  229,  280,  146  CaL 
621, 106  Am.  St  Rep.  63,  2  Ann.  Cas.  796  (cit- 
ing Edwards  v.  Kearzey,  96  U.  S.  600,  24  L. 
Ed.  793). 

"The  'obligation  of  a  contract'  includes 
everything  within  its  obligatory  scope. 
Among  these  elements  nothing  is  more  im- 
portant than  the  means  of  enforcem^it ;  that 
is  the  breath  of  its  vital  existence.  Without 
it  a  contract,  in  the  view  of  the  law,  ceases 
to  be,  and  falls  into  the  class  of  those  Imper- 
fect obligations,'  as  they  are  termed,  which 
depend  for  their  fulfillment  upon  the  will 
and  conscience  of  those  upon  whom  they  rest 
The  ideas  of  right  and  remedy  are  insepara- 
ble. *  •  •  The  laws  which  subsist  at  the 
time  and  place  of  making  a  contract  enter  in- 
to and  form  a  part  of  it,  as  if  they  were 
expressly  referred  4o  or  incorporated  in  its 
terms.  This  rule  embraces  alike  those  which 
affect  its  validity,  construction,  discharge^ 
and  enforcement"  Blakemore  v.  (}ooper,  106 
N.  W.  566,  569,  15  N.  D.  5,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1074,  125  Am.  St  Rep.  574  (quoting  and 
adopting  definitions  in  Edwards  v.  Kearzey, 
96  U.  S.  595,  24  L.  Ed.  793). 

"The  'obligation  of  a  contract'  in  the 
constitutional  s^se.  Is  the  means  provided  by 


law  by  whicb  it  can  be  enforced,  b^  which 
the  parties  can  be  obliged  to  perform  it* 
Bx  parte  Folsom,  181  Fed.  496^  503 ;  HoiDan 
&  Grace  v.  Boajrd  of  caiosen  Fieeliolders  of 
Essex  County,  64  AtL  742,  745,  71  N.  J.  Bq. 
541  (quoting  Louisiana  «c  r^  Ranker  ▼.  New 
Orieans,  102  U.  &  203,  206,  26  L.  fid.  132). 
Thus  a  constltutioaal  amendment  intended 
to  impair  the  means  provided  by  law  for  the 
payment  of  municipal  bonds  Is  obnoxloDS  to 
the  federal  (Constitution.  Ex  parte  Folsom. 
131  Fed.  496,  503  (quoting  and  adopting  defi- 
nition in  Louisiana  ex  reL  Ranger  v.  New  Or- 
leans 102  U.  8.  206^  26  L.  Ed.  182). 

OBLIGATION  OF  UNlTlgD  STATES 

United  States  treasury  checks,  or  orden 
issued  for  interest  accrued  upon  registered 
bonds  of  the  United  States,  where  Intended 
for  immediate  payment,  may  be  taxed  by  a 
state,  in  the  bands  of  the  owner,  witbont  vio- 
lating Rev.  St  U.  8.  f  8701,  tfcempting  ''ob- 
ligations  of  the  United  States"  from  state 
taxation.  Hibemia  Savings  &  Loan  Society 
V.  aty  and  Oounty  of  San  Francisco,  26  Supi 
€%.  266,  266,  200  U.  8.  810,  50  L.  Bd.  ^5,  4 
Ann.  Oas.  934. 


OBUOATOBT  WJUTUIQ 

See  Writing  Obligatory. 
What  constitutes  a  writing, 
—Writings. 


WritiDC 


OBUOSB 

As  creditor,  i 


Creditor. 


OBLITERATE-OBLITERATION 

OBIiITEBATEB  OOBNEB 

Section  2  of  a  circular  of  the  United 
States  General  Land  Office  relative  to  tbe  res- 
toration of  lost  or  obliterated  comers  defines 
an  "obliterated  oomer"  as  one  where  no  via- 
ble evidoice  remains  of  the  work  of  tbe  orig- 
inal surveyor  in  establishing  it;  and  defines 
a  "lost  corneal  as  one,  the  po0iti<m  of  wfaidi 
cannot  be  determined  beyond  reasonable 
doubt,  either  from  original  or  reliable  marfca 
or  reliable  external  evidence.  Oaven  v. 
Lesh,  126  Pac  774,  775,  22  Idaho,  4fi3L 

OBSCENE— OBSCENITY 

The  word  ''obscene,"  when  used,  as  tai 
the  statute,  to  describe  the  characttt*  of  a 
book,  pamphlet,  or  paper,  means  containing 
immodest  and  indecent  matter,  the  reading 
whereof  would  have  a  tendency  to  d^rare 
and  corrupt  the  minds  of  those  into  whose 
hands  the  publication  might  fall,  whose 
minds  are  open  to  such  immoral  influeneea 
United  States  v.  Moore,  129  Fed.  159,  161 
(citing  United  States  v.  Clarke,  38  Fed.  732). 

The  word  "obscene^  means  ''(riSeosAve  to 
senses;  repulsive;  disgusting;  fool;  filthy: 
offensive  to  modesty  or  deomcj;  impore;  as- 
chaste;  indecent;  lewd."  Holeombe  t.  Stat^ 
62  8.  a  ^7»  648,  5  Qa*  AffP^  47. 


OBSO£NE-OBSO£NITT 


673 


OBSERVE 


In  ReT.  St  I  3893,  as  amended  in  1888, 
making  it  a  misdemeanor  to  mail  any  ob- 
8ce&e  writing,  the  word  "obscene**  should  be 
given  fully  as  broad  a  significance  as  it  had 
at  common  law.  Knowles  v.  United  States, 
170  Fed.  409,  412,  95  O.  C.  A.  579. 

A  letter  held  not  to  contain  matter  which 
was  "obscene,  lewd  or  lascivious,'*  within  the 
meaning  of  Rev.  St  I  3693,  so  as  to  render  its 
mailing  an  indictable  offense  thereunder. 
United  Stotes  v.  O'Donnell,  165  Fed.  218,  220. 

The  word  *'vulgar."  as  used  in  the  act  of 
May  e,  1893  (Gen.  Laws,  p.  177,  c.  121),  as 
amended  by  the  act  of  April  27,  1901  (Oen. 
Laws,  p.  314,  c.  13^,  requiring  a  bond  by  liq- 
uor dealers  to  keep  an  orderly  house,  and 
providing  that  it  must  not  contain  any  vul- 
gar or  obscene  pictures,  conveys  such  mean- 
ing as,  with  its  companion  word  "obscene," 
will  accomplish  the  purpose  of  the  statute, 
whidi  was  to  prevent  the  exhibitions  in  sa- 
loons of  immoral  and  indecent  pictures. 
The  word  "obscene"  in  the  statute  is  not  lim- 
ited to  pictures  suggestive  of  lewdness  or 
lasdviousness.  An  instruction  defining  "ob- 
scene'* as  "offensive  to  chastity  and  decency, 
impure^  expressing  or  presenting  to  the  mind 
or  view  something  which  delicacy,  purity, 
and  decency  forbid  to  be  exposed,"  is  errone- 
ous. Raley  v.  State,  105  8.  W.  342,  344, 
47  Tex.  Qv.  App.  426. 

InsvltiBC  iMMg^migB 

A  remark  to  a  married  woman;  "Look 
me  in  the  eye.  Are  you  satisfied  with  the 
man  you  married?' — will  not  sustain  a  con- 
viction for  using  "obscene  and  vulgar  lan- 
guage" in  the  presence  of  a  female,  where 
there  is  nothing  in  the  evidence  to  indicate 
that  the  remark  was  intended  to  convey  an 
obscene  and  vulgar  meaning.  Roberts  v. 
State,  47  S.  B.  511,  512,  120  Ga.  177. 

The  phrase  "obscene  and  vulgar  lan- 
guage," as  used  In  Pen.  Code  1895,  §  396, 
making  a  person  who  shall  use  obscene  and 
vulgar  language  in  the  presence  of  a  female 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  includes  any  foul 
words  which  would  reasonably  offend  the 
sense  of  modesty  and  decency  of  a  woma^  in 
whose  presence  the  words  are  spoken,  under 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Holcombe 
V.  State,  62  S.  E.  647,  648,  5  Ga.  App.  47. 

"Language"  is  a  generic  term,  and  in- 
cludes any  words  or  speech  by  which  thought 
may  be  conveyed,  and  language  may  be  "ob- 
scene and  vulgar"  when  used  in  the  presence 
of  a  female  without  the  use  of  a  single  word 
which  could  be  intrinsically  classified  as  be- 
ing obscene  and  vulgar.  Morris  v.  State,  65 
S.  B.  58,  59,  6  Ga.  App.  896. 

Beziial  impurity 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  f  3893,  declaring 
every  obscene,  lewd,  or  lascivious  book, 
pamphlet,  print  or  ottier  publication  of  an 
Indecent  character,  or  notices  giving  infor- 
mation for  obtaining  such  publicatlonB,  to  be 

8  WDB.&  P.2D  SBB.-43 


nonmailable  matter,  and  prescribes  a  punish- 
ment for  the  use  of  the  mails  to  transmit  or 
circulate  the  same,  the  word  "obscene"  sig- 
nifies that  form  of  immorality  which  has  re- 
lation to  sexual  impurity,  having  the  same 
meaning  as  is  given  them  at  common  law 
in  prosecutions  for  obscene  libel.  Hanson  v. 
United  States,  157  Ffed.  749,  750,  85  C.  O.  A. 
326. 

OBSCURE 

"Obscure",  means  not  dear,  fuH,  or  dis- 
tinct; clouded;  imperfect  "Obscurement  of 
reason"  is  not  synonymous  with  "dethrone- 
ment of  reason"  as  a  definition  of  "heat  of 
passion."  Dillon  t.  State,  119  N.  W.  352, 
356,  137  Wis.  655,  16  Ann.  Gas.  913. 

OBSCITREMENT  OF  BISASOH 

Dethronement   of   reason  distinguished, 
see  Dethronement  of  Reason. 

OBSERVE 

The  word  "observe"  is  defined  to  mean 
"to  notice  with  care;  to  be  on  the  watch  re- 
specting." An  employ^  has  the  right  to  as- 
sume that  a  machine  is  safe,  and  is  charge- 
able with  notice  of  dangers  or  defects  that 
are  plain  and  obvious  to  view,  but  is  not 
bound  to  make  an  Inspectioii  to  ascertain  if 
the  machine  is  free  from  defects ;  tiiat  is,  he 
is  not  required  "to  take  notice  with  care" 
and  "to  be  on  the  watdi"  for  defects  or  im- 
perfections, which  would  be  implied  from 
the  use  of  the  word  "observe"  in  an  instruc- 
tion that  the  law  required  him  to  be  observ- 
ing, and  that  his  failure  to  observe  what  he 
should  have  observed  would  defeat  a  re- 
covery. Rock  Island  Sash  ft  Door  Works  v. 
Pohlman,  71  N.  B.  428,  480,  210  111.  133. 

Where,  by  defendant's  constitution,  ben- 
efits were  restricted  to  members  in  good 
standing  who  had  paid  all  dues,  and  who 
faithfully  observed  the  laws,  rules,  com- 
mands, and  regulations  then  in  force,  or 
which  might  thereafter  be  added  to  the  con- 
stitution, by-laws,  and  rules,  and  in  taking 
his  obligation  of  membership,  without  which 
admittance  was  impossible,  decedent  agreed 
in  writing  to  abide  by  the  constitution  as 
it  then  was,  or  might  thereaft^  be  amended, 
the  words  "to  observe"  and  "to  abide  by" 
meant  to  obey  and  to  accept  the  consequence 
es  of,  and,  so  far  as  amendments  were  con- 
cerned, were  not  restricted  to  amendments 
of  those  laws  and  rules  as  related  entirely 
to  disciplinary  and  social  regulations,  but 
extended  as  well  to  amendments  affecting 
decedent's  right  to  benefits.  Order  of  United 
Commercial  Travelers  of  America  v.  Smith, 
192  Fed.  102,  104,  112  G.  O.  A.  442. 

Snnday 

Unless  an  individual  ceases  from  labor 
on  Sunday,  he  does  not  "observe"  the  day, 
within  the  meaning  of  Or.  Code,  §  241,  and 
if  he  does  on  every  Sunday,  or  the  seventh 


OBSTAOLK 


674 


OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCnON 


•:^i 


1? 


M 


i-i  fr' 


day  of  the  week,  refrain  from  labor,  he  ob- 
serves that  day.  Ex  parte  CaldweU,  118  N. 
W.  133,  135,  82  Neb.  6ii. 

OBSTACLE 

As  obstrmstloa  •!  Idsbwaj 

The  word  "obstacle,"  as  used  In  a  stat- 
ute making  it  a  misdemeanor  to  cat  or  place 
a  tree,  brush,  or  other  obstacle  across  a  pub- 
lic road,  so  as  to  impede  travel,  and  not 
remove  the  same  within  six  hours,  should 
be  construed  as  referring  to  obstructions  of 
a  temporary  dtiaracter,  which,  if  not  willful, 
do  not  become  criminal  unless  they  remain 
for  as  long  as  six  hours.  Goitral  of  Georgia 
Ry.  Co.  V.  State,  40  South.  Ml,  982,  146 
Ala.  99. 

OBSTETRICS 

Am  practice  of  medicine,  see  Practioe  of 
Medicine. 

OBSTINATE  DESERTION 

See^  also.  Desertion. 

"'Obstinate*  means  determined,  fixed, 
persistent'*  "E3ven  if  a  wife  deserts  without 
cause,  and  afterwards  realizes  that  she  has 
acted  hastily  or  foolishly,  and  would  return 
if  the  way  was  opened  for  her,  but  the  hus- 
band refrains  from  doing  anything  to  induce 
her  to  return,  for  the  purpose  of  making  her 
absence  a  ground  for  divorce,  her  desertion 
is  not  'obstinate,*  and  not,  therefore,  a 
ground  for  divoroa"  A  husband  is  not 
bound  to  attempt  to  induce  his  wife  to  re- 
turn, when  it  is  dear  any  effort  in  that  di- 
rection would  be  unavailing.  Hudson  v. 
Hudson,  61  South.  867,  868,  869,  69  Fla. 
629,  29  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  614,  138  Am.  St  Hep. 
141,  21  Ann.  Cas.  278  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  TraU  v.  Trail,  32  N.  J.  Bq.  231). 

A  desertion  can  only  be  adjudged  "ob- 
stinate** within  the  statute  relating  to  di- 
vorce when  it  has  resisted  such  efforts  or 
concessions  as  the  party  alleging  desertion 
ought,  under  the  particular  circumstances, 
to  have  made  to  prevent  it  or  to  bring  it  to 
an  end,  though  the  conduct  of  the  deserting 
party  may  be  of  such  a  nature  that  the  de- 
sertion will  be  deemed  obstinate  without 
any  effort  on  the  part  of  the  deserted  party 
to  prevent  or  terminate  it  Kipp  v.  Kipp,  78 
Att.  682,  77  N.  X  Eq.  686. 

OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTION 

See  Lawful  Obstructions;  Temporary  Ob- 
struction;   Wrongful  Obstruction. 
See,  also,  Obstacle. 

Of  due  admlnistratUa  of  Jvstioe 

Since  the  United  States  commissioner, 
after  having  held  a  person  accused  to  an- 
swer to  the  federal  courts^  has  no  further 
duty  to  perform  in  the  matter,  a  subsequent 


assault  committed  by  such  accused  od  tb( 
commissioner,  induced  by  tlie  latter's  us, 
does  not  constitute  an  "obetructioo  of  \q& 
ttce,**  within  Rev.  St  i  6399,  providmg  tM 
the  punishment  of  every  person  "who  cor 
ruptly,  or  by  threats  or  force,  obstructs  ci 
impedes,  or  endeavors  to  obstmct  or  is 
pede,  the  due  administration  of  Justice"  li 
any  court  of  the  United  Statni  Unite 
States  T.  McLeod,  119  Fed.  418,  41S. 

A  bare  attempt,  without  success,  to  i: 
duce  a  third  person  to  do  what  he  ooold  t 
influence  jurors  in  a  pending  case  in  a  fe^ 
oral  court,  did  not  obstruct  or  impede  tt 
administration  of  justice,  'so  as  to  constitct 
a  contempt,  punishable  under  Rev.  St  f  TS; 
under  the  rule  that,  to  constitute  socb  m 
tempt,  the  act  done  by  the  aocnaed  no; 
naturally  and  directly  tend  to  sodi  otetrvt 
tion.  As  stated  in  United  States  v.  Met 
27  Fed.  Gas.  1010,  no  'obstruct,*  ind^ 
ent  of  the  acceptation  the  word  has  obttiM 
in  the  criminal  law,  would  seem  to  sttod  e 
vi  termini  a  direct  and  positive  interpos 
tion,  which  prevented  or  tended  to  prefa 
the  action  of  the  oflicer  or  court  in  rem 
to  a  matter  then  to  be  proceeded  in.  'In 
pede^  must  necessarily  bear  a  similar  in 
port  and,  if  there  be  any  discriminfltioB  Ix 
tween  the  two  terms,  it  can  only  be  tlu 
the  same  direct  and  positive  interfereDC 
may,  without  amounting  to  a  compiete  ol 
struction,  become  an  impediment  to  the  a< 
Uon  intended  to  be  interested.  The  Inta 
tion  of  the  Legislature  to  give  tbese  tem 
an  application  only  to  direct  acts  of  nolecc 
or  menace  is  inferable  from  the  constrc 
tion  that  the  endeavor  is  made  equL) 
criminal  with  the  entire  completion  of  U 
purpose.  An  endeavor  to  obstruct  or  ii 
pede,  etc,  by  threats  or  force,  woold  nece 
sarily  imply  the  effort  to  put  fortb  sod 
act  which  in  its  natural,  if  not  necessar: 
consequence  must  be  attended  with  as  ol 
struction,  and  with  a  forced  and  compelle 
interruption  of  further  progress  in  tbe  a( 
ministration  of  Justice.**  United  States 
Carroll,  147  Fed.  947,  963  (citing  Unite 
States  V.  Bittinger,  24  Fed.  Caa  1149;  E 
parte  McRae,  77  S.  W.  211,  46  Tei.  Cr.  I 
26Q). 

Of  Uslaway 

As   injury  to  property,  see  InJ^  ^ 

Property. 
As  public  nuisance,  see  Public  Nnisaoc 

The  term  "obstruction,"  used  with  rei 
erence  to  a  street  or  hii^way,  meaos  tb 
placing  of  obstacles  or  impediments  in  tb 
way,  so  as  to  prevent  free  passage  alonf  i 
and  render  it  difficult  for  travel.  People^ 
Eckerson,  117  N.  Y.  Supp.  419,  422, 133  Ap{ 
Div.  220. 

A  street  railway  company's  act  in  P^ 
mitting  its  cars  to  stand  upon  its  trads  f« 
a  reasonable  length  of  time  does  not  coi 
stttute  an  ''obstruction  of  a  highway."  ^ 


:i 


OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTION 


675 


OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTION 


ind  ▼.  United  Traction  Co.,  05  N.  T.  Supp. 
98,  500,  107  App.  DlT.  50L 

An  *'ob8traction"  Is  a  blo<ddng  np;  fill- 
ig  with  obstacles  or  Impediments;  imped- 
ig;  embarrassing  or  opposing  tbe  passage 
long  and  oyer  a  street  Meservey  ▼.  Oulll- 
ord,  03  Pac  780,  786,  14  Idaho,  133  (citing 
:base  y.  City  of  Oshkosh,  51  N.  W.  560,  81 
^Is.  313,  15  L.  R.  A.  563,  20  Am.  St  Rep. 
dS;  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p^  4801). 

An  "obstraction''  Is  an  obstacle  In  the 
ray,  or  an  impediment  or  hindrance  which 
mpedes,  embarrasses^  opposes^  or  Interferes 
nth  the  free  passage  along  tbe  highway.  A 
petition  In  an  action  for  damages  for  the 
emoyal  of  a  cattleway  across  a  public  high- 
ly, which  alleges  that  the  cattleway  was 
lot  a  direct  obstruction,  does  not  negatlye 
he  Inference  that  It  was  %n  obstruction 
^thin  Code  Supp.  1007,  i  1560,  requiring 
he  road  superylsor  to  remoye  all  obstruc- 
ions  In  the  road.  Davis  v.  Pldserell,  117  N. 
V.  276,  277,  130  Iowa,  186. 

A  "street"  Is  a  public  way,  from  side  to 
dde  and  end  to  end,  so  that  any  private  use 
jFbldi  In  any  degree  hinders  or  prevents  Its 
:ree  use  as  a  public  way  to  Its  full  extent  Is 
m  "obstruction"  or  'Incumbrance"  within  the 
JDeanlng  of  the  law.  Lacey  v.  City  of  Oska- 
oosa,  121  N.  W.  642,  644,  143  Iowa,  704,  31 
U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  853. 

An  '^obstruction'*  is  merely  matter  out  of 
Mce,  and  that  which  may  be  a  stepping  stone 
in  a  position  where  It  Is  needed  and  may  be 
ased  as  such  becomes  an  obstruction  when 
occupying  a  place  Intended  for  other  use, 
and  where  it  la  not  needed  and  cannot  be  so 
Qsed.  Where  a  pavement  has  been  laid,  the 
asphalt  surface  of  which  lays  smoothly  down 
to  the  curb,  a  block  of  stone  placed  within  the 
corb  is  an  ''obstruction,"  and  becomes  a  nui- 
sance. McCormack  v.  Robin,  52  South.  770, 
781, 126  La.  504, 180  Am.  St  Rep.  540. 

An  embankment  In  a  street  dedicated  to 
public  travel  and  traveled  as  a  public  street, 
is  an  "obstruction,"  and  under  the  Vrooman 
Act  (St  1885,  p.  160,  c  158)  the  superlnt^d- 
ent  of  streets  Is  liable  for  failing  to  take 
steps  to  protect  against  the  danger  to  public 
travel  caused  thereby.  Merrltt  v.  McFar- 
land,  88  Pac  860,  870,  4  Cal.  App.  800. 

The  placing  of  a  fence  across  a  public 
road  constitutes  an  ''obstruction,"  within  Rev. 
Code  1852,  as  amended  1803,  p.  501,  c.  60,  | 
31t  declaring  that.  If  any  person  shall  ob- 
struct a  public  road,  he  shall  be  deemed 
polity  of  a  misdemeanor.  State  v.  Southard 
(Del.)  66  Aa  872,  873,  6  Pennewlll,  247.  But 
s  fence  permitted  by  a  dty  to  remain  across 
an  unopened  street  after  the  land  had  been 
acquired  for  street  purposes  Is  not  an  Illegal 
"obstmctlon,"  so  as  to  entitle  one  to  recover 
damages  caused  by  surface  flood  water  turned 
back  over  his  land  by  the  fence;  sadx  per- 
Qdsslon  being  expressly  authorized  by  the 


city's  charter.  Parsons  Bros.  v.  City  of  New 
York,  05  N.  T.  Supp.  181,  133,  107  App.  Dlv. 
324. 

A  barbed-wire  fence  Intentionally  placed 
nearly  lengthwise  the  traveled  portion  of  a 
public  highway;  Bartlett  v.  Beardmore,  46 
N.  W.  404,  407,  77  Wis.  35;  or  a  structure 
within  the  limits  of  the  highway  which  Im- 
pedes or  seriously  Inconveniences  travel  there- 
on, constitutes  an  "obstruction"  within  the 
meaning  of  St  1808,  f  1326,  imposing  a  pen- 
alty therefor,  Jones  v.  Tobln,  115  N.  W.  807, 
808,  135  Wis.  286;  and  a  post  set  between 
two  large  stones  already  In  a  highway  may  be 
an  "obstruction"  within  this  statute.  Neale 
V.  State,  120  N.  W.  345,  346,  138  Wis.  484. 

Any  object  unlawfully  placed  within  the 
limits  of  a  highway  Is  an  "obstruction,"  If  it 
Impedes  or  seriously  inconveniences  public 
travel  or  renders  It  dangerous,  and  It  Is  un- 
necessary that  such  object  should  stop  travel 
In  order  to  be  an  obstruction.  Jennings  v. 
Johonnott,  135  N.  W.  170, 171, 140  Wis.  660. 

The  trees,  grass,  and  flowers  growing  on 
park  strips  maintained  by  a  municipality  be- 
tween the  curbing  and  the  sidewalk  and  prop- 
er barriers  placed  around  them  to  protect 
them  are  not  "obstructions"  or  nuisances 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  requiring 
the  dty  council  to  keep  the  streets  of  a  munic- 
ipality open,  In  repair,  and  free  from  nui- 
sance. Village  of  Bamesville  v.  Ward,  06  N. 
B.  087,  088,  86  Ohio  St  1,  40  L.  R.  A.  (N.  &) 

04,  Ann.  Gas.  1012D,  1284. 

A  step  4%  Inches  high  and  10^  inches 
wide,  dose  up  to  a  building  in  front  of  which 
It  is  placed,  and  used  as  a  means  of  access  to 
it  from  the  street,  does  not  constitute  an  un- 
lawful "obstruction,"  and  does  not  Interfere 
to  an  appreciable  or  unreasonable  extent  with 
the  use  of  the  sidewalk,  so  as  to  sustain  an 
action  by  a  pedestrian  Injured  by  stumbling 
over  It    City  of  Richmond  v.  Lambert,  68 

5.  B.  276,  lU  Va.  174,  277,  28  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
880. 

The  lawful  change  of  the  grade  of  a 
street  Is  not  a  "use  or  obstruction  of  the 
street,'*  within  the  meaning  of  Laws  1880,  a 
256,  making  munldpal  and  other  corpora- 
tions liable  for  the  use  or  obstruction  of 
streets,  so  as  to  materially  interfere  with 
their  usefulness  as  such,  etc  Smith  v.  Ban 
Glalre,  47  N.  W.  880,  831,  78  Wis.  467. 

Of  navisatliMa 

A  barge  negligently  moored  to  the  bank 
of  a  canal,  which*  because  of  such  negligence 
floats  out  Into  the  diannd  of  the  canal  caus- 
ing a  collision  with  a  passing  vessel,  Is  clear- 
ly within  the  meaning  of  the  term  "obstruc- 
tion." Gilllkln  &  Gaskell  v.  liSke  Drummond 
Canal  ft  Water  Co.,  60  S.  B.  654, 147  N.  C.  30. 

Act  Cong.  Mardi  8,  1800,  c.  425,  f  0,  80 
Stat  1151  reUtlng  to  the  "obstruction"  of 
navigable  streams,  dedares  that  It  shall  not 
be  lawful  to  construct  or  commence  the  con- 


OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTIOK 


676 


OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTION 


•tmctton  of  any  bridge,  dam,  dike,  or  cause- 
way over  or  in  any  port,  roadstead,  haTon, 
harbor,  canal,  navigable  rlTW,  or  other  na?!- 
gable  water  of  the  United  States,  onless  the 
consent  of  Congress  to  sach  stractares  shall 
have  been  obtained,  and  until  the  plans  for 
the  same  diall  have  been  approved  by  the 
chief  of  engineers  and  the  Secretary  of  War, 
with  certain  provisos.  Section  10  prohibits 
the  creation  of  any  obetrnctlon,  not  affirma- 
tively authorised  by  Congress,  to  the  navl* 
gable  capacity  of  any  of  the  waters  of  the 
United  States.  Held,  that  section  10  not  only 
Includes  the  kind  of  structures  specifically 
referred  to  In  section  9,  but  all  others  that 
may  be  an  obstruction  to  the  navigable  capac- 
ity of  the  waters  of  the  United  States,  with- 
out reference  to  whether  the  obstruction  Is 
but  slight,  and  only  temporary.  Hubbard  ▼. 
Fort,  188  Fed.  087,  907. 

Of  ofleM 

Pen.  Code  1895,  f  906,  making  it  a  misde- 
meanor to  "obstruct,"  resist,  or  oppose  an 
officer  serving  or  attempting  to  execute  any 
lawful  process,  implies  force  as  a  necessary 
element  of  the  resistance.  Moses  v.  State, 
64  S.  E.  099,  6  Ga.  App.  261. 

An  officer  was  sent  into  a  saloon  to  ar- 
rest one  S.,  who  was  in  a  fight  The  def^d- 
ant,  a  one-armed  man,  who  had  known  the 
officer  for  some  30  years  and  was  a  friend  of 
the  belligerent,  put  his  arm  on  the  officer's 
shoulder,  and  told  him  to  let  S.  go,  and  he 
would  take  him  home  and  take  care  of  him. 
The  officer  struck  the  defendant,  who  then 
desisted  from  any  further  act  An  informa- 
tion was  filed,  alleging  that  the  defendant 
had  unlawfully  obstructed  an  officer  in  the 
discharge  of  his  duty.  Penal  Code,  under 
which  this  Information  was  based,  provides 
that  any  one  who  wUlfully  delays  or  ob- 
structs an  officer  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duty  is  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.  Held,  that 
acts  of  the  defendant  did  not  constitute  an 
obstruction  of  the  officer,  as  "obstruction" 
usually  means  "to  impede,  hinder,  or  stop.*' 
State  V.  Knudson,  131  N.  W.  400,  401,  27  S.  D. 
400. 

Of  yreseomtiaa  of  aetloa 

The  term  "obstruct  or  hinder"  In  the 
statute  of  limitations  importo  resistance  and 
obstruction  of  righta,  and  unless  acta  com- 
plained of  by  a  creditor  are  in  point  of  Ssict 
such  as  would  hinder  or  prevent  him  bring- 
ing suit,  notwithstanding  his  desire  to  do  so, 
they  cannot  properly  be  said  to  obstruct  or 
hinder  him.  Ky.  St  1903,  i  2552,  provides 
that  if  judgment  be  rendered  for  plaintiff  in 
any  case  provided  in  the  four  preceding  sec- 
tions (which  refer  only  to  syretiea),  and  the 
same  be  afterward  reversed  or  arrested,  or  if 
the  ^dgment  be  obstructed  by  appeal,  super- 
sedeas, or  injunction,  the  time  of  such  ob- 
struction shifll  also  be  disallowed,  does  not 
apply  where  an  appeal  is  made  in  an  action 
against  the  principal,  and  so  does  not  suspend 


the  statute  of  Umitatlona  In  fiiTor  of  tht 
sureties.  McGovem  ▼.  Bectanus  (Ky.)  145 
S.  W.  965,  967,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  380  (dtlLs 
Reld  ▼.  Hamilton,  18  S.  W.  770,  92  Ky.  61&: 
Coleman  ▼.  Walker,  8  Mete  [00  Ky.]  68.  77 
Am.  Dec.  163;  Kennedy  ▼.  Foster's  Execator 
14  Bush  [77  Ky.]  479). 

Of  milroAd  timek  sr  tralm 

A  statute  which  requires  warnings  to  be 
given  by  a  looomotf ve  when  an  "obatrncdoD" 
appears  on  a  railroad  track  extends  to  per- 
sons appearing  on  the  traek,  or  00  near  there- 
to as  to  be  within  striking  dlstanoeu  One 
does  not  pass '^yond  striking  dlstanoe,"  sou 
to  absolve  the  railroad  from  the  duty  of  stop- 
ping the  train,  so  long  as  he  waa  stilll  so  dow 
to  the  track  that,  having  doe  regard  for  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation  and  tlie  InvoIUD- 
tary  movementa  of  the  body,  tbeie  was  stfll 
a  reasonable  probability  or  likdlliood  that  be 
might  fall  or  be  thrown  against  the  side  of  the 
engine  or  train  as  It  passed  him.  Southern 
By.  Co.  ▼.  Sutton.  179  Fed.  471.  474.  103  C.  C 
A.  61. 

The  word  ''obstruction,*'  in  Code  1997, 
f  6473,  requiring  a  railroad  engineer,  on  per- 
ceiving any  "obstruction'*  on  the  trade  to 
stop  the  train,  la  not  to  be  construed  in  tbe 
sense  of  "object,'*  and  the  statute  does  wi 
require  the  stoppage  of  a  train  on  the  ema- 
neer  perceiving  any  object  on  the  track,  as  1 
chicken,  turkey,  or  buzzard.  Smith  v.  Centnl 
of  (^rgla  By.  Ck).,  61  South.  792,  793.  1^ 
Ala.  407. 

The  oondition  of  the  atmosphere  and  tte 
hour  of  the  day  do  not  oonstltiite  '*obeti«> 
tlons,"  such  as  will  excuse  a  tsaveler  fron 
exercising  his  sense  of  sight  and  hearlES 
in  crossing  a  railroad  track.  On  the  oob- 
trary,  the  darker  it  la,  the  more  carefol  be 
should  be.  Morrow  ▼.  North  QaioUna  B. 
Ck>.,  69  S.  H  168,  169,  146  N.  a  14. 

An  object  does  not  appear  on  the  "rosd." 
within  Shannon's  (3ode,  U  1674,  1675.  reqIil^ 
Ing  railroads  to  maintain  a  lookout  on  tlw 
locomotive,  and  when  any  person  or  other 
"obstruction  appears  on  the  road"  to  soasd 
the  alarm  whistle,  etc,  until  the  object  ^ 
near  enough  to  be  struck  by  a  pawing  traiB. 
Bogers  V.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  4  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.. 
136  Fed.  573,  674,  69  G  0.  A.  321  (dtii« 
Louisville,  N.  &  6.  S.  B.  Go.  v.  Reidmond,  U 
Veti  [79  Tenn.]  205). 
Of  wUewmSk, 

Plalntifr  was  injured  by  flailing  over  t 
plank  left  by  a  dty  contractor  across  a  side- 
walk. The  court  charged  that  plaintUT  U 
the  complaint  alleged  that  defendante  had 
notice  of  the  obstruction  in  time  to  have  pre- 
vented the  injury  to  plaintiff,  that  notice  of 
the  condition  might  be  either  actual  or  ci)s- 
structive,  and  might  be  inferred  from  the 
length  of  time  the  obstruction  existed,  togeth- 
er with  all  the  other  facts  and  drcnmstanc^i 
concerning   the   aame»   and   in   determining 


OBTAIN 


677 


OBVIOUS 


whether  defendants  knew  of  the  obstruction 
the  jury  should  take  into  account  when  it 
was  placed,  the  length  of  time  it  existed, 
the  condition  of  the  street  and  sidewalk  as 
to  whether  there  was  much  or  little  travel, 
or  otherwise,  and  from  all  the  facts  deter- 
mine whether  defendants  knew  it.  Held, 
that  the  court  did  not  err  in  referiing  to 
the  plank  as  an  "obstruction,"  since  anything 
which  to  any  extent  obstructs  the  free  use  of 
a  street  or  sidewalk  is  an  "obstruction" 
though  every  obstruction  is  not  of  sudi  a 
character  as  to  render  the  street  or  sidewalk 
unsafe  for  use,  and  that  the  instruction  was 
not  misleading  as  either  assuming  or  intimat- 
ing that  the  obstruction  was  dangerous  or  of 
sudi  a  charader  as  to  Indicate  that  defend- 
ants were  negligent  in  placing  it  there  or 
permitting  it  to  remain.  Gtty  of  DvansvlUe 
y.  Pifer  (Ind.)  100  N.  S.  UO,  112. 

OBTAIN 

''Obtain"  is  defined  as  follows:  "I.  trans. 
1.  To  get;  procure;  secure;  acquire;  gain; 
as  to  obtain  a  month's  leave  of  absence;  to 
obtain  riches.  •  ♦  ♦  II.  Intrans.  1.  To 
secure  what  one  desires  or  strives  for;  pre- 
vail; succeed."  An  indictment  under  the 
federal  statute  for  mailing  a  letter  giving 
information  where  and  how  and  of  whom 
and  by  what  meami  articles  and  things  de- 
signed and  Intended  for  the  procnjriiig-  of  an 
abortion  might  be  "obtained"  states  an  of- 
fense, where  it  sets  out  a  letter  written  to 
defendant  inquiring  for  some  medicine  or 
other  means  for  accomplishing  such  result, 
and  a  letter,  alleged  to  have  been  mailed  by 
defendant  in  reply,  which,  when  read  in 
connection  with  the  letter  of  inquiry,  in  ef- 
fect offers  for  ft  stated  consideration  to  ef- 
fect the  desired  result  by  some  treatment  or 
operation,  although  the  particular  means 
is  not  specified;  the  word  "thing,"  as  used 
in  tbe  statute,  being  a  comt^rehenslve  term, 
which  includes  any  kind  of  treatment  or  op- 
eration. United  States  v.  Somers,  164  Fed. 
259,  202  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Cent  Diet). 

As  acquire  possession  of 

"Obtain"  means  "to  get  hold  of  by  ef- 
fort" "to  get  possession  of,"  or  "to  have  In 
possession."  On  an  indictment  for  obtaiiring 
money  under  false  pretenses,  it  appeared 
that  defendant  in  Pennsylvania,  to  establish 
a  financial  credit  jmAe  written  statements 
to  a  company  in  New  York,  which  relied  on 
tbe  same,  fURd  accepted  his  order  for  goods, 
and  delivered  them  to  a  carrier,  and  they 
were  received  in  Pennsylvania  by  the  periton 
making  the  order.  Held.that^  such  state-. 
ments  being  false  and  fraudulent  defendant 
'^as  guilty  of  "obtaining"  goods  in  Penftsyl-. 
^anla  under  false  pretepses.  Gommonwj^th 
V.  Schmunk,  66  Atl.  1088,  1089,  207  Pa.  64^, 
w  Am.  St  Eep.  801. 


OBTAIH  VALIDITY 

As  used  In  Rev.  St  1909,  §  1275,  provid- 
ing that  before  any  school  bond  "shall  obtain 
validity  or  be  negotiated,  such  bond  shall  first 
be  presented  to  the  state  auditor,  who  shall 
register  the  same,"  the  term  "obtain  validi- 
ty" means  to  become  clothed  with  validity 
as  a  present  and  subsisting  obligation,  and 
the  term  "negotiated"  means  sold  and  put 
In  circulation  by  delivery  In  consummation 
of  the  sale ;  and  ofiBcers  of  a  school  district 
after  bonds  have  been  voted,  may  advertise 
for  bids  and  accept  a  bid  for  bonds  before 
they  have  been  registered  by  the  state  audi- 
tor; and  hence  such  acts  of  the  oflOcers  fur- 
nish no  reason  for  refusing  registration. 
State  ex  rel.  Carrollton  School  Dlst  v.  Gor- 
don, 133  S.  W.  44,  47,  231  Mo.  547. 

6BTAnrABi:.£ 

The  word  "obtainable,"  in  a  contract  pro- 
viding that  scrip  exchangeable  for  tickets 
will  not  be  honored  for  passage  on  trains 
except  from  stations  where  tickets  are  not 
obtainable,  cannot  be  given  its  full  natural 
meaning,  but  must  be  restricted  to  mean 
that  scrip  cannot  be  used  for  fare  on  trains, 
except  from  stations  where  tickets  are  not 
kept  on  sale  or  for  exchange  for  scrip.  Koz- 
minsky  v.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  Co.,  104 
Pac  670,  572,  86  Utah,  454,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
a)  758. 

OBTAZKnre     obebit     on     faiiSe 

STATBMBJfT 

A  financial  statement  made  by  a  bank- 
rupt to  a  mercantile  agency  in  response  to 
a  request  therefor  stating  that  "this  infor- 
mation la  asked  for  and  received  in  strict 
confidence  for  Qommeifdal  use  only,"  is  not 
within  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c  541,  §  14b 
(8),  as  added  by  Act  Feb.  5,  1903,  c.  487,  f 
4,  making  it  a  ground  for  refusal  of  a  dis- 
charge if  a  bankrupt  has  "obtained  prop- 
erty on  credit  from  any  person  upon  a  ma- 
terially false  statement  in  writing  made  to 
such  person  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  such 
property  on  credit"  as  respects  a  creditor  who 
sold  goods  to  the  bankrupt  more  than  a  year 
after  such  statement  was  made,  and  such 
creditor  has  no  standing  to  oppose  a  dis- 
charge under  such  provision.  Novick  v.  B. 
P.  Reed  A  Co.,  192  ted.  20,  112  C.  C.  A.  408. 

OBTAPmrO    FBOPBBTY    BT    TALMB 

FRsmBura 

See  False  Pretense. 

OBVIOUS 

The  word  "obvious"  means  easily  dis- 
covered, plain,  manifest  evident.  The  Sikh, 
175  Fed.  869,  871;  State  v.  Kauffman,  108 
N.  W.  246,  20  S.  D.  620  (Quoting  Webster's 
Diet.). 

A^  charge  that  the  rules  of  a  railway 
company  are  to  be  strictly  construed  against 
the  company,  and  will  not  be  h^ld  to  en- 


OBYIOUB 


678 


OBVIOU8  B3SKM 


Join  upon  an  employ^  a  particular  duty  with 
res(«ct  to  a  particular  subject,  unleas  such 
du^  be  comprehended  within  the  dear  and 
"obyloua"  meaning  of  the  rule  Itself,  and 
that  the  violation  of  a  rule  by  an  employ^ 
will  not  forfeit  his  rlg^t  to  recover  unless 
there  has  been  a  negligent  violation  of  the 
rule,  according  to  Its  plain  and  ''obvious^ 
meaning,  nor  unless  such  violation  of  the 
rules  has  been  a  contributing  cause  for  his 
Injury,  is  not  erroneous  because  of  the  use 
of  the  word  ''obvious,**  which  Is  a  pretty 
strong  sounding  word.  Its  chief  Jurldlc  em* 
ployment  is  by  Judges  of  courts  of  review, 
who  generally  pronounce  obvious  those  prop- 
ositions which  they  are  able  to  support  with 
but  sparse  array  of  precedent  and  whldi 
they  are  unwilling  to  put  forth  as  an  original 
dictum  without  the  supporting  influence  of 
some  strong,  Impressive,  faith-bearing  word; 
for  a  proposition  weak  In  substance  is  oft 
aided  In  appearance  by  the  strength  of  ao- 
nancy,  and  "obvious**  is  a  sonant  word.  How- 
ever, this  word  is  not  absolutely  Interdicted 
to  the  trial  Judges;  and  in  proper  cases 
they  may  use  it  cautiously,  if  the  facts  are 
sufficient  to  Justify  it  Georgia,  T.  ft  A«  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Sasser,  61  &  £.  505,  506,  4  Ga.  App. 
27«. 

The  word  ''obviously,*'  as  used  In  the 
rule  that  the  employed  will  not  discharge 
his  duty  by  furnishing  the  ordinary  place  or 
appliance,  if  such  ordinary  place  or 
appliance  be  obviously  dangerous,  does  not 
apply  to  any  person,  no  matter  how  unskill- 
ed or  ignorant,  but  to  the  ordinarily  careful 
employer  who  is  charged  with  the  duty  of 
furnishing  the  place  or  appliance,  or  to  a 
person  possessing  equal  skill  and  Judgment 
and  opportunity  for  examination  as  sudti  an 
employer.  Tazdzewskl  v.  Barker,  111  N.  W. 
689,  690,  691,  131  Wis.  494,  120  Am.  St  Rep. 
1059. 

The  word  "obviously,"  before  the  word 
dangerous,  in  an  instruction  that,  where  an 
employ^  has  two  ways  of  performing  a  duty, 
one  of  which  is  dangerous  and  the  other 
safe,  and  he  knowingly  and  voluntarily,  or 
through  negligent  ignorance,  seeks  the  dan- 
gerous one,  thereby  bringing  on  himself  an 
Injury  which  probably  would  not  have  be- 
fallen him  if  he  had  selected  the  other  one, 
merely  emphasizes  the  notion  that,  to  Im- 
pute contributory  negligence  to  the  employ^ 
as  a  matter  of  law,  the  danger  of  the  means 
or  methods  must  have  been  known  to  him, 
or  the  circumstances  must  have  been  such 
that  it  ought  to  have  been  known  to  him, 
and  the  use  of  the  word  does  not  render  the 
Instruction  erroneous.  Johnson  ▼.  Maletta, 
87  Prc.  447,  460,  34  Mbnt  477. 

OBVIOUS  DAirOEB 

Exposure  to,  see  Bxposure. 
Obvious   risk    of   danger,    see   Obrloiis 
Riska. 


OBVIOUS  DSFEOT 

See  Open  and  Obvious  Defsetr 

OBVIOUS  BBBOB 

The  act  of  the  board  in  maktaif 
increase  In  the  aggregate  valuation  was  aa 
"obvious  error"  within  Kirk's  Dig.  f  7903, 
providing  that,  where  there  has  beea  an  ob- 
vious error  discovered  In  the  ■fisMsim  nr  ef 
pecaonal  property,  the  owner  may  have  it  ad- 
Juated  upon  proper  showing  to  the  county 
conrt  Boardof  Bqvaliaatiim  of  Saline  GovD' 
ty  ▼.  Hughes,  106  a  W.  077,  84  Ark.  M7. 

OBVIOUS  BISKS 

An  ^'dbvious  danger,"  with  referenee  t» 
the  diaracter  of  an  employmeat,  la  one  that 
is  discoverable  in  the  eierdse  of  tbat  rea- 
sonable care  which  penons  d  ordinary  in- 
telligence may  be  expected  to  take  for  their 
own  safety.  Hardy  v.  Chicago,  B.  I.  4  P. 
Ry.  Ck>^  116  N.  W.  8»  U,  139  Iowa,  814b  id 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  997  (dtlng  Newbury  v.  Getch- 
el  4  Kartln  l4iniber  ft  Mlig.  Oo^  69  X.  w. 
748,  100  Iowa,  461,  62  Am.  8t  Rep.  682; 
Hanson  v.  Hammell,  77  N.  W.  839,  107  Iowa, 
171). 

'^Obvious  danger,"  as  applied  to  aasomp- 
tlon  of  risk  by  a  servant,  is  that  danger 
which  would  have  bea  seen  and  observed  by 
reasonably  prudent  moi.  James  Ramage 
Paper  Co.  v.  Ruldusai,  147  Fed.  ISl,  154,  71 
a  a  A. 


Stepping  from  a  moving  train,  Irrecpec- 
tlve  of  the  speed  at  which  it  was  moving,  is 
not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  an  "obvious  danger," 
within  an  accident  Insurance  company's  poli- 
cy relieving  the  company  from  liability  for 
death  resulting  from  exposure  to  an  obvious 
risk.  National  life  St  Accident  Ina.  Co.  ▼. 
Lokey,  62  South,  46,  47. 166  Ala.  174. 

The  term  "obviously  dangopous"  means 
plainly  dangerous.  If  a  carrier's  station  plat- 
f om  is  obviously  dangerous,  the  carrier  is 
guilty  of  the  grossest  negligence.  Randolph 
V.  Chicago,  M.  4  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  79  S.  W. 
U70,  U71,  106  Mo.  App.  6i6. 

A  flagstone  in  a  sidewalk  6  feet  wUe. 
which  projected  at  the  highest  point  2^ 
inches  above  the  other  stones,  and  graduallj 
decreased  till  it  was  levd  with  the  other 
stones  at  the  outside  of  the  walk,  was  uoC 
an  "obviously  dangerous"  defect,  rendering  t 
city  liable  for  Injuries  to  one  tillering  and 
falling  over  it  Davidson  v.  City  of  New 
Tork,  117  N.  Y.  Supp.  186.  186,  183  Appw  DiT. 
862. 

A  clause  In  an  accident  policy  llmitittg  re 
covery,  in  case  of  death  "due  to  unnecessary 
exposure,  to  obvious  risk  of  injury  or  ohvious 
danger,"  must  be  deemed  to  Include  all  cases 
of  exposure  to  unnecessary  danger  attributa- 
ble to  negligence  on  the  imrt  of  the  Insured: 
and  It  is  proper  to  charge  the  word  **obri- 
ous,"  as  used  In  the  policy,  meana  '^ppu^ 


OBVIOUS  RISKS 


679 


OCCASION 


ent,"  "perceivable,"  or  whether  or  not  a  thing 
can  be  seen.  Price  ▼.  Standard  Life  &  Aca 
Ins.  Co.,  99  N.  W.  S87,  888,  92  Minn.  23S. 

An  "obvioiis  risk'!  is  such  as  would  in- 
stantly appeal  to  tl\,e  senses  ot  an  intelligent 
person  familiar  with  the  business,  and  about 
which  there  can  be  no  difference  of  opinion 
in  the  minds  of  intelligent  persons ;  and  it  is 
not  required  that  the  servant  make  close 
scrutiny  into  all  the  details  of  the  instru- 
mentalities with  which  he  deals  to  determine 
the  risk  inrolyed.  MiUen  ▼..  Pacific  Bridge 
Co.,  95  Pac.  196,  199,  51  Or.  538 ;  Gentzkow 
V.  Portland  Ry.  Co.,  102  Pac.  614,  619,  54 
Or.  114,  135  Am.  St  Rep.  821  (Quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Johnston  ▼.  Oregon  S. 
L.  4  U.  N.  Co.,  31  Pac.  283,  286,  23  Or.  94, 
105,  and  citing  and  adopting  St»v«n»  t.  Unit- 
ed Gas  &  ElecMc  Oo^  60  AtL  848,  850,  73 
N.  H.  159,  163,  70  L.  R.  A.  119;  Bergin  ▼. 
Southern  New  England  Tel.  Co.,  38  AtL  888, 
70  Conn.  64,  S9  L.  R.  A.  192;  Law  ▼.  Central 
Dist  Printing  4  Telegraph  06.,  140  Fed.  558; 
Anderson  v.  Inland  Telephone  &  Telegraph 
Co.,  58  Pac.  657,  19  W«flb.  575,  41  L.  a  A. 
410;  Wood,  Master  4  Berraat,  763). 

Risks  which  are  incident  to  the  business 
must  not  be  confounded  with  such  as  are 
denominated  ''obyious."  The  former  sort 
comprises  those  which  accompany  or  arise 
from  the  natural  or  usual  method  of  conduct- 
hig  the  particular  business,  and  has  more 
special  relation  to  perils  which  attend  the 
business  generally,  while  the  latter  include 
such  as  are  manifest  as  to  the  sense  of  ob- 
serration,  open,  and  readily  discernible^ 
whether  they  arise  from  the  nature  of  the 
business,  the  particular  manner  in  which  it 
Is  conducted,  or  the  use  of  defective  and  un- 
safe appliances.  New  Omaha  Thomson  Hous- 
ton Elec.  L.  Co.  ▼.  Rombold,  106  N.  W.  218, 
216,  73  Neb.  259* 

Laws  1902,  p.  1750,  c.  600,  §  3,  providing 
that  an  employ^,  by  entering  on  or  continu- 
ing in  the  employer's  service,  shall  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  assented  to  the  necessary  risks 
of  the  employment,  such  risks  including  those 
inherent  in  the  nature  of  the  business,  after 
the  employer  has  exercised  due  care  for  the 
safety  of  employes,  and  complied  with  laws 
regulating  such  business,  distinguishes  be- 
tween ^'necessary  risk"  and  "obvious  risk," 
which  latter  may  be  due  to  the  master's  fail- 
ure to  perform  his  duty.  Hurley  v.  Olcott, 
119  N.  T.  Supp.  430,  435,  134  App.  Olv.  631. 

In  a  dissenting  opinion  in  Logerto  v.  Cen- 
tral Bldg.  Co.,  108  N.  T.  Supp.  604,  123  App. 
Dlv.  840,  the  term  "obvious  risk"  is  defined  as 
roch  a  risk  "as  is  apparent,  and  it  must  be 
apparent  to  the  person  who  is  claimed  to 
luive  assumed  the  risk."  Ward  v.  Edison 
Electric  Illuminating  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  608, 
«10. 124  App.  Dlv.  22. 

An  instmction  that  a  servant,  in  enter- 
ing on  his  employment,  "assumed  all  the  ob- 1 


vious  and  ordinary  risks  or  dangers  incident 
to  the  employment,  and  that,  if  the  injury 
arose  out  of  such  obvious  risks  and  dangers, 
defendant  was  not  liable,"  was  not  improper 
for  failure  to  separate  "obvious  and  ordinary 
risks"  from  "the  obvious  and  the  ordinary 
risks" ;  the  case  having  been  tried  on  the  the- 
ory that  the  risk  was  an  ordinary  one. 
Thomas  v.  Boston  &  M.  Consol.  Copper  & 
Silver  Min.  Co.,  87  Pac.  972,  973,  84  Mont 
370. 

OCCASION 

See  Privileged  Occasion;  Special  Occa- 
sion. 

The  word  "occasion,"  as  used  in  an  aver- 
ment in  a  pleading  of  estoppel  that  S.  had 
full  time,  occasion,  and  opportunity  in  which 
to  notify  the  plaintiff  of  a  forgery,  held  to 
mean,  not  only  time  and  opportunity,  but 
such  conditions  and  circumstances  as  requir- 
ed him  to  speak,  or  otherwise  be  forever  es- 
topped from  denying  his  signature.  Shinew 
V.  First  Nat  Bank,  95  N.  B.  881,  883,  84  Ohio 
St  297,  36  L.  B«  A.  (N.  S.)  1006,  Ann.  Ca& 
1912C,  587. 

The  statute  providing  that  any  telegraph 
company  within  the  state  shall  be  liable  for 
all  damages  "occasioned"  by  the  negligence 
of  their  operators  in  receiving,  copying, 
transmitting,  or  delivering  messages,  does  not 
render  telegraph  companies  liable  for  dam- 
ages other  than  the  proximate  result  of  its 
negligence.  The  word  ^'occasioned"  is  used 
with  reference  to  settled  rules  of  legal  re- 
sponsibility for  breach  of  duty  constituting 
actionable  negligence.  Fisher  v.  Western  Un- 
ion Telegraph  Co.,  96  N.  W.  545,  547,  119 
Wis.  146. 

"Webster  defines  'occasion'  as  follows: 
'To  cause  or  to  bring  about  by  furnishing  the 
condition  or  occasion  needed  for  the  action  of 
a  principal  cause ;  to  cause  accidentally  or  in- 
cidentally, or  simply  to  cause  or  bring  about' " 
A  fire  insurance  policy  provided  that  the  com- 
pany should  "not  be  liable  for  loss  caused, 
directly  or  indirectly,  by  invasion,  •  ♦  ♦ 
or  by  order  of  any  dvil  authority,  or  for 
loss  or  damage  occasioned  'by  or  through 
•  ♦  •  earthquake.' "  Held,  that  the  words 
"directly  or  indirectly"  did  not  apply  to  the 
provision  respecting  earthquake;  that,  con- 
struing such  provision  most  strongly  against 
the  insurer,  in  accordance  with  the  establish- 
ed rule,  the  word  "occasioned"  was  equiva- 
lent to  "caused,"  and  related  to  the  origin  of 
the  fire,  and  the  provision  exempted  the  com- 
pany from  liability  for  loss  only  where  an 
earthquake  was  the  immediate,  direct,  and 
proximate  cause  of  the  fire  which  destroyed 
the  property.  Baker  ft  Hamilton  v.  Wil- 
liamsburgh  City  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  157  Fed.  280, 
283.  See,  also,  Williamsburg^  City  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  of  Brooklyn  v.  Willard,  164  Fed.  404,  406, 
90  a  0.  A.  392,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  103. 


OCCASION 


680 


OCCUPANCY-OCCUPATION 


Under  a  fire  Insurance  policy  which  ex- 
empted the  Insurer  from  liability  for  any  loss 
"occasioned  by  or  through  earthquake,"  there 
can  be  no  recovery  If  it  Is  shown  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence  that  if  there  had 
been  no  earthquake,  and,  but  for  the  earth- 
quake, the  Ore  which  destroyed  the  insured 
property  would  not  have  started,  and  a  fire 
thus  started  by  an  earthquake  in  another 
building,  which  spread  to  and  destroyed  the 
insured  property,  is  one  occasioned  "by  or 
through  earthquake'*  within  the  meaning  of 
such  provision.  Henry  Hilp  Tailoring  Co.  ▼. 
Williamsburgh  City  Fire  Ins.  Go.  of  Brook- 
lyn, 157  red.  285,  286. 

OOOA8IONAX.  DRUfX 

A  life  policy  was  issued  oo  an  applica- 
tion wherein  insured  stated  that  he  bad  no 
daily  habit  as  to  the  use  of  liquor,  but  took 
an  occasional  drink  of  whisky,  and  that  he 
had  always  been  in  the  habit  of  so  doing. 
Insured  drank  more  or  less  frequently  for 
weeks  at  a  time,  or  not  at  all.  His  intervals 
for  drinking  were  not  regular.  He  was  never 
so  intoxicated  as  to  be  incapable  of  doing 
business.  Held,  that  insuredM  statements 
were  not  willfully  and  intentionally  false, 
and  he  could  recover  on  fbe  policy;  the  word 
''occasional*'  meaning  occarrlng  more  or  lesa 
frequently,  but  not  at  fixed  or  regular  inter- 
vals. Aria  T.  Mutual  Life  Ina.  Co.  of  New 
York,  103  Pac.  60,  52,  64  Wash.  269. 

An  "occasional"  glass  of  beer  may  mean 
anything  from  a  glass  once  a  month  to  one 
every  15  minutes,  according  to  the  capacity 
of  the  individual,  or,  perhaps,  according  to 
the  "liberality"  of  his  views.  A  statement  in 
an  application  for  life  insurance  that  the 
applicant  drinks  a  "glass  of  beer  occasional- 
ly" is  suflScient  to  suggest  to  a  discreet  per- 
son the  advisability  of  further  inquiry.  Bler- 
mann  v.  Guaranty  Mutual  life  las.  Co^  120 
N.  W.  963,  965, 142  Iowa,  84L 

OCCUPANCY 

See  During  Occupancy  of  Building. 

In  relation  to  building  insured,  see  Un- 
occupied ;     Vacancy— Vacant — Vacate. 

"Occupancy"  does  not  necessarily  include 
residence.  Webster  defines  "occupancy"  as 
"the  act  of  taking  or  holding  possession,"  and 
an  "occupant"  as  "one  who  occupies  or  takes 
possession;  one  who  has  the  actual  use  or 
possession,  or  is  in  possession  of  a  thing." 
Twiggs  V.  State  Board  of  Land  Com'ra,  75 
Pac.  729,  731,  27  Utah,  241. 

OOOUPAHOT  —  00017PATION  —  OOCIT. 
FT  (Of  Laaa) 

See  Action  for  Use  and  Occupation; 
Actual  Occupant;  Physical  Occupancy. 

Ready  for  occupancy,  see  Ready. 

"Occupation"  is  to  hold  or  keep  for  use, 
to  possess,  to  cover  or  fill.  So  to  say  that 
one  occupies  or  has  occupied  land  contina- 


ously  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  he  has  or 
has  had  actual  possession  of  the  same.  Hall 
V.  Roberts  (Ky.)  74  B.  W.  190.  200  (dtiiis 
Webst  Diet). 

The  phrase  ''occupy  and  use,"  in  a  lease 
which  binds  the  lessee  to  ezprad  a  certain 
sum  for  improvements  on  the  premises,  and 
which  stipulates  that  in  default  of  the  pay 
ment  of  the  rent  the  lessor  may  re-enter  vA 
"occupy  and  use"  for  its  benefit  all  Improre 
ments  thereon,  shows  that  it  was  not  in 
tended  that  the  improvements  should  be  re- 
moved, or  that  they  were  in  any  nmnuer 
severable  from  the  land,  and  the  imprort- 
ments  made  by  the  lessee  are  part  of  the  real 
estate.  In  re  Long  Beach  Land  Co.,  91  N.  I. 
Supp.  508,  60^  101  App.  Div.  109. 

'K>ccupied"  inpUea  actual  posseBsion 
not  oonatructive  poamooion.  A  testttor  sare 
to  hia  housekeepte  f «r  life  the  use  of  cer- 
tain premiaea  oeeispied  by  hin.  A  portiai 
of  the  premlaee  waa  at  the  time  of  his  deatfa 
occupied  by  hUn  aa  a  residenoe,  and  a  por- 
tion by  a  bank  paying  a  monthly  rental 
The  housekeeper  aoqaired  the  me  of  the  por- 
tion of  the  premiaea  occupied  as  a  restdeoce 
only.  In  re  Handley'a  Batate,  57  Aa  755, 
757,  208  Pa.  388. 

A  tract  of  200  actea  of  timber  land  was 
''occupied,"  witbia  l^ax  Law  (Laws  1896,  p 
801,  c.  908)  f  9,  aUowing  land  to  be  assessed 
aa  nonresident  land  only  where  there  la  not 
an  owner  <Hr  occupant  of  it  residing  in  tlie 
tax  district,  and  section  134,  providing  tbat 
the  term  "occupant**  shall  be  construed  to 
mean  a  person  who  has  lawfully  eiter«d 
upon  the  land  so  occupied,  and  is  hi  posses^ 
sion  of  the  same  to  the  exdusion  of  everr 
other  person,  and  that  the  term  "occnpaocf 
shall  mean  the  actual,  lawful  and  ezdnslTe 
use  and  possession  of  such  lands  and  premis- 
es by  such  an  occupant,  where  the  owners 
had  marked  its  exterior  lines  by  blazins 
away  part  of  them,  and  left  a  larger  quantity 
on  the  skids,  and,  at  the  time  the  assessois 
were  on  their  annual  rounds,  were  erectiuf 
on  it  a  substantial  shanty  large  enongb  u 
house  them  and  theJr  bark  peelers.  Clarl: 
V.  Kirkland,  118  N.  Y.  Supp.  315,  319,  133 
App.  Div.  820. 

The  relator  owned  lota  bordering  « 
Lake  Pladd,  on  which  it  had  built  an  Ibil 
and  also  owned  the  greater  parte  of  two  lots 
situated  in  part  on  Moose  Island  in  the  lab 
and  in  part  under  the  water  of  the  lake,  tbe 
parts  of  which  nearest  to  the  inn  were  tm 
2%  miles  to  2%  mUes  distant,  and  wbict 
made,  with  the  other  lota,  a  fairly  comp»« 
tract  owned  and  cared  for  by  the  relator. 
The  lots  sold  were  connected  with  the  iut 
and  with  relator's  boathouae  by  the  watei^ 
of  the  lake,  and  were  used  in  oonnectioD  witB 
the  tract  of  land  for  picnics  and  campiB?' 
and  for  tiie  purposes  of  enjoyment  by  tbe 


OCCUPANCY— OCCUPATION 


681 


OCCUPANCY— OCCUPATION 


members  of  the  Lake  Placid  Boat  Club,  and 
there  were  boat  landings  on  the  two  lots,  and 
relator  had  expended  money  in  repairing  and 
improving  the  approaches  to  the  lots  and  had 
put  up  signs  forbidding  shooting,  etc.  Held, 
that  "occupancy/'  as  defined  by  Tax  Law 
(Consol.  Laws  1909,  c.  60)  |  134,  did  not  rift- 
quire  that  the  o.wuer  should  build  a  house 
and  reside  upon  the  particular  part  of  the 
lands  sold  for  taxes,  and  that  relator,  upon 
the  occupancy  shown,  was  entitled  to  redeem 
the  lots  from  a  tax  sale.  People  ex  rel. 
Lake  Placid  Co.  v.  Williams,  129  N.  Y.  Supp. 
767,  770,  145  App.  Div.  34. 

An  owner  of  a  preserve  irardiaaed  addi- 
tional land  to  litnlghiten  the  boundary  Une 
thereof.  The  adcUtiooal  land  was  fmbaeqnent- 
ly  used  in  conneefcion  with  Hie  preserve.  The 
owner's  snperintendent  actually  I'es&dBd  on 
the  preserve,  and  cootrolled  the  same,  includ- 
ing the  additional  land  which  was  not  inclotih 
ed,  coltivated,  or  loftfiroved.  The  owner  ex- 
pended large  sams  io  improving  the  other 
portion  of  the  preserre,  and  also  continnons- 
ly  kept  domestic  animals  thereon.  He  also 
maintained  on  the  premises  metal  notices 
warning  persona  against  trespassing.  The 
notices  were  placed  along  tbe  botoidary  of 
the  preserve,  including  the  additional  land. 
Held,  to  sAiow  an  actual  occupancy  and  pos- 
session by  the  owner  of  tbe  entire  promisee, 
Including  the  additional  land  within  Tax 
Law  (Consol.  Laws,  c.  60)  f  184,  defining  an 
"occupant"  as  one  who  has  lawfully  entered 
on  land  and  is  in  possession  thereof  to  the 
exclusion  of  others,  and  "occupancy"  as 
the  actual,  lawful,  and  exclusive  use  and  pos- 
session of  land  by  the  occupant,  and  the  own- 
er was  entitled  to  notice  to  redeem  the  prem- 
ises from  a  tax  sale.  People  ex  rel.  Moyne- 
han  V.  Gaus,  U8.  N.  Y.  Supp.  750^  757,  134 
App.  Div.  80. 

Under  the  Constitution,  requiring  occu- 
pancy as  well  as  intention  to  create  a  home- 
stead, intention  without  occupancy  is  insuf- 
ficient to  create  a  homestead,  and  there  must 
be  some  acts  which,  coupled  with  intention, 
constitute  the  necessary  occupancy  Where 
a  widow  purchased  a  vacant  lot,  which  for 
three  years  she  used  onl^  f or  the  raising  of 
vegetables,  being  without  sufilcient  means  to 
erect  a  house,  there  was  no  ^'occupancy"  suf- 
flclent  to  entitle  her  to  daim  the  lot  as*  a 
homestead.  Ware  v.  Hall,  101  N.  W.  47.  138 
Mich.  70,  67  L.  B.  A. '313,  110  Am.  St  Rep.' 
301. 

"To  'occupy'  means  to  hold  in  possession; 
to  hold  or  keep  for  use;  as  to  occupy  an 
apartment"  Act  Cong.  Aug.  14,  1848  (es- 
tablishing the  territorial  government  of  Ore- 
Son)  f  1,  contains  the  proviso  that  the  title  to 
the  land,  "not  exceeding  640  acres,  now  oc- 
^Pied  as  hiissionary  stations"  among  the 
Indian  tribes  in  said  territory,  together  with 
the  Improvements  thereon,  be  confirmed  and 
established  In  the  several  religious  societies 


to  which  said  missionary  stations  respective- 
ly belong.  Held,  that  such  statute  was  not  a 
grant  certain  of  640  acres  to  each  religious 
society  having  a  missionary  station  on  pub- 
lic lands  within  such  territory,  but  was  a 
grant  only  of  so  much  land  as  was  actually 
occupied  by  such  station,  not  exceeding  640 
acres.  Bishop  of  Neequally  v.  Gibbon,  15 
Rup.  Ot.  779,  784,  158  U.  S.  1B5,  168,  39  L. 
Ed.  931. 

Operatlofla  of  mi|M 

"In  the  primary  and  most  familiar  sense 
of  the  word,  'occupy'  la  the  equivalent  of  the 
word  'possess.'  It  implies  the  oonception  of 
permanent  tenure  for  a  period  of  greater  or 
less  duration."  As  used  in  a  deed  relating  to 
the  occupation  of  a  coal  bed,  the  word  "occu- 
py" is  synonymous  with  "work"  or  "operate." 
Hoysradt  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  151 
Fed.  321,  330  (citing  Lacy  v.  Green,  84  Pa. 
520). 

PoMeasioM 

As  commonly  used  and  undeiatood,  the 
word  "occupation"  is  synonymous  with  "pos- 
session." .  Xost  y.  Anchor  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  38 
Pa.  Super.  Ct  594,  599. 

"PosseasUMi"  does  not  iJEOply  "occupa- 
tion." United  States  v.  De  la  Maza  Arredon- 
do,  6  Pet  (31  U.  8.)  691,  74a,  8  L.  £d.  547. 

T0Bse8si<m"  means  actual  control  of 
property  by  physical  occupation.  Collar  v. 
Ulster  &  D.  R.  Co.,  181  N.  T.  Supp.  56,  60, 
72  Misc.  Rep.  274. 

The  word  "possession,"  in  Wilson's  Rev. 
&  Ann.  St.  1903,  §  4787,  providing  that  an  ac- 
tion may  be  brought  by  any  person  in  "pos- 
session," by  himself  or  tenant,  of  real  prop- 
erty, against  any  person  who  claims  an  estate 
or  interest  therein  adverse  to  him,  for  the 
purpose  of  determining  such  adverse  estate 
or  interest,  is  not  equivalent  to  the  word 
"occupancy,"  and  one  who  temporarily  va- 
cates a  homestead  owned  In  fee  simple;  for 
the  purpose  of  giving  educational  advantages 
to  minor  children,  does  not  so  abandon  the 
possession  as  to  forfeit  his  right  to  maintain 
an  action  to  remove  a  cloud  from  the  title. 
Womble  V.  Pike,  87  Pac.  427,  429,  17  Ckl.  122. 

The  ordinary  meaning  of  the  word  **pos- 
session"  is  the  same  as  "occupancy."  It  is 
defined  as  the  act  of  possessing;  a  having 
and  holding  or  retaining  of  property  in  one's 
power  or  control.  Nathan  v.  Dierssen,  79 
Pac.  739,  740,  146  Cal.  63;  Her  v.  MUler,  111 
N.  W.  689,  590,  78  Neb.  675,  14  L.  R.  A. 
(N,  S.)  289  (citing  Cent.  Diet.). 

Mere  occupancy  or  personal  presence  of 
complainant  on  the  ground  does  not  consti- 
tute sHch  possession  as  to  sustain  an  action 
of  forcible  entry,  and  a  mei:e  trecq^asser  can- 
not by  the  very  act  of  trespass  immediately 
and  without  excuse  give  himself  what  the 
law,  understands  by  possession  against  the 
person  wliom  he  ejects.    Schwinn  y.  Perkins, 


OOCUFANCY— OOCUPATIOH 


982 


OCCUPAKT-OCOUFIER 


I  J 


'     i 


78  AU.  19,  21,  79  N.  J.  Law,  515,  32  L.  B.  A 
(N.  S.)  51,  21  Ann.  Oaa.  1228. 

Tba  words  "oGcnpaUon*'  and  **!»•■«- 
a&on"  are  frequentljF  uaed  syiioiiyinoualy,  ea- 
pecUOly  in  laaoaa  and  like  inatromenta.  Thna 
where  a  gnarantj  for  tbe  payment  of  rant 
recited  that  the  landlord  had  exacted  from 
the  leeaeea  a  guaranty  that  they  would  pay 
the  rent  that  might  become  due  nnder  the 
lease  while  they  were  ''in  the  occupation'*  of 
the  premises,  and  stipulated  that  the  guar- 
antor would,  on  default  f6r  sudi  months  as 
the  lessees  were  'in  occupation**  of  the  prem- 
ises pay  the  rent,  it  was  held  that,  to  make 
the  instrument  efleetiye,  the  words  "in  occu- 
pation" will  be  construed  to  mean  'in  posses- 
sion.** Woods  y.  Broder,  118  N.  T.  Snpp. 
885,  886,  129  App.  Dir.  122. 

Where  an  indictment  for  burglary 
charged  an  entry  without  the  consent  of  the 
occupant  of  a  house,  "occupancy**  la  equiva- 
lent to  "possession,*'  and  embraced  a  chicken 
house  on  the  premises  of  proseeuter.  Moore 
▼.  State,  88  &  W.  280,  4B  Tex.  Or.  a.  400. 

Blclit  of  way 

An  owner  of  land  adjoining  a  railroad 
location  may  acquire  by  prescription  during 
20  years  an  easement  of  travel  longitudinal- 
ly over  a  part  of  the  location,  notwithstand- 
ing St  1801,  c  100,  now  St  1008,  e.  468,  pt 
2,  I  80,  providing  that  no  length  of  occupan- 
cy of  land  of  a  railroad  corporation  by  an 
occupier  of  adjoining  land  shall  create  in 
him  a  right  to  such  land,  which,  when  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  St  1892,  a  275, 
prohibiting  the  acquisition  by  prescription 
of  a  right  of  way  across  any  railroad  loca- 
tion, refers  only  to  titles  in  fee  and  not  to  an 
easement;  the  word  "occupancy"  meaning  a 
permanence  and  continuity  of  possession 
greater  than  that  required  in  tbe  establish- 
ment of  a  right  of  way.  Hall  v.  Boston  4 
M.  B.  B.,  97  N.  E.  914,  915,  211  Mass.  174. 


The  word  "occtqiation,'*  aa  used  in  a 
statute  providing  that  every  contract  or 
agreement  for  the  leasing,  rent,  and  occupa- 
tion of  buildings,  not  in  writing,  shall  be  a 
tenancy  from  month  to  month,  terminable 
only  by  a  month's  written  notice,  does  not 
mean  a  mere  possession  of  premises  by  any 
one  who  happens  to  be  in  them  or  get  in 
them,  but  means  an  occupation  pursuant  to 
an  agreement  between  the  owner  and  the  oc- 
cupier, sufficient  to  create  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant  Permission  of  a  land- 
lord to  a  tenant,  on  moving  out,  to  leave 
boxes  in  the  building  for  a  few  days,  on  the 
understanding  that  the  tenant  would  turn 
the  premises  over  dean  and  in  good  condi- 
tion, is  not  such  an  occupation.  Sterling  v. 
Heimann,  82  S.  W.  539,  540, 106  Ma  App.  40. 

Use 
The  occupancy  contemplated  by  Pub.  St 
a  11,  I  5,  cL  8,  as  amended  by  St  1899,  a 


466,  exemptiag  from  taxation  property 
literary,  benevolent  diaritable,  and  scientL 
institutions,  "occupied  by  them  or  tbeir  ol 
cere  for  the  purposes  for  whidi  tbey  we 
incofporated,**  must  tend  direcUy  to  promo 
the  purposes  for  which  the  inatltatlon  w 
incorporated.  The  occupation  of  prsDii 
belonging  to  a  college  by  the  president  » 
the  professors,  and  the  otBottB  of  tbe  ins 
tution  and  their  families,  is  not  Deeesaaii 
inconsistent  with  the  intent  of  the  statni 
Phillips  Academy  v.  Inliabitants  of  AndoT< 
65  N.  B.  841-^848,  175  Mass.  118,  48  U  B. 
560. 

Dormitories  furnished  by  a  coOege  wit 
out  rent  or  lease,  for  the  use  of  Its  atedeni 
who  club  together  for  the  purpoBe  of  c 
taining  board  at*cost,  are  "occupied**  f 
the  purposes  for  whldi  tiie  college  was  1 
eorporated,  within  the  meaning  of  this  sti 
ute;  and  so  Is  a  boose  built  witb  pnU 
funds  on  the  college  grounds  for  Its  pre 
dent,  and  occupied  1^  him  and  bis  fiantiily  i 
a  dwelling,  and  also  used  as  a  place  fcr  coi 
mencisment  and  holding  otber  leo^itioiis  1 
ddent  to  his  fnnctlODa,  faculty  and  comml 
tee  msetlngs,  etc. ;  and  so  are  hoiises  b^on 
ing  to,  and  kept  in  repair  by,  the  college,  ai 
used  partly  for  its  convenience  and  part 
for  uses  incident  to  the  duties  of  professoi 
who  occupied  them  for  dwelling  porposc 
without  rent  or  lease,  exo^  that  tbe  vaii 
of  their  use  as  dwellings  was  takoi  into  s 
count  when  the  professors'  salaries  we 
voted.  Harvard  College  v.  Assessors  < 
Cambridge^  55  N.  SL  844,  846»  ITC  Man.  14 
48  L.  B.  A  547. 

OCOUPAKT-OCCUPISa 

See  Actual  Occupant;  Bona  Fide  Oeo 
pant 

In  a  prosecution  for  breaking  and  ente 
ing  a  storage  room  in  the  custody  of  C,  i 
tnstruction  that,  if  0.  had  the  key  and  e 
dusive  right  and  means  of  entry,  then  he  ^ 
law  would  be  the  "occupant,**  was  corre 
and  was  not  objectionable  as  charging  tbi 
C.  was  in  fact  the  occupant  of  the  rooi 
burglarised.  Kinney  v.  State  (l?exO  148  ! 
W.  783,  786. 

The  words  "the  occupant  thereof,"  i 
used  In  a  statute  providing  that,  if  tbe  pro] 
erty  is  actually  occupied,  the  ocoapant  ttier 
of  must  be  made  defendant,  may  be  read  i 
meaning  "an  occupanlf*  and  not  "all  the  o 
cupants.'*  Glos  v.  Patterson,  68  N.  R  44 
445,  204  IlL  540  (quoting  Hennessey  ▼.  Pas 
sen,  41  N.  B.  516,  147  N.  Y.  255). 

Of  laad 

Ordinarily  the  "occupant**  or  "actual  a 
cupant"  of  land  is  one  in  actual  possessloi 
"Occupant**  is  defined  in* the  Century  Di< 
tionary  as:  "One  who  occupies;  an  inhab 
tant;  especially  one  in  actual  possession,  a 
a  tenant,  who  has  actual  possession,  in  dif 
tinction  from  the  landlord,  who  has  legal  o 


OCWUPANT— OOOOPIEB 


683 


OCCUPANT— OCJCUPIER 


constmctiye  possession.'*  The  Standard  def- 
inition is:  ''One  who  oocnpies;  especially  a 
tenant  in  possession  of  property,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  actaal  owner.  •  •  *•• 
Parsons  v.  Pmdential  Real  Estate  Co.,  125 
N.  W.  621,  623,  86  Neb.  271,  44  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  666. 

The  word  "oocapant,"  as  ^yrdinarily  used 
In  statQtee,  means  one  in  actual  posseflslon 
ot  land,  as  distiingiiifibed  from  constnictlTe 
possession  thereof;  that  is,  one  who  holds 
possession  and  exerdses  dominion  over  it 
There  may  be  occupancy  of  land,  without 
actual  residence  thereon.  Thus  the  owner  of 
a  farm,  of  which  he  is  in  actual  possession, 
though  he  resides  in  a  village  near  by,  is  an 
'occupant"  within  Rev.  Laws  1906,  i  U72 
requiring  notice  of  hearing  on  a  petition  for 
a  highway  to  be  served  on  the  occupants  of 
the  land.  McCauley  v.  Town  of  McOauley- 
vllle,  127  N.  W.  190,  191.  Ill  Minn.  428,  20 
Ana.  Cas.  828. 

Under  Oomp^  Laws  1907,  |  20,  providing 
that  if  any  cattle  shall. treqpass  or  do  dam- 
age upon  the  premises  of  another,  the  ag- 
grieved party,  whether  he  be  the  owner  or 
occupant,  may  recover  against  the  owner  of 
the  cattle,  plaintUf,  who  purchased  luoeme 
seed  from  the  owner  of  land[  and  left  it  in 
an  inclosed  field  to  dry,  was  an  "occupant** 
trithin  the  purview  of  the  statute,  and  might 
Bupport  an  action  against  the  owner  of  cat- 
tle which  trespassed  upon  the  field,  and  ate 
and  ruined  the  seed,  without  pleading  or 
proving  negligence;  the  statute  apparently 
warranting  a  recovery  for  injury  to  person* 
alty,  as  well  as  to  real  estate.  Peterson  v. 
Petterson,  U7  Paa  70,  71,  39  Utah,  354. 

A  tract  of  260  acres  of  timber  land  was 
occupied,  within  Tax  Law  (Laws  1896,  p. 
BOl,  c.  908)  i  9,  allowing  land  to  be  assessed 
as  nonresident  only  where  there  is  not  an 
owner  or  "occupant"  of  it  residing  in  the  tax 
district,  where  the  owners  had  marked  Its 
axterior  lines  by  blazing  trees,  had  made 
roads,  cut  and  skidded  a  large  quantity  of 
logs,  drawn  away  part  of  them,  and  left  a 
larger  quantity  on  the  skids,  and,  at  the  time 
the  assessors  were  on  their  annual  rounds, 
were  erecting  on  it  a  substantial  shanty 
large  enough  to  house  them  and  their  bark' 
peelers.  Clark  v.  BUrkland,  118  N.  T.  Supp. 
^15,  819,  188  App.  Div.  826. 

An  owner  of  a  preserve  purchased  addi- 
tional land  to  straighten  the  boundary  line 
thereof.  The  additional  land  was  subse- 
quently used  in  connection  with  the  pre- 
serve. The  owner's  superintendent  actually 
resided  on  the  preserve,  and  controlled  the 
same,  including  the  additional  land  which 
p^as  not  Inclosed,  cultivated,  or  improved, 
rhe  owner  expended  large  sums  in  improv- 
ing the  other  portion  of  the  preserve,  and 
ilso  continuously  kept  domestic  animals 
thereon.    He  also  maintained  on  the  pieok- 


ises  metal  notices  warning  persons  against 
trespassing.  The  notices  were  placed  along 
the  boundary  of  the  preserve,  including  the 
additional  land.  Held,  to  show  aa  actual  oc- 
cupancy and  possession  by  the  owner  of  the 
entire  premises,  including  the  additional  land 
within  Tax  Law  (Consol.  Laws,  c.  60)  |  134, 
defining  an  "occupant"  as  one  who  has  law- 
fully entered  on  land  and  is  In  possession 
thereof  to  the  exclusion  of  others,  and  "oc- 
cupancy" as  the  actual,  lawful,  and  exclu- 
sive use  and  possession  of  land  by  the  occu- 
panty  and  the  owner  was  entitled  to  notice 
to  redeem  the  premises  from  a  tax  sale. 
People  ex  reL  Moyneham  v.  Oaus,  118  N.  T. 
Supp.  766^  767,  134  App.  Div.  80. 

Laws  1900,  p.  02,  c.  20,  f  220,  gives  to 
the  commission  of  the  fbrest  preserve  the 
care  and  control  of  the  forest  preserve,  and 
by  its  wardens,  foresters,  and  protectors  it 
actually  occupies  the  preserve,  so  that  it  is 
an  "occupant,"  within  the  meaning  of  Laws 
1896,  p.  842,  e  906,  f  184,  requiring  that, 
where  land  shall  be  sold  for  taxes,  notice 
shall  be  given  to  the  occupant  to  redeem 
before  a  deed  is  given.  People  ex  rel. 
Turner  ▼.  Kelsey,  72  N.  E.  624,  626, 180  N.  T. 
24. 

Same— Iiandlord 

"An  'occupant*  is  defined  by  Webster  as 
'one  who  occupies  or  takes  possession;  one 
who  has  the  actual  use  or  possession,  or  is 
in  possession  of  a  thing.*  Bouvier  defines 
'occupant*  as  'one  who  has  actual  use  or  pos- 
session of  a  thing.*  Shumaker  &  Longsdorf 
in  their  Law  Dictionary,  in  defining  'occu- 
pant,' say:  'One  who  has  the  actual  posses- 
sion or  use  of  a  thing;  occupancy  implies 
the  exclusion  of  every  one  else  from  enjoy- 
ment Tenant  in  possession.*"  Under  the 
statute  providing  that  forcible  detainer  in- 
volves eaatrj  during  the  absence  of  the  "oc- 
cupant," an  owner  of  land  in  actual  posses- 
sion of  a  tenant  cannot  maintain  forcible 
detainer  against  one  dispossessing  the  ten- 
ant Chesum  v.  Campbell,  86  Pac.  48,  49, 
42  Wash.  660,  7  Ann.  Cas.  921. 

flamep-^reaMit 

Lessees  in  possession  are  "occupants"  of 
land,  BO  that  they  may  object  to  the  granting 
of  a  liquor  license.  American  Woolen  Co.  v. 
Town  Council  of  North  Smithfield,  69  AtL 
293,  294,  29  R.  I.  98,  16  Ann.  Cas.  1227  (cit- 
ing Lonsdale  Co.  v.  Board  of  License  Com'rs, 
of  Town  of  Cumberland,  26  Atl.  066,  18  R 
1.  7). 

As  used  in  St  1898,  |  1391,  providing 
that  respective  "occupants"  of  adjoining 
lands  used  for  farming  shall  maintain  parti- 
tion fences,  and  that  "owners**  of  land  who 
do  not  maintain  lawful  partition  fences  can- 
not recover  fbr  trespass  by  animals,  the 
term  "owners"  includes  a  tenant  as  the  oc- 
cupant of  the  land,  so  that  his  failure  to 
maintain  the  partition  fence  precludes  him 


OOCUP  ANT— OCCUPIER 


684 


OCCUPATION 


from  recovering  for  trespass,  Peterson  ▼. 
Johnson,  111  N.  W.  659.  132  Wis.  280  (citing 
6  Words  and  Phrases,  pp.  490i,  6134). 

Of  p«bU«  UmA 

Bey.  St  U.  B.  |  2887,  provides  that  the 
judge  of  tlie  oonnty  coart  may  enter  at  the 
proper  land  office  land  occupied  as  a  town 
site  of  an  unincorporated  town,  In  trust  for 
the  ''occupants*' ;  the  execution  of  the  trust 
to  be  under  regulations  prescribed  by  the 
Legislature  of  the  state  or  territory.  Rev. 
St  Arts.  1901,  pars.  4075-4077,  40T9.  4080. 
4085,  4093,  4094.  providing  the  method  of 
executing  the  trust,  require  the  payment  by 
the  "claimant"  to  the  trustee  of  the  pur- 
chase price  of  15  per  lot  before  he  Is  entitled 
to  a  deed.  Held,  that  this  requirement  ap- 
plies to  actual  occupants,  and  not  only  to 
those  who  merely  daim  the  right  to  posse*- 
sion,  and  an  occupant,  to  be  entiUed  to  his 
deed,  must  be  a  claimant,  file  his  statement, 
and  pay  to  the  trustee  the  purchase  price. 
Robertson  v.  Martin,  76  Pac  ei4,  615,  8  Arts. 
422. 

Rev.  St  U.  8.  f  2387.  provides  that, 
whenever  any  portion  of  the  public  lands 
have  been  occuiAed  as  a  town  site,  it  Is  law- 
ful for  the  Judge  of  the  county  court  in  case 
the  town  is  unincorporated,  to  enter  the  lands 
80  occupied  in  trust  for  the  benefit  of  the  oc- 
cupants thereof,  the  execution  of  which  trust 
shall  be  regulated  by  the  legislative  authori- 
ty of  the  territory,  etc.  Held,  that  the  "occu- 
pants'* for  whom  the  trustees  took  the  legal 
title  under  the  act  were  those  who  were  such 
at  the  time  the  town  site  was  entered.  City 
of  Globe  V.  Slack,  95  Pac.  126,  11  Ariz.  408. 

"An  'occupant'  within  the  meaning  of 
the  town-site  law,  la  one  who  is  a  settler  or 
resident  of  the  town  and  in  bona  fide  actual 
possession  of  the  lot  at  the  time  the  entry 
was  made.  *  ♦  •  xhe  'occupancy'  must 
be  actual,  and  cannot  be  begun  by  an  agent. 
It  must  be  for  residence,  or  for  business,  or 
for  use,  and  the  residence,  business,  or  use 
must  be  by  the  claimant  There  must  be  a 
subjection  of  the  land  to  his  will  and  con- 
trol. ♦  ♦  ♦  It  follows  •  •  •  that  there 
can  be  no  such  thing  as  constructive  occu- 
pancy under  the  town-site  law,  but  there 
must  be  an  actual  bodily  presence  of  the 
claimant  or  some  one  for  him,  on  the  lot  or 
lots  for  which  he  seeks  to  acquire  title,  or 
a  purpose  to  enjoy,  united  with  or  manifest- 
ed by  such  visible  acts.  Improvements,  or  in- 
closures  as  wjLU  give  to  the  claimant  the  ab- 
solute exclusive  enjoyment  of  It"  Where 
plainUtr  staked  out  a  lot  in  a  mining  camp  in 
Alaska  and  built  a  log  cabin  thereon,  in 
which  he  resided  for  some  three  years  and 
then  left,  leaving  some  tools,  a  stove,  etc., 
in  the  cabin,  and  asking  two  different  per- 
sons to  look  after  the  property  for  him,  nei- 
ther of  whom  took  possession  of  or  occupied 
it,  and  did  not  return  for  three  years,  and 
about  a  year  after  leaving  other  persons  lo- 


cated the  lot,  and  went  Into  continoous  pos- 
session, and  made  valuable  improvements  os 
the  property,  and  conveyed  it  plaintiff,  al 
though  his  title  was  recorded  in  tbe  book 
kept  for  the  benefit  of  settlers,  there  Um^ 
been  no  steps  taken  to  locate  a  town  site,  vta 
not  an  occupant  or  In  possession,  and  had 
no  right  therein  which  would  ripm  into  a 
tttlt  under  the  town-site  law  (Bev.  St  { 
2867;  Act  March  8,  1891  [26  SUt  10Q5.  t 
061,  I  11))  at  the  time  of  Its  location  by  tbe 
grantor,  or  which  would  support  an  acdon 
to  recover  the  property  from  the  grantee& 
Gordon  ▼.  Ross-filgglns  Co.,  162  Fed.  637. 
610,  80  O.  C.  A.  429  (quoting  and  adopting 
language  In  Bender  ▼.  Sfaimer,  19  L  D.  363, 
867). 

Of  Hcbt  of  way 

The  grantee  of  a  railway  right  of  way 
is  not  the  owner  or  "occupant"  of  the  esuie 
over  which  it  is  granted.  The  mere  running 
of  trains  over  a  road  does  not  make  the  cod> 
pany  running  them  an  "occupanf*  of  tbe 
land.  Kansas  4  C.  P.  R.  Go.  v.  Bums,  (9 
Pac  288,  239,  70  Kan.  627  (dlssenthig  diiB 
ion)  (guoting  Cook  County  ▼.  Chicago,  a  &  (^ 
B.  Co.,  36  IlL  460. 

OCOUPATIOH 

Of  land,  see  Occupancy— Occupati<»- 
Occupy  (Of  Land). 

OfdweUlaclaoiiM 

In  rdation  to  building  Insured,  see  I'c- 
oocupied;     Vacancy— Vacant— Vacate. 

Under  White's  Ann.  Pen.  Code,  art  845c 
providing  that  the  term  ''private  residence" 
shall  be  construed  to  mean  any  bailing  or 
room  "occupied  and  actually  used"  at  tbe 
time  of  the  offense  as  a  residence,  it  is  not 
necessary,  to  constitute  the  offense  of  bar- 
glary  of  a  private  residence,  that  the  family 
be  personally  present  at  the  time  of  the  bur 
glary,  but  it  is  sufficient  if  the  house  Is  ac 
tually  used  at  the  time  as  a  private  residence, 
though  the  family  are  temporarily  alttf*Jflt 
Handy  v.  State,  80  S.  W.  526,  46  Tei.  Cr 
R.  406. 

•The  word  *occm>ation,*  as  applied  to  i 
dwelling  house,  means  living  in  it;  and  hence. 
to  become  vacated  or  unoccupied,  it  must  l^ 
Without  an  occupant— without  any  person  li^ 
ing  in  if  Baggerly  v.  Lee,  73  N.  E-  9-^ 
923,  37  Ind.  App.  139  (citing  Home  Ins.  Co 
of  New  YorK  v.  Boyd,  49  N.  E.  285, 19  Ini 
App.  173 ;  Paine  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.  [> 
Y.]  5  Thomp.  ft  C.  619 ;  American  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Padfleld,  78  111.  169). 

OCCITPATION  (Voeation) 

See  Dangerous  Occupation 
As  property,  see  Property. 
As  trade;  see  Trade. 
Change  of  occupation,  see  Chanire. 
Following  occupation,  see  Follow-Fol- 
lowing 


OCCUPATION 


686 


OCCUPATION 


Other  occupation,  see  Other. 

Some  other  occupation,  see  Some  Other. 

The  term  "occupation"  is  synonymous 
tb  calling,  trade,  business,  or  profession. 
ty  of  Topelta  v.  Jones,  86  Pac.  162,  168,  74 
m.  164. 

The  word  "occupation"  is  a  generic  term, 
d  Is  that  to  which  one's  time  and  attention 
i  habitually  devoted,  vocation,  calling, 
ide,  business,  and  a  **Tocation"  is  an  em- 
•yment,  occupation,  calling,  trade,  Including 
)fes8ions  as  well  as  medianical  occupa- 
Ds.    Village  of  Dodge  ▼.  Guidinger,  127  N. 

122,  87  Neb.  349,  188  Am.  St  Rep.  494. 

"Occupation,*'  as  commonly  understood, 
nlfies  vocation,  calling,  trade,  the  business 
ilch  one  principally  engages  in  to  secure  a 
ing  or  obtain  wealth.  Joliff  v.  State,  109 
W.  176,  177,  178,  53  Tex.  Or.  B.  61  (citing 
indford  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  831);  Cohen 
State,  110  S.  W.  66,  67,  53  Tex.  Or.  R.  422, 
)  (quoting  and  adopting  the  definitions  in 
indford  V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  881;  Love 
State.  20  S.  W.  978,  31  Tex.  Cr.  R.  469; 
enlg  V.  State,  26  S.  W.  835,  33  Tex.  Cr.  R. 
r,  47  Am.  St  Rep.  36;  State  v.  Austin 
lb,  33  S.  W.  113,  89  Tex.  20,  30  L.  R.  A. 
));  Dossier  v.  State,  137  S.  W.  679,  681,  62 
X.  Cr.  R.  258. 

"Occupation"  is  a  term  of  broad  signifl- 
ice,  and  includes  the  trade,  calling,  pro- 
sion,  office,  employment,  or  business  by 
ich  one  generally  gets  his  living;  and  it  is 
:  incidental,  recreatory,  or  even  necessary 
^pension  of  th€»  performance  of  regular 
tj  which  constitutes  a  "change  of  occupa- 
Q"  by  one  insured  against  accident  Bver- 
I  V.  General  Fire  &  Life  Assur.  Corp.,  Lim- 
i,  of  Perth,  Scotland,  88  N.  R  658,  661, 
t  Mass.  169.  Thus,  where  an  accident 
icy  insured  plaintiff  as  the  manager  of  a 
1  and  contained  a  rider  that  the  insurance 
>ald  not  l>e  forfeited  by  a  temporary 
mge  of  occupation,  it  was  not  material 
t  bis  injury  sued  for  occurred  while  he 
s  operating  a  mower  as  a  mere  temporary 
ersion.     Kenny  v.  Bankers'  Accident  Ins. 

of  Des  Moines,  113  N.  W.  566,  569,  136 
ra,  140. 

The  term  "occupation,"  as  used  in  an  ac- 
ent  policy,  ImpUes  simply  that  which  at 
^  time  of  the  accident  constitutes  the  as- 
ed*8  principal  business  or  pursuit;  that 
ich  engages  his  attention  and  time,  as 
tinguished  from  that  which  is  incidentally 
inected  with  the  life  of  men  in  any  or  all 
upations.  Thus,  where  a  party  obtains 
K>Ucy  of  insurance-  against  injury  by  acd- 
It,  specifying  the  occupation  of  the  assured 
be  that  of  a  druggist,  deemed  to  be  a  se- 
t  risk,  and  that  of  a  farmer  or  supervising 
mer  only  is  specified  as  a  more  haeardotm 
It,  calling  for  a,  larger  premium,  and  there- 
er  the  drug  store  of  the  assured  was  d^ 
Dyed  by  fire,  whereupon  the  assuied  mov- 


ed upon  a  tract  of  land  entered  as  a  home- 
stead, into  a  house  built  by  him  thereon, 
which  he  thereafter  occupied  with  his  family 
as  his  home,  and  superintended  the  construc- 
tion of  a  bam  thereon,  and  caused  to  be 
fenced  and  broken  and  cultivated  40  acres 
of  the  land  thereof,  under  his  supervision, 
for  a  period  of  six  months,  and  was  prepar- 
ing for  further  cultivation  of  the  land  at  the 
time  of  his  injury,  and  for  eight  months 
prior  to  such  injury  had  no  connection  with 
the  business  of  a  druggist,  his  occupation 
was  that  of  a  supervising,  farmer,  and  not 
that  of  a  druggist  wltbin  the  meaning  of 
the  policy.  JBitna,  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dunn,  188 
Fed.  630,  633,  71  O.  0.  A.  79.  And  so, 
where  the  application  for  a  life  policy  stated 
that  assured's  occupation  was  "dealer  in 
pumps  and  well  supplies,"  and  the  policy 
stipulated  that  enumerated  occupations,  such 
as  "blasting,  mining,  and  handling  or  trans- 
porting of  inflammable  or  explosive  substanc- 
es" were  risks  not  assumed  by  the  insurer 
during  the  first  year,  and  the  assured  died 
within  the  year  by  reason  of  an  explosion 
during  an  attempt  to  blow  out  a  well  casing 
with  dynamite  in  the  course  of  his  designated 
business,  it  was  held  that  the  risk  of  using 
the  dynamite  did  not  constitute  a  risk  not  as- 
sumed by  the  insurer;  the  stipulation  in  the 
policy  relating  to  an  occupation  different 
from  that  named  in  the  application  as  as- 
sured's  occupation.  Hortensen  v.  Central 
Life  Assur.  Ass'n,  99  N.  W.  1059,  124  Iowa, 
277. 

A  by-law  of  a  fraternal  benefit  order 
which  bars  from  admission  to  the  order  per- 
sons "engaged"  in  blasting,  coal  mining,  man- 
ufacturing e3Q>lo6lve8,  etc.,  or  who  are  en- 
gaged in  any  other  occupation  deemed  extra- 
hazardous, or  who  are  engaged  either  as  prin- 
cipal, agent,  or  servant  in  the  sale  of  liquor 
as  a  beverage,  and  which  provides  that  any 
member  who  shall  engage  in  any  of  the  pro- 
hibited occupations  shall  thereby  render  his 
certificate  void,  is  violated  by  a  member  who 
with  his  son  opened  a  saloon  as  copartners, 
the  license  therefor  being  issued  in  their  Joint 
names,  and  the  member  being  pecuniarily  in- 
terested therein,  though  he  performed  no  la- 
bor in  or  about  the  saloon  and  took  no  active 
part  in  the  business,  the  word  "engaged"  be- 
ing the  equivalent  of  the  words  "carry  on," 
and  the  word  "occupation"  meaning  "busi- 
ness." Graves  v.  Knights  of  the  Maccabees 
of  the  World,  92  N.  B.  792-794,  199  N.  Y.  397. 
139  Am.  St  Rep.  912. 

A  by-law  of  the  defendant  a  fraternal 
insurance  company^  provided  tliat  If  a  mem- 
ber should  enter  into  the  business  or  occupa- 
tion of  selling  at  retail  intoxicating  liquors 
as  a  beverage  liis  member^bdp  should  cease, 
and  the  Insurance  cectificate  and  all  rights 
thereunder  should  become  fpirMted..  Plain- 
tiff's liusband,.  a  .common  laboiter,  -  while  a 
member,  accepted  work  in>  a  village  saloon 
as  a  temporary  substitute  lor  the  bartender 


CHXJUPATIOK 


686 


OCCUPATION  RENTAL 


'Ml  j^n 


for  fire  or  bIx  weeks,  during  wklcb  time  bo 
paid  an  aaoessment  that  came  due  on  the 
membership  certificate.  This  asseasmoit  was 
accepted  and  retained  by  the  officers  of  the 
local  lodge.  Three  dajs  after  the  Insared 
quit  the  said  temporary  employment  he  died. 
After  his  death,  and  with  knowledge  of  his 
said  employment,  defendant's  grand  record- 
er reqnested  farther  proofk,  not  only  as  to 
his  '*occapatlon,**  but  as  to  bnriaL  Assamlng 
that  the  temporary  employment  forfeited  the 
Insurance,  It  is  hdd  that  the  trial  court's 
finding  that  there  was  a  waiyer  of  the  for^ 
felture  Is  sustained  by  the  eridenoe.  Hen- 
drlckson  v.  Grand  Lodge  A.  O.  U.  W.,  188  N. 
W.  946,  060,  120  Minn.  86. 

^'Occupation''  is  correctly  defined.  In  an 
action  on  a  benefit  certificate,  in  which  the 
defense  is  a  wrong  statement  in  the  applica- 
tion as  to  insured's  occupation,  by  an  Instruc- 
tion stating  that  it  means  that  whidi  prac- 
tically takes  up  one's  time  and  energies,  es- 
pecially one's  regular  business  or  employ- 
ment, and  that  the  word  does  not  necessarily 
mean  the  present  occupation,  but  it  means 
that  which  principally  takes  up  one's  time, 
thought,'  and  energy,  especially  one's  regular 
business  or  employment,  so  that  one  might 
have  a  regular  occupation,  such  as  that  of  a 
painter,  and  be  out  of  employment,  and  might 
temporarily  engage  in  other  business,  yet,  if 
he  was  questioned  as  to  what  was  his  occu- 
pation, he  would  give  it  as  a  painter,  that  be- 
ing his  general  occupation.  Supreme  Lodge 
Knights  and  Ladles  of  Honor  ▼.  Baker,  GO 
South.  058,  060,  163  Ala.  6ia 

An  acddent  policy  provided  that,  if  the 
insured  was  injured  while  engaged  in  any 
^'occupation  or  exposure"  more  hazardous 
than  that  against  which  he  was  insured,  his 
insurance  shall  be  so  much  as  the  premiums 
paid  will  purchase  at  the  rates  fixed  for  such 
increased  hazard.  "Occupations"  were  classi- 
fied, with  an  explanation  that  merely  ridltfg 
a  bicycle  for  pleasure  is  not  an  "occupation," 
and  that  one  insured  as  a  proprietor  of  a 
manufacturing  industry  does  not  change  his 
status  by  incidentally  riding  a  bicycle.  Held, 
that  the  fact  that  an  insured  is  injured  while 
incidentally  riding  a  bicycle  does  not  place 
him  in  a  different  class  as  to  hazards  from 
the  "occupation"  named  in  the  policy.  Com- 
stock  y.  Fraternal  Accident  Ass'n,  03  N.  W. 
22,  26,  116  Wia  382. 

Where  defendant,  a  ftirmer,  had  proyid- 
ed  himself  with  the  necessary  equipment  to 
operate  a  flying  jenny,  an  occupation  taxed 
by  law,  and  to  operate  the  same  for  profit,  he 
was  guilty  of  pursuing  an  occupation  without 
paying  the  occupation  tax  provided  therefor; 
the  word  "occupation,"  as  uaed  in  the  statute, 
meaning  vocation,  calling,  trade^  or  the  busi- 
ness which  one  engages  in  to  procure  a  liv- 
ing or  obtain  wealth.  Robblns  v.  States  123 
S.  W.  605,  606,  67  Tex.  Or.  B.  462. 


In  a  iwosecutlon  under  Acta  29th  ] 
(Gen.  Laws  1006,  p.  01)  c  64,  providinf 
the  punishment  of  any  one,  or  the  agen 
employ^  of  any  one,  engaged  in  the  "busL 
or  occupation''  of  keeping  or  storing  int 
canta  for  others  in  any  county,  etc^  in  w] 
the  tale  of  intoxicants  had  been  prohiU 
who  pemdts  anothw  to  drink  intoxia 
within  such  place  of  huabiess,  an  instmc 
defining  "buMneas  or  occupatimi''  to  be  1 
whidi  oigagee  one's  time  and  aLtbeotUm  oi 
bor,  or  that  about  which  one  la  engage 
employed,  was  misleading,  where  aca 
claimed  that  the  Intoxicants  shown  to  I 
been  drunk  on  the  premises  were  not  k^ 
hire  or  profit,  nor  as  a  business  or  call 
but  that  such  keeping  was  csBoal  and  1 
dental;  the  terms  "business"  and  *^occn 
tion,"  as  used  in  the  statute,  meaning  a  < 
log,  trade,  or  vocation  In  whldi  one  e&gi 
to  make  a  living  or  obtain  wealth.  Gobe 
State,  110  S.  W.  66,  67,  68  Tex.  Cr.  R.  42 

Under  Act  AprU  16,  1000  (Acts  31st  ] 
c.  16),  making  it  a  felony  to  pursue  the  o 
pation  of  selling  intoxicating  liquor  in  1 
option  territory,  the  word  "occupation"  < 
not  necessarily  mean  principal  business, 
may  mean  a  business  carried  on  by  the 
fendant  as  a  aide  line,  and  hence  a  chargi 
a  prosecution  under  that  law,  that  in  oi 
to  constitute  and  engage  in  or  iHursue  the 
cupation  of  selling  intoxicating  liquor  1 
necessary  for  the  state  to  prove  beyon 
reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  nnl 
fully  followed  that  business,  places  a  gns 
burden  on  the  state  than  the  law  reqoi 
and  was  not  prejudicial  to  defendant.  Cl 
V.  State,  186  8.  W.  200,  264,  61  Tex.  O 
507. 

An  instruction  that  it  was  not  neoesa 
that  a  party  should  make  a  profit  in  his  b 
ness  in  order  to  be  guilty  of  pursuing  the 
cupation  of  selling  intoxicating  liquors  ' 
not  an  Improper  limitation  on  the  meanini 
the  words,  '^occupation"  or  ''business,** 
used  in  the  statute,  and  was  proper  wl 
the  evid^ice  showed  that  accused  would 
der  whisky  fbr  his  store  customers,  i 
charge  it  in  their  store  account  at  cost  tc 
paid  when  the  rest  of  the  account  was  p 
since  each  of  these  transactions  oonstitii 
a  sale.  And  a  further  charge  that  the  si 
was  not  required  to  show  that  such  **& 
ness"  or  "occupation"  was  accused's  prind 
"business"  or  ''occupation,"  or  that  he  s 
the  whole  or  the  greats  part  of  his  time 
such  business,  but  that  lA  althons^  engaj 
in  his  usual  occupation,  he  secretly  sold 
toxicating  liquors  when  the  opportunity  I 
sented,  he  would  be  guilty,  was  not  objecti 
able  on  the  grounds  that  it  did  not  prope 
define  "business"  or  "occupation.**  Dkb 
V.  State  (Tex.)  146  S.  W.  014,  018. 

OCOUPATIOV  BEITTAI. 

One  occupying  real  pn^^erty  under 
lease  which  is  subsequent  and  subject  u 


OCCUPATION  TAX 


687 


OCCUPIED  BY  ITS  TRACKS 


mortgage  under  foreclosure,  in  an  action 
irhereln  a  recover  has  been  appointed,  must 
tnswer  to  such  recover  for  rent  which  may 
be  due  or  which  may  accrue  after  such  re- 
ceiver's appointment;  or,  if  the  occupant 
claims  to  have  a  defense  to  the  landlord's 
claim  for  rent  as  such,  then  the  occupant 
must  pay  to  the  receiver  as  custodian  of 
property  which  is  security  for  a  mortgage — 
uid  to  safeguard  such  security — a  reasonable 
amount  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  such 
mortgaged  premises,  called  "occupation  rent- 
al," during  the  pendency  of  the  action.  Der- 
by V.  Brandt,  00  N.  X.  Supp.  980, 081,  00  App. 
Dlv.  257. 

OCCITPATIOV  TAX 

License  or  occupation  tax,  see  license 
Tax. 

Laws  1003,  c  176,  I  10,  requiring  itiner- 
ant physidans  to  pay  an  annual  sum  for  a 
license  to  practice  as  such.  Imposes  an  occu- 
pation tax  within  Const  art  6,  |  17,  requir- 
ing that  taxation  shall  be  equal  and  uniform. 
State  V.  Doran,  134  N.  W.  53,  56,  28  S.  D.  486. 

A  specific  tax  upon  agents  and  represen- 
tatives of  packing  houses  and  of  dealers  in 
packing  house  goods  and  products  having  a 
place  of  business  or  stock  of  merchandise  in 
a  dty  and  selling  to  customers  therein  is  a 
vocation  or  occupation  tax.  City  of  Savan- 
nah V.  Oo(«er,  68  S.  S.  188,  189, 140,  131  Ga. 
670. 

The  fees  imposed  by  a  dty  to  pay  the 
cost  of  necessary  Inspection  of  the  installa- 
tion of  electrical  appliances,  inside  and  out- 
side of  buildings  in  the  dty  are  not  taxes 
within  Const  art  8,  |  1,  providing  that  per- 
sons engaged  in  mechanical  and  agricultural 
pursuits  shall  not  be  required  to  pay  an  oc- 
cupation tax.  License  and  Inspection  fees 
levied  under  the  police  power  of  a  dty  are 
not  an  ''occupation  tax'*  within  this  constitu- 
tional provision.  Ex  parte  Cramer,  136  S. 
W.  61,  62,  62  Tex.  Cr.  R.  11,  36  L.  E.  A.  (N. 
S.)  78,  Ann.  Caa.  1013C,  588. 

A  tax  levied  on  a  corporation  for  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  privilege  of  carrying  on  its  busi- 
ness is  an  occupation  tax  within  Const  art  8, 
1 1,  authorissliig  the  Leglalature  to  impose  oc- 
cupation taxes  on  persons  and  corporations 
doing  business  in  the  state.  State  v.  Galves- 
ton. H.  ft  S.  A.  By.  Co*.  07  S.  W.  71,  77,  100 
Tex.  153. 

Laws  1007,  c  65,  imposing  cm  erery  in- 
surance company  doing  business  in  the  state, 
except  domestic  mutual  insurance  companies, 
an  annual  tax  of  2%  per  cent  of  the  gross 
amount  of  premiums  received  in  the  state 
during  the  preceding  year,  etc.,  when  con- 
strued in  the  light  of  the  history  of  the  1^- 
islatlon  on  the  subject  imirases  an  '*occupa- 
tion  tax**  and  not  an  "ordinary  tax"  within  j 
the  Constitution  relating  to  taxation.  Queen 
City  Plre  Ins.  Co.  ▼.  Basford,  130  N.  W.  44, . 
46,  27  S.  D.  164.  1 


OOOUPIED  AS  DWfilXIKO  HOUSE 

A  landlord  who  rents  the  second  story  of 
a  store  buflding,  to  be  used  by  the  lessee  for 
printing  and  publishing  a  newspaper  therein, 
in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  in  the  lease, 
1b  not  bound  to  put  the  building  in  a 'condi- 
tion fit- for  such  occupation,  and  repair  fu- 
ture dilapidations  thereof,  as  the  property 
leased  is  not  intended  '*for  occupation  of  hu- 
man beings*'  within  the  meaning  of  Wilson's 
Bev.  ft  Ann.  St  1003,  H  863,  864.  Tucker  v. 
Bennett,  81  Pac.  423,  424,  15  OkL  187. 

OCCUPIED  AS  rACTO&T 

Defendant  insured  an  ice  manufacturing 
plant  after  Its  operation  had  been  abandoned, 
the  policy  describing  the  property  as  a  build- 
ing ''occupied  as  an  ice  factory,**  and  de- 
scribed the  personal  property  as  appurte- 
nances and  appliances  necessary  to  be  used 
in  plaintiff's  business,  all  while  contained  in 
such  building.  The  policy  also  declared  that 
if  the  subject  of  insurance  was  a  manufac- 
turing establishment  and  it  should  cease  to  be 
operated  for  more  than  10  consecutive  days 
without  the  Insurer's  consent,  the  policy 
should  be  forfeited.  Held,  that  the  policy 
being  construed  most  strictly  against  the  in- 
surer did  not  insure  an  ice  manufacturing 
plant  in  operation,  but  merely  a  building  and 
appliances  therein  that  had  been  used  for 
that  purpose,  and  that  the  policy  was  there- 
fore not  forfeited  by  a  continued  failure  to 
operate  the  plant  without  insurer's  consent. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  North  Little  Rock  Ice  & 
Electric  Co.,  Ill  S.  W.  004,  006,  86  Ark.  538, 
23  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1201. 

OCCUPIED  AS  SAI.OOK 

In  a  fire  Insurance  policy,  the  words,  "oc- 
cupied as  a  saloon,"  are  words  of  description 
only,  and  do  not  mean  that  the  building  in- 
sured shall  be  at  all  times  conducted  as  a 
saloon.  Silver  v.  London  Assur.  Corporation, 
112  Pac.  666»  668,  61  Wash.  503. 

OCCUPIED  AS  A  STEAM  LAUNDBT 

The  phrase  "occupied  as  a  steam  laun- 
dry" In  a  Are  policy  on  property  described  as 
a  two-story  basement  and  bride  building,  and 
additions  adjoining  and  communicating,  in- 
cluding foundations,  "occupied  as  a  steam 
laundry,"  renders  a  boiler  house  connected 
with  the  building:  within  the  policy.  Guthrie 
Laundry  Co.  v.  Northern  Assur.  Co.  of  Loo- 
don,  87  Pac.  640,  651,  17  Okl.  571,  10  Ann. 
Cas.  036. 

OCCUPIED  BT  ITS  TRACKS 

The  phrase  "occupied  by  its  tracks,"  in 
Pub.  St  1882,  c  lis,  II  82,  88,  requiring  ev- 
ery street  railway  company  to  ke^  in  repair 
the  paving  of  the  portion  of  the  street  oc- 
cupied by  its  trades,  refers  to  the  rails  and 
the  space  between  them  oTer  which  theocars 
pass.  City  of  Boston  y.  Boston  Elevated  B. 
Co.,  71  N.  E.  205,  186  Mass.  274. 


OCCUPIED  BY  ITS  TRACKS 


688 


OOCURRENCX 


Under  a  dty  ordinance,  requiring  a  atreet 
railway  company  operating  a  line  wittiin  tbe 
corporate  limiti  to  keep  in  good  repair  all 
that  part  of  the  atreet  occupied  by  it,  when- 
ever the  street  car  company  took  poeaession 
ot  that  portion  of  the  street  for  the. purpose 
of  laying  a  track,  it  was  '^occupied  by  iV 
Montgomery  St  By.  Co.  ▼.  Smith,  39  South. 
757,  761, 146  AU.  316. 

OOOVPIED    EZ0I.ir8XVELT    AS    A 
DWXSXIK0 

The  owner  of  a  two-stoiy  buUdliig  liaT- 
ing  two  show  windows  with  an  entrance  be- 
tween them  conducted-  a  laundry  therein 
from  July  until  September,  when  the  sign 
was  taken  down  and  not  replaced  until  the 
following  June  or  July,  when  the  business 
was  resumed.  Held  that,  though  the  owner 
lived  in  a  part  of  the  building,  it  was  not 
'^occupied  exclusively  for  a  dwelling**  within 
Liquor  Tax  Law  requiring  consents  to  the 
granting  of  liquor  licenses,  and  therefore 
could  not  be  counted  in  ascertaining  assent 
of  the  owners  of  the  surrounding  homes  to 
the  proposed  application  for  a  liquor  tax  cer- 
tificate, though  on  the  date  of  the  applica- 
tion the  sign  was  down  and  the  laundry  had 
been  suspended  for  the  season.  In  re  Ben- 
nett, 136  N.  Y.  Supp.  910,  911,  76  Misc.  Rep. 
310. 

OCCUPIED   FO&  8CHOOI.   PURPOSSS 

In  a  Legal  and  technical  sense,  a  public 
achooL  building  In  which  a  public  school  is 
b^ng  conducted  is  "occupied  for  common 
school  purposes"  from  the  beginning  to  the 
ending  of  the  term,  iadudijig  sdiool  days, 
Saturdays,  Sundays,  and  nights.  The  term 
"unoccupied  for  common  ecbool  purposes,"  as 
used  in  Burns*  Ann.  St  1901,  tl  5920a-5981, 
relating  to  tbe  duration  of  school  terms  in 
school  townships;  and  section  5999,  granting 
the  right  to  use  a  public  school  building  for 
other  than  school  purposes  when  "unoccupied 
for  common  school  purposes,"  has  refer- 
ence only  to  the  time  intervening  between 
terms  of  school,  and  the  statute  does  not  au- 
.thorlze  a  religious  organization  to  use  a 
schoolhouse  on  Sundays  and  evenings  during 
a  school  term,  when  the  school  was  not  ac- 
tually in  session.  Baggerly  v.  Lee,  73  N.  E. 
921,  923,  37  Ind.  App.  139. 

OCCUPT 

See  Cease  to  Occupy;  Occupancy — Oc- 
cupation— Occupy  (Of  Land). 

In  relation  to  insurance,  see  Unoccupied; 
Vacancy — ^Vacant — Vacate. 

"To  occupy"  is  generally  defined  to  be 
to  take  and  hold  possession  of,  .have  in  pos- 
session and  use^  to  take  posseselon  of,  to  keep 
in  possession,  to  possess,  to  h(M  and  use,  as 
to  joccopy  a  house  or  a  farm.  Thieme  v.  Ni- 
agara Fire  Ins.  Co.,  91  N.  Y.  Supp.  499,  501, 
100  App.  Dlv.  278  (quoting  in  support  of  def- 
initions, Stand.  Diet;  Imperial  Diet). 


An  ordinance  which  makes  U  nnlawfal  t 
"oocopy**  or  allow  to  be  occupied  any  portic 
of  a  house  to  he  used  as  a  house  of  HI  fan 
or  disorderly  house  in  the  dtj  of  Atlani 
means  that  occupancy  whidi  oontiihutes  i 
some  manner  to  the  unlawful  ctiaxacter  ( 
the  house,  and  does  not  preclude  an  innoc^ 
and  lawful  oooupancy  of  a  room  or  a  portk 
of  a  house  which  may  in  other  paFts  there 
be  used  for  disorderly  and  immoral  purpose 
Dannie  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  73  8.  B.  6S4,  66 
10  Oa.  App.  471. 

"Occupy,"  within  Rev.  St  e  9,  f  IS,  so 

sec.  1,  providing  that  personalty  employed 
trade  shall  be  taxed  in  the  town  where  it 
employed  April  1st,  if  the  owner  occupies 
landing  place,  etc..,  means  having  control 
whole  or  a  part,  having  a  special   right 
use.    Inhabitants  of  Georgetown  r.  WHlia 
E.  Hanscome  ft  Co.,  79  AtL  379,  380,  106  U 
131. 
Appntpriate  as  syaoaymoas 
See  Appropriate— AppropriatLon. 

OCCUR 

If  a  political  party  at  its  inimazy  mak 
no  nomination  of  a  candidate  for  election 
an  ofllce,  a  vacancy  has  '"occurred,"  wiUi 
the  meaning  of  the  statute  (Gobbey'a  Ann. : 
1011, 1  S888);  and  the  proper  party  eonunitt 
may  fill  that  vacancy.  State  ex  reL  Cur;^ 
V.  Wells,  138  N.  W.  166,  107,  92  Neb.  337. 
U  B.  A.  <N.  S.)  1068. 

Acts  1909,  a  103,  1 3,  am^ding  Acts  19( 
c.  435,  provides  that  all  vacancies  in  tJ 
State  Board  of  Elections  shall  be  filled  1 
Joint  vote  of  the  General  Assembly,  exce 
vacancies  occurring  when  it  is  not  in  sessio 
when,  If  the  office  of  only  one  member  is  v 
cant,  the  remaining  members  of  the  boai 
shall  fill  the  vacancy,  and  if  they  f^il  to  do  j 
it  shall  be  flUed  by  the  Secretary  of  Stat 
Comptroller,  and  Treasurer,  and  that  if  the 
be  more  than  one  vacancy  it  shall  be  fill< 
by  appointment  by  sudi  oflioexa.  f  eid.  1 
view  of  the  meaning  of  ^'vacant,**  whk 
meant  ^'without  an  incumbent,"  regardless  i 
when  or  how  it  became  vacant,  and  of  tl 
words  "occur"  and  "iiappen,"  whicb  wa 
synonymous  and  meant  ''existing"  or  **to  I 
found,"  that  the  Comptroller,  Secretary  i 
State,  and  Treasurer  were  authorised  to  fi 
two  or  more  vacancies  in  the  board  of  ele 
tions  during  recess  of  the  LegLslatuxe,  whet) 
er  such  vacancies  occurred  during  recess  < 
while  the  Legislature  was  in  aeeaion.  Rid 
ardson  v.  Young,  125  S.  W.  604,  6S4,  U 
Tenn.  471. 

OCCURRENCE 

See  Exceptional  Occurrence;  Extraord 
.    nary  Occurrence. 

The  word  ''transaction"  is  not  synoDj 
mouil    with    "occurrence.**    Bxcelalor    Cla 


OOBAK 


OV 


Works  ▼.  Pe  Camp,  80  N.  E.  981,  983,  40  Ind. 
App.  26  (dttng  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Go. 
V.  Van  Auken,  27  N.  B.  119,  1  Ind.  App.  492). 

OCEAN 

OCBAHraONV 

P.  L.  1894,  p.  146,  an  act  to  enable  cities 
located  near  the  ocean  and  exnbrat:ing  within 
their  limits  any  bea(^  or  ocean  front  to  open 
and  lay  out  a  public  park,  defines  in  its  title 
"ocean  front"  as  meaning  as  icnach  of  such 
front  as  is  within  the  territorial  Iknits  of 
such  dty.  Grossan  v.  Ventnor  City,  78  Atl. 
12,  80  N.  J.  Law,  511. 

OCTOROON 

As  negro,  see  Negro. 

OCTROI  TAX 

The  ''droit  de  ville"  and  an  ••octroi  tax" 
are  internal  revenue  imposes  of  France  which 
are  not  general  in  their  application,  but  vary 
with  the  locality  and  are  not  collected  if  the 
merchandise  is  exported.  United  States  y. 
R  F.  Downing  ft  Go.,  131  Fed.  658,  664. 

ODD  WITNESSES 

The  term  "odd  witnesses,"  used  in  a  re- 
cital that  60^d  witnesses  were  Introduced 
in  an  eminent  domain  proceeding,  referred  to 
number  rather  than  to  singularity.  St 
Louis,  M.  k  S.  E3,  R.  Go.  y.  Aubuchon,  97  S. 
W.  867,  860,  199  Mo.  852,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
426, 116  Am.  St  Rep.  499,  8  Ann.  Gas.  822. 

OF 

The  pre|K>sitton  "of*  as  used  in  an  act 
establtBhing  a  dty  police  court  with  Jurisdic- 
tion to  enforce  any  penalty  for  the  yiohitlon 
of  any  regulation  of  such  city  "or  any  board 
thereof,"  should  be  construed  to  denote 
source,  creation,  or  .  autbonhip,  as  distin- 
guished from  mer&  existence  or  possesstoo. 
Board  of  Health  of  Glty  of  AiA>ury  Pack  y. 
New  York  &  L.  B.  R.  Co.,  71  Atl.  259,  77  N. 
J.  Law,  15. 

Rem.  k  Bal.  Gode,  §  6119,  requiring  the 
publication  of  annual  statements  of  infiuraAce 
companies  in  "two  dally  papers  of  the  larg- 
est general  circulation  to  be  designated  by 
the  Insurance  Commissioner,"  requires  the 
publication  in  any  two  papers  belonging  to 
the  class  haying  the  largest  circulation,  which 
class  may  consist  of  more  than  two  papers, 
and  the  commissioner  has  discretion  to  desig- 
nate any  one  of  the  papers  belonging  to  the 
class,  and  to  determine  what  papers  belong  to 
the  class  haying  the  largest  circulation, 
though  the  4lff6rence  in  the  circulation 
may  be  considerable ;  the  worA  "of  Indicat- 
ing the  aggregate  or  whole  of  which  the  lim- 
ited word  denotes  a  part,  or  of  which  a  part 

8  WDS.ftP.2n  SEB.-44 


is  referred  to,  etc.    State  ex  reL  Cowles  y. 
Schlvely,  114  Pac.  901,  903,  63  Wash.  103. 

Under  a  statute  authorizing  a  town  to 
take  "of*  the  waters  of  a  certain  pond  and 
so  much  as  may  be  necessary  for  certain  spec- 
ified purposes,  such  town  did  not  haye  the 
excluslye  right  to  the  water  as  against  a  rail- 
road company  that  had  been  authorised  by 
statute  to  use  the  water  of  the  pond.  Fram- 
ingham  Water  Co.  y.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  57 
N.  E.  680,  681,  176  Mass.  404. 

As  belonsli&s  to 

The  words  "of  the  United  States,"  in  Act 
Cong.  August  1,  1892  (27  Stat  340,  c.  352),  re- 
lating to  hours  of  labor  of  laborers  or  me- 
chanics employed  upon  any  of  the  public 
works  of  the  United  States,  means  belonging 
to  the  United  States.  Dredging  a  channel  in 
Boston  Harbor  Is  not  a  public  work  of  the 
United  States,  within  the  meaning  of  the 
act  forbidding  a  contractor  under  penalty  of 
fine  or  imprisonment  to  permit  or  require 
employ^  on  public  work  to  work  moxe  than 
eight  hours  each  day.  Ellis  y.  United  States, 
27  Sup.  Ct.  600,  602,  206  U.  S.  246,  51  L. 
Ed.  1047,  11  Ann.  Gas.  589. 

The  yalidlty  of  an  indictment  for  lar- 
ceny Is  not  affected  by  the  omission  of  the 
preposition  "of  between  the' Words  "goods 
and  chattels*'  and  the  name  of  the  prosecu- 
tor. Bennett  y.  State,  84  S.  W.  483,  73  Ark. 
386. 

The  word  "of,"  where  it  precedes  the 
words  "all  existing  steam  railroads"  in  an 
elevated  railroad  franchise  regulating  the 
height  of  the  superstructure  over  the  "tracks 
of  all  existing  steam  railroads,"  was  not  in- 
tended to  denote  ownership  or  possession, 
and  that  the  right  of  way  and  tracks  refer- 
red to  therefore  are  only  those  owned  by  "ex- 
isting steam  railroads,"  but  was  evidently 
Intended  only  to  identify  the  right  of  way 
and  tracks  mentioned  in  the  ordinance  by  In- 
dicating the  character  of  the  road  of  which 
they  formed  a.  part  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v. 
Northwestern  Elevated  R.  Co.,  82  N.  R  578, 
575,  230  m.  214. 

As  ift 

The  preposition  "of,"  as  used  In  Code 
Pub.  Oen.  Laws  1904,  art.  23,  |  366,  relating 
to  the  "streets  or  highways  of  Baltimore 
city,"  and  the  granting  of  franchises  for  their 
use  to  electric  light  and  power  companies,  is 
not  descriptive  of  or  relating  to  title  or  own- 
ership, but  refers  to  location  and  municipal 
jurisdiction ;  and  the  expression  quoted  em- 
braces streets  or  roads  within  the  dty  limits 
which  are  currently  traversed  without  objec- 
tion by  Its  citizens,  whether  the  municipality 
has  or  has  not  acquired  the  legal  title  to  the 
land  lying  under  them.  Patapsco  Electric 
Co.  V.  City  of  Baltimore,  72  Atl.  1039,  1041, 
110  Md.  306. 

Lands  "of  the  state,  as  used  in  the  title 
of  an  act  to  promote  public  health,  etc.,  by 


09 


690 


OF  RECORD 


m^- 


•fi. 


draining  the  Unds  "of  the  etate,  means 
lands  "within**  the  state.  Sisson  ▼.  Board  of 
Supers  of  Buena  Vista  County,  104  N.  W.  454, 
458,  128  Iowa,  442,  70  L.  R.  A.  44a 

As  portiim  or  yart  pf 

A  marine  policy  insured  "in  port  and  at 
sea,  ^  ^  *  at  all  times,  in  ail  places  and 
on  all  occasions,  •  •  •  npon  the  hull, 
spars,  sails,  materials  fittings,  boats  (includ- 
ing launches,  steam  or  otherwise,  if  any),  for- 
niture,  provisions,  stores,  *  *  \  boilers, 
etc.,  of  and  in  the  schooner  yacht  Rosemary,'* 
against  all  manner  of  marine  perils,  and  the 
furniture  and  boats  against  fire  when  laid  up 
on  shore.  Held,  that  a  naphtha  launch,  part 
of  the  equipment  of  the  yacht,  carried  on 
davits  when  she  was  under  way,  and  used  as 
a  means  of  communication  with  the  shore 
when  in  port,  while  being  so  used  in  the  usual 
way  between  the  yacht  and  shore  was  "of 
and  in*'  the  yacht,  and  covered  by  the  policy. 
Dennis  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  136  Fed.  481,  482. 


See  Or. 

As  to 

Defendant  employed  plaintiff  as  a  travel- 
ing salesman,  agreeing  to  pay  a  salary  of 
$1,800  per  year,  to  allow  $1,200  for  traveling 
expenses,  and  to  pay  a  commission  of  5  per 
cent  in  excess  'to  $40,000**  sales  made  by 
plaintiff  and  shipped  by  defendant  Held, 
that  the  use  of  the  word  "to**  was  a  mere 
grammatical  error,  the  Intention  of  the  par- 
ties being  that  plaintiff  was  only  to  receive 
commissions  on  sales  made  by  him  in  excess 
of  $40,000,  and  that  the  preposition  "to" 
should  give  place  to  "of  with  which  it  was 
synonymous.  Ettenson  v.  Mendelson,  133  N. 
Y.  Supp.  283,  284,  75  Misc.  Rep.  307. 

OF  COUNSEL 

Where  the  judge  before  whom  deftedant 
was  brought  for  trial  on  an  indictment  for 
suborning  a  witness  at  a  hearing  in  bank- 
ruptcy to  commit  perjury  while  conducting  a 
hearing  in  a  bankruptcy  case  to  discover  as- 
sets, appeared  to  be  angry  and  said  in  the 
presence  of  accused:  "This  is  a  nasty  piece 
of  business.  This  estate  has  been  looted  by 
some  one" — and  then  turned  to  an  officer  of 
the  court  and  directed  that  he  use  what  was 
left  of  the  estate,  even  to  the  last  penny,  to 
investigate  the  matter,  and  if  any  one,  who- 
ever he  might  be,  had  committed  any  act  that 
could  be  reached  and  punished  under  the  law, 
to  institute  proceedings  against  him,  the 
Judge  merely  performed  his  duty  to  direct  an 
official  inquiry  of  what  appeared  to  be  a  crim- 
inal offense,  and  did  not  thereby  become  dis- 
qualified to  try  accused  therefor,  as  being  ei- 
ther "concerned  in  interest"  or  "of  counsel'* 
for  the  prosecution,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute.  Epstein  v.  United  States,  106 
Fed.  354,  355,  116  C.  0.  A.  174. 


or  OOUBSB 

See  Ck>ntinued  of  Course;    Costs  as 
Course. 

The  term  "of  course,"  as  emidoyed 
Code  av.  Proc  ||  1229,  1774,  providing  th 
in  an  action  for  divorce.  Judgment  cannot 
taken  "of  course'*  upon  the  dertsJan  or 
port,  etc^  and  declaring  that  after  the  ex 
ration  of  three  months  final  Judgment  sfa 
be  entered  as  "of  course**  upon  the  dedsi 
etc.,  means,  without  special  direction  or  p 
vision  or  pursuant  to  settled  role  tor  whJ 
there  need  be  no  further  direction  or  auth 
ity.  Petit  V.  Petri,  91  N.  Y.  Supp.  979.  9 
45  Misc.  Rep.  15& 

OF  OBAOE 

A  chancellor  is  said  to  act  "of  grac 
That  grace  sometimes  becomes  a  matter 
right  to  the  suitor,  and,  when  it  is  clear  tl 
the  law  cannot  give  protection  and  relief 
which  the  complainant  in  equity  is  admitt 
ly  entitled,  the  chancellor  cannot  withlM 
his  grace  any  more  than  the  law  can  de 
protection  and  relief,  if  able  to  give  the 
This  is  often  overlooked  when  it  Is  said  tl 
in  equity  a  decree  is  of  grace  and  not 
right  The  phrase  "of  grace**  had  Its  orij 
in  an  age  when  kings  dispensed  their  roj 
favors  at  the  hands  of  chanceUora,  but  li 
no  rightful  place  In  the  Jurisprudence  of 
commonwealth.  Sullivan  v.  Jones  St  Lam 
lin  Sted  Co.,  67  AtL  1065,  1071,  206  Pa.  & 
66  L.  R.  A.  712.  See,  also,  American  Sum 
Ing  ft  Refining  Co.  v.  Godfr^,  158  Fed.  Z 
237,  89  C.  C.  A.  139,  14  Ann.  Gas.  8  (fn 
the  opinion  of  Marshall,  District  Judge, 
the  Circuit  Court,  quoting  from  Walters 
McElroy,  25  AtL  125,  151  Pa.  549). 

OF  KO  EFFECT 

The  phrase  "of  no  effect,**  as  used  in  n 
40  of  the  Supreme  Court,  i»x>vidingr  that  i 
rules,  whether  granted  by  the  court  or  by 
Justice,  sliall  be  entered  in  the  minates  wit 
in  ten  days  and  in  default  thereof  shall 
"of  no  effect,**  is  synonymous  with  '*Told"  si 
not  with  "voidablei"  Jersey  City  t.  Davi 
76  Aa  969,  80  N.  J.  Law,  600. 

OF  OB  GOKGEBHINO 

See  Concern. 

OF  RECORD 

The  rule  that  unsurveyed  land  within  ti 
bounds  of  a  railroad  grant,  which  was  occ 
pied  by  a  bona  fide  settler  intending  i 
homestead  the  land,  acquires  a  superior  rifl 
founded  on  the  terms  of  the  statute  grantii 
certain  alternate  sections,  provided  they  wei 
free  from  pre-emption  or  other  claims  < 
rights,  was  not  altered  by  an  opinion  of  U 
Supreme  Court  referring  to  such  dalm  by 
homesteader  as  "of  record,'*  as  the  court  di 
not  Intend  to  require  that  all  such  claims  ( 
rights  must  be  of  record,  but  intended  to  di 
scribe  only  one  class  of  claims  which  w& 


OFF 


691 


07FRKSB 


xcepted  from  the  granting  act  Northern 
»ac  Ry.  Co.  v.  Trodlck,  81  Sup.  Ct.  607,  609, 
21  U.  S.  208,  55  Lu  Ed.  704  (dtlng  United 
Itates  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St  P.  B.  Co.,  31  Sup. 
^.  7,  218  U.  S.  233,  54  li.  Ed.  1016). 

>FF 

See  Cut  Oflf;    Marked  Off;    Paid  Off: 
Put  Off;   Sign  Off. 

On  a  contract  not  to  become  interested 
a  the  buainess  of  catching  certain  kinds  of 
sh,  other  than  the  business  to  be  conducted 
y  the  other  party,  or  the  business  of  manu- 
acturlng  fish  into  oil  or  guano,  "upon,  along; 
r  *off*  the  Atlantic  seaboard"  the  word  "off" 
dds  to  and  enlarges  the  meaning  of  the 
rords  **upon'*  and  "along,"  and  carries  the 
rohlbltlon  out  into  the  deep  water  more  dls- 
ant  from  the  coast,  and  Includes  all  the  wa- 
ers  adjacent  to  the  eastern  coast  of  the 
Fnlted  States,  and  does  not  exclude  bays  or 
ther  indentations  along  the  coast  American 
Isberies  Co.  T.  linnen,  118  Fed.  869,  874. 

IFFAL 

"Offal"  is  defined  in  Cent  Diet  as  "that 
hich  is  suffered  to  fall  off  as  of  little  value 
r  use;  waste  meat;  waste  or  refuse  of  any 
ind."  Under  a  city  ordinance  providing 
lat  "no  person  shall  go  about  collecting  any 
ouse  'offar  consisting  of  animal  and  vege- 
ible  substances,  or  carry  the  same  through 
oy  of  the  streets,  lanes  or  courts  of  the 
ity,"  except  the  person  appointed  for  that 
arpose  by  the  sanitary  committee,  the  term 
tiouse  offal"  is  held  to  Include  refuse  food 
*om  the  tables  discarded  victuals,  and  swill 
>nsiBting  of  refuse  from  the  table,  though 
[>ne  of  it  be  in  a  decayed  condition.  State 
Robb,  60  AU.  874,  875,  KK)  Me.  180,  4  Ann. 
as.  275. 

A  libel  for  condemnation  of  catsup,  al- 
ging  that  it  was  mlsbranded,  in  that  it  was 
ade  in  part  from  tomato  pulp  screened  from 
clings  and  cores,  as  the  "offal"  of  tomato 
inning  factories,  and  not  from  choice  ripe 
matoes,  etc.,  as  stated  in  the  labels,  did  not 
large  a  violation  of  the  provision  of  the 
ire  food  law  (Act  Cong.  June  30,  1906,  c. 
>15,  I  7,  par.  6)  relating  to  preparations  con- 
sting  in  whole  or  in  part  of  a  filthy,  decom- 
>sed,  or  putrid  animal  or  vegetable  sub- 
ance;  the  words  "as  the  offal  of  tomato 
inning  factories"  being  of  no  exact  slgnlfl- 
Ltion,  and  the  word  "offal"  not  the  equiva- 
nt  of  a  charge  that  the  tomato  pulp  was  a 
thy,  decomposed,  or  putrid  vegetable  sub- 
ance.  United  States  v.  Six  Hundred  and 
Lfty  Cases  of  Tomato  Catsup,  166  Fed.  773, 
A. 

FFENDER 

See  First  Offender;  Pursuit  of  Offender. 


OFFENSE 

See  Body  of  the  Offense ;  Continuing  Of* 
fense;  Criminal  Offense;  Different 
Off^ises;  Each  Offense;  Lesser  Of- 
fense; Minor  Offense;  Petty  Offense; 
Public  Off ense ;  Same  Offense;  Second 
Offense;  Separate  Offense;  Specific 
Criminal  Offense;  State  Prison  Of- 
fense. 

Merger  of  offenses,  see  Merger. 

"An  'offense,*  in  its  legal  signification, 
means  the  transgression  of  a  law."  Town  of 
Neola  V.  Reichart  109  N.  W.  5,  7,  131  Iowa, 
492  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Moore 
V.  State  of  Illinois,  14  How.  [55  U.  S.]  19, 
14  Li  Ed.  806;  Grafton  v.  United  States,  27 
Sup.  Ct  749,  754,  206  U.  S.  383,  358,  51  L. 
Ed.  1084,  11  Ann.  Cas.  640). 

"  'Offense*  signifies  a  public  wrong  which 
subjects  the  perpetrator  to  legal  punishment" 
An  attempt  to  commit  suicide  Is  not  an  in- 
dictable offense  in  the  state  of  Maine.  May 
v.  Pennell,  64  Ati.  885,  887,  101  Me.  516,  7  L, 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  286, 115  Am.  St  Rep.  334»  8  Ann. 
Cas.  851. 

In  Code  Cr.  Proc.  1895,  art.  114,  providing 
that  whenever  a  magistrate  is  informed  on 
oath  that  an  offense  is  about  to  be  commitr 
ted  against  the  person  or  property  of  the  in- 
formant or  of  another,  "or  if  any  person  has 
threatened  to  commit  an  offense,**  he  must 
issue  a  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  accused,  the 
word  "offense,**  as  used  in  the  clause  "or  if 
any  person  has  threatened  to  commit  an  of- 
fense,** has  the  same  meaning  and  is  uped  in 
the  same  sense  as  the  word  "offense**  in  the 
preceding  part  of  the  same  article,  and  should 
be  limited  in  its  meaning  to  offenses  against 
person  or  property.  Ex  parte  Muckenfuss, 
107  S.  W.  1131,  1132,  52  Tex.  Cr.  R.  467. 

An  "offense**  is  a  breach  of  the  laws  es- 
tablished for  the  protection  of  the  public,  as 
distinguished  from  an  Infringement  of  mere 
private  rights.  The  word  is  used  as  a  genus, 
comprehending  every  crime  and  misdemeanor, 
or  as  a  species,  signifying  a  crime  not  indict- 
able but  punishable  summarily  or  by  the  for- 
feiture of  a  penalty.  Laws  Okl.  T.  1903,  p. 
168,  c.  15,  I  4,  providing  that  it  shaU  be  un- 
lawful for  any  carrier  to  receive  any  of  the 
game  mentioned  in  section  1  of  the  act  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  It  to  any  of  the 
places  within  or  beyond  the  territory,  and 
that  any  carrier  so  doing  shall  forfeit  a  cer- 
tain sum  with  costs,  creates  an  offense  within 
the  meaning  of  Organic  Act  (Act  Cong.  May 
2,  1890,  c.  182,  26  Stat  87)  |  10,  and  a  civil 
action  brought  for  the  recovery  of  the  penalty 
must  be  tried  within  the  county  where  the 
violation  is  alleged  to  have  occurred.  Chica- 
go, R.  I.  k  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Territory  of  Oklaho- 
ma, 105  Pac.  677,  679,  25  Okl.  238. 

"Offense"  is  used  synonymously  with 
"misconduct**  which  is  defined  as  "wrong  con- 
duct; bad  behavior;  mismanagement*'    Bail- 


OFFENSE 


692 


OFFENSE 


fll 


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K  \ : 


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ey  T.  Examining  and  Trial  Board  of  Police 
Department  of  City  of  Helena^  122  Pa&  572, 
674,  45  Mont.  197. 

"Offense"  Is  now  used  synonymously  with 
"crime.*'  United  SUtes  ▼.  Zarafonitis,  ISO 
Fed.  97,  101,  80  a  O.  A.  61,  10  Ann«  Gas.  290 
(quoting  and  adopting  Burr.  Law  Diet  yerbo 
"Offense").  And  while  the  words  "offense" 
and  "crime**  are  in  certain  cases  considered 
synonymous,  the  "offenses"  specified  by  New 
Tork  Military  Code,  I  96,  for  the  most  seri- 
ous of  which  the  punishment  is  dismissal 
from  the  servioe  with  a  small  fine,  and  no  one 
of  which  is  designated  as  a  "crime,"  are  not 
"crimes."  People  v.  Wendel,  112  N.  Y.  Supp. 
301,  302,  69  Misc.  Bep.  354. 

The  word  "offense"  implies  a  violation  of 
a  law  by  which  alone  it  can  be  denounced. 
Thomas  y.  United  States,  156  Fed.  897,  900, 

84  C.  a  A.  477,  17  Li  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  720. 

An  "offense**  which  is  pursued  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  injured  party  or  his  repre- 
sentatiye  is  a  dyll  injury,  while  an  offense 
which  Is  pursued  by  the  soyereign  or  the  sub- 
ordinate of  the  soyereign  is  a  crime.  Jeml- 
gan  y.  Gommonweath,  52  S.  E.  861,  362,  104 
Va.860. 

"An  'offense^  which  may  be  the  subject 
of  criminal  procedure  is  an  act  committed  or 
omitted  in  yiolation  of  a  public  law,  either 
forbidding  or  commanding  it"  Dent  y.  Unit- 
ed States,  71  Pae  920,  922,  8  Ariz.  138  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  In  United  States 
y.  Eaton,  12  Sup.  Ct  764,  144  U.  8.  677,  36 
L.  Ed.  691). 

An  action  by  the  state  for  penalties  im- 
posed by  the  anti-trust  act  of  Texas,  declar- 
ing that  corporations  yiolatlng  the  act  shall 
be  guilty,  and  when  conyicted,  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  penalties  recoyerable  by  "suit**  where 
the  "offense"  is  committed,  is  not  a  crimi- 
nal prosecution,  within  the  statute  prescrib- 
ing the  time  for  the  institution  of  criminal 
prosecutions,  but  is  a  clyil  suit;  the  word 
"offense"  haying  reference  to  violations  of 
the  acts,  and  not  being  equivalent  to  the 
words  "felony**  or  "misdemeanor."  Waters- 
Pierce  Oil  Co.  V.  State,  106  S.  W.  918,  48  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  162. 

The  word  "offense,**  as  used  in  Const 
art  5,  S  13,  giving  the  Governor  power  to 
grant  reprieves,  commutations,  and  pardons 
after  convictions  for  all  offenses,  Is  equiva- 
lent to  "crimes,**  and  the  Governor  cannot 
pardon  an  offense  until  after  conviction  by 
the  judgment  of  the  court  Ex  parte  Cam- 
pion, 112  N.  W.  585,  588,  79  Neb.  364, 11  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  865,  126  Am.  St  Rep.  667.  16  Ann. 
Cas.  319. 

The  term  "offense,**  as  used  In  Rev.  St. 

85  4364r-20a,  4364-20b,  which  provide  for  an 
election  in  any  n^unldpallty  to  determine 
whether  or  not  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liq- 
uors as  a  beverage  shall  be  permitted,  and 
which  declare  that  whoever  shall  sell  where 


sales  are  prohibited  shall  be  guilty  of  a  mli 
demeanor,  and  which  ivescribe  the  punist 
ment  for  the  first  offense  and  for  a  secon 
offense^  embraces  the  entire  charge,  thoo^ 
there  may  be  a  number  of  counts,  and  znean 
a  conviction.  Hence  an  affidavit  diargin 
three  separate  sales  to  differoit  persons  o 
the  same  day,  without  alleging  a  previous  coi 
viction,  is  in  legal  effect  a  charge  of  a  fin 
offense  only.  Carey  y.  State,  70  N.  B.  9S 
966,  70  Ohio  St  121. 

Driving  an  automobile  at  a  prohiblte 
rate  not  being  an  offense  against  the  police  c 
towns,  fines  imposed  by  a  justice  of  the  pesc 
for  violations  of  the  speed  limit,  in  the  al 
sence  of  special  provision  to  the  eontnuy,  bi 
long  to  the  county  under  Pub.  St  1901,  c  29( 
I  2,  providing  that,  unless  otiherwiae  spedaU 
provided,  all  fines  and  forfeitures  imposed  b 
a  justice  of  the  peace  for  "offenses  agaliu 
the  police  of  towns,**  and  yiolations  of  b: 
laws  of  towns,  and  fines  and  fbrf^tnies  in 
posed  by  a  police  court,  shall  be  for  the  m 
of  the  town,  and  all  other  fines  and  forfe 
tures  shall  be  fOr  the  use  of  the  comity.  Tt 
phrase  "offenses  against  the  police  of  towx^ 
refers  to  the  offenses  enumerated  under  Uu 
title  in  Pub.  St  1901,  c.  264.  Bodkingluu 
County  y.  Chase^  71  AtL  634,  635,  75  N.  I 
127. 

VIolatioa  of  eity  ordlnaaoe 

A  violation  of  a  city  ordinance  is  an  "o 
fense*'  against  the  city.  The  violatioD 
termed  a  petty  offense  and  constitute 
crime  in  the  broad  sense  of  that  word.  Pea 
son  V.  Wimblflh,  52  S.  E.  751,  755,  124  Ga.  70 
4  Ann.  Cas.  501  (citing  McRae  v.  Mayor,  et< 
of  City  of  Amerlcus,  59  Ga.  170,  27  Am.  Re 
390). 

A  grand  Jnior  is  not  rendered  incomii 
tent  because  charged  with  a  violation  of 
municipal  sanitary  ordinance;  which  is  m 
a  "crime  or  offense*'  within  the  intendment  < 
section  1,  Act  No.  135,  p.  216,  of  1896.  Stal 
V.  Calhoun,  41  South.  360,  361,  117  La.  S 
(citing  State  v.  Thlbodeaux,  19  South.  6S0.  ^ 
La.  Ann.  600;  State  v.  Nicholas.  33  Soatl 
92,  109  La.  84). 

Kvisanee 

B.  &  C.  Comp.  I  1930,  punishing  any  pe 
son  committing  any  act  which  grossly  Injun 
the  person  of  another,  or  which  grossly  di 
turbs  the  public  peace  or  health,  or  openl 
outrages  the  public  decency  and  is  injuriov 
to  public  morals,  not  otherwise  made  punisl 
able,  covers  offenses  against  the  public  peact 
health,  and  morals  not  otherwise  made  poz 
Ishable,  and  known  at  common  law  as  Indld 
able  nuisances;  and  at  common  law  wluil 
ever  tends  to  corrupt  society  is  an  "offens 
against  good  morals,**  and  is  punishable  a 
a  nuisance,  and  such  act  need  not  be  a  coo 
tlnuous  one,  but  may  consist  of  a  single  ad 
and  it  may  not  affect  the  public  at  large,  ta 
only  such  as  come  in  contact  with  it    St&ti 


ENSE  AGAINST  UNITED  STATES 

aymlre,  97  Pac.  46,  47,  48,  52  Or.  281,  21 
.  A.  (N.  S.)  56,  132  Am.  St.  Rep.  699. 

"EMSE  AOAIHST  THE  UNITED 
STATES 

iL  conspiracy  to  violate  the  ''bucket  shop" 
of  the  District  of  Columbia  is  an  "of- 
3  against  the  United  States,"  within  the 
ite,  providing  for  the  removal  of  offend- 
Lgainst  the  United  States  and  the  statute 
log  to  conspiracies  to  commit  offenses 
[ist  the  United  States.  United  States  v. 
pbell,  179  Fed.  762,  764. 

In  Rev.  St  S  4540,  relating  to  conspira- 
the  words  "offenses  against  the  United 
&s''  have  the  same  meaning  as  the  words 
inses  against  the  laws  of  the  United 
es"  in  the  original  act  of  March  2,  1867 
Stat.  484,  c.  169)  the  change  being  mere- 
Qe  of  phraseology  made  by  the  revision 
nission,  and  such  section  denounces  con* 
icies  to  commit  offenses  created  by  any 
e  statutes  of  the  United  States.  Thomas 
nited  States,  156  Fed.  897,  901,  84  O.  a 
r7,  17  !#.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  720. 

Assisting  the  importation  of  alien  con- 
:  laborers  Is  an  "offense  against  the 
ed  States,"  within  the  meaning  of  Rev; 
U.  S.  S  5440,  providing  for  the  criminal 
Bhment  of  persons  conspiring  to  commit 

offenses,  since  Congress,  In  making  it  a 
lemeanor,  by  Act  Feb.  20,  1907,  c.  1134,  | 
[  Stat.  900,  to  assist  the  immigration  of 

persons,  has  made  such  action  a  crime, 
stable  as  such,  although,  by  section  5  of 

act,  it  has  provided  a  remedy  ih  the 
re  of  a  civil  action  for  the  recovery  of  a 
Ity  for  a  violation  of  the  act  United 
es  V.  Stevenson,  80  S.  Ct  87,  88,  215  U. 
K),  54  L.  Ed.  157. 

'ENSE  INVOLVING  MOBAI.  TUR- 
PiTUDE 

See  Moral  Turpitude. 

"ENSIVE 

Wliere  a  restriction  in  a  deed  forbade 
erection  on  the  land  of  "any  tavern, 
king  saloon,  slaughterhouse,  skin-dressing 
t>lishment,  or  any  other  building  for  of* 
Ive  purpose  or  occupation,"  it  includes  a 
ic  garage  for  hire,  storage,  and  repair  of 
mobiles  and  the  furnishing  of  needed 
>lies.  Hibberd  v.  Edwards,  84  Atl.  437, 
235  Pa.  454. 

The  owner  of  land  divided  it  into  build- 
lots,  and  in  each  deed  inserted  a  restric* 
that  the  property  should  not  be  used  for 
business  "offensive  to  the  neighborhood 
Iwelling  houses."  in  a  suit  by  one  of  the 
itees  to  restrain  the  erection  of  an  au* 
)bile  garage,  it  appeared  that  the  build- 
was  designed  to  accommodate  about  125 
e  automobiles,  a  part  of  one  story  being 
?ned  for  a  repair  shop,  ^nd  it  being  in- 
ed  to  place  in  the  building  a  portable 
e;    that  demonstration  cars  were  to  be 


OFFER 

kept,  with  demonstrators  to  run  them;  and 
that  about  75  or  100  customers  were  expect- 
ed to  store  automobiles  there,  such  machines 
to  go  in  and  out  on  an  average  of  once  a 
day.  Held,  that  a  finding  that  the  mainte- 
nance of  such  building  would  constitute  a  vio- 
lation of  the  restriction  was  warranted. 
Evans  v.  Foss,  80  N.  E.  587,  589,  194  Mass. 
513,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1039,  11  Ann.  Cas.  17L 

OFFENSIVE    BSTABIiISHMENT 

Any  other   offensive  establishment,  see 
Any  Other. 

OFFER 

See,  also,  Proposal. 

Const  art  5,  |  7,  provides  that  one  who 
shall  offer  or  promise  to  pay  to  another  any 
money  as  an  inducement  for  the  giving  or 
withholding  of  such  other's  vote  at  an  elec- 
tion shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.  Held, 
that  the  words,  "If  you  will  vote  the  Repub- 
lican ticket,  I  will  pay  yon  |20  after  the 
polls  have  closed,"  constitute  an  offer  to  pay 
within  the  Constitution,  and  render  the  per- 
son making  the  offer  guilty  of  a  misdemean- 
or ;  no  acceptance  of  the  offer  being  re- 
quired, and  no  tender  being  needed  to  make 
an  offer.  State  v.  Barr  (Del.)  79  Atl.  730, 
733,  7  PennewiU,  340. 

In  an  action  for  resdseion  and  cai^cella- 
tlon  of  a  deed  fraudulently  obtained,  an  alle- 
gation  that  plaintiffs  are  ready  and  willing 
to  execute  a  deed  to  the  land  traded  for  to 
defendants  is  a  sufficient  offer  to  restore 
within  Wilson's  Rev.  &  Ann.  St  1903,  S  827. 
Clark  V.  O'Toole,  94  Pac  647.  552,  20  OkL  319. 

The  word  "offered,"  in  a  charge  against 
a  member  of  the  Brotherhood  of  Locomotive 
Engineers  that  he  had  "offered"  his  advice 
and  service  to  railroad  officials  in  their  pro- 
posed plan  to  run  engineers  through  from 
one  city  to  another,  means  that  he  had  vol- 
unteered his  advice  and  service.'  Fritz  v. 
Knaub,  103  N.  Y.  Supp.  1003,  1008,  57  Misc. 
Rep.  405. 

As  attempt 

As  respects  an  attempt  or  offer  to  cast  a 
ballot  and  vote,  the  terms  "offer"  and  * 'at- 
tempt" are  practically  the  same  in  meaning. 
One  of  the  definitions  given  by  Mr.  Webster 
of  the  word  '^offer**  is  '•♦attempt"  State  v. 
Fielder,  109  S.  W.  580,  888,  210  Mo.  18a 

To  support  a  conviction  for  a  violation 
of  a  statute  punishing  every  person  who  shall 
corrupt  or  attempt  to  corrupt  a  Juror,  by  of- 
fering to  give  any  gift  with  intent  to  bias 
the  Juror,  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  an  ac- 
tual tender  of  the  gift  offered  as  a  bribe,  so 
as  to  enable  the  Juror  to  at  once  accept  or 
reject  the  same.  Evl<Jence  showing  a  pro- 
posal or  a  willingness  to  give  a, bribe  to  bias 
the  Juror's  verdict  is  sufficient.  State  v. 
Woodard.  81  S.  W.'857,  861,  182  Mo.  391,  103 
Am.  St  Rep.  646. 


n\ 


OFPEB 


694 


OFFER  FOR  SAIjB 


'^^ 


^l'J.V 


Hi 


In  2  Boayler's  Law  Dictlonaiy,  p.  827» 
the  definition  of  "offer**  is  "a  proposal  to  do 
a  thing."  To  prove  the  commission  of  the 
offense  created  by  Rev.  St.  1899,  |  2043,  pun- 
ishing every  person  who  shall  oornipt  or  at- 
tempt to  corrupt  a  Juror  by  "offering  to  give 
any  gift  *  •  *  with  intent**  to  bias  the 
Juror,  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  an  actual 
tender  of  the  bribe,  but  evidence  showing  a 
proposal  and  declaration  of  a  willingness  to 
give  a  bribe  or  gratuity  to  bias  the  Juror's 
verdict  is  sufficient  State  t.  Miller,  81  S. 
W.  867,  872,  182  Mo.  870. 

Where  a  yerdict  found  defendant  guUty 
of  an  "attempt"  to  bribe,  it  sufficiently  show- 
ed a  violation  of  the  statute  prohibiting  "an 
offer"  to  bribe  an  officer;  the  words  "offer" 
and  "attempt"  in  «uch  connection  being 
synonymoua  Johnson  t.  State,  02  &  W.  257, 
49  Tex.  Or.  R.  26a 

As  eoatMMt 
See  Contract 

As  temder 

The  word  "offer"  is  frequently  used  by 
courts  and  text-writers  as  synonymous  with 
"tender,**  and  it  may  be  properly  so  used 
with  reference  to  articles  capable  of  manual 
delivery  and  actually  produced.  But  with 
respect  to  heavy  articles  of  merchandise, 
situated  at  a  distance  from  the  place  to 
which  they  must  be  transported,  if  restored 
to  the  vendor,  the  phrase  "offer  to  return" 
is  more  commonly  and  aptly  applied  to  ex- 
press a  willingness,  or  to  make  a  proposal 
to  rescind  the  contract  and  return  the  goods. 
In  order  to  work  a  rescission,  it  is  not  suffi- 
cient for  the  purchaser,  who  has  taken  de- 
livery of  the  goods  at  the  vendor's  place  of 
business,  to  give  notice  to  the  vendor  that 
he  holds  the  goods  subject  to  his  order,  or 
that  the  goods  are  at  a  designated  place  sub> 
Ject  to  his  die^sal.  The  goods  must  be  re- 
turned to  the  place  where  acc^ted,  unless, 
upon  an  "offer  to  return,*'  such  offer  is  re- 
fused by  the  vendor.  Mundt  v.  Simpkins,  116 
N.  W.  325,  326,  81  Neb.  1,  129  Am.  St  Rep. 
670  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Mil- 
Uken  V.  SkilUngs,  89  Me.  180,  36  Ati.  77). 

Under  Rev.  St  |  3627,  providing  that, 
at  the  Joining  of  issue  in  an  action  for  in- 
voluntary trespass  before  a  Justice,  defend- 
ant may  "offer  in  wilting"  to  permit  plaintiff 
to  take  Judgment  against  him  for  damages 
and  costs,  and  section  3628,  providing  that  if 
plaintiff  fails  to  recover  a  more  favorable 
Judgment  he  shall  not  recover  costs  made 
after  such  offer,  the  oral  answer  of  de- 
fendant entered  by  the  Justice  in  his  docket, 
that  "defendant  tenders  Judgment  for  six 
cents  and  costs  up  to  day,"  is  sufficient  to 
satisfy  the  statute.  It  bound  defendant  Just 
as  effectually  as  though  he  had  himself 
written  and  subscribed  it  and  then  served 
it  on  the  plaintiff.  Williams  v.  Ready,  39  N. 
W.  779,  72  Wis.  40a 


Medical  treatmemt 

A  will  devising  and  bequeathing  p 
erty  to  trustees  to  convert  into  secaiit 
and  pay  spedfled  sums  and  tbe  balance 
some  hospital  "offering"  to  treat  tnberci 
patients,  makes  a  gift  to  a  hoepital  best 
ing  free  treatment  to  tubereolar  patie 
and  hence  is  a  public  charity,  as  distlngi 
ed  from  a  private  enterprise  for  profit; 
word  ^'offering"  without  any  oondition 
nexed  and  connected  with  a  hospital  in 
ing  bestowing  free  treatment  to  those  so 
ing  from  disease.  French  t.  Calkina,  9( 
B.  877,  881,  202  IlL  24S. 

OFFBB  AJTO  BEFU8AL 

A  statement  by  a  seller  contracdoi 
repurchase  at  the  expiration  of  one  yeai 
the  buyer  desiring  it,  made  before  the  en 
tion  of  the  year  in  response  to  the  bo] 
demand  to  repurchase  that  he  could  no< 
it  is  the  legal  equiyalent  of  an  **offer 
refusal"  within  Civ.  Code,  |  1515,  proTi< 
that  a  refusal  to  accept  perfomuuiee  n 
before  an  offer  thereof  is  equivaJent  to 
offer  and  refusal,  unless  before  perfomu 
is  actually  due  he  gives  notice  of  his  y 
ingness  to  accept  it,  and  the  seller  desi 
to  hold  plaintiff  to  performance  most  s 
that  prior  to  the  eijkiration  of  the  yeaj 
expressed  a  willingness  to  reporcfaaae,  i 
unless  tbe  statement  is  withdrawn  be 
the  expiration  of  the  year,  the  buyer  i 
not  make  demand  and  offer  at  the  exact 
piration  of  the  year.  Howard  ▼•  Galbn 
109  Pac.  889,  890,  13  Cat  App.  873. 

OFFEB  FOB  8AI<E 

Announcement  that  property  will  be 
at  auction  to  the  highest  bidder  is  a  i 
declaration  of  intent  to  hold  an  auction, 
not  an  offer  to  sell  becoming  binding,  < 
conditionally,  on  the  owner  when  a  bi< 
made.  Anderson  v.  Wisconsin  Gent.  By. 
120  N.  W.  39,  46,  107  Minn.  296,  20  L.  B 
(N.  S.)  1133,  131  Am.  St  Rep.  462,  16  I 
Cas.  379. 

A  merchant  has  "offered  or  exposed 
sale"  an  adulterated  or  ndsbranded  arti<d 
food,  in  violation  of  Agricultural  (Law,  H 
166,  added  to  Laws  1893,  a  838,  hy  L 
1903,  c  524,  by  having  the  adulterated  or  i 
branded  article  in  stock  for  the  purpose 
sale,  without  actually  making  a  sale.  1 
pie  v.  Lewis,  122  N.  T.  Supp.  1(^5,  1026, 
Appi  Div.  673. 

The  uncontradicted  testimony  of 
state  agents  that  defendant  deUyered  a 
of  adulterated  milk  at  a  lunchroom,  takin 
receipt  therefor  from  the  person  in  chai 
is  sufficient  evidence  of  ''sale,"  or  ''offer 
sale,"  in  violation  of  Ckmsol.  Laws,  a  1,  f 
making  it  unlawful  to  sell  or  offer  f6r  s 
adulterated  milk.  People  v.  HcDenii 
Dairy  Co.,  122  N.  T.  Supp.  294,  296. 


OFFER  TO^  SALE 


0FFIC5B 


Under  a  contract  with  recovers  by  which 
roker  was  authorized  to  "offer  and  sell" 

stock  of  salmon  of  a  canning  company, 
h  a  provision  that  the  sales  were  to  be 
ject  to  the  receivers*  Instructions  and  con- 
nation,  he  was  not  required  to  procure  an 
r  but  a  purchaser,  aUd  was  entitled  to  the 
tulated  commission  if  he  was  the  efficient 
ins  of  procuring  a  purchaser  whose  offer, 
le  directly  to  the  receivers,  was  accepted, 
[  to  whom  a  sale  was  made.  Colonial 
ist  Go.  V.  Padflc  Packing  ft  Navigation 
.  158  F-ed.  277,  279,  86  G.  O.  A.  539. 

FEB'OF  OOMFBOMI8E 

Admission  distinguished,  see  Admission. 

FEB  OF  BEWABD 

See  Reward. 

FER  OF  SETTIiEMEIlT 

Admission  distinguished,  see  Admission. 

FEB  TO  ours 

Lfl  conTey 

A  bill  foV  specific  performance  of  a  con- 
Tt  for  the  conveyance  of  land,  which  al- 
is  that  defendant  ''offered  to  give"  plain- 
certain  land,  provided  plaintiff  would  not 
::t  a  building  in  a  certain  place  and  man- 
,  and  that  plaintiff  accepted  tlia  offer, 
nged  the  plan  of  the  building,  took  pos- 
iion  of  the  land,  and  erected  the  building 
accordance  with  the  agreement,  states  a 
se  of  action  as  against  a  demurrer;  the 
gation  of  an  agreement  "to  give"  being 
strued  as  an  agreement  "to  convey." 
pley  V.  nnk,  62  Aa  860,  S61,  102  Md. 
,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1002. 

FICE 

See  Business  Office;  Maintenance  (Of 
Office);  Post  Office;  Usual  Business 
Office. 

As  public  place,  see  Public  Place. 

Student  in  office  of  attorney,  see  Student 

To  have  an  "office,"  in  ordinary  or  tedii- 
il  parlance,  implies  to  hate  that  control 
Em  office  which  an  owner  or  lessee,  or  at 
St  a  licensee,  would  exercise.  Althause  v. 
iranty  Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  137  N.  Y. 
>p.  945,  947,  78  Misc.  Rep.  181. 

The  word  "office,"  as  used  in  Code  Civ. 
>c  {  3160,  providing  that  a  plaintiff  in  an 
ion  brought  in  the  City  Court  of  New 
•k,  who  has  an  office  for  the  regular  trans- 
Ion  of  business  in  person  within  the  dty 
New  York,  is  deemed  a  "resident"  of  that 
r,  within  the  meaning  of  sections  3268  and 
9,  which  provide  that  a  defendant  may  re- 
re  securi^  for  costs  where  plaintiff  is  not 
resident,  means  a  place  where  service  is 
idered  or  business  is  done.  Brassack  v. 
erborough  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  121  N.  Y. 
sp.  215,  216,  66  Misc.  Rep.  190. 


An  "office"  in  Missouri,  within  Rev.  St 
1899, 1  3862,  authorizing  service  on  a  fondgn 
corporation  having  no  office  or  place  of  busi- 
ness in  Missouri,  by  service  on  any  agent  or 
employ^  in  any  county  or  state  where  such 
service  may  be  obtained,  means  an  ordinari- 
ly established  office,  and  not  a  mere  casual 
place  of  meeting,  and  hence  a  return  of  serv- 
ice on  such  a  corporation  was  not  objectiona- 
ble in  that  It  recited  that  the  corporation  had 
no  "regular  office"  or  place  of  business  with- 
in the  state.  Stegall  v.  American  Pigment  ft 
Chemical  Co.,  130  S.  W.  144,  158,  150  Mo. 
App.  261. 

Where  a  majority  of  the  board  of  direc- 
tors of  a  corporation  met  pursuant  to  a  reg- 
ular call  for  a  special  meeting  of  the  board, 
and  were  unable  to  obtain  access  to  the  office 
of  the  corporation,  and  convened  as  a  board 
in  the  hallway  of  the  building  Just  outside 
of  the  office,  and  then  adjourned  the  naeeting 
to  a  designated  date,  the  meeting  of  the 
board  was  valid  as  against  the  objection  tliat 
the  board  did  not  meet  at  the  office,  within 
Civ.  Code,  §  319,  requiring  the  holding  of 
meetings  of  boards  of  directors  at  the  corpo- 
ration's office.  Seal  of  Ck>ld  Mining  Go.  v. 
Slater,  120  Pac.  15,  17, 161  Gal.  621. 

The  word  "office"  as  used  In  Civil  Code 
1910,  I  2259,  is  synonymous  with  "place  of 
business."  An  action  upon  a  contract  with  a 
mining  corporation,  which  was  made  or  was 
to  be  performed  in  a  county  where  the  corpo- 
ration maintained  a  plant,  together  with  a 
superintendent  who  was  in  control  of  its  busi- 
ness and  a  large  force  of  laborers,  and  a 
place  for  the  transaction  of  such  business  as 
was  necessary  to  the  operation  of  the  plant, 
may  be  brought  in  the  county  where  the 
plant  is  located,  notwithstanding  the  princi- 
pal office  of  the  corporation  was  by  Its  char- 
ter located  in  another '  county,  where  its 
board  of  directors  met  and  its  financial  opera- 
tions were  carried  on.  General  Reduction 
Co.  V.  Tharpe,  75  S.  E.  339,  340,  11  Ga.  App. 
334  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4921). 

Under  a  petition  alleging  that  plaintiff 
was  lawfully  occupying  a  room  or  "office"  in 
the  northwest  part  of  the  courthouse,  when 
defendants  assaulted,  struck,  and  wounded 
him  and  forcibly  ejected  him  from  the  room 
to  his  damage,  but  containing  no  allegation 
that  plaintiff  was  entitled  tp  maintain  posses- 
sion of  such  room  as  clerk  of  the  county  court 
or  of  the  records  thereof,  whether  he  was  the 
lawful  county  clerk  and  as  such  official  en- 
titled to  possession  of  the  room  and  records 
was  not  in  issue;  the  word  "office"  in  the 
connection  In  which  used  signifying  a  room 
or  apartment  Morgan  v.  Owen,  91  S.  W. 
1055, 1056,  193  Mo.  587. 

An  ordinance  directing  the  corporation 
counsel  to  bring  an  action  to  collect  and  re- 
coyer  on  the  bond  of  a  dty  official  such  mon- 
ey paid  to  hixn  and  belonging  to  the  city  **as 
may  be  i^own  to  have  been  stolen  from  or 


OFFICE 


696 


OFFICE 


nlMpproprlated  in  the  ofiloe  of  the  dty  treas- 
urer and  not  duly  accounted  for/'  did  not 
contemplate  that  the  moneys  for  which  a  re- 
covery was  sought  should  be  shown  to  have 
been  actually  stolen  from  the  room  in  which 
the  treasurer  held  his  office,  or  misappropri- 
ated in  that  particular  room,  but  included 
moneys  of  the  city  stolen  or  misappropriated 
by  the  treasurer  or  his  subordinates  in  such  a 
way  that  the  treasurer  was  liable  therefor. 
City  of  Syracuse  ▼.  Rosooe,  123  N.  Y.  Supp. 
406,  411,  66  Misc.  Rep.  817. 

A  foreign  stock  corporation,  leaving  its 
blank  stock  certificates  and  its  stockbook 
with  a  trust  company  in  this  state,  which  act- 
ed as  a  transfer  agent,  cannot  be  said  to  have 
an  "offlce  for  the  transaction  of  business"  in 
this  state,  within  Stock  CJorporation  Law 
(Consol.  Laws  1900,  c.  50)  |  33,  providing  that 
every  foreign  corporation  having  an  office  for 
the  transacCioB  of  business  in  this  state  shall 
keep  therein  a  stockbook,  and  that,  if  any 
such  foreign  stock  corporation  has  in  this 
state  a  transfer  agent  such  stockbook  may 
be  deposited  in  the  office  of  such  agent,  for 
Inspection  of  stockholders.  Althause  v.  Guar- 
anty Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  187  JN.  Y.  Supp. 
045,  046,  78  Misc.  Rep.  ISL 

OFFICE 

See  Civil  Office;  Color  of  Office;  Con- 
tinuance in  Office;  Corruption  in  Of- 
fice ;  De  Facto  Office ;  Elective  Office ; 
Go  Out  of  Office;  In  Office;  In  Virtue 
of  His  Office;  Lucrative  Office;  Mis- 
behavior in  Office;  Misconduct  in  Of- 
fice; Misdemeanor  in  Office;  Munici- 
pal Office;  Out  of  Office;  Possession  of 
Office;  Principal  Administrative  Office; 
Principal  Office;  Quasi  Office;  State 
Office;  Successor  in  Office;  Term  of 
Office;    Township  Office. 

Any  office,  See  Any. 

Belonging  to  office,  see  Belong — Belong- 
ing. 

His  term  of  office,  see  His. 

Particular  positions  held  to  be  offices,  see 
Officer. 

Vacancy  in  office,  see  Vacancy — Vacant— 
Vacate  (Of  Office). 

An  "office,"  as  the  term  is  used  in  the 
Constitution,  means  something  to  be  held,  not 
something  to  be  done.  Ross  v.  Board  of 
Chosen  Freeholders  of  Essex  County,  65  AtL 
310,  313,  60  N.  J,  Law.  201. 

Jl  The  term  "public  office"  Implies  perma- 

^  nence  and  duties  of  a  public  nature.    Reed  v. 
Schon,  83  Pac.  77,  70,  2  CaL  App.  55. 

An  "office"  is  a  public  charge  or  employ- 
ment, and  the  term  comprehends  every 
charge  or  employment  in  which  the  public  is 
interested.  Michael  v.  State  ex  rel.  Welch, 
50  South.  020,  031,  1G3  Ala.  425. 

An  "office"  is  a  position  or  station  in 
which  a  person  is  employed  to  perform  cer- 
tain duties,  or  by  virtue  of  which  he  becomes 


charged  with  the  performance  of  certab  d 
ties,  public  or  private,  or  a  place  of  tnu 
and  emolument  is  a  usual,  but  not  a  De<% 
sary,  element  of  office.  Wells  v.  State,  \ 
N.  B.  321,  322,  175  Ind.  380,  Ann.  Gas.  19i:i 

"Office**  implies  much  more  than  tl 
right  to  physically  occupy  a  ^)ecifled  rot: 
to  exercise  certain  powers,  and  to  recehe 
prescribed  emolument  People  t.  Abearm  i; 
N.  Y.  Supp.  664,  131  App.  Div.  30;  Id.,  89 : 
E.  a30,  033,  106  N.  Y.  221,  26  U  R.  A.  ■: 
S.)  1153. 

A  '*public  -effloe,"  while  net  property. 
a  position  held  by  right  of  Section  or  a 
pointment,  and  courts  wil  protect  <xie  in  tl 
enjoyment  of  these  Hgbts  as  quickly  and  i 
fully  as  though  it  were  property.  Christy 
Kingfisher,  76  Pac  135,  137,  13  OkL  5S5. 

An  ''office"  is  a  trust  conferred  by  pc 
lie  avthority  for  a  public  purpose  and  i 
a  definite  time.  It  is  "a  public  station  < 
employment  conferred  by  the  appobtnoent  < 
the  government  The  term  embraces  tl 
ideas  of  tenure,  duration,  emoluments,  u 
duUes.**  State  v.  Rose,  86  Pac  296.  29S. 
Kan.  262,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  843,  10  Am  Ca 
027  (quoting  United  States  v.  HartwelL 
WaU.  [73  U.  S.]  385,  303,  18  L.  Ed.  83Cm 

"An  'office,'  as  defined  by  BUtdutoDe. 
a  ri^t  to  ezerdse  a  public  or  private  ei 
ployment  and  to  taka  the  fees  and  emol 
ments  thereunto  bekmging,  whether  pobii 
as  those  of  a  magistrate,  or  private,  as  tai 
iffs,  recovers,  and  tbe  like."  In  re  Opim^ 
of  the  Justices,  62  AtL  960,  970,  73  N.  i 
621,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  415,  6  Ann.  Gas.  2: 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Sbelbr 
Alcorn,  36  Miss.  273,  72  Am.  Dec  169,  ir. 

"The  term  'office'  is  defined  as  "a  i^l 
to  exercise  a  public  or  private  employiuei 
and  to  take  the  fees  and  emoluments  ther 
imto  belonging.'  It  embraces  the  Ideas  * 
tenure,  duration,  emoluments,  and  duti^ 
and  these  ideas  or  elements  cannot  be  se^ 
rated  and  each  conslda?ed  abstracfiy.  ^' 
taken  together,  constitute  the  office."  Tu 
ner  v.  Edward,  86  Pac.  765.  766, 31  Ttah.^ 
120  Am.  St  Rep.  010,  10  Ann.  Cas.  1« 
(quoting  Kendall  v.  Raybould,  i4  Pac  lo:^ 
13  Utah,  226;  2  HI.  Comm.  36). 

'*An  'office'  is  defined  to  be  tbe  rl^bt  i 
exercise  a  public  or  private  employment  u 
to  take  the  fees  or  emoluments  tbereoBt 
belonging."  2  Bla.  Com.  36.  (State  t.  ^^^ 
10  Paa  885,  13  Or.  385).  The  office  of  jar 
commissioner,  created  by  Sesa  Acts  l^- ' 
28,  embodied  in  Rev.  SL  1800.  S!  6539.  ^ 
(Ann.  St  1006,  p.  3272),  relating  to  the « 
pointment  of  Jury  commissioner  in  cities  li»' 
ing  a  specified  population,  is  not  an  "offlff 
within  Const  art  9,  §  14,  limiting  the  ten 
of  office  of  county,  township,  and  munJcip* 
officers  to  four  years.  State  ex  Inf.  ^^' 
V.  Corcoran,  103  S.  W.  1044,  lOlfl^  ^  * 
1,  12  Ann.  Cas.  565. 


OFFICE 


697 


OFFICE 


An  "ofllce"  Is  a  public  charge  or  employ- 
it,  and  he  who  performs  the  duties  of  an 
?e  is  an  "officer."  Blackstone  sdys:  "An 
ce'  is  the  right  to  exercise  a  private  or 
lie  employment  and  to  take  the  fees  and 
)lnments  thereunto  belonging.  An  office 
ilies  an  authority  to  exercise  some  portion 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  state,  either 
Daakiiig,  administrating,  or  executing  the 
8."  The  power  and  jurisdiction  of  an 
%  constitute  t^e  "office*'  and  are  insep- 
ble  from  It    The  true  test  of  a  public  of- 

seems  to  be  that  it  is  a  part  of  the  ad- 
ilstratlon  of  government,  civil  ox  military, 
surper  is  not  an  "officer'*  at  all,  or  for  any 
pose;  for  there  cannot  be  a  de  facto  of- 
r  when  a  de  Jure  officer  already  fills  the 
:e.  Commonwealth  v.  Bush,  115  S.  W. 
,  251,  252,  131  Ky.  384  (quoting  and  adopt- 

definltion  in  United  States  v.  Maurice,  2 
ck.  103,  26  Fed.  Gas.  1211;  Olmstead  v. 

7  of  New  York,  42  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct  481; 
nlon  of  the  Judges,  3  Me.  481;  Common- 
ilth  V.  Gamble,  62  Pa.  343,  1  Am.  Rep. 
:  Eliason  v.  Coleman,  86  N.  C.  235;  cit- 

Eubank  v.  Commonwealth,  103  S.  W. 
,  126  Ky.  348;  United  States  v.  Alexan- 
,  46  Fed.  728;   McCahon  v.  Leavenworth 

8  Kan.  437;  Matter  of  Ounn,  32  Pac. 
,  048,  50  Kan.  155,  10  L.  R.  A.    510). 

"Office'*  is  an  Incorporeal  right  and  con- 

8  in  the  right  to  execute  a  public  trust 
to  take  the  emoluments  belonging  to  it, 

i  an  injury  to  the  right  is  an  injury  to 
rlvate  right  for  which  there  ought  to  be  a 
ledy.  Maloney  v.  Collier,  88  S.  W.  667, 
,  112  Tenn.  78  (citing  Dodd  v.  Weaver,  2 
ed  [34  Tenn.]  670). 

"An  office  l8  an  Incorporeal  right,  and 
sists  in  the  right  to  execute  a  public  trust 
to  take  the  emoluments  belonging  to  it" 
March  27,  1007,  art.  8,  ft  8,  declares  that 
offices  existing  under  the  charter  of  the 
of   Memphis   and   acts   in  amendment 
reof  are  thereby  vacated  and  abolished, 
ler  the  charter  there  was  a  city  tax  asses- 
city   attorney,    and   assistant  attorney, 
ge,  and  clerk  of  the  city  court,  mayor,  and 
)  mayor;  and  Act  March  27,  1007,  provides 
a  city  assessor,  dty  counselor,  president, 
vice  president,  whose  duties  are  respec- 
ily  substantially  the  same  as  those  of  the 
responding  officers  under  the  city  char- 
Held,  that  the  act  could  not  have  the 
ct  to   remove    the   officers    holding   un- 
the  city  charter  and  create  a  vacancy 
be  filled  by  appointment,   since,  though 
porting  to  abolish  the  offices,  it  restored 
n  under  other  names,  and  the  rule  be- 
that,  while  an  office  may  be  abolished, 
'  the  (^cer  cannot  be  legislated  out  of 
re  without  an  abolishment  thereof.     Ma- 
5  V.  Williams,  103   S.   W.   708,  818,   118 
n.  300,  121  Am.   St  Rep.  1002   (quoting 
adopting  the  definition  in  Dodd  v.  Weav- 
2  Sneed  [34  Tenn.]  670). 


That  a  board  of  revision  of  a  city  is  not 
a  quasi  corporation,  as  some  boards  are,  and 
that  there  is  attached  to  the  duty  no  emolu- 
ment has  no  effect  as  to  such  board  consti- 
tuting an  office.  Neither  of  such  character- 
istics is  an  essential  element.  The  most  es- 
sential characteristic  of  an  office  id  that  the 
incumbent  in  his  independent  capacity  is 
clothed  with  some  part  of  the  sovereignty  of 
the  state  to  be  exercised  in  the  interest  of 
the  public  and  required  by  law,  and  that  the 
duties  are  of  a  continuous  character  as  op- 
posed to  a  mere  temporary  employment 
Barker  v.  State,  68  N.  B.  575,  576,  60  Ohio 
St.  68  (citing  State  ▼.  Brennan,  20  N.  B.  593, 
40  Ohio  St  33;  State  ex  rel.  Armstrong  v. 
HalUday,  55  N.  B.  175,  61  Ohio  St  171). 

"Public  office,"  as  used  in  tbe  Constitu- 
tion, has  respect  to  a  permanent  trust  to  be 
exercised  in  behalf  of  the  government  or  of 
all  citizens  who  may  need  the  Intervention  of 
a  public  functionary  or  officer  and  in  all  mat- 
ters within  the  range  of  the  duties  pertain- 
ing to  the  character  of  the  trust  It  means  a 
right  to  exercise  generally,  and  in  all  proper 
cases,  the  functions  of  a  public  trust  or  em- 
ployment, and  to  receive  the  fees  and  emolu- 
ments belonging  to  it,  and  to  hold  the  place 
and  perform  the  duty  for  the  term  and  by 
the  tenure  prescribed  by  law.  People  v. 
Aheam,  80  N.  E.  030,  037,  938,  106  N.  Y. 
221,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1153  (concurring 
opinion  of  Edw.  T.  Bartlett  X;  quoting  Mat- 
ter of  Hathaway,  71  N.  Y.  238,  244). 

"A  'public  office'  la  the  right,  authority, 
and  duty  created  and  conferred  by  law  by 
which,  for  a  given  period,  either  fixed  by  law 
or  enduring  at  the  pleasure  of  the  creating 
power,  an  individual  is  vested  with  some 
portion  of  the  sovereign  functions  of  the 
government  to  be  exercised  by  him  for  the 
benefit  of  the  public''  (quoting  and  adopting 
definition  in  Mechem  on  Public  Officers,  as 
approved  in  Kimb rough  v.  Bamett,  55  S.  W. 
120,  03  Tex.  301).  "As  said  by  Chief 
Justice  Marshall,  'although  an  office  is  an 
employment,  It  does  not  follow  that  every 
employment  is  an  office.'  Mr.  Mechem,  in  his 
work  on  Public  Officers,  says:  'The  most  Im- 
portant characteristic  which  diBtinguishes  an 
office  from  an  employment  or  contract  is 
that  the  creation  and  conferring  of  an  office 
involves  a  delegation  to  the  individual  of 
some  of  the  sovereign  functions  or  govern- 
ment, to  be  exercised  by  him  for  the  benefit 
of  the  public;  that  some  portion  of  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  country,  either  legislative,  ex- 
ecutive, or  Judicial,  attaches  for  tbe  time  be- 
ing, to  be  exercised  for  the  public  benefit 
Unless  the  powers  conferred  are  of  this  na- 
ture, the  individual  is  not  a  public  officer.' 
Now,  while  the  faet  that  the  position  of  ste- 
nographer is  designated  in  tiie  act  provid- 
ing for  its  creation  as  an  office,  and  that  it 
declares  that  the  person  who  may  be  called  to 
perform  its  duties  ^all  be  a  sworn  officer  of 
the  court,*  affords  some  reason  for  deter- 


' 


\& 


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if  if 


K. 


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■t        :■ 


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OFFICE 


698 


OFFICB 


mining  It  to  be  such,  still  it  is  believed  tbe 
place  possesses  none  of  those  sovereign  func- 
tions of  the  Judicial  department  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  which  it  relates*  to  distinguish  it 
from  a  mere  enployment  to  perform  a  spe- 
cies of  service,  under  public  authority,  for 
the  assistance  and  convenience  of  the  court 
and  parties  litigant  therein,  in  which  no  Ju* 
didal  discretion  or  judgment '  is  involved. 
The  creation  of  the  position,  as  shown  by  the 
very  terms  of  the  act,  was  designed  for  no 
other  purpose  than  to  provide  some  one  by 
whom  the  oral  evid^ice  offered,  and  other 
proceedings  involving  objections  made  to  the 
admissibility  of  testimony,  the  ruling  of  the 
court,  and  exceptions  thereto,  might  be  tak- 
en in  shorthand  as  a  method  of  preserving 
those  matters  as  they  occurred,  without  de- 
laying trials,  to  be  afterwards  transcribed 
and  furnished  the  court  and  parties  to  the 
suit,  to  aid  them  in  an  accurate  and  prompt 
preparation  of  the  record.  The  report  or 
transcript  of  the  proceedings  by  the  ste- 
nographer is  not  binding,  however,  upon  the 
court,  and  may  be  adopted  or  rejected  at  his 
discretion.  No  act  which  he  is  authorized 
to  do  is  independent  of  the  control  of  oth- 
ers, or  vested  in  him  as  a  supreme  power  to 
be  exercised  as  a  right  or  prerogative  of  a 
judicial  office.  We  conclude  that  while  the 
position  of  a  stenographer,  under  the  statute 
in  this  state,  may  be,  in  a  sense,  an  office, 
and  the  term  thereof  may  continue  for  a 
longer  period  than  two  years,  yet  there  is  no 
sudi  sovereign  function  of  government  em- 
braced in  the  powers  conferred  upon  the 
individual  performing  its  duties  as  brings  it 
within  the  meaning  of  the  word  'office'  as 
used  in  the  section  of  the  Constitution  quot- 
ed." Robertson  v.  Ellis  County,  84  8.  W. 
1007,  1098,  low,  88  Tex.  Civ.  App.  146. 

Aceaoy,  duty,  or  trast 

A  public  office  is  an  agency  of  the  stata 
State  ex  rel.  Le  Blanc  &  Bailey  v.  Michel,  36 
South.  869,  870,  113  La.  4. 

"The  words  'office  of  public  trust*  are 
equivalent  to  'public  office.*  *'  State  v.  Mona- 
han,  84  Pac.  130,  183,  72  Kan.  492,  116  Am. 
St  Rep.  224,  7  Ann.  Cas.  661. 

An  "office**  is  a  public  agency,  and  an 
"officer"  is  a  mere  agent  of  the  public,  en- 
titled to  exercise  the  functions  and  perform 
the  duties  of  the  office  for  the  public  bene- 
fit, and  not  for  his  own.  Goodrich  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 75  Pac.  1034,  1035,  68  Kan.  765,  64  L.  R. 
A.  945,  104  Am.  St.  Rep.  429,  1  Ann.  Caa  288. 

An  "office"  has  been  defined  as  "a  spe- 
cial trust  or  charge  created  by  competent 
authority";  more  tersely  still  "a  public  office 
is  a  public  trust"  The  general  doctrine  is 
that  the  idea  of  office  clearly  embraces  the 
ideas  of  tenure,  duration,  fees  or  emolu- 
ments, rights  and  powers^  as  well  as  that  ot 
duty.  The  true  test  of  public  office  is  "that 
it  is  a  parcel  of  the  administration  of  gov- 
ernment   Gracey  v.  City  of  St  Louis  (Mo.) 


HI  8.  W.  1059,  1163  (citing  State  ex  i^ 
Walker  v.  Bus,  36  S.  W.  636,  135  Mo.  331 
33  L.  R.  A.  616;  6  Words  and  Phrases,! 
4923;  2  Bouv.  L.  Diet  tit  "Officer*'). 

A  "public  office"  la  a  personal  poba 
trust  created  for  the  benefit  of  tbe  8tat 
without  any  element  of  property.  Scbeoio 
V.  State  (Ala.)  69  Sooth.  169,  16L 

"A  'public  office'  la  an  agency  for  tb 
state,  and  the  person  whose  duty  it  is  to  pei 
form  this  agency  is  a  public  officer.  The  e> 
seuce  of  it  is  the  duty  of  performing  tn  agei 
cy;  that  is,  of  doing  some  act  or  acts,  o 
a  series  of  acts,  for  the  state."  Mslone  \ 
Williams,  103  S.  W.  7»8,  820,  118  Teno.  39( 
121  Am.  St  Rep.  1002  (quoting  and  sdopdA 
the  definition  in  Clark  ▼.  Stanley,  66  N.  C6S 
8  Am.  Rep.  488;  tLOapteA  in  Wood  t.  Belkin] 
27  S.  B.  115,  116.  120  N.  a  212);  Martini 
United  States,  104  &  W.  678^  684,  7  Isd.  1 
451. 

"Though  the  word  'office'  may  be  nw 
in  varying  senses,  the  term  in  any  pnpe 
sense  implies,  as  indicated  by  its  etymolog 
a  duty  or  duties  to  be  performed.  Other  ek 
ments,  such  as  the  public  nature  of  the  dot 
and  its  permanence,  may  be  necessary  to  coi 
stitute  a  public  office;  but  this  element— ths 
is,  duty  or  aervloe  to  he  performed— is  « 
essential  part  of  the  definition.''  Though  tit 
word  may,  like  other  terms,  be  used  is  ai 
improper  sense,  it  will  be  presumed,  unles 
the  contrary  appears,  that  the  proper  sen> 
was  intended.  "The  term  'officer'  and  'office 
are^  indeed,  paronymous,  and  in  their  orig 
Inal  and  proper  sense  are  to  be  regarded  a 
strictly  correlative.  But  both  terms,  iii 
most  other  terms,  are  used  in  varloas  senses 
nor  do  the  variations  of  the  one  always  coi 
reiqwnd  with  the  other."  Reed  v.  Schon,  S 
Pac.  77,  79,  2  C3aL  App.  65. 

An  "office  or  place  of  trust,"  within  t 
constitutional  provision  prohibiting  person 
holding  any  office  or  place  of  trust  under  Uv 
United  States  or  under  the  state  from  bold 
Ing  or  exercising  any  other  office  or  place  oi 
trust  under  the  authority  of  the  state,  me«B 
a  public  position  involving  a  delegation  t( 
the  individual  of  some  part  of  the  sovereigz 
functions  of  the  government  to  be  exerd^ 
for  the  public  benefit  The  most  Importani 
characteristic  which  distinguishes  an  offi« 
from  a  public  agency  is  that  the  conferring 
of  the  office  carries  with  it  a  delegation  tc 
the  individual  of  some  of  the  sovereign  fonc^ 
tions  of  the  government  In  this  respect  tbe 
terms  "office"  and  "place  of  trust"  as  vseH 
in  such  constitutional  provisions  are  synony- 
mous. The  position  of  a  public  admini^n- 
tor  is  not  an  office  within  such  constitntionil 
provisions,  but  is  a  mere  administrative 
agency.  Wooton  r.  Smith,  69  S.  B.  6«,  ^' 
145  N.  a  476. 

A  "pnbllc  office"  la  a  personal  po^^^ 
trust  created  for  the  benefit  of  the  state  u^ 
not  for  the  benefit  of  the  individual  dtla^ 


OFFIOB 


OFFICE 


eof,  and  It  has  in  It  no  element  of  prop- 
.  Therefore  a  statute  providing  for  pref- 
ce  of  honorably  discharged  soldiers  of 
Civil  War  in  appointment,  employment, 
promotion  in  public  service  over  others 
gtual  qualiflcation  does  not  violate  Const 
1, 1  6,  declaring  that  the  General  Assem- 
shall  not  grant  to  any  citizen  or  class  of 
ens  priyileges  or  Immunities  not  equally 
Dgittg  to  all;  the  right  to  hold  a  public 
&  or  to  be  employed  by  the  state  in  any 
idty  not  being  a  privilege.  Shaw  v.  City 
adl  of  Marshalltown,  104  N.  W.  1121, 
,  131  Iowa,  128,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  SO  825, 
UL  Ca&  1089. 

''A  'public  elective  office*  is  a  public 
icy,  which  barring  any  constitutional  in- 
tlon,  express  or  implied,  may  be  aholish- 
curtailed,  or  regulated  by  legislative  en- 
lent**  State  ex  reL  Henson  v.  Sheppard, 
L  W.  477.  481,  102  Mo.  407. 

A  public  office  embraces  more  than  the 
t  to  physically  o<)cupy  a  q;)ecifled  room, 
cise  certain  powers,  and  receive  a  pre- 
)ed  emolument  It  means  the  right  to 
else  generally  and  in  all  proper  cases  the 
tions  of  a  public  trust  or  employment,  to 
Ive  the  fees  and  emoluments  belonging  to 
nd  to  hold  the  place  and  perform  the  du- 
3r  the  term  and  by  the  tenure  prescribed 
aw.  People  v.  Aheam,  115  N.  Y.  S.  664, 
131  App.  Div.  30. 

A  public  office  is  a  mere  public  agency 
ted  by  the  people  for  the  purpose  of  the 
inistration  of  the  necessary  functions  of 
nlzed  society,  and  the  agency  may  at 
time  be  terminated  by  the  power  which 
ted  it  As  between  the  office  holder  and 
^duals  in  their  private  capacity,  and 
aps  as  against  any  authority  except  the 
reign  power  itself  acting  in  pursuance 
power  Of  removal  expressly  reserved  or 
ssarily  implied  from  the  nature  of  office, 
officer  is  entitled  to  the  full,  protection 
he  law  in  his  right  to  hold  the  office, 
tically  to  the  same  extent  as  if  it  were 
ate  property.  In  re  Carter,  74  Pac.  997, 
CaL  816. 

In  the  most  general  and  comprehensive 
8,  a  "public  office"  is  an  agency  for  the 
J,  and  a  person  whose  duty  it  Is  to  per- 
\  this  agency  Is  a  "public  officer."  Stat- 
more  definitely,  a  ''public  office**  is  a 
ge  or  trust  conferred  by  public  authority 
El  public  purpose,  the  duties  of  which  in- 
B,  in  th^r  performance,  the  exercise  of 
i  portion  of  sovereign  power,  whether 
t  or  small.  A  public  officer  is  an  indi- 
al  who  has  been  elected  or  appointed  in 
manner  prescribed  by  law,  who  has  a 
^nation  or  title  given  to  him  by  law,  and 
exercises  the  functions  concerning  the 
i  assigned  to  him  by  law.  A  parish  su- 
atendent  is  an  officer.  State  ex  rel.  Smith 
tieus,  38  South.  870,  872,  114  La.  1007« 


Oompensatioa 

An  "office**  may  be  only  one  of  honor 
without  perquisites  or  profits.  Some  employ- 
ments of  a  private  nature  are  considered  pub- 
lic offices,  if  connected  with  the  public,  as  a 
bank  or  railroad  president,  secretary,  treas- 
urer, or  director.  Bouse  v.  Thompson,  81  N. 
E.  1109,  1120,  228  lU.  522  (dissenting  opin- 
ion by  Carter,  J. ;  citing  People  ex  reL  Koer- 
ner  v.  Bidgley,  21  111.  65;  Dickson  .v.  People 
ex  leL  Brown,  17  IlL  191). 

The  position  of  city  surveyor  of  the  city 
of  New  York  is  not  perhaps  strictly  iB{>eaking 
an  "office,**  for  it  does  not  carry  a  salary, 
yet  inasmuch  as  the  surveyor  is  appointed 
and  is  required  to  take  an  oath  of  office,  and 
because  by  virtue  of  his  appointment  under 
the  authority  of  law  and  the  taking  of  such 
oath  eligible  to  certain  employment  in  the 
nature  of  public  service  for  which  he  Is  en- 
titled to  receive  compensation  which  com- 
pensation in  turn  is  to  be  assessed  upon  the 
property,  the  amount  thereof  depends  upon 
the  law  at  the  time  the  service  is  rendered. 
Pepole  ex  rel.  Crane  v.  Ahearn,  110  N,  Y. 
Supp.  306,  310,  125  App  Div.  795. 

OoiitlniiMce  resardlMMi  •£  laom]mb«a«y 

An  office  is  a  legal  entity,  and  may  ex- 
ist, though  it  be  Without  an  incumbent 
Chflds  V.  State,  118  Pac.  546,  548,  4  Okl.  Cr. 
474,  38  li.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  568. 

OreAt«d  #iid  duUes  yresezibed  by  l*w 

An  office  i»  a  place  in  a  governmental 
system  created  or  recognized  by  the  law  of 
the  state  which  either  directly  or  by  delegat- 
ed authority  assigns  to  the  incumbent  there- 
of the  contiiiuous  performance  of  certain  per- 
manent public  duties.  Fredericks  v.  Board 
of  Health  of  Town  of  West  Hoboken,  82  Atl. 
628,  82  N.  J.  Law,  200. 

Election   or   appointment 

"An  'office*  is  a  public  station  of  emolu- 
ment conferred  by  the  appointment  of  gov- 
ernment The  term  embraces  the  idea  of 
tenure,  duration,  emoluments,  and  duties.** 
State  ex  rel.  Mosconi  t.  Maroney,  90  S.  W. 
141,  146,  191  Mo.  531. 

XUnployment   distlngnished 

Apart  from  the  statute,  the  distinction 
between  a  public  officer  and  an  employ^  is 
that  the  former  is  charged  with  duties  in- 
volving an  exercise  of  some  part  of  the  sov- 
ereign power  in  the  performance  of  which 
the  public  is  concerned,  and  which  are  con- 
tinuing and  not  occasional,  while  one  merely 
performing  duties  required  of  him  by  per- 
sons employing  him  under  an  express  con- 
tract or  otherwise,  though  the  employer  is  a 
public  officer  and  the  employment  be  a  public 
work  or  business,  is  a  mere  employ^  San- 
ders T.  Belue,  58  S.  B.  762,  763,  78  S.  C.  171. 

An  employment  differs  from  both  an  of- 
fice and  a  position,  in  that  its  duties,  which 
are  nongovernmental,  are  neither  certain  nor 


OFFICB 


700 


OFFICB 


permanent  Fredericks  t.  Board  of  Health 
of  Town  of  West  Hobokeo,  82  Atl.  528,  629, 
82  N.  J.  Law,  200. 

Wblle  generally  speaking  an  ''officer"  Is 
one  employed  on  behalf  of  a  goyemment  In  a 
strict  legal  sense,  the  term  implies  employ- 
ment  in  some  fixed  and  permanent  capacity: 
those  engaged  in  mere  transient  or  occasion- 
al employment  being  more  properly  employ^ 
than  officers.  Bilger  y.  State,  116  Pac.  19, 
24,  63  Wash.  457. 

In  Const  art  7,  f  8,  iMroviding  for  the 
appointment  of  officers  whose  offices  shall  be 
created  by  law,  the  word  ''office"  difters  in 
its  legal  signlflcatioii  from  "employ^,"  an  em- 
ploye being  a  mere  agent  Bine  t.  Tetrick, 
72  S.  B.  1038, 1085^  69  W.  Va.  742. 

An  "office"  is  a  public  station  or  employ- 
ment conferred  by  the  appointment  of  gov- 
ernment The  term  embraces  the  idea  of 
tenure,  duration,  emolument,  and  duties.  A 
government  "office"  Is  dlfFerent  from  a  gov- 
ernment contract  The  latter  is  necessarily 
limited  in  its  duration  and  specific  in  its  ob- 
ject An  act  of  the  council  of  the  Muskogee 
Nation,  empowering  the  diief  thereof  to  em- 
ploy an  attorney  nntil  the  dissolution  of  the 
tribal  relations  and  until  a  specified  date, 
with  prescribed  duties,  at  an  annual  salary, 
payable  from  the  general  funds  of  the  na- 
tion, does  not  create  an  "office";  but  the  at- 
torney is  an  employ^  under  contract  Por- 
ter y.  Murphy,  104  8.  W.  658,  669,  7  Ind.  T. 
395. 

"The  distinction  is  plainly  taken  between 
a  person  acting  as  a  'senranf  or  'employ^ 
who  does  not  discharge  independent  duties 
but  acts  by  the  direction  of  others,  and  an 
'officer*  empowered  to  act  In  the  discharge  of 
a  duty  or  legal  authority  in  official  life." 
Padden  v/Clty  of  New  Yorit,  92  N.  Y.  Supp. 
926,  928,  45  Misc.  Rep.  517  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Olmstead  v.  City  of 
New  York,  42  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct  481;  citing 
People  ex  rel.  Gilchrist  v.  Murray,  78  N.  Y. 
535). 

"Although  an  office  is  an  'employment,' 
it  does  not  follow  that  every  employment  is 
an  'office.'  A  man  may  certainly  be  employ- 
ed under  a  contract  express  or  implied  to  do 
an  act  or  perform  a  service  without  becom- 
ing an  o^cer."  An  "office"  is  defined  as  "an 
employment  on  behalf  of  the  government  in 
any  station  of  public  trust  not  merely  tran- 
sient, occasional,  or  incidental."  It  is  a  "spe- 
cial trust  or  charge  created  by  competent  au- 
thority. The  officer  is  distinguished  from 
the  employ^  in  the  greater  importance,  dig- 
nity, and  independence  of  his  position,  in  be- 
ing required  to  take  an  official  oath,  and  per- 
haps to  give  an  official  bond,  in  the  liability 
of  being  called  to  account  as  a  public  of- 
fender f6r  misfeasance  or  nonfeasance  in 
office  and  usually,  though  not  necessarily,  in 
the  tenure  of  his  position.  United  States  v. 
Schllerholz,  137  Fed.  616,  622  (quoting  and 


adopting  definition  in  United  States  r.  }b; 
rice,  26  Fed.  Ota.  1211,  2  Brock.  96;  In  i 
Attorneys'  Oaths  [N.  Y.]  20  Johns.  492;  P« 
pie  ex  reL  Throop  v.  Langdon,  40  Mich.  ^ 

The  use  of  the  word  "employed'  in  se 
tlon  1,  a  114,  Laws  1891  (secdcm  4613,  G« 
8t  1909),  providing  that  eight  hours  sha 
constitute  a  day's  work  for  all  Ubom 
workmen,  mednanics,  or  othtt  penom  en 
X^oyed  on  behalf  of  any  dty  of  the  state,  e 
dudes  officers;  an  office  being  dlstingQislu 
from  an  employment,  in  that  it  Implies  m 
are,  duration,  emolument,  and  duty.  Stii 
V.  City  of  Ottawa,  113  Pac.  391,  394.  84  Ku 
100. 

laVestaM&t  witk  f «aetl«BS  ef  gorai 


*"  'Ofllce^  ia  ceoficaUy  defined  as  a  pobt 
dbargB  or  employment,  through  which  tt 
incumbent  discharges  a  part  of  the  fooctioi 
of  government  for  the  benefit  of  the  public 
State  V.  Peake,  120  N.  W.  47,  55,  18  K.  I 
101  (dissenting  opinion  of  Morgan,  I), 

A  "public  office"  is  a  rightj  author!^ 
and  duty  created  and  conferred  by  lav,  t 
which  an  individual  is  invested  with  son 
portion  of  the  sovereign  functions  of  the  go 
ernment  to  be  exercised  by  him  for  the  be:< 
fit  of  the  public.  It  implies  a  delesatioo  < 
a  portion  of  the  sovereign  power  to  and  1*3 
session  of  it  by  the  person  filling  the  ofSo 
State  T.  Mackie,  74  AtL  750,  761,  82  Goo: 


"A  'poblic  office'  is  one  whose  dotJ^ 
are  in  their  nature  public— that  is,  IdtoItIs 
in  their  performance  the  exerdse  of  m 
portion  of  the  sovereign  power,  whether  ^ 
or  8mail--and  in  whose  propor  perfonniiK 
all  citiMns;  Irrespective  of  party,  are  icte 
ested,  eitiier  as  members  of  the  entiie  bo^ 
politic  or  of  some  duly  established  dlTisioB< 
it"  Qreenough  ▼.  Luoey,  06  Atl.  300,  28 1 
1.230. 

"The  term  'office*  implies  a  delegation  < 
a  portion  of  the  sovereign  power  to,  and  pc 
session  of  It  by,  the  person  filling  the  c^« 
and  the  exercise  of  such  power  within  \fp 
limits  constitutes  the  correct  discharge  i 
the  duties  of  such  office.  The  power  the 
delegated  and  possessed  may  he  a  portio 
belonging  to  one  of  the  three  great  depar 
ments,  and  sometimes  to  another;  still  iti 
a  legal  power  which  may  be  rightfally  ^ 
erdsed,  and  in  its  effects  will  bind  the  ri^- 
of  others,  and  be  subject  to  revision  and  coi 
xection  only  according  to  the  standing  U^ 
of  the  stete."  In  re  Opinion  of  the  Justin* 
62  AtL  969,  970,  73  N.  H.  621,  6  L.  a  A.  \> 
S.)  415,  6  Amu  Cas.  283  (quoting  and  adopto 
definition  in  Re  Opinion  of  the  Justices  [Me 
3  Greenl.  481,  482). 

A  "pubUc  (^Bce"  is  the  right,  aathoritj 
and  duty  created  and  conferred  by  laVi  ^' 
whtdi,  for  a  given  period,  either  fixed  k 
law  or  enduring  at  the  pleasure  of  the  cr^j 
ing  power,   an  individual  is  invested  viQ 


OFFICE 


701 


OFFICE 


le  portion  of  the  sovereign  functiODS  of 
government,  either  executive,  legislative, 

judicial,  to  be  exercised  for  the  benefit  of 
public;  and  unless  the  powers  conferred 
of  this  nature  the  Individual  is  not  a 

»lic  officer.    Chithrie  Daily  Leader  v.  Cam- 

n,  41  Pac.  635,  630,  3  Okl.  677. 

The  true  test  of  •'public  office"  is  in  itself 
arcel  of  the  administration  of  government, 
"office"  has  been  defined  as  a  special  trust 
charge  granted  by  competent  authority, 
'public  office"  is  a  public  trust  The  gen- 
1  definition  is  that  the  idea  of  office  clear- 
jmbraces  the  Idea  of  tenure,  duration,  fees, 
emoluments,  rights  and  powers,  as  well  as 
t  of  duty.    Gracey  ▼.  City  of  St  Louis. 

S.  W.  1159,  1163,  213  Mo.  384  (citing  6 
irds  and  Phrases,  p.  4923;  2  Bouv.  Law 
t  tit.  "Officer";  People  ex  rel.  Throop  v. 
agdon,  40  Mich.  682;  State  ex  rel.  Cannon 
tfay,  17  S.  W.  660,  106  Mo.  488). 

The  individual  invested  with  the  ''right, 
hority,  and  duty  created  and  conferred  by 
r,  by  which  for  a  given  period,  either  fix- 
by  law  or  enduring  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
atlng  power,  or  invested  with  some  portion 
the  sovereign  functions  of  the  government 
be  exercised  by  him  for  the  benefit  of  the 
)lic,"  is  a  ••public  officer."  State  ex  pel. 
sooni  V.  Maroney,  90  S.  W.  141,  146,  191 
.  531  (quoting  and  adopting  the  definition 
Mechem,  Pub.  Off.  |  1). 

As  used  in  Const  art.  14,  |  7,'  providing 
Lt  no  person,  who  shall  hold  any  office  or 
ce  of  trust  or  profit,  under  the  United 
Ltes,  or  any  department  thereof,  or  under 

state,  etc,  shall  hold  or  exercise  any  oth- 
office  or  place  of  trust  or  profit  under  the 
hority  of  the  state,  provided,  etc.,  the 
ma  "office"  and  "place  of  trust"  are  syn- 
rmous,  and  have  reference  to  a  public  posi- 
a,  involving  a  delegation  to  the  individual 
some  part  of  the  sovereign  functions  of 

government,  to  be  exercised  for  the  public 
lefit.  Wooten  v.  Smith,  59  S.  B.  649,  650, 
I  N.  C.  476. 

An  administrator  belongs  to  that  class 
Dfflcers  represented  by  curators,  guardians, 
elvers,  referees,  and  the  like,  whose  duties 
5  private,  and  whose  acts  concern  private 
her  than  public  interests.    An  adminlstra- 
is  vested  with  no  portion  of  the  sovereign 
ictions  of  the  state  to  be  exercised  by  him 
the  benefit  of  the  public,  and  he  is  there*- 
e  not  a  •'state  officer"  Within  the  meaning 
Const,  art.  8,  |  12,  providing  that  ••no  per- 
i  shall  be  elected  or  appointed  to  any  'of- 
^  in  this  state,  dvil  or  military,  who  Is  not 
dtizen  of  the  United  States,  and  who  shall 
ve  resided  in  this  state  one  year  next  pre- 
ling  his  election  or  appointment"    A  ••pub- 
office"  is  a  light  and  authority  created 
law  by  which  an  individual  is  invested 
bh  some  portion  of  the  functions  of  govern- 
nt  to  be  exercised  by  him  for  the  benefit 


of  the  public  for  a  given  period  of  time,  ei- 
ther fixed  by  law  or  enduring  at  the  pleasure 
of  the  creating  power.  The  word  "office,"  as 
here  used,  is  to  be  disUnguished  from  its 
application  to  such  positions  as  are  at  most 
quasi  public  only,  as  the  charge  of  an  ex- 
ecutor, administrator,  or  guardian,  and  from 
the  offices  of  a  private  corporation.  Stevens 
V.  Larwill,  84  S.  W.  113,  118,  110  Mo.  App. 
140  (citing  Mechem,  Pub.  Off.  i  1;  In  re 
Hathaway,  71  N.  Y.  238). 

As  license 

A  license  to  keep  a  dramshop  is  not  an 
••office,"  which  can  be  tested  or  vacated  by 
quo  warranto.  Hargett  v.  Bell,  46  S.  B.  749, 
760,  184  N,  C.  394. 

Position  distinsnislied 

A  position  is  analogous  to  an  ••office," 
in  that  the  duties  that  pertain  to  it  are 
permanent  and  qertaln,  and  it  differs  from 
aa  office  in  that  its  duUes^may  he  nongovern- 
mental and  not  assigned  to  it  by  public  law. 
Fredericks  v.  Board  of  •Health  of  Town  of 
West  Hoboken,  82  AtL  628,  529,  82  N.  J.  Law, 
200. 

A  '*public  office"  is  a  place  crated,  or  at 
least  recognized,  by  the  law  of  the  state,  and 
to  which  certain  permanent  duties  are  as- 
signed either  by  the  law  itself  or  by  regula- 
tions adopted  under  authority  of  law.  A 
•'position,"  within  the  purview  of  the  veteran 
act  of  1895  (8  Oen.  St  189^  p.  3702),  is  a 
places  the  duties  of  which  are  continuous  and 
permanent,  analpgous  to. those  of  an  office, 
and  which  pertain  to  the  position  as  such. 
Hart  V.  City  of  Newark,  77  AU.  1086,  1087, 
80  N.  J.  Law,  600. 

As  property 

Bee  Private  Property;  Property, 
As  priTilese  •£  eitiaen 

See  Privileges  and  Inmaunltiea. 
As  public  office 

The  word  ••offices,"  as  used  in  the  gen- 
eral tax  law  of  1903  (P.  L.  1903,  p.  396,  |  3, 
par.  8),  cannot  be  deemed  to  refer  to  other 
than  public  ••offices."  North  Jersey  St  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Jersey  aty.  67  AU.  33,  35,  74  N.  J. 
Law,  761. 

The  word  •'office,"  in  Mansf.  Dig.  Ark.  c. 
151,  II  6464,  6466,  providing  that  in  Ueu  of 
the  writs  of  scire  facias  and  quo  warranto 
actions  by  proceedings  at  law  may  be  brought 
to  vacate  or  repeal  charters  and  prevent  the 
usurpation,  of  an  office  or  franchise,  and  de- 
claring that  when  a  person  usurps  an  office 
or  franchise  to  which  he  is  not  entitled  by 
law  an  action  by  proceedings,  at  law  may  be 
instituted  against  him  either  by  the  state 
or  the  party  aititled  to  the  office  or  fran- 
chise, to  prevent  the  usurper  from  exercising 
the  office  or  franchise,  means  a  public  office, 
and  does  not  include  the  offices  of  a  private 
corporation.  Le  Bosquet  v.  Myers,  103  S.  W. 
770,  771,  7  Ind.  T.  75. 


OFFICE  COPY 


702 


OFFICE  FURKITUBX 


I 


I 


• 


OFFICE  COPT 

Ad  "office  copy^  of  a  record  is  ''a  copy 
authenticated  by  an  officer  Intnuted  for 
tliat  purpose,  and  It  is  admitted  in  erldence 
upon  the  credit  of  the  officer*'  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  1  Greenleaf  on  Evi- 
dence, I  507).  Under  Rev.  St  1800,  |  8008, 
providing  that  records  kept  in  any  public 
office  of  a  sister  state,  not  appertaining  to  a 
court,  shall  be  evidence  in  this  state,  if  at- 
tested by  the  keeper  of  said  records  and  the 
seal  of  his  office,  it  is  necessary  to  show,  as 
a  basis  for  tlie  introduction  of  an  alleged  cer- 
tified copy  of  articles  of  incorporation  grant- 
ed by  a  sister  state,  that  the  laws  of  that 
state  required  the  articles  to  be  kept  or  re- 
corded by  the  officer  certifying  the  copy. 
Florsheim  &  Co.  v.  Fry,  84  S.  W.  1023,  1024, 
100  Mo.  App.  487  (citing  6  Thomp.  Priv.  Corp. 
i  7712). 

OFFICE  FOB  TKB  BBOULAB  TRAITS- 

Acnoir  OF  BUsiESM  m  peb- 

SOH 

The  expression  "office  fbr  the  regular 
transaction  of  business  in  person,*'  as  used 
in  Code  C:1y.  Proc  f  3100,  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  one  who  carries  on  some  busi- 
ness at  some  particular  place  of  which  he 
is  proprietor;  hence  the  place  where  one  is 
regularly  employed  to  render  services,  where 
he  attends  every  business  day,  Is  a  place  or 
office  for  the  regular  transaction  of  business, 
regardless  of  the  character  of  the  business 
transacted.  Brassack  v.  Interborough  Rapid 
Transit  Oo.,  121  N.  T.  Supp.  215,  210,  66 
Misc.  Rep.  100. 

OFFICE  FOnHD 

A  legislative  act  directing  the  posses- 
sion and  appropriation  of  public  land  which 
had  been  granted  'Is  equivalent  to  'office 
found,*  *'  and  "before  a  forfeiture  or  reunion 
with  the  public  domain  could  take  place  a 
judicial  inquiry  should  be  instituted,  or,  in 
the  technical  language  of  the  common  law, 
'office  found*  or  its  equivalent"  Spokane  & 
B.  O.  R.  Co.  V.  Washington  &  Q.  N.  R.  CJo., 
95  Pac.  64,  67,  49  Wash.  280  (quoUng  United 
States  V.  De  Repentigny,  5  Wall.  [72  U.  S.] 
211,  267,  268,  18  L.  Ed.  627). 

An  alien  purchasing  lands  or  taking 
them  by  devise  may  not  be  divested  of  his 
estate  even  by  the  state  until  after  a  formal 
proceeding  called  "office  found,*'  and  until 
that  is  done  he  may  sell  and  convey  or  de- 
vise the  lands,  and  pass  a  good  title  to  the 
same.  Though  during  the  life  of  an  alien 
the  state,  by  proper  proceedings,  could  have 
declared  an  escheat  of  land  held  by  her  in 
contravention  of  Const  art  2,  |  33,  on  her 
death  it  lost  that  right;  the  land  descend- 
ing to  her  heirs.  Abrams  v.  State,  88  Paa 
327,  329,  45  Wash.  327,  9  Ia  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  188, 
122  Am.  St  Rep.  914,  13  Ann.  C^s.  527. 

"Inquisition**  or  '"office  found,**  as  relat- 
ing to  a  trial  for  or  declaration  of  forfei- 


ture, etc.,  have  no  relation  to  the  ordimi 
eomtton-law  trial  by  jury,  and  the  ja 
there  summoned  was  not  the  commoD-li 
Jury  before  whom  a  dtisen  has  a  i\gbi 
demand  a  trial  where  his  peace  or  his  rlgl] 
were  In  question.  Blackstone  defines  1 
qulsltion*'  or  "office  found"  to  be  "an  inqnt 
made  by  the  king's  officer,  his  sheriff,  a 
oner,  or  eacheater,  virtute  officii,  or  by  ir 
to  them  sent  for  that  purpose,  or  by  co 
missioners  specially  appointed,  concernl 
any  matter  that  entitled  the  king  to  t 
possession  of  lands  or  tenements,  goods 
chattels.  This  is  done  by  a  jury  of  do  ( 
terminate  number,  being  either  twelve, 
less,  or  more.  •  •  •  These  inquests 
office  were  devised  by  law,  as  an  aotben 
means  to  give  the  king  his  right  by  solei 
matter  of  record ;  without  which  he,  in  gi 
eral,  can  neither  take  nor  part  from  ti 
thing.**  For  *1t  is  a  part  of  the  Ubert 
of  England,  and  greatly  for  the  safety 
the  subject,  that  the  king  may  not  eni 
upon  or  seise  any  man*s  possessions  ui 
bare  surmises  without  the  Intervention 
a  jury.**  It  was  a  procedure  pecolia: 
adapted  for  the  king's  use,  and  the  imp 
tant  thing  about  it  was  that  a  record  mi^ 
be  made  and  altered  whereon  the  king  coi 
base  his  right  to  possess  himself  of  tbeUit 
goods,  and  chattels  of  his  subject:  and, 
it  respects  lands,  the  office  found  put  h 
into  Immediate  possessloii,  without  the  i 
cessity  of  a  formal  re-entry.  Althougli 
frequent  use  was  for  the  determinatioD 
attainder,  esdieats,  and  breaches  of  cod 
Uons  aimexed  to  grants,  and  the  like,  t 
record  was  not  conclusive,  and  the  snb> 
was  yet  entitled  to  a  trial  suitable  at  co 
mon  law  for  the  final  determination  of  1 
rights.  A  good  Illustration  is  found  in 
cheats.  "The  usual  form  of  proceeding  1 
this  purpose  was  by  an  inquisition  or 
quest  of  office  before  a  jury,  which  was  b 
upon  a  commission  out  of  the  Court  of  Cbi 
eery,  but  was  really  proceeding  at  oomm 
law ;  and.  If  it  resulted  in  favor  of  tbe  Idi 
then,  by  virtue  of  ancient  statutes,  any  o 
claiming  title  in  the  lands  might,  by  \» 
of  that  court,  file  a  traverse,  in  the  nato 
of  a  plea  or  defense  to  the  king's  dii 
and  not  in  the  nature  of  an  original  so 
•  •  •  The  Inquest  of  office  was  a  ppoc« 
ing  in  rem ;  when  there  was  a  proper  off 
found  for  the  king,  that  was  notice  to  i 
persons  who  had  claims  to  come  in  and  i 
sert  them ;  and,  until  so  traversed,  it  ^ 
conclusive  in  the  king's  favor.*'  Unit 
States  V.  Oregon  &  a  B.  Oa^  186  Fed.  ^ 
926  (quoting  8  BL  ComuL  258,  259;  Hsm 
ton  V.  Brown,  16  Sup.  Ot  586,  687»  161  D. 
256,  263,  40  L.  Bd.  601). 

OFFICE  FURHITUBB 

By  a  mortgage  bin  of  nie  of  all  tl 
desks,  chairs,  trunks,  and  ''office  fnrnitQi^ 
in  a  certain  ofBce^  the  mortgagor  intendi 


OFFICE  HOURS 


703 


OFFICER 


be  articles  of  use  in  the  office  at  the 
should  pass;  and  an  iron  safe,  which 
then  used  there,  would  be  embraced  as 
rticle  of  office  furniture.  Skowhegan 
T.  Farrar,  46  Me.  2d3,  29a 

ICE  HOURS 

^ee  Business  Hours* 

Jnder  Rev.  St  1895,  art  1222,  authoriz- 
he  service  of  citation  upon  a  corpora- 
by  leaving  a  copy  of  the  same  at  the 
Ipal  office  of  the  company  during  "of- 
hours,  a  return  showing  service  during 
ness"  hours  is  sufficient  El  Paso  &  S. 
y.  Ck).  V.  Kelly  (Tex.)  83  S.  W.  855,  860. 

ICE  or  HONOR  OR  PROFIT 

Service  as  a  grand  Juror  is  not  an  "office 
nor  or  profit,"  within  Const  ait.  2,  |  2, 
ding  that  no  person  shall  hold  two  of- 
of  honor  or  profit  at  the  same  time. 
>  V.  Graham,  60  S.  Bl  431,  432»  79  S.  G. 


ICE  OF  TRUST 

Dhe  chairman  of  the  executive  commit- 
f  a  political  party  does  not  hold  an  of- 
»f  trust,  etc.,  within  Terrell  election  law 
e*s  Ann.  Civ.  St  Supp.  1906,  p.  183), 
ding  that  no  holder  of  an  office  of  prof- 
trust,  etc.,  shall  be  a  judge  of  election. 
:er  v.  Mobley  (Tex.)  105  S.  W.  61,  62. 

rhe  office  of  a  commissioner  of  the  Unlt- 
tates  Centennial  Commission  is  an  "of- 
►f  trust"  under  Const  U.  S.  art  2,  |  1, 
lalifying  the  holder  of  an  office  of  trust 
r  the  United  States  for  the  office  of 
)r  of  president  and  vice  president  of 
Jnited  States.  In  re  Corliss,  11  R.  I. 
640,  23  Am.  Rep.  53a 

ICE  UNDER  THE  STATE 

:;ivll  office  under  the  state,  see  Civil  Offi- 
cer. 

[?he  provision  of. the  Constitution  that 
Senator  or  Representative  shall  hold  an 
i  under  the  state'  •  •  •  the  emolu- 
B  of  which  have  been  increased  during 
lession  of  the  Legislature  of  which  he 
a  member,  until  one  year  after  the  ex- 
ton  of  his  term  of  office  in  the  Legisla- 
'  does  not  prohibit  a  member  of  a  Leg- 
ire  that  has  increased  the  emoluments 
embers  of  the  Legislature  from  being 
;mber  of  the  next  Legislature,  as  an 
e  under  the  state"  does  not  include  the 
ative  office.  State  ex  rel.  Olson  v.  Scott, 
;r.  W.  1044,  1046,  105  Minn.  513. 

[CEHOUIIHG 

Offlceholding"  is  a  political  privilege 
the  matter  of  appointment  to  office  is 
ffected  by  the  fourteenth  amendment  or 
provision  of  the  federal  Constitution, 
as  has  been  said,  the  power  of  the  Leg- 
ire  is  supreme  in  respect  to  appoint- 


ments, save  as  the  Constitution  has  limited 
it  Goodrich  V.  Mitchell,  75  Pac.  1034,  1036, 
68  Kan.  765,  64  L.  R.  A.  945,  104  Am.  St 
Rep.  429,  1  Ann.  Cas.  288. 

OFFICER 

See  Army  Officer;  Chief  Officer;  Ci- 
Devant  Officer ;  City  Officer ;  Civil  Of- 
ficer; Collecting  Officer;  Competent 
Officer;  Constitutional  Officer;  Con- 
sular Officer ;  County  Officer ;  De  Fac- 
to Officer;  De  Jure  Officer;  District 
Officer;  Election  Officer;  Executive 
Officer;  Ex-Officer;  Financial  Officer; 
Fiscal  Officer;  General  Officer;  Ju- 
dicial Officer;  Legislative  Officer ;  Lo- 
cal Officer  L  Ministerial  Office— Offi- 
cer; Municipal  Officer;  Peace  Officer; 
Police  Officer;  Precinct  Officer ;  Prop- 
er Officer:  Retired  Officers:  Revenue 
Officer;  Salaried  Officer;  State  Offi- 
cer; Subordinate  Officer;  Tftken  by 
Public  Officers;  Town  Officer;  Town- 
ship Officer;    United  States  Officer. 

All  other  officers,  see  All  Other. 

Any  judicial  officer,  see  Any. 

Any  one  aMK>inted  as  meaning  ofllcer,  see 
Any. 

Discharge  of  officer,  see  Discharge. 

Of  corporation  as  employ^  see  Eknploy^. 

Other  officers,  see  Other. 

Other  taxing  officer,  see  Other. 

Proceedings  to  remove  as  civil  action,  see 
Civil  Action— Case— Suit— etc 

Removal,  see  Remove — RemovaL 

Service  of  officer,  see  Service. 

An  "officer"  Is  defined  to  be  "one  who  la 
lawfully  invested  with  an  office."  State  v. 
Kelly,  77  S.  W.  996,  997,  103  Mo.  App.  7U 
(quoting  Bouvier,  Law  Diet). 

'Tlie  terms  'officer*  and  'office'  are,  in- 
deed, paronymoufi,  and  in  their  original  and 
proper  sense  are  to  be  regarded  as  strictly 
correlative.  But  both  terms,  like  most  other 
terms,  are  used  in  various  senses;  nor  do  the 
variations  of  the  one  always  correspond  with 
the  other."  Thus  it  sometimes  happens  that 
the  word  "officer"  is  used  without  reference 
to  the  original  and  proper  sense.  Reed  v. 
Schon,  83  Pac  77,  79,  2  Cal.  App.  55. 

"A  'public  officer*  is  one  who  is  appointed 
to  discharge  a  public  duty  and  receive  com- 
pensation for  the  same."  People  v.  Warner, 
104  N.  Y.  Supp.  279,  282  (quoting  and  adopt- 
ing Conner  v.  City  of  New  York  [N.  Y.l  2 
Sandf.  355). 

"A  *public  officer*  is  an  individual  who 
has  been  appointed  or  elected  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  law,  who  has  a  designation 
or  title  given  to  him  by  law,  and  who  ex- 
ercises the  functions  concerning  the  public 
assigned  to  him  by  law.'*  State  ex  rel.  Mos^ 
coni  y.  Maroney,  90  S.  W.  141,  146^  191  Mo. 
53L 

"To  be  an  'officer'  one  must  be  chosen 
or  appointed  or  otherwise  invested  with  the 


OITFICEB 


704 


OFFICER 


position.  It  is  not  a  thing  tbat  a  person  gets 
merely  by  fitting  bimself  therefor.  It  takes 
the  act  of  some  other  person  or  body  of  per- 
sons." Danforth  v.  Egan,  119  N,  W.  1021, 
1024,  23  S.  D.  43,  139  Am.  St  Rep.  1030,  20 
Ann.  Gas.  418. 

Where  either  the  people  or  the  Legisla- 
ture create  an  office  or  designate  a  person 
to  perform  some  function  of  government,  the 
head  of  such  an  office  would  be  a  public  of- 
ficer. People  ez  r^.  O'Toole  y.  Hamilton,  90 
N.  Y.  Supp.  547,  649,  98  App.  DIy.  59. 

An  officer  who  exercises  Important  public 
duties  and  has  delegated  to  him  some  of  the 
functions  of  government,  and  whose  office  is 
for  a  fixed  term,  and  whose  powers  and  du- 
ties and  emoluments  become  vested  in  a  suc- 
cessor when  the  office  becomes  vacant,  is  a 
''pubUc  officer."  Richie  v.  City  of  Philadel- 
phia, 74  AU.  430,  431,  225  Pa.  511,  26  L.  R.  A. 
<N.  S.)  289. 

When  public  functions  are  conferred  by 
law  on  certain  persons  elected  by  the  people 
or  appointed  by  the  Legislature,  and  such 
functions  concern  the  general  interests  of  the 
state,  and  are  not  merely  local  or  temporary, 
such  persons  are  public  officers,  especially  if 
they  be  paid  a  salary  for  their  services  out 
of  the  public  treasury,  but  not  so  if  their 
duties  are  merely  transient,  occasional,  or 
incidental.  In  re  Appointment  of  Reviser, 
124  N.  W.  670,  676, 141  Wi&  592,  18  Ann.  Cas. 
1176  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases*  pp.  4925- 
4927). 

"  'Officers,'  with  regard  to  the  public  body 
for  which  they  act,  are  officers  of  the  general 
government,  state  officers,  county  officers,  and 
municipal  officers."  State  ex  rel.  Long  ▼. 
Rexford,  :09  N.  W.  216,  217,  21  S.  D.  86. 

An  "officer"  is  a  mere  agent  of  the 
public,  entitled  to  exercise  the  functions  and 
perform  the  duties  of  the  office  for  the  pub- 
lic benefit,  and  not  for  his  own.  Goodridi  v. 
Mitchell,  75  Pac.  1034,  1035,  68  Kan.  765,  64 
L.  R.  A.  945,  104  Am.  St.  Rep.  429,  1  Ann. 
Cas.  288. 

"A  'public  office'  is  an  agency  tpr  the 
state,  and  the  person  whose  duty  it  is  to 
perform  this  agency  is  a  'public  officer.*  The 
essence  of  it  is  the  duty  of  performing  an 
agency;  that  is,  of  doing  some  act  or  acts, 
or  a  series  of  acts,  for  the  state."  Malone  v. 
WUliams,  103  S.  W.  798,  820,  118  Tenn.  390, 
121  Am.  St  Rep.  1002  (quoting  and  adopting 
the  definition  in  Clark  v.  Stanley,  66  N.  a  63, 
8  Am.  Rep.  488 ;  adopted  in  Wood  v.  Bellamy, 
27  8.  B.  116,  116,  120  N.  C.  212). 

An  ''officer'  la  simply  an  agent  of  the  pub- 
lic, whose  power  of  attorney  is  the  law, 
which  prescribes  his  duties  and  limits  his 
authority  to  such  acts  only  as  are  necessary 
and  incidental  to  a  proper  discharge  of  such 
duties  as  it  imposes.  As  the  agent  of  the 
public,  he  can  no  more  transcend  the  power 


given  by  his  principal  than  can  the  agent  of 
the  humblest  IndivlduaL  While  this  power 
is  sometimes  exceeded,  an  act  in  excess  of  it 
can  never  be  legaL  Callaghan  ▼.  McGown 
(Tex.)  90  S.  W.  319,  327. 

Every  one  who  is  appointed  to  discharge 
a  public  duty,  and  receives  compensation,  in 
whatever  shape,  is  a  ^'puhlic  officer,"  and  tt 
a  duty  be  a  continuing  one,  which  is  defined 
by  rules  prescribed  by  the  government,  and 
not  by  contract*  it  is  v^ry  difficult  to  dis- 
tinguish such  a  charge  or  employment  from 
an  office,  or  the  person  who  holds  it  from  an 
"officer."  Michael  v.  State  ex  reL  Wel<dv 
50  South.  929,  931,  163  Ala.  425  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Bac.  Abr.  and  in  Unit- 
ed States  V.  Mau0ee,  2  Brock.  102,  26  Fed. 
Cas.  1211). 

An  "office"  Is  a  public  charge  or  employ- 
ment, and  he  who  performs  the  duties  of 
an  office  is  an  "officer."  Blackstone  says: 
"An  'office'  is  the  right  to  exercise  a  private 
or  public  employment  and  to  take  the  fees 
and  emoluments  thereunto  belonging.  An 
office  implies  an  authority  to  exercise  some 
portion  of  the  sovereign  power  of  the  state, 
either  in  making,  administrating,  or  execut- 
ing the  laws."  The  power  and  Jurisdiction 
of  an  office  constitute  the  "office"  and  are 
inseparable  from  it.  The  true  test  of  a  pub- 
lic office  seems  to  be  that  it  is  a  part  of  the 
administration  of  government,  dvil  or  mili- 
tary. A  usurper  is  not  an  "offioer**  at  all, 
or  for  any  purpose;  for  there  cannot  be  a 
de  facto  officer  when  a  de  jure  officer  already 
fills  the  office.  Commonwealth  v.  Bush,  115 
S.  W.  249,  251,  252,  131  Ky.  384  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  United  States  v.  Maur- 
ice, 2  Brock.  103,  26  Fed.  Cas.  12U;  Olm- 
stead  V.  caty  of  New  York,  42  N.  Y.  Super. 
Ct.  481 ;  Opinion  of  the  Judges,  3  Me.  481 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Gamble,  62  Pa.  343,  1  Am. 
Rep.  422;  Eliason  v.  Oleman,  86  N.  C.  235; 
citing  Eubank  v.  Commonwealth,  103  S.  W. 
368,  126  Ky.  348;  United  States  v.  Alexander, 
46  Fed.  728;  McOahon  v.  Leavenworth  Co.,  8 
Kan.  437;  Matter  of  Gunn,  32  Pa&  470,  948, 
50  Kan.  155,  19  L.  R.  A.  519). 

Rev.  Codes  Mont  I  262,  authorizing  a 
board  of  examiners  to  employ  clerical  help 
for  any  state  officer  or  board,  and  prohibit- 
ing such  "officers"  or  "boards"  from  employ- 
ing clerks  without  the  authority  of  the  board 
of  exandners,  does  not  apply  to  the  employ^ 
of  the  Supreme  Court;  it  not  being  an  "of- 
ficer" or  "board"  within  the  terms  of  the  act 
State  ex  ret  Schneider  v.  Cunningham,  101 
Paa  962,  965,  39  Mont  166. 

A  coroner's  physician  appointed  by  him, 
as  authorized  by  Laws  1882,  p.  429,  C  410, 
I  1769,  Is  a  subordinate  of  the  coroner  and 
is  not  a  public  officer,  exercising  as  he  does 
no  part  of  the  sovereign  power.  In  re  Flynn, 
119  N.  Y.  Supp.  1079,  1088,  66  Misa  B^ 
233. 


OFFIOBI^ 


705 


OKFICEB 


tmste* 


juialcBuee*   veaelTerf    ov  { 


An  administrator  belongs -to  that  class  of 
cOiceis  represented  by  curators,  guardians, 
reoelTers,  referees,  and  the  like,  whose  duties 
axe  private  and  whose  acts  concern  priyate 
rather  than  public  interests.  An  administra- 
tor Is  vested  with  no  portion  'Ot  the  soyereign 
fonctlons  of  the  state  to  be  exercised  by  him 
for  the  benefit  of  the  public,  and  he  is  there- 
fore not  a  "state  officer"  within  the  meaning 
of  Const  art  8,  f  12,  providing  that  "no 
person  shall  be  elected  or  appointed  to  any 
office  in  this  state,  civil  or  military,  who  ia 
not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  who 
shall  not  have  resided  in  this  state  one  year 
next  preceding  bis  election  or  appointment" 
A  "public  office"  is  a  right  and  authority 
created  by  law  by  which  an  individual  is  in- 
vested with  sonie  portion  of  the  functions  of 
government  to  be  exercised  by  him  for  the 
benefit  of  the  public  for  a  given  period  of 
time,  either  fixed  by  law  or  enduring  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  creating  power.  The  word 
"office,"  as  here  used,  is  to  be  distinguish- 
ed from  its  application  to  such  positions  as 
are  at  most  quasi  public  only,  as  the  charge 
of  an  executor,  administrator,  or  guardian, 
and  from  the  offices  of  a  private  corporation. 
Stevens  v.  Larwill,  84  S.  W.  118, 118, 110  Mo. 
App.  140  (citing  Mechem,  Pub.  Off.  1 1;  In  re 
Hathaway,  71  N.  Y.  238). 

Though  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541, 
I  1,  subd.  18,  30  Stat  544,  defines  the  term 
"officer"  as  used  in  the  act  as  including  trus- 
tees, a  trustee  in  bankruptcy  does  not  occupy 
an  "office"  in  the  sense  in  which  that  term 
is  used  in  the  law  which  prohibits  an  alien 
from  being  a  public  officer,  since  his  duties 
are  not  general  or  permanent,  and  therefore 
an  alien  is  not  disqualified  from  acting  as  a 
trustee  in  bankruptcy.  Section  46  of  this  act 
PKOvides  that  individuals  who  are  competent 
to  perform  the  duties  of  a  trustee  and  who 
reside  or  have  an  "office"  in  the  Judicial  dis- 
trict within  which  they  are  appointed  may 
act  as  trustees.  "Individual"  Is  a  very  broad 
term  and  is  sufficient  to  Include  an  alien. 
In  re  Ck)^  154  Fed.  162,  163  (citing  In  re 
Hathaway,  71  N.  Y.  238;  United  States  v. 
Germalne,  99  U.  S.  508,  26  L.  fild.  482 ;  Auff* 
mordt  V.  Hedden,  11  Sup.  Ct  108,  137  IT.  S. 
310,  34  L.  Ed.  674). 

An  action  by  a  receiver  of  a  national 
bank  to  recover  assets  is  one  by  an  officer  of 
the  United  States  suing  under  authority  of 
an  act  of  Ck)ngress,  within  Bev.  St  §  620, 
cL  3,  of  which  a  Circuit  Court  of  the  United 
States  has  Jurisdiction  without  regard  to  the 
amount  involved  or  the  citizenship  of  the  par- 
ties. '  Murray  v.  Chambers,  151  Fed.  142, 143. 

Prlv.  Laws  1851,  p.  5,  provided  for  the 
Section  of  trustees  to  administer  the  Kaskas- 
kia  commons,  and  provided  for  the  division 
and  lease  of  the  lands  and  for  the  use  of  the 
same  for  school  purposes.  Section  7  also  aa- 
8  WnB.&  P.2d  Sbb.— 46 


I  thorised  trustees  to  appropriate  a  portion  of 
the  proceeds  to  religious  purposes,  when 
asked  for  by  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the 
town  of  Kaskaskia,  etc.  Held,  that  the  trus- 
tees were  not  "public  officers,"  but  trustees 
of  an  educational  and  religious  trust,  the  ad- 
ministration of  which  was  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  of  chancery.  Stead  v. 
President,  etc.,  of  Commons  of  Kaskaskia,  90 
N.  E.  654,  663,  243  HI.  239. 

AttoTmej  at  law 

An  attorney  at  law  is  not  a  "public  of- 
ficer." McKannay  v.  Horton,  91  Pac.  598, 
602,  151  Cal.  711,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  661,  121 
Am.  St  Rep.  146. 

An  attorney  and  counselor  at  law  is  a 
public  officer  appointed  by  the  court  to  per- 
form duties  of  a  public  character,  and  vested 
with  certain  power  and  authority  incidental 
to  the  office.  In  re  Spencer,  122  N.  Y.  Supp. 
190,  192,  137  App.  Div.  330. 

A  prosecuting  attorney  is  a  public  officer, 
becauso  he  represents  the  sovereign  power  of 
the  people  of  the  state  by  whose  authority 
and  in  whose  name,  under  Const  art  6,  | 
20,  all  prosecutions  must  be  conducted,  and 
not  because  of  his  relation  to  the  court 
Fleming  v.  Hance,  94  Pac.  620,  622,  153  CaL 
162. 

In  order  to  constitute  an  attorney  em- 
ployed to  assist  the  Attorney  General  an  of- 
ficer of  the  state,  the  term  of  his  appointment 
and  continuance  in  office  must  be  coterminous 
with  the  term  of  office  of  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral who  appointed  him,  and  of  the  Govern- 
or approving  the  appointment  Terrell  v. 
Sparks,  135  S.  W.  519,  521,  104  Tex.  191. 

Candidate  for  offlee 

A  candidate  nominated  at  a  primary  elec- 
tion for  a  public  office  is  not  an  *'officer" 
within  the  statute  allowing  officers  to  resign. 
State  ex  rel.  Donnelley  v.  Hamilton,  111  Pac. 
1026,  1029,  33  Nev.  418. 

The  provision  of  Code  Pub.  Gen.  Laws 
1904,  art  33,  f  128,  that  cases  of  contested 
elections  of  any  of  the  officers  not  otherwise 
provided  for  shall  be  decided  by  the  Judges 
of  the  courts  therein  named,  does  not  apply 
to  primary  flection  contests;  the  nominee 
of  a  political  party  not  being  an  "officer." 
Foxwell  V.  Beck,  82  Atl.  657,  658,  117  Md.  1. 

Corporate  offioer 

Under  Bankr.  Act  July  1,  1898,  c.  541,  | 
17a  (4),  30  Stat  550,  excepting  from  a  dis- 
charge in  bankruptcy  debts  created  by  the 
bankrupts  fraud,  embezzlement,  misappropri- 
ation, or  defalcation  while  acting  as  an  offi- 
cer, or  in  any  fiduciary  capacity,  an  indebted- 
ness of  an  officer  of  a  private  corporation, 
created  by  his  misappropriation  of  the  fund 
of  such  corporation,  is  not  dischargeable  in 
bankruptcy.  Tatum  v.  Leigh,  72  S.  SL  286, 
238, 136  Ga.  791,  Ann.  Cas.  1912D,  216L 


OFFICER 


706 


OFFICER 


A  director  of  a  trust  comiMiny  la  not  • 
"public  officer^  within  Penal  Law  (ConaoL 
Laws  1900,  c.  40)  i  1867,  punishing  omlasion 
of  public  duty  by  a  public  officer,  and  a  di- 
rector guilty  of  neglect  of  dut^  as  such  is 
not  punishable  under  the  section*  People  ▼. 
Knapp,  90  N.  S.  841,  844,  206  N.  Y.  878. 

The  bankruptcy  acts  of  1841  and  1867 
excepted  from  the  operation  of  a  discharge 
debts  contracted  in  consequence  of  a  defalca- 
tion as  a  '*public  officer.*'  The  act  of  July  1, 
1898,  c.  641, 1  17,  el.  4,  80  Stat  660,  proYldes 
that  the  di«charge  shall  raleaae  a  t>anknipC 
from  all  provable  debts,  except  such  as  were 
created  by  fraud,  embeszlement,  or  defalca- 
tion, while  acting  as  an  *'offlcer."  Htid,  that 
it  must  be  presumed  that  the  change  was  in- 
tentional, and,  by  omitting  the  word  "public," 
officers  of  private  corporations  are  Included 
within  the  term  "officer."  In  re  Harper,  133 
Fed.  970,  973. 

Officers  of  a  corporation,  where  they  get 
control,  with  an  attendant  fiduciary  obliga- 
tion, of  property  of  the  corporation,  are  "of- 
floers,'*  within  Bankruptcy  Act,  exempting 
from  discharge  debts  created  by  misappropri- 
ation or  defalcation  while  acting  as  an  "offi- 
cer," so  that  a  continuance  of  a  suit  in  a 
state  court  against  corporate  officers  for  the 
value  of  corporate  property  mlsai^ropriated 
by  them  will  not  be  stayed  on  the  applica- 
tion of  the  officers  who  had  been  adjudicated 
bankrupt    In  re  Qulick,  186  Fed.  360,  361. 

Covaty  or  parisli  oAeer  or  employ^ 

Tlie  superintendent  of  public  education 
in  a  parish  Is  a  pubUc  officer.'  State  ez  ret 
Smith  y.  Theus,  88  South.  870,  872,  114  l4L 
1097. 

The  superintendent  of  a  county  infirma- 
ry, who  resides  in  some  apartment  of  the  in- 
firmary or  building  contiguous  thereto,  per- 
forms such  duties  as  the  directors  may  im- 
pose, and  is  governed  in  all  respects  by  their 
rules  and  regulations,  and  is  not  removed  ex- 
cept for  good  and  sufficient  cause,  Is  not  the 
holder  of  a  '*public  office'*  within  Rev.  St  f 
6760,  so  as  to  authorize  quo  warranto  to  oust 
him  from  the  same,  but  is  a  mere  employ^ 
The  most  general  distinction  of  a  "public 
office*'  is  that  it  embraces  the  performance 
by  the  incumbent  of  a  public  function  dele- 
gated to  him  as  a  part  of  the  sovereignty  of 
the  state,  and  it  is  essential  that  certain  in- 
dependent public  duties,  a  part  of  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  state,  should  be  appointed  to 
It  by  law  to  be  exercised  by  the  incumbent  in 
virtue  of  his  election  or  appointment  to  the 
office  thus  created  and  defined,  and  not  as  a 
mere  employe,  subject  to  the  direction  and 
control  of  some  one  else.  To  the  incumbent 
of  a  "public  office"  are  delegated  some  of  the 
sovereign  functions  of  government,  to  be  exer- 
cised by  him  for  the  benefit  of  the  public, 
and  some  portion  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
country,  either  legislative  or  executive  or  Ju- 
dicial, attaches  for  the  time  being,  to  be  ex- 


ercised for  the  public  benefit  The  office 
county  warden  is  a  public  office,  as  tfa«  j 
combent  has  power  to  avpoiat  assistants 
mmAat  in  policing  certain  reservoirs  of  t 
state  aBd  territory  pertaining  thereto  in  tbi 
respectiTe  oovnties,  and  to  arrest  all  vioUitc 
of  the  laws  for  Ite  protection  of  flsh  t 
game.  Palmer  y.  Zeigler,  81  N.  El  231  2 
287,  76  Ohio  St  210;  Id.,  81  N.  B.  238. 
Ohio  St  229  (citing  State  ex  rsL  Atton 
General  y.  Kennon,  7  Ohio  St  547,  557,  55 
State  ex  rel.  Attorney  General  v.  Jennioi 
49  N.  B.  404,  405,  57  Ohio  St  415,  421 
Am.  St  Rep.  728;  State  ex  reL  Leiand  r.  II 
son,  66  N.  B.  468,  61  Ohio  St  513;  Stite 
rel.  Attorney  General  v.  Halllday,  56  N. 
118,  61  Ohio  St  852,  49  L.  R.  A.  427). 

An  "officer'*  In  the  constitutloiua  sen 
being  one  who  is  elected  or  appointed  to 
office,  and  who  takes  the  oath  of  office  u 
is  responsible  for  the  official  acts  of  him 
and  subordinates,  his  clerks  are  not  "oi 
cers,"  and  the  provision  in  Oonst  art  2,  | '. 
that  the  General  Assembly  shall  fix  tbe  co 
pensatlon  of  all  officers,  is  not  infringed 
Act  March  22, 1906  (96  Ohio  Laws.  p.  S9),  i 
thorizing  the  county  commissioners  to  fix  t 
compensation  of  clerks  of  county  office 
Theobald  v.  State,  30  Ohio  Or.  Gt  R.  4] 
415. 

A  janitor  is  not  a  county  officer,  witi 
the  constitutional  definition  of  an  '^offio 
so  that  the  salary  of  a  Janitor  cannot  be  cv 
sidered  in  determining  whether  a  oertj 
amount  was  properly  levied  for  the  salary 
county  officers.  People  v.  Cincinnati,  L.  k 
Ry.  CJo..  93  N.  E.  421,  247  IlL  506. 

Within  Veteran  Act  March  H  1895 
GoL  St  p.  8702),  protecting  only  those  pc 
sons  who  hold  an  "office**  or  a  *lK)sLtioii,'' 
person  employed  by  a  board  of  choaen  fn 
holders  to  work  as  a  carpenter  at  daily  « 
ges,  about  the  county  courthouse,  under  tl 
direction  of  the  county  superintendent,  do 
not  hold  an  "ofilce."  Kreigh  v.  Board 
Chosen  Freeholders  of  Hudson  Comitj,  ' 
Atl.  625,  62  N.  J.  Lew,  178  (citing  and  adof 
ing  LewU  v.  Jersey  City,  17  Aa.112,  51 : 
J.  Law,  240;  Stewart  y.  Board  of  Cbos 
Freeholders  of  Hudson  County,  38  Atl  SI 
61  N.  J.  Law,  117). 

A  comparison  clerk  in  the  county  derk 
office  of  the  county  of  New  York  is  a  pob^ 
officer  in  the  dvU  service  of  the  state.  F« 
pie  ex  rel.  OToole  v.  Hamilton,  90  K.  ^ 
Supp.  97,  44  Misc.  Rep.  577. 

Members  of  a  building  committee  i] 
pointed  by  a  co^nty  court  to  contrad  for  ti 
erection  of  a  courthouse  are  "public  officer 
within  Acts  1899,  p.  358,  c.  182,  making  it 
misdemeanor  for  any  "public  officer**  < 
award  a  Contract  for  any  public  work  witl 
out  requiring  the  bond  provided  for  in  i^ 
act  W.  T.  Hardison  &  Co.  ▼,  Teaman,  91 ' 
W.  1111,  1115,  115  Tenn.  639. 


OFFICER 


707 


OJSTIOER 


Bums*  Ann.  St  1901,  {  6633b,  proyldes 
county  boards  of  education  shall  consti- 

boards  of  truancy,  who  shall  appoint 
truant  officer  in  each  county,  and  also 

the  duties  and  compensation  of  such 
T.  Held,  that  such  truant  officer  was  a 
lie  officer,"  and  therefore  bound  to  quali- 
efore  entering  on  the  duties  of  his  office, 
aking  the  oath  prescribed  by  section 
.  Feathemgill  v.  State  ex  peL  Wright, 
f.  B.  181,  182,  33  Ind.  App.  683. 

The  term  "public  officers,*'  as  used  in 
It  art  12,  I  3,  providing  that  the  com- 
ation  of  any  public  officer  shall  not  be 
iased  or  diminished  during  his  term  of 
i,  when  construed  in  connection  with  the 
isions  that  no  money  shall  be  paid  out  of 
:reasury  except  on  appropriation  by  law, 
on  warrant  drawn  by  tiie  proper  offi- 
and  that  the  general  appropriation  bill 
I  embrace  only  appropriations  for  ordi- 

expenses  of  the  executive,  legislative, 
judicial  departments,  etc.,  and  with  ar- 

5,  I  10,  article  30,  f|  8,  15,  and  article 
I  2,  providing  for  the  terms  and  salaries 
ounty  judges,  and  supreme  and  county 
es,  applies  only  to  state  officers  who 
7  their  salaries  from  the  stat^  treasury, 

does  not  include  the  county  judges, 
ser  V.  Seeley,  100  N.  W.  437,  438,  18  & 
08. 

A  "public  officer,"  as  defined  by  Act  1901 
St  at  Large,  p.  754),  declaring  that  the 
I  '^public  officer"  shall  include  all  officers 
he  state  previously  commissioned,  the 
tees  of  the  various  colleges  of  the  state, 
libers  of  the  various  state  boards,  dispen- 

constables,  and  other  persons  whose  du- 
are  defined  by  law,  includes  a  poorhouse 
lintendent  appointed  by  a  county  board 
ommissioners,  under  the  authority  con- 
;d  by  Civ.  Ck>de  1002,  |§  786,  786.    San- 

V.  Belue,  58  S.  E.  762-764,  78  S.  G.  171. 

Under  Const  art  3,  |  28,  prohibiting  the 
iting  of  any  extra  compensation  to  any 
ic  officer,  and  Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  3280, 
Iding  that  each  public  officer  on  w.hom  a 
is  expressly  imposed  by  law,  must  exe- 
the  same  without  fee,  except  where  a 
s  expressly  allowed,  an  agreement  to  pay 
unty  clerk,  a  **publlc  officer"  under  Pub- 
)fficers  Law,  |  2,  for  services  imposed  by 
is  invalid  on  the  ground  of  public  policy. 
Isworth  V.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Livingston 
aty,  115  N.  Y.  Supp.  8,  15. 

The  provisions  of  section  6  of  "an  act  to 
ice  the  number  of  members  of  boards  of 
en  fre^olders,"  etc.  (the  Strong  Act  [P. 
902,  p.  67]),  concerning  the  terms  of  of- 
of  certain  officers,  do  not  apply  to  a  mere 
^ship  in  a  county  institution.  Walker  v. 
rd  of  Chosen  Freeholders  of  Essex  Coun- 
i5  AtL  166,  83  N.  J.  Law,  695. 

"Mr.  Freeman  says  that  a  ^better  deflnl- 
of  an  office  is  that  it  is  a  right  to  exercise 


a  public  function  or  employment  and  take  the 
fees  belonging  to  It'  Applying  the  rule  or 
definition  thus  indicated,  we  think  that,  if 
the  person  who  has  been  duly  selected  and 
authorized  to  do  the  official  county  printing 
is  not  to  be  considered  an  officer,  hU  position 
is  so  analogous  to  that  of  an  officer  that  the 
rules  whicfh  have  been  approved  wih  refer- 
ence to  the  conflicting  claims  of  officers  de 
facto  and  officers  de  jure  and  their  respective 
claims  against  the  state,  county,  or  other 
municipality  may  be  held  applicable."  Smith 
V.  Van  Buren  County,  101  N.  W.  186,  188, 125 
Iowa,  454. 

Oomrt  officer  or  employ^ 

Judges  are  not  public  officers  within 
Const  art  3, 1 13,  providing  that  no  law  shall 
extend  the  term  of  a  public  officer,  or  change 
his  salary,  after  his  election  or  appointment 
Commonwealth  y.  Ifathues,  59  Atl.  961,  980, 
210  Pa.  372. 

A  county  judge  is  a  "public  officer"  with- 
in Const  art  5,  |  30,  providing  that,  except 
as  otherwise  provided  in  the  Constitution,  no 
law  shall  extend  the  term  of  any  public  offi- 
cer or  diminish  or  increase  his  salary  or 
emoluments  after  his  election  or  appoint^ 
ment  Henderson  v.  Boulder  County,  117 
Pac.  997,  998,  51  Colo.  364. 

Judges  of  the  superior  court  of  West 
Florida  were  "public  officers  acting  under  au- 
thority of  Congress"  within  the  meaning  of 
the  proviso  in  Act  June  22,  1860,  ft  3,  prohib- 
iting commissioners  from  embracing  among 
the  Florida  land  claims  which  ought  to  be 
confirmed  "any  claim  which  has  been  hereto- 
fore presented  for  oonflrmation  before  any 
board  of  commissioners  or  other  public  offi- 
cers acting  under  authority  of  Congress,  and 
rejected  as  being  fraudulent,  or  procured  or 
maintained  by  fraudulent  or  improper 
means."  United  States  v.  Dalcour,  27  Sup, 
Ct  58,  59,  62,  203  U.  S.  408,  51  L.  Ed.  248. 

One  appointed  court  stenographer,  though 
for  a  single  case  only,  by  the  judge,  under 
Sess.  Laws  1899,  pp.  Ill,  112,  c.  72,  is  in  the 
discharge  of  his  duties  a  "public  officer,"  so 
that  the  contract  of  the  parties  to  pay  him 
more  than  provided  by  the  statute  for  tran- 
scribing the  testimony  is  void,  as  iigainst 
public  policy.  Dull  v.  Mammoth  Mih.  Co.,  79 
Paa  1050,  1051,  28  Utah,  467. 

"A  *public  office'  is  the  right,  authority, 
and  duty  created  and  conferred  by  law  by 
which,  for  a  given  period  either  fixed  by  law 
or  enduring  at  the  pleasure  of  the  creating 
power,  an  individual  is  vested  with  some 
portion  of  the  sovereign  functions  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  be  exercised  by  him  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  public"  (quoting  and  adopting  defi- 
nition in  Mechem  on  Public  Officers,  as  ap- 
proved in  Kimbrough  v.  Bamett,  55  S.  W. 
120,  93  Tex.  301).  "As  said  by  Chief  Justice 
Marshall,  'although  an  office  is  an  employ- 
ment, it  does  not  follow  that  every  employ- 


OFFICER 


T08 


OFFICSB 


ment  Is  an  offloa*  Mr.  liecbem*  In  bU  work  on 
Public  Offlcez%  lays:  The  most  Important 
characteristic  which  dlstingaishes  an  office 
from  an  employment  or  contract  is  that  the 
creation  and  conferring  of  an  office  inTolres 
a  delegation  to  the  indlTldual  of  some  of  the 
sovereign  functions  of  government,  to  be  ex- 
ercised by  him  for  the  benefit  of  the  public; 
that  some  portion  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
country,  either  legislative,  executive,  or  Ju- 
dicial attaches  for  the  time  being,  to  be  exer- 
cised for  the  benefit  of  the  public.  Unless 
the  powers  conferred  are  of  this  nature  the 
individual  is  not  a  public  officer.'  Now, 
while  the  fact  that  the  position  of  stenogra- 
pher is  designated  in  the  act  providing  for 
its  creation  as  an  office,  and  that  it  declares 
that  the  person  who  may  be  called  to  per- 
form its  duties  'shall  be  a  sworn  officer  of 
the  court,'  affords  some  reason  for  determin- 
ing it  to  be  such,  still  it  is  believed  the  place 
possesses  none  of  those  sovereign  functions 
of  the  judicial  department  of  the  government 
to  which  it  relates,  to  distinguish  It  from  a 
mere  employment  to  perform  a  species  of 
service,  under  public  authority,  for  the  as- 
sistance and  convenience  of  the  court  and 
parties  litigant  therein,  in  which  no  Judicial 
discretion  or  Judgment  is  involved.  The  cre- 
ation of  the  position,  as  shown  by  the  very 
terms  of  the  act,  .was  designed  for  no  other 
purpose  than  to  provide  some  one  by  whom 
the  oral  evidence  offered,  and  other  proceed- 
ings involving  objections  made  to  the  admis- 
sibility of  tsetimony,  the  ruling  of  the  court, 
and  exceptions  thereto,  might  be  taken  in 
shorthand  as  a  method  of  preserving  those 
matters  as  they  occurred,  without  deiaytng 
trials,  to  be  afterwards  transcribed  and  fur- 
nished the  court  and  parties  to  the  suit;;*  to 
aid  them  in  an  accurate  and  prompt  prepara- 
tion of  the  record.  The  report  or  transcript 
of  the  proceedings  by  the  stenographer  is  not 
blading,  however,  upon  the  court,  and  may 
be  adopted  or  rejected  at  his  discretion.  No 
act  which  he  is  authorized  to  do  is  independ- 
ent of  the  control  of  others,  or  vested  in  him 
as  a  power  to  be  exercised  as  a  right  or  pre- 
rogative of  a  Judicial  office.  We  conclude 
that  while  the  position  of  a  stenographer, 
under  the  statute  in  this  state,  may  be,  in  a 
sense,  an  office,  and  the  term  thereof  may 
continue  for  a  longer  period  than  two  years, 
yet  there  is  no  such  sovereign  function  of 
government  embraced  in  the  powers  confer- 
red upon  the  individual  performing  its  duties 
as  brings  it  within  the  meaning  of  the  word 
'office*  as  used  in  the  section  of  the  Constitu- 
tion quoted."  Robertson  v.  Ellis  County, 
84  S.  W.  1097,  1098,  1009,  88  Tex,  Cij.  App. 
146. 

Deputy 

Persons  who  are  appointed  deputies  un- 
der a  statute  are  "public  officers."  Wells  y. 
State,  94  N.  E.  321,  822,  175  Ind.  880»  Ann. 
Cas.  19130,  86. 


A  dspttty  sheriff,  appointed  onder  tlie  ti 
thority  of  Shannon's  Code,  {  448,  to  sen 
process  in  the  portion  of  the  county  In  whic 
he  residesk  being  required  by  sections  107 
1080,  to  take  the  constitutiODal  oath  of  oic 
is  an  officer,  within  Const  art  2i  i  28,  dedi 
ing  that  no  person  shall  hold  moze  Oud  oi 
office  at  the  same  time.  Stats  v.  Sla^e,  i 
S.  W.  826, 115  Tenn.  886L 

A  statute  making  It  a  ndsdemeanor  fi 
any  officer  reanired  to  keep  a  conrt  docb 
Or  to  keep  an  account  of  fees  or  fines  ai 
to  pay  over  the  same,  to  fklsify  sach  dod 
or  account,  Is  not  restricted  to  public  officei 
and  applies  not  only  to  the  deik  of  a  di 
trict  court  but  to  the  deputy  derk.  State 
Hanlln,  110  N.  W.  162, 164,  134  Iowa,  483. 

Under  CoBst  art  2;  f  2,  providing  t 
the  appointment  of  officers  by  the  Preskif 
or  heads  of  departments,  a  6eBfaty  Uniti 
States  surveyor,  appointment  of  whum  by 
Surveyor  General  is  provided  tor  bj  ^ 
St  f  2223,  is  not  an  ^'officer  of  the  Unit 
States"  within  Act  March  8,  1887,  c.  359, 
2,  24  Stat  605,  as  amended  by  Act  June ' 
1808,  c.  608,  80  Stat  495,  wlthdrnwlng  fn 
the  Jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  and  Distii 
Courts  suits  for  fees,  salary,  or  compem 
tion  for  official  services  of  officers  cS.  i 
United  States.  ScuUy  ▼.  United  Statei,  1 
Fed.  186,  186L 

Deputy  inspectors  of  boilers  and  elei 
tors,  provided  for  by  the  <diarter  of  tbe  d 
of  St  Louis,  perform  public  functions.  Tb 
have  a  fixed  tenure  of  office  of  four  yea 
and  are  required  to  give  bond.  Tb<dr  sa 
ries  are  fixed  at  a  certain  sum  per  j» 
Their  qualifications  are  prescribed  by  la 
Their  public  position  is  expressly  daiomt 
ed  as  an  office,  and  their  duties  as  offidal  c 
ties.  Tte  diarter  defines  '"officers"  as  tk 
holding  situations  under  the  dty  goTenuoe 
or  its  departments  with  an  annual  salary 
for  a  fixed  definite  term  of  office,  and  t 
forms  of  official  oath  and  bond  prescrib 
refer  to  their  positions  as  officers.  In  ^ 
of  this,  it  was  held  that  they  are  ''officer 
although  McQuUlin's  Municipal  Code  of ! 
Louis,  I  2107,  authorizes  the  inspectors 
boilers  and  elevators  to  "employ"  depatfa 
the  word  "employ"  conveying  the  idea  of  i 
lecting  and  intrusting  with  a  duty.  Grac 
V.  City  of  St  Louis,  111  S.  W.  1159, 11< 
U61,  1163,  213  Mo.  884  (citing  6  Words  aJ 
Phrases,  p.  4923). 

An  "officer"  in  the  constitational  v^ 
being  one  who  Is  elected  or  ai^inted  to  i 
office,  and  who  takes  the  oath  of  office,  ai 
is  responsible  for  the  official  acts  of  ^ 
and  subordinates,  his  deputies  are  sot  ^ 
ficers,"  and  the  provision  in  Const  art  2. 
20,  that  the  General  Assembly  shaU  fix  tl 
compensation  of  all  i^cers,  is  not  infrio? 
by  Act  March  22, 1006  98  Ohio  Laws,  p.^ 
authorizing  the  county  commissioners  to  i 
the  compensation  of  d^;nities  of  coonty  c 


OFFICEB 


709 


OFFICER 


8.  Theobald  ▼.  8Ute»  80  Olilo  Olr.  Ot  R. 
415. 

Since  the  Legislature  has  not  provided 
the  office  of  deputy  town  marshal  or  dele- 
d  to  towns  the  power  to  create  such  of- 
the  deputy  town  marshal  of  an  unincor- 
Lted  town  was  not  a  **publlc  officer"  wlth- 
en.  Code  1901, 1 143,  making  it  a  criminal 
ise  to  resist  a  public  officer.  Findley  v. 
e  (Aria.)  127  Pac.  716. 

Rev.  St  1899,  i  8863,  as  amended,  pro- 
8  that  every  justice  issuing  any  process 
lorized  by  chapter  48,  art  3,  including 
mons,  on  being  satisfied  that  process  will 
be  executed  for  want  ot  an  officer  to  be 
in  time  to  execute  it,  or  in  all  cases 
re  the  constable  is  a  party  to  the  pending 
,  or  is  otherwise  interested  in  the  result 
eof,  may  empower  any  suitable  person 
a  party  to  the  suit  to  execute  the  same 
ndorsement  thereon,  and  that  the  party 
mpowered  shall  possess  all  the  authority 
be  constable  in  relation  to  its  execution, 
ion  3864  (page  2143)  declares  that  every 
table  or  "other  person"  serving  any  pro- 
authorized  by  the  article  shall  return 
eon  in  writing  the  time  and  manner  of 
ice,  and  shall  sign  his  name  to  such  re- 
I.  Held,  that  a  private  person  specially 
itized  to  serve  a  Justice's  summons  is  in 
lense  an  "officer,"  but  is  in  law  and  fact 
agent  of  the  party  at  whose  instance  and 
^hose  risk  he  has  been  named,  and  hence, 
igh  required  to  make  return  of  the  time 
manner  of  service,  sneh  return  Is  subject 
mpeachment  in  the  action  by  motion  co 
ih,  or  plea  in  abatement,  and  is  not  with- 
he  rule  thai  the  return  of  an  officer  is 
lusive  on  the  parties,  and  can  be  im- 
^ed  only  in  a  direct  action  on  the  officer's 
i  for  a  false  return.  Stegall  v.  American 
nent  &  Chemical  Co.,  180  S.  W.  144,  160, 
Mo.  App.  261. 

rainage  dlstriot  direotov 

The  director  of  a  drainage  district  is  in 
^Dse  a  public  officer ;  but,  as  his  office  is 
one  provided  for  by  the  Constitution,  nor 
1  one  of  the  same  general  character,  as 
that  are  referred  to  in  that  instrument, 
iust  be  deemed  not  to  be  within  the  scope 
le  prohibition;  the  Kansas  Bill  of  Rights, 
prohibiting  any  religious  test  or  property 
llfication  as  a  requirment  for  any  office 
ublic  trust  or  for  any  vote  at  any  election, 
ie  V.  Monahan,  84  Pac.  130,  133,  72  Kan. 
115  Am.  St  Rep.  224,  7  Ann.  Cas.  661. 

leotittB  J«dc«s  or  olerks 

The  Judges  and  cl«-ks  of  election,  ap- 
ited  under  the  authority  of  Act  March  28, 
J  (Laws  1908,  p.  170),  creating  a  board  of 
tion  commissioners  in  cities  having  a 
Illation  of  over  800,000,  requiring  the 
fd  to  appoint,  90  days  prior  to  the  first 
tion  after  the  adoption  of  the  act  and 
^  two  years  thereafter,  Judges  and  clerks 


of  election  for  each  precinct  in  the  dty,  pro- 
viding for  the  removal  of  the  Judges  and 
clerks  from  "office"  for  grounds  specified, 
prescribing  their  duties,  and  fixing  their 
emoluments,  are  *t>ublic  officers"  holding  of- 
fice for  a  fixed  period.  State  ex  rel.  Mosconi 
V.  Maroney,  90  S.  W.  141,  145,  191  Mo.  531. 

A  Judge  of  election  is  a  public  officer  un- 
der "An  act  to  regulate  elections"  (Revision 
of  1898 ;  C.  S.  p.  2073),  upon  whom  a  duty  is 
imposed,  and  the  depositing  by  him  of  a  bal- 
lot, in  the  ballot  box,  of  a  voter  who  has  been 
challenged,  before  the  board  had  by  a  major- 
ity vote  decided  to  receive  such  ballot,  makes 
him  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  under  section 
197  (C.  S.  p.  2187).  State  v.  Lockman,  83 
Ati.  689,  690,  83  N.  J.  Law,  168;  Same  v. 
Stockwell,  134  N.  W.  767,  770,  23  N.  D.  7a 

Employ^,  laborer,  or  serrant 

See  Employ 6 ;  Laborer;  Servant 
Distinction  between  officer  and  employ^ 
generally,  see  Office. 

Insuranoo  asent 

An  insurance  agent,  as  such,  Is  not  a 
"public  officer,"  nor  is  his  character  a  matter 
of  public  interest;  except  as  the  public  has 
an  indirect  interest  in  the  private  character 
and  conduct  of  every  member  of  society ;  but 
this  interest  is  not  sufficient  to  invoke  the 
privilege  in  libel,  granted  in  case  where  one 
holds  or  is  a  candidate  for  some  position  of 
public  trust  Morse  v.  Times-Republican 
Printing  Co.,  100  N.  W.  867,  873,  124  Iowa. 
707. 

Jailer  or  otker  prlsom  keeper 

The  office  of  keeper  of  a  county  Jail  is  an 
"office  or  franchise"  within  Revision,  p.  005, 
providing  that  in  case  any  person  shall  usurp 
or  intrude  into  any  office  or  franchise  the 
Attorney  G^ieral  on  leave  of  the  Supreme 
Court  may  bring  information.  State  ex  rel. 
Bownes  v.  Meehan,  45  N.  J.  Law,  189,  196. 

One  employed  as  an  assistant  matron  of 
a  workhouse  is  not  an  officer  but  a  mere  em- 
ploy6,  although  under  contract  for  one  year, 
and  on  sufficient  proof  of  misconduct  or  neg- 
lect may  be  summarily  removed  by  the  board 
in  control.  Jameson  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  28 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct  R.  41,  43. 

Within  the  definition  of  an  office  as  a 
place  in  a  governmental  system  created,  or 
recognized,  by  the  law  of  the  state  which,  ei- 
ther directiy  or  by  delegated  authority,  as- 
signs to  the  incumbent  thereof  the  continuous 
performance  of  certain  permanent  public 
duties,  the  wardenshlp  of  the  Essex  county 
penitentiary,  in  view  of  Act  March  22,  1900 
(P.  L.  p.  168)  i  6,  and  the  duties  imposed  on 
the  warden  by  the  board  of  freeholders  of 
the  county,  is  an  office,  and  not  a  mere  em- 
ployment, so  that  quo  warranto,  and  not 
certiorari,  is  the  proper  remedy  to  determine 
which  of  the  parties  is  the  lawful  incumbent 
thereof.  Hosp  v.  Martin,  84  AtL  1059,  1060, 
88  N.  J.  Law,  299. 


I        I' 


OFFIOBR 


710 


QFFICBB 


Jwor  or  iwr 

The  qualiflcatloiis  and  competent  of 
grand  Jurors,  except  as  prescribed  by  Oode 
1907,  I  7239t  providing  that  grand  jnrors 
most  be  male  residents  of  the  oounty,  orer  21 
and  under  60  years  of  age,  are  f6r  the  judg- 
ment of  the  Jury  commissioners,  and  a  Juror 
need  not  be  a  qualified  elector,  and  section 
1467,  fixing  the  eligibility  to  office,  has  no 
application  to  Jurors.  Wilson  y.  State,  54 
South.  572,  574, 171  Ala.  25. 

A  Jury  commissioner  is  an  "ofllcer"  with- 
in Oonst  art  160,  proYiding  that  all  oAoers 
shall  take  the  oath  of  office  and,  unless  he 
takes  the  oath  pritecribed  by  that  article,  he 
cannot  enter  on  the  discharge  of  the  duties, 
though  he  may  have  sworn  to  discharge  those 
duties  according  to  acts  1808,  p.  216,  No.  185, 
or  some  other  statute.  State  r.  McClendon, 
43  South.  417,  418,  118  La.  702  (citing  State 
y.  Newhouse,  29  La.  Ann.  824;  State  ▼.  Arata, 
32  La.  Ann.  193;  State  v.  Dellwood,  33  La. 
Ann.  1229;  State  y.  Nockum,  6  South.  729, 
41  La.  Ann.  689 ;  State  y.  Fuselier,  26  Soutii. 
264,  51  La.  Ann.  1317;  State  y.  Scott,  84 
South.  479,  110  La.  371). 

Under  Bums'  Ann.  St  1901,  f  1449,  re- 
quiring Jury  commissioners  to  take  an  official 
oath  to  honestly  perform  their  duties  "during 
their  term  of  office,"  and  section  1456,  declar- 
ing that  any  person  appointed  a  Jury  commis- 
sioner who  shall  "fail  to  take  upon  himself 
said  office,**  etc.,  shall  be  guilty  of  contempt 
of  court,  a  person  appointed  a  Jury  commis- 
sioner is  an  "officer"  whose  acta  axe  protect- 
ed by  the  de  facto  doctrine.  State  y.  Suther- 
lin,  75  N.  B.  642,  645,  166  Ind.  339. 

The  office  of  Jury  commissioner,  created 
by  Sees.  Acta  1879,  p.  28,  relating  to  the  ap- 
pointment of  Jury  commissioner  in  cities 
haying  a  specified  population.  Is  not  an  "of- 
fice" within  Const  art  9,  I  14,  limiting  the 
term  of  office  of  county,  township  and  munic- 
ipal officers  to  four  years.  State  ex  inf. 
Hadley  y.  Corcoran,  103  S.  W.  1044,  1045, 
206  Mo.  1,  12  Ann.  Gas.  565. 

A  grand  Juror  is  not  a  "public  officer*' 
to  be  commisMoned  by  the  Goyernor,  within 
the  statute  construing  the  term  "public  of- 
ficers" to  mean  all  officers  of  the  state  that 
haye  heretotore  been  commissioned  by  the 
Qoyemor,  etc.  State  y.  Graham,  60  S.  B. 
481,  432,  79  S.  C.  116. 

Miuilcipal  offloer  ov  employ^ 

Persons  employed  in  a  city  hall  in  man- 
aging and  conducting  the  affairs  of  the  mu- 
nlcipaUty  are  public  officers,  charged  with 
the  performance  of  public  duties;  and  the 
doctrine  of  respondeat  superior  does  not  ap- 
ply to  such  employments.  Schwalk^s  Adm*r 
y.  City  of  Louisville,  122  8.  W.  860,  862,  135 
Ky.  570,  25  L.  E,  A.  (N.  SO  8a 

An  assistant  dty  auditor,  whose  duty  it 
is  to  assist  the  dty  auditor  and  to  act  in  his 
absence,  is  a  *1[>ublic  officer,"  defined  as  one 


the  performanoe  of  whose  dattes  toroWed 
the  exercise  of  some  portion  of  the  aorerep 
power,  and  in  whose  proper  performance  all 
citizens  are  interested,  either  as  members  d 
the  entire  body  politic  or  of  some  snbditlsion 
of  it  Attorney  General  y.  Tlllin^iast,  S9 
K.  B.  1058»  1060,  203  Mass.  539, 17  Ami.  Ca& 
449. 

The  superintendent  of  streets  In  Oldton 
in  1904-05  was  not  an  employ^  or  agent  o( 
the  dty  entitled  to  damages  for  breacb  oi 
contract  for  employment,  but  was  a  *1ral]lc 
officer^  possessing  official  powers  and  chaif 
ed  with  public  duties,  and  hence  can  recorer 
only  the  salary  or  emolumentB  established 
by  law  for  that  offios  to  be  paid  by  the  dtj. 
St^bens  y.  dty  of  Oldtown,  66  Atl  115, 
U7,  102  Me.  21. 

A  teacher  In  the  public  schools  Is  not  &d 
"officer"  of  the  city  within  the  provisions  oi 
original  Greater  New  Tork  Charter,  $  1117 
relating  to  the  transfer  to  the  service  of  tbf 
consolidated  city  of  those  holding  office  foi 
definite  terms.  Bogert  y.  Board  of  Ednca 
tlon  of  City  of  New  York,  94  N.  T.  Supp. 
180,  183,  106  App.  Dly.  56. 

A  ''public  officer"  being  one  who  renden 
a  public  servioe,  or  senrlce  in  which  the  gen- 
eral public  is  interested*  a  municipal  fire 
man  is  a  public  officer,  as  he  is  cbarged  witb 
the  public  duty  of  protecting  the  property  in 
the  municipality  from  fire.  Schmltt  t.  DooI 
ing,  140  S.  W.  197,  198,  145  Ky.  240.  38  I 
B.  A.  (N.  S.)  881,  Ann.  Cas.  1913B,  107& 


Since  Bums'  Ana.  St  1908,  ff  i 
proylding  for  the  crsation  of  boards  of  beftitt 
recognises  and  treate  them  as  one  of  tbe  ei- 
ecutiye  d^iartmente  of  the  dty,  memben  iA 
such  board  are  dty  offloeis,  and  not  me.** 
employ69.  Watts  y.  City  of  Princeton^  96  N. 
BL  658,  659,  49  Ind.  App.  86. 

The  word  'Offloer,"  as  used  in  Greater 
New  Yortt  Charter,  Laws  1901,  p.  109,  c  4(» 
I  255,  proylding  that  the  oorpocation  coubs^ 
shall  be  the  attorney  for  the  dty  and  eidi 
and  every  officer,  and  shall  conduct  all  i^ 
law  business  In  which  the  dty  Is  Interested. 
and  shall  be  the  legal  adviser  of  tbe  nia^- 
and  dty  boards  and  officers,  and  shall  to:- 
nish  them  such  advice  and  legal  assistaoce 
as  may  be  required,  clearly  related  to  thf« 
officers  who  were  on  the  same  general  M- 
ing  as  the  mayor,  dty  boards,  and  offices 
ete.,  and  not  to  the  subordinate  officers.  ^^ 
ahue  y.  Keeshan,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  144. 147,91 
App.  Div.  602. 

A  derk  appointed  under  Greater  N^^ 
York  Charter,  1 1571,  authorising  the  cok^k^ 
to  appoint  a  clerk«  etc,  who  performs  roo* 
tine  duties  in  strict  subordination  to  a  v^^ 
lie  officer,  and  with  no  authority  nnder  tM 
stetute  to  do  anything  exo^  where  it  |^ 
authorised  and  directed  by  such  officer,  i-^ 
not  a  "public  officer/'  an^  hence  wben  ^ 
missed  in  violation  of  Civil  Service  Law,  i  ^ 
(lAWS  1899,  p.  809,  c  ^70,  as  amended  ^ 


OFFICER 


711 


OFFICER 


vs  1004,  p.  1604,  c  607),  mandamus  la 
remedy.  People  ex  reL  Hoefle  ▼.  Cahlll, 
S,  E.  453,  454,  188  N.  Y.  480. 

Under  Rev.  St  1880,  |  5777,  declaring 

term    **offlcers"   to  include  any   person 

ling  any  situation  under  the  city  govem- 

it  or  any  of  its  departments,  with  an  an- 

1  salary  or  for  a  definite  term  of  office, 

erson  appointed  to  perform  certain  engl- 

ring  duties  with  regard  to  sewers  in  a 

'  of  the  third  class,  for  no  definite  term, 

I  to  receive  a  per  diem  wage,  is  not  an 

icer,"  entitled  to  perform  such  work  un- 

section  5848,  requiring  the  same  to  be 

formed  by  a  dty  engineer  or  other  offi- 

Weesner  v.  Central  Nat  Bank,  80  S.  W. 

,  320,  106  Mo.  App.  66& 

A  clerk  of  the  street  department  la  one 
the  subordinate  officers  whose  appoint- 
it  by  the  council  la  authorized  by  the 
rter  of  the  dty  of  Trenton,  but  his  term 
)ffice  is  for  one  year  unless  sooner  remov- 

and  an  appointment  for  three  years  is 
ond  the  power  of  the  coundl.  Where  the 
ordinate  office  of  clerk  of  the  street  de- 
tment  la  created  by  ordinance  »under  a 
rter  provision  authorizing  the  common 
ndl  to  appoint  such  subordinate  officers 
^all  be  necessary,  the  incumbent  must  be 
icted  and  appointed  by  the  common  coun- 

and  the  duty  cannot  be  delegated  to  one 
the  clt^  officials  appointed  by  the  council, 
i  clerk  of  the  street  department  having 
duty  to  perform  other  than  those  directed 
the  street  commissioner,  his  appointment 
3  not  to  a  public  office,  but  was  in  the  na- 
e  of  a  contract  of  employment  McAvoy 
Inhabitants  of  City  of  Trenton,  80  AtL 
.  051,  82  N.  J.  Law,  lOL 

A  councilman  of  an  incorporated  dty  is 
"officer  or  agent  of  a  corporation"  within 
tatute  prohibiting  any  "officer  or  agent  of 
'  corporation"  or  public  Institution  to  be 
jrested  in  any  contract  to  sell  or  furnish 
'  supplies,  etc.,  to  the  corporation,  etc. 
Dmonwealth  v.  Witman,  66  Atl.  086,  088, 

Pa.  41L 

A  dty  councilman,  like  a  dty  marshal,  is 
1)ubllc  official."  His  duties  are  defined 
law.  He  is  not  the  general  or  private 
nt  of  the  dty,  and  the  coundlmen  could 
y  bind  the  city  by  such  construction  as 
J  are  by  law  authorized  to  make,  and, 
5e  the  right  of  any  public  officer  can  ex- 
only  by  law,  the  dty  coundl  Is  power- 
i  to  bind  the  dty  in  any  manner  to  pay 
ompensatlon  to  the  marshal  not  fixed  by 
alld  ordinance.    G'Dwyer  v.  City  of  Mon- 

100  S.  W.  670,  671,  123  Mo.  App.  184. 

A  diarter  provision  for  a  board  of  ap- 
isement  composed  of  two  aldermen  and 

citizen,  to  which  should  be  referred  all 
tters  pertaining  to  taxation,  does  not  cre- 

a  new  "office,"  but  confers  upon  the  al- 
men,  when  selected,  a  power  which  might 
e  been  given  to  thB  entlie  eoundl,  and 


does  not  violate  Const  art  16,  |  40,  provid- 
ing that  no  pej^son  shall  hold  at  the  same 
time  more  than  one  dvil  "office"  or  emolu- 
ment City  of  Houston  v.  Stpwart,  87  S.  W. 
663,.  665.  00  Tex.  67. 

The  word  "officers,"  .as  used  in  a  dty 
charter  providing  that  the  mayor  shall  ap- 
point all  officers  of  a  dty  whose  election  or 
appointment  is  not  otherwise  provided  for  in 
the  charter  or  by-laws,  does  not  cover  em- 
ploy^ but  only  includes  such  officers  whose 
appointment  is  not  otherwise  provided  for 
at  the  time  of  the  appointment.  MacDonald 
V.  Lane^  00  Paa  181,  182,  48  Or.  530. 

The  secretary  of  a  dty  board  of  health 
is  an  "officer"  within  the  act  for  the  incorpo- 
ration of  cities,  approved  March  14,  1867, 
declaring  that  no  dty  "officer"  shall  be  In 
any  manner  interested  in  any  contract  with 
the  dty,  and  a  contract  made  in  violation 
thereof  to  be  void,  and  hence  a  contract,  be- 
tween a  dty  and  the  secretary  of  the  board, 
whereby  the  secretary  is  to  care  for  small- 
pox patients,  is  void  unless  such  an  emer- 
gency exists  that  it  would  be  manifestly  un- 
just to  delay  action  in  order  to  comply  with 
the  strict  requirements  of  the  statute.  .  City 
of  Greenfield  v.  Black,  82  N.  B.  707,  708,  42 
Ind.  App.  645. 

Under  Rev.  St  1800,  i  5848,  relating  to 
the  duties  to  be  performed  by  a  dty  engineer 
or  other  officer  and  providing  that  on  the 
completion  of  any  sewer  district  the  dty  en- 
gineer or  other  officer  having  charge  of  the 
work  shall  compute  the  cost  thereof,  and 
shall  apportion  the  same  against  the  lots, 
an  officer  other  than  the  dty  engineer  may 
perform  the  duties  in  regard  to  sewers,  but 
an  inspector  appointed  by  the  dty  engineer 
to  have  oversight  of  a  sewer  construction,  as 
agent  of  the  engineer  during  his  temporary 
absence  from  the  work,  is  not  such  an  officer. 
Ernst  V.  aty  of  Springfield.  130  S.  W.  410, 
423,  145  Mo.  App.  80. 

The  word  "officer,"  in  Pen.  Code,  §  672, 
punishing  one  who  with  intent  to  defraud 
presents  for  allowance  or  payment  to  any 
officer  of  any  city,  authorized  to  audit,  al- 
low, or  pay  bills,  fraudulent  claims,  includes 
the  comptroller  of  the  city  of  New  York,  au- 
thorized by  Greater  New  York  Charter,  Laws 
1001,  p.  50,  c.  466,  §  140,  to  adjust  claims 
against  the  dty.  People  v.  Miles,  108  N.  Y. 
Supp.  510,  123  App.  Div.  862. 

The  use  of  the  word  "officer"  in  a  dty 
charter  authorizing  the  common  council  to 
make  rules  and  regulations  for  the  govem- 
mpnt  of  all  "officers,"  and  to  fix  the  fees  and 
charges  for  all  offldal  services,  and  to  fix 
salaries  and  wages  not  otherwise  provided 
by  general  laws,  or  by  the  charter,  aad  a  fur- 
ther provision  stating  the  amount  of  the  an- 
nual salaries  of  the  officers  of  the  dty,  and 
empowering  the  coundl  to  fix  the  salaries  of 
aill  other  officers,  does  not  indude  a  chai'ter 
officer,  and  the  oommon  couadl  was  not  au- 


OFEicrat 


712 


onriGUi 


thorlsed  to  create  aalAcles  for  its  members. 
Woods  ▼.  Potter,  96  Paa  1125,  1127,  8  OaL 
App.  41. 

Village  Law  (Oonsol.  Laws  1909,  c  64)  | 
832,  providing  that  an  "officer"  shall  not  be 
interested  in  a  contact  which  he  or  a  board 
of  which  he  is  a  member  makes  on  behalf  of 
the  village  nor  in  furnishing  work  or  materi- 
als, held  not  to  apply  to  the  street  superin- 
tendent of  the  Tillage  of  Saratoga  Springs, 
as  the  act  creating  snch  offioe  omitted  as  to 
him  the  restriction  applicable  generally  to 
Tillage  officers,  so  that  he  may  recoTer  for 
the  use  of  a  horse  and  wagon  furnished  by 
him  to  couToy  the  sewer,  water,  and  street 
commissioner  about  the  Tillage  in  the  dis- 
charge of  his  duties.  Morrissey  t.  Sewer, 
Water  h  Street  Commission  of  Saratoga 
Springs,  133  N.  Y.  Supp.  366,  866,  73  Misc. 
Rep.  432. 

The  office  of  a  city  treasurer,  appointed 
by  the  mayor  pursuant  to  Municipal  Code 
Act  (Acte  1907.  pp.  799,  811)  ||  17,  83  (Code 
1907,  fl  1067,  1171),  proTidlng  for  the  deter- 
mination by  ordinance  of  the  officers  of  a 
city,  their  salary,  manner  of  election,  and 
terms  of  office,  and  an  ordinance  thereunder 
fixing  the  office  of  treasurer,  defining  his  du- 
ties, requiring  him  to  make  bond,  etc.,  is  a 
'^public  dTil  office,"  the  title  to  which  may  be 
tried  by  quo  warranto  proceedings  under 
Code  1907,  |  6453.  Michael  t.  Stete  ex  rel. 
Welch,  50  South.  929,  961,  163  Ala.  426. 

The  treasurer  of  a  village  is  not  an  ''of- 
ficer" within  Village  Law,  Laws  1897,  p. 
451,  c.  414,  i  313,  providing  that  an  officer 
shall  not  be  interested  in  a  contract  which  he 
or  a  board  of  which  be  is  a  member  is  au- 
thorized to  make  on  behalf  of  the  village, 
since  under  section  81  (page  388)  the  village 
treasurer  is  not  a  member  of  the  board  of 
trustees,  and  is  not  authorized  to  make  con- 
tracte  on  behalf  of  the  village,  so  that  a  con- 
tract for  public  work  entered  into  between 
a  village  and  a  corporation  of  which  the  vil- 
lage treasurer  is  president  is  not  void.  In 
re  Village  of  Kenmore,  110  N.  Y.  Supp.  1008, 
1013,  59  Misc.  Rep.  388. 

Under  Spokane  Charter,  which  esteblish- 
ed  a  commission  form  of  government  and 
classified  civil  service,  one  entitled  to  the 
position  of  foreman  in  the  water  construction 
department  is  an  "officer,"  and  not  a  mere 
subordinate,  as  affecting  his  right  to  maintein 
quo  warranto  on  wrongful  discharge.  State 
ex  rel.  Powell  v.  Fassett,  125  Pac.  963,  964, 
69  Wash.  555. 

St.  1S65,  c  163,  being  an  act  for  supply- 
ing the  dty  of  Cambridge  with  water,  pro- 
vides, in*  section  6,  that  the  powers  therein 
granted  shall  be  exercised  by  such  agents  as 
the  "city  council"  shall  direct  A  water 
board  is  not  provided  for  by  any  subsequent 
act,  but  subsequent  ordinances  of  the  city,  tn 
designating  Ite  agents^  use  the  phrase  '*water 


board***  flt  1891,  c  864,  amendbg  tbe  dt 
charter,  recognizes  the  existence  of  the  wite 
board,  but  makes  no  provisioa  for  the  elecdo 
of  Ite  members,  except  in  section  9,  irbic 
provides  that  all  "ofDcer^*  not  elected  b 
voters  shall  be  appointed  by  the  mayor,  sol 
ject  to  confirmation  by  the  board  of  aldei 
men.  Held,  that  members  of  the  water  boar 
are  "officers,**  within  the  meaning  of  the  la 
ter  section,  and  therefore  an  ordinance  pn 
viding  for  their  appointment  In  such  vavan 
is  valid.  O'Brien  v.  Thorogood,  39  N.  E.  2S: 
288,  162  Mass.  598. 

The  foreman  of  the  yard  of  health  d 
partment  of  a  dty  being  one  of  those  engasc 
in  the  labor  service  of  the  dty  holda  an  "ei 
ployment*'  rather  than  an  "office.*'  G&ni 
V.  City  of  LoweU,  85  N.  B.  182, 185, 199  Mas 
47,  127  Am.  St  Eep.  468. 

8t  Louis  aty  Charter,  art  4,  |  43,  d 
fines  the  term  "ofllcers**  to  indude  "all  pe 
sons  holding  any  dtnation  under  the  ei 
govemment  or  ite  dotartmaitB,  with  an  a 
nnal  salary  or  for  a  definite  term."  An  i 
specter  to  assist  the  commissioner  of  pob] 
bnildingB  In  the  inspection  of  private  boil 
Ings  in  the  course  of  erection  is  an  offici 
Magner  v.  City  of  8t  Lonis,  78  8.  W.  TS 
784, 179  Ho.  495. 

An  ez^npt  flrenan  holding  the  positi' 
of  assistant  building  Inspector  holds  a  *1kk 
tion**  and  not  an  "office.**  Hence  certlon 
and  not  qno  warranto  was  the  proper  reme 
to  test  the  legality  of  his  removal.  McGra 
V.  aty  of  Bayonne,  83  Aa  780,  83  N.  J.  La 
224. 

Where  a  fireman  wrongfully  dischar^ 
from  the  fire  department  of  the  dty  of  X< 
York  pending  reinstetement  accepted  a  pa 
tion  as  sergeant  at  arms  to  the  conndl  of  ti 
munldpal  assembly,  he  was  a  mere  ''e 
ploy6**  of  the  dty  and  not  an  "officer,"  witfi 
New  York  City  Charter  (Laws  1S97,  p.  ^ 
c  378,  I  1549),  prohibiting  **munldpal  office 
from  holding  two  offices.**  Padden  v.  City 
New  York,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  926,  927,  45  Mi 
R^.  517. 

Firem^i  are  not  ofllcers  within  Con 
art  15,  I  1,  providing  that  stete  and  coos 
officers  shall  subscribe  to  an  oath  not  to  i 
ceive  or  use  any  free  pass  or  free  transpoit 
tion  during  thdr  term  of  office.  Oklahos 
City  y.  Oklahoma  Ry.  Co.,  93  Pac  iS, ! 
20  OkL  1, 16  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  65L 

New  Haven  dty  diarter  provides  for  fi 
appointment  of  a  director  of  public  worl 
who  shall  have  necessary  derlcal  assIstM 
to  perform  the  cl«ical  work  of  the  board  ti 
examine  all  transfers  of  real  estate  wltli 
the  dty,  and  presei^e  such  abstracts  of  Hi 
as  may  fadlltete  the  departmental  voi 
The  charter  also  createa  a  dvil  serrlce  bo& 
to  prescribe  dvU  service  rules  for  positio 
in  the  dty  government,  Indudlng  all  derl 
€Qpyist%  JanitoC8»  atMOgraites^  ctft  ^< 


OFPICEK 


tl3 


OFFiOBB 


nee  provided  that  the  cleflf  of  the  deport- 
t  of  public  works  shall  keep  a  record  of 
proceedings  of  the  department  and  per- 
1  other  prescribed  dntleo.  The  director  of 
Ic  works  appointed  relator  to  examine  the 
rds  of  transfers  of  real  estate  and  make 
preserve  abstracts  of  title  for  us0  of  the 
irtment,  but  prescribed  no  other  dutiee. 
position  was  known  as  '^examiner  of  rec* 
*'  with  an  annual  salaiy  assigned  to  it, 
the  dty  yearbook  contained  relator's 
e,  followed  by  that  title.  Upon  adoption 
le  civil  service  roles,  relator  took  the  civil 
ice  examination,  was  appointed  and  con- 
ed in  the  same  duties  until  his  removal. 
I,  that  relator's  position  was  not  a  **public 
»"  to  try  title  to  wtilcAi  quo  warranto  will 
relator  not  being  invested  with  part  of 
sovereign  functioi^  of  government  State 
el.  Neal  v.  Brethauer,  .75  Att.  705,  706,  83 
a.  143. 

Btary  pvblio 

**The  position  or  place  of  *notary  public' 
early  a  public  office."  (Since,  under  the 
non  law,  women  are  disabled  from  hold- 
)ffice,  they  are  disqualified  from  appoint- 
t  as  notaries  public.  In  re  Opinion  at 
Justices,  62  Atl.  069,  970,  971,  78  N.  H. 
5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  415,  6  Ann.  Gas:  288 
3g  People  V.  Hathbone,  40  N.  E.  895,  896, 
N.  Y.  484,  437,  28  L.  R.  A.  884). 

"A  notary  public,  who  receives  his  ap- 
tment  and  commission  from  the  Gov- 
r  of  the  state  upon  the  recommendation 
le  county  court,  must  be  regarded  as  a 
Ic  'officer*  of  the  county."  Governor  v. 
Ion,  15  Ala.  7^75. 

A  notary  public  is  a  *^blic  officer,'* 
In  the  meaning  of  Const  N.  Y.  art  13, 
prohibiting  the  use  of  free  transportation 
i  public  official.  People  v.  Wadhams, 
i.  B.  65,  176  1^.  Y.  9  (citing  People  v. 
ibone,  40  N.  B.  395,  145  N.  Y.  434, 28  Li  B, 
54). 

A  "public  officer",  is  one  who  has  somei 
to  perform  concerning  the  public;  and 
i  not  lesr  so  when  his  duty  is  confined 
arrow  limfts,  because  it  is  the  duty  and 
oature  of  that  duty  which  makes  him  a 
Ic  officer,  and  not  the  extent  of  his  au- 
Ity;  and,  wh«re  an  employment  or  duty 
continuing  one  which  is  defined  by  rules 
rescribed  by  law  and  not  by  contract, 
a  charge  oi*  employment  is  an  office,  and 
person  who  performs  it  is  an  office!*. 
[>tary  public  is  a  public  officer.  In  re 
ion  of  the  Justices,  62  Atl.  969,  970,  73 
[.  621.  5  L.  R,  A.  (N.  S.)  415,  6  Ann.  Cas. 
[quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Shel- 
.  Alcorn,  36  Miss.  273,  72  Am.  Dec  169, 

One  who  has  been  commissioned  as  no- 
and  has  taken  the  oath  of  office,  and  has 
acting  as  notary  fbr  many  years,  and 
the  reputation  of  being  such  in  the  com- 
ity in  which  he  lives,  but  who  has  failed 


to  file  his  oath  df  officb  in  tl!te  offices  of  the 
Secretary  df  State  and  of  the  eferfc  of  court, 
and  has  also  failed  to 'renew  \A^  bond  every 
five  years,  as  required  by  law,  is  a  notary  de 
facto;  and  acts  passed  before  hiib  have  the 
same  validity  as  acts  passed  before  ft  rfbtary 
de  Jure.  The  position  of  a  notary  puWic  ifi^ 
an  "office,?  and  where  a  pecsoui  holds  a/com- 
mission aa  a  notary^  aad  acts^  >  as  one, .  and 
has  the  r^utation  of' being  a  notary  public, 
he  is  a  ^'notary  pubUfl  die  facsto*"  Davenport 
V.  Davenport,  41  South.  240,  241»  U6  I4L 
1009, 114  Am.  St  R^Pw  575. 

OMoev  of  poUtiesl  pa^7 

The  office  of  Demoi^ratlc  ward  committee^; 
man  of  a  city  is  not  a  '^public , office."  Green- 
ough  V.  Lucey,  66  AU.  SOO,  301',  218  ft.  I.  230. 

The  local  executive  committee  of  a  polit- 
ical party,  though  required  to  perform  cer- 
tain duties  by  Laws  1905,  p.  510;  t,  93,  and 
required  to  conduct  political  campaigns,  ate 
not  **publlc  officer^."  Attorney  Geheral  v. 
Barry,  68  Atl.  192,  74  N.  H.  353. 


ftrshal,  or  otHer  peao« 


Police  ofioevy' 
oflloer 

A  city  marshal  elected  by  the  people  is 
a  "t)ublic  officer,"  within  Const  1890,  1175, 
providing  that  such  officer  shall  not  be  re- 
moved from  office  for  Willful  neglect  of  duty 
or  misdemeanor  in  office,  except  on  an  in- 
dictment and  conviction.  Lleano  y.  City  of 
Pass  Christian,  50  ^lith.  981,  982,  96  Miss. 
640. 

A  dty  mairshfil,  holding^  otice  under 
Greater  New  York  Charter,  §  1424,  is  a  "pub- 
lic officer,"  within  Municipal  Court  Act,  | 
338,  authorizing  increased  costs  .where,  the 
successful  defendant  is  a  public ;  officer  ap- 
pointed or  ^ected  under  the  authority  of  the 
state.  Scherl  v.Blam^  121  N.  Yi  Supp.  522, 
528,  136  Apj^.Dlv.  753. 

"A  'public  officer'  Is  one  wlio  has  some 
duty  to  perform  concerning  the  public;  and 
he  is  not  the  less  a  public  officer  when  his 
duty  is  confined  to  narrow  limits,  because  It 
is  the  duty,  and  the  nature  of  that  duty, 
which  makes  him  a  public  officer,  and  not 
the  extent  of  hie  authority."  Policemen  are 
"officers,"  wlthiil  Const.  |  20,  requiring  ofi^i 
cers  to  be  appointed' for  a  definite  time,  s6 
that  ^n  oi^inance  authorizing  appointment 
of  policemen  during  good  behavi<or  is  void. 
Monette  v.  State,  44  South.  989,  91  Miss.  662, 
124  Am.  6t  Rep.  715  (quoting  and  adc^ting 
definition  in  Shelby  t.  Alcorn,  S6  Miss.  273, 
72  Am.  Dec.  169). 

A  special  policeman  appointed  by  the 
Governor  at  t^le  "instance  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany pursuant  to  Code  1899,  c.  145,  f  31  (Code 
1906,  I  4281),  and  paid  by  such  company  for 
his  services,  is  prima  fade  a  public  officer, 
for  whose  acts  the  company  is  not  liable. 
McKaln  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  It.  Co.,  64  S.  B. 
18,  19,  65  W.  Va.  233,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  289, 
131  Am.  St.  Rep.  964, 17  Ann.  Cas.  634. 


A 


OFFIGfiB 


714 


OFFICEB 


PoUoeiBen  are  not  oflKoera  within  Const 
art  16,  I  1,  proTldlng  tluit  itate  and  coanty 
officers  sball  subscribe  to  an  oath  not  to  rs- 
oeiye  or  use  any  free  pass  or  free  transporta* 
tlon  daring  their  term  of  office.  Oklahoma 
aty  ▼.  Oklahoma  By.  Co.,  93  Paa  48,  61,  20 
OkL  1, 16  L.  B.  A.  (N.  B.)  66L 

A  Janitor  of  a  police  station  Is  not  a 
"^pobUc  officer."  Sims  t.  O'Meara,  7»  N.  B. 
824,  826,  196  Mas&  647  (distlngnlshlnf  Ham 
Y.  Boston  Board  oC  Police^  T  N.  B^  640,  142 

11888.90). 

A  Janitor  of  a  police  station,  appointed 
for  a  year,  is  not  a  public  officer,  bat  a  mere 
employ^,  whose  contract  gives  him  no  estate 
for  years  In  the  station  house,  and  no  right 
of  entry  beyond  a  revocable  license.  Wlggln 
y.  City  of  Manchester,  68  Att.  622,  623,  72 
N.  H.  678. 

For  the  purpose  of  determining  his  right 
to  compensation  during  a  period  of  suspension 
on  written  charges  which  on  Investigation  are 
found  untrue,  a  policeman  appointed  subject 
to  the  civil  service  rules  as  required  by  the 
charter  of  the  dty  of  Portland  (section  179), 
who  is  required  to  take  an  oath  of  office  and 
give  a  bond  for  the  faithful , discharge  of  his 
duties,  who  is  made  a  peace  officer  by  B.  &  G. 
Comp.  1 1693,  and  a  large  part  of  whose  du- 
ties are  such  that  he  must  have  authority 
to  act,  not  as  agent  for  the  state  or  city, 
but  by  virtue  of  the  office.  Is  an  officer,  audi, 
when  legally  appointed,  has  title  to  the  office, 
which  can  only  be  terminated  in  the  manner 
provided  by  law.  Beising  y.  City  of  Port^ 
land,  Ul  Pac  877,  378^  67  Or.  296,  Ann.  Gas. 
1912D,  896. 

Section  11  of  the  diarter  of  the  dty 
of  Portland  provides  that  there  shall  be  elect- 
ed a  mayor,  treasurer,  municipal  Judge,  dty 
attorney,  auditor,  and  16  coundlmen,  who 
shall  be  officers  of  the  city.  Section  18  pre- 
scribes the  terms  of  such  officers.  Municipal 
officers  embraced  In  a  department;  wliJch  In- 
cludes detectives,  are  subject  to  the  civil 
service  rule  found  at  section  808.  Const  art 
8,  I  7,  provides  that  such  other  dty  officers 
as  may  be  necessary  shall  be  elected  or  ap- 
pointed in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  law.  Article  16,  |  Z,  provides  that  when 
the  duration  of  any  office  is  not  provided  by 
the  Constitution,  it  may  be  declared  by  law, 
and,  if  not  so  declared,  the  office  shall  be 
held  doring  the  pleasure  of  the  authority 
making  the  appolntmoit  but  the  legislative 
assembly  shall  not  create  any  office,  the  ten- 
ure of  which  shall  exceed  four  years.  Held, 
that  a  detective  is  not  an  oflicer  within  Const 
art  16,  S  2.  Beising  v.  City  of  Portland,  111 
Pac  377,  378,  57  Or.  295,  Ann.  Cas.  1912D, 
895. 

A  duly  appointed  patrolman  of  the  police 
department  of  a  dty  is  an  "officer,"  within 
the  meaning  of  the  laws  of  Ohio.  State  v. 
City  of  Palnesville,  32  Ohio  Clr.  Ct  B.  123, 
129. 


eoMilssI— sgf 
vlser 

A  anpervlBor  of  public  roads  it  t  poba 
officer.  Mlal  v.  EUington,  46  S.  £.  9ei,9£ 
184  N.  a  181,  86  L^  B.  A.  697. 

''A  road  overseer  le  a  public  oflBoer,  ui 
obstructing  him  in  the  performance  of  bl 
duties  as  sudi  public  officer  coosUtota 
public  offense."  BldiardMm  t.  QTbedaHS 
N.  W.  184, 168^  17  &  D.  829. 

•ckeU  mr  sekoel  dietriet  effiMr 

The  office  of  sdiool  director  is  tn'offlee 
within  Const  art  8, 1 12,  oonf  enlos  exdosn 
appellate  Jurisdiction  on  Uie  Supiene  Covi 
In  cases  involving  the  title  to  an  oflke  wk 
this  sUte.  State  ez  inf.  Sutton  v.  Vusat^i 
8.  W.  1,  189  Mo.  682. 

A  school  trustee  is  an  "officer,**  wltiii 
the  meaning  of  the  word  as  used  in  a  ea 
stitutional  provision  that  all  officers  sbi 
take  a  prescribed  oath  before  entering  < 
the  duties  of  their  oAoe.  Budianan  r.  Gr 
ham,  81  S.  W.  1237,  1239,  86  Tex.  CiT.  Ap 
46& 

Powers  In  the  directors  of  a  school  di 
trict  wiil  be  implied  when  the  exercise  the 
of  is  necessary  to  enable  them  to  perform  ti 
duties  Imposed  upon  them ;  school  dlrecto 
being  «^ubUc  offlctts,"  and  subject  to  t 
same  rules  as  other  public  officers  in  respe 
to  their  Implied  powers.  A.  H.  Andrews  C 
V.  Delight  Special  School  Dist,  128  S.  W.St 
363,  95  Ark.  28. 

Under  Bev.  Laws,  a  42,  |  27,  prori 
ing  that  the  school  oonmittee  of  a  town  'slu 
have  the  general  charge  and  saperioteodeii 
ef  all  the  public  s<^ools,"  the  school  cofflm 
tee  act  not  as  "agents"  of  the  town,  bat 
"public  officers,"  intrusted  with  powers  i 
charged  with  duties  concerning  the  maia 
nance  of  the  schools.  Horse  v.  Asbley,  Td 
a  481,  4S2,  193  Mass.  294. 

A  "public  officer"  Is  a  person  appoint 
by  the  government  and  not  by  contract 
perform  a  continuing  duty  defined  by  lav 
governmental  rules.  The  superintendeot 
the  Arkansas  SUte  School  for  tbe  BUj 
elected  by  the  state  board  of  trustees  of  cbi 
itable  institutions  under  a  statute  authorizi 
such  election,  whose  comp^isation  is  fii 
by  the  statute,  and  whose  duties  of  a  poi) 
nature  are  prescribed  by  law,  are  continoo 
and  not  affected  by  change  of  the  persooi 
of  the  Incumbent  and  who  Is  required 
give  a  bond  for  the  faithful  performaiKe 
his  duties  connected  with  the  instituUc 
is  a  public  officer  and  not  an  employ^  ^^^ 
V.  FutraU,  106  &  W.  6«7,  609,  670,  84  ii 
540. 

Bev.  St  I  3899-«,  provides  that  on  t 
third  Monday  in  April,  1896.  and  biannui- 
thereafter,  the  school  councils  shall  el«ct 
clerk,  who  shall  not  be  a  member  of  tl 
council,  and  who  shall  be  derk  of  the  W 
of  education.     School  Code  April  25,  ^ 


OFFICSB 


715 


OFFICSB 


»Ykles  that  all  existing  offleora  <tf  boavds  of 

icatlon  and  school  councils  shall  hold  their 
ces  until  boards  of  educaticm  are  elected 
1  organized  under  the  proviaiona  of  this 
.  On  the  third  Monday  in  April,  1904,  the 
incU  neglected  to  elect  a  clerk,  but  ^ected 
i  on  April  25,  1904,  after  the  provisions  of 

new  School  Code  went  into  effect  Under 
tain  statutory  provisions  the  clerk  of  the 
ird  of  education,  outside  of  his  mere  cleri- 

duties,  which  he  has  to  perform  for  the 
ird  and  as  directed  by  it,  has  many  statu- 
y  duties,  for  the  faithful  performance  of 
ich  he  must  answer  to  the  people.  Held, 
it  the  Incumbent  of  the  office  was  a  public 
cer,  occupying  the  office  of  clerk  of  the 
ird  of  education  at  the  time  the  new  Code 
k  effect,  and  hence  there  ^as  no  vacancy 
the  office  at  the  time  the  school  council 
lertook  to  elect  the  defendant  clerk,  and 

pretended  election  was  void.  State  ex  rel. 
yers  v.  Coon,  26  Ohio  ar.  Ct  B.  241,  242. 

Bev.  St  1890,  |  4274  (Bev.  St  1889,  I 
6),  provides  the  period  within  which  civil 
ions  shaU  be  commenced,  after  the  cause 
action  has  accrued,  as  follows:  "Within 
ee  years:  First  i^n  action  against  a  sher- 

coroner,  or  other  o^cer,  upon  i^;lial)iUty 
urred  by  the  doing  of  an  act  in  his  official 
ttcity,  and  in  virtue  of  his  office,  or  by  the 
ission  of  an  official  duty,  including  tiie 
ipayment  of  money  collected  upon  an  exe- 
lon  or  otherwise,"  ^tc.  Section  9864  te- 
res the  board  of  a  school  district  to  or- 
lize  by  electing  a  president  and  a  treasure 
Section  9868  requires  the  treasurer  to 
e  a  bond  conditioned  "that  he  will  render 
althful  and  just  account  of  aU  money  that 
y  come  into  his  hands  as  such  treasurer, 
1  otherwise  perform  tike  duties  of  hiq  office 
ording  to  law."  Section  9869  provides 
t  the  treasurer  "shall  be  responsible  on 

'official'  bond,"  etc.  Section  9871  re- 
res  the  treasurer  to  make  annual  aettle- 
Qts,  and  prescribes  that  "at  the  expiration 
his  term  of  office"  he  shall  deliver  over 

his  successor  in  office  •  •  ♦  all  mon- 
or  other  property  In  his  hands,"  etc. 
Id,  that  a  treasurer  of  a  school  district  Is 
}ubllc  officer  within  the  meaning  of  seo- 
a  4274.  State  ex  rel.  School  Dist  of  Se- 
U  V.  Barter,  87  S.  W.  941,  943,  188  Mo. 

Itate  oAeev  or  employ^ 

The  state  secretary  of  mine  industries 
vided  for  in  the  act  creating  the  State 
K>ciation  of  Bfinera  (Oen.  St.  1901,  |  4178) 
*x  officio  state  mine  inspector,  and  a  public 
cer.  Titus  v.  Sherwood,  106  Pac.  1070,  81 
D.  870. 

The  words  '^blic  officer^  may  be  syn- 
mouB  with  officer  and  broad  enough  to 
Lude  any  person  authorized  to  perform 
r  public  du^,  but  "public  officer"  is  a  term 

used  in  the  Connecticat  Oonatitntion  «z* 


cept  In  aMcle  24,  prdviding^  that  ndther 
the  General  Assembly,  nor  any  coumty,  city, 
etc.,  shall  pay  ot  grant  any  extra  compensa- 
tion to  any  public  officer,  etc.  It  la  rarely 
used  in  legislation  unless  limited  by  its  con- 
text In  article  10,  providing  a  form  of  oath 
for  members  of  the  General  Assembly,  execu- 
tive and  Judicial  officers,  the  generic  word 
"officer"  is  dealt  with  in  its  broadest  mean- 
ing, and  the  classes  to  which  it  may  apply 
are  defined  as  members  of  the  General  As- 
sembly, executive  officers,  civil  officers.  Judi- 
cial officers,  and  military  officers.  Such 
term,  as  used  in  article  24,  cannot  Include 
members  of  the  General  Assembly  or  legis- 
lative officers,  the  €k)vemor  or  Lieutenant 
Governor.  McOovem  y.  Mitchell,  68  Atl.  433, 
489,  78  Genu.  636. 

Laws  1911,  p.  18,  f  68,  in  so  far  as  it  ap- 
propriated $7,000  for  salary  and  expenses  of 
N.  as  special  agent  and  expert  to  the  Missouri 
Waterway  Commission  he  not  being  an  offi- 
cer of  the  state,  and  there  being  no  law  creat- 
ing an  office,  tenure,  or  duties  which  he  was 
required  to  fill,  is  unoonatitutlonal  as  a  gift 
of  money  to  an  individual,  tn  violation  of 
Const  art  4,  §  46,  and  as  granting  to  him  a 
special  and  exclusive  right  or  privilege,  in  vio- 
lation of  article  4,  t  53,  par.  26;  but  the  in- 
validity of  such  provision  did  not  invalidate 
the  balance  of  the  law,  appropriating  $10,000 
to  the  Commission.  Kavai^uii^  v.  Gordon, 
149  S.  W.  587,  592,  244  Mo.  695. 

Ky.  St  1908,  I  4258,  authoH^sea  the  audi- 
tor of  public  accounts  to  appoint  revenue 
agents,  whose  term  of  office  shall  be  four 
years.  Section  4259  requires  revenue  agents 
to  take  the  oath  required  of  other  officers, 
and  to  execute  a  bond  to  the  commonwealth. 
The  duties  of  such  agents  are  prescribed  by 
law,  and  in  many  matters  they  may  act  in- 
dependently of  the  auditor,  as  in  assessing 
omitted  property  under  section  4241.  Held, 
that  a  revenue  agent  though  an  appointee  of 
the  auditor,  is  an  "officer  of  the  common- 
wealth" holding  for  a  fixed  term,  and  is  not 
subject  to  removal  by  the  auditor  under  sec- 
tion 140  of  the  statutes,  authorizing  the  au- 
ditor to  remove  the  assistant  auditor  and  aur 
ditor's  clerk.  Hager  v.  Lucas,  86  S.  W.  552, 
553,  120  Ky.  307. 

The  commissioners  of  incorporated  ports 
appointed  under  Laws  Or.  1909,  c.  39,  §  8,  who 
are  vested  with  the  power  and  authority 
given  to  corporations  organized  under  the 
act,  are  mere  agents  for  the  performance  of 
certain  duties  defined  by  the  act,  and  are  not 
"officers,"  within  the  meaning  of  Const  art 
15,  I  2,  limiting  the  tenure  of  officers  appoint- 
ed by  the  Legislature  to  four  years.  Bennett 
Trust  Co.  V.  SengStacken,  113  Pac.  863,  868, 
58  Or.  388  (citing  DIavfd  t.  Portland  Water 
Co.,  12  Pac.  174,  14  Or.  96;  State  v.  George, 
29  Pac.  356,  22  Or.  142,  16  L.  B.  A.  737.  29 
Am.  St  Bep.  568;  White  Y.  Mears,  7^4  Pac. 
931,  44  Or.  215). 


<l 


liil! 


ta^A. 


OFFICER 


718 


OFFICER 


OFITCEB  (Of  Oorporfttioa) 

As  officer  in  general,  see  Officer, 
Misconduct  of,  see  Misconduct 

"Offlcen"  are  ttie  means,  tbe  bands,  the 
head  by  which  corporations  normally  act 
The  word  "officer"  has  this  precise  meaning. 
Webster  gives  its  etymology  as  "ops,**  help, 
and  **facere/'  to  do  or  make.  A  corporation, 
in  common,  with  a  natural  person,  may  act 
either  in  chief  or  by  an  agent  In  the  for- 
mer case,  being  an  artificial  person,  it  can 
act  only  through  the  office  of  some  natural 
person,  who  is  on  this  account  called  its 
officer,  and  who,  being  thus  inherent  in  such 
artificial  person,  is  not,  as  regards  it  an 
alius  or  other  person,  and  hence  Is  not  an 
agent,  within  tbe  meaning  of  the  maxim 
"Qui  facit  per  alium  fadt  per  sa"  Ameri- 
can Soda  Fountain  Go.  r.  Stolaenbach,  68 
AtL  1078,  1080,  75  N.  J.  Law.  721,  16  Ll  B. 
A.  (N.  S.)  708,  127  Am.  St  R^.  822. 

Rev.  St  i  5102,  provides  that  when  a 
corporation  is  the  party,  the  verification  of 
the  pleading  may  be  made  by  an  ^'officer 
thereof  its  agent  or  attorney."  The  word 
"officer"  is  not  used  in  this  statute  tautologi- 
cally,  but  is  used  in  contradisttnctioQ  to  the 
word  "agent"  and  an  officer  of  a  corpora- 
tion may  verify  a  pleading  when  an  agent 
can  or  cannot  do  so.  Bullock  Beresford  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Hedges*  81  N.  B.  171,  172,  76  Ohio 
St  91. 

A  councilman  of  an  incorporated  city  is 
an  ^'officer  or  agent  of  a  corporati<Hi,"  with- 
in a  statute  prohibiting  any  "officer  or  agent 
of  any  corporation*'  or  public  institution  to 
be  interested  in  any  contract  to  sell  or  fur- 
nish any  supplies,  etc.,  to  the  corporation, 
etc.  €k>mmonwealth  v.  Witman,  66  AtL  086, 
988,  217  Pa.  411. 

A^nU  distfa&gvlshed 

One  distinction  between  officers  and 
agents  of  a  corporation  lies  in  ttie  manner 
of  their  creation.  An  "officer"  is  created 
by  the  charter  of  the  corporation,  and  the 
officer  Is  elected  by  the  directors  or  the 
stockholders.  An  agency  is  usually  created 
by  the  ofllcers,  or  one  or  more  of  them^  and 
the  agent  is  appointed  by  the  same  authority. 
It  is  clear  that  the  two  terms  "officers"  and 
"agents"  are  by  no  means  interchangeable. 
One  deriving  its  existence  from  the  other, 
and  being  dependent  upon  that  other  for  Its 
continuation.  Is  necessarily  restricted  in  its 
powers  and  duties,  and  such  powers  and 
duties  are  not  necessarily  the  same  as  those 
nertainlBg  to  tbe  authority  creating  it  The 
officers,  as  such,  are  the  oorporatton.  An 
i^ent  is  an  employ^.  A  mere  employment 
however  liberally  compensated,  does  not 
rise  to  the  dignity  of  an  office.  The  term 
''general  agent"  as  applied  to  one  repre- 
senting a  corporation,  does  not  necessarily 
import  tha.t  the  person  designated  is  an  offi- 
cer of  the  corporation.    Vardeman  v.  Penn. 


Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.,  54  S.  E.  66,  67. 123  ( 
117,  5  Ann.  Oas.  221. 

Bookkeeper 

One  employed  as  bo<^Lkeeper  for  t  d 
Inlte  period  Is  not  an  officer  or  agent  of  s; 
corporation  within  Code  1006,  §  22S1,  bll 
bis  place  during  tbe  pleasure  of  the  directc 
and  removable  by  them  without  cause  vi 
oat  liability  on  tbe  corporation  for  bnftcfa 
tbe  contract  of  employment  Munn  t.  We 
burg  Banking  4b  Trust  Co.,  66  S.  E.  290,2 
66  W.  Va.  204, 135  Am.  St  Bep.  1024. 

Mreotor 

A  director  of  a  corporation  is  an  "offia 
within  General  Corporation  Act  I  57,  gif 
employ^  of  an  insoivoit  ooiporatioa  prioi 
for  wages,  but  declaring  that  the  word  "i 
ploy6"  shall  not  in<dnde  any  officer,  and 
is  not  entitled  to  priority  as  an  emploj^ 
wages  as  a  foreman.  In  re  PeninsnlA  i 
Stone  Co.,  82  AtL  688,  9  Dd.  Gb.  348. 


A  foreman  acting  under  the  directioG 
the  superintendent  of  a  corporation  is 
an  '"officer"  of  the  corporation,  and  is  nc 
person  on  whom  service  of  summons  on 
corporation  can  be  made.    Simmons  t. 
fiance  Box  Co.,  62  S.  E.  435,  436»  14S  N 

•A  A 
049. 

Gemevml  ace&t 

A  mere  employment  however  liber 
compensated,  does  not  rise  to  the  dignit] 
an  office,  and  the  term  "general  agent,"  as 
plied  to  (me  representing  a  coiporatioa  <i 
not  necessarily  import  that  he  is  an  "oSc 
of  the  corporation.  One  distinction  bet« 
an  "officer"  of  a  corporation  and  an  "aee 
thereof  is  that  an  officer  may  by  mand^i 
compel  the  corporation  to  reinstate  him.  ^ 
an  agent  may  be  dismissed  without  ca 
and  bis  only  remedy  would  be  compensai 
in  damages.  Vardeman  v.  Penn.  Mut  I 
Ins.  Co.,  64  S.  a  66,  67,  68,  125  Ga.  U: 
Ann.  Cas.  221  (citing  Wheeler  &  Wilson  I 
Co.  V.  Lawson,  15  N.  W.  3d8,  57  Wis.  ^ 
Farmers*  Loan  ft  Trust  Co.  v.  Wanln?. 
Wis.  305;  Thomas  F.  Meton  ft  Sons  r.  Isl 
Wagon  Co.,  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  215 ;  Raleigh  i 
R.  Co.  V.  Pullmann  Co.,  50  S.  B.  1008, 122 
704;  Commonwealth  y.  Christian  [Pa-! 
Phila.  558). 
Manager 

The  manager  of  a  corporation  is 
"officer  of  the  corporation,"  so  that  the  r 
flcatlon  of  a  complaint  by  him  is  the  ^^ 
flcation  by  an  "officer."  Stockton  Lob 
Co.  V.  Blodgett,  84  Paa  441,  8  OaL  Apfi 


See  Person. 
SoUdltor 

A  ''solicitor  of  business^  is  not  «1t 
the  clause  "and  other  officers,"  in  Tier. 
U.  S.  i  5136,  giving  a  national  bank  poire: 
appoint  a  president*  vice  president,  asL 


OFFICER 


T19 


OFFICIAL  BALLOT 


other  officers,  and  dismlas  guch  officers 
easure ;  but  tinder  subdivisions  3  and  7 
lid  section,  empowering  sucli  a  bank  to 
i  contracts  and  to  ezerdse,  bj  duly  au- 
ized  "officers^  or  agoits,  all  such  in- 
ital  powers  as  shall  be  necessary  to  car- 
1  the  banking  business,  it  may  employ  a 
Itor  of  business  for  a  year.  Case  ▼.  First 
Bank  of  City  of  Brooklyn,  109  N.  T. 
K  1119,  1120,  09  Misc.  B^p.  269. 

I  "woTkauaL 

See  Workman. 

TGEB  DE  FAOTO 

See  De  Facto. 

TGEB  EIiEOT 

The  term  "officer  elect**  implies  a  person 
ble  to  hold  office,  and  though  a  person 
chosen  at  a  general  election,  where  he  is 
gible  to  hold  office,  he  is  not  an  "officer 
/'  within  Code  1906,  f  3436,  which  pro- 
3  for  the  holding  of  an  election  to  fill  a 
ncy  created  by  the  failure  of  an  officer 
;  to  qualify.  State  ▼.  Hays,  46  South. 
730,  91  Miss.  756. 

TGEB  HA  VINO  OEKEBAL  SUPEB* 
INTENDENCE 

A  treasurer  of  a  corporatibn  Is  not  an 
%r  having  a  general  superintendence  of 
concerns,"  within  General  Corporation 
(ConsoL  Laws  1909,  c.  23)  ft  90,  91,  au- 
Izing  a  creditor,  trustee,  director,  man- 
,  or  other  officer  of  a  corporation  having 
neral  superintendence  of  its  concerns,  to 
to  compel  officers  to  account  for  their  of- 
I  conduct  Loughlln  T.  Wocker,  137  N. 
^upp.  257,  152  App.  DiT.  466. 

^CEB  OF  OOUBT 

See  Court  Officer. 

Assignee  for  benefit  of  creditors  as,  see 

Officer. 
Attorney  at  law  as,  see  Attorney  at 

Law. 
Clerk  of  court  a^,  see  Okttk.  of  Court 
Beceiver  as,  see  Beceiver. 

•*ICEB  OF  THE  BEVENDE 

See  Bevenue  Officer. 

nCEB  FBO  TEM. 

An  "officer  pro  texn.'*  is  one  who  pro 
>ore  (for  the  time  being)  is  such  officer, 
r,  complete,  and  he  is,  as  Bevisal  1900, 
i33,  provides,  authorized  "to  execute  the 
es"  of  such  office.  State  t.  ThomJEis,  53 
L  522,  523,  141  N.  a  79L 

fTCIAX. 

See  Defaulting  OffidaL 

f*ICIAI.  ACT 

All  acts  of  officials  are  not  "official  acts," 
only  such  as  are  done  under  some  au- 
ity  derived  from  the  law,  or  in  pursuance 


of  prescribed  duties.    Chase  y.  Cochnu^  67 
AtL  320,  322, 102  Me.  43L 

A  statute  authorizing  county  supervisors 
to  declare  a  charge  against  a  county,  the  ex- 
penses of  a  county  officer  in  defending  an  ac- 
tion against  him  for  an  "official  act*'  applies 
only  to  official  acts  in  which  the  public  has 
concern,  and  does  not  apply  to  the  act  of 
the  sheriff  in  returning  an  execution.  Wey 
Y.  O'Hara,  95  N.  Y.  8ui^  81,  84,  48  Misc. 
Bep.  82. 

"By  an  'official  act*  is  not  meant  a  lawful 
act  of  the  officer  in  the  service  of  process; 
if  so,  the  sureties  would  never  be  responsi- 
ble. It  means  any  act  done  by  the  officer  in 
his  official  capacity,  under  color  and  by  vir- 
tue of  his  office.'*  Where  a  conltable;  in  levy- 
ing an  execution,  committed  an  assault  on 
the  Judgment  debtor's  wife,  who  was  attempt- 
ing to  assist  the  debtor  in  making  a  'sdiedule 
of  his  property  claimed  to  be  exempt,  he  was 
acting  under  color  and  by  virtde  of  his  office; 
so  as  to  render  his  bondsmen  liable,  under 
Hurd's  Bev.  St  1906,  p.  1272,  c  79.  §  9.  pro- 
viding that  the  bonds  of  constables  eAiall  be 
held  for  the  security  and  benefit  of  all  per^ 
sons  who  may  be  injured  by  their  official  acts 
or  misconduct  Greenb^rg  v.  People,  80  N.  B. 
100,  102,  225  111.  174,  8  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1223, 
116  Am.  St  Bep.  127  (quoting  and  adopting 
the  definition  in  Turner  y.  Sisson,  137  Mass. 
191). 

Where,  when  deputy  sheriflii  were  with- 
in 250  yards  of  certain  men  at  night  and  ^aw 
flashes  of  pistols  and  heard  pistol  shots  fired 
in  the  public  street  of  a  town,  such  acts  con- 
stituted the  commission  of  an  offttise  al^ahniit 
the  public  peace,  so  that  the  officers'  acts  in 
attempting  to  arrest  the  persons  supposed  i» 
be  guilty  of  such  offense  were  '^official  mtitM,^ 
within  Bev.  St  1895,  art  4897,  making  sher- 
iffs responsible  for  the  official  acts  of  their 
deputies.  King  v.  Brown,  94  S.  W.  328,  329, 
100  Tex.  109. 

The  rendition  of  a  Judgment  is  tlie  "offi- 
cial actf'  of  the  court,  as  distinguished  from 
the  ministerial  act  of  spreading  it  on  the 
records.  Simmons  v.  Hanne,  39  South.  77, 
78,  50  Fla.  267,  7  Ann.  Cas.  322  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  1  Black,  Judg.  1 106). 

OFFICIAX.  BAIXOT 

The  "official  election  ballot,'*  and  "official 
ballot"  in  ComiK  St  1903,  c.  26,  |  32,  pro- 
viding that  in  no  case  shall  the  candidate 
of  any  political  party  be  entitled  to  he  desig- 
nated on  the  official  election  ballot  as  the 
candidate  of  more  than  one  political  party, 
and  shall  be  designated  on  the  "official  bal- 
lot" as  the  nominee  of  the  party  In  whose 
nomination  his  name  appears  as  the  political 
party  with  which  he  affiliates,  refer  to  the 
general  election  ballot  and  not  to  the  primary 
election  ballots.  State  ex  rel.  Adair  v.  Drex- 
el,  105  N.  W.  174,  177.  74  Neb.  770. 


OFFICIAL  BALLOT 


7^ 


OFFICIAL  8£AL 


ReT.  8t  190i8,  I  5919,  requfrlnff  pemimi 
deBirlng  to  be  candidates  for  scbool  director 
to  file  a  written  nottce  of  lntentloii»  and  re- 
qniilng  the  secretary  of  tbe  ediool  district  to 
prepare  iMdlots  oontalnlng  tlie  names  of  cai^ 
dldates  wbe  have  certified  soch  Intention, 
and  proTldlBf  tbat  no  other  person  shall  be 
Toted  for,  cannot  be  enstalned  as  prescrlUnff 
an  "official  ballot,"  which  Is  a  ballot  prepared 
for  election  by.  public  authority  at  public  ex- 
pense, and  ballots  other  than  those  prepared 
by  the  secretary  cast  at  the  election  by  duly 
qualified  electors  must  be  counted  In  the  ab- 
sence of  any  fraud.  littlejohn  y.  People,  121 
Pac  159,  102.  62  Colo.  217,  Ann.  Cas.  191SD, 
610  (quoting  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4952). 

8t  1900,  pi  91,  c.  188^  extending  tbe.pro- 
visions  of  the  dyil  sendee  law  to  the  police 
force  of  the  town  of  Natlck,  and  providing  in 
section  4  that  the  act  shall  take  effect  on  its 
acceptance  by  a  majority  of  the  legal  voters 
at  an  annual  town  meeting  or  at  any  meeting 
called  tor  the  purpose,  and  if  the  vote  thei^e- 
on  la  taken  at  the  annual  town  meeting  it 
shall  be  by  official  ballot,  etc.,  could  not  be 
accepted  by  the  precinct  voting,  the  provision 
that  the  vote  shall  be  by  official  ballot  not 
warranting  the  inference  that  the  vote  could 
be  taken  by  precincts ;  the  term  "official  bal- 
lot,'' as  defined  by  St  1907,  p.  633,  c  560,  i 
1,  meaning  "a  ballot  prepared  for  any  elec> 
tlon,  caucus,  or  primary  by  public  authority 
and  at  public  expense."  Sweeney  v.  Bigelow, 
88  N.  B.  917,  918,  202  Mass.  539  (citing  Stat 
1896,  p.  541,  c.  548,  f  1 ;  Rev.  Laws,  c  U,  | 
1 ;  Stat  1907,  p.  683,  c.  560,  I  1). 

OFFICIAXi  BOXD 

Under  Gode  1906,  f  3463,  relating  to  "offi- 
cial bonds,"  the  bond  of  the  treasurer  of  a 
levee  board  lis  an  "official  bond."  Adams  ▼. 
Williams,  52  South.  865,  869,  97  Miss.  118,  30 
L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  866,  Ann.  Cas.  19120,  1129. 

A  bond  given  by  a  couiity  contractor  un- 
der Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  {  7723,  is  an  "offi- 
cial bond"  within  sectibn  1278,  which  pro- 
vides that  defects  in  official  bonds  shall  not 
vitiate  them.  Holthonse  v.  State^  97  N.  E. 
130,  132,  49  Ind.  App.  178. 

OFnOIAL  pOOTTMENT. 

See  JB'orelgn  Official  Document 

OFFIOIAIi  DUTY 

See  While  In  Discharge  of  Official  Duty. 
Discharge  of  official  duty,  see  Discharge. 

Proceedings  instituted  by  a  drain  com- 
missioner to  enforce  payment  of  his  salary 
were  not  "official  duty"  imposed  on  him  by 
law,  but  were  rather  for  enforcement  of  a 
private  right,  and  hence  fees  for  services  of 
an  attorney  employed  by  him  in  such  pro- 
ceedings were  not  necessary  expenses  in- 
curred by  him  as  drain  commissioner  in  the 
discharge  of  the  duties  of  his  office,  to  be 
paid  by  the  county  as  required  by  Pub.  Laws 
1909,  c  9,  No.  118,  i  5.    Hatch  v.  Board  of 


Sup'rs  of  Chlhoun  County,  136  N.  W.  31 
351,  170  Mich.  322. 

A  county  tnasnrsr's  fallura  to  mecen 
to  the  oountyaad  the  states  and  pay  oi 
the  revenue  In  his  hands,  wan  an  omUskm 
"oflklal  duty,"  within  the  meaning  of  Ci 
1861, 1  1659,  providing  that  actions  agalnsl 
public  officer,  growlng^  out  of  an  omission 
an  official  duty,  must  be  conunenced  wit) 
three  years  after  it  accrues.  State  v.  Dj 
17  Iowa,  223,  227  (citing  and  adopting  defi 
tlon  in  State,  to  Use  of  Mount  I^eass 
Bank,  v.  Conway,  18  Ohio.  234;  State,  to  C 
of  Knox  County  Com*rs,  v.  Blake^  2  Ohio  i 
147). 

OFFICIAX.  BLSCnOH  BAXXOT 

See  Official  Ballot 

OFFICIAX*  JOVRNAI. 

Tbe  "ofllcua  joumar  of  mOt  of  i 
honses  of  the  Legislature  Is  the  journal  fi 
In  th»  office  of  the  Secretary  of  State  In 
cordance  with  law/  and  It  controls  In  case 
any  discrepancy  between  It  and  the  prim 
Journal.  State  ex  rel.  McKinley  v.  Man 
48  South.  846»  847,  160  Ala.  181. 

OmCIAX.  MUOOMDVOT 

His  own  official  misconduct  see  ffis. 
Willful  official  misconduct,  see  Will 

Misconduct 
See,  also.  Misconduct  In  Office. 

Antedating  by  a  clerk  of  a  court  of  i 
filing  of  a  paper,  filed  out  of  tlme^  ao  as 
show  filing  Mthin  time,  is  ''official  misc( 
duct"  warranting  his  removal  under  Ri 
St  1895,  art  3531.  Howard  v.  Gulf,  C. 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.)  135  S.  W.  707,  769  it 
lug  Harris  v.  Hopson,  5  Tex.  529). 

Where  the  mayor  of  a  dtj  by  Intoxk 
tlon  voluntarily  Incapacitated  himself  t 
the  performance  of  his  dutiee,  but  witbo 
undertaking  official'  business  daring  6i» 
time,  and  in  the  case  in  aueetlon  owed  i 
official  duty  to  tide  men  firom  whom  he  pi 
cured  the  Intoxicating  liquors  unlawfuHj. 
was  guilty  not  only  of  private,  but  "offiei 
misconduct"  warranting  his  removal  frc 
ofik*e  for  Intoxication  pursuant  to  Acts  31 
Gen.  Assem.  c.  78,  f  1.  State  v.  Hendtfso 
124  N.  W.  767,  769,  145  Iowa,  65T. 

OFFICIAI.  PROCiaSBIirCHI 

See  Public  Official  Proceedinga. 

OFFICIAI.  8BAI. 

Nothing  short  of  an  Impression  on  tl 
paper  vrill  constitute  an  "official  seal.'*  Tl 
requirement  of  Rev.  St  |  182,  that  a  coi: 
mlssioner  of  deeds  for  Wisconsin  in  anotb 
state  shall  have  a  seal  of  office,  by  whi< 
his  offlcial  acts  shall  be  authenticated,  Ls  m 
complied  with  by  the  use  of  a  seal  whk 
does  not  contain  the  name  of  the  state,  bi 


OFFIGIAL  Bl'EQIroaRAPHER 


721 


OLBBKASS 


whicli  the  space  for  such  name  is  left 
nk,  and  in  the  impreoiion  the  word  "WiGk 
isin"  is  written  in  sach  space  with  a  pen. 
[bermann  v.  Ide,  68  N.  W.  3M  885)  98 
8.  669,  57  Am.  St  Rep.  941 

TICIAIi  STElfOORAPHEB 

Where  two  stenographers  took  the  testi- 
ny  at  the  trial,  acting  at  different  times, 
ler  of  them  was  the  "official  stenogra- 
^r,"  within  Laws  1910,  c.  Ill,  requiring 
nand  for  a  transcript  for  purposes  of  ap- 
il  to  be  serred  on  the  "official  stenogra- 
ir"  within  30  days  after  adjournment  of 
rt ;  and,  such  demand  having  been  served, 

transcript  furnished  will  not  be  stricken, 
ess  shown  to  be  incorrect  in  some  material 
tlcular.  Lumber  Mineral  Oo.  yl  King,  54 
ith.  250,  251,  98  Miss.  7S8. 

TIOIAIi  0UBTET 

An  "official  survey,"  under  St.  l890i  H 
14,  1735,  must  ishow  distinctly  of  what 
ce  of  land  it  is  a  stkrvey,  at  whose  requeet 
ivas  made,  what  owners  were  notified  and 
«ent  at  the  date  of  the  isurvey,  and  the 
ne  of  the  chainman ;  and  if  such  essen- 
Is  are  omitted  it  cannot  be  treated  as  an 
cial  survey.  WatMns  v.  Havigfaorat,  74 
!.  318,  319, 13  OkL  128. 

TIOIAIXT 

See  Only  and  Officially 


FSET 

See  Set-Off. 


FSPRING 

See  Natural  Offspring. 

In  the  absence  of  proof  to  tl^e  contrary, 
nay  be  inferred  thajt^  a  child  described  in 
ition  to  a  named  man  as  his  child  is  not 
rely  a  child  committed  to  his  custody,  but 
the  "offspring"  of  h\^  body  and  lawfully 
otten.     Rimes  v.  States  67  &  B.  223,  7 

App.  55a 

The  electrical  unit  of  resistance,  called 
"ohm,"  is  1,000,000,000  units  of  the  cen- 

eter-gram-second,  usually  ca^ed  .the  ,G. 
S.   system.    Peoria    Waterworks  -  Oo.   v. 

>rla  R.  Ck>.,  181  Fed.  990,  1001. 


"Old"  is  defined  in  the  Century  Die- 
tary as  having  the  form  or  resemblance  of 

thing  indicated,  like,  as,  in  anthropoid, 
B  man;  crystalloid,  like  crystal;  hydroid, 
i  water.  It  is  much  used  as  an  English 
matlve,  chiefly  in  scientific  Words.  Rub^ 
oid,  therefore,  is  a  de8<^rlptive  word, 
aning  like  rubber.    Standard  Patiit  Go.  t. 

3  WDS.&  PJ2d  Seb.— 46 


TrinidUd  Asphalt  Mfg.  Go.,  81  Sup.  Of  456, 
457,  220  U.  S.  446,  55  U  Ed.  536. 

OIL 

See  Gocoanut  Oil;  Dead  Oil;  Linseed 
Oil;  Olive  Oil;  Salad  OU;  Sesame 
Oil;   Wood-Nut  OIL 

As  land,  see  Land. 

As  materials,  see  Materials. 

As  mineral,  see  Mineral. 

As  real  property,  see  Real  Property. 

Dealer  in  oil,  see  Dealer. 

Manufacture  of,  see  Manufactures — 
Manufactured  Articles. 

OEL  <XrailIOiin»Y  VftED  IN  SOAP  MAK^ 

no 

Niger-seed  oil,  wMch,  while  used  in  soap 
making,  can  be  used  tor  other  purposes, 
though  without  the  proper  qualities  for  sucfh 
purposes,  is  within  the  provision  ih  Tariff 
Act  July  24,  1807,  c.  11^  |  2,  Free  List,  par. 
568,  86  Stat.  151,  for  oils'  "commonly  used 
in  soap  making,  •  ♦  ♦  fit  only  for  such 
use."  United  States  v.  Golby  &  Go.,  153  F%d. 
883,  82  0.  0.  A.  629. 

Tariff  Act  July  24,  1807,'  a  11,  f  2,  Free 
List,  par.  568,  80  Stat.  198,  reUting  to  "oils 
oommonly  used  in  soap  making"  and  "fit 
only  ft>r'  such  usee,"  does  not  include  so* 
called  '\>lelc  acid,"  of  red  oil,  which  is  fit 
for  other  uses,  although  commonly  used  as 
soap  st6ck.  Edward  HiU*8  Sons  &  Go.  v. 
ITnited  States^  151  Fed.  475,  81  a  O.  A.  18. 

on  G01fP4^HT 

'     As  merchant,  see  Mertdiant. 

OIL  DEPOT 

Any  warehouse  or  t>lftce  ^'^^n  oils  are 
stored  in  large  quanttties  is  a  depot  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statutes  Unpiosihg  a  tax  on 
"oil  depots,"  wherein  petroleum  or  other  oils 
ate  stored  in  bulk  or  tank.  Standard  Oil 
Co:  v:  OommoiiwellUh,  62  B.  W.  1020,  1022, 
119  Ky.  75.  r   . 

OIL  MUX 

1^  Gotten  Seed  OU  liUk 

OIL  W£IX  ,,  V  ,*"    ..'  ,  ':/"' V  V  , 

'  .  As  mine^  see  Mina  <,,    . 

OLD 

OI<D  BRASS 

"Gomposition  metar  is  a  comiherelal 
designation  for  all  cdmposite  metMOs  of  cop- 
per, tin,  lead,  and  spelter  contmMiing  70  per 
cent,  or  more  of  copper,  and  articles  made  of 
that  metal  are  not  **old  brass,"  within  the 
commercial  meaning  of  that  term.  "Gompo- 
sition  scrap"  is  the  commercial  designation 
which  includes  old  cannon  and  various  oth- 
er articles  made  of  composition  metal,  which 
are  dealt  in  by  the  old-metal  trade.    Do^;vn^ 


OliD-FIELD  PJKB 


7» 


dilVJB  OIL  XN  TINS 


lag  T.  United  Stoied,  122  IM.  446»  440,  68 
G.  a  A.  427. 

oxi]>-Fizx]>  pnra 

A  timber  deed,  which  oooT^yed  all  the 
pine  timber  10  inches  and  up,  indndee  every 
kind  of  pine  on  the  land,  regardless  whether 
it  is  worth  sawing,  and  so  includes  "old- 
fleld  pine,"  which  is  i^e  that  grows  on  land 
that  has  been  once  farmed.  Hearin  t.  Union 
SawmiU  Co,  151  a  W.  1007,  1006,  106  Arte 
406. 

OLB  UHE  FOXJOT 

A  contract  of  life  insurance  whicb  does 
not  unalterably  fix  the  payments  to  be  made 
by  the  insured,  and  which  makes  the  benefit 
to  be  paid  dependent  upon  the  ooUectlen  of 
such  assessments  as  may  be  neoessaiy,  is  an 
assessment  policy,  an  old-line  policy  being 
one  in  which  the  premiums  and  the  liability 
incurred  by  the  insurer  are  fixed  and  unal- 
terable.    Knott  ▼.  Seeurity  Mut  Life  Ins. 

Go.,  144  8.  W.  178,  188,  181  Mo.  App.  679. 

• 

Where  a  policy  provided  that  the  price 
of  the  insurance  was  calculated  on  the  Amer- 
ican Tables  of  Mortality,  and  that  a  certain 
sum  should  be  laid  aside  from  the  premiums 
for  the  first  two  yean  to  make  an  emergen- 
cy fund  required  by  Rev.  St  1809,  |  7906, 
and  that,  if  the  death  rate  should  exceed 
that  estimated  in  the  American  Tables,  an 
assessment  might  be  made  to  meet  the  emer- 
gency, it  was  an  *'old  line  life  insurance  poli- 
cy,'* and  not  an  assessment  policy,  defined  by 
section  7901  as  one  where  the  amount  is  de- 
pendent on  the  collection  of  an  itosessment  on 
persons  holding  similar  contracts,  and  hence 
the  policy  in  question  was  within  section 
7890,  declaring  that  no  misv^Nresentation 
should  avoid  a  policy  unless  the  matter  rep- 
resented should  have  actually  contributed 
to  the  contiligency  or  event  on  which  the 
policy  was  to  become  payable.  Williams  v. 
at  Louis  Ut^  Ins.  Go.,  87  8.  W.  499,  603, 
189  Mo.  70. 

OXiB  WATER 

Where  benefits  of  an  Irrigation  system 
were  classified  under  two  heads,  one  of  "old 
water,'*  and  the  other  of  "new  water,"  and 
the  term  "old  water^  referred  to  existing 
water  rights  at  the  time  of  the  purchase  of 
the  canal,  and  "new  water'*  referred  to  rights 
yet  to  be  acquired  by  the  enlargement  of  the 
canal,  and  no  benefits  under  the  head  of  "old 
water"  were  apportioned  to  plaintHTs  land, 
and  the  oanal  had  not  been  enlarged  so  as 
to  acquire  any  "new  water,"  until  such  en- 
largement occurred,  or  it  was  made  to  ap- 
pear that  the  canal  company  had  sufficient 
water  to  suiH^ly  plaintiiTs  demand  without 
interfering  with  prior  users,  he  could  not  ac- 
quire a  perpetual  water  right  by  the  tem- 
porary use  of  water  from  the  canal  when  pri- 
or users  were  not  demanding  their  full  rights. ' 


Gerber  v.  Nampa  ft  Meridian  Ixr*  Dist,  U 
Pae.  80,  84,  16  Idaho^  1. 

OLEOMARGARINE 

Dealer  in  oleomargarine,  see  Dealer. 

"Oleomargarine  is  a  manufactured  pnx 
net  made  of  oleo  oil,  neutral  lard,  milk  id 
cream,  and  pure  butter,  although  pure  botti 
is  not  used  in  all  grades,  and  butter  and  mS 
and  cream  and  other  coloring  matter  is  e^ 
dently  used  for  the  purpose  of  giving  it  tl 
semblance  of  the  true  dairy  product**  Stai 
V.  Armour  Packing  Ckx,  100  N.  W.  09,  80, 12 
Iowa,  823,  2  Ann.  Cas.  448. 

Agricultural  Law,  Laws  1893,  pi  6G0, 
388,  art  2, 1 20,  defiines  oleomargarine  as  si 
article  or  substance  in  the  semblance  of  bo 
ter  not  the  usual  product  of  the  dairy,  an 
not  made  ezdusiv^  at  pue  aad  madnlte 
ated  milk  or  cream,  or  (2)  any  article  or  tn^ 
stance  into  which  any  oil,  lard,  or  Cat  n 
produced  from  milk  or  cream  enters  ss 
component  part  Section  26  (page  663),  i 
amended  by  Laws  1894,  pi  870,  c  426^  I^i 
1807,  p.  810,  c.  768,  and  Laws  1902,  p.  96 
c.  385,  provides  that  any  person  manufa 
turing,  selling,  etc.,  any  substance  in  imit 
don  or  semblance  of  butter,  shall  be  deesM 
guilty  of  a  violation  of  the  agricultural  U^ 
whether  he  sells  such  substance  aa  bnttx 
oleomargarine,  or  under  any  oth^  name 
designation  whatsoever.  Depositions  i 
which  a  warrant  diarging  a  violation  of  ss 
section  26  was  issued  showed  that  relat 
sold  an  article  called  "Oleomargarine,''  ce 
sisting  of  a  small  brick  of  white  substan 
wrai^ied  in  paper,  and  labeled  "Oleoou 
garine.*'  There  was  no  statement  that  tl 
article  imitated  or  was  in  semblance  of  m 
ural  butter.  The  chemist  who  analyzed  i 
substance  deposed  that  it  was  not  natar 
butter,  nor  of  the  color  of  natural  butt 
produced  from  pure  milk  or  cream,  etc,  b 
was  What  Is  commonly  known  aa  oleoms 
garine.  Held,  that  the  depositions  negatiT< 
the  fact  that  the  substance  was  an  Imitatlc 
or  in  semblance  of  natural  butter,  and  di 
proved  the  essential  fiicts  necessary  to  ooi 
stitute  the  crime.  People  ex  rel.  McAulef 
Wahle,  109  N.  T.  Supp.  629,  631,  124  Ap] 
Div.  762. 

OLIVE  OIL 
OLIVE  OIL  nr  xjLRB 

Construing  Tariff  Act  July  24, 1897,  c  V 
f  1,  Schedule  A,  par.  40,  30  Stat  153,  pn 
viding  (1)  for  oUve  oU  "in  botUes.  jars,  diii 
or  similar  packages,"  and  (2)  for  *'oUve  oi 
not  specially  provided  for,"  held,  that  oil  1 
5-gallon  tins,  in  which  form  it  is  not  soli 
to  the  ^nsumer  but  to  hotels  and  retti 
dealers,  is  not  subject  to  the  first  provisioi 
but  to  the  latter.  United  States  v.  La  U^ 
na,  Aaema  4  iTaman,  154  Fed.  927. 


OLIVES 


728 


ON— UPON 


LIVES 

LIVES  nr  JABS 

Tariflf  Act  July  24.  1897.  a  11.  |  1, 
hedule  G.  par.  264.  80  Stat  171.  relating  to 
ives  "In  bottles.  Jars  or  similar  packages.*' 
id  '*in  casks  or  otherwise  than  in  bottles, 
rs.  or  similar  packages."  does  not  import 
I  intention  to  make  a  division  between 
ives  in  retail  packages  and  those  in  whole- 
le  packages,  and  that  "olives  in  Jars"  hold- 
?  10  gallons  are  therefore  within  the  first 
these  provisions.  United  States  v.  Shing 
ion  ft  Ck>..  173  Fed.  844,  846^ 

LIVES  PREPARED 
Ab  f  ndt.  see  Froit 

LOGRAPHIC  WILL 

See  Holographic  WilL 

MISSION 

See  WiUfol  Omission. 

"Omission"  denotes  a  negative  and  in- 
tion.  Bandle  v.  Birmingham  By...  Light 
Power  Co.,  53  South.  918,  921.  169  Ala.  314. 

"Omission"  is  a  correlative  of  duty.  New 
)rk  Cent  ft  H.  B.  B.  Ck>.  v.  United  States. 
6  Fed.  2Q7,  269.  92  0.  0.  A.  831. 

The  act  of  a  railroad  company  in  closing 

obstructing  a  drain  so  as  to  damage  lands 

id  crops  was  an  act  of  "commission'*  and 

t  of  "omission."     Brown  v.  Liouisiana  & 

W.  B.  Co..  42  South.  666.  118  La.  87. 

Under  St  1894.  c.  889.  requiring  in  case 
omission  to  state  the  place  of  the  injury, 
e  term  "omission"  means  something  more 
an  a  failure  to  state  the  precise  spot  of 
e  accident  with  sufficient  clearness.  The 
llure  must  be  an  omission  patent  on  the 
ce  of  the  document  Hence  a  notice  of  ac- 
lent  on  a  highway,  stating  that  it  occurred 
bile  driving  along  the  F.  road,  leading 
>m  W..  about  three  or  four  miles  from  W., 
a  point  thereon  on  the  F.  side  of  the  five 
idges.  is  not  within  the  statute.  Tobln  v. 
habitants  of  Biimfleld.  65  N.  B.  28.  182 
EiSS.    117. 

The  violation  by  a  corporation  of  the 
ty  imposed  by  the  Employers*  L4ability  Act, 
quiring  all  railroads  to  equip  their  cars 
ed  in  interstate  commerce  with  automatic 
uplers.  constituted  an  "omission,"  within 
c  meaning  of  Code  1896.  §  27.  giving  a 
jht  of  action  to  the  personal  representative 
r  the  wrongful  act.  omission,  or  negligence 
any  person  or  corporation  causing  the 
ath  of  intestate.  Mobile.  J.  &  K.  O.  R.  C6. 
Bromberg.  37  South.  395.  400»  141  Ala.  258. 

ResUot  dlstl»OTlibfwi 

Set  Neglect 


OMUunoNS,    HRouscrra,    ard    re^ 

FAUIiTS 

An  alderman,  clothed  with  original  crim- 
inal jurisdiction  by  the  town  charter,  who 
failed  to  charge  a  person  brought  before 
him  with  any  offense  under  the  charter,  and 
who  tried  him  for  an  offense  not  embraced 
within  the  charter,  and  who  fined  and  im- 
prisoned him  for  an  offense  of  which  he  was 
not  tried  in  an  orderly  manner,  and  to  which 
he  had  not  pleaded  guilty,  and  who  failed  to 
keep  a  record  of  his  Judicial  proceedings 
was  guilty  of  "omissions,  neglects,  and  de- 
faults." within  Bev.  Code  1852.  as  amended 
to  1893.  p.  697.  c.  92.  |  2,  authorizing  the 
Judges  of  the  superior  court  to  punish  the 
contempt,  omissions,  neglects,  and  defaults  of 
enumerated  offloera.  In  re  TuU  (DeL)  78  AtL 
299.  300,  2  Boycc^  126. 

OMIT 

See  Neglect 

Under  Code  Supp.  19to7.  I  1386b.  autJior- 
izing  the  auditor  to  correct  etrors  in  the  as- 
sessment list,  and  to  assess  for  taxation  any 
omitted  property  on  noticing  the  owner,  etc.. 
taxable  property  is  omitted  from  the  assess- 
nient  roll  where  the  assessor  erroneously  de- 
cides that  property  subject  to  taxation  is  not 
taxable  and  leaves  it  off  the  roll  oh  that  ac- 
count, as  well  as  where  through  oversight  or 
ignorance  of  the  existence  of  the  property  It 
is  omitted;  the  word  "omit"  meaning  to  let 
fail,  to  leave  out,  not  to  insert  or  name,  to 
neglect  to  mention  or  to^peak  of,  as  to  "omU*' 
an  item  from  a  list,  etc.  Talley  v.  Bi\Qwn.  125 
N.  W.  248.  253*  146  Iowa,  360.  140  Am.  St 
Bep^  282. 

ON— UPON 

See  As  Upon  the  Trial;  In  or  Upon;  In. 
Upon,  or  About;  Lived  Upon;  Long 
Oh;  Squatted  Ujion;'  Standing  or 
Erected  Upon. 

The  word  "upon"  is  ordinarily  synony- 
mous with  "on*'  in  all  of  its  meanings;  the 
prefix  "up"  being  almost  eliminated.  State 
ex  rel.  Barrett  v.  Hitchcock,  146  S.  W.  40,  51, 
241  Mow  433. 

Where  a  note  is  payable  on  a  fixed  day, 
and  not  "on  or  about"  a  fixed  date,  and  the 
debt6r  makes  payment  before  the  maturity  of 
the  note,  he  is  not  entitled,  in  the  absence  of 
an  agreement  to  the  contrary,  to  Interest  on 
the  payments  from  the  time  they  are  made 
to  the  date  on  which  the  note  is  due.  Black- 
shear  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Stone.  7a  S.  B.  29,  30,  8  Oa. 
App.  661. 

While  Jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  a 
state  extends  only  to  things  "on"  a  river,  and 
not  to  permanent  structures  attached  to  the 
river  bed  within  another  state,  it  includes  a 
suit  relating  to  floating  structures  used  in 
connection  with  fish  nets  in  the  river,  al- 
though anchored  by  means  of  weights.    Co- 


ON--UPOK 


7544 


o»r*-UPON 


lumbia  Biver  FAcksn'  Assli  v.  McGowan,  172 
Fed.  ©91,  ©97. 

In  calling  for  the  Oblo  riTer  as  tlie  north- 
ern boundary  of  a  magisterial  district  which 
bordered  on  it,  the  designation  of  the  begin- 
ning point  as  "on  the  Ohio  river"  means  that 
the  district  line  begins  in  the  line  of  the 
county  on  its  northern  shore.  Commonwealth 
T.  Louisville  &  E).  Packet  Oo.,  80  S.  W.  154, 
155,  117  Ky.  986. 

In  a  conveyance  the  words  "to,"  "on," 
"by,"  "at,"  "along,"  a  nontidal  stream  pre- 
sumptively carry  title  as  far  into  the  stream 
as  the  grantor  possesses.  Leary  v.  Jersey 
City,  189  Fed.  419,  428. 

A  conveyance  of  land  bounding  "on"  a 
way,  where,  as  a  matter  of  construction,  the 
granted  premises  do  not  stop  at  the  side  Hue, 
goes  to  the  line  of  the  ownership  of  the 
grantor.  An  owner  laid  out  a  passageway 
along  the  easterly  line  of  his  tract.  He  sub- 
sequently conveyed  the  tract  by  mortgage, 
which  described  the  land  as  "on  a"  way  and 
gave  courses  and  distances.  He  subsequently 
conveyed  the  way  to  a  third  person.  Held, 
that  the  mortgages  operated  to  convey  to  the 
center  of  the  way,  with  a  right  of  way  over 
the  other  half,  and  that  the  third  person 
had  a  half  of  the  way,  with  a  corresponding 
right  of  way  over  the  other  half.  Gould  v. 
Wagner,  82  N.  E.  10, 11, 13, 196  Mass.  270. 

In  an  action  against  a  street  railroad 
company  for  personal  injuries,  an  allegation 
in  the  declaration  that  plaintiff  was  "on" 
one  of  defendant's  cars  renders  the  count  de- 
murrable^ as  plaintiff  might  have  be^i  on  the 
car  as  a  trespasser;  the  action  being  based 
on  his  legal  presence  on  the  car.  Breese  v. 
Trenton  Horse  B.  Co.,  19  AU.  204,  206,  5^  N. 
J.  Law,  250. 

"There  iS'  a  long  lin^  of  uniform  author- 
ities that  the  words  'on,*  'when,'  'after,*  'from 
and  after,*  and  like  expressions,  used  in  a 
devise  of  a  remainder  following  a  life  estate, 
do  not  afford  sufficient  ground  in  themselves 
for  adjudging  that  a  remainder  is  contingent 
and  not  vested,  and  that  such  words,  unle^ 
their  meaning  is  enlarged  by  the  context, 
are  to  be  construed  as  relating  merely  to  the 
time  of  the  enjoym^itof  the  estate,  and  not 
to  the  time  of  its  vesting  aa  int^est  W)iere 
nothing  appears  in  the  context  of  the  will 
whicii  enlarges  theae  words,  they  do  not  of 
themselves  effect  a  postponement  of  the  vest- 
ing of  the  lemalnder  until  the  death  of  the 
life  tenant"  Davidson  v.  Jones,  98  N.  T. 
Supp.  265,  266,  112  Appu  Div.  264  (citing  Con- 
nelly V.  O'Brien,  60  N.  B.  20,  166  N.  Y.  406; 
Hersee  v.  Simpson,  48  N.  E.  890,  154  N.  T. 
496;  Nelson  v.  Bussell,  31  N.  B.  1008.  135 
N.  T.  137,  Moore  v.  Lyons  [N.  Y.]  25  Wend. 
119). 

Adverbs  of  time,  such  as  "upon,"  '*then," 
"from  and  after,"  etc.,  in  tlie  devise  or  be- 
quest of  a  ririBlndgr  limited  x^ifoik  life  estate^ 


are  construed  to  relate  merely  to  the  time  of 
enjoyment  of  the  estate,  and  not  to  the  time 
of  its  vesting  in  interest  Btapta  v.  Mead, 
137  N.  Y.  Supp.  847,  850,  152  App.  Div.  745. 

The  location  of  a  depot  at  a  point  within 
300  feet  of  the  northern  boundary  of  a  town, 
100  feet  of  its  eastern  boundary,  and  1,450 
feet  from  its  sputhern  boundary  at  the  near- 
est point,  is  not  a  location  "on"  the  southern 
limits  of  the  town  within  the  terms  of  a  deed 
delivered  in  escrow  and  conveying  land  in 
consideration  of  such  location.  Bridgers  t. 
Beaman,  75  S.  B.  798,  799, 159  N.  a  521. 

As  used  in  Code  dv.  Proc.  |  847,  as  It 
stood  prior  to  1897,  requiring  that  Judgment 
be  rendered  upon  the  coming  in  of  the  re- 
port of  sale,  the  word  "upon"  does  not  mean 
"immediately  upon."  Hence  a  defld^acy 
Judgment  in  a  foreclosure  suit,  under  such 
statute,  was  not  erroneous  because  not  ren- 
dered immediately  upon  the  coming  in  of  the 
report  of  sale,  where  entered  at  the  term  at 
which  confirmation  was  had.  Crary  t.  Buck, 
95  N.  W.  839,  840, 1  Neb.  (Unof  .)  596. 
As  after 

As  used  in  a  will  directing  the  payment 
of  certain  indebtednesses  "upon"  the  death 
of  testator's  wife,  the  word  "upon"  meant 
immediately  after.  Brown  v.  Ferren,  68  Atl. 
870,  73.N.H.  6. 

In  section  2330,  Rev.  Codes  1906»  relat- 
ing to  the  division  of  counties,  the  word 
"upon**  means  afiw,  or  following,  and  the 
section  makes  the  qualli^lng  of  the  commis- 
sioners a  cpndition  precedent  to  clothing  the 
new  county  with  legal  existence.  The  word 
"fornM^"  mesAs  and  relates  only  to  the  area 
of  the  county  and  has  no  reference  to  a 
county  equipped  with  means  of  government, 
and  therefore  the  voters  are  legal  voters  at 
a  primary  held  before  tile  appointment  of 
the  commissioners.  Murray  v.  Davis,  128 
N.  W.  305,  306,  21  N.  D.  64. 


Where  a  lease  recited  that  the  lessee  had 
hired  a  store  in  the  course  of  erection  "on" 
a  lot  described,  it  was  held  that  the  word 
"on"  could  not  be  read  as  "and,"  and  that 
the  building  only  was  demised.  Klie  v.  Yon 
Broock,  37  Atl.  469,  472,  56  N.  J.  Bq.  18. 

As  at  the  tiiite  of 

A  claiise  in  a  will  devising  property  to 
testator's  grandchildren  "upon  the  death"  of 
their  mother  does  not  Indicate  an  Intention 
to  postpone  the  vesting  of  the  remainder  to 
the  date  of  the  mother's  death,  ins^d  of 
from  the  date  of  testator's  death,  but  merely 
refers  to  the  time  when  the  remaindermen 
shall  come  into  the  ^Joyment  of  the  est'^te. 
Archer  v.  Ja^iobs,  101  N.  W..  195,  199,  J25 
Iowa,  467. 

A  remainder  is  notf  to  be  considered  con- 
tingent where  it  may  be  vested  consistently 
with  the  intent  oft^dtalor,  and  the  words 
"after"  and  "upon  the  death  ot"  and  like 


ON— UPON 


726 


ON  AND  AJFTKB, 


words,  do  not  make  a  conttDgency,  but  merely 
indicate  when  the  remainder  ehall  take  effect 
In  poBBesBlon.  Clark  v.  Peters,  124  N.  Y. 
Supp.  961»  962»  68  Misc.  Bep.  252. 

A  win  gave  part  of  testator's  estate  in 
trust  for  his  brother,  providing  that  "upon 
his  death"  the  property  should  be  conTeyed 
to  another.  Held,  that  the  use  of  the  word 
"upon,"  followed  by  directions  to  conrey, 
Indicates  that,  until  the  contingency  named 
should  happen,  there  was  to  be  no  vesting. 
In  re  Keogh,  85  N.  Y.  Supp.  191, 196,  47  Misc. 
B^.  37. 

The  word  ''upon,"  as  used  in  a  bond  in 
which  the  condition  is  that  if  within  one 
year,  upon  request  and  payment  of  a  certain 
sum,  the  obligor  shall  make  and  execute  a 
valid  deed  of  a  piece  of  land,  is  eguivalent  in 
meaning  to  the  words  "at  the  time  of,"  and 
requires  the  obligor  to  execute  his  deed  withr 
in  a  reasonable  time  after  request  made  and 
money  piald  or  tendered,  if  done,  within  a 
year.    Brown  v.  Glough,  39  Me.  566,  568. 

Omiditlon .  pveoedent 

The  words  ''on  payment,"  in  a  contract 
of  sale  providing  that,  ''on  payment"  of  the 
contract  price  and  interest,  the  vendor  would 
execute  and  deliver  a  warranty  deed  of  the 
said  premises,  make  the  conditions  of  the 
contract  concurrent  as  to  time  and  dependent, 
so  that  the  payment  ot  the  money  is  a 
condition  precedent  to  the  delivery  of  the 
deed  which  is  Intended  by  the  parties  to  take 
place  at  the  same  time..  ?unt  v.  Lake,  97 
N.  Y.  Supp.  298,  299,  48  Misc.  Eep.  570. 

As  oontiffBonSy  near  to»  or  fit 

When  used  as  indicating  relative  situa- 
tion, "on"  means  at,  near,  or  adjacent  to, 
without  Implying  contact  or  support  O'Mata 
v.  Jensma,  121  N.  W.  518,  519,  143  Iowa,  297. 

The  word  "on"  in  Laws  1905,  p.  Il4, 
making  it  unlawful  for  a' person  to  be  in  an 
intoxicated  condition  on  any  public  street  or 
highway.  Is  not  synonymous  with  "near," 
and  one  could  not  be  convicted  under  the  act 
for  being  Intoxicated  on  a  porch  or  shed  of  a 
store,  within  15  to  30  feet  of  a  pubHc  road. 
Hutchinson  v.  State,  70  d.  E>.  63,  65,  8  Oa. 
App.  684. 

Where  a  deed  described  the  land  as  lot 
10,  of  block  V  of  the  Mott  tract,  "the  same 
being  the  lot  on  the  corner  of  First  street  on 
the  east  side  of  F.  street,  being  65  feet  front 
by  165  feet  deep,"  and  a  map  of  the  Mott 
tract  showed  lot  10  of  block  V,  as  a  lot  front- 
ing 60  feet  on  F.  street  with  a  depth  of  165 
feet,  and  as  located  60  feet  from  First  street, 
and  lot  9  of  the  same  dimensions  lying  be- 
tween it  and  First  street,  and  fronting  on 
F.  street,  the  quoted  words  did  not  render 
the  description  uncertain  as  inconsistent  with 
the  other  description,  for  the  word  "on"  In 
the  quoted .  description  might  be  construed 
as  equivalent  to  "near  to"  or  "at,"  as  simply 
denoting  proximity.  Hall  v.  Bartlett,  112 
Pac.  176,  178,  158  CaL  638. 


Aslm  or  diuriay 

The  word  "on"  is  often  given  the  mean- 
ing of  "in"  or  "during,"  and  this  meaning  is 
well  recognised  when  used  to  designate  a 
date  or  calendar  division  of  time,  and  is  al- 
ways its  meaning  when  used  with  reference 
to  a  named  day.  Henry  v.  Lovenberg  (Tex.) 
128  S.  W.  675,  676. 

As  oa  svrfftoo  of 
Under  Rev.  St  1899,  |  6116^  providing 
that  before  granting  any  franchise  for  con- 
structing and  operating  an  elevated,  under- 
ground, or  other  street  railroad  "on,"  "over," 
or  under  any  street  or  alley,  etii.,  the  word 
Vover"  means  "over,"  and  can  only  apply 
to  elevated  roads;  and  "under"  means  be- 
neath," and  can  refer  only  to  underground 
roads;  and  "on"  means  "on,"  and  can  only 
ref 6r  to  a  surface  road  on  the  street  Ruck- 
ert  V.  Grand  Ave.  Ry.  Oo.,  68 .8.  W.  8U»  818, 
163  Mo.  260. 

As  over 

An  indictment;  alleging  that  accused 
practicing  medicine  without  a  license  treat- 
ed a  patient,  and  that  the .  treat^ient  con- 
sisted in  physical,  manipulations  with  ac- 
cused's hands  "over"  the  patient,  is  sustained 
by  proof  that  accused  placed  his  hands  "up- 
on" the  patient  and  rubbed  and  nianlpulated 
his  hands  "upon"  his  body;  the  words  "up- 
on" and  "over"  being  synonymous.  Milling 
V.  Statte  (Tex.)  150  S.  W.  484.  436. 

Wlieoa  syaoiijmows 
The  wMdci  "on  or  upon,"  wben  affecting 
the  -qualitr  of  an  estate  in  nsference  to  the 
time  of  its  vesting  or  enjoyment,  are  synony- 
mous with  "when."  In  bequests  tfC  personal 
property^  these  words  usnaUy  import  a  condi- 
tion, and,  unless  explained  nr  Controlled  Isy 
ao^e  expressiens  ot  other  pifovtsloiis  ofthte 
will,  they  are  annexed  as  conditions  prece- 
dents to  the  gift  and  render  thelntedrest  con- 
tingent While  several  modem  text-writers 
and  many  dedsions  seem  to  give  these  words 
the  same  significance  in  reference  to  de^ses 
of  real,  and  bequests  of  personal,  property, 
the  older  authorities  hold  that  in  respect  to 
realty  tbey  import  usuaUy  a  condition  subse- 
quent determinative .  of  the  estate  according 
to  the  terms  of  the  conditioBO,  and  that  la  the 
meantime  the  estat^d  would  vest.  But  all  of 
the  authorities  are  agreed  that  both,  as  to 
real  and  personal  property  they  may  be  so 
explained  and  controlled  by  other  expressions 
ajQd.  provisions  of  the  will  that  tbey  do  not 
Import  a  condition  at  all,  but  simply  refer 
to  the  time  of  enjoyment,  and  that  the  in- 
terest conferred  will  vest  at  the  testator's 
death  to  be  possessed  and  enjoyed  at  the 
time  Indicated.  Hooker  v.  Bry^n,  53  S.  E. 
130,  131,  140  N.  C.  402, 

Olf  AKD  AFI^R 

The  provision'  in  section  33,  Tariff  Act 
July  27,  1897,  c.  11,  30  Stat  213,' that  "on 
and  after"  that  date  merchandise  previously 


ON  AKD  AFTER 


726 


OK  OR  ABOUT 


iDPorted  Bhould  be  subjeeted  to  the  duties 
Imposed  by  said  act,  is  not  limited  to  mer- 
chandise imported  prior  to  tbat  date^  but  ap- 
plies also  to  that  imported  on  that  day.  John 
B.  BUlBon  &  Sons  ▼.  United  States,  186  Fed. 
960,  972,  978. 

Where  certain  guaranties  ot  payment  ex- 
pressly applied  to  all  goods  sold  on  credit 
*'on  and  after"  their  dates  from  time  to  time, 
and  for  any  balance  or  balances  of  account 
of  such  goods,  induding  interest  thereon  "af- 
tmr  maturity,"  and  which  were  made  to  con- 
tinue until  notice  of  their  discontinuance  of 
further  liability  thereon,  given  by  the  sub- 
scribers in  writing  to  the  seller,  the  guaj^- 
anties  were  continuing,  notwithstanding  the 
amount  of  the  liability  was  limited,  and  were 
applicable  to  all  future  sales  made  prior  to 
notice  of  discontinuance.  Bond  r.  John  V. 
FarweU  Cio.,  172  Fed.  fi8,  66,  96  a  a  A.  546. 

ON  OB  ABOUT 

An  admission  that  a  notice  was  served 
"on  or  about"  June  16,  1906,  cannot  be  con- 
strued as  an  admission  that  the  notice  was 
served  June  15th  or  prior  thereto.  Hope  v. 
Scranton  &  Lehigh  Goal  Co.,  106  N.  T.  Supp. 
372,  378,  120  App.  Div.  506. 

A  contract  for  the  sale  of  calendars,  con- 
taining the  name  of  the  buyer  and  matter 
advertising  his  business  as  insurance  agent, 
stipulated  that  the  calendars  should  be  ship- 
ped by  freight  and  delivered  f.  o.  b.  cars  "on 
or  about"  November  1st  On  December  8th, 
following,  the  seller  shipped  the  goods  by 
express,  and  the  buyer  received  them  6  days 
later.  It  would  take  a  package  from  8  to  22 
days  to  be  earried  by  freight  field,  that 
time  was  of  the  essence,  and  the  seller  failed 
to  deliver  in  time.  Brown  &  Bigelow  v. 
Bard,  118  N.  Y.  Supp.  871,  874,  64  Misc.  Rep. 
249. 

Where  a  note  is  payable  on  a  fixed  day, 
and  not  "on  or  about"  a  fixed  date,  and  the 
debtor  makes  paymoit  before  the  matuitty 
of  the  note,  he  is  not  entitled,  in  the  absence 
of  an  agreement  to  the  contrary,  to  interest 
on  the  payments  from  the  time  th^  are 
made  to  the  date  on  which  the  note  Is  due. 
Blackshear  Mfg.  Oo.  y.  Stone,  70  8.  B.  29, 
80, 8  Ga.  App.  6ftl. 

"Among  the  meanings  of  the  word 
'about,'  as  given  in  Webster's  Dictionary,  are 
'concerning;*  *wlth  regard  to;*  *on  account 
of;'  'touching.' "  Acts  1898,  p.  1169,  c  602, 
subjecting  eveir  building  to  a  lien  for  the 
payment  of  debts  contracted  for  work  done 
"on  or  about"  the  same,  eliminates  the  right 
of  a  lien  for  materials  furnished  for  a  build- 
ing, and  gives  a  lien  for  labor  only.  A  sub- 
contractor agreed  with  the  principal  contrac- 
tor to  "carve,  furnish  the  models,  and  ^  •  • 
erect  in  place  and  finish  all  the  exterior 
marble  work"  for  a  building.  The  material 
was  taken  to  the  subcohtractor's  yard,  where 
stonecutters  put  the  stones  into  proper  shape. 
The  stones  were  then  loaded  on  cars  and 


transported  to  tte  side  ef  the  boUdl 
where  they  were  unloaded,  and  then  bm 
from  the  sidewalk  and  placed  hi  the  bm 
in  proper  place.  Held,  that  the  scbcoDtnt 
fnmlahed  work  "on  or  abour  the  Iraildi 
within  the  act  Svans  Marble  Go.  t.  Im 
national  Trust  Co.,  60  Aa  667,  672, 101  ] 
210, 109  Am.  St  Rep.  568^  4  Ann.  Ga&hSL 

Comp.  Laws,  f  10,714,  require  the  im 
of  a  dalm  of  mechanic's  lien  within  60  di 
of  tbe  time  of  furnishing  the  hut  m&teil 
A  claim  was  filed  on  April  dOth,  8tatin?il 
the  last  materials  were  furnished  on  or  abi 
March  3d.  Held,  that  as  the  phnae  '^ 
about"  is  a  relative  term,  not  showing  d 
nitely  when  the  materials  were  foniM 
and  as  the  claim  showed  on  its  face  that  i 
last  materials  were  furnished  tt  least 
days  before  lioi  filed,  it  was  not  a  comi 
ance  with  the  statute  Godfrey  Lamber 
y.  Kline,  IBS  N.  W.  528,  529,  167  Mia  \ 
(quoting  6  Words  and  Phrases,  pu  4m. 

Im  etvU  pUadiasTS 

There  is  no  fatal  variance  between 
allegation  that  a  contract  was  made  **m 
about  September,  1905,"  and  proof  tbat 
was  entered  into  on  October  the  same  yf 
Kerr  v.  Blair.  105  8.  W.  548,  561,  47  7 
Civ.  App.  406. 

There  is  no  variance  between  a  a 
plaint  in  trover  alleging  that  the  conrers 
occurred  on  or  about  October  18th  aod 
proof  that  it  occurred  on  October  21st  Bl 
V.  Riddle,  57  South.  382,  383,  3  Ala.  A 
292  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  490^ 

Im  imdiotmenta  or  iiaformmtioiu 

Charging  that  the  offense  was  commit 
"on  or  about"  a  certain  day  is  indefinite  t 
uncertain,  and  is  fatal  upon  motion  in 
rest  of  judgment  Morgan  v.  State,  40  Sot 
828,  829,  51  Fla.  70^  7  Ann.  Caa  773. 

The  words  "on  or  about,"  in  an  ind 
ment  alleging  that  defendant  "did,  o^ 
about  the  1st  day  of  April,  190V'  cocu 
the  offense  charged,  do  not  render  the  ido: 
and  the  year*  as  well  as  the  day,  unceru 
The  meaning  of  the  language  to  tlie  geoe 
understanding  is  that  the  time  of  tbe  ai 
was  near  the  1st  day  of  April  in  tlie  y< 
1901.  There  is  no  uncertainty  as  to  i 
year.  The  words  "April,  1901,"  mean  Af 
in  the  year  1901,  and  no  resource  of  Ingeo 
ty  can  make  them  mean  anything  else. 
averment  in  this  language  is  of  a  time  wltl 
the  year,  and  if  any  day  within  the  year  n: 
be  proved  the  allegation  is  sufficient 
averment  of  time  in  an  indictment  Is  a  n^ 
ter  of  form,  not  generally  material,  and. 
view  of  Rev.  St  f  1025,  which  provides  tt 
no  indictment  shall  be  deemed  Insuffideot 
reason  of  any  defect  in  matter  of  form  oc 
as  well  as  under  the  Oregon  statute,  adopt 
by  rule  in  the  f^eral  courts  in  tbat  sU 
which  provides  that  the  precise  time  dJ 
not  be  stated,  an  indictment  alleging  c 
time  of  commission  of  the  offense  as  on 


OK  OR  ABOUT 


727 


ON  OR  BSFORE 


it  a  day  named  is  suffldent,  except  in 
9  where  the  time  is  an  ingredient  of  the 
use.    United  States  v.  McKinley,  127  Fed. 

171. 

The  common  understanding  of  the  words 
or  about,"  when  used  in  connection  with 
^finite  point  of  time,  is  tliat  they  do  not 
the  time  at  large,  but  indicate  that  it  is 
gd  with  approximate  accuracy.  An  indict- 
t  under  Rer.  St  {  3883,  as  amended  by 

Sept  26,  1888,  c  1089,  i  2,  25  Stat  486, 
depositing  an  obscene,  lewd,  and  lascivi- 

letter  in  the  malls,  is  not  bad  because 
lleged  that  the  offense  was  committed  "on 
Lbout"  a  given  date^  where  it  shows  that 
a  short  tim»  elapsed  between  the  writing 
he  letter  and  the  finding  of  the  indict- 
it ;  the  defect  being  one  of  form  only,  by 
ch  the  defendant  was  not  prejudiced,  and 
t>e  disregarded  under  Rev.  St  i  1025. 
ker  V.  United  States,  151  Fed.  755,  757.  81 
:.  A  379. 

OB  ABOUT  THE  PREMISES 

The  Alabama  statute  provides  that  it 
11  be  unlawful  for  any  person  without  a 
use  to  sell  vinous  or  spirituous  liquors 
ny  quantity,  if  the  same  is  drunk  ''on  or 
ut  the  premises."  This  statutory  prohl- 
on  embraces  places  over  which  the  seller 
no  legal  right  to  exercise  authority  or 
trol,  but  which  are  so  near  his  premises, 
so  situated  In  relation  thereto,  that  they 
within  the  mischief  intended  to  be  rem^ 
1;  but  where  the  liquor  is  taken  by  the 
crhaser,  in  the  quart  measure  of  the  seller, 
I  place  OA  the  opposite  side  of  the  street, 
of  view  of  the  seller's  house,  about  fifty 
;  distant  therefrom,  and  in  front  of  an- 
er  store,  and  is  there  drunk,  the  court 
not  assome,  as  a  legal  conclusion,  that 
ti  place  is  within  the  statute.  Basterling 
ttate^  80  Ala.  46»  4& 

ORBBFOBE 

See,  also,  Before. 

A  written  contract  for  the  exchange  of 
perty,  which  provides  that  property  is  tp 
conveyed  subject  to  an,  incumbrance,  due 

or  before"  two  years,  means  that  tb»  in- 
ibrance  will  mature  in  two  years,  but  may 
paid  at  any  time  on  or  before  maturity, 
enck  V.  Ballon,  97  N.  B.  704,  705,  253  111. 
,  Ann.  Cas.  1913A,  251  (citing  6  Words 
i  Phrases,  p.  4967). 

In  an  admission  that  a  note  sued  on  was 
drsed  by  the  several  defendants  '*on  or  be- 
i  negotiation,"  the  words  "on  or  before" 
luded  **after,"  and  the  word  "negotiation" 
lified  delivery,  that  term  being  generally 
criptive  of  all  those  acts  by  which  a  note 
}ill  is  put  into  circulation  or  passed  in  its 
Illation,  including  delivery  in  issue,  trans- 

by  delivery,  or  transfer  by  Indorsement 
n^ard  Knapp  &  €k>.  v.  Tidewater  Ooal  Ck>., 
^tL  1063,  1066^  85  Conn.  147. 


An  indictment  alleging  that  the  theft 
occurred  "on  or  before"  the  21st  day  of  July 
was  not  fiitally  defective  because  not  show- 
ing that  the  offense  was  committed  within 
the  period  of  limitation;  the  state  being  re- 
quired to  prove  that  the  offense  was  commit- 
ted within  the  period  of  the  limitation  count- 
ing from  the  time  the  indictment  was  re- 
turned by  the  grand  Jury.  Presley  v.  State, 
131  S.  W.  332,  333,  60  Tex.  Cr.  B.  102. 

A  negotiable  note  on  which  the  maker  in- 
dorsed after  it  was  barred  by  limitations  "on 
or  before  the  year  1904  I  promise  to  pay 
within  note"  became  due  and  payable  not 
later  than  January  1,  1904;  the  words  "on  or 
before"  as  used  in  notes  meaning  immediate- 
ly at  or  any  time  in  advance  of  the  date 
named.  Lovenberg  v.  Henry,  140  S.  W.  1079, 
1080,  104  Tex.  560;  Henry  y.  Lovenberg, 
(Tex.)  128S.  W.675. 

Under  a  contract  to  sell  potatoes  to  be 
delivered  on  or  before  November  1st  under 
which  the  buyer  was  to  furnish  cars  and  was 
entitled  to  determine  when  the  potatoes 
should  be  delivered,  giving  the  natural  and 
ordinary  interpretation  to  the  phrase  "on  or 
before,"  the  seller  was  entitled  to  such  sea- 
sonable notice  of  the  arrival  of  the  cars  as 
would  enable  him,  by  the  use  of  reasonable 
diligence,  to  complete  the  transportation  and 
delivery  on  November  1st  and  was  not  re- 
quli^,  wheh  notified  on  November  1st  that 
the  cars  were  ready  to  Commence  hauling 
and  continue  hauling  and  loading  on  that 
and  succeeding  days,  where  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  him  to  complete  the  de- 
livery on  November  1st  Pinkham  v.  Haynes, 
68  Atl.  642,  644,  168  Me.  112  (Leader  v. 
Plants,  60  Atl.  54,  95  Me.  841,  85  Am.  St  Rep. 
415;  In  re  Public  Road  in  Middlesex  and 
Monmouth  Counties,  4  N.  J.  Law.  290). 

As  renderins  note  aonneBeiialile . 

A  note  payable  "on  or  before"  a  certain 
date  is  valid  as  a  negotiable  Instrument 
Lovenberg  v.  Henry,  140  S.  W.  1079,  1081, 
104  Tex.  550;  Cunnln^am  V.  McDonald,  83 
S.  W.  372,  374,  98  Tex.  316. 

A  note  payable  "on  or  before"  a  certain 
date  is  negotiable.  The  maker  of  such  note 
has  the  right  to  pay  before  the  date  named, 
but  the  holder  cannot  demand  payment  be- 
fore that  day.  National  Bank  of  Commerce 
V.  Kenney,  83  S.  W.  368,  371,  98  Tex.  293. 

As  sivins  option  ma  to  ;^yment  of  note 
or  otKer  obUgatipn 

The  words  "pn  or  before,"  in  an  instru- 
ment payable  on  or  before  a  certain  date, 
gives  the  obligor  the  right  to  pay  at  his  op- 
tion any  time  before  the  date.  Henry  v. 
Lane,  128  Fed.  243,  252,  62  0.  0.  A  625  (cit- 
ing KlktDdal  V.  MltcheU,  14  Fed.  Cas.  468,  2 
McLean,  402). 

Where  the  owner  of  lots  wrote  reel  es- 
tate agents  that  he  would  sell  the  lots  for 
a  given  price,  so  much  cash  and  the  balance 


ON^  Oil  NEAR 


728 


ON  ANY  MILIiSITJE,  ETC. 


on  long  ilm^  the  agentd  were  not  alithorlzed 
to  sell  on  terms  whereby  notes  mnning  from 
one  to  tiv^  years,  given  by  the  purchaser  fbi' 
the  t)alance,  were  payable  *\mi  or  before*'  cer- 
tain dates,  nie  quoted  words  placed  in  each 
of  the  notes  gave  the  maker  the  privilege  of 
paying  them  at  any  time  he^  might  choose, 
and  they  did  not  comply  with  the  terms  of 
the  authority,  because  they  were  not  long- 
time notes.  Colvin  v.  Blandiard,  106  S.  W. 
323,  325,  101  Tex.  23L 

ONOBNEAB 

Bee  Property  On  or  Near  Premisea 

QV  ACCEPTING  THIS  OPTION 

The  .first  clause  of  an  <H)tlon  contract  for 
the  sale  of  bonds  provided  that,  in  case  "this 
option  is  nccepted"  by. defendant,  plaintiff 
would  endeavor  to  procure  the  sale  and  de- 
livery of  $50,000  more  of  the  same  kind  of 
bonds  or  such  part  thereof  as  he  could  obtain 
control  of  at  the  same  price.  The  second 
clause  declared,  'In  case  this  option  is  takeo^ 
up  as  hereinafter  provided,"  plaintiff  agreed 
to  sell  at  a  certain  price  stock  of  the  com- 
pany that  issued  the. bonds.  The  third  qlause 
contained  an  agreement  of  plaintiff  to  sell 
certain  other  bonds  of  the  same  kind  at  the 
same  price  **in  case  this  option  is  accepted" 
by  defendant;  .  and  the  seventh  clause  de- 
clared that  it  was  expressly  understood  .that 
defendant  was  to  purchase^  "on  accepting 
this  option,"  $20,000  of  said  bonds,  the  pro- 
ceeds to  be  applied  to  a  particular  purpose. 
Held,  that  the  Words  ''on.  accepting  this  op- 
tion," in  the  seventh  clause,  did  not  mean 
tliat  defendant  was  bound  to  purchase  such 
bonds  on  the  delivery  and  acceptance  of  the 
paper  containing  the  option,  but  only  on  his 
election  to  purchase  the  bonds  specified  in 
the  first  clause.  Martyn  v.  Hitchings,  78  N. 
E.  380;  381,  192  Massi'Tt 

ON  ACCOUNT  OF 

"A  'payment  on  account  of  the  accident* 
means  a  payment  because  of  accident,  and 
may  be  either  on  account  or  tn  full  settle- 
ment"  Wallner  v.  Chicago  Consol.  Traction 
Co..  01  N.  E.  1053,  1055.  245  111.  148. 

In  an  assignment  of  all  claims  or  causes 
of  action  for  or  "on  account  of,"  in  trespass 
upon  certain  real  estate,  the  words  "on  ac- 
count or*  doubtless  mean  by  reason  of.  A 
cause  of  action  in  trover  f6r  the  conversion 
of  logs  previously  crat  by  a  trespasser  certain- 
ly seems  to  be  a  cause  of  action  resulting  "by 
reason  ef  the  initial  trespass.  The  conver- 
sion is  a  natural  and  legitimate  result  of  the 
trespass.  Dulibar  v.  Montreal  River  Lumber 
Co.,  106  N.  W.  88d,  390,  127  Wis.  130. 

Plaintiff  having  sued  two  corporations 
Jointly  for  injuries  alleged  to  have  occurred 
in  a  collision  between  a  street  car  of  defend- 
ant traction  company  and  a  train  belonging 
to  defendant  railroad  company,  received  from 


the  railroad  company,  $1,000  "on  account  of^ 
his  injury,  and  dismissed  the  suit  as  to  it. 
testifying  that  he  had  no  further  clalma 
against  the  railroad  company.  Held,  that  the 
W0T6a  ''on  account  of"  tHnoxM  be  coMtrued 
to  mean  "because  of  the  accident,"  and*  ^d 
not  indicate  a  partial  payment  rather  than  a 
full  settlement,  and  th&t  the  proofs-  tMeretom, 
showed  a  full  payment  and  release  of  one  of 
two  Joint  tort-feasors.  Wallner  v.  Qhioago 
ConsoL  Traction  Co.,  91  N.  B.  1058»  106% 
245  IlL  14& 

ON  AND  HUNO 

Provision  in  a  building  contract  that  the 
third  payment  thereon  should  be  made  "when 
trim  is  on  and  dbora  hung"  in  practice  refer 
to  a  stage  of  the  work  and  are  given  a  liber- 
al construction.  It  is  not  necessary  for  com- 
pliance therewith  that  all  the  trim  be  on  and 
doors  hung,  because  in  practice  son)^  of  the 
doors  are  left  unhung,  although  prepared  to 
be  hung  for  convenience  in  the  work.  Yeitch 
V.  Clark,  57  Atl.  272,  273,  67  N.  J.  Bq.  67. 

ON  ANT  CONSIDERATION 

Under  Rev.  Pen.  Code,  I  618,  making  it 
ail  offense  tp  buy  or  receive  in  any  manner, 
"upon  any  consideration,"  property,  knowing 
that  it  has  been  stolen,  the  gist  of  the  offense 
is  the  buying  or  receiving  with  such  knowl- 
edge, and  an  information  is  not  bad  for  omit- 
ting to  allege  that  the  property  was  bought 
or  received  "upon  ainy  consideration";  that 
phrase  being  synonymous  with  "any  motive" 
or  "for  any  cause."  State  v.  Plrkey,  118  N. 
W.  1042, 1044,  22  S,  D.  550,  13  Ann.  Ca&  192. 

ON  ANT  UELIAtn,  ETC. 

B«  A  O.  Comp.  I  5668,  as  amended  by 
Laws  1907,  p.  294,  ikrovides  that,  when  two  or 
more  mines  are  claimed  by  the  same  person 
or  persons  and  worked  through  a  common 
shaft  or  tunnel  or  at  one  mill,  or  Miet  red«e- 
tlon  works,  then  all  the  ipines,  and  all  roads, 
tramways,  trails*  flumes,  dltch^es,  or  pipe 
lines,  buildings,  irtructures,  or  superilruc- 
tnres  used  or  owned  in  connection  therei^^th, 
shall  be  deemed  one  mine.  Held,  that  the 
words  "roads,  tramways,  trails,  flumes,  ditch- 
es or  pipe  lines."  include  sudi  appurtenances 
when  not  situated  upon  the  mine,  and  that  the 
term  **upon  any  millsite  or  mill  used,  owned, 
or  operated  in  connection  with  such  mine,** 
in  such  section,  prior  to  its  amendment,  had 
reference  to  ttie  millsite  or  mill  not  situated 
on  the  mine;  the  section  as  amended  neces- 
sarily including  the  millsite  or  mlllB  connect* 
ed  with  the  mine,  without  being  specifically 
mentioned,  so  that  a  miner's  lien  notice  need 
not  state  nor  the  proofs  show  that  the  labor 
for  which  the  lien  is  claimed  has  been  done 
on  the  mill  or  buikling  on  the  mine  to  sub- 
ject them  to  the  lien.  Washburn  v.  Inter- 
Mountain  Mining  Co.,  109  Pac  882,  886^  56. 
Or.  578,  Ann.  Cas.  1912C,  857. 


OK  ANT  UNDSBSTAKDING  . 


729 


ON  THE  CUBB 


OH    Ainr   UHDEBSTAHBZHO   OB 
AOBEEMENT 

Under  Pen.  Code,  i  118  (Penal  Law,  f 
2440;  Consol.  Laws,  c.  40),  making  it  a  felony 
to  give  or  offer  to'  a  witness,  or  one  abont  to 
be  called  as  a  witness,  any  bribe  upon  any 
understanding  or  agreement  that  his  testi- 
mony shall  be  thereby  influenced,  or  to  at- 
tempt by  any  other  means  fraudulently  to  in- 
duce any  witness  to  give  false  testimony,  the 
essence  of  the  crime  is  the  understanding  un- 
der which  the  money  was  given  to  a  prospec- 
tive witness  and  not  the  giving  of  the  money; 
the  words  "upon  any  understanding  or  agree- 
ment;;" and  "attempts  fraudulently  to  in- 
duce," being  equivalent  to  **wlth  the  intent" 
People  ▼.  Kathan,  120  N.  T.  Supp.  1090,  1099, 
136  App.  Div.  303. 

OK  APFROVAI. 

In  a  receipt  given  by  a  dealer  in  dia- 
monds to  S.  &  Co.  for  a  pair  of  diamond  ear 
knobs,  "on  approval  to  show  to  my  cus- 
tomers, said  knobs  to  be  returned  to  said  S. 
A  Co.  on  demand/'  the  expression  "on  ap* 
proval,"  as  ordinarily  interpreted,  was  not 
Inconsistent  with  a  mere  authority  '"to  show" 
nor  with  an  obligation  *'to  return  on  de- 
mand," and  parol  evidence  was  admissible  to 
show  that,  in  the  diamond  trade,  such  words 
took  a  recognized  meaning  and  were  under- 
stood, not  to  confer  a  power  to  sell,  but  au- 
thority merely  to  show  diamonds  to  a  cus- 
tomer and  report  to  the  owner.  Smith  v. 
Clews,  21  N.  £.  160,  162,  114  N.  Y.  190,  4  K 
B.  A  392,  U  Am.  St  Rep.  627. 

ON  ABBIVAIi 

Under  the  federal  pure  food  act  of  1906 
(Act  June  80, 1906,  c.  3810,  34  Stat  768),  for- 
bidding the  introduction  of  misbranded  or 
adulterated  liquors  into  one  state  from  anoth- 
er, such  liquors  are  removed  from  the  opera- 
ti<m  of  the  commerce  clause  of  the  federal 
Constitution,  and  become  subject  to  the  laws 
of  the  state  upon  arrival  within  its  territory 
and  before  delivery  to  the  consignee.  State 
T.  Intoxicating  Liquois,  76  AtL  268,  269,  106 
Ma  136. 

The  expression  "upon  arrival  In  such 
state,"  as  used  in  Act  Cong.  Aug.  8,  1890,  c 
728,  26  Stat.  313,  providing  that  Uquors 
transported  into  any  state  shall,  "upon  ar- 
rival in  such  state,"  be  subject  to  the  opera- 
tion of  the  laws  of  such  state  to  the  same 
extent  as  though  they  had  been  produced  in 
such  state,  means  neither  on  entrance  within 
the  state  borders,  nor  on  delivery  to  the  con- 
signee but  on  reaching  Its  destination.  Hud- 
son V.  State,  101  Pac.  276,  279,  2  OkL  Or.  176. 

IjawB  1900,  c  20,  fl  4«  8^  as  amended  by 
lisws  1906»  c.  478,  and  Laws  1907,  c  666,  pro- 
hibit.the  possession  of  deer  between  certain 
dates,  eta,  and  provide  that,  such  possession 
by  a  common  canier  unaccompanied  by  the 
owner  shall  constitate  violatioA  of  .ttae  law. 


Section  141,  added  by  Laws  1902,  c  194,, pro* 
vides  that,  whenever  in  this  act  the  posses- 
sion of  game  is  prohibited,  reference  is  had 
equally  to  such  game  coming  from  without 
the  state  as  to  that  taken  within  the  state. 
Lacey  Act  May  26, 1091,  c.  663,  t  6,  31  Stat 
188,  provides  that  game  transported  into  any 
state  shall,  upon  arrival  therein,  be  subject 
to  the  laws  of  such  state,  to  the  same  extent 
as  though  it  had  been  there  produced.  Held 
that,  in  view  of  the  latter  statute,  the  provi- 
sions of  the  state  statute  do  not  attach  to  a 
shipment  of  foreign  game  while  in  transit, 
in  possession  of  a  common  carrier,  and  until 
its  arrival  at  the  point  of  destination  and  de- 
livery there  to  the  consignee.  People  v. 
Fargo,  122  N.  Y.  Supp.  663,  666,  137  App. 
Div.  727. 

ON  BOARD 

A  marine  policy,  insuring  "freight  on 
board,  or  not  on  board,"  valued  at  £2,062,  or 
actual  freight,  if  more,  "full  interest  admit- 
ted, the  policy  being  deemed  sufficient  proof 
of  interest,"  should  be  construed  to  cover 
the  freight  at  risk  at  the  valuation  spedfled^ 
though  the  freight  actually  at  risk  was  much 
less  in  value.  Where  a  marine  policy  in- 
sured "freight  on  boa^rd,  or  not  on  board," 
valued  at  a  specified  sum,  or  actual  freight 
if  more,  full  interest  admitted,  and  of  the  ac- 
tual freight  insured  lost  the  whole,  except  a 
small  salvage,  there  having  been  no  abandon- 
ment, the  percentage  of  actual  freight  lost 
should  have  been  applied  to  the  value  in  the 
policy.  New  York  4b  Cuba  Mail  S.  S.  Co.  v. 
Boyal  Bzch.  Assur.,  164  Fed.  316,  318,  83  C. 
C.  A  236  (citing  Am.  In&  f  339;  Adams  v. 
Pennsylvania  Ins.  Co.  [Pa.l  1  Rawle,  97;  De 
Longuemere  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  [N.  Y.]  10 
Johns,  127;  Same  v.  New  York  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  [N.  Y.l  10  Johna  201;  Minturn  v.  War- 
ren Ins.  Co.,  2  Allen  [84  Mass.]  86). 

OK  CASH  8AIJS 

See  Cash  Sale. 

OK  A  OOKTIKOEKOT 

See  Contingency. 

OK  OONVIOTXOK 

The  words  "upon  conviction,*'  In  P.  L. 
1906,  p.  199,  providing  that,  wh^«  the  holder 
of  a  liquor  license  shall  sell  liquor  contrary 
to  the  act,  his  license  shall  thereby  **upon  con- 
viction" become  forfeited  and  void,  refer 
to  the  fbrfelture,  and  it  i^  not  necessary  that 
a  petition  for  the  revocation  of  a  license 
should. state  that  the  person  complained  of 
had  been  convicted  of  the  offenses  charged. 
Davis  V.  Kepp,  76  Aa  169,  170,  79  N.  J.  Law, 
394. 

OK  THE  OUBB 

•  A  sale  of  stock  *V>n  the  curb"  is  a  sale 
in  tbe  roadway  neiM^  the  sidewalk  in  Broad 
street  in  the  dty  of  New  York,. where  brokers 
gather  and  dsj^l  in  seQUxltied  which  are  not 


ON  DEMAND 


730      ON  THE  EXPRESS  AGBEEMENT 


listed  at  the  New  Tork  Stock  Exchange. 
Content  v.  Banner,  76  N.  Sk  918,  184  N.  Y. 
121,  6  Ann.  Ga&  lOe. 

OK  DEMAKD 
Ia  bills*  aotei,  or  bonds 

In  a  note  payable  "on  demand,"  the  word 
"demand"  Is  not  a  part  of  the  contract,  but 
is  used  to  show  that  the  debt  is  due.  Van 
VUet  T.  Kanter,  119  N,  Y.  Supp.  187,  188, 
es  Misc.  Rep.  48. 

The  term  ''payable  on  demand"  in  a  bill 
imports  that  the  debt  is  already  due,  so  that 
limitation  begins  to  run  from  the  date. 
Ck)ok  V.  Carpenter,  61  Ati.  799,  803,  212  Pa. 
165,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  900,  108  Am.  St  Rep. 
854,  4  Ann.  Cas.  723. 

An  instrument  which  acknowledges  an 
indebtedness  from  the  maker  to  a  person 
named  and  which  promises  to  pay  a  specified 
sum  to  such  person,  "and  in  the  event  of  my 
(maker*s)  death,  I  hereby  authorize  and  di- 
rect the  payment  of  the  same  out  of  the  funds 
of  my  estate,"  is  a  promissory  note  payable 
on  demand,  within  Negotiable  Instruments 
Law  (Consol.  Laws  1909,  c.  38)  H  26,  29.  de- 
claring that  an  instrument  is  payable  on 
demand  when  no  time  for  payment  is  ex- 
pressed, etc.;  the  quoted  clause  being  sur- 
plusage. Gilbert  y.  Adams,  131  N.  Y.  Supp. 
787,  788,  146  App.  Div.  864. 

ON  DEMAND  AFTER  DATE 

A  note  payable  to  the  order  of  the  maker 
"on  demand  after  date**  at  a  bank  designated 
is  a  note  payable  on  demand,  within  Nego- 
tiable Instrument  Law  (Laws  1897,  p.  728,  c 
612,  §  26),  declaring  that  a  note  is  payable 
on  demand  where  it  is  expressed  to  be  pay- 
able on  demand,  or  in  which  no  time  for  pay- 
ment is  expressed,  and  is  not  a  note  payable 
at  a  determinable  future  time,  within  sec- 
tion 23  (page  722),  providing  that  a  note  is 
payable  at  a  determinable  future  time  which 
is  expressed  to  be  payable  at  a  fixed  period 
after  date^  etc.,  and  it  must  be  presented  foe 
payment  within  a  reasonable  time  after  its 
issue,  as  expressly  required  by  section  131 
(page  736).  Schlesinger  r.  Schultz,  96  N.  Y. 
Supp.  383,  386,  UO  App.  Diy.  356. 

ON  DEPOSIT 

The  words  "on  deposit,"  in  the  writing 
as  follows:  "Received  of  L.  $1,600  on  de- 
posit in  national  currency" — have  a  well- 
known  meaning  and  imply  a  promise  to  pay 
upon  presentation,  where  no  other  date  of 
payment  is  fixed.  Lewis  v.  Norris,  103  Pac. 
134,  135,  80  Kan.  620  (quoting  Long  v.  Straus, 
6  N.  E.  123,  7  N.  E.  763,  107  Ind.  94.  67  Am. 
Rep.  87. 

ON  DUTY 

An  employe  is  "on  duty**  within  the 
statute  making  it  unlawful  for  any  inter* 
state  carrier  to  require  or  permit  any  em- 
ploy 6  to  be  or  remalib  on  duty  for  a  longes 


time  than  16  consecutive  hours,  where  he  Is 
at  his  post  in  obedience  to  rules  or  require- 
ments of  his  superior  and  ready  and  willing 
to  work,  whether  actually  at  work  or  await- 
ing orders,  or  the  removal  of  hindrances  from 
any  cause,  and  the  limitation  of  time  of  con- 
tinuous servioe  when  applied  to  trainmen 
includes  the  time  of  duty  preceding  and 
subsequent  to  the  time  of  service  in  actual 
operation  of  trains,  as  required  by  the  rules 
of  the  employment  United  States  v.  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  P.  S.  R.  Go.,  195  Fed.  783,  786. 

The  exprecBion  "on  duty,"  as  used  In 
the  Hours  of  Service  Law,  othecwise  known 
as  the  Sixteen-Hour  Law,  of  March  4,  1907 
(chapter  2989,  34  Stat  1415,  1416),  means  «to 
be  actually  engaged  in  work  or  to  be  charg- 
ed with  present  responsibility  for  such  should 
the  occasion  for  it  arise."  United  States 
V.  Denver  &  R.  Q.  R.  CJo.,  197  Fed.  629,  631. 

Act  March  4,  1907,  c.  2939,  |  2,  34  Stat 
1415,  provides  that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for 
any  common  carrier  subject  to  the  act  to  re- 
quire or  permit  any  employ^  subject  thereto 
to  be  or  remain  on  duty  for  a  longer  period 
than  16  consecutive  hours,  and  whenever 
such  employ^  has  been  continually  on  duty 
for  16  hours  he  shall  be  relieved,  and  not  re- 
quired or  permitted  again  to  go  on  duty  until 
he  has  had  at  least  10  consecutive  hours  off 
duty;  and  no  such  employe  who  has  been  on 
duty  16  hours  in  the  aggregate  in  any  24-hour 
period  shall  be  required  or  permitted  to  con- 
tinue or  again  go  on  duty  without  having 
had  at  least  8  consecutive  hours  off  duty. 
The  act  further  provides  in  section  1  that 
the  term  "employes"  as  used  in  the  act, 
shall  be  held  to  mean  persons  actually  en- 
gaged in  or  connected  with  the  movement 
of  any  train.  Held,  that  where  an  interstate 
carrier  had  a  rule  requiring  engineers  to  re- 
port 30  minutes  before  leaving  time,  duiin? 
which  they  were  required  to  overlook  their 
engines  in  preparation  for  the  trip,  to  see 
that  they  were  properly  oiled  and  the  brakes 
O.  K.,  and  to  connect  the  englnees  with  their 
trains,  the  time  so  occupied  constitutes  a 
part  of  their  time  of  duty;  and  this  though 
it  was  the  custom  of  the  carrier  not  to  strict- 
ly enforce  the  rule.  United  States  v.  IUinol» 
Cent  R.  Ck>.,  180  Fed.  630,  631. 


ON  EITHER  SIDE 

See  Run  Upon  Bither  Side. 

ON  THE  EXFBES8  AGREEMENT 

Where  a  deed  provided  that  it  was  "upon 
the  express  agreement**  of  the  grantee  to 
build  or  cause  to  be  built  on  the  premises, 
within  six  months,  a  dwelling  house  to  cost 
not  less  than  $1,500,  which  agreement  was 
considered  as  a  part  of  the  consideration 
for  the  conveyance,  sndi'  provision  constitat- 
ed  a  mere  personal  covenant  on  the  part  of 
the  grantee,  and  was  not  a  oonditton  subse- 
quent, authorizing  a  forfeiture  for  nonper- 
formanoe.    Hawley  v.  Kaflt%  8S  Pac.  248^ 


ON  THB  FARM 


781 


ON  HAND 


249»  148  CaL  3d3,  3  L.  a.  A.  (N.  S.)  741,  113 
Am.  St  Sep.  282. 

OXr  THE  FABM 

Where  the  judgment  debtor  aBA  his 
fSamily  lived  on  land  belonging  to  his  wife 
and  her  coheirs  in  IndlviBlon,  and  his  sons 
cnltlyated  the  land  under  an  agreement  by 
^hlch  they  receired  the  surplus  of  the  cotton 
after  the  sappUes  were  paid  for,  and  plain- 
tiff  received  the  other  products  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  fftmily,  corn,  hay,  and  cane  raised 
on  the  land  belonged  to  the  debtor  atnd  were 
"on  the  farm"  within  the  law,  so  as  to  ex- 
empt from  sehBure  upon  execution;  the  law 
not  requiring  that  the  farm  belong  to  the 
person  claiming  the  exemption.  Hlnton  t. 
Roane,  60  South.  798,  799,  124  La.  027,  134 
Am.  St  Bep.  62a 

onfujb 

The  withdrawal  of  the  deposition  of  a 
party  from  the  flies  of  the  state  circuit 
court  where  the  action  was  begun  for  use  on 
the  trial  of  the  action  in  the  federal  court 
after  removal  to  the  federal  court  does  not 
prevent  the  use  of  the  deposition  on  a  subse- 
quent trial  within  Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  {  456, 
permitting  the  use  of  depositions  provided 
they  remain  "on  file"  from  the  time  the  for- 
mer action  was  dismissed  until  the  time  at 
which  it  was  proposed  to  use  them  in  a  sub- 
sequent action.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Huffman,  97  N.  E.  434,  437,  177  Ind.  126. 

ON  Fllf  AI.  BISTBIBimOK 

Testator  bequeathed  to  a  daughter  a  cer- 
tain sum  "to  be  paid  out  of  my  residuary  es- 
tate upon  final  distribution."  In  a  subse- 
quent section  of  the  will  he  left  the  residue 
of  his  estate  in  trust,  and  provided  that  the 
income  should  be  paid  to  his  wife  during  her 
natural  life  or  while  she  remained  unmarried 
for  her  maintenance  ahd  the  education  and 
maintenance  of  two  daughters,  and  that 
when  said  daughters  arrived  at  lawful  age, 
the  trustees  were  requested  to  convey  to  each 
of  them  a  moiety  of  the  property  in  their 
handa  Held,  that  the  phrase,  "upon  final 
distribution,"  did  not  mean  upon  final  dis- 
tribution of  the  personal  estate  made  pur- 
flfuant  to  order  of  the  probate  court,  but 
referred  to  the  final  distribution  on  the  com- 
ing of  age  of  the  two  daughters  who  were 
to  take  the  property  left  in  trui^t.  McDevltt 
T.  Hibben,  123  111.  App.  438,  441;  Id.,  77  N. 
B.  586,  221  lU.  234. 

-ON  nB£ 

A  marine  policy  contained  a  clause, 
••Warranted  free  from  particular  average, 
unless  the  vessel  or  craft  or  the  interest 
insured  be  stranded,  sunk,  or  on  fire."  The 
libel  alleged  that  on  November  18th,  while 
the  ship  was  lying  In  port  and  before  dis- 
charge, a  fire  broke  out  in  the  after  'tween- 
decks  of  the  ship  and  burned  the  bulkhead 
forward  of  the  lazarette,  the  door  thereof, 


and  a  considerable  portion  of  dunnage,  and 
other  parts  of  the  ship.  An  exhibit,  quoting 
from  the  ship's,  psotest,  recited  that  the  mas- 
ter, on  the  alarm  being  given,  went  below 
through  the  lazarette  and  saw  the  reflection 
of  the  flre  over  the  top  of  the  bulkhead  be- 
tween the  after  'tween-decks  and  the  laza- 
rette, which  were  then  full  of  cargo,  and 
that  after  considerable  trouble  the  flre  was 
extinguished  with  considerable  damage.  It 
was  held  that  the  words  "on  flre,"  as  used  in 
the  particular  average  clause,  were  not 
synonymous  with  the  word  "burnt,"  contain- 
ed in  former  policies,  but  were  indicative 
of  a  happening  Whereby  the  ship  was  en- 
dangered by  actual  flre  burning  some  part 
of  it,  necessitating  extraordinary  efforts  to 
prevent  serious  damage,  and  that  under  such 
definition,  the  libel  was  not  subject  to  ex- 
ception as  stating  a  loss  from  which  the  in- 
surer was  exempted  by  the  particular  aver- 
age clause  as  matter  of  law.  Pacific  Creosot- 
ing  Co.  V.  Thames  &  Mersey  Mfarine  Ins. 
Co.,  184  red.  947,  949. 

on  THE  OBOUND 

Under  a  contract  to  conduct  a  dremi 
for  four  days,  entitling  the  amusement  com- 
pany to  draw  on  funds  derived  from  advance 
sales  of  tickets  when  the  show  was  "on  the 
ground,**  the  show  was  "on  the  ground"  when 
the  *  paraphernalia  arrived  at  the*  show 
grounds  and  the  actors  at  their  lodgings,  and 
the  equitable  title  to  part  of  funds  then  vest- 
ed in  the  company*is  assignee,  so  as  to  pre- 
clude the  other  party,  who  had  knowledge 
of  the  assignment,  from  defeating  the  as- 
signee's rights  by  paying,  with  the  company's 
consent,  money  due  the  actors,  who  refused 
to  perform  unless  paid  in  advance.  Brindze 
V.  Atlantic  City  Policemen's  Beneficial  Ass*n, 
72  Atl.  435,  437,  76  N.  J.  Eq.  406. 

ON  HAND 

See  Cash  On  Hand;    Stock  en  Hand; 
Then  on  Hand. 

A  bequest  by  a  manufacturer  of  a  prod- 
uct "on  hand"  Inclades  that  in  the  hands  of 
a  selling  agent  in  another  city,  as  well  as 
that  at  the  factory.  Brown  v.  Olothey,  79 
N.  BL  269,  270,  193  Mass.  271. 

Where  a  shipper,  demanding  stock  cars, 
has  his  stock  within  five  miles  of  the  station 
ready  to  be  loaded  within  a  few  hours  after 
receiving  notice  of  the  arrival  of  the  cars, 
he  has  his  stock  "on  hand,"  within  Rev. 
St.  1895,  art.  4502,  relating  to  furnishing 
shippers  with  cars  on  demand,  a^d  providing 
that  it  shall  be  necessary  for  the  party  bring- 
ing suit  against  any  railroad  company  under 
the  provisions  of  this  law,  to  show  by  evi- 
dence that  he  had  "on  hand,"  at  the  time 
demand  was  made,  the  freight  necessary  to 
load  the  cars.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Taylor, 
126  S.  W.  1117,  1119,  103  Tex.  367  (citing 
Crouch  V.  Parker,  56  N.  Y.  597).  , 

The  phrase  "on  hand,"  as  used  in  Rev. 
St  1895,  ai:t  4502,  docis  not  require  that  the 


OK  HAND 


T8S 


OK  THB  PART  OT 


dripper  shall  hare  the  property  at  the  imaiedl- 
ate  point  of  ehipment  at  the  time  of  demaad, 
bat,  as  the  statnte  gives  tlie  railroad  oom- 
panj  six  days  from  demand  within  which  to 
famish  cars,  and  the  shipper  48  hours  there* 
after  to  load,  the  words  mean  that  he  has 
or  owns  the  property  so  circumstanced  as 
may  be  shipped  within  the  time  named.  Tex* 
as  &  P.  Ry.  Oo.  t.  Taylor,  118  a  W.  109T, 
1100.  54  Tfex.  ClT.  App.  419. 

The  requirement  of  Rev.  St  1895,  art 
4502,  that  the  shipper  prove  that  he  had  on 
hand,  at  the  time  of  the  order,  the  neces- 
sary freight  for  loading  the  cars  forbade  any 
character  of  speculation  and  precluded  re- 
covery by  a  shipper,  where  such  freight  in 
form  and  condition  to  be  shipped  is  not  there 
on  hand,  though  he  is  able  to  show  that  he 
could  have  had  it  ready  if  the  cars  had  been 
furnished,  and  a  shipper  of  crushed  ston4, 
who  intended  to  load  from  the  crusher  and 
save  expense  in  handling  the  crushed  prod- 
uct did  not  have  such  fMght  "on  hand," 
and  he  was  not  entitled  to  a  penalty  for 
failure  to  furnish  the  cars  demanded.  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  A  Q.  Ry.  Go.  v.  Risley  Bros.  A 
Co.,  119  S.  W.  897,  898,  55  Tex.  Giv.  Ai^.  eO. 

OH  HCABDro  nr  sauTrr 

An  order  of  a  Circuit  Court  granting  a 
preliminary  injunctioii  made  after  the  filing 
of  a  bill  and  on  notice  to  the  defendants,  pur- 
suant to  which  their  counsel  appeared  spe- 
cially to  object  to  the  jurisdiction,  but  were 
heard  upon  the  merits  a«  amid  curin,  was 
made  "upon  a  hearing  in  equity"  within  the 
meaning  of  section  7  of  the  act  (Act  March 
8, 1891,  c  517,  26  Stat  82®,  creating  the  Cir- 
cuit Courts  of  Appeals,  as  am^ded  by  Act 
April  14,  1906,  c.  1627,  84  Stat  116»  and  is 
appealable  thereunder.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co. 
V.  Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n,  165 
Fed.  1,  5,  91  C.  C.  A.  39;  Union  Pac.  R. 
Co.  V.  Oregon  A  Washington  Lumber  Mfrs.' 
Ass'n,  165  Fed.  13,  91  C.  C.  A  61. 

OH  ITS  UHS 

Where  a  railroad  company  operates  its 
trains  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  with 
its  own  engines  and  crews  over  the  tracks 
of  another  company,  under  a  contract  be- 
tween them,  such  tracks  are  a  part  of  its 
line,  within  the  meaning  of  Safety  Appliance 
Act  March  2,  1893,  c  196,  i  6,  27  Stat  532, 
as  amended  by  Act  April  1,  1896,  c.  87,  29 
Stat  85,  imposing  a  penalty  on  any  rail- 
road company  hauling  or  using  "on  its  line" 
any  car  in  violation  of  its  provisions,  and  it 
is  immaterial  that  its  trains,  while  on  such 
tracks,  are  run  subject  to  rules  and  regula- 
tions prescribed  by  the  owner  of  the  tracks ; 
nor  is  it  any  defense  to  an  action  to  recover 
the  penalty  for  hauling  a  car  not  equipped 
as  required  by  the  act  in  one  of  its'  inter- 
state trains  on  such  tracks  that  the  inspec- 
tion of  sudi  cars  is  made  by  a  servant  of 
the  company  owning  the  tracks,  who,  in  per- 
forming such  duty,  acts  as  Its  own  inspect 


tor.     Phlladdphla  A  B.  R.  Co.  v.  I^ 
States,  191  Fed.  1,  2,  Ul  a  C  A  (MO. 

OH  THB  JOB 

Whan  pUdiitiir  oontimcted  with  defei 
ant  city  to  repair  a  brid^s^  the  coDtncc  pi 
Tiding  that  plaintUTs  compensstioD  sbm 
be  a  oertala  sum  per  thousand  feet  for  t 
lumber  osed,  and  that  no  work  riumld  be  I 
gua  untU  material  for  at  least  wtia]l 
the  repairs  should  be  ^'on  the  job,"  ud 
compliance  with  this  requlreiDeDt  plaisi 
distributed  lumber  along  the  bridge,  and  h 
used  a  part  of  it  In  making  repain,  wheel 
bridge  and  all  the  lumber  was  destroyed 
fire,  he  was  entitled  to  reeow  for  the  In 
her  which  had  been  used,  but  not  for  t! 
which  had  not  Yoang  v.  Qlty  of  Ghioiv 
72  N.  B.  63,  186  Mass.  6ia 

OH  A  JOUBHET 

See  Journey. 

OH  THB  UKB  FBOOV 

"Upon  the  like  proof,**  as  used  In  B 
St  1898,  I  2891,  authorizing  the  entry  of 
fault  Judgments  on  the  applicant  iSliag 
proof  of  default  with  the  derk  before 
plying  for  a  judgment  and  authorlzlBg  pis 
tiff  to  apply  to  the  court  for  judgment  wl 
the  defendant  has  made  default  '^ipon 
like  proof,**  means  proof  of  default  made 
the  court;  and  hence,  where  the  applicat 
is  made  to  the  court  it  is  not  necessarr  ti 
proof  of  service  should  be  filed  before 
rendition   of   judgment     Schmidt  t.  B 
mann,  105  N.  W,  44,  46,  126  Wis.  65. 

OH  ntB  MKKI'n 

See  Merits. 

OH  THB  OPIHIOH  BBLOW 

Where  a  Oiiyniit  Court  of  Appeals  alBi 
a  decision  "^on  the  opinion  briow/'  It 
proves  the  reasoning,  adopts  the  fl&dii 
and  concurs  in  the  conclusions  of  tbe  co 
below;  but  where  the  decision  below  te  b< 
ly  "affirmed,**  such  approval  and  concnrre 
are  not  to  be  inferred,  but  <ni  the  coatn 
it  is  to  be  understood  that  for  some  reai 
the  appellate  court  prefers  not  to  adcvt 
opinion  below.  Victor  Talking  Ma(*.  Co. 
Hoschke,  188  Fed.  826,  828,  UO  G.  C 
304. 

OH  THE  PART  OF 

The  words  "on  the  part  of  the  mothj 
as  used  in  Tex.  Rev.  St  1895,  art  1" 
making  bastards  capable  of  inheriting  '^ 
and  through"  their  mother  and  of  "tran^ 
ting  estates,"  and  giving  them  the  riglit 
distributive  shares  of  the  personal  esta 
of  any  of  their  kindred  "on  the  part  of  tl) 
mother,"  mean  of  the  mother's  side  of  < 
genealogical  tree,  and  the  artide  gires  i 
bastard  kincOilp  in  law  on  the  iDOtl» 
side,  but  does  not  change  his  status  as  to  i 
father.  Berry  v.  Powell,  106  &  W.  845, 3 
47  Tex.  Otv.  App.  08iL 


OK  THB  PUEMISEd 


783 


OK  STOPICIOK 


THE  PlkEMIBES 

A  brewery  company  owned  lots  8  to  10, 
islve;   the  brewery  proper  covering  lots 

10.  The  second  story  of  the  building 
ots  3  and  4  was  occupied  by  the  piesi- 
;  of  the  brewery  as  a  residence,  that  part 
he  first  story  on  lot  4  was  used  as  his 
e,  and  that  part  on  lot  3  was. occupied  as 
loon.  There  weip^  partitions  between  the 
on  and  office  and  the  office  and  brewery 
ler,  with  entrances  jthrough  them,  and 
public  entrance  to  the  saloon  was  on  the 
er  of  lot  3,  through  which  brewery  em- 
6s,  who  were  givei>  free  beer,  entered. 
1,  that  the  brewery  was  selling  beer  "up- 
:he  premises"  within  Code,  {  2460,  pro- 
Dg  that  one  operating  any  brewery  per- 
Ing  any  drinking,  or  sale  at  retail,  of 
;)roduct  upon  the  pfiemises,  shall  forfeit 
exemption   thereby  granted,  so  that  it 

not  exempted  under  section  2456,  ex- 
tlng  manufacturers  of  liquor  from  the 
titles  provided  by  law  for  manufacturing 
Drs.    Orke  v.  McManus,  121  N.  W.  177, 

142  Iowa,  654  (citing  6  Words  and 
ases,  p.  5512). 

PROPER  CAUSE  SHOWH 

Corporation  Act  (P.  L.  1896,  p.  202)  i  44, 
rides  that  the  books  of  a  corporation,  ex- 
;  the  stock  and  transfer  books,  may  be 
t  outside  of  the  state,  If  the  by-laws  or 
iflcate  of  incorporation  so  provides,  and 
t  the  Court  of  Chancery  or  the  Supreme 
rt  or  any  Justice  thereof,  may,  upon  prop- 
lause  shown,  summarily  order  any  or  all 
he  books  of  the  corporation  to  be  fottk- 
1  brought  witMn  the  sttite  and  kept  there- 
t  such  place  and  for  such  time  as  may  be 
gnated  in  such  order.  Held,  that  the 
Else  ''ui>on  proper  cause  shown"  means  a 
96,  the  propriety  of  which  is  made  to  ap- 
r  to  the  judicial  officer  nominated  in  the 
ion,  and  the  propriety  of  the  "cause 
wn**  must  be  submitted  to  the  determina- 

of  such  officer,  and  for  such  determina- 
i  the  conclusion  reached  by  applicant  for 
order  from  undisclosed  facts  is  not  a  val- 
rabstitute,  and  a  petition  for  such  order 
setting .  forth  fact»  from  which  the  oBL- 
can  make  such  determination  U  insuffl- 
it    National  Packing  Co.  v.  Qarven,  78 

703,  706,  70  N.  J.  Law,  266. 

REASOHABLE  TERMS 

The  phrase  "on  reasonable  terms"  in 
mon  parlance  means  the  charges  for  serv- 
I  rendered  or  the  price  of  goods  sold  and 
vered.  State  v.  Central  Vermont  By.  Co., 
^tL  104,  196,  81  Yt  463,  130  Am.  St  Bep. 
5. 

SALE  (In  Patent  Law) 

See,  also,  Public  Use  (In  Patent  Law). 

Proof  of  a  meve  oontraet  to  construct 
n  plans,  and  to*' deliver  in  ttie  futsre,  a 
::hine  or  ttanufaetan  not  dlown  to  luive 


be^  previously  built,  is  insufficient  to  estab- 
lish that  the  machine  or  manufacture  was 
''on  sale"  within  the  meaning  of  Rev.  St.  $ 
48^,  so  as  to  defeat  a  patent  therefor  not 
applied  for  uhtil  more  than  two  years  after 
such  contract  was  made,  in  the  absence  of 
any  evidence  that  the  invention  had  beeii 
reduced  to  practice  at  the  time  the  executory 
contract  was  made.  McCreery  Engineering 
Co.  V.  Massachusetts  Fan  Co.,  195  Fed.  498, 
501.  115  C.  O.  A.  408. 

A  single  unrestricted  sale  by  the  inventor 
of  his  Invention  is  a  public  sale,  or  puts  it 
"on  sale,"  within  the  meaning  and  Intent  of 
Rev.  St  U.  S.  f  4886,  but  a  single  sale  of  an 
invention  by  the  inventor  for  experimental 
purposes,  where  he  is  Unable  otherwise  to 
make  proper  tests,  does  not  put  the  invention 
"on  sale."  In  re  Mills,  25  App.  D.  C.  377, 
383. 

A  machine  put  out  for  trial,  under  a  "sale 
or  return"  contract,  does  not  constitute  a  be- 
ing on  sale  two  yea!rs  before  the  patent  ap- 
plication, uiiless  the  trial  period  expired,  or 
unless  there  was  actual  acceptance  more  than 
two  years  befote  the  application.  William 
B.  Miershoo  ft  Go.  v.  Bay  City  Box  ft  Lumber 
Co.,  180  Fed.  741,  748. 

Where  the  inventor  of  a  cigar  pocket  for 
more  than  two  years  before  applying  for  a 
patent  therefor  made  and  sold  such  pockets 
in  the  regular  course  of  his  business,  such 
articles  were  in  **publlc  use"  and  "on  sale," 
and  defeated  his  right  to  a  patent  under  Rev. 
St  I  4886,  although  they  were  not  kept  by 
him  in  stock,  but  were  made  up  only  on  or- 
ders received;  it  being  the  custom  of  the 
trade  to  take  such  orders  by  sample.  A  de- 
vice will  be  "on  sale"  and  in  "public  use"  if 
it  is  offered  for  sale,  whether  any  specimen 
of  it  is  actually  sold  or  not  Dittgen  v.  Ra- 
dne  Paper  Goods  Co.,  181  Fed.  394,  398  (cit- 
ing Walk.  Pat  [11th  Ed.]  p.  96). 

OH  STOCK 

No  obligation  to  honor  any  draft  except 
one  for  the  price  of  stock  shipped  to  the 
drawee  is  assumed  by  a  live  stock  commis- 
sion firm  in  writing  to  a  bank,  "We  will  hon- 
or P.*8  draft  for  one  thousand  dollars  on 
hogs  or  cattle."  There  is  a  manifest  differ- 
ence between  the  expressions  "for  stock"  and 
"on  stock."  The  one  merely  relates  to  the 
use  the  drawer  is  to  make  of  the  money  he 
obtains  for  the  draft,  and  the  other  is  equiv- 
alent to  "against  stock,"  and  clearly  Implies 
that  the  draft  is  to  be  drawn  on  the  strength 
of  the  stock;  that  the  stock  is  to  be  made 
in  a  way  security  for  the  draft  Stough  v. 
E.  J.  Healy,  89  Pac.  898.  899,  75  Kan.  526, 
10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  9ia 

OK  suspicion 

Where  the  consignee  refused  to  accept 
oertaln  cigars,  and  the  consignor  directed 
them  to  be  deUvvrad  to  a<  thirds  person,  such 


ON  THB  TABLB 


784 


OVErBjaJt  aALLOK 


conduct  Indicatee  tbat  the  dsaxs 
oat  "on  suspicion'*  (that  ifl»  in  expectation 
that  they  would  be  accepted),  and  not  that 
they  had  been  bought  or  ordered  by  the 
consignee  or  by  such  third  person.  New 
Tork  ft  N.  J.  Steamboat  Go.  ▼.  New  Jersey 
Produce  Co.,  68  Aa  200,  210,  70  N.  J.  Law, 
20a 

OH  THE  TABLE 

See  Continued  on  the  Table. 

ONCE 

SeeAtOnca 


ONCE  A  WEEK 

Proof  that  a  summons  was  published  for 
"six  sncoesslve  weeks'*  in  a  weekly  newsiMi- 
per  sufficiently  shows  a  publication  "once  a 
week"  for  six  successive  weeks.  McHenry  ▼. 
Bracken,  101  N.  W.  900,  061«  063,  93  Minn. 
510  (citing  Iowa  State  Sav.  Bank  ?.  Jacob- 
son,  66  N.  W.  453,  8  S.  D.  292). 

Const  1001, 1 106,  provides  that  no  local 
law  shall  be  passed,  unless  notloe  of  the  Inr 
tention  to  apply  therefor  shall  have  be«i  pub- 
lished at  least  oncea  week  fbr  tonr  oongMcutive 
weeks  in  some  newspaper  published  in  sudi 
county  or  counties,  or,  if  there  is  no  newspa- 
per so  published,  th^i  by  posting  a  notice 
for  four  consecutive  weeks  at  fve  different 
places  in  the  county  or  counties,  prior  to  the 
introduction  of  the  bill.  Held,  that  the  post- 
ing clause  requires  that  the  notice  must  be 
posted  during  a  period  of  4  weeks,  or  28 
days,  before  the  introduction  of  the  bill,  but 
that  the  word  "a"  in  the  clause  "once  a  week 
for  four  consecutive  weeks,"  in  the  publica- 
tion clause,  was  used  in  the  sense  of  "in 
each,"  so  that,  where  the  notice  was  publish- 
ed in  a  newspaper  once  a  week  in  each  of  four 
consecutive  weeks  prior  to  the  introduction 
of  the  bUl,  the  constitutional  requirement 
was  complied  with,  though  28  days  did  not 
intervene  between  the  first  publication  and 
the  introduction  of  the  bilL  Lower  v.  State 
(Ala.)  59  South.  611«  612. 


As  vequirims:  fttU  Mvmber  of  weeks 

A  tax  sale  notice  published  once  in  each 
week  for  four  consecutive  weeks  prior  to  the 
day  of  sale  complies  with  the  requirements 
of  section  7639,  Gen.  St  1901,  providing  that 
notice  shall  be  published  "once  in  each  week 
for  four  consecutive  weeks  prior  to  the  day 
of  sale,"  though  the  first  publication  was 
made  2S  days  only  before  the  sale.  Tidd  v. 
Grimes,  71  Pac  844,  845,  66  Kan.  401. 

ONCE  A  TEAR 

Where  a  policy  of  fire  Insurance  provides 
that  "the  insured  shall  take  an  'inventory' 
of  the  stock  hereby  covered,  at  least  *once  a 
year,'  during  the  life  of  this  policy,"  the  as- 
sured has  a  year  from  the  date  of  the  policy 
in  which  to  make  an  Inventory,  although  the 
policy  runs  for  one  year  only*    Tucker  ▼• 


Colonial  Fire  Ins.  Coug  61.  &  IL  8(1^  88^  J 

w.  va.  aa 
ONE 

See  Some  One. 

CUE  BVTEJMMik 

Under  liquor  Tax  Law,  taws  1897,  ] 
220,  e.  812, 1 17,  subd.  8,  requiring  tbe  cocses 
of  the  owners  of  two-thirds  of  tbe  Dumbe 
of  buildings  used  ezduslvely  as  dwelling 
and  situate  within  IMK)  Aset  of  premises  to  t< 
used  for  the  liquor  trafllc  to  the  carrying  o 
of  such  traflic,  an  ordinary  frame  baOdinj 
in  a  country  village,  Intended  and  used  to 
two  families,  is  one  building.  In  re  Clenern 
103  N.  T.  Supp.  157,  158,  118  App.  DIt.  575. 

The  words  "one  dwelling  house,"  as  use 
in  a  conveyance  of  land  declaring  tlutt  tfa 
grantee  shall  not  occupy  the  premises,  a 
cept  tot  one  dwelling  house  to  each  lot,  ai 
used  in  the  sense  in  which  the  words  ax 
ordinarily  used.  A  building  planned  asd  di 
signed  for  two  or  more  dweHings  caimc 
properly  be  described  aa  one  dw^ling  honsi 
A  building  designed  and  planned  for  tw 
families,  one  to  occupy  the  ground  floor  an 
one  the  second  fioor,  each  to  have  a  separat 
entrance,  violates  the  restriction  in  the  c(h 
veyance.  Harris  v.  Roraback,  100  N.  V 
391,  392, 137  Mich.  292;  109  Am.  St  Rep.  ^ 

A  double  two^tery  building,  comprisii 
four  flats  under  a  single  roof,  with  a  div 
sion  wall  running  through  it  on  the  centi 
line  of  the  lot  from  front  to  rear  and  fioi 
cellar  to  roof,  on  either  side  of  which  wi 
a  bay  front,  intended  for  the  occupation  ( 
several  families,  was  not  ''one  dwelling 
within  a  restrictive  building  covenant  pr 
viding  that  not  moro  than  "one  dwelUnj 
should  be  erected  on  each  lot  Sanders 
Dixon,  89  S.  W.  577,  582,  585,  114  Mo.  Ap 
229. 

OHE-HAJLF 

See  Eastern  One-Half. 

OHE-HAZ.F  OAIXOH 

Gm.  Ulwb  1909,  c  123,  i  52,  Imposing 
penalty  for  the  sale  or  keeping  for  sale  by  r 
tail  druggists,  without  first  obtaining  a  ! 
cense,  of  enumerated  Uqnors,  and  dedarli 
that  the  finding  of  any  liquors  ennmerau 
on  the  premises  of  any  retail  druggist  i 
quantities  exceeding  one-half  gallon  shall  I 
considered  evidence  that  the  same  is  kept  f« 
sale,  when  construed  in  the  light  of  chap^* 
32,  i  3,  providing  that  every  word  importm 
the  singular  number  only  may  be  constroe 
to  include  the  plural,  and  every  word  imvo^ 
Ing  the  plural  number  only  may  be  constra* 
to  embrace  the  singular,  prohibits  the  ie«I 
ing  of  intoxicating  liquor  in  quantities  ci 
ceeding  oofrhalf  gallon,  whether  it  con^ 
of  one  kind  only,  or  ia  tiie  aggzegate  of  «fv 


0S1&  HOUSE 


78S 


OKLT 


kinds.    8tate  ▼.  Almy,  79  Aa  902,  968, 

.  I.  415. 

3  HOUSE 

The  erection  of  a  house  or  flat  two  sto- 
hlgh  under  a  single  roof,  planned  for 
rate  occupancy  by  two  families,  one  on 
floor,  with  separate  entrances,  did  not 
titute  a  breach  of  a  building  restriction 
deed  providing  that  not  more  than  '*one 
e"  should  be  erected  on  each  40-foot 
tage  Pank  t.  Eaton,  89  S.  W.  686,  587, 
tfo.  App.  171. 

S  I.OT 

The  words  '*one  town  or  city  lot/*  in  Act 
8,  1852,  iimitinr  the  extent  of  the  home- 
1,  mean  the  lot  or  piece  of  ground  on 
h  the  head  of  a  family  has  a  house,  with 
ippurtenances  which  he  uses  as  a  home, 
gh  it  contains  more  than  one  lot,  accord- 
to  the  plat  and  survey  of  the  town  or 
Owens  ▼.  Jabine^  115  S.  W.  883,  384, 
rk.  468. 

3  PUkCB 

On  a  trial  for  keeping  a  liquor  nuisance, 
proof  showed  that  defendant  conducted 
tel  and  in  the  rear  of  it  about  three  feet 
ilTom  is  a  small  building,  and  that,  to 

entrance  to  it,  it  is  necessary  to  pass 
ugh    the    hotel.    The    evidence   showed 

defendant  sold  liquor  in  the  basement 
ie  hotel  and  in  this  building.  Held  that, 
in  Rev.  Codes  1905,  |  9373,  the  building 
tituted  "one  place"  for  the  maintenance 

liquor  nuisance,  and  it  was  not  error  to 

defendant's  motion  to  require  the  prose- 
in  to  elect  which  place  they  would  rely 
s  the  place  of  sale.  State  v.  Ildvedsen, 
^.  W.  489,  490, 20  N.  D.  62. 

S  RAIIAOAB 

Circular  No.  325  of  the  railroad  commls- 
declaring  that  continuous  mileage  rates 
apply  to  the  Central  Railroad  and  the 
ley  Southern  Railway  Company  for 
sportation  of  passengers  and  freight 
Ing  between  those  railroads  or  over  any 
on  of  either,  such:  rates  to  be  governed 
le  freight  and  passeiiger  tariffs  prescrih- 
y  the  Qeorgia  railroad  commission  for 
Central  of  Georgia  Railway  Company,  is 
iAT  and  complete  fixlpg  of  a.  continuous 
ige  rate  between  the  two  roads,  without 
ssity  of  resorting,  to  ascertain  its  mean- 
to  rule  No.  1  of  the  commission,  declar- 
;hat,  when  two  or  mpre  con^iecting  lines 
lilroad  are  operated  by  one  maoagement* 
here  the  majority  of  the.stock  of.  each 
introlled  by  one  od  sulrh  companies^  the 
of  railroads  of  all  shall  be  considered  as 
tituting  but  one  railroad,  and  the  rates 
be  computed  on  a  cont^uoM  mileage 
L  Hill  V.  Wadley  Southdin'By;  06.,  57 
796,  800, 128  «a.  7%.'  I 


OITB  8TATB  TO  AJTOTRBR 

Engaged  in  transportation  from  one  state 
to  another,  see  Engaged. 

ONE  SUBJECT 

See  Subject  (Of  Statute). 

ONEROUS 

"Onerous"  means  burdensome  or  oppres- 
sive. Meador  v.  Adams,  76  S.  W.  238,  239, 
33  Tex.  Civ.  App.  167. 

ONEROUS  DONATION 

An  "onerous  donation"  is  a  gift  burdened 
with  charges  imposed  by  the  donor.  A  man< 
ual  gift  may  be  free,  onerous,  or  remunera- 
tive, and  when  the  donor  makes  such  a  gift, 
omnium  bonorum,  on  condition  that  the  do- 
nee shall  maintain  him  for  the  rest  of  his 
life.  It  will  be  dealt  with  as  an  onerous  dona- 
tion, and  not  as  a  commutative  contract 
Ackerman  v.  Lamer,  40  South.  581,  587,  116 
La.  lOL 

ONLY 

See  Fit  Only. 

The  word  "only,"  in  PoL  Code  Mont  | 
4350,  providing  ttiat  the  county  treasure! 
must  disburse  the  county  moneys  only  on 
county  warrants  issued  by  the  county  clerk, 
based  on  orders  of  the  board  of  county  com- 
missioners, or  as  otherwise  provided  by  law, 
limits  the  power  of  the  treasurer  to  pay  out 
the  money  of  the  coimty,  both  as  to  the 
amount  and  the  precedent  conditions  of  pay- 
ment Ex  parte  Farrell,  92  Pac.  7S5,  786,  36 
Mont  254. 

Seattle  City  Charter,  art  16,  |  12,  de- 
clares that  every  employ^  in  the  classified 
civil  service  shall  hold  office  until  removed 
or  retired;  that  any  employ^  may  be  re- 
moved by  the  appointing  power  "only"  on  the 
filing  with  the  Civil  Service  Commission  of 
a  statement  of  the  reasons  therefor;  that 
an  employ^  removed  may  demand  an  Investi- 
gation, which  the  Commission  shall  make, 
and  certify  its  decision  to  the  appointing 
oflScer,  and  If  the  removal  is  not  sustained 
the  employ^  shall  be  reinstated.  The  Com- 
mission is  given  power  to  require  the  at- 
tendance of  witnesses.  Section  4  provides 
that  the  Commission  "shall  make  rules  for 
examinations,  appointments,  and  removals. ** 
Article  24,  |  8,  provides  that  every  officer, 
board,  or  department  authorized  to  appoint 
any  employ^  shall  have  the  right  to  remove 
the  person  so  appointed.  Article  16,  §  20, 
provides  that  any  officer  who  has  been  con- 
victed after  trial  before  the  Commission  shall 
be  dismissed  from  the  service.  Held,  that 
the  Commission  has  no  power  to  dismiss  a 
clerk  in  the  police  department  who  has  been 
appointed  by  the  chief  of  police;  such  pow- 
er of  removal  being  in  the  a^iet  of  police 
"only^**  and  the  action  of  the  OomnUssion  au« 
tiiori£ed  by  ttie  chaiter  being  a  mere  basis 


ONIiT 


Tse 


OPAQOX 


for  action  by  Um  nmoTtnt  powttr.  Baismi  T. 
City  of  SeatUe,  78  Pac  496,  406»  82  Waih. 
406. 

In  a  written  warranty  that  "It  la  under- 
stood that  the  goods  are  warranted  only 
against  breakage  cansed  by  manifest  defects 
in  material,"  the  word  "only**  necessarily  ex- 
cludes all  other  warranties.  Giving  the 
word  its  ordinary  meaning,  and  applying  it 
in  its  restrictive  sense,  as  qualifying  the 
word  to  which  it  naturally  belongs,  the  con- 
clusion cannot  be  escaped  that  it  restricts 
the  meaning  to  be  given  to  the  v^b  warrantr 
ed.  Dowaglac  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mahon,  101  N.  W. 
903,  13  N.  D.  616. 

Im  UaUtatioA  la  deed  or  Imam 

A  conveyance,  **ft>r  railroad  imrposes 
only^  entitles  the  company  to  the  use  and 
possession  of  ttie  entire  strip  so  long  as  any 
part  of  it  is  used  for  such  purposes.  Ritter 
V.  Thompson,  144  8.  W.  910,  911,  102  Ark. 
442. 

Where  grantors  of  a  shore  front  at  a 
summer  resort  reserved  the  right  to  build  a 
pier,  covenanting  not  to  permit  the  sale  of 
commodities  thereon,  and  to  charge  '*only  an 
entrance  fee,"  their  covenant  is  not  broken 
by  charging  for  the  use  of  roller  skates  at 
a  rink  on  the  pier,  where  all  who  pay  the 
entrance  fee  may  go  to  every  part  of  the  pier, 
including  the  rink.  Atlantic  City  t.  Asso- 
ciated Realties  Corp.,  67  AtL  987,  938,  72 
N.  J.  Eq.  684. 

Im  Umitatloa  of  Jvrisdietloa 

Using  Webster's  definition  of  **only"  as 
"utterly,  entirely,  wholly"  (WebsL  Diet  p. 
913),  Jurisdiction  cannot  be  founded  only  on 
one  ground,  when  another  and  equally  im- 
portant constitutional  ground  is  presented  in 
the  same  suit  Cound  v.  Atchison,  T.  ft  8. 
F.  R.  Co.,  173  Fed.  527.  533. 

The  word  "only"  in  the  judiciary  act 
(Act  March  3,  1887,  c  373,  i  1,  24  Stat  552, 
as  amended  by  Act  Aug.  13,  1888,  c.  866,  {  1, 
25  Stat  43^,  providing  that,  where  Jurisdic- 
tion is  founded  "only"  on  the  fact  of  diver- 
sity of  citizenship,  suit  may  be  brought  in 
the  district  of  the  residence  of  either  the 
plaintiff  or  the  defendant,  is  equivalent  to 
"solely" ;  and  a  suit  within  the  general  Juris- 
diction of  the  federal  courts,  both  on  the 
ground  of  diversity  of  citizenship  and  be- 
cause founded  upon  a  law  of  the  United 
States,  can  be  brought  only  in  the  district 
where  defendant  resides.  Whittaker  ▼.  Illi- 
nois Cent  R.  Co.,  176  Fed.  130,  181  (citing 
(3ound  V.  Atchison,  T.  ft  8.  F.  R.  Ck)^  173  Fed. 
627;  McCormick  Harvesting  Hach.  Co.  y. 
Walthers,  10  Sw.  Ct  485»  134  U.  &  41,  83 
L.  Ed.  888). 

OTOrr  ADVISOB.T 

The  phrase  "only  advisory,**  within  the 
rule  holding  tliat  a  nuister's  findings  are  only 
advisory  to  the  court,  simply  mean  ttiat  such 
findings  are.  not  «enelvaLT»  npMk  the  coozt, 


but^  on  the  eoatrary,  his  condasloiii  boQ 
law  and  ftict  may  be  reviewed  by  tbe  d 
cellor.  In  other  words,  the  master's  cod 
slons  do  not  bind  the  court  on  any  quest] 
of  law  or  fact  Guarantee  Gold  Bond,  L 
ft  Savings  0>.  v.  Edwards,  104  &  W.  i 
633,  7  Ind.  T.  207. 

onT  owTfiiminr 

A  complaint  on  a  note,  whldi  avei 
that  tiie  payee  died  intestate  lesTliig 
widow  and  that  he  left  plaintiSs  as  his  < 
dren  and  only  children  and  **0Dly  bein 
law,**  that  all  claims  against  him  and  bit 
tate  had  been  paid,  and  that  no  letters  of 
ministration  had  been  granted  on  the  es< 
was  suffldeat  to  show  the  plsiptiiW  r 
to  sue  as  owners  of  the  note,  tboogb 
quoted  words  be  taken  to  stste  a  mere 
elusion,  the  words  *'only  cUldRO,**  itin 
unqualified,  including  deceased  as  well 
living  children.  Barrett  ▼.  Sipp,  06  N 
310,  811,  50  Ind.  App.  804. 

ONYX 

So-called  Mexican  onyx  is  dotiibU 
"onyx"  rather  than  as  "marble,"  ud 
Tariff  Act  July  24.  1807,  c  11,  |  1,  Sche 
B,  par.  114,  30  Stat  158.  Blochman  Bi 
ing  Co.  ▼.  Blake»  168  Fed.  572. 

OONTZ 

It  was  held  in  Oonunonwealth  v.  B 
merer  (Ky.)  18  S.  W.  108,  under  a  statute 
vidlng  that  "Whoever  •  •  •  shall 
up,  carry  on  or  conduct  •  •  ♦  a  1 
bank,  faro  bank,  or  other  machine  or 
trlvance  used  in  betting,"  etc.,  "shall  be 
ed,"  eta,  that  "oontz,**  which  is  played  y 
dice  on  a  table  or  other  surface  was 
within  the  meaning  of  "oth»  machioe 
contrivance.*'  White  t.  States  76  N.  E. 
555,  87  Ind.  Appi  05. 

OPAL 

As  preoloua  stooe^  see  Predons  Stn 

OPAQUE 

The  term  ''opaque^'*  as  employed  la 
scribing  a  patent  for  a  current  control 
device  for  telephone  circuits,  and  hi  de& 
a  circuit  In  its  r^atkm  to  the  enensizbi?' 
rent,  is  a  circuit  containing  a  condoisef 
equivalent  device  which  prevents  tbe  pt 
ing  through  the  dreuit  of  an  appreciable 
substantial  amount  of  current-— tbat  i& 
vnfllclent  amonnt  to  affieet  the  operatic 
the  system  to  an  eb^eetlonable  degree^ 
by  the  term  ^'ofpaque^"  when  refeiring  to  i 
taUdng  conent,  is  contemplated  that  (^ 
aeftnlatio  of  the  dicott  wb&di  vrltt  v^ 
the  passage  of  the  talking  cunento  tb^ 
through  4a  sofflcient  wnount  to  materia 
affect  the  tynnsmlsalon  of  the  talking  a 
rents  through  the  91^.  oontalniag  tlte  te 


OPEN 


737 


OP£N 


»  receiver.  EjeUogg  Switchboard  A  Sup- 
k>.  v.  Dean  Electric  Ck>.,  168  Fed.  549, 
adopting  definition  given  in  description 
tents  in  Oongress). 


N 

See  Holding   Open;     Unopened;     Way 
Opened  and  Dedicated  to  Public  Use. 
Seep  open,  see  Keep. 

defendant  owned  a  tract  lying  between 
tiflTs  land  and  a  certain  creek,  and  the 
es  made  a  contract  by  which  plaintiff 
d  to  furnish  labor  "to  clean  off  right  of 
and  dig  ditch  through  G.  pond  and  to 

out  and  open  the  old  ditch"  on  defend- 

land;  plaintiff  agreeing  "to  dig  this 
not  less  than  six  or  eight  feet  wide  and 
)roper  depth  necessary  and  not  to  ex- 
three  feet  in  the  new  ditch."  The  con- 
further  provided  that  defendant  should 

plaintiff's  water  right  of  way  through 
itch,  through  the  pond  to  the  creek,  for 
purpose  of  keeping  the  ditch  clean  and 

The  new  ditcdi  referred  to  was  to  con- 
with  the  old  ditch,  which  was  to  furnish 
utlet  to  the  creek ;  the  purpose  being  to 
\  one  drainage  ditch  by  digging  the  new 

to  meet  the  old.  Held  that,  under  the 
sion  "to  clean  out  and  open  the  old 
,"  plaintiff  was  required  not  merely  to 
ve  the  rubbish  therefrom,  but  to  widen 
>  as  to  make  it  an  unobstructed  outlet 
be  water;  the  word  "open"  meaning  to 
by  cutting,  cleaning,  removing,  or  push- 
aside  whatever  impedes  or  hinders, 
mder  v.  Smith,  67  South.  104,  107,  8 
App.  001. 

looa 

I  saloon  is  "open"  on  Sunday,  in  viola- 
of  MiUs'  Ann.  St  (Rev.  Supp.)  i  184ed, 
^h  not  kept  open  in  the  same  manner  as 
eek  days;  it  being  enough  that  it  is  so 
that  access  may  be  had  thereto  by  per- 
not  employed  about  it,  and  that,  though 
ofr  is  not  kept  open,  it  is  opened  on  ap- 
tion  for  admission.  Birmingham  v.  Peo- 
K)  Pac.  1121,  40  Colo.  302. 

Jnder  a  statute  forbidding  the  keeping 
of  a  tippling-house  on  the  Sabbath,  the 
loes  not  concern  itself  with  the  length 
me  during  which  it  was  open,  but  does 
r  some  circumstances  justify  the  open- 
if  a  house  used  as  a  saloon  on  secular 
even  on  the  Sabbath  day,  and  a  charge 
1  failed  to  present  the  distinction  be- 
a  the  lawful  and  unlawful  opening  of 
a  house,  but  charged  that  the  offense 
complete  whenever  it  appeared  that  the 
i  in  question  was  a  tippling-house  and 
it  was  open  on  the  Sabbath  day  and 
the  law  did  not  concern  itself  with  the 
3S€  for  which  it  was  open,  too  greatly 
Icted  the  pui'poses  for  which  a  saloon 
be  open  on  the  Sabbath  day.    Bicfaard- 

3  Wo8.ft  P.2D  SxB.— 47 


son  V.  State,  59  S.  D.  916^  917,  8  Ga.  App. 
318. 

Street  or  road 

The  expression  "to  open,"  as  applied  to 
a  street  or  road,  is  used  almost  indifferently 
to  express  two  very  different  processes— the 
act  of  establishing  or  creating  a  highway, 
and  that  of  actually  putting  in  shape  for 
travel  one  already  having  a  legal  existence. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Cowley  CJounty  v.  John- 
son, 90  Pac.  805,  807,  76  Kan.  65. 

In  an  ordinance,  which  proposes  to  va- 
cate a  part  of  a  street  and  open  It  on  other 
lines,  the  words  "open  on  other  lines"  are 
only  applicable  to  an  already  existing  high- 
way. Brie  By.  Co.  v.  City  of  Pasaic,  74  Atl. 
838.  79  ^.  J.  Law,  19. 

Where  an  ordinance,  entitled  "An  ordi- 
nance to  open,  grade,  macadamize  and  other- 
wise improve"  a  new  street  designated  in 
such  title,  contained  provisions  for  the  tak- 
ing of  the  lands  required  for  such  street,  by 
condemnation,  and  the  paym^it  of  proper 
damages  for  such  taking,  it  was  held,  that 
the  word  "open"  implies  the  acquisition  by 
condemnation,  if  such  acquisition  be  neces- 
sary, of  the  lands  required  for  such  opening, 
and  that  the  title  sufficiently  indicates  an 
intent  to  condemn.  Beechwood  Park  Land 
Co.  V.  City  of  Summit,  78  AtL  57,  58,  78  N. 
J.  Law,  182. 

A  charter  giving  a  city  authority  to 
"open,  alter,  widen,  establish,  abolish,"  etc, 
streets,  does  not  give  it  authority  to  alienate 
streets.  Krause  v.  City  of  El  Paso  CTex.) 
101  S.  W.  828,  833. 

The  method  of  opening  a  street  in  Jer- 
sey City  is  prescribed  in  its  charter,  which 
declares  that  a  street  must  be  opened  in  that 
manner  and  not  otherwise.  Every  street 
"opened"  in  the  dty  involves:  (1)  The  ac- 
quisition of  the  necessary  lands;  (2)  the  ob- 
ligation of  the  dty  to  improve,  maintain, 
and  keep  in  repair  the  streets  of  the  city; 
and  (3)  the  assessment  for  benefits.  City  of 
Jersey  City  v.  National  Docks  B.  Co^  26 
AtL  145,  148,  55  N.  J.  Law,  194. 

The  word  "opened,"  as  used  with  refer- 
ence to  streets  and  public  places,  refers  to 
the  time  when  the  city  becomes  vested  with 
the  title  to  the  land  on  which  the  street  or 
avenue  is  to  run.  But  it  was  not  used  in 
that  sense  In  Laws  1895,  p.  2037,  c.  1006,  |  2, 
relating  to  the  discontinuing  and  closing  of 
streets,  and  providing  that  the  contiguous 
street  bounding  the  plot  or  square  wherein 
is  situated  the  land  sought  to  be  closed  and 
occupied  has  been  opened;  but  the  puii>ose 
of  the  act  was  to  substitute  one  system  of 
the  public  highways  for  another  by  opening 
new  streets  and  closing  old  ones,  and  it  was 
not  intended  to  physically  close  the  streets 
of  one  system  without  providing  something 
to  take  their  places.  Johnson  ft  Co.  v.  Cox, 
86  N.  Y.  Supp.  601,  608,  42  Misc.  Bep.  301. 


OPEN 


738 


OPEN  AOOOUNT 


Where  J.  avenue  was  opened  under 
Laws  1867»  p.  953,  c  400,  under  which  act  the 
dty  acquired  only  an  easement  for  street 
purposes,  and  thereafter  proceedings  were 
instituted  to  acquire  land  to  widen  the  ave- 
nue, when  a  part  of  it  then  in  use  was  aban- 
doned under  Laws  18d5,  p.  2037,  c  1006,  {  2, 
providing  that,  when  the  public  easement  in 
a  street  was  legally  abandoned,  the  owner 
regained  complete  possession  thereof,  and, 
after  the  new  street  was  opened,  could  oc- 
cupy the  abandoned  part,  and  the  cemetery 
association  owned  the  fee  in  land  which  was 
Included  within  the  abandoned  portion  of  J. 
avenue»  th^  new  street  was  not  "opened," 
within  the  statute,  until  there  had  been  an 
actual  physical  opening,  and  hence  the  aban- 
doned part  of  the  avenue  was  not  exempted 
from  assessment  as  ''land  actually  used  for 
cemetery,"  by  Laws  1879,  c.  801,  |  1.  In  re 
Jerome  Ave.  in  City  of  New  York,  85  N.  E. 
755,  756,  192  N.  Y.  459. 

Laws  1895,  p.  2037,  c.  1006,  relating  to 
the  discontinuing  and  closing  of  streets  and 
other  thoroughfares  in  New  Yoirk  city,  pro- 
vides (section  2)  that  on  the  filing  of  a  map 
showing  the  intention  of  the  public  authori- 
ties to  close  or  discontinue  any  street,  road, 
or  other  thoroughfare  which  has  been  in 
actual  and  physical  use,  the  owner  of  the 
fee  thereof  shall  be  permitted  to  close  and 
use  and  occupy  the  same  as  fully  as  if  the 
same  had  not  been  laid  out,  dedicated,  es- 
tablished, or  used,  provided  the  contiguous 
street  bounding  the  plot  or  square  wherein 
the  land  sought  to  be  closed  and  occupied  has 
been  "opened."  Held,  that  the  term  "open- 
ed" as  used  therein  meant  actually  op^ied  so 
that  a  road  could  be  used,  and  that  till  a 
road,  intended  to  take  the  place  of  a  discon- 
tinued thoroughfare,  was  "physically  opened 
and  capable  of  public  use"  owners  of  prem- 
ises abutting  the  old  road  are  properly  pro- 
hibited from  closing  or  fencing  the  roadbed 
In  front  thereof.  Isaac  G.  Johnson  ft  Co.  v. 
Cox,  89  N.  E.  454,  457,  196  N.  Y.  110. 

OPEN  AOCOUNT 

Money  advanced  under  a  contract  or  at 
the  instance  and  request  of  another  is  not  an 
"open  account"  within  Rev.  St  1895,  art. 
3102,  providing  that  on  all  open  accounts, 
when  no  interest  is  agreed  on  by  the  parties, 
interest  shall  be  allowed  from  the  first  day 
of  January  after  the  same  are  mada  Cou- 
turie  V.  Roensch,  134  S.  W.  413,  416. 

Items  for  unliquidated  damages  set  forth 
in  a  petition  do  not  constitute  an  "open  ac- 
count," within  Rev.  St.  1909,  §  1799,  provid- 
ing that  in  actions  on  an  open  account  where 
the  items  are  set  forth  in  the  petition,  de- 
fendant, who  makes  default,  shall  be  deemed 
to  admit  the  account  to  he  due  as  set  forth 
in  the  petition,  and  a  petition  in  an  action 
by  a  subcontractor  against  the  principal  con- 
tractor for  damages  for  failure  to  procure 
for  the  subcontractor  access  to  the  grounds 


on  which  the  work  ia  to  be  done,  is  not 
larged  by  items  of  unliquidated  damagec 
corporated  In  the  petition.  W.  W.  Br 
Const  Co.  V.  MacArthur  Bros.  Ca,  139  & 
104,  106,  236  Mo.  41. 

Civ.  Code  1895,  {  4130,  whidi  prov 
the  mode  of  proof  and  defense  in  a  sui 
a  Justice's  court  on  an  '^open  account,'' 
not  apply  to  an  action  for  the  loss  of  or  ( 
age  to  personal  property  by  a  conmioo 
rler,  even  though  the  cause  of  action  ii 
out  in  detail  in  a  statement  attached  to 
sununons  and  verified  by  the  affidavit  ol 
plaintiir.  £1.  E.  Lowe  Co.  v.  Cencm 
Georgia  Ry.  Co.,  51  S.  E.  653,  123  Ga.  7 

"'An  account  current'  is  an  *opei 
running  account'  between  two  or  more 
ties,  or  an  account  which  contains  item 
tween  the  parties  from  which  the  bal 
due  to  one  of  them  is  or  can  be  ascotaj 
from  which  it  follows  that  such  an  ace 
comes  under  the  terms  of  an  'open  ac» 
in  so  far  as  it  is  running,  unsettled,  or 
closed."  Where  supplies  of  coal  for  a 
sel  were  ordered  and  delivered  at  diffe 
times,  a  bill  being  rendered  after  each  d 
ery,  the  several  charges  do  not  constitn 
running  account,  but  each  constitutes  a 
arate  and  distinct  cause  of  action,  and  U 
title  the  seller  to  a  lien  for  any  item  oi 
the  New  York  statute  notice  thereof  i 
have  been  filed  within  30  days  after  i 
item  was  furnished  or  suit  to  enforce 
lien  must  have  been  instituted  within 
time.  The  Golden  Rod,  153  Fed.  in, 
82  C.  C.  A.  345  (quoting  and  adopting  df 
tion  in  1  Cyc.  p.  363). 

Where  petition  alleged  that  plaintiff 
and  delivered  certain  goods  to  defenc 
the  amounts  and  prices  of  which  were  i 
ized  in  an  exhibit,  and  paid  certain  fn 
charges  for  defendant,  and  that  correct 
and  invoices  were  made  out  at  the  tim 
the  shipments,  and  received  by  defent] 
who  agreed  to  pay  the  sums  set  forth 
Itemized,  an  affidavit  as  to  the  correctne 
the  items  was  no  proof  thereof,  und^ 
St  1895,  art  2323,  providing  that  in  ai 
tion  on  an  open  account  an  affidavit  o] 
correctness  shall  be  prima  facie  evid 
thereof,  as  the  petition  showed  an  ae»^ 
stated  so  far  as  the  sales  were  concer 
and  the  freight  charges  were  evidently  fe 
on  a  special  contract,  which  formed  no 
of  the  account  for  goods  sold.  An  "open 
count"  is  one  in  respect  to  which  nothing 
occurred  to  bind  either  party  by  its  st 
ments;  an  accojint  which  is  yet  fnlly  c 
to  be  disputed.  An  account  consisting 
many  items  based  on  agreements  as  to  e 
item  as  to  price  and  time  of  payment  is 
an  open  account  any  more  than  one  in  wl 
the  price  and  time  of  payment  has  been  & 
by  an  agreement  made  after  all  the  items 
the  account  have  been  consummated  hj  s 
and  delivery.  The  word  "open"  indies 
that   there   is   something   undetermined 


OPEN  AND  APPARENT 


739 


OPEN  CONCUBINAGE 


ict  of  the  parties,  or  by  the  application 
:tled  rules  of  law,  and  an  account  can- 
e  said  to  be  "open*'  when  there  remains 
rm  of  contract  to  be  settled  bj  agree- 
"Open  account'*  la  used  in  opposition 
tated  account/'  wherein  the  account  is 
I  by  the  assent  to  its  correctness  by  the 

charged.  An  "account  stated"  is  an 
ment  between  two  persons  who  have 
previous  transactions  fixing  the  amount 
1  respect  to  such  transactions  and  prom- 
to  pay  them.  In  other  words,  an  "ac- 
stated"  is  one  consisting  of  many  items 

on  agreements  as  to  each  item  as  to 
)rice  and   time  of  payment     Wroten 

1  &  Lumber  Co.  7.  Mineola  Box  Mfg. 
rex.)  95  S.  W.  744,  745  (citing  McCam- 
.  Batsell,  69  Tex.  363;  Abb.  Law  Diet.; 
Llesey  v.  SpoCford,  47  Tex.  13). 

(f  AND  APPARENT 

L  hazard  is  open  and  apparent  which 
e  discovered  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
by  the  party  charged  with  the  duty  of 
Lsing  such  care.  Indianapolis  Traction 
rminal  Co.  v.  Holtsclaw,  82  N.  £.  986, 
LI  Ind.  App.  620. 

f  AND  NOTORIOUS  ADULTERY 

L  married  man  was  not  guilty  of  "open 
lotorious  adultery**  because  he  lived  in 
ery  with  his  brother*s  wife,  under  such 
ustances  that  the  community  in  which 
ed  believed  that  they  were  married  and 
i  their  adulterous  relation  was  kept  se- 
People  v.  Salmon,  83  Pac.  42,  43,  148 
303,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1186,  113  Am. 
ep.  268. 

H  AND  NOTORIOUS  POSSESSION 

in  instruction  that  the  sale  of  goods  or 
rty  by  one  who  is  involved  deeply  in 
and  unable  to  meet  his  obligations  in 
to  be  valid  against  the  creditors  of  the 
or  must  be  accompanied  by  open  and 
lous  change  of  possession,  and  that  by 
and  notorious  possession**  I  mean  the 

2  change  of  possession,  which  is  to  con- 
and  to  be  manifested  continually  by  the 
ird  and  visible  signs,  such  as  render  it 
Qt  that  possession  of  the  judgment 
r  has  ceased,  is  correct  Swartzburg 
ckerson,  78  Pac.  282,  12  Okl.  666. 

ff  AND  OBVIOUS  DEFECT 

lu  open  and  obvious  defect  is  one  mani- 
;o  the  sense  of  observation,  whether  It 
\  from  the  nature  of  the  business,  the 
er  in  which  it  is  conducted,  or  the  use 
(fective  and  unsafe  appliances.  New 
La  Thomson^Houston  Electric  Light  Co. 
mbold.  106  N.  W.  213,  216,  73  Neb.  259. 

Ef  BIDDING 

Iurd*s  Rev.  St  1899,  p.  453,  c.  32,  {  85, 
der»  that  the  board  of  directors  of  a 
iDg  and  loan  association  shall  hold  such 
1   meetings,   not  less    frequently    than 


once  a  month,  as  may  be  provided  by  the  by- 
laws, at  which  the  money  in  the  treasury 
shall  be  offered  tot  loan  ih  open  meeting,  and 
that  th&  stockholders  who  shall  bid  the 
highest  premium  for  the  preference  or  priori- 
ty of  loan  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  a  loan 
of  a  certain  amount  for  each  share  of  stock. 
Held,  that  where  at  a  regular  meeting  "mon- 
ey was  offered  for  sale,**  and  there  were 
several  bids  therefor,  among  which  was  th& 
bid  in  question,  the  requirement  of  the  stat- 
ute with  reference  to  "open  bidding"  was 
complied  with  as  to  the  bid  in  question, 
though  it  was  made  by  way  of  written  appli- 
cation for  the  money,  submitted  without  the 
presence  of  the  bidder.  Savage  v.  Evanston 
Savings  ft  Loan  Ass*n,  81  N.  E.  1062,  1063, 
228  111.  431  (citing  Farmers*  Savings  &  Build- 
ing ft  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Kent,  30  South.  874,  131 
Ala.  246;  Ruppel  v.  Missouri  Guarantee  Sav- 
ings ft  Building  Ass*n,  69  S.  W.  1000,  158 
Mo.  613;  SUte  v.  Stockton,  86  Mo.  App.  477; 
Miller  v.  Missouri  Guarantee  Sav.  &  Build- 
ing A8s*n  of  Hannibal,  83  Mo.  App.  669; 
Edinger  v.  Same,  83  Mo.  App.  616). 

OPEN  CAR 

An  "oi)en  car**  on  a  trolley  line  is  one 
with  a  running  board  on  each  side  along 
which  the  conductor  passes  collecting  the 
fares  and  discharging  his  general  duties. 
Drake  v.  Auburn  City  Ry.  Co.,  66  N.  B.  i21, 
122,  178  N.  Y.  466. 

A  policy,  issued  to  a  railroad  company, 
which  covered  in  general  terms  all  cotton  on 
or  in  depots,  platforms,  qr  grounds  adjacent 
thereto,  and  in  transit,  but  which  provided 
that  cotton  in  open  cars  was  not  covered,  in- 
sured cotton  on  a  stationary  flat  car  placed 
on  a  spur  track  adjacent  to  a  depot  to  re- 
main there  about  12  hours,  though  the  cot- 
ton was  subsequently  to  be  transported  on  the 
car,  since  the  ''open  cars**  referred  to  meant 
cars  of  that  description  commonly  used  for 
transportation,  as  the  company  sought  to  re- 
lieve itself  from  the  increased  hazard  inci- 
dent to  the  transportation  of  cotton  on  open 
cars  due  to  sparks  from  locomotives  in  ac- 
tual transportation,  and  since  the  words  "in 
transit"  meant  in  course  of  passing  from 
point  to  point  Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Texas  ft 
G.  Ry.  Co.,  116  S.  W.  117,  120,  63  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  164. 

OPEN   GONCUBINAOE 

The  word  "open,**  in  Civ.  Code,  art.  1481, 
providing  that  those  living  in  open  concubin- 
age are  respectively  incapable  of  making  to 
each  other  any  donation  of  immovables, 
means  "not  secret,  without  concealment  or 
disguise**;  so  that,  where  the  living  is  under 
the  cloak  of  an  innocent  reliation  and  sought 
to  be  kept  secret,  it  d6es  not  give  rise  to  the 
Incapacity  pronounced  by  that  article.  Suc- 
cession of  Jahraus,  38  South.  417,  418,  114 
La.  45a 


OPEN  OOUBT 


T40 


OPEN  HOUSE 


OOUBT 

See  Conf  eseioii  in  Open  Court 

An  "open  coortf*  contemplates  the  piee- 
euoe  of  the  Judge  and  the  ^erk  of  the  conrt, 
or  a  duly  qualified  deputy,  the  legular  open- 
ing and  (Aodng  of  the  court,  and  the  pree- 
ence  of  the  derk'a  docket,  upon  which  should 
be  entered,  under  the  eye  of  the  court,  the 
succeeslTe  steps  taken  In  open  court  in  each 
case.  Hays  ▼.  Philadelphia,  W.  ft  B.  B.  Co., 
68  Aa  439,  441,  W  Md.  418. 

Written  application  filed  with  the  clerk, 
end  not  brought  to  the  court's  attention,  is 
not  made  In  "open  court,**  within  Rev.  St 
1!S95,  art  8188,  providing  that  no  Jury  trial 
fllaall  be  had,  unless  application  therefor  be 
omde  in  open  court  Gibson  v.  Singer  Sewing 
llach.  Co.  (Tex.)  147  8.  W.  285,  286. 

In  the  provision  of  Bankr.  Act  July  1, 
1808,  c.  Ml,  I  12,  80  Stat  649,  that  a  bank- 
rupt may  offer  terms  of  composition  to  bis 
creditors  after  he  has  been  examined  In  open 
court  or  at  a  meeting  of  his  creditors,  etc., 
the  term  'in  open  court"  refers  to  proceed- 
Ings  before  the  referee.  In  re  Bloodworth- 
Stembridge  Co.,  178  Fed.  372,  373. 

Pub.  Laws  1911,  c.  702,  |  2,  provides 
that  theaters  afterwards  erected  should  have 
an  open  court  or  space  on  sides  not  border- 
ing on  streets  or  alleys  which  should  be  at 
least  six  feet  wide,  etc  This  act  took  the 
place  of  Pub.  Laws  1909,  c  472,  |  27,  pro- 
viding for  similar  courts  from  the  prosceni- 
um line  to  the  line  of  the  street  in  front 
parallel  with  the  adjoining  street  which  de- 
dared  that  such  courts  should  be  "opoi  to 
the  sky  opposite  the  whole  length  of  the  au- 
ditorium.*' Held,  that  "open  court"  as  used 
in  the  act  of  1911  was  one  complet^y  uncov- 
ered and  open  to  the  sky,  and  that  a  covered 
passageway  was  not  in  compliance  there- 
with. Greenough  v.  Allen  Theater  ft  Bealty 
Co.,  80  Aa  200,  281,  83  B.  L  120. 

Coatlmvoaui  session  dIsttnsiniAed 

The  term  "open  court"  as  used  in  Acts 
1898,  No.  108,  p.  156,  providing  that  appeals 
in  criminal  cases  shall  be  taken  by  motion, 
either  verbal  or  in  writing,  in  open  court 
within  three  days  after  sentence  shall  have 
been  pronounced,  means  the  actual  session 
of  the  court  while  the  judge  is  on  the  bench, 
as  contradistinguished  from  the  continuous 
session  of  ten  months  provided  for  by  arti- 
cle 117  of  the  Constltutton.  SUte  v.  Yick- 
uair,  43  South.  635,  637,  118  La.  963. 

H€»ld  court  synoaymons 

Acts  1888-89,  p.  64,  is  not  violative  of 
Const  1875,  art  4,  |  19,  providing  that  no 
bill  shall  be  so  altered  or  amended  on  its 
passage  through  either  house  as  to  change  its 
original  purpose;  the  change  having  been 
only  from  a  bill  to  fix  the  time  of  "opening" 
courts  to  one  to  fix  the  time  of  "holding" 
courts,  and  the  terms  as  used  in  the  connec- 


tion being  synonymous.    Letcher  v.  State,  49 
South.  805,  806, 109  Ala.  09, 17  AmLGa&m 


The  expression  "open  crosBbg,"  lAo 
apidied  to  railroads,  has  a  weU-endentood 
mesntng,  and  the  use  to  be  made  of  It  ihc» 
sarily  depends  somewhat  upon  the  dianeter 
of  the  land  on  eadi  side  of  the  tuck  and 
the  purposes  to  which  the  owner  pot  it,  and 
where  a  railroad  company  sgreed  to  jive 
the  owner  an  ''open  croestaig,"  wbere  tbe 
road  intenected  a  220-acre  pa^ure,  tbe  pir* 
ties  contemplated  an  "open  croseiiis"  for  tbe 
passage  of  stock  between  the  sepaitte  puts 
of  tiie  farm.  Hartshorn  v.  Ghieego  Grat 
Western  By.  Co.,  113  N.  W.  810,  841,  IT 
Iowa,  824. 

OFEH  FOB  BirSIirESS 

Where  an  insurance  policy  wimstF^. 
that  insured  should  keep  an  inventory  vA 
his  books  of  account  in  a  flreiNroof  safe  dr 
ing  the  hours  when  his  drug  store  "was  y: 
open  for  business,**  and  insured  was  In  the 
habit  of  keeping  his  store  open  for  bosbe" 
until  11  or  12  o'clock  at  night,  the  policy  <£' 
not  require  that  such  books  shooki  be  plaa<: 
in  his  safe  during  his  temporary  absence  fro: 
the  store  at  about  9  o'docfc  on  the  eTenins  ^ 
the  fire,  answering  a  professioDSl  call,  as  > 
physician,  about  a  blodc  distant  from  tb;  i 
store.  Major  ▼.  Insurance  Co.  of  NVJ!| 
America,  86  S.  W.  883,  884,  112  Mo.  Ar^ 
280. 

Where  a  store  containing  insiired's  ii ' 
tures  and  stock  was  locked  for  a  half  lioor  i:  i 
noon  while  the  persons  in  charge  weret: 
lunch,  and  during  that  tJmp  ^^e  property  ^ 
destroyed  by  flre^  the  store  was  not  ^  I 
"open  for  business,**  within  a  provisioD  of  tb  | 
iron-safe  clause  in  the  policy,  requirlv  ^ 
assured  shall  ke^  his  books  and  inTeob)?  I 
locked  in  a  fireproof  safe  when  tbe  Nldisf  | 
is  not  actually  open  for  busLneBS,  or  In  sose  i 
place  not  exposed  to  a  fire  which  would  d^ 
stroy  the  building.     Joffe  ft  Mankowiti  ^  I 
Niagara  ITire  Ins.  Co.,  81  AtL  281,  283,lli 
Md.  166,  Ann.  Cas.  1913C,  1217. 


OPEN  HOU8B 

Under  Acts  81st  Leg.  c  17, 1 15i  deflnisf 
an  "open  house"  as  one  in  whldi  no  scnesi 
obstructing  the  view  throned  the  place  of » 
trance  into  such  house  are  used,  a  salooD<^ 
ducted  in  a  wing  of  the  entrance  lobby  <kS 
hotel  in  plain  Tlew  of  the  aitranoe  ti>e^ 
is  conducted  in  an  "open  house."  Doyle«( 
Scott  (Tex.)  184  S.  W.  829,  83a 

Acts  30th  Leg.  c.  138,  •  15,  leqniritf  Pf^ 
sons  engaged  in  the  sale  of  intoxicatiits  ^t 
uors  to  be  drunk  upon  the  premises  to  P^ 
bond  conditioned  that  ttiey  will  keep  an  oi^ 
house,  and  defining  an  "open  house"  « J* 
in  which  no  screen  or  other  derioes  areoaj 
inside  or  outside  such  house  tbat  will  f>> 
struct  tbe  view  throng  the  open  door  ^ 


OPEN  MARKBT 


741 


OPEN  SHOP 


i  of  entrance  where  the  liquors  are  sold, 
not  require  that  ordinary  doors  used  at 
entrances  shall  be  constructed  of  trans- 
nt  material,  and  a  failure  to  so  construct 
I  is  not  a  breach  of  the  bond,  where  there 
)  other  screen  or  deyioe  to  obstruct  the 
through  the  open  door.  State  ▼.  W.  C 
d  &  Sons  (Tex.)  136  S.  W.  182,  183. 

!N  MABKET 

In  an  action  against  a  carrier  for  dam- 
to  a  shipment  of  cattle,  in  a  requested 

'uctlon  for  defendant  that  there  was  no 

mce  to  show  that  the  cattle  in  certain 
were  not  sold  in  "open  market"  on  a 

lin  date,  the  words  "open  market"  unez-  i 

led  would  necessaHly  have  confused  and  | 

ed  the  Jury,  and,  if  by  "open  market"  i 
meant  that  the  sale  was  made  before' 

close  of  the  regular  market  as  held  that 
the  request  should  have  been  so  framed 

)  express  that  meaning.    Baltimore  &  O. 

;o.  y.  WhitehUl,  04  AU.  1083,  1039,  104 

295. 

m  MORTGAOB  CLAUSE 

The  indorsem^t  on  a  fire  policy  that 
if  any,  shall  be  payable  to  the  mortgagee 
is  mortgage  interest  may  appear,  desig- 
s  the  payee  of  any  loss  which,  for  the 
K)se8  of  distinction,  has  been  called  "open 
:gage  clause,"  but  does  not  bring  insurer 
mortgagee  into  contractual  relations  with 
other,  either  directly  or  through  an  as- 
ment  of  the  policy,  and  neither  does  the 
^gagee  thereby  become  a  person  whose 
erty  or  property  interests  are  insured 
iv  the  policy,  and  the  contract  for  indem- 
remains  one  exclusively  between  insurer 
the  owner  of  the  property.  ColUnsvllle 
Soc.  V.  Boston  Ins.  Co.,  60  Atl.  047,  048, 
;onn.  076,  00  L.  B.  A  924. 


:h,  notorious,  and  continu- 
ous  change  of  possession 

The  words  "open,  notorious,  and  continu- 
change  of  possession,"  used  to  describe 
of  the  requisites  of  a  valid  sale  of  prop- 
as  against  the  seller's  creditors,  means 
the  possession  taken  must  be  actual,  and 
t  be  of  such  a  character  as  to  apprise  the 
nunity,  or  those  who  are  accustomed  to 
with  the  seller,  that  the  goods  have 
iged  hands,  and  that  the  title  has  passed 
of  the  seller  and  into  the  buyer.  Wil- 
s  V.  Youtsey,  131  S.  W.  706,  706,  151  Mo. 
09. 

:n  policy 

An  open  or  unvalued  policy  is  one  in 
^b  the  value  of  the  interest  at  risk  is  not 
I  in  the  policy,  but  is  estimated  by  a  cer- 
standard,  and  in  case  of  loss  is  made  out 
)roof.  Peninsular  A  O.  S.  S.  CJo.  v.  At- 
Ic  Mut  Ins.  Co.,  185  Fed.  172,  174. 

An  "open  policy  of  insurance"  is  one 
re  the  value  of  the  property  insured  is  not 


agreed  on  or  liquidated.  On  an  open  policy 
of  marine  insurance  on  a  cargo,  the  recovery 
in  case  of  a  total  loss  is  the  value  of  the  car- 
go, at  the  place  of  shipment,  and  does  not  in- 
clude a  loss  of  profits.  Leonard  v.  Bosch,  08 
AtL  60,  73  N.  J.  Eq.  438. 

Under  a  marine  insurance  policy  cover- 
ing an  importation  valuing  the  property  at 
the  invoice,  an  invoice,  not  stating  the  actual 
cost  or  actual  market  value,  as  required  by 
Act  Cong.  June  10,  1890,  c.  407,  20  Stat  131, 
to  be  stated  in  the  "invoice"*  accompanying 
importations,  was  not  such  an  invoice  as  the 
contract  contemplated ;  and  hence  the  policy 
was  an  open  and  not  a  valued  one,  and,  the 
insured,  having  paid  in  reliance  on  the  valua- 
tions given  in  such  invoice,  might  recover 
back  the  excess  over  the  actual  value.  Insur- 
ance Co.  of  North  America  v.  Willey,  98  N.  B. 
077,  079,  212  Mass.  76. 

Civ.  Code,  {  1793,  defines  insurance  as  a 
contract  whereby  one  undertakes  to  indem- 
nify another  against  loss.  Section  1846  pro- 
vides that  a  policy  is  either  open  or  valued. 
Section  1840  defines  an  open  policy  as  one  in 
which  the  value  of  the  thing  insured  is  not 
agreed  upon,  but  left  to  be  ascertained  in 
case  of  loss.  Section  1847  defines  a  valued 
policy  as  one  which  provides  that  the  thing 
insured  shall  be  valued  at  a  specified  sum. 
Section  1877  provides  that  double  insurance 
exists  where  the  same  person  is  insured  by 
several  insurers  in  respect  to  the  same  sub- 
ject. Section  1878  provides  that  in  case  of 
double  insurance  each  insurer  shall  contrib- 
ute ratably  toward  the  loss.  Sess.  Laws  1905 
c  120,  prescribes  a  standard  form  of  fire  pol- 
icy which  provides  that  the  amount  of  in- 
surance written  therein  on  real  property  shall 
be  taken  conclusively  to  be  the  true  value. 
Held  that,  under  the  standard  policy,  the 
value  of  real  property  on  total  loss  is  conclu- 
sively fixed  by  the  total  of  all  the  insurance 
written  therein  which  is  the  amount  of  the 
policy  and  concurrent  insurance,  and  the  total 
amount  of  loss  Is  the  sum  total  of  insurance, 
and,  the  value  of  the  property  being  condu- 
sivedy  fixed  at  a  sum  equal  to  the  loss,  the 
several  policies  cannot  be  prorated.  Lawver 
V.  Globe  Mut  Ins.  Co.,  127  N.  W.  016,  019, 
26  S.  D.  649. 

Valued  polloy  distinKiiislied 

See  Valued  Policy. 

OPEN  SHOP 

An  employer  who  does  not  discriminate 
between  union  and  nonunion  labor,  but  leaves 
the  matter  to  the  voluntary  choice  of  his  em- 
ployes, maintains  an  "open  shop."  Shine  v. 
Fox  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.,  150  Fed.  357,  80  C.  C. 
A  811. 

The  term  "open  shop"  has  a  distinctive 
trade  meaning,  and  in  reference  to  trade  mat- 
ters means  that  in  selecting  employes  there 
should  be  no  discrimination  against  union  or 
nonunion  men.    The  term  excludes  the  idea 


OPI^  STORE 


742 


OPENlfESS,  NOTORIETY 


of  dlscriminatioii  against  men  because  of 
tbelr  membership  in  a  union.  The  moment 
men  are  discriminated  against  with  refer^ice 
to  their  employment  because  they  are  union 
men,  the  shop  pursuing  this  policy  becomes  a 
"closed  shop."  The  principle  of  an  "open 
shop**  is  that  in  it  men  are  employed  regard- 
less of  whether  they  are  union  or  nonunion. 
This  is  the  sense  in  which  the  term  '*open 
shop*'  is  invariably  used.  Sackett  ft  Wil- 
helms  L.  &  P.  Go.  v.  National  Ass'n  of  Em- 
ploying Lithographers,  113  N.  Y.  Supp.  110, 
114,  61  Misc.  Rep.  160. 

OPEH  STORE 

The  Iceeping  of  a  fruit  stand  open  on 
Sunday  for  the  sale  of  fruit  is  the  keeping  of 
an  "open  store"  within  Code  Miss.  1906,  | 
1367,  providing  that  a  person  shall  not  keep 
open  his  store  on  Sunday  for  the  purpose 
of  disposing  of  any  wares  or  merchandise, 
etc.  City  of  Oulfport  v.  Stratakos,  43  South. 
812,  90  Miss.  489, 18  Ann.  Cas.  855. 

OPEH  TO  USE 

The  words  "open  to  use,'*  as  used  in  an 
act  providing  that  every  railroad  company 
or  corporation  whose  lines  or  road,  or  any 
part  thereof,  is  "open  to  use,*'  shall  within 
six  months  after  the  passage  of  the  act  main- 
tain fences  on  the  sides  of  their  roads,  or 
the  part  thereof  "open  to  use,*'  where  the 
same  passes  through,  along,  or  adjoining  in- 
closed or  cultivated  fields  or  uninclosed  lands, 
and  that  any  such  railroad  company  failing 
to  maintain  such  fences  shall  be  liable  to  the 
owners  of  Uve  stock  killed,  injured,  or  dam- 
aged by  their  agents,  employes,  engines,  or 
cars,  do  not  include  a  railroad  which  the  evi- 
dence shows  was  built  in  1872,  and  further, 
that  an  owner  of  stock  had  done  business 
with  the  "Rio  Grande**  for  25  years.  Denver 
&  R.  G.  R.  Go.  V.  Kelso,  90  Paa  05, '66,  40 
Colo.  84. 

OPEH  VISIBLE  RISK 

An  "open  visible  risk"  is  such  a  one  as 
would  instantly  appeal  to  the  senses  of  an  in- 
telligent person  familiar  with  the  business, 
and  about  which  there  can  be  no  difference  of 
opinion  in  the  minds  of  intelligent  persons; 
and  it  is  not  required  that  the  servant  make 
close  scrutiny  into  all  the  details  of  the  in- 
strumentalities with  which  he  deals  to  de- 
termine the  risk  involved.  Millen  v.  Pacific 
Bridge  Co.,  95  Pac.  196,  199,  51  Or.  58a 

OPEHED   AHB    DEDICATES   TO    PUB- 
UO  USE 

See  Way  Opened  and  Dedicated  to  Public 
Use. 

OPEHIHG  OF  THE  OOUBT 

Code  1882,  |  4926,  providing  that  defend- 
ant shall  file  his  answer  in  writing  on  or 
before  the  "opening  of  the  court"  at  the  re- 
turn term  of  the  suit,  is  mandatory,  and  a 
rule  of  court  providing  that  new  cases  shall 


be  called  for  assignment  on  the  seoond  Moa- 
day  of  the  ttf  m,  and  that  defendants  sboold 
have  until  *fuch  call  to  file  answer  in  all  ose 
where  an  appearance  has  been  entered  dar- 
ing the  first  day  of  the  term,  is  void.  It  \m 
an  unwarranted  construction  to  extend  tbe 
meaning  of  the  words  "opening  of  the  court" 
to  include  any  other  day  except  tbe  first  dar 
of  the  term.  If  the  plea  could  be  filed  after 
the  first  day  of  the  term,  it  could  be  filed  oo 
the  last  day,  as  well  as  on  any  Intermediitf 
day.  To  give  any  other  oonstmction  to  tliii 
statute  would  be  to  deprive  it  of  t  definite 
meaning  in  this  regard.  Lippman  v.  ftu 
Ins.  Co.,  47  8.  E.  093.  594,  120  Ga.  247. 

OPEHIHO  STATEXEHT 

As  pleading,  see  Pleading. 

OPEHLT 

An  answer  setting  up  that  a  waste  ditdi 
was  used  continuously,  openly,  peaceablj. 
etc.,  flufllciently  shows  that  tbe  use  was  cot 
clandestine,  as  the  word  "openly"  sufficieDtij 
shows  that  f^ct  Abbott  t.  Pond,  76  Ptc 
60,  142  Oal.  898. 

OPEHI.Y  OUTRAGE  PUBLIC  DECEKCY 

The  statute  (St.  1893,  $  2552;  Wilsons 
Rev.  &  Ann.  St  1903,  |  2650)  making  it  la 
offense  to  commit  any  act  which  "openly  oai- 
rages  public  decency"  and  is  Injurious  to 
public  morals  is  directed  against  acts  wbi-  i: 
are  committed  openly  and  affect  the  public. 
A  doctor's  private  office  is  not  siich  a  phut 
as  will  give  an  act  committed  therein  tte 
character  of  an  open  act,  especially  when  c? 
one  was  present  except  the  one  against  wboit 
the  act  was  committed.  Gunn  v.  Territory,  SI 
Pac  861,  862, 190  OkL  240. 

OPEHI.Y  POSSESS 

Where  a  petition  alleges  that  the  plfli^ 
tiffs  own  and  "openly  possess*'  land,  tbe  pet 
tion  is  not  drawn  under  Act  No.  38  of  l^- 
authorizing  suits  to  establish  title  to  rea^ 
estat^  where  neither  of  the  claimants  are  i£ 
actual  possession,  since  the  quoted  phras 
cannot  be  construed  as  an  averment  sinpjJ 
of  title  to  the  land,  but  means  to  possess  i: 
an  open  manner;  publicly;  not  In  prlTate 
without  secrecy ;  by  some  word  or  act  vhic: 
is  an  open  declaration  to  those  Ui  the  neirii 
borhood  that  they  are  exercising  the  rlgbts 
of  ownership.  McHugh  v.  Albert  Haiis?a 
Lumber  Co.,  56  South.  636,  637,  129  La.  6S) 

OPEHHESS,  HOTORIETT,  AHD  BXOX- 
SIVEHESS  OF  PO8SE88I0K 

An  instruction  that  "openness,  notoriety, 
and  excluslveness  of  possession"  are  sh-^'^ 
by  such  acts  In  respect  of  the  land  in  its  coe 
ditlon  at  the  time  as  comport  with  owwr 
ship,  such  acts  as  would  ordinarily  ^  I^ 
formed  by  the  true  owner  in  appropriatit? 
the  lands  or  its  avails  to  his  own  nse,  or  pre- 
venting others  ftrom  the  use  of  it  as  ftr  ^ 
reasonably  practicable,  was  correct  Alaba^ 


OPENWOHK  ARTICLES 


743 


OFERATB 


ma  State  Land  Ck>.  t.  Matthews,  03  South. 
174,  175.  168  Ala.  200. 

DPENWOBX  ABTIOI.es 

As  exnbioiderles,  see  Bmbroidery* 
Not  dutiable  as  articles  in  iinltation  of 
lace,  see  Articles  Within  Tariff  Act 

OPERA 

The  word  "opera**  is  different  in  mean- 
ing from  the  words  "opera  house,"  in  that 
the  former  may  have  no  relation  to  the  build- 
ing in  which  it  may  be  rendered,  and  so  a 
"theater"  may  mean  a  place  where  plays  are 
produced,  whereas  a  "theater  building"  may 
be  such  whether  plays  are  produced  therein 
or  not  Neher  v.  Vlviani,  110  Pac.  095,  098, 
15  N.  M.  460. 

OPERA  HOUSE 

Opera  distinguished,  see  Opera. 

The  word  "opera"  is  different  in  mean- 
ing from  the  words  "opera  house,"  in  that 
the  former  may  have  no  relation  to  the 
building  in  which  it  may  be  rendered,  and 
so  a  "theater"  may  mean  a  place  where 
plays  are  produced,  whereas  a  'theater 
building"  may  be  such  whether  plays  are 
produced  therein  or  not  Neher  ?•  Vivia^i, 
110  Pac  695,  698,  16  N.  M.  460.  , 

OPERATE 

See  Cease  to  be  Operated;  Constructed, 
Run,  and  Operated;  Continuously  Op- 
erated; In  Operation;  Physical  Op- 
eration of  Switch ;  Properly  Operated; 
Under  the  Control,  Management,  or 
Operation. 

The  word  "operate"  is  defined  as  "to 
put  in  action  and  supervise  the  working  of, 
as  to  operate  a  machine,"  or  as  "to  put  into 
or  to  continue  in  operation;  to  work,  as  to 
operate  a  machine."  Thus,  by  a  strict  def- 
inition, the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "operat- 
ing a  machine,"  as  used  in  Labor  Law,  §  81, 
providing  that  children  under  16  years  of 
age  shall  not  be  permitted  to  operate,  or  as- 
sist in  operating,  dahgerous  machinery  of 
any  kind,  would  be  to  work  the  machine,  or, 
in  other  words,  to  regulate  and  control  its 
management  and  operation.  Gallenkamp  v. 
Garvin  Mach.  Co.,  86  N.  Y.  Supp.  378,  384, 
91  App.  Div.  141  (dissenting  opinion  by  In- 
graham,  J.,  adopted  in  72  N.  E.  1142,  179  N. 
Y.  688.    Citing  Stand.  Diet ;    Imp.  Diet). 

In  an  action  against  an  abutting  owner 
for  injuries  from  defects  in  the  cover  of  a 
coal  hole,  where  the  complaint  predicates 
negligence  of  the  defendant  in  the  manage- 
ment, operation,  and  control  of  the  sidewalk, 
and  in  keeping  the  coal  hole  in  defective  or- 
der, and  in  failing  to  provide  proper  warning 
as  to  the  defective  state  of  the  coal  hole 
cover,  there  is  no  l^al  differentiation  be- 
tween the  terms  "management"  "operation," 


and  "control,"  and  any  one  of  them  would 
be  suQcient  to  justify  the  admission  of  tes- 
timony to  sustalA  a  delinquency  intended  to 
be  charged.  Maldosky  y,  Germania  Bank, 
127  N.  Y.  Supp.  292,  293. 

Under  Code  Va.  Supp.  1898,  9  2486,  pro- 
viding that  "all  persons  furnishing  supplies 
to  a  mining  or  manufacturing  company  nec- 
essary to  the  operation  of  the  same  shall 
have  a  prior  lien  upon  the  personal  property 
of  such  company  other  than  that  forming 
part  of  its  plant,"  etc.,  supplies  necessary  to 
the  "operation  of  a  manufacturing  establish- 
ment" are  such  as  pertain  to  its  output,  and 
do  not  include  material  or  machinery  nec- 
essary to  the  construction,  equipment,  and 
completion  of  its  plant,  and  for  the  latter 
the  statute  gives  no  lien.  American  Wood- 
working Machinery  Co.  v.  Agelasto,  136  Fed. 
899,  400,  69  O.  O.  A.  248. 

The  phrase  "purchasing  or  construct- 
ing," as  used  in  Const,  art.  10,  §  12a,  and 
Laws  1903,  p.  93,  authorizing  certain  cities 
with  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the  voters 
thereof,  voting  at  an  election  for  the  purpose, 
to  become  indebted  In  a  larger  amount  than 
specified  in  Const,  art.  10,  9  12,  not  exceed- 
ing an  additional  5  per  cent  of  the  value  of 
the  taxable  property  for  the  purpose  of  pur- 
chasing or  constructing  waterworks  or  elec- 
tric light  plants  to  be  owned  exclusively  by 
the  dty  so  purchasing  or  constructing  the 
same,  do  not  give  cities  the  power  to  issue 
bonds  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  and  op- 
erating waterworks  or  electric  light  plants,  for 
the  power  to  maintain  and  operate  water- 
works and  electric  light  plants  is  not  necessa- 
rily incident  to  or  implied  in  the  power  to 
purchase  or  construct  waterworks  or  electric 
light  plants,  for  the  word  "maintain"  does 
not  mean  to  provide  or  construct,  but  to  keep 
up  and  preserve,  and  the  word  "operate" 
means  to  put  into  or  continue  in  operation 
or  activity.  State  ex  rel.  City  of  Chillicothe 
V.  Wilder,  98  S.  W.  465,  467,  200  Mo.  97. 

The  expression  "operate  as  a  grant," 
used  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  in  construing  the  confirmatory  act  of 
June  13,  1812  (2  Stat  748,  c.  99),  to  operate 
as  a  grant  of  the  fee  from  the  United  States 
to  the  claimant  of  land,  is  in  no  case  used 
by  that  court  in  any  different  sense.  It  is 
simply  a  judicial  construction  to  the  effect 
that  Congress  intends  by  an  act  of  confirma- 
tion, where  there  is  a  confirmee  or  class  of 
confirmees  to  take  thereunder,  that  the  same 
shall  operate  to  vest  in  the  confirmer  any 
legal  title  which  may  be  in  the  United  States. 
Catron  v.  Laughlin,  72  Pac  26,  31,  11  N.  M. 
604. 
Operatliic  ear 

EiUgaged  in  operation  of  car,  see  En- 
gaged. 

Operating  encina 

Engaged   in  operating  engine,   see   En- 
gaged. 


OFXKATB 


744 


OP£RATB 


09«r«tlac  k««M  eff  pvMtltstioA 

Since  a  eontlcUon  of  a  Tlolatioii  4if  Act 
April  26,  1900,  pnnlflhlng  one  who  aball  en- 
gage or  asslet  in  operating  or  managing  any 
house  of  proetltntion,  cannot  be  had  nnlees 
it  is  shown  tliat  accused  tiad  control  of  and 
conducted  or  assisted  in  the  management  and 
operation  of  the  affairs  of  the  bouse  In  some 
manner,  or  that  be  was  abU  to  brine  about 
or  assist  in  bringing  about  prostitution,  a 
charge  that  if  accused  in  any  manner  aided 
or  abetted  a  third  person  in  the  management 
of  the  house  he  is  guilty  is  erroneous;  the 
word  "management"  meaning  the  act  of  man- 
aging; the  manner  of  treating,  directing, 
carrying  on,  or  using  for  a  purpose;  and 
the  word  "operate"  meaning  to  put  into  or  to 
continue  in  operation  or  actiTity ;  the  word 
"manager"  meaning  one  who  baa  the  conduct 
or  direction  of  anything;  and  the  phraee  "to 
carry  on,"  when  applied  to  business,  mean- 
ing to  prosecute,  to  help  forward,  to  oon< 
tinue,  etc.  Trozso  ▼.  Peoplei  117  Pac.  160, 
154,  51  Oolo.  323. 

Operatlac  yllfoadl 

Engaged  in  operation  of  railroad,  see 
Engaged. 

Code,  i  2071,  makes  every  railroad  com- 
pany liable  for  damages  to  employte  by  the 
mismanagement  of  the  engineers  or  other 
employte,  when  such  wrongs  are  in  any  man- 
ner connected  with  the  "use  and  operation'* 
of  any  railway  about  which  they  shall  be 
employed.  PlaintUf  was  a  machinist's  helper 
in  the  machine  shop  of  defendant  railroad 
company  where  engines  were  brought  for 
repairs;  his  duty  being  to  block, the  wheels 
of  an  engine  when  placed  over  the  draw  pit 
in  the  shop  and  to  remove  such  blocks  when 
the  engine  was  to  be  moved.  After  one  set 
of  wheels  had  been  put  on  an  engine  and  it 
was  about  to  be  moved  by  another  engine, 
in  order  to  put  on  the  second  pair  of  drivers, 
plaintiff  attempted  to  brush  a  chock  from 
under  the  wheel  of  the  dead  engine,  when 
the  other  engine  started  without  warning 
and  crushed  his  hand.  The  operating  de- 
partment of  the  railroad  had  no  control  over 
the  machine  shops,  which  were  used  only  for 
repairing  disabled  equipment  which  had  been 
withdrawn  from  service,  and  not  merely  for 
temporary  repairs  and  cleaning,  as  were  the 
roundhouses.  Held,  that  the  statute  refer- 
red to  the  physical  "use  and  operation"  of 
the  railroad  in  transportation,  and  the  rails 
on  the  shop  floor  did  not  constitute  a  ''rail- 
way," nor  was  the  movement  of  the  repair- 
ed engine  by  the  other  engine  done  in  the 
"use  and  operation"  of  the  railway,  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute,  so  that  tne  com- 
pany was  not  liable  for  the  negligence  of 
the  engineer  in  starting  the  live  engine. 
Slaats  V.  Chicago,  M.  ft  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  129 
N.  W.  63,  64,  149  Iowa,  735,  Ann.  Gas.  1912D, 
642. 

The  risk  of  Injury  attending  the  removal 
from  the  track  of  a  hand  car  used  fbr  the 


tiaiisportatJoii  of  a  section  oew  tiid  »• 
terials  is  peculiar  to  the  "operation  of  nfl- 
roads,"  within  Bev.  8t  1886,  |  1818,  ii 
amended  by  Laws  1908,  p.  741,  c  448,  prorU- 
ing  that  every  raihroad  Bball  be  Uable  for 
damages  to  its  employte,  provided  tbe  wot 
shall  arise  from  a  risk  peculiar  to  tbe  "oper 
ation  of  railroads."  Hardt  v.  Chictgo,  IL  t 
St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  110  N.  W.  427,  481,  130  ^ 
612. 

Where  a  section  hand,  engaged  with  otb- 
ers  in  trucking  rails,  was  injured  by  a  nil 
which  he  was  standing  astride  being  snddfs- 
ly  dropped  to  the  ground,  in  view  of  the 
necessity  of  haste  caused  by  frequently  ps5<^ 
ing  trains  and  the  embarrassment  of  standics 
ground  between  rails  and  ties,  tbe  Injnrr 
was  one  arising  from  a  risk  peculiar  to  tbe 
operation  of  railroads  within  8t  1898,  |  ISii 
as  amended  by  Laws  1908,  p.  741,  e.  418. 
making  the  company  liable  for  socb  injories, 
though  caused  by  the  negligence  of  a  Mot 
servant  Meo  v.  Chicago  ft  N.  W.  By.  Co, 
120  N.  W.  344,  138  Wis.  340. 

The  complete  control  and  manigemat 
of  the  track  is  the  very  easoioe  of  "operat- 
ing" a  railroad.  Bedford*Bowllng  Greei 
Stone  Oa  ▼.  Oman,  184  Fed.  441,  450i 

.  Hie  word  •^operate,''  In  St  1808,  |  M 
requiring  railroads  to  be  fenced  and  pn^ 
ed  with  cattle  guards  within  three  nootls 
from  the  time  of  commencing  to  "operate  the 
same,'*  refers  to  the  transportation  of  goods 
and  passengers,  and  not  to  tbe  numing  of 
construction  trains.  Nordean  v.  MlnDeapoli& 
St  P.  ft  a  8.  M.  By.  Co.,  185  N.  W.  150.  U 
148  Wis.  027. 

A  joint  traffic  arrangement  undtf  whidi 
one  line  hauls  the  cars  of  another  within 
the  state  does  not  constitute  the  "operatioc 
of  a  railroad."  Slaughter  v.  CanadUn  Pie 
Ry.  Co.,  119  N.  W.  398,  400.  106  Minn.  26i 

A  blacksmith  engaged  in  constractioii  of 
a  railroad  bridge,  and  injured  by  tbe  act  of « 
feUow  servant  in  letting  a  coll  of  rope  tiH 
whUe  they  were  both  at  camp,  Ib  not  injarefi 
in  the  ^'operation  of  a  raUroad,"  witbls  tbe 
meaning  of  the  railway  fellow-serrast  att 
(Revlsal  1906,  i  2646).  O'Neal  v.  Soatb  k  W 
B.  Co.,  67  S.  SL  1022,  1023,  1S2  N.  G  4W 

A  cause  of  action  against  a  railroad  opff* 
atlng  a  road  in  front  of  premises  tocnxs 
when  every  part  of  the  road  is  adjusted  l<^ 
cording  to  its  final  construction  and  It  bcgiffl 
to  carry  passengers,  for  until  tiiat  time  K  i^ 
not  in  "operatton,"  defined  as  actlTeexerdse 
of  some  specific  function  of  office^  or  power  ex 
erdsed  in  producing  an  effect  tfaoa^  P^^^ 
to  that  time  construction  and  ^perlineou 
trains  had  been  operated.  Rothman  t  Inter 
borough  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  121  N.  T.  Si# 
200,  201,  66  Misc.  B^i.  37& 

An  employ^  of  a  railroad  company,  en- 
gaged in  trucking  freight  from  a  wardwo* 
to  a  freight  car.  la  within  the  protectl« 


OBERATB 


746: 


OPSiRATB' 


of  Rev.  St  1899^  {  2878,  makliig  orery  rail- 
road corporation  liable  for  all  injuries  %o  a 
servant  while  engaged  In  the  work  of  operat- 
ing the  railroad  by  reason  of  the  negligence 
of  any  other  servant  Orendorff  v.  Terminal 
R.  Ass'n  of  St  Louis,  92  S.  W.  148,  149,  116 
Mo.  App.  34& 

The  fellow  servant  act  <PriT.  Laws  1897, 
p.  83,  c.  66,  I  1),  giving  a  servant  of  any 
railroad  company  "operating"  in  the  state  a 
right  of  action  against  the  company  for  in- 
juries sustained  through  the  negligence  of 
a  fellow  servant,  is  not  applicable  to  an  in- 
jury sustained  by  a  servant  assisting  in  tha 
construction  of  a  railroad  at  a  point  five  or 
six  milea  from  the  completed  track,  and  still 
further  from  the  track  on  which  trains  were 
being  operated.  The  word  "operatiag,"  as 
applied  to  a  railroad,  means  operation  in  the 
course  of  its  business  in  any  of  Its  depart- 
ments but  not  in  the  course  of  its  construc- 
tion. Nicholson  V.  Transylvania  R.  Oo.»  51 
8.  E.  40,  41,  138  N.  O.  616. 

While  the  mere  repair  of  a  roadbed  or 
track  is  not  operation  of  a  rivllroad,  yet  the 
risk  of  injury  attending  the  removal  from  the 
track  of  a  hand  car  used  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  a  section  crew  and  materials  is  pe- 
culiar to  the  ''operation  of  railroads*'  within 
a  statute  providing  that  every  railroad  shall 
be  liable  for  damages  to  its  employes  from 
risks  peculiar  to  the  **operatlon  of  railroads?' 
Hardt  V.  Chicago.  M.  &  St  P.  Ry.  C!o.,  110  N. 
V*  427,  431,  130  Wis.  512. 

Doder  the  statute  providing  that  every 
railroad  corporation  owning  or  operating  a 
railroad  shall  be  Uable  for  all  damages  sus- 
tained by  any  servant,  "while  engaged  in  the 
work  of  operating  such  railroad,  by  the  neg- 
ligence of  any  other  agent  or  servant  there- 
of," a  fireman  who,  after  attending  to  the 
headlight  of  his  engine,  stood  in  front  of  the 
pUot  a  short  time,  and,  while  returning  to  the 
cab,  was  struck  by  lumber  projecting  from 
the  door  of  one  of  the  passing  cars,  was 
engaged  in  the  "operation  of  a  railroad." 
St  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Bussong,  90  S.  W 
72,  73,  40  Tex.  av.  App.  476. 

A  contractor  to  furnish  logs  to  a  saw- 
mill over  a  logging  railroad,  to  which  spurs 
were  connected  and  on  which  a  log  skidder 
was  operated  solely  to  haul  logs  to  a  point 
where  they  could  be  loaded  on  cars  and  traos- 
ported  to  the  mill,  was  a  person  "operating 
a  railroad"  within  Sayles*  Ann.  Civ.  St  1897, 
art.  4560h,  providing  that  all  persons  engaged 
In  the  common  service  of  a  person  operating 
a  railroad  in  the  same  grade  of  employment 
and  together  doing  the  same  character  of 
work  at  the  same  time  and  place  are  'fellow 
servants,"  and  that  employes  who  do  not 
come  within  such  provisions  are  not  ftellow 
servants.  Hampton  ▼.  Woolsey  (Tex.)  139  S. 
W.  88S,  890. 


Asm*  at  ISMs  I  2873,' makes  every  rafl- 
road  liable  for  damages  sustained  by  a  serv- 
ant while  engaged  in  operating  the  railroad 
by  reason  of  the  negligence  of  another  serv- 
ant Section  1192  requires  railroads  to  carry 
a  limited  amount  of  baggage  for  each  pas- 
senger, and  section  1100  requires  them  to  give 
XiheckB  i&erefor.  Plaintiff  was  Injured  while 
engaged  with  another  employ^  in  transferring 
baggage  from  and  to  passenger  trains  to  the 
baggage  rooms  of  defendant  railroad  termi- 
nal company.  H^d,  that  plaintiff  was  en- 
gaged in  "operating  the  railroad,"  within 
section  2873.  Turner  v.  Terminal  R.  Ass'n 
of  St  Louis,  lU  S.  W.  841,  842,  132  Ma  App. 
38. 

Rev.  St  1899,  i  2873,  provides  that  ev- 
ery railroad  corporation  owning  or  operating 
a  raUroad  in  this  state  shaU  be  liable  for  any 
damages  sustained  by  any  agent  or  servant 
thereof  while  engaged  in  the  work  of  operat- 
ing such  railroad  by  reason  of  the  negligence 
of  any  other  agent  or  servant  thereof.  Held, 
that  the  work  of  repairing  or  reconstructing 
a  bridge  over  which  a  railroad  company's 
track  was  laid  is  work  performed  in  "operat- 
ing such  railroad,"  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute.  Huston  v.  Quincy,  O.  &  K.  C. 
R.  Co.,  107  S.  W.  1045,  1048,  129  Mo.  App. 
576. 

Rev.  St  Mo.  1899,  i  2873,  providing  that 
every  railroad  corporation  shall  be  liable  for 
all  damages  sustained  by  any  servant  while 
engaged  in  the  work  of  ''operating  such  rail- 
road,"  by  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any 
other  agent  or  servant  thereof,  is  not  limited 
in  its  application  to  the  servants  of  the  rail- 
road company  actually  engaged  In  the  oper* 
ation  of  trains  thereon,  but  Includes  all  serv- 
ants whose  work  is  directly  necessary  for 
the  running  of  trains,  and  therefore  includes 
section  hands  engaged  in  z^)alring  the  road. 
Callahan  v.  St  Louis  Merchants'  Bridge 
Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  71  S.  W.  208,  170  Mo.  478, 
60  L.  R.  A.  249,  94  Am.  St  Rep.  746. 

Under  Railroad  Law  (Laws  1890,  p.  1113, 
c.  565,  t  101)  as  amended  by  Laws  1897,  p. 
776,  c.  688,  relating  to  street  surface  rail-" 
roads,  and  providing  that  no  corporation  con- 
structing and  operating  a  railroad  under  the 
provisions  of  this  article,  etc.,  shall  charge  any 
passenger  more  than  five  cents  for  one  continu- 
ous  ride  from  any  point  on  its  road,  "or  on 
any  road,  line  or  branch  operated  by  U,  or 
under  its  control,"  to  any  other  point  thereof, 
etc.,  and  Railroad  Law  (Laws  1890,  p.  1096,  c. 
565,  {  39)  imposing  a  penalty  on  any  railroad 
corporation  receiving  more  than  the  lawful 
rate  of  fare,  etc.,  the  operation  or  control 
of  a  road  within  the  meaning  of  such  sections 
means  a  control  of  the  operation  of  the  road, 
and  not  merely  a  control  of  the  corporation 
or  individuals  operating  it  by  reason  of  the 
ownership  of  a  majority  of  the  road's  capi- 
tal stock.    Judgment  Senior  T.'Nefw  York 


OPJSRATB 


746 


OPKBATE 


a^  R.  Co.,  97  N.  T.  Snpp.  646,  lU  App.  DIt. 
89. 

Where  a  railway  company  for  a  fixed 
rental  furnished  to  a  brewina  company  a 
locomotive  for  the  ezclnaiTe  nee  of  the  brew- 
ing company  in  a  yard  containing  tracks  and 
switches,  the  ties  and  rails  for  which  were 
owned  by  the  railway  company  and  the  real 
estate  by  the  brewing  company,  and  the  engi- 
neer and  fireman  operating  the  locomotiTO 
were  selected  by  the  railway  company  and 
paid  by  the  brewing  company,  the  mainte- 
nance and  operation  of  such  yard  was  the 
operation  of  a  railway,  within  Rev.  Laws 
1905,  I  2042,  p^viding  that  every  company 
owning  or  operating  a  railroad  shall  be  liable 
for  all  damages  sustained  within  the  state 
by  any  agent  or  servant  thereof,  without 
contributory  negligence  on  his  part,  by  rea- 
son of  the  negligence  of  any  other  servant 
thereof,  so  that  neither  the  railway  company 
nor  the  brewing  company  conld  escape  lia- 
bility to  an  injured  person  upon  the  ground 
that  the  injury  resulted  from  the  negligence 
of  a  fellow  servant,  if  the  injured  employ^ 
was  exposed  to  a  railroad  hasant  School  v. 
Chicago.  St  P.,  M.  ft  O.  Ry.  Co.,  127  N.  W. 
433,  434.  112  Minn.  38,  45  U  R.  A.  (N.  a)  84L 

In  Gen.  Laws  1899,  p.  214,  c.  125,  |  1, 
providing  that  whenever  freight,  baggage,  or 
other  property  has  been  transported  over  two 
or  more  railroads  operating  any  part  of  their 
roads  in  this  state  and  having  an  agent  in 
this  state,  or  operated  by  any  assignee,  trus- 
tee, or  receiver  of  such  railways,  suit  for  loss 
or  damages  thereto  may  be  brought  against 
any  one  or  all  of  such  railroad  corporations, 
the  term  "operating  any  part  of  their  roads 
in  this  state"  means  that  such  corporations 
are  engaged  in  the  transportation  of  freight, 
baggage,  or  other  property  within  the  state. 
Where  the  undisputed  evidence  showed  that 
a  raUway  track  did  not  extend  into  the  state, 
and  that  the  company  was  not  engaged  in  the 
transportation  of  any  freight,  baggage,  or 
other  property  within  the  limits  of  the  state, 
but,  in  the  course  of  business  between  it  and 
another  railroad  company  as  connecting  lines, 
the  engines  and  cars  of  each  road  recipro- 
cally passed  over  the  boundary  line  of  the 
states  of  Texas  and  Arkansas,  in  no  sense 
could  It  be  said  that  such  interchange  of 
bu&lness  is  within  the  term  "operating  any 
part  of  their  roads  within  this  state."  St 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  V.  J.  H.  White  &  Co., 
80  S.  W.  77,  79,  97  Tex.  493. 

Operatlas  sAwaiill 

An  employ^  engaged  in  cutting  and  deliv- 
ering logs  to  his  employer's  sawmill  Is  not 
entitled  to  a  lien,  under  Ballinger's  Ann. 
Codes  &  St  I  5919,  giving  a  lien  for  labor  in 
the  operation  of  a  sawmill,  etc.,  but  he  may 
assert  a  lien  on  the  logs  cut  and  delivered 
under  section  5390  et  seq.,  giving  to  a  person 
performing  labor  on  logs  a  lien  thereon,  etc 


Oraham  t.  Gardner*  89  Pae.  171,   172,  •& 
Wash.  648. 

Overmtiac  stve«t  vallway 

Authority  to  an  electric  company  to 
''operate"  its  railway  on  a  certain  street  does 
not  authorize  it  to  exclude  the  public  traa 
the  street  nor  to  operate  the  railway  so  u 
to  render  the  street  unnecessarily  dAngeroos. 
MciOm  ▼.  aty  of  Philadelphia,  W  AtL  3iQ, 
342,  217  Pa.  243,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  &)  506l 

It  has  been  held  thst  a  street  railroad 
company  running  its  cars  over  portions  of  tbe 
lines  of  another  company  by  virtue  of  a  lease 
is  not  "operating"  a  railroad,  as  that  tens 
is  employed  in  the  Constitution  and  in  Rail- 
road Law,  §§  91, 102,  requiring  the  consent  of 
abutting  owners  to  the  construction  or  cfpen- 
tk<m  of  a  street  railroad.  Topham  ▼.  Interor* 
ban  St  R.  Co.,  86  N.  Y.  Supp.  295,  299.  42 
Misc.  Rep.  503  (citing  IngersoU  ▼.  Nasao 
Electric  R.  Co.,  52  N.  BL  545,  157  N.  Y.  453. 
48  L.  R.  A.  236). 

Operatlaic  tralas,  locomotives,  or  con 

Where  plaintiif  was  Injured  while  blodc- 
ing  up  a  turntable  so  as  to  turn  a  push  car 
by  the  car  being  derailed  and  a  timber  there- 
on falling  on  plaintiff,  he  was  "operating  « 
car,"  within  Sayles'  Ann.  Qv.  St  1897.  ait. 
4560f,  making  railroads  Uable  for  injuries  to 
employ^  while  operating  cars,  etc^  by  neidi- 
genoe  of  other  employ^  Missouri,  K.  ft  I. 
R9-  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Bailey,  115  8.  W.  601, 605. 
53  Tex.  Civ.  ApQ.  295. 

Injury  to  a  railway  sectionman,  caused 
by  his  foreman  suddenly  stopping  a  hand 
car  on  which  they  were  riding,  did  not  arise 
in  the  operation  of  railroad  trains,  within  tbe 
employer's  liability  act  (Bums'  Ann.  St.  190S. 
S  8017),  making  railroad  companies  liable  for 
injuries  to  employ^  in  oiumerated  cases. 
Richey  v.  Qeveland,  C,  C.  ft  St.  U  R.  Co.,  96 
N.  E.  694,  697,  176  Ind.  542. 

Where  sectionmen  in  building  a  tempora- 
ry track  used  a  push  car  to  bring  the  rails. 
and  plaintiff  was  injured  by  the  falling  of 
a  rail  while  being  removed  from  the  car  to 
the  trade,  the  injury  did  not  occur  while  ei^ 
gaged  in  the  work  of  "operating  a  car,'*  witli- 
in  the  fellow  servant  rule  of  Batts'  Ann.  Qt. 
St  art  4560ea.  Texarkana  &  Ft.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Anderson,  118  S.  W.  127,  102  Tex.  402. 

"Operate:  •  •  •  <2)  To  effect  any  re- 
sult; exert  agency;  act  (3)  To  bring  about 
a  specified  result  (4)  To  produce  the  proper 
or  intended  effect"  Under  Rev.  St  art  4560t 
providing  that  every  corporation  operating 
a  railroad  shall  be  liable  for  damages  sos- 
tained  by  any  servant  while  engaged  in  oper- 
ating its  cars  by  reason  of  the  negligence  of 
any  other  servant,  though  a  fellow  servaLL 
an  employ^  In  a  quarry  was  engaged  in  oper 
ating  a  car,  where  he  and  another  employ^ 
loaded  It  with  rock,  started  it,  and  moimtfl 
it  when  loaded,  and  by  the  use  of  brak^ 
regulated  its  speed  down  the  track  to  Uie 


OPKRATB 


747 


OPERATB 


crusher,  and  after  unloadUag  it  puabed  It 
back.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Webb,  72  S.  W. 
1044,  1046,  31  Tex.  Civ.  App.  4d8  (quoting 
and  adopdJig  Office  Stand.  Diet.). 

In  a  complaint,  in  an  action  by  a  servant 
for  injuries,  ascribing  the  injury  to  the  negli- 
gent operation  of  a  train  by  an  engineer,  the 
word  "operation"  means  management  or  con- 
duct, and  presupposes  the  existence  of  the 
subject  of  operation,  and  does  not  extend  to 
negligence  in  the  composition  of  the  train, 
and  evidence  tending  to  show  negligence  in 
the  composition  of  the  train  does  not  support 
the  averment.  Reeves  v.  Henderson-Boyd 
Lumber  Co.,  55  South.  191,  192,  172  Ala.  526 
(citing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4992). 

The  term  "operation,"  In  an  instruction 
in  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  passenger  caus- 
ed by  the  negligent  handling  and  running  of 
the  train,  in  which  the  court  declared  the 
prima  facie  liability  of  the  carrier  for  the 
negligent  "operation"  and  running  of  the 
train,  is  synonymous  with  the  term  "run- 
ning," and  the  instruction  is  not  objection- 
able as  not  confining  the  negligence  to  the 
running  of  the  train.  Louisville,  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Willis,  51  South.  134, 136,  58  Fla.  307. 

"Operation"  means  how  cars  shall  be  run, 
and  what  shall  be  done  in  that  respect  by  a 
street  railway  company,  and  does  not  relate 
to  fare.  A  provision  in  a  contract  between 
a  city  and  a  street  railway  company  that  the 
dty  should  not  reduce  fares  below  five  cents 
was  not  abrogated  by  a  subsequent  contract 
providing  that  in  the  construction,  mainte- 
nance, and  "operation"  of  its  lines  the  com- 
pany should  be  subject  to  all  present  or  fu- 
ture ordinances  of  the  dty.  Minneapolis  St 
R.  Co.  Y.  City  of  Minneapolis,  155  Fed.  989, 
1000. 

Where  a  "fire  knocker,"  for  the  purpose 
of  moving  blocked  cars  of  wood,  to  unload 
which  was  a  part  of  his  duty,  was  attempting 
to  remove  the  block  so  as  to  move  the  cars 
a  short  distance,  and  another  "fire  knocker" 
was  on  top  of  the  cars  signaling  the  engineer 
for  the  same  purpose,  they  were  engaged  in 
operating  cars  under  Rev.  St.  1895,  art  4560f, 
exempting  persons  engaged  in  "operating  the 
cars"  from  the  fellow-servant  rule.  Texas 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Johnson,  118  S.  W.  1117, 1118, 
55  Tex.  Civ.  App.  495. 

One  employed  as  night  hostler  in  a  rail- 
road yard  charged  with  the  duty,  pursuant  to 
the  orders  of  his  superior,  of  turning  engines 
when  they  come  in  the  yard,  seeing  that  they 
get  fuel,  sand,  and  water,  and  are  oiled, 
wiped,  and  dispatched  on  the  road,  is  not, 
while  inspecting  a  switch  engine  to  deter- 
mine whether  it  has  been  properly  wiped, 
engaged  In  the  operation  of  a  locomotive, 
within  the  statute  relating. to  employes  en- 
gaged in  the  work  of  operating  locomotives. 
Galveston,  H.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cochran,  109 
S.  W.  261,  263,  49  Tex.  Civ.  App.  591. 


Where  a  railroad  section  foreman  was  In- 
jured while  assisting  his  colaborers  in  load- 
ing rails  onto  a  flat  car  composing  part  of  a 
train,  while  the  train  was  at  rest,  he  having 
no  duty  to  perform  with  reference  to  the 
movement  of  the  train,  he  was  not  engaged 
in  operating  a  car,  locomotive,  or  train  vrith- 
in  Sayles*  Ann.  Civ.  St  1897,  art.  4560f,  pro- 
viding that  every  person,  receiver,  or  corpora- 
tion operating  a  railroad  shall  be  liable  for 
damages  sustained  by  any  servant  or  em- 
ploy^ while  engaged  in  operating  cars,  loco- 
motives, or  trains,  by  reason  of  the  negligence 
of  any  fellow  servant  St  Louis  Southwest- 
ern Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  McGee  (Tex.)  141 
S.  W.  1054,  1055. 

An  allegation  in  a  petition  that  injury 
occurring  upon  the  derailment  of  a  train  was 
caused  from  the  manner  in  which  the  engine 
and  cars  were  being  "operated,"  refers  to  that 
which  was  being  done  by  the  employes  on  the 
engine  and  cars  at  the  time  of  the  accident, 
and  not  to  the  manner  in  which  the  train 
was  ordered  to  be  run  by  the  officials  of  the 
road.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v. 
Poole,  133  S.  W.  239,  240,  104  Tex.  36. 

A  freight  handler  negligently  run  into 
by  an  engine  while  he  was  pushing  a  car  to  a 
freighthouse  by  direction  of  his  superior  is 
within  Laws  1893,  c.  220,  making  railroad 
companies  liable  for  injuries  to  any  employ 6 
through  the  negligence  of  another  employ^, 
without  contributory  negligence  on  his  part, 
while  engaged  in  "operating  cars."  Ban  v. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Qo.,  69  N.  W.  997,  998,  95 
Wis.  69. 

Plaintiff  was  engaged  with  others  in  dis- 
tributlDg  ties  along  a  railway  track.  The  ties 
were  placed  on  a  car  which  was  pushed  along 
the  track  by  plaintiff  and  the  other  workmen 
and  the  ties  pulled  or  thrown  off  where  need- 
ed without  stopping  the  car,  if  possible.  It 
was  the  duty  of  plaintiff  to  assist  in  starting, 
stopping,  and  moving  the  car  as  well  as 
throwing  off  the  ties.  While  he  was  moving 
a  tie  thrown  off,  a  co-employ6  caused  another 
to  slide  off,  which  Injured  him.  Held,  that 
plaintiff  was  injured  while  engaged  In  operat- 
ing a  car  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute, 
declaring  that  the  fact  that  injury  in  such 
cases  is  due  to  the  act  of  a  fellow  ser^^ant 
does  not  defeat  recovery.  Freeman  v.  Shaw 
(Tex.)  126  S.  W.  53,  55. 

Where  railroad  employes  were  transport- 
ing ballast  on  a  push  car  for  repair  of  a 
track,  and  had  to  remove  the  car  from  the 
track  between  trips  and  replace  it  on  the 
track,  they  were  "operating  the  car"  within 
a  statute  providing  that  a  railroad  company 
shall  be  liable  for  injuries  to  a  servant,  in 
operating  a  car,  through  the  negligent  act  of 
any  other  servant  Seery  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  77  S.  W.  950,  951,  84  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
89. 

Under  Rev.  St  Mo.  1899,  §  2864,  as  amend- 
I  ed  by  Laws  Mo.  1906,  pp.  185-137,  providing 


OPBRATB 


748 


OPEBATINa  SXPEN8E8 


tbat  whenerer  any  person,  Indudlng  an  em- 
plo74  of  the  corporation  or  Indirldnal  here- 
inafter referred  to,  whoee  death  la  eaiiaed  by 
the  negligence  of  a  coemployd  thereof,  shall 
die  from  an  Injury  resulting  from  or  occa- 
sioned by  the  negligence,  unsklUfulnesa,  or 
criminal  Intent  of  any  officer,  agent,  serrant, 
or  whilst  running,  conducting,  or  managing 
any  locomotive,  car,  or  train  of  ears,  or  any 
street  car,  or  of  any  master,  pilot,  engineer, 
agent,  or  employ^  whilst  running,  conducting, 
or  managing  any  steamboat,  or  of  any  driver 
of  any  stage,  automobile,  or  other  public  con- 
veyance whilst  in  diaige  of  the  same  as  a 
driver,  and  when  any  passenger  shall  die 
from  an  injury  resulting  from  any  defect  or 
insufficiency  in  any  railroad,  or  in  any  loco- 
motive, car,  street  car,  steamboat,  stage,  au- 
tomobile, or  other  public  conveyance,  the  cor- 
poration, or  individual  in  whose  employ  any 
such  officer,  agent,  servant,  master,  pilot,  en- 
gineer, or  driver  shall  be  when  such  injury 
is  committed,  or  who  owns,  operates,  or  con- 
ducts any  such  railroad,  locomotlvei  car, 
street  car,  automobile,  coach,  or  other  public 
conveyance  when  any  injury  is  received  re- 
sulting from  or  occasioned  by  any  defect  or 
Insufficiency,  unsklllfulness,  negligence,  or 
criminal  intent  above  declared,  shall  forfeit 
and  pay  as  a  penalty  tor  every  such  person, 
employ^,  or  passenger  so  dying  not  less  than 
$2,000,  nor  more  than  $10,000  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  jury,  which  may  be  sued  for  and 
recovered  by  persons  bearing  specified  rela- 
tions to  deceased,  the  words  "operates  or  con- 
ducts" do  not  include  a  tnere  servant  of  a 
railroad  company  or  other,  public  carrier, 
but  has  reference  to  the  railroad  company  or 
Individual,  using  the  locomotive,  cars,  or  oth- 
er conveyances  of  another  railroad  company 
or  individual,  as  lessee  or  bailee  for  the  par- 
ticular purpose.  Chicago,  R.  I.  4  P.  B.  Co.  v. 
Stepp,  151  Fed.  908,  918. 

The  term  "operation,"  as  used  in  Sayles* 
Ann.  Civ.  St.  1897,  art.  4560f,  providing  that 
every  person  or  corporation  operating  a  rail- 
road shall  be  liable  for  all  damages  sustain- 
ed by  any  servant  thereof  while  engaged  in 
the  work  of  operating  cars  of  such  railroad 
by  reason  of  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  serv- 
ant, comprehends  something  more  than  the 
mere  running  of  cars,  locomotives,  and  trains 
of  a  railroad  company.  It  Includes  within 
its  meaning  every  employ^  who  when  injured 
was  performing  some  work  In  the  line  of  his 
duty  directly  connected  with  or  Incident  to 
the  movement  and  operation  of  a  car,  loco- 
motive, or  train.  A  servant  of  a  railroad 
company  injured  while  unloading  ties  from 
a  box  car  in  a  train  used  for  distributing  the 
ties  along  the  trade  by  the  negligence  of  a 
fellow  servant  was  engaged  in  work  proxi- 
mately and  neoessaiily  connected  with  the 
operation  of  the  cars  at  the  time  of  his  in- 
jury and  was  oititied  to  the  protection  of 
the  statute.    St  Louia  Southwestern  Ry.  Co. 


of  Itaaa  ▼.  Thornton^  103  8.  'W.  437, 438^  4fi 
Tex.  Civ.  APP.  649. 


OpeMtftac  mmdMt  pmUmt 

A  license  to  "operate  under  a  pateof 
does  not  authorise  the  licensee  to  tray  op  io- 
fringing  arttdes  made  by  others,  wbo  hare 
been  adjudged  infringers,  and  resell  tbea 
under  its  own  name.  Victor  Talking  Mad 
Go.  ▼.  American  Oraph^^hone  Co.,  178  Fed. 
577,  578. 

Where  defendant,  which  had  been  eDjoio- 
ed  from  infringing  a  patent  owned  by  cosi- 
plainant,  covering  a  sound-producing  apiian- 
tus  for  talking  machines,  including  the  9mA 
record,  under  a  subsequent  contract  wltb 
complainant  was  given  the  right  to  "operate" 
under  such  patent,  in  return  for  the  giantlDg 
of  a  like  right  under  a  patent  of  its  own,  it 
had  the  right  to  sell  records  made  by  another, 
as  well  as  those  of  its  own  make,  and  wu 
not  chargeable  with  violation  of  the  injnoe- 
tion  because  It  sold  records  made  by  aootber, 
who  had  been  held  as  a  contributoiy  infrios- 
er  of  complainant's  patent;  snch  reGordi 
however,  not  being  a  direct  Infringemest 
American  Oraphophone  Co.  v.  Victor  Talkiog 
Mach.  Co.,  188  Fed.  580,  581, 106  C.  GL  A  m 

OPERATE    SUBSTAETIAUiT  AS  BE- 
80BIBED 

The  words  *^  operate  substantiaUy  i-> 
deecribed,**  at  the  end  of  a  dalm  hi  an  ap- 
plication for  a  patent,  do  not  import  into  the 
dalm  elements  described  in  the  spedflcatioa 
but  not  mentioned  in  the  dalm  for  tbe  pur- 
pose of  either  extending  or  limiting  it  G€fi^ 
eral  Blectric  Co.  v.  International  Spedaltj 
Co.,  126  Fed.  755,  768,  61  O.  C.  A  329;  ft 
Long  Hook  &  Eye  Co.  ▼•  Francis  Hook  &  Eje 
&  Fastener  Co.,  150  Fed.  601,  nota 

OPERATED  WITHOUT  LI0EH8E 

See  License  (Governmental  Begulatioo). 

OPERATIHG  EXPEK8E8 

The  "operating  expenses"  of  a  raflraad 
Include  the  value  of  the  use  of  property  tbat 
is  used  but  not  consumed  in  rendering  tbe 
service,  as  well  as  the  value  of  labor  aai 
management  used,  and  of  property  used  and 
consumed,  in  rendering  the  service.  State  c 
rel.  Railroad  Com'rs  v.  LoulsvUle  &  >••  ^ 
Co.,  57  South.  673,  676,  63  Fla.  274. 

It  has  been  held  that  taxes,  rents  ac^ 
cost  of  construction  are  ^'operating  expenses 
of  a  railroad.  There  are  some  kinds  of  (^ 
struction,  some  kinds  of  rents,  and  ^(^ 
kinds  of  taxes,  that  ought  not  to  be  ebars^d 
as  "operating  expenses" ;  but  whether  or  B'^ 
rents,  taxes,  and  cost  of  construction  are  ''it- 
erating expenses'*  depends  on  the  circuis- 
stances  of  each  particular  case,  to  be  det^ 
mined  by  the  evidence.  Schmidt  t.  l^ 
vUle,  C.  &  L.  By.  Co.,  84  a  W,  81i  31S,  ^ 
Ky.  287. 

Liabilities  incurred  by  the  recetreroi^ 
railroad  for  car  rentals^  for  cars  destrop^ 


OPKRATION 


7i9 


OPERATOB 


by  fire,  for  rolling  stock,  equipment  and  traf- 
fic balances  doe  other  roads,  and  for  dam- 
ages for  injuries  to  persons  or  property  caus- 
ed by  torts  of  the  servants  of  tbe  receiver 
are  legally  classed  as  items  of  "operating  ex- 
penses.'* St  Louis  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Texas 
Southern  By.  Go.  (Tex.)  126  &  W.  286^  SOO. 

OPEBATION 

See  Mining  Operation ;  Negligent  Opera- 
tion. 

A  policy  indemnifying  an  employer 
against  liability  for  claims  for  personal  in- 
juries to  its  employes  while  engaged  in  "oper- 
ations connected  with  the  business  of  iron 
and  steel  works»"  covers  injuries  received  by 
an  employ^  by  reason  of  the  construction  ol 
a  building  by  the  employer  for  use  in  his 
business.  Hoven  v.  Smployers'  Ldab.  Ass'n 
Oorp.,  67  N.  W.  46,  48,  83  Wis.  201,  32  L.  B. 
A38& 

The  word  "thing"  is  defined  as  *that 
which  is  or  may  become  the  object  of 
thought;  that  which  has  existence  or  is  con- 
ceived or  imagined  as  having  existence ;  any 
object,  substance,  attribute,  idea,  fact,  cir- 
cumstance^  event,  etc.  A  thing  may  be  mate- 
rial or  ideal,  animate  or  Inanimate,  actual, 
possible,  or  imaginary."  And  the  word  "op- 
eration" is  defined  as  "the  course  of  action  or 
series  of  acts  by  which  some  result  is  accom- 
plished ;  procesa  (a)  In  surg.,  the  act  or  se- 
ries of  acts  and  manipulations  performed  up- 
on a  patients  body,  as  in  setting  a  bone,  am- 
putating a  limb,  extracting  a  tooth,  etc"  An 
indictment  under  the  federal  statute  for  mail- 
ing a  letter  giving  information  where  and 
how  and  of  whom  and  by  what  means  arti- 
cles and  things  designed  and  intended  for  the 
procuring  of  an  abortion  might  be  obtained 
states  an  offense,  where  it  sets  out  a  letter 
written  to  defendant  inquiring  for  some  medi- 
cine or  other  means  for  accomplishing  such 
result,  and  a  letter,  alleged  to  have  been 
mailed  by  defendant  In  reply,  which,  when 
read  in  connection  with  the  letter  of  inquiry, 
in  effect  offers  for  a  stated  consideration  to 
effect  the  desired  result  by  some  treatment  or 
operation,  although  the  particular  means  is 
not  specified;  the  word  "thing,"  as  used  in 
the  statute,  being  a  comprehensive  term, 
which  Includes  any  kind  of  treatment  or  op- 
eration. United  States  v.  Somers,  164  Fed. 
259,  261,  262  (quoting  and  adopting  definition 
in  Cent  Diet). 

The  term  "operation,"  in  an  accident  in- 
surance policy  issued  to  a  physician  which 
covered  "that  class  of  injuries  known  as  sep- 
tic wounds,  caused  by  accident  while  per- 
formiiig  any  'operation'  pertaining  to  the 
business  of  the  insured,"  means  treatment 
pertaining  to  tlie  business  of  insured,  and  the 
company  was  liable  where  death  was  caused 
by  septicsemia  resulting  from  a  wound  from 
a  broken  bottle  which  he  broke  while  prepar- 
ing medicine  for  a  patJaiit,    Central  Acddent 


Ins.  Ck>.  ▼.  Bembe,  77  N.  B.  128,  126,  220  IlL 
151,  6  Ii.  B.  A.  (N.  8^  833,  110  Am.  St  Bep. 
285,  5  Ann*  Oaa.  155. 

A  surgical  **  'operation'  begins  when  the 
opening  is  made  Into  the  body  and  ends  when 
this  opening  has  been  closed  in  a  proper 
way  after  all  appliances  necessary  to  the 
successful  operation  have  been  removed  from 
the  body."  Harris  v,  Fall,  177  Fed.  78,  84, 
100  0.  a  A  487,  27  Lu  B.  A  (N.  S.)  1174 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Akridge  v. 
Noble,  41  S.  B.  78,  114  Ga.  848). 

OPERATIOK  AXB  BEPAIB 

Labor  performed  in  mowing  grass,  weeds, 
and  bushes  off  a  railway  right  of  way  is 
work  done  in  the  "operation  and  repair  of  a 
railroad,"  within  Sayles'  Ann.  Civ.  St  1897, 
art  3312.  Idlssouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas 
V.  Bryan  (Tex.)  107  S.  W.  572,  576  (citing 
Pittsburg  &  B.  Pass.  By.  Co.  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burg, 80  Pa.  72,  74;  Arthur  v.  City  of 
Charleston,  41  S.  B.  171,  51  W.  Va.  132). 

OPERATIOK  OF  UkW 

See  Domicile  by  Operation  of  Law. 

The  suing  out  of  an  injunction  to  re- 
strain a  performance  of  a  contract  for  street 
improvements  is  not  a  prevention  of  perform- 
ance by  the  "operation  of  law"  within  the 
meaning  of  that  phrase  as  used  in  Civ.  Code, 
§  1511,  providing  that  the  want  of  perform- 
ance of  an  obligation  is  excused  when  such 
performance  is  prevented  or  delayed  by  the 
"operation  of  law."  Union  Contracting  ft 
Paving  Co.  V.  Campbell,  84  Pac  806,  806^  2 
Cal.  App.  584. 

OPERATIVE 

See  Practical  Ballroad  Operatives 
Oivll  eiiglneer 

A  civil  engineer  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien 
for  wages  earned  by  him  in  the  construction 
of  a  railroad  under  Bev.  St.  art  3312,  be- 
ing neither  a  "mechanic,"  "laborer,"  nor 
"operative."  Gulf  &  B.  V.  B  Co.  v.  Berry, 
72  S.  W.  1048,  1050,  31  Tex.  Civ.  App.  3. 

Operator  distinguished 

See  Operator. 

Workmam  fHsttngwIshed 

See  Workmen. 

OPERATOR 

See    Confidence    Operator;     Telegraph 
Operator. 

In  an  arbitration  proceeding  between 
a  railroad  company,  and  the  Order  of  Rail- 
road Telegraphers,  in  which  the  question  was 
submitted  whether  members  of  the  Order  of 
Railroad  Telegraphers  in  the  employ  of  the 
railroad  company  should  legislate  for  train 
dispatchers  relative  to  rates  of  pay,  hours 
of  service,  or  otherwise,  expert  or  opinion 
evidence  tending  to  show  tlmt  a  train  dis- 
patcher was  an  entirejly  different  functionary 
from  a  telegrapher  oc  "operator,"  that  while 


OPERATOR 


750 


OPINION 


the  dispatcher  might  be  an  operator  he  was 
not  necessarily  such,  his  duties  being  very 
dissimilar  in  character,  largely  administra- 
tive,  and  of  much  greater  importance  not  only 
to  his  employer  in  carrying  on  the  service  but 
to  the  safety  and  convenience  of  the  public, 
that  he  stood  in  a  different  relation  to  his 
employer,  as  well  in  fact  as  in  law,  and  rep- 
resenting him  in  the  discharge  of  his  duties 
as  an  alter  ego  or  vice  principal  In  his  re- 
lations with  other  employes,  was  competent 
In  re  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  155  Fed.  1001,  1004. 

Operative  dlstlBC^lshed 

An  ''operator"  is  one  who  operates  or 
produces  an  effect,  while  an  "operative**  is  a 
skilled  workman,  an  artisan,  or  mechanic. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  By.  v.  Continental  Trust 
Co.,  166  Fed.  587,  600. 

OPHTHALMOLOGY 

Practice  of  science  as  practice  of  medi- 
cine, see  Practice  of  Medicine. 

OPINION 

See  Fixed  Opinion;  Intimation  of  Opin- 
ion; Matter  of  Impression  or  Opinion. 

An  "opinion"  is  "a  notion  of  conviction 
founded  on  probable  evidence;  belief  stronger 
than  an  impression,  less  strong  than  positive 
knowledge."  In  re  Clark,  103  S.  W.  1105, 
1108,  126  Mo.  App.  391  (quoting  Webst.  Diet). 

"Opinion"  arises  when  the  assent  of  the 
understanding  is  so  far  gained  by  the  evi- 
dence of  probability  that  it  rather  inclines  to 
one  persuasion  than  to  another,  yet  not  with- 
out a  mixture  of  uncertainty  or  doubt  Bil- 
ton  V.  Teerltory^  09  Pac  163,  167,  1  OkL  Cr. 
566. 

While  the  word  "opinion,"  in  a  close  and 
strict  sense,  means  a  court's  decision  upon 
pleadings  and  facts  duly  presented  in  a 
cause,  yet  in  a  broader  sense  It  means  one's 
'^notion,"  **idea,"  "view,"  or  even  one's  "senti- 
ments." Ex  parte  Clark,  106  S.  W.  990,  998, 
208  Mo.  121,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  389. 

In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  passenger, 
testimony  of  plaintiff  that  she  slipped  on 
material  on  the  platform  of  the  oar  which 
"looked  like  old  ice"  is  not  an  "opinion"  in  its 
ordinary  sense,  which  is  an  inference  as  to 
what  will  follow  from  a  given  state  of  facts, 
"but  is  the  observation  of  an  existing  condi- 
tion." Murphy  v.  North  Jersey  St  Ry.  Co., 
80  Atl.  331,  334,  81  N.  J.  L.  706,  35  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  592. 

As  disqualifying  a  Jw«r 

As  applied  to  the  opinion  of  a  Juror  when 
challenged  for  bias,  an  "impression"  of  the 
juror  is  correctly  defined  as  an  opinion,  re- 
membrance, or  belief,  especially  when  that  is 
somewhat  indistinct  or  vague.  Under  St.  I 
7278,  providing  that  if  a  Juror  has  formed 
an  "opinion"  the  court  may  examine  him 
and  permit  him  to  serre  if  satisfied  Chat  th6 


Juror  will  render  an  impartial  verdict  on  the 
evidence,  **oplnion"  is  a  conclusion  or  a 
judgment  held  with  confidence  but  falling 
short  of  positive  knowledge,  facts  h^d  to 
show  that  the  court  did  not  abuse  its  dis- 
certaln  in  overruling  a  diallenge  for  bias 
after  an  examination  on  voir  dire.  Lindsey 
V.  State,  69  N.  B.  126,  131,  69  Ohio.  St  215. 

False  vepvesentatioa  distlBcaiAed 

See  False  Representation. 
Impression  or  nnderstaadiag 

There  is  "a  marked  distinction  between 
a  matter  of  'opinion'  and  a  matter  of  'impres- 
sion* or  'understanding.*  The  former  is  predi- 
cated upon  the  existence  or  nonexistence  of 
a  fact.  The  latter  is  only  a  deduction  drawn 
from  the  assumption  of  that  fact,  so  that, 
while  the  one  may  rise  to  the  standard  of 
evidence,  the  other  is  universally  rejected  as 
such."  Cross  v.  Aby,  45  South.  820,  822,  66 
Fla.  311  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in 
Chalres  v.  Brady,  10  Fla.  133,  140). 

An  "opinion,"  within  the  meaning  of 
Bates*  Ann.  St  |  7278,  providing  that  if  a 
Juror  has  formed  an  opinion  the  court  shall 
thereupon  proceed  to  examine  him  on  the 
grounds  of  such,  opinion,  etc.,  is  well  defined 
as  being  a  conclusion  or  Judgment  held  with 
confidence  but  falling  short  of  positive  knowl- 
edge, and  while  an  "opinion**  and  an  *im- 
presslon"  are  alike  In  mind,  there  is  an  es- 
sential difference  between  the  two  in  degree, 
an  impression  as  applied  to  this  subject-mat- 
ter being  correctly  defined  as,  a  notion,  re- 
membrance, or  belief  especially  one  that  is 
somewhat  indistinct  or  vague.  lindsey  t. 
State,  69  N.  E.  126,  131,  69  Ohio  St  215. 

Within  Gen.  St  853,  |  205,  providing  that 
it  shall  be  good  cause  of  challenge  to  a  Juror 
that  he  has  formed  or  expressed  an  opinion 
on  the  issue  or  any  material  fact  to  be  tried, 
an  impression  depending  only  on  the  news- 
paper account  of  the  truth  of  which  he  had 
no  knowledge  Is  not  an  opinion.  State  v. 
Medlicott,  9  Kan.  257.  279. 

Jvdcmaat  distliigoished 

See  Judgment  (Of  Court). 
Statemeat  of  fact  distincvislied 

"To  distinguish  'opinions'  from  'state- 
ment of  facts,*  the  general  rule  is  if  the 
vendor,  knowing  them  to  be  untrue,  makes 
statements  with  the  intention  of  misleading 
the  vendee,  and  if  the  latter,  relying  upon 
them,  is  misled  to  his  injury,  or  If  he  induces 
the  vendee  not  to  make  inquiries  with  re- 
spect to  value,  or  any  extrinsic  facts  affect- 
ing values,  or  makes  statements  In  8a<^  a 
manner  that  the  vendee.  Instead  of  being  put 
on  inquiry,  is  put  off  his  guard,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  substantial  right  to  recover  dam- 
ages Is  created,  or  the  vendee  may,  at  his 
opinion,  avoid  the  contract  To  effect  this, 
however,  the  representations  must,  as  a 
rule,  be  coupled  with  other  olreumstances, 
as  where  they  «re><vaiidnteBtfy  made  of  par- 


OPINION 


T51 


OP.^ORT  UNITY 


ticulars  in  rdatton  to  the  estate  whititi  the 
vendee  has  not  equal  means  of  knowing*  and 
wliere  he  is  Induced  by  the  vendor's  artifice 
to  forbear  inquiries  which  he  would  other- 
wise have  made;  but  whether  a  representa- 
tion as  to  value  is  merely  an  expression  of 
'opinion'  or  belief,  or  an  affirmation  of  fact 
to^be  relied  on,  is  a  question  for  the  Jury,  and 
should  properly  be  left  to  their  decision. 
Again,  while  the  purchaser  must  rely  upon 
his  own  judgment  in  questions  of  value,  yet, 
in  regard  to  any  extrinsic  facts  affecting  the 
quality  or  value  of  the  subject  of  the  con- 
tract, he  may  rely  upon  the  assurances  of 
the  vendor ;  and,  if  he  does  so  rely,  and  those 
assurances  are  fraudulently  made  to  induce 
him  to  enter  into  the  contract,  he  may  main- 
tain an  action  for  the  injury  sustained.** 
Oneal  v.  Weisman,  88  S.  W.  290,  292,  39  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  692  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion 2  Warv.  Vendors,  |  946). 

A  statement  of  a  salesman  of  a  seller  of 
an  automobile  that  the  tires  of  the  machine 
were  as  good  as  new  was  merely  an  expres- 
sion of  "opinion**  as  to  their  condition,  and 
not  a  statement  of  a  present  existing  fact, 
necessary  to  constitute  a  warranty.  Warren 
v.  Walter  Automobile  Co.,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  396, 
398,  50  Misc.  Rep.  605. 

OPIKION  (Of  Court) 

See  On  the  Opinion  Below. 

An  "opinion"  is  a  written  statement  by 
the  court  of  its  reasons  for  the  conclusion 
reached  from  an  examination  of  the  law  and 
of  the  facts  in  controversy,  but  forms  no  part 
of  the  Judgment,  though  it  may  with  proprie- 
ty be  consulted  tq  explain  an  ambiguity 
ther^b:u  State  v.  Gray,  71  Pac.  978,  979,  42 
Or.  261  (adopting  definition  in  Houston  v. 
WlUlams,  13  CaL  24,  73  Am.  Dec.  565 ;  Keane 
V.  Fisher,  10  La.  Ann.  261). 

Hie  "opinion**  of  a  court  giving  the  rea- 
sons on  which  its  Judgment  is  based  is  never 
called  a  "report"  In  appellate  tribunals, 
when  in  a  given  case  the  court  has  reached 
its  conclusion,  and  is  ready  to  pronounce  Its 
Judgment,  some  member  of  the  court  is  usual- 
ly designated  to  prepare  the  opinion,  but 
he  Is  never  said  to  report  it  The  opinion  is 
delivered,  not  reported,  by  him.  Gillette  v. 
Peabody,  75  Pac.  18,  20, 19  Colo.  App.  356. 

In  Pennsylvania  practice,  the  docket  en- 
try, •*rule  absolute  for  new  trial,"  implies  all 
that  Is  meant  by  the  words  "Judgment  vaoat- 
ed,  verdict  set  aside,  and  new  trial  granted," 
and  following  that  practice  in  the  United 
States  Circuit  Court  of  the  Eastern  District 
of  Pennsylvania,  the  words  "opinion  granting 
a  new  trial  filed,**  entered  in  the  appearance 
docket  of  the  Lnited  States  court,  have  the 
effect  of  disposing  of  any  doclcet  entries 
which  stand  In  the  way  of  the  order,  and  Im- 
ply all  that  is  meant  by  the  words  "Judgment 
vacated,  verdict  set  aside,  and  new  trial 
granted/*    Bv«ns  v.  Freeman,  140  Fed.  419^ 


428  (dtlng  Fisher  v.  Hestonvllle^  M.  &  F. 
Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Atl*  97,  185  Pa.  602). 

Beeislon  distimsvlslied 

Under  Rev.  Civ.  St.  1911,  art.  1955,  pro^ 
viding  that  a  plaintiff  may  take  a  nonsuit  be* 
fore  the  Jury  retires,  and,  on  trial  by  the 
Judge,  before  declsdon  is  announced,  the  term 
"decision"  Is  not  equivalent  to  "opinion," 
and,  though  the  court  in  a  case  tried  without 
a  Jury  expressed  an  opinion  indicating  that 
he  intended  to  render  a  decision  in  favor  of 
the  defendants,  the  plaintiffs  would  not  be 
precluded  thereby  from  having  a  nonsuit  (cit- 
ing 2  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  1901).  Kidd  v.  . 
McCracken,  150  S.  W.  885,  887,  105  Tex.  383. 

As  Judgment 

See  Judgment  (Of  Court). 

OPHnOIf  EVIDEKOE 

"Opinion  evidence*'  is  that  which  Is  giv- 
en by  a  person  of  ordinary  capacity  who  has 
by  opportunity  for  practice  acquired  a  special 
knowledge  outside  of  the  limits  of  common 
observation  and  which  may  be  of  value  In 
elucidating  a  matter  under  consideration. 
The  experiential  qualifications  of  the  witness, 
including  his  opportunity  to  observe  the  very 
thing  under  inquiry,  being  first  shown,  his 
special  knowledge  may  be  imparted  in  aid  of 
the  Jurors  at  the  trial  under  questions  in 
ordinary  form.  Crosby  v.  Wells,  67  Atl.  295, 
298,  73  N.  J.  Law,  790. 

All  matters  of  physical  facts  are  not 
"opinion  evidence*'  In  the  legal  sense  of  that 
term.  They  are  not  theoretical,  nor  conclu- 
sions drawn  by  inference,  but  a  statement  of 
facts  from  personal  observation,  and  hence 
also  they  are  not  "expert  evidence.**  The 
exceptions  to  the  rule  that  witnesses  cannot 
give  opinions  is  not  confined  to  the  evideuce 
of  experts  testifying  on  subjects  requiring 
special  knowledge,  skill,  or  learning,  but  it 
includes  the  evidence  of  common  observers 
testifying  the  result  of  their  observations 
made  at  the  time  in  regard  to  common  ap- 
pearances, facts,  and  conditions  which  can- 
not be  reproduced  and  made  palpable  to  a 
Jury.  Britt  v,  Carolina  Northern  R.  Co.,  61 
S.  E.  bOl,  603,  148    N.  C.  37. 

OPIUM 

See  Crude  Opium. 

Manufacture  of,  see  Manufactures — Man- 
ufactured Articles. 

Unmanufactured  <:9itum»  Bee  Unmanu* 
factured. 

OPPORTUNITY 

See  Clear  Opportunity. 

By  "opportunity"  Is  meant  "fit  or  con- 
venient time;  suitable  occasion;  time  or 
place  favorable  for  executing  th»  purpose 
or  doing  the  thing  in  question.*'  Under  9 
provision  in  a.  policy  of  insurance  that  a  de- 


oppoBTUNrrr 


7ia 


OPPRESSION 


Unqnent  should  bave  thie  ^^oppoitnnity  for 
reliiBtatemeiit  on  similar  oonditloDs,''  tbe 
context  showing  tliat  tbo  term  '^slmUar  oen- 
dltlons"  liad  reference  to  tlie  payment  of 
pastrdne  premiums,  assessments,  and  other 
indebtedness,  a  d^inquent  was  entitled  to 
relnstatonent,  and,  if  tbe  company  refused 
to  reinstate  him,  to  recover  the  premiums 
paid  In  the  absence  of  anything  in  the  policy 
which  required  the  approval  of  the  company, 
or  any  of  its  officers  as  a  condition  precedent 
to  reinstatement  Lane  t.  Fidelity  Mut 
Ufa  Ins.  Ck>.,  64  &  B.  864,  855,  142  N.  0.  66, 
116  Am.  St  Bep.  728. 

The  rule  that  opportunity  to  know  the 
truth  will  prevent  recovery  means  merely 
that  one  may  not  blindly  act  on  statement  in 
disregard  of  knowledge  of  their  falsity  or 
with  such  opportunity  that  by  the  exercise 
of  ordinary  observation,  not  necessarily  by 
search,  he  would  have  known  thereof. 
Jacobsen  y.  Whitely,  120  N.  W.  286,  280,  138 
Wis.  434. 

OPPOSITE 

The  term  "opposite,"  in  a  stipulation  in 
a  contract  between  a  railroad  company  and 
landowners,  providing  that  the  former 
should  have  certain  rights  respecting  land  in 
consideration  of  the  construction  of  its 
railroad,  and  that  the  company  would  cause 
its  railroad  to  be  constructed  within  one 
year  and  in  operation  "opposite"  lands  of  the 
parties  by  a  time  fixed,  must  be  liberally  and 
reasonably  construed  so  as  to  carry  into 
effect  the  general  intent  expressed  in  the 
contract,  and  means  a  place  or  places  from 
which  the  land  can  be  reached  for  develop- 
ment of  its  resources,  it  being  underlaid  with 
coal,  economically  and  conveniently,  consid- 
ering the  topography  of  the  land  and  all  ma- 
terial circumstances,  and  completion  of  the 
road  to  a  point  10  miles  distant  from  the 
place  from  which  this  can  be  done,  is  not  a 
compliance  with  the  stipulation,  though  it  is 
possible  to  build  a  branch  road  to  the  land 
from  that  point  Adams  v.  Guyandotte  Val- 
ley Ry.  CJo.,  61  S.  E3.  341,  343,  64  W.  Va.  181. 

Advevee  syiumyaioiis 

"Opposite"  is  a  synonym  of  "adverse.*' 
Prunty  v.  Consolidated  Fuel,  etc.,  Co.,  108 
Pac.  802, 803,  82  Kan.  641  (dtlug  Webst  Uni- 
versal Diet). 

OPPOSITE  PABTT 

The  term  "opposite  party,"  as  used  in  a 
statute  providing  for  the  reversal  of  a  decree 
entered  on  a  bill  taken  for  confessed,  and 
requiring  reasonable  notice  to  the  opposite 
party  of  the  motion  to  reverse,  does  not  mean 
only  the  plaintiff,  but  any  party  to  the.  suit, 
who  has  an  interest  in  upholding  the  decree 
sought  to  be  reversed,  whose  pecuniary  or 
profiting  interest  would  be  prejudiced  by  re- 
versal.   It  means  opposite  la  interest    Mor- 


rison A  Ottr  T.  Lea<di«  47  &  &  287, 288, 55  W. 
▼a.lML 

Hie  phrase  "opposite  party,**  in  tfaeetit 
ute  providing  that  when  a  suit  is  proseeoied 
or  defended  by  heirs,  assigns,  deriseea,  lep 
tees,  or  personal  repres^tatlves  of  i  d^ 
ceased  person,  the  "opposite  party"  M 
not  be  admitted  to  testify  to  matters  eqnall; 
within  the  knowledge  of  decedent,  lefen  ts 
the  real  party  in  interest  who  must  be  coodiil- 
ed  by  the  determination  of  the  suit  Wbm 
on  appeal  by  heirs  from  an  order  allowinftbe 
final  account  of  the  administrator,  the  isste 
was  whether  certificates  of  deposit  Id  favorof 
decedent  and  which  had  be^i  in  tbe  bi&d» 
of  the  administrator  were  a  part  of  tbe  es- 
tate, the  testimony  of  a  witness  od  bebalf  sf 
the  administrator  that  the  property  bdm 
ed  to  her  by  gift  causa  mortis  from  deceda: 
was  not  incompetent ;  the  witness  sot  beiii 
the  real  party  in  interest  Beed  v.  Whippie. 
108  N.  W.  648,  663,  140  MidL  7. 

OPPOSITE  TO 

Laws  1816,  c.  199,  {  1,  supplemeatiiii 
Bev.  Laws  1813,  c.  74,  |  4,  allowed  tbe  co= 
missioners  of  the  land  office  to  grant  to '  i'^ 
jacent"  owners  land  under  the  water  sci 
rounding  Staten  Island,  which  grant  was  d3: 
to  extend  more  than  600  feet  from  low-wit^r 
mark.  A  riparian  landowner  applied  for  i 
grant  of  land  opposite  to  and  "adjoining 
his,  and  extending  to  a  point  600  feet  fni 
low-watei'  mark,  and  an  aflMaTlt  npps^ 
to  his  application  described  his  land  u  b^ 
ing  bound  by  the  low-water  mark.  1%e  At 
tomey  General  recommended  that  applies: 
be  granted  the  land  "opposite  to"  tbat  nci? 
held  by  him,  and  the  commissioiiers  passed! 
resolution  that  letters  patent  be  issued  t 
him  for  the  land  under  water  applied  for.  A 
patent  was  issued,  describing  tbe  land  pe&' 
ed  as  beginning  at  low-water  mark  and  ei 
tending  to  a  point  600  feet  out  Held,  tb: 
the  words  "adjoining"  and  "opposite  u' 
must  be  understood  to  be  equlTalent  to  t^- 
Jacent"  as  used  in  the  statute,  and  the  i? 
plication  must  l>e  taken  to  apply  to  l£i^ 
immediate  contiguous  to  that  of  the  ap^ 
cant,  and  as  declaring  that  he  owned  the  Us- 
to  low-water  mark,  and  hence  was  ^v^ 
enough  to  Include  any  land  lying  between  lu> 
actual  boundary  and  low-water  maA  » 
that  the  patent  must  be  construed  as  ff^- 
ing  to  applicant  all  the  land  lying  bettree: 
his  land  and  a  line  600  feet  out  froio  lov- 
water  mark,  as  any  other  construction  wot*. 
not  be  in  accord  with  the  commissioners'  rer 
olutlon,  and  would  render  the  patent  Toi 
under  the  statute.  Bardes  v,  Herman,  i^ 
N.  Y.  Supp.  723,  720,  144  App.  DlT.  T^- 
Warth  V.  Same,  129  N.  T.  Supp.  730. 144  m 
Div.  943. 

OPPRESSION 

A  poUce  officer  la  guUty  of  "oppresaea" 
mnder  Pen.  Code^  i  608,  where  he  tf^ten' 


OPaPBBSfiOEOK 


758 


OPTION 


nloon,  and,  witfaont  any  JuetUlcatlon,  point* 
a  pistol  at  a  woman  who  la  tbne^  and  de- 
tains her  against  her  will,  and  oommlts  acts 
whereby  she  is  Injured.  People  ez  reL 
Reardon  t.  Flynn,  HI  N.  Y.  Snpp.  1067,  58 
Misc.  Rep.  624. 

Where  a  person  goes  to  a  billiard  room 
to  collect  a  bill,  and  while  there  the  place  is 
raided  by  the  police  on  information  that 
gambling  was  going  on  theee^  and  an  officer, 
tbongh  told  by  soch  person  of  the  reason  for 
his  presence,  stmck  him  and  t04^  him  before 
a  magistrate  for  disorderly  conduct,  od 
which  charge  the  magistrate  discharged  him, 
and  such  person  was  neither  gambling  nor 
In  the  conunission  of  any  overt  act  authorijE- 
Ing  his  arrest,  the  polioe  oflElcer  was  guilty  of 
"oppression"  under  Pen.  Code,  |  066.  People 
ex  rel.  Beardon  ▼.  Flynn,  111  N.  X.  Supp. 
1065,  1066,  58  Bilsc  Bep.  621. 

"Oppression'*  is  defined  by  the  Standard 
Dictionary  as  "the  act  of  subjecting  to  crueL 
and  unjust  hardships."  The  mere  omission 
to  repair  a  damage  unintentionally,  though 
negligently  done,  cannot  be  said  to  be  sub- 
jection to  cruel  and  unjust  hardship.  Civ. 
Code,  I  3294,  authorizing  an  award  of  puni- 
tive damages  in  an  action  not  arising  from 
contract,  where  defendant  has  been  guilty 
of  oppression,  fraud,  or  malice,  express  or 
implied,  does  not  apply  to  a  case  of  simple 
negligence.  That  defendant  constructed  a 
bulkhead  adjoining  plalntUTs  property  for 
the  purpose  of  retaining  dirt,  gravel,  sand, 
etc.,  so  negligently  that  it  gave  way,  and  pre- 
cipitated gravel,  dirt,  etc.,  onto  plalntiiTs 
premises,  destroying  a  portion  of  his  fence 
and  chicken  house,  was  insufficient  to  show 
such  gross  negligence,  wantonness,  or  oppres- 
sion aa  to  justify  an  award  of  punitive  dam- 
ages. Spencer  v.  San  Francisco  Brick  CJo., 
89  Pac.  851,  852,  5  Oal.  App.  126. 

0PPBS88IVE  ACT 

There  is  no  ftital  inconsistency  between 
a  general  verdict  against  a  sheriff  on  the 
theory  that  he  was  a  trespasser  in  making 
an  execution  levy  and  special  findings  show- 
ing that  he  acted  "oppressively,"  though  the 
jury  do  not  afflrmativrty  find  that  the  writ 
was  in  his  hands  more  than  60  days  before 
the  levy  so  as  to  make  him  liable  on  the  the- 
ory that  the  writ  was  functus  officio;  an 
'^oppressive*'  act  in  its  ordinary  sense  being 
an  act  of  cruelty,  severity,  unlawful  ex- 
action, domination,  or  excessive  use  of  au- 
thority. Gallegos  v.  Sandoval,  106  Paa  873, 
376,  15  N.  M.  216. 

OPTIC 

OPTICAIi  IVSTBUlfiarX 

Certain  small  slightly  made  magic  lan- 
terns not  saffldently  substantial  to  be  used 
by  mature  persons,  but  rather  by  ehildren  as 
toys,  are  not  dutiable  as  "oi^al  Instru- 

3  WDS.&  P.2D  SEB.-48 


meats,'*  under  Tariff  Act  1894,  1 1,  Schedule 
B,  par.  98.  Borgfttdt  t«  United  States,  224 
Fed.  457,  45a 

OPTIGIAN 

Itinerant  optician,  as  merchant,  see  Mer- 
chant. 

An  "optician**  is  a  maker  of  optical  fu* 
struments,  and  applies  to  a  man  who  fits 
glasses  to  the  eyes.  One  who  diagnosed 
his  patient's  diseases  by  a  microscopic  exam* 
inatlon  of  a  drop  of  blood,  and  treated  them 
by  placing  them  under  the  rays  of  electric 
arc  lights,  is  not  an  "optician"  within  Acts 
U901,  p.  115,  c  78^  excepting  opticians  from 
its  provisions  as  to  licensing  persons  practic- 
ing medicine.  O'NeU  v.  State,  90  S.  W.  627, 
628,  115  Tenn.  427,  3  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  762. 

OPTICS 

The*  term  "optics,"  as  defined  by  the 
Standard  Dictionary,  is  "the  science  that 
treats  of  light  and  vision,  the  organs  of 
sight,  chromatics,  and  all  that  is  connected 
with  the  phenomena  of  sight.  It  includes: 
(1)  Geometrical  optics.  (2)  Physical  optics, 
embracing  (a)  the  undulatory  theory,  and 
the  effect  explained  by  it,  as  polarhsation, 
refraction,  and  interference;  and  (b)  elec- 
trooptics,  treating  of  such  phenomena  as  de- 
pends on  bodily  function  or  brain  action." 
O'NeU  V.  State,  90  S.  W.  627,  629,  115  Tenn. 
427,  3  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  762. 

OPTION 

See   At  the   Option   of   Either   Party; 

Buyer's  Option;    Local  Option  Law; 

On  Accepting  this  Option. 
Agency  distinguished,  see  Agency. 
As  property,  see  Property. 
As  sale,  see  Sale. 
See,  also,  Attempt  to  Purchase. 

An  "option'*  is  an  exclusive  privilege  to 
buy;  and  a  contract  for  an  option  is  the 
agreement  by  whiclL  the  privilege  is  created. 
Benedict  v.  Pincus,  84  N.  B.  284,  286,  191 
N.  X.  377. 

An  "option**  is  a  right  acquired  by  con- 
tract to  accept  or  reject  an  offer  to  purchase 
property  at  a  fixed  price  within  a  specified 
time.  Wlnslow  v.  Dundom,  125  Pac.  136, 138, 
46  Mont  71. 

An  "option**  is  a  continuing  offer  which 
the  offerer  may  not  withdraw  until  the  expi- 
ration of  the  time  limited.  Adams  y.  Pea- 
bOdy  Coal  Co.,  82  N.  E.  645,  646,  230  m.  469. 

An  "option"  is  simply  a  contract,'  by 
which  the  owner  of  property  agrees  that  an- 
other shall  have  a  right  to  buy  it  at  a  fixed 
price  within  a  certain  time.  The  owner  does 
not  sell  the  property,  but  sells  the  privilege 
to  boy  at  the  option  of  the  other  person. 
McGregor  ▼.  Irdand,  121  Pac.  358,  86  Kan. 
426  (cittQg  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  5001). 


OPTION 


754 


OPTION 


""An  option  conveyB  no  tjitl*  to  the  tlilnt 
■old,  bnt  creates  rights  In  personun,  whidl 
may  be  again  sold  or  assigned  by  the  Tsn- 
dee."  Womaek  t.  Coleman,  100  N.  W.  9,  11, 
92  Minn.  32a 

An  ^'option**  has  been  defined  to  be  "an 
unaccepted  offer  to  sell."  It  transfers  no 
title  or  right  in  rem,  but  areates  a  ri^t  in 
personam,  and  that  right  is  to  accept  or  re- 
ject a  present  offer  within  a  limited  or  rea- 
sonable time  In  the  future.  It  is  a  continu- 
ing offer  until  the  expiration  of  the  time 
limited.  Btandiford  t.  Thompson,  135  Fed. 
991,  996,  68  G.  G.  A.  425. 

**  'An  option  contract  to  purchase'  is  but 
a  continuing  offer  to  sell,  and  conveys  no 
interest  in  the  property.  •  •  •  Although 
based  upon  a  consideration,  it  is  but  an  of- 
fer, a  privilege  extended,  differing  from  an 
ordinary  offer  only  In  this:  That  It  Is  not 
rerocable,  because  based  upon  a  valuable 
consideration.  An  assignment  of  it  therefore 
passes  no  Interest  in  the  property  to  which  It 
relates.'*  Rease  y.  KitUe^  49  S.  B.  150,  154, 
66  W.  Va.  269  (citing  CaldweU  t.  Frailer,  68 
Pac.  1076,  65  Kan.  24;  Gilbert  t.  Port,  28 
Ohio  8t  276). 

An  "option"  is  "a  right  of  choice  or  elec- 
tion; sometimes  applied  to  contracts  whereby 
one  purchases  the  right  for  a  certain  time, 
at  his  election,  to  demand  and  receive  or  to 
deliver  property  at  a  stated  price."  Mont- 
gomery V.  Hundley,  108  S.  W.  527,  531,  205 
Mo.  138,  11  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  122  (quoting  and 
adopting  the  definition  in  Cyc  Law  Diet  p. 
645). 

The  obligation  by  which  one  binds  him- 
self to  sell,  and  leaves  it  discretionary  with 
the  other  party  to  buy,  is  what  is  termed  in 
law  an  '^option,"  which  is  simply  a  contract 
by  which  the  owner  of  property  agrees  with 
another  person  that  he  shall  have  the  right 
to  buy  the  property  at  a  fixed  price  within  a 
certain  time.  Montgomery  v.  Waldeck,  2 
Alaska,  581,  585;  Montgomery  v.  Hundley, 
103  S.  W.  527,  531,  205  Mo.  138,  11  L.  R.  A. 
<N.  S.)  122  (quoting  and  adopting  the  deflni- 
Uon  in  Black  v.  Maddox,  30  S.  E.  723,  104  Ga. 
157) ;  Womaek  v.  Goleman,  100  N.  W.  9, 11,  02 
Minn.  328  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  In 
Black  V.  Maddox,  30  8.  E.  723,  104  Ga.  157). 

An  "option"  is  "the  obligation  by  which 
one  binds  himself  to  sell  and  makes  it  dis- 
cretionary with  the  other  party  to  buy,  which 
is  simply  a  contract  by  which  the  owner  of 
property  agrees  with  another  person  that  he 
shall  have  a  right  to  buy  the  property  at  a 
fixed  price  within  a  certain  time."  Indiana 
&  A.  Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Pharr,  102  S.  W. 
686,  689,  82  Ark.  573  (quoting  and  adopting 
the  definition  in  Black  v.  Maddox,  30  S.  E. 
723, 104  Ga.  157). 

An  "option"  is  a  continuing  offer  or  con- 
tract by  which  the  owner  stipulates  with  an- 
other that  the  latter  shall  have  the  right  to 


buy  the  property  at  a  fixed  price  witUn  t 
certain  time,  and,  unless  the  option  is  foniMt 
ed  on  a  coosideraUoii,  It  may  be  withdnn 
at  any  time  before  acceptance.  Ganat  t.  j 
M.  Guffey  Petroleum  Go.,  110  N.  Y.  Snpp.  R 
177, 125  App.  Dlv.  760. 

"An  'option*  Is  an  unaccepted  offer.  It 
states  the  terms  and  conditions  on  wMcb  tbe 
owner  Is  willing  to  sell  or  lease  his  land  U 
the  holder  elects  to  accept  within  the  tiae 
limited.  If  the  holder  does  so  riect,  be  mast 
give  notice  to  the  other  party,  and  the  ac 
cepted  offer  thereupon  becomes  a  tdndios 
contract  If  an  acceptance  is  not  made  mtb- 
In  the  time  fixed,  the  owner  is  no  \Qm 
bound  by  his  offer,  and  the  option  is  at » 
end."  John  v.  Elkins,  69  S.  £.  961,  963.  Si 
W.  Va.  15a 

An  ''option"  is  a  rli^t  acquired  bj  co^ 
tract  to  accept  or  reject  a  preset  offer  wltb 
In  a  limited  or  reasonable  time  In  the  fatare. 
In  such  contract  two  elements  exist:  Fii^L 
the  offer  to  sell,  which  does  not  becomes 
contract  until  accepted.  Second,  the  com- 
pleted contract  to  leave  the  offer  open  fortiK 
specified  time.  Bates  v.  Woods,  80  K.  E.  Si 
85,  225  111.  126  (citing  Black  v.  Maddox.  m 
Ga.  157,  80  8.  £.  723 ;  Ide  v.  Ldser,  10  Moql 
5,  24  Pac.  695,  24  Am.  St  Rep.  17). 

"An  'option*  is  a  right  aeqiiired  by  cot 
tract  to  accept  or  reject  a  present  offer. 
within  a  limited  or  reasonable  time  is  ^ 
future."  It  is  "the  obligation  by  which  oae 
binds  himself  to  sell,  and  leaves  it  discreCioih 
ary  with  the  other  party  to  boy,  which  is 
simply  a  contract  by  which  the  owner  of 
property  agrees  with  another  person  that  bf 
shall  have  the  right  to  buy  the  property  it  > 
fixed  price  within  a  certain  time.'*  Trogdn 
V.  Williams,  56  S.  B.  865,  868,  144  N.  C.  l^ 
10  L.  U.  A.  (N.  S.)  867  (quoting  and  h^&m 
definition  in  Black  v.  Maddox,  30  S.  E.  7^ 
104  Ga.  157,  and  citing  Sitterding  v.  Orinnl 
19  S.  E.  02,  114  N.  C.  108;  Hopwood  t.  M.^ 
Causland.  04  N.  W.  469,  120  Iowa.  218;  Uc 
v.  Goosliug,  19  S.  W.  527,  93  Ky.  185.  21 L 
R.  A.  127 ;  Cozart  v.  Herndon,  19  S,  E  1»^ 
114  N.  C.  252 ;  Clark.  Cont  369;  Cya  p.  265». 

An  "option"  is  a  continuing  offer  npos 
the  part  of  the  optioner  to  sell,  and  vbo 
limited  to  a  certain  time  ft  Ib  essential  tbtt 
it  should  be  accepted  within  8U<di  time  by  s 
compliance  with  Its  terms  upon  the  l«rt  of 
the  optionee,  and  if  not  accepted  within  sod 
time,  the  right  to  do  so  is  lost  An  '*opti<»' 
is  not  an  executory  contract,  but  is  ao  eI^ 
cuted  one,  giving  a'  right  to  the  optionee,  br 
complying  with  the  provisions  of  the  optica 
to  convert  it  into  a  valid  and  binding  eiecih 
tory  contract  Fulton  v.  Messenger,  56  S.  E 
830,  831,  61  W,  Va.  477  (citing  Pollock  ^ 
Brookover,  53  S.  B.  795,  60  W.  Va.  7^  ^ 
li.  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  403:  Rease  v.  Kittle,  49  J^ 
B.  150,  56  W.  Va.  269;  Weaver  v.  Borr.  > 
S.  B.  743,  31  W.  Va.  736^  a  li.  &  A  91;  Bafr 


OPTION 


765 


OPTION 


I7  y.  WattersDn;10  fl.  B.  63^  89  W.  Ya.  214; 
DonnaUy  v.  Parker,  6  W.  Va,  801). 

**An  'option*  is  in  a  sense  a  continuing 
offer  of  a  contract,  and  if  the  oflPeree  decides 
to  exercise  his  right  to  demand  the  conrey- 
ance  or  other  act  contemplated  he  must  sig- 
nify that  fact  to  the  offerer/'  Hence  a  les- 
see's acceptance  of  an  option  to  purchase 
creates  a  contract  for  purchase.  Sizer  v. 
Clark,  93  N.  W.  539,  541, 116  Wis.  534. 

In  a  sense  all  options  are  contingent  be- 
cause they  may  or  may  not  be  exercised  with- 
in the  time  or  upon  the  conditions  stipulated; 
and  such  contingency  does  not  render  the 
options  invalid.  An  option  is  a  unilateral 
agreement  binding  upon  the  party  who  exe- 
cutes It  from  the  date  of  its  execution,  and 
becomes  a  contract  inter  partes  when  exer- 
cised according  to  Its  terms.  Boyer  v.  Nes- 
bitt,  76  AtL  103,  106,  227  Pa.  898,  136  Am.  St 
Rep.  890. 

The  phrase  "option  of  either  party,"  in 
an  agreement  between  a  dealer  in  electric 
lamps  and  a  manufacturer,  whereby  the 
dealer  agreed  to  carry  the  manufacturer's 
lamps  in  stock  at  ail  times,  with  prlrllege 
"to  settle  by  return  of  lamps  at  any  time 
at  option  of  either  party  and  by  a  sixty-day 
notice  by  either  party,"  must  receive  a  con- 
struction in  harmony  with  the  entire  agree- 
ment, and  the  manufacturer  did  not  have  the 
right  to  elect  to  take  lamps  in  payment,  but 
the  election  related  to  the  time  of  payment 
Union  Trust  Ck>.  v.  Michigan  Electric  Co.. 
103  N.  W.  656,  657, 140  Mich.  131. 

An  "option  to  purchase'*  is  merely  an 
agreement  whereby  the  buyer  may  upon  com- 
pliance with  certain  terms  and  conditions  be- 
come the  owner  of  the  property,  the  seller 
giving  him  that  option,  and  an  "option  to 
purchase"  differs  from  an  "option  to  re- 
turn," In  that  in  the  former  the  property 
does  not  pass,  while  it  does  pass  In  the  lat- 
ter, subject  to  the  right  to  rescind.  In  re 
Allen,  183  Fed.  172,  174. 

An  "option"  to  purchase  If  one  likes  is 
essentially  different  from  an  option  to  re- 
turn a  purchase  if  one  should  not  like  it, 
and  in  the  one  case  title  will  not  pass  until 
the  option  is  determined,  while  in  the  other 
the  property  passes  at  once,  subject  to  the 
right  to  rescind  and  return.  State  v.  Betz, 
106  S.  W.  64,  66,  207  Mo.  589  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Hunt  v.  Wyman,  100 
Mass.  198,  200). 

"An  *option  to  purchase'  If  he  liked  is 
essentially  different  from  an  option  to  re- 
turn a  purchase  if  he  should  not  like.  In 
one  case,  the  titie  will  not  pass  until  the 
option  is  determined;  in  the  other,  the  prop- 
erty passes  at  once,  subject  to  the  right  to 
rescind  and  return."  The  option  given  by  an 
agreement  for  a  transfer  of  corporate  stock, 
together  with  th«  owner's  vtqw  as  director, 
in  consideration  of  a  .tflnedlled  eum  "to  be 


considered  an  option,"  running  until  a  given 
date,  when  an  addltioaal  sum  is  to  be  paid, 
or,  in  lieu  thereof,  all  the  property  delivered 
HndejT  the  agreement  is  to  be  returned,  Is  not 
an  option  to  purchase,  but  one  to  return; 
^nd,  if  not  exercised  at  the  time  named,  the 
sale  is  complete,  and  the  promise  to  pay  the 
purchase  price  becomes  absolute.  Guss  v. 
Nelson,  26  Sup.  Ct  260,  261,  200  U.  S.  298, 
50  L.  Ed.  489  (quoting  and  adopting  defini- 
tion in  Hunt  v.  Wyman,  100  Mass.  198,  200, 
quoted  approvingly  in  Sturm  v.  Boker,  14 
Sup.  Ct  99,  104,  150  U.  S.  312,  329,  37  L.  Ed. 
1093,  1100). 

An  "option"  being  a  mere  right  to  pur- 
chase, the  consideration  of  the  contract  Is 
the  consideration  given  for  the  right  to  pur- 
chase, and  not  the  value  of  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  the  contract;  therefore  the  recording 
fee  for  recording  an  option  contract  to  pur- 
chase land  will  under  Act  March  17.  1910 
(Acts  1910,  c.  315),  which  graduates  the  fees 
for  recording  such  contracts  according  to  the 
consideration,  be  based  upon  the  considera- 
tion given  for  the  contract  and  not  upon 
the  land  in  question.  Stearnes  v.  Goad,  69 
S.  B.  1101,  111  Va.  834. 

Where  a  contract  for  the  division  of  cor- 
porate stock  between  promoters  provided 
that  plaintiff  should  have  one-half  of  a  cer- 
tain block  of  the  stock  on  his  selling  or  pay- 
ing for  a  specified  portion  of  the  corpora- 
tion's bonds,  it  was  not  error  for  the  court 
to  refer  to  the  contract  as  an  "option,"  de- 
fined to  be  a  right  to  choose  between  one  of 
two  or  more  alternatives.  Malloy  v.  Drum- 
heller,  122  Pac.  1005,  1009,  68  Wash.  106. 

An  instrument  reciting  that  plaintiff  ha& 
an  "option"  to  purchase  land  with  all  grow- 
ing crops  for  $10,200,  to  be  paid  $250  cash 
and  the  balance  on  or  before  August  15, 
1903,  otherwise  the  cash  payment  was  to  be 
forfeited,  and  declaring  that  the  $250  was  a 
part  payment  on  the  land,  etc.,  constituted 
a  mere  option  to  purchase;  there  being  no 
mutuality  of  obligation  on  the  part  of  plain- 
tiff. White  V.  Bank  of  Hanford,  83  Pae.  698, 
699,  148  Cal.  552. 

Where  an  offer  of  sale  was  based  on  a 
valuable  consideration,  it  amounted  to  an 
''option"  binding  the  promisor  to  make  the 
proposed  sale  if  accepted  by  the  promisee, 
and  waa  irrevocable  until  the  expiration 
of  the  time  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  dur- 
ing which  the  offer  was  to  remain  open,  and, 
if  acceptance  was  made  within  such  time,  it 
would  complete  the  contract  Simpson  & 
Harper  v.  Sanders  &  Jenkins,  60  S.  £.  541, 
543, 130  Ga.  265. 

A  vendor,  contracting  to  sell  for  a  sped- 
fled  sum  described  real  estate,  providing  that 
the  contract  shall  be  void  after  a  designated 
date,  gives  to  the  puridiaser  only  an  "option" 
to  puflChasQ.on  payment  of  tbepilce,  and  the 
purchaser  cannot,  befofe  ticercifSns  hgls.'OP- 


OK 


758 


OB 


be  read  "and."  Manson  ▼.  DaytoOr  163  Fed. 
258,  269,  82  C.  C.  A.  588  (citing  End.  Interp. 
St.  S  3a3 ;  Thomas  v.  City  of  Grand  Junction, 
56  Pac.  666.  667,  18  Colo.  App.  80,  84,  86; 
Kitchen  v.  Southern  Ry.,  48  S.  E.  4^  6,  68  S. 
a  664,  1  Ann.  Cas.  747). 

An  instruction  is  not  erroneous  for  au- 
thorizing the  conviction  of  one  who  "advised 
or*  encouraged"  another  in  the  commission 
of  a  crime  instead  of  "advised  'and*  encour- 
aged," in  accordance  with  the  definition  of  a 
principal  In  Pen.  Code,  |  41.  State  v.  Allen, 
87  Pac.  177,  182,  34  Mont  403. 

A  warrant  of  attorney  contained  in  a 
Joint  and  several  note  signed  by  eight  makers 
authorizijDig  the  holder  to  have  Judgment 
against  "us,  or  any  or  either  of  us,"  is  not 
exhausted  by  the  entry  of  Judgment  against 
one  or  more  but  not  all  of  the  makers,  but 
is  the  equivalent  of  eight  separate  warrants, 
signed  by  one  of  the  makers,  and  the  holder 
may  at  his  election  enter  a  several  Judgment 
against  each  maker.  It  cannot  be  doubted 
that  in  this  case  "or"  includes  ''and."  Oth- 
erwise the  power  would  be  exhausted  if  the 
Judgment  was  entered  against  only  one  of  the 
signers — a  result  that  is  so  absurd  as  hardly 
to  need  refutation.  George  D.  Barter  Bank 
V.  Straus,  170  Fed.  489,  492. 

Same— In  deeds  and  eonveyaiioes 

Where,  in  an  oil  and  gas  lease,  it  is  stip- 
ulated that  the  lessee  shall  complete  one  well 
within  one  year,  ''or"  pay  at  the  rate  of  $4 
quarterly,  in  advance,  for  each  additional 
three  months  such  completion  is  delayed,  and 
it  is  expressly  declared  that  the  contract  is 
made  "for  the  sole  and  exclusive  purpose  of 
mining  and  operating  for  oil  and  gas,"  and  it 
is  otherwise  manifest  from  the  instrument  as 
a  whole  that  the  intention  of  the  parties  was 
not  that  the  lessee  should  have  the  right  to 
simply  hold  the  land  during  the  term  of  the 
lease — not  exploring  it  himself  for  oil  and 
gas,  and  not  allowing  any  one  else  to  do  so — 
but  that  he  should  be  bound  to  complete  a 
well  within  one  year,  the  obligation  to  pay  $4 
quarterly  will  be  held  to  be  a  mere  penal 
clause,  and  not  an  alternative  obligation,  and 
the  making  of  said  payments  will  be  held  not 
to  be  a  fulfillment  of  the  principal  contract, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  but  merely  the  payment 
of  liquidated  damages.  Murray  v.  Bamhart, 
42  South.  489,  492,  117  La.  1023. 

A  trust  deed,  stating  in  the  granting 
clause,  "has  and  hereby  does  grant,  bargain, 
sell  and  convey  unto  said  party  of  the  second 
part  or  his  successors  in  trust,"  is  not  void 
for  uncertainty  as  to  the  grantee  by  reason 
of  the  use  of  the  word  "or" ;  it  being  the  in- 
tention of  the  grantor  to  vest  the  legal  title 
of  the  property  in  the  trustee,  with  power,  on 
conditions  named,  to  substitute  a  trustee. 
Empire  Ranch  &  Cattle  Co.  v.  Stratton,  126 
Pac.  1094,  22  Colo.  App.  577  (citing  6  Words 
and  Phraaes,  p.  50Q2). 


eiva  atot«te» 

««Or"  and  *%nd"  may  be  read  conTertiblT 
in  construing  a  statute,  to  effect  legi^tiTt 
intent  Ransom  v.  Rutherford  Conotj,  m 
S.  W.  1057,  1063,  128  Tenn.  1,  Ann.  Ca? 
1912B,  1366;  In  re  Stelnruck's  InsokeiKy.  :4 
Aa  360,  226  Pa.  461;  People  ex  rel  CobaT 
Butler.  109  N.  Y.  Supp.  900,  903,  125  A?f 
Div.  384. 

The  word  "and**  may  be  substitiited  foi 
the  word  "or"  when  necessary  to  mik  i 
statute  express  the  true  legisladTe  intent  a 
gathered  from  the  context  and  the  drcoiir 
stances  attending  its  enactment  James  r. 
United  States  FideUty  &  Guarantee  Co^  u: 
S.  W.  406,  409,  133  Ky.  299;  State  y.  Hooka;. 
98  Pac  964,  972,  22  OkL  712;  James  t.  Udt 
ed  States  Fidelity  &  Guarantee  Co.,  117  S.  W 
406,  409,  133  Ky.  299. 

As  uaed  in  the  proviso  limitiDg  die  goe- 
al  right  of  a  wife  to  inherit  the  real  estited 
her  husband,  as  given  In  sectlOD  8  of  le 
concerning  descents  and  distributtons  isr. 
tion  2510,  Gen.  St  1901),  which  dedans  tbi: 
the  wife  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  latere^ 
under  the  provisions  of  tliis  section*  in  uj 
land  to  which  the  husband  has  made  a  oc& 
veyance,  when  the  vrlf e  at  the  time  of  tke 
conveyance  is  not  "or"  never  has  been  a  re<- 
dent  of  this  state,  the  word  "or"  should  tc 
read  '*and,"  with  the  effect  that  a  wife  ^? 
had  ever  been  a  resident  of  this  state  is » 
titled  to  the  benefits  of  the  act  Kenned?  t 
Haskell,  73  Pac.  913,  914,  67  Kan.  612. 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  1887,  §  4842.  pro# 
ing  that  an  appeal  from  a  Justice's  coort  l| 
not  effectual  unless  an  undertaking  be  £i^^ 
for  $100  for  the  payment  of  the  costs  od  H^ 
peal,  or  if  a  stay  of  proceedings  be  ciaisMil^^ 
a  sum  equal  to  twice  the  judgment,  the  witI 
"or"  means  "and,"  and  the  statute  reqoins 
that  an  undertaicing  be  given  for  the  sam  ^' 
1100  for  the  payment  of  costs,  and  if  &  ^^ 
of  proceedings  be  claimed,  then  In  an  adi 
tional  sum  equal  to  twice  the  judgment  13- 
by  V.  Spokane  Valley  Land  &  Water  C«.  ?* 
Pac  715,  717,  15  Idalio,  467. 

Where  a  landlord  had  entered  for  tbe 
tenaut*s  breach  of  the  lease  and  claimed  po^ 
session,  it  was  entitled  to  answer  In  sumiMi? 
proceedings  by  the  tenant's  agent  to  rwc^r 
possession  of  a  part  of  the  premises  froin  i 
subtenant  under  Code  Civ.  Proc  i  2244.  pr^ 
viding  that  the  person  to  wh<Hn  the  prertJ^ 
is  directed  or  his  landlord  or  any  peRon  t 
possession  "or"  claiming  possession  of  tt« 
premises  or  a  part  thereof,  may  answer;  ^ 
word  "or"  being  used  in  such  section  Id  ^^ 
copulative  and  not  in  its  disjunctive  «s» 
Cohen  v.  Carpenter,  113  N.  Y.  Supp.  168.  T- 
128  App.  Div.  862. 

Labor  Law  (Laws  ISOT,  p.  468,  c.  41& 
I  20,  as  amended  by  Laws  1899,  p.  ^^  f 
102),  providing  that,  if  hoisting  appa»tfl«** 
in  a  building  in  the  course  oC  ooost^ 


OB 


759 


OB 


tion,  the  *V:ontmetovB'Or  ownen'*  shall  cause 
the  openings  in  each  floor  to  be  inclosed, 
places  such  duty  on  the  owner  of  a  bulldlnf 
as  to  an  employ^  of  an  independent  contrac- 
tor, as  well  as  on  the  contractor,  though 
all  the  work  on  the  building  is  being  done  by 
independent  eontractom  and  the  hoisting  ma- 
chine is  installed  by  a  hoisting  machine  com- 
pany, paid  by  the  contractors  for  the  use 
thereof.  Rooney  v.  Brogan  Const  Co.,  95  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1,  5,  107  App.  Dlv.  258. 

In  Act  N.  J.  April  18, 1884,  |  4,  proTiding 
"that  this  act  shall  not  apply  to  railway, 
canal,  'or*  banking  corporations,  ♦  ♦  ♦ 
'or'  manufacturing  companies  'or'  mining 
companies  carrying  on  business  in  this  state," 
the  word  "or"  is  used  in  its  copulative,  and 
not  in  its  disjunctiye,  sense,  and  the  qualify- 
ing words  ''carrying  on  business  in  this  state" 
relate  to  all  the  corporations  designated  in 
the  act,  and  not  merely  to  mining  companies. 
Standard  Underground  Cable  Co.  y.  Attorney 
General,  19  AU.  733,  735,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  270,  19 
Am.  8t  Rep.  394. 

Laws  1905,  p.  163,  c.  103,  §  6,  providing 
that  one  who  has  not  purchased  "one  comple- 
ment" of  school  land  **under  this  act  or 
former  law"  may  buy  not  to  exceed  eight 
sections  in  designated  counties,  or  such  part 
thereof  as  will  complete  "his  complement," 
under  this  act,  including  the  purchase  under 
the  act  of  1901,  when  taken  in  connection 
with  section  5,  authorizing  a  lessee  of  school 
land  or  an  assignee  of  an  entire  lease  to  pur- 
chase land  included  in  the  lease,  provided  the 
applicant  has  not  purchased  one  complement, 
as  provided  by  this  act  or  other  law,  which 
announces  a  general  rule  applicable  to  all 
lands  except  those  mentioned  in  section  6, 
and  defines  the  rights  of  lessees  and  as- 
signees, authorizes  one  who  has  purchased 
four  sections  in  one  of  the  designated  coun- 
ties the  full  amount  allowed  by  the  act 
of  1901  to  purchase  four  sections  additional 
in  such  county;  the  word  "complement"  in 
section  6  meaning  eight  sections,  and  the 
phrase  therein,  "under  this  act  or  former 
law,"  meaning  "under  this  act  and  former 
law."  Ross  V.  Terrell,  90  S.  W.  1098,  1095, 
99  Tex.  602. 

Same— In  pesial  statutes 

When  necessary  to  give  eflPect  to  any 
part  of  a  statute  of  the  intention  of  the 
Legislature,  the  word  ''and"  may  be  substi- 
tuted for  "or,"  and  vice  versa.  Williams  v. 
State.  137  S.  W.  927,  928,  99  Ark.  149,  Ann. 
Caa  1913A,  1056;  State  v.  Hooker,  98  Pac. 
964,  972,  22  Okl.  712. 

Kirby*s  Dig.  |  5242,  which  is  part  of  an 
act  regulating  the  practice  of  medicine,  pro- 
vides that  any  itinerant  vendor  of  drugs  in- 
tended for  the  treatment  of  disease  "or"  who 
may,  by  writing,  print,  or  otber  methods,  pro- 
fess to  cure  diseases  by  any  drug,  shall,  un- 
less he  has  a  certificate^  be  in  violation  of 


this  law.  Other  parts  of  the  act  provide  for 
an  examining  board  to  issue  certificates,  and 
section  5241  makes  it  an  offense  to  practioe 
medleiiie  without  a  license,  and  section  6243 
defines  what  constitutes  the  practice  of  medi- 
cine. Held,  that  in  view  of  the  general  scope 
of  the  act,  and  that,  if  construed  otherwise, 
the  clause  "who  may  by  writing,  print  or  oth- 
er methods  profess  to  cure  disease,"  etc., 
would  be  rendered  ineffective,  this  section 
must  be  taken  to  require  only  those  itinerant 
vendors  of  drugs  who  profess  to  cure  disease 
to  secure  a  license;  the  word  "or"  being  con- 
strued as  "and."  Williams  v.  State,  137  S. 
W.  927,  99  Ark.  149,  Ann.  Cas.  1913A,  1056. 

Acts  1901,  c.  78,  entiUed  "An  act  to  reg- 
ulate the  practioe  of  medicine  and  surgery," 
as  amended  by  Acts  1907,  c.  543,  provides  in 
section  4  that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any 
itinerant  physician,  or  vendor  of  any  drug, 
nostrum,  or  application,  to  sell  "or"  apply  the 
same.  Held  that,  in  view  of  Const  art.  2,  | 
17,  prohibiting  a  bill  from  embracing  more 
than  one  subject,  which  shall  be  expressed  in 
its  title,  the  disjunctive  "or,"  used  between 
"sell"  and  "apply,"  must  be  construed  as 
"and,"  to  bring  the  act  within  the  title,  so 
that  the  statute,  thus  being  a  regulation  of 
the  practice  of  medicine,  is  not  open  to  the 
objection  that  it  prohibits  the  sale  of  proper- 
ty, and  works  a  deprivation  of  the  same,  con- 
trary to  Const,  art  1,  §  8,  and  Const  U.  S. 
Amend.  14.  Kirk  v.  State,  150  S.  W.  83,  84, 
126  Tenn.  7,  Ann.  Cas.  1913D,  ^239. 

Enforcing  Act  (Laws  1907-08,  p.  606,  C 
69)  art  3,  §  8,  providing  that  no  warrant  shall 
issue  but  upon  probable  cause,  supported  by 
oath  describing,  as  particularly  as  may  be, 
the  place  to  be  searched  "or"  the  person  or 
thing  to  be  seized,  was  evidently  intended  by 
the  Legislature  to  follow  Const  art  2,  |  30 
(Bunn*s  Ed.  i  39),  providing  that  no  search 
warrant  shall  issue  but  upon  probable  cause, 
supported  by  oath  describing  the  place  to  be 
searched  "and"  the  person  or  thing  to  be 
seized,  and,  the  word  "or"  being  inserted  by 
inadvertence,  and  to  carry  out  the  evident 
legislative  intent,  the  same  will  be  construed 
by  substituting  the  conjunctive  particle  "and" 
in  place  of  the  disjunctive  "or."  State  v. 
Hooker,  98  Pac.  964,  972,  22  Okl.  712. 

Rev.  St.  1889,  I  3486,  provided  that  any 
person  who  should,  "under  promise  of  mar- 
riage, seduce  and  debauch  any  unmarried  fe- 
male of  good  repute  should  be  punished." 
This  section  was  amended  by  Acts  1897,  p. 
106,  entitled  "An  act  to  amend  section  3486, 
chapter  47,  article  2,  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
of  Missouri  of  1889,  relating  to  the  seduction 
of  unmarried  females  under  18  years  of  age," 
an<l  changed  the  section^  so  as  to  provide  that 
any  person  who  should,  under  promise  of 
marriage,  seduce  or  debauch  any  unmarried 
female,  etc.,  should  be  punished.  Held,  that 
the  words  "seduce"  and  "debauch,"  though 
ordinarily  not  BynonymQus«  were  used  in  such 


rat 


Teo 


OB 


Mctldn  nyamymimBlj,  and  that  tba  word  ^'or^ 
miut  be  constrned  to  maan  ''and,"  In  order  to 
bring  the  offenae  dedned  within  the  tlile»  ae 
that  an  instroction  that  the  jnry  could  oon* 
Vict,  If  they  beUered  proeecntrlx  waa  either 
eeduced  "or"  debauched  by  defendant  under 
promise  of  marriage,  waa  erroneous.  State 
T.  Long,  141  S.  W.  109Q,  UOl,  288  Mo.  883. 

flame— Xb  pleadlmg 

In  Rev.  Codes  1006,  I  0088,  subd.  4,  au- 
thorizing an  attachment  where  defendant  has 
sold,  assigned,  transferred,  secreted,  or  oth- 
erwise disposed  of,  "or"  is  about  to  sell,  as- 
sign, eta,  with  Intent  to  cheat  or  defraud  his 
creditors  or  hinder  or  delay  them,  the  dis- 
junctive conjunction  ''or"  does  not  connect 
two  grounds  for  an  attachment,  but  the 
whole  subdivision  states  only  one  ground  con- 
sisting of  different  phases  of  facta  or  condi- 
tions intimately  related,  pertaining  to  that 
one  ground,  and  an  affidavit  for  an  attach- 
ment stating  such  ground  disjunctively  in 
the  language  of  the  statute  is  sufficient 
McCarthy  Bros.  Co.  v.  McLean  County  Farm- 
ers' Blevator  Co.,  U8  N.  W.  1040,  lOCM),  18 
N.  D.  178,  188  Am.  St  Rep.  767.  20  Ann.  Cas. 
674  (citing  Shlnn,  AtUdi.  ft  Gam.,  R  146, 
146;  Waples,  Attache  &  Oam.,  i  186;  Wood 
V.  Wells,  2  Bush  [66  Ky.]  197;  Klenk  ▼. 
Schwalm,  19  Wis.  111). 

An  Indictment  for  forgery  of  a  writing 
"or"  paper  did  not  describe  the  Instrument  in 
the  alternative^  since  the  words  "writing" 
and  "paper"  when  connected  disjunctively 
clearly  amount  to  the  same  thing,  a  written 
Instrument  Blala  v.  SUte,  126  &  W.  1064, 
1066,  94  Ark.  827. 

An  indictment  Is  subject  to  demurrer  If 
the  descriptive  terms  relating  to  any  material 
allegation  are  set  forth  in  an  alternate  form. 
The  word  "or"  is  generally  used  as  a  dis- 
junctive, and  to  express  the  notion  that  the 
two  clauses  which  it  connects  are  alternative ; 
but  this  is  not  always  so.  It  may  properly 
be  used  to  introduce  a  statement  which  is 
an  amplification  or  expIaDation  of  a  preced- 
ing statement  The  use  of  the  word  in  the 
present  indictment  was  of  the  latter  nature. 
Whltaker  v.  State,  76  S.  B.  258,  11  Ga.  App. 
208. 

A  pleader  should  use  the  word  "and" 
in  an  indictment  when  the  word  "or"  Is  used 
in  the  statute,  whenever  the  word  "or"  would 
leave  the  averment  uncertain  as  to  which  of 
two  or  more  things  is  meant,  but  not  so 
where  the  complaint  <^arges  inaction  as  the 
violation  of  a  statute  commanding  action,  and 
the  use  of  the  conjunctive  "and,"  Instead  of 
the  disjunctive  "or,"  would  not  make  the  al- 
legation more  certain.  In  a  prosecution  un- 
der Pub.  Laws  1908,  p.  287,  c.  1592,  |  12,  re- 
quiring every  chauffeur,  after  knowingly  caus- 
ing an  accident  by  collision  or  otherwise, 
or  knowingly  injuring  any  person,  horse,  or 
vehicle,  to  forthwith  bring  his  motor  vehicle  to 
a  full  stop,  return  to  the  scene  of  the  accident, 


and  give  to  any  proper  panon,  ikmuOit 
the  aaiM,  the  number  of  hla  driver's  Uoaa, 
tiia  regtatratioB  number  of  the  motor  Tebide. 
and  the  names  and  reddsDoes  otm±wk 
occupant  It  was  held  tiiat,  under  the  ni« 
ttiat  the  word  "or"  la  a  proper  oonoectiTsia 
pleading  negative  averments,  a  oompUist 
charging  that  accused,  while  driving  &  sifitdr 
▼ehlde,  did  not,  after  knowingly  cuim  u 
accident  by  a  collision  with  a  horse,  etc. 
bring  such  vehicle  to  a  full  stop  "or'*  letnn 
to  the  scene  of  the  accident  bat  drore  tbe 
vehicle  away  therefrom  with  great  speei 
against  the  statute,  eta,  was  not  objection- 
able for  duplicity.  State  v.  SmiUi,  72  At: 
710,  711,  715,  29  K,  I.  513. 

8am»-lB  wUla 

To  effectuate  the  intention  of  fiie  tesa 
tor,  the  word  "or"  may  be  read  as  'W  cr 
vice  versa,  when  necessary  to  avoid  defeitiai 
his  intention.  Shropshire  ▼.  Gaalt  (Ky.)  S?^ 
S.  W.  690  (citing  Hunt  t.  Johnson,  10  B 
Mon.  [49  Ky.]  342;  Robb  ▼.  Belt,  12  B.  Mot 
151  Ky.]  647;  Aulick  v.  Wallace^  12  Bosfe 
[76  Ky.]  631) ;  In  re  Allison,  102  N.  I.  %Wr 
887,  891,  68  fiflsc.  Bep.  222;  Shaver's  Adal 
▼.  Bwald's  Ex*r,  134  S.  W.  906,  907, 142  Kr. 
472. 

Where,  from  the  language  of  the  wilL  it 
la  apparent  that  the  testator  used  the  vord 
"or"  as  the  equivalent  of  "and,"  it  will  be 
so  Gonatrued.  Olcott  v.  Tope,  115  ni  App. 
121;  Id.,  72  N.  B.  761,  753,  213  lU.  U 
Thus  where  testatrix  made  specific  beqae^« 
to  some  of  the  diildren  and  all  of  the  gnsd^ 
children  of  her  toother  who  had  four  If 
ing  children,  two  of  whom  had  children  ^'^ 
four  deceased  children,  two  of  whom  le^ 
issue  surviving,  and  further  proTided  M 
the  house  In  which  she  lived  was  to  be  dl^ 
posed  of  and  the  proceeds  equally  dinde^ 
between  the  "children  and  heirs'*  of  her  brott 
er,  the  clause  disposing  of  the  remaloder  d 
her  estate  to  the  "living  children  or  heirs  of 
her  brother.  Including  the  widow  of  a  de- 
ceased child  and  the  son  of  another  deceased 
child,"  should  be  construed  as  if  ''or"  was 
"and."  McClench  ▼.  Waldron,  91  N.  B.  12& 
128,  204  Mas&  664. 

In  a  will  by  which  testatrix  gave  h« 
entire  estate  to  her  daughter,  providing  tiiit 
if  she  should  not  be  living  "at  the  time  oi 
my  decease  or  die  without  lawful  Issne"  tb? 
estate  should  be  divided  between  her  t^ 
sons,  the  word  "or"  will  be  constrned  tf 
mean  "and,"  and  the  daughter,  snrrlTlnir  t!ie 
mother,  wiU  take  the  whole  estate  absolnt^^ 
In  re  Edwards*  Estate,  76  Aa  28,  29,  22T  Pi 
299,  19  Ann.  Oas.  921. 

Under  the  provision  for  the  establl^ 
ment  of  an  asylum  with  the  money  ^ 
queathed  to  the  adopted  daughters,  or  i^ 
of  them,  upon  the  deatii  of  either  before  tt^ 
should  become  of  age  or  be  married, 
amount  bequeathed  to  B.  was  notawfla^ 
for  such  charitable  use  where  ahe  becan« 


OB 


761 


OB 


age  before  her  deatb  unmarried,  it  being  ao 
available  only  in  case  sbe  died  before  either 
event  happened;  it  being  p^rmlaaible  to  oon^ 
fltme  the  word  "or"  to  mean  "and,'*  when  it 
seems  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the  meaning 
of  testator.  Clarke  v.  Inhabitants  of  An- 
dover,  d2  N.  B.  1018,  1016,  207  Mass.  91. 

A  testator  devised  his  whole  estate  to  his 
wife  to  manage  and  control  in  every  particn* 
lar,  "that  is  to  say,  to  seU  a  part  or  any  part, 
or  the  whole,  shonld  it  be  necessary  or  ad- 
visable in  her  best  Judgment"  Held,  that 
she  took  the  property  absolutely,  and  that 
her  title  was  not  cut  down  by  the  subsequent 
provlrion  '*or  I  further  wish  and  desire  my 
said  wife  to  make  a  last  will  and  testament 
wherein  such  division  of  our  estate  shall  be 
made  among  our  children  as  in  her  best  ludg- 
ment  will  be  just,  reasonable  and  proper"; 
"or^  apparently  meaning  in  the  event  of  her 
not  selling  the  property,  and,  even  if  read  as 
"and,"  merely  expressing  a  wish  as  to  the 
disposition  she  should  make  of  the  property. 
Snyder  v.  Snyder,  83  AtL  246,  247,  116  Md. 
e09. 

A  will,  after  giving  a  life  use  of  testa- 
tor's residuary  estate,  consisting  of  land,  to 
his  wife,  provided  that  after  her  death,  sub- 
ject to  her  life  use  thereof,  testator  gave  to 
his  daughter  A.  for  her  life  the  use  of  the 
T.  block,  and  then  proceeded:  "On  the  death 
of  both  my  said  wife  and  daughter,  I  give 
♦  ♦  •  said  T.  block  to  my  son  H.  abso- 
lutely, or  in  case  he  should  die  before  that 
time,  to  his  legal  helrs-at-law,  to  be  distrib- 
uted among  them  as  if  it  were  his  intestate 
property."  Held,  that  reading  the  devise 
to  the  son,  as  it  must  be  read  in  view  of  the 
rule  that  the  law  favors  vested  estates,  as 
though  phrased  "subject  to  the  life  estates 
above  created  in  favor  of  my  wife  and  daugh- 
ter, I  give,"  etc.,  and  treating  the  word  "or," 
in  said  devise,  as  used  as  the  equivalent  of 
"and,"  which  use  is  plainly  shown  from  the 
employment  of  the  latter  word  for  a  Uke  pur- 
pose in  a  subsequent  devise  of  a  remainder  to 
the  daughter,  the  son  was  given  a  vested  re- 
mainder in  fea  Cody  v.  Staples,  07  Atl.  1,  80 
Conn.  82. 

Testatrix  gave  all  her  realty  to  her  hus- 
band for  life,  after  his  death  such  realty  to 
revert  to  testatrix's  two  daughters,  and  pro- 
vided that,  if  either  daughter  should  die 
without  leaving  legal  issue,  the  property 
should  go  to  the  other  daughter,  if  living, 
and,  if  both  should  die  without  leaving  legal 
issue,  the  property  should  go  to  testatrix's 
husband  "or  his  heirs."  Held,  that  the  in- 
tent was  that,  if  both  daughters  died  without 
leaving  legal  issue  during  their  father's  life- 
time, the  daughters'  interests  should  go  to 
him  in  fee,  the  daughters  taking  remainders 
which  vested  in  them  immediately  upon  tes- 
tatrix's death;  the  word  "or"  in  the>  phrase 
"or  his  heirs"  being  construed  as  "and,"  the 
general  rule  that,  where  the  context  of  the 
will  is  flQent,  woida  rafsfxlng  to  the  death  of 


the  prior  legatee  In  oonnection  with  some 
collateral  event  apply  where  the  contingency 
happens  after  as  well  as  before  death  of  tes- 
tator, not  applying  where  the  context  shows 
the  intent  to  be  otherwise.  Smith  v.  Dellitt, 
94  N.  £.  lis,  116,  249  IlL  118  (citing  6  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  0008). 

Hot  eoastraed  as  and 

The  conjunction  "or"  may  be  used  as  a 
disjunctive  or  as  an  equivalent.  As  stated 
in  Webster's  International  Dictionary,  "or" 
may  be  used  to  join  as  alternatives  terms  ex- 
pressing unlike  things  or  ideas,  or  different 
terms  expressing  the  same  thing  or  idea. 
Amet  V.  Texas  &  P.  By.  Co.,  41  South.  721, 
722,  117  La.  464. 

The  use  of  the  disjunctive  "or"  in  "where 
goods,  wares  or  merchandise  are  manufac- 
tured or  offered  for  sale,"  means  either 
where  they  are  manufactured,  or  where  they 
are  offered  for  sale.  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W. 
R.  Co.  V.  Cavanaugh,  71  N.  B.  239,  242,  35 
Ind.  App.  82. 

The  meaning  of  the  term  "proper  party,'* 
as  used  in  the  phrase  'Is  not  a  proper  or  nec- 
essary party,"  is  not  so  clear  as  the  mean^ 
of  the  term  "not  a  necessary  party."  The 
word  ''or"  may  be  used  in  two  forms.  In  one 
it  corresponds  to  "either,"  and  in  that  sense 
the  term  "proper  or  necessary"  would  mean 
either  proper  or  necessary;  that  is,  one  or 
the  other.  In  the  other  form  it  means  to  ex- 
press the  same  thing  alternatively  in  differ- 
ent words.  In  that  sense,  the  term  "not 
proper  or  necessary,"  would  imply  that  it  was 
not  proper;  that  is,  not  necessary.  Jones  v. 
Kansas  City,  Ft  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  77  S.  W. 
890,  893,  178  Mo.  628,  101  Am.  St  Rep.  434. 

Provisions  in  the  charter  of  a  college 
that  the  trustees  should  hold  inviolate  all 
furniture,  stock,  assets,  lands,  buildings, 
moneys,  or  endowment  funds,  professorships, 
scholarships,  or  other  funds,  did  not  forbid 
the  trustees  from  using  for  current  expenses 
money  donated  without  any  direction  as  to 
the  purpose  for  which  it  was  to  be  used; 
the  word  "or"  not  being  used  as  equivalent  to 
"either,"  and  as  presenting  the  choice  of  ei- 
ther. The  word  "or"  has  two  significations. 
It  may  be  used  to  convey  the  idea  of  an  al- 
ternative, or  may  be  used  to  join  different 
terms  expressing  the  same  thing  or  idea,  and 
in  this  sense  it  was  here  used.  Board  of 
Trustees  of  Park  College  v.  Attorney  Gener- 
al, 129  S.  W.  27,  81,  228  Mo.  614. 

In  an  action  under  Civil  Damage  Act 
(Code  1906,  c.  32)  |  26,  by  a  wife  injured  in 
her  means  of  support,  against  a  saloon  keep- 
er alleged  to  have  unlawfully  sold  her  hus- 
band intoxicants,  it  was  error  to  instruct 
that  a  sale  of  intoxicants  to  a  person  "at  a 
time  when  he  was  intoxicated  or  when  the 
defendant,  or  his  bartender,  or  cleric,  or  any 
of  them,  knew  or  had  reason  to  believe"  he 
was  intoxicated,  was  an  unlawful  sale,  since 
an  actual  sale  to  an  intoxicated  person,  and 


OR 


702 


OB 


knowledstt,  actual  or  oonstnictlve,  by  the 
seller  of  sach  Intoxlcatlou,  are  two  eaaentlal 
elements  of  one  offense,  and  the  word  ^^or** 
instead  of  "and"  conveys  the  idea  that  either 
element  of  the  offense,  without  the  other,  is 
sufficient  to  constitnte  an  unlawful  sale. 
Duckworth  v.  Stalnaker,  60  S.  E.  850,  854,  68 
W.  Va.  197. 

A  city  ordinance  providing  that  the  dty 
treasurer  shall  receive  a  monthly  salaiy  And 
a  specified  *'per  cent  of  all  moneys  received 
and  paid  out  by  him  as  treasurer,"  which 
shall  be  payable  monthly,  is  unambiguous, 
and  comprehends  both  a  receipt  and  disburse- 
ment of  funds  before  any  commisision  is  pay- 
able; and  under  Code  Civ.  Proc.  {  1858,  re- 
quiring the  court,  in  the  construction  of  a 
statute,  to  declare  its  terms,  and  not  insert 
what  has  been  omitted,  the  court  may  not 
construe  the  ordinance  so  as  to  allow  the  per- 
centage on  all  moneys  received,  and  on  all 
moneys  paid  out,  by  construing  the  word 
"and"  in  the  quoted  phrase  to  mean  "or." 
City  of  Corona  v.  Merriam,  128  Pac  769,  770, 
20  Cal.  App.  231. 

It  is  error  to  define  a  principal  as  one 
who  "aids  or  abets"  in  the  commission  of  a 
crime  instead  of  "aids  and  abets"  in  accord- 
ance with  the  definition  of  I'en.  Code,  §  41. 
State  V.  Allen,  87  Pac.  177,  178,  34  Mout.  403 
(dttng  People  t.  Dole  [Cal.]  51  Pac.  945;  Id., 
55  Pac.  581, 122  Cal.  486,  68  Am.  St  Rep.  50). 

An  instruction  that  accused,  on  trial  for 
homicide,  cannot  be  guilty  as  an  aider  or 
abettor  in  the  kiUing  of  decedent  if  he  gave 
no  "assistance  or  uttered  no  word  to  the  per- 
son doing  the  killing,"  etc.,  is  misleading  for 
using  the  word  "or,"  instead  of  "and,"  be- 
tween the  words  "assistance"  and  "uttered." 
Morris  ▼.  State,  41  South.  274,  284,  146  Ala. 
66. 

Where,  in  a  prosecution  for  keeping  a 
bawdy  house,  the  court  charged  that  a  bawdy- 
house  was  a  house  of  ill  fame  kept  for  the 
resort  and  commerce  of  lewd  people  of  both 
sexes,  an  instruction  that  if  the  jury  believ- 
ed that  accused  kept  a  common  bawdyhouse 
and  "did  willfully  and  knowingly  keep  or 
suffer  to  remain  in  and  about  her  house  lewd 
women,  or  men,  for  the  purpose  of  prostitu- 
tion, or  permit  them  to  come  together  and 
meet  or  remain  there  for  the  purpose  of  hav- 
ing illicit  sexual  intercourse,"  etc.,  she  was 
guilty,  was  not  prejudicially  erroneous  in 
that  the  use  of  the  disjunctive,  "or,"  author- 
ized a  conviction  in  case  accused  suffered  ei- 
ther lewd  women  or  men  to  remain  in  her 
house  without  requiring  that  the  house  was 
permitted  to  be  used  for  immoral  purposes. 
State  V.  Price,  92  S.  W.  174,  175,  115  Mo. 
App.  656. 

In  a  docket  entry  of  a  justice  of  the 
peace,  relating  to  the  preliminary  examina- 
tion of  a  person  charged  with  crime,  which 
recites  that  the  offense  of  "pocket  picking 
'or*  larceny  from  the  person"  had  been  commit- 
ted, tlie  word  "or"  la  not  used  disjunctively, 


bat  liidlcateB  the  synonym  of  the  tenns  pie. 
ceding  and  following  it  State  v.  Duid,  7: 
Pac  811,  812,  66  Kan.  483. 

Where,  in  an  action  for  injuries  to  u 
employ^,  the  grounds  of  negligence  were  the 
failure  of  the  engineer  to  warn  the  emplojl 
of  the  backing  of  the  train  and  the  failure  to 
keep  a  brakeman  stationed  near  the  re&r  od 
of  the  train  to  warn  the  employ^  and  dim 
was  nothing  in  the  evidence  to  sngsest  vlj 
other  grounds  of  recovery,  an  iiutnKtu>a 
that  if  the  person  in  charge  of  the  en^oeat 
the  time  of  the  injniy  was  guilty  of  &e$3- 
genoe  in  operating  the  engine,  followed  by  i 
distinct  disjunctive  statement  of  the  tic 
grounds  of  negligence  alleged,  is  not  mta^r 
ing,  though  connected  by  the  word  'a: 
which  must  have  been  used  in  the  sense  of 
"that  is."  Choctaw,  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Ca  t.  iic 
Laughlin,  96  8.  W.  1091,  1093,  43  TeL  Qr 
App.  523. 

Same— In  eivil  statmtes 

Const  {  201,  prohibiting  consolidatioo  of 
"parallel  or  competing"  railroads,  sbooid  n^ 
be  read  "parallel  and  competing."  Commoir 
wealth  ex  rel.  Breathitt  v.  LouisviUe  k  \  ^ 
Co.,  138  S.  W.  291,  293,  144  Ky.  324,  Am 
Caa  1913A,  633. 

The  word  "or"  may  be  osed  to  jot 
as  alternatives,  terms  expressing  diflereit 
things,  as  well  as  to  join  different  terms  ei 
pressing  the  same  thing,  and,  in  a  sutine 
giving  an  action  for  damages  caused  bj  m* 
son  of  the  insufficiency  of  any  bridge  or  a- 
vert,  it  is  used  In  the  former  sense,  so  tlui 
it  does  not  co-ordinate  "bridge"  and  'col 
vert,"  and  make  each  in  turn  the  eqoiraitii 
of  the  other,  but  specialises  one  to  one  oh^ 
ing  and  the  other  to  another  meanlDg,  tbif 
making  the  statute  mean  as  though  it  kaI 
"either  a  bridge  or  a  culvert"  Clevelwd  t. 
Town  of  Washington,  65  AU.  684, 585.  T^  Vi 
498. 

**The  conjunction  'or*  may  be  osed  mi 
disjunctive  or  as  an  equivalent*'  As  uaed  ii> 
a  statute  providing  that  all  claims  for  l«»fc 
or  damages  to  the  owner  caused  by  its  ta)^^ 
ing  "or"  expropriaUon  for  pubUc  works  shi'l 
be  barred  by  two  years*  prescription,  tbt 
word  "or"  makes  the  terms  taking  and  o 
propriation  equivalent  Amet  v.  Texas  &  P 
Ry.  Co.,  41  South.  721,  722,  117  La.  454  (dt 
ing  and  adopting  Webst  Int  Diet). 

The  word  "or,"  in  Acts  1889,  p.  117.  <- 
81,  providing  that  a  conditional  seller,  on  i^ 
gaining  possession  on  the  buyer's  de&Q>^ 
shall  advertise  the  property  for  sale  *^y 
printed  hand  bills  or  written  or  printed  »' 
Uces/*  etc,  is  used  in  its  ordinary  meanio^ 
to  indicate  an  altemaUve.  J.  I.  Case  Thresl^ 
ing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Watson,  122  S.  W.  974. 9-* 
122  Tenn.  156. 

As  used  in  Code,  |  3106,  providing  tbat 
every  laborer  or  miner  who  shall  perftnn  1* 
bor  in  opening,  developing,  or  operating  ttj 
coal  mfae  shall  have  a  Ucn  an  aU  property 


OR 


763 


OR 


of  the  person,  firm  or  corporation  owning  or 
peratlng  soch  mine,"  etc,  the  word  **or/' 
etween  the  words  "owning"  and  "operate 
Qg/'  cannot  be  ooastrued  to  mean  "and," 
nd  henoe  the  statute  does  not  give  a  lien  on 
aiDing  property  of  an  owner  in  favor  of  the 
mployte  of  an  operating  lessee.  Caster  t. 
fcOleUan,  109  N.  W.  1020,  1021,  132  Iowa, 
02  (citing  G  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  6009). 

The  statute  making  adultery  ground  for 
lirorce,  but  imposing  on  the  complaining 
tfirty  the  burden  of  proving  that  the  adultery 
ras  without  his  or  her  "consent,  connivance, 
(rivity,  or  procurement,"  by  the  use  of  the 
iisjunctlve  conjunction  "or"  makes  the  Inhibi- 
lon  apply  to  each  of  the  quoted  words  sep- 
irately,  and  the  existence  of  either  condition 
s  therefore  suflkdent  to  bar  a  favorable  de- 
!ree.  Richardson  v.  Richardson,  114  N.  T. 
}app.  912,  910. 

Webster  says  the  colijunctlon  "or"  Is 
>ften  placed  between  different  terms  express- 
ng  the  same  thing  or  idea;  as  this  is  a 
iphere  or  globe.  The  word  "assessments" 
ind  the  word  "dues,"  in  Rev.  St  1899,  §  1408 
Ann.  St  1906,  p.  1111),  declaring  that  a  fra- 
ernal  beneliciary  association  might  make 
)royision  for  the  payment  of  benefits  from  a 
und  to  be  derived  from  "assessments  or 
lues"  collected  from  Its  members,  are  used 
here  without  definition,  and  seemingly  as 
ueaning  the  same  thing.  State  ex  rel.  Su- 
)Teme  Lodge  K.  P.  v.  Vandiver,  111  S.  W. 
)11.  916,  213  Mo.  187,  16  Ann.  Cas.  283. 

In  Act  May  .11,  1874,  imposing  a  double 
iability  on  "all  stockholders  in  banks,  bank- 
Dg  companies,  saving  fund  institutions,  trust 
companies  and  all  other  incorporated  compa- 
nies doing  the  business  of  banks  or  loaning 
ind  discouDting  moneys  as  such  in  this  com- 
monwealth," the  word  "or**  is  used  to  mark 
!in  equivalent  and  has  the  same  effect  as  If 
it  were  "that  is."  De  Haven  v.  Pratt,  72 
ai.  1068,  1073,  223  Pa.  633. 

In  Acts  1906,  p.  679,  c.  167,  §  123  (Bums* 
dm,  St  1908,  §  7793),  provides  that  any  per- 
son aggrieved  b^  decision  of  the  county  com- 
missioners in  proceeding  relating  to  hlgh- 
n^ays  may  appeal,  and  that  such  appeal  shall 
t)e  tried  de  novo,  and  may  be  had  as  to  any  is- 
sue tried,  "or  that  might  have  been  tried,  be- 
fore the  county  board,"  the  last  clause  only 
authorizes  the  trial  of  such  Issues  as  might 
tiave  been  tried  under  issues  before  the  board, 
and  does  not  authorize  the  trial  of  issues  not 
presented.  JGtna  Life  Ins.  Go.  v.  Jones,  89 
N.  E.  871,  872,  173  Ind.  149. 

Under  Mills'  Ann.  St  Colo.  §  1508,  giv- 
ing a  right  of  action  for  death  negligently 
claused  by  a  carrier  to  be  sued  for  aud  re- 
LX)vered,  first,  by  the  husband  or  wife,  If 
there  is  no  husband  or  wife,  by  the  children, 
and,  if  the  deceased  be  a  minor  or  unmar- 
ried, by  the  father  and  mother,  the  words 
"minor  or  unmarried*'  cannot  be  construed 
to  mean  "minor  and  unmarried,"  thus  giving 


no  riglit  of  action  for  the  death  of  an  adult 
leaving  no  husband,  wife,  or  children,  but 
should  be  construed  as.  giving  the  father  and 
mother  a  right  of  action  whenever  the  de- 
ceased leaves  no  husband,  wife,  or  children. 
Hopper  V.  Denver  &  R.  G.  B.  Co.,  155  Fed. 
273,  275,  84  0.  C.  A.  21. 

Under  Levee  Act,  i  58,  providing  that  the 
owner  of  land  outside  a '  drainage  district 
who  shall  make  a  connection  with  a  drain- 
age ditch  or  whose  land  will  be  benefited  by 
such  ditch  shall  be  deemed  to  have  made 
voluntary  application  to  be  Included  in  the 
district,  it  is  not  necessary  that  there  should 
be  both  connection  and  benefit,  but  either 
in  itself  Is  sufficient,  since  this  Is  the  plain 
and  unambiguous  meaning  of  the  language 
of  the  act,  and  there  is  no  room  for  construc- 
tion where  there  Is  no  ambiguity,  and,  while 
"or'*  may  sometimes  be  construed  In  statutes, 
contracts,  or  wills  as  "and"  to  effectuate  the 
intention  of  the  parties,  this  will  be  done 
only  where  the  intention  Is  clearly  manifest, 
and  a  construction  of  the  word  according  to 
its  real  meaning  would  Involve  an  absurdity, 
or  produce  an  unreasonable  result  Qar 
Creek  Drainage  Dist.  v.  Wagner,  100  N.  E. 
190,  196,  266  III.  888. 

Baiae    Tn  penal  atatntea 

Penal  statutes  are  to  be  construed  In  fa- 
vor of  the  accused,  and  the  word  "or"  will 
not  in  general  be  construed  "and"  or  vice 
versa,  where  the  effect  would  be  to  aggravate 
the  offense  or  would  be  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  accused.  Williams  v.  United  States, 
87  Pac.  647,  648,  17  Okl.  28  (citing  United 
States  V.  Ten  Cases  of  Shawls,  28  Fed.  Cas. 
35;  Rice  v.  United  States,  53  Fed.  910,  4 
C.  C.  A.  104 ;  United  States  v.  Fisk,  3  WalL 
[70  U.  S.]  445,  18  L.  Ed.  243). 

Rev.  St  1870,  |  910,  making  it  an  offense 
to  retail  intoxicating  liquors  "without  pre- 
viously obtaining  a  license  therefor  from  the 
police  jury  of  said  parish  or  from  the  author* 
itles  of  any  town  or  dty,"  is  to  be  construed 
literally,  and  the  word  "and"  cannot  be  sub- 
stituted for  the  word  "or."  State  v.  Lewis, 
41  South.  63, 110  La.  762; 

In  a  statute  which  punishes  "every  per- 
son who  holds,  arrests,  returns  or  causes  to 
be  held,  arrested  or  returned,"  three  distinct 
acts  are  mentioned,  that  of  holding,  arrest- 
ing, and  returning,  and  the  disjunctive  "or** 
indicates  the  separation  between  them  and 
shows  that  either  one  may  be  the  subject  of 
indictment  and  punishment  Clyatt  v.  Unit- 
ed States,  25  Sup.  Ct  429,  431,  197  U.  S. 
207,  49  L.  Ed.  726. 

As  used  in  Rev.  St  §  792,  making  it 
criminal  to  assault  another  by  willfully 
shooting  at  him,  "or"  with  intent  to  commit 
murder,  rape  "or"  robbery,  the  word  "or'*  is 
to  be  taken  as  written ;  and  "shooting  at"  is 
a  complete  crime  In  Itself.  State  v.  Fnlr- 
banks,  89  South.  448,  444,  115  La.  457  (citing 


0& 


7M 


OK 


Bute  T.  Bradj.  2  Sonftli,  0D6»  89  Lk.  Abd. 
687). 

The  word  *'or,*'  m  VMd  in  BftUinger't 
Ann.  Codes  ft  81  |  7104,  prorldlnc  tor  tbe 
punlahment  of  persons  who  sbaU  ^'wUlfnlly 
or  maUdouBly"  commit  certain  acts,  cannot 
be  construed  as  ''and."  State  ▼.  Tiffany,  87 
Pac.  032,  d38,  44  Wash.  802  (citing  Bonntree 
▼.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  110;  Weiner  t.  8tat% 
87  K.  W.  417,  96  Wis.  268). 


to— Im  pUmMmM 

The  diflJnnctiTe  "or,**  in  an  allegation 
that  the  death  of  a  servant  was  canaed  by 
the  negligence  of  the  officials  or  some  one  of 
the  employes  of  defendant,  and  especially  by 
the  negligence  of  the  employ^  of  defendant 
or  its  officers,  Indicates  that  the  words  ''offi- 
cers," ''officials,'*  and  "employ^**  meant  the 
same  thing— coemployte  or  fellow  serrants 
of  deceased.  State,  to  Use  of  Zier  ▼.  Chesa- 
peake Beach  By.  Co^  56  AtL  886,  888,  08  Md. 
85. 


will* 

The  word  ''and"  will  not  be  snbstitnted 
for  "or"  in  tU^  danse  in  a  will  pvovidillg  f6r 
the  disposition  of  the  testator's  estate  in 
case  any  of  his  sons  shonld  die  "without 
leaving  a  wife  or  child,"  nnless  the  whol4 
context  of  the  will  plaiiUy  and  beyond  qnes- 
tton  requires  such  sabstitation  in  order  to 
give  effect  to  the  intention  of  the  testator. 
Travers  ▼.  Beinhardt,  27  Sup.  Ot  583,  565, 
205  U.  S.  423,  51  L.  Ed.  865. 

In  construing  the  expression  in  a  wHI, 
"without  leaving  a  wife,  or  a  child,  or  chil- 
dren," the  word  "and"  will  not  be  substituted 
for  the  disjunctive  "or,"  where  the  dominant 
intention  of  the  testator  in  the  disposal  of 
his  estate  as  appears  from  his  will,  does  not 
require  su<di  substitution,  and  especially 
where  the  repetition  of  the  same  expression 
in  another  part  of  the  will  shows  delibera- 
tion and  care  by  the  testator  in  the  selection 
of  words.  Under  such  circumstances,  the 
words  used,  being  plain  and  unambiguous, 
must  be  given  their  ordinary  and  usual 
meaning,  and  cannot  be  controlled  by  con- 
jecture. Traverse  v.  B^nhardt,  25  App.  D. 
0.  567,  576. 

The  word  "or,"  as  used  in  devises  to 
one's  children  "or"  other  lineal  descendantSi 
etc.,  indicates  alternate  devises  to  children, 
if  any,  and,  if  none,  then  to  other  lineal  de- 
scendants. BeiUy  V.  Bristow,  66  AtL  262, 
264,  105  Md.  826. 

Where  testatrix  bequeathed  to  her  infant 
daughter  all  her  residuary  estate,  with  a  pro- 
vision that  if  she  should  die  before  arriving 
at  the  age  of  21  years  or  without  disposing 
of  the  same,  or  without  having  made  a  last 
will,  then  over,  in  construing  the  proviso, 
"and"  could  not  be  substituted  for  "or,"  as 
it  would  express  a  saise  contrary  to  the 
plain  intent  of  the  testatrix.  In  re  Polley's 
Estate,  62  Aa  558,  554,  70  N.  J.  Bq.  658. 


A  will  ta  whidi  tHlator  fltatsd  hh 
intention  to  tmvel  and  that  knowing  tbe  hd- 
oerCainty  of  a  jontney  h&  beqaeatiied  Mi 
real  estate  and  pemonal  piopeftr  ta  Ui 
wife  and  also  all  Judgments  owned  fay  hia 
and  notes  due,  and  should  anytblog  beftl 
him  while  away,  "or"  that  he  should  die. 
all  his  estate  and  property  was  set  orer  tc 
his  wife  for  her  sole  benefit,  waa  not  nmelj 
contingent  on  testator's  death  during  tbe 
Journey,  but  continued  operative  after  1^ 
safe  return  and  his  death  thereafter.  In  re 
Forquers'  Estate,  66  AtL  82,  95,  216  Pa.  SI, 
8  Ann.  Cas.  U46. 

Testator's  wiU  gave  hla  wife  a  life  » 
tate,  and  provided  tiiat  on  her  death  tbe 
property  should  be  divided  between  his'^dill^ 
dren  or  their  heirs  as  the  Uw  directs."  H^ 
that,  inasmneh  as  under  Code,  §  2913,  maUag 
technical  words  unnecessary  to  create  a  Ut 
a  construction  of  '''or"  aa  "and"  would  render 
the  clause  meaningless,  and  as  there  appeu^ 
ed  no  reason  to  believe  "or"  was  intended  tas 
"and,"  the  will  meant  that  the  heirs  of  & 
child  dying  before  the  life  tenant  took  oi^ff 
the  will,  and  not  by  descent,  and  hence  xi& 
remainder  was  contingent  Conrts  of  jasti.> 
will  transpose  the  clauses  of  a  will  and  ccih 
strue  "or"  to  be  "and"  and  "and"  to  be  "or- 
only  in  sudi  cases  when  it  is  absolutely  seo 
essary  so  to  do  to  support  the  evident  js^vt 
ing  of  the  testator.  But  th^  cannot  aitr.- 
trarily  expunge  or  alter  words  without  ssd 
apparent  necessity.  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  92  X. 
W.  71,  72,  118  Iowa,  407  (citing  Griffithf 
Lessee  v.  Woodward  [Pa.]  1  Yeatea,  318). 

Testator,  having  when  he  wrote  his  win 
but  one  sister  and  one  half-sister  and  ose 
half-brother  living,  and  having  had  brotiiei? 
and  sisters  who  died  previously,  leaving  is- 
sue, the  heirs  of  such  deceased  brothers  &ad 
sisters  are  Included  in  the  provision  of  tbe 
will  for  division  of  property  between  his  '^ 
ters  and  brothers  or  their  heirs.**  The  word 
"or,"  as  thus  used,  probably  has  no  signif- 
cance,  if  used  alone,  but,  when  used  in  cf^ 
nectlon  with  a  gift  to  "hia  brothers  or  tbeir 
heirs,"  would  seon  to  indicate  an  IntentioB 
that,  where  the  brothers  w«:e  not  living  so 
they  could  not  take,  their  heirs  shonld  take 
for  them.  In  re  Edwarda,  117  N.  T.  S\m 
8,  5,  132  App.  Div.  644. 


"Or"  ia  usually  disjunctive,  occastosa}- 
ly  is  construed  as  a  conjunction  to  avoid  aN 
surdity,  and  is  sometimes  used  In  the  so^ 
of  "aliaa,"  as,  "violin  or  fiddle."  ^^Or,"  witb^ 
in  the  provision  of  St  1888,  1 17T7,  for  tol] 
or  boom  charges"  by  a  boom  company,  is  osed 
in  the  sense  of  "alias."  Menominee  Ri^K 
Boom  Go.  V.  Augustus  Spies  Lumber  &  Cedar 
Ck).,  132  N.  W.  1118, 1122, 147  Wis.  559. 

As  oomf errlas  dlseretioiuurj  poorer 

As  used  in  a  municipal  ordinance  wlric^ 
provided  that  whoever  should  be  found  g^- 
ty  of  being  a  vagrant  shonld  be  fined  not  M 


OPERATE 


746 


OPBRATB' 


of  Rev.  St  1899,  |  2878,  maklDg  every  rail- 
road corporatioii  liable  for  all  injuries  to  a 
senrant  while  engaged  In  the  work  of  operat- 
ing the  railroad  by  reason  of  the  negligence 
of  any  other  servant  OrendorfT  v.  Terminal 
R.  Ass'n  of  St  Louis»  92  S.  W.  148,  149,  116 
Mo.  App.  34a 

The  fellow  servant  act  (Prlv.  Laws  1897, 
p.  83,  c.  56,  f  1),  giving  a  servant  of  any 
railroad  company  "operating"  in  the  state  a 
right  of  action  against  the  company  for  in- 
Jnries  sustained  through  the  negligence  of 
a  fellow  servant,  is  not  applicable  to  an  in 
jury  sustained  by  a  servant  assisting  in  the 
construction  of  a  railroad  at  a  point  five  or 
six  miles  from  the  completed  track,  and  stlU 
further  from  the  track  on  which  trains  were 
being  operated.  The  word  "operating,"  as 
an>Ued  to  a  railroad,  means  operation  in  the 
course  of  its  business  in  any  of  its  depart- 
ments but  not  in  the  course  of  its  construc- 
tion. Nicholson  V.  Transylvania  R.  Go.,  51 
S.  E.  40,  41,  138  N.  0.  516. 

While  the  mere  repair  of  a  roadbed  or 
track  is  not  operation  of  a  r^lroad,  yet  the 
risk  of  injury  attending  the  removal  from  the 
track  of  a  hand  car  used  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  a  sectioq  crew  and  materials  is  pe- 
culiar to  the  "^operation  of  railroads"  within 
a  statute  providing  that  every  railroad  shall 
be  liable  for  damages  to  its  employes  from 
risks  peculiar  to  the  "operation  of  railroads?' 
Hardt  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  110  N. 
V.  427,  431,  130  Wis.  512. 

Under  the  statute  providing  that  every 
railroad  corporation  owning  or  operating  a 
railroad  shall  be  liable  for  all  damages  sus- 
tained by  any  servant  "while  engaged  in  the 
work  of  operating  such  railroad,  by  the  neg- 
llg^ce  of  any  other  agent  or  servant  there- 
of," a  fireman  who,  after  attending  to  the 
headlight  of  his  engine,  stood  in  front  of  the 
pUot  a  short  ttme,  and,  while  returning  to  the 
cab,  was  struck  by  lumber  projecting  from 
the  door  of  one  of  the  passing  cars,  Was 
engaged  in  the  "operation  of  a  railroad." 
St  Louis  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Bussong,  90  S.  W. 
72,  73,  40  Tex.  Civ.  App.  476. 

A  contractor  to  furnish  logs  to  a  saw- 
mill over  a  logging  railroad,  to  which  spurs 
were  connected  and  on  which  a  log  skidder 
was  operated  solely  to  haul  logs  to  a  point 
where  they  could  be  loaded  on  cars  and  trans- 
ported to  the  mill,  was  a  person  "operating 
a  railroad"  within  Sayles*  Ann.  Civ.  St.  1897, 
art.  4560h,  providing  that  all  persons  engaged 
in  the  common  service  of  a  person  operating 
a  railroad  in  the  same  grade  of  employment 
and  together  doing  the  same  character  of 
work  at  the  same  time  and  place  are  "fellow 
servants,"  and  that  employes  who  do  not 
come  within  such  provisions  are  not  ffeUow 
servants.  Hampton  v.  Woolso^  (Tex.)  139  S. 
W.  88%  89a 


Aitu.  St  Ifloe,  I  28T3,  makes  every  rail- 
road liable  for  damages  sustained  by  a  serv- 
lint  while  engaged  in  operating  the  railroad 
by  reason  of  tlie  negligence  of  another  serv- 
ant Section  1192  requires  railroads  to  carry 
a  limited  amount  of  baggage  for  each  pas- 
senger, and  section  llOO  requires  them  to  give 
checks  Hierefor.  Plaintiff  was  injured  while 
engaged  with  another  employ^  in  transferring 
baggage  from  and  to  passenger  trains  to  the 
baggage  rooms  of  defendant  railroad  termi- 
nal company.  Held,  that  plaintiff  was  en- 
gaged in  "operating  the  railroad,"  within 
section  2873.  Turner  v.  Terminal  R.  Ass'n 
of  St  Louis,  111  a  W.  841,  842,  132  Ma  App. 
38. 

Rev.  St  1899,  f  2873,  provides  that  ev- 
ery railroad  corporation  owning  or  operating 
a  railroad  in  this  state  shall  be  liable  for  any 
damages  sustained  by  any  agent  or  servant 
thereof  while  engaged  in  the  work  of  operat- 
ing such  railroad  by  reason  of  the  negligence 
of  any  other  agent  or  servant  thereof.  Held, 
that  the  work  of  repairing  or  reconstructing 
a  bridge  over  which  a  railroad  company's 
track  was  laid  is  work  performed  In  "operat- 
ing such  railroad,"  vrtthin  the  meaning  of 
the  statute.  Huston  v.  Quincy,  O.  &  K.  C. 
R.  Co.,  107  S.  W.  1045,  1048.  129  Mo.  App. 
576. 

Rev.  St  Mo.  1899,  f  2873,  providing  that 
every  railroad  corporation  shall  be  liable  for 
all  damages  sustained  by  any  servant  while 
engaged  in  the  work  of  "operating  such  rail- 
road," by  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any 
other  agent  or  servant  thereof,  is  not  limited 
In  its  application  to  the  servants  of  the  rail- 
road company  actually  engaged  in  the  oper* 
ation  of  trains  thereon,  but  includes  all  serv- 
ants whose  work  is  directly  necessary  for 
the  running  of  trains,  and  therefore  includes 
section  hands  engaged  in  repairing  the  road. 
Callahan  v.  St  Louis  Merchants*  Bridge 
Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  71  a  W.  208,  170  Mo.  478, 
60  L.  R.  A.  249,  94  Am.  St  Rep.  746. 

Under  RaUroad  Law  (Laws  1800,  p.  1113, 
c.  565,  S  101)  as  amended  by  Laws  1897,  p. 
776,  c.  688,  relating  to  street  surface  rail- 
roads, and  providing  that  no  corporation  con- 
structing and  operating  a  railroad  under  the 
provisions  of  this  article,  etc.,  shall  charge  any 
passenger  more  than  five  cents  for  one  contlnu- 
ous  ride  from  any  point  on  its  road,  "or  on 
any  road,  line  or  branch  operated  by  it,  or 
under  its  control,"  to  any  other  point  thereof, 
etc.,  and  Railroad  Law  (Laws  1890,  p.  1096,  c. 
565,  §  39)  imposing  a  penalty  on  any  railroad 
corporation  receiving  more  than  the  lawful 
rate  of  fare,  etc.,  the  operation  or  control 
of  a  road  within  the  meaning  of  such  sections 
means  a  control  of  the  operation  of  the  road, 
and  not  merely  a  control  of  the  corporation 
or  individuals  operating  it  by  reason  of  the 
ownership  of  a  majority  of  the  road's  capi- 
tal stock.    Judgment  Senior  t.  New  York 


OFJSBATE 


746 


OPERATE 


aty  R.  Co.,  ©7  N.  Y.  Supp.  645,  111  App.  DIt. 
39. 

Where  a  railway  company  for  a  fixed 
rental  furnished  to  a  brewing  company  a 
locomotive  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the  brew- 
ing coinpany  in  a  yard  containing  tracks  and 
switches,  the  ties  and  rails  for  which  were 
owned  by  the  railway  company  and  the  real 
estate  by  the  brewing  company,  and  the  engi- 
neer and  fireman  operating  the  locomotive 
were  selected  by  the  railway  company  and 
paid  by  the  brewing  company,  the  mainte- 
nance and  operation  of  such  yard  was  the 
operation  of  a  railway,  within  Rev.  Laws 
1905,  I  2042,  pi^viding  that  every  company 
owning  or  operating  a  railroad  shall  be  liable 
for  all  damages  sustained  within  the  state 
by  any  agent  or  servant  thereof,  without 
contributory  negligence  on  his  part;  by  rea- 
son of  the  negligence  of  any  other  servant 
thereof,  so  that  neither  the  railway  company 
nor  the  brewing  company  could  escape  lia- 
bility to  an  injured  person  upon  the  ground 
that  the  injury  resulted  from  the  negligence 
of  a  fellow  servant,  if  the  injured  employ^ 
was  exposed  to  a  railroad  hazard.  Schoen  v. 
Chicago,  St  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  127  N.  W. 
433,  434,  112  Minn.  38,  45  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  841. 

In  Gen.  Laws  1899,  p.  214,  c.  125,  I  1, 
providing  that  whenever  freight,  baggage,  or 
other  property  has  been  transported  over  two 
or  more  railroads  operating  any  part  of  their 
roads  in  this  state  and  having  an  agent  in 
this  state,  or  operated  by  any  assignee,  trus- 
tee, or  receiver  of  such  railways,  suit  for  loss 
or  damages  thereto  may  be  brought  against 
any  one  or  all  of  such  railroad  corporations, 
the  term  "operating  any  part  of  their  roads 
in  this  state"  means  that  such  corporations 
are  engaged  in  the  transportation  of  freight, 
baggage,  or  other  property  within  the  state. 
Where  the  undisputed  evidence  showed  that 
a  railway  track  did  not  extend  into  the  state, 
and  that  the  company  was  not  engaged  in  the 
transportation  of  any  freight,  baggage,  or 
other  property  within  the  limits  of  the  state, 
but,  in  the  course  of  business  between  it  and 
another  railroad  company  as  connecting  lines, 
the  engines  and  cars  of  each  road  recipro- 
cally passed  over  the  boundary  line  of  the 
states  of  Texas  and  Arkansas,  in  no  sense 
could  it  be  said  that  such  interchange  of 
buMness  is  within  the  term  "operating  any 
part  of  their  roads  within  this  state."  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R  Co.  v.  J.  H.  White  &  Co., 
80  8.  W.  77,  79,  97  Tex.  493. 

Opevfttins  SAwaiill 

An  employ^  engaged  in  cutting  and  deliv- 
ering logs  to  his  employer's  sawmill  is  not 
entitled  to  a  lien,  under  Ballinger*s  Ann. 
Codes  &  St  i  5919,  giving  a  lien  for  labor  in 
the  operation  of  a  sawmill,  eta,  but  he  may 
assert  a  lien  on  the  logs  cut  and  delivered 
under  section  5390  et  seq.,  giving  to  a  person 
performing  labor  on  logs  a  lien  thereon,  etc. 


Qraham  t.  Gardner,  89  Pac  171,   172,  4S 
Wash.  648. 
Opsrmtins  street  rallwmy 

Authority  to  an  electric  company  to 
"operate"  its  railway  on  a  certain  street  does 
not  authorize  it  to  exclude  the  public  trom 
the  street  nor  to  operate  the  railway  so  as 
to  render  the  street  unnecessarily  dangerous. 
McKim  ▼.  City  of  Philadelphia,  06  AtL  340, 
342,  217  Pa.  243,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  506. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  street  railroad 
company  running  its  cars  over  portions  of  the 
lines  of  another  company  by  virtue  of  a  lease 
is  not  "operating"  a  railroad,  as  that  term 
is  employed  in  the  Constitution  and  in  Rail- 
road Law,  fifi  91, 102,  requiring  the  consent  of 
abutting  owners  to  the  construction  or  opera- 
tion of  a  street  railroad.  Topham  v.  Internr- 
ban  St  R.  Co.,  86  N.  T.  Supp.  295,  299,  42 
Misc.  Rep.  503  (citing  Ingersoll  v.  Nassau 
Electric  R.  Co.,  52  N.  E.  645,  167  N.  Y.  468, 
43  L.  R.  A.  236). 

OperAtins  trains,  looomotlTes,  or  ears 

Where  plaintiff  was  injured  while  block- 
ing up  a  turntable  so  as  to  tnm  a  push  car 
by  the  car  being  derailed  and  a  timber  there- 
on falling  on  plaintiff,  he  was  "operating  a 
car,"  within  Sayles'  Ann.  Civ.  St  1897,  art 
4560f,  making  railroads  liable  for  injuries  to 
employ^  while  operating  cars,  etc.,  by  negli- 
gence of  other  employte.  Missouri,  K.  ft  T. 
R^.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Bailey,  115  S.  W.  601,  606, 
53  Tex.  Civ.  App.  295. 

Injury  to  a  railway  sectionman,  caused 
by  his  foreman  suddenly  stopping  a  hand 
car  on  which  they  were  riding,  did  not  arise 
In  the  operation  of  railroad  trains,  within  the 
employer's  liability  act  (Bums'  Ann.  St.  1906, 
§  8017),  making  railroad  companies  liable  for 
injuries  to  employes  in  enumerated  cases. 
Rlchey  v.  Cleveland,  C,  C.  ft  St  L.  R.  Co.,  96 
N.  E.  694,  697,  176  Ind.  542. 

Where  sectionmen  in  building  a  tempora- 
ry track  used  a  push  car  to  bring  the  rails, 
and  plaintiff  was  injured  by  the  falling  of 
a  rail  while  being  removed  from  the  ear  to 
the  track,  the  injury  did  not  occur  while  en- 
gaged in  the  work  of  "operating  a  car,"  with- 
in the  fellow  servant  rule  of  Batts'  Ann.  Civ. 
St  art  4560ea.  Texarkana  ft  Ft  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Anderson,  118  S.  W.  127,  102  Tex.  402. 

"Operate:  •  •  •  (2)  To  effect  any  re- 
sult; exert  agency;  act  (3)  To  bring  about 
a  specified  result  (4)  To  produce  the  proper 
or  intended  effect"  Under  Rev.  St  art  4560f, 
providing  that  every  corporation  operating 
a  railroad  shall  be  liable  for  damages  sus- 
tained by  any  servant  while  engaged  in  oper- . 
ating  its  cars  by  reason  of  the  negligence  of 
any  other  servant,  though  a  fellow  servant, 
an  employ^  in  a  quarry  was  engaged  in  oper- 
ating a  car,  where  he  and  another  employ^ 
loaded  it  with  rock,  started  it,  and  mounted 
it  when  loaded,  and  by  the  use  of  brakes 
regulated  its  speed  down  the  track  to  the 


OPERATB 


747 


0F5RATK 


crusher,  and  After  anloading  It  pushed  It 
back.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Webb,  72  S.  W. 
1044,  1046,  31  Tex.  Civ.  App.  408  (quoting 
and  adopting  Office  Stand.  Diet.). 

In  a  complaint,  in  an  action  by  a  servant 
for  injuries,  ascribing  the  injury  to  the  negli- 
gent operation  of  a  train  by  an  engineer,  the 
word  "operation"  means  management  or  con- 
duct, and  presupposes  the  existence  of  the 
subject  of  operation,  and  does  not  extend  to 
negligence  in  the  composition  of  the  train, 
and  evidence  tending  to  show  negligence  in 
the  composition  of  the  train  does  not  support 
the  averment  Reeves  v.  Henderson-Boyd 
Lumber  Co.,  55  South.  191,  192,  172  Ala.  526 
(citing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  4992). 

The  term  "operation,"  in  an  instruction 
in  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  passenger  caus- 
ed by  the  negligent  handling  and  running  of 
the  train,  in  which  the  court  declared  the 
prima  fade  liability  of  the  carrier  for  the 
negligent  "operation"  and  running  of  the 
train,  is  synonymous  with  the  term  "run- 
ning," and  the  instruction  is  not  objection- 
able as  not  confining  the  negligence  to  the 
running  of  the  train.  Louisville,  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Willis.  51  South.  134,  136,  58  Fla.  807. 

"Operation"  means  how  cars  shall  be  run, 
and  what  shall  be  done  in  that  respect  by  a 
street  railway  company,  and  does  not  relate 
to  fare.  A  provision  in  a  contract  between 
a  city  and  a  street  railway  company  that  the 
dty  should  not  reduce  fares  below  five  cents 
was  not  abrogated  by  a  subsequent  contract 
providing  that  in  the  construction,  mainte- 
nance, and  "operation"  of  its  lines  the  com- 
pany should  be  subject  to  all  present  or  fu- 
ture ordinances  of  the  city.  Minneapolis  St 
R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  155  Fed.  989, 
1000. 

Where  a  "fire  knocker,"  for  the  purpose 
of  moving  blocked  cars  of  wood,  to  unload 
which  was  a  part  of  his  duty,  was  attempting 
to  remove  the  block  so  as  to  move  the  cars 
a  short  distance,  and  another  "fire  knocker" 
was  on  top  of  the  cars  signaling  the  engineer 
for  the  same  purpose,  they  were  engaged  in 
operating  cars  under  Rev.  St  1895,  art  4560f, 
exempting  persons  engaged  in  "operating  the 
cars"  from  the  fellow-servant  rule.  Texas 
&  P.  Ry.  Co,  V.  Johnson,  118  S.  W.  U17, 1118, 
55  Tex.  Civ.  App.  495. 

One  employed  as  night  hostler  In  a  rail- 
road yard  charged  with  the  duty,  pursuant  to 
the  orders  of  his  superior,  of  turning  engines 
when  they  come  in  the  yard,  seeing  that  they 
get  fuel,  sand,  and  water,  and  are  oiled, 
wiped,  and  dispatched  on  the  road,  is  not, 
while  inspecting  a  switch  engine  to  deter- 
mine whether  it  has  been  properly  wiped, 
engaged  in  the  operation  of  a  locomotive, 
within  the  statute  relating  to  employes  en- 
gaged in  the  work  of  operating  locomotivea 
Galveston,  H.  ft  N.  Ry.  Go.  v.  Cochran,  100 
8.  W.  261,  263,  49  Tex.  Civ.  App.  891. 


Where  a  railroad  se.tion  foreman  was  in- 
jured while  assisting  his  colaborers  in  load- 
ing rails  onto  a  fiat  car  composing  part  of  a 
train,  while  the  train  was  at  rest,  he  having 
no  duty  to  perform  with  reference  to  the 
movement  of  the  train,  he  was  not  engaged 
in  operating  a  car,  locomotive,  or  train  with- 
in Sayles'  Ann.  Civ.  St  1897,  art.  4560f,  pro- 
viding that  every  person,  receiver,  or  corpora- 
tion operating  a  railroad  shall  be  liable  for 
damages  sustained  by  any  servant  or  em- 
ploy^ while  engaged  in  operating  cars,  loco- 
motives, or  trains,  by  reason  of  the  negligence 
of  any  fellow  servant  St  Louis  Southwest- 
ern Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  McGee  (Tex.)  141 
S.  W.  1054,  1055. 

An  allegation  in  a  petition  that  injury 
occurring  upon  the  derailment  of  a  train  was 
caused  from  the  manner  in  which  the  engine 
and  cars  were  being  "operated,"  refers  to  tbat 
which  was  being  done  by  the  employes  on  the 
engine  and  cars  at  the  time  of  the  accident, 
and  not  to  the  manner  in  which  the  train 
was  ordered  to  be  run  by  the  oifldals  of  the 
road.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  ▼. 
Poole,  133  S.  W.  239.  240,  104  Tex.  36. 

A  freight  handler  negligently  run  into 
by  an  engine  while  he  was  pushing  a  car  to  a 
freighthouse  by  direction  of  his  superior  is 
within  Laws  1893,  c.  220,  making  railroad 
companies  liable  for  injuries  to  any  employ 6 
through  the  negligence  of  another  employ 6, 
without  contributory  negligence  on  his  part, 
while  engaged  in  "operating  cars."  Ean  v. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  (;;o.,  69  N.  W.  997,  998,  95 
Wis.  69. 

Plaintitf  was  engaged  with  others  in  dis- 
tributing ties  along  a  railway  track.  The  ties 
were  placed  on  a  car  which  was  pushed  along 
the  track  by  plaintiff  and  the  other  workm&a 
and  the  ties  pulled  or  thrown  off  where  need- 
ed without  stopping  the  car,  if  possible.  It 
was  the  duty  of  plaintiff  to  assist  in  starting, 
stopping,  and  moving  the  car  as  well  as 
throwing  off  the  ties.  While  he  was  moving 
a  tie  thrown  off,  a  co-employ6  caused  another 
to  slide  off,  which  injured  him.  Held,  that 
plaintiff  was  injured  while  engaged  in  operat- 
ing a  car  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute, 
declaring  that  the  fact  that  injury  in  such 
cases  is  due  to  the  act  of  a  fellow  servant 
does  not  defeat  recovery.  Freeman  v.  Shaw 
(Tex.)  126  S.  W.  53,  56. 

Where  railroad  employ^  were  transport- 
ing ballast  on  a  push  car  for  repair  of  a 
track,  and  had  to  remove  the  car  from  the 
track  between  trips  and  replace  it  on  the 
track,  they  were  "operating  the  car"  within 
a  statute  providing  that  a  railroad  company 
shall  be  liable  for  injuries  to  a  servant,  in 
operating  a  car,  through  the  negligent  act  of 
any  other  servant  Seery  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  77  S.  W.  950,  951,  84  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
89. 

Undtt  Rev.  St  Mo.  1899,  S  2864,  as  amend- 
ed  by  Laws  Mo.  1905,  pp.  185-137,  pro^^ding 


OKDER 


708 


OBDEB 


eml  orders,  and  tlie  protectton  of  tbe  stat- 
nte  does  not  extend  to  an  employ^  Injured 
from  the  negligence  of  the  foreman  while 
working  under  general  directions.  Indian- 
apolis St  Ry.  Go.  ▼.  Kane,  80  N.  B.  841,  843, 
169  Ind.  25. 

Of  yailroAd  eemadssiom 

The  expression  *'order  of  the  commia- 
slon,"  as  used  in  Act  Aug.  23,  1907  (Laws 
1907,  p.  78)  f  9,  relating  to  the  Jurisdiction  of 
the  railroad  commission,  and  providing  that 
if  any  corporation  within  its  jurisdiction 
shall  do  any  act  declared  unlawful,  or  omit 
to  do  any  act  required  to  be  done  either  by 
any  law  of  Georgia,  or  by  an  order  of  the 
commission,  it  shall  be  liable  to  persons  in- 
jured thereby,  has  reference  to  special  or- 
ders of  the  commission,  and  not  to  its  gen- 
eral rules.  Southern  Bell  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.  T.  Beach,  70  S.  B.  137,  139,  8  Ga. 
App.  720. 

Ordinamoe  dlstinsiiislied 

See  Ordinance. 
Wmmu&t 

Under  Sand,  ft  H.  Dig.  Ark.  |  5273,  which 
provides  that  each  dty  council  shall  cause 
to  be  provided  for  its  clerk's  office  a  seal, 
which  seal  shall  be  affixed  to  all  transcripts, 
orders,  or  certificates  which  it  may  be  neces- 
aary  or  proper  to  authenticate  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  act,  a  dty  warrant  is  not  an 
''order.**  Condon  v.  City  of  Eureka  Springs, 
135  Fed.  566,  571. 

OBDEB  (la  Ooameretal  1iaw> 

See  Attested  Order;  Mail  Order;  Money 

Order;  Money  Order  Funds. 
Warrant  synonymous,  see  Warrant 

''An  'order'  is  in  its  principal  elements 
the  same  whether  it  is  for  the  payment  of 
money  or  for  the  delivery  of  goods."  United 
States  V.  Green,  136  Fed.  618,  649  (citing 
Bish.  St  Crimes,  p.  298,  §  327). 

The  indorsement  of  a  check  payable  to  a 
real  or  fictitious  person,  other  than  accused, 
is  equivalent  to  an  "order  for  the  payment 
of  money,"  within  Penal  Code,  f  470,  enumer- 
ating the  subjects  of  forgery.  People  v. 
Jones,  106  Paa  724,  725,  12  CaL  App.  129. 
As  rendering  instmmeAt  mesotiaMe 

The  words  "or  order"  are  not  essential  to 
make  a  bill  of  lading  quasi  negotiable. 
Forbes  v.  Boston  &  L.  B.  Co.,  133  Mas&  154, 
157. 

Partievlar  laatruBieats 

A  written  instrument  in  the  following 
language:  "Mr.  Alex.  Sapp  Please  let  Jim 
have  $1.00  in  trade  and  oblige,  0.  H.  Bogers. 
$1.00  P.  S.  Will  pay  Thursday"— is  "an  or- 
der for  money  or  other  property,'*  within  the 
meaning  of  the  forgery  statute.  Johnson  v. 
SUte,  86  South.  166,  47  Fla.  35. 

Bala  dlatiaciUaliea 

A  sale  of  personal  property  is  a  trans- 
mutatioB  ol  property  from  one  man  to  an- 


other in  consideration  of  soma  priee  or  rec- 
ompense in  value^  and  ao  one  having  an 
agency  to  sell  wine^  which  he  was  expected 
to  deliver,  is  not  entitled  to  a  commission  on 
the  mere  procuring  of  orders,  the  title  of  the 
wine  not  passing  until  an  actual  delivery ;  an 
"order"  being  only  an  executory  agreement 
which  cannot  even  be  deemed  a  "sale**  for 
the  purpose  of  determining  the  number  of 
sales  made  by  the  agent  in  a  given  time^ 
Hall  V.  French-American  Wine  Co.,  134  N.  T. 
Supp.  158,  161,  149  App.  Div.  609. 

OBDEB  dn  Praotiee) 

See  Final  Order;   Interlocutory  Order; 

Lawful  Order. 
See,  also,  Final  Decree  or  Judgmoit 

As  expressly  defined  by  Gen.  Code  Ohio, 
1 11582,  an  "order"  is  a  direction  of  the  court 
or  judge  made  or  rendered  in  writing^  and 
not  included  in  a  Judgment  Mannington  t. 
Hocking  Val.  By.  Co.,  183  Fed.  133,  141. 

Under  Bev.  St  1887,  §  4880,  an  "order^ 
ia  defined  to  be  every  direction  of  a  court  or 
judge  made  and  entered  in  writing  and  not 
included  in  a  judgment  Dahlstrom  v.  Port- 
land Biin.  Co.,  85  Pac.  916,  917,  12  Idaho,  87. 

Under  Bev.  St  1899,  |  4402,  providing 
that,  on  the  dismissal  of  an  aM>eal  from 
Justice  court  for  irregularity,  the  district 
court  clerk  shall  certify  the  "order"  of  dis- 
missal to  the  justice^  under  section  4247  de- 
fining a  final  order  to  be  an  order  affecting 
a  subatantlai  right  when  it  determines  the 
action  and  prevents  a  judgment,  and  section 
4249  providing  that  a  final  ordar  of  the  dis- 
trict court  may  be  reversed,  etc,  an  order 
dismissing  an  appeal  from  a  justice  court 
must  be  made  by  the  district  court,  and  most 
appear  upon  its  record,  and  no  individual  act 
of  appelant,  such  aa  an  entry  on  the  docket* 
can  operate  as  a  dismissal  of  the  appeaL 
Mayott  V.  Knott,  92  Pac  240^  16  Wyo.  108. 

The  provision  in  Chicago  Municipal 
Court  Act  (Hurd*s  Bev.  St  1909,  c  87)  I  264. 
authorizing  the  chief  Justice  to  prescribe  ab- 
breviated forms  of  entries  of  "orders"  by  the 
court,  extends  to  all  orders,  whether  inter- 
locutory or  final,  dty  of  Chicago  t.  Oole- 
man,  98  N.  B.  621,  522,  254  IlL  88a. 

The  term  "rule"  or  "order,"  whi(A  are 
synonymous,  includes  commands  to  lower 
courts  or  court  officials  to  do  ministerial 
acts.  Garter  v.  Louisiana  Purchase  Expo- 
sition Ca,  102  S.  W.  6,  9,  124  Mo.  App.  530. 

The  error  of  a  trial  court  in  directing  or 
refusing  to  direct  a  verdict  is  one  of  law 
reviewable  by  the  Supreme  Court  on  appeal 
as  coming  within  "orders,  rulings,  or  deci- 
sions," made  in  the  action  within  Oomp. 
Laws  1907,  |  8804,  authorizing  the  court  on 
appeal  from  a  Judipnent  to  review  orders,  rul- 
ings, and  decisions  in  the  action.  Ism  ▼• 
Smith,  98  Pac  800,  80i  S4  Utah.  894. 


ORDSR 


799 


OJR0XR 


An  indorsenitfit  by  a  Jnsttce  of  the  city 
ooort  npon  an  "order"  fbr  tine  examination 
of  a  judgment  debtor,  xedting,  "Proceedings 
dismissed  npon  objection  made  by  jndgment 
debtor/'^  is  itseif  an  order  witbin  Oode  Civ. 
Proc  f  767,  defining  a  written  direction  of  a 
court  or  jndge,  not  contained  in  a  Judgment, 
to  be  an  order.  McAlpln  ▼.  Stoddard,  105 
N.  Y.  Snpp.  d,  12,  64  Misc.  Rep.  647. 

Code  1896,  f  1372,  allows  SO  cents  for  Al- 
tering any  "order"  of  court,  and  an  item  of 
a  cost  bill  stated  upon  an  execution  was  **or^ 
ders  of  court,  dO^."  Held,  tbat  it  was  ob- 
TiouB  tbat  the  word  "order"  was  intended, 
and  tbe  execution  was  not  invalid  on  the 
ground  that  the  bill  of  costs  was  not  itemised 
as  required  by  section  1888.  Simmons  ▼. 
Sharpe,  42  South.  441,  442, 148  Ala.  217. 

The  words  "judgment"  and  "order,"  in 
Obde,  9  542,  subhead  8,  which  provides  that 
the  Supreme  Ck>urt  may  reverse,  vacate,  and 
modify  a  judgment  of  a  district  court  for 
errors  appearing  on  the  record,  and  in  revers- 
ing su^  judgment  or  "order"  may  reverse, 
vacate,  or  modi^  any  immediate  "order"  in- 
volving the  merits  of  the  action  or  any  part 
thereof,  are  used  somewhat  indiserindnately, 
80  much  so  as  to  suggest  that  any  specific  in- 
dependent part  of  a  judgment  is  appealable. 
Kremer  v.  Kremer,  90  Pa&  996,  999,  76  Kan. 
1S4. 

Where  a  justice  of  the  pence  was  derk  as 
well,  an  execution  issued  by  him  was  "order- 
ed by  the  court,"  within  Qen.  St  a  88,  art  1, 
i  4,  providing  that,  unless  so  ordered,  no  ex- 
ecution shall  issue  till  10  days  after  judgment 
roidered.  Guelot  v.  Pearce  (Ky.)  88  S.  W.. 
882,  893. 

A  record  stating  "that  the  said  indict- 
ment and  proceedings  are  handed  down  to  the 
quarter  sessions,  there  to  be  proceeded  with 
according  to  law,"  etc,  is  svidDcient  to  give 
the  quarter  sessions  jurisdiction ;  the  words 
"handed  down"  and  "ordered  to  be  delivered" 
being  convertible  terms.  Engeman  v.  State, 
28  Atl.  676,  678,  54  N.  J.  Law,  247. 

An  order  of  approval  of  an  account  and 
discharge  of  a  guardian  is  "an  order  or  Judg- 
ment," within  Rev.  St  1895,  art  2799,  provid- 
ing that  any  person  interested  in  a  guardian- 
ship may  by  a  bill  of  review  have  any  order 
or  judgment  corrected  on  showing  error 
ther^n.  Nicholson  v.  Nicholson  Cl^ex.)  125 
S.  W.  965.  967. 

As  JndgaieBt  or  deeree 

See  Decree;  Judgment 
As  Botiee 

See  NoUce. 

Order  after  iudgment 

An  order  of  the  trial  court  quashing  an 
execution  is  an  "order  on  a  summary  appli- 
cation in  an  action  after  judgment,"  and  ia 
appealable.  Bamett  v.  Bohannen,  ua  Pae. 
967,  98a,  27  OkL  36& 

8  Wnaft  P.2D  Ssb.— 49 


An  order  setting  aside  a  default  before 
entry  of  Judgment  thereon  is  not  appealable ; 
it  not  being  an  "order  after  judgment"  or  an 
"interlocutory  order,"  within  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
I  963,  making  appealable  interlocutory  orders 
entered  in  actloas  to  redeem  mortgaged  prop- 
erty or  in  partition  suits,  etc.  Savage  v. 
Smith,  97  Pac.  821,  822,  154  Cal.  325. 

Order  against  sale  or  oo&veyanoe 

An  order  of  the  superior  court,  annulling 
and  setting  aside  a  former  order  confirming 
the  sale  of  realty  belonging  to  a  decedent's 
estate,  is  an  order  "against  directing  a  sale 
or  conveyance"  within  Code  Civ.  Proc.  i  963, 
subd.  3,  so  as  to  be  appealable  to  the  Supreme 
Court  In  re  West's  Estate,  122  Pac  953, 
954,  162  Cal.  352. 

An  order  of  the  probate  court  discharg- 
ing an  order  upon  the  executrix  to  show 
cause  why  the  homestead  devised  by  the  will 
of  the  testate  should  not  be  sold  to  pay  debts 
of  the  estate  is  an  "order  refusing  to  direct 
the  sale  of  real  estate,"  within  the  meaning 
of  subdivision  8,  |  4665,  Gen.  St  1894,  and 
such  order  can  be  reviewed  by  appeal  only, 
and  not  upon  certiorari.  In  re  Wilson's  Es- 
tate, 97  N.  W.  647,  648,  91  Minn.  116. 

Aa  proooedinsp 

See  Proceeding. 
RiiUjic  on  deaaarror 

A  decision  overruling  a  demurrer  to  an 
amended  complaint,  with  leave  to  defendants 
to  answer,  was  not  a  judgment  of  ttfielf,  but 
an  "order"  which  was  subject  to  vacation  for 
cause  under  Code  Civ.  Proc.  |  473,  providing 
that  the  court  may  relieve  a  party  from  a 
mistake  in  an  ord^r  made  during  the  prog- 
ress of  the  proceedings  during  the  term  in 
the  furtherance  of  justice.  Dent  v.  Superior 
Court  of  Los  Angeles  County,  95  Pac.  672, 
673,  7  Cal.  App.  683.  , 

Under  Pen.  Code,  I  1008,  providing  that, 
if  a  demurrer  Is  allowed,  the  judgment  is 
final  on  the  indictment  or  information,  and 
Is  a  bar  to  another  prosecution  for  the  same 
offense,  unless  the  court,  being  of  the  opinion 
that  the  objection  may  be  avoided  in  a  new 
indictment  or  information,  directs  the  case 
to  be  resubmitted  or  directs  a  new  informa- 
tion to  be  filed,  provided  that,  after  such  or- 
der, the  defendant  may  be  examined  before 
a  magistrate,  and  discharged  or  committed 
by  him  as  in  other  cases,  and  section  1009 
providing  that  if  the  court  does  not  permit 
the  information  to  be  amended,  nor  direct 
that  a  new  information  be  filed,  the  defend- 
ant must  be  discharged,  the  court's  minutes 
reciting  tbat,  the  demurrer  to  the  informa- 
tion having  been  argued  and  submitted,  the 
court  expvBBsed  the  opinion  that  Ihe  demur- 
rer should  be  sustained,  but  that  the  defect 
in  ttie  information  might  be  corrected  by  a 
new  information,  did  not  constitute  an  order 
within  section  1098,  authorising  proceedings 
4e  novo  and  a  new  information  agfUnst  the 


ORDER 


770 


ORDER  TO  SHOW  CAUSE 


accused.    Ez  parte  Hayter,  110  Flc.  870, 
S72,  10  GaL  App.  211. 

Aa  written  iaatnimeat 

See  Written  Inatrument 

ORDER     AFFEOmrO     SUBSTAJfTIAL 
RIGHT 

See  Substantial  Right 

ORDER  ORAKTnrO  OR  OOETUIUIJIO 
IKJUKOnOH 

An  order  overruling  a  motion  to  dissolre 
or  modify  an  injunction  previously  granted 
is  not  one  continuing  the  injunction  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute,  and  is  not  ap- 
pealable. Lewis  T.  Hitchman  Goal  A  Goke 
Co.,  170  Fed.  549,  550,  100  C.  O.  A.  137. 

A  preliminary  restraining  order  requir- 
ing the  defendants  to  show  cause  why  it 
should  not  be  made  permanent,  is  an  "order 
granting  an  injunction"  within  the  statute. 
Taylor  v.  Breese,  103  Fed.  078.  088,  90  C.  C. 
A.  558.  And  so  is  an  interlocutory  decree  in 
a  suit  for  infringement  of  a  patent  which  ad- 
Judges  the  patent  valid  and  infringed,  awards 
an  injunction,  and  directs  an  accounting. 
Highland  Glass  Co.  v.  Schmertz  Wire  Glass 
Co.,  178  Fed.  944,  970, 102  G.  C.  A.  310. 

ORDER     GRANTIHO     OR     REFUSING 
ALIMOmr 

An  order  adjudging  or  refusing  to  ad- 
Judge  a  share  of  the  husband's  property  to 
the  wife,  where  a  divorce  is  granted  to  the 
husband  by  reason  of  the  aggression  of  the 
wife,  under  Rev.  St.  f  5700,  is  an  ''order 
granting  or  refusing  alimony,"  within  Rev. 
St  1908, 1  6700,  and  either  party  may  appeaL 
Fiesler  v.  Fiesler,  93  N.  B.  899,  000,  83  Ohio 
St  200. 

ORDER  OF  OOURT 

See  By  Order  of  Court 

As  law,  see  Law. 

See,  also,  Judgment;  Order  (In  Practice). 

The  expression  "orders  of  court**  has 
been  treated  as  covering  not  only  orders  of 
the  courts  In  session,  but  orders  of  the  ab- 
sent Judges.  United  States  v.  McCabe,  129 
Fed.  708,  711,  04  C.  a  A.  230. 

ORDER  OF  DEPORTATIOir 

The  requirement  of  Chinese  Exclusion 
Act  May  5,  1892,  c.  00,  27  SUt  25,  as  amend- 
ed by  Act  Nov.  8,  1893,  c.  14,  28  Stat  7, 
that  an  order  of  deportation  be  executed 
by  the  marshal,  and  that  the  person  to  be 
deported  shall  not  be  admitted  to  ball,  refers 
to  the  final  order  of  deportation,  and  does  not 
prohibit  ball  pending  an  appeal.  United 
States  V.  Yee  Yet,  192  Fed.  577,  579. 

ORDER  OF  nrXERSTATE  OOXMEROE 
COMMISSION 

The  Commerce  Court  has  Jurisdiction  of 
a  suit  to  annul  an  "order**  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  which  either  awards 
or  denies  reparation  to  a  complainant  under 


Interstate  Commerce  Act  Feb.  4,  1887,  e.  lOi 
I  10,  24  Stat  884,  as  amended  by  Act  Juihe 
29,  1900,  c.  3591,  |  5,  84  Stat  590.  A  petitun 
by  a  carrier  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission for  leave  to  refund  to  a  slflpper  a 
portion  of  a  freight  diarge  paid  which  it 
admits  to  have  been  excessive  Is  not  the 
equivalent  of  a  complaint  for  reparatiaii  b? 
the  shipper  under  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
Feb.  4,  1887,  c.  104,  |  13,  24  Stat  383,  and  i 
denial  of  the  petition  by  the  Commission  for 
want  of  Jurisdiction,  because  under  its  cod- 
structicm  of  the  statute  the  daim  of  the  ship- 
per  was  barred  by  limitation,  does  doc  co& 
stitute  an  order  adverse  to  the  shipper  whidi 
can  be  made  the  basis  of  a  suit  by  him  for 
relief  in  the  Conunerce  Court  AriEaasu 
Fertiliser  Co.  v.  United  States,  103  Fed.  Gb*T. 
009  0;>er  Archbald,  Judge,  solus). 

Act  Cong.  June  18,  1910,  a  300,  36  Stat 
539,  confers  on  the  Commerce  Coort  Jnils^ 
diction  previously  possessed  by  the  Cinniii 
Courts  of  the  United  States  of  cases  hrou^ 
to  enjoin,  set  aside,  annul,  or  suspend  any 
^'order*'  of  the  Interstate  Coouneroe  Commls- 
slon,  also  authorising  the  Commeroe  Court 
to  exercise  any  and  all  powers  of  the  Circ^ 
Court  of  the  United  States  so  far  as  may  l< 
appropriate  to  the  effective  exercise  of  tbe 
Jurisdiction  conftered,  and  that  nothing  con- 
tained in  the  act  shall  be  construed  as  enlai^- 
ing  the  Jurisdiction  previously  possessed  b? 
the  courts  thereby  transferred  to  and  vested 
in  the  Commerce  Court ;  the  Jurisdiction  so 
tAT  as  conferred,  however,  being  exclusiTe. 
and  so  far  as  not  conferred  being  reserved. 
Held,  that  since  capacity  to  sue  in  the  Coid- 
merce  Court  depends  on  the  general  equltr 
practice  in  force  in  the  Circuit  Courts,  aod 
prior  to  the  creation  o<  the  Commerce  Coon 
a  shipper  claiming  to  be  injured  by  a  ruling 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  re- 
fusing to  annul  a  private  car  demurrage  rule 
could  have  sued  in  the  Circuit  Court  to  sec 
aside  the  commission's  ruling,  such  rulii^ 
though  granting  no  affirmative  relief,  shouid 
be  construed  as  an  "order"  of  the  commlssioa 
which  the  Commerce  Court  had  Jorisdictioa 
to  review  on  petition  of  the  person  .conceiTiBs 
himself  injured  thereby.  Procter  &  Gamble 
Co.  V.  United  States,  188  Fed.  221,  224. 

ORDEB  OF  PUBUCATIOH 

As  process,  see  Process. 

ORDEB  TO  SHOW  CAUSE 

An  "order  to  show  cause"  Is  Imt  a  metis 
prescribed  by  law  in  the  nature  of  a  process 
to  bring  a  defendant  into  court  to  answer 
plamtiff's  demands  Morehouse  v.  PaciSc 
Hardware  &  Steel  Co.,  177  Fed.  337,  339.  lU' 
a  C.  A.  W7* 

An  "order  to  show  cause*'  is  an  order 
requiring  a  party  to  appear  and  show  cause 
why  a  certain  thing  should  not  be  done  or 
permitted.    Spaeth  v.  SeUs^  176  F^d.  797,  79SL 


OKDXaiiT  H0U8B 


771 


OKDINANOB 


OBDSBLT  Houaa 

See,  also«  Disorderly  Housa 

An  ''orderly  house/'  or  place  for  tiie  sale 
of  Uqnors,  within  the  condition  of  a  bond  pro- 
viding that  a  liquor  dealer  shall  maintain 
such  a  place,  is  one  in  which  no  music,  loud 
or  boisterous  talking,  yelling,  or  indecent,  vul- 
gar language  is  allowed,  used,  or  practiced, 
or  any  other  noise  calculated  to  disturb  or. 
annoy  any  person  residing  or  doing  business 
in  that  vicinity.  Adams  t.  State  (Tex.)  14e 
8.  W.  1086,  108a 

ORDINANCE 

See  Criminal  Ordlnanee;  Fixed  by  Ordi- 
nance; Necessary  Police  Ordinances; 
Permanent  Ordinance;  Prescribed  by 
Law  or  Ordinance;    Prior  Ordinance. 

Any  proposed  ordinance,  see  Any. 

Vacation  ordinance,  see  Vacation. 

The  term  ''ordinance,"  as  used  in  speak- 
ing of  the  legislation  of  the  constitutional 
convention,  means  a  law  which  is  essential 
to  carry  into  effect  the  objects  for  which  the 
convention  was  created,  and,  when  oncie 
adopted  by  the  convention,  such  ordinance 
has  the  force  and  effect  of  law.  Smith  v. 
State  ex  rel.  Hepburn,  118  Pac.  932,  935,  28 
Okl.  235  (quoting  and  adopting  the  definition 
in  FrantB  v.  Autry,  91  Pac.  193,  18  OkL  561); 
Frantz  v.  Autry,  91  Paa  193,  218,  18  Okl. 
56L 

"An  'ordinance*  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion is  a  local  law,  and  binds  persons  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  corporation."  Pitts- 
burgh, 0.,  a  &  St  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Lighthelser, 
71  N.  B.  218,  221,  les  Ind.  247  (citing  Balti- 
more &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Peterson,  59  N.  E. 
1044,  156  Ind.  364;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Stege- 
meier,  20  N.  B.  848i,  118  Ind.  806,  10  Am.  St 
Rep.  136). 

•'Ordinance"  as  a  term  of  municipal  law, 
is  the  equivalent  of  legislative  action,  and  in 
a  statute  carries  with  It  by  implication  the 
usual  incidents  of  such  action.  Stemmler 
V.  Borough  of  Madison,  88  AtL  85,  82  N.  J. 
Law,  696,  Ann.  Cas.  1913D,  767. 

An  "ordinance"  is  a  local  law  prescrib- 
ing a  general  and  permanent  rule.  "A  city 
council  is  a  miniature  general  assembly,  and 
their  authorized  ordinances  have  the  force 
of  laws  passed  by  the  Legislature."  Kersey 
V.  CJity  of  Terre  Haute,  68  N.  E.  1027,  1029, 
161  Ind.  471  (citing  atlzens'  Gas  &  Mln.  Co. 
V-  Town  of  Elwood,  114  Ind.  332,  16  N.  B. 
624,  and  quoting  Taylor  v.  City  of  Carondel- 
et,  22  Mo.  105), 

A  municipal  ordinance  is  a  local  law,  af- 
fecting the  property,  rights,  and  Uberty  of 
citizens^  who  are  entitied  to  know  at  what 
time  and  under  what  drcnmstances  it  ac- 
quires that  status.  Mayor  and  Board  of 
Trustees  of  Town  of  New  Iberia  v.  Moss 
Hotel  Co^  86  South.  662,  668,  112  La.  526. 


I  A  "mniildpal  ordiimncer*  Is  a  law  of  lo- 
cal application,  and  a  violation  of  the  ordi- 
nance is  an  offense  against  the  city  enacting 
the  ordinance.  The  ordinance  is  penal  in 
its  nature;  otherwise  the  offender  oould  not 
be  arrested  and  taken  in  custody  for  its 
violation.  An  infraction  of  the  ordinance 
is  termed  a  petty  pffense  and  constitutes  a 
crime,  in  the  broad  meaning  of  that  word. 
Pearson  v.  Wimbish,  52  S.  E.  751,  755,  124 
Ga.  701,  4  Ann.  Ois.  501  (citing  McHae  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  Amerlcus,  59  Ga.  170, 
27  Am.  Rep.  390). 

"An  'ordinance  regulating  a  street*  is  a 
legislative  act  entirely  beyond  the  judicial 
power  of  the  state."  Indiana  R.  Co.  v.  Cal- 
vert, 80  N.  B.  961,  964,  168  Ind.  321,  10  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  780,  11  Ann.  Cas.  635  (quoting  and 
adopting  the  definition  in  Wood  v.  Mears, 
12  Ind.  515,  74  Am.  Dec.  222;  Indianapolis 
&  C.  R.  Co.  V.  State  ex  rel.  City  of  Lawrence- 
burg,  37  Ind.  489). 

"  'FoUce  ordinances'  are  at  once  family 
rules  on  a  large  sci^e  and  state  laws  on  a 
small  scale.  •  •  •  In  a  city,  we  think, 
a  man  may  fis^t  in  a  way  to  violate  an  or- 
dinance without  being,  guilty  of  an  assault 
and  battery."  Porter  v.  State,  52  S.  £.  283, 
288,  124  Ga.  297,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  730  (quot- 
ing and  adopting  definition  in  McRae  v.  May- 
or, etc,  of  City  of  Amerlcus,  59  Ga.  168,  27 
Am.  Rep.  390). 

"Wrltins  oss«Btljd 

Since  an  ordinance  must  be  reduced  to 
writing  before  it  can  be  acted  on  by  the  city 
council,  it  means  something  more  than  a  ver- 
bal motion  subsequentiy  reduced  to  writing 
by  the  clerk  or  secretary  of  the  council,  and 
hence  a  recital  in  the  minutes  of  a  city  coun- 
cil that  a  certain  councilman  presented  a 
petition  from  P.  asking  permission  to  erect 
a  fence  around  a  portion  of  the  property  on 
which  a  new  building  was  to  be  erected,  includ- 
ing a  poison  of  a  street  and  alley  with  a 
recommendation  of  the  board  of  fire  com- 
missioners that  the  request  be  granted,  and 
that  on  motion  the  request  was  granted,  did 
not  constitute  an  ordinance  and  was  insuffi- 
cient to  grant  the  authority  prayed;  especial- 
ly under  Austin  City  Charter  (Sp.  Laws 
1909,  c.  2,  art  11)  I  15.  providing  that  an 
ordinance  shall  be  complete  in  the  form  in 
which  it  is  finally  passed,  and  be  filed  with 
the  clerk  of  the  city  council  before  action 
shall  be  taken  tiiereon.  American  Const 
Co.  V.  Seellg,  133  S.  W.  429,  431,  104  Tex.  16. 

"Ordinance/*  as  used  in  Indiana  Act 
1899,  p.  343,  c.  164,  S  25,  providing  that  no 
board  of  county  commissioners,  officers, 
agent,  or  employ^  of  any  county  shall  have 
power  to  bind  the  county  by  any  contract  or 
agreement  or  in  any  other  way  to  any  ex- 
tent beyond  the  aiitount  of  money  at  the 
time  already  appropriated  by  ordinance  for 
the  purpose  of  the  occupation,  etc.»  means 


OBDIKAMUB 


772 


OBDINAKCB 


in  Instnunent  in  wflttny,  toiMtlilnff  more 
and  addltloiial  to  a  verbal  motloii  sabMiiueiit- 
ly  reduced  to  writing  by  a  dark  or  eabotdl- 
nate  of  the  local  board,  ao  tliat  audi  acta 
required  to  be  done  by  ordlnanoe  cannot  be 
validly  done  by  order,  reaolotloa,  or  notiee. 
State  ez  rel.  DaTia  t.  Board  o(  Comibiafllon- 
era  of  Newton  County,  T4  N.  B.  IWU  1006, 
165  Ind.  202,  6  Ann.  Caa.  40a 


Bee  Contract 

An  ordinance  amending  an  ordinance 
pasaed  by  an  incorporated  town  of  the  In- 
dian Territory  granting  to  a  corporation  a 
franchiae  to  furnish  said  town  with  light 
and  heat  by  meana  of  natural  gaa,  and  ex- 
tending the  time  aet  in  the  ordinance  amend- 
ed for  fumiahing  the  aame,  la  an  "ordinance 
of  general  and  permanent  nature*'  within 
Mansf.  Dig.  Ark.  |  924  (Ind.  T.  Ann.  St  1889, 
I  dB4),  proTiding  that,  when  an  ordinance 
of  auch  a  nature  ia  advanced  from  the  first 
to  the  third  reading  on  the  aame  day,  two- 
thirda  of  the  members  of  the  council  must 
vote  in  favor  thereof.  Town  of  Sapulpa  v. 
Sapulpa  OU  &  Qaa  Co,  07  Pac  lOOT,  1010, 
22  Okl.  847. 
By-lawa,  mleat  mmd  vegvlationa  symoa* 
yaioitfl 

The  words  "ordlnanceai**  ••mlea,*'  ••regu- 
lations/' and  "by-laws'*  are  synonymous 
terms.  State  ez  reL  Kreba  v.  Hector,  120 
N.  W.  190,  200,  83  Neb.  090  (citing  6  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  6026). 

Within  a  city  charter  authorizing  tiie 
board  of  commissionera  by  ••ordinance"  to 
levy  an  additional  taz,  a  mere  order  or  res- 
olution of  ratification  and  affirmanoe,  modify- 
ing in  imrt  a  prior  ordinance  levying  an  ad- 
ditional taz  and  in  all  other  reqiiects  confirm- 
ing it,  waa  a  valid  ezerdse  of  the  powers  of 
the  commissionera.  Johnston  v.  City  of 
Huntington,  76  8.  B.  142,  144,  71  W.  Va.  106. 

Law  diatingnlslied 

Law  as  including  ordinance,  see  Law. 
As  law  of  the  state,  see  Law  of  the 
State. 

A  "municipal  ordinance'*  ia  not  regarded 
in  the  light  of  a  public  law  of  which  the 
courts  should  take  judicial  notice.  Stott 
V.  aty  of  Chicago,  68  N.  £.  736,  739,  206  IlL 
281. 

•'A  city  ordinance"  ia  not  a  law  of  the 
same  character  aa  a  statute.  It  ia  merely  a 
regulation;  a  rule  of  conduct  passed  by  the 
common  council  for  the  direction  and  super- 
vision of  Its  dtiaens.  People  v.  (Gardner,  106 
N.  W.  641,  646,  148  MidL  104. 

Aa  liaUUty 

See  Liability. 


Ovdev 

Though  the  words  ••regulatloB  or  order*' 
and  •'ordinance  and  reaolutlon,"   aa  found 


in  the  California  atatuftas,  may  oflm  be  ved 
to  ezpresa  tlie  aame  meaning,  it  doci  act 
neceaaarUy  follow  tliat  in  all  eases  tbe  word 
•'order"  ia  synonymous  with  "ordinaoce.^ 
and,  under  the  ConaoUdatlon  Act  April  2l 
1868  (St  Cat  1868,  pi  640,  c:  352),  whicii 
authorisea  the  board  of  anpervison  of  tbe 
dty  and  county  of  San  Frandsoo  to  pro- 
ceed under  the  police  power  by  "regulatloD 
or  order,"  a  contract  for  the  dlspositioc 
of  garbage  may  be  made  by  •'order*"  and  \k 
mayor's  signature  la  not  essential  to  its  n 
lidity.  California  Bednction  0>.  t.  Sanittrr 
Reduction  Work%  126  JML  20,  40^  a  a  C 
A.  91. 

Aa  vvtvate  aat 

See  Private  Act 

Heaelmtiea  1n«l»dad 

The  term  •\>rdinanoe**  or  "Ksolotioia' 
aa  need  la  Nev.  Codea  1906,  |  2668»  glTiogtbe 
mayor  of  the  dty  power  to  sign  or  veto  taj 
ordinance  or  resolution,  was  intended  to  is^ 
elude,  not  only  ordinancea  as  sadi,  but  alft 
resolutions  of  a  legislative  character,  wbi:^ 
therefore  are  similar  to  ordlnaDces  in  this 
respect  State  v.  Duis,  116  N.  W.  75L  7Ji 
17  N.  D.  319. 

An  •Vtfdinanoe^*  la  also  a  resoliitloii  asd 
the  two  are  equivalent.  Henos  aa  ordiniKe 
authorising  a  street  ImiiroventaDt  pmed  obIt 
19  daya  after  the  reaolutlon  of  intentkn  bad 
been  paaaed  is  premature  and  void  under  tk 
Vrooman  Aet  (St  1886,  pi  147,  c.  laS). 
though  not  aigned  by  the  mayor  imtil  tfv 
daya  after  tta  enactment  Mnlbeny  ^ 
G'Dea,  88  Pac  867,  868,  4  CaL  App.  385  idt 
ing  City  of  Loa  Angtiea  v.  WaUroo,  3  Pit 
890,  66  CaL  283;  HeUman  v.  8hostten,41 
Pac  916,  46  Pac  1067,  U4  CaL  1S7). 

Under  Barre  City  Charter  (Acts  ISU 
Ko.  166)  H  S>  68.  66,  veatiiig  the  adminiitn 
tion  of  municipal  alEaira  in  the  mtyor  ml 
board  of  aldermen,  and  empowering  tbp 
council  to  make  ••ordinances,"  regnlttksi 
and  by-lawa  to  provide  a  supply  <tf  w*^ 
etc,  a  grant  of  a  privilege  to  an  indiTldBii 
to  instaU  a  ayatem  of  pipes  tfaroogli  the 
streets  of  the  city,  to  convey  water  to  tbe 
inhabitants  thereof,  may  be  by  resolntioD  (tf 
the  board  of  aldermen,  approved  by  ^ 
mayor,  and  need  not  be  by  ordlnanoe  wbicii 
strictly  speaking,  ia  an  expression  of  ^ 
municipal  will  affecting  the  condnct  of  tbe 
inhabitants  generally  or  of  a  number  of  tbes 
under  some  general  deslgnatloB.  Citx  -^ 
Barre  v.  Perry  ft  Scrlbner,  73  Atl.  574, 82  Tt 
801. 

There  is  a  plain  distinction  between  tbe 
functions  of  an  •^ordinance'*  and  a  ^^^ 
••reeolution"  not  adopted  aa  an  ordlitfact 
An  •'ordinance"  la  a  mode  of  expiesiins  ^ 
legialative  sets  of  a  municipal  corpoittkA 
and  a  resolnttoB  ia  an  ordur  of  tmv^ 
character  and  of  a  mlnislwial  natnie.  P^ 
aacoU  V.  Southern  BeU  a>BlephdM<^^ 


ORDIKANOB 


778 


OBPINABT  BAGG A0B 


South.  820,  8^4,  48  Fla.  161  (citing  aty  of 
Jacksonyille  v.  Ledwltli,  7  South.  885,  26  Fla. 
163.  9  L.  B.  A.  69,  23  Am.  St  Bep.  65Q, 

As  statmte 

See  Statute. 
Eleotion  of  city  ofHeer 

Election  of  a  city  solicitor  by  the  Gam- 
bridge  board  of  aldermen,  aa  required  by 
Rev.  Laws,  c.  26,  |  7,  is  not  an  "ordinance" 
or  ''order,"  within  general  rules  and  orders 
of  the  city  council,  providing  that  every  ordi- 
nance and  order  requiring  concurrent  action 
shall  remain  with  the  clerk  fbr  86  hours  after 
passing  one  board.  Pevey  v.  Aylward,  91  N. 
E.  315,  816,  205  Mass.  102. 

Oraat  of  liuad 

The  word  "ordinance,"  in  its  usnal.  pri- 
mary sense,  means  a  local  law,  a  rule  of  con- 
duct prospective  in  its  operation,  and  apply- 
ing generally  to  the  persons  and  things  sub- 
ject to  the  local  jurisdiction.  It  does  not,  in 
its  ordinary  use  or  signification,  include  a 
grant  of  landa  Southern  Pac.  Go.  v.  Western 
Pac.  it  Go.,  144  Fed.  160,  181. 

Warrant 
Under  Sand,  ft  H.  Dig.  Ark.  |  6273, 
which  provides  that  "each  city  council  shall 
cause  to  be  provided  fbr  its  clerk's  office  a 
seal,  whldi  seal  shall  be  affixed  to  all  tran- 
scripts, orders,  or  oertiflcates  which  it  may  be 
necessary  or  proper  to  authenticate  under 
the  provisions  of  this  act  or  of  any  by-law 
or  ordinance  of  the  dty,"  a  city  warrant  is 
not  an  "ordinance."  Gondon  v.  Gity  of  Eu- 
reka Springs,  135  Fed.  566,  571. 

ORDINARY  (ADJ.) 

"Ordinary"  means  methodical,  regular, 
according  to  established  order,  common,  usu- 
al, often  recurring.  Gity  of  Long  Beach  v. 
Boynton,  119  Pac.  677,  679,  17  GaL  App.  290. 
See,  also,  Frits  v.  Western  Union  TeL  Go.,  71 
Paa  209,  218,  25  Utah,  268. 

In  prosecutions  for  homicide,  in  charging 
u  to  the  presumption  that  persons  Intend  the 
ordinary  results  of  their  acts,  the  words 
"necessary,"  **prx)bable,*'  "usual,'*  and  "ordi- 
nary" are  sabstantlally  synonymous.  Beau* 
regard  v.  State,  131  N.  W,  347,  361,  146  Wis. 
280. 

Where  a  reservation  in  a  timber  deed 
provided  that  the  vendors  should  have  the 
right  to  use  such  timber  from  the  land  as 
inight  be  necessary  for  ordinary  plantation 
purposes  connected  with  the  land,  not  includ- 
ing the  right  to  clear  any  of  the  land,  the 
srantors  or  those  claiming  under  them  were 
entitled  to  use  the  timber  for  every  other 
ordinary  plantation  purpose,  than  clearing 
any  part  of  the  land,  etc,  construing  the 
word  "ordinary"  in  Its  usual  acceptation  as 
"common,""  "usual,"  "common  occurrence^" 
"usual  practice,"  and  the  word  "plantation" 
u  a  cultivated  estate^  a  large  farm  for  rais- 


ing the  different  products  of  agriculture. 
Midland  Timber  Go.  v.  Peguee,  76  S.  B.  82, 
34,  93  8.  G.  82. 

ORDINABT  AGTXOH 

Rev.  St  1874,  c.  68,  |  11,  providing  that 
notice  of  proceedings  by  an  abandoned  spouse 
to  sell  the  property  of  the  delinquent  spouse 
for  family  support  shall  be  given  "as  in  ordi- 
nary actions,"  and  that  anything  done  under 
"the  order  or  decree  of  the  court"  shall  be 
valid,  as  if  done  by  the  party  owning  the 
property,  authorisses  service  by  publication  as 
in  chancery,  notwithstanding  the  use  of  the 
word  "action";  that  word  in  a  comprehensive 
sense  being  synonymous  with  ''suit,"  and 
being  used  Interchangeably  therewith  to 
mean  any  legal  proceeding  in  a  court  for  the 
Mifbroement  of  a  right,  so  that  the  words 
"ordinary  actions"  did  not  contemplate  per- 
sonal service  as  in  a  strictly  legal  action. 
Brand  v.  Brand,  96  N.  B.  918,  920,  252  111. 
IM. 

OBDIKABT  APPLIAHOBS 

An  instruction  that,  if  the  Jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  defendant's  locomo- 
tive was  running  at  such  rapid  rate  of  speed 
that  It  would  have  been  impossible,  by  the 
use  of  ordinary'  means  and  appliances,  to 
stop  the  locomotive  and  prevent  the  Injury 
to  the  stock  within  the  distance  in  which 
stock  upon  the  tracks  could  be  seen  by  the 
aid  of  the  headlight,  then  the  defendant  was 
guilty  of  negligence  is  not  erroneous  for  the 
reason  that,  if  the  locomotive  in  question  was 
equipped  with  some  extraordinary  appliance 
by  which  it  could  be  stopped  within  the  dis- 
tance to  which  the  headlight  throws  the 
light,  it  would  not  be  within  the  rule,  since 
the  expression  ^'ordinary  means  and  appli- 
ances" refers  to  the  ordinary  or  customary 
means  and  appliances  at  the  command  of 
that  particular  train  or  locomotive.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  B.  Go.  v.  Ghrlstian  Moerlein  Brew- 
ing Go.,  48  Sonat  723,  726^  160  Ala.  890. 

ORDINARY  BAGGAGE 

See,  also,  Ordinary  Luggage. 

The  word  "baggage"  has  been  well  de- 
fined to  mean  such  articles  of  necessity,  or 
personal  convenience,  as  are  usually  carried 
by  passengers  for  their  personal  use,  and  not 
merchandise  or  other  valuables,  though  car- 
ried in  the  trunks  of  passengers,  not  destined 
for  such  use,  but  for  other  purposes,  as  for 
sale,  and  the  like.  The  addition  of  the  word 
ordinary,"  In  the  statute  regulating  the 
carrier's  charges  for  transporting  passengers 
with  "ordinary  baggage,"  does  not  limit  the 
word  "baggage"  to  wearing  apparel  and  other 
articles  ordinarily  carried  by  a  common  trav- 
eler, but  is  used  merely  to  recognize  the  well- 
established  meaning  of  the  word  "baggage" 
as  distinguished  from  "merchandise."  Doer- 
ner  v.  St  Louis  A  S.  F.  B.  Go.,  180  S.  W.  62, 
63,  149  Mo.  App.  170. 


OaDINART  BAaOAQB 


774 


ORDIKABT  CARK 


*^rdlDary  twggage"  Is,  In  general,  sncb 
articles  of  necessity  and  convenience  as  are 
usually  carried  by  passengers  for  personal 
use  and  comfort,  or  protection.  The  property 
must  have  the  characteristics  of  personal  ef- 
fects, and  be  carried  for  the  passenger's  use. 
Manifestly  this  excludes  merchandise,  and, 
by  weight  of  authority,  it  excludes  all  prop- 
erty carried  for  trade  purposes,  or  designed 
and  Intended  to  be  used  in  connection  with 
such  purposes.  Thus,  samples  carried  by  a 
passenger  in  his  trunk  to  be  used  in  malcing 
sales  of  goods  are  not  baggage,  and  it  is  im- 
material that  they  are  necessary  to  the  ob- 
ject of  the  passmger's  Journey.  And  Uiere 
is  no  principle  on  which  to  distinguish  be- 
tween a  case  involTlng  samples  of  the  goods 
to  be  sold  and  one  involving  models  or  photo- 
graphs Intended  to  represent  the  goods  to  be 
sold.  So  under  Code,  |  2077,  requiring  a  car- 
rier to  accept  and  carry  the  ordinary  baggage 
of  a  passenger,  a  carrier  is  not  liable  for 
delay  In  the  delivery  of  a  sample  case  check- 
ed by  a  passenger  as  baggage  and  containing 
photographs  of  articles  of  furniture  which 
the  passenger  was  engaged  in  selling  as  a  com- 
mercial traveler.  McElroy  v.  Iowa  Cent  Ry. 
Co.,  110  N.  W.  915,  916,  133  Iowa,  544. 

OBDIHAJIT  BUSIHBSS 

By  the  "ordinary  business  of  a  municipal 
corporation,"  which  under  Code,  |  4850,  can- 
not be  stopped  by  temporary  injunction.  Is 
meant  simply  those  mattera  which  come 
within  the  exercise  of  those  powera  and  func- 
tions conferred  upon  it  by  law  wlilch  ara 
beneficially  incident  to  its  existence  and  op- 
eration as  a  corporation.  It  does  not  extend 
to  those  mattera  where  the  dty  acts  merely  by 
appointment  from  the  state,  and  in  respect 
of  which  the  beneficial  Interest  la  in  the  pub- 
lic at  large.  Wingert  v.  Snouffer  A  Ford,  108 
N.  W.  1036,  1087,  134  Iowa,  97. 

ORDIHAJIT  OAS^Laa 

Things  repeated  dally  or  weekly  in  tlie 
course  of  trade  or  business  are  parts  of  the 
"ordinary  calling"  of  a  man  exercising  such 
trade  or  business.  Ellis  ▼.  State,  68  8.  £. 
688,  589,  5  6a.  App.  615. 

ORDIHABT  OABE 

See  Reasonable  and  Ordinary  Care;  Usu- 
al and  Ordinary  Care;  Want  of  Ordi- 
nary Care. 

See,  also,  Ordinary  Diligence;  Ordinary 
Negligence. 

"Ordinary  cara"  is  that  kind  of  care,  in 
the  particulara  specified,  as  other  persons 
similarly  situated  exerdae  under  like  circum- 
stances, and  nothing  more.  City  of  Mankato 
V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  142  Fed.  829, 
346,  73  C.  C.  A.  439. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  that  measure  of  pru- 
dence universally  exacted  in  all  the  lawful 
relations  of  life,  except  where,  from  other 
considerations,  a  higher  degree  of  caution,  is 


enjoined.     Sullivan-Sanford  Lamber  Go.  ▼. 
Watson  (Tex.)  186  S.  W.  686,  638. 

The  mere  exercise  of  one's  best  Jndgmes 
Is  not  necessarily  <nrdinary  care.  Men  of 
average  prudence  sometimes  airlTe  at  erro- 
neous  concluaions  from  a  heedless  or  can- 
less  consideration  of  the  subject  before  theai. 
or  from  want  of  ordinary  care  in  other  n- 
spects.  Carney  v.  Concord  St.  Ry.,  67  AtL 
218,  222,  72  N.  H.  864. 

Instructions  defining  "ordinary  care*  ts 
such  care  as  a  prudent  man  of  tbe  reqnisitt 
skill  will  take  under  the  circumstances  of  the 
particular  case,  or  such  as  ordinarily  pnh 
dent  men  exercise  in  mattera  affecting  thdr 
own  Interests,  erroneously  fix  tbe  stand&rd 
of  such  care.  Reffke  v.  Patten  Paper  Col. 
117  N.  W.  1004, 1006, 136  Wis.  536. 

An  instruction  which,  in  attempting  to 
define  "ordinary  care,"  makes  the  Jorora  tlie 
standard  of  what  la  a  prud^it  person  is  er- 
roneous. Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  Ameiins 
V.  Johnson,  68  S.  B.  618-620,  2  Ga.  App.  3Ta 

As    eare    exercised   Iby   •&•    iiinj— I— ■ 
ed  or  skilled 

''Ordinary  care,"  as  apidied  to  railwajr 
employes  and  agenti^  is  that  degree  of  care 
which  railway  employ^  and  agents  of  ordi- 
nary skill  and  prudence  obserre  under  simi- 
lar circumstances.  Loolsville,  H.  &  St  L. 
B.  Co.  ▼.  Kessee  (Ky.)  103  S.  W.  261,  261. 

'^Ordinary  care"  and  skill  on  tlie  part  of 
a  physician  and  surgeon  is  that  degree  of 
care  and  skill  usually  exercised  and  possess- 
ed by  physicians  and  surgeons  of  ordin&rj 
care  and  skill  in  similar  communities.  Dor 
rU  V.  Warford,  100  S.  W.  812,  313,  124  Ky. 
768,  0  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  1090, 14  Ann.  Caa  OOl 

As  used  in  an  Instmctioii  defatns  "ordi- 
nary care"  as  that  degree  of  care  wlii<di  ordi- 
narily prudent  and  skillful  men  usoally  exer- 
cise under  the  circumstances  in  oocapattoos 
similar  to  those  proven  In  tbe  particultr 
case,  the  word  **8klllfal"  does  not  add  t 
new,  distinct,  or  different  standard,  bat  only 
requires  what  should  be  required  of  ordinary 
men  in  the  business  in  which  they  are  ec- 
gaged.  It  is  better  to  give  the  ordinary  defi- 
nition. The  instruction  is  only  technicaUy 
erroneous,  if  at  alL  Southern  R.  Co.  in  Eeo- 
tucky  V.  Otis'  Adm'r  (Ky.)  78  S.  W.  480,  4S1. 

As  eare  ezerelsed  la  person's  o^m  af- 
fairs 

"Ordinary  care"  Is  that  degree  of  cire 
which  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  woiil<l 
take  of  the  property  under  the  same  cirenm- 
stances  if  it  were  his  own.  Bigger  t.  Acree, 
112  S.  W.  879,  87  Ark.  318,  23  L.  R.  A,  (N.  S.) 
187. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  that  care  which  m**!! 
of  common  prudence  generally  exercise  abcat 
their  own  affairs  in  the  age  and  country  in 
which  they  liv^.  Lyman  v.  Soutbern  R.  Cf^^ 
44  S.  B.  550,  551,  182  N.  C.  721  (quoting  aa4 


ORDINARY  GARB 


775 


ORDINARY  CAKB^ 


adopting  deflnltlon  In  Neal  ▼.  Wilmington  k 
W.  R.  Co.,  53  N.  O.  482). 

"Ordinary  care*'  is  such  care  as  it  is 
to  be  assumed  that  an  ordinarily  prudent 
man  would  exercise  in  the  circumstances 
were  the  risk  his  own.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  Ry. 
Ck>.  V.  Ford,  78  N.  B.  969,  972, 167  Ind.  205. 

The  words  "ordinary  care,"  as  nsed  in  an 
instruction  In  an  action  for  the  wrongful 
death  of  an  employ^,  mean  such  care  as  an 
ordinarily  prudent  man  would  use  in  matters 
luYolvlng  his  own  interest  under  circumstanc- 
es similar  to  those  under  investigation.  Illi- 
nois Cent.  R.  Ca  t.  Cane's  Adm'z  (Ey.)  90 
S.  W.  1061, 1064. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  ordinari- 
ly prudent  meta,  as  a  class,  would  exercise  in 
caring  for  their  own  property  under  the  like 
circumstances.  Fraam  ▼.  Grand  Rapids  A  I. 
Ry.  Co.,  126  N.  W.  861,  863,  161  Mich.  666, 

29  L.  R.  A  (N.  8.)  834,  21  Ann.  Gas.  96. 

I 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  an 
ordinarily  prudent  person  would  use  for  his 
own  safety  under  like  conditions  and  similar 
circumstances.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  T. 
Ueltschi's  Ex'rs  (Ky.)  97  S.  W.  14,  16. 

The  term  "ordinary  care"  contemplates 
that  degree  of  care  that  an  ordinarily  pru- 
dent person  would  use  in  the  transaction  of 
his  own  business  under  like  or  similar  dr- 
cumst&nces.  Guitar  v.  Randel  (Tex.)  147  S. 
W.  642,  647. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  ordinari- 
ly careful  and  prudent  persons  are  accustom- 
ed to  use  in  their  own  affairs.  Nashville,  O.  & 
St  L.  R.  Co.  V.  RusseU,  110  S.  W.  317,  819, 
129  Ky.  14. 

Rev.  Codes  1905,  i  6694,  defines  "ordinary 
care"  as  such  care  as  persons  of  ordinary 
prudence  usually  exercise  about  their  own 
affairs  of  ordinary  Importance.  Relnke  v. 
Minneapolis,  St  P.  &  S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  186  N. 
W.  779,  782,  28  N.  D.  182;  McBride  v.  Wal- 
lace, 117  N.  W.  867,  858,  17  N.  D.  495  (citing 
Rev.  Codes  1905,  H  5472,  6694;  8  Current 
Law,  162,  note  69* 

Aa  oAre  of  seneralitj  or  majority  of 
peopio 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  the  great 
mass  of  mankind  would  ordinarily  use  in  the 
same  or  similar  circumstances.  Palmer  v. 
Schulz,  120  N.  W.  349,  352,  138  Wis.  455  (cit- 
ing Nass  V.  Schulz,  81  N.  W.  133,  105  Wis. 
146,  150;  Duthle  v.  Town  of  Washburn,  58 
N,  W.  380,  87  Wis.  231,  233;  Hennessy  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  74  N,  W.  554,  99 
Wis.  110;  Ward  v.  Milwaukee  &  St  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  29  Wis.  144;  Stafford  v.  CJhippewa  Val- 
ley Electric  R.  Co.,  86  N.  W.  1086,  110  Wis. 
^1,  354;  Dehsoy  ▼.  Milwaukee  Electric  Ry. 
*  Light  Co.,  85  N.  W.  973,  110  Wla  412; 
Schrunk  t.  0t  Joseph,  97  N.  W.  946, 120  Wis. 


"Ordinary  care,"  in  the  abstract,  is  sudi 
care  as  the  great  mass  of  mankind  ordinarily 
exercise,  and,  as  applied  to  any  particular 
case,  it  is  such  care  as  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind ordinarily  exercise  under  the  same  or 
similar  circumstances.  Sufferling  v.  Heyl  S^ 
Patterson,  121  N.  W.  252,  254, 139  Wis.  510. 

"  'Ordinary  care'  •  •  •  is  such  de- 
gree of  care  and  prudence  as  ordinarily  care- 
ful and  prudent  persons,  or  as  the  great  mass 
of  mankind  (that  is,  the  majority  of  persons), 
would  exercise  under  the  same  circumstanc- 
es." Banderob  v.  Wisconsin  Cent  Ry.  Co., 
113  N.  W.  738,  743,  133  Wis.  249. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  that  degree  of  care 
"whidti  the  great  mass  of  mankind,  or  the 
type  of  that  mass,  the  ordinarily  prudent 
man,  exercises  under  like  circumstances." 
Pumorlo  V.  City  of  Merrill,  103  N.  W.  464, 
466,  126  Wis.  102  (quoting  and  adopting  defi- 
nition in  Dehsoy  v.  Milwaukee  Electric  Ry. 
&  light  Co.,  85  N.  W.  978,  110  Wis.  412). 

In  an  action  tor  injuries  to  an  employ^, 
an  instruction  that  "ordinary  care"  in  such 
a  case  is  such  care  as  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind would  have  exercised  under  the  same 
circumstances  was  held  sufficient,  without 
the  addition  of  the  words  "engaged  in  a  sim- 
ilar employment."  Johnson  v.  St  Paul  &  W. 
Coal  Ca,  105  N.  W.  1048.  1052,  126  Wis.  492. 

An  Instruction  that  "ordinary  care"  was 
su^  care  as  the  great  majority  of  mankind 
would  and  do  exercise  in  the  transactions 
of  human  life  under  like  conditions  and 
circumstances  was  not  erroneous  because  of 
the  use  of  the  expression  "under  like  circum- 
stances" ;  this  being  the  equivalent  of  "under 
the  same  or  similar  circumstances,"  which 
is  the  proper  standard.  Warden  ▼.  Miller,  87 
N.  W.  828,  830, 112  Wis.  67. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  the  care  ordinarily 
exercised  by  the  great  mass  of  mankind  or 
the  ordinarily  prudent  person  under  the  same 
or  similar  circumstances,  and  an  instruction 
defining  this  term,  which  omits  the  qualifica- 
tion **under  the  same  or  similar  circumstanc- 
es" or  "under  like  circumstances,"  is  errone- 
ous. Yerkes  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  88  N. 
W.  34,  36,  112  Wis.  184,  88  Am.  St  Rep.  961; 
Boelter  V.  Ross  Lumber  Co.,  79  N.  W.  243, 
245,  103  Wis.  324  (citing  Duthle  v.  Town  of 
Washburn,  58  N.  W.  380,  87  Wis.  233 ;  Hen- 
nesey  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  W. 
554,  99  Wis.  110,  118). 

An  Instruction  that  the  Jury  might  find 
"proximate  causation"  between  the  negli- 
gence of  a  street  car  conductor  and  plaintUTs 
injury  if  the  injury  might  reasonably  have 
been  expected  by  the  conductor  in  the  exer- 
cise of  "ordinary  care"  as  a  man  of  intelli- 
gence having  the  knowledge  that  might  he 
reasonably  expected  and  ought  to  have  been 
had  in  doing  each  work,  if  not  actually  er- 
roneous,  would  have  been  more  nearly  accu- 
rate If  it  had  been  limited  to  what  might 


ORDIXABT  CARS 


776 


OBPIKART  CARE 


k8T«  been  expected  by  a  man  of  "ordinary 
IntelUgenoe**;  the  standard  of  oonparlaon  be- 
ing the  conduct  or  foresight  of  ordinarily, 
prudent,  careful,  and  Intelligent  persons,  and 
the  omission  of  the  qualifying  expression 
oonyeylng  the  idea  of  sometldng  higher  than 
the  ordinary.  Dehsoy  ▼.  Milwaukee  BtoctHc 
Ry.  A  Light  Co.,  86  N.  W.  978,  974,  UO  Wis. 
412. 

"Actionable  negligence"  is  the  absence 
of  ordinary  care,  and  ''ordinary  care**  is  that 
care  which  Is  exercised  by  the  great  mass  of 
mankind.  If  the  defendant's  conduct  does 
not  measure  up  to  this  standard,  it  is  negli- 
gent, whether  it  falls  much  or  little  below 
the  standard.  Sonsmith  t.  Pere  Martfuette 
R.  Co.,  188  N.  W.  847,  861,  178  Mich.  67. 

As  ears  olMerred  Iby  yersoa  of  eo: 


"Ordinary  care,**  required  of  a  boarding 
house  keeper  in  caring  for  the  property  of 
guests,  Is  the  average  common  prudence,  or 
such  care  as  a  prudent  person  would  ordi- 
narily exercise  in  caring  for  his  own  proper- 
ty. Herter  v.  Dwyer,  129  N.  T.  Supp.  606, 
607. 

The  "ordinary  care**  required  of  travel- 
ers upon  highways  is  such  care  as  persons 
of  common  prudence  generally  exercise. 
Farrar  v.  Inhabitants  of  Qreene,  82  Me^  674. 

As  ears  af  ordlaaiily  prtademt  yg>an 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  an  ordi- 
narily careful  and  prudent  person  would  ex- 
ercise under  the  same  or  similar  circum- 
stances. Everett  v.  St  Louis  A  8.  F.  R.  Co., 
112  S.  W.  486,  497,  214  Mo.  64;  Skonieczny 
V.  Churchman  (Del.)  78  AU.  634,  636,  7 
Pennewill,  226;  Felver  v.  Central  Electric 
R.  Co.,  116  8.  W.  960,  988,  216  Mo.  196;  Ben- 
son ▼.  City  of  Spokane,  80  Pac  1106,  1107, 
39  Wash.  101 ;  Galveston,  H.  A  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Olds  (Tex.)  112  S.  W.  787,  792;   Gulf,  C.  A  8. 

F.  R.  Co.  V.  Hays,  89  S.  W.  29,  32,  40  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  162;  Nephler  v.  Woodward,  98  8. 
W.  488,  490,  200  Mo.  179;    International  A 

G.  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Tasby,  100  S.  W.  1030,  1081, 
45  Tex.  Civ.  App.  416;  Jackson  v.  Sumpter 
Valley  Ry.  Co.,  93  Pac.  356,  360,  60  Or.  466; 
Chrlsmer  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  92  S.  W.  378,  383, 
194  Mo.  189,  6  L.  R.  A  (N.  S.)  492;  Louis- 
ville, H.  A  St  L.  R.  Co.  V.  Stillwell,  134  8.  W. 
202,  204,  142  Ky.  330;  Reynolds  v.  Galves- 
ton, H.  A  S.  A  R..CO.  (Tex.)  99  8.  W.  669, 
570;  Rapid  Transit  R.  Co.  v.  Miller  (Tex.) 
85  S.  W.  439;  Chesapeake  A  O.  R.  Co.  ▼. 
Wilson's  Adm'r  (Ky.)  102  8.  W.  810,  812; 
Wellmeyer  v.  St  Louis  Transit  Co.,  96  8.  W. 
925,  928,  198  Mo.  627;  Heberling  v.  City  of 
Warrensburg,  103  S.  W.  36,  89,  204  Mo.  604 
(quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Cohn  v. 
aty  of  Kansas,  18  S.  W.  973,  108  Mo.  392) ; 
Adkisson*s  Adm'r  v«  Louisville,  H.  A  St  L. 
R.  Co.  (Ky.)  110  8.  W.  284,  286;  Cross  v. 
lUlnbis  Cent  R.  Co.  (Ky.)  110  8.  W.  290, 
292 ;  Gilliam  v.  Texas  A  P.  R.  Co.,  38  South. 
166,  168,  114  La.  272  (citing  Little  Rock  A 


M.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Wilson,  16  8.  W.  613, 90  Tm 
271,  13  L.  R.  A  364,  26  Am.  8t  Bepi  e83<: 
Reybum  ▼.  Missouri  Paa  R.  Co.,  86  8.  w. 
174,  176,  187  Mo.  666;  Murray  v.  St  Um 
Transit  Co.,  76  8.  W.  6U,  612, 176  Mo.  1S3: 
Moore  V.  Lindell  Ry.  Co.,  75  S.  W.  672,  97i 
176  Mo.  628;  Houston  A  T.  0.  B.  Co.  r. 
J<dinson,  127  8.  W.  689,  641,  103  Tex.  320: 
Kolh  ▼.  St  Loots  Transit  Co.,  76  &  W.  1060. 
1062,  102  Mo.  App.  148;  Miswari,  K.  ft  T. 
R.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Parrott,  92  &  W.  19d,  lOO 
Tex.  9;  Southern  Pac  Co.  v.  Heteer.  135 
Fed.  273,  288,  j6S  C.  a  A.  26,  1  L.  R.  i.  <N. 
&.)  288;  Dallas  ConsoL  Electric  St  By.  Co. 
V.  Conn  (Tex.)  100  S.  W.  1019,  1020;  Peter 
son  ▼.  Westmann,  77  &  W.  1016,  1016, 103 
Mo.  App.  672. 

**  'Ordinary  cars^  to  auch  care  as  t  po" 
son  of  ordinary  prudence  would  exerdse  on- 
der  the  same  or  like  drcumstsnoea"  Gal- 
Teston,  H.  A  8.  A.  R.  Co.  ▼.  Hubbard,  76  & 
W.  764,  33  Tex.  Civ.  Appi  343;  Athertoar. 
Tacoina  Ry.  A  Power  Co.,  71  Pac.  39.  41 30 
Wash.  396. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  deflned  as  audi  care 
as  a  reasonably  prudent  person  would  bare 
exercised  under  the  same  drcumatances,  or 
such  care  as  is  usually  exodsed  by  men  of 
ordinary  prudence  under  the  same  or  atntiar 
circumstances.  Copeland  y.  Wabash  B.  Co, 
75  8.  W.  106,  106,  109,  176  Ma  66a 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  to  ordi- 
narily prudent  man,  mindful  of  himself  aod 
of  the  rights  of  others,  would  exercise  uiMler 
the  same  circumstances.  Amoican  loe  C& 
V.  South  Qardiner  Lumber  Co.,  79  AtL  &  «. 
107  Me.  494,  32  L.  R.  A  (N.  8.)  lOOa. 

"Ordinary  care"  la  such  care  as  a  persn 
of  ordinary  prudence  and  caution  woald  ba^« 
exercised  in  the  circumstances  sunoondiag 
the  plaintiif  or  in  like  drcumstanoea  Cbi» 
go  Union  Traction  Co..  t.  Hansen,  125  III 
App.  163,  16a 

'X)rdinary  care"  is  that  degree  (A  off 
usually  exercised  by  persons  of  ordinaiy  can 
and  prudence  "engaged  in  the  same  or  aist 
lar  business  under  the  same  or  similar  df 
cumstances,"  and  a  charge  substitatinfr  is 
place  of  the  quoted  phrase,  the  phrase,  '^ 
der  the  facts  and  circumstances  surrooDdiH 
them  at  the  time,"  is  erroneous.  Willie 
▼.  North  Wisconsin  Lumber  Co.,  102  N.  ^ 
689-691,  124  Wis.  828. 

"Ordinary  care"  may  be  defined  as  tint 
degree  of  care  which  a  person  of  ordiD&|^ 
prudence,'  in  the  same  occupatloor  ^^^' 
use  under  the  same  or  similar  drcamsUiK^ 
Theobald  v.  St  Louis  Transit  Co.,  90  S.  » 
364,  366»  191  Mo.  396. 

"  'Ordinary  care^  by  a  person  to  ^^ 
f ormance  of  daily  taaks  is  that  degi«e  ^ 
care  which  men  of  ordinary  prudence  ex^' 
else  under  the  ordinary  aftd  usosl  dr^ 
stances  of  their  occupationa."   CbicagOi  ^' 


OftDINAHT  CAtlB 


'777 


ORDIKAR-r  CAKE 


Q.  R.  Co*  V.  UUey,  99  H.  W.  UK12,>  1616,  4 
Neb.  (Unof.)  286. 

An  Instmction  that  "ordinary  care"  as 
nsed  in  instructions  given  meant  snch  care 
as  ordinarily  prudent  persons  would  exercise 
under  circumstances  similar  to  ttiose  proven 
in  the  case,  and  that  negligence  was  the 
failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care,  was  correct. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Lucas'  Adm'r  (Ky.) 
98  S.  W.  308,  312. 

A  charge  defining  "ordinary  care'*  as 
"that  degree  of  care  which  men  of  ordinary 
caution  and  prudence  would  use  under  the 
same  or  similar  circumstances,  a  fSailupe  to 
use  ordinary  care  is  negligence,"  while  not 
in  the  usual  form,  is  suhstantially  correct, 
and  not  subject  to  the  criticism  that  it  im- 
poses on  the  person  charged  a  hlgiher  degree 
of  care  than  that  required  by  law.  8t  Louis 
8.  W.  R.  Co.  of  Texas  ▼.  ConnaUy  <1>bz.)  d3 
S.  W.  206,  207. 

"Ordinary  care''  implies  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  diligence,  and  it  is  the  care  which 
persons  of  ordinary  prudence,  not  careless 
persons,  would  take  under  all  the  dream- 
stances.  Wilson  T.  New  York,  N.  H.  ft  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  69  AtL  864,  372,  29  R.  I.  146  (quoting 
Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  McDaniels,  2  Sup.  Ct  932, 
107  U.  8.  454,  24  L.  £ki.  605;  Biayhew  v.  Sul- 
Uvan  Min.  Co.,  76  Me.  100,  112). 

^'Ordinary  care"  is  such  as  an  ordinarily 
reasonable  and  prudent  person  would  exer- 
cise under  the  same  surroundings.  Lawson 
V.  Seattle  ft  R.  Ry.  Co.,  76  Pac  71,  72,  84 
Wash.  500. 

^'Ordinary  and  reasonable  care"  is  such 
care  as  an  ordinarily  careful  person  would 
use  in  given  circumstances.  Colsch  v.  Chi- 
cago, M.  ft  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  127  N.  W.  198,  200, 
149  Iowa,  176,  34  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1018,  Ann. 
Cas.  1912C,  915. 

The  legal  duty  which  one  owes  to  anoth- 
er in  respect  to  caie  f6r  the  safety  of  the 
person  or  property  of  that  other  is  "ordinary 
care"  under  the  circumstances,  whititi  is  that 
degree  of  care  which  a  person  of  ordinary 
prudence  would  exercise  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances, and  sudi  duty  may  be  assumed 
by  contract  or  may  arise  from  the  circum- 
stances or  the  relation  of  the  parties.  Shar- 
key V.  Skilton,  77  AtL  950,  052,  88  Com>.  503. 

"Ordinary  care"  means  such  care  as  per- 
sons  of  ordinary  prudence  and  caution  would 
exercise  in  the  same  situation  and  under  like 
circumstances.  Linder  v.  St.  IjOuIs  Transit 
Co.,  77  S.  W.  907,  999,  103  Mo.  App.  574. 

An  instruction  that  '*by  the  term  'ordi- 
nary care'  Is  meant  such  care  as  a  person  of 
ordinary  care  and  prudence  ordinarily  'would' 
have  exercised  under  circumstances  the  same 
as  or  similar  to  those  disclosed  by  the  testi- 
mony" was  not  objectionable  becahse  of  the 
use  of  the  word  ''would."  Roedler  v.  Chica- 
go, M.  ft  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  109  N.  W.  88,  91,  129 
Wis.  2Ta 


.  la  SB  action  for  personal  injuries,  "or- 
dinary care"  was  defined  as  care  which  a 
person  of  ordlnaiy  oaiUion,  prudence,,  and 
Judgment  would  be  expected  to  exercise  in 
any  given  case,  and  counsel  took  an  excep- 
tion thereto,  claiming  that  '^ordinary  care  Is 
such  care  as  ordinarily  careful  and  prudent 
persons  usually  exercise  or  are  accustomed  to 
exercise  under  similar  circumstances."  Held 
that,  while  possibly  the  latter  definition  was 
couched  in  better  chosen  language,  the  dis- 
tinction between  "person"  and  "persons"  and 
between  the  "given  case"  and  "similar  cir- 
cumstances" was  not  so  marked  or  so  vital 
as  to  raise  a  presumption  that  the  Jury  were 
misled  to  defendant's  prejudice.  Crandall 
V.  City  of  Dubuque,  112  N.  W.  656,  556,  136 
Iowa,  663. 

There  is  a  want  of  ordinary  care  on  the 
part  of  the  i^intlfr  only  when,  under  all  of 
the  circumstances  and  surroundings  of  the 
case,  he  has  done,  or  omitted  to  do,  some- 
thing which  "an  ordinarily  careful  and  pru- 
dent person,"  in  a  like  situation  as  the  plain- 
tiff, would  not  have  done,  or  omitted  to  do, 
and  which  was  the  efficient  and  proximate 
cause  of  plaintiff's  injury.  Hone  v.  Mam- 
moth Min.  Co..  75  Pac.  381,  383,  27  Utah, 
168. 

"What  a.  person  of  ordinary  care  and 
prudence  would  do  in  a  given  case  furnishes 
a  fair  and  reasonably  test  of  'ordinary  care/ 
and  the  omission  pf  anything  which  an  or- 
dinarily prudent  person  would  do  is  a  failure 
to  do  that  which  ordinary  prudence  sug- 
gests."   Uttle  V.  McGuire,  43  Iowa,  447,  44a 

Warehousemen  must  use  "ordinary  care" 
to  protect  iHToperty  Intrusted  to  them,  which 
is  such  care  as  ordinarily  prudent  persons  in 
that  bysiness  are  accustomed  to  exercise. 
Muskogee  Crystal  Ice  Co.  ▼.  Riley  Bros.,  106 
Paa  629,  630,  24  Okl.  114. 

The  "ordinary  care"  required  of  a  bailee 
for  hire  is  that  degree  of  care  which  ordina- 
rily prudent  persons  would  use  in  similar 
circumstances.  Michigan  Stove  Co.  v.  Puebld 
Hardware  Co.,  116  Pac.  340,  842,  51  Colo.  160. 

As  eare  ordinarily  or  usually  msed 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  an  ordi- 
narily prudent  person  usually  exercises  under 
the  same  or  similar  circumstances.  Louls- 
vlUe  k  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Berry  (Ky.)  Ill  S.  W. 
370,  372;  Louisville  R.  Co.  v.  Bsselman^  03 
S.  W.  50,  52;  Cross  v.  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co. 
(Ky.)  110  S.  W.  290,  292;  PosUl  TeL  Cable 
Co.  V.  Terrell,  100  S.  W.  292,  293,  124  Ky. 
822,  14  L.  R.  A-  (N.  S.)  927;  D.  H.  Ewing  & 
Sons  V.  Callahan  (Ky.)  105  S.  W.  387,  388. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  ordinari- 
ly careful  and  prudent  persons  ordinarily 
exeircise  under  the  same  or  similar  circuqar 
stances,  in  the  same  or  similar  business. 
City  of  Covington  v.  Whitney  (Ky.)  99  8.  W. 
337,  338;    Toebbe  v.  City  of  Covington,.  141 


OBDINABY  OARB 


T78 


OBDIHABTGLiBB 


S.  W.  421,  423,  140  Ky.  768;  Lovi^vUto  k  N. 
B.  Oa  ▼.  Outer  (Ky.)  112  8.  W.  904,  908. 

"Ordinary  care^  is  that  degree  of  care 
and  diligence  which  an  ordinarily  carefol 
and  pmdent  person  wonld  ordinarily  nee  un- 
der like  or  siniilar  dreomstancee.  Logan  t. 
Metropolitan  8t  B.  Go.,  82  8.  W.  120,  128, 

183  Mo.  682;  Creamer  ▼.  Lonisyllle  By.  Oo., 

184  S.  W.  193,  196,  142  Ky.  840. 

The  controlling  standard  or  test  of  rea- 
sonable or  "ordinary  care*'  la  what  a  reasona- 
bly pmdent  person  would  ordinarily  hare 
done  in  the  like  circumstances,  rather  than 
the  prevailing  practice  of  others  engaged  in 
the  same  business.  The  practice  of  others, 
even  though  not  a  general  or  prevailing  one, 
is  some  evidence  of  what  could  have  been 
done,  and  so  has  a  material  bearing  upon 
whether  the  requisite  cars  was  exercised  in 
what  was  actually  done;  and  an  instruction 
which  treats  what  a  reasonably  prudent  per- 
son would  ordinarily  have  done  in  the  like 
circumstances  as  the  controlling  standard  or 
test  of  reasonable  or  "ordinary  care,"  and 
also  evidence  only  of  ttiat  standard,  and 
directs  that  such  practice  be  considered  with 
ail  the  other  evidence  bearing  upon  the  sub- 
ject in  fixing  upon  that  standard,  is  not  ob- 
jectionable as  permitting  the  jury  to  find  that 
the  conduct  in  question  was  negligent,  even 
though  it  conformed  to  the  prevailing  prac- 
tice of  others,  because  that  practice  was  not 
in  itself  the  legal  standard,  but,  as  indicated 
in  the  instruction,  was  evidence  only  thereof. 
Chicago  G.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonough,  161 
Fed.  667,  606^  88  O.  a  A.  617. 

"Ordinary  cars^  is  sudi  care  as  ordinari- 
ly careful  and  prudont  persons  ordinarily 
exercise  under  the  same  or  similar  circum- 
stances. Cornelius  v.  8outh  Covington  ft  C. 
St  B.  Co.  (Ky.)  96  8.  W.  648,  644. 

"Ordinary  care"  means  the  degree  of 
cars  usually  exercised  by  ordinarily  careful 
and  prudent  persons  under  the  same  or  simi- 
lar circumstances.  Hauler  v.  Ft  Dodge 
Light  ft  Power  Co.,  107  N.  W.  693,  694,  133 
Iowa,  326  (quoting  and  adopting  the  defini- 
tion in  Gorman's  Adm'r  v.  Louisville  B.  Co. 
(Ky.l  72  8.  W.  760). 

"Ordinary  care"  means  such  care  as  a 
person  of  ordinary  prudence  would  usually 
exercise  in  the  same  situation  and  drcum- 
stances.  Dean  v.  Kansas  City,  St  L.  ft  C.  B. 
Go.,  97  8.  W.  910,  912,  199  Mo.  386. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  persons 
of  ordinary  prudence  usually  exerdse  under 
similar  drcumstances.  Dorrls  v.  Warford, 
100  S.  W.  312,  313,  124  Ky.  768,  9  L.  B.  A. 
(N.  S.)  1090, 14  Ann.  Caa  602. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  that  care  which  is 
usually  exercised  under  like  drcumstances 
by  persons  of  ordinary  prudence.  Weber  v. 
Union  Development  ft  Construction  Co.,  42 
South.  652,  663,  118  La.  77*  12  Ann.  Gaa 
1012. 


A  rsqasst  to  Insfemct  that,  if  pUtatif 
was  injured  by  attempting  to  Jump  trom  Ur 
buggy,  she  cannot  recover  unless  a  peraoo  tct- 
Ing  with  due  care  would  have  beliered  it 
necessary  to  so  Jump,  and  she  used  onUnur 
care  in  doUig  so,  should  have  beea  snnted: 
the  "ordinary  care"  referred  to  bdos  oidi 
care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  vooU 
exercise  in  view  of  the  existing  drcnisstiiK 
ea.  Warth  v.  JaduK>n  County  CDoit,  76  & 
B.  420,  423,  71  W.  Va.  184. 

An  iBStnicti<m  that  "ordinazy  or'  is 
such  care  as  is  usually  exercised  by  penoa 
of  ordinary  care  and  prud^ce  in  tlie  aseud 
country,  and  under  the  same  or  similar  or- 
cnmstanoes,  as  a  party  charged  with  lib 
neglig^ice  is  suffidoit  Arkansas  CItj  t. 
Payne,  102  Pac.  781«  782,  80  Kan.  353,  IS 
Ann.  Css.  82. 

"Ordinary  care^is  such  as  a  person  of 
ordinary  prudence  and  caution,  aocordiDg  ta 
the  usual  and  general  experience  of  mtnlM 
would  exerdse  in  the  same  situation  anddr 
cumstances  as  those  of  the  defendant,  vbose 
conduct  in  that  regard  is  in  questioD.  Carr 
V.  Ifissoufi  Paa  B.  Co.,  92  fi.  W.  87i  S7& 
195  Mo.  214;  Feddeck  v.  St  Loois  Oar  Co. 
102  S.  W.  675,  679,  125  Ho.  App.  24. 

«^rdinary  care"  is  that  care  wfaicb  u 
intelligent  prudent  person  engaged  in  tlia: 
kind  of  business  ordinarily  exercises  with  r^ 
spect  to  it  Shandrew  ▼.  Chicago,  St  P^  H. 
ft  O.  By.  Co.,  142  Fed.  820,  324,  73  a  C  i 
430. 

"Ordinary  care**  is  such  care  as  one  cu 
ordinary  prudence  usually  exerdsea  oDde: 
given  circumstances.  Cincinnati,  N.  0.  &  T. 
P.  By.  Oo.  V.  Evans'  Adm'r,  110  S.  W.  8ti 
848,  129  Ky.  162. 

An  instruction  that  "ordinary  care"  ^ 
that  degree  of  care  and  caution  that  a  pei^ 
of  ordinary  prudence  is  accustomed  to  i£<? 
under  like  or  similar  drcumstances  is  ^ 
incorrect,  as  there  can  be  no  practical  differ 
ence  between  what  a  person  of  ordinary  pn>; 
dence  would  "ordinarily  do  or  usnallj  do' 
and  what  such  person  is  accustomed  to  ^ 
under  similar  circumstances.  St  Louis  S 
W.  By.  Coi  of  O^xas  v.  Brown,  68  S.  W.  101ft 
1012,  30  Tex.  av.  App.  57. 

An  instruction  that  "ordinary  ca«*  ^ 
such  care  as  persons  of  ordinary  pnidefic^ 
and  intelligence  exercise  under  tlie  saioe  ^ 
similar  circumstances  was  not  fatally  ^ 
fective  for  failure  to  use  the  word  "ordluri^ 
ly/»  'iiguaUy,"  or  "customarily,"  or  a  v^^* 
of  like  import  after  the  word  'intelUgeuc^ 
Coppins  V.  Town  of  Jefferson,  105  X.  W.  lt>'- 
1080,  126  Wis.  578. 

An  Instruction  defining  "ordinary  ctft 
as  that  degree  of  care  which  a  person  of  onli^ 
na^y  prudence  would  usually  exerdse  nd^^ 
the  same  drcumstances,  and  the  failure  ^ 
use  such  care  is  negligence,  is  not  enooeos^ 
because  of  a  qualification  of  the  word  "ex^ 


OBBINAHY  GABX 


779 


OBDINABY  GABB 


ctee-  by  the  word  "usually."  International  ft 
a.  N.  B.  Oo.  T.  Ford  (Tttr.)  118  S.  W.  1137, 
1138. 

Aa  eare  of  ordiiuury  maa 

In  an  action  for  damages  from  a  collision 
wltb  a  street  car,  an  instmction  tbat  ^ordina- 
ry care  is  snch  oare  as  an  ordinary  person 
would  usually  observe  under  the  same  or 
similar  drcumstaoces  as  those  under  investi- 
gation'* is  erroneous;  ordinary  care  being 
such  care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  person 
would  usually  exercise  under  circumstances 
similar  to  those  proven  in  the  case.  Hender- 
son aty  R,  Oo.  V.  Lockett  (Ky.)  9S  S.  W.  303, 
304. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  that  degree  of  care 
which  an  ordinary  person  would  use  under 
like  or  similar  circumstances.  Missouri,  K. 
&  T.  R.  Co.  of  Texas  y.  O'Connor  (Tex.)  78  S. 
W.  374,  876. 

A  livery  man  is  liable  for  injuries  to 
horses  in  his  care  only  when  caused  by  his 
lack  of  "ordinary  care,"  which  is  that  care 
an  ordinary  man  would  exercise  over  his  own 
similar  property  under  like  conditions.  Cald- 
well y.  Ni<diol,  184  S.  W.  622,  623,  07  Ark. 
42a 

As  eare  of  pmdeaty  earef  ul,  or  eantlons 


"Ordinary  care^'  is  such  care  as  would  be 
ordinarily  used  by  a  prudent  person  perform- 
ing a  like  service  under  similar  circumstanc- 
e&  Holden  v.  Missouri  B.  Co.,  76  S.  W. 
073,  078,  177  Mo.  466. 

"'Ordinary  care'  is  that  care  which  a 
prudent  person  ordinarily  uses  under  like  cir- 
cumstances, which  is  another  and  different 
thing  from  such  care  as  persons  ordinarily 
use  under  like  circumstances."  Heberling  v. 
City  of  Warrensburg,  103  6.  W.  36,  30,  204 
Mo.  604  (quoting  Cohn  v.  City  of  Kansas,  18 
S.  W.  073,  108  Mo.  302). 

A  charge  defining  "ordinary  care"  as 
"such  care  as  a  prudent  man  would  exercise 
under  the  same  or  similar  circumstances"  is 
erroneous,  since  it  makes  the  test  the  care 
that  a  prudent  man  would  exercise,  while 
the  true  test  is  the  care  that  an  ordinarily 
prudent  person  would  have  exercised.  City 
of  Paris  y.  Tucker  (Tex.)  03  S.  W.  283,  235. 

An  instruction  deflniug  "ordinary  care" 
in  an  action  for  injuries  on  a  toll  bridge  as 
such  care  as  a  prudent  operator  of  a  toll 
bridge  would  exercise  under  the  same  or  sim- 
ilar circumstances  is  not  misleading  or  con- 
fusing in  using  the  words  "such  care  as  a 
prudent  operator  of  a  toll  bridge  would  exer- 
cise" instead  of  "such  care  as  a  person  of 
ordinary  prudence  would  exercise "  as  both 
expressions  mean  practically  the  same  thing. 
Gibler  v.  Terminal  B.  Ass'n  of  St  Louis,  101 
S.  W.  37,  40,  203  Mo.  208, 11  Ann.  Cas.  1104. 

"'Ordinary  cars  and  caution'  is  such 
care  and  caution  as  a  prudent  man  would 


exercise  under  similar  circumstances."  In^ 
temational  A  G.  N.  B.  Co.  v.  Trump,  94  S.  W. 
903,  906,  42  Tex.  Ctv.  App.  536  (Quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Houston  A  T.  By.  Ca 
V.  Oram,  49  Tex.  346;  Texas  A  N.  O.  B.  Co. 
v.  Black  [Tex.]  44  S.  W.  673). 

A  charge  that  "ordinary  care"  is  "that 
care  that  a  prudent  man  would  exercise  un- 
der like  or  similar  circumstances"  is  not  mis-' 
leading  because  the  word  "a,"  instead  of  the 
word  "every"  is  used.  Ooodwyn  v.  Central 
of  Georgia  B.  Ck>.,  58  S.  El  688,  2  Ga.  App. 
470. 

"Ordinary  ca^"  means  that  care  that  a 
prudent  person  would  exercise  under  the 
same  or  similar  circumstances.  This  definir 
tion  is  in  substantial  accOTd  with  that  given 
of  ordinary  diligence  in  av.  Code  1895,. | 
2808.  aty  of  Atlanta  y.  Harper,  50  S.  £3. 
230,  129  Ga.  415. 
As  care  of  reasoMiblo  and  inteUisent 

maa 

"  'Ordinary  care'  means  simply  that  de- 
gree of  vigilance  which  a  reasonable  and 
prudent  person  would  exercise  under  like 
circumstances."  Lake  Shore  A  M.  S.  By.  Co. 
V.  Mcintosh,  38  N.  B.  476,  479»  140  Ind.  261. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  a  per- 
son of  reasonable  and  ordinary  prudenoe  and 
skill  would  reasonably  exercise  under  the 
same  or  similar  circumstances.  Oousineau 
V.  Afuskeg<Hi  Traction  A  lighting  Co.,  108  N. 
W.  720,  722,  145  Mich.  314. 

It  is  inaccurate,  but  not  reversible  error, 
to  instruct  that  "ordinary  care"  is  such  care 
as  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  and  intelli- 
gence would  use  under  the  same  or  similar 
circumstances.  Houston  A  T.  C.  B.  Co.  v. 
Gray,  85  S.  W.  838,  830,  38  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
249  (citing  Houston  A  T.  0.  B  Co.  v.  Brown, 
85  S.  W.  44,  37  Tex.  Civ.  App.  595;  Same  v. 
Kothmann,  84  S.  W.  1089,  37  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
548). 

"'Ordinary  care'  is  defined  as  the  care 
that  would  be  exercised  by  a  reasonably  pru- 
dent person  under  the  same  or  similar  cir- 
cumstance&"  Comovski  v.  St  Louia  Tran- 
sit Co.,  106  S.  W.  51,  56,  207  Mo.  263;  Denver 
A  B.  Q.  B.  Co.  V.  Norgate,  141  Fed.  247,  250, 
72  0.  C.  A.  865^  6  U  B  A.  (N.  S.)  081,  5  Ann. 
Cas.  448. 

"Ordinary  care"  Is  such  care  as  a  rea- 
sonable and  prudent  man  would  use  under 
the  same  or  similar  circumstancea  Antonlan 
y.  South.  Pac.  Co.,  100  Pac.  877,  880,  9  CaL 
App.  71& 

"Ordinary  care^'  Is  such  care  as  a  rea- 
sonable, prudent,  and  careful  person  would 
exercise  under  similar  circumstancea  Camp- 
bell y.  Walker  (DeL)  78  Atl.  601, 603,  2  Boyce, 
41. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  sndi  as  a  man  of  rea- 
aonable  prudence  and  caution  would  exerdae 
under  the  drcumatancea.    Hot  Springs  8L 


OSDINABX  OABB 


T80 


OBDINABT  GABS 


a  Co.  T.  Hndrtth,  82  8.  W.  246^  MT,  72  Ark. 
672. 

I&stnictliig  thmt  ordinary  care  o(  Om 
driver  would  bo  '^acb  a  degreo  of  care  and 
caution,  all  things  considered,  that  a  reason* 
ably  prudent  man  would  have  ezerdsed,** 
without  adding  at  the  end  the  words  "un- 
der the  same  or  similar  circumstances,"  if 
error,  was  technical,  and  not  injurious. 
Kwalm  y.  Northern  Pac.  By.  Co,  128  N.  W. 
82,  88,  148  WlSL  4i2. 

"  'Ordinary  care'  is  that  care  which  the 
Ideal  prudent  man  would  ha?e  exercised  un- 
der the  existing  conditions.**  Hence,  in  an 
action  for  injuries  to  a  conductor  by  falling 
down  the  steps  of  a  depot  platform  at  night, 
in  the  absence  of  a  light,  an  instruction  that, 
though  plaintiff's  lantern  was  blown  out,  he 
was  entitled  to  proceed  to  Us  train,  "if  he 
thought  he  could  safely  make  the  Journey  by 
exercising  ordinary  care,"  was  erroneous; 
the  standard  of  plaintiff's  duty  being,  not 
what  he  thought  he  could  safely  do,  but  what 
a  reasonably  prudent  man  under  the  circum- 
stances would  do.  Beard  ▼.  Southern  By. 
Co.,  56  S.  a  005,  608,  143  N.  C.  13a 

As  eare  reaaottably  to  be  esyeeted 

By  ''ordinary  card"  Is  meant  such  care 
and  caution  as  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence 
might  reasonably  be  expected  to  exercise  un- 
der like  circumstances.  Louisville  A  N.  B. 
Co.  T.  Joshlin  (Ky.)  110  S.  W.  882,  886.  . 

"Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  ought 
reasonably  to  be  expected  of  an  ordinarily 
prudent  person  in  the  same  situation  as  the 
person  whose  conduct  is  in  question.  Booker 
V.  Southwest  Missouri  B.  Co.,  128  a  W.  1012, 
1017,  144  Mo.  App.  278. 

'*  'Ordinary  care'  is  that  degree  of  care, 
precaution,  or  diligence,  which  may  properly 
be  expected  or  required,  having  regard  to  the 
nature  of  the  action  and  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  transaction."  Missouri,  K. 
A  T.  B.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Moss  (Tex.)  135  S. 
W.  6:66,  627. 

"Ordinary  care,  foresight,  and  diligence" 
mean  such  foresight  and  diligence  as  a  per- 
son of  ordinary  sense  or  prudence,  engaged 
in  the  same  or  similar  business,  might,  be 
reasonably  expected  to  use  under  the  same  or 
similar  circumstances.  Laurence  L.  Prince 
A  Co,  V.  St  Louis  Cotton  Compress  Co.,  86 
S.  W.  873,  877,  112  Mo.  App.  49. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  that  degree  of  care 
which  may  have  been  reasonably  expected 
from  a  sensible  person  in  the  situation  of  the 
plaintiff  and  defendant  at  the  time.  Whit- 
field v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  B.  Co.,  60  S.  E. 
1126,  1128,  147  N.  C.  236. 

An  instruction  defining  "ordinary  care" 
to  be  that  degree  of  care,  precaution,  or  dili- 
gence which  may  i^ropwly  be  expected  or  re- 
quired, having  regard  to  the  nature  of  the 
act  or  duty  and  to  the  attending  oircumstanc- 


ea,  Is  not  arroneoua.  Hooston  A  T.  C  R.  Ok 
y.  Boberta,  100  &  W.  982.  983,  00  Tto.  Or. 
App.  00. 

As  dme  eare 

The  expression  "due  careT  Is  sot  tbe 
equivalent  of  "ordinary  care."  City  of  Su 
Antonio  T.  TUerico  (Tex.)  78  8.  W.  28,  31 

"Due  care,"  "due  diUgence,"  and  "onfr 
nary  care"  are  convertible  terms,  and  liMtc 
the  same  thing.  Western  Union  TeL  C^.  t 
Smith  (Tex.)  133  8.  W.  1062,  1064;  Cornov^k: 
V.  St  Louis  Transit  Co.,  106  S.  W.  51,  56, 207 
Mo.  263  (citing  3  Words  and  Phrases,  pi  2222: 
6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  503$).  But  see  Qtj 
of  San  Antonio  r.  Talerico  (Tex.)  78  &  W. 
28,  82. 

The  rule  of  law  now  generally  reoogidied 
Is  that  the  legal  measure  of  duty  except  tbat 
made  absolute  by  law,  is  better  expressed 
by  the  phrases  "due  care,"  "reasonable  care," 
or  ^'ordinary  care,**  used  Intercfaangeablj. 
Baymond  v.  Portland  B.  (>).,  62  AtL  602, 60i 
100  Me.  029.  3  L.  B.  A.  (N.  &)  94. 

**  'Due  care'  is  'ordinary  care';  and  *or- 
dinary  care'  is  the  care  that  would  be  exer 
deed  by  a  reasonably  prudent  person  aiider 
the  same  or  similar  circumstancea"  Cors^ 
ovski  V.  St  Louis  Transit  Co.,  106  S.  W.  51 
56,  207  Mo.  263. 

A  traveler  crossing  a  railroad  track  ii 
bound  only  to  use  ''due  care,*'  whicb  is  not 
the  highest  degree  of  care  possible,  bat  U 
only  "ordinary  care"  under  the  clrcalD8UB^ 
es.  Colorado  A  S.  By.  Ck).  v.  ChUes,  114  Pat 
661,  664,  60  O>lo.  19L 

The  care  to  be  exercised  by  a  gas  cofi>- 
pany  to  prevent  escape  of  gas  from  its  maio& 
to  the  injury  of  trees  along  the  street,  is  d^ 
"ordinary  care,"  as  distinguished  from  "€i- 
traordinary  care,"  but  due  care  or  caie  com- 
mensurate with  the  danger.  <3ould  r.  ni 
nona  Gas  C5o..  Ill  N.  W.  254,  258,  100  Minn 
258.  10  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  889. 


"Ordinary  care"  means  reasonable  car* 
Hanley  v.  Ft  Dodge  Light  A  Power  Co..  K'- 
N.  W.  593,  594,  133  Iowa,  326. 

To  use  "reasonable  care"  is  eaulTaltfflt 
to  the  expression  to  use  or  exercise  "ordin&i? 
care."  International  A  6.  N.  R.  Ca  t. 
Trump,  94  S.  W.  903,  906,  42  Tex.  a?.  App 
536. 

The  phrase  "reasonable  care"  bts  b«s 
declared  by  the  courts  of  England  to  be  ?P 
onymous  with  "ordinary  care."  (^aren  ^ 
Bodwell  Granite  Co.,  69  Ati.  285,  287,  99  M? 
278. 

The  words  "ordinary  care"  embody  tu? 
same  degree  of  diligence  as  the  words  "or* 
nary  and  reasonable  care  and  diligence,"'  aod 
have  substantially  the  same  signifl<*D** 
The  words  "ordinary"  and  ^'reasonable"  ^ 
acrlptive  of  diligenoe,  aia  synonymoos,  ts^ 


ORDINABY  CABB 


781 


0RDINAB7  CABB 


:e  used  Interchangeably  in  gtatates  and  by 
le  courts.  Goodwyn  v.  Central  of  Georgia 
.  Co.,  58  8.  B.  688,  2  Ga.  App.  470. 

The  terms  "ordinary  care"  and  "rea- 
»nable  care"  are  In  law,  practically  synony- 
ous.  In  their  ordinary  use  in  connection 
ith  the  subject  in  hand,  they  are  also  sub- 
antially  synonymous,  and  may  be  used 
terchangeably  in  instructions  in  an  action 
r  injuries.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  CJo.  v. 
ointer's  Adm'r,  69  S.  W,  1108,  1112,  118 
y.  952.  See,  also,  Gaven  v.  Bodwell  Gran- 
e  Co.,  69  Atl.  286,  287,  99  Me.  278. 

The  use  of  the  words  "reasonable  care^" 
stead  of  "ordinary  care,''  in  an  instruction 
1  an  action  for  injuries,  is  not  such  a  defect 
i  will  inyaUdate  a  Judgment  for  plaintiff, 
paulding  v.  Metropolitan  St  B.  Co.,  107  S. 
' .  1049,  1061,  129  Mo.  App.  607. 

"Ordinary  care"  and  "reasonable  care," 
3  applied  to  the  duty  of  a  master  to  provide 
lies  for  the  regulation  of  his  actlvitieB,  are, 
rdinarily,  convertible  terms.  Texas  &  N. 
.  R.  Co.  V.  Walker  (Tex.)  126  S.  W.  99,  106. 

An  instruction  that  a  telegraph  company 
lust  use  "reasonable  care*'  in  transmitting 
Qd  delivering  messages  imposes  no  higher 
egree  of  care  on  the  company  than  "or^l- 
ary  care,"  as  the  two  ternui  are  synony- 
I0U8.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Gulnn 
rex.)  130  S.  W.  616,  618. 

Where  the  court  in  its  diarge  used  the 
iTTOB  "ordinary  care,"  "reasonable  diligence," 
Qd  "reasonable  care,"  it  should,  in  an  in- 
tructlon  defining  ordinary  care,  have  also 
)ld  the  Jury  that  reasonable  diligence  or 
^sonable  care  is  ordinary  care.  Greene  v. 
ouisville  R.  Co.,  84  S.  W.  1154, 1166, 119  Ky. 
62,  7  Ann.  Cas.  1126. 

An  instruction,  in  an  action  for  negli- 
ent  delay  in  transmission  and  delivery,  on 
be  measure  of  the  telegraph  company's  duty 
1  delivering,  was  not  erroneous  for  requiring 
:  to  transmit  in  "due  time  (that  is,  such  time 
s  it  would  have  been  delivered  by  the  exer- 
ise  of  reasonable  care  and  diligence  in  getr 
ing  it  through  and  delivered),"  on  the  ground 
bat  it  was  only  required  to  use  "ordinary 
are,"  in  absence  of  a  request  for  a  more 
pedflc  charge ;  the  terms  '^reasonable  care" 
Qd  "ordinary  care"  haying  substantially 
le  same  meaning.  Western  Union  Telegraph 
Jo.  V.  Vance  CTex.)  161  S.  W.  904,  907  (citing 
Words  and  Phrases,  p.  6955). 

At  relative  tevat 

"Ordinary  care"  is  a  relative  term,  and 
spends  on  the  circumstances  and  conditions 
^  the  particular  case.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry. 
'0.  V.  Frltts,  49  S.  B.  971;  973,  108  Va.  687, 
8  Ta  R.  a.  864,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  911 ;  Oou- 
ineau  v.  Muskegon  Traction  &  Lighting  Co., 
08  N.  W.  720,  722,  145  Mich.  814;  Anderson 
•  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  99  Pac.  91,  96,  16 
^ho,  618;   Liberty  T.  Haines^  66  Atl.  738, 


741,  106  Me.  182;  Feddeck  v.  St  Louis  Car 
Co.,  102  S.  W.  676,  679,  126  Mo.  App.  24; 
Lynch  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  106  S.  W.  68, 
76,  208  Mo.  1;  Woods  t.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  86 
S.  W.  1082, 1086, 188  Mou  229  (dting  1  Thomp. 
Neg.  1 26). 

The  term  "<M*dlnary  cave",  is  of  a  flexible 
nature,  and  adapts  itself  to  the  particular  cir- 
cumstances under  which  it  is  to  be  applied, 
depending  upon  the  relation  betwe^i  the  par- 
ties in  interest,  and  the  business  in  which 
they  are  engaged,  and  varying  with  the  pecu- 
liar phase  of  every  situation.  Palace  Hotel 
Co.  V.  Medart,  100  N.  A  317,  320,  87  Ohio  St 
130,  Ann.  Cas.  1913E;  860  (citing  6  Words 
and  Phrases,  p.  5035). 

"The  terms  'ordinary  care,'  'reasonable 
prudence,'  and  such  like  terms,  as  applied  to 
the  conduct  and  afCairs  of  men,  have  a  rela- 
tive significance  and  cannot  be  arbitrarily  de- 
fined. What  may  be  deemed  ordinary  care  in 
one  case  may,  under  different  surroundings 
and  circumstances,  be  gross  negligence.  The 
policy  of  the  law  has  relegated  the  determina- 
tion of  such  questions  to  the  Jury  under  prop- 
er instructions."  Palmer  v.  Portland  Ry., 
Ught  d;  Power  Co.,  108  Pac  211,  214,  66  Or. 
262  (quoting  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ives,  12 
Sup.  Ct  679,  682,  688,  144  U.  S.  406,  417,  36 
L.  Ed.  486) ;  Hainlin  v.  Budge,  47  South.  825, 
832,  66  Fla.  342  (quothig  and  adopting  defini- 
tions in  7  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  6976) ;  Bir- 
mingham Ry.,  Light  &  Power  Co.  v.  Williams, 
48  South.  93,  96,  158  Ala.  381  (citing  Grand 
Trunk  R.  CJo.  v.  Ives,  12  Sup.  Ct  679,  144  U. 
S.  408,  36  L.  Ed.  486);  Johnson  v.  Union 
Pac  Coal  Co.,  76  Pac  1089,  1090,  28  Utah. 
46,  67  L.  R.  A.  506  (citing  Cayzer  t.  Taylor, 
10  Gray  (76  Mass.]  274,  69  Am.  Dec  317 ;  Ni- 
tro-Glycerine  Case,  15  WaU.  624,  688»  21  L. 
Ed.  206;  Boyle  v.  Union  Pac  Ry.,  71  Pac  988, 
991,  26  Utah,  422,  480;  Shearman  ft  Redfield, 
Neg.  i  196;  BaUey,  Mast  liab.  p.  101;  Titus 
V.  Bradford,  B.  dc  K.  R.  Co.,  20  AtL  617,  618, 
136  Pa.  618,  626,  20  Am.  St  Rep.  944 ;  Dickert 
V.  Salt  Lake  City  Ry,  Co.,  69  Pac  96,  20  Utah, 
394) ;  Oklahoma  Gas  &  Electric  Co.  v.  Lukert 
84  Pac  1076,  1084,  16  OkL  897  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Ives,  12  Sup.  Ct  679,  682,  144  U.  S.  408,  417, 
36  L.  Ed.  485);  Southern  Ry.  Ck>.  v.  McGowan, 
43  South.  878,  382,  149  Ala.  440;  Lynch  v. 
Klneth,  78  Pac  923,  924,  36  Wash.  368,  104 
Am.  St  Rep.  958 ;  Meng  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  84  S.  W.  213,  215,  108  Mo.  App.  553  (cit- 
ing Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Ives,  12  Sup.  Ct. 
679,  144  U.  S.  loc  cit  417,  36  L.  Ed.  485; 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffith,  16  Sup.  Ct 
105,  159  U.  S.  603,  40  L.  Ed.  274 ;  Texas  &  P. 
Ry.  V.  Gentry.  16  Sup.  Ct  1104, 163  U.  S.  353, 
41  L.  Ed.  186;  Warner  v:  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Co.,  18  Sup.  Ct  68,  168  U.  S.  349,  '42  L.  m. 
491;  Washington  &'G.  R.  v.  McDade,  10  Sup. 
Ct  1044,  135  U.  S.  554,  34  L.  Ed.  235);  Sans 
Bois  Coal  CJo.  V.  Janeway,  99  Pac  153,  156. 
22  OkL  425  (quoting  and  adopting  a  definition 
in  Worth  BrosL  Qo«  v«SaRaa,  U2  Fed.  306^  89 


ORDINARY  CABB 


782 


ORDINARY  GARB 


G.  0.  A.  186);  Enox^ille  TractlMi  Go.  t. 
Brown,  89  8.  W.  819,  820,  115  T^nn.  323  (cit- 
ing Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  y.  It«8,  12  Snp.  Gt 
679.  144  U.  S.  417,  86  L.  Ed.  485);  Worth 
Bros.  Go.  ▼.  Kallas,  162  Fed.  806,  308,  89  C 
C.  A.  186  (quoting  with  approyal  from  Grand 
Trunk  R.  Go.  y.  lyea,  12  Sap.  Gt  679,  682, 
144  U.  8.  406,  417,  86  L.  Ed.  485);  Klutt  y. 
PhUadelphia  &  R.  R.  Go.,  142  Fed.  894,  896, 
73  G.  G.  A.  494 ;  Swift  &  Co.  y.  Sandy,  165 
Fed.  622,  623,  92  G.  G.  A.  56;  Kobe  y.  St 
JjOViXb  Transit  Co.,  78  8.  W.  55,  59,  103  Mo. 
App.  582  (quoting  Frick  y.  St  Louia,  K.  G. 
&  N.  Ry.  Co.,  76  Mo.  596). 

"  'Ordinary  care,'  or  the  care  the  common 
law  requires  one  to  exerdae  in  and  about  his 
business,  has  a  rdatlye  signiflcatioQ.  It 
means  such  care  as  a  man  of  ordinary  pru- 
dence and  foresight  would  be  expected  to  ex- 
ercise in  like  circumstances;  the  cart  com- 
mensurate with  the  risk  and  danger  of  the 
business  to  others."  Mortens  y.  St  Louis 
Transit  Co.,  99  S.  W.  612,  614,  122  Ma  App. 
304. 

"Ordinary  can^  Is  a  relatlye  term,  and 
diligence  amounting  to  ordinary  care  yaries 
with  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  Oenson 
y.  Georgia  Ry.  dt  Electric  Co.,  68  S.  BL  1113, 
136  Ga.  182. 

The  term  "ordinary  care"  does  not  ex- 
press distinctly  any  certain  degree  of  care; 
what  is  ordinary  care  depends  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  particular  case,  so  that 
ordinary  care  under  one  set  of  circumstances 
might  be  positiye  negligence  under  other  cir- 
cumstancea  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co.  y.  Keegan, 
112  IlL  App.  28.  36. 

Gniere  is  no  fixed  standard  In  the  law  by 
which  a  court  can  arbitrarily  say  in  all  cas- 
es what  conduct  shall  be  considered  reasona- 
ble and  prudent  or  what  shall  constitute  "or^ 
dinary  care,"  and  the  Jury  are  free  to  fix  the 
standard  for  reasonable,  prudent  and  careful 
men  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case  as 
they  find  them  according  to  their  judgment 
and  experience  of  what  that  class  of  men  do 
under  sudi  circumstances,  and  to  test  the 
conduct  inyolyed  in  the  issues  by  that  stand- 
ard. Southern  R.  Co.  y.  Stntts,  144  Fed.  948, 
949,  75  G.  C.  A.  588. 

The  care  imposed  by  law  is  ordinary 
care;  that  is,  such  care  as  persons  of  ordi- 
nary prudence  would  use  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances. "Ordinary  care"  would  require 
the  exercise  of  a  yery  great  degree  of  yigi- 
lance  under  some  circumstances,  and  the 
amount  of  yigilance  and  caution  to  be  used 
will  yary  according  to  the  situation  of  the 
parties  and  the  surrounding  circumstances. 
But  the  standard  by  which  the  acts  are  to  be 
judged  does  not  change ;  it  remains  the  same. 
Dallas  ConsoL  Electric  St  R.  Co.  y.  Cham- 
bers, 118  S.  W.  851,  852,  55  Tex.  Ciy.  App.  331. 

Care  or  the  want  of  it  is  not  to  be  meas- 
ured arbttraxily  aoeordlng  to  fixed  definitions 


as  "slight  care,"  "ordinary  caie.**  or  "ex 
traordlnary  care,"  or  "ali^t  negU«eDoe,* « 
''gross  negligence,"  although  all  tbeae  pbrav 
es  are  used  somewhat  loosely  by  courts  ni 
law-writers,  but  it  is  to  be  measared  by  res 
sonableness,  under  all  the  drcniDsUDces  cf 
the  particular  inquiry.  The  only  tne  mas- 
ure  is  "reasonable  care."  And  that  expi*^ 
sion  has  been  declared  by  the  courts  in  Eo? 
land  and  elsewhere  to  be  synonymous  vith 
^'ordinary  care."  ''Reasonable  care"  is  t  reis 
tiye  term,  and  what  is  reasonable  care  ia  & 
giyen  case  depends  upon  many  oanslderaddnv 
What  would  be  reasonable  caie  under  ti^ 
conditions  would  clearly  be  tae^Hgeaot  t 
others.  Reasonable  care  and  TigUance  rtiy 
according  to  the  exigencies  wbidi  requift 
yigilance  and  attention.  They  relate  to  ^ 
work  to  be  done,  to  the  Instromentalities  ti 
be  used,  to  the  dangers  that  may  result  tx. 
tbieir  use,  to  the  yarying  duties  owed  by  tb<s^ 
who  supply  or  use  them.  And  in  an  cts^ 
reasonable  care  means  such  care  ss  raso3s 
ble  and  prudent  men  use  under  like  drcos 
stances.  Gayen  y.  Bodwell  Granite  Co,  3 
AU.  286,  287,  99  Me.  278  (citing  FletderT 
Boston  ft  M.  R.,  1  Allen  [83  Mass.]  9. 79  A:: 
Dec.  695;  Bigelow  y.  Reed,  61  Me.  325;  I^ 
er  y.  Penobscot  Lumbering  Ass'n.  38  At 
108,  90  Me.  198;  Sawyer  y.  J.  M.  Arnold  Sa?^ 
Co.,  38  AtL  333,  90  Me.  309;  Cayier  t.  ft: 
lor,  10  Gray  (76  Mass.]  274,  69  Am.  Dec.  s: 
Cunningham  y.  Hall,  4  Allen  [86  M&s&]  ^ 
Holly  y.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  8  Gny  H^ 
Mass.]  128,  69  Am.  Dec.  233). 

"Ordinary  care"  as  applied  to  a  nttstcrt- 
such  care  as  reasonable  and  prudent  meo  t^ 
under  similar  circumstances  in  providing  a^- 
and  suitable  appliances  and  instnuoeiitali:!-^ 
for  the  work  to  be  done,  and  in  proTidlnJE- 
erally  for  the  safety  of  the  eerrant  In  '^ 
course  of  his  employment,  regard  being  h 
to  the  work  and  difficulties  and  dangers  i: 
tending  it  The  term  has  a  relative  sigi^ 
cance  and  its  definition  must  depend  on  tt^ 
surrounding  circumstances  of  the  particoi^ 
case,  the  determination  of  whidi,  wben  t  p- 
en  state  of  facts  Is  sndi  that  reasoaableBS 
may  fairly  differ  upon  the  question  of  fif 
ligence,  is  for  the  Jury.  FLBher*8  Admr* 
Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  62  8.  B.  373.  ^ 
104  Va.  635,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  0.)  9M  (dc< 
Bertha  Zinc  Go.  y.  Martin's  Adm'r,  22  Sj 
869,  93  Va.  804,  70  L.  R  A.  990;  BichlM* 
Iron  Co.  y.  Blkins,  17  a  B.  890,  90  Va-Sl 

In  an  action  against  a  railroad  cm^ 
for  damages  for  suffering  endured  by  ?^ 
tifTs  intestate,  killed  while  crossing  <le/e£> 
ant's  tracks,  an  instruction  that  wliUe  ^ 
fact  that  there  was  a  freight  train  staoi^  | 
on  the  side  track,  the  engine  of  wbicbj^^ 
tially  obstructed  the  crossing  and  was 
ing  a  loud  noise,  would  impose  upon  de^ 
ed  a  greater  degree  of  care  for  his  o^^ 
ty,  yet  If  these  conditions  existed,  m^ 
f endant  was  rw^onaible  for  them,  tbis  ^^^ 


OBDINABY  CAKB 


T83 


OBDINABY  GABB 


mpo6e  upoA  defendant  a  cocrespondiniTly 
leater  degree  of  care,  was  not  erroneous  in 
mposlng  upon  defendant  a  greater  degree  of 
are  than  "ordinary  care";  "ordinary  care" 
elng  but  reasonable  care  which  varies  ac- 
ording  to  the  circumstances,  and  requires 
nusual  caution  where  the  circumstances  are 
nusually  hazardous.  St  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 
L  Go.  y.  Ghamberlain,  150  8.  W.  157,  161, 

05  Ark.  180. 

The  terms  "ordinaiy  cave"  and  "ordinary 
iligence"  must  be  understood  to  import  all 
be  care,  prudence,  and  diligence  which  the 
eculiar  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  condi- 
Lons  and  Instruments  employed,  reasonably 
equire,  and  such  as  a  reasonably  prudent 
Bd  careful  man  would  exercise  under  like 
ircumstances.  Neal  y.  Wilmington  &  N.  G. 
:iectric  By.  Ga,  58  Aa  338,  339,  8  Penne- 
FlU,  467. 

Same— As   applied   to   ehildlren  or  in- 
fants 

The  term  "ordinary  or  reasonable  care," 
pplied  to  the  conduct  of  a  child,  means  such 
are  as  may  reasonably  be  expected  of  chil- 
ren  of  similar  age,  judgment,  and  experi- 
nce  under  similar  circumstances.  Bohloff 
.  Fair  Hayen  &  W.  B.  Go.,  58  Ati.  6,  7.  76 
k)nn.  689;  Galyeston,  H.  A  N.  B.  GO.  y.  Olds 
rex.)  112  S.  W.  787,  792. 

"Ordinary  care,"  as  applied  to  a  child, 
3  the  kind  of  care  which  children  of  its  age 
nd  intelligence  are  accustomed  to  exercise 
mder  the  same  or  similar  circumstances; 
nd  this  though  he  had  arriyed  at  the  age 
rhen  he  should  be  chargeable  with  the  care 
equlred  of  an  adult  as  a  matter  of  law.  Erie 
i.  Co.  y.  Weinsteln,  166  Fed.  271,  273,  92  a 
).  A.  189. 

The  rule  that  ordinaiy  care  is  such  care 
IS  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would  use 
mder  similar  circumstances  does  not  apply 

0  a  child  of  tender  years,  and  the  care  re- 
luired  of  a  child  is  according  to  his  maturity 
nd  capacity  only,  wbich  must  be  determined 
•y  the  circumstances  of  each  case.     Texas 

1  P.  B.  Co.  y.  Crump  (Tex.)  110  S.  W.  1013, 
014. 

An  instruction  defining  "ordinary  care," 
D  an  action  for  injuries  recelyed  by  a  boy 

6  years  of  age,  while  employed  in  feeding 
beets  of  brass  to  a  rolling  machine,  as  such 
are  as  boys  of  the  age^  intelligence,  and  ex- 
erience  of  plaintiff  usually  exercise  under 
Imilar  circumstances,  contains  the  idea  that 
he  care  used  must  be  the  care  ordinarily 
ised  by  the  great  mass  of  boys  or  by  the  dass 
f  ordinary  careful  boys,  and  is  correct  An- 
lerson  y.  Chicago  Brass  Co.,  106  N.  W.  1077, 
080,  127  Wis.  273. 

The  "ordinary  care"  of  an  infant  is  that 
legree  of  care  which  children  of  the  same 
ge,  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence^  are  ae- 
ustomed  to  exexdse  under  like  circumstanc- 


es.    Qoldstein  y.  PeoiHe's  B.  Go.  (DeL)  60 
AU.  975,  976,  5  PennewiU,  806. 

In  determining  the  question  of  negligence, 
the  conduct  of  children  is  not  Judged  by  the 
same  rules  which  goyern  that  of  adults,  and 
"ordinary  care"  for  them  is  that  degree  of 
care  which  children  of  the  same  age,  of  or- 
dinary care  and  prudence,  are  accustomed  to 
exercise  under  like  circumstances.  Geccbi  y. 
Lindsay  (Del.)  75  AtL  376»  878,  1  Boyce,  185. 

"Ordinary  care"  depends  on  the  facts 
of  each  particular  case,  and  with  reference 
to  an  injured  infant  means  such  care  as  a 
child  of  his  age,  intelligence,  capacity,  and 
experience,  as  shown  by  the  eyidence,  would 
ordinarily  exercise  in  the  same  situation  and 
circumstances  in  which  the  infant  was  plac- 
ed at  the  time  he  was  injured.  Morgan  y. 
G.  Hager  A  Sons  Hinge  Mfg.  (^.,  97  S.  W. 
638»  642,  120  Mo.  App.  590. 

Whether  or  not  an  infant  exercised  "or^ 
dinary  cHre"  depends  upon  whether  he  used 
that  care  that  a  person  of  his  own  age,  edu- 
cation, and  mental  and  physical  capacity 
would  ordinarily  use  under  like  circumstance 
es.  Marius  y.  Motor  Dellyery  Co.,  181  N.  X. 
Supp.  857,  360,  146  App.  Diy.  608. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  a  relatiye  term,  and 
the  same  standard  is  not  expected  of  an  inr 
fant  as  of  a  mature  man,  and  what  will  be 
regarded  as  carelessness  in  the  latter  will 
not  necessarily  be  so  in  the  case  of  the  for- 
mer. United  Bys.  ft  Electric  Go.  of  Balti- 
more y.  Carneal,  72  AtL  771,  774,  110  Md. 
211. 

The  standard  of  "ordinary  care"  to  be 
required  of  a  boy  of  16  years  is  "such  care  as 
boys  of  his  age,  intelligence,  and  experience 
usually  use  and  exercise  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances." Kucera  y.  Merrill  Lumber  Co., 
65  N.  W.  374,  375,  91  Wis.  637. 

"Ordinary  care,"  as  applied  to  a  boy  14 
years  of  age,  is  that  degree  of  care  which 
may  reasonably  be  looked  for  in  a  boy  of 
his  age,  experience,  and  intelligence.  Chess 
&  Wymond  Co.  y.  Ctohagan's  Guardian  (Ky.) 
105  S.  W.  890. 

Where  employes  of  a  railroad  see  a  child 
of  tender  years  upon  the  track,  "ordinary 
care"  is  the  greatest  care  that  can  be  exer- 
cised to  ayoid  injury.  Anderson  y.  Great 
Northern  By,  Co.,  99  Pac.  91,  96,  15  Idaho, 
513. 

Same--Ckavaeter  of  Imsiness  affeetins 

"Ordinary  care  exercised  by  those  who 
make  a  business  of  using  electricity  for  prof- 
it to  preyent  injury  to  others  therefrom  re- 
quires much  greater  precaution  in  its  use 
than  where  the  element  used  is  of  a  less  dan- 
gerous character.  A9  there  is  greater  dan- 
g^  and  ha^rd  in  the  use  of  electricity,  there 
must  be  a  corresponding  exercise  of  skill  and 
attention  in  ayoiding  injury  to  another  to 
constitute   what   the   law   terms   'ordinary 


ORDINARY  GARB 


784 


ORDINARY  CARl 


cara."*    Gommonwealtli  Bleetxle  O0.  t.  Mil- 
vUle,  70  N.  B.  1052,  lOOS,  210  IlL  70. 

A  power  eompany,  fnniflhlng  electrtdty 
to  patrons,  with  respect  to  employes  of  the 
latter  rightfully  on  the  premises  and  UkMy 
to  come  in  contact  with  wires  carryinf  the 
current,  Is  bound  to  use  ordinary  eare,  whidi 
demands  such  diligence  as  is  commensurate 
with  the  danger  inrolved  in  the  use  <tf  the 
electricity.  Denson  y.  Georgia  Ry.  4  Blectric 
Go.,  68  &  ID.  1113,  ld5  Qa.  182. 

By  ''ordinary  and  reasonable  oare^  Is 
meant  such  care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  and 
careful  person,  hSTlng  in  mind  the  dangers 
to  be  apprehended,  would  exercise  under  the 
same  circumstances.  The  precautions  neces- 
sary to  be  taken  in  the  ezerdse  of  reasonable 
and  ordinary  care  vary  with  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case  and  the  de- 
gree of  hazard  connected  therewith;  greater 
precautions  being  necessary  in  the  case  of 
great  hazard,  and  less  in  cases  where  there 
is  Jittle  danger.  "Electric  companies  are 
bound  to  use  reasonable  care  in  the  construc- 
tion and  maintenance  of  their  lines  and  ap- 
paratus. This  care  varies  with  the  danger 
which  would  be  incurred  by  negligence.  In 
cases  where  the  wires  carry  strong  and  dan- 
gerous currents  of  electricity,  and  the  result 
of  negligence  might  be  exposure  to  death  or 
serious  accident,  the  highest  degree  of  care 
is  required."  Under  such  circumstances,  rea- 
sonable care  requires  the  exercise  of  a  high 
degree  of  diligence,  and  the  terms  "reason- 
able care"  and  "high  degree  of  diligence*' 
may  be  deemed  to  be  synonymous.  Gilbert 
T.  Duluth  General  Blectric  Go.,  100  N.  W.  653, 
665,  03  Minn.  09,  106  Am.  St  Rep.  430. 

"Ordinary  care,"  under  the  circum- 
stances, Is  the  legal  standard  In  all  cases. 
The  significance  of  the  term  "ordinary  care" 
varies  with  the  attendant  and  surrounding 
drcumstanoes.  This  care  is  to  be  exercised 
by  the  carrier  of  passengers  at  all  times 
when,  and  at  all  places  where,  the  parties 
are  in  the  relation  of  passenger  and  carrier, 
whether  during  transit,  at  the  stations,  and 
upon  platforms,  or  in  waiting  rooms;  and  it 
applies  to  all  matters  which  pertain  to  the 
business  of  the  carrier  of  passengers.  Pom- 
roy  V.  Bangor  &  A.  R.  Co.,  67  Atl.  561,  562, 
102  Me.  497  (citing  Dodge  v.  Boston  &  B.  S. 
S.  Co.,  19  N.  B.  373,  148  Mass.  207,  2  L.  R. 
A.  83,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  541;  Jordan  v.  New 
York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co..  43  N.  B.  Ill,  165 
Mass.  346,  82  L.  R.  A.  101,  52  Am.  St  Rep. 
522;  Shafinon  y.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  2  Atl. 
678,  78  Me.  52). 

Railroads  owe  the  duty  to  exerdse  "or- 
dinary care,"  which  iln  the  case  of  passen- 
gers is  the  highest  degree  of  care  that  a  per- 
son of  ordinary  prudence  can  exercise  con- 
sistent with  the  mode  of  conveyance  and  the 
:>roper  conduct  and  management  of  the  bui^ 
ness  to  see  that  their  passengers  are  furnish- 
ed safe  and  comfortable  transportatioiL    49t 


Lonls,  I.  M.  de  8.  R.  Oa  t.  Pttcock,  101 1% 
725»  727,  82  Ark.  44U  118  Am.  8t  Bep.  ^ 
12  Ana.  Gas.  688. 

^e  term  ^'ordinary  care,**  when  t^i 
to  an  engineer  conducting  a  train  In  an  ax:- 
gency,  means  the  "ordinary  care**  of  com;«^ 
tent  men  in  that  position  and  cannot  be  re^ 
garded  as  anything  less  than  gntt  cv^ 
Rowe  T.  Southern  Gallfomia  Ry.  Co,  S7  h( 
220,  222,  4  Gal.  App.  1  (citing  Henderson  - 
Los  Angeles  Traetkm  Go.,  89  Pac  976, 1% 
Gal.  660;  Ekrey  r.  Soutliein  Pac.  COn37FK 
600, 106  GaL  644,  645;  Bverett  ▼.  Los  Angeles 
GonsoL  Blectric  Ry.  Go^  43  Pac  207, 46  Pit 
888,  116  GaL  114,  34  L.  R.  A.  3S0). 

The  term  "ordinary  care,"  when  ipp8*d 
to  the  management  of  railroad  engines  ic' 
cars  in  motion,  imports  all  care  whidi  t* 
peculiar  circumstances  of  the  place  or  occs 
sion  reasonably  require,  and  this  will  be  iir 
creased  or  diminished  according  as  ordlni:; 
liability  to  danger  and  accident  and  to  do  i- 
Jury  to  others  is  increased  or  diminished  i: 
the  movement  and  management  of  sncb  et 
gines  and  cars.  MacFeat  v.  Philadelphia  ^ 
&  B.  R.  Co.  (DeL)  62  Aa  898,  906,  5  Penae 
wUl,  52. 

"Ordinary  care  and  diligence,**  vbeni> 
plied  to  <he  managanent  of  xailwaja,  mt< 
be  understood  to  import  all  the  care,  drccL 
q;>ection,  prudence,  and  discretion  wMcfa  *^^ 
peculiar  circumstances  of  the  place  or  occi 
sion  reasonably  require  of  the  aerrants  1 
the  company;  and  this  will  be  Incretse^I  - 
diminished  according  as  the  ordinary  lit^ 
ty  to  danger  and  accident,  and  to  do  Inj:? 
to  others,  is  increased  or  diminished  in  ^ 
movement  and  operation  of  the  cars.  Bosi 
win  V.  Wlhnington  City  R.  Go.  (Del)  eOAt: 
865,  866,  4  Pennewill,  381. 

"Ordinary  care,"  which  is  the  caie  tla: 
an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would  orshocK 
exercise  under  similar  circumstances,  b  1 
comparative  thing,  and  what  would  be  (^ 
nary  care  under  one  condition  might  be  ^ 
negligence  under  another.  The  s^  |^ 
which  a  street  car  Is  running  may  be  nerJ^ 
gent  speed,  although  ordinance  speed  or  less 
depending  on  the  care  required  under  ^ 
circumstances.  Beier  y.  St.  Louia  T»^ 
Co.,  04  S.  W.  876,  880,  107  Mo.  215. 

The  term  "ordinary  care  and  dfllgwcp. 
applied  to  the  management  of  electric  «fi  2 
motion,  means  all  the  care,  prudence,  •» 
discretion  which  the  circumstancei  ^  * 
place  and  occasion  require.  Goldstein  t.  ^ 
pie's  R.  Co.  (Del.)  60  Att.  975,  978,  5  Pe»^ 
will,  306. 

The  "ordinary  care"  required  in  the  ^ 
eratlon  of  electric  street  cars  imports  i^  ^ 
care  and  discretion  which  the  place  of  t^ 
danger  and  the  occaskm  requires,  and  ^ 
care  Increases,  or  diminishes  as  the  dmi^ 
of  accident  increases  or  dlmJiri^hw  ^^ 
operation  of  the  <:ars.   LanlMwIei  ▼*  ^^niBi"^ 


OBDINA&Y  OABB 


780 


OltDlNART  OA^US 


ton  ats  B.  Oo.  (D«L)  74.  AtL  U,  18,  7  Peime- 
will,  64. 

The  ezerdse  of  ''ordinary  eare*'  la  the 
operation  of  a  street  railway  ImpUee  au^ 
care  as  the  drcnmstances  of  the  place  or  oc- 
casion reasonably  require,  to  be  increased  or 
diminished  as  the  danger  of  accident  or  in- 
Jury  Increases  or  diminighea.  Eaton  y.  Wil- 
mington City  B.  Oo.  (DeL)  75  AtL  369,  871, 
1  Boyce,  436. 

A  street  railroad  company  is  bound  to 
operate  its  property  with  "ordinary  care  and 
caution" ;  such  term  being  understood  to  im- 
port all  the  care  and  caution  which  the  par- 
ticular circumstances  of  the  case  reasonably 
require,  and  such  aa  a  reasonably  careful 
man  would  exercise  under  like  circumstances, 
the  amount  of  care  varying  with  the  ordi- 
nary liability  to  danger  and  accident  and  to 
do  injury  to  others  in  the  operation  and  use 
of  the  railroad.  Gismondl  y.  People's  B. 
Co.  (DelO  83  AtL  186,  138,  2  Boyce,  677. 

"Ordinary  care,"  as  applied  to  the  motor- 
man  of  an  electric  street  car,  means  the  de- 
gree of  care  which  men  of  average  prudence 
and  skill,  engaged  in  operating  street  cars 
by  electric  power  in  the  city  in  question  and 
on  the  street  on  which  the  accident  occurred 
usually  exercise  under  similar  circumstances. 
Louisville  By.  Ck>.  v.  BouteUler  (Ky.)  110  S. 
W.  357,  3e0. 

"The  term  'ordinary  care  and  diligence,' 
when  applied  to  the  management  of  electric 
railway  cars  in  motion,  must  be  understood 
to  import  all  the  care,  circumspection^  pru- 
dence, and  discretion  which  the  particular 
circumstances  of  the  place  or  occasion  re- 
quire of  the  servants  of  the  ♦  ♦  ♦  com- 
pany, and  this  will  be  Increased  or  dimin- 
ished as  the  ordinary  liability  to  danger  and 
accident  and  to  do  injury  to  others  Is  in- 
creased or  diminished  in  the  movement  and 
operation  of  such  cars."  Dl  Frisco  v.  Wil- 
mington City  B.  Ck>.  (Del,)  67  Aa  906,  009,  4 
Pennewlll,  627  (citing  Tully  v.  Philadelphia, 
W.  &  B.  B.  Co.  [Del.]  3  PennewUl,  456,  50 
AtL  95). 

"Ordinary  care''  is  not  great  care,  and, 
where  an  elevator  la  used  as  a  means  of 
personal  transportation,  a  higher  degree  of 
care  than  ordinary  care  is  required  in  its 
operation.  Belvidere  Bldg.  Co.  of  Baltimore 
V.  Bryan,  64  Aa  44,  60,  103  Md.  514. 

"Ordinary  care"  in  the  selection  and  re- 
tention of  servants  and  agents  requires  that 
degree  of  diligence  and  precaution  which  the 
exigencies  of  the  particular  service  reason- 
ably require,  and  la  such  care  as,  in  view  of 
the  consequences  that  may  result  from  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  employes,  is  fairly  com- 
mensurate with  the  perils  or  dangers  likely 
to  be  encountered.  Emery  v.  City  of  Ta- 
coma,  127  Pac.  851,  853,  71  Wash.  132. 

The  "ordinary  care"  exacted  in  employ- 
ing servants  is  that: degree  .of  care  that  a 

8  Wns.&  P.2o  Seb.— 60 


of  ordinary  prudence  would  use  in  view 
of  the  nature  of  the  employment  ajod  the  con- 
aequttices  of  ems^ylng  an  incompetent  per- 
son. Worley  v.  SpreclLolB  Bros.  Commercial 
Co.,  124  Pac.  697,  701,  163  Cal.  60. 

The  term  "ordinary  care,"  as  used  in  the 
rule  requiring  an  employer  to  use  ordinary 
care  In  the  selection  of  an  employ^,  means 
that  degree  of  care  that  a  man  of  ordinary 
prudence  would  use  in  view  of  the  nature  of 
the  employment  and  the  consequence  of  the 
employment  of  an  Incompetent  persoa  Still 
V.  San  Francisco  &  N.  W.  By.  Co.,  98  Pac. 
672,  675,  164  Cal.  659,  20  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.) 
822;  129  Am.  St.  Bep.  177. 

The  test  of  "ordinary  care"  on  the  part 
of  an  employer  toward  his  servants  is  not 
whether  he  may  apprehend  that  an  injury 
might  result  to  some  one  of  them,  but  wheth- 
er an  ordinarily  prudent  person,  under  the 
same  or  similar  circumstances,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  ordinary  care,  would  have  apprehend- 
ed such  injury.  Quae  v.  Power  &  Mining  Ma- 
chinery Co.,  139  N.  W.  195,  198,  161  Wis.  400. 

"Ordinary  care"  by  a  master  in  giving 
notice  to  his  servants  of  all  perils  to  which 
they  will  be  exposed,  other  than  such  as  aey 
should,  in  the  exercise  of  "ordinary  care," 
have  foreseen,  as  necessarily  Incidental  to 
the  business,  requires  that  he  should  actually 
give  the  notice  and  not  merely  try  to  give  it. 
"If  therefore,  he  falls  to  give  such  notice  in 
terms  sufficiently  clear  to  call  the  attention 
of  his  servants  to  the  peril  of  which  he  is 
aware,  he  is  liable  to  them  for  any  Injury 
which  they  may  suffer  thereby  in  ignorance 
of  that  peril  and  without  contributory  neg- 
ligence." Crapo  V.  City  of  Syracuse,  76  N. 
B.  465,  468,  183  N.  Y.  3d5  (citing  Mather  v. 
Billston,  15  Sup.  Ct.  464.  156  U.  S.  891,  39 
L.  Ed.  464;  Gates  v.  State,  28  N.  B.  373,  128 
N.  y.  226:  Simone  v.  Kirk,  65  N.  B.  739,  173 
N.  Y.  13;  Pantzar  v.  Tilly  Foster  I.  M.  Co.,  2 
N.  B.  24,  99  N.  Y.  368;  BeuKlng  v.  Stelnway 
&  Sons,  6  N.  D.  449,  101  N.  Y.'647;  Finn  v. 
Cassidy,  69  N.  B.  311,  165  N.  Y.  684,  63  L. 
B.  A.  877). 

The  "ordinary  care"  required  of  a  drug- 
gist in  compounding  medicines  and  filling 
prescriptions  requires  a  degree  of  vigilance  # 
and  prudence  commensurate  with  the  dan- 
gers Involved,  and  the  highest  practicable  de- 
gree of  prudence,  thoughtfulness,  vigilance, 
and  the  most  exact  and  reliable  safeguards 
consistent  with  reasonable  conduct  of  the 
business  that  human  life  may  not  be  exposed 
to  the  danger  resulting  from  substitution  of 
deadly  poisons  for  harmless  medicine.  Trem- 
blay  V.  Kimball,  77  AtL  406,  408,  107  Me. 
63,  29  L.  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  900,  Ann.  Caa.  1012C, 
1215. 

Same— la.  oroaaing;  railroads 

"Ordinary  care"  on  the  part  of  a  motor- 
man  approachlAg  a  street  crossing  where  a 
t^yeler  is  atte^tpting  to  cross  in  front  of 


OBDINABT  GARB 


7M 


OBDINA&T  OABB 


tbe  car  meaiu  that  decree  of  care  whkh 
men  of  ordinary  pmdence  and  skill,  engaged 
in  like  work,  would  ezerdae  under  similar 
drcamatancee;  while  ordinary  care  on  the 
part  of  the  driyer  means  that  degree  of  care 
which  a  man  of  ordinary  pnidence,  drlTing 
a  wagon,  engaged  in  like  work  and  under 
the  same  or  similar  circumstances^  usually 
exercises  for  his  own  safety.  Keefe  ▼.  Seat- 
tle Electric  Co.,  104  Pac.  774,  770,  56  Wash. 

44a 

"Ordinary  care'*  Is  that  care  which  oi^ 
dinarlly  prudent  persons  use  in  their  busi- 
ness, or  such  care  as  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind observe  in  the  transactions  of  human 
life.  One  crossing  a  street  car  track  in  ad- 
vance of  an  approaching  car  must,  in  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care,  take  the  speed  of 
the  car  into  consideration,  where  the  car  is 
approaching  at  an  unlawful  rate  of  speed, 
and  it  is  observable.  Grimm  v.  Milwaukee 
Electric  B.  &  L.  (3o.,  119  N.  W.  833,  835,  138 
Wis.  44  (citing  Dreher  v.  Fitchburg,  22  Wis. 
675,  99  Am.  Dec.  91;  Duthie  v.  Town  of 
Washburn,  58  N.  W.  380,  87  Wis.  231,  233; 
Kass  V.  Schuls,  81  N.  W.  133,  106  Wis.  146; 
Hayes  v.  Railway  Co.,  Ill  N.  W.  471,  181 
Wis.  399). 

"Ordinary  care,*'  as  applied  to  cases 
where  the  public  has  by  acquiescence  acquir- 
ed license  to  use  or  travel  over  railroad 
grounds,  is  that  degree  of  care  which  is  rea- 
sonably adequate  to  meet  and  avoid  the 
dangers  which  ought  to  be  anticipated  under 
all  the  circumstances,  including  the  fact  of 
the  licensed  use.  Rowley  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 
St  P.  B.  Co.,  116  N.  W.  866,  869,  136  Wis. 
208. 

Within  the  rule  requiring  a  person  ap- 
proaching a  railroad  crossing  to  exercise  "or- 
dinary care  under  the  circumstances,"  the 
quoted  phrase  is  precisely  defined  by  law, 
and  makes  it  the  duty  of  such  person,  in 
attempting  to  cross,  to  listen  for  signals,  no- 
tice signs  put  up  as  warnings,  and  look  at- 
tentively up  and  down  the  track.  Wilkin- 
son V.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  Co.,  99  Pac. 
466,  468,  35  Utah,  110  (quoting  with  approv- 
al from  Mann  v.  Belt  Ry.  &  Stockyard  Co., 
26  N.  B.  820,  128  Ind.  142). 

In  an  action  for  the  death  of  a  person  at 
a  station,  the  court  instructed  that,  though 
he  was  negligent,  defendant  was  liable  if  the 
train  employ^  saw  decedent  who  was  una- 
ware of  his  peril,  and  failed  to  give  a  prop- 
er warning  by  a  signal  which  he  would  be 
likely  to  bear,  and,  such  signal  being  unheed- 
ed, failed  to  stop.  The  court  further  instruct- 
ed that  if  he  was  struck  between  the  street 
crossing  and  the  depot  at  which  defendant's 
trains  made  regular  stops,  and  the  track  was 
so  a  pedestrian  could  have  been  seen  for  a 
long  distance  with  ordinary  care  and  dili- 
gence, and  was  frequently  used  at  such  point 
by  pedestrians,  and  deceased,  while  walking 
thereon,  became  in  imminent  peril,  and  the 


tralnmeo  haeame  aware  tteceof  hi  ttoie,  bj 
ordinary  care,  to  have  stxipped  the  tnln  and 
averted  the  lojuzy,  and  they  fdted  to  m 
such  care  and  stop  the  train,  and  he  wu 
struck  and  killed,  the  Jury  must  find  (or 
plaintiff,  though  they  found  that  decedeo: 
was  negligent,  and  that  by  ordinaiy  care  ins 
meant  such  as  an  ordinary  careful  and  pn- 
dent  person  would  exerdae  under  the  suuor 
similar  circumstances.  Hdd,  not  to  conflict 
with  an  instruction  that  it  was  decedent's  do 
ty  to  look  both  ways  and  listen  for  the  ip^ 
proach  of  trains,  and  if  at  any  time  before  be 
was  injured  he  could,  either  by  looking  cr 
listening,  have  known  of  the  train's  approad 
in  time  to  get  off  and  avoid  the  accident 
plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  recover.  Potte; 
V.  8t  Louis  &  8.  F.  R.  Co.,  117  8.  W.  SI 
601,  136  Mo.  App.  125. 

In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  trareler  oa 
a  highway  by  a  collision  with  a  street  or. 
the  court  defined  "ordinary  care"  to  meu 
such  a  degree  of  care  under  the  drcoiostio: 
es  in  which  plaintiff  was  placed  "at  the  time' 
as  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would  exer 
else  under  like  circumstances.  A  subseqnei 
instruction  declared  that,  in  going  acroas  or 
near  defendant's  track  at  the  time  asA  place 
in  question,  it  was  plaintiff's  dnty  to  exer 
dse  ordinary  care  to  avoid  tojuiy  from  the 
approaching  car,  and,  if  he  failed  to  do  ff. 
he  could  not  recover.  Held,  that  the  first  k 
struction  was  not  objectionable  as  limltlBl 
the  time  at  which  plaintiff  was  reqoired  d 
exercise  care  to  the  momoit  of  the  coUisoc. 
Chicago  aty  Ry.  Go.  v.  Ryan,  8D  N.  £.  11& 
118,  225  lU.  287. 

One  driving  onto  a  railroad  at  a  crossing 
where  the  gates  have  negligently  been  left  o? 
though  a  train  is  approaching,  has  do  right  to 
rely  exclusively  on  the  operatives  of  the  gatf^ 
or  of  the  train  in  looking  out  for  his  nfety 
and  giving  him  notice,  but  he  must  use  "or 
dinary  care,*'  such  care  as  an  ordinarilT  pn> 
dent  person  would  use  under  the  same  o: 
similar  circumstances,  to  discover  the  H'- 
proach  of  the  train  and  for  his  own  aif^ 
and,  if  he  does  so  rely  on  the  others,  vitt 
out  using  such  care,  he  is  guilty  of  coDt^ib1^ 
tory  negligence.  Louisville  A  N.  R.  Oa  t. 
Roth,  114  8.  W.  264,  268,  190  Ky.  730. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  a  relative  term,  de- 
pending upon  many  things,  and  differiiu' 
greatly  in  specific  cases.  "What  woold  te*'- 
dinary  care  in  approaching  an  oskno^ 
place  of  danger,  such  as  a  railroad  cros^ 
with  nothing  to  disdose  its  presence,  and  tbe 
inabiUty  to  see  it  from  darkness,  wonid  1)^ 
an  entirely  different  thing  from  approacfais^ 
a  known  or  visible  crossing.**  Chicago  &  ^ 
R.  Co.  V.  Frets,  90  N.  B.  76,  TO,  173  lni5lS 

"Ordhiary  care"  is  that  care  whicb » 
careful  and  prudent  person  ordinarily  e«f 
cises  under  like  circumstances  and  condltioi^ 
To  entiUe  a  pedestrian  to  proceed  on  his  ffs? 

and  cross  the  tracks  of  a  street  railway  <xh^ 


OSDINAB7  CABB 


787 


OBDINART  OABB 


pany,  he  is  not  bound  to  wait  for  conditions 
that  exclude  all  doubts  of  safety,  but  it  is  his 
priyUege  to  take  such  a  chance  as  a  person 
of  "ordinary  care*'  and  prudence  would  take 
in  the  exercise  thereof  under  the  circum« 
stances;  and  therefore,  in  an  action  against  a 
street  railway  company  for  injuries  to  a  trav- 
eler in  a  collision  with  a  car,  an  instruction 
that,  if  the  traveler  took  a  doubtful  chance 
of  being  able  to  cross  in  front  of  the  car,  it 
would  be  a  negligence  precluding  a  recovery 
was  properly  refused.  Doherty  y.  Metropoli- 
tan St  Ry.  Ck).,  91  N.  Y.  Supp.  19,  20. 

Same— Baaser  as  affeotinff 

"Ordinary  care"  is  a  relative  term,  and 
means  a  degree  of  care  commensurate  with 
the  danger  involved.  Tackett  v.  Henderson 
Bros.  Ck>.,  108  Paa  151,  165, 12  Gal.  App.  658. 

What  is  "ordinary  care"  must  be  gauged 
and  determined  by  the  danger  which  its  ex- 
ercise requires  to  be  overcome,  for  what 
would  be  "ordinary  care"  under  certain  condi- 
tions might  under  different  conditions  be 
gross  negligence.  Galveston,  H.  A  S.  A.  B. 
Co.  V.  Thompson  (Tex.)  116  S.  W.  106,  108. 

''Ordinary  care"  is  such  care  as  men  or- 
dinarily exercise  under  the  same  or  similar 
circumstances.  The  amount  of  care  which 
will  satisfy  this  requirement  is  necessarily 
adjusted  to,  and  varies  with,  the  danger  to 
be  guarded  against  As  the  danger  or  the 
probability  of  injury  therefrom  increases,  so 
do  men  ordinarily  increase  the  care  which 
they  exercise  for  their  own  protection.  Chi- 
cago &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Andrews,  130  Fed. 
65,  73,  64  C.  0.  A.  899. 

"Ordinary  care"  is  that  degree  of  care 
which  prudent,  intelligent,  and  experienced 
men  usually  employ  under  like  circumstances 
to  guard  against  dangers  which  are  obvi- 
ous or  reasonably  to  be  anticipated.  An  in- 
struction, in  an  action  against  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  recover  for  an  injury  to  a  brakeman 
by  falling  through  an  open  culvert,  which 
stated  that  the  degree  of  care  required  from 
defendant  in  the  construction  of  the  culvert 
was  such  as  a  master  would  ordinarily  use 
if  the  danger  to  be  guarded  against  was  a 
personal  danger  to  the  master  himself,  is  er- 
roneous, as  stating  an  incorrect  measure  of 
care,  as  well  as  misleading,  in  that  there 
could  be  no  evidence  to  make  it  ai^Ucable  to 
a  railroad  company.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v. 
Gloyd,  138  Fed.  388,  391,  70  C.  C.  A.  628. 

What  Is  "ordinary  care"  depends  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  and, 
when  the  circumstances  are  such  that  an  or- 
dinarily careful  and  prudent  person  would 
take  greater  precautions  for  his  own  safety 
than  under  less  threatening  drcumstancefl, 
the  greater  degree  of  caution  is  "ordinary 
care."  One  injured  by  another's  negligence 
may  recover  if  he  has  observed  ordinary  care 
for  his  safety.  Dickson  v.  Geo.  B.  Swift  & 
Go...  87  N.  IB.  69,  61,  238  IlL  62  (citing  West 


Chicago  St  B.  Co.  v,  Manning,  48  N;  IL  958 
170  111.  417). 

"Negligence"  is  defined  to  be  the  want  of 
"ordinary  care" ;  that  is,  such  care  as  an  or- 
dinary prudent  person  would  exercise  under 
like  circumstances.  There  is  no  precise  defi- 
nition of  "ordinary  care  "  but  it  may  be  said 
that  it  is  such  care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent 
person  would  exercise  under  like  circumstanc- 
es, and  should  be  proportioned  to  the  danger 
and  peril  reasonably  to  be  apprehended  from 
a  lack  of  proper  prudence.  Hill  v.  Glen- 
wood,  100  N.  W.  522.  523,  124  Iowa,  479. 

"Ordinary  care"  Is  defined  to  be  "that 
degree  of  care  which  a  person  of  ordinary 
prudence,  under  the  particular  circumstances, 
is  presumed  to  exercise  to  avoid  injury.  Such 
care  is  required  to  be  in  proportion  to  the 
danger  to  be  avoided  and  the  fatal  conse- 
quences that  might  result  from  the  neglect" 
Indianapolis  St  Ry.  Co.  v.  Seerley,  72  N.  E. 
169, 170, 1034,  35  Ind.  App.  467  (adopting  defi- 
nition in  Toledo  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Goddard,  25 
Ind.  185,  197;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co. 
V.  Schmidt,  46  N.  B.  34^,  147  Ind.  638-640; 
Illinois  Cent  R,  Co.  v.  Cheek,  53  N.  E.  641, 
152  Ind.  663). 

What  Is  proper  care  in  a  given  situation 
is  gauged  by  the  danger  to  be  reasonably  ap- 
prehended under  the  circumstances  existing 
at  the  time,  and  not  by  looking  back  after  the 
accident;  and  "ordinary  care,"  where  the 
danger  is  great,  may  call  for  unremitting  at- 
tention; but  the  mere  probability  of  injury 
arising  from  want  of  "ordinary  care"  is  an 
Important  element  in  determining  the  degree 
of  care  required.  Parry  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Eaton, 
83  N.  E.  510,  513,  41  Ind.  App.  81. 

The  term  "ordinary  care,"  as  applied  to 
one's  duty  to  provide  reasonably  safe  appli- 
ances furnished  a  third  person  for  the  use 
of  his  employes,  is  a  relative  term*,  diligence 
commensurate  with  the  danger  being  requir- 
ed. Trask  v,  HalloWell  Granite  Works,  76 
Ati.  919,  921, 106  Me.  458. 

"Ordinary  care,"  when  applied  to  the  du- 
ty of  a  master,  means  such  care  as  a  person 
of  ordinary  prudence  would  exercise,  taking 
into  consideration  all  the  circumstances  of 
the  case;  and  as  a  danger,  increases  that 
which  would  be  "ordinary  care"  and  prudence 
must  Increase.  When  applied  to  an  employ^ 
with  regard  to  the  condition  of  the  machinery 
furnished  by  the  master,  it  means  such  care 
as  a  person  situated  as  the  employ 6  is  situ- 
ated will  ordinarily  use.  Atoka  Coal  &  Min- 
ing Co.  V.  Miller,  104  S.  W.  555,  560,  7  Ind. 
T.  104. 

Where  a  locomotive  engineer  knew  that 
a  fireman  was  at  work  under  an  attached 
engine,  "ordinary  care"  on  the  part  of  the 
engineer  would  be  the  use  of  every  precau- 
tion to  prevent  the  engine  from  moving.  At- 
chison, T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  CO.  V.  Seeger,  98  &  W. 
892,  896,  44  Tex.  Qv.  App.  634. 


ORDINABT  CABB 


788        ORDINARY  OIRCUMBPfiOTION 


"Ordinary  caref*  la  the  degree  of  care 
tbat  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  would 
commonly  exercise  under  like  drcumatances. 
*The  degree  of  care  does  not  vary  with  the 
Increase  or  diminution  of  danger.  It  con- 
tinues to  be  ordinary  In  degree,  hut  the  quan- 
tum of  diligence  to  be  used  differs  under 
different  conditions."  "'Ordinary  care'  wUl 
require  the  exercise  of  a  very  great  degree  of 
vigilance  under  some  circumstances,  and  the 
amount  of  vigilance  and  caution  to  be  used 
will  vary  according  to  the  situation  of  the 
parties  and  the  surrounding  circumstances, 
but  the  standard  by  which  the  acts  are  to 
be  judged  does  not  change.*'  International 
&  G.  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Hall  (Tex.)  92  S.  W.  996, 
998  (quoting  and  adopting  definition  in  Gal- 
veston, H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Oo.  v.  Gormley,  48 
S.  W.  878.  91  Tex.  899.  86  Am.  St.  Rep.  894; 
Gulf,  0.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.  t.  Smith,  28  S.  W. 
522,  87  Tex.  854). 

"Ordinary  care"  Is  that  care  which  per- 
sons of  ordinary  prudence  would  exercise  un- 
der the  circumstances.  "Ordinary  care'*  In 
some  circumstances  Is  nothing  short  of  the 
highest  degree  of  cftre,  while  In  some  cir- 
cumstances much  less  and  sometimes  very 
little  care  would  satisfy  the  requirement  of 
ordinary  eare.  Whlttadcer  v.  Brooklyn,  Q. 
C.  &  S.  R.  CO.,  97  N.  Y.  Supp.  414,  415,  110 
App.  Dlv.  767. 

In  case  of  an  impending  collision  be- 
tween a  street  car  and  a  wagon,  "ordinary 
care*'  on  the  part  of  the  street  car  company 
Implies  that  the  machinery  and  appliances 
should  be  in  proper  condition,  and  also  that 
the  servants  of  the  company  shall  do  all  that 
men  of  reasonable  care,  prudence,  and  alert- 
ness in  the  same  situation  and  with  the 
same  appliances  could  do  to  stop  the  car  and 
prevent  the  collision.  Memphis  St  R.  Co.  t. 
Haynes,  81  S.  W.  374,  376,  112  Tenn.  712. 

tein^— Knowledge  as  affeetlns 

The  term  "  'ordinary  or  reasonable  care 
to  prevent  injury*  means  all  ordinary  care  in 
the  light  of  all  the  surrounding  facts  and 
circumstances,  so  that  the  care  required  to 
prevent  the  Infliction  of  injury  is  always 
proportioned  to  the  probability  that  exists 
that  an  injury  will  be  done  under  circum- 
stances which  are  known  to  exist  or  from 
past  experience  may  be  reasonably  expected 
to  exist  in  a  particular  case."  Chesapeake 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.  T.  Farrow's  Adm'x,  55  S.  B. 
569,  571,  106  Va.  137,  10  Ann.  Cas.  12. 

There  is  no  precise  definition  of  "ordi- 
nary care,"  but  It  may  be  said  that  it  is  such 
care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would 
exercise  under  like  circumstances,  and 
should  be  proportioned  to  the  danger  and 
peril  reasonably  to  be  apprehended  from  a 
lack  of  proper  prudence.  A  blind  person, 
while  crossing  a  public  street,  is  not  bound 
to  exercise  any  higher  degree  of  care  to 
avoid  accident  from  a  defective  condition 
of  the  street  than  a  person  having  the  full 


sense  of  sight.    Hill  y.  Ckty  of  Glenwopd, 
100  N.  W.  522, 528, 124  Iowa,  479. 

When  a  traveler  perceives  that  a  way  Is 
under  repair  and  much  incumbered  for  that 
purpose,  and  that  but  a  narrow  and  difficult 
passage  is  open  for  him,  the  exercise  of  '*or- 
dlnary  care"  requires  that  he  exercise  that 
degree  of  watchfulness  and  caution  which 
men  of  ordinary  prudence  would  under  such 
circumstances,  and  that  he  do  not  drive  with 
the  same  rapidity  or  exercise  only  the  same 
attention  which  would  be  allowable  on  a 
smooth  and  unincumbered  way.  Jacobs  t. 
Inhabitants  of  Bangor,  16  Me.  187,  190,  33 
Am.  Dec.  652. 

Same— Means  of  preTentIsc  aa  affeefe- 

''Ordinary  care,"  as  used  in  the  defini- 
tion of  negligence  as  failure  to  exercise  the 
ordinary  care  of  prudent  men  under  all  the 
attending  circumstances,  does  not  require 
that  all  possible  means  for  avoiding  accident 
should  be  availed  of.  Stephoison  v.  Corder, 
80  Fac.  938,  939,  71  Kan.  475,  69  L.  R.  A. 
246,  114  Am.  St  Rep.  500. 

"Ordinary  care"  calls  for  the  use  of  the 
senses  to  discover  approaching  danger,  and 
for  a  reasonable  exercise  of  Judgment  to 
avert  it  A  person  of  "ordinary  care"  never 
will  trust  himself,  or  those  committed  to 
his  care,  to  mere  chance,  where  means  are 
available  upon  employment  of  whldi  he  may 
overcome  probable  danger.  Where  a  section 
foreman  allowed  his  men  to  place  hand  cars 
on  the  trade  in  order  to  go  to  camp  without 
warning  the  men  that  a  train  might  over^ 
take  them,  or  taking  any  precautions  to  as- 
certain if  a  train  was  approaching,  or  to  give 
warning  in  case  one  should  approach,  when 
he  knew  that  a  passenger  train  was  due, 
and  that  the  sharp  curves  in  the  track  and 
the  topographical  obstructions  made  the  risk 
of  being  run  down  very  great,  his  acts  show- 
ed a  failure  to  exercise  "ordinary  care.'* 
State  V.  Koonse,  101  S.  W.  139,  144,  123  Mo. 
App.  655. 

Bllslit  negllgenoe  dlstlBcaisked 

Slight  negligence  is  not  incompatible 
with  the  exercise  of  "ordinary  care."  Malott 
V.  Schlosser,  119  IlL  App.  269,  261. 

OBDIHABT  OAimON 

"Ordinary  caution"  is  such  caution  as  a 
person  of  ordinary  prudence  would  use  for 
his  own  protection  under  the  same  circum- 
stances, in  view  of  the  danger  to  be  avoided. 
Jansen  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  89  Pac.  616, 
617,  5  CaL  App.  12. 

OBDIHABT  CIBOUlf 8PEOTIOX 

The  portion  of  the  charge,  "Plaintiff  was 
not  bound  to  inspect  the  track  at  the  place  in 
question  to  ascertain  if  it  was  reasonably 
safe  to  be  used  by  him  in  the  performance  ji 
his  duties  as  hrakeman,''  ^ven  after  a  por- 


ORDmARY  CLISRK 


T89 


ORDINARY  CURRENT  EXPENSES 


tion,  fhat  Chough  the  tra<^  at  the  place  was 
not  reasonably  safe,  plaintiff  assamed  the  risk 
from  such  unsafe  condition,  if  any,  of  whidi 
he  had  actual  knowledge,  or  would  have 
learned  by  the  exercise  of  that  ordinary  dr- 
cnmspection  which  a  prudent  and  compe- 
tent man  would  have  used  in  the  particular 
employment;  and  in  an  action  for  injury  to 
a  brakeman  by  being  struck  by  an  engine, 
while  his  foot  was  caught  in  an  unfilled  space 
between  ties  in  the  track,  on  evidence  that 
the  unfilled  spaces  directly  causing  the  In- 
Jury  were  covered  and  obscured  by  tall, 
thickly-growing  grass,  making  it  appear  on 
casual  inspection  that  the  efpaces  were  filled^ 
and  that  plaintiff  had  never  had  an  opportuni- 
ty to  be  on  the  track  before,  and  did  not  know 
that  there  were  unfilled  spaces  there— was 
not  calculated  to  confuse  and  mislead  the  Ju- 
ry; there  being  a  difference  between  making 
a  previous  critical  examination,  which  the 
word  "inspection"  means,  of  the  track  to  as- 
certain if  it  was  reasonably  safe,  and  using 
reasonable  care  and  caution,  which  is  the 
meaning  of  ''ordinary  cipcumspection,"  to  ob- 
serve what  wad  open  and  obvious,  to  discern 
whether  it  was  unsafe.  St  Louis  Southwest- 
em  R.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Ford,  121  S.  W.  709, 
713,  56  Tex.  Civ.  App.  521. 

OBDINABY  OliEBX 

There  is  no  such  position  as  that  of 
"ordinary  clerk"  known  to  the  charter  of  the 
city  and  county  of  San  Francisco.  The  term 
is  used  by  the  Civil  Service  Commissioners 
to  designate  an  arbitrary  class  established 
by  them,  from  -which  various  extra  clerks  al- 
lowed to  various  officers  and  departments 
must  be  appointed.  An  appointee,  having 
taken  the  examination  for  ordinary  clerks 
under  a  classification  established  by  the  Civil 
Service  Commission,  as  provided  for  in  arti- 
cle 13  of  the  charter  of  the  city  and  county 
of  San  Francisco,  who  was  appointed  to  a 
temporary  position  in  the  office  of  the  board 
of  elections  under  article  11  of  the  charter, 
giving  the  board  a  right  to  appoint  such 
clerical  assistants  as  might  be  necessary,  and 
later  to  other  temporary  positions  In  the 
office  of  the  tax  collector  and  auditor,  under 
article  4  of  the  charter,  providing  for  the 
appointment  of  extra  clerks  In  such  offices, 
was  merely  an  extra  clerk,  whose  employ- 
ment ended  when  his  services  were  no  longer 
required,  and  on  the  termination  of  such  em- 
ployment the  placing  of  his  name  on  the  reg- 
ister of  eliglbles,  according  to  the  relative  ex- 
cellence of  his  examination,  without  regard 
to  the  priority  thereof,  along  with  persons 
taking  the  examination  after  his  appoint- 
ment to  the  position  in  the  office  of  the  board 
of  elections,  was  not  a  discharge,  in  viola- 
tion of  the  provisions  of  article  13  of  the 
charter  relating  to  the  appointment,  term  of 
employment,  and  discharge  of  dvil  service 
employes.  Rodrlgue  v»  Rogers,  87  Pac.  G68, 
664,  4  CaL  App.  267. 


OXDIHABT  OOUBflB  OF  BVMOnBBS 

In  an  action  in  France  ^n  a  foreign  bill 
by  the  indorsee  against  the  drawee,  the  orig- 
inal of  which  the  latter  had  paid  under  a 
forged  indorsement,  the  court  found  that  the 
drawee  made  such  payment  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  business  over  the  counter,  and  with- 
out notice  that  the  original  Mils  had  been 
lost,  and  without  opposition  or  objection  to 
such  payments,  and  that  there  was  no  evi- 
dence that  the  payments  were  made  in  bad 
faith.  Held,  that  the  use  of  the  phrase  ''paid 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  business'*  construed 
with  the  balance  of  the  finding  merely  meant 
that  payment  was  made  tq  the  holder  of  the 
original  drafts  against  their  surrender  at  the 
drawee's  bank  on  a  business  day,  in  banking 
hours,  in  the  same  way  it  usually  paid  drafts, 
and  was  insufficient  to  exclude  an  inference 
of  negligence  in  the  drawees,  arising  from 
their  failure  to  detect  a  variance  in  the  in- 
dorsement which  was  forged.  Sessler  v. 
Armstrong  Cork  Co.,  168  Fed.  744,  760,  85  C. 
C.  A.  642. 

Stock  Corporation  Law,  I  16,  which  is 
entitled  'Toluntary  sale  of  franchise  and 
property,"  provides  that  a  stock  corporation, 
with  tiie  consent  of  the  holders  of  two-thirds 
of  its  stock,  may  convey  its  property,  rights, 
privileges,  and  franchises,  or  any  interest 
therein,  or  any  part  thereof,  to  a  domestic 
corporation  engaged  in  a  business  of  the 
same  general  character,  and  that,  before  the 
conveyance  is  made,  sudi  consent  shall  be  ob- 
tained at  a  meeting  of  the  stockholders.  A 
stodc  corporation  havtaig  operated  a  calendar 
department  and  employed  salesmen  and  kept 
acooonts  for  it  separate  from  its  other  busi- 
ness, but  doing  the  printing  or  lithograph- 
ing for  such  department,  sold  to  a  corpora- 
tion, organized  for  the  purpose,  its  business, 
assets,  good  will,  and  contracts  with  sales- 
men, in  all  about  one-thirteenth  part  of  its 
whole  business.  Held,  that  the  sale  was  not 
an  "ordinary  business  transaction,"  but  a 
sale  and  transfer  of  a  part  of  its  franchise 
and  property  within  the  meaning  of  the  sec- 
tion. In  re  Tlmmls,  98  N.  B.  522,  523,  200  N. 
Y.  177. 

OBDINABT  OOURflE  OF  LAW 

The  right  to  seek  relief  before  the  board 
of  railroad  commission  is  not  a  remedy  in  the 
^'ordinary  course  of  the  law,"  so  as  to  pre- 
vent the  issuance  of  mandamus,  under  Gen. 
St  1901,  i  5185,  prohibiting  such  writ,  where 
the  relator  has  a  plain  and  adequate  remedy 
under  the  "ordinary  course  of  the  law.'* 
I^arabee  Flour  Mills  Co.  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co..  88  Pac.  72,  78,  74  Kan.  808. 


OBBIN ABT  ODBWBHT  ! 

Gen.  Laws  1909,  c.  135,  1 12,  requires  the 
town  sergeant  of  each  town  annually  in  April 
to  make  a  list  of  the  keepers  of  dogs  in  the 
town,  and  return  such  list  to  the  town  clerk 
on  or  before  May  l8t»  ft»r  whieh  aetovice  he 


ORDINARY  DEBT 


790 


ORDINARY  BXPKNSIB 


tBoAy  from  Che  town  ttmmmf  90 
cents  for  each  dog  listed,  and  section  13  pro- 
vides for  the  killing  of  nonllcensed  dogs  and 
for  the  payment  of  a  fee  of  $2  out  of 
the  town  treasury  for  each  dog  killed  and 
buried.  Held,  that  a  city's  liabiUty  for  the 
salary  of  chief  of  police  and  town  sergeant, 
and  for  the  fees  of  the  sergeant  as  dog  lister* 
under  such  proyision,  constituted  an  "ordi- 
nary current  expense"  of  the  town,  which,  if, 
with  other  like  expenses,  it  was  within  the 
town's  limit  of  current  revenues  and  such 
special  taxes  as  it  might  legally  and  in  good 
faith  levy  therefor,  was  not  the  'incurring 
of  indebtedness"  U\  excess  of  the  limit  fixed 
by  Acts  1886,  c  1428;  and  hence  the  fact  that 
the  town's  debt  limit  was  exceeded  was  no 
defense  to  an  action  to  enforce  liability  for 
such  services.  Trainor  v.  Lee,  8a  Atl.  847, 
848,  84  R.  L  84S. 

OBDIHABY  DSBT 

Where  a  city  purchased  fire  apparatus 
without  complying  with  Const  art  11, 1  5,  re- 
quiring provision  for  assessment  and  collec- 
tion of  a  sinking  fund  so  that  the  provision 
was  invalid,  the  city's  use  of  the  property  so 
purchased  raised  an  implied  promise  to  pay 
the  reasonable  rental  value  thereof  and  ren- 
dered the  city  liable  for  r«it,  whidi,  being 
an  "ordinary  debt,"  payable  out  of  current 
revenues,  was  not  within  such  constitutional 
provision.  Fabric  Fire  Hose  Cki.  v.  City  of 
Teagne  (Tex.)  152  S.  W.  506,  508. 

OBDINABY  DHJOEWOB 

"'Ordinary  diligence,'  like  most  other 
human  qualifications  or  characteristiGS,  is  a 
relative  term,  to  be  judged  of  by  the  nature 
of  the  subject  to  which  it  is  directed."  Hol- 
laday  V.  Kennard,  12  WaU.  [70  U.  8.]  264, 
258,  20  L.  Ed.  380. 

"Ordinary  care"  and  "ordinary  dili- 
gence" are  commonly  treated  as  synonymous 
and  interchangeable  when  applied  to  the 
same  conduct  in  cases  of  injury.  Atlanta,  K. 
&  N.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Tilson,  82  S.  £.  281.  285,  131 
Ga.395. 

"Ordinary  diligence"  is  such  care  and 
diligence  as  a  man  of  ordinary  prudence 
bestows  on  his  own  affaira  This  definition 
was  given  with  reference  to  the  care  required 
of  a  warehouseman.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Aldredge  A  Shelton,  38  South.  805,  807,  142 
Ala.  368  (citing  Moore  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City 
of  Mobile  [Ala.]  1  Stew.  284;  Jones  v.  Hatch- 
eU,  14  Ala.  743). 

The  term  "ordinary  diligence"  contem- 
plates that  degree  of  diligence  that  an  ordi- 
narily prudent  person  would  use  in  the  trans- 
action of  his  own  business  under  like  or  sim- 
ilar circumstances.  Guitar  v.  Randel  (Tex.) 
147  S.  W.  642,  647. 

The  terms  "ordinary  care"  and  "ordi- 
nary diligence"  must  be  understood  to  import 


all  the  oare^  prudence^  and  diUgeaee  wUd 
the  peculiar  drcumstances  of  the  case,  tiu 
conditions  and  instruments  emptoyed,  ms&^ 
ably  require,  and  sn<ft  as  a  ressonablj  pro^ 
dent  and  careful  man  would  exercise  imdeT 
like  circumstances.  Neal  v.  Wilmington  k 
N.  O.  Blectric  Ry.  Co.,  53  AtL  338,  339, 3 
Pennewill,  467. 

'^Ordinary  diligence  or  care^  requlnd 
of  a  bailee  for  hire  is  su<A  as  would  be  ex 
erdsed  by  a  person  of  ordinary  prndesit 
with  reference  to  his  own  proper^  under  ttte 
same  or  like  drcumstanceB.  Weick  t 
Dougherty,  90  8.  W.  966,  967,  139  Ky.  SS. 
3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  348. 

''Ordinary  diligence"  is  that  degree  cf 
care  which  every  prudent  man  takes  of  lib 
own  property  of  a  similar  nature.  Sootben 
Ry.  Go.  V.  Davis,  65  S.  B.  131,  132.  122  Gt 
812. 

In  an  action  by  an  employ^  for  peraooal 
injuries,  an  instruction  defining  '^ordln&i? 
diligence"  as  that  diligence  which  eveir  pn^ 
dent  man  takes  under  similar  droomstaocis 
was  CfNrrect  •  Sanders  v.  Central  of  Geoigia 
Ry.  Co.,  51  S.  B.  728,  123  Ga.  763, 

An  instruction  that  one  who  uses  u 
much  care  as  to  his  neighbor's  propeitf  ^ 
he  does  to  his  own  is  exercislDg  "ordiDai? 
diligence"  is  erroneous,  under  (31v.  Code  ^^ 
i  2898,  providing  that  ordinary  diligence  is 
that  care  which  **every  prudent  man"  ti^ 
of  his  own  property  of  a  similar  oatoit 
Brown  Store  Co.  v.  Chattahoochee  Lumber 
Co,  67  8.  B.  1043,  1  Ga.  App.  600. 

••Ordinary  diligence"  is  defined  by  0^ 
Code  1895,  |  2898,  as  -that  care  which  ereu 
prudent  man  takes  of  his  own  property  of  i 
similar  nature.  The  absence  of  such  diligeiKf 
is  termed  ordinary  neglect"  Insurance  Ca  rf 
North  America  v.  Leader,  48  a  B.  972, 9n. 
121  Ga.  260;  Southern  Railway  Co.  ▼•  I>»t]& 
65  8.  B.  131,  132,  132  Ga.  812. 

OBDIHABY  DOOIUTT 

Sheep  are  domestic  animals  of  **ordiBir7 
docility,"  within  the  rule  that  railroads  mo^ 
fence  against  "all  domestic  animals  of  ord^ 
nary  dodUty."  Cotton  v.  Wiscassct.  W.  * 
F.  R,  Co.,  57  AtL  785,  786,  98  Me.  511 

OBDINABT  EXFiarSSS 
Of  mvaieipallty 

The  words  •'ordinary  county  expenses- 
used  in  Civ.  Code  1902,  |  T99,  providini  ^ 
an  estimate  by  the  board  of  commissioBeR 
of  the  amount  necessary  to  pay  such  es^ 
es,  are  those  to  be  incurred  for  the  currflj 
fiscal  year.  State  ex  reL  People's  Bank « 
GreenvUle  v.  Goodwin,  62  S.  B.  1100.  m 
81  S.  C.  419. 

The  proviso  to  section  8  of  aitide  8  ^ 
the  Constitution,  "that  this  section  sbaU  i^ 
be  construed  to  apply  to  the  ordinary  *» 
necessary  expoises  authorised  by  the  ^ 


OBDINART  EXPBKSBS 


791      ORDINARY  PROBATE  PROCEEDINGS 


eral  laws  of  the  state/'  may  properly  be 
construed  by  the  Leslslatnre  to  authorize 
the  lawmaking  body  to  include  within  the 
term  "ordinary  and  necessary  expenses"  any 
expenditure  rendered  necessary  by  casualty 
or  accident,  which  has  Unpaired  or  injured 
municipal  property  that  is  necessary  for  the 
protection  of  the  city  against  fires,  or  for 
the  health  and  welfare  of  the  city.  Hlckey 
V.  City  of  Nampa,  124  Pac  280,  281,  22  Idaho, 
4L 

A  purchase  by  a  city  of  a  city  hall  site 
is  not  an  ordinary  municipal  expense  within 
the  charter  authorizing  the  levying  of  taxes 
for  "ordinary  municipal  expenses,'*  and  the 
cost  thereof  may  not  be  paid  out  of  fund  for 
such  expenses.  Niles  Bryant  School  of  Piano 
Tuning  v.  Bailey,  126  N.  W.  lid,  U8,  161 
Mich.  103. 

OBDIHABY  FLOODS 

An  ordinary  flood  is  one,  the  repetition 
of  which,  though  at  uncertain  intervals, 
might  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  diligence  in 
investigating  the  character  and  habits  of  the 
stream  have  been  anticipated.  Chicago,  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  McKone,  127  Pac.  488,  490, 
86  OkL  46,  42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  709;  Town  of 
Jefferson  v.  Hicks,  102  Pac.  79,  80,  28  Okl. 
684,  24  Ll  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  214. 

OBDIHABY  LAHGUAGE 

The  notice  of  injury  required  by  the 
factory  act  is  to  be  written  in  "ordinary 
language";  that  is,  the  party  is  to  use  his 
own  untutored  language.  Berger  v.  Metro- 
politan Press  Printing  Co.,  104  Pac  617,  619, 
55  Wash.  422  (quoting  Dresser,  Employers' 
UabiUty,  i  27;  citing  DriscoU  ▼.  City  of 
Fall  River,  89  ^.  E.  1003, 163  Mass.  105). 

OBDIHABY  I.OW.WATEB  MABK 

"Ordinary,"  in  the  grant,  in  1640,  of  tide 
flats  around  an  island,  to  the  "ordinary  low- 
water  mark,"  means  "mean,"  in  the  absence 
of  usage  to  the  contrary  at  that  time  or  a 
contrary  construction  by  the  parties.  E3ast 
Boston  Co.  V.  Commonwealth,  89  N.  E.  236, 
237,  203  Mass.  68,  17  Ann.  Gas.  146. 

OBDIHABY  LUOOAOS 

See,  also,  Ordinary  Baggage. 

**Ordinary  luggage*'  being  confined  to 
that  which  la  personal  to  the  passenger,  and 
carried  for  his  use  or  convenience,  it  follows 
that  what  is  carried  for  the  purposes  of  busi- 
ness, such  as  merchandise,  or  the  like,  or  for 
larger  or  ulterior  purposes,  such  as  articles 
of  furniture  or  household  goods,  would  not 
come  within  the  description  of  "ordinary  lug- 
gage" unless  accepted  as  such  by  the  car- 
rier. Memoranda  and  papers  in  the  posses- 
sion of  an  agent,  but  relating  exclusively  to 
the  business  of  his  principal,  and  carried  by 
him  solely  for  business  purposes,  are  not 
baggage,  when  put  by  the  agent  into  his 
trunk.     Yazoo  A  M.  Y.  R.  Co.  r.  Georgia 


Home  Ins.  Co.,  37  South.  500,  85  Mias.  7,  67 
L.  R.  A.  646,  107  Am.  St  Rep.  265. 

OBDIHABY  HEGLEOT 

By  Civ.  Code  1895,  S  2898,  "ordinary 
neglect"  is  defined  as  the  absence  of  ordinary 
diligence.  Brown  Store  Co.  v.  Chattahoochee 
Lumber  Co.,  49  S.  E.  839,  840,  121  Ga.  809 
(citing  Macon  &  W.  R  Co.  v.  McConneU,  81 
Ga.  133,  76  Am.  Dec.  685;  Macon  A  W.  R. 
Co.  V.  Davis,  13  Ga.  68;  Southern  Mut  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Hudson,  38  S.  B.  964  [2],  113  Ga.  434). 

OBDIHABY  HBGLIGEHOE 

See,  also.  Ordinary  Care. 

"Ordinary  negligence"  is  the  omission  to 
exercise  ordinary  care — that  degree  of  care 
generally  exercised  by  an  ordinarily  prudent 
person  under  like  circumstances.  Cummings 
V.  Wichita  R.  &  Light  Co.,  74  Pac.  1104, 1106, 
68  Kan.  218,  1  Ann.  Cas.  708. 

"Ordinary  negligence*'  is  characterized 
by  inadvertence,  ordinarily  present  with  the 
great  mass  of  mankind,  and  injuries  proxi- 
mately resulting  therefrom  to  the  person  or 
property  of  another,  and  not  proximately 
contributed  to  by  that  other's  want  of  ordi- 
nary care,  are  actionable.  Astin  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St  P.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  W.  265,  268,  143 
Wis.  477,  31  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  158. 

"Ordinary  negligence,"  as  distinguished 
from  "willful  or  wanton  negligence,"  is  not 
actionable  if  the  negligence  of  the  injured 
party  directly  contributed  to  the  result ;  will- 
ful negligence  authorizing  an  action  regard- 
less of  such  contribution.  Alger,  Smith  & 
Co.  V.  Duluth  Superior  Traction  Co.,  101  N. 
W.  298.  299,  93  Mhm.  314. 

Gross    and    sUsltt    nesUgenoe    distin- 
Snlslied 

A  cause  01  action  sounding  in  ordinary 
negligence,  and  a  cause  of  action  sounding  in 
gross  negligence,  are  different,  as  both  can- 
not characterize  a  single  circumstance  of  a 
person  being  injured  by  another.  Astin  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St  P.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  W.  265, 
268,  143  Wis.  477,  31  L.  R  A.  <N.  S.)  158. 

"'Gross  negligence'  is  a  relative  term. 
It  is  doubtless  to  be  understood  as  meaning 
a  greater  want  of  care  than  as  implied  by  the 
term  'ordinary  negligence';  but  after  all  it 
means  the  ausence  of  the  care  which  was 
necessary  under  the  circumstances."  Ray- 
mond V.  Portland  R.  Co.,  62  AU.  602,  605,  100 
Me.  529,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  94  (quoting  and 
adopting  definition  in  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co.  V.  Arms,  91  U.  S.  494,  23  L.  Kd.  374). 

As  aesligenee 

See  Negligenoa 

OBDIHABY  PBOBATE  PBOCEBDIHQS 

Code  Civ.  Proc  |  1616,  as  amended  in 
1905,  allows  executors  all  necessary  expenses 
of  management  and  settlement  of  the  estate, 
and  authorizes  any  attorney,  who  has  render- 


OBDIKABT  FKUDKMCB 


792 


OBDIKABT  STATE  BUSUTfiSS 


ed  aeiTloM  to  an  executor,  to  apply  for  an  al- 
lowance of  aaltabte  compensation  out  of  the 
estate.  Section  1619  allows  administrators, 
etc.,  for  fees  for  their  attorneys  for  ordinary 
probate  proceedings,  the  same  amounts  allow- 
ed for  their  own  senrlces  by  section  1618  as 
amended  in  1906,  with  such  further  allow- 
ance aa  the  court  deems  reasonable  for  any 
extraordinary  serrices,  as  for  litigation  nec^ 
essary  for  the  administrator  to  prosecute  or 
defend.  Petitioners  applied  for  compensa- 
tion from  the  estate  for  l^eir  senrlces  as  at 
tomeys  in  opposing  a  contest  of  two  codicils, 
altering  legacies  giren  by  the  will,  and  giv- 
ing some  additional  ones.  Held  th^t,  while 
counsel  fees  incurred  in  opposing  a  contest 
may  be  charged  against  the  estate,  if  it  goes 
to  the  parties  benefited  by  the  litigation,  un- 
der the  circumstances  the  estate  had  no  in- 
terest therein,  and  the  application  was  prop- 
erly denied,  sudi  expenses  being  chargeable 
to  those  legatees  having  a  direct  interest  in 
supporting  the  codicils,  and  services  in  pro- 
bating the  instruments,  such  as  the  order  ad- 
mitting them  to  probate,  etc.,  were  not  "ex- 
traordinary services,'*  but  were  services  ren- 
dered in  "conducting  the  'ordinary  probate 
proceedings,*  '*  within  section  1619,  for  which 
compensation  was  allowable  only  on  final  ac- 
counting. In  re  Hete*s  Estate,  101  Pac  448, 
449, 155  OaL  448. 

OBDIKABT  PBtJDSHCE 

"Ordinary  prudence"  requires  a  person 
to  take  into  consideration  the  natural  and 
probable  consequences  of  a  given  act,  and  not 
such  consequences  as  are  remote,  speculative, 
or  merely  possible.  Dunphy  v.  St  Joseph 
Stockyards  Co.,  95  S.  W.  301,  305,  118  Mo. 
App.  506. 

OBDIKABT  BAIKFAX& 

"Ordinary  rainftills*'  are  such  as  are  not 
extraordinary,  and  floods  which  habitually 
occur,  though  at  irregular  intervals,  are  not 
extraordinary.  Miller  A  Lux  v.  Madera 
Canal  A  Irrigation  Co.,  99  Pac.  502,  508,  155 
Cal.  69,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  391. 

OBDIKABT   BBPAIB8 

The  replacing  of  a  dO£y  or  rotten  round 
in  a  40-foot  extension  ladder  used  in  the 
business  of  an  electric  light  company  is  not 
such  ordinary  repairs  as  a  workman  is  usu- 
ally expected  to  make,  In  the  absence  of  proof 
that  the  defective  condition  of  the  round  was 
known  to  the  servant  Twombly  v.  Consoli- 
dated Electric  Light  Co.,  57  AU.  S6,  87,  98  Me. 
353,  64  L.  R.  A.  551. 

The  work  of  rebuilding  a  factory  a  large 
part  of  which  has  been  destroyed,  is  not 
"ordinary  repairs,"  but  "construction,  demoli- 
tion, or  extraordinary  repairs,'*  within  the 
exception  of  an  employers  liability  policy  ex- 
cepting injuries  to  persons  occurring  in  the 
oonstructiaD,  demolition,  or  in  making  ectra- 


OTdlnary  repairs  to  atrvctores,  IniildiBKL  or 
plants.  Home  Mixtuva  Guano  Go.  ▼.  Oecu 
Accident  A  Quarantee  Corpomtlon,  Limited. 
of  London,  Bngland,  176  Ved.  600,  003. 

OBDIKABT  BISK 

l%e  failnve  of  the  master  to  uk  proper 
eara  to  provide  a  reasonably  safe  plic«  ftt 
the  servant  to  perform  bis  woik  and  t^ 
famish  him  with  reasonably  safe  appIiaiMes 
is  not  an  ^'ordinary  risk  of  his  empiojuKD:'  i 
with  the  assumption  of  which  tiie  serrut  ^ 
charged  unless  he  knows  of  such  Mat 
Smith  T.  Buffalo  Oil  Co.,  91  S.  W.  383.  ^1 

41  Tex.  av.  App.  267  (citing  MlSBOorl  E.  k 
T.  By.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Hannig,  43  8.  W.  5(K 
91  Tex.  360 ;  Texas  A  N.  O.  R.  Go.  ▼.  BIdu 

42  S.  W.  971,  91  Tex.  287;  St  Lcmis  S.  V 
Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Smith  [Tex.]  63  S.  W 
1064;  Gulf,  C.  A  S.  F.  B.  Co.  v.  Moore.  f> 
B.  W.  559,  28  Tex.  av.  App.  603;  1  Sbetr  i 
R.  Ner  [4th  Ed.]  1 186). 

The  "ordinary  risk**  of  emidoymeL: 
which  is  assumed  by  a  servant  does  not  b 
elude  such  risks  of  dangers  as  a  master  tooil 
by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  discorer  n: 
prevent.  Klofski  v.  Railroad  Supply  U 
85  N.  B>.  274,  278,  235  IlL  146. 

OBDIKABT  SXnX 

The  term  "ordinary  sklU"  contempUtes 
that  degree  of  skill  that  an  ordinarilj  v^ 
dent  person  would  use  in  the  transactioa  i^' 
his  own  business  under  like  or  similar  cii 
cumstances.  Guitar  v.  Randel  (Tex.)  147  S. 
W.  642,  647. 

As  regvirad  of  pfc^ekM 

Persons  practicing  as  physddims  u< 
surgeons  are  required  to  possess  ordiBi;r 
skill  in  their  profession,  and  to  practice  tbeir 
profession  with  ordinary  skin,  which  is  ths: 
degree  skill  which  is  ordinarily  possessed  t^ 
physicians  and  surgeons  in  practice  Krufe: 
T.  McCaughey,  14»  111.  App.  440,  444. 

"Ordinary  care  and  skill*'  on  the  partu 
a  physician  and  surgeon  U  that  degree  >i| 
care  and  skill  usually  exercised  and  poss^^^ 
by  physicians  and  surgeons  of  ordinary  stuJ 
in  similar  communltiea.  Donls  v.  WazfonL 
100  S.  W.  312,  313,  124  Ky.  768»  9  L  B.  ^ 
(N.  S.)  1090,  14  Ann.  Cas.  602. 

OBDIKABT  STATE  BUSOIKS 

The  State  Warehouse  Act  (LawslSl^P 
707),  in  so  far  as  it  provides  for  an  Issoac^' 
of  bonds  and  an  increase  of  the  pubUc  debt. 
without  first  submitting  the  question  to  it* 
qualified  voters,  violates  Const  art  10,  f  '^ 
prohibiting  an  increase  in  the  state  d^^" 
without  the  consent  of  the  voters  except  i^' 
the  "ordinary"  and  current  business  oi  ^^ 
state ;  the  building  of  warehouses  not  beic; 
"ordinary"  state  business,  and  the  bonds  d  < 
being  intended  to  be  for  a  debt  of  the  stss 
State  ex  rel.  Lym  v.  McCown,  75  S.  R  ^K- 
396,  92  8.  C.  81. 


ORDINARY  TAX 


793        ORDINARY  WEAR  AND  TEIAR 


OBDINA»T  TAX 

Laws  1907,  c.  6S,  imposing  <hi  every  in- 
sorance  company  doing  business  in  the  state, 
except  domestic  mutual  insurance  companies, 
an  annual  tax  of  2%  per  cent  of  tlie  gross 
amount  of  premiums  recelyed  in  the  state 
during  the  preceding  year,  etc.,  when  con- 
strued in  the  light  of  the  history  of  the  legis- 
lation on  the  subject,  imposes  an  "occupation 
tax^  and  not  an  "ordinary  tax"  within  the 
Ck>nstitutioa  relating  to  taxation.  Queen 
aty  Fire  Ins.  Go.  ?.  Basfoid,  180  N.  W.  44, 
47,  27  8.  D.  164. 

obdhtart  tbkaxot 

Leases  in  which  i»t>perty  is  let  to  single 
tenants  are  Q>oken  of  as  "ordinary  tenan- 
dee.**  La  Plante  v.  La  Zear,  68  N.  B.  812, 
313,  31  Ind.  App.  438. 

O&DIKAKT  THRBABS 

The  word  "ordinary,"  In  a  statute  pro- 
viding for  tariff  on  imported  "cotton  doth 
in  which  other  than  the  'ordinary*  warp  and 
filling  threads  have  been  introduced  in  the 
process  of  weaving  to  form  a  figure,"  means 
those  threads  which  ordinarily  enter  into  the 
construction  of  the  ordinary  plain  fabric  and 
which  cannot  be  removed  without  destroying 
its  integrity,  as  disttnguished  from  "extraor- 
dinary threads,"  whi<A  are  not  an  integral 
part  of  the  fabric,  but  are  independent 
threads  introduced  to  form  a  figure  and  for 
no  other  purpose.  United  States  v.  Rusch  ft 
Co.,  107  Fed.  028,  625,  88  0.  C.  A.  IfiO. 


OBBIXABY 

The  words  "ordinary  time,"  as  used  in 
Revisal  1905,  |  2632,  imposing  a  penalty  on 
a  carrier  for  neglecting  to  transport  within 
the  ordinary  time  required  for  such  trans- 
portation, mean  the  regular  customary  time 
within  which,  by  the  facilities  in  general  use 
for  the  performance  of  the  duty  of  carrying 
goods,  the  carriage  should  be  completed. 
Jenkins  v.  £k>uthem  Ry.  Ca,  09  S.  B.  003, 
060^  146  N.  0.  17a 

Revisal  1905,  |  2032,  declares  that  it 
shall  be  unlawful  for  any  railroad  company 
to  neglect  to  transport  within  a  reasonable 
time  any  goods  received  for  shipment  and 
billed  to  or  from  any  place  in  the  state,  un- 
less otherwise  agreed  between  the  parties, 
or  unless  the  same  be  destroyed,  under  a  pen- 
alty. It  is  further  provided  that  the  com- 
pany shall  be  downed  to  have  transported  the 
goods  in  a  reasonable  time  if  it  has  done  so 
within  the  ordinary  time  required  for  such 
transportation,  and  that  a  delay  of  two  days 
at  the  initial  point,  and  48  hours  at  one  in- 
termediate point  for  each  100  miles  or  frac- 
tion over  which  goods  are  to  be  transported, 
shall  be  held  to  be  prima  fade  reasonable^ 
and  a  failure  to  transport  within  such  time 
shall  be  held  prima  facie  unreasonable.  The 
duty  imposed  by  the  statute  is  but  declara- 
tory of  the  eommon  law,  and  the  definition  ci 


reasonable  ttme  '^as  the  ordinary  time  requir- 
ed" within  whidi  an  Act  is  to  be  d<me  is  the 
regular,  customary,  and  usual  time  and  is 
synonymous  with  "reasonable  time,"  which 
means  "as  soon  as  the  party  conveniently 
can«"  The  provision  as  to  the  allowance  of 
time  at  the  initial  point  and  intermediate 
points  lowers  the  standard  of  duty,  as  it  is 
not  dear  that  so  much  time  would  be  given 
undor  all  circumstances.  The  last  sentence  In 
the  statute,  "And  a  failure  to  transport  with- 
in sadk  time  will  be  held  prima  fade  un- 
reasonable," is  not  very  clear,  and  the  words 
cannot  refer  to  time  which  "shall  not  be 
charged,"  because  to  do  so  would  be  con- 
tradictory and  destructive  of  the  immedi- 
ately preceding  sentence.  The  last  sentence 
should  therefore  be  referred  to  the  terms  "or- 
dinary time,"  thus  making  the  act  to  read 
"a  failure  to  transport  within  ordinary  time 
shall  be  held  prima  fade  unreasonable." 
Stone  A  Go.  v.  Atlantic  Ooast  Line  Co.,  50  S. 
E.  932,  984,  144  N.  O.  220  (citing  Moore, 
Carriers,  188;  Tiflfany,  Sales,  195;  Crook  v. 
Cowan,  04  N.  C.  748 ;  State  v.  Patterson,  47 
&  B.  808,  184  N.  C.  612;  Ober  v.  Smith,  78 
N.  C.  816). 

ORDINARY  TRAVZX 

"Ordinary  travel"  on  a  public  street  in- 
dudes  the  use  of  a  street  by  bicyde^  and  a 
bicyde  is  a  vehide  of  such  a  nature  that  it 
may  be  properly  used  on  highways  and  its 
use  regulated  by  the  Legislature,  and,  being 
a  vehide,  its  proper  place  is  on  the  highway 
or  street,  and  not  on  the  sidewalk,  unless 
otherwise  provided  by  statute.  Molway  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  88  N.  E.  485.  486,  239  111. 
486,  23  L.  R.  A.  (K.  S.)  543,  16  Ann.  Cas. 
424. 

OBDINARy  U8S 

Where  the  court  instructed  that  munic- 
ipalities are  only  liable  for  such  defects  in 
sidewalks  as  are  apparent,  or  suggested  by 
appearances,  ot  disdosed  by  a  test  in  the 
nature  of  the  "ordinary  use  of  such  walks," 
it  properly  explained  that  by  "ordinary  use 
of  such  walk"  was  not  meant  such  as  a  per- 
son walking  over  the  walk  with  no  regard 
for  the  walk  would  have,  but  such  as  a  per- 
son going  over  the  walk  in  the  ordinary  way 
that  people  go  over  walks,  at  the  time  bdiig 
mindful  of  its  condition  and  having  particu- 
larly in  mind,  the  duty  of  ascertaining  the 
condition  of  the  walk  with  reference  to 
whether  it  was  safe  and  fit  for  public  travel. 
Hunter  v.  ViUage  of  Ithaca,  105  N.  W.  9, 
10, 141  Mich.  589. 

l%e  taking  of  water  from  a  stream  for 
purposes  of  irrigation  is  not  an  "ordinary  or 
natural  use"  within  the  rule  giving  riparian 
owners  the  absolute  right  to  such  uses. 
Bigham  Bros.  v.  Port  Arthur  Canal  A  Dock 
Co.  (Tex.)  91  S.  W.  848,  853. 

OBDINABY  WEAB  AHD  TEAR 

The  breaking  of  a  window  due  to  a  de- 
fect in  the  construotioa  of  the  hnilding  is  a 


ORDIKART  WEAR  AND  TEAR        7M 


ORGANIC  AOT 


part  of  the  "ordinary  wear^  within  the  ex- 
ception to  a  covenant  In  a  lease  to  leare  the 
premises  In  as  good  condition  as  when  taken* 
^'ordinary  wear^  excepted.  The  term  here 
used  is  "ordinary  wear/'  while  the  term  is 
usually  "ordinary  wear  and  tear" ;  but  It  Is 
doubtful  if  there  Is  any  distinction  between 
the  two  expressions.  An  exception  in  ei- 
ther form  will  doubtless  api^y  more  natural- 
ly to  the  gradual  deterioration  which  results 
from  use,  lapse  of  time,  and  the  operation  of 
the  elementa  It  has  been  held,  howerer, 
and  seems  to  be  the  accepted  doctrine,  that 
the  words  "ordinary  wear  and  tear'*  will 
cover  a  specific  and  substantial  injury  sud- 
denly sustained  as  the  result  of  a  structural 
defect  Drouln  v.  Wilson,  67  Atl.  826,  827, 
80  Vt  835,  18  Ann.  Gas.  93  (citing  Brown  v. 
Burrington,  36  Vt  40). 

In  general,  the  ordinary  reasonable  nse 
and  wear  of  property  by  a  tenant  has  rela- 
tion to  the  depreciation  in  condition  of  build- 
ing or  property  which  it  undergoes  during 
the  tenant's  occupation,  when  the  tenant,  in 
the  case  of  a  residenoet  at  least,  does  nothing 
in  connection  with  the  use  more  than  to  come 
and  go  and  perform  the  acts  usually  incident 
to  creating  and  maintaining  conditions  for 
living  in  the  ordinary  way.  Taylor  v.  Gamp- 
bell,  106  N.  T.  Supp.  399,  400,  123  App.  Div. 
698. 

IdTe  stoek  tHmaported 

In  an  action  for  damages  for  injuries  to 
stock  shipped  over  defendant's  road,  the  term 
"ordinary  wear  and  tear  excepted,"  as  used 
in  an  instruction  that  "the  law  requires  a 
common  carrier  who  receives  stock  for  trans- 
portation to  carry  and  transport  the  same 
from  place  of  shipment  to  the  place  of  des- 
tination in  as  safe  and  speedy  a  way  as 
possible  and  to  deliver  the  same  in  like  or- 
der and  condition  as  received  'ordinary  wear 
and  tear  excepted,' "  should  be  construed  to 
mean  the  depreciation  in  value  which  re- 
sults from  the  mere  transportation  itself  un- 
accompanied by  negligence  of  the  carrier. 
International  &  O.  N.  R.  Go.  v.  Young  fTex.) 

72  s.  w.  oa 

ORDINARILY 

"Ordinarily"  means  "according  to  estab- 
lished order;  methodical;  regular;  custom- 
ary, as  the  ordinary  forms  of  law  or  Jus- 
tice; common,  usuaL"  Renew  v.  State,  120 
S.  W.  174,  176,  56  Tex.  Or.  R.  843  (quoting 
and  adopting  definition  in  Webst  Diet). 

In  an  action  for  injuries  to  a  passenger, 
an  instruction  that  plaintiff  assumed  the 
risks  "ordinarily"  incident  to  the  coupling  of 
the  cars,  instead  of  such  risks  as  were  "us- 
ually" incident  thereto,  was  not  objectiona- 
ble; such  words  b^ng  regarded  as  synony- 
mous. St  Louis  Southwestern  R.  Go.  of  Tex- 
as V.  Morrow  <Tex.)  98  S.  W.  162»  168. 


ORDnrABILT  PBUDEirr  uam 

In  a  personal  injury  action  by  a  mr- 
ant,  the  court  told  the  Juiy  that  it  would  re- 
fer during  the  charge  to  **the  prudent  noii. 
and  reasonable  care"  and  they  would  oDder 
stand  thereby  '*the  care  and  prudence  ol  m 
ordinarily  careful  and  prudent  man  in  lil« 
drcumstanoes,"  and  would  measure  pluo- 
tiifs  conduct  by  that  standard,  that  cue  of  a 
prudent  man  under  some  drcumstanees 
might  be  negligence  under  others,  and  theF 
should  apply  the  teat  with  their  gen«n! 
knowledge  of  the  degree  of  caze  tbat  a  im 
of  ordinary  prudence  would  exercise  and,  ii 
directing  attention  to  the  question  of  i)iai]^ 
tiff's  care,  told  them  to  consider  whether  be 
exercised  the  care  and  prudence  ''of  an  or- 
dinarily prudent  man  and  was  without  faol: 
on  his  part"  Held,  that  the  standard  of  csre 
stated  as  the  measure  of  plalntUTs  coDdnt 
was  too  low ;  the  words  "ordinarily  pmdeBt 
man"  suggesting  mediocrity  of  care,  if  so: 
carelessness.  Drown  y.  New  England  Tele^ 
phone  &  Telegraph  Go.  &  GonsoUdated  Ugbt 
ing  Go.,  70  AtL  590,  605^  81  Vt  35& 

The  term  "ordinarily  prudent  perm"  i> 
synonymous  with  the  term  "person  of  ordist* 
ry  care."  A  charge  sulmiitting  tbe  iasne  of  ur 
sumed  risk,  whidi  uses  the  term  ^'ordinaiij 
prudait  person,"  Is  sufildent,  under  the  eot- 
ute  proTlding  that  the  defense  shall  not  be 
available  where  a  "person  of  ordinary  can' 
would  hare  continued  in  the  serrice  witb  i 
knowledge  of  the  defect  Tftxas  4  P.  B.  Ca 
T.  Johnson,  106  &  W.  778,  776^  4B  Tex.  Ot 
App.  135. 

OBDIHABILT  PURE 

"Ordinarily  pure  and  wholesome  water 
means  water  reasonably  dean  and  free  froa 
bacteria  or  other  contamination,  renderijigit 
unfit  for  domestic  use  and  dangerous  to  ifi£ 
viduals.  Peffer  t.  Pennylvanla  Water  Co, 
70  Ati.  870.  873,  221  Pa.  57a 

ORE 

See  Extra  €k>od  Ore;  Iron  Ore;  Bout 
ing  Ore. 

As  property,  see  Property. 

••Ore"  is  a  metalliferous  mineral  or  roct 
especially  one  which  Is  of  sufllci^t  n)^^ 
be  mined.  J.  M.  Ouffey  Petroleum  Oo-  * 
Murrel,  58  South.  705,  713, 127  La.  466. 

OBE  BOA8TEB 

"An  'ore  roaster*  is  designed  for  ex^ 
ling  the  sulphur  from  iron  ore  prelimio^ 
to  smelting."  I>ayiB<k>lby  Ore  Boaster  tj 
T.  Lackawanna  Iron  4  Steel  Go,  12S  F<^ 
453. 

ORGANIC 

OBGANIO  AOT 

The  charter  or  sUtute  by  wU<*  *  ^ 
nidpal  corporation  is  created  is  its  orgasm 


act,  and  ndther  the  coiporation  oor 


m^- 


ORaANIO  LAW 


796 


OROAKIZED  TSSLBITOBT 


fleers  can  do  any  act,  make  any  contract,  or 
incar  any  liability  not  authorised  thereby,  or 
by  some  legislatiTe  act  applicable  thereto. 
Wakefield  t.  Brophy,  122  N.  X.  Supp.  632, 
6H  67  Misc.  Rep.  29& 

OBOAKIO  UkW 

Under  the  constitution  dedaiinf  that  a 
freeholder's  charter  shall  be  the  "organic 
law  of  the  dty,*  such  diarter  is  properly 
termed  the  local  constitution  of  the  city  and 
fixes  the  organization  of  the  municipal  gov- 
ernment In  re  Pfahler,  88  Pac.  271,  276, 
160  Cal.  71,  11  l4  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1092, 11  Ann. 
Oas.  Oil. 

ORGANIZE 

See  Ck>unt7  Completely  Organised;  Daly 
Organized  and  Existing. 

•^o  organize*'  means  to  arrange  or  con- 
stitute in  parts;  each  having  a  special  func- 
tion or  relation.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Nor- 
folk County  V.  Duke,  78  S.  B.  466,  469,  113 
Ya.  94. 

Tlie  word  "organized,**  used  in  relation 
to  a  school  board,  might,  interpreted  in  its 
limited  sense,  be  held  to  mean  merely  the 
election  of  ofiloers  for  the  board,  but,  inter- 
preted in  a  broader  sense,  the  word  means: 
Erected,  established,  constituted,  composed, 
and  formed  as  to  its  constituent  parts.  Gope- 
lin  V.  Board  of  School  Directors  of  City  of 
Harrisburg,  64  Ati.  6422,  544,  646,  216  Pa. 
868. 

An  indictment  charging  embezzlement  by 
an  ofllcer  of  the  city  was  not  objectionable 
in  failing  to  allege  that  the  money  in  ques- 
tion belonged  to  an  '^organized  city."  The 
use  of  the  word  "or^nized"  in  the  statute 
qualifies  the  word  "dty"  and  is  mere  sur- 
plusage, since  a  dty  must  be  organized  to  be 
a  dty,  a  distinct  entity  capable  of  owning 
property  susceptible  of  embezzlement  Bode 
V.  State,  113  N.  W.  996,  997,  80  Neb.  74. 

Oorporatioiis 

A  corporation  created  by  spedal  charter 
is  fu.lly  "organized,"  within  Pub.  St  1882,  c. 
106,  8  9,  now  Rev.  Laws,  c.  109,  §  18,  so  as  to 
transfer  the  franchise  from  the  incorporators 
to  the  corporation,  when  the  first  meeting  has 
been  called,  the  act  of  Incorporation  accepted, 
officers  elected,  by-laws  for  future  meetings 
adopted,  and  stock  subscriptions  accepted; 
and  thereafter  the  affairs  of  the  corporation 
are  subject  to  the  control  of  the  stockhold- 
ers, even  if  only  a  small  part  of  the  stock 
has  been  subscribed  for  and  accepted,  and  al- 
though no  payments  have  been  made  there- 
on; no  call  for  payments  having  been  made. 
Roosevelt  v.  Hamblin,  86  N.  B.  98,  100,  199 
Mass.  127, 18  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  748. 

Real  estate  trusts  created  by  deed  for 
the  purchasing,  improving,  holding,  or  selling 
of  lands  and  buildingB,  and  for  the  benefit 
nf  the  shareholders,  which  do  not  derive  any 


benefit  from  and  are  not  "organized"  under 
any  statute  of  the  state,  and  which  by  the(r 
terms  end  with  lives  in  being  and  21  years 
thereafter,  are  not  subject  to  the  exdse  tax 
imposed  by  Act  Aug.  6,  1909,  c.  6,  S  38,  36 
Stat  112,  on  the  doing  of  business  by  cor- 
porations. Joint-stock  companies,  or  associa- 
tions "organized"  under  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  or  of  any  state  or  territory. 
Eliot  ▼.  Freeman,  81  Sup^  Ct  860,  361,  220 
U.  8. 178,  66  L.  Ed.  424. 

OBGAHIZATIOir 

See  Color  of  Apparent  Organization;  La- 
bor Organization. 

The  term  "organization"  implies  a  recog- 
nition of  order,  and  an  obedience  to  duly  eon- 
stituted  authority.  State  ex  rel.  Ck>ok  v. 
Houser,  100  N.  W.  964,  980,  122  Wis.  634. 

As  used  in  Code,  tit  9,  c.  9,  S  1833,  pro- 
viding that  mutual  benefit  associations  shall 
not  employ  paid  agents  in  solidtlng  and  pro- 
curing members,  except  in  the  "organiza- 
tion" of  subordinate  bodies,  the  word  "organi- 
zation" refers  to  subordinate  bodies,  and 
not  that  of  the  association  itself.  First  Nat 
Bank  of  Marsh alltown  v.  Church  Federation 
of  America,  106  N.  W.  678,  680,  129  Iowa, 
268. 

OBGAHIZATIOH  OF  IXEOTOB8 

In  Const  Amend.  1908,  art  2,  }  2^, 
which  provides  that  the  Legislature  may  en- 
act laws  as  to  the  election  of  delegates  to 
conventions  of  political  parties,  and  shall  en- 
act laws  providing  for  the  direct  nomination 
of  candidates  for  public  office  by  electors, 
political  parties,  or  organizations  of  electors 
without  conventions,  at  elections  to  be  known 
as  "primary  elections,"  the  term  "political 
parties"  is  intended  to  embrace  those  which 
had  participated  In  a  struggle  at  the  polls 
for  political  ascendancy,  and  political  "or- 
ganizations of  electors"  is  intended  to  include 
new  parties  which  had  not  partldpated  in 
prior  elections,  organized  to  advance  some 
principle  or  measure  of  public  policy.  Sodal- 
ist  Party  v.  Uhl,  103  Pac.  181,  186^  165  Cal. 
776. 

OBOAKIZATIOir  OF  MII.ITIA 

The  word  "organization"  as  used  in  Act 
Cong.  May  27,  1908,  c.  204,  that  the  organiza- 
tion, armament,  and  discipline  of  the  organiz- 
ed militia  in  the  several  states  shall  be  the 
same  as  that  which  Is  now  or  may  hereafter 
be  prescribed  for  the  regular  army  of  the 
United  States,  does  not  relate  to  or  include 
the  enlistment  of  a  soldier,  but  relates  to  the 
distribution  of  the  personnel  of  the  army  or 
militia  into  units.  A<2ker  v.  Bell,  67  South. 
356,  358,  62  Fla.  108,  39  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  454, 
Ann.  Cas.  1913C,  1269. 

OBOAIIIZED  TERRITORY 

"Organized  territories"  have  reference 
exdusively  to  that  system  of  organized  gov- 
emmenta  long  existing  within,  the  United 


OROAKIZED  TOWN 


7M 


ORIOIKAIi  ▲MIWEB 


Btates,  by  which  oertela  regions  of  the  eoon- 
try  haye  been  erected  into  dvU  goTemmente. 
Tbeir  powers,  ezecntlTe,  legislatite^  and  Judi- 
cial, are  conferred  npon  them  by  act  of  Oon- 
grees,  and  their  legislative  acts  are  subject  to 
the  disapproval  of  the  Oongress  of  the  United 
States;  they  are  not  in  a  sense  independent 
governments,  yet  they  exercise  nearly  all  the 
powers  of  governments  under  what  are  gen- 
erally called  organic  acts,  passed  by  Oon- 
gress, conferring  such  powers  on  them.  More 
briefly,  "organised  territory"  has  been  defined 
as  an  "inchoate  state."  Porto  Rico,  though 
it  became  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  a  "territory" 
of  tbe  United  States,  did  not  become  an  "or- 
ganised territory"  in  the  technical  sense  of 
the  words  so  as  authorised  extradition  from 
a  state  or  territory  of  the  United  States  to 
Porto  Bico.  In  xe  Kopel,  148  IM.  506,  007 
(citing  De  lima  v.  Bidwell,  21  Sup.  Gt  743, 
182  U.  S.  1,  46  L.  Ed.  1041;  In  re  Lane,  10 
Sup.  Ct  700,  136  U.  8.  447,  84  L.  Bd.  219; 
Bx  parte  Morgan,  20  FM.  80(9. 

OBOAXIZXD  TOWV 

An  incorporated  village  is  an  ''organized 
town"  within  the  statute  requiring  a  dupli- 
cate of  the  auditor's  notice  of  the  meedng 
of  the  county  board  of  commissioners  to  pass 
on  the  petition  of  the  Judge  of  the  county 
seat  to  be  posted,  10  days  before  such  meet- 
ing, in  a  public  place  in  ea<di  organlced  town 
of  the  county.  Tucker  v.  Board  of  Gom'rs 
of  Lincoln  Coxmtj,  97  N.  W.  103,  104»  90 
Minn.  406. 

ORGANZINE 

Silk  "organzine^**  damaged  in  dyeing,  is 
not  by  reason  of  the  damage  removed  from 
the  provision  for  "organzine,"  in  Tariff  Act 
July  24,  1897,  c.  U,  1 1,  Schedule  L,  par.  386, 
30  Stat  186,  and  is  classifiable  as  such, 
rather  than  as  "silk  wasted'  under  section  2, 
Free  List,  par.  661,  30  SUt  201.  Cohen  v. 
United  SUtes,  180  Fed.  634. 

ORIFICE 

A  contract  to  furnish  water  for  public 
purposes  contained  this  dause:  "Said  first 
party  agrees  to  furnish  water  at  its  mains 
without  extra  charge,  for  the  following  mu- 
nicipal purposes:  ^  •  ^  For  eighteen  (18) 
taps  or  faucets  in  computing  which  each 
'orifice'  beyond  the  main  shall  be  counted  as 
one  'tap,'  exo^  that  in  the  town  hall  and 
in  schoolhouses  one  faucet  may  be  connected 
with  all  the  water-closets  and  urinals  in 
any  one  building."  In  addition  to  the  water 
charged  in  the  account  annexed,  plaintiff  has 
for  many  years  furnished  without  charge 
water  for  the  dty  hall  with  IS  separate  taps 
or  faucets,  for  the  city  farm  with  6  faucets, 
and  for  the  dty  farm  stable  with  1  faucet; 
each  building  being  connected  with  the  main 
by  one  service  pipe.  The  plumbing  for  each 
water-doset  and  for  the  urinal  in  the  town 


hall  is  cBtiiely  ssparate  and  distiaet  (ne 
that  of  eadi  ether.  Held,  that  each  of  tbe« 
faucets  was  an  "orifice^'  beycmd  the  kiie 
and  must  be  counted  as  one  "tap."  Po^lk 
Works  Co.  V.  City  of  (M  Town,  66  AtL  % 
724,  102  Me.  806. 

ORIGIN 

See  Domicile  of  Origin. 

ORIGINAL 

See  Triplicate  OtlginaL 

Where  two  copies  of  a  letter  ai«  vritta 
exactly  alike  by  the  same  writer,  od«  &' 
which  is  desired  to  be  mailed  and  tbe  otiiff 
retained,  the  one  has  not  become  the  '^• 
inal"  and  the  other  a  copy  by  whateTcr  e^r 
deuce  the  accuracy  of  the  copy  is  estabiisbel 
so  that  a  typewritten  carbon  copy  of  a  leoer 
mailed  is  not  a  duplicate  original,  so  as  t? 
be  admissible  in  evidence  without  acconntiu 
for  the  original.  McDonald  v.  Hanks,  113  i 
W.  604,  607,  62  Tex.  Ov.  App.  140. 

OBienrAX.    AMOim    ni   ooitbo- 


Under  Const  art  4,  |  4,  proTidisf  tin: 
the  Supreme  Court  shall  not  have  JariaiiflK< 
of  actions  for  the  recovery  of  money  vbr: 
the  ''original  amount  in  controversy"  dwsiM( 
exceed  f200,  the  amount  in  contioversT  i- 
the  amount  of  the  prindpal  sum  saed  K' 
with  intersst  to  the  conunenoemeDt  of  tbe 
action,  and  not  with  interest  to  tbe  date  c^ 
the  trial,  since  the  obvious  meaning  and  po: 
pose  of  the  word  "original"  is  to  ttmit  tiv 
amount  to  the  time  when  the  matter  tK 
originates  as  a  controversy  in  cosrt  Ins^ 
V.  Wm.  P.  Harper  k  Son,  128  Pac  07&  ^ 
71  Wash.  286. 

Under  Const  art  4,  |  4,  and  BalUc^er^ 
Ann.  Codes  k  St  S  4650,  providing  thit  '^ 
appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  Sspreme  Orf> 
shall  not  extend  to  dvfl  actioiifl  at  law  fc* 
the  recovery  of  money  where  tbe  "ori^^ 
amount  in  controversy  does  not  exceed  £^^ 
the  amount  in  controversy  to  wblcb  tlie  >>' 
pellate  Jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Coartei 
tends  is  that  which  was  in  actual  dlspotetj 
fore  the  action  was  brought,  and  does  not  ^' 
elude  attorney's  fees  which  are  merely  i£- 
dental  to  the  suit ;  the  word  "original"  dk*^  i 
ing  "pertaining  to  the  origin  or  begii^^  | 
preceding  all  others;  first  in  order;  pr^; 
itive;  pristine."  Fidelity  k  Deposit  Cf  ; 
Maiyland  v.  Faben,  08  Pac  764,  1^'^ 
Wash.  308. 

ORIOnrAX.  AK8WEB 

A  pleading  which  in  its  sobstanceb* 
direct  and  full  reply  to  the  cause  of  af^ 
set  up  in  the  plainUlTs  petition  sod  '^* 
tains,  among  other  matter,  a  sworn  d 
of  partnership  of  the  deftedsnti,  akoold- 1^ 
der  the  rules  of  pleading,  be  denomiottedf^ 
ther  an  "origlaal*'  or   «*amended"  «Q^ 


OBietlKAL  AITOiXCATION 


797 


ORIOINAIi  DISTKIOT 


And  Is  not  a  '"tnppUineiitKl  aniwtr/'  Gliloa- 
go,  R.  I.  ft  T.  R.  Ckx  ▼.  HftUnll,  98  8.  W.  16^ 
96  Ota.  244. 

obiohtaXi  appuoatxom 

The  "original  application,"  aa  used  in 
Rev.  St.  8  4897,  providing  that  a  oecond  ap- 
plication may  be  made  within  twe  years  aft- 
er t&e  allowance  of  original  application, 
means  the  first  ai^Uoation.  Weston  Elec- 
trical Instroment  Ck>.  v.  Empire  Electrical 
Instmment  Ck>.,  131  Fed.  90,  91. 

ORIOnr Ati  AProOPRIATIOM 

Where  the  owner  of  certain  land  had 
nsed  water  from  a  main  irrigation  ditch 
throngh  a  lateral  since  S^tember  8,  1888, 
when  tile  right  so  to  do  was  decreed  to  her 
by  a  void  probate  decree,  such  use  constitut- 
ed an  "original  appropriation"  as  of  that 
date.  Bunerdick  ▼.  Hersmeyer,  81  Pac.  384, 
335,  82  Mont  641. 

OBIOHTAX.  OOHSTBirOTXOB 

Until  property  once  bears  specifically 
the  cost  of  building  a  pavement  abutting  it 
done  on  the  order  of  the  council  of  the  dty, 
or  by  the  city's  express  permission,  inc&cated 
by  act  of  its  legislative  body,  there  has  not 
been  an  original  construction  of  such  im- 
provement within  a  statute  allowing  the  dty 
to  order  the  original  construction  of  such 
improvement  at  the  cost  of  the  abutting  own- 
ers. Gullfoyle's  Ex'r  v.  City  of  Maysville, 
112  8.  W.  006,  129  Ky.  682. 

Where  a  portion  of  an  old  turnpike 
road,  by  the  extension  of  the  limits  of  a  city, 
was  included  within,  and  became  a  public 
way  of,  the  dty,  and,  as  such,  had  a  few 
repairs  made  on  it,  tiie  regrading  and  paving 
of  the  road  was  an  "original  construction" 
of  the  street,  within  Ky.  St  1894,  |  2833, 
making  lot  owners  liable  for  the  costs  of  the 
"original  construction,"  and  the  dty  liable 
for  costs  of  ^reconstruction,"  of  streets.  Mc- 
Henry  v.  Selvage,  36  8.  W.  MS,  99  Ky.  232. 

OBIOnr AI.  GOHTRAOT 

See  Contract  to  Answer  for  Default  of 
Another. 

OBXeiHAIi  OailTRAOTOB 

An  '^original  contractor"  within  Mechan- 
ics' Lien  Law  is  one,  who,  for  a  Hixed  price, 
agrees  to  perform  certain  work,  and  does 
not  indude  persons  doing  carpentry  work, 
etc.,  by  the  day.  Van  Horn  Trading  Co.  v. 
Day  (Tex.)  148  8.  W.  1129,  1130. 

Every  person  who  deals  dlreetiy  with 
the  owner,  and  who,  in  pursuance  of  a  con- 
tract with  him,  perfenns  labor  or  furnishes 
material,  1m  an  original  contraetor  witiiin 
Compu  Laws  1897,  |  2221,  giving  every  origi- 
nal contradtor  a  Itm.  Qsay  v.  New  Mexico 
Pudle  Stoma  Co.*  110  JBae.  606,  e04»  16  N.  M. 
478. 


Under  L.  O.  L.  |  7420,  making  it  the 
duty  of  every  original  contractor  to  file  his 
lien  wlthlB  00  days  from  the  completion  of 
his  contract,  and  of  every  mechanic  or  other 
person  to  file  within  30  days,  one  engaged 
merely  to  work  for  an  indefinite  time,  under 
the  direction  of  the  lessee  of  a  house,  is  a 
mere  ^'laborer,"  whose  rights  to  a  Uen  would 
ezplie  within  30  days  from  his  last  day  of 
work;  but  one  engaged  under  a  direct  con- 
tract with  the  owner  to  fsmidi  labor  or  la- 
bor and  materials  is  an  "original  contrac- 
tor," though  the  contract  be  implied.  Ber- 
nard V.  Hassan,  118  Pac.  201,  60  Or.  62. 

Where  plaintiff  contracted  with  a  lessee 
to  raise  a  number  of  old  buildings  above  the 
street  level  and  remodel  them,  and  "furnish 
all  of  the  necessary  labor  and  material  to  be 
used  to  fully  complete  the  work,"  plaintiff  to 
receive  the  actual  cost  of  the  materials  and 
labor,  plus  10  per  cent,  and  the  reasonable 
value  of  the  work,  to  be  determined  by  the 
amount  of  work  and  labor  done  when  it  was 
completed,  it  was  held  that  the  labor  to  be 
performed  was  not  merely  incidental  to  the 
furnishing  of  the  materials,  and  hence  plain- 
tiff was  an  "original  contractor"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute,  and  not  a  material- 
man, and  was  not  entitied  to  a  mechanic's 
lien  where  the  contract  was  not  in  writing 
and  filed  with  the  county  recorder  as  the 
statute  (Code  Oiv.  Proc.  i  1183)  requires. 
Peterson  v.  Frelermuth,  121  Pac.  299,  301,  17 
Gal.  App.  609. 

Materialman 

A  party  furnishing  the  material  for  a 
building  is  an  original  contractor,  within 
Rev.  St  1899,  |  4207,  requiring  an  original 
contractor  to  file  his  lien  account  within  six 
months  after  the  Indebtedness  shall  have 
accrued.  B.  R.  Darlington  Lumber  Co.  v. 
James  T.  Smith  Bldg.  Co.,  114  8.  W.  77,  78, 
134  Mo.  App.  316. 

ORIOnrAX.  OOBT 

In  determining  what  is  a  fair  and  rea- 
sonable price  to  be  paid  by  a  city  for  a  wa- 
terworks system  at  the  termination  of  a 
franchise  to  a  private  company,  is  not  to  be 
determined  by  the  "original  cost"  of  the 
plant,  but  by  its  present  value,  and  "original 
cost"  and  "present  value"  are  not  equivalent 
terms.  Galena  Water  Co.  v.  City  of  Galena. 
87  Pac.  786,  737,  74  Kan.  644  (citing  National 
Waterworks  Co.  v.  Kansas  City,  62  Fed.  863, 
10  C.  0.  A.  663,  27  L.  R.  A.  827;  Town  of 
Bristol  V.  Bristol  &  Warren  Waterworks,  49 
Ati.  974,  23  R.  I.  274). 

Omom AX.  DISTRICT 

Code  Supp.  1907,  |  1989a23,  provides 
that  if  any  person  owns  lands  within  a 
drainage  district  which  has  been  assessed  for 
benefits,  and  which  is  separated  from  the 
4itidi  by  the  land  of  others,  and  shaU  desire 
to  drain  his  land  across  the  land  «f  aach  oth- 


ORIGIKAL  BNTRIBB 


798 


ORiaiKAX^  PACSAQB 


era  Into  th«  diteh,  and  shall  be  unable  to 
agree  on  the  terms  on  which  be  may  eoter 
on  their  lands  and  constmct  sndi  ditch,  he 
may  file  a  petition,  asking  the  board  of  au- 
per^laors  to  establish  a  snbdistrict  within 
the  limits  of  the  original  district  to  seenre 
more  complete  drainage,  describing  the  lands 
to  be  affected,  and  that  all  other  i»oceedings 
shall  be  the  same  as  provided  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  original  districts.  By  Acts  38d 
Gen.  Assem.  c.  118,  |  22,  it  was  provided  that 
additional  lands  within  any  district  wliidi 
were  benefited  by  an  improvement  might  be 
included  therein.  Held,  that  the  terms  "sub- 
diatrict'*  and  "original  district'*  in  secUon 
1989a23  were  used  in  contradistinction  to 
each  other,  the  term  "original  district"  not 
having  been  used  in  the  earlier  statute  in 
contradistinction  to  the  annexed  territory 
provided  for  by  section  1989a54,  as  added  by 
Acts  83d  Gen.  Assem.  c.  118,  i  22;  and  hence 
the  phrase  "within  the  limits  of  the  original 
district"  in  section  1980a23  must  be  deemed 
as  applicable  to  annexed  territory  as  to  the 
lands  originally  included  in  the  district,  so 
that  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  annexation  of 
territory  to  a  district  that  it  shall  have  been 
within  the  original  territory.  Bird  v.  Board 
of  Sup'rs  of  Harrison  County,  135  N.  W.  681, 
584,  154  Iowa,  692. 

ORIGIHAXi  ENTBXES 

See  Book  of  Original  Entries. 

ORIOIKAZ.  mPBOVEXEXT 

The  construction  for  the  first  time  of 
sewer  is  an  "original  improvement"  with- 
in Ky.  St  1903,  i  3100,  providing  that  no 
error  in  the  proceedings  of  the  general  coun- 
cil shall  exempt  from  payment  after  the 
work  is  done,  as  required  by  the  ordinance 
or  contract,  but  that  no  ordinance  for  any 
original  improvements  mentioned  in  the  act 
shall  pass  both  branches  of  the  general  coun- 
cil at  the  same  meeting,  and  at  least  two 
weeks  shall  intervene  between  its  passage 
in  the  two  branches.  Thomas  v.  Woods,  108 
S.  W.  878,  879,  128  Ky.  565. 

OBIGIKAZ.  IK STRUMZUrr 

Where  a  declaration  of  trust  is  made  in 
duplicate  by  the  ^ame  impression  of  the  type- 
writer, and  signed  at  the  same  time,  each 
party  taking  one,  either  is  admissible  as  an 
originaL  First  Nat  Bank  of  Bandon  ▼. 
Jamieson,  128  Pac  433,  63  Or.  694. 

oRionrAi.  jVRisDicnoH 

The  phrase  "original  Jurisdiction"  means 
the  power  to  entertain  cases  in  the  first  in- 
stance as  distinguished  from  appelate  juris- 
diction, and  does  not  mean  exclusive  Juris- 
diction. A  court  of  original  Jurisdiction  is 
one  in  which  an  action  has  its  origin.  Burks 
V.  Walker,  109  Pac.  544,  545,  25  Okl.  353. 

The  "jurisdiction"  to  consider  causes  de 
novo^  on  appeal,  and  to  decide  them  on  the 


law  and  tiis  crideooe  sooordlng  to  flie  rigkt 
of  the  oase^  Independent  of  the  nliogi  uA 
jndgm^t  of  the  lower  court,  is  origiiul  aod 
not  appelUite.  In  re  Bumette,  85  Pic  ^ 
577,  73  Kan.  dOO. 

OBIGIHAX.  UABIUTT 

The  words  "original  UaMUty,**  wltblii 
y.  8.  1188>  providing  that,  if  execution  on  i 
judgmoit  obtained  against  an  assodation  id 
retomed  unsati8fled«  a  suit  for  tbe  aiDoaat 
unpaid  may  be  brought  against  any  or  til  of 
the  associates  on  their  "original  Uabilitr; 
have  reference  to  the  liability  canseqaeDt  on 
membership  in  the  association  at  the  time  of 
the  creation  of  the  liability  on  which  tk 
judgment  was  recovered,  and  persons  who&e 
membership  had  ceased  whoi  the  liabiliq; 
merged  in  the  judgm^it  or  persons  wb(» 
membership  did  not  commence  until  sai^ 
quent  thereto  were  not  respcmslble  in  sop- 
plementary  proceedings  under  tiie  sectluD. 
F.  R.  Patch  Mfg.  Go.  v.  Capeless,  63  Atl  93S 
940.  79  Vt  1. 

OBIOIKAZ.  X.OGATOB 

The  "original  locator**  of  mining  gronsd 
is  a  discoverer  of  the  mineral  theielD  m 
tained.    Zenes  v.  Yanina,  134  Fed.  610, 61i 

OBIOnrAX.  OBLXGATIOH 

Under  Bev.  Civ.  Code,  |  1973,  makisgt 
promise  to  answer  for  another's  obligstioB 
an  "original  obligation,"  where  the  promise 
is  made  by  one  wlio  has  received  piopem 
upon  an  undertaking  to  apply  it  pursuant  u- 
such  promise,  etc.,  an  agrement  to  paj  is^ 
other's  account  is  an  original  contract,  and 
not  a  guaranty,  where  the  debtor  has  turcei 
his  bills  receivable,  etc,  to  the  promisor,  ^a 
his  agreement  to  pay  the  debtor's  debc& 
Grimsrud  Shoe  Co.  v.  Jackson,  115  K.  W 
656,  659,  22  S.  D.  114. 

Under  the  provisions  of  subdlrision  1 1 
6010,  Rev.  St  1687,  a  promise  to  answa  for 
the  obligation  of  another  is  deemed  an  ''on^ 
inal  obligation"  of  the  promisor,  and  need 
not  be  in  writing,  where  the  promise  is  f<|f 
an  antecedent  obligation  of  another,  tJ^  ^ 
made  upon  the  consideration  that  the  parti 
receiving  it  cancels  the  antecedent  obligatitii 
and  accepts  the  new  promise  as  a  sobsilR^ 
therefor.  McCallum  v,  McClarren,  96  P»t 
200,  201,  15  Idaho,  374. 

OBIGHTAX.  PACKAGE 

An  "original  package**  is  defined  as  i 
bundle  put  up  for  transportation  or  coikb^t 
clal  handling,  and  usually  consists  of  a  n"^' 
ber  of  things  bound  together  conyenieDt  f^" 
handling.  It  is  again  defined  to  he  the  csit 
which  the  carrier  receives,  transmits,  and  ^ 
livers  as  an  article  of  commerce,  and  a^is 
as  that  package  wliich  is  d^vered  by  tbe 
Importer  to  the  carrier  at  the  initial  point  (| 
shipment  in  the  emot  condition  in  wiiicb  it 
was  shipped.    If  sold.  It  must  be  in  tbe  fi^ 


ORiaiKAL.  PACKAGE 


799 


ORiaiNAL  PACKAGE 


i  shipped  or  receiyed,  for,  if  tbe  package  be 
roken  after  such  delivery.  It  by  that  act 
lone  becomes  a  part  of  the  common  mass 
f  property  within  the  state,  and  is  subject  to 
\e  laws  of  that  state,  enacted  in  virtue  of  Its 
jllce  power.  State  v.  Eckenrod,  127  N.  W. 
>,  58,  148  Iowa,  173. 

The  term  "original  packages,"  as  used  in 
aws  Kan.  1907,  c.  250,  providing  that  it 
lall  be  unlawfol  to  sen,  offer  for  sale,  or 
eliver  for  nse  at  any  coal  mine  or  mine 
i  the  state,  powder  in  any  manner  except  in 
rlginal  padEages,  containing  12^  pounds  of 
owder,  etc,  do  not  necessarily  have  the 
ime  meaning  aa  used  in  decisions  of  the 
Hleral  Supreme  Court,  so  as  to  make  the 
:atute  void  as  designed  to  prohibit  importa- 
ons  of  black  powder  from  other  states,  the 
ct  not  dealing  with  importations,  special  or 
^neral,  but  only  with  sales  within  the  state, 
t  a  spediied  place,  and  delivery  at  such  place 
f  the  powder  sold  in  other  than  the  pre- 
:ribed  quantity  and  in  a  prescribed  package. 
Williams  v.  Walsh,  32  Sup.  Ct  137,  139,  222 
f.  S.  415,  56  li.  Ed.  253. 

"The  doctrine  [of  'original  package']  has 
0  application  where  the  manufacturer  puts 
p  the  package  with  the  express  intent  of 
rading  the  laws  of  another  state,  and  is 
nabled  to  carry  out  his  purpose  by  the 
iicile  agency  of  an  express  company  and 
lie  connivance  of  his  consignee.*'  Crlgler  v. 
Jommonwealth,  87  S.  W.  276,  279,  120  Ky. 
12  (quoting  and  approving  Austin  v.  Tennes- 
ee,  21  Sup.  Ct  132,  179  U.  S.  343,  45  L.  Ed. 
24). 

Each  separate  bottle  shipped  into  the 
tate  by  a  manufacturer  to  a  local  dealer 
nder  a  contract  by  the  terms  of  which  the 
greed  prices  were  per  cask  containing  10 
ozen  bottles,  and  per  case  containing  6  dozen 
ottles,  cannot  be  considered  an  original  pack- 
ge,  so  as  to  save  the  local  sales  from  the 
iterdiction  of  Laws  Miss.  1908,  c.  115,  pro- 
Ibitiug  sales  of  malt  liquors.  Purity  Ex- 
ract  &  Tonic  Co.  v.  Lynch,  33  Sup.  Ct  44, 
5,  226  U.  8.  192,  57  L.  Ed.  184. 

An  original  package  as  governed  by  the 
iterstate  commerce  law  is  one  delivered  by 
le  importer  to  the  carrier  at  the  initial  point 
f  shipment,  and  retains  its  form  and  con- 
mts  until  rec^ved  by  the  consignee  in  the 
une  condition  as  when  shipped,  and  if  up- 
Q  arriving  at  Its  destination  in  a  sister  state 
le  package  is  broken,  and  its  contents  in 
mailer  units  offered  for  sale,  entering  into 
le  retail  commerce  of  tbe  state  the  distinc- 
ve  quality  of  interstate  commerce  is  lost, 
Dd  the  goods  become  at  once  subject  to 
:ate  laws.    Ehc  parte  Agnew,  131  N.  W.  817, 

19,  89  Neb.  306,  36  L.  R.  A.  (N.  8.)  886,  Ann. 
'as.  1912C,  676;  Ex  parte  King,  131  N.  W. 

20,  89  Neb.  298. 

Where  goods  are  packed  in  a  case  by  the 
Upper  in  another  state^  and  are  shipped  in- 


to the  state,  the  "original  package"  was  the 
case  in  which  the  goods  were  packed  and 
shipped  into  the  state,  and  when  the  case 
was  opened  for  the  sale  and  delivery  of  tbe 
separate  packages,  and  they  were  removed 
therefrom,  such  packages  lost  their  distinc- 
tive character  of  articles  of  interstate  trans- 
portation, and  became  a  part  of  the  taxable 
property  of  the  state.  Parks  Bros.  &  Co.  v. 
Nez  Perce  County,  89  Pac.  949,  951,  13  Idaho, 
29S,  121  Am.  St  Rep.  261, 12  Ann.  Cas..  1113. 

Where  a  liquid  in  casks  is  shipped  in  In* 
terstate  commerce  in  car  load  lots,  the  cask 
and  not  the  car  is  the  ''original  package" 
within  the  meaning  of  Food  &  Drugs  Act 
June  30,  1906,  c.  3915,  {  10,  34  Stat  771, 
which  authorizes  the  seizure  and  forfeiture 
for  adulteration  or  misbranding  of  articles 
so  shipped  while  remaining  in  "original  un- 
broken packages."  United  States  v.  Sixty- 
Five  Casks  Liquid  Extracts,  170  Fed.  449, 
454  (citing  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  5059;. 

Where  the  manufacturer  of  whisky  re- 
ceived a  barrel  of  his  product  from  a  govern- 
ment warehouse  after  paying  tbe  tax,  hav- 
ing the  barrel  stamped  to  show  the  pajment 
and  receiving  stamps  to  be  aflixed  on  each 
five  gallons  thereof  when  transferred  to  kegs 
of  that  capacity,  he  was  uot  required  to  sell 
the  whole  barrel  in  one  package  to  avoid 
payment  of  a  license,  but  could  divide  it  in- 
to five-gallon  kegs  for  sale,  and  when  stamp- 
ed the  kegs  were  "original  packages  contain- 
ing not  less  than  five  gallons"  within  the 
statute  authorizing  the  sale  of  whisky  by  the 
manufacturer  thereof  in  that  manner  without 
license.  Bunch  v.  State,  114  S.  W.  239,  88 
Ark.  230. 

SnbdiTisioiui  of  paokaffes 

'The  term  'original  packages'  Is  not  de- 
fined by  any  statute,  and  is  simply  a  conven- 
ient form  of  expression  adopted  by  Chief 
Justice  Marshall  in  Brown  v.  Maryland,  12 
Wheat  [26  U.  S.]  419,  6  L.  Ed.  678,  to  indicate 
that  a  license  tax  could  not  be  exacted  of 
an  importer  of  goods  from  a  foreign  country 
who  disposes  of  such  goods  in  the  form  in 
which  they  were  imported.  It  Is  not  denied 
that,  in  the  changed  and  changing  conditions 
of  commerce  between  the  states,  packages 
in  which  shipments  may  be  made  from  one 
state  to  another  may  be  smaller  than  those 
'bales,  hogsheads,  barrels,  or  tierces,'  to 
which  the  term  was  originally  applied  by 
Chief  Justice  Marshall,  but,  whatever  the 
form  or  size  employed,  there  must  be  a  rec- 
ognition of  the  fact  that  the  transaction  is 
a  bona  fide  one,  and  that  the  usual  methods 
of  interstate  shipment  have  not  been  depart- 
ed from  for  the  purpose  of  evading  tlie  police 
laws  of  the  states."  The  tax  imposed  on 
cigarette  selling  by  Code  Iowa,  f  5007,  is  not 
an  invalid  regulation  of  commerce  as  applied 
to  sales  at  retail  of  packages  of  ten  cigarettes 
in  small  pasteboard  boxes,  sealed,  and  stamp- 
ed with  the  revenue  stamp,  which  had  been 


ORIGINAL  PROMISB 


800      ORIGINAL  SPtOLAL  PROCSEDINa 


shipped  loose  to  the  retailer  from  another 
state  by  an  express  company  which  merely 
issued  a  receipt  in  duplicate,  showing  the 
number  of  packages  and  the  name  of  the 
consignee,  the  packages  not  being  separately 
or  otherwise  addressed,  since  such  a  box  can 
in  no  just  sense  be  considered  an  "original 
package."  Cook  ▼.  Marshall  County,  Iowa, 
26  Sup.  Ct  283,  286,  196  U.  6.  261,  49  L.  Bd. 
47L 

OBIOm AX.  FBOmSB 

An  obligation  to  answer  for  the  debt,  de- 
fault, or  miscarriage  of  another  is  original 
and  valid,  though  in  parol,  if  made  at  the 
time  or  before  a  debt  is  created,  where  credit 
is  given  solely  to  the  promisor;  or  where 
credit  is  given  on  the  promises  of  both,  as 
principals  and  Jointly  liable,  and  not  on  the 
promise  of  one,  as  surety  for  the  other;  or 
a  promise,  made  after  the  debt  is  created, 
when,  by  reason  of  the  promise,  the  original 
debtor  is  released ;  or  if  it  is  a  promise  to 
pay  out  of  funds  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
promisor  by  the  debtor ;  or  if  it  be  a  promise 
based  on  a  new  consideration  of  benefit  or 
harm  passing  between  the  promisor  and  the 
creditor.  Where  there  is  no  benefit  to  one 
promising  to  answer  for  the  debt  of  another, 
and  the  promise  does  not  create  an  original 
obligation,  but  is  a  collateral  promise,  merely 
superadded  to  the  promise  of  another  to  pay 
the  debt,  the  original  promisor  remaining 
liable,  the  collateral  promisor  is  not  liable, 
unless  there  is  a  writing,  whether  the  prom- 
ise is  made  when  the  debt  is  created  or  not 
Peele  ▼.  Powell,  78  S.  B.  234,  236,  156  N.  0. 
663. 

A  promise  made  at  the  time  or  before  a 
debt  is  created,  and  where  credit  is  given 
solely  to  the  promisor  or  to  both  promisors 
as  principals,  or  a  promise  based  on  a  new 
consideration  passing  between  the  promisor 
and  the  creditor,  or  a  promise  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  promisor  where  he  has  a  personal 
and  pecuniary  interest  in  the  transaction  in 
which  a  third  party  is  the  original  obligor, 
is  an  "original  promise,"  which  is  not  with- 
in the  statute  of  frauds,  but  a  promise  not 
creating  an  original  obligation  and  merely 
superadded  to  the  promise  of  another  who  re- 
mains liable,  to  pay  such  debt,  is  a  collateral 
promise  required  by  the  statute  to  be  in  writ- 
ing and  signed,  whether  made  at  the  time  the 
debt  was  created  or  afterwards.  Whitehurst 
V.  Padgett,  73  S.  E.  240,  241,  167  N.  a  424. 

Where  the  defendant  bought  uncompleted 
houses,  the  plumbing  in  which  plaintiffs  had 
contracted  with  her  vendors  to  do,  and  which 
they  had  partly  done,  her  promise  that,  if 
they  would  hurry  up  the  work  so  that  the 
buildings  could  be  rented,  she  would  pay 
them,  not  only  for  the  work  of  completion, 
but  for  what  they  had  done  for  her  vendors, 
is  an  "original  promise"  on  a  new  and  sufll- 
dent  consideration,  and  eo  not  within  the 


statute  of  frauds.    Breen  ▼.  Isaacs,  96  N.  T. 
Supp.  741,  49  Misc.  Rep.  127. 

Where  defendant,  who  was  the  owner  of 
certain  premises,  promised  that,  if  plaintiff 
would  refrain  from  filing  a  lien  thereon  for 
materials  delivered  to  a  contractor  and  would 
continue  to  furnish  sand  for  the  buildings 
being  erected,  def^dant  would  pay  the  debt 
owing  by  the  contractor  to  plaintiif,  defend- 
ant's agreement  wAs  an  original  promiae 
based  on  a  new  consideration,  and  was  not, 
therefore^  within  the  statute  of  frandsi 
Scbnaufer  ▼.  Ahr,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  195,  198» 
63  Misc.  Rep.  29a 

A  promise  to  pay  the  debt  of  another  in 
consideration  that  the  creditors  release  the 
debtor  and  accept  the  promise  instead  thereof 
is  an  original  promise  which  is  not  required 
to  be  in  writing  under  Rev.  St  1887,  |  6010. 
subd.  3,  making  a  promise  for  an  antecedent 
obligation  of  another  in  consideration  that 
the  party  receiving  it  cancel  the  antecedoit 
obligation  and  accept  the  new  promise  as  a 
substitute  therefor  an  original  promise.  Mc- 
Oallum  V.  McClarren,  98  Pac  200,  201,  16 
Idaho,  874. 

OBIGIKAZ.  BECOBB 

It  was  complainant's  custom  in  operating 
a  lumber  yard,  on  receiving  an  order,  to  write 
the  substance  on  a  small  order  blaxik,  which 
was  given  to  a  loader,  who  put  the  material 
on  a  wagon,  and  returned  the  slip  to  the  yard 
clerk,  who  then  made  three  "original  sUpe" 
on  an  automatic  register,  showing  the  date, 
names,  quantity,  price,  etc.  In  filling  out 
the  blanks  the  machine  made  three  exact  cop- 
ies of  the  slips  by  one  impression,  and  au- 
tomatically numbered  them.  One  of  the  slips 
was  given  to  the  driver,  who  delivered  the 
lumber,  and  the  other  two  and  the  original 
written  memorandum  retained  by  plalntifr. 
Held,  that  the  original  written  memorandum 
was  a  mere  shop  book  entry,  and  not  ordi- 
narily admissible,  but  that  one  of  such  "orig- 
inal slips"  retained  by  plaintiff  in  its  oflElce 
was  admissible  as  the  original  record.  Fed- 
eral Union  Surety  Co.  r.  Indiana  Lumber  k 
Mfg.  Oo^  96  N.  B.  1104,  U06, 176  Ind.  328. 

OBIGIKAX.  SPECIAL  FBOOEEDIHO 

While  a  criminal  contempt  proceeding  for 
violating  an  order  enjoining  accused  from 
maintaining  a  liquor  nuisance  in  which  a 
warrant  of  attachment  was  issued  is  an  "orig- 
inal apedal  proceeding"  under  Bev.  Codes 
1906, 1  7666,  providing  that,  if  an  attachment 
la  issued  in  contempt  proceedings,  it  shall  be 
deemed  an  original  special  proceeding  by  the 
state  against  accused,  it  is  not,  strictly  peak- 
ing, an  independent  proceeding,  as  it  grows 
out  of  and  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  connected 
with  the  main  action  and  is  dependent  for  its 
foundation  upon  the  proceedings  in  the  main 
action  and  the  violation  of  the  Injunctlonal 
order  therein  issued.  Stats  r.  Helser,  127  N. 
W.  72,  76.  20  N.  D.  867. 


ORIGINAL  SUIT 


801 


ORNAMENT 


oRioiNAX.  mm 

A  proceeding  under  Rev.  St.  1885;  c  17> 
tit.  30,  art  1375,  authorizing  a  new  trial 
for  good  caiiae  shown,  apon'd^endant^s  appli- 
cation, whne.  Judgment  was  lendeiDed  against 
him  on  semloe  by  publication  without  af)* 
pearance^  is  not  an  "original  suit,''  iHit  a 
^'continuation  of  the  form^  suit"  Uence^ 
tlie  order  vacating  the  ori^nal  judgment  is 
as  interlocutory  order  from  which  no  appeal 
Ue&  WoU  v.  Sahm,  120  S.  W.  Uli,  1117, 
56  Tex.  GiT.  App.  564. 

ORIGIKAI<  SUM 

The  phrase  "original  sum«"  as  used  in  St 
1909,  c.  490,  pt.  2,  I  59,  which  requires  a  per- 
son redeeming  land  sold  for  taxes  to  pay  the 
original  sum,  with  interest  and  other  duirges, 
means  the  amount  paid  at  tax  sale;  hence, 
where  a  purchaser  of  a  tract  of  land  at  a  tax 
sale  has  subdiyided  it  by  his  own  deed  before 
the  time  for  redemption  had  expired,  in  such 
a  way  that  his  grantee  owned  the  tax  title  to 
a  part  of  the  land  and  plaintiff  the  equity  of 
redemption,  the  right  to  redeem  depends  upon 
plaintiff's  paying  the  whole  sum  paid  for  the 
tax  deed.  McNeil  v.  O'Brien,  91  N.  B.  138, 
140,  204  Mass.  594. 

OBXOINAI<  mrDEBTAKIN O 

If  no  other  person  is  liable  for  the  same 
debt  for  which  the  undertaking  is  made,  al- 
though  another  person  may  be  liable  for  a 
distinct  debt  which  is  the  measure  of  the  oue 
in  question,  the  undertaking  is  an  original 
one.  Jolley  v.  Walker's  Adm'rs,  26  Ala.  690, 
702. 

Where  a  tenant  became  sick  after  plant- 
ing the  crop,  and  defendant  bought  the  crop 
from  him  and  agreed  to  pay  the  lessor  the 
rent  due,  and  the  lessor  accepted  defend- 
ant as  his  tenant,  the  agreement  to  pay 
the  rent  was  an  "original  undertaking,"  not 
required  to  be  in  writing  under  the  statute 
of  frauds.  Pylant  v.  Webb,  58  S.  B.  329,  2  Ga. 
App.  171. 

"VVTiere  relators  furnished  supplies,  labor, 
and  materials  to  a  subcontractor  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  highway,  and  treated  the  latter 
as  their  debtor  "until  after  he  absconded,  the 
undertaking  of  the  contractors,  if  any,  to  liq- 
uidate such  indebtedness,  was  not  an  "orig- 
inal undertaking,"  but  a  contract  to  answer 
for  the  default  of  another,  within  the  stat- 
ute of  frauds.  Millef  v'.  State  ex  rel.  Prather, 
74  N*  B.  260,  261,  36  Ind.  App.  379. 

OaiOIHAL  WIPTH     . 

The*  words  ''original  -width,"  as  used  In 
Bums'  Ann.  St  1908,  §  7663,  creating  a  high^ 
way  by  20  years'  user,  bpt  declaring  that  all 
highways  previously  laid  out  according  to. 
Uiw,  or  used  as  such,  for  20  years  or  moi^re* 
shall  continue  as  located  and  as  of  their  orig- 
inal width  respectively  until  changed  ac- 
cording to  law,;  related  to  the  width  of  the 
liighway  when  the  proceeding  was  begun  to 
8WDS.&  P.2n  Seb.— 51 


ascertain  and  record  it  and  not  to  a  possi- . 
bly  wi^ei:or  narrower  way  at  son^e  remote  or 
recent  period.    Pitser  v.  McCreery,  89  N.  B. 
317.  318,  319,  172  Ind.  663.   , 

ORIGINAL  WRIT 

See  Scire  Facias. 

OBKlnrAXiLY  fiXEROISBD  BT  CBAH- 
CERTCMItrEtV 

See  Jurisdiction  Originally  Bxerdsed  by 
Chancery  Court 

Tike  words. "originating"  and  "arising," 
as  used  In  the  section  of  the  Gonatitntion 
relating  to  the  appellate  jurisdictioix  of  the 
Supreme  Court  and  the  circuit  oaurt  reler 
to  cases  which  the  circuit  and  county  courts, 
respectively,  exercise  original  Jurisdiction  of 
and  determine.  Mugge  v.  Warnell  Lumber 
&  Veneer  Co.,  50  South.  645,  646,  58  Fla.  318. 

OBIOnrATlNO  CAUSE 

The  initial  and  moving  or  "originating 
cause"  is  to  be  understood  as  meaning  the 
surrounding  conditions  in  which  the  negli- 
gence of  defendant  operated  as  the  efficient 
cause  of  the  injurious  consequences.  Winchel 
V.  Goodyear,  105  N.  W.  824,  827,  126  Wis.  271. 

OBXOIHATiko  WITHIN  TEHICIiS 

Where  an  accident  to  an  automobile  re- 
sulted in  the  leakage  of  gasoline  from  the 
tank,  and  Are  was  communicated  to  the  gaso- 
line, which  had  escaped  from  burning  lamps 
affliced  to  the  outside  of  the  vehicle,  the  Are 
loss  on  the  vehicle  was  not  one  "originating 
within  the  vehicle,"  within  a  clause  of  a  flre 
policy  exempting  the  insurer  from  liability 
for  fire  so  originating.  Preston  v.  Mtna.  Ins. 
Co.,  103  N.  Y.  Supp.  638,  639,  118  App.  Dlv. 
784;  Same  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc,  103  N,  T. 
Supp.  640,  641,  118  App.  Dlv.  788. 

ORNAMENT 

Personal  oraamehts  as  goods  and  cihatr 
tels,  see  (Toods. 

A  watch,  chain,  purse,  or  rosary,  being 
each  an  article  of  use,  and  not  worn  for  orna- 
ment, is  not  a  "Jewel"  or  "ornament,**  within 
the  statute  relieving  an  innkeeper  ffom  lia- 
bility for  loss  of  money,  Jewels,  or  ornaments, 
where  he  provides  a  safe,  posts  notice  there^ 
of,  and  the  guest  neglects  to  deposit  the  same 
in  the  safe.  Jones  v.  Hotel  Latham  Co.,  115 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1084, 1085,  02  Misc.-  Rep.  620. 

.Watoh     .    '."' 

A  watqh  and^foi)  i^re  embraced  in  the 
terms  "jewels"  and,  "ornaments,"  as  used  in 
Act  1879,  p.  185^  c.  145,  relating  to  the  lia- 
bility of  the  proprietor  of  a  hotel  for  the 
keeping  of  any  Jisweis  and  ornaments  be- 
loxkging  to  a  guest  Mr.  Webster  defines  the 
word  "Jewel"  as  an  ornament  of  dress,  usu- 
,  ally  made  of  a  precloua  metal,  having  enamel 
or  precious  stones  as  a  part  of  its  design; 


ORNAMENTAL  FEATHERS 


802 


ORPHAN 


but  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  It  was  nsed 
by  the  Legislature  in  the  common  meaning 
attributed  to  it  as  an  ornament  or  nsefol  ar- 
ticle of  yalue,  and  embraces  a  watch  used  for 
a  timekeeper  or  dironometer,  and  in  whldi 
precious  stones  may  or  may  not  form  a  part 
The  fob  is  evidently  an  article  kept  and  worn 
both  for  use  and  ornament  Rains  v.  Max- 
w^  HoBse  Co.,  70  8.  W*  U4.  HI,  112  Tttin. 
219,  04  L  R.  A.  470,  2  Ami.  Gat.  4S& 

OKN AKEHTAX.    FEATHERS 

Peacock  feathers  in  a  crude  condition, 
osed  in  that  state  for  ornamental  purposes, 
are  dutiable  under  the  provision  in  paragraph 
425,  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11, 1 1,  Sched- 
ule N,  30  SUt  101,  for  "ornamental  feath- 
ers," and  not  under  that  in  the  same  para- 
graph for  *^eathers  crude."  George  Silva 
&  Co.  y.  United  States,  127  Fed.  781. 

Crude  ostrich  feathers,  which  In  that 
condition  are  never  used  for  ornamental  pur- 
poses, but  need  to  be  dressed  and  otherwise 
manufactured  before  becoming  suitable  for 
such  use,  are  dutiable  as  "feathers  •  •  ^ 
crude,**  and  not  as  "ornamental  feathers,** 
under  the  Tariff  Act  Brodie  v.  United 
States,  135  Fed.  914,  915;  Spero  v.  Same,  135 
Fed.  915,  910. 

OKN AMEHTAX.  nXTVHSS 

An  electric  chandelier,  annunciator,  and 
like  contrivances  or  devices  attached  to  the 
celling  or  walls  of  a  house  by  a  tenant,  at  his 
own  expense  and  for  his  personal  comfort 
and  convenience,  come  within  the  legal  defini- 
tion of  "domestic  or  ornamental  fixtures" 
when  so  placed  that  they  can  be  readily  de- 
tached without  injury  to  the  premises.  In 
the  absence  of  any  understanding  to  the  con- 
trary, such  fixtures  may  be  removed  by  the 
tenant  at  any  time  during  his  term  or  occu- 
pancy, and  even  thereafter,  if  he  be  deprived 
of  the  oppoitunlty  to  remove  them  by  a 
wrongful  retaking  of  possession  of  the  prem- 
ises by  the  landlord.  Not  being  annexed  to 
the  rented  structure  with  any  view  to  their 
becoming  permanently  attached  thereto  as  a 
part  of  the  realty,  t|iey  do  not  lose  their  iden- 
tity as  chattels,  and  a  possessory  warrant 
will  lie  to  recover  them  from  a  landlord  who 
wrongfully  withholds  possession  thereof  from 
the  tenant  Raymond  v.  Strickland,  52  S.  B. 
619,  020,  124  Ga.  504,  3  U  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  09. 

OBHAMENTAL  LEAVES 

Bleached  or  dyed  grasses  that  are  intend- 
ed for  ornamental  or  decorative  purposes  are 
classible  as  "ornamental  •  •  •  leaves 
•  •  •  not  specially  provided  for,"  under 
TarifT  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11,  |  1,  Schedule 
N,  par.  425,  30  Stat  191.  And  so  sire  palm 
leaves  that  have  been  subjected  to  a  process 
of  painting,  etc,  to  give  them  their  natural 
appearance  and  to  prevent  decomposition. 
And  also  wreaths  and  crosses  mounted  on 
wire  frames.   United  States  v.  H.  Bayersdorf- 


er  ft  Ca,  175  Fed.  959,  900,  99  G.  C.  A.  4r< 
See,  also,  Bayersdorfer  ft  Go.  v.  United 
States,  171  Fed.  280. 

OBVAKEHTAX.  FBOJEOrXOXS 

As  used  In  m  dty  oidlnanee,  aathoiiaii; 
the  lasttance  of  permits  to  coastriKt  '^om 
mental  pxojeetiona**  beyond  the  Imfldhig  Jm, 
included  all  deoormtiw  pro jecdoiis  on  tbe  Hue 
of  a  buildtng  beyond  the  bniUBBS  Uw  ia  tb» 
nature  of  porehes,  arches,  portleoa,  pedesttln 
free  standing  statuary  colnmns,  and  iiilkR 
erected  entirely  for  the  enhancement  of  ^ 
beauty  of  the  building  from  an  artistic  sos^ 
point  McMillan  v.  Klaw  ft  Erlauger  Ccisi 
Go.,  95  N.  T.  Supp.  365,  307,  107  Appi  Irj 

OBVAXEHTAX.  8TOHSS 

In  construing  the  provision  in  pangnii 
435,  Schedule  N,  1 1,  Tarilf  Act  July  2i  IS^ 
a  11,  30  Stat  192,  for  Imitation  predoi? 
stones  not  "ornamented  or  decorated,''  h&i 
as  to  stones  which  have  been  incmsted,  ^ 
in  which  the  incrustations  are  a  part  of  tiip 
imitation,  that  they  are  not  ornamented  o? 
decorated  within  the  meaning  of  said  pro^ 
sion.  United  States  v.  R.  F.  Downing  &  Cc. 
144  F^  1022,  73  G.  a  A.  42;  Id.,  139  Fed 
155. 


ORHAXEHTS  AHB 

See  Other. 


OTHER  ABTICLES 


ORPHAN 

"Orphans,'*  as  used  in  a  certificate  of  a 
mutual  benefit  association,  providing  for  pa: 
ment  to  the  family,  "orphans,"  or  dep«H]t£^ 
of  the  member,  as  he  might  direct,  represe^^ 
ed  the  children  of  the  family  after  the  dein 
of  father  and  mother.  Klee  v.  Elee,  98  > 
T.  Supp.  588,  590,  47  Misc.  Rep.  lOL 

'^Orphans,*'  as  used  In  the  rules  of  a 
association  providing  that  upon  the  death  ci 
a  member  the  society  would  pay  to  the  ^^ 
ower  or  orphans  of  the  deceased  memleri 
certain  sum,  is  Intended  in  the  sense  of  **cliil 
dren**  and  not  in  the  strict  legal  sense  .' 
orphans.  Fischer  ▼.  Malchow,  101  N.  W.  &J^ 
003,  93  Minn.  390. 

Where  a  benevolent  assodation^s  charter 
provided  for  the  paymait  of  benefits  to  "«?* 
phans,"  such  term  would  not  be  limited  tv 
persons  who  were  oiphaas  la  a  strict  sense. 
embracing  those  only  related  by  caDsaogsiB^ 
ity,  but  would  be  construed  in  the  sense  ^ 
children.  Berdan  v.  Milwaukee  Mat  life 
Ins.  Co.,  90  N.  W.  411,  413.  130  Mich.  396. 4 
Ann.Caa.832. 

A  bequest  for  the  education  of  •'orpbass 
or  poor  children"  means  orphans  without  €*• 
tate  to  pay  fOr  such  education  and  childres 
whose  parents  are  living  but  are  too  poor  to 
pay  for  it.  Crow  ex  rel.  Jones  v.  Clay  Coea- 
ty,  95  8.  W.  309,  879, 190  Mo.  231 


ORPHAN  ASYLUM 


803 


OTHER 


OBPHAK  ABTXilTM-OBPHAini'  HOME 
— ORFHAHAOE 

As  charity,  see  Charity. 

As  public  charity,  see  Public  Charity. 

Lezicographera  are  not  unanlmoos,  but 
lean  toward  a  meaning  for  "orphanage"  or 
"oiphan  asylum"  suggesting  destitution  of 
those  reUeyed,  rather  than  a  profit-seeking 
enteiprlse.  Standard  Diet  "Orphanage^" 
"^An  institution  for  the  care  of  destitute  <»- 
plians;  oxphan  asylum."  0»it  Diet  "Or- 
phanage." "An  institution  or  home  for  or- 
phans; orphan  asylum;  an  asylum  or  home 
fdr  destitute  orphan  children."  Webst  Diet 
'^Orphanage."  "An  institution  or  asylum  for 
the  care  of  orphans."  Id.  "Asylum."  "An 
institution  for  the  protection  or  relief  of  some 
dasB  of  destitute^  unfortunate,  or  afflicted 
persons."  Baker  t.  Btate^  97  N.  W.  660^  5«9, 
130  Yna.  185. 


ORTHOPEDIST 

As  physidan,  see  Physician. 

OSTENSIBLE 

OSTEHfllBXiE  AOEKOT 

An  agency  Is  "ostensible^  when  the  prin- 
cipal intentionally  or  by  want  of  ordinary 
care  causes  a  third  person  to  believe  another 
to  be  his  agent  who  is  not  really  employed  by 
Mm.  Weidenaar  y.  New  York  life  Ins.  Co., 
94  Pac.  1,  6,  36  Mont  592. 

OSTEHSIBXiE  AUTHOBXTT 

"Ostensible  authority"  of  an  agent  is 
such  as  a  principal  intentionally  or  by  want 
of  ordinary  care  causes  or  allows  a  third  per- 
son to  belieye  the  agent  to  possess.  Weide- 
naar T.  New  York  Ufe  Ins.  Co.,  94  Fac«  1,  7, 
86  Mont  692  (citing  Civ.  Code,  |  860S).  But 
a  colleetor  vt  a  loelil  lodge  of  a  mutual  ben- 
efit society,  consisting  of  a  grand  lodge  and 
8ubf»dinate  local  lodges,  empowered  to  act 
as  superintendent  of  the  society  in  the  state 
in  the  institution  of  new  lodges,  has  no  au- 
thority to  walTs  delinquency  of  a  m^nbor 
in  a  locsl  lodge  or  iscelTe  current  dues  from 
one  wha  has  ceased  to  be  a  member  of  the 
society.  Kemiedy  y.  The  Grand  Fraternity, 
92  Pac  971,  977,  36  Mont  826,  25  Ia  B.  A. 
<N.  a)  78.  dr.  Code  CaL  |  2817,  gires  the 
same  definition.  And  so,  where  certificates  of 
stock  owned  by  piaintiff  were  indorsed  in 
blank  without  knowledge  by  his  brother  in 
plaintiff's  DE^e,  and  hypothecated  to  se<iure 
a  debt  of  the  brother,  and  plaintiff,  being  In- 
fjormed  by  the  secretary  of  the  corporation, 
said  it  was  all  right,  the  plaintiff  could  not 
as  against  an  innocent  purchaser  from  the 
pledgee  dispute  the  brother^s  authority  to 
transfer  the  stock.  Dover  r.  Pittsburg  Oil 
Co.,  77  Pac.  406,  406,  148  CaL  601. 


osTzarsiBUS  fabtiveb 

GIt.  Code  Oa«  1910,  |  8167,  declares  that 
"an  'ostensible  partner'  is  one  whose  name 
appears  to  the  world  as  such,  and  he  is 
bound,  though  he  have  no  interest  in  the 
firm.'*  E(e  is  liable  as  a  partner  only  to 
those  persons  who  have  acted  on  the  faith  of 
the  truth  of  the  appearance.  American  Cot- 
ton College  ▼.  Atlantic  Newspaper  Union,  74 
S.  XL  1084,  1085,  188  Oa.  147. 

OSTEOPATH 

As  i^iyslGlan,  see  Physician. 
As  practicing  ^nedidne,  see  Practice  of 
MediehM. 

08TBOFATHT 

See  Practice  of  Medicine,  Surgery,  and 
Osteopathy. 

As  practice  of  medicine,  see  Practice  of 
Medicine. 

'•Osteopathy^  is  a  method  of  treating 
diseases  of  the  human  body  without  the  use 
of  drugs,  by  means  of  manipulation  applied 
to  various  nerre  centers,  chiefly  those  along 
the  spine,  with  a  view  to  inducing  free  cir- 
culation of  the  blood  and  lymph,  and  an  equal 
distribution  of  the  nerve  forces.  Special  at- 
tention is  given  to  the  readjustment  of  any 
bones,  muscles,  or  ligaments  not  in  the  nor- 
mal position.  State  v.  Johnson,  114  Pac  300, 
892,  84  Kan.  411,  41  Ii.  B.'  A.  (N.  S.)  5»9 
(quoting  6  Words  and  Phrases,  p.  6070) .  It  is 
that  method  of  the  healing  art  accomplished 
by  a  system  of  rubbing  or  kneading  the  body. 
State  V.  Marble,  73  N.  E.  1063,  1064,  72  Ohio 
St  21,  70  L.  B.  A.  835,  106  Am.  St  Rep.  570, 
2  Ann.  Cas.  898.  See,  also,  Ex  ];»irte  Collins, 
121  S.  W.  501,  503,  57  Tex.  Cr.  B.  2 ;  Llgon  v. 
State,  39  South.  662,  663,  145  Ala.  659;  Ben- 
nett V.  Ware,  61  S.  B.  548,  549,  4  Ga.  App. 
293  (quoting  State  v.  Uffrlng,  55  N.  E.  168, 
61  Ohio  St  39,  46  L.  B.  A.  334,  76  Am.  St 
Bep.  358;  Kelson  v.  State  Board  of  Health, 
57  S.  W.  501,  108  Ky.  769,  50  L.  B.  A.  383; 
State  V.  McEnight,  42  S.  E.  680, 131  N.  C  717, 
59  Lu  B.  A.  187). 

OSTRICH  FEATHERS 

Not  -dutiable  as  ornamental  feathers,  see 
Ornamental'  Feathers. 

OTHER 

See  All  Other;  Another;  Any  Other; 
Every  Other;  No'  Other;  Some  Other; 
With  Every  Other  Person. 

Pen.  Code  1901,  §  172,  declares  that 
"murdep"  is  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human 
being  with  malice  aforethought  Such  malice 
is  express  or  implied.  Section  173  declares 
that  all  murder  perpetrated  by  poison  or  by 
any  other  kind  of  willful,  deliberate,  and  pre- 
meditated killing,  or  whlchr  is  committed  in 


OTHEB 


804 


OTHEB 


the  perpetration  of  oortain  crtoiM,  U  nmrder 
in  the  first  degree,  and  all  other  kinds  of 
murder  are  in  the  second  degree.  Held,  that 
the  word  "other'*  In  section  173  was  used  to 
supply  the  sense  of  addition  to  the  enumera- 
tion ;  and  hence  an  instructldn  that  It  was  not 
essential  to  a  verdict  of  murder  tn  the  first 
degree  by  poison  that  there  should  be  proof 
that  defendant  administered  the  poison  to 
decedent  with  a  specific  intent  to  kill  him  was 
proper;  malice  being  implied.  Eytinge  t. 
Territory,  100  Paa  448,  440,  12  Aril.  181. 

Asdlffemt 

The  natural,  lumal,  and  normal  mie  of 
the  word  "other"  is  to  Indieate  Adlflering 
from  or  an  addition  to  the  ttdng  o^  things 
immediately  in  contemplation.  De  Loach  & 
Co.  T.  iEtna  Ins.  CkK,  82  d.  B.  478,  474,  4 
Ga.  App.  740. 

As  ejiudem  Kemeria 

"Where  a  statute  or  other  document 
enumerates  several  classes  of  persons  or 
things,  and  immediately  following,  and  class- 
ed with  such  enumeration,  the  clause  embrac- 
es 'other'  persons  or  things,  the  word  'other' 
wUl  generally  be  read  as  'other  such  like,' 
so  that  persons  or  things  thereifi  comprised 
may  be  read  as  ejusdem  generla  with,  and 
not  of  a  quality  superior  to  or  different  from, 
those  specifically  enumerated."  Standard 
OU  Go.  ▼:  Swanson,  49  8.  E.  262,  268, 121  Ga. 
412  (dting  Sanders  v.  State,  12  S.  B.  1058,.  86 
Qtu  717 ;  St  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.  ▼. 
Penman,  151  Fed.  961,  969,  81  C.  O.  A.  151). 

The  rule  that  where  a  statute  enumer- 
ates several,  classes  of  persons  or  things^  and 
immediately  following  and  classed  with  such 
enumeration  the  clause  embraces  "other" 
persons  or  things,  the  word  "other"  will  be 
read  as  "other  such  like,"  so  that^  the  per- 
sons or  things  comprised  may  be'  read  as 
ejusdem  generis  with,  and  not  of  a  quality 
superior  to,  or  different  from,  those  specific- 
ally enumerated,  does  not  apply,  where  the 
Intention  of  the  Legislature  is  clear  and 
there  is  no  room  for  construction.  Vassey 
V.  Spake,  65  S.  E.  825,  826,  83  S.  G.  566. 

"When  general  words  follow  an  enumer- 
ation of  particular  cases,  they  apply  only  to 
cases  of  the  same  kind  as  those  ex^essly 
mentioned,  or,  stated  in  diffevent  language, 
'the  word  "other,"  following  an  enumeration 
of  i^articulars,  embraces  enumerated  par^e- 
ulars  of  like  nature  only,  unless  a  btohder 
sense  is  obviously  intended.' "  .Chicago 
Union  Traction  Co..  v.  Chicago,  65  N.  E.  451, 
460,  199  111.  4S4,  59  Ia  R.  A.  631  (quoting 
an4  adopting  Union  County  v.  Ussery,  35  N. 
E.  618,  147  111.  204;  and  citing  and  adopting 
Misch  V.  Russell,  26  N.  E.  528,  136  111.  22, 
12  L.  a  A.  125;  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Joliet 
V.  Adam,  ^8  N.  B.  955,  138  IlL  483 ;  Ritchie 
V.  People,  40  N.  B.  454,  155  tlL  98,  29  L.  R. 
A.  79,  46  Am.  St  Rep.  31b). 


Otfc^r  acetdamtal  or  aatml  mmau 

Testator  recited  that  having  in  mind  t^ 
many  catastrophes  resulting  from  the  actlva 
of  the  elements,  and  the  great  anfferins^  At^ 
caused  by  the  destruction  of  life  and  prn> 
erty  by  storms,  floods,  fires,  aad  otiier  sd- 
dental  and  natural  causes,  etc,  be  <^sr^ 
the  remainder  of  hia  estate  to  tmstcfs  to 
invest  and  pay  the  income  for  tbe  ehtr- 
itable  purpose  of  relieving  the  waots.  ^ 
tress,  and  suffertag  arlsfng  from  sodi  aef 
es,  and  for  the  purpose  of  aidiii?  snda  p^f 
sons  as  the  trustees  deemed  adTisaHe  ^ 
were  victims  of  such  acddenti  and  catifrnh 
phes,  and  enjolnliig  the  trmtees  to  seled 
subjects  worthy  of  assistance,  and  to  use  t^ 
fund  for  the  greatest  possible  benefit  to  nf- 
ferlng  humanity.  In  determhihi;  vbetber 
there  was  a  snfflclMitly  definite  desdinadn 
of  beneficiaries,  the  court  said:  "Csn  It  k 
doubted  that  the  tesUtor  intended  by  & 
word  "such*  to  limit  the  relief  to  snfferci 
from  some  causes,  accidents,  or  cetafttropbei 
as  distinguished  from  others  not  witMn  bis 
mental  category?  We  think  not  Certaiiij 
he  intended  that  some  causes,  some  acdd^:^ 
and  catastrophes,  should  be  exclnded  fp)= 
those  whose  victims  were  to  he  tbe  gubjMs 
of  the  annual  expenditures  of  the  Income  ' 
this  fund.  If  so,  tiien  is  it  not  possible  f(^ 
the  court  to  find  some  line  of  differentiati  a 
which  was  in  the  mind  of  the  testator,  ^^ 
suffidept  certainty  and  definiteness  to  mtl'i 
it  to  decide,  in  any  concrete  instance  of  ti 
pendlture  or  proposed  expenditure,  whe>r 
it  is  authorized?  We  are  convinced  ttat  ^ 
is  possible.  Obviously  the  purchase  of  t^^ 
for  the  hom^ess  victims  of  the  New  Bi^- 
mond  cyclone'  would  be  justified.  We  tti:i 
it  equally  obvious  that  expendltnre  to  ui 
the  cure  of  consumptives  or  inebriates  voaJ 
be  forbidden  to  the  trustees.  Whether  fan 
ine  sufCeiers  of  a  dreuth-stridcai  re^ic: 
might  be  relieved,  would  perhaps  be  a  qve^ 
tion  of  BBore  doubt  than  either  of  the  c^ 
two,  for  they  would  not  he  videos  of  stom 
fire,  or  flood.  The  inquiry,  thereft>re,  weaH 
be  whether  drootti  would  bea'oatiuala^ 
so  similar  in  eharacter  or  results  to  tl>» 
specified  that  We  must  conolude  that  tbe  t^ 
tator  had  it  in  mind  in  enlarging  ttefe| 
otherwise  limited  by  the  three  expi«» 
causes.  We  must  presume  tiiat  he  In^  ^ 
mind  a  class  of  causes  illustrated  hj  ^ 
three  named,  thou^  not  strictly  ixxi&s^ " 
them,  but  Similar  enough  to  be  wltMfl  ^ 
same  general  conception  of  posslUe  sofferitt 
which  he  desired  to  relieve.  Such  \»^^ 
avoidable  force  and  slgniflcance  of  the  »oj^ 
used."  Kronrfiage  v.  Variell,  97  N.  W.  ^ 
929,  120  Wis.  161. 

OtlLer  action 

."  'Other  action'  pending  is  agoodpJ«'° 
bar  to  a  popular  action,  or  a  qui  tam  ac"^ 
for  a  penalty,  because,  by  bringing  li^  ^' 
suit,  the  plaintlH  in  It  is  entiUed  eiciusi'^ 


OTHER 


805 


OTHER 


ly  to  the  penalty,  and  consequently  no  other 
E)erson  can  ever  have  any  right."  **It  Is  well 
^own  that  a  man  cannot  bring  a  second 
lotion  for  the  same  canse  for  which  he  has 
I  prior  actiiHi  pending.  The  same  rale  ap- 
)lles  to  qui  tarn  actions  where  the  plaintiffs 
ire  different.  If  the  canse  of  action  is  the 
«me."  B.  F.  Johnson  Pub.  Co.  y.  Oommon- 
ffealth  (Ky.)  97  S.  W.  749,  750  (quoting  An- 
lerson  v.  Barry,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  [26  Ky.]  266 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Churchill,  6  Mass.  174). 

Other  actionable  injury 

Code  Civ.  Proc.  S  549,  authorizes  the  ar- 
rest of  defendant  in  an  action  for  damages 
for  "personal  injury.*'  By  section  3343,  subd. 
),  '"personal  injury"  Is  defined  as  including 
issault,  battery,  false  imprisonment,  or  "oth- 
jr  actionable  injury  to  the  person."  Held, 
:hat  the  words  "other  actionable  injury  to  the 
person"  mean  other  actions  like  to  assault, 
)r,  in  other  words,  an  action  in  which  ^efend- 
int  was  himself  at  fault,  and  hence  the  stat- 
ate  does  not  authorize  the  arrest  of  defendant 
IX  an  action  for  negligence  or  assault  where 
:he  act  causing  the  injury  was  that  of  his 
servant,  but  which  Is  Imputed  to  be  his  act, 
though  not  authorized  by  him.  Davids  y. 
Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co.,  92  N.  T.  Supp.  220, 
122,  45  Misc.  Rep.  208. 

Other  aets 

The  "other  act"  referred  to  In  B.  &  0. 
uomp.  §  549,^  subd.  4,  providing  that,  where  a 
party  in  good  faith  gives  due  notice  of  an 
ippeal,  and  thereafter  omits,  through  mis- 
take, to  do  any  other  act  necessary  to  per- 
fect the  appeal,  the  court  may  permit  an 
imendment  or  performance  of  such  act,  Is 
the  filing  of  an  undertaking  on  appeal,  an 
amission  to  do  which  through  mistake  may  be 
supplied  on  application  therefor.  Hanley  t. 
Stewart,  102  Pac.  2,  64  Or.  38. 

Other  acent 

Rev.  St  1898,  §  2948,  as  amended  by 
Laws  1899,  c.  61,  p.  74,  and  Laws  1906,  c  106, 
p.  126  providing  that  service  of  summons  on 
I  foreign  corporation  must  be  by  delivering  a 
copy  to  an  officer  "or  other  agent  having  the 
management,  direction  or  control  of  any  prop- 
erty of  such  corporation,"  does  not  authorize 
service  on  a  person  unconnected  with  th? 
business  for  which  the  corporation  was  or- 
ganized, and  not  having  under  his  control 
any  property,  related  to  such  business,  but 
«vho,  while  temporarily  In  the  state  on  his 
own  business,  Is  intrusted  by  the  vice  pres- 
ident of  a  foreign  corporation  with  a  bill  for 
collection.  The  phrase  "other  agent"  must 
be  given  a  restricted  meaning,  and  must  be 
held  to  mean  a  person  who  is  In  some  way 
connected  with  the  business  of  the  corpora- 
tion for  which  It  was  created,  or  has  under 
his  control  any  property  In  some  way  re- 
lated with  such  business.  In  other  words, 
the  "other  agent"  must  possess  some  of  ^e 
powers  possessed  by  the  persons  named  Im- 


mediately preceding  the  phrase  "or  other 
agent"  Honerine  Min.  &  Mill  Co.  v.  Tal-: 
lerday  Steel  Pipe  &  Tank  Co.,  88  Pac.  9,  11, 
81  Utah,  326. 

Other  anmseinents 

As  used  in  Pen.  Code  1896,  art.  199,  pro- 
hibiting merchants,  grocers,  or  traders  In 
any  business  whatsoever,  or  the  proprietor 
of  any  public  place  of  amusement,  to  barter 
or  permit  his  place  of  business  or  of  public 
amusement  to  be  opened  on  Sunday,  and  fur- 
ther providing  that  the  term  public  amuse- 
ment shall  be  construed  to  mean  drcuses, 
theaters,  and  such  ^'other  amusements"  for 
which  admission  fee  is  charged,  the  phrase 
"other  amusements"  refers  to  amusements  of 
like  or  similar  diaracter  of  those  expressly 
named  in  the  statute,  and  does  not  include 
the  game  of  baseball.  Ex  parte  Roquemore, 
131  8.  W.  1101,  1103,  60  Tex.  Cr.  R.  282,  32 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  3.)  1186.  And,  while  a  moving 
picture  show  is  not  a  theater,  it  falls  within 
the  prohibition  of  the  statute  as  one  of  "such 
other  amusements"  prohibited.  Bx  parte 
Ungenfelter,  142  S.  W.  656,  657,  64  Tex.  Cr. 
R.  80. 

In  Code  Ann.  St.  1903,  |  8663,  conferring 
power  to  license,  tax,  suppress,  regulate 
and  prohibit,  theatrical  and  other  exhibi- 
tions and  shows,  and  "other  amusements," 
the  words  "other  amusements"  must  be  con- 
strued in  the  light  of  the  purpose  of  the 
section  and  must  be  limited  to  amusements 
of  the  kind  and  character  named  in  the  sec- 
tion. They  could  not  be  extended  to  include 
private  amusements  which  are  in  themselves 
harmless,  and  therefore  an  ordinance  prohib- 
iting the  keeping  of  card  tables  for  sale  in  a 
place  of  business  or  making  it  unlawful  to 
permit  card  playing  in  and  under  all  cir- 
cumstances in  places  of  business,  or  adjacent 
thereto,  is  unauthorized.  £7x  parte  Sapp,  113 
N.  W.  261,  79  Neb.  781,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
441. 

Other  animal 

The  words  "or  other  animal,"  In  New 
York  Sanitary  Code,  §  195,  providing  that  no 
person  owning  a  stable  or  other  premises 
shall  keep  therein  any  dog  or  other  animal 
which  shall  by  noise  disturb  any  person  in 
the  vicinity,  applies  to  animals  ejus  Jem  gen- 
eris, and  does  not  apply  to  horses  kept  in 
stables.  People  v.  Edelstein,  86  N.  Y.'  Supp. 
861,  91  App.  Dlv.  447.. 

The  words  "other  animals,"  as  used  In 
a  contract  for  the  shipment  of  live  stock  that 
the  value  for  which  the  carrier  should  be  lia- 
ble in  case  of  loss  should  not  exceed  for  a 
horse  or  mule  $100,  cattle  $30  each,  other 
animals  at  $6  each,  include  hogs.  Nashville, 
C.  &  St  L.  R.  Co.  V.  Stone  &  Haslett,  79  S. 
W.  1031,  1038,  112  Tenn.  348,  106  Am.  St. 
Rep.  956. 

Under  Laws  1906,  p.  113,  i  16,  subd.  16, 
authorizing  cities  and  villages  to  pass  ordi- 


OTHSB 


806 


OTHEB 


nances  regnlatlAc  the  ruining  at  large  of  cat^ 
tie,  hogs,  mnlea,  sheep,  goatt,  doge,  and  oth- 
er animals,  they  may  imiss  ordinances  to  pre- 
sent the  ninning  at  large  of  horses  within 
the  corporate  limits;  the  phrase  "other  an- 
imals'* being  broad  enough  to  include  horses 
and  all  other  animals.  Beet  ▼.  Broadhead, 
108  Pac.  883,  830,  18  Idaho,  11. 

atkw  avtielee 

Qelatln  spangles  strung  on  cord,  and 
used  In  making  trimmings  or  ornaments  for 
wearing  apparel,  are  eluadem  generis  with 
the  articles  enumerated  in  Tariff  Act  July 
24,  1887,  a  U,  I  1,  Schedule  N,  par.  408,  80 
Stat  189,  proTldlng  for  "ornaments,  trim- 
mings and  other  articles"  composed  of  gela- 
tin spangles,  and  arc  dutiable  under  that 
proTision,  rather  than  under  paragraph  460 
(80  Stat  193)  relating  to  "manufactures  of 
•  *  ^  gelatin."  O.  Hirsch's  Sons  ▼.  Unit- 
ed States,  141  Fed.  380,  881 ;  Hirsch  ▼.  Unit- 
ed States,  145  Fed.  1022,  74  G.  C.  A.  681. 

In  Rev.  Laws  Mass.  c.  196,  |  14,  which 
giyes  a  lien  on  a  vessel  tor  money  due  for 
"proyisions,  stores,  or  other  articles  furnish- 
ed for  or  on  account  of  such  vessei"  by  ylrtue 
of  a  contract,  express  or  implied,  with  the 
owner,  the  words  "other  articles"  Include 
only  sudi  articles  in  the  nature  of  provisions 
and  stores  as  might  be  necessaries  for  the 
vessel  in  the  sense  of  the  maritime  law.  The 
SateUite,  188  Fed.  717,  719. 

Bead  fringes,  whldi  consist  of  beads 
strung  on  a  cord  or  webbing  and  are  used  to 
decorate  lamps  as  trimmings  and  shades,  are 
not  removed  by  the  doctrine  of  ejusdem  gen- 
eris from  the  provision  for  "ornaments,  trim- 
mings, and  other  articles  *  *  *  in  part 
of  beads,"  in  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c.  11, 
I  1,  Schedule  N,  par.  408,  30  Stat  189.  Hoi- 
comb  &  Co.  V.  United  States,  180  Fed.  796, 
796. 

"Spangled  hat  crowns"  are,  in  a  gener- 
al way,  of  the  same  character  as  the  class 
of  materials  considered  under  the  provision 
In  the  Tariff  Act  for  fabrics,  wearing  ap- 
parel, trimmings,  etc.,  including  "other  arti- 
cles •  •  •  composed  wholly  or  in  part" 
of  gelatin  spangles,  and  are  dutiable  under 
said  provision  for  "articles,"  rather  than 
as  manufactures  of  gelatin.  Louis  Metzger 
&  Ck>.  V.  United  States,  141  Fed.  381,  882. 

Otker  iMdlee 

The  statute  defining  the  crime  of  embes- 
Blement  by  "any  carrier  or  other  bailee"  is 
not  confined  to  bailees  of  the  class  "carriers," 
but  embraces  all  bailees.  Faggard  v.  StatCi 
104  Pac.  930,  931,  3  Okl.  Cr.  159. 

The  word  "bailee,"  used  in  its  broad 
sense,  Includes  every  person  to  whom  the 
possession  of  personal  property  is  delivered 
by  another.  The  words  "other  bailee,"  as 
used  in  Pen.  Code  Ga.  1896,  |  191,  providing 
that  any  factor,  commission  merchant,  ware- 
house keeper,   etc.,  or  any  "other   bailee," 


who  Shan  fraudulently  convert  tnyUdng  of 
value  intrusted  to  him,  shall  be  gniltf  of  i 
felony,  are  equivalent  to  tlie  words  "othe 
Uke  bailee,"  and  it  is  necessary  that  the  dar 
acter  of  the  relation  be  a  more  fldadur  ooe 
tlian  that  arising  from  a  mere  loan  for  the 
benefit  of  the  borrower.  Bice  v.  State,  64  S. 
B.  676,  6  Oa.  App.  160  (citing  Sanders  t. 
State,  12  8.  B.  1068,  86  Ga.  718;  CodjT. 
States  28  8.  B.  106,  lOO'Ga.  109). 

A  person  hiring  a  horse  and  \mggj  froc 
the  owner  for  one  day  contracts  to  retnit 
the  property  at  the  end  of  such  period,  aodls 
a  "bailee"  within  Klrhy's  Dig.  1 1S39,  prorid^ 
ing  that  any  carrier  or  other  bailee  who  steO 
embeszle  or  convert  to  his  own  ude  propeit? 
in  his  possession  as  bailee  shall  be  gnUtr  cf 
larceny;  the  term  "bailee"  in  that  seetioo 
not  being  limited  by  the  rule  of  ejnsd^ 
generis  to  bailees  of  the  graeric  class  of  car- 
riers, but  embracing  all  bailees.  Tally  r. 
State,  160  8.  W.  110,  Ul,  106  Ark.  28. 


Otker 

Slot  machines  where  the  chances  are  ot 
equal,  with  the  dianoes  in  favor  of  the  lu- 
dilne^  are  "other  banking  games'*  ffUlea 
Laws  1907,  p.  26,  c  6i,  i  1,  making  it  onlflv 
ful  to  operate  any  banking  games  of  cbaoee 
such  as  faro,  monte,  etc,  or  any  other  bao^ 
ing  games.  Territory  v.  Jones,  99  Pac  3& 
342,  14  N.  M.  679,  20  K  B.  A.  (N.  S.)  239.  ^1' 
Ann.  Gas.  128. 

Other  bovato  mAterial 

The  enumeration  in  paragraph  11,  Tsri^ 
Act  July  24,  1807,  c.  11,  |  1,  Schednlel^ 
Stat  162,  of  "other  borate  material,''  K&r> 
only  to  borate  materials  found  in  nature  i: 
a  raw  condition,  such  as  the  "borates  of  liae 
or  soda"  Included  in  the  same  proTisioDt  u^^ 
does  not  embrace  borate  of  maopuies  or 
bormangan,  which  is  a  manuf actored  artic^ 
made  from  manganese  and  borataB  of  Uoiet''' 
soda,  and  which  is  held  to  be  dullahle  u  i 
chemical  compound  or  salt  xaaAer  ptraini^ 
8  of  said  act,  |  1,  Schedule  A,  80  Stat  15:^ 
Hempstead  v.  Thomas,  129  Fed.  907,  ifl^^ 
O.  a  A.  889. 
Other  buildias 

An  awning  in  front  of  a  building  eitec^ 
ing  13  feet  from  the  house  line  to  the  cor^ 
supported  by  five  posts  and  covered  with* 
roof  of  transparent  glass,  is  not  covered  bJ 
the  words  "dwelling  house  or  other  buildinc^ 
in  a  deed  providing  that  the  front  line  «^^ 
any  messuages,  dwelling  houses,  or  otbtf 
buildings  shall  recede  eight  feet  from  it- 
street  line.  Olcptt  V.  Sheppard,  Knapp  4  C<' 
89  N.  Y.  Supp.  201,  202.  96  App.  Dir.  28L 

Burns'  Ann.  St  1901,  {  8541,  saixl  i 
authorises  municipal  corporations  to  dii^ 
the  location  of  tallow  chandltfies,  sosp^^ 
tories,  and  other  buildings  and  to  probil^  /^ 
erection  of  such  buUdlngs,  or  the  cootlDi^ 
ance  of  noxious  trades  th^^ein.  Snbdin^ 
11  authorizes  such  corporations  to  dir«^">' 


OTHBB 


807 


OTHER 


location  of  markets  or  slaiigbterlioiiBes,  and 
to  regnlate  tlie  same,  and  glyes  them  juito- 
diction  f6r  that  purpose  for  two  mllea  in  all 
directlonB  from  the  dty  Umits,  Held,  that 
the  express  mention  of  slaosbterbonaes  In 
subdivision  11  predndes  the  eactension  of  the 
power  of  prohibition  contained  in  sabdivlsion 
4,  80  as  to  include  slaughtertionses  within 
the  general  designation  of  "other  bnildings 
and  stractnres."  C^ty  of  Blkhart  ▼.  Lip- 
Bddtz,  74  N.  B.  628,  529, 164  Ind.  671. 

The  phrase  "wharf  or  place  of  storage, 
or  in  any  warehouse,  mill,  store  or  other 
building,'*  in  Hurd's  Rev.  St  1906,  c.  88,  I 
124,  providing  that  whoever  fraudulently  ut- 
ters any  receipt  or  other  written  evidence  of 
the  delivery  or  deposit  of  any  grain,  floor, 
pork,  etc.,  on  any  wharf  or  place  of  storage, 
or  in  any  ^warehouse,  mill,  store  or  other 
building,  when  the  quantity  specified  has  not 
In  tnct  been  delivered  or  d^ioslted,  shall  be 
imprisoned,  do  not  limit  the  operation  of  the 
section,  or  of  section  1J26,  providing  that  who- 
ever, having  given  any  such  recdpt,  shall 
sell  or  in  any  manner  remove  from  the  place 
of  storage  any  such  property,  without  the 
consent  of  the  holder  of  the  receipt,  shall  be 
Imprisoned,  to  buildings  alone  in  which  goods 
are  received  in  store  for  hire,  but  the  words 
extend  to  all  buildings  in  which  goods  are 
stored,  whether  for  hire  or  otherwise,  and 
hence  one  who,  being  the  owner  of  an  eleva- 
tor, and  having  issued  a  receipt  for  grain 
therein  also  owned  by  him,  thereafter  remov- 
ed the  same  without  the  consent  of  the  hold- 
er, violated  section  126.  McReynolds  v.  Peo- 
ple, 82  N.  E.  945,  947,  230  HL  623. 

Other  oases 
Rev.  St  1899,  |  2982,  provides  that  no  pe- 
tition for  review  of  any  judgment  for  divorce 
shall  be  allowed,  but  there  may  be  review 
of  any  order  or  judgment  touching  the  alimo- 
ny and  maintenance  of  the  wife,  and  the 
care,  custody,  and  maintenance  of  the  chil- 
dren, or  any  of  them,  as  in  "other  cases." 
Held,  that  the  phrase  "as  In  other  cases" 
refers  to  a  petition  for  review,  the  sole  mat- 
ter with  which  the  section  is  concerned,  and 
not  to  a  writ  of  error,  and  the  section  means 
that  there  shall  not  be  a  petition  for  review 
of  a  divorce  judgment,  but  may  be  a  petition 
for  review  of  the  alimony  and  custody  of 
children,  as  in  ordinary  cases  where  the  peti- 
tion may  be  had  under  sections  777-783.  El- 
Uott  V.  EUlott,  115  8.  W.  486,  487,  135  Mo. 
App.  42. 

Otber  easualty 

"  'Other'  is  frequently  used  in  an  unre- 
stricted sense— not  limited  by  the  rule  ejus- 
dem  generis."  As  used  in  McClain's  Code,  | 
1685,  authorizing  domestic  insurance  compa- 
nies to  insure  houses,  buildings  and  all  other 
kinds  of  property  against  loss  or  damage  by 
fire  or  other  casualty,  the  words  "other  casu- 
altar  Induda  other  risks  than  those  already 


mentioned  In  the  specific  reference  to  loss  or 
damage  by  fire.  Baskent*  Mut  Casualty  Oo. 
V.  First  Nat  Bank  of  Council  Bloflb,  108  N. 
W.  1046,  1048,  131  Iowa,  456  (citing  Flower 
V,  Witkovsky,  87  N.  W.  80^  69  Mich,  371; 
People  V.  Stone  [N.  Y.]  9  Wend.  182;  Hall  v. 
States  4  N.  W.  1068,  48  Wis.  689). 

Other  eavses 

The  words  "other  causes,"  as  used  in  a 
contract  of  sale  of  a  specified  number  of  cars 
daily  of  furnace  coke  during  a  specified  peri- 
od of  time,  subject  to  strikes,  accidents,  or 
other  eauses»  relate  to  shortage  of  cars,  and 
hence  a  shortage  of  cars  is  a  legal  excuse 
for  nondelivery.  Hatfield  v.  Thomas  Iron 
Co.,  67  AtL  950,  963»  206  Pa.  478. 

Defendant  contracted  to  use  natural  gas 
from  plaintiffs'  wells  for  a  spedfled  time  at 
spedfled  prices,  the  contract  providing  that, 
if  by  reason  of  fire,  explosion,  or  other  cause 
defendant's  factory  should  be  closed  down, 
plaintiffs  might  during  the  time  dispose  of 
gas  elsewhere,  and,  if  the  nonuse  extended 
over  a  month,  plaintiffs  should  have  the  right 
to  cancel  the  contract  Held,  that  the  words 
"other  cause,"  following  "fire  and  explosion," 
should  be  construed  to  mean  other  cause 
similar  to  fire  or  explosion  under  the  rule  of 
ejusdem  generis,  and  did  not  therefore  enti- 
tle defendant  to  shut  down  his  factory  for 
any  cause  whatsoever  without  a  liability  for 
breach  of  such  contract  Hickman  v.  Cabot, 
183  Fed.  747,  749.  106  a  C.  A.  183. 

Const  Ely.  1 192,  provides  that  a  corpora- 
tion shall  not  hold  any  real  estate  accept  such 
as  may  be  necessary  for  carrying  on  its  legit- 
imate business,  for  a  longer  period  than  five 
years,  under  pi&nalty  of  escheat  Ky.  St 
1903,  I  567,  contains  the  same  provisions. 
Ky.  St  1903,  I  2971,  being  a  part  of  the  laws 
relating  to  the  government  of  cities  of  the 
first  class,  provides  that  so  much  real,  per- 
sonal, or  mixed  property  in  the  city  which, 
from  alienage,  defect  of  heirs,  failure  of  kin- 
dred, or  other  causes,  shall  es<*heat  to  the 
commonwealth  shall  vest  in  the  board  for  the 
benefit  of  the  schools,  and  that  the  board 
may,  in  the  name  of  the  commonwealth,  sue 
for  and  recover  the  same.  Held,  that  the 
Legislature  intended  by  the  use  of  the  words 
"other  causes'*  In  section  2971  to  provide  for 
the  recovery  of  escheats  by  school  boards 
happening  upon  events  of  a  different  class 
than  those  specifically  mentioned  in  the  sec- 
tion, hence  the  board  might  sue  to  recover 
land  escheated  by  a  corporation  under  Const. 
S  192,  and  Ky.  St  1903,  §  567.  Common- 
wealth, for  Use  of  LoulsvlUe  School  Board, 
V.  Chicago,  St  Ii.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.,  99  S.  W. 
596,  599,  124  Ky.  497. 

While  the  extent  of  Indulgence  by  a 
court  in  allowing  supplemental  affidavits  of 
defense  Is  larg^  In  Its  discretion,  such  in- 
dulgence cannot  be  extended  after  a  case  has 
been  finally  passed  upon  by  an  appellate 


OTHEB 


808 


OTHER 


court,  except  tor  legal  or  equitable  reasons 
of  which  defendant  conld  not  have  ayalled 
himself  when  his  original  affidavit  of  defense 
was  filed,  and  un^er  Act  March  18,  1874  (P. 
L.  64),  providing  that  Judgment  should  be 
entered  for  plaintiff  where  the  refusal  of 
judgment  for  want  of  a  sufficient  affidavit  of 
defense  has  been  reversed  by  the  appellate 
court,  unless  "other  legal  or  equitable  causes" 
Shan  be  shown,  means  a  defense  which  did 
not  exist  when  the  affidavit  of  defense  was 
filed,  and,  where  an  original  affidavit  of  de- 
fense setting  forth  that  an  assignment  sued 
upon  was  void  as  contravening  the  federal 
bankruptcy  law  was  held  good  by  the  lower 
court,  but  upon  appeal  was  held  insuffici^it, 
a  supplemental  affidavit  setting  up  that  the 
assignment  was  void  under  the  state  assign- 
ment acts  of  March  24,  1818  (P.  L.  285),  and 
AprU  17,  1843  (P.  L.  273),  could  not  be  filed 
after  return  of  the  record  and  motion  by 
plaintiffs  for  judgment  Wood  v.  Kerke- 
slager,  76  Atl.  425,  426,  227  Pa.  636;  Third 
Nat  Bank  v.  Same,  76  AtL  427,  227  Pa.  542. 

Otker  el&ildren 

In  a  statute  providing  that  a  wife  shall 
be  entitled  to  one-half  of  the  estate  of  her 
deceased  husband  "if  there  was  no  'other* 
heirs,  and  an  heir's  part  if  there  should  be 
'other'  heirs,  in  all  cases  where  there  1b  no 
will,"  the  word  "heirs"  is  used  in  the  sense 
of  "children,"  and  the  use  of  the  word  "oth- 
er" before  "children"  was  intended  to  in- 
clude grandchildren  or  descendents  of  any 
child  living  at  the  death  of  the  intestate. 
De  Graffenreid  v.  Iowa  Land  k  Trust  Co.,  d5 
Pac.  624,  640,  20  Okl.  687. 

Other  elrcn  m  stanoes 

The  "other  circumstances'*  referred  to  in 
Code  av.  Proc.  f|  872,  882,  requiring  that 
the  affidavit  to  take  the  testimony  of  a  wit- 
ness shall  show  that  the  witness  is  about  to 
depart  from  the  state  or  is  sick,  or  that  some 
other  special  circumstances  exist  requiring 
Ills  examination  in  advance,  means  such  as 
will  make  the  presence  and  evidence  of  the 
witness  at  the  trial  doubtful  and  uncertain 
as  bearing  on  the  probability  of  his  future 
attendance.  W.  P.  Davis  Mach.  Go.  v.  Rob- 
inson, 85  N.  X.  Supp.  574,  575,  42  Misc.  Rep. 
52. 

Other  elalst 

Where  plaintiff  and  defendant's  testator 
arrived  at  a  settlement  as  to  their  controversy 
and  as  to  certain  claims  by  plaintiff  against 
the  testator,  and  the  latter  made  provision 
for  plaintiff  in  his  last  will,  and  agreed  never 
to  revoke  or  modify  the  will,  so  as  to  defeat 
plaintiff's  rights  therein,  and  plaintiff  agreed 
that  upon  faithful  execution  by  the  testator 
of  the  covenants  to  be  performed  by  him  she 
would  release  him  "from  all  other  and  fur- 
ther claims,  demands,  and  causes  of  action 
of  every  kind,"  and  that  thereupon  she  would 
take  "no  action  at  law  or  in  equity  to  en- 


fone  any  suefa  other  or  further  daiffl,"  the 
word  "other,"  in  such  a  contract,  pliiDtil 
having  but  one  claim  against  the  testator. 
must  be  taken  in  the  sense  of  "additional,' 
so  that  the  meaning  would  be  that,  opoa  the 
transtor  to  i^aintiff  of  the  portion  o(  the 
estate  devised  to  her  by  the  will,  sbe  would 
take  such  portion  in  full  payment  of  her 
daim,  and  make  no  further  or  additionil 
claim  on  the  same  indebtedness  or  cause  of 
action.  Colt  v.  O'Connor,  109  N.  Y.  Snpr- 
689,  694,  69  Misc.  Rep.  83. 

Other  eempeBaatlom 

The  words  "other  oompensation,"  as  wA 
in  Hurd's  Bev.  St  1906,  e  24,  i  8a,  proTidiai 
that  if  the  salary,  fees,  or  other  compen^ 
tion  of  certain  city  oflioers  has  been  ooce 
fixed,  such  fees  or  oompensatioa  sball  M 
be  increased  or  dimlnisfaed,  to  take  effect 
during  the  term  tor  liiiich  any  such  officer 
was  elected  or  appointed,  ii  broad  enoosb 
to  include  allowances  made  for  Uie  paym^it 
of  assistants  and  office  expenses.  CltyofC3u 
cage  V.  Wolf,  77  N.  B.  414r-418,  221  IlL  15- 

Other  eorporatioas 

Const  1901,  i  235,  providing  that  wm'^ 
U>al  and  other  corporations  invested  with  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  shall  make  compen- 
sation for  property  taken,  "injured,"  or  de 
stroyed  by  the  construction  of  their  works. 
highways,  or  improvements,  includes  witlib 
the  term  "other  corporations"  counti^  ^ 
as  to  make  a  county  liable  for  damages  t. 
premises  due  to  a  change  In  the  grade  of  i 
road,  whereby  the  premises  were  left  at  i 
considerable  distance  above  the  road  on  s 
perpendicular  embankment  Dallas  Comity 
V.  Dillard,  47  South.  135,  136^  156  ila.  351 
18  L.  B.  A.  (N.  8.)  884. 

OtKer  eevntrr 

The  PhlUpplne  Islands  are  not  "anotbtf 
country"  within  the  meaning  of  artlde  8  d 
the  Cuban  Treaty,  providing  that  the  raM 
therein  granted  shall  continue  preferential  ii 
respect  to  like  imports  from  "other  coafr 
tries."  Faber  v.  United  States,  31  Sup.  Cl 
659,  660,  221  U.  S.  649,  55  L.  Ed.  &t 

OtlaeY  oovnty  buUdinca 

Shannon's  Code,  §  6045,  subsec.  11 » 
thorlzes  the  expenditure  of  tiie  general  fna^ 
of  a  county  by  the  county  Judge  for  bafldic^ 
repairing,  and  taking  care  of  courtbouses^ 
jails,  and  "other  county  buUdlngs.*'  Heli 
that  the  words  "other  county  buildings."*-* 
so  used,  under  the  rule  of  ^usdem  geoeii^ 
meant  county  buildings  of  the  same  Mtu^f 
and  kind  as  courthouses  and  jails,  and  <&- 
not  include  schoolhouses  and  buildings  ii*-| 
for  school  purposes.  State  ex  rel.  Da*^- 
County  Board  of  Education  v.  Pollard,  13^^ 
W.  427,  429,  430,  124  Tenn.  127. 

Ky.  St  1908,  I  3948,  provides  that  U« 
"jailer  of  each  county  ahaU  be  superioteiid^^ 
of  the  public  square^  eourthouse^  derk's  or 


OTHER 


OTHER 


flee.  Jail,  stray-p^i  and  other  public  county 
tnilldlngs  at  tbe  seat  of  Justice.**  Sectton  366 
requires  the  jailer  to  furnish  fuel,  lights;  and 
water  to  the  circuit  court  rooms,  and  allows 
him  $2  a  day  therefor,  to  be  paid  out  of  the 
state  treasury.  Section  1749  provides  against 
the  allowance  of  a  fee  bill  for  any  ex  officio 
services.  Held  that  the  duty  and  expense  of 
maintaining,  lighting,  heating,  and  Janitor's 
service  for  an  armory  erected  at  the  seat  of 
justice  by  the  fiscal  court  at  the  expense  of  the 
county  was  not  intended  to  be  borne  by  the 
county  Jailer ;  the  words  "other  county  build- 
ings" referring  only  to  buildings  of  the  same 
class  as  those  specifically  mentioned  In  the 
section.  Fiscal  Court  of  Jefferson  County  v. 
Pflanz,  104  S.  W.  1002,  1003,  127  Ky.  8. 


Otlier 

Const,  art  7,  f  1,  as  amended  in  1881, 
providing  that  the  Judicial  power  of  the  state 
should  be  vested  in  the  Supreme  Court,  in 
drcuit  courts,  and  in  such  "other  courts"  as 
the  General  Assembly  might  establish,  au- 
thorized the  Legislature  by  Acts  1007,  p.  7, 
c.  5,  to  create  a  superior  court  Within  a 
district  composed  of  two  counties  with  the 
same  Jurlsdictiop  as  circuit  courts  were  then 
empowered  to  exercise.  Board  of  Corners  of 
Elkhart  County  v,  Albright,  81  N.  B.  679,  580, 
168  lud.  5&4;  Mumaw  v.  Turner,  81  N.  E. 
721, 169  Ind.  701. 

Other  eropt 

The  words  "other  crops,"  in  Sess.  Laws 
1899,  p.  176,  c.  17,  art.  1,  §  5,  providing  for 
the  Insurance  of  grain  in  bins  and  stacks, 
"growing  wheat,  rye,  barley,  flax,  oats,  and 
other  crops"  include  growing  cotton.  State 
Mut.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Clevenger,  87  Pac.  583,  17 
Okl.  49. 

(Hhmr  cUaasM 

The  actual  damagea  from  failure  to  un- 
load a  passenger's  baggage  at  the  proper  sta- 
tion does  not  oonstitote  "other  element  of  re- 
coverable damages"  within  the  rule  that  men- 
tal suHering,  without  physical  injury  or  other 
element  of  recoverable  damages,  cannot  be 
made  the  subject  of  an  independent  action, 
though  the  act  complained  of  was  willful. 
Chicago,  K.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Moss,  116  S.  W. 
192,  89  Ark.  187. 

Other  deadly  iraapon 

"Where  a  statute,  in  defining  a  crime 
committed  by  use  of  weapons,  mentions  cer- 
tain weapons  *or  other  deadly  weapon,'  it  is 
held  that  those  named  in  the  statute  need 
not  be  described  as  deadly  weapons;  but,  if 
another  than  those  named  in  the  statute  is 
relied  upon  as  coming  within  the  term  'other 
deadly  weapon,'  It  must  be  so  averred  as  to 
bring  It  within  that  designation."  State  v. 
Spigener,  50  South.  977,  96  Miss.  597  (quoting 
State  V.  Taylor,  93  Pac.  252,  50  Or.  449). 

A  pistol  used  In  striking  another  is  a 
deadly  weapon,  within  Ky.  St  I  1166,  pro- 


viding for  the  punishment  of  any  one  who 
shall  willfully  and  maliciously  ''strike*'  an- 
other with  a  knife,  sword,  or  "other  deadly 
weapon,"  with  intent  to  kill.  Riggs  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.)  38  S.  W.  413,  414. 

Otber  defeets 

A  contract  for  a  newly  patented  machine 
contained  several  specific  warranties,  and 
after  them  a  general  clause  which  provided 
that,  if  there  were  any  *'other  defects"  vrha.i- 
ever,  the  contract  should  be  void.  Held,  that 
the  words  "other  defects"  referred  to  defects 
in  the  patent  and  not  in  the  machine  itself. 
Vaughan  v.  Porter,  16  Vt.  266,  270. 

Othev  defense 

The  term  "or  other  defense,"  in  Rev.  St. 
1899,  S  4488,  declaring  that  In  actions  on  as- 
signed accounts  defendant  shall  be  allowed 
every  Just  set-off  "or  other  defense"  which 
existed  in  his  favor  at  the  time  of  his  being 
notified  of  such  assignment.  Is  used  in  a  re- 
strictive sense  and  must  be  a  defense  to  the 
demand  itself,  not  a  set-off  or  counterclaim. 
Scarritt  Estate  Co.  v.  J.  F.  Schmelser  &  Sons 
Arms  Co.,  86  S.  W.  489,  490,  110  Mo.  App.  406. 

Otber  demands 

Rev.  Code  1852,  c.  89,  }  25,  fixing  the 
order  In  which  executors  or  administrators 
shall  pay  demands  against  decedent,  does  not 
mention  taxes,  though  the  last  clause  pro- 
vides for  payment  of  "other  demands."  Held, 
that  though  the  statute  does  not  mention  tax- 
es, in  view  of  the  intention  to  include  all 
legal  claims  against  the  estate,  taxes  will  be 
deemed  to  come  under  the  class  designated 
"other  demands"  to  be  paid  after  Judgments. 
Dayett  v.  WilUts,  74  Atl.  6^,  601,  9  Del.  Ch. 
424. 

Other  disability 

The  nondeclaratlon  of  the  result  of  an 
election  for  Governor  is  not  a  disability  of 
the  Governor  such  as  Is  meant  by  Const.  S 
16,  art.  7,  providing  that.  In  case  of  the  death, 
conviction  on  Impeachment,  failure  to  quali- 
fy, resignation,  or  "other  disability"  of  the 
Governor,  the  president  of  the  Senate  shall 
act  as  Governor  until  the  vacancy  Is  filled 
or  the  disability  removed.  It  is  simply  non- 
action or  Incomplete  action  by  the  agencies 
of  the  law  assigned  to  vest  the  title  in  the 
candidate.  It  is  not  like  Insanity.  Convic- 
tion of  the  oflScer  for  crime,  continued  ab- 
sence, or  other  disability  connected  with  the 
person  of  the  Governor,  death,  conviction  on 
Impeachment,  failure  to  qualify,  or  resigna- 
tion would  produce  a  vacancy,  and  it  would 
seem  that  the  language  "or  other  disability" 
means  something  of  a  different  character 
from  those  cases  named — something  attach- 
ing to  the  person  of  the  Governor  and  dis- 
abling him ;  and  this  construction  seems  con- 
firmed by  the  after  language  of  the  section, 
providing  that  "the  president  of  the  Senate 
shall  act  as  Governor  until  the  vacancy  is 
filled  or  the  disability  is  removed,"  thus  us- 


OTHBB 


810 


OTHEB 


inf  tiM  word!  ''▼mcanar"  and  "^dlaabiUtr"  m 
iiMmnIng  dlfferant  thlngg;  ''▼acanejr'*  nter- 
ring  to  dMtli,  oonTiottoD,  faUIng  to  qualify, 
and  resignation,  bnt  '"dtsablUty"  referring  to 
something  relating  to  tbe  person,  and  for  tbe 
time  being  disabling  him,  notwithstanding 
the  use  of  the  word  "other.^  Oarr  t.  Wilson, 
9  S.  BL  81,  30,  82  W.  Va.  419,  8  L.  B.  A.  64. 

Other  dispositlma 

A  will  gare  testator's  granddangbter  a 
life  estate,  proTided  on  her  death  the  prop- 
erty should  be  divided  among  her  living  chil- 
dren and  the  heirs  of  any  who  should  hare 
died,  authorized  her  on  the  eldest  becoming 
of  age  to  alienate  and  dispose  of  the  remain- 
der over  in  favor  of  such  child  or  children, 
and  empowered  her  in  esse  she  left  no  chil- 
dren or  descendants  to  dispose  of  the  prop- 
erty by  wilL  A  codicil  provided  in  case  the 
granddaughter  should  die  without  children 
or  descendants,  and  making  no  will  or  "other 
disposition  of  the  property,"  the  remainder 
over  should  go  to  testator's  nephew  by  mar- 
riage. Held  that,  by  the  words  "other  dispo- 
sition," the  codicil  did  not  recognise  a  right 
in  the  granddaughter  to  make  disposition  of 
the  property  generally,  but  only  as  provided 
in  the  will,  and  so  did  not  change  her  quali- 
fied title  to  an  absolute  title.  I4chter  v. 
Thiers,  121  N.  W.  153,  139  Wis.  481. 

Other  domestio  pwposes 

The  right  to  cut  timber  from  public 
mineral  lands,  subject  to  mineral  entry  only, 
for  building,  agricultural,  mining,  or  other 
domestic  purposes,  given  to  any  bona  fide 
resident  of  certain  states  and  territories  by 
Act  June  3,  1878,  a  160,  20  Stat  88,  extends 
to  all  such  lands  in  the  state  or  territory, 
without  limitation  to  any  local  subdivision. 
Under  such  statute,  a  resident  of  Montana, 
where  he  observes  the  regulations  made  by 
the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  for  the  pro- 
tection of  undergrowth,  etc.,  may  lawfully 
cut  timber  for  firewood  from  public  mineral 
lands  within  the  state,  and  ship  the  same  to 
any  part  of  the  state  for  sale  and  use  there 
in  households,  hoisting  works  in  mines,  smel- 
ters, or  other  local  purposes,  all  of  which  are 
domestic  purposes  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute.  United  States  v.  Edgar,  140  Fed. 
665,  659. 

OtkMr  duties 

Tbe  general  words  "other  duties,"  in 
Const  art  13,  I  11,  requiring  that  the  board 
of  equalization  shall  perform  such  other  du- 
ties as  may  be  required  by  law,  must  be 
restricted  to  mean  other  duties  of  general 
character,  with  duties  indicated  in  the  previ- 
ous provision  to  be  performed  by  the  board. 
State  V.  Eldredge^  76  Pac  337,  340,  27  Utah, 
477. 

The  use  of  the  word  "other,"  in  Snyder's 
Const  p.  203,  art  6,  f  31,  i^ovlding  that  the 
board  of  agriculture  diaU  be  the  board  of 
regents  and  shall  discharge  such  "other"  du- 


ties as  may  be  provided  by  law,  dorlr  tt 
dieates  that  the  framers  of  the  Cotutitstkn 
had  in  mind  that  certain  duties  would  f<H^ 
low  tiie  creation  of  the  board.  ThtpP^Oook 
Const  Co.,  106  Pac  667,  669,  24  OU.  8Nl 

Otker  «weUeM 

Liquor  Tax  Law,  Laws  190S,  pi  1132,  c 
486,  i  31,  subd.  "k,"  defines  a  hotd  u  t  boibt 
ing  regularly  kept  open  for  the  accommodi 
tion  of  all  able  to  pay  for  tiieir  enteitiiiK 
ment  and  who,  without  any  stipoUted  b- 
gagement  as  to  the  duration  of  their  stay,  ir 
as  to  compensation,  are  supplied  with  Deals. 
lodging,  and  attention,  and  in  which  tbe  only 
"other  dwellers"  are  the  UmSlj  and  sm 
ants  of  the  hotel  keeper.  Held  tfait,  wbe» 
a  building  contained  rooms  of  the  litt  mi 
nmnber  required  by  the  statute  which  vm 
kept  open  and  free  tor  the  aooommoditki 
of  transient  "guests'*  who  mi^t  apply,  per 
sons  who  occupied  some  of  su<di  roons  m 
tinnously  at  a  stipulated  weekly  or  mcotbiy 
rental  should  be  regarded  as  "guests*'  aodiKK 
"other  dwdlers**  within  sudi  statate;  Oe 
wor^B  "other  dweUers"  being  limited  to  per 
sons  other  than  "guests"  of  any  chancter,  t? 
wit,  those  who  are  in  the  hotel  under  a  stipo 
lated  engagement  or  without  anyengagenect 
CulUnan  v.  Clark,  93  N.  Y.  Sopp.  256. 2^ 
46  Misc.  Rep.  18a 

Otker  employte 

Under  subdivision  7.  I  1617,  PoL  Code 
authorizing  boards  of  education  and  tni5- 
tees  of  school  districts  to  employ  teadter^ 
"also  to  employ  janitors  and  other  employ^ 
of  the  schools,  and  to  fix  and  order  paid 
their  compensation,"  the  words  "Janltora  ud 
other  employes  of  the  schools"  refer  to  pei 
sons  employed  in  and  about  the  schools  and 
buildings,  in  the  actual  carrying  oat  and 
maintenance  of  Uie  sdiooto  themstiTeB,  aod 
cannot  by  any  reasonable  oonstmctioD  k 
held  to  include  a  person  rendering  legal  serr- 
ices  to  the  board  of  education  or  board  of 
trustees.    Denman  v.  Webster,  7B  Pac.  13% 

188  CaL  452. 

• 
Otber  employmeat 

By  "other  employment,"  as  used  in  tbe 
rule  making  it  the  duty  of  a  serrant  ^ 
charged  in  violation  of  a  contract  of  hii^ 
to  seek  "other  employment,"  is  meant  eit 
ployment  of  a  character  such  as  that  ic 
wliich  he  was  onployed,  or  not  of  a  dor 
menial  kind.  Cooper  v.  Stronge  &  Waoer 
Co.,  126  N.  W.  641,  111  Minn.  177, 27  L  R  A 
(N.  8.)  1011,  20  Ann.  Ca&  66S. 

Otlaer  entertainment 

Greater  New  York  Charter.  Laws  ISS* 
p.  622,  c  378,  i  1481,  after  prohibiting  cer 
tain  specified  amusements  on  Sunday,  P^ 
hibited  "any  other  entertainment  of  ttf 
stage."  Held,  that  the  word  "other"  as  *' 
used  was  unrestrictedly  comprehoisive  and 
embraced  every  other  sort  or  kind  of  eot? 
tainment  whetlier  ejuadem  generis  with  tte 


OTHEB 


811 


OTHEB 


dass  enmuerated .  or  not.  In  re  Hammer- 
slelii,  106  N.  Y.  Supp.  197,  196,  57  MIm.  Bep. 
S2. 


Other  •qaivaleM 

The  law  does  not  require  the  "other 
equiralent  drcnmstances"  referred  to  in 
P^.  Code  1896,  I  66,  making  it  a  necessary 
element  of  volnntary  manslaughter  that  there 
be  an  assault  upon  the  person  killing,  or  an 
attempt  t6  commit  a  serious  personal  injury, 
or  other  equivalent  circumstances  to  Justify 
the  ezdtement  of  passion  and  to  exclude  all 
idea  of  deliberation  or  malice,  to  be  in  the 
nature  of  an  assault,  or  an  attempt  to  com- 
mit a  serious  personal  injury;  but  the  cir- 
cumstances referred  to  must  be  such  as  would 
as  much  exclude  all  doubt  of  deliberation  or 
noaliee  and  Justify  the  excitement  of  passion 
as  would  an  assault,  or  attempt  to  commit  a 
serious  personal  injury.  Battle  t.  State,  66 
8.  B.  862,  884,  188  Ga.  162. 

VThere  there  was  evidence  that  the  de- 
ceased had  been  guilty  of  frequent  sexual 
intercourse  with  the  wife  of  the  accused,  and 
knowledge  of  that  fiact  had  been  brought 
home  to  the  accused  before  the  killing,  and 
after  such  knowledge  the  accused  came  upon 
the  deceased,  and,  in  a  conversation  with 
him  in  reference  to  the  illicit  relaticms,  th^ 
passions  of  the  accused  were  aroused,  it  was 
a  question  for  the  Jury  to  determine  whether 
the  sight  of  the  deceased  and  the  conversa- 
tion which  then  ensued  constituted  "other 
equivalent  circumstances  to  Justify  the  ex- 
citement of  passion,  and  to  exclude  all  idea 
of  deliberation  or  malice,  either  express  or 
implied";  and  a  charge  to  the  effect  that  if 
the  Jury  believed  that  the  dreumstances  at 
that  time  were  sudb  as  to  arouse  in  ttie  mind 
of  accused  that  passion  supposed  to  be  irre- 
sistible, and  he  shot  and  kiUed  under  those 
drcnmstances,  it  would  not  be  murder,  but 
voluntary  manslaughter,  is  substantially  a 
correct  statement  of  the  law.  The  law  does 
not  require  the  ^other  equivalent  drcum* 
stances,"  referred  to  in  section  66,  Pen.  Oode 
1910,  to  be  in  the  nature  of  an  assault,  or  an 
attempt  to  commit  a  serious  personal  injury, 
by  the  deceased;  but  the  circumstances  there- 
in referred  to  must  be,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
jury,  the  equivalent  of  an  assault,  or  of  an 
attempt  to  commit  a  serious  personal  injury 
on  the  slayer,  in  Justifying  the  exdt^nent  of 
passion  and  excluding  all  idea  of  delll)eration 
or  malice.  Land  v.  State,  76  S.  B.  78,  11  Ga. 
App.  761  (citing  Battie  v.  State,  66  S.  B.  382, 
188  Ga.  186). 

Other  estate 

A  Judgment  creditor  expressly  released 
his  lien  on  certain  described  real  estate  of  his 
debtor  that  it  mii^t  be  conveyed  to  a  mort- 
gagee, the  debtor  having  a  right  to  reconvey- 
ance on  payment  of  the  mortgage  debt  at  any 
time  before  the  property  should  be  sold  by 
the  mortgagee.  The  release^  however,  pro- 
vided that  it  should  not  affect  the  creditors' 


Uen  on  the  other  estate  of  the  debtor.  Held, 
that  on  a  sale  of  the  property  free  from  Uena 
by  the  mortgagee  and  the  debtor's  trustee  in 
l>ankruptcy,  realizing  a  sum  more  than  suffi- 
cient to  pay  the  mortgage  debt,  such  surplus 
did  not  constitute  "other  e^tate^  within  the 
meaning  of  the  release,  and  that  the  Judg- 
ment creditor  had  no  claim  thereto.  In  re 
OuUen,  176  Fed.  468,  4M. 

Other  evideaoe 
A  disclosure  or  statement  by  the  com- 
plainant, which  depends  wholly  upon  her 
veracity,  is  not  ''other  evidence^'  in  support 
of  her  version  of  the  affair,  within  the^  mean- 
ing of  Pen.  Code,  I  288,  providing  that  no 
conviction  can  be  had  for  abduction,  compul- 
sory marriage,  rape,  or  defilement,  upon  the 
testimony  of  the  female  abducted,  compel- 
led, or  defiled,  unsupported  by  "other  evi- 
dence." People  V.  Green,  92  N.  Y.  Silpp.  608, 
611,  108  App.  Div.  79  (citing  People  v.  Page, 
66  N.  B.  760,  162  N.  Y.  272). 

Books  of  account,  which  lieing  shown  to 
conform  tp  the  requirements  of  Ck)mp.  Laws 
1897,  i  8031,  are  admissible  in  evidence, 
when  so  admitted  in  a  suit  against  an  ad- 
ministrator, may  constitute  "other  material 
evidence,"  corroborating  the  claimant  as  re- 
quired by  section  8021.  Radcliffe  v.  Chaves, 
no  Pac.  699,  701,  16  N.  M.  268. 

Oilier  evidenee  of  ladebtedaess 

See,  also,  Bvidence  of  Indebtedness. 

The  warehouse  receipts  authorized  to  be 
issued  under  the  State  Warehouse  Act  (Laws 
1912,  p.  707)  are  not  "scrip,  certificates  or 
other  evidence  of  state  indebtedness"  within 
the  meaning  of  Const,  art  10,  f  7,  restrict- 
ing the  issuance  of  such  paper.  State  ex  rel. 
LyoD  V.  McCown,  76  8.  B.  892,  396,  92  S.  O. 
81. 

Wilson's  Rev.  ft  Ann.  St  1908,  S  2408, 
provides  that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any 
public  officer  either  directly  or  indirectly  to 
buy,  barter  for,  or  otherwise  engage  in  any 
manner  in  the  purchase  of  any  bonds,  war- 
rants, or  any  other  evidence  of  indebtedness 
against  the  territory,  any  subdivision  thereof, 
or  municipality  therein,  of  which  he  is  an 
officer.  Held,  that  the  words  "other  evidence 
of  indebtedness,"  under  the  rule  ejusdem 
generis,  applies  only  to  bonds,  warrants,  and 
other  evidence  of  indebtedness  of  that  char- 
acter, and  did  not  prevent  a  county  com- 
missioner from  advancing,  on  the  credit  of 
the  county,  mon^  with  which  to  employ  a 
chain  bearer  in  the  survey  of  a  road.  Ticer 
V.  State  ex  rel.  Holt,  128  Pac.  493,  496^  35 
OkL  1. 

Public  Service  Commissions  Law  (Laws 
1907,  c.  429)  S  66,  provides  that  any  raUroad 
corporation  may  issue  stock,  bonds,  notes,  or 
other  evidence  of  indebtedness,  payable  at 
periods  of  more  than  12  months  after  date, 
when  necessary  for  certain  enumerated  pur- 
poses, provided  it  shall  secure  from  the  Pub* 


OTHEB 


812 


OTHEB 


he  SerHee  Commlsslan  an  order  autborlzlng 
8udi  Issue.  The  vice  presidents  of  several 
railroad  companies  calling  themselTes  In 
combination  the  "New  York  Central  lines,** 
parties  of  tbe  first  part,  altered  Into  an 
agreement  with  a  trust  company,  designated 
as  trustee,  and  the  six  railroad  companies 
designated  as  parties  of  the  third  part,  by 
which  the  parties  of  the  first  part  sold  cer- 
tain rolling  stock  to  the  trust  company,  and 
the  trust  company  rented  the  same  to  the 
several  railroad  companies;  such  companies 
issuing  certificates  to  tbe  trust  company  to 
the  amount  of  the  purchase  price  of  the 
equipment,  payable  In  installments,  and 
denominated  as  rent  The  trust  company 
was  not  to  be  liable  on  the  certificates  in  any 
event  Held  that,  while  the  words  "other 
evidence  of  indebtedness"  as  used  in  the 
statute  refer  to  obligations  of  like  character 
with  stock,  bonds,  and  notes,  tbe  trust  cer- 
tificates were  substantially  obligations  of 
that  character,  and  hence  the  issuance  of 
the  same  must  be  sanctioned  by  the  Public 
Service  Commission.  People  v.  New  York 
Cent  &  H.  R,  R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  Supp.  125, 
127,  138  App.  Div.  601. 

Otker  ezhiUttion 

Where,  under  Sayles'  Ann.  Civ.  St  189T, 
art  5049,  subd.  23,  Imposing  a  license  tax  on 
"circuses  and  other  exhibitions,"  a  Wild 
West  show  is  not  a  circus,  it  cannot  be  held 
as  "another  exhibition,"  as,  In  construing 
laws  Imposing  burdens  of  taxation,  nothing 
should  be  left  to  Inference.  State  t.  Cody 
(Tex.)  120  8.  W.  267,  269. 

Otker  eai^eases 

Charter  of  the  City  of  St  Louts,  art  5,  f 
14,  provides  that  no  money  shall  be  expend- 
ed except  by  ordinance,  the  provisions  of 
which  shall  be  specific  and  definite.  An  ap- 
propriation ordinance  provided  for  "publish- 
ing proceedings,  printing,  stationery,  ofllce 
expenses,  furniture,  rent  of  telephone  and 
other  expenses  of  house  of  delegates.'*  Held, 
that  the  term  "other  expenses"  means  ex- 
penses of  tbe  character  theretofore  mention- 
ed in  that  clause  of  the  appropriation  act, 
and  does  not  include  an  appropriation  for 
expenses  Incurred  by  a  committee  appointed 
by  a  resolution  of  the  house  of  delegates  to 
investigate  tax  returns.  State  ex  reL  Gavi- 
gan  V.  Dierkes,  113  S.  W.  1077,  1081,  214  Mo. 
578;  State  ex  rel.  Barrett  v.  Same^  113  S. 
W.  1081,  214  Mo.  592. 

Ky.  St  1909,  f  4464,  provides  for  an  elec: 
tion  upon  the  question  of  levying  a  tax  to 
maintain  a  graded  common  school  and  for 
Erecting  or  repairing  suitable  buildings 
therefor,  if  necessary.  Section  4481  (section 
5758)  makes  It  the  duty  of  the  district  trus- 
tees to  provide  funds  for  purchasing  suitable 
buildings,  or  for  erecting  or  repairing  them, 
and  for  other  expenses  needful  in  conducting 
a  good  graded  common  school,  and  permits 


them  to  me  audi  part  of  the  proceedi  of  Oe 
tax  as  they  may  deem  necessary.  Held,  tUt 
the  phrase  "and  tor  other  eTpensew  needlul 
in  conducting  a  good  graded  common  sehrjcr 
implies  the  power  to  rent  a  suitable  boildiiiK 
temporarily  and  until  one  can  be  secared  or 
built  by  the  trustees,  and  a  petition  JEor  tbe 
election,  reciting  that  t^e  proposed  tax  vy 
to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  maint&ini&g  i 
graded  common  school  and  for  tbe  erecting 
purchasing,  leasing,  and  repairing  of  soitalk 
buUdlnga  therefor  if  necessary,  was  no  ntuie 
than  the  two  sections  of  the  statute  xathvi- 
ized,  meaning  that  the  trustees  were  to  t^ 
a  building  if  they  could,  and,  if  not,  to  bnj  i 
lot  and  built  a  house,  to  repair  any  boildiLi 
bought  or  built  by  them,  and  in  tbe  utm- 
time,  to  lease  a  suitable  building  for  tbe  con- 
tinuation of  the  school,  and  did  not  md«: 
the  petition  insufilclent  Jeffries  v.  Board  o' 
Trustees  of  Columbia  Graded  Common  School. 
122  S.  W.  813,  817,  135  Ky.  48a 

Oilier  •zplodTa 

Blasting  powder,  although  it  may  ^  > 
less  dangerous  explosive  than  dynamite  or 
gunpowder,  is  none  the  less  buinded  Id  tlie 
words,  "or  other  explosives,"  as  uaed  in « 
condition  avoiding  a  policy  of  fire  insunmee 
if  there  be  kept,  used,  or  allowed  on  tbe 
premises,  benzine^  benzole,  dynamite,  ether, 
fireworks,  gasoline,  Greek  fire,  gunpowder. 
naphtha*  nitroglycerin,  or  other  explodrei 
Penman  v.  St  Paul  Fire  &  Marin^  Ins.  Co. 
30  Sup.  Ct  312,  313,  216  U.  S.  311,  54  L  EiL 
4d3. 

A  proTlsion  of  a  fire  insurance  polkT. 
making  it  void  if,  without  permlssioo  i£^ 
dorsed  thereon,  there  should  be  kept  or  &> 
lowed  on  the  insured  premises  "benzine,  i-^- 
loie,  dynamite,  ether,  fireworks,  gasoline. 
Greek  fire,  gunpowder  exceeding  tweo? 
five  pounds  in  quantity,  nai^tba,  nitrugiK 
erin  or  other  explosives,  phosE^ms  or  i^ 
troleom  or  any  of  its  products  of  greater  b 
flammabUity  than  kerosene  oil  of  tbe  loitf^ 
States  itandaidt"  must  be  OQUBtmed  to  is- 
elude  blasting  powder  by  the  words  "c.her 
explosives,"  in  the  absmoe  of  evidence  sbcv 
Ing  that  it  is  of  less  explosive  force  thau  aay 
one  of  the  substances 'enumerated,  and  ther^ 
fore  not  in  the  same  class.  St  Paul  Fiiei 
Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Penman,  151  Fed.  961 
963,  81  C.  C.  A.  151. 

Otl&er  gaublins  deviee,  bank,  table,  tf 
itiaoliine 

It  was  held  in  Commonwealth  t.  K^^^ 
merer  (Ky.)  13  S.  W.  108,  under  a  statnf 
providing  that  ♦'whoever  •  ♦  ♦  sliall  *: 
up,  carry  on  or  conduct  •  •  •  a  i^eih' 
bank,  faro  bank,  or  other  machine  or  cc* 
trivanoe  used  in  betting,"  etc,  **8haU  be  ^ 
ed,"  etc,  that  "oontz,"  which  is  played  vii* 
dice  on  a  table  or  other  surface,  was  c"^ 
within  the  meaning  ^t  "other  machine  or 
contrivance."  White  ▼»  States  T6  N.  E.  ^ 
555,  37  Ind.  App.  95. 


OTHER 


813 


OTHER 


Oilier  ffood  and  Taliutble  oonsideratlon 

Where  an  instrument  of  advice  had  a 
D  si  deration  at  $1  and  other  good  and  valu- 
lie  consideration,  the  term  "other  good 
id  valuable  consideration"  means  nothing, 
td  would  be  given  no  weight  in  the  absence 

evidence  explaining  the  nature  and  char- 
ter of  that  consideration.  Where  K.  takes 
deed  from  M.  to  all  his  interest  in  a  min- 
g  claim,  which  is  aU  the  property  of  M. 

this  state,  fior  a  consideration  ^of  $1,  and 
ther  good  and  valuable  consideration," 
tilch  latt^  ^Dsideration  is  not  explained, 
id  at  the  time  of  such  transfer  K.  has 
»tice  that  bis  grantor  is  heavily  indebted  in 
is  state,  and  has  avoided  personal  service 

process,  and  haa  allowed  a  judgment  in 
m  entered  against  him  for  over  $50,000, 
id  has  been  trying  to  buy  up  such  claims 

one-fifth  their  face,  value,  and  that  he  is 
)t  meeting  his  obligatioas  in  due  course  of 
isiuess,  and  that  he  has  no  other  property 

the  state  out  of  which  such  indebtedness 
n  be  made,  and  during  the  meanwhile  K, 
id  occupied  a  close  confidential  relation 
Ith  M^  under  such  circumstances,  held, 
lat  K.  cannot  restrain  an  execution  sale  of 
ich  property  to  pay  creditors  on  the  theory 
tat  he  is  an  innocent  purchaser  for  a  valu- 
)le  consideration.  California  Consol.  Min. 
0.  V.  Manley,  8X  Pac.  50-52,  10  Idaho,  786. 

Otlier  ffood  autterial 

Vitrified  brick  is  "other  good  material," 
ithln  Acts  1904,  p.  225,  c.  225,  I  4,  providing 
lat  the  specifications  of  material  to  be  used 
I  the  consrtruction  of  public  roads  shall  re- 
Jire  the  construction  "of  a  macadamized  or 
t  a  telford  or  of  other  stone,  or  of  a  road 
)Dstructed  of  gravel  or  of  other  good  ma- 
;rial."  Anne  Arundel  County  Com'rs  ▼. 
nited  Ry.  *  Electric  Co.,  72  Atl.  542,  547, 
)9  Md.  377. 

Other  soods  of  same  owner 

Laws  1902,  p.  1776,  c.  608,  |  2,  gives  a 
arehousemau  a  lien  on  goods  stored  for 
:orage  charges,  etc.,  on  such  goods  or  "oth- 
r  goods  belonging  to  the  same  owner." 
ield^  that  the  words  "other  goods  belonging 
)  the  same  owner"  should  be  restricted  to 
ctual,  as  distinguished  frpm  apparent,  own- 
rshlp  due  to  possesion,  so  that  where  sell- 
ig  agents,  in  possessiofi.  of  goods  belonging 
>  plaintiffs,  stored  the  goods  with  other 
oods  belonging  to  such  agents,  the  ware- 
ouseman  was  not  entitled  to  a  lien  on  plain- 
ils'  goods  for  the  storage  charges  on' the 
oods  belonging .  to  the  agents.  .  Schwab  v. 
►atman,  106  N.  Y.  Suihpl  741,  747,  56  Misc. 
^ep.  393. 

Other   ffOTemlng  autliorlty 

The  words  "or  other  governing  authorl- 
F,"  used  in  Const,  art  290,  in  designating 
he  authority  whose  consent  would  have  to 
e  obtained  by  riparian  owners  desiring  to 
olid  wharves  on  their  front,  refer  not  nec- 


essarily to  town  councils  which,  in  certain 
communities,  are  designated  by  other  names, 
but  to  whatever  body  or  functionary  is  vest- 
ed by  the  Legislature  with  authority  over'  the 
river  front  at  the  time  the  consent  is  solitit- 
ed.  State  ex  rel.  IlUnois  Cent  R.  Co.  vi 
Board  of  Levee  Com'rs  of  Orleans  Levee 
Dist,  38  South.  385,  396,  109  La.  403. 

Otber  grievanees 

A  lease  limiting  the  liability  of  the  ten- 
ant respecting  orders  of  a  city  department 
to  those  issued  for  the  correction,  preven- 
tion,  and  abatement  of  "nuisances"  or  "other 
grievances"  does  not  render  the  tenant  lia- 
ble for  the  cost  of  a  I9re  escape,  as  the  words  ' 
are  to  be  taken  in  their  natural  and  usual 
sense.  The  absence  of  a  fire  escape  is  not  a 
'^nuisance,"  as  that  word  is  commonly,  used, 
and.  the  more  generic  words  "other  griev- 
ances" do  not  extend  the  plaintifhi  liability 
so  fiar  as  to  ^render  him  liable  for  the  cost 
of  the  fire  escape.  ^Kalman  v.  Cox,  92  N.  T. 
Supp.  816,  46  Misc.  R^.  589. 

dtlier  indebtedness 

Xbe  Legislature,  in  1900,  after  having 
made  specific  appropriation  for  payment  of 
lijterest  for  the  ensuing  two  years  on  certain 
designated  debts  of  the  state,  appropriated  a 
specific  sum  for  each  of  the  years  1900  and 
1901  for  the  payment  of  interest  on  "other 
state  indebtedness."  H^ld,  that  such  "other 
staite  indebtedness"  included  state  bonds  is- 
sued as  provided  by  Acts  1896,  p.  27,  c  34, 
and  disclosed  a  legislative  intention  that 
such  bonds  should  remain  outstanding  and 
interest-bearing  for  the  whole  of  the  year 
1901.  Colbert  v.  State,  39  South.  65,  66,  86 
Miss.  769. 

A  provision  of  the  articles  of  incorpora- 
tion that  a  building  and  loan  association 
shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  shares  of  each 
shareholder  for  any  sum  due  it  for  subscrip- 
tion, money  loaned,  or  any  "other  indebted- 
ness due  from  the  shareholder"  did  not  give 
a  lien  for  the  amount  of  defalcation  upon 
stock  held  by  a  defaulting  officer;  the 
phrase  quoted  having  reference  only  to  in- 
debtedness as  a  shareholder.  Jewell  v.  Nuhn 
(Iowa)  138  N.  W.  457,  458. 

Other  industry 

A  cotton  gin  is  embraced  within  the  term 
"other  Industry,"  as  used  in  Const,  art  9,  f  33, 
which  provides  that  any  person  owning  or 
operating  a  coal,  lead,  iron,  or  zinc  mine,  or 
any  sawmill,  grain  ^levator,  or.  other  indus- 
try, when  the  Corporation,  Commission  shall 
reasonably  determine  that  the  amount  of 
business  is  sufficient  to' justify  it,  near  or 
within  a^  reasOnal;>le  distance  of  any  railroad, 
may,  at  the  expense  of  ^uch  person,  build 
and  ke€;p  in  repair  a  switch  leading  from  the 
railroad  to  such  mine,  etc.,  or  other  industry, 
the  railroad  being  required  to  furnish  the 
switch'  stand  and  frog  and  .other  necessary 
materials  for  making  connections  with  the 


OTHEB 


814 


OTHEB 


Bide  trai^.    8t  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  t.  Zalon- 
dek,  116  Pac  867,  8G9»  28  Okl.  746. 

Other  ImtosUailBC  U^tton 

The  pbraee  "other  intoxlcetliig  Uqnon/' 
in  Lews  1906,  p.  86,  c  21,  u^ing  the  words, 
spiritaoos,  linoiiB,  malt  or  **other  Intozicatr 
log  Uquors"  in  reference  to  local  option.elec- 
tlons,  does  not  add  anything  to  the  legal 
effect  of  the  statute,  and  the  act  Is  equlTa- 
lent  to  Oonst.  I  61,  and  Ky.  8t  1003,  I  2554, 
relating  to  local  option  elections,  and  using 
the  words,  spirituous,  yinous,  or  malt  liquors. 
O'Neal  y.  Minary,  101  8.  W.  861.  954,  125 
Ky.  671. 


Otkev  JvdIeUl 

Oonst  art  6,  enumemtes  yailous  Judicial 
officers,  including  judges  of  the  Court  of  Ap- 
peals, justices  of  the  Supreme  Court,  county 
Judges,  surrogates,  and  justices  of  the  peace, 
and  authoriBes  the  election  of  district  ooort 
justices  and  the  establishment  of  infMor 
local  courts,  and  section'  11  authorises  the 
removal  of  judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeals 
and  Supreme  Court  justices  by  concurrent 
resolution  of  both  legislative  houses,  and  pro- 
vides that  "all  other  judicial  officers  except 
justices  of  the  peace  and  judges  or  justices 
of  inferior  courts  not  of  record  may  be  re- 
moved by  the  Senate,"  on  the  Governor's 
recommendation,  for  cause  and  after  hear- 
ing. Held,  that  the  Court  of  Claims  was  not 
included  within  the  words  "all  other  judicial 
officers**;  they  referring  to  judicial  officers 
expressly  named  in  the  Constitution  or  those 
which  it  authorized  the  Legislature  to  create, 
so  that  the  judges  of  that  court  could  be  re- 
moved summarily  without  hearing  by  the 
abolition  of  their  offices^  People  ex  rel. 
Swift  V.  Luce,  133  N.  T.  Supp.  9,  15,  74  Idsc 
Rep.  551. 

OtKer  lands 

The  phrase  "owner  of  other  lands,"  used 
in  Rev.  av.  St  1897,  art  4218fff,  permitting 
owners  of  other  lands  contiguous  to  school 
lands,  or  within  a  radius  of  five  miles  there- 
of, to  buy  such  school  lands,  which  article 
is  a  part  of  the  act  of  1897  which  permitted 
a  settler  to  buy  four  sections  of  school  land 
in  all,  provided  not  more  than  two  were 
classed  as  agricultural  lands,  does  not  in- 
clude the  owner  of  a  lot  or  lots  in  town,  but 
applies  only  to  persons  engaged  in  agricultur- 
al or  stock  raising  pursuits.  Conn  v.  Terrell, 
80  S.  W.  608,  609,  97  Tex.  578. 

A  testator  executed  his  will  in  1885, 
which  was  probated  in  1896.  The  substance 
of  so  much  of  the  instrument  as  is  here 
material  was:  Separate  parcels  of  described 
realty  were  devised,  respectively,  to  the  three 
daughters  of  the  testator,  Lavinla,  Josephine, 
and  Emma,  and  to  his  son  George,  in  items 
1,  3,  6,  and  8.  EacA  of  such  devises  was  for 
and  during  the  life  of  the  devisee,  with  re- 
mainder to  the  (fhild  or  children  of  the  re- 
spective devisee  living  at  the  time  of  the 


death  of  the  devisee.  In  item  6  certain  otber 
described  realty  was  devised  to  Josrpbioe. 
and   to    Emma,   'In   trust  for  Lodndi  Y. 

•  •  •  said  Joephine  •  •  •  to  hit? 
and  to  hold  the  property  in  this  Item  be- 
queathed to  her  for  and  during  ber  mtinl 
life,  and  at  her  death  to  her  ebOdrai  Uric* 
at  the  time  of*  her  death.  And  the  saij 
Emma  *  ^  ^  to  have  and  to  hold  the 
property  in  this  item  bequeathed  to  ber » 
trustee  for  my  daughter,  said  Lodsda  v. 

•  •  •  in  trust  for  the  use,  benefit  ird 
behoof  of  the  said  Ludnda  V.,  •  •  *  (>? 
and  during  her  natural  life,  and  atherdeitt 
to  her  children  living  at  the  time  of  her 
death.**  In  item  7  certain  other  described 
realty  was  devised  to  Emma,  in  trust  *to  aid 
for  my  daughter  said  Ludnda  Y.,  *  *  ' 
for  and  during  her  natural  life,  then  V>  rt?. 
in  and  become  the  property  of  the  diUdrsi  of 
the  said  Ludnda  V.  •  •  •  Uvtag  it  te 
death.**  Item  10  was  as  follows:  "I  m 
devise  and  bequeath  to  my  said  dtii^» 
Lavinla,  •  ♦  ♦  Josephine,  •  •  •  Es^ 
ma,    •    •    •    in    trust    for    Ludndt  Y. 

•  •  •  Emma,  •  •  •  and  to  my  sa 
George,  •  •  •  all  my  other  lands  k:  j 
hereinbefore  disposed  of,  of  whldi  I  may  & 
seised  and  possessed,  for  and  during  tbei: 
natural  lives,  and  at  their  deaths  to  their  rr 
spective  children  living  at  the  time  of  tiieJ 
death,  to  be  divided  among  my  said  cbildrezu 
share  and  share  alike.  Item  13  was  tf  <o^ 
lows:  "Having  fully  provided  for  mj  ^ 
ceased  daughter  Boxy  Ann,  •  •  *  i3 
her  lifetime,  and  having  advanced  to  ber  is 
lands  and  money  a  portion  equal  to  the  ^"^ 
given  to  each  of  my  said  children  in  this  wu 

I  make  no  provision  or  bequest  to  her  di 
dren.**  The  testator  died  seised  and  p(^ 
sessed  in  fee  of  other  lands  than  those  ss^ 
dflcally  devised  in  items  1«  S,  5.  e,  7.  aod  ^ 
of  the  will,  which  others  were  subject  to  ^ 
provisions  of  item  10,  and  which,  after  tbe 
death  of  the  testator,  were  partitioned  t 
kind  among  the  diildren  of  the  testtt^' 
named  in  item  10  of  the  wilL  Lndadi  ^ 
subsequently  died  unmarried  and  witbt^ 
children.  Held,  item  10,  in  which  was  if- 
vised  only  aU  "other  lands"  of  whlcfa  ^ 
testator  might  die  seised  and  possessed  "i^ 
hereinbefore  disposed  of,*'  did  not  purport  t 
dispose  of,  nor  dispose  ot  any  of  the  Iis^ 
previouflty  devised  to  Ludnda  V.  in  itecs^ 
and  7,  nor  any  reversionary  interest  thereti 
Lane  v.  Patterson,  76  S.  B.  47, 13S  Ga.  na 

Otker  lUUUtlMi 

Act  AprU  28,  1876  (P.  L.  63),  providitf 
that  members  of  beneficial  assodatioos  sbiS 
not  be  individually  liable  for  the  paymeot  ci 
periodical  or  funeral  benefits  or  other  UabJ^- 
ities  of  the  association,  and  the  sums  M  ^ 
payable  out  of  the  treasury,  by  the  *oi* 
-other  Uabilitiear  meaUs  all  liabilities  vj^ 
erly  chargeable  to  the  treasury  of  the  society 
and  contemplates  obligaaons  in  additloo  tii 


OTHEB 


815 


OTHBB 


funeral  ezpenaes  or  death  benefits.  Wolfe  t. 
Limestone  GouncU  No.  373,  Order  of  Inde- 
pendent Americans,  82  AtL  499,  601,  233  Pa. 
357. 

Oili^  UwfiU  expMuws 

OUigoni  In  a  bond  given  by  them  to  a 
third  person  at  the  request,  for  the  benefit 
of,  and  on  the  agreement  of  defendant  and 
others  to  be  responsible  for  th^  share,  exe- 
cuted a  declaration  of  trust  reciting  that  the 
obligors  held  land  in  trust  for  defendant  and 
the  other  beneficiaries,  and  that  on  demand 
each  of  the  beneficiaries  would  pay  his  pro- 
portion of  any  interest  charged,  taxes,  assess- 
noents,  or  "other  lawful  expense  of  said 
trust"  HUd,  that  the  quoted  words  tn  the 
declaration  of  trust  included  any  sum  paid 
by  the  obligors  cm  the  bond,  if  iwid  in  good 
faith,  pursuant  to  a  reasonable  settlement  of 
their  liability  thereon.  Cunniff  v.  McDonell, 
81  N.  B.  879,  880, 196  Biass.  7. 

OtIi«r  Un 

The  holder  of  an  invalid  tax  deed  in 
possession  of  the  real  estate  brought  an  ac- 
tion to  quiet  his  title.  The  tax  deed  was 
beld  void  as  a  muniment  of  title,  but  the  lien 
of  the  taxes  was  preserved,  and  the  land  was 
ordered  sold  and  was  sold,  to  satisfy  it 
Held,  the  redemption  act  (chapter  109,  p. 
188»  Laws  1898),  which  provides  that  the  act 
Shan  apply  to  all  sales  under  foreclosure  of 
mortgage,  mechanics'  lien,  or  *V)ther  lien," 
whether  special  or  general,  has  no  applica- 
tion to  such  a  sale,  and  neither  the  defendant 
owner  nor  the  holder  of  a  mortgage  lien  has 
any  right  to  redeem  therefrom.  The  "other 
liens,"  general  or  special,  to  which  the  act 
makes  reference,  are  those  arising  firom  obli- 
gations created  in  or  connected  with  deal- 
ings between  private  parties.  Davidson  v. 
Plummer,  92  Pac.  706,  706,  76  Kan.  462. 

The  operation  of  Const  art  6,  |  15,  de- 
daring  that  the  annual  assessment  for  taxes 
made  on  landed  property  shall  be  a  special 
lien  thereon,  and  that  the  land  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  sale  for  the  payment  of  taxes  and  pen- 
alties, whereby  landed  property,  whether 
homestead  or  not,  is  subject  to  a  sale  for  tax- 
es and  for  penalties  accruing  on  account  of  a 
delinquency,  is  not  limited  by  article  16,  {  50, 
protecting  the  homestead  against  forced  sale, 
and  providing  that  no  mortgage,  deed  of 
trust,  or  other  lien  on  the  homestead  shall  be 
valid;  the  words  "other  lien''  including  only 
such  Uens  as  are  created  by  contract  by  hus- 
band and  wife.  City  of  San  Antonio  v.  Toep- 
perwein,  133  S.  W.  416, 417, 104  Tex.  43. 

Pub.  Bt  1901,  c.  246,  I  28,  provides  that 
If  a  trustee  is  adjudged  chargeable  for  any 
personal  property  subject  to  mortgage, 
pledge,  or  other  lien,  the  court  may  appoint 
a  receiver  and  dispose  of  it»  if  more  can  be 
obtained  for  it  than  the  claims  upon  It  Sec- 
tion 29  provides  that  if  a  trustee  is  adjudged 
chargeable  for  any  promissory  note^  or  other 


security  for  payment  of  money,  or  any  chose 
in  action  upon  which  execution  caimot  be 
levied,  the  court  may  appoint  a  receiver  to 
collect  ft  Sectiofh  80  provides  that  the  trus- 
tee may  be  adjudged  trustee  for  the  value  of 
any  n6te,  diose  In  action,  etc.,  which  he  re- 
fuses to  deliver  to  the  receiver,  pursuant' to 
the  court's  order.  Section  81  requires  a  trus- 
tee adjudged  chargeable  to  retain  the  sum  or 
article  other  than  that  for  which  a  receiver 
is  appointed,  for  which  he  is  so  charged,  until 
demanded  of  him  upon  execution  issued,  or 
the  suit  is  otherwise  terminated,  and,  by 
section  32,  the  proceeds  of  property  in  the 
hands  of  a  receiver,  for  which  the  trustee 
was  charged,  shall  be  applied  under  the 
court's  direction  after  paying  costs,  charges, 
and  prior  liens,  in  satisfaction  of  the  Judg- 
m^it,  and  any  surplus  shall  be  paid  to  de- 
fendant The  trustee  held  a  check  payable 
to  himself  and  defendant,  who  transferred 
his  interest  therein  to  claimant,  after  service 
of  the  writ  with  claimant's  knowledge.  Held, 
that  the  check  held  by  the  trustee  was  a 
chose  in  action,  and  his  possession  thereof  is 
aptly  described  by  the  term  *'otber  Uen,'*  used 
in  the  statute,  even  though  defendant  did  not 
indorse  the  check  to  him  for  collection,  so 
that  the  trustee  was  chargeable  therefor,  and 
a  receiver  was  properly  appointed  to  collect 
it  Musgrove  v.  Goss,  72  Atl.  371,  373,  75  N. 
H.  208  (citing  Mitdiell  v.  Qreen,  62  N.  H. 
588,  590). 

Other  maohinery 
A  policy  describing  the  insured  property 
as  a  frame  building  "while  occupied  as  a 
flour  and  roller  mill,"  and  the  fixed  and  mov- 
able machinery,  pipes,  belting,  pulleys,  shaft- 
ing, roller  mills,  and  appurtenances,  smut 
mill  and  appurtenances,  purifiers,  blowers, 
dusters,  tools,  etc.,  *'and  such  other  machin- 
ery not  more  hazardous  as  is  usual  to  roller 
mills"  will  be  held  to  include  machinery  used 
in  the  manufacture  of  meal,  bran,  and  other 
feed  products,  where  not  to  do  so  would  ren- 
der the  policy  void  from  its  execution.  Cap- 
ital Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  109  Pac  536,  537, 
26  Okl.  286. 

By  "other  machinery,"  in  a  statute  using 
the  term  "mill  and  other  machinery,"  ma- 
chinery that  is  appurtenant  to  the  mill  prop- 
er is  meant  Southwest  Missouri  Light  Co. 
V.  Scheurich,  73  S.  W.  496,  498,  174  Mo.  235. 

Other  matter  or  tMaa 

The  general  words  '^r  other  matter  or 
thing,"  in  Rev.  St  I  1782,  prohibiting  a  Unit- 
ed States  senator  from  receiving  compensa- 
tion for  rendering  services  to  any  person  in 
relation  to  any  proceeding,  contract  etc.,  or 
other  matter  or  thing  in  which  the  United 
States  is  a  partyK  were  intended  to  cover 
kindred  subje<?ts,  like  preliminary  examina- 
tions and  inquiries  necessary  to  enable  the 
government,  acting  through  one  of  its  depart- 
ments, to  determine  whether  a. proceeding 
should  be  instituted,  a  charge  or  accusation 


OTHEB 


816 


OTHEB 


made  or  an  arreat  ordered*  or  whether  a  con- 
tract or  claf m  should  be  knade.  United  States 
T.  Burton,  181  Fed.  te2,  556. 

An  order  appointing  an  attorn^  to  act 
for  the  coantj  attomty  In  a  cane  petove  the 
grand  jury  wherein  the  county  attornco^  was 
under  diaablUty  by  reason  of  interest,  and 
also  to  act  as  county  attorney  in  "another 
matter/'  and  fixing  the  compensatlont  was 
invalid,  as  it  would  be  assumed  that  the  pay- 
ment included  services  In  "another  matter** 
which  was  beyond  the  court*s  jurisdiction. 
SUte  y.  Miller,  ;LOe  N.  W.  10S7,  1089.  132 
Iowa,  587. 

Otber  meaaa 

The  i>hrase  ''by  mechanical  or  other 
means/'  as  used  in  the  statute  making:  it  a 
misdemeanor  for  any  person,  not  Mcensed,  to 
record  or  register,  by  mechanical  or  other 
means,  bets  or  wagers  on  trials  of  speed,  etc., 
embraces  something  outside  the  mechanical 
class,  and  covers  the  registration  of  such  beta 
by  means  of  the  initials  or  private  marks  of 
the  parties  written  on  cards.  State  v.  Vil* 
lines,  81  S.  W.  212,  218,  107  Mo.  App.  5»3. 

The  words  "other  means,"  as  used  In 
Gen.  St.  Kan.  1901,  f  1249,  cL  23,  enumerat- 
ing some  of  the  purposes  for  which  corpo- 
rations may  be  formed,  among  which  being 
the  manufacture  and  supply  .of  gas  or  the 
suj^ly  of  light,  or  heat  to  the  public  by  fny 
other  means,  are  broad  enough  to  Include 
natural  gas,  although  when  the  act  was  pass- 
ed the  use  of  natural  ga^  may  not  haVe  been 
within  the  contemplation  of  the  Legislature. 
Compton  V.  People's  Gas  Co.,  89  Pac.  1039, 
1040,  75  Kan.  57?,  10  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   787. 

In  Ck)mp.  Laws,  |  504,  relating  to  allow- 
ance of  alimony  pendente  lite,  and  providing 
.that  such  orders  may  be  enforced  and  made 
effectual  by  attachment,  commitment,  and  by 
requiring  security  for  obedience  thereto,  or 
by  "other  means  according  to  the  .usages  of 
courts,"  the  words  "other  means  according 
to  the  usages  of  courts"  would  not  support 
the  authority  of  the  court  to  order  an  exe- 
cution to  issue;  enforcement  of  Interlocu- 
tory orders  for  payment  of  money  by  exe- 
cution does  not  appear  to  be'  according  to 
the  usages  of  courts  and  can  be  resorted  to 
only  where  the  statutes  speclflcally  so  pro- 
vide, and  the  only  provision  for  execution  in 
our  dvll  procedure  is  after  final  judgment 
Kapp  V.  Seventh  Judicial  Diat.  Oooit,  107 
Pac.  95,  96,  32  Nev.  264,  Ann.  Oas.  1912D,  177. 

Otber  meokanlcal  oontriTancea 

See  Vehicles  and  Other  Mechanical  Ck)n- 
trlvances. 

Oilier  aterekaadiae 

Paragraph  8  of  section  2  of  the  general 
tax  act  of  1902  (Acts  1902,  p.  21),  imposhig  a 
special  tax  upon  traveling  venders  "of  patent 
or  proprietary  medicines,  special  nostrums, 
jewelry,  paper,  soap,  or  other  mekchandise," 


does  not  embrace  Tmders  of  merdusd&« 
not  ejusdem  generis  with  the  artides  fs:prv>^ 
ly  enumerated.  Standard  OD  Co.  r.  Swa: 
son,  49  8.  a  262,  263,  121  Ga.  412. 
Otker  mlMMl 
The  words  *ottier  miners]^  or  'other 
valuable  minerala"  taken  In  tbe  broideA 
aenae  would  Indnde  petroieam  oil;  tnt  S 
the  parttes  did  not  Intend  timi  tbe  tltk  to 
petroleum  and  gas  sbonld  pan,  Am  title  r& 
mains  in  the  owner  of  tbe  fee.  A  dcedpsr 
porting  to  convey  aU  mlnetals  uoderlriBs  '^ 
scribed  land  does  not  eoamf  tbe  utut. 
gaa  tlierevnder,  where  tbe  paxtiei  do  ooteii- 
template  a  conveyance  tbereot  McKhoers 
Heirs  T.  Central  Keatncky  Natand  Gu  C«, 
120  S.  W.  314,  316,  134  Ky.  239.  30  An 
Gaa.  964  (<|aotlng  and  adopthig  d^liiitiai  t 
Donahue,  Petroleum  ft  Gaa,  p.  220). 

Oilier  mlaeral  sHlMtaaices 

Pure  Food  and  Drug  Act  June  30.  M 
c.  3915,  34  Stat  768,  is  entiUed  "An  act^t 
preventing  the  manufacture,  sale  or  m> 
portation  of  adulterated  or  misbriDdel  *i 
poisonous  or  deleterloaa  foods,  dmgs,  wi 
cinea  and  Uqnora,"  and  section  7  pror;<)R 
that  an  artkde  ahall  be  deemed  adolten:^. 
In  the  case  of  confectionery,  if  it  cooiii:* 
terra  alba,  barytes,  talc,  chrome  jellow.  '. 
other  mineral  subatancea  or  p(risoooiL<  ec  - 
or  flavor,  or  othw  ingredient  deteterioos  * 
detrlmeotal  to  health.  Held  that  slixs  ^ 
purpose  e#  the  act  waa  to  protect  tiie  ]c 
chaser  of  food  pvoducta  from  having  infer;? 
and  dlfferait  articles  passed, off  on  Me:: 
plaee  of  those  he  desired,  and  to  iffoten  '^^ 
from  In^ry  by  prohibiting  the  additi'>Q ' 
foods  of  snhAtances  poisonous  or  deleten.^ 
to  health,  the  words  "other  mineral  c</ 
stancea,"  nndes  the  doctrine  of  ^xisdm  k 
erl8»  Included  other  mineral  substaoces  ^^■' 
are  deleteriflua .  or  detrimental  to  bMltb  • 
the  same  nature  as  those  spedfioall^  i^ 
scribed  pr^edlng  such  words,  and  hence  i- 
not  include  a  thin  coating  of  pure  silver  ^^• 
ering  candy,  used  principally  by  conferti 
ers  for  decorative  purposes,  and  not  deleft- 
ous  or  detrimental  to  health.  French  Si:'^ 
Dragee  Co.  v.  United  States,  179  Fed.  S:l 
827,  103  C.  C.  A.  316. 

Oilier  meaejed  aapital 

See  Moneyed  CapltaL 

Otk«r  anaiaiyalitlea 

The  phrase,  "other  municipalities,"  ^ 
talned  in  the  title  and  body  of  P.  L.  19^^' 
13,  relative  to  official  oaths  of  oificcn  elef-; 
or  appointed  in  towns,  townships,  and  ''^'^■ 
municipalities'*  of  the  stabe,  is  sufficiently* 
scrlptlve  ef  cities  to  Include  them.  Lod^'- 
V.  Dallaa,  81  Aa  489»  490,  82  N.  J.  Uv.  ^ 

The  enactment  of  laws  providing  f^'f/- 
creotlon  of  municipal  and  public  corportti^^ 
is  within  the  inherent  legislative  pov^^*  ^-^ 
Laws  1911,  c.  92,  authoriring  the  estab^ 
ment  of  port  districts,  and  providing  ^^  ^* 


OTHER 


817 


OTHER 


development  of  a  system  of  harbor  improve- 
ments and  terminal  facilities,  and  tbe  method 
of  payment  therefor,  with  defined  p^>wers  to 
be  exercised  l^y  a  board  of  commissioners, 
is  constltntional,  there  being  no  constitutional 
provision  in  terms  prohibiting  the  creation  of 
other  municipal  corporations  than  counties, 
cities,  towns,  and  school  districts,  specifically 
recognised  as  municipal  corporations ;  Const, 
art.  11, 1  4,  which  requires  the  Legislature  to 
establish  a  system  of  XH>unty  government,  and 
Const,  art  U,  |  10,  which  declares  that  mu- 
nicipal corpcrationB  shall  not  be  created  by 
special  laws,  being  only  declarations  of  man- 
datory duty  placed  upon  the  Legislature's  in- 
herent powers,  and  the  words  *'other  munioi- 
pel  corporations,"  as  used  in  Const  art  8, 
f  6,  limiting  the  rate  of  indebtedness  of 
counties,  cities,  towns,  and  school  districts, 
and  other  municipal  corporations,  hairing  ref- 
erence to  others  than  those  specifically  nam- 
ed. Paine  v.  Port  of  Seattle,  126  Pac.  628, 
630,  631,  70  Wash.  2M. 

Other  necessaries 

Under  Rev.  St  1900,  I  4065,  requiring 
tbe  necessary  expense  incurred  by  the  pro- 
bate court  for  books,  furniture,  and  other 
necessaries,  to  be  paid  b^  tbe  county,  a  pro- 
bate judge  was  entitled  to  recover  from  tbe 
county  the  expense  of  a  janitor,  in  his  office, 
and  for  telephone  service  r  the  latter  coming 
within  the  term  "other  necessaries."  Motley 
V.  Pike  County,  135  fi.  W.  39,.  40,  233  Mo.  42. 

Other  neeessart^  eKpeasea 

Acts  1875,  p.  68,  c.  24,  provides  that  the 
trustees  of  the  several  townships,  towns;  and 
cities  shall  have  the  power  to  levy  a  special 
tax  in  their  respective  townships,  towns,  and 
cities  for  the  construction,  renting,  or  repair- 
ing of  schoolhouses,  for  providing  furniture, 
school  apparatus,  and  fuel  therefor,  and  f6r 
the  payment  of  other  necessary  expenses  of 
the  school,  etc.  Held,  that  t,he  clause  for  the 
payment  of  "other  necessary  expenses"  of  the 
school  did  not  authorize  the  levying  of  a  tax 
to  provide  free  transportatlen  for  the  pupils 
of  a  consolidated  school  district  tg  and  from 
the  school.  State  v.  Jadcson,  81  N.'.£.,62,  64, 
168  Ind.  384  (citing  Honey  Greek  School  Tp. 
v.  Barnes,  21  N.  B.  747,  119  Ind.  213;  First 
Nat  Bank  of  Marion  v.  Adams  School  Tp., 
46  K.  E.  832,  17  Ind.  App.  375;  School  City 
of  Rushville  v.  Hays,  70  1^.  B.  134,  162  Ind. 
103). 

Other  notes  olrculatiiMC  ai  money 

As  used  in  Kirhy*s  Dig.  $  1814,  making  it 
a  felony  for  a  cashier  of  an  insolvent  bank  to 
receive  on  deposit  bank  blUs'or  mtee,  United 
States  Treasury  notes,  or  "other  notes,  bllls> 
or  drafts,  circulating  as  money  or  curren- 
cy," the  quoted  phrase  refers  to  notes,  bills, 
or  drafts^  other  than  United  States  Treas- 
ury notes  and  natiohal  bank  notes,  which 
pass  from  hhnd  t^  hand ;  that  is,  such  as  are 
payable  to  bearer  or  are  properly  indorsed 

3  Wds.&  P.2d  Sta.— 52 


by  the  payee  so  that  the  legal  title  may 
pass  by  delt^^ery.  '  State  t.  Smith,  120  S.  W. 
ISe,  157,  01  Ark.  1. 
btl&er  nniiU^noe 
Where  a  deed  provided  that  the  grantor 
should  not  put  upon  the  premises  ''any  build- 
ings, timber,  trees  or  other  nuisances*,**  the 
words  **other  nuisances*'  will  not  include  ex- 
cavations unless  it  appears  from  the  whole 
instrument  that  such  was  the  Intention. 
CrosiB  V.  Frost,  23  Ati;m«,  64  Vt.  179,  1«2. 

Other  obligation  hj  whipl&  delit  U  se- 
cured 

The  phrase  ''other  obligation  by.w^ch^ 
debt  ia  secured,"  as  used  in  Const  art  13,  § 
4,  providing  that  a  mortgage^  deed  of  trust, 
contract,  or  other  obligation  by  which  a  debt 
is  secured  shall,  for  the  purpose  of  hssess- 
ment  or  taxation,  be  deemed  an  Interest  in 
the  property  thereby  affected,  does^  not  in- 
clude a  collateral  security,  or  credits  by  loan 
on  personalty.  Bank  of  Willows  v.  Glenn 
County.  101  Pac.  13,  14,  155  Cal.  352. 

The  term  "contract  or  other  obl^atlon," 
in  Const  art.  13,  S  4,  providing  that  a  mort- 
gage, deed  of  trust,  or  other  obligation  by 
which  a  deed  is  secured  shall  for  tbe  pur- 
pose of  taxation  be  treated  as  an  interest  in 
property,  were  Inserted  to  cover  any  and  all 
possible  contracts  of  Hen  npon  realty  which 
the  ingenuity  of  lawyers  might  attempt  to 
devise  to  evade  the  constitutional  t^ulre- 
ment.  Bank  of  Woodland  v.  Pierce,  77  Pac. 
1012.  1013,  144  Cal.  434. 

Otliev^  oeenpttHoa 

Under  charter  authority  to  a  city  to  reg- 
ulate and  prescribe  the  compensation  of  hack- 
men,  cabmen,  omnibus  drivers,  and  all  "oth- 
ers pursuing  a  like  occupation,*'  the  city  can 
limit  the  rate  of  fare  to  be  charged  by  street 
railway  companies,  inasmuch  as  the  ]^ase 
^'Others  pursuing  a  like  occupation,"  when 
consttued  ejusdem  generis,  Includes  rstreet 
x'allway  companies.  Chicago  Union  Traction 
CO.  V.  Chicago,  65  N.  E.  451,  460,  199  111. 
484,  59  L.  R.  A.  631  (dUng  and  adopting 
Union  County  T.  Ussery,  35  N.  £.  618,  147 
111.  204;  Misch  v.  Russell,  26  N.  B.  528^  136 
tU.  22,  12  L.  R.  A.  126 ;  First  Nat  Bank  of 
Joll^t  V.  Adam,  28  N.  B.  955,  138  111.  483 ; 
Ritchie  v.  People,  40  N.  B.  454,  155  111.  96, 
20  L.  R.  A.  79,  46  Am.  St  Rep.  315). 

Other  ofFenses 

See  Assault  to  Commit  Other  Offense. 
Other  oflleere 
The  words,  "other  officer,"  as  used  In  the 
statute  covering  bribery  (Rev.  St  |  6000), 
must  be  extended  to  Include  members  of  the 
council  of  a  municipality.  Amiindson  y. 
SUte,  28  Ohio  Cir.  Ct  R.  655,  656. 

The  words  "other  officers,"  in  Rer.  Code, 
1852,  as  amended  to  1893,  p.  697,  a  92,  |  2, 
authoiitslng  the  judges  of  the  Superior  Court 
to  punish  the  contempt,  omissions,  n^lects. 


OTHEB 


818 


OTHEB 


and  defiittlto  of  Joaticet  of  tbo  poaoe,  sboriAi, 
coroners,  clerks  and  "otber  offloers"  within 
the  state,  include  the  office  of  alderman.  Test- 
ed with  Jurisdiction  to  administer  the  crim- 
inal law.  In  re  TuU  (Del.)  78  AtL  299,  800, 
2  Boyce,  126. 

The  words  "other  officers,"  as  nsed  In 
Oonst  art  8,  i  8,  making  it  the  duty  of  the 
two  houses  of  the  General  Assembly  after 
organization  at  request  of  either  house  to 
Join  in  grand  committee  for  the  purpose  of 
electing  other  officers,  undoubtedly  meant 
such  officers  as  by  special  direction  of  the 
Ck)n8titution  or  by  law  were  to  be  elected  by 
the  General  Assembly.  In  re  Decision  of 
Justices,  69  AtL  565,  666,  28  R.  I.  607. 

A  "solicitor  of  business*'  is  not  within 
the  clause  "and  other  officers,"  in  Rev.  St 
U.  8.  }  5136,  giving  a  national  bank  power  to 
appoint  a  president  vice  president,  cashier, 
and  other  officers,  and  dismiss  such  officers 
at  pleasure;  but  under  subdivisions  8  and  7 
of  said  section,  empowering  such  a  bank 
to  make  contracts  and  to  exercise,  by  duly 
authorized  "officers"  or  agents,  all  such  inci- 
dental powers  as  shall  be  necessary  to  carry 
on  the  banking  business.  It  may  employ  a 
solicitor  of  business  for  a  year.  Case  v.  First 
Nat  Bank  of  Brooklyn,  109  N.  Y.  Supp.  1119, 
1120,  50  Misc.  Rep.  269. 

As  used  in  Code  Civ.  Proc.  1 1986,  subd. 
3,  as  amended  by  St  1907,  p.  730,  c.  391,  f 
1,  providing  that  a  subpoena  to  require  at- 
tendance out  of  court  before  a  Judge,  Justice, 
or  other  officer  authorized  to  administer 
oaths  or  take  testimony  in  any  matter  under 
the  laws,  is  to  be  issued  by  the  Judge,  Justice, 
or  other  officer  before  whom  att^idance  is 
required,  and  if  the  subpoena  is  Issued  to  re- 
quire attendance  before  a  commissioner  or 
other  officer  upon  the  taking  of  a  deposition, 
it  must  be  issued  by  the  clerk  of  the  superior 
court  of  the  county  wherein  the  attendance 
is  required,  upon  the  order  of  such  court  or  a 
Judge  th^eof,  the  term  "other  officer"  means 
any  one  authorized  to  administer  oaths  or 
take  testimony,  eta,  and  includes  a  notary 
public,  in  view  of  PoL  Code,  I  794,  provid- 
ing that  it  is  the  duty  of  notaries  public  to 
take  depositions  and  affidavits  and  administer 
oaths  in  all  matters  to  be  used  before  any 
court  etc.,  and  it  was  proper  for  a  Judge  of 
the  superior  court  of  S.  county  to  order  the 
clerk  to  issue  a  subpoena  requiring  a  witness 
residing  therein  to  attend  before  a  notary  in 
the  county  to  give  his  deposition,  and  for  the 
clerk  to  issue  such  subpoena.  In  re  Scott 
96  Paa  385,  387,  8  CaL  App.  12. 

In  Const  f  160,  expressly  making  two 
years  the  term  of  office  of  city  legislative 
boards  generally,  and  in  the  next  clause 
prescribing  the  manner  of  Meeting  such 
boards  in  cities  of  the  first  and  second  class, 
and  in  the  succeeding  clause  providing  that 
"other  officers"  of  towns  or  cities,  if  elected 
by  the  voters  thereof;  shall  hold  office  for 


"four  years,  and  until  their  snconson  s&£ll 
be  qualified,"  the  provtsion  as  to  tbe  tenb 
of  oflloe  of  "other  officersT'  was  idainly  ei- 
chialTe  of  the  provisions  as  to  the  tenos  of 
city  legislative  boards,  and  was  not  open  tc 
construction.  HcDermott  v.  Dty  of  Loois- 
vlUe,  32  S.  W.  264,  265,  98  Ky.  50. 

Since  1886  there  has  been  in  MisBooiii 
separate  statute  limiting  the  time  vitUii 
which  actions  against  constables  nut  be 
commenced  (Rer.  St  1835,  p.  116,  i  4),  vMdi 
limitation  was  in  1889  sKteaded  iim  t«o  to 
three  years  (Ber.  St  1889,  f  2377;  Rer.  SL 
1899,  i  882).  Ibe  term  "or  otber  ofBcet: 
used  in  Rev.  St  1899,  I  4274,  limitiDS  k^ 
tioQB  against  a  dieriff,  coroner,  or  otber  of 
fleer  to  three  years  after  accrual  of  aise. 
was  not  in  the  original  act  of  1848  (Acts 
1848-49,  p.  79,  I  5),  which  r^ted  only  toi 
dierilf  or  a  coroner;  the  words  being insBted 
in  the  revision  of  1866  (Rev.  St  18S5,  p.  Wk 
c  103,  art.  2,  I  4),  In  which  revisiOD  tten 
was  a  separate  statute  of  llmitatioiis  of  trc 
years  as  to  constables  (Rev.  St  1S55,  p.  SIT. 
c.  29,  i  6).  Held,  that  the  term  "or  other  ef 
fleer,"  in  section  4274,  applies  to  a  tretsonf 
of  a  school  district  and  bars  a  drll  a^ 
tion  against  him  and  his  sureties  on  Ms  of 
flcial  bond,  if  not  brought  within  the  tlse 
limited.  State  ex  reL  School  District  of  Se 
dalia  V.  Barter,  87  S.  W.  941,  9H  188  M» 
516. 

The  term  "oth^  officers,"  as  nsed  in  I^ 
Act  Mich.  1907,  No.  461,  p.  862,  wbicb  nale^ 
it  the  duty  of  a  certain  county  treasoref 
and  all  "other  officers"  of  the  county  bariie 
county  funds  in  their  possession  or  nv^ 
their  control  to  deposit  them  in  depositaries 
designated  by  the  board  of  supervisors,  may 
include  deputies  of  the  treasurer  and  peisoi^ 
appointed  under  Comp.  Laws,  |  3527,  to  p^ 
form  the  duties  of  treasurer  but  wbo  trr 
not  designated  as  "treasurer."  Gratiot  Cm 
ty  V.  Munson,  122  N.  W.  117,  11*  157  Midi 
505. 


Otber 

In  Tariff  Act  July  24,  1897,  c  IX  I  ^ 
Schedule  Q,  par.  258,  30  Stat  171,  rating  :^ 
sardines  "in  bottles,  jars,  thi  boxes,  or  cm 
of  various  small  sizes  not  exceeding  70  c^' 
inches,  also  "in  othor  packages,"  the  dodrii^ 
of  nosdtur  a  socils  is  not  to  be  so  applied  t' 
to  limit  the  Utter  phrase  to  packages  of  > 
retail  size,  and  thus  exclude  sardines  in  laif^ 
tins  dealt  in  at  wholesale.  Strohmeftf^ 
Arpe  CJo.  v.  United  States,  178  Fed.  268,  lOi 
0.  C.  A.  400. 
Otliev  paper 

The  words  "other  paper,"  as  wed  it 
Kirby's  Dig.  |  3490,  aUowing  the  deii  of  »k 
circuit  court  10  cento  each  "for  ma  ^ 
plaint,  answer,  reply,  petition,  den»iner.» 
fldavit  or  'other  paper* "  in  a  cause  is  ag^ 
eral  term,  but  according  to  the  old  and  s^ 
tied  rule  of  stotutory  construction  most » 
confined  in  ito  meaning  to  that  dass  of  P*^ 


OTHEB 


819 


OTHER 


pen  to  which  the  preceding  words  belong. 
Hempstead  County  t.  Harkness,  84  8.  W.  7d9, 
73  Ark.  600  (citing  BastetH  Arkansas  Hedge- 
Fence  Co.  T.  Tanner;  53  S.  W.  88^  67  Ark. 
156;  Matthews  ▼.  KimbaU,  66  S.  W.  661,  69 
S.  W.  547,  70  Ark.  451;  Sedg.  St  &  Cotost 
Law  r2d  Od.]  pp.  360,  361 ;  Bnd.  Interp.  St 
§1  400-407;  Suth.  St  Const  268-276;  State 
▼.  Blackburn,  83  S.  W.  529,  61  Ark.  407). 

In  a  statute  laying  tariff  on  imported 
"paper  hangings  and  paper  for  screens  or  for 
fire  boards  and  all  'other  paper^  not  specific- 
ally provided  for  in  this  act**  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  the  words  ''other  papei*' 
were  used  with  any  different  meaning  from 
that  given  it  in  a  former  act  in  which  the 
words  were  used  in  a  like  association,  and 
therefore  plain  paper  stamped  by  single  oper-^ 
ation  into  shapes  with  lace-like  effects  to  be 
used  on  the  tops  of  packages  of  candy,  fruit, 
etc  or  under  finger  bowls,  was  dutiable  as 
"paper,"  rather  than  as  "manufactures  of 
paper."  Hamilton  t.  United  States,  167  Fed. 
796,  798,  93  C.  C.  A.  186. 

Other  party 

The  term  "other  parties,"  as  used  in 
Code  Civ.  Proa  Cal.  I  389,  providing  that 
when  a  complete  determination  of  a  contro* 
versy  cannot  be  had  without  the  presence  of 
other  parties  court  must  then  order  them  to 
be  brought  in,  etc.,  means  persons  whose 
presence  is  essential  to  the  complete  determi- 
nation of  a  controversy  between  parties  who 
were  already  before  the  court  Alpers  v. 
Bliss,  79  Pac  171,  173,  145  Cal.  565. 

Rev.  St  1899,  f  4652,  providing  that  in 
actions  where  one  of  the  original  parties  to 
the  contract  tn  issue  and  on  trial  is  dead  the 
other  party  to  such  contract  cannot  testify  in 
his  own  favor,  means  by  the  "other  party" 
one  who  is  a  party  to  the  suit,  as  well  as  to 
the  contract  Jackson  v.  Smith,  123  S.  W. 
1026,  1028, 139  Mo.  App.  691. 

A  decedent's  executrix,  in  a  suit  to  en- 
force subrogation  to  the  rights  of  a  mort- 
gagee in  certain  land  as  against  an  heir  of 
decedent  by  his  first  wife;  was  not  disqualified 
to  testity  as  the  "oth^  party*'  to  any  con* 
tract  or  catuse  of  action  in  issue,  under  P.  S. 
1589,  though  she  might  benefit  by  a  successful 
terminaticm  of  the  Utigation  by  force  of  the 
decedent's  wllL  wader's  Bx'r  v.  Wilder,  72 
Aa  203,  206,  82  Vt  123. 

Notice  of  applioatton  by  a  landholder  for 
the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  review 
the  assessment  o^  damages  to  his  land,  by 
laying  out  a  road  over  tlie  same,  must  be 
given  to  the  township  committee,  and  not  to 
the  applicants.  The  town  committee  are 
"the  other  party"  referred  to  In  the  act  of 
Biarch  1,  1860.  Inhabitants  of  Hopewell  Tp. 
V.  Welling,  24  N.  J.  Law,  127, 128. 

Other  pemuutent  flxtures 

"Other  permanent  fixtures,"  as  used  in 
a  policy  providing  that  the  insurer  should  not , 


be  liable,  unless  liability  waa  spedflcally  as- 
sumed, for  loss  of  store  or  office  furniture  or 
fixtures,  and  describijig  the  property  insured 
as  a  building  Including  gas,  steam,  and  war 
ter  pipes  and  all  otiter  permanent  fixtures 
contained  therein,' did  not  cover  or  include 
counters,  shelving,  and  office  fixtures  in  the 
building  which  might  be  removed  without 
injury  to  the  building.  Banyer  v.  Albany 
In^  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  65,  85  App.  Div.  122. 

Other  persons 

Under  Rev.  St  f  6480,  Act  June  8,  1872, 
C.  835, 17  Stat.  823,  as  amended  by  Act  March 
2,  1889,  c.  893,  §  1,  25  Stat  873,  providing 
that  if  any  person  having  devised  or  intend- 
ing to  devise  any  scheme  or  artifice  to  de- 
fraud, to  be  effected  by  either  <q;»ening  or  in- 
tending to  open  correspondence  or  communi- 
cation with  any  person,  whether  resident 
within  or  outside  the  United  States,  by  means 
of  the  post  office  establishment  of  the  Unit- 
ed States,  or  by  Inciting  such  "other  person" 
or  any  person  to  open  communication  with 
the  person  so. devising  or  intending;  shall, 
In  and  for  executing  such  scheme  or  artifice, 
or  attempting  so  to  do,  mall  any  letter  or 
receive  any  letter  from  the  mail,  he  shall, 
upon  conviction,  be  punishable  by  a  fine  or 
imprisonment,  or  both.  The  clause,  or  by  In- 
<];lt(ng  such  "other  person"  or  any  person  to 
open  communication  with  the  person  so  de- 
vising or  intending,  clearly  indicates  that  the 
person  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause 
with  whom  the  devisor  opened  or  intends  to 
open  correspondence  is  to  be  such  "other  per- 
son" and  not  himself.  Erbaugh  v.  United 
States,  173  Fed.  433,  434,  97  C.  C.  A.  663. 

An  employ^  in  the  customs  service  of  the 
United  States  who  makes  and  returns  false 
weights  in  connection  with  an  entry  of  im- 
ported merchandise  is  comprehended  by  the 
words  ''other  person"  in  tbe  provisions  of  the 
customs  administration  act  (Act  June  10, 
1890,  c.  407,  §  1,  26  Stat  131),  for  the  for- 
feiture of  goods  or  their  value  where  "any 
owner,  Importer,  consignee,  agent,  or  other 
person"  shall  make  an  entry  by  means  of 
false  and  fraudulent  practices,  or  shall  be 
guilty  of  any  unlawful  act  or  omission  where- 
by the  United  States  is  deprived  of  the  law- 
ful duties,  and  for  the  punishment  of  such 
person  by  fine  or  Imprisonment  or  both. 
United  States  v.  Mescall,  80  Sup.  Ct  19,  20, 
215  U.  8.  26,  54  L.  Bd.  77. 

As  used  in  General  Tax  Act  1905,  §  2, 
par.  28  (Acts  1905,  p.  30),  which  levies  a  spe- 
cial tax  upon  each  brewing  company  for  each 
plant  or  brewery  in  the  state  and  "upon  all 
other  persons,  firms,  and  corporations  who 
are  engaged  in  the  sale  of  beer,  whether  on 
consignment  or  otherwise  •  •  •  for  each 
place  of  business  including  all  other  per- 
sons, corporations,  or  agencies  maintaining 
storage  depots  in  this  state,"  etc.,  the  word 
"other"  following  the  word  "including"  was 
not  Intended  to  contrast  the  persons,  corpo- 


OTHEB 


820 


OTHER 


rations,  and  agenqles  enuinerated  after  It 
with  the  peraatu,  flrmg,  or  coiporations  Just 
previously  enumerated*  The  phrase  *'aU  oth- 
er persons"  haa  the  same  meaning  as  the 
identical  words  "all  other  persons"  earlier 
in  the  paragraph.  Whittlesey  t.  Acme  Brew- 
ing Go.«  06  8.  B.  290,  800, 127  Ga.  20a 

As  used  in  Laws  1903,  p.  141,  c.  93,  im- 
posing a  penalty  on  an  officer  of  a  corpora- 
tion who  makes  exaggerated  reports  "to  the 
stockholders  or  to  other  persons  dealing  with 
such  corporation,"  the  comprehensive  class 
"stockholden  or  other  persons"  includes  all 
persons  dealing  with  corporations.  State  t. 
Merchant,  92  Pac.  890,  891,  48  Wash.  69. 

.  The  words  "or  other,"  in  St  1898,  f 
1165,  provldil^g  that  the  owner  or  occupant 
of  any  land  sold  for  taxes  "or  other"  person 
may  at  any  time  within  three  yeara  from  the 
date  of  the  certificate  of  sale  redeem  the 
same  or  any  part  thereof  or  interest  therein, 
must  be  given  such  construction  as  will  en- 
able those  whose  rights  will  be  directly 
prejudiced  by  absolutism  of  a  tax  title  to  ra^ 
deem,  though  they  be  neither  ownen  nor  oc- 
cupants, and  a  minor  is  entitled  to  redeem 
from  a  tax  sale,  and  he  has  such  an  interest 
after  executing  and  delivering  a  warranty 
deed  as  entitles  him  to  redeem.  Hoffman  ▼. 
Peterson,  102  N.  W.  4T,  48,  123  Wis.  632. 

Rev.  St  I  725,  which  gives  to  federal 
courts  power  to  punish  as  contempts  dis- 
obedience or  resistance  by  officers,  "or  by 
any  party,  juror,  witness,  or  *other.  person,* 
to  any  lawful  writ,  process,  rule,  decree  or 
command  of  the  said  courts,"  extends  the 
power  of  such  court  to  enforce  its  decrees  to 
persons  oth^r  than  those  made  parties  by 
name;  and  it  is  the  settled  rule  thereunder 
that,  to  render  a  person  amenable  to  an  In- 
junction, it  is  neither  necessary  that  he 
should  have  been  a  party  to  the  suit  nor  have 
been  actually  served  with  a  copy  of  the  in- 
jimction,  so  long  as  he  appears  to  have  had 
actual  notice.  Employers*  Teaming  Co.  v. 
Teamsters'  Joint  CJoundl,  141  Fed.  679,  681. 

The  words  "other  person,"  in  Wilson's 
Rev.  &  Ann.  St  1903,  §  2774,  providing  that 
every  transfer  of  property  with  intent  to 
delay  or  defraud  any  creditor  or  "other  per- 
son" of  his  demands  is  void  against  all  cred- 
itors, includes  a  wife,  and,  where  a  husband 
by  cruel  treatment  compels  the  wife  to  leave 
him  and  bring  an  action  for  divdrce  and 
alimony,  she  is  a  quasi  creditor  In  relation 
to  the  alimony  which  the  law  awards  her, 
and  a  transfer  by  the  husband  of  property 
with  intent  to  defraud  the  wife  Is  void  as 
against  her.  Bennett  v.  Bennett,  81  Pac. 
632,  637,  15  Okl.  286,  70  L.  R.  A.  864. 

The  words  "other  person,"  in  Mills'  Ann. 
St  i  2564,  providing  if  "any  officer  or  other 
person,"  by  virtue  of  any  execution,  shall 
take  or  seize  property  exempted  from  levy  ^ 
and  saie^  such  officer  or  person  shall  be  lia- 


ble for  three  times  the  value  of  the  property, 
includes  an  execution  creditor,  who  autb  t- 
ins  or  knowingly  ratifies  the  act  of  an  o& 
ear  In  sdeing  under  execution  and  gelliBi 
exempt  property  of  the  judgment  deUuL 
Seerie  v.  Brewer,  90  Pac  508,  609, 40  Coio. 
200,  122  Adl  St.  Rep.  1065. 

In  Rev.  St  f  1166,  authorizfaig  the  o^ 
er,  occupant,  or  other  person  to  redeem  laa! 
sold  for  taxes,  the  words  *'or  other  peisof 
do  not  eoabraoe  other  persons  having  do  i&- 
tereet  whatever  in  the  land.  Butledge  t. 
Price  Co^  27  N.  W.  819,  920,  66  Wi&  35. 

All  noncombatants  except  the  wives  aod 
children  of  military  and  civil  oflkers  vei* 
embraced  in  the  words  "other  persons"  in  i 
contract  with  the  United  States  for  tbe 
transportation  to  Spain  at  tiie  cabin  rate  of 
Spanish  military  and  dvll  ofiicers  in  tbe 
Philippine  Islands,  and  at  the  steerage  rate 
of  such,  other  persons  as  might  be  desi; 
nated  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  J.  M.  Celal^ 
los  &  Oo.  ▼.  United  States,  29  Sop.  a  583. 
988,  214  U.  S.  47,  68  L.  Ed.  904. 

In  Act  Aug.  18,  1907  (Acts  1907,  p.  TTIk 
regulating  the  issuance  of  prescriptloDs  for 
intoxicating  liquors  by  licensed  physicUi]^ 
or  other  persons,  the  words  "other  pcraoi^" 
apply  to  a  licensed  physician,  or  one  not  li^ 
censed  who  assumed  to  practice  mediciaa 
and  therefore,  whether  die  physician  wb^<se 
name  was  signed  to  tbe  prescription  by  d^ 
fendant  was  a  licensed  physician  or  not  L' 
he  practiced  such  profession,  he  was  withi: 
the  terms  of  the  act  McAllister  v.  SUte,  41 
South.  161,  163,  156  Ala.  122. 

The  term  "other  persons,"  as  naed  is 
Act  1901  (23  St  at  Large,  p.  754),  proridins 
that  the  term  public  officer  shall  include  aii 
officers  of  the  state,  and  other  persons  vbo« 
duUes  are  defined  by  law,  in  its  Uteral  me&£ 
ing  would  include  guardians,  admlnlstntans 
and  other  trustees,  and  it  could  not  bare 
been  the  intration  of  the  Legislature  to  ^ 
dude  such  persons  in  the  definition  of  po^ 
Uc  officers.  The  intention  probably  was  ti? 
Include  in  the  definition  all  persons  wtaoae 
public  duties  are  defined  by  law  sndi  &$ 
poorhouse  superintendenta  Sanders  t.  Bel^ 
ue,  58  S.  B.  762;  764,  78  S.  C.  17L 

Laws  1S91,  a  114.  f  1  (Gen.  St  1909 1 
4643),  providing  that  eight  hours  shall  ei«- 
stitute  a  day's  work  for  all  laborers  or  oth^* 
persons  emi^yed  by  any  city,  applies  to  ^ 
eiiglneers^dnd  firemen  wlio  operate  the  water 
and  electric  tplant  of  the  city  of  Ottt«i 
State  ▼.  City  of  Ottawtt*'  113  Pac  391, 396. 
84  Kan.  100. 

The  words  "otljer  persons,*  ts  osed  is 
Gen.  St  1901,  c.  38,  S  3,  subd.  8.  pro« 
that  every  person  residing  in  tbAs  state  an^ 
being  the  head  of  a  family  shall  hare  exeffl^ 
from  seizure  and  sale  upon  any  attacfameBL 
execution,  or  other  process,  the  following J^ 
tides  of  personal  property:    The] 


OTIIEB 


821 


OTHER 


«ols  and  implements  of  any  mecbanlo,  miner, 
:  "other  person"  used  and  kept  In  stock 
)T  the  purpose  of  cariTing  on  his  trade  or 
jsiness,  means  other  persons  obliged  to  use 
w)ls  or  implements  to  carry  on  their. trades 
:  business  in  the  same  way  that  a  mechan- 
or  miner  requires  tools  or  implements  to 
irry  on  his  trade  or  buslnesa  Williams  v. 
incent,  79  Pac.  121,  122,  70  Kan.  685,  68  U 
.  A.  634,  109  Am.  St  Bep.  469. 

A  person  residing  In  the  sttite  who  Is  the 
ead  of  a  family,  and  whose  principal  busi- 
ess  is  the  mnning  of  a  tiiresbing  machine, 
I  inclnded  in  the  i^rase,  "or  other  person," 
3  used  in  the  statutes  of  Kansas  relating  to 
cemptlon  of  tools.  Jackman  ▼.  Lambert- 
>n,  80  Pac.  55,  66,  71  Kan.  188. 

The  words  "other  person  or  persons,"  a6 
sed  In  Bums'  Ann.  St.  1908,  §  8346.  mak- 
ig  it  unlawful  for  any  railroad,  or  any  com- 
lon  carriers  or  agent  thereof,  or  any  dray- 
lan,  or  other  person  or  persons,  to  ship,  re- 
eire,  transport,  carry,  or  handle  intozicat- 
ig  liquors  under  false  or  fictitious  names  or 
Itles,  within  the  state,  include  all  indiyldu- 
Is,  though  they  are  not  engaged  in  the  busi- 
ess  of  a  common  carrier,  so  that  an  afflda- 
it  charging  violation  of  the  statute  was  not 
Qsufficient  for  failing  to  allege  that  defend- 
Dts  or  either  of  them  was  either  a  railroad, 
ommon  carrier,  or  agent  thereof,  or  person 
ngaged  in  transportation  business  or  any 
»usiness  of  like  kind  or  character.  State  v. 
)ecker,  89  N.  E.  316,  317,  172  Ind.  614. 

The  clause  "other  person  having  the  le- 
;al  care  and  control  of  any  infant,"  in  Rev. 
>t  1899, 1 1857,  punishing  any  master  or  mis- 
ress  of  an  apprentice,  or  ''other  person  hav- 
ng  the  legal  care  and  control  of  amy  infant," 
rho  shall  unlawfully  assault  such  apprentice 
>r  infant,  Is  modified  by  the  context,  and  has 
elation  to  the  preceding  words  "master 
'  *  *  of  an  apprentice,"  and  this  refers  to 
I  different  kind  of  relat&onahip  from  that 
)f  parent  and  child,  and  where  one  who 
idopted  a  child  by  a  deed  of  adoption,  as  au- 
horized  by  section  5248,  providing  that  from 
:be  time  of  filing  a  deed  of  adoption  a  child 
idopted  shall  have  the  same  rights  for  sup- 
port and  propier  treatment  as  any  child  has 
>y  law  commits  an  assault  and  battery  on 
iie  child,  the  prosecution  must  be  brought 
jnder  section  1850,  fixing  the  punishment  for 
my  one  who  shall  assault  another  under 
such  circumstances,  as  not  to  constitute  any 
3ther  offense,  instead  of  under  section  1857. 
State  V.  Koonse,  101  S.  W.  139,  141,  123  Mo. 
/^pp.  655. 
Same— As  ejwsdem  generis 
In  St  1898,  §  2320,  providing  that  con- 
veyances made  with  the  intent  to  hinder,  de- 
lay, or  defraud  creditoils,  "or  other  persons," 
of  their  lawful  actions  or  demands,  shall  be 
void  as  against  sneh  person,  the  words  "oth- 
er persons"  refer  to  persons  of  the  same  gen- 
era] class  having  rights  of  action  which  may 


be  hindered  by  conyeyance.^-Oorry  v.  Shear, 
128  N.  W.  892,  894^  144  Wis.  185,  Ann.  Ca& 
1912A,  U54. 

The  words  "and  any  other  persons,"  as 
used  in  Laws  1897,  p.  326,  c.  112,  {  1,  giving 
cities  power  to  construct  and  operate  water- 
works to  supply  the  inhabitants  thereof  and 
any  other  persons  with  water,  does  not  in- 
clude other  municipalities.  The  words  must 
be  construed  according  to  th^,rule  of  ejusdem 
generis.  The  specific  words  in  the  statute 
referred  to  that  class  of  persons  who  are  In- 
habitants of  the  city  (that  Is  to  say,  persond 
who  are  habitually  and  regularly  within  the 
corporate  limits) ;  and  the  ,  general  words 
following  can  have  no  broader  application 
than  to  persons  within  the  corporate  limits, 
such  as  transient  persona.  Farwell  v.  City 
of  Seattle,  86  Pac.  217,  218,  43  Wa^h.  141,  10 
Ann.  Gas.  130. 

Oilier  person  lateyested 

The  purchaser  of  the  intexiest  of  an  heir 
to  land  owned  by  decedent  is  not  enticed  to 
apply  for  a  sale  thereof  for  the  payment  of 
debts,  under  Bev.  St  1899,  |  150,  providing 
that  such  application  may.be  made  by  any 
"creditor  or  other  person  Uiterested  in  the 
estate."  The  term  "other  person  Interested 
in  the  estate"  contemplates  persons  who  have 
an  interest  (n  the  distribution  of  the  estate 
or  ^ho.have  a. right  to  partlcipa^  in  such 
distribution,  such  as  an  heir  or  one  who  is 
made  the  legatee  by  will  or  the  guardian  or 
creditor  of  one  of  the  heirs  of  the  estate  or 
other  persons  who  may  be  entitled  to  a  dis- 
tributive share  of  the  estate.  The  puichase 
of  the  Interest  of  two  children  of  deceased  in 
land  which  descended  to  them  falls  far  short 
of  creating  any  "interest  in  the  estate,"  as 
contemplated  by  the  statute.  Stark  v.  Kirch- 
graber.  85  S.  W.  868,  871,  186  Mo.  633,  .105 
Am.  St  Rg!^  629. 

Other  peitooiial  efleeta  or  property 

The  phrase  "other  personal  property"  in 
the  iron-safe  clause  of  a  fire  policy,  requiring 
that  the  clause  shall  be  comi^led  with  If  the 
insurance  covers  merchandise  or  otlier  per- 
sonal property,  means  articles  in  the  nature 
of  merchandise,  and  does  not  inclode  ordi- 
nary store  fixtures  such  as  show  cases,  iron 
safes,  etc.  American  Ins.  Go.  v.  Bagley,  65 
S.  E.  787,  6  Ga.  App.  736. 

Where  a  statute  exempted  stocks  and 
other  personal  property  from  taxation  In 
certain  circumstances,  the  use  of  the  word 
"other"  Is  a  clear  Indication  that  the  Legis- 
lature regarded  stocks  as  included  within 
the  description  of  personal  estate.  Trenton 
V.  Standard  Fire  Ins.  Go.,  68  ^tL  1111,  1112, 
76  N.  J.  Law,  79. 

The  word  "other,"  as  used  in  a  provision 
of  a  tax  law  relating  to  the  taxation  of  "roll- 
ing stock  and  other  personal  property," 
means  other  than  located ;  1.  e.,  the  unlocat- 
ed  personalty  or  personalty  of  like  nature 


OTHEB 


822 


OTHBB 


with  rolling  stock.  Greene  County  t.  Wright, 
04  S.  £.  901,  954, 126  GkL.  004  (citing  Ck>liim- 
bus  Southern  Rj*  Oue^  10  8.  B.  298,  89  Ga. 
674). 

Oikev  pUm« 

In  constmlng  Rer.  St  1899,  |  1806, 
which  makes  it  an  offense  for  any  father  or 
mother  or  any  other  person  to  whom  a  child 
under  the  age  of  six  years  has  been  confided 
to  "expose  such  child  in  a  street,  field,  or 
other  place  with  intent  wholly  to  abandon 
it,"  the  rule  of  ejusdem  generis  does  not  ap- 
ply, and  "other  places"  will  not  be  limited  In 
Its  meaning  to  places  like  a  street  or  field; 
and  therefore  an  indictment  chargi